SECRET

# STORY of the 313th AIR DIVISION

313TH AIR DIVISION

JULY - DECEMBER 1962

NARRATIVE
VOLUME I

SECRET

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# HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY 1962 - 31 DECEMBER 1962

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Headquarters, 313th Air Division

APPROVED BY:

A. P. CLARK
Major General, USAF
15 February 1964

FIFTH AIR FORCE, PACIFIC AIR FORCES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

A KB-50 AERIAL TANKER REFUELS AN
F-105 (TOP), AN F-100 (CENTER),
AND AN RF-101 (BOTTOM)


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
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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

1962

1 Jan. Detachment 2, 6313th Air Base Wing, is designated and organized at the Onna Point Administration Annex/Office, Ryukyu Islands, per PACAF SO G-93, dtd. 7 Dec. 1961.

Detachment 3, 6313th Air Base Wing, is designated and organized at the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex Area, Okinawa, per PACAF SO G-93, dtd. 7 Dec. 1961.

Detachment 2, 315th Air Division, is designated and organized at Kadena AB, with operational control to be exercised by Detachment 1, 315th Air Division, at Naha AB, the personnel to be furnished from sources available to the Commander, 315th Air Division, and logistical support to be furnished by the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-75, dtd. 5 Oct. 1961, and PACAF SO G-97, dtd. 26 Dec. 1961. Detachment 2 is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support, per 313th AD SO G-2, dtd. 12 Jan. 1962.

11 Jan. The supervisory surveillance of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, previously exercised by the Deputy Chief of Staff/Communications-Electronics, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, per 5AF GO 29, dtd. 24 June 1960, is transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, per 5AF SO G-4, dtd. 11 Jan. 1962.

20 Feb. Lieut. Colonel John H. Glenn, Jr., USMC, becomes the first American to complete an orbit of the earth, soaring around the globe three times within the space of four hours, 56 minutes, in the course of which he covers more than 81,000 miles. Blasted off from the Cape Canaveral rocket pad by a 360,000-pound-thrust Atlas-D missile, at 0947 EST, Colonel Glenn completes his first orbit of the earth in his 4,000-lb. "Friendship 7" space vehicle in 88.29 minutes. The apogee of Colonel Glenn's orbit is 162 miles above the earth, while the perigee is about 99 miles. At the end of the third orbit the temperature of the Mercury space capsule's skin reaches 3,000° F. He slows down from a speed of 17,500 m.p.h. to 270 m.p.h. in a little more than five minutes by employing the reverse rockets with which "Friendship 7" is equipped. The trip ends when the space capsule is safely parachuted into the Atlantic at 1443 EST, near Grand Turk Island in the Bahamas, some 700 miles

1962

20 Feb. southwest of Cape Canaveral. At 21,000 feet a six-foot parachute opens to slow his descent; then at 10,000 feet an air-pressure-operated device pops out a 63-foot-diameter chute, which lowers the capsule gently toward the ocean at 18 feet per second. Here the destroyer Noa, stationed six miles away, sights the "Friendship 7" at 1445 EST. Nineteen minutes later the capsule and Colonel Glenn are safely on her deck; at 1520 EST he emerges to the light of day and fame.

1 Mar. The 6051st Organizational Maintenance Squadron (Provisional) is designated and organized at Naha Air Base, per 5AF Ltr., sub.: Organizational Maintenance Squadrons Provisional, dtd. 9 Feb. 1962.

The 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron (Provisional) is designated and organized at Kadena Air Base, per 5AF Ltr., sub.: Organizational Maintenance Squadrons Provisional, dtd. 9 Feb. 1962.

Motobu Auxiliary Airfield (PIN 2987), previously assigned to the real property account of Naha Air Base and inactivated effective 30 June 1957, is reassigned in an inactive status to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, per PACAF SO G-16, dtd. 23 Feb. 1962.

27 Mar. The following units are attached to the 6313th Support Squadron for normal squadron administrative support only, excepting court martial jurisdiction and administrative board actions affecting officer personnel, which must be retained by the Unit of Assignment, per 313th AD SO G-3, dtd. 27 March 1962:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing
558th Air Force Band

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet (5th AF) is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance support and organizational maintenance (with no change in other attachments or assignments), per 313th AD SO G-3, dtd. 27 March 1962, and 313th AD SO G-11, dtd. 18 Sept. 1962.

The following 313th Air Division and tenant units or activities are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support (excluding field maintenance) and administrative support, per 313th AD SO G-3, dtd. 27 March 1962:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division (except for normal squadron administrative support to be furnished by the 6313th Support Squadron)
Okinawa Division, Tachikawa Air Procurement Office, AMFP (AFLC)

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27 Mar. 558th Air Force Band (except for normal squadron administrative support to be furnished by the 6313th Support Squadron)
Detachment #1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron (AFLC)
Detachment #3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (AFLC)
Headquarters, 1962d Communications Group (AFCS)
Mobile Training Detachments (ATC)
Field Training Detachments (ATC)
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF (Hq Comd)
Detachment #2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group (Hq Comd)
Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing (MATS)
1505th Support Squadron (MATS)
Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron (MATS)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing
7th Tactical Depot Squadron (PACAF) (including assignment and promotion of personnel)
11th Air Postal Squadron
District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet (5th AF) (with no change in other attachments or assignments)
Detachment #2, 27th Communications Squadron (SAC)
6922d Radio Group Mobile (USAFSS)
498th Tactical Missile Group

27 Mar. The following units or activities are attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance support only, per 313th AD SO G-3, dtd. 27 March 1962, and 313th AD SO G-4, dtd. 3 April 1962:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
6313th Air Base Wing
558th Air Force Band
11th Air Postal Squadron
Okinawa Division, Tachikawa Procurement Office, AMFP (AFLC)
District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
Headquarters, 1962d Communications Group (AFCS)
1505th Support Squadron (MATS)
Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron (MATS)
Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing (MATS)
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF (Hq Comd)
Detachment #2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group (Hq Comd)
6922d Radio Group Mobile (USAFSS)

1962

27 Mar. Detachment #2, 27th Communications Squadron (SAC)
Mobile Training Detachments (ATC)
Field Training Detachments (ATC)
498th Tactical Missile Group
Detachment #1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron (AFLC)

31 Mar. Complex "B" of Site #1, 498th Tactical Missile Group, becomes operationally ready at Bolo Point, Okinawa, with four TM-76B missiles. Simultaneously, Complex "A" at the same site is taken off alert and returned to the contractor for completion of construction and modification.

1 Apr. Detachment 3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (AFLC) is discontinued, as part of the parent 2703d EOD Squadron's discontinuance, per PACAF SO G-23, dtd. 2 March 1962. The 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron and all its detachments were reassigned to PACAF effective this same date, 1 April 1962, by Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) SO G-14, dtd. 26 Feb. 1962.

8 Apr. Detachment 12, 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group is designated and organized at Kadena AB under an appropriate UMD, with a non-T/O authorization of two officers and one airman, the personnel to be furnished from resources under the control of the Commander, Tactical Air Command (TAC), per TAC SO G-30, dtd. 12 Mar. 1962. Detachment 12 is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing.

26 Apr. Colonel Charles H. Pierce succeeds Colonel George B. Simler as Commander of the 6313th Air Base Wing and ex officio Kadena Air Base Commander.

1 May The 6051st Air Police Squadron (Provisional) is designated and organized at Naha Air Base, where it is attached to the 51st Air Base Group, per PACAF SO G-29, dtd. 27 Mar. 1962.

3 May Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, is attached to the 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron for squadron administrative and logistical support, per 313th AD SO G-5, dtd. 3 May 1962.

19 May Condition III is called for Typhoon Hope at 2300I.

20 May The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Hope at 1550I.

Brigadier General John G. Ondrick, USA, Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands, departs for the ZI, where he is to retire in the near future. Deputy Civil Administrator Edward K. Shultz (civilian) acts as the Civil Administrator until the arrival of the new Civil Administrator, as yet to be named.

24 May Complexes "A" and "B" of Site #2, 498th Tactical Missile Group, become operationally ready at White Beach, Okinawa, giving the group a total of 12 TM-76B missiles on alert.

1962

1 June Detachment 1 (PACAF Standardization/Evaluation Team), Headquarters, PACAF, is attached to the 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support, per PACAF SO G-37, dtd. 16 Apr. 1962, following completion of a PCS move from Fuchu Air Station, Japan, to Kadena AB, without change in assignment, per PACAF MO 4, dtd. 19 Mar. 1962. Approximately 13 officers and one airman are involved in the unit movement.

4 June Major General Henry W. Buse, Jr., succeeds Major General Robert E. Cushman as Commanding General of the Third Marine Division.

8 June The 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron is reorganized under the appropriate UMD with an O/T strength of 35 officers and 74 airmen, all personnel being furnished from sources available to the Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-32, dtd. 6 Apr. 1962.

19 June Colonel George B. Simler assumes command of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena Air Base, succeeding Colonel Francis S. Gabreski.

Detachment 1 (PACAF Standardization/Evaluation Team), Headquarters, PACAF, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support (excluding field maintenance) and administrative support, and is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance only, per 313th AD SO G-7, dtd. 19 June 1962.

27 June Captain Thomas L. Andrews, Jr., USN, assumes the dual titles of Commander, Fleet Activities Ryukyus, and Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Air Facility, Naha, succeeding Captain Saxe P. Gantz, USN.

29 June The 345th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, which has arrived at Naha Air Base in a permanent change of station movement from Sewart AFB, Tennessee, is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support, per 313th AD SO G-9, dtd. 29 June 1962.

