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HISTORY
of the
313TH AIR DIVISION

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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JANUARY THROUGH 30 JUNE 1957

Wallace C. Barrett

WALLACE C. BARRETT
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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(28 October 1958)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239)



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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1957

1957

1 Jan. Detachment #1, 1503d Air Terminal Squadron, is deactivated. The 1505th Support Squadron (Transport) is designated and organized at Kadena AB and is assigned to the Pacific Division, MATS, with further assignment to the 1503d Air Transport Wing, Medium, APO 226, per 18th FBW Daily Bulletin, 2 Jan. 1957.

5 Jan. Kamejiro Senaga, the rabidly anti-American, pro-Communist head of the Okinawa People's Party, is inaugurated as Mayor of Naha City, the capital and largest city of the Ryukyu Islands.

13 Jan. The first two North American F-100D Super-Sabres are received by the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, as the initial step in conversion of the entire 18th Fighter Bomber Wing from F-86F's.

20 Jan. The 6157th Operations Squadron is discontinued at Naha Air Base, the personnel and equipment rendered surplus reverting to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division, per 313th AD GO 3, dtd. 15 Jan. 1957.

23 Jan. The 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile, is attached to the 18th FBW for administrative and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 4, dtd. 23 Jan. 1957. So much of paragraph 1b of 313th AD GO 15, dtd. 16 May 1955, as pertains to the 6927th Security Flight (USAFSS) is rescinded.

1 Feb. The following units are relieved from attachment to the 313th Air Division for operational control, administration, and logistical support, reverting to the Fifth Air Force for these functions, per FEAF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957:

Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing (including promotion and assignment of personnel)
18th Tactical Hospital
Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Group
44th Fighter Bomber Squadron
67th Fighter Bomber Squadron
Headquarters, 18th Maintenance and Supply Group
18th Field Maintenance Squadron
18th Transportation Squadron
18th Supply Squadron
Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group
18th Air Police Squadron
18th Communications Squadron
18th Food Service Squadron
18th Installations Squadron

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1 Feb. Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, having reverted to control of Fifth Air Force, is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 9, dtd. 7 Feb. 1957.

1 Feb. The following units are relieved from all previous attachment and are attached for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, as follows, per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957:

UNITS	ATTACHED TO
Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group	Headquarters, 313th Air Division
44th Fighter Bomber Squadron	Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing
67th Fighter Bomber Squadron	Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing
18th Transportation Squadron	Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group
18th Supply Squadron	Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group
18th Field Maintenance Squadron	Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing
18th Tactical Hospital	Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group
6332d USAF Dispensary	Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group

1 Feb. The following units are relieved from all previous logistic attachments and are attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
13th Communications Squadron, Division
17th Communications Construction Squadron
11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment #1, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron
1505th Support Squadron (Transport)
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile
District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
F-100-8 Mobile Training Detachment
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
12th Aviation Depot Squadron, SAC
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot
336th Fighter Day Squadron

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1957

1 Feb. The Commander, 18th Air Base Group, is designated Air Base Commander of Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957. Colonel William C. Adams, heretofore the Commander, 18th Maintenance and Supply Group, assumes this position.

1 Feb. The 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, and to Headquarters, 49th Fighter Bomber Group for operational control and administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.

The 336th Fighter Day Squadron is relieved from attachment to Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and is attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.

The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.

The 6333d Technical Training Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet is relieved from attachment to the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for administration and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support and administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.

The 558th Air Force Band is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support and administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), per 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.

The 18th Tactical Hospital is attached for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), logistic support, and operational control to the 6332d USAF Dispensary, per 18th ABGp GO 2, dtd. 20 Feb. 1957.

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1 Feb. The 15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight is assigned to the 6332d USAF Dispensary, Kadena AB, per FEAF GO 8, dtd. 29 Jan. 1957.

The 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron is attached to the 18th Air Base Group for POL and rations support only, per 313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.

The Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF, is attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.

2 Feb. Colonel Paul E. Hoeper succeeds Colonel John H. Bell as Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base.

10 Feb. The 12th and 44th Fighter Bomber Squadrons receive their first F-100D Super Sabre aircraft.

12 Feb. The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) is relieved from assignment to the 313th Air Division and reverts directly to Fifth Air Force, per FEAF GO 11, dtd. 14 Feb. 1957. Operational control of this unit is not to be delegated further without prior approval of the Commander, FEAF. The 322d TCS is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and remains attached to the same organization for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 16, dtd. 12 March 1957.

18 Feb. The 20th Weather Squadron in Japan is inactivated, and seven of its detachments are transferred to the 15th Weather Squadron, with headquarters at Kadena AB, per 1st Weather Wing GO 6, dtd. 18 Feb. 1957. The detachment at Itazuke AB, Kyushu, is redesignated as Detachment #9, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #7 at Itami AB, Honshu, is redesignated Detachment #15; Detachment #18 at Ashiya AB, Kyushu, as Detachment #10; Detachment #19 at Matsushima AB, Honshu, as Detachment #22; Detachment #21 at Miho AB, Honshu, as Detachment #18; Detachment #29 at Tsuiki AB, Kyushu, as Detachment #21; and Detachment #45 at Hamamatsu AB, Honshu, as Detachment #20.

27 Feb. The Bishagawa Fuel Storage Annex is redesignated the Bishagawa Power Line Annex, per FEAF GO 13, dtd. 27 Feb. 1957.

11 Mar. The Procurement Division of the 313th Air Division Materiel Directorate is made a separate staff agency, designated as the Office of Procurement, per 313th AD GO 9, dtd. 8 March 1957.

15 Mar. The 6318th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron is organized at Kadena AB with a planning strength of 13 officers and 289 airmen, per 5th AF GO 15, dtd. 8 March 1957. Personnel, manpower spaces, and equipment are to be furnished from resources available to the Commander, 5th Air Force. The 6318th is assigned to the

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15 Mar. Thirteenth Air Force, with further assignment to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, but is organized by the Commander, Fifth Air Force in accordance with appropriate Unit Manning Documents. Operational control, administration, to include promotion and assignment of personnel, and logistics of the 6318th are vested in the Commander, Fifth Air Force, per FEAF GO 25, dtd. 23 Apr. 1957.

The 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron is relieved from attachment to the 49th Fighter Bomber Group and to the 18th Air Base Group, and is attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 16, dtd. 12 March 1957.

27 Mar. The 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron completes its complement of F-100D aircraft.

30 Mar. The 12th and 67th Fighter Bomber Squadrons complete their complements of F-100D aircraft.

10 Apr. The AN/FPS-6 height finder radar at Site P-55, Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station, is given its technical acceptance.

18 Apr. Futema Auxiliary Air Field, previously assigned to Naha AB, is transferred to the Department of the Navy, per PACAF GO 38, dtd. 26 Nov. 1957; DAF GO 22, dtd. 13 May 1957; and Msg. 41482, USAF Hq. to Comdr. PACAF, dtd. 15 Nov. 1957.

1 May The 13th Communications Squadron, Division is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for all purposes (including assignment and promotion of personnel), per 313th AD GO 13, dtd. 30 Apr. 1957.

James H. Douglas is sworn in as Secretary of the Air Force, succeeding Donald A. Quarles, who is promoted to the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense. Mr. Douglas was previously the Under Secretary of the Air Force.

8 May The following units are relieved from all previous logistic attachments and are attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 14, dtd. 13 May 1957:

33d Air Rescue Squadron
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
Headquarters, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Headquarters, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (POL and ration support only are to be provided by the 18th Air Base Group at Kadena AB)

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8 May Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

27 May The Installations Division of the 313th Air Division Materiel Directorate is established as a separate staff agency, designated as the Office of Installations, per 313th AD GO 17, dtd. 27 May 1957.

18 June The 33d Air Rescue Squadron at Naha Air Base is reassigned from the 3d Air Rescue Group to the 2d Air Rescue Group.

25 June The 5th Communications Group is assigned to 313th Air Division, per FEAF GO 41, dtd. 28 June 1957, amended by PACAF GO 12, dtd. 30 July 1957.

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CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COMMANDER

The mission of the 313th Air Division as the year 1957 began was "to conduct defensive and offensive operations in the division's operating areas and the areas adjacent thereto." Fifth Air Force Regulation 23-4 of 16 August 1955 was the authority for this mandate, while an even earlier Fifth Air Force Regulation, No. 55-18 of 26 April 1955, had defined 313th Air Division's area of responsibility as being contained within imaginary lines drawn between the following points: 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point.

With the removal of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing from 313th Air Division's control and its reversion directly to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 1 February 1957--of which more anon--this command no longer possessed an appreciable capability of conducting offensive operations, left as it was with only two squadrons of F-86D fighter-interceptors at Naha Air Base, an F-86F fighter-day squadron at Kadena AB, and a photographic reconnaissance squadron equipped with RF-84F Thunderstreaks, also at Kadena. Accordingly, in order to make the obligation conform with the reality, the mission of the 313th Air Division was re-phrased that same date, 1 February 1957, to reflect this decrease in responsibility. Henceforth, the mission of the 313th Air Division was "to conduct defensive operations and <u>support</u> offensive operations in the division's operating areas and the areas

adjacent thereto."[1]

The 313th Air Division was organized as a Non-Table of Organization unit, assigned to Fifth Air Force, and, to enable it to carry out its mission and responsibilities, was provided a headquarters and such other units and facilities as were considered necessary by the Commander, Fifth Air Force and were approved by the Commander, Far East Air Forces (FEAF).

The Commander, 313th Air Division would exercise command control over all assigned and attached units, and, as set forth in 5AFR 23-4 and 5AFR 23-4A, was to be directly responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for:

1. Organizing, administering, training, equipping, and preparing for combat all assigned units, as well as attached units when so directed.

2. Preparing, coordinating, and implementing general emergency plans.

3. Planning and conducting joint training and operations with friendly forces.

4. Developing tactics and techniques of aerial warfare, as well as requirements for new weapons, and improving the utilization of current weapons.

5. Exercising operational control over all Army AAA units for air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine AAA units when shore based, and control of AAA gunfire from ships' batteries, when such fire was in support of the defense of shore installations within the air defense sector.

6. Operational control of all shore-based Naval and Marine fighter aircraft made available for air defense or offensive operations.

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7. Supervising maintenance, engineering, operations, internal security, and local ground defense of all assigned facilities.

8. Exercising continuous review of communications and electronics requirements, and initiating programming action necessary to obtain the required equipment.

9. Maintaining assigned and/or attached units under his operational control at the highest possible state of readiness.

10. Supporting Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations.

11. Supporting special activities, tenant, and attached units.

12. Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence data.

13. Controlling tactical air traffic within the assigned area.

14. Controlling passive air defense measures in the 313th Air Division areas of responsibility, these measures comprising the following:

a. Area electronic emission control.

b. Illumination control procedures for the area.

15. Supervising organizational and personnel training programs.

16. Supervising the organization and field maintenance of assigned equipment and/or the equipment of attached units under his operational control.

17. Issuing mission directives for all assigned units.

18. Monitoring ground control for the utilization of air space, within the limits of the assigned area.

19. Operating an Air Defense Control Center (ADCC).

20. Coordinating with the appropriate local United States governmental authorities all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil affairs.

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21. Coordinating with appropriate local Army and Navy commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used utilities and installations.

22. Supporting the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands (an ex officio title of the Commanding General, Headquarters, Ryukyus Command and IX Corps) in the discharge of United States Civil Administration responsibilities, except as otherwise prohibited by AFR 24-1.

23. Operating and maintaining all ranges within the 313th Air Division area of responsibility and executing all other directives which might be assigned by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.[2]

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the Commander, 313th Air Division was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might otherwise direct.[3]

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

The Headquarters Section, 313th Air Division.

Two changes in the structure of the Headquarters, 313th Air Division occurred during the first half of 1957. On 11 March, the Procurement Division of the Materiel Directorate was elevated to the status of a separate staff agency and designated as the Office of Procurement.[4] The second change came on 27 May, when the Installations Division of the Materiel Directorate was similarly established as a separate staff agency and designated as the Office of Installations.[5] Thus, with these losses, the Directorate of Materiel, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, was reduced from an empire to a principality comprising only three divisions--Supply and Services, Maintenance,

and Transportation.

The 18th Air Base Group.

As the year 1957 got underway, the Kadena base organization was the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, as it had been since 1 May 1955, when the 6332d Air Base Wing was discontinued and its role taken over by the 18th FBW. By the same laws of inheritance, the Commander, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had also acted as the Commander, Kadena Air Base, since 5 April 1955.

For precisely one month of the historical period, this situation obtained; then, on 1 February 1957, came a wide-sweeping change. Headquarters, Far East Air Forces issued General Order Number 7, relieving the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in its entirety--the Headquarters of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing itself, of the 18th Fighter Bomber Group, the 18th Maintenance and Supply Group, and the 18th Air Base Group, as well as all of their respectively assigned squadrons and the 18th Tactical Hospital--from attachment to 313th Air Division for all purposes. The order further directed that all of these units would revert directly to Fifth Air Force.[6]

This action was complemented by a general order from Fifth Air Force (Number 7) designating the Commander, 18th Air Base Group as the Air Base Commander for Kadena, and attaching the 18th Air Base Group to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support.[7] Simultaneously, the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support;[8] while the 18th Transportation Squadron, 18th Supply Squadron, 18th Field Maintenance Squadron, 18th Tactical Hospital, and 6332d USAF Dispensary were attached to the 18th Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel),

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operational control, and logistic support.[9] These units were in addition to the integral elements of the pre-February 1957 18th Air Base Group, consisting of the 18th Communications Squadron, the 18th Installations Squadron, the 18th Air Police Squadron, and the 18th Food Service Squadron--which continued to be attached for all purposes.

The 44th and 67th Fighter Bomber Squadrons--two of the three assigned units of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing--were attached to the parent headquarters for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support.[10] The third unit, the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron, was, however, relieved from all previous attachments and re-attached to the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, and to Headquarters, 49th Fighter Bomber Group for operational control and administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel.[11]

The 336th Fighter Day Squadron was relieved from attachment to Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and was attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support.[12] This headquarters thereupon delegated the responsibility for logistic support of the 336th Fighter Day Squadron to the 18th Air Base Group.[13]

The 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) had been attached to 313th Air Division for operational control and to the 18th Air Base Group for administration and logistical support, including promotion and assignment of personnel, since 1 August 1956. Now, as one ramification of the great upheaval of 1 February 1957, the 6333d TTS was relieved from the operational control of this headquarters and was attached for all purposes

to the 18th Air Base Group.[14]

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, was relieved from attachment to the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and was attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for administration and logistic support.[15]

Two organizations—the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron and the 558th Air Force Band—were relieved from attachment to the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and were attached for administration, including assignment and promotion of personnel, and logistic support to the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group.[16]

Other units whose attachment for logistic support was transferred from the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing to the 18th Air Base Group were the Headquarters, 313th Air Division; the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special); 13th Communications Squadron, Division; 17th Communications Construction Squadron; 12th Aviation Depot Squadron, SAC; 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot; 11th Air Postal Squadron; 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile; 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; 1505th Support Squadron (Transport); Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #1, 11th Air Postal Squadron; Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron; District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; the F-100-8 Mobile Training Detachment; and the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF.[17]

In a more specialized arrangement, the 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron was attached to the 18th Air Base Group for POL and rations support only.[18]

At the same time, as its contribution to the reorganization, the 18th

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Air Base Group further attached the 18th Tactical Hospital to the 6332d USAF Dispensary for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), logistic support, and operational control.[19]

The 15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight, activated at Kadena on 15 July 1956, had heretofore been assigned to the 313th Air Division and attached for all purposes to the 6332d USAF Dispensary. On 1 February 1957, however, it was reassigned to the 6332d USAF Dispensary, in conformance with a general FEAF-wide trend in this direction.[20]

Organized as a Table of Organization unit directly subordinate to the 313th Air Division, the 18th Air Base Group was provided with a headquarters and such other facilities, personnel, and units as were considered necessary to carry out its assigned mission and responsibilities. In addition, certain detachments and squadrons of specialized command were attached to complete the required elements of the mission.[21]

As laid down by 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-2 of 12 March 1957, the mission of the 18th Air Base Group was to provide a forward operating base with the necessary facilities, personnel, and equipment for the purpose of immediate and adequate support of tactical elements of FEAF, Strategic Air Command (SAC), and Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to include units assigned, attached or operating from Kadena AB, and such other units as might be directed.

For his part, the Commander, 18th Air Base Group would exercise command jurisdiction of all assigned units and units attached for all purposes. In addition, he was expected to administer, provide administrative and logistical support and/or exercise operational control, as directed, of such other units

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as might be attached. Finally, and more specifically, he would be directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Maintaining a forward operating base with the necessary personnel, equipment, and facilities to permit immediate and adequate support of the Strategic Air Command, tactical elements of the Far East Air Forces, and the Military Air Transport Service, including the following details:

a. Administrative and logistical support of the units of the Strategic Air Command as a matter of highest priority, in accordance with current plans, regulations, directives, or policies.

b. Administrative and logistic support of FEAF units in accordance with the appropriate priority as published by 313th Air Division Headquarters.

c. Administrative and logistical support of attached units of the Military Air Transport Service.

2. Furnishing administrative and logistical support, as required, to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, other tenant units, and such additional units as might be directed.

3. Commanding Sector "E" in accordance with the current joint USARYIS/IX Corps-313th Air Division-3d Marine Division Area Damage Control Plan to include:

a. Keeping the 18th Air Base Group Damage Control Plan current.

b. Preparing, testing, and executing the various phases of this plan as outlined in current 313th Air Division and Fifth

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Air Force directives.

4. The administration, operation, and maintenance of Kadena Air Base and assigned off-base installations, as might be assigned, in accordance with Air Force Regulation 35-54.

5. Providing an air terminal at Kadena AB for military aircraft.

6. Maintaining optimum organizational, administrative, and operational efficiency to include the proper utilization, classification, and assignment of personnel.

7. Coordinating and/or conducting continuous training programs to develop and maintain the maximum professional qualification of personnel, as well as the maximum capability of organizations which might be assigned or attached.

8. Issuing a mission directive to each unit assigned and/or attached for all purposes.

9. The maintenance of current general emergency plans for the defense of Kadena AB and assigned off-base installations; coordination of these plans with Army, Navy, Marines, and other Air Force commanders as appropriate, and with civilian agencies as directed, and the maintenance of a state of readiness for the execution of these plans.

10. Joint planning, training, and operations with friendly forces, as required.

11. The security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment other than for the internal equipment of special activities.

12. The internal security of assigned installations and the ground defense of these installations and facilities against acts of sabotage or organized attack by enemy agents, units, or groups, including the

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organizing, equipping, and training of assigned troops for ground defense.

13. Adequate passive defense measures for the protection of installations, equipment, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 18th Air Base Group.

14. The control of construction programs, as directed, and staff supervision of air installations activities.

15. Providing aircraft for, and supervising the proficiency flying of, Air Force personnel assigned within the area of responsibility to activities having no organic facilities for the accomplishment of such flying.

16. Preparing plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare as directed.

17. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division.

18. Administering and supervising the Air Force Civilian Personnel program for Okinawa.

19. Administering Port Accounting Activities (Pipeline) for Air Force personnel arriving and departing Okinawa.

20. Establishing and enforcing standards of discipline, conduct, courtesy, and appearance of assigned and attached personnel.

21. The performance of such other tasks as should be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

When 313th ADR 23-2 was initially issued on 12 March 1957, it authorized the Commander, 18th Air Base Group to communicate directly with other local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Commanders and with the heads of civilian

agencies as appropriate on matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication with other major commands was also authorized by this headquarters, but for "specific matters only."[22]

Less than a month went by when circumstances altered or someone in this headquarters had a change of heart. In any event, 313th ADR 23-2 was amended to such effect that the Commander, 18th Air Base Group was denied authority to communicate directly with other local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Materiel Command Depot Commanders and heads of civilian agencies "except on routine administrative and logistical matters pertaining to his mission." Hereafter, all policy matters and direct communications with other major commands were to be handled only by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, unless specific authorization was granted.[23]

Two previously important organizations—the 18th Fighter Bomber Group and the 18th Maintenance and Supply Group—were reduced to a skeletal basis of "one and one" (one officer and one airman) for record purposes, but it was not until 1 October 1957, three months beyond the scope of this history, that they were finally inactivated, to revert to control of the Department of the Air Force.[24]

The mission of the 18th Tactical Hospital was to operate medical facilities and be prepared to move on an instant's notice to one or more new bases, as required to support the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in the performance of its mission, and to assume full responsibility for providing medical support to the parent organization. While at Kadena, the 18th Tactical Hospital would perform medical services in accordance with the Joint Occupancy Agreement, occupying the role of a non-fixed facility attached to the 6332d USAF Dispensary for all purposes. As such, it was to help

operate and provide out-patient medical service to all assigned units and to such attached units as competent authority should direct. It was also to procure and issue medical supplies to all Air Force medical units and to units supporting Air Force activities on Okinawa; conduct a comprehensive preventive medicine program; provide veterinary service and complete dental service; conduct medical examinations for indigenous personnel employed by the Air Force and by Air Force personnel; assist members of allied armed forces in case of emergency by furnishing medical support; provide an effective aviation medicine program including aviation physiological training; and execute such other missions as competent authority should direct.[25]

Two changes affecting units attached to the base organization occurred in January, while the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing still constituted their headquarters of attachment for one or more functions. On 1 January 1957, Detachment #1, 1503d Air Terminal Squadron, was inactivated. To replace it, the 1505th Support Squadron (Transport) was designated and organized at Kadena AB, where it was assigned to the Pacific Division, MATS, and further assigned to the 1503d Air Transport Wing, Medium.[26] Then, on 23 January 1957, the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile, was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administrative and logistic support.[27]

On 12 February the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) was relieved from its assignment to 313th Air Division and reverted directly to Fifth Air Force, who attached it to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel) and logistic support. FEAF stipulated that operational control of the 322d TCS should not be delegated further without previous approval of the

Commander, Far East Air Forces.[28]

On 27 February the Bishagawa Fuel Storage Annex, which operated under the control of the 18th Air Base Group, was redesignated as the Bishagawa Power Line Annex.[29]

On 15 March the 6318th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron was organized at Kadena AB with a planning strength of 13 officers and 289 airmen.[30] The personnel, manpower spaces, and equipment were all to be furnished from resources available to the Commander, Fifth Air Force. The 6318th was assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force, with further assignment to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing (which was also assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force). Operational control, administration (including promotion and assignment of personnel), and logistical support of the new squadron were vested in the Commander, Fifth Air Force.[31]

That same date, 15 March 1957, the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron was relieved from attachment to the 49th Fighter Bomber Group and the 18th Air Base Group, and was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for operational control, administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support.[32]

At the beginning of the period, the 13th Communications Squadron, Division was assigned directly to 313th Air Division, which also exercised direct operational control but delegated administrative and logistic support to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing. With the reorganization of 1 February 1957, the 13th Communications Squadron was withdrawn from its dual attachment to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and was attached instead to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, as we have seen. Administrative support responsibility simultaneously reverted to this

headquarters. Then, on 1 May the 13th Communications Squadron was attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for all purposes (including assignment and promotion of personnel), while remaining assigned to 313th Air Division.[33]

The final organizational action of the six-month period affecting the 18th Air Base Group—and then only indirectly—was the assignment of the 5th Communications Group to 313th Air Division on 25 June 1957.[34] This was a purely paper change, however, as it was not until 1 September that the Headquarters, 5th Communications Group (PACAF) physically moved from Gifu AB, Japan, to Kadena AB, there to be attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistics only.[35]

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet.

Since 16 August 1956, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, an assigned unit of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, had been attached to the 313th Air Division and further attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administration and logistics, although operational control was retained by the parent wing.[36] On 1 February 1957, however, the great reorganization of the Kadena base structure described in earlier pages caused the 15th TRS to be relieved from attachment to the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and attached instead to the 18th Air Base Group for administration and logistic support.[37]

Although the next change affecting the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron falls just beyond the scope of this history, it is so close in point of time that mention of it appears warranted. On 1 July 1957, Fifth Air Force attached it to Headquarters, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

for both operational control and administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), thus relieving the 18th Air Base Group of responsibility for the latter function. The requirement for providing logistic support of the squadron continued to be vested in the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group.[38]

The mission of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, was divided into three parts--tactical, technical, and general.

The tactical mission of the 15th TRS was to conduct visual and photographic reconnaissance of enemy-occupied areas during daylight hours, with special emphasis on (1) front line basic coverage for photographic and tactical studies; (2) bomb damage assessment photography; (3) surveillance of enemy activity by regular coverage of recurring targets and specific targets of particular interest; and (4) observing and photographing targets of opportunity such as new construction of installations, troop movements, accumulation of supplies, and other activities.

The technical mission comprised the following: (1) first echelon maintenance of aerial photographic equipment; (2) first and second echelon maintenance of aircraft; and (3) processing, printing, first phase interpretation, and reporting in connection with the aerial photography accomplished.

The general mission consisted of (1) maintaining current staging and redeployment plans; (2) maintaining administrative, operational, organizational, and logistical effectiveness; (3) preparing and maintaining in readiness such other plans as might be prescribed; (4) conducting continuous research for means of improving reconnaissance effectiveness; and (5) assuming responsibility to the Commander, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing for the foregoing.[39]

As its flying equipment, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron possessed 18RF-84F Thunderstreaks and two T-33 trainers. During the six-month period, the squadron flew a total of 2,298:10 hours in the course of 1,390 sorties--the RF-84F's accounting for 2,012:25 hours of this figure and the T-33's 285:45. The flying time would have been considerably greater but for a substantial cut, amounting to 90 hours, levied on the 15th TRS in the months of April, May, and June. This measure reduced the time available for transitioning new pilots, and reached its point of greatest pressure in June when it was possible to meet only the requirements of flying for flight pay and 60-2. ("60-2" is the stock phrase used in Air Force circles in referring to minimum annual flying requirements established by Air Force Regulation 60-2 for each type of specialist). Transition and combat-ready time accomplished was negligible, but, wherever possible, was integrated with flights being made in fulfillment of flight pay and 60-2 requirements.

During January the Armament Section equipped four F-84F's with JATO bottles for the first jet-assisted take-off ever attempted by the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. The experiment was successful.

The gain of one Photo Interpreter greatly increased the capability and efficiency of the Intelligence and Photo Intelligence Section in January, as did the arrival of an Intelligence Officer. During April 16 operational targets were laid down, and by the end of May most of them had been completed. In addition, a priority 1A target laid down at 1500 hours, 24 May 1957, was completed within approximately 48 hours.

On 19 March the entire squadron completed a move from the area which it had occupied since its arrival at Kadena from Yokota AB, Japan, the

previous August and September to a new location on the same base.

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was awarded a plaque by Fifth Air Force on 25 June for six months of accident-free flights during the period from 1 November 1956 to 30 April 1957.[40]

The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special).

At the beginning of the period, the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) was assigned to Headquarters, FEAF, with further assignment to 313th Air Division, as it had been since being activated on 18 September 1956 to serve as a pocket-size version of the 581st Air Resupply Group which it replaced. Operational control and administration of the 322d were retained by this headquarters, while logistic support responsibility was delegated to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

With the extensive reorganization of the 18th FBW on 1 February 1957, the attachment of the 322d TCS to that organization for logistic support was transferred to the 18th Air Base Group, while 313th Air Division continued to exercise operational control and furnish administrative support.[41]

This new arrangement was short-lived, however. Effective 12 February 1957, FEAF relieved the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron from assignment to 313th Air Division, and Fifth Air Force therewith became the parent organization. Thus, Fifth Air Force, as the unit of assignment, was automatically vested with operational control, administration, and logistic support of the 322d TCS, and FEAF further specified that the function of operational control was not to be delegated without first obtaining the approval of the Commander, Far East Air Forces.[42] Fifth Air Force then acted to divest itself of direct responsibility for administration of

the 322d TCS by attaching it to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for that function (including assignment and promotion of personnel), as of 12 February. To the surprise of practically no one, the 322d was left attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support.[43]

Because of its frequent excursions into the realm of world politics, the mission of the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron possessed an intrinsic sensitivity which prohibits its being described in a history of this classification. Therefore, the reader must exercise his powers of observation and deduction if he would have some notion of the 322d's reason for being.

The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron was not long in discovering that the new alignment was not an unmixed blessing; for difficulties in administrative procedures manifested themselves almost at once. After pondering over the probable causes of these difficulties for some time, the squadron adjutant came to the conclusion that they derived from the attachment of the 322d TCS, a tactical unit, to an air base group organization already staggering under a work load beyond its capacity, caring for a large number of non-tactical housekeeping units and operating the largest air base in the Far East.[44]

Including the personnel required to man Detachment #1, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron (10 officers and 26 airmen), the 322d TCS was authorized 69 officers and 193 airmen throughout the six-month period. By comparison, on 31 January there were 70 officers and 235 airmen assigned; on 28 February the figure stood at 68 officers and 204 airmen; by 31 March the numbers had risen to 69 officers and 213 enlisted men; April saw the officer strength unchanged but the airmen grown to 215; on 31 May the assigned officers had dropped sharply to 57 and the airmen had declined to 207; and as of 30 June the officer picture had brightened, 65 being assigned, while the airman strength

approached more closely to the authorized figures than at any other time during the period, numbering only 197 personnel on hand.

The chief reason for the heavy overage of personnel during the early part of the year was the squadron's inheritance of a considerable number of surplus airmen--individuals for the most part with a short retainability in the theater or with Air Force Specialties of no use to the 322d TCS--from the 581st Air Resupply Group. As can be seen from a study of the foregoing figures comparing authorized and assigned strength, each month witnessed a closer approach of one category to the other; and it required no great stretch of the imagination to realize that, if the degree of administrative support being received from the 18th Air Base Group were any criterion, the 322d could properly look for a serious shortage in the maintenance career fields during the summer and fall of 1957.

As has been shown, the assigned officer strength corresponded closely with the authorization throughout the period, and, in general, there were no prolonged shortages, other than four C-54 co-pilots, an Operations Officer, and an Intelligence Officer. The latter two vacancies were filled by different means. In the case of the Operations Officer position, the squadron Executive Officer assumed dual duties; while the Intelligence Officer job was filled by transferring an officer from another organization.

In compliance with policies of this headquarters and the 322d TCS itself pertaining to on-the-job training, the latter strove to produce a progressive and realistic OJT program, stressing quality of training. During this period, 39 airmen were upgraded--37 to the "5" level and two to "7" level. That the supervision and support given to the OJT program, as well as the initiative and ability of the trainees themselves, were excellent is attested to by the

fact that there were no test failures during the entire six months.[45]

Although the flying commitments were quite heavy—1,458,200 passenger miles and 605,240 cargo miles, as well as many additional thousands of miles flown on training missions—the 322d TCS enjoyed an accident free operation during the six-month period. If not contributing to this enviable record, the high experience level maintained by the squadron's pilots at least added no difficulties to its achievement. Out of the 42 pilots assigned, eight were co-pilots, two were first pilots, and the balance were either aircraft commanders or instructor pilots. The average flying time per pilot was 2,375 hours.

In a major change in the Operations Section, the crew system was abolished and the pool system set up in its place, the object being to create a more equitable distribution of flying time for each air crew member. Although no definite conclusions could be drawn, because of the short time the new system had been in effect, the initial impression was that results were excellent and crew members were averaging approximately 40 hours per month, thus boosting morale no end.

A total of 2,954:45 hours were flown by the nine C-54's of the squadron from January through June, 316 hours of this being flown by the aircraft which had been modified to carry VIP's. In addition, the lone C-118 logged 518:05 hours during the same period, making the total 3,473:20 for Flights "A" and "B" of the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron.[46]

Theoretically, four SA-16 Albatrosses were assigned to the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, but in actuality only one of the four was of any real value. SA-16 (AF51-012) had left Kadena for IRAN (Inspection and Repair As Necessary) on 1 November 1956; but, before it could even reach its

destination, it broke down at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and when last heard from was still stranded there in an AOCP (Aircraft Out of Commission for Parts) condition.

A second SA-16 (AF51-011) had been damaged during a take-off in heavy seas while undergoing water transition training at Subic Bay, Luzon, the previous October 21st. Taken to Cubi Point Naval Air Station immediately afterward, the amphibian had still not been released on 30 June 1957. Nevertheless, this plane was charged against the 322d TCS, and, as it flew no hours whatsoever, the squadron in-commission rate was rendered the worse thereby.

While a third SA-16 (AF51-017) was physically on hand and flyable, it was suffering from a defective compass system which had caused it to be restricted to daytime VFR (Visual Flight Regulation) flights over land areas only as far back as 3 November 1956, after previously being grounded by TOC from the time it was originally acquired from the inactivated 581st Air Resupply Group on 18 September 1956. This limitation on its operations in an area of great water expanses and small islands reduced the SA-16's usefulness to a low point. As though this were not enough, excessive corrosion in the keel of the aircraft debarred it from attempting water landings. It had been scheduled for IRAN in the ZI, but the ferry crew sent to pick it up refused to do so when they discovered that there was no carburetor air system. Anyway, even if one had been installed and operational, the undependable nature of the compass system would have prevented the amphibian from leaving Kadena for IRAN. As a result, this SA-16 flew only 41:50 hours during the entire six months.

The fourth SA-16 (AF49-086) had returned from IRAN in the States early

the preceding December, but during the first four months of 1957 even this aircraft was devoid of operational radar or loran (Long Range Aid to Navigation). As it was, the bulk of training missions were flown in this plane--a total of 208:55 hours being registered during the months January through June. Of the 250:45 hours flown by the two SA-16's present at Kadena, all assigned personnel were given a share. Admittedly this time was not sufficient to keep any of them fully qualified, but at least it constituted an effort to wring the maximum good from the scanty hours available.

Of the four crews authorized for Flight "C" and its SA-16's, two were carried as combat ready for half of the period and three for the other half.

Eight pilots with a 1034 AFSC were authorized. Seven officers in this category were assigned during most of the period, while an eighth arrived on 27 May. Fortunately, no SA-16 pilots were lost. Although four navigators were authorized, only three were assigned during most of the period. Two navigators rotated during the six months covered herein, but their replacements arrived around the same time, so that no hiatus occurred. Only two qualified flight engineers were assigned during most of the six months, but in May a third man was assigned and his training was begun almost immediately. By 30 June he was qualified for landings and take-offs on land, but he was not yet ready for water.

Eight pilot standardization rides were conducted between January and June, with one pilot being up-graded from aircraft commander, land, to aircraft commander, land and water. Water transition training was extremely difficult to carry out because of the lack of crash boat units in the Okinawa area since inactivation of Detachment #1, 6046th Crash Rescue Boat Squadron

on 8 September 1956. One way of circumventing this hazardous condition was to conduct all water transition training in the Philippines, where both Naval aircraft and power boats were available to cover possible disaster. At the same time, the SA-16 flight furnished support to the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) at Kadena on a basis of approximately 50 per cent of the amount requested.[47]

Although the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron began the year with three C-119G aircraft (53-7869, 53-7871, and 53-7874) assigned, the first of these (53-7869) had sustained extensive typhoon damage in September 1956 which made it AOCP for approximately five months while awaiting control surfaces and various other parts not available at Kadena AB. During the first quarter, C-119G's 7869 and 7874 were flown to Ashiya AB, Japan, for necessary double engine changes, as Kadena lacked the requisite facilities for readily changing and building up C-119G engines. Then, on 27 May, the former (7869) was sent to Civil Air Transport (CAT) at Tainan, Taiwan, for IRAN.

The only regularly scheduled flights made by the C-119G's were ones to Clark AFB, Philippine Islands, each Thursday, which returned to Kadena the following day. The balance of the missions were support type flights, such as several which were made to assist in moving Headquarters, Fifth Air Force from Moriyama Air Station to Fuchu Air Station, or those made to support the 336th Fighter Day Squadron in deploying to Taiwan and returning as part of a mobility exercise. Such missions were flown at the direction of this headquarters and set up through base flight, coordination being effected with the maintenance section of the 322d TCS at the same time. Crews for these flights were composed mostly of base flight personnel assisted by the two instructor pilots of the 322d TCS when needed, though squadron navigators

and radio operators were frequently utilized in accomplishing these missions.

Actually, none of these C-119G aircraft were organic equipment of the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, all belonging to the base flight section of the 18th Air Base Group. On 1 July 1957 all three Flying Boxcars were turned over to the 18th Air Base Group for complete operational control and maintenance care. With them were transferred the remaining C-119 maintenance personnel, flight engineers, and crew chiefs.

During the six months of 1957 in which the three C-119G aircraft belonged to the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron on a loan basis, they flew the following hours: January--48:10; February--83:25; March--152:45; April--87:35; May--84:45; and June--59:10.[48]

As the year began, all sections of the 322d TCS were preparing to vacate their old buildings and move into the ones occupied by the 18th Fighter Bomber Group--which would, in its turn, occupy the area of the 322d. Some, at least, of the squadron sections were foresighted enough to coordinate with their corresponding sections in the 18th Fighter Bomber Group in advance of the move, to determine what property could be exchanged, thus obviating the need for the transfer of similar items by both sections. Thanks to such advance planning, the two organizations succeeded in completing the move in one day, 26 January. The new location of the 322d TCS was inside the flight line gate, just northeast of Base Operations. Admittedly the facilities were neither as large nor as comfortable as those the squadron had just vacated, and the noise created by aircraft engines running up tended to interrupt conversations and fray sensitive nerves. Still, business managed to get done despite these adverse circumstances.

In April, Operation Paragon, conceived and executed by the officers and

airmen of the 322d TCS Intelligence Section for training purposes, was presented to the Squadron Commander and his staff. The theme of this mission was a simulated resupply of friendly forces operating behind enemy lines, and those preparing it derived much help from it because of the realism with which it was staged. The 322d Commander and members of his staff expressed themselves as well satisfied with the planning and the probability of success which would attend such a mission under actual conditions.

The Traffic Management Section was made up of four subdivisions: the Parachute Shop, the Packaging Shop, Warehouse and Loading, and the Distribution Section. The Parachute Shop was kept quite busy throughout the period with more than 300 cargo and personnel parachutes to be maintained in a state of readiness at all times. This was accomplished notwithstanding a complete turnover of personnel. The Loading and Distribution Section spent most of their time in training, since all drops had been canceled, rigging aerial delivery containers and packing cargo type parachutes.[49]

The 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival).

At the start of the year, the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival), an assigned unit of the 313th Air Division, was attached to this headquarters for operational control and to the 18th Air Base Group for administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistical support.[50] Effective 1 February 1957, the 6333d TTS was relieved from all existing attachments and was attached to the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for operational control, administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support.[51]

The mission of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) was to

operate the FEAF Survival School for the training of all FEAF tactical air crew personnel in the basic principles, tactics, and techniques of escape, recovery, rescue, and emergency communications, and to train FEAF recovery team personnel, as directed.

More specifically, the Commander of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron was expected to exercise command or operational control--whichever was appropriate--of all personnel, sections, and facilities assigned or attached to it. In addition, he was made directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for (1) operation of the FEAF Survival School, which was expected to train, in accordance with FEAF policies, all FEAF tactical air crew personnel in the principles, tactics, and techniques of evasion, escape, conduct after capture, survival, recovery, rescue, and emergency communications that would apply in FEAF's area of interest; (2) determining training and proficiency standards for FEAF tactical air crew members in the fields just listed; (3) developing and revising through field and documentary research the basic principles, tactics, and techniques listed above, then forwarding the resulting recommendations to Headquarters, FEAF; (4) forwarding any changes in the current curriculum to Headquarters, FEAF through Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, for approval; (5) compiling additions and revisions to FEAF Manual 50-2, "Evasion", and FEAF Manual 50-3, "Escape", which would then be forwarded to Headquarters, FEAF; (6) preparing and forwarding to Headquarters, FEAF all recommendations pertaining to barter items, evasion aids, survival equipment, gear and aids, and recovery, rescue, and communication aids; (7) providing a course outline and training materials for refresher training programs conducted at unit level, these course outlines and training materials being revised on a continuing basis in order to keep FEAF Survival School graduates up-to-date on all phases of the instruction covered in the FEAF

Survival School; (8) training FEAF recovery team personnel for their wartime mission, including participation in peacetime operational training exercises (note: command jurisdiction and operational control of the FEAF recovery teams would revert to the Commander, FEAF in wartime); and (9) designating and training, on a volunteer basis, instructor personnel within the 6333d TTS as an interim measure to fill the military authorization of the FEAF recovery teams until such time as Headquarters, USAF should provide trained personnel.[52]

Although the Operations and Training Section of the squadron was responsible for the over-all training provided by the Survival School, making it the most important section of the organization, it was constantly confronted with a serious shortage of fully-trained personnel. This exiguity was most acutely felt in the field training sub-section where, at one time during January and February, there were only three field instructors available to handle the classes in the field--classes averaging around 31 students in size. As a stopgap measure in February and March, the Officer-in-Charge of the field training sub-section utilized personnel from all sections of the squadron as reliefs for the field instructors at Motobu, whenever possible. Normally, five or six enlisted personnel would go up the field training site on the Motobu Peninsula on a Thursday and take over the less important training tasks, thus allowing all of the field instructors except the NCOIC for that particular week to return to Kadena for some rest before returning to the camp at Motobu Airfield with a new class the following Monday. For some reason--probably because of the job knowledge of the field instructors and their conscientious willingness to work unsparingly--the quality of

instruction was not seriously affected by the great strain placed on all personnel in the field sub-section.

With the erection of several small quonset-type buildings at Motobu by the Naha Air Base AIO late in 1955, living conditions for the personnel assigned to the field training site had become reasonably pleasant, as power generators furnished electricity, and a large field radio with a phone patch to Kadena made direct telephone contact with the squadron headquarters possible. However, maintaining all of this equipment and repairing the buildings themselves presented a constant problem to the OIC of the section. Since maintenance of the buildings was the responsibility of Naha AIO, it was very difficult to get action on work orders for needed repairs, a steady flow of paper work between Naha and Motobu being necessary in most instances before anything could be accomplished. This reluctance on the part of Naha AIO to respond to requests for work contained in work orders was, however, rather understandable, since compliance would involve a drive of some 40 miles up the island--part of it over rough, dusty roads--just to "rehang a few doors blown off by a typhoon" or some similar task.

The only other problem of significance which beset the field sub-section during the historical period was that of transportation. The entire Survival School was allotted two 6x6 trucks, one 3/4-ton weapons carrier, and a jeep. Usually the two 6x6's and the jeep were deployed at the Motobu camp, leaving only the weapons carrier at Kadena to take care of all the supply and orderly room business. While the field sub-section generally had enough transportation to carry out the training in the field, great difficulty was almost always encountered when it became necessary to replace a faulty vehicle. For example, if the brakes failed on a truck and it had

to be sent to the Kadena motor pool for repairs, there was seldom any replacement vehicle available, so that the 6333d simply had to wait for the original defective truck to be repaired.

The classroom sub-section of the Operations and Training Section was not so seriously affected by the shortage of personnel as was the field sub-section, chiefly because there were enough officers and non-commissioned officers available from the various sections of the squadron to carry the classroom instructional load without reducing its overall quality. The established practice of having at least three instructors prepared to teach each class paid off handsomely, as it enabled the officers of the squadron (in most cases all of the classified lectures were given by officers) to perform their sundry additional duties, keep abreast of their flying requirements, and devote some time to research on lesson plans without adversely affecting the instruction.

One of the largest single tasks which the classroom sub-section encountered was the planning for reorganization of the physical plant of the squadron after it moved into four permanent buildings and 12 quonsets in the Hadley area of Kadena Air Base from its former location in the old Air Police area opposite the golf driving range on Highway #20 in late January and early February. The move itself was accomplished without breaking the training schedule, but the effort expended by the entire squadron in order to do this was "almost phenomenal", most of the load falling on the classroom sub-section and the Supply Section. However, everyone felt much better about the heavy toil he had undergone when time revealed that the new squadron area offered much more usable classroom space, more comfortable barracks, and a generally more satisfactory physical set-up for the entire squadron.

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Be that as it may, a great deal of work had to be performed by members of the squadron before the new area was actually functional. Partitions were built in the main classroom building and two quonsets were erected to serve as alternate classrooms; electrical work had to be performed in practically every building in the area; and new training aids more permanent in nature than those which had been used at the old location (installed movie screens, projection booths, storage rooms, and the like) had to be designed and constructed. As might be expected, much assistance was rendered these various projects by the supporting units at Kadena such as AIO; but, in the final analysis, all the planning and coordinating fell on the Operations and Training Section and the classroom sub-section, while much of the actual labor was performed by members of the squadron.[53]

Another major section of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron was the Operations Analysis Section--which nominally contained three sub-sections: instruction, survival, and intelligence, although in actual practice the first two functioned as a single entity on the same level as Operations Analysis. The primary purpose of this section was constantly to evaluate the training conducted by the squadron, suggesting and, often, implementing changes and revisions on the basis of the evaluation. A great deal of time was consumed by this section in monitoring the various aspects of the curriculum and conducting painstaking research in order to fulfill the mission requirements of the squadron more efficiently and completely.

A continuing responsibility of Operations Analysis was to monitor all individual classes conducted in the Survival School very carefully, in order

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that various discrepancies which occasionally appeared could be resolved with a minimum of lost effectiveness in the over-all training program. Also of great importance in the improvement of classroom presentation and techniques were the critiques completed by all students upon completion of their two weeks of instruction. At the start of each new class week, the critiques for the previous class were carefully checked, and all pertinent comments and criticisms were noted and resolved as quickly as possible. In general, many of the adverse comments made by the students pertained to factors over which the organization had no control. For instance, the bus from the base motor pool which was used to transport the students for parachute and aquatic training was often several minutes late, because of heavy commitments. Not unnaturally, at such times the day's schedule was slightly disrupted, making it necessary for school officials to revise it. Or the electricity might fail, thus precluding the use of visual training aids, such as films. For such factors as these there was obviously no remedy within the power of the squadron. Almost as often, however, the comments made by the students in their critiques were valid criticisms lying within the capacity of the Operations Analysis Section to correct or prevent recurrence thereof. Such a case was that of the spoiled "C" rations which were inadvertently issued for student consumption in the field during March. Subsequent investigation by the Operations Analysis Section disclosed that the case of rations in question was part of a large quantity of these cans which had been damaged by water during Typhoon Emma in September 1956 while stored in the Kadena commissary. Thereafter, all rations in the squadron Supply Section were carefully checked before being issued to the students. With this precautionary measure in effect, the problem disappeared as quickly as it

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had appeared.

By far the largest number of the criticisms on the part of the students nonetheless concerned fairly minor facets of the Survival School's operations. This interpretation is borne out by a breakdown of the ratings given the school by the 880 students who attended from 1 January through 31 August 1957. Twenty-one per cent rated the school "superior"; 46 per cent rated it "excellent"; 18 per cent gave a rating of "above average"; 10 per cent rated the school "average"; while one per cent rated it "below average", and another four per cent omitted any rating for lack of a basis of comparison with other service schools. No "unsatisfactory" ratings were given. Especially significant--and conducive to good morale, since no one dislikes receiving a compliment--was the fact that almost every student commented very favorably on the generally high enthusiasm which all of the instructors displayed for the subjects they were teaching. On the basis of the student critiques alone, every member of the Survival School could justly feel that each and every student left the course with the realization that what he had learned there could someday mean the difference between life and death or escape and capture.

As an indication of the diversity of the students who took the course, it may be mentioned that 42 per cent were USAF personnel, 30 per cent were U.S. Army, 18 per cent were U.S. Navy, nine per cent were U.S. Marine Corps, and one per cent were members of various Allied armed forces, such as the Royal Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force.

An interesting aspect of the evasion training is that a total of 477 out of the 880 students participating (54 per cent) were captured by the

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Marine "aggressor" forces. This seemingly high percentage can be explained by two major factors. First, the Marine aggressor forces were generally much more familiar with the terrain than the students, since various elements of the 3d Marine Division were constantly rotating to the Motobu Peninsula to take part in the evasion exercises. Second, the students themselves were usually quite fatigued and hungry by the time Friday rolled around; hence, they were not so "sharp" in traversing the extremely rugged terrain as were the better fed and fresher Marines. It was found that the weekly ration in the field of one day's "C" rations and one live chicken per man gave the students a very good idea of hunger without adversely affecting their health, but it did leave them "dragging" by the end of the week.

During the period of 1 January through 31 August 1957 (when the squadron was inactivated), a total of 880 students completed the course of instruction, as has been stated above. The average number of students in each class was roughly 31, and a total of 29 classes graduated during the eight-month period. Classes commenced on Monday and ended on Saturday of the following week. At any given time, there would be two classes attending the school--one in its first week of instruction in the classroom at Kadena, and one in its second week of instruction in the field at Motobu. The fact that there were always two classes in session at one time imposed quite a strain on the entire organization from January through July, when the personnel situation was very critical; but, of course, it had its compensation in the much larger number of students whom it was thus possible to train.

The largest single operation conducted by the Intelligence sub-section

during the period was the resistance training program, which began in April. Authorization for such a program was granted by Headquarters, FEAF on 15 February, and the physical set-up essential to its implementation was completed early in March; but the actual training could not be started at that time because of the severe shortage of personnel in the school. Many airmen were needed to act as guards in the program; and experienced, or at least semi-experienced, men were necessary to conduct the actual interrogation. But these personnel were simply not available at the time. This situation existed until early April, when the original program was reduced somewhat in scope, in order that some resistance training could be incorporated into the formal school curriculum. By then a few of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 6333d TTS had worked with representatives of the 3d Marine Division's Counter Intelligence Corps and become fairly familiar with the basic principles of interrogation.

Nevertheless, when the resistance training did commence with the class that graduated on 26 April, there were some misgivings among school personnel as to the feasibility and effectiveness of the program watered down in duration as it was by the shortage of personnel. The original plans had called for resistance training to commence immediately upon a student's reporting to the school on Sunday afternoon and last until late Monday evening or thereabouts. Then there was also to be an interrogation phase tied in with the field training at Motobu in which those students not succeeding in evading the aggressor forces furnished by elements of the 3d Marine Division would be interrogated in a field situation.

Owing to the personnel shortage and other considerations such as time,

budget, and the like, the resistance training program finally adopted in April lasted for only a few hours and was conducted entirely by school personnel. Interrogation rooms were built in the rear of each of the three quonsets assigned to the Supply Section.

The "psychological training", as the resistance training was termed on the schedule furnished the students, normally began immediately after completion of physical training on Wednesday and ran until approximately 2000 hours the same day. During this time the students were stripped of all clothing save their underwear, locked in a steel wire cage installed in one of the quonsets in the squadron area, given more physical training, and made generally uncomfortable. Then they were forced to undergo some five to 15 minutes of actual interrogation in which several different approaches and techniques--the friendly approach, the violent, the indirect, with informers being utilized, and various others known to be favored by the Communists--were employed. Those prisoners who showed any particular will to resist or who were uncooperative were placed in very small "sweat boxes" for periods of not more than one hour. No actual physical force was exerted during this training, and any student who so desired was released immediately by one of the squadron personnel acting as "impartial observers".

The purpose behind this resistance training was simply to acquaint the students more vividly with the possible treatment they could receive as prisoners of war. No attempt to acquire military information of a strategic nature was made by the interrogators. In fact, the only thing they sought was to maneuver the student into breaking a minor point of the Code of Conduct. In most instances, the students gave no information

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of any real value; however, a few were too much inclined to "chat" with the interrogator, and were thus tricked into letting slip information which they would not normally have divulged. In fact, it was this inclination to talk freely with the interrogator that constituted the chief failing of most of the students when they were being grilled.