1 July The Deragawa Communications Annex (PIN 2993), consisting of 130.18 acres of land with an annual rental of $22,222.92, is transferred to the U.S. Army. The total prepaid rental for 62.17 acres is $98,015.06, leaving a current annual rental of $11,622.69. All buildings and utilities are transferred by separate Engineer Form 290, dated 30 June 1962.

Ginowan-Son, in south-central Okinawa, is promoted in status to the designation of Ginowan-Shi (City), its population having passed the required minimum figure for that purpose.

1962

3 July Colonel Dale S. Sweat assumes command of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, vice Colonel William W. Ingenhutt.

W. Garland Richardson, the United States Consul General in the Ryukyu Islands, returns to the United States for reassignment. Until the arrival of his successor, Miss Ann Pomroy, the Vice-Consul, acts as Principal Officer of the Consular Unit, Naha City, Okinawa.

5 July Cyrus R. Vance is sworn in as Secretary of the Army, replacing Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., whose resignation was effective 30 June 1962.

8 July Condition III is declared for Typhoon Joan, at 1600I; Condition II at 2140I; and Condition I at 2230I.

9 July The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Joan at 1945I.

14 July Camp Koza, which had most recently been occupied by the 3d Pioneer Battalion of the 3d Marine Division, is returned to its Ryukyuan landowners. The camp, comprising 47,000 tsubo (37.44 acres) has been used by the U.S. Forces for the past 17 years. In place of restoring the land to its original state or paying the compensation required to do so, the Marines turn over all the camp buildings and other facilities to the approximately 80 landowners, who realize $17,000 from their sale.

17 July Dr. Shannon B. B. McCune, previously sworn in as Civil Administrator of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) by Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance on 12 July 1962, arrives at Kadena AB to assume his duties. Dr. McCune is the first civilian to fill this position, all of his predecessors having been military officers of one-star rank. This change from a military to a civilian position is directed by an amendment of Executive Order No. 10713, dtd. 19 March 1962.

24 July Colonel Lester C. Hess assumes command of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, succeeding Colonel Dale S. Sweat.

30 July Condition III is declared for Typhoon Nora at 1453I.

31 July Condition II is declared for Typhoon Nora at 0725I; Condition I at 1804I.

1 Aug. The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Nora at 1510I.

3 Aug. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Opal at 1555I.

4 Aug. Condition II is declared for Typhoon Opal at 0731I.

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5 Aug. The All Clear is called for Typhoon Opal at 0800I.

8 Aug. The 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron is reorganized under the appropriate UMD with an O/T strength of 35 officers and 74 airmen, all personnel being furnished from sources available to the Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-32, dtd. 6 Apr. 1962.

The 44th Tactical Figher Squadron is reorganized under the appropriate UMD with an O/T strength of 35 officers and 74 airmen, all personnel being furnished from sources available to the Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-32, dtd. 6 Apr. 1962.

18 Aug. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Sarah at 2205I.

19 Aug. Condition II is declared for Typhoon Sarah at 0730I; and at 1500I the All Clear is called.

1 Sep. Headquarters, 6920th Security Wing is discontinued at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, and in its place is organized Headquarters, Pacific Security Region, likewise at Wheeler AFB, where it is assigned to the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), per USAFSS SO GB-9, dtd. 19 July 1962. The personnel of the discontinued 6920th Security Wing are reassigned to Headquarters, Pacific Security Region.

Headquarters, 6922d Radio Group Mobile at Kadena AB, Okinawa, is redesignated Headquarters, 6922d Security Wing, and is assigned to Pacific Security Region. The UMD strength is authorized as 37 officers, 332 airmen, and one civilian, per USAFSS SO GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962.

Condition III is declared for Typhoon Amy at 0700I; and at 1220I Okinawa is placed in Condition II.

2 Sep. Condition III is again declared for Typhoon Amy at 0953I, as she turns away from Okinawa.

5 Sep. The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Amy at 0830I.

8 Sep. The 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Provisional, at Kadena Air Base is discontinued, and in its place is simultaneously organized the 18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron. This unit, previously constituted and activated by DAF AFOMO letter 882m of 7 Aug. 1962, is assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962.

1962

8 Sep. The 6051st Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Provisional, at Naha Air Base is discontinued, and in its place is simultaneously organized the 51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron. This unit, previously constituted and activated by DAF AFOMO letter 882m of 7 August 1962, is assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, per PACAF SO G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962.

11 Sep. Richard W. Finch arrives on Okinawa to assume the duties of Consul and principal officer in charge of the American Consular Unit in Naha City, relieving Miss Ann Pomroy, who has headed the Consular Unit since the departure of Consul General W. Garland Richardson on 3 July 1962.

30 Sep. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Dinah at 2215I.

1 Oct. The 6925th Radio Squadron Mobile at Clark AB, P.I., is redesignated Headquarters, 6925th Radio Group Mobile, and is assigned to the 6922d Security Wing, per USAFSS SO GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962.

The 6923d Radio Squadron Mobile at Tan Son Nhut, Republic of Vietnam, is relieved from assignment to the 6922d Security Wing and is assigned to the 6925th Radio Group Mobile, per USAFSS SO GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962.

The 6987th Radio Squadron Mobile at Shu Lin Kou ASN, Taiwan, is redesignated Headquarters, 6987th Radio Group Mobile and is assigned to the 6922d Security Wing, per USAFSS SO GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, succeeds General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, erstwhile Deputy Commander, Allied Forces in Europe, succeeds General George H. Decker, USA, as U.S. Army Chief of Staff. General Decker retires from active service.

2 Oct. The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Dinah at 1000I.

13 Oct. Vice Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, relieves Vice Admiral William A. Schoech, USN, as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet in a change of command ceremony aboard the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk at Yokosuka, Japan.

30 Oct. The first three-plane increment of F-105 "Thunderchiefs" with which the 12th, 44th, and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing are scheduled to be re-equipped is flown into Kadena AB, led by Wing Commander George B. Simler. These late model aircraft are to replace the F-100's with which the 18th TFW has been equipped since 1957, when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing converted from F-86F's.

1962

1 Oct. Complexes "A" and "B" at Site #3, 498th Tactical Missile Group, become operationally ready at Tancha, Okinawa, adding eight missiles to the total unit strength.

27 Oct. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Gilda at 1105I.

29 Oct. The All Clear is called for Typhoon Gilda at 0725I.

30 Oct. The first three-plane increment of F-105 "Thunderchiefs" with which the 12th, 44th, and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing are scheduled to be re-equipped is flown into Kadena AB, led by Wing Commander George B. Simler. These late model aircraft are to replace the F-100's with which the 18th TFW has been equipped since 1957, when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing converted from F-86F's.

1 Nov. Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) Squadron at Kadena Air Base is discontinued, and in its place is designated and organized Detachment 2, 2875th GEEIA Squadron, per AFLC SO G-83, dtd. 25 Oct. 1962.

11 Nov. In the contest for the 29 seats in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) Legislature, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) elects 17 candidates, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP) seven, the Okinawa People's Party (OPP) one, the Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP) one (the first from this party ever elected to the Legislature), and three independents win office. Of these last, one, Shoken Kudaka, is "independent" in name only, actually being strongly-pro-Communist and a member of the OPP; while another, Busuke Tanaka, demonstrates his "independence" by joining the OLDP four days after the election. Of the total 461,628 registered voters, 328,672 cast their ballots; but 26,267 of these are ruled invalid, including 22,303 cast for ineligible OPP and OLDP candidates. The OLDP receives 134,884 valid votes, the OSMP 92,774, the OPP 20,000, the OSP 7,877, and independents 46,870.

13 Nov. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Karen at 1045I.

14 Nov. Condition II is called for Typhoon Karen at 0730I.

15 Nov. Condition I is declared for Typhoon Karen at 1415I.

16 Nov. The All Clear is called for Typhoon Karen, the closest approach of the eye having been 120 nautical miles from Kadena AB. Maximum sustained winds at Kadena were 56 knots, with peak gusts of 69 knots.

1962

21 Nov. Both Complexes "A" and "B" at Site #4, 498th Tactical Missile Group, become operationally ready at Ginbaru, Okinawa, making all four missile launch sites on Okinawa operational.

30 Nov. Rear Admiral R. A. McPherson, USN, relieves Rear Admiral Bernard M. Strean, USN, as Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's Taiwan Patrol Force in a change of command ceremony aboard the seaplane tender USS Currituck at White Beach, Okinawa.

8 Dec. The modification program for the Mace launch sites is completed, and all four sites are operational with missiles on "quick strike."

13 Dec. Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, announces that under the provisions of United States Presidential Order No. 10713 of 5 June 1957, as amended by President Kennedy on 19 March 1962, he is reappointing Seisaku Ota to the post of Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands for a second term. Previously, on 8 December, the GRI Legislature has renominated Mr. Ota for reappointment.

20 Dec. A KB-50, based at Yokota AB, Japan, crashes into Yara Village, a suburb of Kadena Village, following an abortive landing attempt. Five crew members and two Okinawans are killed almost immediately, and an eighth victim is added the next day, when the aircraft commander succumbs to his burns. Six other villagers and a single crewman are injured in varying degrees.

31 Dec. Of the 498th Tactical Missile Group's full complement of 32 launch bays, 30 contain TM-76B missiles, 27 of these being on "Quick Strike" as the year ends.

# CHAPTER I

## ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

# CHAPTER I

## ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

### THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Disinclined toward change merely for the sake of change itself and quick to recognize the merits of any directive originating at Fuchu Air Station, Fifth Air Force Headquarters left untouched throughout the period 1 July-31 December 1962 its Regulation No. 23-4, originally published on 24 November 1961. This document, setting forth the mission of the 313th Air Division in the Ryukyu Islands, called, in general terms, for the maintenance of all assigned and attached forces in such a state of combat readiness as would insure the success of any military operations which higher authority might direct.[1]

In the matter of air defense, although a new version of the Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 55-18 defining the division/wing areas of responsibility within that command was promulgated, on 11 September 1962, the 313th Air Division continued to be responsible for the same area as it had been for many years past--one encompassed within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.[2]

As a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force, the 313th Air Division at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, the largest and most important of the Ryukyu

Islands, was provided with a headquarters and such units and facilities as were essential to the performance of its mission and the execution of Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in the 313th Air Division area of jurisdiction.

The Commander, 313th Air Division was responsible for the following specific tasks and duties:

1. Exercising command of all assigned units, except for such direct control as the Commander, Fifth Air Force retained over offensive tactical forces.

2. Controlling and/or supporting the various attached units, as directed.

3. Organizing, administering, equipping, and training the assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies, and plans issued by either Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters.

4. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, preparing such plans as should be required to support Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.

5. Insuring that combat training was conducted in accordance with existing directives and was oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with the tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders.

6. Insuring that all combat and combat direct support units were furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total

guidance necessary to the maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

7. Insuring the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

8. Monitoring the development and conduct of training programs to include:

(a) The technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(b) General military training, in accordance with applicable Air Force unit training standards.

(c) Assisting in aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program, as required.

(d) Other training, as directed.

9. Contributing toward the development of:

(a) The tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(b) Requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.

(c) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

10. Providing aircraft for and supervision over the annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel as outlined in AFR 60-3.

11. Providing administrative and logistic support, as directed.

12. Supporting the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and other USAF activities, in accordance

with the current priorities of programmed units, as reflected on the latest applicable USAF programming document.

13. Exercising operational control of forces other than those of the United States, when so directed.

14. Exercising operational control of U.S. Army and Navy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), surface-to-air missile units, and other anti-aircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

15. Representing CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in the coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region.

16. Conducting search and rescue operations as directed.

17. Organizing and administering an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units.

18. Providing for sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations.

19. Providing for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required to support the mission.

20. Exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

21. Coordinating with and providing assistance to other U.S. military services and governmental agencies as follows:

a. By formulating and jointly preparing plans for use in local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbance,

typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuation, and special demonstrations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies.

b. By coordinating with the appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

c. By participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies, as directed by the Commander, U.S. Forces.

d. By contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Services Police (RASP) force and the Ryukyuan Army and Air Force Exchange Service (REX).

e. By providing a base, training facilities, and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations, upon the completion of the appropriate agreements.

f. By supporting the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands (Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA) in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership to the Joint Planning Group, all sub-committees, and panels.

g. By coordinating all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities with the appropriate local U.S. governmental authorities.

h. By supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands

(another title held by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA, who was also Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) and IX Corps, and CINCPAC-REP, Ryukyu Islands) in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

22. Insuring that all commanders and staff officers were familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publications: "Unified Actions Armed Forces."

23. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

24. Insuring that mission directives had been prepared for all units of the 313th Air Division, and requiring that they be reviewed semi-annually and brought up to date when found necessary.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might direct to the contrary.[3]

In addition to the foregoing Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4, which described the 313th Air Division's organization and its mission, the responsibilities delegated to the 313th Commander and those specifically retained by the Fifth Air Force Commander continued to be laid down in the so-called "Burns letter" of 27 June 1960, as revised on 1 August 1960.

According to this letter, written by the Fifth Air Force Commander of that period, Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, "a degree of direct

control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters /Fifth Air Force/ is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons." Moreover, this degree of direct control went beyond the "centralized control" ordinarily accepted in the employment of conventional forces. Then, to further clarify a knotty subject, he defined control as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations."

These lexicographic matters having been disposed of, General Burns turned to the task of describing in detail "the minimum control that this headquarters intends to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces" of the 313th Air Division. Comprised in this were the following:

1. The ordering, directing, and monitoring of maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.

2. The ordering and monitoring of routine and special force deployments.

3. The ordering, directing, monitoring, and evaluating of combat readiness training programs.

4. The controlling and directing of the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system would provide direct communication between Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and the tactical wings.

5. The control and direction of the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.

6. Such other control as operational necessity might dictate.

General Burns pointed out that the action of his headquarters in retaining direct control of tactical wings had reduced the requirement for personnel on 313th's operations staff. For, to have such officers would only mean a duplication of the Fifth Air Force effort in the direction and control of the strike forces. On the other hand, he did consider it "necessary and desirable" for the 313th Air Division Commander to keep himself and key members of his staff informed concerning the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned to his command, in order that he might be prepared to carry out effectively the responsibilities assigned to him by Annex "E" of the WPC.

One point on which the Burns letter placed considerable emphasis was his belief that no augmentation of the 313th Commander's operations staff was warranted by the requirement of the mission directive that the latter assure the accomplishment of combat readiness training, the preparation of plans and orders, and the provision of command policy and guidance, along with sundry other responsibilities toward the command and control of tactical striking forces. On the contrary, these responsibilities, extensive though they were, could well be discharged by the existing staff, with the assistance of personnel of the Inspector General's office and the tactical wing staffs.

Finally, said General Burns, Fifth's control of the tactical striking forces would be exercised through direct communication with the tactical wings and groups, with information copies of all correspondence between the Fuchu headquarters and these tactical units, other than that of a routine nature, being furnished to 313th Air Division.[4]

Revised Missions of Subordinate Organizations.

The Mission of the 6313th Air Base Wing: The reader of these chronicles of the 313th Air Division possessing the mnemonic faculties of an elephant or a Thomas Babington Macaulay will doubtless remember that a new edition of 313th Air Division Regulation (313ADR) No. 23-2 was published on 17 January 1962, prescribing the mission and responsibilities of the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. So well was this document written that, although 11 more months were to go by, with time working its inevitable changes in leaders and circumstances, 313th Air Division found it necessary to make only one small, almost imperceptible, alteration in its wording.

As originally indited on 17 January 1962, one of the matters for which the 6313th Air Base Wing Commander had been responsible to the 313th Air Division Commander was that of commanding Sector "E" in accordance with the Joint USARYIS/IX Corps/313th Air Division/3d Marine Division Area Damage Control Plan to include the preparation of a 6313th ABW Damage Control Plan, then testing and executing this plan to insure its adequacy. On 6 December 1962, 313th Air Division revised this paragraph to make the 6313th Commander responsible for the preparation of a 6313th ABW Disaster Control Plan instead of the former Damage Control Plan. Actually, it was little more than a matter of semantics, but the revision was designed to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the literal-minded.[5]

The Mission of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet: More caducous than the 313th Air Division Regulation covering the organization and mission of the 6313th ABW was that which had been promulgated for the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet,

on 17 January 1962. Although considerable care and thought had gone into the preparation of this regulation, and despite the fact that the 15th was still equipped with the same RF-101 Voodoos at the year's end, so many small changes were found necessary here and there that this headquarters decided that issuing a completely new mission directive would be simpler than patching up the old one in numerous places. Thus it was that 12 December 1962 saw the publication of a new 313th ADR No. 23-5.

The January version had called for the 15th TRS to obtain direct pre-strike and post-strike photography and provide ground, air, and naval forces with visual and photographic information concerning the disposition, movement, and activity of friendly and hostile forces "during the hours of daylight."

The regulation, as written in December 1962, eliminated the phrase "during the hours of daylight," thus implying that the squadron was to be responsible for these activities at all times.

The 15th TRS was organized as an AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division and attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) for operational, logistical, and administrative control. While himself exercising command and administrative control of the 15th, the squadron commander was responsible to the Commander, 18th TFW for:

1. Command and control of assigned and attached squadron personnel.

2. The organization of squadron facilities, functions, and individuals into an efficient unit.

3. Providing the initial production and distribution of photographic intelligence reports for dissemination, within the capabilities of the equipment and personnel assigned.

4. Interpreting photographs and preparing immediate photographic intelligence reports for dissemination, within the capabilities of the equipment and personnel assigned.

5. Conducting operations in support of general and contingency war plans.

6. Performing operations functions for the control of all aircraft assigned to the 15th TRS.

7. Developing and maintaining a high state of mobility for the deployment of personnel and equipment as required to accomplish the assigned mission.

8. Providing unit and individual training, including on-the-job training (OJT), technical and specialized, for the personnel assigned.

9. Promoting general understanding and appreciation, within the limitations of security, of the principle of tactical reconnaissance operations.

10. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division, to such an extent as was consistent with the requirements of the squadron's primary mission.

11. Performing such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

Deleted from the provisions of the former version of the regulation was the responsibility of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Commander for "performing flight-line maintenance of assigned unit equipment and attrition aircraft."[6] However, it is extremely doubtful that he had ever performed much flight-line maintenance, regardless of the regulation!



THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Activations, Inactivations, and Redesignations at Kadena Air Base.