Each Thursday, the day following this interrogation, the students were given an opportunity to evaluate the resistance training and discuss the mistakes they had made with the school personnel who conducted the questioning. The general student reaction to the training was quite gratifying to the instructor personnel, as the great majority of the students in each class were quite enthusiastic about it and only wished that more time could have been devoted to it and that it had been more rigorous. Practically every student realized or had it brought home to him once the exercise was over and had been discussed that resisting an experienced interrogator was no easy task, and that to do it at all required the "prisoner" to be constantly on his guard.[54]

The Supply Section of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron was responsible for procuring, storing, and issuing all supplies necessary to the mission of the Survival School. The scope of this responsibility was much larger than might be thought at first glance because of the necessity for keeping on hand a fairly large stock of field equipment for constant student use, along with all the supplies necessary for the routine functions of a normal Air Force unit.

By this time the school had been in operation long enough that nearly all of the items, such as signal flares, office equipment, small pieces of field equipment, a tape recorder, and the like, which had previously presented a problem, had long since been received and put into daily use.

This had been brought about by the not-simple expedient of obtaining SLOE's (Special Lists of Equipment) from Headquarters, USAF in April 1956, on the strength of the Survival School's having a need for certain equipment peculiar to its mission.

Probably the greatest annoyance suffered by the Supply Section was the constant loss of minor pieces of field equipment—knives, hand axes, compasses, etc.—by the students while they were at Motobu. For some reason, the section invariably had great difficulty in making the students realize that they were responsible for all equipment which they took with them to the field camp. Particularly was this true of flying personnel, who had evidently "long since acquired the habit of treating every item save their aircraft as expendable." Not only did this carelessness require a great deal of paper work which had to be accomplished on Saturday mornings after the students turned in their gear and before they departed for their home stations, but it also necessitated the continual ordering of replacement equipment which, more often than not, was not easily available through local Air Force supply channels.

All things considered, the Supply Section of the 6333d TTS performed a very commendable job in keeping track of some 10,000 separate items with a total value of approximately $25,000. This fact gains in significance when it is realized that a great many supplies were kept in the field at Motobu or were constantly shuttling from Kadena to Motobu Airfield and from Motobu Airfield to Kadena. Other functions of the section, such as the maintenance of equipment (rust prevention was an unending task), handling the pick-up and delivery of permanent party laundry as well as the weekly laundering of field equipment used by the students (sleeping bags,

mosquito nets, etc.), and furnishing transportation for the squadron in general whenever the other unit vehicles were at Motobu, were discharged effectively throughout the period.[55]

During the first two months of the year, all of the records of permanent party personnel were kept by the Personnel Section of the 18th Air Base Group. This arrangement was not at all satisfactory, however; for it involved a drive of some three miles each time it was necessary to check a man's records. In March, though, all records of school personnel were brought back to the squadron and maintained there. This system worked quite well until the end of the period.

The Administration Section was responsible for the maintenance of all records of the permanent party personnel, the preparation, receipt, and filing of all unclassified school correspondence, the processing of all students, and the over-all coordination of all activities not directly bearing on the mission of the Survival School.[56]

The 13th Communications Squadron, Division.

On 1 January 1957 the 13th Communications Squadron, Division was assigned directly to the 313th Air Division, which also exercised direct operational control, while delegating administrative and logistic support of the squadron to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing at Kadena Air Base.

With the reorganization of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing on 1 February, however, the 13th Communications Squadron was relieved from its logistic attachment to that organization, and was attached for the same purpose to the inflated 18th Air Base Group.[57]

The mission of the 13th Communications Squadron was to install, operate, and maintain communications facilities connected with the support

of tactical and administrative operations of Headquarters, 313th Air Division; to provide communications center services, receipt for and transmit messages for all units assigned or attached to Kadena Air Base; provide messenger service as announced by separate directives; and perform such other communications support as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division in the accomplishment of the division mission.[58]

The assigned and attached units at or near Kadena Air Base which were provided electrical communications facilities under the terms of the mission directive were the following:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division; the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and its subordinate squadrons; the 18th Air Base Group and its assigned squadrons and units; the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special); Detachment #1, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special); the 336th Fighter Day Squadron; the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron; the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival); the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron; the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron; the 11th Air Postal Squadron; Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron; the 13th Communications Squadron, Division, itself; the 17th Communications Construction Squadron; the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot; the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet; the 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile (USAFSS); the 1505th Support Squadron (Transport); Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron; the 315th Air Division Liaison Office; the 15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight; District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF; the Marine Liaison Office; the American Red Cross Office; and the 558th Air Force Band.

In January a request was received from the Director of Communications at this headquarters to send a representative of the 13th Communications Squadron to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force to assist in the development of a new manning document for a base communications squadron for Kadena Air Base. It was the opinion of Fifth Air Force that a large number of airman and officer manning spaces could be saved by combining the 13th and 18th Communications Squadrons. The date for this consolidation, as set forth by Fifth Air Force, was 1 February 1957--which would make it effective at the same time as the reorganization of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the emergence of the 18th Air Base Group as the Kadena base organization. Representatives of this headquarters and of the 13th Communications Squadron held that this date was unrealistic, as all of the complicated ramifications of such an amalgamation could not be worked out in such a short time. However, a proposed manning document which had been developed beforehand was submitted to the Fifth Air Force emissary at this meeting.

The constant changing of the proposed consolidation date presented operational and administrative problems, albeit of a minor nature, since it caused an aura of doubt and indecision to hover over all planning and operations. As Fifth Air Force was unable to provide a firm date for the consolidation, officials of the 13th Communications Squadron had to act as though there was going to be no consolidation. Undoubtedly this was the only realistic attitude which could be adopted, but the enlisted men found difficulty in understanding it. The confusion and doubt were, however, held to a minimum by the assumption that all of the talk about consolidation would end in the same way as such discussions had done so often in the past--with everything unchanged.[59]

Eventually, however, the decision to combine the 13th and 18th

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Communications Squadrons was definitely reached, and 1 May 1957 was established as the date on which it would become effective. At that time the 13th Communications Squadron was attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for all purposes (including the assignment and promotion of personnel).[60] The 18th Communications Squadron was then relieved from all previous attachments and was attached for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), logistic support, and operational control to the 13th Communications Squadron.[61]

In an effort to provide better and faster communications, maintenance and technical control operations (TCO) personnel of the Division Communications Center connected two transmitter distributors to the JAO (Globecom) send machines in January 1957 for the purpose of speeding traffic to Base Operations by the use of pre-cut channel numbers.

During February, an AN/TRC circuit (radio back-up for land line communications) connecting the various sections of the squadron was modified to insure 100 per cent back-up for land lines. The Transmitter Site acted as a major relay point between the TCO and the Division Receiver Site. This line also contained an intercom between sections. The theory behind this revamping was to provide a circuit that could be used 24 hours a day, with one of its channels being utilized as a maintenance hot line. Whenever this circuit became inoperative, the fact was automatically recorded, enabling crews to repair it immediately. Previously, only routine checks of the circuit had been made, with the result that extended outages occurred constantly.[62]

Communications-Electronics Facilities Programming: On 2 January 1957 an emergency request was submitted to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for

programming of a full duplex on-line teletype circuit from the Division Communications Center at Kadena to the SAC Control Room, also at Kadena, with the teletype equipment on hand in Project Seaweed stocks being applied against this circuit. The cryptographic equipment for the circuit was reprogrammed as an immediate requirement from equipment previously requested on normal lead time procurement of 18 months. The retention of the teletype equipment in Project Seaweed stocks was not considered advisable, owing to the requirement for providing SAC communications support on short notice and the probable conflict with other commitments requiring simultaneous installation with SAC equipment.

An emergency request was also submitted to Fifth Air Force on 17 January for programming SAC Control Room air-ground radio equipment to provide SAC operations with the capability of contacting all their aircraft on VHF or UHF and monitoring HF transmissions. Two excess VHF radio sets intended for Kume Shima Air Station were reprogrammed, as were two multi-channel sets currently authorized, but not as yet received, as part of the VHF equipment for Miyako Jima Air Station. Two radio sets were also programmed from 313th Air Division resources to be met with equipment on hand and excess at Naha Base Supply.[63]

During March the Far East Command approved and forwarded to USCAR a request for the acquisition of .6 acre of land at Deragawa needed by the 13th Communications Squadron to provide a corridor connecting the two antenna farms at this location when they were rehabilitated.

That same month a direct telephone circuit between the Combat Operations Division (COD) and Senior Controller positions at the Naha ADCC and the radphone operator console at the Deragawa Transmitter Annex was

installed in an effort to reduce line signal loss normally found in long line circuits of this nature. Once this circuit was installed, an appreciable reduction in signal loss became apparent at once.

On 6 March a half duplex send-and-receive teletype circuit was activated between Yuza Dake Air Station and Kadena Air Base. This was followed on 22 March by activation of a second teletype circuit of the same kind linking Yuza Dake and Okino-Erabu Shima Air Stations.

The circuit to Kadena heretofore utilized in off-line operation for classified traffic was programmed for conversion to full duplex on-line operation. When completed, this circuit would be utilized for command and administrative traffic from the 623d AC&W Squadron to the 313th Communications Center, and for operational traffic from the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) at Naha AB to the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) at Yuza Dake through rapid relay at Kadena.

Readers of the 313th Air Division history chronicling events of the last half of the year 1956 will recall that the Deragawa Transmitter Annex had absorbed quite a buffeting at the hands of Typhoons Emma and Harriet the previous September. This rude treatment would have been unpalatable under any circumstances, but it was rendered more than ordinarily unsavory by the squadron's knowledge that a new, typhoon-resistant operations building of concrete and steel construction had been completed ready for occupancy for nearly six months at the time Emma paid her visit. Had the transmitting facilities been safely ensconced in this sturdy structure, the damage would have been confined mostly to the outside antenna system and to such ancillary temporary buildings as the mess hall and the seven-man billet. But the decision had been made to leave the new building vacant

until the new equipment to be used there could be installed, rather than bring in the existing equipment, then remove it when the permanent gear arrived. This being so, operations at Deragawa were still being conducted from an old quonset which had been too weak to fend off the winds of Typhoon Gloria as far back as July 1949—and age had not increased its powers of resistance. It is not surprising, then, that all of the doors were blown in by Typhoon Emma, and that the expensive equipment within was soaked by the salty rain which poured in as though discharged from a fire hose.

Heroic efforts on the part of the 13th Communications Squadron, a team of repairmen borrowed from the 24th Communications Construction Squadron, and the 17th Communications Construction Squadron succeeded in restoring the transmitter equipment to operation in a remarkably short time; but there was no escaping the fact that future typhoons would probably inflict the same sort of damage on the flimsy structure as long as it continued to be used.

At first this headquarters, the 13th Communications Squadron, and SAMAP planned to hold in abeyance any action on moving the transmitter facility into the new concrete building until it could be done on a permanent basis. However, when SAMAP learned that there would be a considerable delay in the arrival of materials for the permanent installation and that 10 to 12 months would probably elapse before it could be placed in operation, all concerned decided to accept an interim installation which could be readied in some 2½ months. After all, it seemed wiser to do the same work twice than to leave the equipment where it was while waiting for the permanent gear; for future typhoons might prove to be even more severe than Emma and Harriet.

Representatives of this headquarters' Communications Division went TDY to SAMAP on 13 March, and one of their first moves was to make arrangements for relocation of the interim transmitter facility from the old quonset structure to the new building at the earliest possible date. In addition to the relocation of transmitter equipment, the project was to involve the relocation and extension of the transmission line feeder system, replacement of some doublets with omnidirectional antennas, and minor rehabilitation of other existing antennas. Since SAMAP's outside plant teams already had heavy commitments, it was decided that two construction teams would be provided by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron to expedite installation of the antenna system. The Project Oki-Emma materials already received for rehabilitation of the antennas damaged by Typhoon Emma were to be utilized to the maximum extent, and the remainder of the materials required would be provided by SAMAP.

On 28 March a group of engineers from SAMAP arrived at Kadena to lay out the installation requirements for the interim facility, and, after surveying the task which lay ahead, made an estimate that if the work got started on 8 April, as they expected, it should be completed around 1 July 1957.[64]

The month of March also saw submission of an emergency request, in accordance with AFR 100-46, for duplex teletype terminal equipment to provide the Kadena Communications Center with the capability of meeting SAC Tango patching requirements. Under the priority requirements for SAC, the Kadena Communications Center was required to terminate, on an as-required basis, the SAC-allocated full period on-call STRATCOM

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(Strategic Communications—the new name for the old GLOBECOM) radio channel to the 3d Air Division on Guam.

Another emergency request submitted by this headquarters as a requirement of the PC Program related to a full duplex on-line teletype circuit between the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations Center and the 313th Air Division Communications Center. When installed, this facility would provide for the rapid relay of classified operational traffic to and from the Fifth Air Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC). This was not to be a direct circuit between the Fifth Air Force TOC and the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations Center, but, rather, all traffic would be relayed over the on-line radio teletype circuit between the Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division Communications Centers. Teletype and on-line crypto equipment for this circuit were to be obtained from other theater resources. When placed in operation, this circuit would require 10 additional teletype operators, a study of the matter revealed.[65]

In order to provide the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile with better internal telephone service at its Onna Point Receiver Annex, this headquarters assigned it in May a BD-110 switchboard and the associated equipment formerly used with the Eden tactical switchboard. This Eden switchboard had served the Kadena Combat Operations Center until the relocation of that function to the Naha ADCC eliminated the requirement for such a facility, after which it was operated only to augment the Kadena base administrative telephone system. Having assigned the 6927th RSM this peripatetic switchboard, the Communications Division of this headquarters submitted programming action to Fifth Air Force to obtain USAF PC approval of the interim facility. Also packaged with this plan

was removal of the Eden switchboard from the PC document and addition of a permanent 50-line switchboard at Onna Point to replace the interim equipment just installed. The permanent facility would be set up in accordance with normal procurement-installation lead time schedules--which meant that at least three years would elapse before the installation was actually made.[66]

Changes in Communications Circuits: In May the Nagoya radio-teletype circuit was inactivated, as a result of the movement of Fifth Air Force Headquarters from Moriyama Air Station to Fuchu Air Station, which had just been evacuated by Headquarters, FEAF. To replace this circuit, a "Fuchu Bravo" circuit was activated, thus giving the Kadena Base Communications Center two circuits linked with Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

The following month, the circuit to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) was installed and given the designation of "Kunia Teletype Circuit." Activation of this circuit was necessitated by the move of Headquarters, Far East Air Forces from Fuchu AS to Wheeler AFB, T.H., where it was redesignated as Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces on 1 July 1957.

The C-W (or "Morse Code") administrative circuit was also transferred to the Okinawa ADCC in June--the last C-W circuit to be operated from the 13th Communications Squadron Receiver Site. Thereafter, the receiver site employed voice operations only, with radphone circuits to Fuchu, Nagoya, Clark, Taipei, and Tainan.[67]

Problems of Supply: The supply situation in the 13th Communications Squadron continued to be discouraging, as the inability to obtain such minor items as tubes and fuses came perilously close to forcing the shutdown of circuits. The only thing that saved them from actually going

on the binnacle list was the squadron's talent for borrowing to the limit from other units in order to keep the equipment in commission. Obviously, this was not the accepted or desired procedure for obtaining parts; it was simply the lesser of two evils. Either, formal regulations and procedures could be strictly adhered to--and the circuits shut down while awaiting results--or this frowned-on borrowing could be practiced--and the circuits continue operating. If this device had not been adopted, approximately one-half of the tactical circuits would have become inoperative at one time or another. Besides, every item thus borrowed was already on back order or emergency requisition at the time it was obtained in this irregular manner.

Teletype ribbons were also in such short supply that for weeks at a time they were not used on some of the send positions. Naturally, this made it extremely difficult for an operator to read what he was sending, as he had to read the typing imprints. This slowed message transmission greatly.

Although seven M-19 teletype sending machines and two M-15 teletype receiving machines were received from depot overhaul, they did not prove to be the boon to the hard-pressed maintenance section that might be expected, since the depot overhaul personnel had installed many wrong parts. As a result of this egregious error, some of the machines could not be used until the right parts had been requisitioned and received.

Much of the effort expended by the 13th Communications Squadron's Maintenance Section was devoted to assembling the damaged teletype equipment which had been dismantled after Typhoon Emma in September 1956 and preparing it for turn-in. The squadron's first intention had been

to repair this gear, but, as is true of so many of this world's good intentions, nothing came of it, and the material was thrown into boxes where it was stored until June, at which time the decision to turn it in was made.[68]

Upon the virtual absorption of the 18th Communications Squadron by the 13th Communications Squadron on 1 May 1957, the majority of the latter's personnel moved from Barracks #114 to #110, which was adjacent, although three bays in the former dormitory continued to be occupied by the 13th Communications Squadron. At the same time, the 13th's orderly room was also moved into Barracks #110.

Construction at the Deragawa Transmitter Annex: June saw work begun on a $54,309.62 permanent construction project at the Deragawa Transmitter Annex by JHW, Inc.* under Contract AF 62(321)-892. This project (KAD-541-57) called for the construction of one concrete building with

*JHW, Inc., was a Chinese-Filipino firm which derived its name from the initial letters of the given name of three members of the Yu family--John, Henry, and Willie. For many years the Yu Kimteng Construction Corporation had operated on Okinawa and in the Philippines performing jobs for the U.S. military forces. At some time in 1956, however, the members of the firm came to the conclusion that it would be to their advantage if the corporation were reorganized as an American firm. Accordingly, Yu Kimteng Construction Corp. was succeeded by JHW, Inc., and registered in Dover, Delaware, under the latter name. Thenceforth, JHW, Inc. could legally receive U.S. military payment certificates (M.P.C.) and, at times, when performing contracts for the Army which so specified, enjoy Post Exchange privileges, attend military theaters, and have free entree to the bases. Although the Air Force never granted JHW these same privileges, it made little difference to the contractor, since a P-X ration card good in an Army exchange was also honored in an Air Force or Marine exchange. At the time JHW, Inc. undertook the project at Deragawa, it was nearing completion of a $135,000 hobby shop at Kadena Air Base. Yu Kimteng, the father, was chairman of the board of directors and president of the firm. Willie Yu, the oldest son, was vice-chairman of the board, first vice-president, and general manager. John O. Yu was second vice-president; Vincente L. Yu was third vice-president; Henry Yu was treasurer; and Mary L. Yu was secretary. Thus it may be seen that this was strictly a one-family enterprise.

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14 two-man rooms, four single NCO rooms, and a day room, connected by a breezeway with another permanent building for the messing facility. Besides these two major structures, the contractor was to construct a concrete block power building. Since these buildings would occupy the same location as the old temporary structures, the latter had to be torn down and squad tents set up to house the men during the period of construction. This was not too pleasant for the personnel involved, but under ordinary circumstances it was passable. The vulnerability of such tents to typhoon winds was recognized, however, and plans were made accordingly for the men to move into the transmitter building itself during Condition II of any future storm. By the end of September, the project was 75 per cent complete, it may be mentioned, and the final acceptance inspection was made on 6 December 1957.[69]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	5th AFR 23-4A, sub.: Organization—Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 1 Feb. 1957.
2	1	5th AFR 23-4, sub.: Organization—Field: 313th Air Division, 16 Aug. 1955; 5th AFR 23-4A, sub.: Organization—Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 1 Feb. 1957.
3	1	Ibid.
4	2 3	313th AD GO 9, dtd. 8 March 1957; Report of Manpower Management Review: Purchasing and Contracting Office, Directorate of Materiel, Hq. 313th Air Div., 6 March 1956.
5	2	313th AD GO 17, dtd. 27 May 1957.
6	4	FEAF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
7	5	5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
8	5	5th AF GO 9, dtd. 7 Feb. 1957.
9	5	5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
10	5	Ibid.
11	5	Ibid.
12	5	5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.
13	2	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.
14	5	5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957
15	5	Ibid.
16	5	5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
17	2 5	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957; 5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
18	2&5	Ibid.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
19	6	18th ABG GO 2, dtd. 20 Feb. 1957.
20	4	FEAF GO 8, dtd. 29 Jan. 1957.
21	7	313th ADR 23-2, sub.: Organization--Field: 18th Air Base Group, 12 March 1957.
22	7	Ibid.
23	7	313th ADR 23-2A, sub.: Organization--Field: 18th Air Base Group, dtd. 9 Apr. 1957.
24	--	5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 1957.
25	--	18th FBWR 23-4, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 18th Tactical Hospital, 24 Jan. 1955; HDR, 6332d USAF Dispensary and 18th Tactical Hospital, 1 Jan-30 June 1957, p. 1
26	--	Hq MATS GO 163, dtd. 27 Nov. 1956.
27	2	313th AD GO 4, dtd. 23 Jan. 1957.
28	4	FEAF GO 11, dtd. 14 Feb. 1957; 5th AF GO 16, dtd. 12 March 1957.
29	4	FEAF GO 13, dtd. 27 Feb. 1957.
30	5	5th AF GO 15, dtd. 8 March 1957.
31	4	FEAF GO 25, dtd. 23 Apr. 1957.
32	5	5th AF GO 16, dtd. 12 March 1957.
33	2	313th AD GO 13, dtd. 30 Apr. 1957.
34	4	FEAF GO 41, dtd. 28 June 1957, as amended by PACAF GO 12, dtd. 30 July 1957.
35	--	313th AD GO 26, dtd. 17 Oct. 1957.
36	--	313th AD GO 26, dtd. 16 Aug. 1956.
37	5	5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.
38	5	5th AF GO 43, dtd. 25 June 1957.
39	--	67th TRW Reg. No. 23-10, dtd. 19 Aug. 1957.
40	--	History, 15th TRS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, pp. 1-4.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
41	5	5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
42	4	FEAF GO 11, dtd. 14 Feb. 1957.
43	5	5th AF GO 16, dtd. 12 March 1957.
44	--	Semi-Annual History, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Jan.-June 1957, pp. 2-3.
45	--	Ibid., pp. 4-5.
46	--	Ibid., pp. 8-10.
47	--	Ibid., pp. 11-12.
48	--	Ibid., pp. 14-15.
49	--	Ibid., pp. 20-24.
50	--	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 30 July 1956.
51	5	5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.
52	7	313th ADR 23-1, sub.: Organization--Field: 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival), dtd. 3 Aug. 1956.
53	--	Terminal History, 6333d Technical Training Sq., 1 Jan.-31 Aug. 1957, pp. 1-4.
54	--	Ibid., pp. 6-12.
55	--	Ibid., pp. 14-16.
56	--	Ibid., p. 17.
57	2	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.
58	--	313th ADR 23-8, dtd. 30 Aug. 1955.
59	--	History, 13th Comm. Sq., 1 July 1956-30 Apr. 1957, pp. 3-4.
60	2	313th AD GO 13, dtd. 30 Apr. 1957.
61	6	18th ABG GO 3, dtd. 2 May 1957.

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Footnote No.	Document No.	
62	--	History, 13th Comm. Sq., 1 July 1956-30 Apr. 1957, pp. 9-10.
63	--	History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan 1957, p. 20.
64	--	Ibid., March 1957, pp. 10-11.
65	--	Ibid., pp. 11, 14.
66	--	Ibid., May 1957, pp 13-14.
67	--	History, 13th Comm. Sq., 1 May-30 Sept. 1957, p. 4.
68	--	Ibid., pp. 8-9.
69	--	Ibid., p. 10.

CHAPTER II

THE 17TH COMMUNICATIONS CONSTRUCTION SQUADRON

AND

PROJECT NEW MOON

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THE 17TH COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON

The Squadron Mission.

The mission of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, which had been stationed at Kadena Air Base since 10 September 1953, was to provide necessary communications construction support of tactical and administrative operations of the 313th Air Division. More specifically, the functions of the squadron were as follows:

1. To construct, install, maintain, and repair open wire, underground and aerial communications cable, lead cable, field wire, and rubber-covered cable. Wire maintenance and repair functions would normally extend from the various main frames to the corresponding terminals, excluding subscriber drops, line protectors, and sub-sets.

2. To provide surveying missions, as required.

3. To plan, design, and construct communications facilities, as directed.

4. To operate and maintain the assigned equipment.

5. To perform other functions, as directed.

The Squadron Organization.

Throughout the first half of 1957 the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was assigned to the Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and, as the period opened on 1 January, was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administrative and logistic support, with operational control retained by 313th Air Division.

On 1 February 1957, when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was relieved from attachment to this headquarters and the 18th Air Base Group was elevated to the status of the Kadena base organization, the 17th CCS was in turn relieved from its attachment to the 18th FBW for administrative and logistic support, and was attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support.[1] The Headquarters, 313th Air Division continued to exercise operational control in its capacity of the parent unit of assignment.

Thus things stood until 1 July 1957, at which time the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was reassigned from FEAF to the Air Materiel Command (AMC).[2] The Air Materiel Command then reassigned the 17th CCS from Headquarters, 313th Air Division to the Headquarters, 2720th Maintenance Group at Clark AFB, without change in station, personnel, or equipment.[3]

Project New Moon.

Already described at some length in the previous history of the 313th Air Division, Project New Moon was a program providing for the underground installation of new, permanent telephone cable at Air Force bases throughout the Far East, including Naha and Kadena Air

Bases on Okinawa. Although the subject of correspondence and inter-command discussions as early as September 1955, Project New Moon had not actually been translated into positive action at either base as the year 1957 began. In fact, it was only as recently as 17 December 1956 that the Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K.K. (translated literally as Maritime Wireless Communication and Telephone Co., Ltd., but more briefly on the firm's official letterhead as Maritime Radio Company, Ltd.) of Tokyo had signed Contract DA-92-557-FEC-25049 to install the underground telephone cable system at Naha Air Base. And then agreement on the terms had been reached only after weeks of negotiations in which the contractor held out for a contract figure deemed excessive by NAMAP, only to lower his sights in the end.[4]

On 17 January, NAMAP (Northern Air Materiel Area, Pacific), whose headquarters was at Tachikawa AB, Japan, informed this command that the contractor would commence work early in March and should have it completed by the end of May. If the inside plant of the new Naha Dial Exchange were completed before the outside plant, a reasonably early use of the new exchange could be realized only by means of a partial cutover to the new cable system. This could be accomplished by placing the cable system for the main base area, the new housing area, and Senaga Shima in operation separately. The main base area cable would be installed as an initial part of the project to provide for the partial cutover contingency.[5]

The realization of the 1 March starting date was contingent upon several factors, any one of which could knock the whole schedule awry if things went wrong. In the first place, Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa KK.,

would have to obtain permission from the Japanese Ministry for International Trade and Industry to use the dollar allocation--and the usual processing time for such matters was three to four weeks. Once this permission had been received, the company could submit its application for passports. This, too, could be expected to consume about four weeks. On the credit side of the ledger, however, NAMAP had already begun to procure the material which would be used in Naha Project New Moon; therefore, this should pose no obstacle to maintenance of the schedule. If the workers arrived on Okinawa in early March, as anticipated, the lead-covered cable should be installed in 70 days, the tape-armored cable in 50 days, and splicing should consume 80 days--all running concurrently.[6]

Having digested this information, the Communications Division of this headquarters asked the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha to review all New Moon drawings for proper cable counts, and to verify the in-place availability of all ducts, stub-outs, and telephone cabinets required as supporting construction for the project. This was essential in order that all deficiencies could be detected and corrected as expeditiously as possible to avoid work stoppages for the contractor once he got underway.

The same letter admonished the Naha wing that although the Japan Procurement Agency would be providing personnel to inspect the quality of work and to insure conformance to installation specifications, it would nonetheless be incumbent upon the base communications personnel to monitor the project as closely as possible. Any deviations from the

specifications or changes thereto considered necessary after the project was underway were to be referred immediately to the Communications-Electronics Branch of this headquarters for resolution. Also, base representatives were not to issue any instructions directly to the contractor, except as authorized in the engineering specifications.[7]

To a request for information on the status of the Kadena Project New Moon, Fifth Air Force informed 313th late in January that the specifications had been submitted to the Japan Procurement Agency for contract action, and that the date for its awarding would be around 1 March. This unfortunate delay was explained by the prospective bidders' expressed desire to survey the work site before submitting any figures coupled with the difficulty of arranging transportation for these representatives of the contractors from Japan to Okinawa. However, it was anticipated that the contractor successful in getting the award would request 180 days' completion time, thus placing the turnover date around 1 September 1957. Hope springs eternal, it is said, so it is really no subject for wonder that officials in the Communications Division for this headquarters continued to be optimistic that the Kadena Project New Moon contractor would actually complete the project in considerably less than the 180 days allowable. And this they believed, notwithstanding the known obstacles to swift execution which would be imposed by Japanese regulations and Japanese bureaucracy.[8]

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East and Eighth U. S. Army (Rear), informed NAMAP on 1 March that an inspector was being detailed by its Signal Officer to monitor Project COMM FY57-NAHA-1-OP (Naha Project New Moon) on a full time basis. As the Air Force's contribution to this

individual's work, the Army headquarters asked that it assign him a vehicle on 24-hour dispatch, seven days a week, in order that he might adequately cover the areas where work would be in progress, before and after normal duty hours, as well as on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. This was considered essential, since the contractor had indicated his intention of working long hours every day, in order to meet the required completion date. Headquarters, AFFE/8th Army also requested that a qualified technical interpreter be furnished for full time duty with the inspector, since it could not otherwise be assured that instructions to the contractor were clearly understood; and any interpreter be furnished for full time duty with the inspector, since it could not otherwise be assured that instructions to the contractor were clearly understood; and any interpreter provided by the contractor, being naturally under his control, might tend to interpret instructions in a manner favorable to the interests of his employer. An interpreter hired by the U.S. Forces, on the other hand, could reasonably be expected to provide literal translations.[9]

Three days later, before the above-mentioned Army letter had arrived at this headquarters, 313th directed the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to appoint a base project officer to monitor the installation of New Moon cable by the contractor, to control government-furnished project materials, and to coordinate with this headquarters' Communications-Electronics Branch on any work performance discrepancies or deviations from specifications which might be discovered. The same letter gave this project officer authority to release 53 specified items to Senpaku Musen

Denshin Denwa K. K. from the Project New Moon stocks.[10]

Next, on 12 March, personnel of 313th's Communications Division conducted a survey of the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot area to determine the telephone cable requirements for that unit and for the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron. This survey was necessitated by recently-formulated plans for relocating the 7th TDS to a new area in Central Okinawa and a decision by higher headquarters that some ammunition storage facilities and all permanent administrative buildings for the 546th ASSD would not be constructed.[11]

The following day, March 13th, a bill of materials and a cable scheme were prepared, then a work order was issued to the 17th Communications Construction Squadron for the installation of 810 fleet of 101-pair aerial cable at Naha Air Base. This installation, when complete, would provide a cable re-route permitting the removal of cable from ducts to be utilized for Project New Moon cable.[12]

Meantime, on 4 March this headquarters had received a TWX from SAMAP advising that the following work schedule was to be followed by Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K. in his installation of telephone cable at Naha AB: From 23 March to 3 June he would install aerial cable; from 23 March to 12 May he would install underground cable; from 23 March to 11 June he would splice cable and install terminal boxes; from 1 May to 11 June he would test the cable; and from 11 to 16 June Air Force officials would inspect the installations to determine their acceptability. For some unknown reason, however, the people in the 313th Air Division C-E Branch did not forward this information to the 51st

Fighter Interceptor Wing until 22 March, just one day before the first part of the schedule was to be gotten underway.[13]

While NAMAP, SAMAP, AFFE/8A (Rear), Fifth Air Force, 313th Air Division, and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing were drawing up specifications, negotiating, and generally laying the groundwork for Project New Moon, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was making the following telephone cable installations to meet interim requirements pending the installation of New Moon underground cable, or permanent requirements in areas for which the cable had been programmed under the Public Works Program for Fiscal Year 1958:

1. One 26-pair local cable from the Kadena telephone exchange satellite switchboard to the former 322d Troop Carrier Squadron area. This cable, comprising reclaimed materials, would provide limited service for relocated activities of the 18th FBW pending installation of Kadena Project New Moon cable by a Japanese contractor. Any expansion beyond the existing service was not possible, due to the inherent limitations of the Elbow switchboard.

2. A total of 3,629 feet of 606-pair and 400-pair secondary feeder cable, tying in the Kadena North Hardstand area and the Morgan Manor Housing and Bishagawa areas respectively with the Kadena telephone exchange 1212-pair main feeder cable at Base Operations. This latter cable was a part of the permanent base telephone communications system.

3. A 200-pair feeder cable and distribution system to provide permanent service at Naha AB for the Base Supply Warehouse, the Base

Maintenance Hangar, the Radio and Radar Maintenance Shop, the Flight Simulator Building, the Base Photo Laboratory, an airmen's barracks, and a mess hall. This cable had originally been programmed as part of Naha Project New Moon; but, when it was realized that these particular facilities required as early service as possible, the consent of SAMAP was sought and obtained to have underground cable installed by the 17th CCS at an earlier date than was possible for Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K.[14]

An interesting technical point which arose in connection with Naha Project New Moon had to do with American and Japanese methods of combating moisture in telephone cables. The specifications called for the use of both paraffin and a desiccant. However, the contractor asked permission to follow the Japanese practice of employing a desiccant only, because of the greater ease of maintenance once the installation was completed. This modification in procedure was acceptable to NAMAP, which was accustomed to seeing this practice followed by all contractors in Japan; but before giving Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K. an answer, the headquarters at Tachikawa requested SAMAP's concurrence. Informed by SAMAP of the contractor's proposal, 313th Air Division radioed the former that cable specialists at Kadena considered the use of both paraffin and desiccant material essential, in view of the prevailing high humidity of Okinawa. The paraffin was necessary to remove moisture from the non-exposed portion of cable pairs, while the desiccant's role was to absorb residual moisture which had collected in the exposed portion of cable pairs during the splicing operation.[15]

It will be recalled that SAMAP had stated that the contractor would commence work on Naha Project New Moon on 23 March 1957. However, that date came and went, to be followed by many more days, all of which brought no sign of the hoped-for Japanese communications personnel. With each passing day, the anxiety of this headquarters grew apace; for every day's delay meant that the 17th CCS would have to perform additional emergency work which could not wait indefinitely for the contractor to take care of it. And whenever this was done, it automatically entailed revisions in the contract. By 4 April the delay had become so pronounced that SAMAP radioed AFFE/8A (Rear) at Camp Zama, Japan, calling the latter's attention to the fact that Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa's contract crew had not yet appeared, despite the scheduled March 23d beginning date. SAMAP then inquired when they would actually arrive, and why there had been such a delay in the first place.[16]

On the weekend of 6-7 April, 20 Japanese nationals representing eight companies interested in the Kadena Project New Moon contract--Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K., Tokyo Denki Tsushin Kogyo Co., Sanwa Denki Kogyo K. K., Nippon Electric Co., Ltd., Dai Ichi Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., Denki Kogyo Co., Ltd., Tokyo Denki Doboku, and Oki Electric Co., Ltd--visited Kadena AG, where they were first briefed on the job specifications, then escorted to the work sites. By thus viewing the actual locations where the underground cable was to be laid, the contractors' representatives were enabled to gain a much better idea of the relative difficulty of installation and what their approximate costs would be. Without the benefit of this on-the-site surveillance, the companies would either have had to plunge blindly into an expensive undertaking guided only by official

specifications and second-hand information, with the consequent risk of "losing their shirts", or they would have had to peg their bids so high in the interests of self-preservation that AFFE/8th Army and NAMAP could have no choice but to rule them all unacceptable.[17]

Back on 19 March this headquarters had notified NAMAP that several items in the Project COMM-FY 57-Kadena-1-OP specifications should be deleted, since the 17th Communications Construction Squadron had already installed them at 313th's direction. Included were cable in the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, Kadena vault detail, and Kadena telephone exchange permanent base cable at the Base Operations building. In addition, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron's move from its former area to the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, the deletion of storage structures from the construction program in the 546th ASSD area, and the installation of critically-needed facilities in the flight line and Base Operations complex by the 17th CCS would necessitate revisions in the specifications.[18]

It would seem from the tenor of NAMAP's reply that the Tachikawa headquarters was annoyed more than a little by the intelligence of these extensive modifications to Kadena Project New Moon. In a TWX of 1 April 1957, NAMAP informed 313th that these "minor" changes would, in fact, require a complete revision of the basic project. Furthermore, until new drawings reflecting these modifications were received from this headquarters, officials of the air materiel area could take no action whatsoever toward remedying the situation. Even then, when the revised drawings were in hand, the tedious task of incorporating these changes into the project specifications would be undertaken only "some time

during April, May, or June"--provided NAMAP's current workload permitted. Besides this, since Far East Command procurement directives and regulations required that revisions be processed in the same manner as basic projects, 313th could expect a delay of 45 to 60 days after the contractor had finished his site survey. Under the circumstances, NAMAP "strongly advised that no further installation of cable on this project be accomplished by troop labor, as such action compounds the difficulties encountered in obtaining bids and getting contractor on job site."[19]

Aware of these undesirable by-products of taking the bull by the horns when necessity seemed to dictate such drastic action, the Communications people at this headquarters had already weighed them against the consequences of quietly doing nothing until the New Moon contractor could eventually accomplish the same projects in more regular fashion. And, having weighed them in the balance, these officials had concluded that AFFE directives could not be allowed to stand in the way of getting vital telephone communications established by the quickest possible means--in this case, by utilization of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron.

Hence, it was not without some indignation and sense of unjust treatment that they received NAMAP's criticism of their action and its accompanying implication that 313th would be penalized in the form of protracted delays for having directed the 17th CCS to carry out work items originally included under Project New Moon. In personally answering the TWX, Lieutenant Colonel William Y. Brown, Chief of 313th's

Communications Division, pointed out that the revisions to the project had been necessitated by unit relocations and deletion of new construction previously programmed. The installation of cable by the 17th CCS had been unavoidable, if critical requirements of the air division were to be met. Anyway, the possibility of 313th's installing various portions of this work prior to completion of the contract had been discussed with and concurred in by SAMAP representatives during the New Moon conference held at Kadena AB in July 1956. Furthermore, such action on the part of this headquarters would not have been necessary had it not been for excessive delays in awarding the contract. In any event, the proposed changes had been explained to the Japanese contract bidders and NAMAP representatives when they visited Kadena on 6 April to study the cable sites.

Having defended 313th's action to date, Colonel Brown advised, in a final note of conciliation, that the revised drawings then being prepared would be forwarded to NAMAP before 23 April, and he "urgently requested expedited action to process these revisions and achieve and early contract award."[20]

At almost the same hour that 313th was thus defending its action to NAMAP, Fifth Air Force sent a rather heated message on the very same subject to this headquarters. According to "informal information" obtained by Fifth, Kadena Project New Moon had been altered-- without its approval-- to such an extent that the potential Japanese contractors who had recently visited the base now declined to make any bids. However, since the damage was already done, it was "now essential and mandatory"

that all details of the changes made in the outside plant during the past nine months be assembled, in the form of "identifying and usable drawings", and hand-carried to NAMAP on or before 16 April 1957. (Note that this was exactly one week earlier than Colonel Brown had promised NAMAP the revised drawings would reach that headquarters). Such an early cut-off date was necessary, Fifth explained, in order for NAMAP to readjust the present engineering specifications and forward them to the Japan Procurement Agency in sufficient time to effect contractual action during the current fiscal year. Any failure to meet the 16 April date would result in a further delay of some two or three months in the starting date of the project and would preclude the obligation of funds procured under "a very austere program."[21]

Colonel Brown answered the stern parent headquarters that his message of 9 April to NAMAP had already explained the reasons for the changes made in Kadena Project New Moon. But, to restate them for Fifth Air Force's benefit, they had, in general, been "generated by factors beyond the control of this headquarters including relocation of 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, reorganization of 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, revisions in construction program for 546 ASSD area, and critical need for cable service in base operations and flight line complex." As it was, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron had finally been assigned to accomplish the last-named item only after 10 months' delay in awarding the contract. Besides, during a Project New Moon conference held at Kadena in July of the previous year, the SAMAP representative had consented to 313th's installing any critically

needed portions of the work in case the contract was delayed for any reason.

Colonel Brown added that NAMAP had been advised in a radiogram of 23 July 1956 that the Base Operations work should be deleted from any contract specifications, since it was anticipated that the 17th CCS would handle cable installation there. As a result, this work had been omitted from the specifications, but, for some reason, was included in the drawings. All of these changes had been explained to the Japanese contract bidders during their site survey of April 6th and 7th with the full realization that any actual bids would be delayed until revised specifications were issued by the Japan Procurement Agency. Finally, the revised drawings, he promised, would be handcarried to NAMAP on 15 April, one day ahead of the deadline established by Fifth Air Force.[22]

Having gained a respite with this promise, the Communications Division set about making it good by preparing revised drawings and a recomputed bill of materials reflecting the changes in Kadena Project New Moon. In order to meet the new hoped-for contract award date of 1 June 1957, that office requested that expedited processing through NAMAP, AFFE/8th Army, and the Japan Procurement Agency be provided. The inherent urgency of seeing Kadena Project New Moon completed before the onset of the 1957 typhoon season was increased by the existence of a man-made deadline of 1 May for FY 1957 projects being handled through the Japan Procurement Agency. On 15 April, as promised, the civilian

telephone engineer from the Communications Division, Mr. Arthur Fishwick, hand-carried the revised drawings and recomputed bill of materials to NAMAP.[23]

Upon his return to Okinawa on 22 April, it was learned that NAMAP had indicated that the specifications would be hand-carried to the Japan Procurement Agency around 1 May, and that the contract would be awarded by the end of June. Taking into consideration the transportation of work forces to Okinawa, the procurement of materials to be furnished by the contractor, and the actual installation time of four to five months, NAMAP did not look for the job to be completed before 1 March 1958.[24]

Subsequently, on 6 May, when NAMAP transmitted Revision #1 to COMM-FY57-KAD-1-OP to this headquarters, information that the project had been forwarded to AFFE/8A for contractual action on 30 April was included, along with an estimate that the contract award date would be around 15 June 1957.

The general responsibilities of the contractor as set forth in Revision #1 included the following:

1. The contractor should install hooks and racks in each of the manholes as required.

2. The contractor should test all cable to be spliced, whether existing or proposed, and whenever trouble was found, should repair the cable and submit the test data and repair data to the Base Project Supervising Officer before making the final splice.

3. The contractor should install all cables in existing ducts unless tape armored direct buried cable was specified.

4. The contractor should install cable markers at all buried splice points where the cable changed directions and at each side of road crossings.

5. The contractor should furnish his own splicing tents, pumps, and tools for this specification.

6. The contractor would receive splicing instructions and cable pair counts from the Base Telephone Officer in charge when these were not specified on project drawings.

7. The contractor would be required to bury cable at a minimum depth of 30 inches, except at road crossings, where it would be placed in an iron pipe and buried at a minimum depth of 36 inches. The trench should be sanded to provide a cushion for the cable.

a. When solid rock or coral was encountered within six inches of the surface, the cable should be so placed that coverage of at least 12 inches was obtained.

b. Buried telephone cable might be placed in the same trench with a power in duct, provided there was a separation of at least 12 inches of well tamped earth or three inches of concrete.

c. When cable was buried in the same trench with foreign structures such as gas, water, or oil mains, there should be a separation of at least six inches of well tamped earth or three inches of concrete.

d. If a buried power cable with or without metallic sheath were in the same trench, there should be a separation of at least three inches of concrete or 12 inches of well tamped earth.

8. The trench excavation--comprising satisfactory removal and disposition of all materials, including clay, silt, sand, gravel, hardpan, loose shale, and other loose stone in masses and boulders--should be accomplished by the contractor.

9. The trench should not be backfilled until all required tests and inspections had been performed. Then it was to be carefully backfilled with excavated materials approved for the purpose--viz., earth, loam, sandy clay, sand, gravel, soft shale--which would be deposited and tamped in six-inch layers for coverage of one foot. The remainder of the backfilling material should be thrown into the trench and tamped in, with no layer to exceed one foot in depth. Blasted rocks, coral, broken concrete, and large boulders were not to be used as backfilling materials.

10. All materials and equipment provided by the contractor under this specification should be new and unused, unless otherwise stated.

11. Sufficient stocks of materials were to be kept on hand at all times to assure an uninterrupted progress of work, and they should be carefully stored at the site to insure their being in proper condition when used or installed.

12. The contractor should flash-test each and every splice with oil-pumped nitrogen gas, then submit a certificate guaranteeing that the sleeve joints did not leak and were satisfactory.

13. The contractor should install ground rods and bond all cables in every manhole and cable vault, using a bonding ribbon.

These, then, were the general terms upon which any contractor bidding for the Kadena New Moon project would have to agree to be governed. And close inspection of the work as it progressed could easily insure that they were adhered to. All of Project New Moon, unfortunately, was not so simple, as Colonel Brown and his subordinates already knew. Only one day after Fifth Air Force's angry TWX denouncing the changes made in the Kadena contract specifications had been received, this headquarters was the recipient of a letter from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing requesting that Naha Project New Moon be amended to include the installation of cable in the South Hardstand area and from Manhole 29A to the interior of the Wing Command Post (which had been set up in a former Japanese cave). Naha's justification for this request was that the subterranean cable in the South Hardstand area had provided satisfactory service at the time the original New Moon requirements were being formulated, but the cable had since deteriorated to the point of non-serviceability and would have to be replaced if service adequate to the operational requirements in that area were to be provided. As it was, the only existing service was the 26-pair leg serving the Fighter Alert Control Center (FACC), and it was loaded to capacity. Although the FACC was then located within the hardstand area, the FY 59 Military Construction Program called for its relocation to the south of the west perimeter road coincidentally with extension of the Naha runway. Thus, the wing deemed it necessary to extend a 51-pair leg to Building T-2402 to provide a feeder capability to the new location.

The other suggested change, installation of a 51-pair signal cable from Manhole 29A to the Wing Command Post, had not previously been considered a permanent base requirement. However, the 51st FIW now regarded it as necessary, in order to provide service after cutover to the dial telephone system was effected some time in 1957. The Wing Command Post was currently being served by a rubber-covered cable above ground, extending to the manual exchange; but a buried cable was actually needed to insure continuity of the outside plant installation.[25]

It may be that the Communications people would have viewed this request with some sympathy if it had been received before the minatory TWX's from NAMAP and Fifth Air Force. As it was, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing could hardly have selected a more unpropitious time to seek changes in the Naha Project New Moon contract. A burnt child dreadeth the fire, it has been observed; and certainly the Communications Division at this headquarters had suffered a thorough singeing that fell just short of burning at the stake. Still, there was neither point nor justice in venting their spleen on the 51st Wing just because of a coincidence of bad timing. Therefore, the Communications Division fell back on the unassailable defense line of formal rules and regulations--the last refuge of officials reluctant to do something but unable to find a good reason for not doing it--in rejecting the requests. In the first place, quoth 313th's indorsement, the letter had not been submitted in accordance with FEAF Regulation 100-3 of 9 November 1956. In the second place, NAMAP had objected to processing major changes to contracts on which work was in progress or impending. Finally, the requirements

for cable systems would have to be projected in accordance with the procedures contained in T.O. 31-1-8.[26]

In the meantime, Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K. had mobilized its New Moon crew and put them aboard ship at Tokyo on 2 April. By the week of 10-18 April, the personnel were in place at Naha Air Base and had begun construction of the subterranean cable system. Little more than a fortnight had gone by, however, before SAMAP found it necessary to radio Rome Air Force Depot for the immediate shipment of several items "urgently required at the earliest possible date" to prevent installation of the cable from coming to a halt.[27] As events were to demonstrate, this was but a foreshadowing of the shape of things to come; for, from that time until the project was completed, materiel shortages were to punctuate the story of work progress on New Moon.

On 27 June 1957, Contract DA-92-557-FEC-26669 for the installation of Kadena Project New Moon was awarded to Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K., the same firm which was already engaged with Naha Project New Moon. This headquarters forwarded a copy of the contract to the Commander, 18th Air Base Group (the base organization for Kadena at that time) on 15 July, with a request that the specifications and associated drawings be reviewed for technical adequacy and 313th advised of any deficiencies. The letter went on to inform the 18th ABG that the contract would be monitored by the Japan Procurement Agency (JPA), which customarily furnished a project engineer for this purpose, and all dealings with the contractor were to be conducted through this individual. Of especial importance, the air base group was admonished not to instruct the

contractor to deviate from the contract specifications under any circumstances. If changes were unavoidable, the contract would have to be amended, and any necessary funding arranged through command channels with NAMAP and JPA.

As a friendly hint, however, 313th Air Division suggested that, while deviations from contract specifications might not be permissible, it was always possible to "steer" the contractor's work effort into those areas most in need of telephone service. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, and the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron had previously stated that they had urgent operational requirements for communications service which this contract would provide. In view of this, 313th requested that a planning meeting be held immediately after arrival of the contractor work forces to establish a priority schedule for the accomplishment of these urgent items. In order to establish realistic priorities, three factors should be considered--operational need of a particular item, the contractor's capability to execute it, and the schedule governing the receipt of the requisite materials.[28]

By 10 July 1957 the new central telephone exchange at Naha Air Base, which was to provide automatic dial telephone service in place of the existing manual operation when complete, was ready to become operational as soon as the carbon blocks and heat coils used as protector devices were received. These were reported to be enroute by air shipment. At the same time, the New Moon cable installation was approximately 60 per cent complete, but was being delayed by plugged conduit and other construction deficiencies of the type against which this headquarters was

shortly to warn the 18th Air Base Group. In addition, 25 key terminals required to tie in the new housing area were not provided on the bill of materials through an engineering oversight. This meant that a change order now had to be negotiated through NAMAP and JPA to allow Senpaku to furnish them.[29]

Representatives of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, SAMAP, United States Army, Japan (USARJ was the new designation of AFFE/8A after 1 July 1957), JPA, Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K., and 313th Air Division met on 4 August to discuss completion of the Naha telephone cable contract. The upshot was an agreement that Senpaku would make the additional splices necessary to re-route existing service from the old telephone exchange to the new one at the time the new dial exchange was placed in service, even though this work was not specifically called for in the contract. The east-west causeway from Naha AB proper to the tiny island of Senaga Shima, where both the Air Force and Navy had ammunition storage areas, was then in process of reconstruction by the Navy and was not expected to be completed before October. Since the installation of underground telephone cable across this causeway to various terminal points on Senaga Shima was one of the most important aspects of New Moon, the project as a whole could not be concluded until this causeway was ready to receive the cable. Therefore, the conferees reached an agreement that the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the Japan Procurement Agency would execute a receiving report showing 95 per cent completion on or before 31 August 1957, with Senaga Shima listed as not completed. Then SAMAP would formally request

that the contract be amended to extend the 100 per cent completion date to 28 February 1958, the scheduled terminal date for Kadena Project New Moon--an arrangement which would permit Senpaku to complete the Senaga Shima work while the installation at Kadena was still in progress. Finally, the information that the materials for the Kadena New Moon Project should arrive around 1 September was disseminated to those present.[30]

Luckily, NAMAP had the good sense to concur in this request, particularly since Senpaku had agreed to install the Senaga Shima cable at no additional cost to the Air Force, provided he could do so while his crew was still in place in connection with the Kadena project.[31]

On 8 August this headquarters addressed a second letter to the 18th Air Base Group to instruct the latter in ways whereby it might make Kadena Project New Moon run more smoothly, by avoiding the errors committed and the pitfalls encountered at Naha Air Base. It was now expected that Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K. would commence work at Kadena around 1 September 1957.

The difficulties which had had to be overcome at Naha fell into two categories--inaccurate engineering specifications and deficient or non-existent supporting structures. In the first group it had been found that terminal boxes were often too small to accept the specified cable terminal, conduit was too small in diameter to receive the specified cable, no provision had been made to require the contractor to splice into service certain cables which had been laid previously by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, the specifications called

for the route of direct buried cable to follow difficult, or even impossible, terrain and to cross paved areas unnecessarily, and, lastly, cable installation had been specified in some instances for buildings which were not yet completed, or which had since been deleted from the base master plan.