The 6922d Security Wing: On 1 September 1962, the Headquarters, 6920th Security Wing (AFSS) was discontinued at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, and in its place was organized Headquarters, Pacific Security Region, at the same location, which was assigned to the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). The personnel of the discontinued 6920th Security Wing were reassigned to the new Headquarters, Pacific Security Region.[7]

Simultaneously with this action, Headquarters, 6922d Radio Group Mobile at Kadena AB, Okinawa, was redesignated Headquarters, 6922d Security Wing and assigned to the new Pacific Security Region with an authorized Unit Manning Document (UMD) strength of 37 officers, 332 airmen, and one civilian.[8]

One month later, on 1 October 1962, the 6925th Radio Squadron Mobile at Clark AB, Philippine Islands, was redesignated Headquarters, 6925th Radio Group Mobile and assigned to the fledgling 6922d Security Wing.[9] As a result of the unit's upgrading, a headquarters squadron was organized and manned from within existing resources.

That same date, 1 October, the 6923d Radio Squadron Mobile at Tan

Son Nhut, Republic of Vietnam, was relieved from its assignment to the 6922d Security Wing and was assigned to the 6925th Radio Group Mobile.[10]

Also effective 1 October 1962, the 6987th Radio Squadron Mobile at Shu Lin Kou Air Station, Republic of China, was redesignated Headquarters, 6987th Radio Group Mobile, and was assigned to the 6922d Security Wing.[11] Concurrently with this action, the new group established a headquarters squadron section.

The 18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Provisional: Effective 8 September 1962, the 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Provisional, which had been designated and organized at Kadena AB only as recently as 1 March of the same year, was discontinued. To replace it, PACAF organized the 18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron,[12] which had previously been constituted and activated by a Department of the Air Force letter of 7 August 1962,[13] and assigned it to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

Detachment 2, 2875th GEEIA Squadron: On 1 November 1962, Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) Squadron, was discontinued at Kadena AB, and in its place was designated and organized Detachment 2, 2875th GEEIA Squadron. The unit personnel and equipment strength were unaffected by the change.[14]

Back on 1 January 1959, Operating Location #1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron, had been organized as a detachment of the 2876th GEEIA Squadron at Clark AB, replacing the inactivated 17th Communications Construction Squadron at Kadena AB. Then, on 1 September 1960, Operating Location #1 had been transformed into Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron, in which form it functioned until the metamorphosis of 1 November 1962 described above.

Reorganisation of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron: On 8 August 1962 the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 18th TFW, was reorganized under the appropriate UMD with an Organisation Table (O/T) strength of 35 officers and 74 airmen, all personnel to be furnished from sources available to the Commander, 18th TFW.[15]

Reorganisation of the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron: On 8 August 1962 the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 18th TFW, was reorganized under the appropriate UMD with an O/T strength of 35 officers and 74 airmen, all personnel to be furnished from sources available to the Commander, 18th TFW.[16]

Activations, Inactivations, and Reorganizations at Naha Air Base.

The 51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron: Effective 8 September 1962, the 6051st Organizational Maintenance Squadron, Provisional, which had seen the light of day at Naha AB as recently as March 1st of the same year, was discontinued, and in its place was organized the 51st Organisational Maintenance Squadron.[17] Assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha, the new squadron had previously been constituted and activated by a Department of the Air Force letter of 7 August 1962.[18]

THE 498th TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP

Although the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena Air Base underwent no change in its organisation nor its mission during the period under study, several operational events of sufficient importance to warrant recording did occur in the course of the year.

The first of these actually occurred at 2359I, 31 December 1961,

when four TM-76B Mace missiles of the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, 498th TMG, became operationally ready in a semi-hard launch environment in Complex "A" at Site #1, Bolo Point, Okinawa. However, the contractor (Matsumura Gumi, a Japanese contractor) had to perform certain modifications (known as MOD 23) on this site, as well as all the others, before they could be considered as at all satisfactory. Experience had shown that if all four main cell doors (water-filled monstrosities weighing 140 tons) in a complex were opened at the same time, hydraulic fluid had to be added to the system before the last doors could be raised, since the reservoir was too small to hold the added fluid while the doors were in a closed position. Therefore, the chief modification was the installation of larger hydraulic reservoirs for the main cell doors and exhaust door actuating systems. In addition, isolating valves had to be installed in the hydraulic system so that the entire system did not have to be shut down to permit maintenance; the pedestals that supported the hydraulic rams responsible for opening and closing the main cell doors needed strengthening; the circuit breaker system had to be rewired to prevent complete loss of site power in consequence of isolated malfunctions; and other minor design deficiencies required correction.

On 31 March 1962, Complex "B" of Site #1 became operationally ready with its four TM-76B missiles; however, the 498th's offensive weaponry remained the same as before, since Complex "A" was simultaneously taken off alert and returned to the contractor for completion of construction and performance of the requisite modifications.

On 23 April 1962, a Fifth Air Force team conducted the Initial Capability Inspection (ICI) of Launch Site #2, at White Beach. This ICI

THE PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW
SHOW THE DAMAGE RESULTING FROM
DEFICIENCIES IN THE DESIGN OF
THE HYDRAULIC DOORS AT THE
MACE LAUNCH SITES ON OKINAWA







was designed to determine if the group was ready and if it was capable of receiving and mating nuclear warheads to missiles, as well as to check its compliance with the pertinent safety rules. The ICI also checked site security measures, the adequacy of missile handling and launch facilities, and the proper utilization of PACAF Positive Control Procedures (PCP). Site #2 passed the inspection successfully, and on 24 May 1962 all eight missiles in the two complexes were placed on alert, giving the 498th a total of 12 operationally-ready missiles.

Complex "A" of Site #1 resumed its status as an operationally-ready facility on 9 August 1962, to bring the group's O/R strength to 16 birds.

On 18 and 23 September respectively, Complexes "B" and "A" at Site #3 (Tancha) passed their rapid fire multiple launch tests, and on 1 October both assumed an operationally-ready condition. This would have given the 498th a total of 24 missiles "on the line," had it not been for the necessity of shutting down Complex "B" at Site #2 on 26 September to permit Matsumura Gumi to perform modifications at that place. The actual O/R strength, then, stood at 20 missiles in bays and 17 on "quick-strike," as of 1 October 1962.

The number of ready birds dipped to 16 on October 18th, when Complex "B" at Site #1 was shut down for modification, but rose to 20 once more on the 21st, as a result of Complex "B" at White Beach's resuming its O/R posture.

The total was boosted once more to 24 missiles on 20 November and to 28 the following day, as Complexes "B" and "A" respectively became operationally-ready at Site #4 (Ginbaru).

This situation obtained only briefly, however; for on 26 November

Complex "A" at Bolo Point joined its sister complex in being shut down for modification. Fortunately, this proved to be an even briefer suspension, as the complex returned to the line the next day, November 27th.

At last, on 8 December 1962, Complex "B" at Site #1 again became O/R, its modifications completed, giving the 498th Tactical Missile Group an operational array of 30 missiles in bays, 25 of them on "quick-strike." With this achievement the United States Air Force now boasted its first "hardened" tactical missile force in an overseas area. At the year's end, 27 of the 498th's TM-76B Mace missiles were on "quick-strike."[19]

## DETACHMENT 3, 313th AIR DIVISION

As in the case of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, at Naha Air Base, was unaffected by any administrative changes during the second half of 1962, but its operations were of sufficient importance to warrant chronicling in this history, and, if not here set forth, they would go untold.

The mission of Detachment 3, as related in previous histories of this command, was to perform radar evaluation services throughout the PACAF area of responsibility, conduct analyses of the Radar Quality Control Programs, and act as an advisory agency in matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics. The detachment was also expected to analyse such matters as the effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, the relationship of target aspect ratio to the probability of detection, and the validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft. Detachment 3 was also to provide special advisory service on specific electronic problems related to the

operating efficiency of the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) system, as well as provide training for field personnel at new radar installations and furnish electronic warfare training in support of ground radars.[20]

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division came under the direct operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, whose Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations exercised supervisory surveillance. In the matters of logistic support (except for field maintenance) and administrative support (less the assignment and promotion of personnel), the detachment was attached to the 51st Support Squadron, while field maintenance only was provided by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. However, because the unit personnel were assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, their records were maintained by the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB.[21]

On 5 July 1962, the four remaining members of the team which had gone to the Koke Air Force Station (AFS) at Lihue, Kauai, Hawaii, to perform a special evaluation of the site's AN/FPS-20A returned to Naha AB, having been preceded to the home station by Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa and a non-commissioned officer (NCO). After completing their primary assignment at Kokee, the quartet had conducted classes on quality control, as well as live ECM (electronics counter-measures) and ECCM (electronics counter-counter-measures) at Koko Head, Oahu, Hawaii. The NCO mentioned above, Technical Sergeant Thomas E. O'Hare, was subsequently awarded the Air Force Commendation Medal for his outstanding performance of duty while assigned to Detachment 3. Moreover, on 29 June 1962, Brigadier General Valentine A. Siefermann, Commander of the Hawaiian Air National Guard, wrote a letter of appreciation to Detachment 3 for the special evaluation the six-man team had conducted from 1 through 15 June. As

he described the circumstances of the evaluation, it had been "imperative" that the cause of the unusually strong sea clutter returns, deeply pronounced lobing, and extended fading experienced by the AN/FPS-20A which combined to reduce the station's effectiveness be ascertained and corrective action taken. And that action must needs be taken within two weeks, as an operational readiness inspection (ORI) of the Hawaiian Air Defense System by the PACAF IG team was scheduled to be held during the Hawaiian Air National Guard's summer training. While the evaluation team had only a fortnight in which to correct the trouble, it did not have uninterrupted access to the equipment even during that time, since the ailing search radar had to be used in team training exercises and system training missions. On top of this, even the weather was uncooperative, being inclement all too much of the time. Nevertheless, they "managed to completely check the equipment, analyzed the effects of weather, flight check the radar, determined the cause of the difficulties encountered, and made recommendations for corrective action which enabled the unit to realize a much better radar coverage capability." As a result of the team's work, the 150th AC&W Squadron performed well during the ORI and received a "satisfactory" rating from the PACAF IG team.[22]

On 15 July, a seven-man team headed by Captain William Etheridge, the detachment commander, flew down to Bangkok, Thailand, from where they performed a station evaluation at Ubon on the AN/MPS-11 L-band surveillance radar and the AN/MPS-14 S-band height finder. Captain Etheridge and four other team members returned to Naha on 6 August, stopping at Clark AB enroute to inform Thirteenth Air Force of their findings and corrective actions. An enlisted Operator Specialist remained at Ubon to conduct quality control lectures, returning to Detachment 3 on August 11th.