In the second category, it had been found that conduit and stub-outs were frequently non-existent, or were in locations other than those shown on the structural "as-built" drawings, the ducts and conduit were too often plugged with excess concrete or earth, the conduit was installed with acute angle bends, and in some instances the conduit and stub-outs were located beneath concrete or asphalt paving.

Furthermore, the 18th Air Base Group must realize that the correction of deficiencies in the supporting structure would not be the responsibility of the contractor. Also, while any minor changes in the specifications might be negotiated with the contract monitor representing the Japan Procurement Agency, all major changes would require renegotiation of the contract—and this would involve delay and funding problems. Hence, the "fullest cooperation" of the installation engineer and base communications agencies was necessary, and the following preparatory work should be started immediately: (1) the existence of all underground ducts specified for use in the contract should be verified by visual inspection; (2) the existence of all building conduits and stub-outs should be verified by visual inspection; (3) the existence of all terminal boxes should be verified by visual inspection and the size

of these boxes ascertained to be adequate; (4) the terrain over which the direct buried cable was scheduled to cross should be inspected to insure that such a route was feasible; (5) the proposed splicing details should be reviewed for compatibility with the existing cable plant; and (6) immediate corrective action should be taken to provide or modify any supporting structure found to be deficient—the Fifth Air Force Installations Representative (FAFIR) to the Okinawa Engineer District being called upon for assistance in correcting any OKED deficiencies.[32]

On 21 August 1957, Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K. completed Naha Project New Moon, except, of course, for the Senaga Shima portion of the contract. Now that all of the cable was underground, safe from the most violent typhoons, every effort was exerted to convert the Naha Air Base telephone system to automatic dial operation as of 2400 hours, 4 October. In order to make this possible, this headquarters mobilized the 13th Communications Squadron, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, and the 5th Communications Group to assist the 51st Communications Squadron in the preparatory work. This consisted of extensive re-wiring to connect telephones into the new exchange via the new outside cable plant. The new wiring was placed in parallel with that connecting to the old manual exchange, which was to be removed following the cut-over. All existing service, expanded trunking service, as well as some new service to housing areas, would convert to the dial system on the cut-over date.[33]

Before the scheduled cut-over could take place, however, Typhoon Faye smashed Okinawa on September 26th, inflicting extensive damage on the manual control telephone system at Naha, among countless other destructive acts. In this emergency, officials of this headquarters and the 51st Air Base Group (which had succeeded the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing as the base organization at Naha) decided to convert to the dial system immediately. The heat coils and carbon blocks had still not arrived, but enough of them were obtained from the Kadena telephone exchange and the Army Signal Depot to make emergency conversion possible at 0100 hours, 27 September 1957. Although no technical problems developed immediately, numerous "bugs" in the inside plant equipment gradually manifested themselves during the week that followed.[34]

On 14 October this headquarters proposed to Fifth Air Force that all of the remaining aerial telephone cable at both Kadena and Naha Air Bases be placed underground. The cable in question had not been included in Project New Moon because it served temporary areas such as the Jennings Housing Area and the Military Academy Area at Kadena and the Naha quonset housing area. If the plan were accepted, it would involve replacement of two major feeder cables at Kadena and five at Naha, at a total estimated cost of $159,000, of which sum $20,000 would come from Typhoon Faye reconstruction funds. Once this was realized, the only element of the telephone systems left vulnerable to typhoon winds would be the individual building drops at temporary structures.[35]

Nearly one year later, however, nothing concrete had been accomplished in this connection, although PACAF Form 189 action had been

taken to have all aerial cables placed underground on an individual basis, using troop labor of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron. On the basis of available evidence, it would probably be 1960 before the last cable at Kadena and Naha was buried.[36]

As 1957 came to an end, Kadena Project New Moon was 70 per cent complete, a position making it slightly ahead of schedule. When completed, it would furnish telephone cable to the whole of Kadena Air Base proper, as well as the satellite areas occupied by the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron, and the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot. However, the lack of dial telephone service to these areas and to the North Terrace housing area was not expected to improve until certain critical items required to complete the installation of new dial facilities in the Kadena telephone exchange were obtained. Pending receipt of these items, the Chief of the Communications Division for this headquarters directed that work be suspended. This inside plant work was in addition to, not a part of, Project New Moon; but its effect on that project was nonetheless great. December also saw the necessary cable installed to furnish telephone facilities to the new 6313th Air Base Wing and 313th Air Division headquarters buildings as soon as the three new concrete-and-steel structures were completed.[37]

Senpaku Musen Denshin Denwa K. K., by great good fortune, had proved to be a paragon of contractors. Not only did the Japanese firm complete Kadena Project New Moon on 10 February 1958, 18 days ahead of schedule, but the $318,000.00 job was accepted the following

day with no major discrepancies in evidence. Both the celerity and the excellence of the work were rare qualities in the realm of construction in the Far East. In addition, the contractor had consistently exhibited a laudable degree of cooperativeness, showing himself ever ready to perform minor items of work not called for in the contract, and willing to be "steered" into those particular phases of the project which Air Force officials deemed deserving of high priority.

At the same time, much of the credit for Sempaku's cooperativeness must go to Mr. Paul L. Stressman, a Department of the Army Civil Service employee who served as the New Moon Project Coordinator for AFFE/8A. Every individual having any appreciable knowledge of the two New Moon contracts praised Stressman's devotion to his work as a phenomenon almost unique in the world of government employment. Although a middle-aged man, he worked seven days a week, and gave no heed to eight-hour days in his c onstant surveillance of the projects he was determined should be carried out to the best advantage of the Air Force. Many of the minor modifications accepted by the contractor were made as the result of Stressman's insistence or persuasion.

By a piece of sheer irony, when Mr. Stressman returned to Japan upon completion of Kadena Project New Moon, he found that the Manpower people had eliminated his position, placing him in the ranks of the unemployed. Thus was virtue rewarded. However, he subsequently found a job opening in Korea and was hired to work there. Whether the disillusionment of being treated so shabbily after he had worked so conscientiously on Okinawa (and, probably, in every other project which

he monitored) deprived him of any of his enthusiasm and extraordinary industry is not known.[38]

Projects Executed by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron.

Kadena Air Base Projects: A total of 22 work order projects were completed at Kadena during the first half of 1957, the largest being the installation and splicing of 606-pair cable for the flight line primary and secondary feeder systems. Although 2,390 man-hours were expended in accomplishing this job, the only difficulties encountered were connected with the use of reclaimed 606-pair cable, the lead sheath of which was always likely to have sustained damage during the reclaiming process. Other major projects completed by the 17th CCS at Kadena included the installation of permanent building immediately to the rear of the main exchange building; an interim distribution system for the North Terrace housing area; and installation of new telephone cable to serve the FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) housing area near Kadena Gate #1. A total of 12,000-odd man-hours were devoted to the 22 Kadena projects.[39]

Naha Air Base Projects: Although only six projects were completed at Naha in the six-month period, more than 6,000 man-hours were consumed in their accomplishment. Perhaps the most troublesome was the work performed on the 202-pair cable on the Naha flight line, where the splicing operation was complicated by the necessity for installing 202-pair stub-outs at each splice. Other projects completed at Naha AB included the installation of a 51-pair tie-in telephone cable between the old

and new Navy Communication Centers; removal of overhead spiral-four telephone cable from the control tower to the UHF/DF site; straightening on-base telephone poles; and removal of unusable antenna poles and wire at the Naha MARS station.[40]

Off-Base Projects: The largest off-base project tackled by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was the rehabilitation of the Yuza Dake Air Station (Site P-56) antenna farm, which had been heavily damaged by Typhoon Emma the previous September. Ordinarily this would not have been a very time-consuming task, but the team assigned to the job found that in this case a good percentage of the anchors and pole holes had to be dug into coral rock, which, if not one of the harder forms of stone, was still quite capable of resisting ordinary digging methods.

Other off-base projects completed were the installation of a 26-pair cable at Yontan Auxiliary Air Field to provide increased service to the transmitter site of the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile; installation of a cable distribution system at Morgan Manor housing area; general rehabilitation of all antennas located at the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile's Onna Point Receiver Annex; and installation of a new permanent 200-pair trunking telephone cable to serve the Bishagawa Billeting Annex.

In April the Philco Contract Technician assigned to the headquarters Communications Division and two surveyors from the 17th Communications Construction Squadron flew down to Miyako Jima to determine the

feasibility of installing a Tropospheric Scatter Communications System between Site P-53 and Yuza Dake Air Station. Sightings were made to plot horizontal clearances in the range of 40° to 70° azimuth from the transmitter, receiver, and operations buildings. This survey was required in order to draft programming action and operational plans for this 12-channel system.

That same month, incidentally, emergency programming action for a full duplex teletype circuit between the ADCC at Naha and the ACC/JOC at Taipei, Formosa, was prepared by 313th's Communications Division and submitted to Fifth Air Force. This facility was programmed with an operating date of the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1958 to coincide with the expected operational date of the Army's Okinawa-Taiwan Tropospheric Scatter System over which this teletype circuit would be transmitted. Original programming had included on-line cryptographic equipment; however, this headquarters was advised by Thirteenth Air Force that the Nationalist Chinese would be operating the distant terminal at Taipie; therefore USAFSS on-line crypto equipment could not be used.[41]

Problems of Supply: The 17th Communications Construction Squadron was plagued by an unrealistic Unit Allowance List (UAL) throughout the historical period, many vehicles being actually on hand though not included on the UAL, yet authorized the squadron on the Master Equipment Authorization List (MEAL). In June 1956 the Supply and Operations Officers of the 17th CCS had gone to Headquarters, FEAF, to justify possession of the vehicles on hand, taking with them UAL Change

Requests for approval. In February 1957 these Change Requests were returned disapproved to the squadron because of the impending reorganization of the 17th CCS. That same month, the MEAL was screened, and the vehicles on hand were listed thereon as being authorized to the squadron, leading 17th CCS officers to believe that they would likewise be entered on the UAL then being printed at FEAF. When the Unit Allowance List was received in March, however, it was discovered that most of the vehicles had, instead, been deleted or omitted.

Around this time the 17th CCS received notification that it was to be transferred to control of the Southern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (SAMAP) on 1 April 1957. When the Squadron Commander and the Supply Officer made a coordination visit to SAMAP in March, they learned that the date for transferring the unit had been set back to 1 July 1957, as well as that FEAF had forwarded SAMAP the card deck used in preparation of the squadron's UAL, together with the UAL of 1 March 1957.

The fact that these documents were given SAMAP in March led the 17th to conclude that FEAF no longer had UAL or Change Request responsibility for it; yet, on the other hand, there was the undeniable fact that the squadron would not be reassigned to the 2720th Maintenance Group at Clark AB until 1 July. In an attempt to clarify this muddled situation, 313th Air Division radioed Fifth Air Force to ask on what date SAMAP would assume responsibility for processing UAL Change Requests. Fifth Air Force forwarded the query to FEAF, who replied that the effective date would be 1 July 1957.

In order to assist SAMAP in the preparation of the UAL, the 17th's supply sergeant visited that headquarters in June. There he found that SAMAP's Master Equipment Authorization List was not up to date, if the MEAL on file in the Materiel Directorate at this headquarters was itself accurate. It could be anticipated that this would hinder SAMAP a great deal in preparing the squadron's UAL, with the probable result that many corrections and UAL Change Requests would be necessary. But, be that as it might, the 17th CCS strove constantly to have a suitable UAL ready by 15 August 1957.

During the six-month period, Base Supply cancelled all due outs except for emergency requirements and lettered priorities, because of its conversion to the single balance IBM (International Business Machine) system. This imposed a minor workload on every affected organization, including the 17th CCS, since all canceled items had to be re-requisitioned. This artificially-produced repetition of work was rendered the more palatable, however, by the assumption that it would be easier to obtain supplies once Base Supply commenced complete operation under the IBM system.

The 17th Communications Construction Squadron was authorized 14 centrifugal pumps, stock number 4320-289-3683, but only three were on hand, and these were unserviceable. On 26 July 1956 the Supply Section submitted FEAF Form 197 for four of the additional pumps due the squadron, only to be informed by Base Supply that they were back-ordered and would not be delivered until approximately 11 December.

When December came and went without receipt of the pumps, the squadron was informed that follow-up action was being taken with the Memphis Air Force Depot, which had, in turn, extracted the requisition to the Gadsden Air Force Depot. In January 1957, FEAF Form 197 was returned to the squadron. The seventh indorsement stated that the 17th CCS would be advised concerning any further supply action upon receipt of such information by the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, the Kadena base organization at that time. When two more months went by without any further information, the squadron returned the FEAF Form 197 to the 18th Air Base Group (which had inherited the role of Kadena base organization) on 13 March, with a request that something be done. In May the much-traveled FEAF Form 197 reappeared, by now garlanded with 17 indorsements, the thirteenth of which, from Headquarters, Gadsden Air Force Depot, stated that the four pumps were being shipped direct from the contractor on AFD 2346 Requisition ENG 11-56-5, with an estimated delivery date of 15 August 1957. As the period ended on 30 June, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron could only hope that this was no false promise and that no further follow-up action would be necessary.[42]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	2	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.
2	--	Hq. USAF Ltr. to Comdr. AMC, sub.: Reassignment of 17th Comm. Const. Sq., dtd. 9 Apr. 1957, and FEAF GO 32, dtd. 15 May 1957.
3	8	AMC GO 25, dtd. 19 Apr. 1957.
4	9	PMDCG 12 4701 E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th AD, 10/1009Z Dec. 1956.
5	--	History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan 1957, pp. 22-23.
6	10	PNMCC-3 0034, Hq. NAMAP to Comdr. SAMAP, 10/0810Z Jan. 1957.
7	11	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div., to Comdr. 51st FIW, sub.: Naha Project New Moon, 21 Jan. 1957.
8	--	History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan. 1957, pp. 22-23; History, 51st FIW, July-Dec. 1956, p. 55.
9	12	Ltr., Hq. AFFE/8A (Rear) to Comdr. NAMAP, sub.: Project COMM FY57-NAHA-1-OP, 1 March 1957.
10	13	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, sub.: Naha Project New Moon, 4 March 1957; DJ, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., 4 March 1957.
11	14	DJ, D/O, 13 March 1957; History, D/O, March 1957, p.8.
12	14	DJ, D/O, 13 March 1957.
13	15	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, sub.: Naha Project New Moon Work Schedule, 22 March 1957.
14	--	History, D/O, March 1957, pp. 8-9.
15	16	3130C-E U-3-401, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 21/0655Z March 1957.
16	17	PSMDC-4 3738 E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. USAFFE/8th Army Rear, 04/0158Z Apr. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
17	— 14	Ltr. Order 3-183, Hq. AFFE/8 (Rear) to Individuals Named, sub.: Invitational Travel Order, 15 March 1957; DJ. D/O, 9 Apr. 1957.
18	18	3130C-E U-3-342, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. NAMAP, 19/0017Z March 1957.
19	19	PNMB 03712, Hq. NAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 01/0455Z Apr. 1957.
20	20	3130C-E U-4-182, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. NAMAP. 09/0725Z Apr. 1957.
21	21	5FMME-E 09406, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 09/0810Z Apr. 1957.
22	22	3130C-E U-4-221, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 11/0420Z Apr. 1957.
23	14	DJ. D/O, 9, 11, 16 Apr. 1957.
24	14	Ibid., 23 Apr. 1957.
25	--	Ltr., Hq. 51st FIW to Comdr. 313th Air Div., Sub.: Request for Amendment to FY 57-NAHA-1-OP (New Moon), 10 Apr. 1957.
26	--	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. 51st FIW to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Request for Amendment to FY 57-NAHA-1-OP (New Moon), 10 Apr. 1957), Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, 22 Apr. 1957.
27	—	PSMDS-5-4158-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 06/0542Z May 1957
28	23	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 18th ABG, sub.: Kadena "New Moon" Telephone Cable Contract,15 July 1957.
29	—	DJ, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., 10 July 1957.
30	—	Ibid., 5 Aug. 1957.
31	24	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, sub.: Naha Outside Plant Telephone Cable Contract,21 Aug.1957.
32	25	Ltr.,Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 18th ABG, sub.:Kadena New Moon Cable Project, 8 Aug. 1957.

J-5-4-3

Footnote No.	Document No.	
33	--	History, 6431st ABG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1957, p.72; DJ D/O 18, 25 Sept. 1957; telephone conversation by Command Historian with T/Sgt Jones E. Chandler, 6431st Operations Sq., 2 Sept. 1958.
34	--	DJ, D/O, 4 Oct. 1957; History 6431st ABG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1957, pp. 72, 73, 74. The Operations Directorate, in its daily staff journal item, gives the date for the cut-over as 27 September, while the 6431st ABG History places it on 28 September on p.73 and on 27 September on p. 74. T/Sgt Jones E. Chandler, of the 6431st Operations Squadron, supplied a date of 28 September in telephone conversation with the Command Historian on 2 September 1958.
35	--	DJ.D/O, 15 Oct. 1957.
36	--	Conversation by Command Historian with Captain Walter A Proft, 313th AD Comm. Div., 4 Sept. 1958.
37	--	DJ, D/O, 30 Dec. 1957; History, D/O,Dec.1957,pp.11-12.
38	--	Conversation by Command Historian with Captain Walter A. Proft, 313th Air Div. Comm. Div., 4 Sept. 1958; conversation by Command Historian with Captain Victor R. T. Rentschler, Naha Base Comm.Officer,28 Aug.1958.
39	--	History, 17th CCS, 1 Jan-30 June 1957, p. 12; History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Apr. 1957, p. 13.
40	--	Ibid.
41	--	History, 17th CCS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, p.12;History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Apr. 1957, p. 13, May 1957, pp. 14-15.
42	--	History, 17th CCS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, pp. 6-8.

CHAPTER III

THE 15TH WEATHER SQUADRON

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THE 15TH WEATHER SQUADRON

THE ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE SQUADRON

As the year 1957 began, the 15th Weather Squadron, with headquarters at Kadena Air Base, was operating under 1st Weather Wing Regulation 23-2 of 17 November 1955, which stated that its mission was to provide meteorological services, as required, in the area of the Ryukyu, Bonin, Philippine, and Marianas Islands, in conformity with Air Force Regulations 105-3 and 105-9, and as directed by the Commander, 1st Weather Wing. The Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron was attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for operational control and to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistic and administrative support, while its parent unit of assignment was the 1st Weather Wing, whose headquarters was at Fuchu Air Station, Japan.

On 1 February 1957, as we have seen, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was relieved from attachment to the 313th Air Division, and the 18th Air Base Group replaced it as the base organization for Kadena. As a result of this change, the Headquarters and Detachment #4 of the 15th Weather Squadron were relieved from their erstwhile attachment to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and were re-attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support.[1] Detachment #1 at Clark AB, Philippine Islands, continued to be attached for operational control, logistic support, and administration to the 6200th Air Base Wing, located at the same base. Detachment #2, at Andersen AFB, Guam, was attached for

all purposes to the 3960th Air Base Wing (SAC). Detachment #6, at Iwo Jima Air Base, Volcano Islands, was attached for all purposes to the 6361st Air Base Squadron. Detachment #7, at Naha Air Base, Okinawa, remained attached for all purposes to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

Thus matters stood until 18 February 1957, when an administrative temblor occurred, shaking up the entire air weather service structure in the Western Pacific. On that date the 20th Weather Squadron was inactivated at Moriyama Air Station, together with 19 of its detachments located at as many different places in Japan. Simultaneously, the 10th Weather Group was activated at Moriyama Air Station and assigned to the 1st Weather Wing as an intermediate headquarters between that headquarters and the surviving 15th and 30th Weather Squadrons. The same Headquarters, Air Weather Service General Order (No. 6, dated 29 January 1957) which set these changes in motion also transferred eight detachments of the defunct 20th Weather Squadron to the 15th Weather Squadron. Thus, Detachment #6 at Itazuke AB, Kyushu, was redesignated as Detachment #9, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #18 at Ashiya AB, Kyushu, reappeared as Detachment #10; Detachment #7 at Itami AB, Honshu, became Detachment #15; Detachment #21 at Miho AB, Honshu, was redesignated as Detachment #18; Detachment #19 at Bofu AB, Honshu, retained the same designation; Detachment #45 at Hamamatsu AB, Honshu, became Detachment #20; Detachment #29 at Tsuiki AB, Kyushu, became Detachment #21; and Detachment #19 at Matsushima AB, Honshu, emerged as Detachment #22.

However, the additional burden to which the 15th Weather Squadron thus fell heir on 18 February was not quite so great as it might at first appear, as five of these detachments (#18, #19, #20, #21, and #22) were Japan Air Self Defense Force training detachments and were 15th Weather Squadron units in name only. At the time of this reorganization, these five detachments became operating locations under the 10th Weather Group, and all USAF personnel previously stationed there were assigned to that organization, which thenceforth assumed operational and administrative control over these units. This arrangement was adopted because of the proximity of these JASDF units to the new 10th Weather Group Headquarters, and also to provide continuity of the JASDF technical capability possessed by Headquarters, 10th Weather Group.[2]

With the introduction of these numerous new detachments into the structure of the 15th Weather Squadron, it became necessary for the 10th Weather Group to rewrite the regulation prescribing the mission and functions of the latter organization. Accordingly, 10th WGR 23-1 of 18 February 1957 declared that the mission of the 15th Weather Squadron was to provide meteorological service as required in the Ryukyu, Bonin, Philippine, and Marianas Islands of the Western Pacific Ocean area and the islands of Kyushu and Honshu, Japan, in conformity with AFR 105-3, AFR 105-9, and as directed by the Commander, 10th Weather Group.

In more specific terms, the functions outlined for the squadron were as follows:

1. To provide meteorological technical advice and assistance to the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands (the civilian hat worn by the Army Commanding General, Ryukyus Command and IX Corps) in the operation of the Ryukyuan Weather Service.

2. To provide meteorological technical advice and assistance to Japanese civil weather agencies, when directed by the Commander, 10th Weather Group.

3. To provide on-the-job training to personnel of the Japanese Air Self Defense Force Weather Service.

4. To provide weather service to civil agencies, in accordance with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)* procedures, within the limits of AFR 55-18.

5. To provide staff weather officers to Air Force and Army units as required.

6. To maintain North Pacific typhoon warning centers at Andersen AFB, Guam, and Clark AFB, Luzon, Philippine Islands.

7. To conduct an Easterly Wave ** forecast program with the assistance of the 57th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron.

8. To assist the Staff Weather Officer to Headquarters, Fifth Air force (an ex officio title of the Commander, 10th

*The ICAO establishes policy on civil aircraft throughout the world.

**Easterly Waves designate a type of weather phenomenon from which full-fledged typhoons often develop.

Weather Group) in accomplishing actions directed by Headquarters Fifth Air Force, insofar as they might pertain to 15th Weather Squadron detachments serving Fifth Air Force bases.

9. To make weather observations as required to support the world-wide meteorological observation network.[3]

On 7 June 1957, Detachment #2, 57th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, at Eniwetok Atoll, Marshall Islands, was redesignated as an operating location under the 15th Weather Squadron. This action was scheduled to be formalized on 1 July 1957 with the station's redesignation as Detachment #25, 15th Weather Squadron.[4]

The period of this history was a relatively bright one for the 15th Weather Squadron in the matter of personnel. A total of 21 officers, two warrant officers, and 145 airmen were gained during the six months, while only 14 officers, one warrant officer, and 74 airmen were lost. Even so, however, the number of people on hand compared unfavorably with the total authorized. For example, as of 30 June 1957, 81 weather officers and six non-weather officers were authorized, but the assigned figures were 50 and four respectively. As another case in point, 96 weather observers were authorized, but only 79 were assigned. Again, 16 weather observer technicians and 11 weather forecast specialists were authorized by the manning documents, but the squadron actually possessed only two of the former and one of the latter. On the other side of the coin, though, a total of 82 apprentice weather observers were on the roster, despite a mere 40 being authorized. Still, this exception notwithstanding, the general trend is shown by the fact that

306 personnel of all types and varieties were authorized, while only 276 were assigned at mid-year.

All personnel with weather specialties were either obtained by MATS(Military Air Transport Service--of which the Air Weather Service was a subordinate organization) requisitions from other Air Weather Service organizations or by assignment from Headquarters, Chanute AFB and the 3345th Technical Training Wing (Air Training Command), also at Chanute AFB.

The problems previously plaguing the Personnel Section of the squadron had been virtually eliminated by the close of the period. Although the experience level was not as high as might be desired, the potential was on hand, and an adequate training program was in effect to develop this potential to the highest degree possible.[5]

Rawinsonde Operations.

The 15th Weather Squadron began the year with three rawinsonde sections--at Clark AB, Kadena AB, and Iwo Jima AB. On 18 February a fourth was added with the accession of Itazuke AB, Japan, as Detachment #9. The rawinsonde section at Clark continued its ascendency over the other units of the squadron, placing first in altitude achieved in January, February, March, April, and May. In addition, the section won first place honors for the entire Air Weather Squadron, when Major General Thomas G. Moorman, Commander, Air Weather Service, presented the Bassett Award to Detachment #1 at Clark AB in ceremonies at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Master Sergeant James T. Bragg, the NCOIC of the Clark detachment, was present to receive the award.

The reader of the preceding 313th Air Division History may recall (if he has a penchant for statistics, a deep interest in weather operations, and a good memory) that the 86,000-foot average altitude achieved by the four rawinsonde sections at Clark, Andersen, Kadena, and Iwo Jima for the year 1956 was 15,000 feet better than had been attained in 1955. During the first six months of 1957 the Clark rawinsonde section averaged 98,566 feet in its balloon releases; Iwo Jima averaged 96,532 feet; Kadena 93,722 feet; and Itazuke 88,970 feet (from 1 February through 30 June).

Early in 1956, each rawinsonde section had sought to standardize a certain balloon for optimum use in daylight hours and another for top performance at night time, in order to reduce the number of types of balloons which had to be kept on hand. From these tests they learned that the best day balloon in use was the ML-391/B, which consistently averaged well over 90,000 feet at each detachment. The rawinsonde sections at Iwo Jima and Kadena also found that excellent results could be obtained from daytime launchings with the Dewey and Almy ML-443/A. However, although spectacular altitudes were achieved during the hours of sunlight, none of the balloons proved to be completely satisfactory at night. The Dewey and Almy ML-443/A and the Japanese-manufactured Totex, CO-8 were used almost exclusively by all the sections; but, although the Totex gave good results at Clark AB, the other three detachments obtained only average results with it. Whether this difference in performance derived from atmospheric conditions or from variations in skill in launching procedures was not

readily determinable--but it existed nonetheless. As for the ML-443/A, the performance obtained from it at Kadena, Andersen, and Iwo Jima was above average, but the supply of these ballons had been exhausted before mid-year 1956. In this situation there was nothing for it but for each rawinsonde section to standardize and improve the procedure to be used in launching the Totex balloons at its own particular location.

During the period January--June 1957, the ML-391/B was used exclusively in the daytime, producing an average height of 104,563 feet for the four sections at Clark, Kadena, Iwo Jima, and Itazuke. Although the Totex soared to an average altitude of only 90,038 feet in the nocturnal launchings made during the same period, this figure was not one of which to be ashamed, being, in fact, better than the averages achieved in daytime launchings in past years. By this time, experience had shown that these two balloons were the best available for use by 15th Weather Squadron's rawinsonde sections, since they were the least affected by extremely cold tropopause temperatures and heavy precipitation.

The personnel situation in the rawinsonde units gave no cause for undue alarm. While the operators were, in the majority of cases, "3" (apprentice) level airmen, they performed their work remarkably well. In addition, the technician manning level was such that each section had at least two fully qualified NCO's. Thanks to the "superb maintenance capabilities and qualifications" of these technicians, the squadron missed only one scheduled release during the entire six-month period.[6]

The AN/CPS-9 Storm Detection Radar.

Although the AN/CPS-9 storm detection radar programmed for Kadena Air Base had been the subject of extensive correspondence as far back as March 1953 and had finally been scheduled for delivery in January 1956, it was not until July of the latter year that it finally arrived on Okinawa. Fortunately, the 15th Weather Squadron had not succumbed to the insidious effects of "Okinawa-itis" but had, instead, displayed foresight and energy by employing the interval in installing ducts and bringing the modulator building to completion. By good luck, also, the necessary qualified maintenance personnel had been requisitioned and actually on hand since January 1956, the date on which the equipment had originally been slated to appear. With the radar set delivered, the squadron called upon the 16th Communications Construction Squadron to erect a 75-foot antenna tower. By 20 November 1956 this had been accomplished.

Installation of the AN/CPS-9 (#2270) turned out to be a species of "do it yourself" operation, with considerable trial and error experimentation an unavoidable concomitant, since it turned out that the EI agency had no personnel familiar with this equipment. After much agonizing work, however, the radar was finally erected and accepted for operation on 1 February 1957 in what was probably the only instance of an AN/CPS-9's being installed exclusively by Air Weather Service personnel. Once the new set had begun to operate, officials of the 15th Weather Squadron wondered how they had ever done without it, located as the 313th Air Division was in the very heart of the "typhoon belt". Target ranges of 325 miles were not

uncommon features of the AN/CPS-9's performance.

A second AN/CPS-9 had been scheduled to commence operation early in 1956 at Iwo Jima Air Base, and it was in fact installed by March of that year. A succession of troubles, chiefly occasioned by penetration of moisture into the underground cables, made it necessary to move the console temporarily into a new building where shorter cables could be used in conjunction with the set. On 1 December 1956 the AN/CPS-9 finally began limited operations on a high pulse recurrence frequency (PRF), but as long as no replacement cable was available, it was impossible to return the console to the site at which it was intended to function and to place the set in full operation. Early in 1957, Northern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (NAMAP) received the long-awaited cable, enabling the entire detachment at Iwo Jima to turn to the task of replacing the underground power line assembly in its entirety. By April this not inconsiderable labor had been completed, and the AN/CPS-9 became fully operational--just in time to furnish information on 1957's first products as they came off the typhoon assembly line.

Rather unexpectedly, in view of the unceasing problems of this same kind encountered by the AC&W sites in connection with their radar sets, neither Detachment #4 at Kadena AB nor Detachment #6 at Iwo Jima AB experienced any major difficulties with respect to parts. The average life of the magnetrons was between 750 and 1,100 hours; so plans were developed to make an automatic exchange of the hydraulic units every 5,000 hours of operation. If this policy were adhered to, Kadena should be due for an exchange in September and Iwo Jima in October 1957.

Great care was taken to see that two or three fully-qualified technicians for the AN/CPS-9 radar were on hand at all times, and the furits of this endeavor were evident in the excellent condition in which the sets were dept throughout the period.[7]

Programmed Equipment.

The only facility installed during the first half of 1957 was the AN/CPS-9 at Kadena, just described. In March, however, this headquarters, acting upon recommendation of the Air Weather Service, submitted a programming request to Fifth Air Force for a Horizontal Visibility Measuring Facility and a Rotating Beam Ceilometer, Facility #2277. The former would provide a weather observer at the Kadena base weather station with horizontal visibility at the touchdown zone of the instrument runway for relay to incoming aircraft, while the latter would replace the obsolete ceilometer currently installed at Kadena. The requested operating date for both of these two facilities was the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1959, but Fifth Air Force informed 313th that the Rotating Beam Ceilometers would not begin functioning before the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1960.[8]

In April further programming action was submitted by this headquarters to Fifth Air Force for a Remote Surface Temperature and Humidity Indicator (AN/TMQ-11(V), Facility #2275), at Kadena. This would provide the base weather station with true measurements of ambient temperatures of the free air over the runways. By utilizing this device, the weather personnel could better brief pilots on the true temperature at their takeoff point than was possible by depending

on a reading taken at the weather station. Headquarters, Air Weather Service assigned an operating date of the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1958 for this facility.

In addition, Clark, Kadena, and Naha Air Bases were scheduled to have Transmissometers (Facility #2278) operational at their weather detachments in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1959.[9]

The Naha Combat Operations Division Weather Section.

A shortage of forecasters--believed at the time to be only temporary in nature--forced the 15th Weather Squadron to reduce the forecasting service at the Naha Combat Operations Division (COD) on 11 December 1956 from a 24-hour-a-day schedule to one of only 10 hours, from 0700 to 1700 daily. Henceforth, the remaining 14 hours of each day were handled by the Naha Weather Station. This decision to allow the weather station to support the COD was made only after consideration of the required duties at each section and following a review of the assistance potentially available from other sources.

The year 1957 had not progressed very far, however, when the indications from higher headquarters began to form a picture of continuing shortages of forecasters at Naha. Thus, the maintenance of separate forecasting personnel in the COD, even on a part-time basis, was seen to be a difficult, if not impractical, matter. Eventually, a workable solution to the dilemma was worked out through coordination between the Detachment Commander and the Operations Officer. Under this arrangement, one officer was assigned to the COD Weather Station, serving as staff weather officer to the COD Commander and as supervisor of the observers' section at the COD. The COD observing section was

made responsible for plotting hourly and special observations from Naha and Kadena, three-hour forecasts for Naha and Kadena, and three-hourly weather reports from the off-island stations around Okinawa. Upper winds from Kadena, Itazuke, and Taipei were plotted as they were received. The hourly weather and specials from Naha and Kadena, as well as the three-hour forecast for these stations, were radioed to the GCI (Ground-Controlled Intercept) sites. The Base Weather Station was given the responsibility for preparation of a three-hour forecast in the format of a DD Form 175 entry, which was issued hourly to the Combat Operations Division, the Alert Center, and the fighter squadrons. This forecast was used for weather clearance for scramble aircraft, and for training flights from the Alert Center and the fighter squadrons. This forecast was used for weather clearance for scramble aircraft, and for training flights from the Alert Center and the fighter squadrons.

The terminal forecast section and winds aloft data were passed to the COD Weather Station for relay to the GCI sites and posting on the COD plotting board for use of the COD Commander and the duty controllers. In addition, an area forecast for six specified points was prepared every six hours and passed to the COD by the Base Weather Station. This forecast was issued in a color code for scattered, broken, and overcast layers. The COD Weather Officer prepared the anomalous propagation data from the Kadena RAOB's.* By 30 June this method of

*RAOB is the determination of temperature, humidity, and pressure by use of rawinsonde balloons, employing their measuring devices and associated communications equipment.

handling the COD weather support had been in operation for several months, and the Commander of the 15th Weather Squadron felt justified in declaring that "thus far" it had "worked out very well."[10]

Ie Shima PIBALS.

In April 1957 the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing at Kadena AB levied a special requirement on Detachment #4 for information concerning wind conditions in the air over Ie Shima, the little island just off the tip of Okinawa's Motobu Peninsula where 313th Air Division had a bombing range. Because of the special type of bombing training being conducted, low level winds (those existing between the surface and 18,000 feet altitude) exercised a critical influence on the success or failure of the operations. Furthermore, officials of the 18th FBW suspected that there was actually a considerable difference between the low level winds at Ie Shima and the winds obtained by the rawinsonde section at Kadena.

In order to learn whether or not there was any justification for these suspicions, observers from Detachment #4 began taking PIBALS at Ie Shima on 29 April. (It should, perhaps, be explained that PIBALS are observations of wind velocity and direction obtained by releasing "pilot balloons"--the source of the operation's name, PIBALS being a contraction of the two words--into the atmosphere as high as 18,000 feet, using theodolites to compute these factors by measurement of the horizontal and vertical angles). Each day when the aircraft of the 18th FBW were scheduled for bombing training, PIBALS were taken hourly, after which the results were called in to the Base Weather

Station and the Wing Operations Center at Kadena. While a complete analysis of the winds had not been completed at mid-year, the initial studies revealed that there was a considerable difference between the winds at Ie Shima and those at Kadena--a tentative finding which would vindicate the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in its suspicions if confirmed by more conclusive analyses.[11]

Mobility Exercises.

The 15th Weather Squadron continued to be responsible for supporting mobility exercises at Tainan, Formosa, with one officer forecaster and two observers for one-month periods, alternating at first with the 20th Weather Squadron, then, upon its dissolution, with the 30th Weather Squadron, every other month, in providing personnel. Toward the end of the historical period, however, the 10th Weather Group directed that as of 1 July 1957 the 15th Weather Squadron would have sole responsibility for furnishing these personnel.

As in the past, the matter of logistic support for these deployed weather personnel continued to be a problem, especially with respect to bedding and transportation, both of which had to be arranged personally on a month-to-month basis by the deployed weather officer.

In an endeavor to improve the observing and forecasting accuracy at Tainan, 15th Weather Squadron Headquarters communicated directly with the staff weather officer at Air Task Force 13 (Provisional), and with the staff weather officer for the Commander, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) at Taipei. The squadron personnel who had deployed to Taiwan for these mobility exercises reported that considerable improvement in the utilization of radar reports from the Taiwan area

was possible; therefore, the 15th Weather Squadron devoted increased effort to that purpose. Communications to and from Taiwan were still a problem on 30 June, despite the realization that this was so and consequent efforts to improve the condition. Late in the period the Commander, 10th Weather Group suggested that the 15th WS might possibly find it advantageous to deploy the mobility weather personnel for 90-day periods rather than on a monthly basis. A staff study was being devoted to an examination of this interesting theory as the first half of 1957 ended.

Miscellaneous Exercises.

Throughout the period, detachments of the 15th Weather Squadron provided weather support for various operational exercises. SAC rotational movements and deployments of fighter units posed no particular problems. One noteworthy exercise of the former category was the SAC B-52 round-the-world flight, for which forecast support was provided in part by Detachment #1 at Clark and Detachment #2 at Andersen. Again, Detachment #4 at Kadena provided detailed Met Watch* support for the ferrying of F-100's from Japan to Kadena when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing converted from F-86F's to F-100D's.[12]

Assignment of Priority to Certain Operations.

The month of January 1957 was notable, insofar as the 15th Weather Squadron was concerned, for being the occasion of formal inspections by officers from Headquarters, Air Weather Service, and a staff visit by

*"Met Watch"(short for meteorological watch)was the term used to identify the provision of weather forecasts for jet aircraft flying from one point to another, usually at some distance, and subsequent corrections made by the point of destination to insure their having the latest information of the weather.

Major General Thomas G. Moorman, the AWS Commander. As a result of these visits, the squadron obtained valuable high level guidance on which particular facets of its operations should be given the highest priority. Once this was known, the Squadron Commander announced that these items would thenceforth become the focal points of the organization's efforts. Since "austerity in numbers of weather personnel /was/ a problem /the squadron had/ become accustomed to living with . . . . its management efforts /had to be focused on the sinews of the job, with whatever time remaining--if any--being devoted to the fat." Guided by this philosophy, the squadron devoted its primary efforts during the six-month period to the following:

1. Prompt and Adequate Dissemination of Correct Observations. Because of its importance, this had been a recurring special item for inspectors visiting the 15th Weather Squadron, and the squadron had in turn given it special attention in its own staff visits. Although officials believed that they had this potential problem well in hand for the time being, they were well aware that the constant turnover of observers, which saw approximately 90 per cent of the replacement observers arriving no better than semi-skilled, was a subject for continuous close supervision. An effort was also made to instill in all the chief observers a sense of responsibility for frequent checks and re-checks to insure that correct observations were disseminated promptly and adequately by the airmen under their supervision. As guidance in this, the squadron published 15th Weather Squadron Manual 50-1, a weather observer training program designed to aid all observers in their career progression.

2. Improvement in Rawinsonde Operations. With five of the eight USAF rawinsonde stations in the FEAF Theater assigned to the 15th Weather Squadron, much of the latter's efforts perforce had to be devoted toward improvement in the altitudes and accuracy of rawinsonde operations.

3. Currency and Adequacy of Severe Weather and Typhoon Warning Plans. Involved in this was the operation of Typhoon Warning Centers at Andersen AFB, Guam, and Clark AB, Philippine Islands, which provided a large part of the typhoon warnings. With the cost of modern Air Force aircraft and equipment skyrocketing every year, the business of providing protection for them by means of adequate warning against severe weather and typhoons had assumed an ever increasing importance in the squadron's weather operations. The adequacy of these warning plans was covered in a survey of all 15th WS detachments completed in April.

4. Improvement in Terminal Forecasting Proficiency. Periodically the 15th Weather Squadron received terminal forecasting proficiency tables from the 1st Weather Wing based on the latter's forecast verifications program. To furnish a starting point for the development of terminal forecasting improvement projects, 15th WS Headquarters asked its detachments to prepare a set of proficiency curves based on these tables. The development of objective forecasting methods was encouraged; however, this was a time-consuming task requiring large amounts of data, and the current inadequate forecaster manning made the development of objective forecasting projects all the more difficult. Parallel with, or, if necessary, in lieu of, objective forecasting

projects, the 15th Weather Squadron asked its detachments to prepare a file of local forecasting procedures which would be discussed and made known to all station forecasters in seminars arranged for that purpose. In addition, the headquarters asked that these rules be forwarded to it for evaluation and dissemination to other detachments of the squadron.[13]

Typhoons in the Western Pacific.

Five tropical storms, four of which became typhoons, developed in the 15th Weather Squadron area of responsibility during the first half of 1957. All of these were born in the Andersen AFB area of forecasting responsibility, and three of them--Rose, Shirley, and Virginia-- penetrated the Clark area of typhoon forecasting responsibility.

Typhoon Rose (22-26 January) developed southwest of Truk and moved northwest towards Yap, where it reached a maximum intensity of 120 knots. When the storm was 720 nautical miles west of Guam, it re-curved and rapidly degenerated as it entered the high level ridge.

Typhoon Shirley (12-17 April) was first detected as an Easterly Wave near Guam. A closed circulation developed at the base of the wave, which moved west along the parallel of seven degrees north latitude. Four days after being detected, the circulation developed to tropical storm intensity near Koror in the Palaus and to typhoon intensity 150 miles east of the Philippine coast where it attained maximum sustained winds of 100 knots. When less than 150 miles off the northeast coast of Luzon, Shirley rapidly degenerated into a tropical storm.

Typhoon Trix (12-16 May) first attracted attention as a vortex southeast of Ponape, from whence she proceeded west along three degrees north latitude. At a point southeast of Truk the vortex reached typhoon intensity and changed course north-northeastward to 9° 30' north latitude, 156° east longitude. From this position it headed towards Iwo Jima, passing within 230 miles of Guam enroute. An anti-cyclonic circulation developed south of the typhoon, causing Guam to have a westerly flow for several days. Trix re-curved when southeast of Iwo Jima and proceeded east along 22° north latitude to a position south of Marcus Island. Here she changed course again to the northeast and degenerated in a mid-latitude position 550 miles north of Wake. At one time during her career Trix attained maximum winds of 120 knots.

Typhoon Virginia (19-27 June) developed from a vortex which formed between ponape and Truk in the Carolines, but typhoon intensity was not observed until shortly after she passed south of Guam. Virginia then took a path northward toward the Sea of Japan where she dissipated in the vicinity of the polar front. Thus, Virginia was the second typhoon of the year to threaten Guam, while the Ryukyus remained exempt from the unwanted visitations. Okinawa's turn was to come later in the year.[14]

Measurements of Rainfall at the Various Detachments.

Detachment #1 at Clark AB recorded 17.44 inches of rainfall from 1 January through 30 June 1957. Detachment #2 at Andersen AFB recorded 15.01 inches of rainfall for the same period. As was generally the case, Detachment #4 at Kadena AB led all other elements of the 15th Weather

Squadron with 47.95 inches of rainfall. Also true to form, Detachment #6 at Iwo Jima AB received the least precipitation--11.39 inches. Detachment #7 at Naha AB, rather understandably was not far behind Kadena--they were separated geographically only 13 miles--with 43.86 inches. Detachment #9 at Itazuke AB obtained only 12.80 inches. Detachment #10 at Ashiya AB did considerably better, with 29.64 inches of rainfall.[15]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	2	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957
2	--	Historical Report (HR), 15th Weather Squadron (WS), Jan.-June 1957, pp. 1-2, 18; Air Weather Service
	26	(AWS) GO 6, dtd. 29 Jan. 1957.
3	27	10th WGR 23-1, sub.: Organization--Field: Mission and Functions of the 15th Weather Squadron, 18 Feb. 1957.
4	--	HR, 15th WS, Jan.-June 1957, pp. 18-19
5	--	Ibid., pp. 6-9.
6	--	Ibid., pp. 25-26.
7	--	Ibid., pp. 26-27.
8	--	Ibid., p. 27; History, D/O, March 1957, p. 11.
9	--	HR, 15th WS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, p. 27; History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., p. 12.
10	--	Ibid., pp. 23-24.
11	--	Ibid., p. 24.
12	--	Ibid., pp. 20-21.
13	--	Ibid., pp. 21-23.
14	--	Ibid., pp. 31-32.
15	--	Figures obtained for Command Historian by Hq., 15th WS, 21 Jan. 1958.

CHAPTER IV

SUPPORT OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

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THE 12TH AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON (SAC)

The Squadron Mission.

The mission of the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC), located at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, was as follows: (1) To organize, train, and maintain a capability for special weapons support as directed by the Commander, 3d Air Division; (2) to be prepared to perform wuch tasks as might be assigned in the Emergency War Plan (EWP) and related operations orders; (3) to provide special weapons support for deployed SAC units; (4) to receive, store, issue, maintain, assemble, calibrate, and provide salvage and ground handling, surveillance, and technical supply of special weapons as specified in applicable publications; (5) to load special weapons in aircraft and perform applicable tests and checks; (6) to maintain technical equipment and security of special weapons at the operational storage site; (7) to perform such special missions as higher headquarters might direct; and (8) to train and maintain conventional munitions capability in accordance with unit training standards.[1]

The mission of an aviation depot squadron, as defined in Air Force Technical Order 11N-4-1 (Glossary of Military Field of Atomic Energy), dated 1 March 1956, was as follows:

> Aviation Depot Squadron (ADS), an Air Force unit whose functions include: (1) The receipt, storage, issue, modernization, storage inspection, storage monitoring, technical supply, salvage, and loading of special weapons; (2) the calibration and maintenance of technical equipment required for special weapons inspection and assembly; (3) the internal security of its own technical area. An aviation depot squadron (ADS) is trained to perform the functions enumerated for all types of special weapons presently required by the Air Force; in addition, it is capable of dispatching a part of its own organization as a small forward technical organization, as the need arises. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The 12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC) shared with the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron the distinction of being one of the only two organizations attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for "administrative and logistical support, except for items peculiar to special weapons," as the year 1957 began.[2] On 1 February, with the reorganization of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, the 12th ADS was relieved from all previous logistic attachments and was attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support.[3] The responsibility for administrative support of the 12th ADS automatically reverted to the 3d Air Division (SAC) on Guam, the parent organization to which the squadron was assigned.

Reorganization of the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron.

Effective 1 January 1957, the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron was reorganized under Part II, O/T 4855A, dated 31 October 1956, as confirmed by SAC General Order 68, dated 16 December 1956; but, since this organization table was not received at the time, no actual steps were taken to implement the changes set forth therein. Several personnel of the squadron who were shown copies of a proposed Unit Manning Document (UMD) prepared in anticipation of the reorganization concluded that the

deletion of certain officer and airman Air Force Specialties (AFS's) as shown therein could quite easily impair the squadron's ability to perform its mission.

One proposed deletion in particular--that of the Personnel Officer (AFSC 7324)--caused much concern, owing to the great distance separating the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron from its parent headquarters, the fact that the Personnel Officer also acted as Squadron Adjutant, the volume and nature of the correspondence the organization had to process, and the conditions under which the squadron operated. In view of the 12th's peculiar position as a SAC unit tenant to the base organization of another major command (FEAF), its entire function was comparable to that of an air base group. For this reason, interested personnel of the squadron gave it as their "considered opinion" that the assignment of an officer to work in the dual capacity of Personnel Officer and Adjutant was a definite requirement if firm administrative control of reports and correspondence was to be assured. By so doing, it would also be possible to provide adequate supervision over the maintenance of personnel records, which could not otherwise be consolidated with those of the parent base. However, no action was contemplated until the official Tables of Organization were received, although a study was begun and information compiled for justification in requesting the augmentation of certain AFSC's should this become necessary.[4]

A SAC Inspector General team had recommended in October 1956 that the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron establish a Quality Control Section. On 1 January 1957 this was officially put into effect, with a captain named as Quality Control Officer. In February three airmen representing

the technical AFSC's of the squadron--331XX(Electrical), 461XX (Loading), and 463XX(Mechanical)-- were assigned to the section. The individuals selected were chosen because it was believed that they possessed sufficient experience in their respective fields to serve as inspectors and monitors of the technical fields. To supplement these men who were assigned on a full-time basis, the squadron published orders on selected airmen in the administrative and supply fields to act periodically as Quality Control Inspectors, thus giving the Quality Control Section an all-around monitoring capability.[5]

By March the Quality Control Section had progressed beyond the early organizational stages where an undue proportion of the effort had to be devoted to establishing administrative and operational procedures. As a result, it was able to divert personnel to field work with the operating sections, where they monitored the storage inspections of Department of Defense (DOD) weapons and nuclear capsules, and also were able to spend some time working with the loading crews.[6]

During the first half of April the reorganization of the squadron structure was completed and brought into alignment with the procedures set forth in the advanced copy of the SAC Procedural Manual for aviation depot squadrons. The major difference between the former and the new organizational structures of the 12th ADS stemmed from that portion of the squadron mission calling for it to "train and maintain conventional munitions capability in accordance with unit training standards." As a means of facilitating this, the SAC Procedural Manual provided for the establishment of a Munitions Branch to serve as the controlling agency

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for all munitions, in so doing replacing the old Operations Division, which would become a subordinate part of the Munitions Branch.

As a result of this added responsibility, the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron expanded its weapons function to include conventional bombs of weights up to 12,000 lbs., conventional ammunition for aircraft, including .50 caliber and .20 millimeter, and equipment for providing aircraft with the components required in jet-assisted take-off (JATO). Under the new organizational structure, the responsibility for controlling these munitions, as well as special weapons* rested with the Munitions Branch Chief.

Immediately under the Munitions Branch Chief came the Munitions Control Section, which was actually the "controlling tool" of the Munitions Branch. Next was the Supply Administration Section, which received, stored, issued, and accounted for all of the organization's munitions and supervised the operations of the unit classified account, AFB-4712, which handled supply action on the special weapons assigned. This section also exercised quasi-control over the Unit Supply Section, which handled conventional munitions and training items related to the field.

The Operations Section, which utilized the weapons on hand, was composed of three separate sub-sections: (1) the Handling Sub-Section, responsible for the proper movement of the weapons, both within and without the Ordnance Storage Area (OSA); (2) the Assembly Sub-Section, responsible for the assembly, inspection and maintenance of both the Training and Department of Defense-War Reserve (DODWR) weapons of an

*A "special weapon" was an instrument of combat utilizing nuclear energy as the principal means of inflicting damage upon an enemy. It could be either atomic or thermonuclear.

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atomic or thermonuclear nature which might be assigned to or present within the OSA, plus the inspection and maintenance of the nuclear capsules assigned to the organization; and (3) the Loading Sub-Section, which was responsible for properly loading and off-loading special and conventional type weapons, including the components for JATO units.

The Quality Control Section came directly under the supervision of the Munitions Branch Chief, and was responsible for monitoring the activities of all sections and sub-sections of the Munitions Branch, to insure that the provisions of pertinent directives and technical orders were being complied with and to insure that each section was at all times capable of fulfilling its required function in the event of implementation of the SAC Emergency War Plan, and could thereby deliver an acceptable and reliable end product, in the form of both special and conventional type weapons, plus the nuclear components. The Quality Control Officer of the 12th ADS was assigned the additional duty of Squadron Training Officer, in which capacity he monitored all training performed throughout the squadron. In so doing, he could further his knowledge of the squadron's actual ability to carry out its mission by first-hand observation of the level of training attained by the personnel, thus enabling him to take action wherever necessary to insure that they obtained proper training.