Two members of a four-man team which had departed for Japan and Korea on 28 June remained in Japan following their colleagues' return to Okinawa, conducting debriefings at Fifth Air Force, 41st Air Division, and Headquarters, Japan Air Self Defense Force (HASDF). They also conducted four hours of ground training at Komaki Air Station for intercept directors and pilots on 6 August. Previously, the team had conducted ECM and ECCM training at Site 44 (Miniokayama), Site P-1 (Kasatori), Site P-23 (Wajima), and Site 46 (Sado Shima), in addition to Komaki; while in Korea they had conducted similar training at Pyongtaek (K-6) for Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) personnel.

On 12 August a five-man team departed for Fuchu Air Station, Japan, where, after receiving a briefing at Fifth Air Force Headquarters, they quickly took off for Misawa AB, Hokkaido. After getting another briefing from personnel of the 39th Air Division (whose headquarters was at Misawa AB), the team moved on to Site P-42, Ominato, Japan. Here the detachment's contract technician, who had remained in Japan on leave following the June-July trip to Korea and Japan, joined the team in performing a special investigation of the AN/FPS-20A search radar.

Two members returned to Naha on 22 August, but the others went on to Sites P-29 (Okujiri Shima), P-45 (Tobetsu), P-33 (Funakawa), and P-26 (Nemuro) to conduct quality control visits for 39th Air Division. After debriefing 39th Air Division on their findings, the team then flew south to Itazuke AB, Kyushu, where they received briefing instructions from Detachment #2, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, and then departed for Site P-17 (Mishima, Japan). Quality control records were checked and lectures given to site personnel concerning the areas of quality control procedures.

This done, the team returned to Itazuke to debrief Detachment #2, 8th TFW.

On 16 August two airmen went to Thailand to survey and obtain coverage information on Udorn, Korat, and Phitsanulok for use in the forthcoming station evaluations planned for those sites. On 4 September the two men were back at Naha.

Second Lieutenant James E. Wickell went to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 2 September to coordinate UMD personnel requirements, Detachment 3 having requested 10 additional personnel it felt were necessary in order successfully to carry out the increased commitments assigned the unit in recent months.

The Okinawa Air Defense System was the subject of Detachment 3's ministrations for the first time during the historical period on 14 September, when a team flew down to Miyako Air Station (Site P-53) to conduct a special evaluation of the AN/FPS-6 height finder. The work was completed on September 19th.

Meantime, on 15 September, a team led by Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa (who had succeeded Captain William B. Etheridge as the detachment commander on 11 September, the latter returning to the CONUS for retirement from USAF) had gone to Thailand on 15 September, where they evaluated the AN/TPS-1D portable search set at Phitsanulok and the AN/MPS-11 at Don Muang until 5 October.

The Okinawa Air Defense System was visited for the second time from 30 September to 9 October, when a team performed a special evaluation of the AN/FPS-6 height finder at Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu Jima Air Station).

The "promised land" of Hawaii was again visited by a detachment team

from 25 October to 20 November. At Koko Head tilt error checks, contour and horn alignment checks, and quality control checks were conducted. At Kokee AFS, contour and horn alignment checks and tilt error checks were performed; while at Punamano the team devoted themselves to feed horn alignment and contour checks, as well as tilt error checks.

While this team was enjoying the delightful climate of Hawaii, a second team departed Naha for Southeast Asia on 28 October to conduct station evaluations on the AN/TPS-1D surveillance radar, the AN/TPS-10D height finder, and the AN/MPS-16 height finder sets at Pleiku and Danang in the Republic of Vietnam. Thirteenth Air Force had requested such a study, particularly at Pleiku, because the antenna assembly of the AN/TPS-1D at that site had been changed and relocated. However, they were unable to evaluate the AN/MPS-16 properly, because the power supply for the height-range indicator (HRI) was inoperative. All of the team, except for the lieutenant in charge, returned to Naha AB on 18 November. He stopped off at Clark AB for two days to debrief Thirteenth Air Force electronics officials on the findings of the evaluation.

On 15 and 18 November, two airmen of Detachment 3 flew down to Lubang, Mindoro, in the Philippine Islands, where they repainted the plotting board, returning to Okinawa on the 26th.

At the request of Thirteenth Air Force, the detachment commander, Captain Mendonsa, led a team down to Taipei, Taiwan, on 8 December to hold talks with the Chinese Air Force and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) representatives aimed at determining how much and what type of evaluation had to be accomplished at Chinese Air Force AC&W sites.

Among the topics discussed were quality control, ECCM, weather, and the like. The team returned to Naha on 14 December 1962.[23]

## CHANGES INVOLVING AIR FORCE LAND IN THE RYUKYUS

### Deragawa Communications Annex.

On 1 July 1962, the Deragawa Communications Annex (PIN 2993), an area comprising 130.18 acres of land with an annual rental of $22,222.92, was transferred by 313th Air Division to the U.S. Army. The total prepaid rental for 62.17 acres of the whole was $98,015.06, leaving a current annual rental of $11,622.69 for the balance, to be assumed by the new tenants. All buildings and utilities at Deragawa (an Americanization of the name of the adjacent village of Tairagawa) were transferred by separate Engineer Form 290, dated 30 June 1962.

### Camp Koza.

Although Camp Koza was no longer Air Force real property--it had ceased to be so on 1 July 1958 when the former Koza Housing Annex (PIN 2992) was transferred to the Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps--it does not seem improper to relate in this place the story of its release to the former Ryukyuan landowners.

Before the U.S. Tenth Army's conquest of Okinawa in 1945, the area which was later to become Camp Koza comprised several farms, a cemetery, and a riding ground belonging to Goya-Ku (village). After this part of the island had been captured and secured, but while fighting was still in progress to the south, a Navy construction battalion built a quonset camp there as a base of operations and living area, until their departure from Okinawa in May 1947, at the time of the great "Navy Rollup."[24]

With the "Seabees'" evacuation of Camp Koza, the 822d Engineer Aviation Battalion moved in almost at once, remaining there until the Korean War called them and sister SCARWAF (Special Category Army With the Air Force) units to that embattled land on 10 July 1950.[25] For a brief period the Kadena Industrial Property Yard occupied the area, but in short order it was taken over by Vinnell-Wunderlich Joint Venture, the huge construction firm which was to build the paved airfields at Kadena, Naha, Futemma, and Yontan, for use as an office headquarters, billeting, dining, and storage area. The first official recognition we have of its existence in this incarnation is in the form of a 313th Air Division General Order of 19 May 1955 listing it as the Kadena/Koza Contractor Housing Annex.[26] However, when Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) published a list of redesignated 313th Air Division installations and facilities on 17 November 1955, it gave the area's former name as, simply, "Contractor Housing Area."[27]

With completion of the airfield contracts, Vinnell-Wunderlich pulled out of the area, and the 313th Air Division employed the vacated quonsets as BOQ's for a part of the civil service employees and technical representatives (tech reps) assigned to Kadena AB. Since the designation "Contractor Housing Area" was no longer descriptive of its mission, the area was redesignated as Koza Annex #2 on 17 November 1955.[28]

On 18 September 1956 the designation was again changed to the "Koza Billeting Annex."[29] The next metamorphosis came on 11 March 1958, when the area was named the "Koza Housing Annex.[30]

People were just beginning to get accustomed to the new designation

when, on 1 July 1958, the Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, acquired both the Koza Housing Annex (PIN 2992) and the Koza Parking Annex (PIN 4085).[31] The new occupants of Camp Koza, as the Marines promptly named their latest acquisition, were the 3d Pioneer Battalion, 3d Marine Division.

On 10 May 1962, the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO) announced that Camp Koza, with its area of 47,000 tsubo (37.44 acres) would be released by August and the land returned to its former owners, the 3d Pioneer Battalion having already moved to Camp Hansen, a permanent base, earlier the same year. This promised action actually came to pass on 14 July 1962. Instead of restoring the land to its original state or paying to compensation required to do so, the 3d Marine Division turned over all of the camp buildings and other facilities (including the only two asphaltic-concrete tennis courts on the island) to the approximately 80 landowners, who realized $17,000 from their sale.