The Technical Administration Section of the Munitions Branch was responsible to the Munitions Branch Chief for the procurement and maintenance of complete sets of up-to-date technical orders and manuals, as well as their dissemination to each appropriate section and sub-section.

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The last section of the MunitionsBranch was the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Section, which fell within the jurisdiction of the Quality Control Officer. This section was responsible for the disposal and salvage of special and conventional weapons both on and off base, when they came within the purview of the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron.

The only other section affected by the reorganization of the 12th ADS's structure was Unit Supply. Formerly this section had functioned under the supervision of the Technical Support Officer. Under the new arrangement, that position was eliminated and Unit Supply was placed directly under the Commander's supervision. It would continue to service the organization in all normal supply functions, and, in addition, would furnish the squadron support in connection with special weapons by requisitioning, receiving, and issuing either entire training units or components of the training items. The Unit Supply Section was responsible for the supply support of training weapons* utilized by the squadron. Requests for such items were submitted to Unit Supply, which in turn requisitioned them from AFB-4712, the squadron's classified property account section, for further requisitioning from the depot. Upon the arrival of these items at Kadena they would be issued in the reverse order of the foregoing. All other items in the special weapons category, such as Department of Defense (DOD)** weapons or the components thereof, were

*The term "training weapons" referred to mock-up items closely approximating actual atomic and thermonuclear weapons and nuclear components.

**Department of Defense (DOD) weapons comprised all atomic weapons in the custody of the Department of Defense (as opposed to the Atomic Energy Commission) irrespective of source, including maneuver weapons, service weapons, and training weapons.

requisitioned, processed, and issued through AFB-4712.

The Unit Administration and Security Branches were left unchanged within the new organizational structure, remaining directly under the supervision of the Commander, with no change in authorized strength except for the deletion of the Personnel Officer (AFSC 7324) position in Unit Administration, first learned of when the proposed UMD was received in January, as already related.

Advance copies of the UMD for aviation depot squadrons received in April indicated that they would be reduced from a combined T/O and non-T/O strength of 15 officers and 180 airmen to 12 officers and 172 airmen.[7]

The official copy of SAC UMD #4485A, pertaining to the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC), was received on 8 June. A review of the document revealed that only a negligible number of changes would be necessary, as the previous realignment of personnel which had been worked out by reference to a rough copy of the same document received in April left little to be done other than to formalize the changes made. The new UMD set forth both T/O and non-T/O authorizations, which, fortunately, merely confirmed the assumptions made previously by officials of the 12th ADS and the 3d Air Division. The squadron had recently sought to have the UMD include one Personnel Officer/Adjutant (AFSC 7324), 14 Munitions Specialists (AFSC 46150), two Munitions Supervisors (AFSC 46170), one Organization Supply Specialist (AFSC 64151), and two Administrative Clerks (AFSC 70250); but 3d Air Division had advised that no requests for additional space authorizations were to be submitted for the next 16 months. Now, to the chagrin of the 12th ADS, they found that the UMD

contained an authorization for a Guided Missile Officer (AFSC 3265), despite the fact that no guided missiles were scheduled for storage in the near future. True, future long-range planning at higher headquarters might indeed contemplate such storage, but it seemed rather premature for a Guided Missile Officer to be assigned months, and maybe even years, before any missiles were received--particularly when an Ammunition Officer (AFSC 3254) was needed immediately, but was denied. Besides, Guided Missile Officers were undoubtedly in scarce supply, and the assignment of one to the 12th ADS long before any missiles arrived on Okinawa would mean that some other place sorely needing such a specialist would be deprived of his services.[8]

Operations and Training.

During January 1957 the 96th Bombardment Wing arrived at Guam to replace the 320th Bombardment Wing, which returned to March AFB, California. It was not until the 29th of the month, however, that two B-47's of the former organization arrived at Kadena to assist the Loading Section in operational training of its personnel. Almost as soon as the two medium bombers set down at Kadena, the loading crews of the 12th ADS began practice loadings, so that in the two days before the month's end they completed seven loadings, with all but three of the crews being afforded the opportunity to train on one MK-15 exercise. Even these three crews would have been able to participate in the training exercise had it not been that the greater part of the aircraft of the 96th Bombardment Wing were of the MK-15 configuration, while only one MK-15 MOD-0 training unit was assigned to the squadron.

Additional training saw all loading crews attending classroom instructions in MK-6, MK-15, and MK-21 "standboard procedures" for both B-36 and B-47 type aircraft. Besides this, the loading personnel spent two days at the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot, area, where they were afforded the opportunity for further study of conventional armaments.

The Security Division experienced a relatively slow month until 19 January, when a C-124 arrived at Kadena with a shipment of classified material for the squadron. Because of the nature and quantity of material in the shipment, the Security Division placed its recall plan into effect. All personnel reported as required. A classified convoy was formed, proceeding from the Ordnance Storage Area to the flight line receiving point, where final shipment transactions were executed and the material returned by convoy to the OSA for proper storage. Although the shipment was voluminous and the accountability paper work connected with its transfer time consuming, it was the general consensus that the material had been received, convoyed, and stored in a remarkably short time.

Later, when the two B-47's of the 96th Bombardment Wing landed at Kadena on 29 January, the Security Division received further convoy training in conjunction with loading operations. The out-bound and in-bound convoys of classified materials from the OSA to the loading site were conducted without incident.

Existing policy made the Security Division of the 12th ADS responsible for the security of SAC aircraft only during actual loading operations. Upon completion of loading, this responsibility reverted to the

18th Air Police Squadron at Kadena Air Base. In December 1956, however, the latter organization, being badly undermanned, had begun to adopt the viewpoint that, since the 12th ADS's Security Division was admittedly 100 per cent manned, it should be responsible for the security of SAC aircraft at all times, regardless of the fact that no official change had been made in the long-established policy. When repeated explanations of the true mission of the Security Division failed to convince the 18th Air Police Squadron that it was evading a responsibility properly its own, the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron prepared to seek assistance from the parent 3d Air Division in resolving the knotty issue.[9]

Whether the 12th actually sought this help is not known to the writer; but, be that as it may, in February we see the Base Provost Marshal accepting responsibility for the security of all SAC aircraft at Kadena, except during loading operations, and by so doing making the 18th Air Police Squadron liable for the protection of the SAC air fleet scheduled to deploy to Kadena under Operation "White Horse" the following month. The advance party of the task force began arriving on 25 February, at which time plans were formulated to utilize SAC security personnel who would be brought in from Guam. Even then, though, the primary responsibility for security of the aircraft was to rest with the Base Provost Marshal.[10]

An incident in January illustrating the delicate nature of everything touching on the mission of the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron may be worth recounting at this point. On the 16th of that month, a number

of nuclear components were received by air shipment from the Zone of Interior (ZI). Several of the items were secured with a lead seal on which was engraved one of the numbers issued to qualified military nuclear inspectors by the Atomic Energy Commission. Each of the components was accompanied by a "historical document" listing all authorized inspections and the authorized lead seal number that should appear on the item. In the case of this particular shipment, some of the lead seal numbers did not correspond to those shown on the historical documents, indicating either that some error had been made by the nuclear inspectors in the ZI, or that compromise of the contents of the item had possibly occurred.

The squadron immediately queried the Air Materiel Command by electrical transmission for an explanation of the discrepancy and suggested that the possibility of compromise be investigated. The Head quarters, AMC replied on 20 January that an administrative error had been made during the last inspection of the items, thus causing a wrong, although qualified, number to be affixed to the lead seals. Upon receipt of this comforting message, the 12th ADS inspected the items in question and, finding them to be satisfactory, removed them from the "red" condition in which they had been held until the matter could be satisfactorily resolved and transferred them to "yellow" condition.[11]

We have already seen that the type of B-47 rotational aircraft coming TDY to Kadena restricted the training of loading crews to MK-15 weapon configuration for the most part. A second impediment to the proper training of the loading crews was created when the Commander of

the 96th Bomb Wing designated Kadena Air Base as a quasi-rest and recuperation area for his personnel, and gave orders that they put to work only every third day. To make matters worse, he directed that all loading operations must be monitored by his armament and electronics (A&E) personnel. Under this restrictive program it was possible to train the crews of the 12th ADS only during the duty hours each day, in consequence of which the burden placed on the support divisions such as Security and MHE in handling and moving training items was disproportionately heavy in comparison with the actual loading training achieved.

Loading personnel had a busy month in February training-wise, when they were not engaged in actual loading operations. In anticipation of Operation "White Horse", which would see a large number of tactical aircraft arrive at Kadena with "hot units" aboard, two members of each loading crew were given refresher courses in the disarming of "hot" weapons. Plans were also drawn up for the Loading Division to service all "hot units" which arrived, while the Nuclear and Security Divisions would receive, transport, store, and return nuclear components during the aircraft's sojourn at Kadena. In anticipation of the possibility that it might be necessary to off-load the incoming aircraft for inspection purposes or aircraft maintenance, AFB-4712, in cooperation with the Plant Section, removed two training MK-6 MOD-6 type weapons from their dollies and placed them on dunnage. Besides this, additional dollies were ordered through supply channels to bring the 12th ADS up to field capability in case Kadena AB were used as the post-strike base by aircraft of the Strategic Air Command.[12]

Operation "White Horse"--2-13 March--was the most extensive deployment of SAC aircraft ever to utilize a Far East Air Base as a staging area. The aircraft participating represented three bombardment wings--the 6th Bombardment Wing (H), Walker AFB, New Mexico; the 5th Bombardment Wing (H), Travis AFB, California; and the 22d Bombardment Wing (M), March AFB, California, which was the rotational wing then on temporary duty at Andersen AFB, Guam.

Extensive plans for support of the operation were included in 12th ADS Operations Plan 17-57, every section having some role in the activities. The squadron area of responsibility lay primarily in the following fields--first, storage of classified documents brought in aboard the tactical aircraft which were deployed to Kadena; second, storage of nuclear capsules brought in aboard "hot" aircraft; and third, the servicing of weapons aboard the "hot" aircraft. The squadron was also prepared to off-load any units from incoming aircraft which required extensive maintenance at Kadena. By so doing, the 12th ADS killed two birds with the single stone: personnel of the Loading Section were thus enabled to complete a sizeable training schedule, utilizing the arriving aircraft for practice loadings, at the same time that the ailing aircraft was made available for the maintenance work which it required.

As might be expected, many complicating factors not susceptible of accurate calculation, such as aircraft aborts and late arrivals, often threw prepared schedules out of joint. In this respect the 12th ADS was greatly hampered at first by inadequate communications between the 12th

Aviation Depot Squadron Control Center and the Kadena Task Force Control Center located on the flight line. This problem was quickly solved by assigning one of the squadron officers to the SAC Control Center during peak periods of activity, to act as liaison between the Task Force Commander and support personnel of the 12th ADS. By so doing, the squadron was assured of a ready and reliable source of information.

The first area of support responsibility, that of classified document storage, was assigned to the officers of the squadron, who were assisted by personnel of the Administrative Section acting in the capacity of drivers for the document couriers. This use of personnel from the Administrative Section was in consonance with the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) whereby men of that section were to be used to augment other squadron agencies whenever the 12th ADS went into EWP operations, in order to assure accomplishment of the mission. Although these personnel of the Administrative Section were called upon to perform this function during their off-duty hours while "White Horse" was in progress, they still managed to maintain a high level of administrative output.

It had originally been planned to store all arriving classified documents in the vault of the administration building; but, because of the unexpectedly large quantity of material received, they had to be transferred to one of the weapon storage structures. While the exercise was in progress, all courier officers of the squadron were authorized by the Security Officer to open this structure.

The responsibility for storing nuclear capsules arriving aboard tactical aircraft was vested in the two officers designated as Nuclear

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Officers. As each plane designated "hot" by SAC Control touched down at Kadena and was placed on a hardstand, it was met by one of the two Nuclear Officers with a convoy of security personnel. The capsules were given a thorough but brief visual inspection by the courier officer, who then accepted them and provided a receipt to the responsible member of the aircrew for the item. The capsules, like the classified documents, were secured in weapons storage structures. Two hours before the aircraft was scheduled to depart, the components were returned and loaded aboard.

The third area of responsibility--that of servicing the DOD weapons aboard incoming aircraft--was performed by picked personnel of the Loading Section who, like the Nuclear Officers, met arriving aircraft as soon as they landed, performing a speedy visual inspection of the weapons, then completing the requisite servicing operation. Because of the celerity of the servicing crews, it was necessary to schedule only one such crew at a time to adequately service all units, even though the aircraft arrived at 15-minute intervals.

Thanks to advance planning by squadron personnel, the support function was successful in all respects during Operation "White Horse". An example of this foresightedness may be found in the matter of squadron vehicles. Knowing that extraordinarily heavy demands would be made on the organizational trucks, jeeps, etc., during "White Horse", the transportation people deadlined a large percentage of the vehicles during the last part of February, attending to repairs and the replacement of old or worn parts which might otherwise produce trouble when

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they were most needed during the exercise. As a result of this forethought, 18 of the squadron's 23 vehicles were operational during the two-week period of the operation, despite the fact that they were included in innumerable convoys and were subjected to hard treatment.

One benefit derived from "White Horse" was the disclosure that the existing method of coordinating weapon movements in the Ordnance Storage Area was inadequate on occasion. As a result, the system for notifying all concerned activities of such movement was re-evaluated and a new plan drafted.

Before the B-47 task force took off for Kadena, its Commander had sought and received assurance that all of the hardstand parking areas were strong enough to sustain the weight of this type aircraft under loading operations, as well as under normal conditions. He had good reason to doubt the accuracy of this assertion, however, when a B-47 which had just been completely loaded with a MK-21 MOD-0 type weapon began to settle into the blacktop of its hardstand. Because of the size of this weapon, the clearance tolerances on a B-47 aircraft were extremely fine. Fortunately, though, the bomber had settled at an uneven angle which allowed the weapon to be removed under one side of the bomb bay. Had the B-47 settled evenly, it would have been necessary to defuel it and jack it up to permit removal of the weapon--a costly and time-consuming process.

By the time towing vehicles could be obtained to pull the B-47 from the man-made quicksand which mired it down, its landing gear wheels had become embedded some 11 inches below the normal surface of the parking

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area. Not a few persons viewing the jet bomber's plight questioned whether it could be extricated from its predicament, but when the tractors brought in for the rescue operation began to exert their horsepower, the trapped plane came free without placing undue stress on the landing gear. In the wake of this incident, base installations officials promised that a thorough test of the hardstands on this portion of the Kadena flight line would be conducted before any further attempts were made to use them for loading purposes.[13]

Before the month was out, Operation "Boresight" took place, with troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Army, Japan, attempting in their role of aggressor forces to penetrate defensive forces of the same division stationed on Okinawa to protect an ammunition storage area located adjacent to the 12th ADS Ordnance Storage Site. Since the operation primarily concerned the security personnel of the squadron, all matters in this respect were coordinated with the Army Liaison Team by the 12th's Security Officer. In view of the sensitive nature of the ordnance items stored within the squadron OSA and the possibility that Communist agents on Okinawa might conceivably use the mock attack of the 1st Cavalry Division as a camouflage for an actual attack on the OSA, the Army Liaison Team was requested to divert all activities of the aggressor forces away from there. This it readily agreed to do.

It transpired, nevertheless, that a small aggressor force mistook the main gate of the 12th ADS for that of the neighboring 7th Tactical Depot Squadron and launched an attack against it. When his error was explained to the leader of the aggressor force, he promptly withdrew his

forces, thus averting what could have developed into a serious incident had the Army "band" persisted in its mock assault.[14]

During the first part of March, the loading personnel were diverted from the cross-training program in which they had been engaged to take advantage of the loading opportunity presented by the large number of tactical aircraft of all configurations available during "White Horse". One result was that five crews were given their first opportunity in several months to load the MK-6 MOD-6 type weapon.

One of the chief concerns of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense was the actual adequacy of the maintenance and storage procedures employed in connection with atomic and thermonuclear weapons stored in field depot sites throughout the world. Since it was impossible to test all of the weapons, a number were picked at random by the serial numbers listed on the Department of Defense roster of weapons and selected for return to the ZI for a complete check, on the theory that they would be representative of the supply of weapons in the field.

On 11 April 1957, Headquarters, 3d Air Division radioed the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron of Operation "Downbeat" under which the 12th was to prepare six MK-6 MOD-6 configurated DODWR (Department of Defense, War Reserve) atomic weapons for air shipment to the ZI. There they would undergo a quality assurance inspection by the Sandia Corporation, contractors to the Atomic Energy Commission, at Manzano Base, and it was believed unlikely that these particular ones would be returned to the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron.

In preparation for the shipment of these units, the squadron placed three of the weapons in so-called "Beta Boxes" (large crates of wood construction reinforced with metal). As it happened, however, the 12th ADS had only two complete "Beta Boxes" on hand, plus a portion of a third, at this time. Since this left the squadron short three of the crates required to transport the weapons, the dilemma was resolved by shipping three MK-6 MOD-6 weapons in the MF4 bomb dollies which were normally used to cradle them when stored in the squadron area. These dollies were four-wheeled units with a rated load capacity of 12,000 pounds, 10 feet long, 82 inches wide, and 26 inches high, which were used to store, transport, and position bombs under aircraft for loading. The bombs rested on suitable chocks which enabled the dolly to be adapted to weapons of various shapes and sizes. The MF4 dolly was not a part of the weapon kit; therefore, accountability for the three shipped out was transferred to Special Weapons Project 1003, Manzano Base. On 12 April, three C-124 aircraft arrived at Kadena and the six weapons were loaded aboard. The Globemasters departed Kadena the following day.[15]

Advance party personnel of the 22d Bombardment Wing (M), which had replaced the 96th BW as the SAC 90-day rotational unit at Andersen AFB, Guam, arrived at Kadena AB early in April to outline for Munitions Branch personnel their program for supplying the 12th ADS with tactical B-47 aircraft to be used in loading training. If everything went according to plan, two aircraft would be on the ground at Kadena at all times, supposedly available for loading training, provided maintenance was not being performed on them. One plane would arrive from Guam each afternoon

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for the next three months, and another would leave Kadena for Guam each afternoon. Loading training was to begin on the morning of the first day after the aircraft arrived, running from 0600 to 1800 that day. The second full day that the B-47 was on the ground, AMC "B" teams of Operation "Blue Shield"* would train on it, and the aircraft would return to Guam on the third day.

The first aircraft to arrive during April were predominantly of the MK-15 configuration--thus presenting the same difficulty that had been encountered in the B-47's of the 96th Bombardment Wing--but arrangements were made with the 22d Bombardment Wing's Detachment Commander at Kadena to provide a mixture of MK-6 and MK-21 aircraft in May. In consequence of this imbalance of aircraft configuration types, the loading training accomplished consisted of four loadings and 19 aborts with the MK-15 weapon. During the loadings the four-man crew standboard** procedures developed in March were utilized to good effect. This is not to say, however, that they thus became firm and unchangeable; for it was in the very nature of standboard procedures that they should habitually undergo almost constant revision, either by reason of technical order changes or

*Blue Shield personnel were FEAF technical personnel stationed at Kadena AB who were trained to perform ground servicing and maintenance on SAC tactical aircraft, utilizing Kadena Air Base flight facilities.

**Although "standboard" and "training" were synonyms, the former word had a far more specialized meaning. The noun "standboarding" referred to a system under which a group of technicians were selected and trained as a team in the latest techniques and procedures for a particular job. After initial training, they worked as a team, keeping current on procedural changes by frequent group discussions and team exercises. The team then "standboarded" or trained similar teams in the approved procedures by working team-to-team, man-to-man, thus establishing a single system and procedures for accomplishing a specific job.

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as the result of new ideas evolved during the actual loading process in the hope of providing the crew with a more workable procedure which would also bring about a greater time savings.[16]

Without a doubt, the worst aspect of Okinawa is its high humidity. Rusting, rotting, and corroding, tarnishing, mildewing, and molding, almost nothing is exempt from its influence. Metals, leather, fabrics, wood, and even concrete succumb to its invisible assault. And--though less apparent--man himself falls prey to the insidious decay. Debilitating the body, it also attacks the moral fiber within, producing sloth and evil. Yet it is only by long observation of its effects that one can understand the all-pervading nature of humidity's effects on this largest of the Ryukyu Islands. Seldom does the temperature figure exceed the humidity percentage--especially in the summer months--and no military organization present there can declare itself unaffected by the ubiquitous moisture. The only appreciable difference is in the relative importance of their missions and the corresponding seriousness of sustaining damage from humidity.

For this reason, the fact that the exteriors of weapons and security covers of the 12th ADS were very susceptible to deterioration from humidity was more than ordinary concern. The Quality Control Section of the squadron was charged with the responsibility for closely monitoring all stored weapons for excessive sweating conditions; but, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of its personnel, humidity made such inroads that it came to be realized that the nuclear units would have to be withdrawn from the storage

structures for certain periods each month in order that they might dry out in the sunlight, unless conditions improved.[17]

This periodic airing and sunning of the stored weapons was carried out through May, but when it appeared early in June that weather conditions had stabilized sufficiently to make this extra labor unnecessary, the Quality Control Section abandoned the practice. At the month's end, the inspection required by regulations was performed. To the section's dismay it was found that an excessive amount of moisture had accumulated after all. There was no alternative, then, but to reinstate the weekly inspection and outdoor airing system.[18]

Loading personnel completed one of the busiest monthly training schedules of the year in May, accomplishing four MK-6 loadings in an average time of 1:07 hours, 59 MK-15 loadings in an average time of 1:14 hours, and four MK-21 loadings in an average time of 2:10 hours. Besides these successful loadings there were six aborts of partial loadings brought about by inclement weather conditions or aircraft system failures. The high number of MK-15 MOD-0 thermonuclear weapon loadings and the low number of loadings of the other type weapons was due to the bomb bay configuration of the aircraft made available to the squadron for such training. It so happened that the configuration of these B-47's was not interchangeable in the matter of weapons to be carried without the use of conversion kits, and these were not available at Kadena. It will be recalled that the Detachment Commander representing the TDY aircraft of the 22d Bombardment Wing (M) at Kadena AB had promised to intersperse

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more MK-6 and MK-21 aircraft with the MK-15's sent to Okinawa, but it appears that he either forgot his promise or was unable to fulfill it through lack of cooperation on the part of the Wing Commander.

In June six of the eight loading crews were standboarded (trained) in the MK-6 MOD-6 atomic weapon loading procedures by participating as students in 84 MK-6 loadings with an average loading time of 1:05 hours and four MK-15 loadings with an average loading time of 1:52 hours. Thus, the personnel of the 12th ADS finally got ample opportunity to practice loading weapons other than the MK-15--and ones which were the most likely to require loading under actual EWP conditions. The quality Control personnel who monitored the loading training on a selective basis during June found the loadings to be generally satisfactory. However, they noted that in many instances the crew chiefs failed to use their check-lists as intended. or did not use them at all. This constituted a serious omission, since an error in any one of the phases of loading covered by the list would, in all probability, endanger the mission. The discrepancy was reported to the Loading Supervisor, who took immediate corrective action.[19]

In the course of a periodic inspection of spares in stock conducted in March, the Quality Control Section discovered that of six take-off nose covers for MK-6 MOD-6 weapons that were tagged as serviceable, only three were actually in serviceable condition and met the specifications set forth in Technical Order 11N-B6A-1. Since the 24th Supply Squadron, Depot, Special, on Guam was supposedly the last supply agency which had

had custodial control of these items, the 12th ADS submitted a discrepancy report to that organization.[20]

Contracts were let in February for the construction of two permanent type quonset huts to replace the security buildings damaged by the four typhoons of August-September 1956. The uncovering of discrepancies in some portions of the specifications delayed the commencement of actual construction, but the completion date was nonetheless projected for mid-April. When the year rounded into March, however, a suspicion that the buildings would not be ready for occupancy as early as scheduled became generally prevalent. On 26 March another contract was let for a "composite" building to replace the structures then occupied by the Loading Section, and construction got underway the latter part of April. Around this same time, the Squadron Commander was disturbed by the persisting delay in completing construction of that portion of the main access road washed away during Typhoon Emma the previous September. A temporary fill had been put in immediately afterward; but not being replaced, it had deteriorated to a point where it was becoming hazardous to move weapon convoys over it except at very slow speeds. For most organizations this would have constituted only an inconvenience; but for the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron it meant that the convoys were endangered from a security standpoint, as a slow-moving truck could be much more easily stopped by subversive elements than could one traveling at a fast speed.[21]

A new and larger boiler was installed in the assembly plant generating room in April, to provide the 12th ADS with an independent source of

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power and other utilities on which it could rely in the event of island-wide power failure during execution of the EWP. This same need was common to all organizations dealing in special weapons. As part of the utilities system, the boiler in the plant generating room was used to reheat the air for the plant after it had passed over the condenser coils of the air conditioning system. Since the weapons were normally sealed when in storage, they had to be opened and resealed within a humidity and temperature-controlled structure. The new boiler brought in to achieve this end had two advantages over the previous one: (1) it was larger and, therefore, had a greater potential capacity in maintaining tempoerature control of the air; (2) the nature of its design allowed it to retain its heat for a longer period of time, making it more economical to operate, since it could thus be run for a shorter time, yet provide an acceptable amount of heat.

During the first three months of 1957 the ability of the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron to meet its EWP commitments was seriously imperiled by lack of adequate supply support from the 18th Air Base Group, the logistic support organization. In the opinion of the Squadron Commander, the 12th ADS lacked so many of the items authorized as Unit Mission Equipment (UME) that it was extremely doubtful the squadron mission could be carried out. In March, the indices on the 12th's V-2 report falling below the standard figures specified by SAC Manual 171-2, Headquarters, 3d Air Division instructed the squadron to supply it with information as to which items were causing the V-2 report to drop below established standards. This the 12th did, forwarding both 3d Air Division and Headquarters, Strategic

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Air Command a list of the missing UME items that were considered most critical to the organization's successful operation.[22]

The month of April was notable for a realignment of personnel designed to bring them into consonance with the procedural manual for SAC Regulation 20-4, then in the planning stage. To assist in this realignment, 3d Air Division sent a copy of the UMD 4485A governing aviation depot squadrons stationed at overseas bases. However, this manning document was a working copy only to be used by the 12th ADS during the interim period until the final document arrived in June, and included only to T/O strength, the grade, and the AFSC authorization by 3d Air Division. On the basis of the document received, squadron personnel were readjusted by mid-April.

The previous squadron strength of 198 personnel--105 T/O* officers and airmen, plus 93 non-T/O security personnel--was cut to 184 personnel, to be composed of 91 T/O officers and airmen, plus 93 non-T/O security personnel. In addition, the new UMD changed the number of personnel authorized in certain AFSC's, notably the 463XX field. Hitherto, a majority of the 463XX (Assembly) personnel had been assigned to the Loading Section. For operational purposes, these personnel were now returned to the Assembly Section. Material Handling Equipment (MHE) personnel were withdrawn from the control of Unit Supply and placed under the Loading Section, which was itself cut in strength to allow only sufficient personnel to man eight four-man loading crews plus two

*A Table of Organization (T/O) was an Air Force publication or table prepared by the Department of the Air Force which prescribed the organizational structure and personnel for any one of several like units with fixed missions and workload requirements.

officers and enough enlisted supervisor personnel, in addition to the aforementioned MHE personnel.

The Assembly Section found itself confronted with the unusual but not unpleasant problem of having more personnel than it knew what to do with, as a result of the transfer of people from the Loading Section. Since untrained men were worse than none at all, the section introduced a two-shift system of operation running from 0600 to 1200 and from 1200 to 1800 each day, except Sunday, which allowed all of its personnel to receive adequate training. This device was hit upon, as the amount of equipment in the Assembly Section was necessarily limited, and it was impractical to train more than one man at the same time on a specific piece of equipment under the OJT system of instruction.

The critical replacement problem created by the departure of security personnel who had served out their tours of overseas duty was somewhat relieved during April with the arrival of 13 new men from the ZI. This brought the Security Branch up to strength momentarily and allowed the rotation of the scheduled April returnees to be projected for early May. However, to judge from the content of orders received from losing organizations in the ZI, the 12th ADS expected that several of the personnel who were scheduled for return in both May and June would have to be involuntarily extended, in order for the squadron to retain 100 per cent strength.

The problem was attacked from another angle when 3d Air Division radioed on 10 April that six additional airmen could be placed at seven level in the Air Police career field (AFSC 771XX). The addition of this

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increment to the seven airmen already authorized to hold 77170 AFSC's would bring the total in the squadron to 13. Since the Security Branch was scheduled to lose 50 per cent of its NCO supervisors through normal rotation by the end of September, this increase in seven level personnel would allow all of the remaining NCO's to be placed on OJT for upgrading.[23]

By May the replacement of personnel due to rotate to the ZI had acquired greater urgency, especially insofar as the technical and security career fields were concerned. This problem had been with the squadron so long and so regularly that officials finally became convinced that errors had been made by "intermediate headquarters" (a euphemism for Headquarters, 3d Air Division) in the submission of personnel requisitions to higher headquarters. Unable to sit quietly by and watch the squadron reduced to impotence, the 12th ADS queried 3d Air Division early in May to learn what, if anything, was being done to alleviate the impending shortages. The Guam headquarters responded with a request that the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron recapitulate its assigned and authorized strength, as well as its projected losses and accessions of personnel for the months May through December 1957. On 16 May the 12th radioed the desired information to Guam, but received no immediate indication of what action the division intended to take. The squadron was instructed, however, to involuntarily extend personnel in both the technical and security career fields in increments of 30 days up to a total of 90 days, at which time they were to be released. If replacement personnel were received at any time during the extension period, the incumbent was to be released for shipment at once. The message granting this authority contained an additional request for personnel information. This the squadron furnished

in a follow-up TWX.

On the brighter side of the personnel picture, the June promotion quotas for the lower airman grades were received and proved to be larger than at any other time during the past year. The 12th ADS was authorized to promote 17 airmen to the rank of airman first class (A/1C) and four to airman second class (A/2C) as of 1 June 1957. The total personnel eligible for promotion to A/1C numbered 77, while 14 were eligible for promotion to A/2C. The lion's share of the promotions went to personnel of the Security Branch. As for the promotion of squadron personnel to the non-commissioned officer (NCO) grades, this was the province of 3d Air Division, although the ultimate selections were based on recommendations submitted by the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron.

The dolorous appeals by the 12th ADS for reinforcements in the security field finally brought action from the parent 3d Air Division in June, in the form of a promise that 12 security personnel would be reassigned to Kadena from the SAC units at Guam before 15 July 1957. Not only would this alleviate the squadron's shortages in that particular career field, but it would permit the release of those men currently serving involuntary extensions with the Security Branch. Although the other pressing personnel problem--that connected with the shortage in the technical field--did not elicit a promise of such immediate assistance, 3d Air Division did submit an emergency requisition to Headquarters, Strategic Air Command for five men qualified in the munitions field.

Owing to a realignment of squadron personnel resulting from the new UMD (Unit Manning Document), the Assembly Section found itself suffering from a lack of sufficient supervisory personnel. The UMD could not be blamed for the exiguity of higher level specialists; for six NCO's were authorized in the nuclear weapons mechanical career field (AFSC 461XX) and six in the nuclear weapons fuzing system electrical field (AFSC 331XXB). The trouble was that authorizations did not necessarily mean "bodies", and the squadron actually had on hand only one NCO in each of these fields, both individuals being assigned to the Assembly Section. As the historical period ended, an intensive effort was being made to qualify additional personnel as supervisors, but, even as the program was in process, officials recognized that lack of rank would detract from the over-all effectiveness of these trainees regardless of how technically qualified they might become. It is always hard for a man to compensate with mere skill for the tangible evidence of authority presented by a stripe on the sleeve.[24]

THE 7TH TACTICAL DEPOT SQUADRON.

The mission of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was to receive, store, inspect, maintain, modify, modernize, and assemble atomic weapons and components for delivery to atomic forces of the Fifth Air Force or higher authority in the same chain of command. Additionally, the 7th TDS was responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and modifying atomic weapons stored by other units in the Fifth Air Force area. Furthermore, the squadron was required to be capable of delivering a certain

number of weapons to transport aircraft and to the armament units of fighter bomber squadrons--all within a specified, limited time. Implicit in all these facets of the mission was the absolute necessity for continuous security of the atomic weapons and nuclear components.[25]

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron had originally been assigned to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 1 October 1955,[26] with the latter retaining operational control. Administrative and logistic support (except for items peculiar to special weapons) had, however, been delegated to 313th Air Division,[27] which in turn had passed these responsibilities down to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.[28] With the conversion of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing from the base organization for Kadena to one strictly engaged in pursuing its primary tactical mission, on 1 February 1957, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron--along with all other attached units--was relieved from attachment to the wing for these functions and was attached to the 18th Air Base Group, the new base organization, for logistic support and administration, including the assignment and promotion of personnel.[29]

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was a typical Air Force logistical organization serving both air transport units and combat strike forces with atomic munitions. The tactical forces thus served comprised the fighter-bomber units of Fifth Air Force located at Kadena AB (the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron); Itazuke AB, Japan (the 80th FBS); Komaki AB, Japan (9th FBS); and Misawa AB, Japan (the 8th FBS).[30]

Early in 1957 new emergency war plans (EWP) were drawn up by the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron and submitted to Fifth Air Force for approval. OPLAN's 1-57 and 2-57, as they were designated, were based on Fifth Air Force's Operations Plan 1-57, which had been published on 25 January 1957.

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OPLAN 1-57 blueprinted the part to be played by the main atomic weapons depot at Kadena Air Base in the event of all-out war, while OPLAN 2-57 prescribed the role which Detachment #1 at Iwo Jima would take under the same circumstances.

Exercises Participated in by the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron.

Exercise Thumbscrew: Early in January 1957, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force published its periodic weapon and nuclear components delivery schedule, which was based on target priorities assigned by Headquarters, FEAF to Fifth Air Force strike forces. As soon as this schedule was received, the squadron fairly exploded into activity. The first thing done was to check the quantity and type of items scheduled for delivery against the corresponding quantities and types of items on hand in the stockpile. This done, a chart was made listing the amounts and types of nuclear weapons that were to be loaded aboard specific aircraft at certain times, as well as the materiel scheduled for delivery by truck to the Kadena-based 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron.

This weapons delivery chart having been disseminated to the responsible sections, the Accountable Office prepared shipping documents--vouchered in advance--for each consignee. These documents listed the nomenclatures, stock numbers, and serial numbers of the items to be involved in the exercise. The Nuclear Branch, in the meantime, reshuffled the nuclear cores in such a manner that it would be possible to withdraw them rapidly from storage in the sequence dictated by the delivery schedule. Plans and standing operating procedures (SOP's) written under

the guidance of the Operations Officer, were published, and the men of the squadron were briefed by the Plans Officer on their particular jobs. Meantime, the Production Control Officer busied himself keeping track of the status of the weapons, so that the Assembly Branch would be able to maintain them in the latest condition required by the operations plan.

The first three weeks of January were filled with activity, as the Warehouse Section industriously kept the weapons moving from storage structures to the plants and back again into storage.

Finally, at 0435 hours, 28 January 1957, Thumbscrew began. By 0500 hours, the personnel who had been on immediate alert had assembled at the squadron's motor pool--the point of departure for the 7th TDS troops whenever an EWP was implemented--which was located about half way between the airmen's living quarters and the operational site. There they transferred to vehicles which took them to their duty stations. The Nuclear Yard Crew reported to their supervisor at the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron site, where they stacked a load of dummy "birdcages" (the name given to a carrying case for nuclear components) and simulated nuclear cores on a flat-bed trailer to approximate the materiel which would be delivered to the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron.

At the same time, the Weapons Handling Crew and the Convoy Crew were busily engaged at the 7th TDS's operational site in breaking out special weapons for delivery to the 12th FBS, in order that they would arrive at Area "C" on the Kadena Flight Line, the Loading Control Point, at approximately the same time as the cores.

Equally as important as the physical movement of materiel was the paper work that went with it. Documents resembling the real ones as nearly as possible were prepared and used, the better to simulate actual EWP conditions.

Exercise Thumbscrew was concerned with only a portion of the entire weapon delivery schedule--the delivery of a specified number of weapons and cores to the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron.[31]

The 7th TDS Prepares to Move to a New Location.

Almost ever since the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron had first established itself at Kadena Air Base, it had suffered from congestion of its facilities, the entire operational and administrative activities of the squadron being crammed into an area less than 500,000 square feet in size. The northern section contained the weapon storage structures. Four warehouses and the building which housed both the materiel offices and the communications center were sandwiched between the two weapon workshops. Adjacent to the Forward Inspection Team (FIT) plant was an inflammable fuel tank. Across the road were three quonsets used as offices, the center one being the squadron orderly room. Toward the southern portion of the area stood the security office and the alert flight shack.

This unsatisfactory situation had been known to higher headquarters for some time, and had resulted in permission for the 7th TDS to be moved to a new location where there would be elbow room, as well as greater security. In January 1957, Fifth Air Force approved an expenditure of $200,000 for a construction project which would provide the

7th TDS a new operational and storage area within the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot storage facility. Mere approval of the project did not solve all problems, it soon turned out, since the plans submitted in April by the architectural-engineering firm of Thomas J. Bourne Associates called for an expenditure of $260,000--and Fifth Air Force promptly rejected them. The latter headquarters then began a scrutiny of the plans, seeking places where costs could be cut down without jeopardizing the squadron's ability to perform its mission. The result was the elimination of many features such as building fixtures and furnishings which were regarded as desirable but not necessary. This brought the estimated cost within range of the $200,000 figure.

With this accomplished, the revised plans were submitted to a number of contractors, who were instructed to return their bids by 29 April. The award went to State Construction Company, which was given a completion date of 1 October, so that the squadron could occupy the new buildings before the end of 1957. Contract AF 62(321)-903 was let for $204,000, slightly in excess of the limit prescribed by Fifth Air Force, but near enough that it was accepted. The contractor began work on 15 May on the erection of seven new buildings--a squadron orderly room, Operations and Materiel Division offices, Unit Supply, Special Supply, a Security Division office, a guard dormitory, and two generator houses. In addition, existing warehouses were to be modified.

Some 35 days were lost because of heavy rainfall and the failure of supplies such as steel and electrical fixtures to arrive from the United

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States within the six-month period on which the contractor had relied in preparing his progress estimate.[32]

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron Acquires New Responsibilities.

The year 1957 witnessed a considerable growth in the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron. Early in April, WMT "E" was sent TDY to Johnson AB, Japan, and on 7 June orders were received from higher headquarters making the move a permanent change of station (PCS). Meantime, Iwo Jima was gradually being built up as an additional nuclear weapons storage area, despite the geographical obstacles present such as the heat radiated from its volcanic soil and the hot gases that escaped through natural vents to the surface from time to time. The result of these expansions of the 7th TDS to Johnson and Iwo Jima Air Bases was apparent in a number of changes made in the internal structure of the squadron. Perhaps the earliest of these, which came in January, affected the Operations Division. Heretofore, technical inspectors of the old Storage Control Branch had maintained a personal observation of the men of the Weapons Maintenance Teams to ascertain how closely they were adhering to the procedures laid down in the manual. Under the revised concept, however, a Quality Assurance Team checked only a sampling of certain lots of weapons, while the Quality Control program, under this change, fell to the WMT Commander.

A Technical Supply Section was also formed to requisition, receive, store, and issue expendable supplies in support of weapons maintenance activities, while also assuming responsibility for the issue and turn-in of non-expendable Special Support Equipment (SSE) and 39-D* material.

*39-D material was equipment used in connection with training weapons and test gear.

The other functions of Production Control and Quality Assurance, such as production control and the product improvement program, remained pretty much the same.

There were five Weapons Maintenance Teams at the beginning of the year, but during the six months which followed they occasionally increased in number to seven. These WMT's were organized under the jurisdiction of the Assembly Branch. WMT "D", known as the "home team", did not deploy as did the others, but remained at Kadena to act as a training organization. On 1 March, however, WMT "D" was transferred from the Assembly Branch to the Training and Standardization Branch. The WMT's kept the bombs in condition for use in war, checking, inspecting, testing, modifying, repainting, re-stenciling, unpacking, packing, disassembling, and assembling them in strict accordance with technical orders and specifications.

Dovetailing with the work of the Assembly Branch was the new Training and Standardization Branch mentioned in the preceding paragraph. This element of the Operations Division took over the entire Butler building, making the FIT structure available for use by technicians of the Assembly Branch. Thus, the Butler building housed the battery shop, the Maintenance and Calibration Section, and WMT "D"--all formerly subordinate elements of the Assembly Branch prior to 1 March. The new Training and Standardization Branch now took over these undertakings, together with the over-all squadron training program.

The training WMT not only continued to polish newly-arrived electrical and mechanical technicians so that they could be funneled into the

Assembly Branch, but it also developed standardized WMT procedures, check sheets, and proficiency examinations, which were commonly used by all WMT's, in addition to assuming the responsibility for inspecting and assembling W-5 warheads.*

The Training Section, a new functional grouping for the 7th TDS, was set up to monitor the entire training program for the squadron, including general military training and technical or on-the-job training.

The Plans and Nuclear Branches continued to function as in the past. All operations plans and orders were received and written by the Plans Branch, then clarified by the preparation of SOP's and other regulatory directives. For its part, the Nuclear Branch performed maintenance and inspection on the cores and ancillary equipment.

In February 1957 the Materiel Division moved the Accountable Section from its cramped quarters in the division office to a quonset warehouse remodeled as an office which it would occupy by itself. At the same time, Unit Supply moved into the vacated division office from its former location in the corner of another warehouse.

On 25 March the 7th TDS orderly room was moved from its location in the operational and storage area, where it violated explosive safety distance criteria, to a new permanent building inside Kadena Air Base proper where it was close enough to Gate #3 to permit speedy exit or entry to the operational area, slightly more than two miles distant.

*The W-5 was the warhead used in the TM-61 Matador tactical guided missile.

This move gave both the squadron Commander and the Deputy Commander private offices at the same time that the Administrative Division and Command Section acquired nearly 2,000 square feet of space in which to operate, as compared with only 800 square feet in the old quonset.[33]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	28	3d ADR 20-4, dtd. 20 Dec. 1956.
2	---	313th AD GO 14, dtd. 16 May 1955.
3	2	313th AD GO 8, dtd. 25 Feb. 1957.
4	---	History, 12th ADS, Jan. 1957, pp. 1-2.
5	---	Ibid., p. 2; Feb. 1957, p. 1.
6	---	History, 12th ADS, Feb. 1957, p. 1.
7	---	Ibid., Apr. 1957, pp. 3-8.
8	---	Ibid., May-Oct. 1957, pp.3-5.
9	---	Ibid., Jan. 1957, pp. 10-13.
10	---	Ibid., Feb. 1957, p. 12.
11	---	Ibid., pp. 12-13.
12	---	Ibid., Feb. 1957, pp. 13-15
13	---	Ibid., March 1957, pp. 10-13, 25.
14	---	Ibid., p. 14.
15	---	Ibid., Apr. 1957, pp. 18-19.
16	---	Ibid., pp. 19-20.
17	---	Ibid., p. 21.
18	---	Ibid., June 1957, p. 23.
19	---	Ibid., p. 24.
20	---	Ibid., March 1957, p. 17.
21	---	Ibid., pp. 19-20.
22	---	Ibid., Apr. 1957, pp. 13-14, 22-23.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
23	--	Ibid., pp. 15-17.
24	--	Ibid., May, June 1957, pp. 14-16
25	--	History, 7th TDS, 1 Jan-31 Dec. 1957, pp. 2-3.
26	--	FEAF GO 118, dtd. 30 Sept. 1955.
27	--	5th AF GO 110, dtd. 16 Nov. 1955; 5th AF GO 118, dtd. 22 Dec. 1955.
28	--	313th AD GO 14, dtd. 16 May 1955.
29	5	5th AF GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
30	--	History, 7th TDS, 1 Jan-31 Dec. 1957, p. 1.
31	--	Ibid., pp. 7-9.
32	--	Ibid., pp. 4-6.
33	--	Ibid., pp. 10-13.

CHAPTER V

THE 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING

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THE WING MISSION AND ORGANIZATION.

The mission and responsibilities of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, as set forth in 313th Air Division Regulation 23-6 of 15 March 1955, were as follows:

1. To administer, equip, train, and prepare for combat in accordance with 313th Air Division directives, policies, and schedules such Air Force units and personnel as might be designated, assigned, or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

2. To maintain operating bases and other assigned installations with the necessary personnel and equipment for the purpose of immediate and adequate support of the 313th's defense mission.

3. To maintain facilities and necessary equipment to support tactical elements of the Far East Air Forces, Military Air Transport Service, Naval Air Facility, Naha, and such other forces as might be allocated by this or higher headquarters to carry out the missions of the Far East Command.[1]

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and, besides, was attached for operational control, administration, and logistical support. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was automatically also Installation Commander of Naha Air Base. As such, he exercised command jurisdiction over all assigned units, as well as those units attached for all purposes. In addition,

he administered and/or exercised operational control, as appropriate, of such other units as happened to be attached. He was also directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for the following:

1. Providing aircraft and personnel incidental to the air defense mission, as directed.

2. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

3. Logistical support of those units engaged in the air defense mission of the 313th Air Division, as directed.

4. The preparation and maintenance of such defense plans as might be necessary to support plans and directives issued by the Commander, 313th Air Division; the coordination of these plans with Army, Navy, and other Air Force Commanders as appropriate, and with civilian agencies as directed; and the maintenance of a state of readiness to execute these plans.

5. Submitting recommendations concerning the requirement for personnel and equipment of units to be employed in the air defense operations assigned as an integral part of his organization.

6. Joint planning, training, and operations with friendly forces.

7. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel or such other training programs as might be directed.

8. Providing air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) personnel and such other units as might require this service.

9. Furnishing administrative and logistic support, as required, to other Air Force Commanders utilizing installations under the jurisdiction of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

10. Logistical support of tactical elements of Far East Air Forces, as directed.

11. Insuring that passive air defense measures were provided for installations, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

12. The security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment, with the exception of internal equipment belonging to special activities.

13. The maintenance, operation, and internal security of assigned installations and the defense of these installations against acts of sabotage or organized attack by enemy agents, groups, or units. This would include the organization, equipping, and training of assigned troops for ground defense.

14. Preparing plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare, as directed.

15. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to the 51st FIW for that purpose.

16. Providing an air terminal at Naha Air Base for military aircraft. Facilities for commercial air operations were also to be provided, as required.

17. Controlling the entry and exit of passengers and cargo via commercial air transportation, in accordance with policies established by the 313th Air Division or higher headquarters.

18. Maintaining and operating assigned installations, in accordance with the provisions of AFR 24-1.

19. Acquiring and maintaining off-base real estate necessary to support assigned and attached units.

20. Controlling construction programs, as directed, and supervising air installations activities.

21. Convening Special and Summary Courts-Martial for all assigned or attached Air Force units and personnel stationed on and under the jurisdiction of Naha Air Base.

22. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division Headquarters, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

23. Performing such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

On matters pertaining to his mission, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders and with heads of civilian agencies as appropriate. However, direct communication with other major commands was authorized by Headquarters, 313th Air Division for specific matters only.[2]

At the beginning of 1957, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was composed of a headquarters, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, the 51st Air Base Group, the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group, the 51st Tactical Hospital, and such other facilities, personnel, and assigned units as were necessary to accomplish its mission and meet its responsibilities.

REORGANIZATION OF THE 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING

Changes Are Made in the Headquarters.

In January 1957, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force directed this headquarters to reduce the strength of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Inspector's Office to one officer, one NCO, and one civilian. At the same time, the division Inspector General's Office was to be increased by six airman spaces. The Inspection function at the 18th Air Base Group, Kadena AB, incidentally, was deleted entirely.[3]

In March, Fifth Air Force directed that the Manpower function throughout the command was to be reorganized as follows: Air divisions would henceforth perform management studies and prepare all Unit Manning Documents (UMD's), while bases would confine themselves to management improvements and manning reviews. The effect of this was to add one staff sergeant and an airman first class authorization to the Manpower and Organization Division at this headquarters, to delete two staff sergeant spaces from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing M&O Office, and to eliminate one captain, one technical sergeant, and a staff sergeant from the 18th Air Base Group M&O Office.[4]

Plans for Reorganization of the Wing Structure.

On 26 April a meeting was held at this headquarters to discuss procedures for reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. In attendance were Brigadier General William G. Hipps, the 313th Air Division Commander; Colonel Paul E. Hoeper, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Base Commander; Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston, Director of Operations, 313th Air Division; Colonel James B. Cobb, Director of Personnel, 313th Air Division; Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin P. Rambo, Chief, Manpower and Organization Division, 313th Air Division; and Major Jack D. Alexander, Assistant Chief, Manpower and Organization Division, 313th Air Division.

Major Alexander began by summarizing the more important subjects discussed and decisions reached at a Fifth Air Force conference from which he had recently returned. One of these was a plan by Fifth Air Force to publish documents activating operations squadrons for the offensive wings in June or July, with those for defensive wings such as the 51st FIW to be issued at a later date. Another subject which he brought back from Moriyama Air Station was Fifth Air Force's desire that the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron be assigned to the 51st Air Base Group.

Next, Lieutenant Colonel Rambo presented the recommendations of his office that the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing be reorganized immediately, the Maintenance and Supply Group and the Fighter Interceptor Group each being reduced to a manning strength of one officer and one airman, with the personnel thus rendered surplus turned over to the 51st Air Base Group and the 51st FIW Headquarters respectively. Until

official reorganization orders were received from Fifth Air Force, the manning and equipping documents of these two headquarters would have to remain in existence, even though the organizations themselves survived in name only.

General Hipps declared that although the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was not going to suffer any great loss of personnel before 1 July 1957, the primary problem with which the 313th Air Division and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing were faced was that of obtaining enought personnel--officers, in particular--to staff the wing after mid-year. Scheduled losses of key officers in June and July would have a deleterious effect on the efficiency of the 51st if a reorganization were delayed until after the rotation of these key personnel. To avoid this disastrous situation, the 313th Commander recommended that the functions of the Maintenance and Supply Group and the Fighter Interceptor Group be consolidated as soon as possible, in order to maintain a greater continuity in and control over the operations of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

After further discussion by the conferees, it was decided that the objectives on which a reorganization of the 51st FIW should be based during the interim period were as follows: First, to consolidate all personnel functions (excepting those for the two fighter interceptor squadrons) under the 51st Air Base Group. Second, to consolidate the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group Headquarters with that of the 51st Air Base Group, upon which the three squadrons or the M&S Group would report directly to the Air Base Group Commander. Third, to work out a schedule by which all base support type functions currently performed by the Wing Headquarters and the Fighter Group Headquarters would be

transferred to the Air Base Group. Thus, the Fighter Group and Wing Headquarters would ultimately be reduced to a residual element of personnel and functions directly related to tactical operations. Later, this element might be transferred to the 313th Air Division or, alternatively, to a small Air Defense Group Headquarters which would be activated upon official reorganization by Fifth Air Force.

In consonance with this line of thought it was agreed that the tentative time phasing for the various changes contemplated would be as follows:

1. On 15 May 1957 a consolidated base personnel section would be established, reporting to the Commander, 51st Air Base Group, to take care of the records of the air base group, the maintenance and supply group, the wing headquarters, and the dispensary. Fighter group records would continue to be handled through its own Consolidated Group Personnel Section, for the time being, but plans should be made for the ultimate return of the records of the fighter interceptor squadrons to the respective squadron organizations.

2. On 15 May the Provost Marshal, Information Services, Inspector, Ground Safety, Flying Safety and Chaplain functions would be transferred to the 51st Air Base Group.

3. On 17 May all personnel of the M&S Group, except one officer and one airman retained for record purposes, would be reassigned to the 51st Air Base Group.

4. On 20 May the Wing Communications Section, presently a part of the Operations Directorate, would be transferred to the 51st Air Base Group.

5. On 31 May the Wing Comptroller's functions and base support functions of the Wing Materiel and Operations Directorates would be transferred to the 51st Air Base Group.

6. On 15 June the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group would be reduced to a manning strength of one officer and one airman. Previously, on 20 May, the Commander, 51st FIG would have submitted his recommendations concerning a division of the functions of his headquarters between the 51st Air Base Group and 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Headquarters.[5]

The Reorganization Gets Underway.

The first step toward realization of this extensive reorganization came on 15 May, with the issuance of 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing General Order No. 8. Not confining itself to the six staff agencies which the conference of 26 April had designated for transfer to the 51st Air Base Group--Provost Marshal, Inspector, Information Services, Chaplain, Flying Safety, and Ground Safety--this general order also attached the Personnel Directorate and the Office of the Installations Engineer to the air base group for all purposes except the assignment and promotion of personnel.[6]

Two days later, 17 May 1957, the Headquarters, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group, as well as its three component squadrons--the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron, the 51st Supply Squadron, and the 51st

Transportation Squadron--was attached to the 51st Air Base Group for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel.[7]

Still according to plan, on 20 May the Communications Section of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was attached to the 51st Air Base Group for all purposes except the assignment and promotion of personnel.[8]

Next in the inexorable metamorphosis of the Naha base structure came the attachment on 1 June of the Comptroller function and its component elements--Accounting, Management Analysis, Budget, Finance, and Statistical Services--to the 51st Air Base Group for all purposes except the assignment and promotion of personnel.[9]

Finally, on 1 July 1957, the functions and personnel of Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group were attached to the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, thus in effect reducing the former to a "one and one" basis.[10] Simultaneously, the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons, though still technically assigned to the ghostly 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, were attached for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, to the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[11]

THE 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR GROUP MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The twofold mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was, first, to administer, equip, train, and prepare for sustained combat operations any Air Force units and personnel that might be assigned or attached to it, in accordance with directives, policies, and schedules

issued by Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing; and, second, to maintain such personnel and equipment as were essential to the immediate and adequate support of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing mission.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was a subordinate unit of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, as we have seen, reporting directly to that headquarters. To perform its primary mission it was provided with a headquarters, fighter interceptor squadrons, and such other facilities, personnel, and assigned or attached units as were needed to carry out these responsibilities. The 51st FIG was attached for operational control to the Chief, Combat Operations Division*.

The Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group exercised command jurisdiction over assigned units and units attached for all purposes, unless otherwise specified in the regulation, and administered and/or exercised operational control, as appropriate, of any other units which chanced to be attached. More specifically, he was directly responsible to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander for the following functions:

1. Training personnel assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group.

*51st FIW Base Reg. No. 24-3, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, 20 July 1956, actually stated that the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was attached for operational control to the Air Defense Commander, but that position had been abolished on 2 July 1956, 18 days earlier than the date of the regulation. The Chief, Combat Operations Division (known as the Combat Operations Center until 11 September 1956) was the official whose duties and authority most closely corresponded to those of the deleted Air Defense Commander.

2. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel or such other training programs as might be directed.

3. Training assigned or attached units in their respective combat roles in the air defense mission.

4. Joint planning, training, and operations with assigned or attached units of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

5. Submitting recommendations concerning requirements for personnel, equipment, and facilities for units to be employed in air defense operations assigned as an integral part of his organization.

6. The preparation and maintenance of defense plans to support plans and directives issued by the Wing Commander. Coordination of plans with appropriate commanders and maintenance of a state of readiness to execute these plans.

7. Maintaining a state of readiness consistent with the alert status specified by the 51st FIW or higher headquarters.

8. Redeployment of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group as necessary.

9. Security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment.

10. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by the 51st FIW, to the extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

11. Providing aircraft for, and proper supervision of, the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status assigned or attached to the 51st FIG for flying.

12. Preparing, submitting, and maintaining current plans for executing assigned tasks and responsibilities.

13. Effective operational performances of assigned or attached units in their respective missions.

14. Maintaining a high standard of administrative, operational, and organizational efficiency.

15. Assisting the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing in the promotion of efficiency and economy by submitting appropriate and timely recommendations.

16. Performing such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was authorized to communicate directly with the Commander, Detachment #1, 313th Air Division, on matters relating to air defense, and with other commanders assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, as appropriate, on matters pertaining to his mission. However, direct communication with commanders other than those just listed would have to be authorized by the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, for specific matters only.[12]

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was composed of three assigned squadrons equipped with F-86D Sabrejets--the 16th, 25th, and 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons--the first two being stationed at Naha AB and attached for all purposes to their parent group, while the 26th FIS

was attached for all purposes to the Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force, having been transferred PCS to Clark AB on 11 July 1955.

THE 51ST AIR BASE GROUP MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The triple mission of the Commander, 51st Air Base Group was as follows:

1. To administer, equip, and train such units and personnel as might be assigned or attached to the 51st Air Base Group, in accordance with directives, policies, and schedules issued by the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

2. To maintain operating bases with the necessary personnel and equipment for immediate and adequate support of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

3. To maintain facilities and necessary equipment to support tactical elements of the 313th Air Division, Military Air Transport Service, Naval Air Facility (NAF) Naha, and such other civilian agencies or military forces as might be allocated by the 51st FIW or higher headquarters to carry out the mission of the 313th Air Division.

The 51st Air Base Group was a subordinate command reporting directly to Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. In order to perform its primary mission it was provided with a headquarters section, four squadrons--the 51st Communications Squadron, the 51st Installations Squadron, the 51st Air Police Squadron, and the 51st Food Service Squadron--and such other facilities, personnel, and assigned or attached units as should be necessary to carry out these responsibilities.

The Commander, 51st Air Base Group exercised command jurisdiction over all assigned units, as well as those attached for all purposes, unless otherwise specified in the governing regulation; and he administered and/or operationally controlled, as appropriate, such other units as were attached. In addition, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the following functions and services:

1. Providing facilities necessary for the training of units assigned and attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

2. Joint planning, training, and operations with other units assigned or attached to the 51st FIW.

3. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel, or such other training programs as might be directed.

4. Submitting recommendations concerning requirements for personnel and equipment of assigned units.

5. Maintaining and operating assigned installations in accordance with AFR 24-1.

6. Furnishing administrative and logistic support, as required, to other units assigned or attached to the 51st Wing, utilizing installations under command of the 51st FIW.

7. Preparation and maintenance of defense plans necessary to support plans and directives issued by the Wing Commander, coordinating these plans with other commanders, with civilian agencies when so directed, and maintaining a state of readiness for the execution of these plans.

8. Maintenance, operation, and internal security of assigned installations, and the defense of these installations against acts of sabotage or organized attack by enemy agents, groups, or units. These measures would include organizing, equipping, and training assigned troops for ground defense.

9. Security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment, except internal equipment of special activities.

10. Implementation of plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare as directed.

11. Insuring redeployment of the group if and when necessary.

12. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by Headquarters, 51st FIW, to an extent consistent with the requirements of his mission.

13. Providing an air terminal at Naha Air Base for military aircraft. Facilities for commercial air operations would be provided as required.

14. Controlling the entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation.

15. Providing aircraft for, and proper supervision of, flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status assigned or attached to his group.

16. Providing aircraft for, and proper supervision of, administrative and logistical support flights for units assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

17. Controlling, as directed, construction programs and air installations activities.

18. Maintaining necessary off-base real estate to support assigned and attached units.

19. Administration and operation of non-appropriated activities, including open messes and central non-appropriated welfare funds.

20. Maintaining a high standard of administrative, operational, and organizational efficiency.

21. Assisting the Wing Commander in the promotion of efficiency and economy by the submission of appropriate and timely recommendations.

22. Performance of such other tasks as should be directed by the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

The Commander, 51st Air Base Group was authorized direct communication with other unit commanders assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, and with heads of civilian agencies, when appropriate, on matters relating to his mission. For any direct communication other than this, the Air Base Group Commander had to receive authorization from the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[13]

THE 51ST MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY GROUP MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

The missions of the Commander, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group, in order of general priority were:

1. To administer, equip, and train, in accordance with applicable directives, policies, and schedules issued by the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, such units and personnel of the Air

Force as might be designated, assigned, or attached to the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group.

2. To maintain necessary personnel and equipment for the immediate and adequate support of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing mission.

3. To maintain facilities and necessary equipment to support tactical elements, support elements, and other forces, as might be allocated by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing or higher headquarters.

The 51st Maintenance and Supply Group was a subordinate command reporting directly to Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. In order to perform its primary mission, it was provided with a headquarters, three squadrons--the 51st Maintenance Squadron, the 51st Supply Squadron, and the 51st Transportation Squadron--as well as such other facilities, personnel, and assigned or attached units as were necessary to carry out these responsibilities.

The Commander, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group exercised command jurisdiction over these assigned units, as well as over any other units attached for all purposes, unless otherwise specified in the governing regulation. He also administered or exercised operational control, as appropriate, over such other units as happened to be attached. Furthermore, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the following:

1. Providing facilities for the training of assigned personnel and such other units as might be necessary.

2. Sumbitting recommendations concerning the requirements for personnel and equipment of units to be employed in support of the wing's mission.

3. Supplying field maintenance and vehicular support of all units assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, as well as such other units as were involved in the air defense mission, as directed

4. Operating a surface transportation section in accordance with directives and policies established by the 51st FIW and higher headquarters, and utilizing air transportation whenever it was necessary.

5. Joint planning, training, and operations with units assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing or to Army and Navy units.

6. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel, or such other training programs as might be directed.

7. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, consistent with accomplishment of the primary mission.

8. Security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment.

9. Performing field maintenance as defined in applicable technical orders on assigned aircraft.

10. Compliance with all outstanding technical orders requiring base maintenance facilities and furnishing assistance on all others necessary. Compiling and submitting reports on technical order compliance, as required.

11. Supplying parts for all equipment as expeditiously as possible, including local manufacture if necessary.

12. Insuring that aircraft being returned to using units had been given the highest quality of maintenance.

13. Establishing and maintaining a corrosion control team.

14. Establishing and operating a base motor pool, and insuring that assigned or attached vehicles were maintained in a high state of readiness.

15. Providing jet engine minor repair for all assigned aircraft and any other support aircraft as directed by the 51st FIW or higher headquarters.

16. Preparing and maintaining an evacuation plan for noncombatants.

17. Assisting the Commander, 51st FIW in the promotion of efficiency and economy by submitting appropriate and timely recommendations.

18. Performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 51st FIW.

19. Maintaining a state of readiness for rapid and effective deployment.

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20. Maintaining a high standard of administrative, operational, and organizational efficiency.

The Commander, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group was authorized direct communication with other unit commanders assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, or to Army, Navy, and heads of civilian agencies as appropriate on matters relating to his mission. Direct communication with appropriate supply depots to accomplish routine supply matters was likewise authorized. Any direct communication other than that specified would have to be authorized by Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[14]

THE 6351ST USAF DISPENSARY AND THE 51ST TACTICAL HOSPITAL.

The mission of the 6351st USAF Dispensary was to operate a fixed medical treatment facility for the examination and treatment of ambulatory patients. As such, it was organized as a Non-Table of Organization unit directly subordinate to the 313th Air Division. A non-tactical, non-mobile unit designed, staffed, and equipped to operate the fixed medical facility at Naha AB, the 6351st USAF Dispensary was assigned to 313th Air Division and attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes. It was provided with such facilities and personnel as were deemed necessary to carry out its assigned mission and responsibilities.

The Commander, 6351st USAF Dispensary was under the direct supervision of the 313th Air Division Surgeon for technical control of all medical activities. At the same time, he was responsible to the Commander, 51st Interceptor Wing for the following matters:

1. Providing out-patient medical and dental service for all assigned and attached units, as directed by competent authority.

2. Providing preventive medical, veterinary, and dental service.

3. Conducting sanitation inspections.

4. Conducting medical examinations of and administering immunizations to Category I and II indigenous (Ryukyuan) labor.

5. Providing medical service for military dependents, civilian employees and their dependents, and all others as directed.

6. Assisting all members of the Allied Armed Forces in case of emergency by furnishing medical support.

The Commander, 6351st USAF Dispensary was authorized direct communication with other unit commanders assigned or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, other services, and heads of civilian agencies, as appropriate, on matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication other than this would have to be authorized by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander.[15]

The mission of the 51st Tactical Hospital was, in part, to provide medical support of all units engaged in the air defense mission of the 51st FIW: to furnish hygienic service to all units assigned or attached to the wing; to operate and maintain a medical dispensary; and to provide such other medical facilities and services for all units assigned

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or attached to the wing within its capabilities. The 51st Tactical Hospital was to be prepared for redeployment at any time, to which end it would maintain the personnel and equipment necessary for immediate and adequate support of the wing's air defense mission.

The 51st Tactical Hospital was assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, but attached for all purposes to the 6351st USAF Dispensary.[17]

Writing of conditions in his dual command during the latter half of 1956, the Commander of the 6351st USAF Dispensary and 51st Tactical Hospital had complained that a shortage of manpower was forcing the latter to neglect its responsibilities as a tactical organization "in the absence of a mobility mission and in the face of a heavy commitment for base support." By so doing, the 51st Tactical Hospital succeeded in providing essential medical support for the personnel at Naha Air Base and in submitting endless reports, "howsoever routine and non-contributory." By the same token, however, the 51st Tactical Hospital was effectively prevented from being organized and trained as a tactical organization, and little time was left for support of the training mission of the command or of the personnel of the Medical Services.[18] The necessity for using the personnel of the 51st Tactical Hospital full-time to support the daily work of the 6351st USAF Dispensary made it impossible to train them or to ready their equipment for the potential fulfillment of the unit mission.

As the months went by, however, the Commander of the 6351st and 51st Medical units gradually came to realize that there was "no requirement for a tactical medical organization in the support of the mission of the parent wing, and that the tactical hospital exists here only to provide manpower authorizations for personnel needed to operate the base dispensary." Taking off from this point of departure, he concluded that there was "no valid training requirement for this unit."[19]

Toward the end of June 1957, a rumor that the 51st Tactical Hospital was going to be inactivated began to be bruited about. In substantiation of this rumor, higher headquarters intimated that such action was possibly contemplated for some future date. Whether events would actually take such a course was something the Commander had no way of knowing, but he did know that if they did, many minor problems would be solved and much confusion eliminated.[20]

On 21 July 1955 the Vinnell Corporation had begun construction of a new dispensary for Naha Air Base under Contract FEC-668. By mid-year of 1956 two things had become evident in connection with the project. Firstly, the rate of progress was remarkably slow, even for Okinawa, the building being only 18 per cent complete; and, secondly, the new facility was going to be entirely inadequate for the needs of Naha Air Base, as even less space was allotted for the medical activity than existed in the quonsets currently being used. The new building had originally been designed as a dental clinic, but higher headquarters had intervened and designated it as the home for both medical and dental activities. If either existing or requested manpower authorizations

were any criterion, there was not going to be enough space for the medical and dental officers authorized. Besides, the building was too small for the necessary medical administrative activities. In any event, the provisions of AFM 16-13--Dental Administrative and Technical Procedures--were being ignored in the design of this structure, since it established as a rule of thumb that all dental clinics with six or more operating units should be housed in a separate building. Yet, the need for evacuating the present buildings as quickly as possible was urgent, owing to the probability that an ill-disposed typhoon would damage or even blow them away.[21]

By 31 December 1956 the new dispensary had been brought to a completion stage of 64.5 per cent, but it was still not considered too far advanced to obviate the possibility of modification. A request was submitted to Fifth Air Force to include only two dental operating units--the dental X-ray room and the dental dark room--in the new structure, in contrast to the eight units programmed. Both Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division concurred in this request, thus alleviating most of the difficulties which would otherwise have been encountered in attempting to house the entire professional services division and the medical administrative division (minus the supply and unit command sections) in the new building.

A further review of the plans and specifications at this point served to uncover various other unacceptable discrepancies in the physical plant. One of these was the attempt to house the clinical laboratory in a room too small for the volume of work required. Another

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was the failure of the engineers' specifications to provide the audiometric room with acoustical tile. Also, the pharmacy was entirely too small; the interior color scheme provided for white paint to be used throughout the building; the ceramic tiles in the dark room were a highly-glazed white; the door louvres from both the medical and dental X-ray rooms to the adjoining corridors and rooms were not lead-shielded; and the medical X-ray room was not equipped with a shield to protect the operator while he was making exposures of the patients.

These numerous deficiencies were written up and forwarded to the Fifth Air Force Installations Representative (FAFIR) at the Okinawa Engineer District with a request that the building's design be modified to incorporate the suggested changes.[22]

On 15 June 1957 the new dispensary and dental clinic, constructed at a cost of $164,659, was accepted--nearly two years after the Vinnell Corporation had first commenced work on it. The 6351st USAF Dispensary and 51st Tactical Hospital occupied the new structure on 28 June, providing themselves with all the latest facilities and comforts which had been so sadly lacking in the old dispensary buildings. It was hoped that, in the days to come, these superior facilities would improve not only the caliber of medical care but also the morale of the medical service personnel assigned to provide this care.

Several new projects--including a dental clinic, a preventive medicine-veterinary medicine building, an ambulance garage, and an orderly room-unit supply building--were submitted in the 1959 Military Construction Program, but this headquarters had to disapprove them for lack of funds.

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OTHER ATTACHED UNITS OF THE 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING.

Besides these integral elements of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing--the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, the 51st Air Base Group, the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group, and the 51st Tactical Hospital--a number of other organizations were attached to that headquarters in various ways at one time or another during the period 1 January-30 June 1957. Attached to the 51st FIW for administrative and logistic support at the beginning of the period were Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; the 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron (MATS); the 33d Air Rescue Squadron; Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron; Detachment # 7, 15th Weather Squadron (MATS); the 6351st USAF Dispensary; the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF; Detachment "A", District Office #3, 6001st IG Special Investigation Squadron; and the 6157th Operations Squadron (Standardization and Indoctrination), which had existed on a "one and one" basis since 15 August 1956.

On 20 January 1957 the 6157th Operations Squadron was discontinued at Naha Air Base, with the personnel and equipment rendered surplus reverting to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division.[24]

On 18 April Futema Auxiliary Air Field, which had been assigned to Naha AB, was transferred to the Department of the Navy, which planned to develop it on a large scale as a complete base for helicopter units of the 1st Marine Air Wing, an organization designed to transport combat troops from ship to shore for invasions or for other tactical movements.[25]

On 13 May this headquarters issued General Order No. 14, effective 8 May 1957, relieving the following units from all previous logistic attachments and attaching them to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic support: the 33d Air Rescue Squadron; Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; Headquarters, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Yuza Dake Air Station; Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Miyako Jima Air Station; Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Kume Shima Air Station; Headquarters 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Yae Take Air Station, except for POL and rations support, which would be provided by the 18th Air Base Group at Kadena AB; Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station; Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; and the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF.[26]

The last change of the historical period affecting the units at Naha AB came on 18 June 1957, when the 33d Air Rescue Squadron was reassigned from the 3d Air Rescue Group to the 2d Air Rescue Group. This action by Headquarters, MATS reversed that of 20 September 1955, which had transferred the 33d Air Rescue Squadron from the 2d Air Rescue Group to the 3d Air Rescue Group.

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	313th ADR 23-6: Organization--Field: 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 15 March 1955.
2	--	Ibid.
3	29	Ltr., Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Reorganization of the Command Inspection System, 21 Jan. 1957; History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan. 1957, p. 24.
4	--	History, D/O, March 1957, p. 22.
5	--	Memo, for Record, Hq. 51st FIW, sub.: Reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 30 Apr. 1957.
6	30	51st FIW GO 8, dtd. 15 May 1957.
7	30	51st FIW GO 9, dtd. 15 May 1957.
8	30	51st FIW GO 10, dtd. 15 May 1957.
9	30	51st FIW GO 11, dtd. 15 May 1957.
10	30	51st FIW GO 14, dtd. 28 June 1957.
11	30	51st FIW GO 15, dtd. 28 June 1957.
12	--	51st FIW Base Reg. No. 24-3, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, 20 July 1956.
13	--	51st FIW Base Reg. No. 24-2, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 51st Air Base Group, 15 Aug. 1956.
14	--	51st FIW Base Reg. No. 24-5, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 51st Maintenance and Supply Group, 23 July 1956.
15	--	313th ADR 23-7, sub.: Organization--Field: 6351st USAF Dispensary, 20 Aug. 1956.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
16	--	51st FIWR 24-4, sub.: Organization--Air Bases and Air Units: 51st Tactical Hospital, 15 Nov. 1954.
17	--	51st FIW GO 16, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.
18	--	History, 6351st USAF Dispensary and 51st Tactical Hospital, 1 July-31 Dec. 1956, p. 2.
19	--	Ibid., 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, pp. 3-4.
20	--	Ibid., pp. 4-5.
21	--	Ibid., 1 Jan.-30 June 1956, pp. 6-7.
22	--	Ibid., 1 July-31 Dec. 1956, pp. 10-11.
23	--	Ibid., 1 Jan.-30 June 1957, p. 7.
24	2	313th AD GO 3, dtd. 15 Jan. 1957.
25	--	PACAF GO 38, dtd. 26 Nov. 1957; DAF GO 22, dtd. 13 May 1957; Msg. 41482, USAF Hq. to Comdr. PACAF, dtd. 15 Nov. 1957.
26	2	313th AD GO 14, dtd. 13 May 1957.

SECRET

CHAPTER VI

DETACHMENT #1, HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

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DETACHMENT #1, HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

THE DETACHMENT MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The mission of Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, located at Naha Air Base, was to operate the Okinawa Air Defense Control Center (ADCC); while the Detachment Commander was assigned the additional duty of Chief, Combat Operations Division (COD), Headquarters, 313th Air Division.[1]

The Commander, Detachment #1, was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for (1) reporting administrative information as prescribed in pertinent regulations and directives; (2) normal personnel administration (including proper utilization, classification, and assignment) and supply functions pertaining to the personnel assigned to Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; and (3) the security of all assigned facilities, equipment, and areas. In addition, the Commander, Detachment #1 was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, through the Director of Operations, for operation of the Combat Operations Division, as outlined in 313ADM 20-1, dated 1 October 1956.

The Commander, Detachment #1, 313th Air Division was authorized direct communication with all staff agencies of the division headquarters.

Direct communication with all units subordinate to 313th Air Division Headquarters was also authorized on routine Air Defense matters. Any other direct communication should be only as authorized by the 313th Division Commander.[2]

Detachment #1 was assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division and was directly responsible to the Chief, Combat Operations Division, Headquarters, 313th Air Division--located in the ADCC building at Naha AB--for all operating procedures. Detachment #1 was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administrative and logistic support, but remained under this headquarters for operational control.[3]

THE PERSONNEL SITUATION IN DETACHMENT #1

Authorizations Versus Assignments.

On 1 January 1957 Detachment #1 could show a personnel strength of 12 officers and 147 airmen, as against 14 officers and 157 airmen authorized. At the end of the month the situation had deteriorated further, as the officers numbered only 10 and the airmen 137. As of 28 February the officers on hand again totalled 12, but the airmen had declined to 132. By the end of March, however, the situation had taken a definite turn for the better, with 13 officers and 150 airmen assigned. April witnessed an odd twist, as the officers dropped to 12, while the airmen increased to 201--44 more than were authorized. Although the Unit Manning Document was revised in May to provide Detachment #1 with 17 officers and 165 airmen, on the 31st of that month only

14 officers were assigned, in contrast to the 214 airmen on hand. At the close of the period on 30 June the assigned officers numbered 12 and the airmen 152, as compared with the 16 officer and 75 airman spaces provided under a new UMD which became effective in June.

Changes Resulting from the New Unit Manning Document.

A total of 72 personnel were lost to Detachment #1 when its Communications Section was transferred to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing by the June 1957 Unit Manning Document. The following personnel were involved in this transfer:

FUNCTION CODE	TITLE	GRADE	AFSC	TOTAL
84010	COMM ELEC. MAINT			
	COMM OFF	Captain	3034	1
	DRAFTSMAN	S/Sgt	22350	1
				2
84020	COMM ELECT OPER			
	APPREN ADM CLERK	A/2C	70230	1
	ADM CLERK	S/Sgt	70250	1
				2
84110	TELEPHONE MAINT			
	AP O/S W&A SY U&M SP	A/2C	36130	1
	O/S W&A SY IN & MA SPE	A/1C	36150	1
	CEN OFF EQP SPEC-MAN	A/1C	36250	1
	CEN OFF EQP SPEC-MAN	S/Sgt	36250	2
				5
84120	TELEPHONE OPER			
	APR COMM CENTER SP	A/2C	29130	4
	COMM CENTER SPEC	A/1C	29150	3
				7
84210	TELETYPE MAINT			
	APPREN COMM MACH REPMN	A/2C	36330	1
	COMM MACH REPMN	A/1C	36350	2
	COMM MACH REPMN	S/Sgt	36350	2
	COMM MACH MAINT SOP	T/Sgt	36370	1
				6

FUNCTION CODE	TITLE	GRADE	AFSC	TOTAL
84220	TELETYPE OPER			
	APPREN COMM CENTR SP	A/2C	29130	6
	COMM CENTR SPEC	A/1C	29150	3
	COMM CENTR SPEC	S/Sgt	29150	3
	COMM CENTR SUPV	T/Sgt	29170	1
				13
84410	GROUND RADAR MAINT			
	AP RADRLY RPTR EQ R	A/2C	30430B	1
	AP RADRLY ANTR EQ R	A/2C	30430C	1
	G/C L/M/H/DF & A/FM AP	A/2C	30432A	1
	RADRLY CR RPTR EQ R	A/1C	30450B	2
	RADRLY ANTRAC EQ PR	A/1C	30450C	2
	G/C L/M H/DF & A/FMR	A/1C	30452A	2
	GND COM XMTR EQ RP/H	S/Sgt	30453A	1
	RADRLY CR RPTR EQ R	S/Sgt	30453B	1
	RADRLY ANTRAC EQP R	S/Sgt	30450C	1
	GND COM EQ MAINT TEC/L	T/Sgt	30472	1
				13
84420	GROUND RADAR OP			
	APR CHAN/TEC CON OP	A/2C	29330	10
	CHAN & TECH CON OPR	A/1C	29335	2
	GROUND RADIO OPR	A/1C	29350	5
	GROUND RADIO OPR	S/Sgt	29350	5
	CHAN & TECH CON OPR	S/Sgt	29355	1
	RAD OPERATIONS SUPV	M/Sgt	29370	1
				24

At the same time that these 72 spaces were lost through transfer of the Communications function, six additional slots were eliminated from the UMD of Detachment #1. These were as follows:

04000	UNIT SUPPLY OFFICER	Lt	6424	1
	ORG SUPPLY SUPV	M/Sgt	64173	1
29000	INTEL OFFICER	Lt	2054	1
80020	AIR OPS OFF	Major	1435	1
	AIR OPS OFF	Captain	1435	1
01000	PERSONNEL OFF	Captain	7324	1

More than compensating for these eliminated spaces were the following nine additions authorized in the new UMD:

01000	COMMANDER	Lt Col	1416	1
03000	ADJUTANT	Captain	7324	1
04000	ORGN SUPPLY SPECL	S/Sgt	64151	1
29000	INTEL STAFF OFF	Major	2016	1
	INTEL OPS TECH	M/Sgt	20470	1
	ADMINSTR CLERK	S/Sgt	70250	1
				3
80020	OPS STAFF OFF	Major	1416	1
84520	INTERCEPT CONTROLLER	Major	1644	1
	DRAFTSMAN	S/Sgt	22350	1
				2

Thus, Detachment #1 gained five officer and four NCO spaces, while losing one NCO and five officer slots.[4]

AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES

Exercise "Easy Street".

Exercise "Easy Street" was conducted at the direction of 313th Air Division on 21 January 1957 for the purpose of providing realistic training of Air Defense units against high speed, high altitude attacks, as had been recommended by the critique which followed Exercise "Dragon Fly" of 6-8 November 1956. F-86F aircraft of the 18th Fighter Bomber Group at Kadena were utilized as the aggressor force, and multiple intercept techniques were employed to increase both pilot and director proficiency. An evaluation of over-all results which was made upon conclusion of the exercise found them to be highly satisfactory in comparison with other recent exercises which involved similar type intercepts.

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When the U.S. Navy conducted an exercise in the Okinawa area from 19-24 January, the ADCC at Naha was provided with a copy of the Operations Plan, thus enabling Navy-Air Force inter-communication to function much more efficiently than it had during "Dragon Fly". The Navy made a sincere effort to prevent any confusion or cases of misidentification, and was cooperative in notifying the ADCC of any changes in planned operations. Even so, the Combat Operations Division felt compelled to call attention once more to the lesson it had learned from "Dragon Fly"--viz., that a Navy liaison officer should be assigned to the ADCC during important Navy exercises, at least on a temporary basis.[5]

Exercise "Thumb Screw".

A test of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group's atomic deployment and strike operations capability, Exercise "Thumb Screw" was implemented on 28 January, with the Okinawa ADCC and COD assigned the responsibility of relaying messages between the Fifth Air Force Air Offensive Operations Center (AOOC)* and the task forces deployed in the Okinawa area. All messages were relayed as soon as they were received, and no important communication lags were experienced.

*On 1 February 1957 the term "Air Offensive Operations Center" as applied to the command post at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force was discontinued in favor of "Tactical Operations Center". Fifth Air Force further decreed that each offensive wing should establish an Air Operations Center (AOC) to control tactical operations within the wing. In addition, a "Special Operations Center" (SOC) was to be established at each strike base by deployed units to control ATF, RTF, and TTF at squadron tactical operations.

315th OPLAN 53-56 Brings the 817th Troop Carrier Squadron to Okinawa.

This headquarters had a visitor from Japan the latter part of January in the person of a Major Wright, the Communications Officer for the 315th Air Division. The purpose of his visit was to outline the communications requirements that would be levied on this command by implementation of 315th OPLAN 53-56. According to this plan, troop carrier aircraft of the 315th Air Division would deploy to Okinawa on 1 February, there scattering to the auxiliary airfields at Yontan, Motobu, Futema, and Yonabaru from which points they would operate for the duration of the exercise. Headquarters for the 817th Troop Carrier Squadron, the unit involved in the exercise, was to be located at Futema Auxiliary Airfield. The existing telephone cable to Futema and Yontan would be used. In addition, the 315th Air Division planned to operate an HF radio circuit between the 817th TCS and its parent wing in Japan, as well as an HF radio net among the four deployed flights on Okinawa. 313th Headquarters would enter the intra-island net for the purpose of exchanging message traffic with the Kadena Communications Center.

During the second week of the exercise, loss of communication with Japan was to be simulated; whereupon the Commander, 313th Air Division would assume operational control of the squadron. To make the exercise reasonably realistic, daily frag orders for the Okinawa Area Cluster were to be sent over the FEAF CW net, and, as a means of simulating the 313th Air Division Commander's control, an AN/GRC-26 radio van was set up at the Communications Center to relay these frag orders to Futema by CW.

On 29 January, Major James S. Kennedy, Chief of this headquarters' Tactical Operations Branch, visited the ADCC at Naha AB to brief the Combat Operations Division on the role its people were to play in the exercise and to advise the ADCC that it would be furnished information copies of all frag orders.

Although scheduled to arrive on 1 February 1957, it was not until the 7th of the month that the aircraft of the 817th Troop Carrier Squadron actually made their appearance on Okinawa. Because of the delay, the 817th was placed under operational control of this headquarters on the second day of the exercise, instead of the second week, to the accompaniment of a welcome recommendation that the cargo planes be used as advantageously as possible. Quick to grasp the possibilities contained in this suggestion, 313th extemporized cargo flights to Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, transporting tons of supplies which were stockpiled at the first two of these places to Okinawa and Taiwan. By virtue of this unusual, but eminently practical, use to which the exercise was put, supply shortages which might otherwise have been of long duration were eased and eliminated in a few days.

When the exercise was all over and Materiel people in this command were congratulating themselves on their good fortune in having been the beneficiaries of this unexpected airlift, the 313th Commander received a TWX from the 315th Air Division Commander thanking this headquarters for the cooperation extended during the 817th's deployment on Okinawa! It could just as well have been the other way around; for this was very much like being thanked for accepting a favor.[6]

Exercise "Hash House".

Continuing its program of more realistic training against the possibility of high altitude, high speed attacks by the Communist enemy, Fifth Air Force directed that Exercise "Hash House" be conducted in February. As in Exercise "Easy Street" the aggressor aircraft were fighter-bombers of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing whose mission was the destruction of local targets by means of simulated atomic attacks. The results of this exercise were assessed as above the average of recent ones of a similar nature, and it was felt that both the intercept controllers and the F-86D pilots benefited directly, since the strikes flown by the 18th were much more realistic than those utilizing slower and lower-flying aircraft, as had been the case all too often in the past. After all, an efficient defense against attacks of this nature was vital to the Okinawa Air Defense System, in view of the proximity of Chinese mainland bases from which such attacks might be staged.[7]

Exercise "White Horse".

On 11 February this headquarters received Fifteenth Air Force Operations Order 17-57 (Exercise "White Horse"), itself supporting the previously received SAC Operations Order 17-57, which provided for a large scale simulated combat mission in the Far East. One important difference in the two documents was observed, however. Where the earlier SAC Operations Order 17-57 had stated that 401 personnel would be airlifted to Kadena, Fifteenth Air Force's version called for 680 people to be airlifted, and for a total of 1,122 to be participants in

the exercise at this base. The aircraft taking part in "White Horse" would come from three ZI bombardment wings--the 5th Bombardment Wing (h) at Travis AFB, the 6th Bombardment Wing (H) at Walker AFB, and the 22d Bombardment Wing (M) at March AFB, which was then serving its 90-day tour at Andersen AFB, Guam, as the regular SAC rotational unit. Shortly after, information was received from Headquarters, 3d Air Division (SAC) on Guam, outlining the administrative space and office and communications requirements for support of the Kadena Task Force Headquarters.

By 21 February the control ADVON was in place, with the main body scheduled to arrive on the 27th. Subsequently, because of adverse weather conditions encountered by the bombers enroute from the ZI, X-Day was moved back to 1 March.

Fifteenth Air Force Operations Order 17-57 placed a requirement on this command for two B-26's to serve as courier aircraft between Kadena and Guam; but, aware of the absence of navigational equipment in the B-26's, this headquarters recommended to Fifth Air Force that another type of aircraft be utilized for this duty. The Moriyama headquarters responded with a promise that two RB-50 aircraft would be dispatched to Kadena for this purpose and would be in place by E-hour plus 6 hours.

The 18th Air Base Group at Kadena found difficulty in planning for "White Horse" because of a lack of the detailed information required for specific action. As a consequence, the planners were forced to

proceed on assumptions derived from Base Operations Plans 1 and 2, even though "White Horse" would require a greater support factor than OPLAN 1-57. Since the complete plan was not being exercised, Kadena would be expected to support a considerable overload condition. Thus, Exercise "White Horse" would definitely not prove the base's ability to support SAC under realistic conditions. These facts, together with detailed problem areas, were submitted to higher headquarters in the study form, but Fifth Air Force took no action to provide relief.

It had been expected by this command that "White Horse" would serve as an excellent opportunity for the Okinawa Air Defense System to get a workout. In the event, however, the ADCC's participation was limited by two primary factors. The first was extremely poor weather conditions, and the second was the fact that many of the SAC aircraft did not rigidly adhere to the limited flight plans which were received. With respect to the weather factor, the COD was on a "below minimum" scramble status during a great part of the exercise, causing the controllers to forego several opportunities to initiate intercepts because of safety considerations. The second factor--failure of the SAC bombers to adhere rigidly to the flight plans--was partially a result of the weather and partly due to poor engine performance or malfunctions of some aircraft.

One B-36 assumed the status of an "unknown" when he aborted his mission and returned to Okinawa from the north. The COD scrambled F-86D's of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and intercepted the bomber, but when the latter was visually identified as a B-36, the Sabrejet immediately broke off.

All things considered, then, and in view of the limited participation that had been possible for the ADCC, officials there felt that their performance during "White Horse" had been more than adequate.[8]

Operation "Beacon Hill".

Operation "Beacon Hill" was a joint Navy-U.S. Marine Corps operation involving the transfer of large numbers of USMC aircraft from Japan to the Philippines for participation in large scale air-sea-land assault exercises. The ADCC completed intercepts on some of the inbound flights but abstained from attempting them in many instances because of inclement weather and the desire to conserve the 51st's fighters. One of the in-bound flights had a mid-air collision, but, thanks to the excellent assistance of Site P-52 at Yae Take Air Station, the two damaged aircraft succeeded in landing safely at Naha AB.[9]

Blackout Tests on Okinawa.

On 21 March Okinawa had a test blackout, but the results were not considered successful, except for the opportunity afforded to try the new test warning system for air raids. Because of the numerous failures to blackout the island, the test was repeated the following night. This time it was regarded as satisfactory.[10]

Anti-American Demonstrations in Taiwan.

Although no defense exercises were conducted during either April or May, the COD and ADCC stood by during the latter month to be of maximum assistance in the event of an evacuation or any other air activity in support of the American position on Taiwan.

This situation was brought about by a recent incident in Taipeh which had provided ample evidence of a latent animosity toward Americans in "friendly" Nationalist China. On 20 March 1957 an Army Master Sergeant, Robert G. Reynolds, living with his family in Taipeh, had shot and killed an alleged Chinese "Peeping Tom", Liu Chi-tjan, whom he caught looking into the bathroom where his wife was taking a shower. When an Army court martial acquitted Sergeant Reynolds on grounds of self defense on 23 May, the Taipeh newspapers erupted into a tirade of articles and editorials against this "travesty of justice". The following day infuriated mobs of Chinese sacked the U.S. Embassy and injured nine Americans on whom they were able to get their hands. Although order was eventually restored and U.S. installations in other sectors of Taipeh were unmolested, the underlying hatred which had burst into flame so unexpectedly had not been quenched but was undoubtedly smoldering still, only awaiting some future incident to touch it off again.

By means of the existing HF communications with Taiwan, the ADCC maintained continuous contact with the JOC and TACC on that Nationalist stronghold, and it was prepared to relay any information of an urgent or emergency nature to Fifth Air Force or FEAF with a minimum of delay. When the Taiwan TACC passed information on several unknowns to the Okinawa ADCC, the latter flashed the data to the Fifth Air Force COC. None of these unknowns were detected by the radar sets of the Okinawa Air Defense System, and the ADCC received no notification of any other unusual air activities which might have originated in or passed through the Taiwan Sector.[11]

Special Projects.

Late in December 1956, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force had apprised the COD of the harmful effect of inaccurate or late information concerning winds aloft upon high altitude interceptions. It was suggested that engineering test or air defense back-up aircraft be utilized to obtain winds aloft data and that the information obtained be disseminated to adjacent ADCC's and ADDC's.

In compliance with these recommendations, the COD implemented Operations Memorandum #14 on 23 January 1957 (Air Defense Memorandum #12). The procedure outlined was, briefly stated, as follows: The Senior Controller at the ADCC would notify the Senior Director at one of the two ADDC's to scramble two F-86D's from "at ease" status for a winds aloft check at 45,000, 40,000, 35,000, and 30,000 feet. The aircraft scrambled would first be directed to 45,000 and 40,000 feet. There wind speed runs were to be made with single aircraft at each of these altitudes, limiting each leg to a five minute run. The procedure would then be repeated at 35,000 and 30,000 feet, fuel permitting. A calculation of the winds would be accomplished after each check by means of the E6D computer. Upon completion of the wind speed check, the mission aircraft were to be positioned information and returned to base by means of GCI/GCA. The Senior Director at the ADDC would furnish the computed winds to the adjacent ADDC and the Weather Officer at the ADCC. Winds aloft were to be furnished adjacent areas by the ADCC Weather Section in the form of PIREPS, and the winds were posted on the vertical plotting board in the ADCC for the Senior Controller's information. The winds

aloft missions would be conducted twice daily or when deemed necessary. It was anticipated that accurate winds aloft would greatly facilitate the air mass positioning problem for practice and actual Air Defense operations.

New procedures for Special Electronic Search Project (SESP) flights made by the Navy went into effect on 24 January, and all Controllers were briefed on these missions by the COD Air Operations Officer.

Summary of ADCC Operations for the Period January - June 1957:

	Air Defense Activities	January	February	March
1.	Total Tracks	3,360	2,702	---
2.	Tracks Initially Unidentified	58	24	40
3.	Tracks Remaining Unidentified	1	1	6
4.	Total Fakers	28*	22*	21*
5.	Actual Scrambles	44**	16**	28**
6.	Actual Air Defense Diversions	7*	2	9
7.	Number of Active Air Defense Sorties	94	36	74
8.	Actual Intercepts	30**	7	15
9.	Identified Prior to Intercept	22	15	19
10.	Identified Prior to Scramble	5	0	0
11.	Weather Plots	1	1	0
12.	Misplots	1	0	0

*Does not include air defense exercises.

**Does not include faker tracks.

	Air Defense Activities	April	May	June
1.	Tracks Initially Unidentified	35	13	19
2.	Tracks Remaining Unidentified	3	0	0
3.	Total Fakers	20*	21*	4*
4.	Actual Scrambles	20**	10**	9**
5.	Actual Air Defense Diversions	4	2	0
6.	Number of Active Air Defense Sorties	48	24	18
7.	Actual Intercepts	11	7	2
8.	Identified Prior to Intercept	14	5	15
9.	Identified Prior to Scramble	7	1	1
10.	Weather Plots	0	0	1

*Does not include air defense exercises.

**Does not include faker tracks.

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	7	313th ADR 23-11, sub.: Organization--Field: Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, 24 June 1957.
2	7	Ibid.
3	--	History, Det. #1, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan. 1957, p. 1.
4	--	Histories, Det. #1, Hq, 313th Air Div., Dec. 1956, p.3; Jan. 1957, p.3; Feb. 1957, p.3; March 1957, p.3; Apr. 1957, p. 3; May 1957, p. 3; June 1957, pp. 3-5.
5	--	History, Det. #1, Jan. 1957, p. 4.
6	14	History, Det. #1, Jan. 1957, pp. 4-5; DJ D/O, 25 Jan. 1957; History, D/O, Jan. 1957, p. 19; Feb. 1957, pp.3-4.
7	--	History, Det. #1, Feb. 1957, p. 5.
8	--	History, Det. #1, Hq. 313th Air Div., March 1957, p.4; History, D/O, Hq. 313th Air Div., Jan. 1957, pp. 12-13;
	14	Feb. 1957, pp. 10-11; DJ, D/O, 12, 21, 26, 28 Feb., 1,5 March 1957.
9	--	History, Det. #1, Hq. 313th Air Div., March 1957, p.4.
10	--	Ibid., p. 6.
11	--	Ibid., May 1957, p. 8; Okinawa Morning Star, 24, 25 May 1957.

CHAPTER VII

AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON ACTIVITY

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THE 623D AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON

The Squadron Mission.

313th Air Division Regulation 23-10 of 29 August 1956 made the 623d AC&W Squadron responsible for the tactical air defense activities of the South Sub-Sector of the Ryukyus Air Defense System, as outlined by 313th ADR 55-18 of 26 January 1956, for providing facilities and personnel for an alternate ADCC, and for providing navigational assistance to friendly aircraft.

As for the 623d AC&W Squadron Commander, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for the following matters:

1. Operation and maintenance of radar, radio, telephone, and teletype equipment and associated equipment in support of the assigned mission.

2. Reporting of AC&W operational information, as prescribed in pertinent regulations and directives.

3. Normal personnel, administration, and supply functions incident to the squadron.

4. Food service support for assigned personnel.

5. Security of all assigned facilities, equipment, and areas.

6. Emergency medical treatment and routine medical care for assigned personnel.

7. Processing and coordinating Site Concurrence Letters (T.O. 31-1-J) with the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

8. Computing budgetary requirements incident to squadron operations.

9. Monitoring special projects incident to squadron operations.

10. Preventive maintenance on assigned buildings and facilities.

The Squadron Organization.

The Headquarters of the 623d AC&W Squadron was located at Yuza Dake Air Station (P-56) in southern Okinawa, which served as the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) for the South Sub-Sector of the Ryukyus Air Defense System, as well as an alternate Air Defense Control Center to be utilized in case the primary ADCC at Naha AB were out of commission for any reason. The squadron also operated two off-island detachments--P-54 at Kume Shima Air Station.

The 623d AC&W Squadron was assigned directly to 313th Air Division, as it had been since inactivation of the 529th AC&W Group on 15 March 1955, with operational control and administrative support being retained by this headquarters. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing provided logistic support.

Electronic Equipment of the 623d AC&W Squadron.

Electronic Equipment at P-56: For its radar equipment Site P-56 employed an AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar, an AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator, and an AN/GPX-12 identification-interrogation device; while the detachments at Miyako and Kume featured AN/FPS-3's, AN/FPS-6's, and AN/GPX-7 identification-interrogation equipment. The AN/GPA-30 video-mapper for the AN/FPS-3A search set at P-56 arrived in January 1957, but officials of this headquarters refused to accept it because some of the parts were missing, thus making it impossible to complete the installation.

A General Electric team from Southern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (SAMAP) arrived at Yuza Dake on 25 March and worked 220 man-hours completely overhauling the AN/FPS-6 height finder. When they had finished and the set was returned to operation, it was found that a tremendous improvement in accuracy was immediately apparent. In April the AN/FPS-6 was modified to such good purpose that its maximum capability for picking up targets was increased from 60,000 to 75,000 feet.

The 15-J-1C target simulator, which had been non-operational was repaired on 8 May and placed in working condition with three targets. Besides this, the AN/GPX-12 system caused trouble for a time as the result of moisture's forming in the antenna and cables, but this problem was finally solved in June by replacing the antenna.

In the closing days of June the flexible radome on the AN/FPS-3A was dismantled to make way for installation of the first plastic rigid radome to be introduced into the Ryukyus Air Defense System under

Project Tight Top. However, it was not until after the close of the historical period, on 8 July, that the work of assembling this "jigsaw" type radome was completed.

Early in February the 623d AC&W Squadron received a directive from Fifth Air Force to operate the AN/FPS-3A with a 3° antenna tilt, in place of the 1.5° tilt which had been employed in the past. On 19 February a Fifth Air Force radar calibration team arrived for a three-week visit, at the end of which they pronounced that the mechanical tilt of the antenna at P-56 was 1.1° higher than the electrical tilt. Therefore, if the set were to be operated at 3° electrical tilt as directed, the mechanical tilt would have to be set at 4.1°. Although the squadron was unable to produce mathematical data to support its views, Operations personnel soon came to believe that the 1.1° difference between tilts was approximately .3° or .4° too high. They were led to this conclusion by the fact that the quality control figure of P-56 had dropped 10 per cent since the arrival of the Fifth Air Force calibration team, and the average detection range had diminished approximately 30 miles, despite the fact that the power output and minimum discernible signal (MDS) remained the same.[1]

Electronics Equipment at P-53: The early warning station at Miyako Jima operated an AN/FPS-3 search radar, an AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator, and an AN/GPX-7 identification-interrogation set as its electronic equipment.

The rather unseasonable approach of Typhoon Virginia caused Site P-53 to typhoonize both its radars on 24 June. However, the measures

taken were considerably different in the two instances. The end sails and the IFF antenna were removed from the AN/FPS-3 search set as a precautionary measure, then the radar was put back in operation. As for the AN/FPS-6 height finder, since it was not as vital to the security of the Ryukyus, detachment personnel removed the lower end sail, tilted back the antenna and tied it down, taking the set completely out of commission. The two radars remained this way until 1500 hours, 26 June, when the "All Clear" enabled personnel to begin the unpleasant task of restoring the parts which had been removed and placing both surveillance and height-finding weapons back into 100 per cent commission.[2]

Electronics Equipment at P-54: The air defense equipment at Kume Shima Air Station was identical with that at Miyako--AN/FPS-3, AN/FPS-6, and AN/GPX-7-- but one problem existed which did not similarly affect P-53. This was the absence of protective radomes for both radar weapons. The inflatable bubble designed to protect the AN/FPS-3 had been destroyed by Typhoon Babs on 15 August 1956, and that for the AN/FPS-6 had been blown away even earlier, on 1 August 1956, by Typhoon Wanda. Since then, no flexible radomes had been brought in to replace the ones destroyed--partly at least, because it was hoped to have the new rigid radomes installed before the first typhoon of the 1957 season could hit.

Despite this, the radar maintenance section at P-54 enjoyed a reasonably trouble free time during the first half of 1957, with only the lack of sufficient personnel constituting a major problem. In

January a Bendix overhaul team arrived from SAMAP and worked on the AN/FPS-6 for 10 days. Other than this, the two radars were in commission during the greater part of the six months, excepting for routine maintenance shutdown periods. The AN/FPS-3, in fact, consistently maintained a quality control of approximately 105 per cent, highest for any site in the 313th Air Division.[3] An AN/GPA-30 video-mapper was installed on 23 May.

Communications in the 623d AC&W Squadron.

Communications at Site P-56: At the beginning of the year the squadron communications center was located in a newly completed BOQ at Yuza Dake which was not immediately needed for officer quarters. Its operation consisted of an administrative (CW) net to Miyako Jima and Kume Shima Air Stations. Shortly thereafter, it was moved to the radar operations building in anticipation of the installation of four teletype circuits--one to the 13th Communications Squadron at Kadena AB, which could be used for administrative and tactical traffic; one to the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) at Kadena AB, which would serve for passing flight plans and NOTAMS (Notices to Airmen); one to Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron, at Kadena AB, to be used for passing weather information, naturally enough; and one to Kume Shima AS, for use in passing administrative and tactical traffic, if necessary.

These four circuits were actually installed and put "on the air" in March, with the exception of the teletype weather circuit, which

lacked the necessary equipment at the Kadena Weather Station. Thus, at the end of the period, the 623d AC&W Squadron communications center comprised one administrative radio (CW) net and three teletype circuits.

Microwave equipment was also installed and accepted, but the responsibility for this operation had not been accepted by 30 June, as the installing agency was unable to establish acceptable communications via this circuit, fluctuations in power apparently being responsible for a false "ringing" sound. However, it was believed that this trouble could be eliminated in the near future.

The largest maintenance problem occurred in January when P-56 lost all UHF and VHF radio as a result of the underground cables connecting radar operations with the transmitter and receiver sites becoming waterlogged and shorting out. Yuza Dake was off the air for three days while these lines were dug up and dried out or replaced. Other than this, the communications maintenance section had to deal only with routine repair and replacement of equipment.[4]

Communications at Site P-53: Some point-to-point difficulties in communications caused, for the most part, by atmospheric conditions were experienced at Miyako Jima Air Station in January. Then, during February and March, there followed difficulties in the FM circuit which produced a high percentage of outages.

On 26 March 1956 Sanko Kensetsu had turned over to 313th Air Division the new transmitter and receiver buildings which that construction firm had built at P-53 under Contract FEC-479 as Phase II

Project Airtight work. Certain items required for completion of the equipment installation were unobtainable at the time, however, and the problem of communications to and from Miyako was becoming critical as the year ended, since the existing communications facilities were not adequate to support the mission of the site. Finally, a cable and antenna installation team from the 10th Communications Flight at Clark AB arrived in April 1957 and began installing underground cable and antennas for the new transmitter and receiver sites.