FOOTNOTES

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961. |
| 2 | 2 | 5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations - Division/Wing Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 11 Sept. 1962. |
| 3 | 1 | 5AFR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961. |
| 4 | 3 | Ltr., Hq. Fifth Air Force (5AF) to 313th Air Division (313AD), sub.: Hq. 5th Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking Forces, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960. |
| 5 | 4 | 313ADR No. 23-2A, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 6313th Air Base Wing, dtd. 6 Dec. 1962. |
| 6 | 5 | 313ADR No. 23-5, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, dtd. 12 Dec. 1962. |
| 7 | 6 | U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) Special Order (SO) GB-9, dtd. 19 July 1962. |
| 8 | 7 | USAFSS SO GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962. |
| 9 | 7 | Ibid. |
| 10 | 7 | Ibid. |
| 11 | 7 | Ibid. |
| 12 | 8 | Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) SO G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962. |
| 13 | — | Department of the Air Force (SAF) AFOMO Ltr. 882m, dtd. 7 Aug. 1962. |
| 14 | 9 | Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) SO G-83, dtd. 25 Oct. 1962. |
| 15 | — | PACAF SO G-32, dtd. 6 Apr. 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | — | PACAF SO G-32, dtd. 6 Apr. 1962. |
| 17 | 8 | PACAF SO G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962. |
| 18 | — | DAF AFCMO Ltr. 882m, dtd. 7 Aug. 1962. |
| 19 | — | History, 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG), 1 Jan.-30 June 1962, pp. 9-11; History, 498th TMG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1962, pp. 6-8, Appendix 3. |
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| 20 | — | 5AFR No. 23-7, sub.: Organization - Field: Detachment 3, Hq. 313th Air Division, dtd. 11 July 1960; PACAFR No. 55-8, par. 7c, dtd. 9 Mar. 1962. |
| | — | |
| 21 | — | 5AF General Order (GO) 29, dtd. 24 June 1960; 313th AD GO 32, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960; 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 14 Dec. 1960; 5AF SO G-4, dtd. 11 Jan. 1962. |
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| 22 | 10 | Ltr., Comdr. Hawaiian Air National Guard (HANG) to 326th Air Division (HADD), 5th Air Force, Det 3, 313th Air Div., sub.: Letter of Appreciation, 29 June 1962; History, Det. 3, 313th Air Division, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1962, p. 2. |
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| 23 | — | History, Det. 3, 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1962, pp. 2-10. |
| 24 | — | Telephone conversations by Command Historian with Mr. Ralph W. Young, USAEDO; Mr. Frank W. Roberts, U.S. Army Engineer Group (USAEG); and Mr. Edward T. Broadwell, 6313th Air Base Wing Base Engineers, 4 Feb. 1964; recollections of Command Historian. |
| 25 | — | 20th AF Movement Order No. 5, dtd. 10 July 1950. |
| 26 | — | 313th AD GO 16, dtd. 19 May 1955. |
| 27 | — | FEAF GO 139, dtd. 17 Nov. 1955. |
| 28 | — | Ibid. |
| 29 | — | FEAF GO 87, dtd. 18 Sept. 1956; FEAF GO 13, dtd. 27 Feb. 1957. |
| 30 | — | PACAF GO 14, dtd. 11 March 1958. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|---|---|---|
| 31 | — | DAF GO 7, dtd. 9 Feb. 1959; PACAF GO 8, dtd. 9 Feb. |
| | — | 1959. |
| — | 11 | 313AD SO G-10, dtd. 2 July 1962. |
| — | 12 | 313AD SO G-11, dtd. 13 Sept. 1962. |

to the relief headquarters which had been set up by the Kadena-Son authorities. Here he conveyed his sympathy to Mayor Shunsho Irei and GRI Legislator Hideo Chibana of the Tenth Electoral District, which included Kadena-Son. (Both officials, incidentally, were members of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP), a Left-wing party definitely hostile to the U.S. Forces, though not so antagonistic as the even further left Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP) and Okinawa People's Party (OPP). The latter two parties could invariably be depended upon to follow the Communist line.)

After expressing his regret that such a calamity had occurred, particularly at the Christmas season, General Smart assured the Ryukyuans that the injured would be given "the best care that medical facilities and medical science" available on Okinawa would permit, while those whose homes had been damaged or destroyed would be taken care of. Of course, there was "no possible way to compensate for injuries that one has suffered," but the Air Force would attempt to make settlements that were "as appropriate and as suitable" as it possibly could. In short, every endeavor would be made to insure that no surviving member of the Fukuhara family suffered from want during the time the Air Force was attempting to make restitution for the property damage.

The Fifth Air Force Commander also promised that everything within his power would be done to learn <u>why</u> the accident had taken place. However, he reminded his listeners, there could be no guarantee that the cause would be found (this all took place, of course, before the accident investigation board had conducted its analysis and announced its findings); for, while the Air Force was sometimes successful in ascertaining what

factors were responsible for a crash, there were other occasions when the causes never could be completely explained.[11]

From the relief headquarters at Kadena Village, General Smart drove to the U.S. Army Hospital at Camp Kue, where he visited the two surviving crewmen of the KB-50--Lieutenant Darling and Airman Winzer--as well as Chiyoko Arasaki and her two injured children, Nae Shinzato, and Yoshi Fukuhara. Before ending his consolatory tour for the night, the Fifth Air Force Commander went to the relatives' homes where the uninjured but uprooted victims of the crash were staying. In the destruction of the Fukuhara house an unusually large number of young people had been rendered homeless; for, living with Choshin and Yoshi Fukuhara were three of his brother's children--Hatsuko (21), Chiyoko (19), and Chozen (14)--in addition to the hospitalized father, Chosho, and Choshin Fukuhara's own six offspring--Chobin (26), Choki (24), Choei (19), Chosei (15), Katsuko (13), Setsuko (12), and Kimiko (8).

When General Smart called, Katsuko, Setsuko, and Chosei were staying at the Kadena Village home of Eijin Isa, a relative; but it was planned that Tsuru Miyagi, whose abode was in their own village of Yara, would care for them until their parents got out of the hospital and had a place to live in once more. Later, however, all nine Fukuhara children moved into the home of Masatake Yamauchi in Kadena Village.

The bodies of Choki Fukuhara and Morio Arasaki were turned over to their relatives and the father respectively by the police later that night. The former was taken to the home of an uncle, Yuko Miyagi, of Kadena, while the baby was carried to his father's home in Goya-Ku,

Koza City.

Shortly after 0900 on the 21st, the bodies of the two victims were removed from the homes where they had been taken overnight and transferred to the crematorium in Koza. Approximately 80 persons, including Deputy Mayor Kenei Tamayama of Koza City and officials of Kadena-Son, attended the cremation ceremony at 1030 that same morning.[12]

Around 1000 hours on 22 December, Colonel Charles H. Pierce, Commander of the 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena Air Base, and several members of his staff visited Seiko Arasaki (the name can also be transliterated as Shinzaki or Nizaki), the husband of the injured Chiyoko Arasaki, in Goya-Ku, Koza City, to present $50.00 as condolence money and inquire about the condition of the injured members of the family. ($20.00 of this sum was intended as solatium for the death of his son, Morio, while the remaining $30.00 comprised $10.00 each for the injuries suffered by Chiyoko and their two children--Emiko and Seijo.) That same day, Colonel Pierce received a radiogram from Eugene M. Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force, asking him to convey that official's "deepest sympathy to the families of those who suffered fatal injuries in the crash."[13]

Already, at 1600 on the 21st, the Central District Municipal Mayors' Association, whose chairman was Mayor Chojo Oyama of Koza City, had held an emergency meeting at the Kadena-Son Office at which a resolution was adopted that maximum efforts should be made to eliminate similar aircraft accidents in the future and that "proper" compensation should be paid for the victims and the next-of-kin involved in this latest tragedy. Although this marked the first time that "proper compensation" had been mentioned officially in connection with the KB-50 crash at Yara Village, it was not

the first time that the subject had been broached since the accident, nor was it to be the last. Even as early as the evening of the tragedy, Mayor Irei of Kadena-Son had told General Smart that "The U.S. should reflect in their mind what has caused so many accidents, such as those at Ishikawa, Kawasaki, and this one, despite the fact that the country has made great progress scientifically. We wish the U.S. to make compensation for the bereaved families and those who have suffered in the crash quickly and in a way that will satisfy them."[14]

Earlier in the day, five Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) Legislators--Yasukuni Yamagawa, the Vice-Speaker of the Legislature, representing the 4th Electoral District (Motobu-Cho and Ie-Son); Choko Iraha, of the 17th Electoral District (central Naha); Kiko Tomoyose, of the 18th Electoral District (the Miebashi district of Naha); Shotoku Asato, of the 20th Electoral District (representing a conglomeration of small islands several hundred miles apart, in some cases); and Keisho Kakinohana, of the 27th Electoral District (Shimoji-Cho on the island of Miyako and the satellite islands of Irabu and Tarama)--had visited Yara Village to express their sympathy for the crash victims. From there the quintet proceeded to the office of the Liaison Officer for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) in Naha City and asked that he convey to High Commissioner (Lieutenant General, USA) Paul W. Caraway their desire that the victims be relieved "immediately" and compensated "completely."