Another team representing the 10th Communications Flight flew into Miyako in may to commence the installation of inside cable and equipment in the two new buildings. An antenna was cut and installed to accommodate the frequency change to typhoon net. By the end of June most of the equipment had been moved to the new transmitter and receiver sites, causing squadron officials to look forward to a reduc- in the operating and maintenance difficulties encountered in the past.[5]

Communications at Site P-54: Sanko Kensetsu had also completed new transmitter and receiver buildings at Kume Shima Air Station under Contract FEC-463 and turned them over to this command on 24 May 1956. Teams from the 10th Communications Flight had already installed most of the equipment connected with these buildings before 1957 began, so that personnel of the detachment were able to occupy the new buildings in February--a move which produced an immediate improvement in the communications section's ability to perform its mission.

During the first quarter, communications maintenance was sorely hampered by a shortage of personnel, but the situation took a turn for the better in April as replacements began to report to the station for

duty. Even so, on 30 June there was still no qualified officer permanently assigned in the communications section.[6]

Squadron Operations.

Operations at Site P-56: In past years almost all air defense training missions had been flown at altitudes below 35,000 feet--an approach to the problem which was rather unrealistic, since it was highly probable that if hostile aircraft ever launched an air attack, it would be carried out at altitudes above 40,000 feet. Recognizing that the types of missions which had heretofore been in vogue were not adequately training either the interceptor pilots or the controllers for the actual situation which would occur in case of war, Air Defense officials began to place increasing emphasis on intercepts at altitudes in excess of 40,000 feet, employing multiple fighters and combat trail tactics. With this more realistic training came many attendant problems, such as controller and pilot unfamiliarity, poor communications in direct ratio to increases in range and altitude, almost total inability of the AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar to "skin paint" the target, and the inability of the E-4 rocket control system in the F-86D interceptor to pick up a high altitude target consistently at more than six miles. In spite of these obstacles, though, the controllers evolved standard tactics in conformance with ADCM 55-5 and made steady progress in obtaining successful results.

On 1 January 1957 the ADDC at Yuza Dake Air Station had an assigned controller strength of eight officers possessing a 1644 AFSC and four

with that of 1641. Six months later there were 13 controllers, but of these only four held the 1644 AFSC, while nine were only 1641's. Thus, while the total strength increased by one, the experience level, job knowledge, and over-all effectiveness were diminished 50 per cent by the replacement of experienced personnel with inexperienced entry level personnel.

This wholesale turnover of personnel at not only P-56 but also P-53, P-54, and P-52 (the ADDC for the Northern Sub-Sector of the Okinawa Air Defense Identification Zone) necessitated a thorough training course for the new personnel. Accordingly, at the direction of this headquarters, Yuza Dake inaugurated a seven-day indoctrination and familiarization course for controllers on 29 April. The course ran continuously through 30 June and was so successful in the results obtained that it seemed likely to become a regular requirement for all new controllers in the future.

In February the assigned strength of the Operations Section at P-56 fell to a point of 50 per cent of the authorization; but, immediately thereafter, and continuing through March, replacements began to arrive until the manning attained a figure of 110 per cent. By 30 June, however, the assigned personnel numbered only 90 per cent of the authorized strength.

In April the ADDC created a new position in its Operations Section--an Intercept Control Technician. A lack of personnel and the necessary facilities had previously prevented this position from being manned, but with the communications now installed it functioned quite satisfactorily.

The situation concerning radar operators was much the same as that involving controllers in that the site received an influx of new personnel who were for the most part "3" level graduates of Air Force technical schools, with no practical experience and a need for a great deal of training. To alleviate this condition, an Operations Training NCO was appointed to conduct a course of classroom training and informal job training, in addition to the formal on-the-job training (OJT).[7]

Operations at Site P-53: Operations at Miyako Jima Air Station underwent a great improvement during the first half of 1957, particularly in the passing of traffic and in forward telling. Where it had taken 20 to 40 minutes to receive track numbers and flight plans from Sites P-54 and P-56 three or four months before, only four to eight minutes were now required to accomplish the same task.

The problem of personnel also experienced a distinct improvement--approximately 200 per cent, in fact. In February 1957, the Operations Section at P-53 was functioning with 14 personnel, and airmen first and second class were serving as crew chiefs. At mid-year there were 32 men on hand, two of them technical sergeants, the other four staff sergeants. Most of the additional personnel had recently graduated from the radar operators' course at Keesler AFB and been placed in OJT as soon as they reported for duty at Miyako. The OJT program was considered as satisfactory as could be expected under the circumstances, but it was felt that a 15-J-1C target simulator such as P-56 had, was highly desirable and would certainly be utilized to the maximum extent.

Internal and external communications at P-53 improved greatly during the historical period, as all positions within Operations were connected on a conference circuit, and all monitor boxes of HF, VHF, and UHF were moved from there to the new receiver building, eliminating approximately 90 per cent of the noise that had plagued the section. At the end of June another HF circuit to be used as a TAC net for all traffic other than that required for the normal forward telling of plots was in the process of installation. Besides this, a control technician's position was being constructed on the upper dais, thus solving the space problem connected with the teller's position and enabling the work load ordinarily performed by one harassed individual to be divided between two.[8]

Operations at Site P-54: The six-month period was uneventful at Kume Shima Air Station. In January, as has been related, the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator was off the air for 10 days while a Bendix overhaul team from SAMAP was renovating it. During February the physical arrangement of the equipment in the Operations building was changed to conform to uniform layout requirements and, at the same time, increase operating efficiency.[9]

THE 624TH AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING SQUADRON

The Squadron Mission.

The 624th AC&W Squadron was responsible for the tactical air defense activities of the North Sub-Sector of the Ryukyus Air Defense System, as outlined by 313th Air Division Regulation 55-18 of 26 January 1956, and

for providing navigational assistance to friendly aircraft. In the accomplishment of this primary portion of the mission, the 624th AC&W Squadron would be directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Operation and maintenance of radar, radio, telephone, and teletype equipment and associated equipment in support of the assigned mission.

2. Reporting of AC&W operational information as prescribed in pertinent regulations and directives.

3. Normal personnel, administration, and supply functions incident to the squadron.

4. Food service support for assigned personnel.

5. Security of all assigned facilities, equipment, and areas.

6. Emergency medical treatment and routine medical care for assigned personnel.

7. Processing and coordinating Site Concurrence letters (T.O. 31-1-J) with the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

8. Computing budgetary requirements incident to squadron operations.

9. Monitoring special projects incident to squadron operations.

10. Preventive maintenance on assigned buildings and facilities.[10]

The Squadron Organization.

The Headquarters of the 624th AC&W Squadron had been located at Yae Take Air Station (P-52) on northern Okinawa's Motobu Peninsula since 7 August 1956, acting as the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) for the North Sub-Sector of the Ryukyus Air Defense System. Early warning information was obtained from its single satellite site at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station (P-55), 60 miles north of Hedo Misaki, the northern tip of Okinawa.

Not long before, plans for opening a gap-filler radar site on the Japanese island of Takara Jima, in the Tokara Gunto, 110 nautical miles north of Okino-Erabu Shima, had progressed into the site survey stage;* and for some time it had looked as though it were merely a question of how soon construction would begin. An AN/TPS-1D light weight search radar there would plug the gap which existed below 8,000 feet in the coverage provided by AN/FPS-3 type radars at P-55 and P-9 (in southern Japan). When proceedings reached the point of discussions with the native landowners concerning the acquisition of land for the radar site, a TACAN installation, and an indispensable L-20 landing strip, however, the Air Force encountered so much reluctance to do business that Headquarters, USAF finally informed PACAF at a programming conference that Takara Jima should be given no further consideration as an AC&W site and was to be deleted from Volume 2 of the FEAF Operating and Budget Program.[11] Thus, all the time, effort, and travel expense already

*See pp. 379-409 of the 313th Air Division History for the period 1 January-30 June 1956 for a complete account of the Takara Jima gap-filler site.

devoted to the Takara project went down the drain.

The 624th AC&W Squadron was assigned directly to 313th Air Division, as it had been since 15 March 1955 when the parent 529th AC&W Group was inactivated. Logistic support was provided by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, while this headquarters retained operational control and the responsibility for administrative support.

Electronic Equipment of the 624th AC&W Squadron.

Site P-55 at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station was the only place in the Ryukyus Air Defense System lacking its complete arsenal of radar weapons as the year opened. But even this deficiency was made good before the six months were out. the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator being given its technical acceptance on 11 April to team up with the AN/FPS-3A surveillance set and AN/GPX-7 identification-interrogation equipment already in operation.

Site P-52 at Yae Take Air Station had long functioned with an AN/FPS-3 surveillance radar supplemented with AN/GPX-7 and an AN/FPS-6 height finder. An AN/GPA-30 video-mapper was installed at P-52 on 15 May and accepted as serviceable, but it was not actually used since the maps to be used with it had not yet arrived. It had also been contemplated that a video-mapping unit would be installed at P-55; this plan, however, was abandoned. Recording systems were scheduled for installation at both sites at some indefinite date in the near future.

Despite a large turnover of personnel and the fact that most incoming airmen were inexperienced men just out of school, the radar

maintenance sections at P-52 and P-55 managed to keep their equipment operational much of the time. Of some 500 hours' unscheduled off-the-air time for all radar equipment at both sites, more than 300 hours compresed time in which parts were being awaited. Much of this ROCP (radar out of commission for parts) time was logged because of inoperative magnetrons. Each time one of these parts became defective, a replacement had to be sent from Naha Base Supply, since a command-wide shortage of magnetrons precluded their being stocked at lower echelons. In several other instances a set was ROCP for several hours because the Service Stock at the site was not authorized to handle the needed part.

Other off-the-air time at Yae Take included nearly 28 hours spent in painting the flexible radome and 303 hours for annual overhaul of the AN/FPS-6 in March. In the light of subsequent events, this expensive radome painting by a civilian contract team was so much wasted money; for shortly afterward plans were announced for the installation of rigid arctic-type radomes beginning that summer.

Quality control figures on the surveillance radar at P-55 ran close to 100 per cent throughout the six months. At P-52 also they were nearly perfect in January, February, and March; then, in April, May, and June, they dropped to an average of 87 per cent. Since no important change in procedures had taken place, considerable thought was given to discovering the reason for this sudden drop in efficiency. The conclusion finally reached was that the quality of operations was probably no worse than before, but that the Operations Section was now

maintaining a more accurate account of quality controls, figuring the percentage for nearly every track that appeared on the scopes, instead of for only a "representative number" of tracks each shift. Although this discovery was slightly embarrassing in its exposure of unsuspected imperfections, it actually served a good purpose, as it caused maintenance personnel to seek ways in which target pick-up might be improved. The upshot was that operators began to observe better presentations, and, after old cables were replaced late in June, there was a perceptible improvement in the quality control figures.[12]

Communications in the 624th AC&W Squadron.

Communications personnel of the 624th AC&W Squadron fought an uphill battle during the period from 1 January through 30 June 1957 in their endeavor to provide the sites with adequate radio facilities. Since most of the equipment at P-55 was relatively new, keeping the necessary frequencies on the air there was less of a problem. At P-52, the ADDC, however, the obstacles were almost insurmountable.

If anything, the Direction Center needed to have the better communications equipment; but, as luck would have it, the system in use at Yae Take Air Station was the GTA-4, when a GTA-6 system should have been installed for such an operation. As the GTA-4 was used longer and longer, both the supply and maintenance problems grew more complex, parts for the ancient system being out of manufacture in some cases, and not stocked, even at depot level, in many other instances. This inability to obtain proper replacement parts frequently necessitated

unorthodox modifications to keep the system operational, and, as the modifications multiplied, the maintenance problem increased in complexity and time consumption.

As if this were not enough of a burden, P-52 suffered from a shortage of communications maintenance personnel during the period, never possessing more than 75 per cent of the number authorized to keep its outmoded equipment going. As a self-help measure, the site assigned eight 273X0 radar operators as receiver monitors on a temporary basis. In addition to serving as monitors, they also performed minor maintenance on the GTA-4 system.

Still another deterrent to good communications was the slow return of items sent to the depots for maintenance. As an example of this, eight units were sent to the depot in March to be repaired and returned, but only one had come back to Yae Take by the end of June.

Radio maintenance was also made difficult by the lack of adequate test equipment. Many of the communications units being used could have been greatly improved if the site personnel had had access to suitable testing devices.

The microwave terminal linking the Globecom Receiver Site on Ie Shima with the Globecom Communications Center at Kadena Air Base was completed at Yae Take during the period, and 16 MW circuits were put into operation, the 1962d AACS Squadron attaching personnel to maintain the terminal. Also activated was an FM circuit to the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) at Kadena, VHF "C" channel and teletype circuits

to Kadena and Okino-Erabu Shima. Site P-55 activated three ground-to-air UHF single channel units in April. On the other side of the coin, "Kadena Alert", an FM circuit, was inactivated.

Of all the various communications difficulties, those most directly affecting the operational status of the ADDC were connected with the UHF units. From March through June only six of the site's 10 UHF air-to-ground units were working. In many instances these outages were caused by shorted antennas, which it was believed, were produced by the high humidity and rain and by wind conditions at Yae Take. Communications officials recommended to higher headquarters that the more weather resistant AT-197 discone type antenna be substituted for the AS-505 being used. While awaiting action on this recommendation, personnel installed a waterproof cover on one antenna as an experiment. Since this was done late in the period, no conclusive results had become evident by the end of June.

Also undertaken as an experiment in June was the modification of one H-70-A/1C headset for use in the ADDC. It proved acceptable in the short time it was in use, but, again, more time would have to pass before its long-term usefulness could be known for certain.

Standard operating procedures for the preventive maintenance of all communications equipment were put into effect in May, with all units being inspected and maintained, where necessary, every two weeks.[13]

Squadron Operations.

From January through April there were a great many changes in the Operations Section at P-52, including a 100 per cent turnover in officer

personnel. The months of March and April also saw many new airmen assigned to the section, to alleviate the critical shortage of airmen which had afflicted the ADDC during the first two months of the year. This reinforcement in numbers proved to be no panacea, however, since only one of all the newly assigned directors had previously worked as an interceptor director--all of the others were just out of controller school--and about half of the new airmen were only "3" (apprentice) level. The only remedy for this was to increase the emphasis on training. Since most of this training was needed to familiarize the new arrivals with station procedures, an on-the-job training course was inaugurated for this purpose.

Emphasis was placed on cross-training for airmen in the 273 (radar operator) field. The crews on midnight and swing shifts assigned one man each night to radar maintenance and radio monitors, so that they could better understand the work of these sections. Also set up was a cross-training program with the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) at Naha AB. Four direction center airmen were scheduled to work with control center crews for 27 days, while a like number from the control center were training at the direction center. This exchange program continued through the end of the period with satisfactory results.

At the instance of this headquarters, new directors (1641's) arriving in January and February were sent to a two weeks' controller refresher course at Yuza Dake Air Station. Later, the length of the

school was shortened to one week, with a two-day cross-training period scheduled the following week. Again in May, all directors were ordered back to Yuza Dake for another week's schooling. While there was a beneficial exchange of ideas at the second course, most directors attending felt that it was little more than a repetition of the previous training and constituted, in fact, an interruption of their on-the-job training.

Another cross-training program in which the ADDC at P-52 participated was concerned with F-86D pilots from the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons at Naha. A different pilot lived on the site and observed operations each week, beginning in March. This program worked out very well and was assessed as mutually beneficial to the fighter squadrons and the ADDC.

Although there was a slight decrease in the number of intercepts run after March, P-52 continued to perform the functions of a direction center efficiently. An average of 270 practice intercepts were directed each month, in addition to which an average of 11 unknown aircraft were actually intercepted. About 400 friendly aircraft were given navigational assistance, while an average of 75 GCI/GCA descents were directed each month. Approximately 1,400 tracks were picked up and identified at an average inbound detection range of 189 nautical miles every month. Although P-55 was equipped to direct intercepts, its directors were occupied with other duties and controlled aircraft only in emergency situations. It did, however, provide navigational assiatance to friendly aircraft from time to time. Installation of the AN/FPS-6

height finder in April vastly increased Okino's value as a source of information, as well.[14]

Problems of Water Supply.

Obtaining enough water continued to be a problem at both Yae Take and Okino-Erabu Shima Air Stations as it had been ever since AC&W sites were first constructed there. On several occasions P-52 borrowed a trailer to carry supplemental supplies of water to Yae Take from the Army's Motobu Quarry some seven or eight miles distant. During these periods the site personnel found it necessary to curtail showers and washing of clothes. As bad as the situation was at Yae Take, however, it was far worse at Okino-Erabu Shima. There the people had to observe far more stringent water rationing, and, even so, were dependent upon water hauled from a spring near the port a great deal of the time.

The Air Force planners of Phase II of Project Airtight had taken cognizance of the acute water problem common to all isolated areas in the Ryukyus lying beyond the reaches of the Island-Wide Water System on Okinawa, particularly those at high elevations. Contract FEC-463, awarded to Sanko Kensetsu, provided for the construction of a water system, a dam and impounding basin, a 10,000-gallon water storage reservoir, five pump houses, and a septic tank at Yae Take. Contract FEC-464, which went to Kokuba Gumi, called for the construction of a water system, a hydropneumatic pump house, shoring of a cavern through which flowed a small stream and building of a dam therein, a 20,000-gallon water storage reservoir, and a chlorinator shed and sedimentation

basin at Okino-Erabu. All of this Phase II work at Yae Take had been completed and turned over to 313th Air Division on 13 April 1956, while that at Okino-Erabu Shima had been accepted on 9 October 1956.

Despite this heroic effort to provide sufficient water for the sites, both P-52 and P-55 continued to suffer water shortages, as described above, making it necessary to conduct surveys for new water sources. The situation at Okino was so dire, indeed, that Contract FEC-701, covering Phase III Airtight work at P-55, had been written to include the construction of a 750,000-gallon water reservoir, a filtration plant, and water storage "with a stone arch and lining." Before this extensive work could possibly be completed, though, many months would go by, and water would continue to be a commodity often requiring the same careful handling as POL products.

Looking ahead a bit, as is our prerogative, Hirose Industry completed all Phase III work at Okino-Erabu, including the water facilities, on 7 August 1957.[15]

Inadequate Supply Channels.

Supply personnel of the 624th AC&W Squadron found difficulty in performing their assigned duties during January and February because of an extreme shortage of personnel. As an indication of the situation, there was no NCOIC in headquarters supply from the first week in January until the last week of February. Service stock was manned by one airman for the first three weeks of the year, after which, with the addition of one other airman, it was manned until April. Fortunately, an influx of

new personnel in April did much to ease the crisis. Much the same situation was true of Site P-55.

New Unit Authorization Lists (UAL's) were submitted to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing in January. Until these UAL's were submitted and given interim approval, the organization was compelled to operate under UAL's which had been in use previous to the organizational realignment of the sites. Another project of the Yae Take supply section was the establishment of a bench stock at the motor pool in June.

While it was true that requests for electronic parts were generally handled expeditiously by the AC&W liaison officer at Naha base supply, other requisitions seemed to get no action at all. One type of item which was particularly hard to obtain was building maintenance materials. P-55 reported that it was unable to get nails, paint, and window screening month after month. The AIO section at P-52 had difficulty in procuring plumbing and electrical supplies, in addition to the items which Okino found hard to get.

One explanation of the unavailability of these items was that many of these classes were stocked in the retail store at Base Supply; so that, unless someone from the AC&W organization was on hand when the limited quantities were put on display, the organizations on base sent their shoppers in to pick up all that were available. Under this peculiar system it was conceivable that isolated units might never obtain some of the scarce items. The only way this situation might be

overcome would be through the working out of some plan whereby the AC&W sites and other outlying organizations would be given a priority on needed items before these were displayed in the retail store. P-55 greatly improved its supply operations in January by physically combining the service stock and unit supply into one activity.[16]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	HR, 623d AC&W Sq., Jan-June 1957, pp. 10-12.
2	--	Ibid., p. 15.
3	--	Ibid., pp. 16-17
4	--	Ibid., pp. 12-14.
5	--	Ibid., p. 16.
6	--	Ibid., p. 17.
7	--	Ibid., pp. 7-8
8	--	Ibid., pp. 14-15.
9	--	Ibid., p. 16.
10	--	313th ADR 23-9, sub.: Organization--Field: 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 30 Aug. 1956.
11	--	5th AF Daily Staff Journal, 24 Sept. 1957.
12	--	HR, 624th AC&W Sq., Jan.-June 1957, pp. 5-6.
13	--	Ibid., pp. 7-9.
14	--	Ibid., pp. 3-4.
15	--	Ibid., p. 16; Construction Contract Data, prepared by OKED, 15 Jan. 1957.
16	--	HR, 624th AC&W Sq., Jan.-June 1957, pp. 15-16.
--	31	Daily Staff Journals, Director of Materiel, Hq. 313th Air Div., 1 Jan.-30 June 1957.
	32	Daily Staff Journals, Director of Personnel, Hq. 313th Air Div., 1 Jan.-30 June 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
--	33	Daily Staff Journals, Office of Procurement, Hq. 313th Air Div., 13 March-30 June 1957.
--	34	Daily Staff Journals, Comptroller's Office, Hq. 313th Air Div., 1 Jan.-30 June 1957.
--	35	313th Air Div. Personnel Strength Reports, as of 31 Jan., 28 Feb., 31 March, 30 Apr., 31 May, and 30 June 1957.
--	36	Manpower and Organization Review, 18th Motor Vehicle Squadron, Kadena Air Base, APO 239, 11 July-31 August 1955.
--	37	A Study of the Manpower Problems of the 581st Air Resupply Group, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 10 August-25 September 1955.
--	38	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Survey of 51st Air Installations Squadron and Staff Study of 313th Air Division Communications and Electronics Functions, 10 Feb. 1956.
--	39	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div., to Comdr. 18th FBW, sub.: Transient Alert Section, 18th Air Base Group, 3 Jan. 1956.
--	40	Analysis of Availability of Fighter Pilots, 19 Sept. 1955.
--	41	Analysis of Manning of the Aircraft Maintenance and Supply Fields, n.d.
--	42	Memo., Hq. 313th Air Div., to Comdr., sub.: Manning Criteria, 8 Feb. 1956.
--	43	Memo., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr., sub.: Organization and Manning Requirements for the 313th Air Division Communications Functions, 24 Jan. 1956.

APPENDIX 1

KEY STAFF POSITIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1957

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

POSITION	NAME
COMMAND SECTION	
Commander	Brig. General William G. Hipps (1 January - 30 June)
Deputy Commander	Colonel Wallace C. Barrett (1 January - 30 June)
Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Charles P. Downer (1 January - 1 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Fred W. Bock (1 February - 30 June)
Aide de Camp	1st Lieutenant James D. Pewitt (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL	
Inspector General	Colonel Kermit R. Kann (1 January - 1 February)
	Colonel Leo C. Moon (1 February - 30 June)
Provost Marshal	Lieut. Colonel Richard J. Wade (1 January - 30 June)
Director of Inspections	Major Charles J. Pellerin (1 January - 30 June)
Maintenance Inspector	Major Lewis J. Villani (1 January - 2 June)
	Major Chester C. Napierkoski (2 June - 30 June)
Communications and Electronics Inspector	Captain Bert A. Steen (1 January - 30 June)

Position	Name
Supply Inspector	Major Dale P. Simpson (1 January - 16 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Belvie R. Lowrance (16 May - 30 June)
Administrative Inspector	1st Lieutenant Kenneth H. Kennedy (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE	
Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel Robert O. Rollman (1 January - 22 April)
	*Lieut. Colonel John F. Taylor (Ad'l Dy). (22 April - 2 June)
	Lieut. Colonel John A. McLaughlin (2 June - 30 June)
COMMAND ADJUTANT SECTION	
Command Adjutant	Captain Randolph L. Hall (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON	
Surgeon	Colonel Anthony Czerwinski (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN	
Staff Chaplain	Lieut. Colonel Richard M. Graham (1 January - 30 June)
HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION	
Commandant	Captain Oliver C. Kyle, Jr. (1 January - 6 May)
	Captain John F. Cooper (6 May - 30 June)

*Primary duty: Judge Advocate, Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group. Assigned additional duty as Staff Judge Advocate, Hq., 313th Air Division, per 313th AD GO 12, dtd. 15 April 1957.

Position	Name
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES	
Information Services Officer	Lieut. Colonel Frederick J. Betz (1 January - 30 June)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER	
Comptroller	Lieut. Colonel Rex V. Anderson (1 January - 13 April)
	Captain Charles E. Clarke (13 April - 25 June)
	Lieut. Colonel John E. Laybourn (25 June - 30 June)
Budget Officer	Captain Charles E. Clarke (1 January - 13 April)
	Vacant (13 April - 25 June)
	Captain Charles E. Clarke (25 June - 30 June)
Chief, Management Analysis Division	1st Lieutenant Patrick G. Wells (1 January - 30 June)
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE	
Director of Operations	Vacant (1 January - 18 February)
	Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston (18 February - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Donald V. Miller (1 January - 2 May)
	Vacant (2 May - 30 June)

Position	Name
Chief, Plans and Programs Division	Major James C. Finlayson (1 January - 24 January)
	Major Joe N. Swanger (24 January - 30 June)
Chief, Programs Branch	Major Joe N. Swanger (1 January - 24 January)
	Vacant (24 January - 30 June)
Chief, Plans Branch	Vacant (1 January - 12 April)
	Major Earl H. Singleton (12 April - 30 June)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Lieut. Colonel Peter F. English (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Air Defense Operations* Branch	Major John C. Baird (1 January - 1 February)
Chief, Defense Systems Operations Branch	Major James M. Jones, Jr. (1 February - 30 June)
Chief, Tactical Operations** Branch	Major James S. Kennedy (1 January - 1 February)
Chief, Electronics Warfare*** Branch	Major Ralph D. Terpening (1 January - 1 February)
Chief, Projects Branch	Major Ralph D. Terpening (1 February - 30 June)
Special Assistant for Operations Analysis	Mr. Jerry Goodman (Civilian) (1 February - 30 June)

*Air Defense Operations Branch abolished on 1 February 1957 and absorbed by Defense Systems Operations Branch.

**Tactical Operations Branch abolished on 1 February 1957 and absorbed by Defense Systems Operations Branch.

***Electronics Warfare Branch abolished on 1 February 1957 and absorbed by Projects Branch.

Position	Name
Chief, Standardization Team*	Major Robert M. Ryan, Jr. (1 January - 5 March)
Chief, Combat Operations Division	Lieut. Colonel James R. Geary, Jr. (1 January - 2 January)
	Lieut. Colonel William A. Beard (2 January - 30 June)
Chief. Operations Services Branch	Captain William T. Shelton (1 January - 22 April)
	Captain Thomas O. Batey (22 April - 30 June)
Chief, Communications Division	Lieut. Colonel William Y. Brown (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch	Major Frank A. Papcun (1 January - 2 June)
	Captain Walter A. Proft (2 June - 30 June)
Chief, Communications Systems Branch	Major John W. R. Johnson (1 January - 14 January)
	Vacant (14 January - 30 June)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Lieut. Colonel James F. Giddens (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Operational Intelligence Branch	Captain Rudolph H. Pestalozzi (1 January - 19 June)
	Vacant (19 June - 30 June)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Lieut. Colonel Benjamin P. Rambo (1 January - 24 May)
	Major Jack D. Alexander (24 May - 30 June)

*Standardization Team was discontinued with transfer of Major Ryan.

Position	Name
MATERIEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Materiel	Colonel Clemens K. Wurzbach (1 January - 3 June)
	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (3 June - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Materiel	Lieut. Colonel Lewis W. Chick, Jr. (1 January - 18 January)
	Vacant (18 January - 3 June)
	Major James T. Huckabay (Ad'l. Duty) (3 June - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (1 January - 3 June)
	Captain Michael V. Doran (3 June - 30 June)
Chief, Aircraft Supply Branch	Major Howard W. Peterson (1 January - 25 May)
	Vacant (25 May - 30 June)
Chief, General Supply and Services Branch	Captain Ralph H. Stem (1 January - 15 March)
	Vacant (15 March - 30 June)
Chief, Communications and Electronics Branch	Major Robert T. Kraus (1 January - 11 April)
	Major James P. Goss (11 April - 30 June)
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Rycom, and POL Officer	1st Lieutenant Cyrus B. Gittings (1 January - 30 June)
Damage Control Officer	Captain Michael V. Doran (1 January - 3 June)
	Captain Michael V. Doran (Ad'l Duty) (3 June - 30 June)

Position	Name
Chief, Maintenance Division	Lieut. Colonel Lewis W. Chick, Jr. (1 January - 18 January)
	Vacant (18 January - 25 January)
	Major James T. Huckabay (25 January - 30 June)
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	Captain Barton W. MacNeill (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Transportation Division	Lieut. Colonel Stanley E. Bradley, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Air Priorities Officer	2d Lieutenant Don E. Smith (1 January - 25 May)
	Vacant (25 May - 30 June)
Air Transportation Officer	1st Lieutenant Walter L. Apperson* (1 January - 30 June)
Surface Transportation Officer	CWO Gene A. Vincent (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Procurement Division#	Major Albert J. Sterm** (1 January - 11 March)
Chief, Installations Division##	Lieut. Colonel William W. Robertson (1 January - 27 May)
Assistant Civilian Chief, Installations Division##	Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 January - 27 May)
Chief, Real Property and Programs Branch##	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (1 January - 27 May)
Chief, Facilities Support Branch	Mr. Marion W. York (Civilian) (1 January - 27 May)

*Promoted to 1st Lieutenant effective 17 February 1957.

**Promoted to Major effective 18 February 1957.

#The Office of Procurement was designated as a separate staff agency effective 11 March 1957.

##The Office of Installations was designated as a separate staff agency effective 27 May 1957.

Position	Name
PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Personnel	Colonel James B. Cobb (1 January - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel George H. Johnson, II (1 January - 5 April)
	Lieut. Colonel Kathleen McClure (5 April - 30 June)
Chief, Officers' Division	Major James R. Cables (1 January - 6 May)
	Lieut. Colonel David B. Moody (6 May - 30 June)
Chief, Warrant Officers' and Airmen's Division	Lieut. Colonel David B. Moody (1 January - 6 May)
	CWO William A. McNease (6 May - 30 June)
Chief, Training and Utilization Division	Captain Harold E. Raleigh (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Personnel Services Division	Captain Stanley M. Reddicks (1 January - 5 April)
	Lieut. Colonel George H. Johnson, II (5 April - 30 June)
Staff Exchange Officer	Lieut. Colonel Irvin G. Anderson (1 January - 1 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Charles P. Downer (1 February - 30 June)
Dependents' School Officer	2d Lieutenant Noel H. McCoy (1 January - 30 June)
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT*	
Procurement Officer	Major Albert J. Stern (11 March - 30 June)

*The Office of Procurement, previously a division of the Materiel Directorate, was designated as a separate staff agency on 11 March 1957.

Position	Name
Chief, Contract Division	1st Lieutenant Arden B. Engebretsen (23 March - 30 June)
OFFICE OF INSTALLATIONS*	
Installations Officer	Lieut. Colonel William W. Robertson (27 May - 30 June)
Assistant Installations Officer, and Chief, Engineering Branch	Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann (Civilian) (27 May - 30 June)
Chief, Real Property and Programs Branch	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (27 May - 30 June)
Chief, Facilities Support Branch	Mr. Marion W. York (Civilian) (27 May - 30 June)
FIFTH AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO OKED	
FAFIR, OKED	Major Robert F. Kavanaugh (1 January - 6 April)
	Vacant (6 April - 3 June)
	Colonel Clemens K. Wurzbach (3 June - 30 June)
OFFICE OF ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	
Assistant for Safety	Major Ulmer L. Buchanan (1 January - 16 March)
	Vacant (16 March - 2 April)
	**Major Dean F. Schwendeman (2 April - 30 June)
Flying Safety Officer	Captain Roy L. Zink, Jr. (1 January - 12 March)
	Vacant (12 March - 2 April)
	Major Dean F. Schwendeman (2 April - 30 June)

*Office of Installations was designated as a separate staff agency effective 27 May 1957.
**Assigned primary duty as Flying Safety Officer, additional duty AS.

Position	Name
Commander, OSI District Office #3	Captain John P. Bayer (1 January - 29 January)
	Lieut. Colonel Lewis J. Kolb (29 January - 30 June)

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
18th Fighter Bomber Wing-Base Commander	Colonel Robert C. Orth (1 January - 1 February)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Commander	Colonel Robert C. Orth (1 February - 30 June)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel John C. Healey (1 January - 1 February)
	Colonel William S. Chairsell (1 February - 30 June)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Executive Officer	Vacant (1 January - 1 February)
	Colonel Britt S. May (1 February - 30 June)
18th Air Base Group Commander	Colonel Britt S. May (1 January - 1 February)
18th Air Base Group and Base Commander	Colonel William C. Adams (1 February - 30 June)
18th Communications Squadron* Commander	Major John W. Berge, Jr. (1 January - 1 May)
18th Installations Squadron Commander	Major Truman O'Keefe (1 January - 4 April)
	Lieut. Colonel John H. Buie (4 April - 30 June)
18th Air Police Squadron Commander	Captain James S. Roberts (1 January - 30 June)

*The 18th Communications Squadron was absorbed by the 13th Communications Squadron, effective 1 May 1957.

Position	Name
18th Food Service Squadron Commander	Captain Carold D. Pierce (1 January - 30 June)
18th Maintenance and Supply* Group Commander	Colonel William C. Adams (1 January - 1 February)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Alzie D. Donovan (1 January - 10 February)
	Major Chester C. Napierkoski (10 February - 25 March)
	Major George O. McMahan (25 March - 30 June)
18th Supply Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Jack E. Grapentine (1 January - 30 June)
18th Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Carmon M. Anderson (1 January - 30 June)
18th Fighter Bomber Group** Commander	Colonel Leo C. Moon (1 January - 1 February)
	Vacant (1 February - 30 June)
12th Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Warren S. Patterson, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
44th Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lucien K. Cox (1 January - 30 June)
67th Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander	Major Dean F. Schwendeman (1 January - 2 January)
	Lieut. Colonel Jesse C. Davis (2 January - 30 June)
18th Tactical Hospital and 6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel Anthony Czerwinski (1 January - 30 June)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Edgar L. Kiser (1 January - 30 June)

*The 18th Maintenance and Supply Group was reduced to a one and one basis on 1 February and was inactivated on 1 October 1957.

**The 18th Fighter Bomber Group was reduced to a one and one basis on 1 February and was inactivated on 1 October 1957.

Position	Name
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Weldon O. Huston (1 January - 30 June)
12th Aviation Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Maurice E. Murphy (1 January - 30 June)
13th Communications Squadron* Commander	Major William R. Walls (1 January - 1 May)
	Major John W. Berge, Jr. (1 May - 30 June)
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Commander	**Lieut. Colonel William E. Nuding, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
15th Weather Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lowell A. Schuknecht (1 January - 30 June)
15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight Commander	Captain Simpson J. Roper (1 January - 30 June)
17th Communications Construction Squadron Commander	Major William E. Hignite (1 January - 30 June)
322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter P. Williams (1 January - 30 June)
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot Commander	Major George E. Thompson (1 January - 30 June)
336th Fighter Day Squadron Commander	Major Richard J. Condrick (1 January - 30 June)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Major John W. Woodill (1 January - 30 June)
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lester L. Gaylord (1 January - 30 June)
6318th Armament and Electronics# Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Roland G. Fox (15 March - 30 June)

*The 13th Communications Squadron absorbed the 18th Communications Squadron, effective 1 May 1957.

**Promoted from major to lieutenant colonel, effective 16 April 1957.

#The 6318th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron was organized at Kadena Air Base on 15 March 1957.

Position	Name
6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) Commander	Major Robert E. Pasho (1 January - 30 June)
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile Commander	Major John M. Pledge (1 January - 30 June)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Base Commander	Colonel John H. Bell (1 January - 2 February)
	Colonel Paul E. Hoeper (2 February - 3 May)
	Colonel Robert L. Cardenas (3 May - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Ground Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (1 January - 2 February)
	Colonel William P. Farnell, Jr. (2 February - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Group Commander	Colonel Robert L. Cardenas (1 January - 3 May)
	Lieut. Colonel George C. Farr (3 May - 30 June)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Glenn E. W. Mann, Jr. (1 January - 1 May)
	Major Norman H. Frisbie (1 May - 30 June)
25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Hugh C. Slater (1 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Commander	Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
51st Communications Squadron Commander	Captain Rodney R. Helms (1 January - 20 May)
	Major John W. R. Johnson (20 May - 30 June)

Position	Name
51st Installations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Stanley R. Wilber (1 January - 30 June)
51st Air Police Squadron Commander	Major James L. Dixon, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
51st Maintenance and Supply Group Commander	Colonel Paul E. Hoeper (1 January - 2 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (2 February - 30 June)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Tadas J. Spelis (1 January - 14 June)
	Major Garland E. Cain (14 June - 30 June)
51st Supply Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Bernard M. Campbell (1 January - 2 February)
	Major Roland E. Deaton (2 February - 30 June)
51st Transportation Squadron Commander	Captain Thomas L. Newsom (1 January - 30 June)
51st Food Service Squadron Commander	Major John Marusiak, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
51st Tactical Hospital and 6351st USAF Dispensary Commander	Major Norman I. Condit (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division Commander	Major Carl Reese (1 January - 10 January)
	Captain Kerby P. Spencer (10 January - 6 June)
	Lieut. Colonel William A. Beard (6 June - 30 June)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Major Maurice W. Gouchoe (1 January - 3 January)
	Lieut. Colonel James R. Geary, Jr. (3 January - 30 June)

Position	Name
624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Major Emanuel A. Pelaez (1 January - 25 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Johnnie V. Haselby (25 February - 30 June)
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Calof (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Captain Raymond F. Kearney (1 January - 5 April)
	1st Lieutenant Andrew S. Jones (5 April - 30 June)

APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS

LET BY THE

313TH AIR DIVISION PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1957

Appendix 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1957

January: Twelve numbered contracts totalling $321,091.00 and 113 unnumbered contracts totalling $117,658.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-849 for $38,397.00 was awarded to State Construction Company for repair of roofs in the M & K area on Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-850 for $18,000.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Company for the repair of Base Supply Building 70 at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-851 for $172,328.38 was awarded to Western Pacific Corp. for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-852 for $4,975.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne for A-E services at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-853 for $10,125.15 was awarded to Yomitan Industries for Relocation and Modification of two quonsets at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-854 for $12,347.69 was awarded to Pan Pacific Co. for repair of the Little Theater at Naha Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-855 for $2,663.12 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi for construction of Weather Shelter at Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-856 for $18,621.36 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu for exterior painting of 144 temporary buildings at Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-857 for $4,575.69 was awarded to Sugawara Kensetsu for repair of Hirara Air Strip, Miyako Jima.

January: (j) Contract AF 62(321)-858 for $4,330.00 was awarded to Pacific Architect and Engineer Co. for A-E services for Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-859 for $8,227.96 was awarded to the Okinawa Times for printing the Vanguard for the 313th Air Division for a six month period.

Twelve numbered contracts totalling $186,016.91 and 89 unnumbered contracts totalling $107,875.49 were closed during January.

Two salvage contracts totalling $21,778.00 were written during January.

February: Six numbered contracts totalling $160,928.54 and 75 unnumbered contracts totalling $73,056.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-860 for $41,519.87 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for erosion control at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-861 for $36,228.50 was awarded to the State Construction Company for the maintenance of M116 fire bombs at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-862 for $2,353.00 was awarded to the Daido Construction Company for the construction of a retaining wall, Route 60, Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-863 for $49,996.27 was awarded to Yomitan Industries for erosion control at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-864 for $22,371.00 was awarded to Isa Construction Company for construction of maintenance apron and ramp at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-865 for $8,459.90 was awarded to Sagawa Kensetsu Construction Company for erosion control at Naha Air Base.

Three numbered contracts totalling $15,945.00 and 60 unnumbered contracts totalling $54,205.61 were closed in February.

Twenty-nine salvage contracts totalling $142,435.00 were written during February.

March: Twelve numbered contracts totalling $247,727.09 and 70 unnumbered contracts totalling $49,639.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-866 for $17,700.00 was awarded to State Construction Company for repair of typhoon damage to the Globecom Transmitter Building at Awase.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-867 for $33,670.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for maintenance of rocket motors (FFAR) at the 546th ASSD Area.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-868 for $14,400.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne Associates, Inc. for the A-E development of Kadena Annex No. 2, AVAMMO Area.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-869 for $21,360.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for exterior repainting of 19 airmen's dormitories and BOQ's at Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-870 for $12,500.00 was awarded to Asanuma Gumi for repairs to street lighting at Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-871 for $25,000.00 was awarded to E. V. Lane Corp. for the construction of jet engine test facilities at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-872 for $50,005.76 was awarded to Matsumura Gumi for the reroofing of airmen's dormitories, BOQ'x, and cafeterias at Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-873 for $24,475.72 was awarded to VIT Construction Co. for repair of 12th ADS facilities at Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-874 for $3,057.86 was awarded to Sagawa Kensetsu Kogyo for the erection of a security fence at the Naha Diesel Power Plant, Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-875 for $26, 524.00 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders, Inc. for exterior and interior painting and reroofing of permanent buildings at Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-876 for $1,577.87 was awarded to Daido Construction Co. for the construction of sidewalks in the Air Police, 25th FIS, Dependent School, and Vehicle Parking areas at Naha Air Base.

March: (1) Contract AF 62(321)-877 for $17,455.88 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for construction of one pyrotechnic storage building, one flammable storage building, a new road, and a parking area at Naha Air Base.

Ten numbered contracts totalling $213,608.37 and 115 unnumbered contracts totalling $131,739.42 were closed during March.

One salvage contract for $95,988.35 was written during March.

April: Twenty-five numbered contracts totalling $322,461.94 and 84 unnumbered contracts totalling $67,391.00 were awarded to contractors for procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-878 for $6,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (Services) for April, May and June 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-879 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for a blanket purchase agreement (Office Supplies) for April, May, and June 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-880 for $900.00 was awarded to Furugen Bros. Company, Ltd. for a blanket purchase agreement (Live Chickens) for April, May, and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-881 for $20,252.00 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for repair of warehouse buildings #735A, 740A, 773A, 775, and 793, at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-882 for $540.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (Services) for April 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-883 for $7,645.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for interior and exterior painting and for asphalt tile floors in buildings of the M & K Area, Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-884 for $33,425.83 was awarded to Notomi Kensetsu Company for reconstruction of a water storage tank at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-885 for $12,000.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for repair of tile roofs of Buildings T-160, T-161, T-162, and T-162A at Kadena Air Base.

April: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-886 for $3,718.89 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for a warning signal system for Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-887 for $2,645.45 was awarded to State Construction Co. for repair of the roof of Building 439 at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-888 for $12,031.49 was awarded to JHW, Inc. for the repair of typhoon shutters at Stilwell Park dependent housing area, Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-889 for $11,000.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for painting road and airfield pavement markers and for repair of hardstand signs at Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-890 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (Services) for April, May, and June 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-891 for $18,161.68 was awarded to JHW, Inc. for the repair of Buildings 240 and 244 at Kadena Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-892 for $54,309.62 was awarded to JHW, Inc. for the restoration of troop housing and dining facilities at the Deragawa Transmitter Annex.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-893 for $15,739.39 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for the repair of typhoon damage to recreational facilities at Kadena Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-894 for $600.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (Neoprene Kits) for April, May and June 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-895 for $23,684.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for painting airmen's dormitories at Kadena Air Base.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-896 for $3,000.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (Carbon Dioxide) for April 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-897 for $4,500.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (Services) for April, May, and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

April: (u) Contract AF 62(321)-898 for $500.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor & Co., Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (Services) for May 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-899 for $7,407.99 was awarded to Himiya Gumi Construction Co. for the repair of typhoon damage to seven permanent buildings at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-900 for $36,500.00 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Co. for the repair of typhoon damage at Kume Shima Air Station.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-901 for $3,804.90 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for the repair of typhoon damage to Buildings 3405, 3408, and 3409 at Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-902 for $26,095.70 was awarded to Matsumura Gumi for painting the exterior of 275 houses in Stearley Heights dependent housing area at Kadena Air Base.

One numbered contract for $12,583.62 and 113 unnumbered contracts totalling $137,365.58 were closed during the month of April.

Fifteen salvage contracts totalling $164,962.00 were written during April.

May: Forty-three numbered contracts totalling $1,718,746.13 and 159 unnumbered contracts totalling $113,416.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-903 for $204,000.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for the construction of 7th TDS facilities in the AVAMMO Area, 546th ASSD.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-904 for $132,500.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for replacement of typhoon shutters on 135 houses in Stearley Heights dependent housing area at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-905 for $10,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for a blanket purchase agreement (Office Supplies) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-906 for $5,524.06 was awarded to Oshiro Gumi for the repair of two lighted softball diamonds at Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-906 for $3,796.38 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for the construction of a security fence and driveway at the telephone exchange area at Naha Air Base.

May:

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-908 for $14,857.13 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Co. for repair of the road leading to the operations area at Yae Take Air Station.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-909 for $5,168.83 was awarded to Yomitan Industries for the repair of air terminals, ammunition igloos, and for erosion control of 12th ADS facilities in the Ordnance Storage Area, Kadena Air Base, necessitated by typhoon damage.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-910 for $4,500.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor & Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (automobile parts) for may and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-911 for $4,500.00 was awarded to Barclay Motors for a blanket purchase agreement (automobile parts) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-912 for $1,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for a blanket Purchase agreement (automobile parts) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-913 for $49,907.85 was awarded to Okisui Construction Co. for the construction and increasing of transformer banks and the installation of secondary wiring at Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-914 for $4,526.40 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders, Inc. for miscellaneous repairs and repainting of four temporary buildings at Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-915 for $18,347.09 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Co. for construction of a bus terminal at Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-916 for $15,313.92 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Co. for construction of three POL tanks at Kadena Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-917 for $11,993.75 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for repair of typhoon damaged temporary buildings at Bishagawa Billeting Annex.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-918 for $2,500.00 was awarded to Machinato Machine Shop for a blanket purchase agreement (service and parts) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

May:

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-919 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (service and parts) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321-920 for $2,000.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (paint) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-921 for $4,500.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical supplies) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-922 for $2,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for a blanket purchase agreement (office supplies) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-923 for $1,000.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (hardware) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-924 for $1,707.12 was awarded to Isa Construction Co. for trenching and backfilling for antenna cables and for excavation and backfilling of pits for guy anchors at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-925 for $12,000.00 was awarded to Consolidated Contractors for a blanket purchase agreement (hardware) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-926 for $4,500.00 was awarded to Consolidated Contractors for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical items) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-927 for $5,600.00 was awarded to Isa Construction Co. for repair of typhoon damage at Ie Shima.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-928 for $49,400.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coating Co. for exterior painting of miscellaneous buildings and structures at Kadena Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-929 for $46,000.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for reconstruction of warehouse building T-741 at Kadena Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321-930 for $18,456.02 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for construction of a concrete block motor pool building to replace a condemned quonset over an existing concrete slab at Naha Air Base.

May: (cc) Contract AF 62(321)-931 for $475,364.40 was awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Corp. for the repair of typhoon damage to temporary type dependent quarters at Morgan Manor, Jennings Area, and Arnold Terrace, Kadena Air Base.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-932 for $8,000.00 was awarded to Consolidated Contractors for a blanket purchase agreement (building materials) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(ee) Contract AF 62(321)-933 for $5,500.00 was awarded to Consolidated Contractors for a blanket purchase agreement (plumbing) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(ff) Contract AF 62(321)-934 for $92,950.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for the repair and painting of security fences at Kadena Air Base.

(gg) Contract AF 62(321)-935 for $925.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for the painting of airfield pavement markers in the 16th FIS and 25th FIS areas at Naha Air Base.

(hh) Contract AF 62(321)-936 for $28,925.47 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Co. for the construction of a warehouse to be used by Base Supply at Naha Air Base.

(ii) Contract AF 62(321)-937 for $2,629.82 was awarded to State Construction Co. for relocation of the KØ homing beacon tower at Kadena Air Base.

(jj) Contract AF 62(321)-938 for $685.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne Associates for design preparation of a project for dismantling the typhoon-damaged 18th Air Base Group Headquarters building at Kadena Air Base.

(kk) Contract AF 62(321)-939 for $45,792.50 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for the repair of typhoon-damaged electrical distribution and lighting facilities at Kadena Air Base.

(ll) Contract AF 62(321)-940 for $49,990.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for reconstruction of buildings T-2088 and T-2089 at Kadena Air Base.

(mm) Contract AF 62(321)-941 for $199,992.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for the reconstruction of eight nose docks at the flight line, Kadena Air Base.

(nn) Contract AF 62(321)-942 for $4,000.00 was awarded to Asanuma Gumi Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical) for May and June 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

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May: (oo) Contract AF 62(321)-943 for $50,000.00 was awarded to International Dairy Supply Co. for dairy products handling at Kadena Air Base.

(pp) Contract AF 62(321)-944 for $215,393.39 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for repair work on typhoon-damaged construction at Miyako Jima, Yae Take, Okino-Erabu Shima, and Yuza Dake Air Stations, and repair of the access road to the Senaga Shima ammunition storage area at Naha Air Base.

Five numbered contracts totalling $112,212.12 and 142 unnumbered contracts totalling $143,417.24 were closed in May.

Forty salvage contracts totalling $218,432.00 were written during May.

June: Fifty-three numbered contracts totalling $1,702,437.06 and 72 unnumbered contracts totalling $111,038.35 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-945 for $35,600.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for dismantling of Building T-1451 (the old Post Exchange warehouse) and construction of a new concrete block warehouse for the base commissary on the same site at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-946 for $4,810.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for top soiling, sodding, and overseeding the grounds of the Flight Simulator building, the Post Exchange, the Little Theater, the baseball diamond, Air Base Group Headquarters, and the Air Police operations area at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-947 for $21,866.60 was awarded to VIT Construction Co. for dismantling Building T-1990 (the Roads and Grounds Office) and rebuilding it in the form of a new concrete block structure at a different site on Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-948 for $2,700.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne Associates for architectural-engineering services for the construction of Nose Docks T-812 and T-814 at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-949 for $140,251.74 was awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Corp. for the complete dismantling of Buildings T-1 and T-5 (the old 313th Air Division Headquarters Building and the old Materiel, Intelligence, and 313th Air Division Communications Center Buildings) and construction of two new concrete-and-steel headquarters buildings in their place at Kadena Air Base.

June:

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-950 for $4,420.90 was awarded to VIT Construction Co. for construction of tie-down ring static grounding units for aircraft parking areas at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-951 for $16,802.23 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi for erosion control in the Community Center area at Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-952 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Office Machines for maintenance of office machines at both Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-953 for $2,500.00 was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers for Title I A-E services for a project to repair 200 GARIOA houses in the Machinato/ Naha dependent housing area.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-954 for $86,909.15 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for dismantling of the old quonset 18th Air Base Group Headquarters Building and the construction of a new concrete and steel headquarters building in its place.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-955 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Rycom Watch Center for the repair of aircraft clocks and watches for Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-956 for $800.00 was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers for Title I A-E services for design preparation of the revised drawing for Project NAH-130, Construction of a two-stall aircraft maintenance shelter at Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-957 for $18,700.20 was awarded to Tokyo Denki for maintenance and repair of electrical distribution system at Kadena Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-958 for $13,861.05 was awarded to Yomitan Industries for rehabilitation of Quonsets T-791, T-1823, T-1805 and T-1880, and for exterior utilities and rehabilitation of cafeteria building T-120 at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-959 for $844.00 was awarded to the National Cash Register Company for the maintenance of cash registers at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-960 for $50,000.00 was awarded to the Ryukyu Oil Corp. for delivery of diesel fuel oil and kerosene for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

June: (q) Contract AF 62(321)-961 for $10,369.78 was awarded to Sagawa Kensetsu Construction Co. for the restoration of three observation towers at the Ie Shima Bombing Range.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-962 for $16,344.10 was awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Corp. for the repair of existing Quonsets and construction of exterior electrical utilities and repair of Building T-2050 on the Kadena Flight Line.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-963 for $5,604.85 was awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Corp. for the replacement of windows in Buildings 228, 229, and 730 at Kadena Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-964 for $5,340.00 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for the installation of venetian blinds in six BOQ's at Naha Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-965 for $3,731.60 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for the repair of 17 security towers and seven sentry shelters in the 546th Ammo Storage Area at Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-966 for $20,327.40 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for exterior painting of dependent housing in Stilwell Park at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-967 for $16,407.63 was awarded to State Construction Co. for the procurement and installation of venetian blinds in 12 BOQ's at Kadena Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-968 for $29,851.80 was awarded to R. C. Williams & Co. for the purchase of 132 refrigerators for Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-969 for $2,800.00 was awarded to Okisui Construction Co. for the repair of airmen's barracks at Onna Point.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-970 for $1,828.20 was awarded to Nanyo Doken Construction Co., Ltd. for furnishing and installing asphalt tile flooring in Building T-4K at Kadena Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-971 for $20,720.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for the repair of nine airmen's barracks in the M&K Area at Kadena Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-972 for $220,869.77 was awarded to Y. Higa Enterprises, Ltd. for a blanket purchase agreement (packing and crating household goods for the Fiscal Year 1958) for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

June:

(cc) Contract AF 62(321)-973 for $125,690.35 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for the rehabilitation of airfield pavements at Naha Airfield.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-974 for $174,524.02 was awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Corp. for aircraft maintenance shelters at Naha Air Base.

(ee) Contract AF 62(321)-975 for $167,000.00 was awarded to State Construction Co. for the repair of 200 family dwellings in the Machinato/Naha housing area.

(ff) Contract AF 62(321)-976 for $100,000.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction Co. for the renovation of wooden office and household furniture and mattresses at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(gg) Contract AF 62(321)-977 for $8,679.00 was awarded to Hopkins and Munfrey for Title II - Services, Inspection, and Supervision of construction contract AF 62(321)-944 at Naha Air Base.

(hh) Contract AF 62(321)-978 for $1,245.00 was awarded to Hopkins and Munfrey for Title II - Services, Inspection, and Supervision of Performance of Project NAH-148-57 under contract AF 62(321)-900 at Naha Air Base.

(ii) Contract AF 62(321)-979 for 11,139.71 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for construction of an air conditioning system for Building 876 at Kadena Air Base.

(jj) Contract AF 62(321)-980 for $9,333.00 was awarded to Isa Construction Co. for a general base clean-up including demolition work at Kadena Air Base.

(kk) Contract AF 62(321)-981 for $11,042.85 was awarded to Nobaru Radio Shop for the installation of a Maintenance Expediter Intercommunications System at Kadena Air Base.

(ll) Contract AF 62(321)-982 for $10,914.37 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for electrical rewiring of one entire Tybase barracks, Building 725, at Kadena Air Base.

(mm) Contract AF 62(321)-983 for $4,698.00 was awarded to Daido Construction Co. for grass cutting and vegetation control in the 546th ASSD, 7th TDS, and 12th ADS areas of Kadena Air Base.

June: (nn) Contract AF 62(321)-984 for $38,620.00 was awarded to C. E. Harris Builders for repair of termite damage at Stilwell Park, Kadena AB.

(oo) Contract AF 62(321)-985 for $24,445.90 was awarded to R. C. Williams & Co., for 115 refrigerators for Naha Air Base.

(pp) Contract AF 62(321)-986 for $4,500.00 was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers for Title II - Services, Inspection, and Supervision of Performance of Projects NAH 117, 118, and 130-57 under Air Force contract AF 62(321)-974 at Naha Air Base.

(qq) Contract AF 62(321)-987 for $49,892.84 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for 399 dryers for Kadena Air Base.

(rr) Contract AF 62(321)-988 for $49,947.20 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for 310 washers for Kadena Air Base.

(ss) Contract AF 62(321)-989 for $1,982.00 was awarded to Shonan Kogyo for an addition to Building 1715, the residence of the Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division, at Kadena Air Base.

(tt) Contract AF 62(321)-990 for $2,814.19 was awarded to Daido Construction Co. for construction of a parking area for the Clayton Mess Hall at Kadena Air Base.

(uu) Contract AF 62(321)-991 for $2,900.00 was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers for Title II - Services, Inspection, and Supervision of Performance of Project NAH-1-57, under Air Force contract AF 62(321)-973 at Naha Air Base.

(vv) Contract AF 62(321)-992 for $15,880.00 was awarded to Shonan Kogyo for furnishing and installation of asphalt tile in H-type barracks at Kadena Air Base.

(ww) Contract AF 62(321)-993 for $4,500.00 was awarded to Pacific Architects and Engineers for Title II - Services, Inspection, and Supervision of Project NAH-238-57, Repair of 200 houses in the Machinato/Naha housing area under Contract AF 62(321)-975.

(xx) Contract AF 62(321)-994 for $41,625.00 was awarded to R. C. Williams & Co. for 185 refrigerators for Kadena Air Base.

June: (yy) Contract AF 62(321)-995 for $8,735.55 was awarded to Kishi Gumi & Co. for the construction of sidewalks and parking areas at Kadena Air Base.

(zz) Contract AF 62(321)-996 for $49,725.00 was awarded to R. C. Williams & Co. for 221 refrigerators for Kadena Air Base.

(aaa) Contract AF 62(321)-997 for $10,342.08 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for 36 washers and 36 dryers for Kadena Air Base.

Fifty-seven numbered contracts totalling $59,012.41 and 26 unnumbered contracts totalling $139,507.72 were closed during June.

Eight salvage contracts totalling $49,869.00 were written during June.

APPENDIX 3

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS

313TH AIR DIVISION

JANUARY - JUNE 1957

SECRET

313TH

COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
JAN-MAR 1957

6/6085

SECRET

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COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY
COMPTROLLER
HEADQUARTERS, 313 TH AIR DIVISION
APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND-MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

Rex V. Anderson
REX V. ANDERSON
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER


GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
JAPAN
SHANGHAI
30 N 123 E
30 N 145 E
EAST CHINA SEA
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
IWO JIMA
313TH A.D.
TIAWAN
23 N 123 E
23 N 132 E

AIRFIELD STATUS



STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



COMMAND: The Command rate of 7.3% reported during the month of March, is our highest rate in over a year. Our average rate has been 6.2% for the past three months as compared to 5.7% for all Fifth Air Force Units.

Hq. 313TH A.D.: The Headquarters, 313th Air Division rates of 2.6% and 2.7% reflect our lowest rates since April 1956. Our average rate has been 2.9% for the past three months.

J 7 7 8

REPORTING



51ST FIW: Their rate of 6.7% reported during the month of March is the highest rate for this Wing in over a year. Their monthly average has been 4.4% for the past three months, slightly below the 5.7% for Fifth Air Force Units.

18TH ABG: Having reported 61% of the total number of late reports submitted by the Division during the past quarter, it is apparent a number of problems exist. Their average rate over the past three months has been 9.4%.

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW — F-86D 1 JAN — 31 JAN



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	185	445	22	125	260	650	44	225	130	195
FLOWN	194	476	15	167	136	748	3	142	141	70

Upon completion of the first month of training under the revised Fifth Air Force Regulation 51-10, the 51st FIW has completed 83.4% of its overall F-86D training requirements. The visual attack phase of training has the lowest percent of accomplishment at the present time.

J 7 8 1

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51 ST FIW — F-86 1 JAN — 28 FEB



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	373	897	44	251	524	1310	88	449	262	393
FLOWN	396	1202	37	383	361	1458	43	143	321	167

During the period 1 Jan thru 28 Feb the 51st FIW has completed 83.7% of its overall F-86D training requirements, a slight improvement over the previous month. All phases under the desired 100% reflected an improvement over the previous month with the exception of the Weapons Phase which decreased to 32% and has the lowest percent at the present time.

J 7 8 2

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW—F-86D 1 JAN-31 MAR



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	561	1349	66	378	788	1970	132	675	394	591
FLOWN	691	1796	65	525	559	2287	90	226	568	376

During the period 1 Jan thru 31 Mar the 51st FIW has completed 86.4% of its overall F-86D training requirements, a 2.7% increase over the previous month. All phases under the desired 100% reflected an improvement. The Simulated Flame-Out phase reflected the greatest improvement, while the weapons phase, reflecting a slight increase, continues with the lowest rate.

U 7 8 3

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS — F-86F 1 JUL — 31 JAN



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	440	1170	366	236	218	867	73	1380	863
FLOWN	321	832	790	346	376	495	12	1536	1023

The 336th Fighter Day Squadron has accomplished 84.1% of its overall training program for the period 1 July thru 31 January. This is a 2.5% increase over the previous period. Their lowest percent of accomplishment continues to be the Simulated Emergency Flight Phase.

J 7 8 4

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS — F-86F 1 JUL — 28 FEB



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	488	1298	408	262	242	963	81	1540	959
FLOWN	350	917	872	358	387	535	17	1613	1057

The 336th Fighter Day Squadron has accomplished 83.8% of its overall F-86F crew training program for the period 1 July thru 28 February. This is a slight decrease from the previous month. Three phases remain below the 100% desired, with the Simulated Emergency Flight phase reporting the lowest percent of accomplishment.

J 7 8 5

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS – F-86F 1 JUL – 31 MAR



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	530	1410	444	284	263	1047	88	1680	1043
FLOWN	386	980	962	362	392	605	22	1773	1122

The 336th FDS has accomplished 84.1% of its overall F-86F training requirements during the period 1 July thru 31 March. This is a slight increase over the previous month. The Simulated Emergency Flight and Instrument phases continue to remain below the desired 100%.

1786

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

COMMAND



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	178	104	104			
ASSIGNED	170	94	88			
OPNL READY	140	77	75			

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - - -

February: The Command reflected a net loss of 74 authorized spaces, 76 assigned and 63 operational ready crews. This decrease was brought about by the reorganization of the 18th FBW and the loss of operational control of the 322nd TCS. As a result of this change manning decreased from 95.5% to 90.3% and the operational ready rate decreased from 82.4% and 81.9%.

March: The loss of 6 assigned and 2 operational ready crews resulted in a decrease of manning from 90.3% to 84.6%, however, increased the operational ready rate from 81.9% to 85.2%.

J 7 8 7

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

51ST FIW



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	74	74	74			
ASSIGNED	71	70	68			
OPNL READY	65	66	65			

ASGD/AUTH ——— ----- O/R/ASGD

51ST FIW: With a net loss of 3 assigned crews and only a slight change in operational ready crews during the past quarter, manning decreased from 95.9% to 91.8% and the operational ready rate increased from 91.5% to 95.6%. Three crews remain to qualify. A monthly average of 90.2% of their assigned crews have been operational ready for the period 1 December thru 28 February as compared to 93.1% for Fifth Air Force F-86D Units.

J 7 8 8

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



16TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		25TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
37	37	37				AUTHORIZED	37	37	37			
35	34	35				ASSIGNED	36	36	33			
33	32	33				OPNL READY	32	34	32			

ASGD/AUTH ——— ----- O/R/ASGD

16TH FIS: With the gain of 1 assigned crew during the month of March the manning rate returned to 94.5% after a decrease to 91.8% in February. The operational ready rate remains at 94%.

25TH FIS: With a loss of 3 assigned crews during the quarter their manning decreased from 97.3% to 89.2%. This drop in assigned crews, however, increased the operational ready rate from 88.9% to 97%.

7 8 9

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30			
ASSIGNED	30	24	20			
OPNL READY	18	11	10			

336TH FDS: With a net loss of 10 assigned and 8 operational ready crews during the past quarter, manning has decreased from 100% to 66.7% and the operational ready rate dropped from 60% to 50%. This turnover in personnel for the most part explains the reason for their decline in manning and operational ready crews. A monthly average of 62% of their assigned crews have been operational ready for the period 1 December thru 28 February as compared to 61.5% for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units.

3190

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
HOURS FLOWN	1128	1118	1140			
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	45	45	42			
ASSIGNED CREWS	71	70	68			

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
HOURS FLOWN	623	556	576			
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	25	25	25			
ASSIGNED CREWS	30	24	20			

= AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

= AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

— = 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

— — — = 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

51ST FIW: The possessed F-86D aircraft averaged 25.6 hours monthly during the past quarter, while Fifth Air Force Units averaged 25.1 during January and February. The assigned F-86D crews averaged 16.2 hours for the past quarter, while Fifth Air Force Units averaged 17 hours During January and February.

336TH FDS: The possessed F-86F aircraft averaged 23.4 hours monthly during the past quarter, while Fifth Air Force Units averaged 26.1 hours during January and February. The assigned F-86F crews averaged 24.2 hours during this quarter, while Fifth Air Force Units averaged 27.4 hours in January and February.

0791

AIR DEFENSE

SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	57	41	27			
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	19	16	17			
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	38	25	10			
	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	1	2	1			
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	0	1	0			
6	INTERCEPTED	37	22	9			

LINE 2+3=LINE 1
LINE 4+5+6=LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts has been 93.1% during the period 1 January thru 31 March. The rate of unknown tracks has been 15.6 during this period, with 8,019 tracks processed and 125 unknown. The percent of successful intercepts as determined by this headquarters differs from higher headquarters in as much as targets identified prior to interception are not considered as an unsuccessful attempt.

1192

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 JANUARY 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-100D	F-86D	F-86F	C-54D	SA-16	F-84G	RF-84F	B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
18TH FBW	2		46					2	3	3			8							64
322ND TCS				9	3															12
12TH FBS						30							2							32
15TH TRS							18						2							20
KADENA TOT	2		46	9	3	30	18	2	3	3			12							128
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		45							1		1	3	7							57
NAHA TOT.		45							1		1	3	7							57
313TH TOT.	2	45	46	9	3	30	18	2	4	3	1	3	19							185

Kadena AB: During the month of January Kadena Air Base reflected a gain of 2 F100D's, 2 C54D's and 1 T-33A. Losses were 23 F-86F's, 1 C119 and 1 C-47.

Naha AB: During the month Naha Air Base reflected a loss of 3 F-86D's and 1 C-47. No gains were reported.

3194

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

28 FEBRUARY 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT													
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100	F-84G	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16A	B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33								TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	25							2	3	3			7								40
18 FBW	12		32																		44
322 TCS						7	3														10
12FBS-15TRS				29	18								4								51
KADENA TOT	37		32	29	18	7	3	2	3	3			11								145
NAHA AB																					
51ST FIW		45							1		1	2	8								57
NAHA TOT.		45							1		1	2	8								57
313TH TOT.	37	45	32	29	18	7	3	2	4	3	1	2	19								202

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 30 F100D's and a loss of 9 F-86F's, 1 F84G, 2 C54D's, and 1 T-33A during the month.

Naha Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 T-33A and a loss of 1 L20 during the month.

1795

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 MARCH 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	F-84G	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16	B-26	C-47	C-1119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	25							2	3	3			6							39
18 FBW	3		78	8									4							93
322 TCS						8	3													11
15 TRS					18								2							20
KADENA TOT	28		78	8	18	8	3	2	3	3			12							163
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		42							1		1	2	7							53
NAHA TOT.		42							1		1	2	7							53
313TH TOT.	28	42	78	8	18	8	3	2	4	3	1	2	19							216

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 46 F100D's, 1 C-54D, 1 T-33A and a loss of 9 F-86F's and 21 F-84G's.

Naha Air Base: Reported a loss of 3 F-86D's and 1 T-33A. No gains reported.

1196

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OPERATIONAL READY	68.1	71.2	76.2			
% ANORM SKED	12.1	10.3	8.5			
% ANORM UNSKED	13.9	14.1	13.7			
% ANORS	5.9	4.4	1.6			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

COMMAND: During the past quarter our assigned tactical units have reflected an increased operational ready rate. Our present rate is well over the desired 70% standard. This improving trend can be attributed to the fact that scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 3.8%, while the ANORS rate dropped 4.3%. Our ANORS rate is presently 3.4% below the desired standard.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



51ST FIW: The operational ready rate of 74.7% is the highest reported by the Wing since the revision of AFR 65-110 and the second consecutive month they have been over the desired 70% standard. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 3.4% to contribute towards this improvement, while the ANORS rate decreased 7.9% to give the largest assistance in reaching the operational ready goal. The ANORS rate is presently 3% below the standard.

1198

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



16TH FIW JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		25TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
51.4	63.8	76.3				% OP READY	75.8	76.8	74.5			
13.4	9.2	5.4				% ANORM SKED	7.3	9.9	10.4			
20.0	14.7	15.8				% ANORM UNSKED	12.6	13.3	14.6			
15.2	12.3	3.5				% ANORS	4.3	0.0	0.5			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

16TH FIS: Their operational ready rate has reflected a 23.9% increase during the past quarter. Their present rate of 75.3% is the highest obtained by this unit since revision of AFR 65-110. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance reflected a 12.2% decrease, while the ANORS rate declined 11.7% to assist in obtaining the 70% operational ready rate. The ANORS rate is presently 1.5% below the standard.

25TH FIS: Their operational ready rate has been over the desired standard for the fifth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance reflected a slight increase during the quarter, while the ANORS rate reported a 3.8% decrease and is presently well below the standard.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	76.3	72.5	78.8			
% ANORM SKED	11.6	11.6	9.7			
% ANORM UNSKED	11.8	14.5	10.5			
% ANORS	1.3	1.4	1.0			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

336th FDS: Their operational ready rate has been over the desired 70% standard for the fourth consecutive month. The 6.3% increased operational ready rate during March can be attributed to a decrease in scheduled, unscheduled maintenance and ANORS. The ANORS rate continues to remain below the established standard.

J 8 0 0

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	73.5	62.1	49.6			
% ANORM SKED	13.9	9.7	4.3			
% ANORM UNSKED	10.8	24.1	35.7			
% ANORS	1.8	4.1	10.4			

18th FBW: The conversion to F-100D's and the phase out of F-86F and F-84G type aircraft are the primary cause factors for the decline in the operational ready rate. The F-100D operational ready rate for March was 40.3%, while the F-84G rate was 78.3% and the F-86F rate was 36%. The F-100D rate, however, represents 69% of the total aircraft hours possessed by the Wing. The increasing unscheduled maintenance and ANORS are the areas involved in the drop of the operational ready rate. In March the F-100D unscheduled rate was 45.4% and the ANORS rate was 10.9%.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
61.3	65.0	76.5				% OP READY	52.4	68.7	63.1			
11.3	3.7	6.3				% ANORM SKED	13.9	10.1	14.0			
20.5	23.1	16.2				% ANORM UNSKED	14.8	8.5	9.5			
6.9	8.2	1.0				% ANORS	18.9	12.7	13.4			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5. % ANORS STD — % ANORS

322nd TCS: Their operational ready rate has reflected a definite increase during the past quarter and is presently 6.5% above the desired standard. A 9.3% decrease in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and a 5.9% drop in the ANORS rate are the reasons for the improved operational ready rate. The ANORS rate is presently 4% below standard.

15th TRS: Their operational ready rate decreased 5.6% in March, after a 16.3% increase during the month of February. The present rate is 6.9% below the standard. A 4.9% increase in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and a slight increase in the ANORS rate account for the decline in the operational ready rate. The high ANORS rate continues to present a problem.

J 8 0 2

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	42702	36290	41181			
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	2387	2359	2682			
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	2474	2017	1507			

= $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

COMMAND: Our vehicle out of commission rate decreased from 11.4% to 10.2% during the past quarter. This decline can be attributed to the decreasing VDM rate, however, the high VDP rate continues to place the combined rate well over the desired 5% standard. Our average monthly vehicle out of commission rate has been 11.2% during the past quarter as compared to 15.1% during the 1 Oct thru 31 Dec period.

J 8 0 3

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN			JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	11946	10279	11739				1	VEH DAYS ASGD	30756	26011	29442			
2	229	306	236				2	DAYS DP	2158	2053	2446			
3	75	46	126				3	DAYS DM	2399	1971	1381			

▨ = $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$ ▦ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

51ST FIW: For the fourth consecutive month their vehicle out of commission rate has remained below the 5% standard.

18TH ABG: Their vehicle out of commission rate continues in excess of the desired standard. The maintenance rate has reflected a declining trend for the past 5 months. Their excess VDP rate is explained as follows: "Central Reimburseable funding for Technical Service property has been abolished, and due to lack of Base funds, no replenishment requisitions have been submitted to Rycom Ordnance since 1 November 1956. This has resulted in depletion of Base stocks and an inevitable increase of VDPs.

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 JANUARY 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1072	978	91	8489	8183	96	477	450	94	4957	4838	98
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	840#	762%	91	6400	6217	97	458	432	94	4338	4248	98
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	500	452	90	3372	3325	99	191	182	95	1741	1673	96
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	340	310	91	3028	2892	95	267	250	94	2597	2575	99
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	89	84	94	138	159	115	55	61	111	7	12	171
KADENA												
18TH FB WG (ATCHD)	307	277	90	2695	2589	96	267	250	94	2597	2575	99
322ND TCS MED (SP)(ASGD)	69	71	103	193	222	115				16	21	131
13 & 17 COMM SQ (ASGD)	16	13	81	370	315	85		1		40	38	95
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ (ATCHD)	33	33	100	333	303	91						
15TH ACI FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
6333 TECH TNG SQ (ASGD)	13	8	61	51	37	72	1					
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	232	216	93	1855	1802	97	134	119	89	1434	1403	98
623 & 624 AC&W SQ (ASGD)	66	48	73	602	640	106	1	1	100	244	199	82
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	14	10	71	150	137	91						
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	232	216	93	2089	1966	94	19	18	95	619	590	95
TOTAL PIPELINE		14			262							

Includes 26 WO's % Includes 21 WO's

Officers: The Command assigned unit officer manning remained constant due to the net loss of 15 authorized spaces and 18 in the assigned strength. Airmen: The net loss of 189 in assigned strength and 61 authorized spaces resulted in a 2% drop in manning. Civilian: The DAFC manning reflected a slight increase with the loss of 2 authorized spaces and a gain of 3 in the assigned strength. The indigenous manning declined with a loss of 29 in the assigned strength and a gain of 24 authorized spaces.

J 8 0 6

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 28 FEBRUARY 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1090	995	91	8574	8295	97	515	443	86	4932	4663	94
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	647#	585%	90	5358	5135	96	487	360	74	4221	3912	93
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	457	411	90	3253	3164	97	190	176	93	1705	1584	92
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	190	174	92	2105	1971	94	297	184	62	2516	2328	92
HQ 313TH AIR DIVISION	89	87	98	138	157	114	55	57	104	7	11	157
KADENA												
18TH AB GP (ATCHD)	157	140	89	1772	1597	90	297	184	62	2516	2328	92
336TH FD SQ (ASGD)	37	30	81	132	126	95						
13 & 17 COMM SQ (ASGD)	16	10	62	370	324	88		1		40	37	92
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ (ATCHD)	33	34	103	333	374	112						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	234	215	92	1848	1833	99	134	117	87	1414	1390	98
623 & 624 AC&W SQ (ASGD)	66	54	82	602	579	96	1	1	100	244	146	60
DET #1-313TH AIR DIV (ASGD	14	13	93	150	132	88						
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	443	410	92	3216	3160	98	28	83	230	711	751	106
TOTAL PIPELINE		7			249							

Includes 18 WO's % Includes 24 WO's

Officers: Due to the reorganization of the 18th FBW the Command assigned unit officer manning decreased with a net loss of 177 in the assigned strength and 193 authorized spaces. Airmen: Airmen manning also reflected a slight drop in manning with a net loss of 1,042 authorized spaces and 1,082 in assigned strength. Civilian: The DAFC and Indigenous manning reflected a definite decrease due to the reorganization. Paper transfer of personnel from the 18th FBW to the 18th ABG has not been completed, but should be in alignment by 31 March 1957.

J 8 0 7

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 MARCH '1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1083	988	91	8400	8450	101	511	485	95	4915	4664	95
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	642#	574%	89	5336	5287	99	486	460	95	4221	3919	93
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	457	406	89	3250	3227	99	190	178	94	1705	1550	91
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	185	168	91	2086	2060	99	296	282	95	2516	2369	94
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	89	83	93	138	148	107	55	57	104	7	7	100
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GROUP (ATCH	152	135	89	1753	1710	97	296	282	95	2516	2369	94
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	37	30	81	132	147	111						
13TH & 17TH COMM SQ (ASDG	16	10	62	367	314	85				40	39	97
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ (ATCHD)	33	33	100	333	350	105						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	234	214	91	1848	1816	98	134	121	90	1414	1341	95
623RD & 624TH AC&W (ASGD)	66	53	80	602	639	106	1	-	-	244	163	67
DET #1-313TH AIR DIV (ASGD)	14	14	100	150	150	100						
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	441	414	94	3064	3163	103	25	25	100	694	745	107
TOTAL PIPE LINE		13			439							

#Includes 18 WO'S %Includes 24 WO's

Officers: Assigned Unit officer manning reflected a 1% decrease during the month due to a net loss of 11 in the assigned strength and 5 authorized spaces. **Airmen:** Assigned Unit airmen manning reflected a 3% increase with a net gain of 152 in the assigned strength and 22 authorized spaces. **Civilian:** The DAFC manning for assigned units increased 21% due to the completion of paper transfer of personnel from the 18th FBW to the 18th ABG. Indigenous manning remained constant at 93%.

J 8 0 8

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
GEN	AUTH	3	2	2			
	ASGD	1	1	1			
	% MANNED	33	50	50			
COL	AUTH	15	12	12			
	ASGD	15	12	12			
	% MANNED	100	100	100			
L/COL	AUTH	57	49	49			
	ASGD	46	40	43			
	% MANNED	81	82	88			
MAJ	AUTH	130	103	103			
	ASGD	111	87	84			
	% MANNED	85	84	81			
CAPT	AUTH	282	227	226			
	ASGD	249	185	185			
	% MANNED	88	81	82			
LTS	AUTH	327	236	232			
	ASGD	319	236	225			
	% MANNED	98	100	97			
WO	AUTH	26	18	18			
	ASGD	21	24	24			
	% MANNED	81	133	133			
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	840	647	642			
	ASGD	762	585	574			
	% MANNED	91	90	89			
	PROJ'D				554	520	520

J 8 0 9

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
M/SGT	AUTH	426	327	327			
	ASGD	336	252	253			
	% MANNED	79	77	77			
T/SGT	AUTH	652	496	496			
	ASGD	501	377	400			
	% MANNED	77	76	81			
S/SGT	AUTH	1622	1352	1350			
	ASGD	852	684	734			
	% MANNED	53	51	54			
A/1C	AUTH	2106	1804	1793			
	ASGD	1056	878	993			
	% MANNED	50	49	55			
A/2C	AUTH	1447	1251	1242			
	ASGD	2218	1786	1749			
	% MANNED	153	143	141			
* A/3C	AUTH	147	128	128			
	ASGD	1254	1158	1158			
	% MANNED	853	905	905			
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	6400	5358	5336			
	ASGD	6217	5135	5287			
	% MANNED	97	96	99			
	PROJ'D				5309	5507	5590

* INCLUDES A/B

J 8 1 0

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	JANUARY AUTH	JANUARY ASGD *	JANUARY % MANNED	FEBRUARY AUTH	FEBRUARY ASGD *	FEBRUARY % MANNED	MARCH AUTH	MARCH ASGD *	MARCH % MANNED	APRIL AUTH	APRIL ASGD *	APRIL % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	268	230	86	309	254	82						
	5	1070	889	83	1126	998	89						
	3	440	617	140	474	620	131						
	1	21	14	67	22	10	45						
18TH ABG	7	497	469	94	186	266	143						
	5	1469	1359	93	862	821	95						
	3	709	665	94	491	414	84						
	1	71	103	145	52	87	167						
51TH FIW	7	313	280	89	314	286	91						
	5	1047	1030	98	1044	1081	103						
	3	440	418	95	435	417	96						
	1	55	37	67	55	36	65						
COMMAND TOTALS	7	1078	979	91	809	806	99						
	5	3586	3278	91	3032	2900	96						
	3	1589	1700	107	1400	1451	104						
	1	147	154	105	129	133	103						

* PAFSC

The Command 7 and 5 skill levels increased 8% and 5%, respectively, during the month of February, while the 3 and 1 levels decreased 3% and 2%. The reorganization of the 18th FBW resulted in a transfer of personnel to the 18th ABG during February, however, authorisation changes are not effective until 1 March, therefore a true picture of manning will not be reflected for February.

PROBLEM AREAS

31 JANUARY 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
6424	Supply Officer	55	35	49	69
7324	Personnel Officer	34	31	48	91
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	5	50	71
3034	Communications Off	28	22	41	79
3044	Ground Electronics Off	7	3	100	43
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	0	0	0
291X0	Comm Center Spec	164	113	53	69
361X0	Cable & Ant Sys Spec	78	62	52	79
472X0	Gnd Pow Equip Oper	82	68	40	83
641X2(74)	Supply Records	83	69	66	83
672X0	Accounting	21	16	50	76
77XXX	Air Police	541	408	64	75
922X0	Pers Equip & Surv	50	41	69	82

Althought the above figures indicate that AFSC's 1616, 3034 and 3044 are not within the purview of problem areas, they are required at remote sites and must be manned at 100%. The low percent of skilled personnel continues to be the big problem in the remaining areas.

1812

PROBLEM AREAS

28 FEBRUARY '1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	8	25	110
3034	Communications Off	28	22	63	79
3044	Ground Electronic Off	7	2	100	29
6424	Supply Off	47	32	43	68
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
7024	Administrative Off	19	17	53	89
7324	Personnel Off	28	22	45	78
291X0	Comm Center Sp	171	124	47	73
361X0	Cable & Ant Sys Spec	94	65	56	69
472X0	Gnd Pow Equip Oper	86	64	63	74
561X0	Electrician	45	42	68	93
641X2(74)	Supply Records Spec	109	57	61	52
732X0	Personnel	185	180	67	97

AFSC's 1616, 3034 and 3044 still require 100% manning, which is not available. The majority of the remaining problem areas reflect good manning however, the low percent of skilled personnel continues to cause trouble.

PROBLEM AREAS

31 MARCH '1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1616	Aircraft Control Staff Off	7	9	11	127
1644	Intercept Controller	47	35	43	74
2054	Intelligence Officer	12	10	40	83
3024	Elec Countermeasures Off	5	2	0	40
3044	Grnd Electronics Off	7	3	66	42
4344	Acft Maint Off	11	8	50	72
4384	Grnd Equip Maint Off	4	1	100	25
6416	Supply Staff Off	8	8	48	100
6424	Supply Off	47	30	44	63
6434	Supply Services Off	8	8	25	100
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
7324	Personnel Off	28	19	48	61
291X0	Comm Cent Spec	171	119	49	70
322X0B	Fire Cont Sys	44	39	62	89
361X0	O/S Wire Ant Sys	94	58	48	62
472X0	Grnd Pow & Sup Eq Rpmn	85	64	44	75
641X2/74	Supply Records Spec	96	75	60	78

AFSC's 1616, 3034 and 3044 still require 100% manning, which is not available. The majority of the remaining problem areas reflect good manning owever, the low percent of skilled personnel exists.

J 8 1 4

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2126	1799					ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	698	724				
1794	1480					OJT—C	624	627				
158	116					OJT—D	30	38				
239	210					COMPLETED OJT	81	88				

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGBLE FOR TRNG X 100 = 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

COMMAND: The decreased in-training rate can be attributed to a net loss of 327 eligibles and 356 in-training during February. The completion rate was 12.2% in Jan and 13.2% in Feb, with 449 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training. Fifth Air Force reported a 90% in-training and a 11.4% completion rate in January.

HQ 313TH AD: The decreased in-training rate can be attributed to a net gain of 26 eligibles and 10 in-training. The completion rate was 12.4% in Jan and 13.2% in Feb with 169 being upgraded and completing cross training.

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
551	555					ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	877	520				
481	482					OJT—C	689	371				
40	37					OJT—D	88	41				
98	97					COMPLETED OJT	59	25				

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

51ST FIW: Their in-training rate reflected a slight decrease during the month of February, however, remains only 6% below the desire 100% standard. The completion rate of 19% in January and 18.7% in February is better than the desired 15% standard.

18TH ABG: Their decreased in-training rate can be attributed to the recent reorganization. The present figures do not represent a true picture since the manning documents will not become effective until March. Their completion rate of 7.6% in January and 6.1% in February was the lowest in the Division.

J 8 1 6

DISCIPLINE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVERAGE STRENGTH	9719	9304	9864			
AWOL	4	2	4			
OFFENDERS	120	136	111			

▨ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 1000$ ▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

AWOL: The Command AWOL rate has increased from 0.2 for the period 1 October thru 31 December to 0.4 for the past quarter. 10 AWOL's were reported during the past quarter as compared to 5 during the October-December period.

OFFENDERS: The Command offenders rate has decreased from 1.6 for the October - December period to 1.2 for the January - March period. 367 offenders were reported during the past quarter as compared to 480 during the October - December period.

DISCIPLINE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
51ST FIW	3091	2891	3273			
	1	1	0			
	18	32	33			
AVERAGE STRENGTH	6628	6413	6591			
AWOL	3	1	4			
OFFENDERS	102	104	76			
18TH ABG	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN

▩ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 1000$ ▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

51ST FIW: Reported 2 AWOLS during the past quarter as compared to one during the October - December period. The number of offenders decreased from 96 for the October - December period to 83 during the past quarter.

18TH ABG: Reported 8 AWOLS during the past quarter as compared to 4 during the October - December period. The number of offenders decreased from 384 for the October - December period to 284 during the past quarter.

0818

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



During the January thru March period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.23 per thousand persons assigned. The special and summary rates were 1.02 and 1.32, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The General Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the special and summary rates reflected a decrease.

0819

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



		JAN – MAR	APR – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
TRIALS	GEN	7			
	SPEC	31			
	SUM	40			

During the January thru March period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.23 per thousand persons assigned. The special and summary rates were 1.02 and 1.32, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The General Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the special and summary rates reflected a decrease.

J 8 2 0

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.15 during the Jan-Mar period, while the special and summary rates were 0.63 and 1.02, respectively per thousand persons assigned. The General Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the special and summary rates decreased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.42 during the Jan- Mar period, while the special and summary rates were 1.87 and 2.07, respectively. The Special rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Summary rate decreased and the General rate remained constant.

0821

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JAN		FEB		MAR		APR		MAY		JUN	
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		1904.2		1953.4		1948.0							
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	6.1		0.0		4.1							
		REPAIR	14.0		15.1		10.5							
		COMMITTED	67.1		67.3		67.3							
TOTAL NO.	NO.WAITING	MOS.WAIT	333	3	246	3	252	3						
	NO.DRAWING	DEPARTS	70	56	128	52	119	41						
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	1985		2022		2064			2300		2370		
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	586		647		672							
		AIRMEN	1228		1344		1303							
		CIVILIAN	19		20		20							

The percent of unoccupied homes has been in an unfavorable condition for the past three months. This condition can be attributed to the excess number of unoccupied quarters which are committed but not filled.

J 8 2 2

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



$ THOUSAND $

6
5
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KADENA



NAHA JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		KADENA JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1,658	2,275	2,165				NET PROFIT/LOSS	-2,184	4,731	1,521			
27,336	29,612	31,777				NET WORTH	52,055	57,101	73,879			

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess has reflected a net profit of $6,098.57 during the past quarter. The net worth has increased accordingly.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess has reflected a net profit of $4,068.05 during the past quarter, despite a net loss of $2,184.90 during the month of January. The excess increase to the net worth during the month of March was due to a cost adjustment on the exhaust system.

1823

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2,301	5,486	3,518			
84,654	90,034	93,823			

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
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-5
-6

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
NET PROFIT/LOSS	-953	-3,949	-2,636			
NET WORTH	44,618	39,936	37,743			

KADENA



NAHA: The NCO Open Mess has reflected a net profit of $11,306.56 during the past quarter. A slight increase in the net worth during March was due to trade in value on fully depreciated property.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess has reflected a net loss of $7,540.02 during the past quarter and is the only facility reflecting a net loss during this period. Their net worth has decreased accordingly.

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMEN

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
658	2,651	1,930			
36,803	39,697	46,628			

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
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-6

NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
-995	2,081	2,613			
43,315	45,396	47,859			

NAHA: The Airmen Open Mess has reflected a net profit of $5,438.03 during the past quarter. The excess increase in the net worth during March was due to a $5,000.00 grant from the FEAF Central Open Mess Fund.

KADENA: The Airmen Open Mess has reflected a net profit of $3,698.94 during the past quarter. The net worth has also increased accordingly.

0825

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

UNITS	JAN '57		1957 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 40 80 120 160 200
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18TH ABG	0	741	0	741	0	
336TH FDS	0	623	0	623	0	
25TH FIS	0	606	0	606	0	
51ST ABG	0	537	0	537	0	
44TH FBS	0	511	0	511	0	
67TH FBS	0	419	0	419	0	
322ND TCS	0	363	0	363	0	
16TH FIS	1	522	1	522	192	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN 1956) — — — — — (70.2)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN 1957) ..... (23.1)

The Command reported one (1) major aircraft accident during the month of January with a total of 4,322 hours flown. Our current rate is 23.1 as compared to the Fifth Air Force rate of 11.3 for the same period.

J 8 2 7

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

UNITS	FEB '57		1957 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18TH ABG	0	491	0	1232	0	
336TH FDS	0	556	0	1179	0	
25TH FIS	0	567	0	1173	0	
51ST ABG	0	515	0	1052	0	
44TH FBS	0	0	0	511	0	
67TH FBS	0	0	0	419	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	363	0	
16TH FIS	0	551	1	1073	93.2	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–FEB 1956) ———— (36.8)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–FEB 1957) ••••••••• (14.3)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of February with a total of 2,680 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first two months of calendar year 1957 are one (1) accident with 7,002 hours flown. Our present rate is 14.3 as compared to 10 for Fifth Air Force for this period.

J 8 2 8

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	MAR '57		1957 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18TH ABG	0	726	0	1958	0	
25TH FIS	0	733	0	1906	0	
51ST ABG	0	279	0	1331	0	
44TH FBS	0	0	0	511	0	
67TH FBS	0	0	0	419	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	363	0	
336TH FDS	1	608	1	1787	56.0	
16TH FIS	0	695	1	1768	56.6	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100.000

313TH AF AVERAGE (JAN—MAR 1956) — — — — — (21.0)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN—MAR 1957) . . . . . (19.9)

The Command reported one (1) major aircraft accident during the month with a total of 3,041 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first three months of calendar year 1957 are two (2) accidents with 10,034 hours flown. Our present rate of 19.9 is a slight improvement over the rate of 21 for the same period of calendar year 1956.

Fifth Air Force advises hours flown by the 18th FBW & 322nd TCS during Jan have been transferred from this Command. The adjusted totals should read 2 accidents with 8,750 hours flown and an accident rate of 22.9. Subsequent publications will reflect this change.

J 8 2 9

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

JANUARY 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	NO OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	1	1	60.6	
	COMMAND	1	1	23.6	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	1	1	60.6	
	COMMAND	1	1	23.6	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	

313TH AD RATE (JAN 1956) .....

Investigation Board findings reveal that the cause factor for the accident during this month was materiel failure. Upon take off aircraft experienced a main fuel system failure and flamed out. During the attempted return to Naha Air Base the aircraft crashed and the pilot was fatally injured.

0830

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	FEBRUARY 1957 ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	1	30.3
	COMMAND	0	1	14.3
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	1	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	1	30.3
	COMMAND	0	1	14.3
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0

RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100

313TH AD RATES (JAN-FEB 1956).....

Rate decreases are due to the fact that the Command went accident free during the month of February.

1831

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	MARCH 1957 ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE	RATE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	1	1	56.0	
	51ST FIW	0	1	20.0	
	COMMAND	1	2	19.9	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	1	20.0	
	COMMAND	0	1	9.9	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	1	1	56.0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	1	1	9.9	

313TH AD RATE (JAN-MAR 1956).....

Investigation board findings reveal that the cause factor for the accident during the month was undetermined. A probable cause is materiel failure from an unknown source. While attempting to land pilot encountered jet wash, while applying power for a go around aircraft caught fire. Pilot landed and evacuated aircraft without injury. Aircraft was destroyed by fire.

J 8 3 2

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	JANUARY 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	JANUARY 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	JANUARY 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
18TH ABG	0	0	0	0	0
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	0	0
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	0	0
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	1	7	210	1	210
313TH AD	1	10	300	1	300
18TH FDM	1	14	420	1	420
51ST M&SG	2	20	600	2	600
18TH FBW	3	46	1,380	3	1,380

1957 CUMULATIVE COST — $ 100



313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN 1956)- - - ($ 173)

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN 1957)..... ($ 223)

The Command reported eight (8) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $2,910.00. This is $660.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during January:

Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh.	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Misc.
2	8	1	2	1	2	2*

* Gripping glass to tight and hammering threaded bolt.

No fatalities were reported during the month of January.

J 8 3 3

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	FEBRUARY '1957 NO OF DIS INJ	FEBRUARY '1957 MAN DAYS LOST	FEBRUARY '1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	0	0
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH INSTL & AP	1	4	120	1	120
322ND TCS	0	0	0	1	210
313TH AD	0	0	0	1	300
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
51ST M & SG	1	21	630	3	1,230
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
18TH ABG	5	119	3,570	5	3,570



313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-FEB 1956) — — — ($196)

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-FEB 1957) . . . . . ($556)

The Command reported seven (7) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $4,320.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are fifteen (15) injuries at a cost of $7,230.00. This is $4,680.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during February:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
February	2	7	0	2	1	1	2	1	0
Cumulative	4	15	1	2	3	2	4	1	2

One (1) fatality was reported during the month due to a motor vehicle accident.

J 8 3 4

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	MARCH '1957 NO OF DIS INJ	MARCH '1957 MAN DAYS LOST	MARCH '1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ	COST ——— $ 100 (0 2 4 6 8 10)
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	1	120	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	1	210	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420	
624TH AC&W	1	21	630	1	630	
313TH AD	1	20	600	2	900	
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	3	1,230	
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380	
18TH ABG	1	14	420	6	3,990	

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAR 1956)———($ 274) 313TH AVARAGE COST (JAN-MAR 1957).....($ 683)

The Command reported three (3) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $1,650.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are eighteen (18) injuries at a cost of $8,880.00. This is $5,310.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during March:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
March	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	
Cumulative	5	18	1	2	3	2	6	1	3

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to two in 1956 for this same period.

1835

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	JANUARY '1957 ACDTS	JANUARY '1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	JANUARY '1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS $10.00 (0 1 2 3 4 5)
18TH ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH INSTL & AP	1	0	0	1	0	
51ST M & SG	1	1	10	1	10	

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN 1956) ——— ($ 5.00)

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN 1957) ····· ($.75)

The Command reported two (2) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $10.00. This is $58.00 lower than last years cost for the same period.

J 8 3 6

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	FEBURARY '1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		COST OF ACCIDENTS $10.00
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	0 1 2 3 4 5
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	1	0	
51ST M & SG	1	0	0	2	10	
18TH ABG	1	2	173	1	173	

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-FEB 1956) ——— ($ 45.00) 313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-FEB 1957) ····· ($ 14.00)

The Command reported two (2) motor vehicle accidents during the month of February at a total cost of $173.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents at a cost of $183.00. This is $398.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

One (1) accident during this month resulted in the death of one airman and injury to two others.

J 8 3 7

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	MARCH 1957 ACDTS	MARCH 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	MARCH 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS $ 100.00 (0 1 2 3 4 5)
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10	
18TH INSTL & AP	1	7	43	2	43	
18TH SUP & TRANS	2	12	187	2	187	
18TH ABG	1	30	425	2	598	

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAR 1956) — — — ($ 322.00) 313TH AVERAVE COST (JAN-MAR 1957) · · · · · ($ 64.00)

The Command reported four (4) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $655.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are eight (8) accidents at a cost of $838.00. This is $3,348.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The four (4) accidents this month resulted from poor jugement, backing without a guide, driving at excess speed and failure to place the vehicle in gear.

J 8 3 8

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DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
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313TH

COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
APRIL 1957

617057

SECRET

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COMMAND-MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY
COMPTROLLER
HEADQUARTERS, 313 TH AIR DIVISION
APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND-MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

Charles E. Clarke
CHARLES E. CLARKE
CAPT., USAF
ACT. COMPTROLLER

J 8 4 2


GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
JAPAN
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
IWO JIMA
313TH A.D.
TIAWAN
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

AIRFIELD STATUS



STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



J 8 4 2

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



COMMAND: The late report rate of 6% is a slight improvement over the previous month, however, is well over the desired rate. Our average rate has been 5.9% for the past three months as compared to 5.1% for all Fifth Air Force Reporting Units.

HQ. 313TH A.D.: Our present rate of 9.9% is the highest rate reported by the Headquarters in over a year. Our average rate has been 5.5% for the past three months.

J 8 4 7

REPORTING



51ST FIW: Their late report rate of 2% during the current month is a definite improvement over the previous month. Their monthly average rate has been 3.4% for the past three months, slightly below the Fifth Air Force average.

18TH ABG: A number of problems continue to exist in the reporting area at this Base. Their average rate has been 8.5% for the past three months, well over the desired goal.

0848

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51 ST FIW — F-86D 1 JAN - 30 APR



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	754	1814	89	509	1060	2650	178	908	528	795
FLOWN	1184	2470	105	804	620	3084	175	534	854	652

During the period 1 Jan thru 30 Apr the 51st FIW has completed 91.1% of its overall F-86D training requirements. This is a 4.7% increase over the previous period. All phases under the desired 100% reflected a marked improvement, with the exception of the profile phase which decreased 13% from the previous period.

J 8 5 0

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS — F-86F 1 JUL — 30 APR



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	558	1514	470	304	281	1119	94	1764	1115
FLOWN	424	1020	1052	366	398	665	27	1842	1221

The 336th FDS has accomplished 84.1% of its over-all F-86F training requirements during the period 1 July thru 30 April. This is the same over-all rate reported during the previous month. The simulated emergency flight and instrument phases continue to remain below the desired 100%.

J 8 5 1

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	178	104	104	104		
ASSIGNED	170	94	88	89		
OPNL READY	140	77	75	72		

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - - -

The Command reflected a net gain of 1 assigned and a loss of 3 operational ready crews during the month of April. This gain in assigned crews increased the crew manning rate from 84.6% to 85.6%, while the loss in operational ready crews decreased the operational ready rate from 85.2% to 80.9%.

1852

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	74	74	74	74		
ASSIGNED	71	70	68	65		
OPNL READY	65	66	65	64		

ASGD/AUTH ——— ----- O/R/ASGD

The 51st FIW reflected a loss of 3 assigned and 1 operational ready crew during the month. The loss of assigned crews decreased their crew manning from 91.8% to 87.8%, while the operational ready rate increased from 95.6% to 98.5%. A monthly average of 93.8% of their assigned crews have been operational ready for the period 1 January thru 31 March as compared to 95.1% for Fifth Air Force F-86D Units.

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
37	37	37	37			AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37		
35	34	35	32			ASSIGNED	36	36	33	33		
33	32	33	31			OPNL READY	32	34	32	33		

ASGD/AUTH ——

---- O/R/ASGD

16TH FIS: With a loss of 3 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month their crew manning decreased from 94.5% to 86.5%, while the operational ready rate increased from 94% to 96.9%. One crew remains to qualify.

25TH FIS: The gain of 1 operational ready crew during the month increased the operational ready rate from 97% to 100%. Their manning remains constant at 89.2%.

J 8 5 4

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30		
ASSIGNED	30	24	20	24		
OPNL READY	18	11	10	8		

ASGD/AUTH ——— ----- O/R/ASGD

The 336th FDS reflected a net gain of 4 assigned and a loss of 2 operational ready crews during the month of April. This gain in assigned crews increased the manning from 66.7% to 80%, while the loss of operational ready crews resulted in a drop from 50% to 33.3% in the operational ready rate. A monthly average of 42.6% of their assigned crews have been operational ready for the period 1 Jan thru 31 Mar as compared to 53.8% for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units.

J 8 5 5

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
HOURS FLOWN	1128	1118	1140	1130		
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	45	45	42	42		
ASSIGNED CREWS	71	70	68	65		

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
HOURS FLOWN	623	556	576	457		
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	25	25	25	25		
ASSIGNED CREWS	30	24	20	24		

▨ = AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT ▦ = AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

—— = 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT - - - = 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

51ST FIW: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 26.9 and 17.3 hours, respectively, during the month of April. In March the possessed aircraft averaged 27.1 hours as compared 26.6 for Fifth Air Force F-86D Units, while the assigned crews averaged 16.7 hours as compared to 17 for Fifth Air Force crews.

336TH FIS: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 18.2 and 19 hours, respectively, during the month of April. In March the possessed aircraft averaged 23 hours as compared to 25.9 for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units, while the assigned crews averaged 28.8 hours as compared to 26.1 for Fifth Air Force crews.

J 8 5 6

AIR DEFENSE



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	57	41	27	37		
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	19	16	17	21		
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	38	25	10	16		
4	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	1	2	1	4		
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	0	1	0	0		
6	INTERCEPTED	37	22	9	12		

LINE 2+3=LINE 1
LINE 4+5+6=LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts decreased 15% during the month of April. Our successful intercept rate has been 84.3% during the period 1 Jan thru 31 Mar as compared to 81.5% for Fifth Air Force Units. The Command unknown track rate during April was 13.4, with 2,762 tracks processed and 37 unknown. This is a 3.7 increase over the previous month.

0857

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

30 APRIL 1957

KADENA AB	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												TOTAL
	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16	B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33								
336FDS-48ABG	25							4	4	3			4							40
18 FBW	1		79										6							86
322 TCS						8	3													11
15 TRS					18								2							20
KADENA TOT	26		79		18	8	3	4	4	3			12							157
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		42						1	1		1	3	7							55
NAHA TOT.		42						1	1		1	3	7							55
313TH TOT.	26	42	79		18	8	3	5	5	3	1	3	19							212

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 F-100D, 2 B-26's, 1 C-47 and a loss of 2 F-86F's and 8 F-84G's.

Naha Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 B-26 and 1 L-20. No losses reported.

J 8 5 9

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OPERATIONAL READY	68.1	71.2	76.2	75.6		
% ANORM SKED	12.1	10.3	8.5	11.4		
% ANORM UNSKED	13.9	14.1	13.7	10.2		
% ANORS	5.9	4.4	1.6	2.8		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The Command operational ready rate reflected a slight decrease during the month of April, however, remains above the desired 70% standard for the third consecutive month. Unscheduled maintenance decreased 3.5%, while the scheduled maintenance and the ANORS rate reported a 4.1% increase. The ANORS rate is presently below the desired 5% standard and has been for the past three months.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	63.5	70.5	74.7	76.6		
% ANORM SKED	10.4	9.6	7.8	11.1		
% ANORM UNSKED	16.3	13.9	15.5	11.1		
% ANORS	9.8	6.0	2.0	1.2		

The 51st FIW operational ready rate reflected a slight increase during the month of April and continues above the desired 70% standard for the third consecutive month. Scheduled, unscheduled maintenance and the ANORS rate all reflected a slight decrease to assist in this improving trend. The ANORS rate is presently below the desired 5% standard.