Leaving as little to chance as was possible in the circumstances, the five Legislators next called on Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) in the same building, to

urge that he apply the emergency relief law and, at the same time, negotiate with the military for early compensation for the victims.[15]

In still another action of 21 December, the Kadena-Son Assembly met in extraordinary session at 1500 hours to discuss the problems arising from the air crash. After Mayor Irei had briefed the assembled solons on the relief measures already taken, it was decided that they would assist the victims in filing compensation claims, in order that the latter might receive "the maximum payments" for the injury done them. Coming, as this accident did, on the heels of earlier military aircraft crashes at Ishikawa and Kawasaki, the assembly resolved that the Air Force should not be allowed to evade an explanation of the causes of the catastrophe, as it had successfully done in those instances. Knowing from past experience that the U.S. military's Achilles heel was its almost morbid fear of adverse publicity, the assembly determined to concentrate its attack on that particular point. This attack would take the form of an appeal to all the people of Okinawa to unite in demanding that an explanation of the causes of the crash, as well as payment of compensation satisfactory to everyone concerned (excepting, perhaps, the Air Force), be promptly forthcoming. After all, it was not just the citizens of Kadena-Son who could be said to have the sword of Damocles suspended above their heads by a single hair both day and night. It was, in reality, the entire populace of Okinawa. For there was no telling just when and where the next aircraft accident might occur![16]

Far from resting on their oars after this burst of verbal energy, the officials of Kadena-Son met again at 1030 on December 22d to discuss the problems connected with the recent accident. On this occasion, however,

the son assembly was joined by various ku-cho's (village chiefs), school superintendents and principals, representatives of the police, presidents of wives' clubs (yes, dear reader, Okinawan society in the year 1962 did indeed boast those trappings of "civilization," wives' clubs!), heads of youth associations, Deputy Mayor Kenei Tamayama of Koza City (whose sympathies had been revealed on 24 October 1961 when he addressed a Koza rally in protest against the presence of the Kaysen Survey Team sent to Okinawa by President Kennedy to study and analyze the political and economic situation), Speaker Miyajima of the Koza City Assembly, Legislator Hideo Chibana, and officials of the ad hoc Kadena Airplane Crash Relief Headquarters.

Deputy Mayor Seiko Shimabukuro* of Kadena-Son, who presided over the meeting, opened with a briefing on the actions taken during the two days since the tragedy. While the son authorities had provided clothing and food to the victims, the Air Force had supplied nothing whatsoever, notwithstanding General Smart's promise on the night of the crash that every effort would be made to prevent any of the survivors from suffering from want in the period which would necessarily elapse before official

*Demonstrating once again how little any of us can foresee what the future holds, within the compass of another December Seiko Shimabukuro was himself to die, under suspicious circumstances. On the night of 26 December 1963, the deputy mayor attended a banquet for village officials, leaving around 2300 hours. Approximately an hour later he was seen at a Kadena sake shop, which witnesses reported he subsequently departed in the company of three unidentified men following "a heated verbal dispute." Early Friday morning, the 27th, his body was found at the bottom of a 50-foot cliff near the Hijagawa River, which flows behind Kadena Village. The three suspects were questioned by the police, but all declined to incriminate themselves, leaving the gendarmes no choice but to release them for lack of evidence. As a result, the police closed the case, ruling that Shimabukuro's fall had resulted from his own inebriation, rather than from his being pushed over the cliff by another person or other persons. Hence, his death had been accidental.

claims settlements could be reached. Shimabukuro had himself gone to Kadena AB on the afternoon of the 21st to urge the Air Force officials there to erect a temporary shelter for the homeless members of the Fukuhara family, but he had received no definite reply as yet. Since the family's need was imperative and the Air Force gave no sign of shaking its lethargy, the Kadena-Son authorities now planned to construct two 100-square-foot temporary shelters for the victims.

As a result of Shimabuku's explanation of the situation, the gathering decided to take five actions: (1) to pay condolence visits to the six patients in the Army Hospital (Choshin Fukuhara had been transferred there from the Koza Hospital, to which he had been originally taken, as we have seen); (2) to collect relief articles through appeals by newspaper and radio; (3) to hold a joint funeral service for Choki Fukuhara and Morio Arasaki on 26 December; (4) to petition GRI to use its good offices in persuading the military to succor the Fukuharas immediately; and (5) to establish a committee for filing claims.[17]

Suiting action to word, the crash relief headquarters mobilized all the male employees of the Kadena-Son Office that same afternoon (22 December) and quickly threw together two temporary shelters near the site of the former Fukuhara home for the six brothers and sisters and the two nieces of Choshin Fukuhara who had been living with their uncle, Mr. Miyagi, since the disaster. These buildings, so flimsy that they scarcely deserved the appellation "temporary," were constructed with nailed-down boards for walls and canvas for roofs. More tents than houses, these shelters were reluctantly occupied by the eight victims that same evening, and it was here that they placed the memorial tablets

of the deceased Choki Fukuhara on an empty box and received their numerous visitors. Even the relief headquarters, which was responsible for these jerry-built hovels, wondered whether the survivors could spend "a happy and warm New Year's holiday" in them! That their concern was shared by the survivors themselves is indicated by the bitter comment of Chobin, the eldest, that "This won't help us to keep ourselves warm when we sleep. We have also appealed to the Air Force authorities to do something about it; however, it is making little headway. We demand that the authorities do something about it that will satisfy our needs."[18] Fortunately for all concerned, the weather at this Christmas season of 1962 remained unusually warm and dry; so that the victims were never actually subjected to the ordeal by cold and rain which their fears had conjured up in anticipation.

Nevertheless, although the Fukuharas received their condoling visitors in the temporary shelters, they absolutely refused to spend even one night there, but returned to the home of their relatives to sleep.[19]

The Okinawa Times, in reporting the failure of the Air Force to provide tangible assistance for the KB-50 crash victims, remarked that "Only a 19-year-old girl who received scratches on her hands and feet while fleeing from the disaster received a $10 present in token of sympathy.* Almost all relief for the Fukuhara family is being provided by the son authorities, women's club, and other civic organizations." The article went on to describe the deep dissatisfaction of the victims

*This was evidently a reference to Chiyoko Fukuhara, the 19-year-old niece of Choshin Fukuhara, who, only a month later, was to file a claim of $2,128.00 for her personal injuries, time loss, and medical expenses. It is hard to reconcile mere "scratches on her hands and feet" with such a demand, but it is typical of the honesty of most of the claims submitted in all Ryukyuan cases against the U.S. Forces.

and the son authorities at the inactivity of the military, noting that although the aircraft wreckage scattered over the crash scene had been cleared away (for purposes of investigating the cause of the accident, rather than in the interests of tidying up the area, though the Times probably did not know this) on the 22d, almost nothing had been done toward clearing the home site of the debris not directly a part of the KB-50. In fact, "A pig burnt to death was left there, and an official of the relief headquarters buried it." (With suitable honors, it is hoped.)

Whether in a spirit of subtle irony or by simple coincidence, the very next paragraphs of the same article quoted the message sent to General Smart by Director Shiga of the Japan Self-Defense Agency extending the "deepest sympathy" of his agency for the "unfortunate occurrence," and the Fifth Air Force Commander's reply. After expressing the gratitude felt for Kadena Mayor Irei's presentation of the facts connected with the crash to the people "in a non-sensational manner," as well as for Legislator Hideo Chibana's "cooperation," General Smart stated that the Air Force was, "of course," exerting every effort to learn the cause of the accident, so that everything possible might be done to prevent similar occurrences. Furthermore, he and the people under his command on Okinawa were "doing everything we can to care for the victims to recompense for their losses."[20]

If the Fifth Air Force Commander thought to still the critical voice of a hostile politician by a bit of flattery, he proved to be dealing with one less easily imposed upon than he imagined. Rather than being won over by the blandishment, Legislator Chibana reacted by pulling the telegrams of sympathy sent by Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert and

General Smart from his pocket before the assembled members of the GRI Legislature on 24 December and observing sarcastically that "the U.S. military's sympathy is of this kind!"[21] Which is to say that it took the form of words instead of deeds!

At 1100 hours on Sunday, the 23d,* the Kadena-Son Assembly met in special session for the second consecutive day and adopted a resolution conspicuous for its outspoken antagonism toward the U.S. military and its unspoken expression of any word of sympathy for the six crewmen of the stricken KB-50 who had died in the crash. The gist of the resolution was as follows:[22]

> The Kadena-Son Assembly expresses its deepest condolence and sympathy for the two Okinawans who were deprived of their lives and eight others who suffered serious or slight injuries respectively and the considerable damages to property in the disastrous accident, which occurred when a U.S. military plane crashed at Yara Village in Kadena-Son on the 20th.
>
> The third air crash, which occurred in Yara Village, Kadena-Son, following the Ishikawa and Kawasaki crashes, has given a great shock to the people of this prefecture. These crashes occurred as a result of the presence of military installations here. In order to relieve the people from their shock, we hereby demand the immediate withdrawal of the atomic and hydrogen bomb bases from Okinawa. There is no other way to help the souls of the dead to repose in peace. And it is the only way the U.S. can assure peace and security for the people of this prefecture. The Kadena-Son Assembly demands that the compensation for damages be settled speedily to the satisfaction of the claimants. At the same time, we strongly demand of the U.S. military that it never repeat such an accident in the future.

In addition to the studied insult conveyed by their ignoring of the death of six airmen and the insinuation that the Air Force could have prevented the accident had it so desired, the Kadena-Son Assembly

*This was the time reported by the Ryukyu Shimpo, while the rival Okinawa Times stated that the meeting opened at 1000 hours. Probably both are correct. The assembly was, quite likely, scheduled to convene at 1000 hours, but, owing to the inevitable operation of that local phenomenon known as "Okinawa time," enough members did not arrive on time to permit the beginning of business until an hour later, at 1100.

sought to rub more salt in the former's wounds by the subtle ploy of referring two different times to "this prefecture." As has been pointed out in previous histories of the 313th Air Division, those elements in the Ryukyus inimical to the United States were wont to achieve a heady euphoria by sniffing the weed of Communism and exhaling such phrases as "Okinawa prefectural people," "abolish the atomic and hydrogen bomb bases," and "immediate reversion to the motherland."