J 8 6 1

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



16TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		25TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
51.4	63.8	75.3	79.3			% OP READY	75.8	76.8	74.5	74.1		
13.4	9.2	5.4	8.4			% ANORM SKED	7.3	9.9	10.4	13.8		
20.0	14.7	15.8	10.0			% ANORM UNSKED	12.6	13.3	14.6	12.1		
15.2	12.3	3.5	2.3			% ANORS	4.3	0.0	0.5	0.0		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

16TH FIS: Their operational ready rate increased 4% during the month of April. This improvement can be attributed to a decrease in unscheduled maintenance and ANORS. The scheduled maintenance reflected a 3% increase during this period. The ANORS rate is presently 2.7% below the desired standard.

25TH FIS: Their operational ready rate reflected a slight decrease, however, continues above the standard for the sixth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance reflected a slight increase, while the ANORS reported a slight drop.

3862

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	76.3	72.5	78.8	73.6		
% ANORM SKED	11.6	11.6	9.7	11.8		
% ANORM UNSKED	11.8	14.5	10.5	8.5		
% ANORS	1.3	1.4	1.0	5.9		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 336th FDS operational ready rate reflected a 5% decrease during the month of April, however, remains above the desired 70% standard for the fifth consecutive month. The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance remained constant, however, a 4.9% increase in the ANORS rate resulted in the decreased operational ready rate. The ANORS rate is over the desired 5% for the first time in the past six month.

J 8 6 3

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS

18TH FBW



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	73.5	62.1	49.6	46.4		
% ANORM SKED	13.9	9.7	4.3	10.0		
% ANORM UNSKED	10.8	24.1	35.7	35.4		
% ANORS	1.8	4.1	10.4	8.2		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 18th FBW operational ready rate decreased 3.2% during the month of April. The F-100D rates represent 93% of the total aircraft hours possessed by the Wing. The ANORS rate reflected a 2.2% decrease during the month, however, the 5.7% increase in scheduled maintenance area is the reason for the decreased operational ready rate. The unscheduled maintenance remains high at better than 35%. The ANORS rate continues above the desired 5%.

J 8 6 4

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



322ND TCS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		15TH TRS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
61.3	65.0	76.5	72.5			% OP READY	52.4	68.7	63.1	68.1		
11.3	3.7	6.3	7.5			% ANORM SKED	13.9	10.1	14.0	14.5		
20.5	23.1	16.2	17.4			% ANORM UNSKED	14.8	8.5	9.5	8.5		
6.9	8.2	1.0	2.6			% ANORS	18.9	12.7	13.4	8.9		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

322ND TCS: Their operational ready rate reflected a 4% decrease during this month, however, remains above the desired 70% standard for the second consecutive month. A slight increase in scheduled, unscheduled maintenance and ANORS resulted in the decreased operational ready rate. The ANORS rate is below the desired 5%.

15TH TRS: Their operational ready rate reflected a 5% increase during the month and is presently 1.9% below the desired 70%. A 4.5% decrease in the ANORS rate is the major contributing factor to the increased operational ready rate. The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance reflected only a slight decrease. The ANORS rate remains above the 5%, although reflecting an improvement during the current month.

J 8 6 5

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	42702	36290	41181	43758		
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	2387	2359	2682	3834		
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	2474	2017	1507	2722		

= $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}}$ X 100

= $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}}$ X 100

Our vehicle out of commission rate increased 4.8% during the month of April. This is the highest rate since October 1956 and 10% over the desired standard. The vehicle out of commission rate has been 11.2% during the period 1 January thru 31 March as compared to 8.1% for Fifth Air Force Units.

J 8 6 6

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES

51ST FIW



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
11946	10279	11739	12342		
229	306	236	166		
75	46	126	127		

18TH ABG



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
30756	26011	29442	31416		
2158	2053	2446	3668		
2399	1971	1381	2595		

1	VEH DAYS ASGD
2	DAYS DP
3	DAYS DM

▦ = LINE 2 / LINE 1 X 100

▦ = LINE 3 / LINE 1 X 100

51ST FIW: For the fifth consecutive month their vehicle out of commission rate has remained below the 5% standard. No apparent problems exist.

18TH ABG: Their vehicle out of commission rate continues in excess of the desired standard and the present rate is the highest since October 1956. Their VDP rate continues high due to depletion of base stocks, while the increased VDM rate is due to a requirement to repair or replace all equipment considered a safety hazard.

J 8 6 7

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 APRIL 57

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1082	967	89	8450	8613	102	474	493	104	4863	4735	97
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	641#	561%	88	5372	5451	101	447	463	104	4169	4071	98
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	456	394	86	3231	3295	102	167	177	106	1672	1632	98
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	185	167	90	2141	2156	101	280	286	102	2497	2439	98
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	86	88	102	149	154	103	49	56	114	7	7	100
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCHD)	152	134	88	1808	1783	99	280	286	102	2497	2439	98
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	37	25	68	132	156	118						
13TH & 17TH COMM SQ (ASGD)	16	10	62	367	308	84				40	38	95
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ (ATCHD)	33	33	100	333	373	112						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	236	203	86	1824	1795	98	117	120	103	1381	1372	99
623RD & 624TH AC&W (ASGD)	66	54	82	600	668	111	1	1	100	244	215	88
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	14	12	86	146	201	100						
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	445	406	91	3078	3162	103	27	27	100	694	664	96
TOTAL PIPELINE		12			420							

#Includes 18 WO's %Includes 24 WO's

Officers: Assigned Unit manning reflected a 1% decrease with a net loss of 13 in the assigned strength and 1 authorized space. Airmen: Assigned unit manning reflected a 2% increase with a net gain of 164 assigned and 36 authorized spaces. Civilian: The DAFC manning reflected a 9% increase with a gain of 3 assigned and a loss of 39 authorized spaces. Indigenous manning increased 5% with a gain of 152 assigned and a loss of 52 authorized spaces.

9869

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
GEN	AUTH	3	2	2	2		
	ASGD	1	1	1	1		
	% MANNED	33	50	50	50		
COL	AUTH	15	12	12	12		
	ASGD	15	12	12	12		
	% MANNED	100	100	100	100		
L/COL	AUTH	57	49	49	49		
	ASGD	46	40	43	43		
	% MANNED	81	82	88	88		
MAJ	AUTH	130	103	103	101		
	ASGD	111	87	84	85		
	% MANNED	85	84	81	84		
CAPT	AUTH	282	227	226	223		
	ASGD	249	185	185	179		
	% MANNED	88	81	82	80		
LTS	AUTH	327	236	232	236		
	ASGD	319	236	225	217		
	% MANNED	98	100	97	94		
WO	AUTH	26	18	18	18		
	ASGD	21	24	24	24		
	% MANNED	81	133	133	133		
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	840	647	642	641		
	ASGD	762	585	574	561		
	% MANNED	91	90	89	87		
	PROJ'D					520	520

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
M/SGT	AUTH	426	327	327	335		
	ASGD	336	252	253	253		
	% MANNED	79	77	77	76		
T/SGT	AUTH	652	496	496	504		
	ASGD	501	377	400	407		
	% MANNED	77	76	81	81		
S/SGT	AUTH	1622	1352	1350	1370		
	ASGD	852	684	734	757		
	% MANNED	53	51	54	55		
A/1C	AUTH	2106	1804	1793	1810		
	ASGD	1056	878	993	923		
	% MANNED	50	49	55	51		
A/2C	AUTH	1447	1251	1242	1231		
	ASGD	2218	1786	1749	1703		
	% MANNED	153	143	141	138		
* A/3C	AUTH	147	128	128	122		
	ASGD	1254	1158	1158	1408		
	% MANNED	853	905	905	1100		
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	6400	5358	5336	5372		
	ASGD	6217	5135	5287	5451		
	% MANNED	97	96	99	101		
	PROJ'D					5507	5590

* INCLUDES A/B

J 8 7 1

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	JANUARY AUTH	JANUARY ASGD *	JANUARY % MANNED	FEBRUARY AUTH	FEBRUARY ASGD *	FEBRUARY % MANNED	MARCH AUTH	MARCH ASGD *	MARCH % MANNED	APRIL AUTH	APRIL ASGD *	APRIL % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	268	230	86	309	254	82						
	5	1070	889	83	1126	998	89						
	3	440	617	140	474	620	131						
	1	21	14	67	22	10	45						
18TH ABG	7	497	469	94	186	266	143						
	5	1469	1359	93	862	821	95						
	3	709	665	94	491	414	84						
	1	71	103	145	52	87	167						
51TH FIW	7	313	280	89	314	286	91						
	5	1047	1030	98	1044	1081	103						
	3	440	418	95	435	417	96						
	1	55	37	67	55	36	65						
COMMAND TOTALS	7	1078	979	91	809	806	99						
	5	3586	3278	91	3032	2900	96						
	3	1589	1700	107	1400	1451	104						
	1	147	154	105	129	133	103						

* PAFSC

Information necessary for completing this chart has not been received from Fifth Air Force. The May publications will contain data required for the month of March.

J 8 1 2

PROBLEM AREAS

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1024A	Pilot, Helicopter	4	1	100	25
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	6	0	85
1644	Intcp Controller	47	34	33	66
2054	Intelligence Off	12	7	29	58
3034	Comm Off	28	18	78	85
3044	Gnd Electronic Off	7	2	50	29
4344	Acft Maint Off	11	9	56	81
4384	Gnd Equip Maint Off	4	1	100	25
6416	Supply Staff Off	8	6	17	75
6424	Supply Off	47	32	53	68
6434	Supply Services Off	8	7	25	88
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
7324	Personnel Off	23	15	66	65
291X0	Comm Cent Spec	171	119	49	70
322X0B	Fire Cont Sys	44	39	62	89
361X0	O/S Wire Ant Sys	94	58	48	62
472X0	Gnd Pow & Sup Eq Rpmn	85	64	44	75
641X2/7	Supply Records Spec	96	75	60	78

AFSC's 3034 and 3044 required at remote sites need 100% manning which is not available. The majority of the remaining problem areas exist due to the low percent of skilled personnel, rather than manning.

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2126	1799					ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	698	724				
1794	1480					OJT—C	624	627				
158	116					OJT—D	30	38				
239	210					COMPLETED OJT	81	88				

▨ NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

Information necessary for completing these charts has not been received from Fifth Air Force. The May publications will contain data required for the month of March.

3874

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
551	555					ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	877	520				
481	482					OJT — C	689	371				
40	37					OJT — D	88	41				
99	97					COMPLETED OJT	59	25				

NUMBER ON OJT — C & OJT — D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING
OJT — D = CROSS TRAINING

Information necessary for completing these charts has not been received from Fifth Air Force. The May publications will contain data required for the month of March.

1815

DISCIPLINE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVERAGE STRENGTH	9719	9304	9864	9934		
AWOL	4	2	4	2		
OFFENDERS	120	136	111	150		

▒ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$ ▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

AWOL: The Command reported 2 less AWOL's during the month of April, thus decreasing the AWOL rate accordingly.

OFFENDERS: The rise in the offenders rate during the month of April is readily explained by the increased number of offenders.

J 8 7 6

DISCIPLINE



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
3091	2891	3273	2839			AVERAGE STRENGTH	6628	6413	6591	7095		
1	1	0	1			AWOL	3	1	4	1		
18	32	33	39			OFFENDERS	102	104	78	111		

▪ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}}$ X 1000

▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}}$ X 100

51ST FIW: Reported 1 AWOL during the month of April and increased their AWOL rate accordingly. The increased offenders rate is due to a decrease in strength and a larger number of offenders reported.

18TH ABG: Reported 3 less AWOL's during the month and decreased their rate accordingly. The increased offenders rate is explained by the rise in the number of offenders.

J 8 7 7

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



During the January thru March period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.23 per thousand persons assigned. The special and summary rates were 1.02 and 1.32, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The General Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the special and summary rates reflected a decrease.

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.15 during the Jan-Mar period, while the special and summary rates were 0.63 and 1.02, respectively per thousand persons assigned. The General Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the special and summary rates decreased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.42 during the Jan- Mar period, while the special and summary rates were 1.87 and 2.07, respectively. The Special rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Summary rate decreased and the General rate remained constant.

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JAN		FEB		MAR		APR		MAY		JUN	
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		1904.2		1953.4		1948.0		2102.6					
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	6.1		0.0		4.1		32.6					
		REPAIR	14.0		15.1		10.5		10.5					
		COMMITTED	67.1		67.3		67.3		57.1					
TOTAL NO.	NO.WAITING	MOS.WAIT	333	3	246	3	252	3	334	3				
	NO.DRAWING	DEPARTS	70	56	128	52	119	41	103	57				
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	1985		2022		2064		2152			2200		2268
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	586		647		672		691					
		AIRMEN	1228		1344		1303		1298					
		CIVILIAN	19		20		20		20					

The percent of unoccupied quarters has remained rather stable for the past four months. The committed rate reflected a slight decrease during the current month, however, the increased usable rate placed the present rate slightly over the desired 4%.

1880

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1,658	2,275	2,165	287		
27,336	29,612	31,777	37,707		

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
-2,184	4,731	1,521	-1,894		
52,055	57,101	73,879	72,813		

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $287.41 during the month of April. This increases their total profit for calendar year 1957 to $6,385.98. The excess increase to the net worth during the month was due to the club facility absorbing the transient VOQ and it's assets valued at $5,642.93.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net loss of $1,894.87 during the month. This decreased their total profits for calendar year 1957 to $2,173.18. With an adjustment pertaining to the exhaust system, the net worth only decreased $1,066.90.

J 8 8 1

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2,301	5,486	3,518	2,623		
84,654	90,034	93,823	95,863		

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
NET PROFIT/LOSS	-953	-3,949	-2,636	4,264		
NET WORTH	44,618	39,936	37,743	42,008		

KADENA



NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $2,623.08 during the month of April. This increased their total profits for calendar year 1957 to $13,929.64.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $4,264.90 during the month. This increase reduced their net loss for calendar year 1957 to $3,275.12. Their net worth increased accordingly.

0882

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMEN

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
658	2,651	1,930	-830		
56,803	39,697	46,628	45,979		

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
NET PROFIT/LOSS	-995	2,081	2,613	3,498		
NET WORTH	43,315	45,396	47,859	51,358		

KADENA



NAHA: The Airmen Open Mess reflected a net loss of $830.43 during the month of April. Theis loss decreased their net profit for calendar year 1957 to $4,607.60. The net worth decreased accordingly.

KADENA: The Airmen Open Mess reflected a net profit of $3,498.31 during the month. This increased their net profit for calendar year 1957 to $7,197.25. The net worth increased accordingly.

1883

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	APR '57		1957 CUMULATIVE			
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	560	0	2466	0	
18TH ABG	0	380	0	2338	0	
51ST ABG	0	190	0	1521	0	
16TH FIS	0	570	1	2338	42.8	
336TH FDS	0	483	1	2270	44.1	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO. OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}} \times 100{,}000$

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–APR 1956) — — (26.8)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–APR 1957) ····· (18.3)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month with a total of 2,183 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first four months of calendar year 1957 are two (2) accidents with 10,933 hours flown. Our present rate of 18.3 is an improvement over the rate of 26.8 for the same period of calendar year 1956.

J 8 8 5

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

APRIL 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	NO OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	1	44.1	
	51ST FIW	0	1	15.8	
	COMMAND	0	2	18.3	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	1	15.8	
	COMMAND	0	1	9.1	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	1	44.1	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	1	9.1	

313TH AD RATE (JAN–APR 1956).....

Rate decreases are due to the fact that the Command went accident free during the month of April

1886

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	APRIL 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	APRIL 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	APRIL 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	1	120
18TH SUP & TRANS	1	10	300	1	300
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
322ND TCS	1	21	630	2	840
624TH AC&W	1	14	420	2	1,050
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
51ST ABG	1	48	1,440	1	1,440
313TH AD	1	21	630	3	1,530
51ST M&SG	2	19	570	5	1,800
18TH ABG	0	0	0	6	3,990
51ST FIG	4	479	14,370	4	14,370



313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN–APR 1956)– – – –($ 321) 313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN–APR 1957).....($ 2,095)

The Command reported eleven (11) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $18,360.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are twenty-nine (29) injuries at a cost of $27,240.00. This is $23,070.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during April:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
April	2	11	0	6	1	1	2	0	1
Cumulative	7	29	1	8	4	3	8	1	4

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to two in 1956 for this same period.

1887

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	APRIL 1957 ACDTS	APRIL 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	APRIL 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10
51ST ABG	1	5	81	1	81
18TH INSTL & AP	1	5	74	3	117
18TH SUP & TRANS	1	1	5	3	192
18TH APG	0	0	0	2	598



313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-APR 1956)———($ 332.00) 313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-APR 1957).....($ 77.00)

The Command reported three (3) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $160.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are eleven (11) accidents at a cost of $998.00. This is $3,316.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The three (3) accidents this month resulted from backing without a guide, driving at excess speed and running into an embankment with a stolen vehicle.

J 8 8 8

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DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICE, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 18TH AIR BASE GROUP	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
COMMANDER, 322ND TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (MED)(SP)	1
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1889

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313TH COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
MAY-JUN 1957

617952

SECRET

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COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY
COMPTROLLER
HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION
APO 239

FOREWORD

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW IS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DIRECTING ATTENTION AND E PHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. PRESENTATION MATERIEL HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY STAFF AGENCIES.

John E Laybourn

JOHN E. LAYBOURN
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER

1892


GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
JAPAN
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
30 N
145 E
EAST CHINA SEA
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
IWO JIMA
313TH A.D.
TIAWAN
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

AIRFIELD STATUS



STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTPATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



5TH AF RATE

(May - June)

Information on late reporting has not been received by this headquarters during the past two months due to the relocation of Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

3897

REPORTING



5TH AF RATE ——

(May - June)

Information on late reporting has not been received by this headquarters during the past two months due to the relocation of Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

J 8 9 8

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW-F-86D — 1 JAN-31 MAY



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	930	2238	110	628	1277	3270	220	1120	652	981
FLOWN	1462	3244	150	986	745	3958	241	690	1102	941

During the period 1 January thru 31 May the 51st FIW has completed 91.2% of its overall F-86D training requirements. This is a slight improvement over the previous period. All phases under the desired 100% reflected a marked improvement, with the exception of the profile phase which remained constant at 58%.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW – F-86D

1 JAN – 30 JUN



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	1089	2621	129	736	1473	3830	257	1312	764	1149
FLOWN	1613	3551	162	1104	779	4532	266	787	1224	1126

During the first six months of calendar year 1957, the 51st FIW has completed 90.7% of its overall F-86D training requirements. This percentage is slightly less than the 91.2% reported for the period 1 Jan - 31 May. Three phases continue to remain below the desired 100%.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS – F-86F 1 JUL – 31 MAY



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	586	1618	496	324	299	1191	100	1848	1187
FLOWN	444	1040	1099	368	399	710	34	2085	1306

During the period 1 July thru 31 May the 336th FDS has accomplished 83.4% of its overall F-86F training requirements. This is a slight decrease from the previous period. The simulated emergency flight and instrument phases continue to remain below the desired 100%.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS - F-86F 1 JUL - 30 JUN



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	614	1722	522	344	317	1263	106	1932	1259
FLOWN	486	1118	1138	380	406	785	44	2170	1380

The 336th FDS has accomplished 84.3% of its overall F-86F training requirements for the period from 1 July 56 through 30 June 57. This is a slight increase over the previous month, however, it falls 15.7% short of meeting the 100% required. The Simulated Emergency Flight and instrument phases have been below the desired 100% during the entire period.

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	178	104	104	104	104	103
ASSIGNED	170	94	88	89	73	77
OPNL READY	140	77	75	72	64	62

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - - -

The Command reflected a net loss of 1 authorized (336th FIS), 1 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month of June. The assigned crew manning rate went from 75% to 74.7% while the turnover in crews decreased the operational ready rate from 82% to 80.5%. During the period April - June, the manning rate has been 78.5% and the operational ready rate has been 81.1%.

3904

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	74	74	74	74	74	74
ASSIGNED	71	70	68	65	59	61
OPNL READY	65	66	65	64	56	55

ASGD/AUTH ——— O/R/ASGD - - - -

The 51st FIW reflected a net gain of 2 assigned and a net loss of 1 operational ready crews during the month of June. The assigned crew manning rate went from 79.7% to 82.4% while the turnover in crews decreased the operational ready rate from 94.9% to 90.2%. During the April - June period, the manning rate has been 83.3% and the operational ready rate has been 94.6%

J 9 0 5

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37	37	37
ASSIGNED	35	34	35	32	30	30
OPNL READY	33	32	33	31	28	28

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37	37	37
ASSIGNED	36	36	33	33	29	31
OPNL READY	32	34	32	33	28	27

ASGD/AUTH ——

---- O/R/ASGD

16TH FIS: The manning and operational ready rates remained at 81.1% and 93.3% respectively, during the month of June.

25TH FIS: There was a net gain of 2 assigned and a net loss of 1 operational ready crew during the month, with a manning rate of 83.8% and a 87.1% operational ready rate.

J 9 0 6

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30	30	29
ASSIGNED	30	24	20	24	19	16
OPNL READY	18	11	10	8	8	7

The 336th FDS reflected a net loss of 3 assigned and 1 operational ready crew during the month of June. The assigned crew manning rate* went from 63.3% to 55.2% while the turnover in crews increased the operational ready rate from 42.1% to 43.7%. During the period April - June, the manning rate has been 67.8% and the operational ready rate has been 39.0%.

*NOTE: The number of crews authorized has been in error and should read 29.

U 9 0 7

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW



51ST FIW-F-86D							336TH FDS-F-86F					
JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1128	1118	1140	1130	916	606	HOURS FLOWN	623	556	576	457	394	291
45	45	42	42	40	41	POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	25	25	25	25	25	23
71	70	68	65	59	61	ASSIGNED CREWS	30	24	20	24	19	16

▨ = AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT ▦ = AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

—— = 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT - - - = 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

51ST FIW: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 14.8 and 9.9 hours, respectively, during the month of June. In May they averaged 22.9 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 20.3 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units, while the assigned crews averaged 15.5 hours as compared to 14.2 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D crews.

336TH FDS: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 12.6 and 18.2 hours, respectively, during the month of June. In May they averaged 15.7 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 21.9 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F units, while the assigned crews averaged 20.7 hours as compared to 21.2 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F crews.

0908

AIR DEFENSE



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	57	41	27	37	29	12
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	19	16	17	21	16	6
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	38	25	10	16	13	6
4	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	1	2	1	4	1	0
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	0	1	0	0	1	2
6	INTERCEPTED	37	22	9	12	11	3

LINE 2+3=LINE 1
LINE 4+5+6=LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts decreased 34.6% during the month of June. Our successful intercept rate has been 82.1% during the period 1 March through 31 May as compared to 67.2% for Fifth Air Force Units. The Command unknown track rate during June was 7.5, with 1,601 tracks processed and 12 unknown. Our unknown rate has been 12.2 during the period 1 March through 31 May as compared to 5.0 for Fifth Air Force Units.

0909

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 MAY 1957

KADENA AB	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
336FDS·18ABG	26							5	3	2			3							39
18 FBW			79									1	7							87
322 TCS					8	3														11
15 TRS				18									2							20
KADENA TOT.	26		79	18	8	3		5	3	2		1	12							157
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		40							2		1	3	7							53
NAHA TOT.		40							2		1	3	7							53
313TH TOT.	26	40	79	18	8	3		5	5	2	1	4	19							210

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 L-20, 1 B-26 and a loss of 1 C-47 and 1 C-119.

Naha Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 C-47 and a loss of 2 F-86D's and 1 B-26.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

30 JUNE 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	23							8	3			1	3							38
18 FBW			78										7							85
322 TCS					8	3				2										13
15 TRS				18									2							20
KADENA TOT	23		78	18	8	3		8	3	2		1	12							156
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		41						3	2		1	2	7							56
NAHA TOT.		41						3	2		1	2	7							56
313TH TOT.	23	41	78	18	8	3		11	5	2	1	3	19							212

KADENA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 3 B-26's and a loss of 3 F-86F's and 1 100-D.

NAHA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 3 B-26's and 1 F-86D and a loss of 1 L-20.

0912

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OPERATIONAL READY	68.1	71.2	76.2	75.6	76.7	80.9
% ANORM SKED	12.1	10.3	8.5	11.4	8.7	6.1
% ANORM UNSKED	13.9	14.1	13.7	10.2	11.3	10.6
% ANORS	5.9	4.4	1.6	2.8	3.3	2.4

% OPERATIONAL READY ——— 70 % OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED - - - - 5 % ANORS STD % ANORS

The Command Operational Ready rate reflected an increase of 4.2% during the month of June and remains above the desired 70% standard for the fifth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 2.6% and 0.7%, respectively. The ANORS rate also decreased this month and is below the 5% standard for the fifth consecutive month.

U 9 1 3

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	63.5	70.5	74.7	76.6	74.4	83.0
% ANORM SKED	10.4	9.6	7.8	11.1	9.5	4.4
% ANORM UNSKED	16.3	13.9	15.5	11.1	13.8	9.8
% ANORS	9.8	6.0	2.0	1.2	2.3	2.8

% OPERATIONAL READY — — — — 70 % OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED ———— 5 % ANORS STD % ANORS

The 51ST FIW Operational Ready rate reflected an increase of 8.6% during the month of June and remains above the desired 70% standard for the fifth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 5.1% and 4.0% respectively. The ANORS rate remains below the 5% standard for the fourth consecutive month. Their monthly operational ready rate has been 75.2% for the period 1 March through 31 May as compared to 67.7% for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units.

J 9 1 4

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



16TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		25TH FIS JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
51.4	63.8	75.3	79.3	73.1	85.8	% OP READY	75.8	76.8	74.5	74.1	75.8	80.3
13.4	9.2	5.4	8.4	9.1	1.7	% ANORM SKED	7.3	9.9	10.4	13.8	9.9	7.0
20.0	14.7	15.8	10.0	13.3	6.8	% ANORM UNSKED	12.6	13.3	14.6	12.1	14.3	12.7
15.2	12.3	3.5	2.3	4.6	5.7	% ANORS	4.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

16TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 12.7% during the month of June and remains above the desired goal for the fourth consecutive month. This increase can be attributed to a drop in the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates. The ANORS rate is slightly above the 5% standard for the first time in the past four months.

25TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 4.5 during the month of June and continues above the desired standard for the eighth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates decreased while the ANORS rate was at 0.0% for the third consecutive month. This rate has been below the standard for the past ten months.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	76.3	72.5	78.8	73.8	80.0	77.2
% ANORM SKED	11.6	11.6	9.7	11.8	7.6	9.0
% ANORM UNSKED	11.8	14.5	10.5	8.5	7.4	12.0
% ANORS	1.3	1.4	1.0	5.9	5.0	1.8

The 336TH FDS Operational Ready rate decreased 2.8% during the month of June but remained above the desired standard for the seventh consecutive month. The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased to account for the lower operational ready rate. The ANORS rate decreased 3.2% to bring it below the 5% standard for the first time during the past three months. Their operational ready rate has been 77.7% for the period 1 March through 31 May as compared to 76.0% for all Fifth Air Force F-86F units.

U 9 1 6

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
% OP READY	73.5	62.1	49.6	46.4	40.6	36.7
% ANORM SKED	13.9	9.7	4.3	10.0	15.7	13.8
% ANORM UNSKED	10.8	24.1	35.7	35.4	33.1	26.6
% ANORS	1.8	4.1	10.4	8.2	10.6	23.9

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 18TH FBW F-100D Operational Ready rate decreased 3.9% during the month of June. The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates decreased 1.9% and 7.5% respectively, while the ANORS rate increased 13.3% and is the highest rate reported since the F-100D's were received by this organization.

1917

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS

322ND TCS



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
61.3	65.0	76.5	72.5	71.1	62.5
11.3	3.7	6.3	7.5	7.4	13.2
20.5	23.1	16.2	17.4	17.3	14.2
6.9	8.2	1.0	2.6	4.2	10.1

15TH TRS

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
52.4	68.7	63.1	68.1	70.3	72.4
13.9	10.1	14.0	14.5	13.6	15.0
14.8	8.5	9.5	8.5	9.7	10.6
18.9	12.7	13.4	8.9	6.4	2.0

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

322ND TCS: Their Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 8.6% during the month of June and is below the 70% standard for the first time in the past four months. Scheduled maintenance increased 5.8% while unscheduled decreased 3.1%. Their ANORS rate increased 5.9% and is above the 5% standard for the first time in the past four months.

15TH TRS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 2.1% during the month of June and is above the standard for the second consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance reflected slight increases of 1.4% and 0.9% respectively, while the ANORS rate decreased 4.4% and is below the 5% standard for the first time in the past six months.

0918

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	42702	36290	41181	43758	43164	44740
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	2387	2359	2682	3834	3615	1928
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	2474	2017	1507	2722	3216	3439

= $\frac{\text{LINE } 2}{\text{LINE } 1} \times 100$ = $\frac{\text{LINE } 3}{\text{LINE } 1} \times 100$

Our vehicle out of commission rate decreased to 11.9% during the month. There was a 4.1% decrease in the deadlined for parts area but the overall rate is still 6.9% over the desired standard. Our vehicle out of commission rate has been 13.7% for the period 1 March through 31 May as compared to 8.5% for Fifth Air Force Units.

0919

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN			JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1	11946	10279	11739	12342	12254	11360	1	VEH DAYS ASGD	30756	26011	29442	31416	30910	33380
2	229	306	236	166	109	97	2	DAYS DP	2158	2053	2446	3668	3506	1831
3	75	46	126	127	63	95	3	DAYS DM	2399	1971	1381	2595	3153	3344

= LINE 2 / LINE 1 X 100

= LINE 3 / LINE 1 X 100

51ST FIW: For the seventh consecutive month, the vehicle out of commission rate has remained well below the 5% standard. No apparent problems.

18TH ABG: Their vehicle out of commission rate continues in excess of the desired standard, however, the present rate is the lowest since May 1956. The VDP rate was reduced 4.7% as a result of a concentrated effort by Supply and Transportation. This reduction, consequently, required a continuation of the high VDM rate, putting the previously VDP vehicles back on the road.

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 MAY 57

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1077	959	89	8452	8596	102	471	478	101	4848	4778	99
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	701#	625%	89	5542	5604	101	446	454	102	4175	4136	99
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	449	388	86	3190	3401	107	166	173	104	1661	1651	99
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	252	237	94	2352	2203	94	280	281	100	2504	2475	99
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	78	88	113	128	137	107	48	56	117	7	7	100
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCHD)	150	131	87	1826	1608	88	280	281	100	2486	2458	99
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	37	27	73	134	164	122						
322ND TRP CAR SQ (ATCHD)	69	73	106	193	205	106				18	17	94
13TH & 17TH COMM SQ (ASGD)	16	11	69	362	446	123				30	38	127
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ (ATCHD)	33	33	100	333	390	117						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	234	193	82	1805	1764	98	116	116	100	1380	1383	100
623RD & 624TH AC&W (ASGD)	66	55	83	600	662	110	1	1	100	244	223	91
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	17	12	70	148	215	145	1	0	0			
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	376	334	89	2910	2992	103	25	24	96	673	642	95
TOTAL PIPELINE		14			175							

#Includes 19 WO's %Includes 22 WO's

The reporting of the 322nd TCS as an assigned unit increased the authorized and assigned figures in the officer, airmen and indigenous areas. Officer manning increased 1% with a net gain of 64 assigned and 60 authorized spaces. Airmen manning remained constant at 101%, with an increase of 153 assigned and 170 authorized. DAFC manning decreased 2% with a loss of 9 assigned and 1 authorized, while the indigenous manning increased 1% with a gain of 65 assigned and 6 authorized spaces.

J 9 2 2

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 JUNE 57

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1077	928	86	8349	8604	81	467	474	101	4829	4790	99
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	702#	596%	85	5531	5645	102	444	451	102	4174	4139	99
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	441	360	82	2961	3124	106	166	170	102	1657	1646	99
TOTAL ATCH UNITS	261	236	90	2570	2521	98	278	281	101	2517	2493	99
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIVISION	76	77	101	124	131	106	48	55	115	7	7	100
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCHD)	192	165	86	2377	2320	98	278	281	101	2499	2476	99
322ND TRP CAR SQ (ATCHD)	69	71	103	193	201	104				18	17	94
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	37	24	65	134	170	127						
17TH COMM SQ (ASGD)	7	4	57	144	124	86				28	27	96
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	13	100						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	234	193	82	1867	1869	100	116	114	98	1379	1394	101
623RD & 624TH AC&W (ASGD)	70	48	69	604	665	110	1	1	100	243	218	90
DET #1 - 313TH AD (ASGD)	16	12	75	75	152	203	1	0	0			
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	375	332	89	2818	2959	105	23	24	104	655	651	99
TOTAL PIPELINE		29			318							

Includes 28 WO's

% Includes 22 WO's

Officers: Assigned unit manning reflected a 4% decrease with a net loss of 28 in the assigned strength and 8 authorized spaces. Airmen: Assigned unit manning reflected a 1% decrease with a net loss of 277 in the assigned strength and 229 authorized spaces. Civilian: The DAFC manning reflected a 2% decrease with a net loss of 3 assigned and no change in authorized. Indigenous manning remained constant at 99%, with a decrease of 5 assigned and 4 authorized.

1923

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
GEN	AUTH	3	2	2	2	2	2
	ASGD	1	1	1	1	1	1
	% MANNED	33	50	50	50	50	50
COL	AUTH	15	12	12	12	12	12
	ASGD	15	12	12	12	12	10
	% MANNED	100	100	100	100	100	83
L/COL	AUTH	57	49	49	49	50	50
	ASGD	46	40	43	43	43	40
	% MANNED	81	82	88	88	86	80
MAJ	AUTH	130	103	103	101	107	109
	ASGD	111	87	84	85	96	92
	% MANNED	85	84	81	84	90	84
CAPT	AUTH	282	227	226	223	249	245
	ASGD	249	185	185	179	207	209
	% MANNED	88	81	82	80	83	85
LTS	AUTH	327	236	232	236	262	256
	ASGD	319	236	225	217	244	223
	% MANNED	98	100	97	94	93	87
WO	AUTH	26	18	18	18	19	28
	ASGD	21	24	24	24	22	21
	% MANNED	81	133	133	133	116	75
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	840	647	642	641	701	702
	ASGD	762	585	574	561	625	596
	% MANNED	91	90	89	87	89	85
	PROJ'D						566(JUL)

U 9 2 4

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
M/SGT	AUTH	426	327	327	335	341	340
	ASGD	336	252	253	253	258	256
	% MANNED	79	77	77	76	76	75
T/SGT	AUTH	652	496	496	504	538	538
	ASGD	501	377	400	407	448	456
	% MANNED	77	76	81	81	83	85
S/SGT	AUTH	1622	1352	1350	1370	1434	1438
	ASGD	852	684	734	757	785	814
	% MANNED	53	51	54	55	55	57
A/1C	AUTH	2106	1804	1793	1810	1845	1832
	ASGD	1056	878	993	923	842	1019
	% MANNED	50	49	55	51	46	56
A/2C	AUTH	1447	1251	1242	1231	1260	1259
	ASGD	2218	1786	1749	1703	1673	1668
	% MANNED	153	143	141	138	133	132
* A/3C	AUTH	147	128	128	122	124	124
	ASGD	1254	1158	1158	1408	1598	1432
	% MANNED	853	905	905	1100	1289	1155
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	6400	5358	5336	5372	5542	5531
	ASGD	6217	5135	5287	5451	5604	5645
	% MANNED	97	96	99	101	101	102
	PROJ'D						5410(JUL)

* INCLUDES A/B

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	JANUARY AUTH	JANUARY ASGD *	JANUARY % MANNED	FEBRUARY AUTH	FEBRUARY ASGD *	FEBRUARY % MANNED	MARCH AUTH	MARCH ASGD *	MARCH % MANNED	APRIL AUTH	APRIL ASGD *	APRIL % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	268	230	86	309	254	82	309	261	84	273	222	81
	5	1070	889	83	1126	998	89	1124	941	84	1007	795	79
	3	440	617	140	474	620	131	473	645	136	442	691	156
	1	21	14	67	22	10	45	22	7	32	20	5	25
18TH ABG	7	497	469	94	186	266	143	241	281	116	289	322	111
	5	1469	1359	93	862	821	95	946	887	94	1111	1048	94
	3	709	665	94	491	414	84	513	442	86	546	546	100
	1	71	103	145	52	87	167	53	69	130	55	51	93
51TH FIW	7	313	280	89	314	286	91	314	288	92	319	282	88
	5	1047	1030	98	1044	1081	103	1044	1010	97	1029	940	91
	3	440	418	95	435	417	96	435	456	105	427	499	117
	1	55	37	67	55	36	65	55	32	58	49	20	41
COMMAND TOTALS	7	1078	979	91	809	806	99	864	830	96	881	826	94
	5	3586	3278	91	3032	2900	96	3114	2838	91	3147	2783	88
	3	1589	1700	107	1400	1451	104	1421	1543	109	1415	1736	123
	1	147	154	105	129	133	103	130	108	83	124	76	61

* PAFSC

The command 7 skill level decreased 5% during March and April, with a net gain of 72 authorized spaces and 20 assigned. The 5 level skill decreased 8% with a net gain of 115 authorized spaces and a loss of 117 assigned. The 3 skill level increased 19% with a gain of 15 authorized spaces and 285 assigned. The 1 skill level decreased 42% with a loss of 5 authorized spaces and 57 assigned.

1926

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	MAY AUTH	MAY ASGD *	MAY % MANNED	JUNE AUTH	JUNE ASGD *	JUNE % MANNED	JULY AUTH	JULY ASGD *	JULY % MANNED	AUGUST AUTH	AUGUST ASGD *	AUGUST % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	270	264	98									
	5	991	934	94									
	3	441	852	193									
	1	20	9	45									
18TH ABG	7	292	331	113									
	5	1122	931	83									
	3	544	495	91									
	1	55	52	95									
51TH FIW	7	317	287	91									
	5	1013	900	89									
	3	426	525	123									
	1	49	47	96									
COMMAND TOTALS	7	879	882	100									
	5	3126	2765	88									
	3	1411	1872	133									
	1	124	108	87									

* PAFSC

The command 7 skill level is at 100%, with a net loss of 2 authorized spaces and a net gain of 56 assigned. The 5 level skill remained constant at 88% with a net loss of 21 authorized spaces and 18 assigned. The 3 skill level increased 10% with a net loss of 4 authorized spaces and a net gain of 136 assigned. The 1 skill level increased 26% with a net gain of 32 assigned.

J 9 2 7

PROBLEM AREAS

31 MAY 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1024A	Helicopter Pilot	4	1	0	25
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	6	8	0	133
1644	Intop Controller	47	33	45	70
2054	Intelligence Off	12	5	60	42
3034	Communications Off	28	19	74	68
3044	Gnd Electronic Off	7	2	50	28
4344	Acft Maint Off	12	9	56	75
4384	Gnd Equip Maint Off	4	2	100	50
6416	Supply Staff Off	8	6	17	75
6424	Supply Off	46	31	54	67
6434	Supply Services Off	8	8	50	100
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
7324	Personnel Off	23	15	66	67
291X0	Comm Center Spec	154	132	39	86
472X0	Gnd Pow & Sup Eq Rpmn	60	72	52	120
571X0	Firefighter	163	95	55	58
603X0	Veh Oper	172	111	126	65
641X1/73	Orgn Supply	190	179	52	94
641X2/74	Supply Records	86	93	62	108
643X0	Pet Supply	143	90	44	63

Of the twenty existing problem areas seventeen reflect below the desired percent of skilled personnel and eight are below the desired manning rate. The supply and communications fields have reflected problem areas for the past six months.

U 9 2 8

PROBLEM AREAS

30 JUNE 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1024A	Helicopter Pilot	4	1	100	25
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	8	.01	114
1644	Intercept Controller	47	35	29	74
2054	Intelligence Off	11	7	0	63
3034	Communications Off	26	16	63	61
3044	Gnd Electronics Off	7	3	66	42
6416	Supply Staff Off	8	5	0	62
6424	Supply Off	45	29	66	64
6434	Supply Services Off	8	7	29	86
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
7324	Personnel Off	23	15	47	65
293X5	Chan Tech Cont Opr	18	1	0	6
361X1	Cable Splicer	24	14	0	58
362X1	Auto Cen Off Equip Rpnr	21	9	100	43
451X0	Prod Scdh Spec	10	5	25	50
567X1	Elect Power Prod Rpnr	11	7	13	64
603X0	Vehicle Oper	170	98	100	58
902X2	Operating Room Specl	10	3	33	30
921X0	Rescue & Survival	27	8	71	30
982X0	Dental Lab Specl	9	4	38	44

Manning should be at 100% for AFSC's 3034 and 3044, required at remote sites. The remaining problem areas are much the same as in the past, save the introduction for the first time this month of the 9XXXX field.

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AIRMEN TRAINING

COMMAND



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2126	1799	1865	2022	2172	
1794	1480	1472	1565	1703	
158	116	97	80	74	
239	210	118	61	163	

%
100
75
50
25
0

ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG
OJT—C
OJT—D
COMPLETED OJT

HQ 313TH AD



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
698	724	737	772	918	
624	627	598	616	684	
30	38	29	31	27	
81	88	13	10	70	

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGBLE FOR TRNG X 100

5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

COMMAND: The slightly increased in training rate can be attributed to a net gain of 150 eligibles and 132 in training during May. The completion rate was 9.2% in May, with 163 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training. Fifth Air Force reported 88.8% in training and a 7.7% completion rate in May.

HQ 313TH AD: The decreased in training rate can be attributed to a net gain of 146 eligibles and 64 in training during May. The completion rate was 9.8%, with 70 being upgraded and completing cross training.

J 9 3 0

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
551	555	581	620	666		ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	877	520	547	630	588	
481	482	536	543	585		OJT—C	689	371	338	406	434	
40	37	28	21	21		OJT—D	88	41	40	28	26	
99	97	77	17	24		COMPLETED OJT	59	25	28	34	69	

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

51ST FIW: Their in training rate remained consvant with a net gain of 46 eligibles and 42 in training. The completion rate was 4.0%, with 24 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

18TH ABG: Their increased in training rate is due to a net loss of 42 eligibles and a net gain of 26 in training. The completion rate was 15.0%, with 69 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

1931

DISCIPLINE



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
AVERAGE STRENGTH	9719	9304	9864	9934	9912	10204
AWOL	4	2	4	2	1	3
OFFENDERS	120	136	111	150	119	163

▩ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$ ▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

AWOL: The Command reported 3 more AWOL's during the month of June, increasing the AWOL rate accordingly.

OFFENDERS: There was an increase of 0.4% in the offenders rate during June. This is the highest rate reported since May 1956.

1932

DISCIPLINE



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
3091	2891	3273	2839	3155	3379	AVERAGE STRENGTH	6628	6413	6591	7095	6757	6825
1	1	0	1	0	0	AWOL	3	1	4	1	1	3
18	32	33	39	30	58	OFFENDERS	102	104	78	111	89	105

= $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$

= $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

51ST FIW: There was an increase of 0.8% in the offenders rate during June. No military personnel were reported AWOL for the third consecutive month.

18TH ABG: There was a slight increase of 0.2% in the offenders rate during June. Three AWOL's were reported this month, bringing the total for the first six month of this year to 13 AWOL's.

1933

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



TRIALS	JAN – MAR	ARP – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
GEN	7	2		
SPEC	31	25		
SUM	40	65		

During the April thru June period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.07 per thousand persons assigned. The Special and Summary rates were 0.83 and 2.14, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The Summary Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special and General rates reflected a decrease.

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA						NAHA			
JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC			JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC
3	0			GEN	GEN	4	2		
13	18			SPEC	SPEC	18	7		
21	38			SUM	SUM	19	27		

KADENA AIR BASE: There were no General Court Martials during the April - June period. The Special and Summary rates were 0.89 and 1.93, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The last time this base went free from General Court Martials was during the October - December period. The Special and Summary rates increased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.20 during the April - June period, while the Special and Summary rates were 0.79 and 2.74, respectively. The Summary rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special and General rates decreased.

0935

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JAN		FEB		MAR		APR		MAY		JUN	
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		1904.2		1953.4		1948.0		2102.6		2215.0		2214.0	
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	6.1		0.0		4.1		32.6		56.0		16.0	
		REPAIR	14.0		15.1		10.5		10.5		30.0		53.0	
		COMMITTED	67.1		67.3		67.3		57.1		50.0		11.0	
TOTAL NO.	NO.WAITING	MOS.WAIT	333	3	246	3	252	3	334	3	293	5.5	290	6
	NO.DRAWING	DEPARTS	70	56	128	52	119	41	103	57	140	97	123	79
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	1985		2022		2064		2152		2215		2218	2242
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	586		647		672		691		661		654	
		AIRMEN	1228		1344		1303		1298		1404		1462	
		CIVILIAN	19		20		20		20		21		22	

The percent of unoccupied quarters decreased 2.5% during the month of June, bringing the command into a favorable housing condition for the first time during the past 6 months. The decrease can be attributed for the most part to fewer homes being carried in the unoccupied usuable and committed categories.

J 9 3 6

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	
1,658	2,275	2,165	287	1,791	2,384	NET PROFIT/LOSS
27,336	29,612	31,777	37,707	39,498	41,958	NET WORTH

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

KADENA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
-2,184	4,731	1,521	-1,894	92	-4,590
52,055	57,101	73,879	72,813	69,667	41,152

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $2,384.35 during the month of June. This increased their total profit for the first six months of calendar year 1957 to $10,561.49 and is in comparison to a $358.00 net loss shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net loss of $4,590.25 during the month of June. Club operations during the first six months of calendar year 1957 resulted in a net loss amounting to $2,324.00. This loss compares unfavorably with a net profit of $18,197.00 for the same period during 1956.

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2,301	5,486	3,518	2,623	4,737	4,017
84,654	90,034	93,823	95,863	100,640	104,653

$ THOUSAND $

6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6

NET PROFIT/LOSS

NET WORTH

KADENA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
-953	-3,949	-2,636	4,264	3,911	5,164
44,618	39,936	37,743	42,008	47,289	52,454

NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $4,016.58 during the month of June. This increases their total profit for the first six months of calendar year 1957 to $22,684.14 and is $6,223.14 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $5,164.34 during the month of June. This increases their total profit for the first six months of calendar year 1957 to $5,800.68 and is in comparison to a $205.00 net loss shown for the same period during 1956.

0938

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMEN

NAHA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
658	2,651	1,930	-830	-705	1,321
36,803	39,697	46,628	45,979	45,092	46,414

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
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-2
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-6

NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
-995	2,081	2,613	3,498	1,419	286
43,315	45,396	47,859	51,358	52,777	53,063

NAHA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $1,321.24 during the month of June. This increased their total profit for the first six months of calendar year 1957 to $5,025.00 and is $2,341.00 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $285.84 during the month of June. This increased their total profit for the first six months of calendar year 1957 to $8,902.00 and is $6,708.00 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	MAY '57		1957 CUMULATIVE			
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	539	0	3005	0	
18TH ABG	0	324	0	2662	0	
51ST ABG	0	237	0	1758	0	
16TH FDS	0	526	1	2864	34.9	
336TH FDS	0	489	1	2759	36.2	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO. OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN—MAY 1956)— — — (28.8)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN—MAY 1957).....(15.3)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month with a total of 2,115 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first five months of calendar year 1957 are two (2) accidents with 13,048 hours flown. Our present rate of 15.3 is an improvement over the rate of 28.8 for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 17 in April as compared to 18.3 for the Division.

U 9 4 1

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	JUN '57 ACDTS	JUN '57 HRS FLOWN	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE HRS FLOWN	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	366	0	3371	0	
18TH ABG	0	143	0	2805	0	
51ST ABG	0	195	0	1953	0	
16TH FDS	1	365	2	3229	61.9	
336TH FDS	1	358	2	3117	64.2	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO. OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}} \times 100{,}000$

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-JUN 1956) - - - - (27.4)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-JUN 1957) ..... (27.6)

The Command reported two (2) major aircraft accidents during the month of June with a total of 1,427 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first six months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 14,475 hours flown. Our present rate of 27.6 is slightly higher than the 27.4 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 18 in May as compared to 15.3 for the Division.

J 9 4 2

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	MAY 1957 UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	NO OF ACDTS	RATE	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	1	36.2	
	51ST FIW	0	1	13.6	
	COMMAND	0	2	15.3	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	1	13.6	
	COMMAND	0	1	7.7	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	1	36.2	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	1	7.7	

313TH AD RATE (JAN-MAY 1956).....

The Command went accident free during the month of May, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

U 9 4 3

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	JUN 1957 UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	1	2	64.2	
	51ST FIW	1	2	23.4	
	COMMAND	2	4	27.6	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	1	2	23.4	
	COMMAND	1	2	13.8	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	1	2	64.2	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	1	2	13.8	

313TH AD RATE (JAN-JUN 1956).....

The command reported two (2) aircraft accidents during the month of June, one of an undetermined cause in the 336th FIS and one in the 16th FIS on which investigation board findings revealed materiel failure as the cause factor.

J 9 4 4

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	MAY 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
	NO OF DIS INJ	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	COST OF INJ	COST ——— 1,000 (0 2 4 6 8 10)
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	2	1,050	
18TH INSTL & AP	2	35	1,050	3	1,170	
322ND TCS	1	14	420	3	1,260	
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	1,440	
313TH AD	1	7	210	4	1,740	
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	5	1,800	
18TH SUP & TRANS	1	90	2,700	2	3,000	
18TH ABG	1	3	90	7	4,080	
51ST FIG	1	25	750	5	15,150	

313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAY 1956)— — — — ($ 406)
313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAY 1957)..... ($ 2,433)

The Command reported seven (7) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $5,220.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are thirty-six (36) injuries at a cost of $32,490.00. This is $27,210.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during May:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
May	1	7	1	0	1	0	1	1	3
Cumulative	8	36	2	8	5	3	9	2	7

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to two in 1956 for this same period.

3945

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	JUN 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	JUN 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	JUN 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	2	1,050
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	3	1,170
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	1,440
322ND TCS	1	20	600	4	1,860
313TH AD	1	7	210	5	1,950
51ST M&SG	1	7	210	6	2,010
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	2	3,000
18TH ABG	3	47	1,410	10	5,490
51ST FIG	1	6	180	6	15,330



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-JUN 1956)- - - - ($ 708)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-JUN 1957)..... ($ 2700)

The Command reported seven (7) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $2,610.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are forty-three (43) injuries at a cost of $35,100.00. This is $25,890.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occurred during June:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
June	2	7	3	0	0	1	1	0	2
Cumulative	10	43	5	8	5	4	10	2	9

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to two in 1956 for this same period.

9946

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	MAY 1957 ACDTS	MAY 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	MAY 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	81
18TH INSTL & AP	1	1	1	4	118
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	3	192
18TH ABG	1	1	5	3	603



313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAY 1956) — — — — ($ 410.00)
313TH AVERAGE COST (JAN-MAY 1957) . . . . . ($ 77.00)

The Command reported two (2) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $6.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are thirteen (13) accidents at a cost of $1,004.00. This is $4,323.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The two (2) accidents this month resulted from backing without a guide and failure to yield the right away.

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	JUN 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS —— $ 100 (0 1 2 3 4 5)
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0	
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIN	0	0	0	0	0	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10	
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	4	118	
51ST ABG	1	5	78	2	159	
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	3	192	
624TH AC&W	1	5	351	1	351	
18TH ABG	1	0	0	4	603	

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—JUN 1956)------($ 441.00)

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—JUN 1957)-------($ 90.00)

The Command reported three (3) motor vehicle accidents during the month of June at a total cost of $429.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are sixteen (16) accidents at a cost of $1,433.00. This is $4,304.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The accidents this month resulted from backing without a guide, approaching vehicle on wrong side of the road and lost control of a vehicle.

1948

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