The resolution was to be sent to President John F. Kennedy, the president of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, General Jacob E. Smart, Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, Colonel Charles H. Pierce, the Kadena Base Commander, the Government of Japan, Chief Executive Seisaku Ota, and Speaker Akio Nagamine of the GRI Legislature.

It was undoubtedly this resolution and others of its kind which inspired Robert Prosser, the acid-tongued editor of the English-language Okinawa Morning Star, to dip his typewriter ribbon in an unusually strong mixture of caustic and vinegar and write the following editorial:[23]

> Almost as tragic as the plane crash which mars the Yule season by snuffing out eight lives is the Ryukyuan reaction to this heart breaking event.
>
> While the debris is still being cleared away, civic committees are forming up to plan how to best use the event to their own advantage. Either by naivete or design, members of the legislature overlook the fact that six of the seven crew members aboard the ill-fated plane died in Thursday's crash, and the seventh member will bear the scars of the accident forever, in case he is fortunate enough to recover. Instead of recognizing the event as unavoidable, the legislators, with owlish wisdom, deplore the dead for having died and recommend regulations to prevent others from following their example.
>
> Struggle groups pause in their demonstrations for long enough to add a new slogan to their already tattered store of "gimmie"

demands, and the communists and the socialists issue their usual prepared-in-advance statement to the effect that the people of Okinawa will never be safe until the Americans stop trying to protect them.

Somewhere, a professional viewer-with-alarm will compile a list of accidents involving American airplanes and Ryukyuan people and real estate to prove that the Ryukyuans are the victims of a massive plot which is intended to deprive them of their lives, their homes, and their traditional sub-standard way of life.

Overlooked along with the American dead and American efforts to make restitution to those Ryukyuans who also suffered is the "why" of the whole series of events.

Forgotten in the years of negotiation and sugar coating reality is the basic, bitter fact that there would be few Americans in the Ryukyus today had it not been for World War II. . . . The United States is determined to remain in the Ryukyus to prevent other misguided conquerors from attempting to succeed in the thing in which Japan failed.

United States presence in the Ryukyus does not have universal approval. However, it . . . . has the strong approval of today's leaders of Japan, who are grateful for the protection which the U.S. gives the main Japanese islands.

On the other hand, American presence in the Ryukyus does not have the approval of Soviet Russia or Communist China. China's and Russia's dissatisfaction with American presence in the Ryukyus is religiously voiced upon all occasions by the leaders of the Okinawa Peoples (communist) party and their satrap socialist associates.

There are no doubt Americans who question the necessity of U.S. presence in the Ryukyus in the light of the frequent petulant outbursts from the Okinawan citizenry who seem to feel that even American tragedies are engineered for the inconvenience of the Okinawans.

Democracy is a wonderful thing. It must confess a few shortcomings, however. It cannot please everyone and it has yet to raise the dead . . . .

During its long and necessary tenure on Okinawa, the U.S. hopes to confer upon the Ryukyuans not only the form but the feeling of democracy. This may be done by offering examples of dignity which will relegate to their proper place in society those mercantile souls who attempt to place a price tag on tragedy and who use the misfortunes of others as a source of personal gain.

The drumfire of opposition to the continued presence of military bases—inspired by the Kadena KB-50 crash in some truly honest hearts, but acquiring most of its volume from the clamor of those of more sinister bent for whom the latest tragedy was merely welcome propaganda fodder—reached a crescendo on December 24th. At 1000 hours that day, most of the members of the Central District Municipal Mayors' Association, under the domination of their chairman, Mayor Chojo Oyama of Koza City, called at USARYIS (United States Army, Ryukyu Islands) Headquarters to present a resolution of protest to the High Commissioner.

After describing the "fits of anger and indignation" which surged within their hearts as a result of the successive aircraft crashes of 1959, 1961, and 1962 (at Ishikawa, Kawasaki, and Yara) and "the traffic accidents of American car-riders running over school pupils and other cases," the mayors had concluded in their resolution that they could not avoid regarding "this slaughter of human lives as the same as war action."

In order to prevent future repetitions of "this brutal accident," the Chubu Shi-Cho-Son Kai (Central District Municipal Mayors' Association) requested (1) a thorough investigation of the cause of the crash and a public announcement of the findings; (2) an improvement in and enforcement of military discipline; (3) the enforcement of a more strict check-up and maintenance of "machines and equipment;" (4) the discontinuance of maneuvers on land; (5) all future takeoffs and landings "should be made in the direction of the ocean."

Furthermore, the mayors demanded immediate compensation for the accident victims, the immediate restoration of the burnt and destroyed houses, and the payment of compensation for damaged farm products and

other property.

Accompanying the 13-man delegation were cameramen from both of the local Japanese-language television stations--the Ryukyu Broadcasting Corporation (RBC) and the Okinawa Television Broadcasting Company (OTV)--who "kept on moving back and forth around the entire group." After the TV crews had decamped, at the insistence of the High Commissioner's language aide-de-camp (a nisei), Mayor Oyama announced that the purpose of their visit was to see General Caraway in connection with the recent airplane crash at Kadena. (It is unlikely that this came as exactly a surprise to Major Sakai!) It being the day before Christmas, the general was not in his office, they were told. After the good mayors had worked themselves up for a dramatic confrontation of the High Commissioner with their imposing resolution, this must have come as quite a let-down!

As it was, the mayoral "lynching party" had to content themselves with the anti-climactic gesture of leaving the resolution of protest with his aide for the HICOM's perusal at a later date. Finally, they were thwarted in their last-ditch attempt to arrange a meeting with General Caraway on December 26th by the same well-tutored aide's advice that the proper channel for such complaints and protests was, first, their presentation to the USCAR Liaison Officer, then to the Civil Administrator, and, lastly, if the latter believed it necessary, to the High Commissioner himself. Although the visitors were not told <u>this</u>, it was thus that the HICOM insulated himself from the direct assault of large groups of indigenous agitators who found courage to be outrageous in strength of numbers. Chief Executive Seisaku Ota and his deputy, Hiroshi

Senaga, could readily testify to the frequency with which this obnoxious tactic was employed by Leftist elements.

That same afternoon, however, the same friendly group of mayors was more successful in catching Colonel Charles H. Pierce in his office at 6313th ABW Headquarters, where they proceeded to press on him their demands that compensation be paid promptly and in generous measure to the victims of the KB-50 crash. In response, the Base Commander stated that he would do his best to comply with all that they asked, except for the demand that the direction in which aircraft took off and landed at Kadena Air Base be changed. As for the prefabricated shelters which his visitors sought for the homeless victims, Colonel Pierce objected that to provide such items would only complicate the compensation question. (Just why he felt that any donation of T-huts to the Fukuhara family would have to be weighed in the scale as something to be deducted from their eventual compensation payment is inexplicable; for, in remarkably similar circumstances, no consideration at all had been given by his predecessors--Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston and Colonel George B. Simler respectively--to the prefabricated BOQ's turned over to the victims of the Ishikawa and Kawasaki jet crashes. When final payment was made for the destruction of their homes, the Air Force had not subtracted a penney from the total for the value of the T-huts previously given them. Neither is it clear why Colonel Pierce appointed no Kadena Crash Project Officer, as had been done within hours of the earlier accidents.)

Evidently, he told the mayors, the expectation of the Ryukyuan side that temporary shelters would be immediately provided for the victims by the Air Force was the result of a misunderstanding. However,

Colonel Pierce added, all that the victims or Mayor Irei had to do to obtain food, shelter, or clothing was simply ask for them. (He evidently did not follow the Japanese-language newspapers very closely, or he would have known two days earlier that practically everyone was expecting Kadena Air Base to furnish temporary shelters!)[24]

Perhaps it was pure coincidence; but, in any event, when Chief Executive Ota arrived at General Caraway's office just an hour after the Central District Mayors' abortive visitation, he not only found him in, but even eager to resolve any misunderstandings and put things to rights, as far as lay within his power. Evidently both the HICOM and the Chief Executive had assumed, until they read the contrary in the daily newspapers, that everything was going smoothly for the crash victims. General Caraway told Mr. Ota that the accident problems were not his responsibility, but fell within the purview of the Fifth Air Force Commander. Nevertheless, when the Chief Executive suggested that the victims be provided with prefabricated shelters (probably having in mind the two-man BOQ's or T-huts, such as had been donated at the time of the Ishikawa and Kawasaki jet crashes, as well as after the landslides accompanying Typhoon Charlotte which had left a number of families in Sashiki-Son homeless in October 1959), the general replied that he imagined the Air Force was already doing something of the kind.

Still, just to make certain, he picked up the telephone and talked to an Air Force official at Kadena, who informed him that an engineering crew would soon be dispatched to the Yara crash site to clear away the debris of the Fukuhara dwelling and the other destroyed or damaged structures, so that a new home might be built there. Inasmuch as General

Caraway made no definite statement about prefabricated houses upon hanging up the phone, Chief Executive Ota received the impression that "there was a difference of opinion between the Air Force and the others concerned." He was told, however, that the Air Force intended to provide "immediate relief" to the victims. The HICOM added that he would ask USCAR to cooperate with the Air Force, "so that the people might be satisfied."

The Chief Executive, who paid for the high post he occupied by serving as the target for incessant pressure and constant abuse, had scarcely returned to his own office when two visitors--unwanted ones, in all likelihood--Legislators Koichi Taira and Hideo Chibana of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, the former its Secretary-General, were announced. Taira asserted that it was "utterly irresponsible" that the military and civilian governments had "neglected to discharge their own responsibility for the well-being of the people with whom they are charged." For his part, Chibana commented that although four days had now passed since the accident, the victims had been given only a cash present in token of sympathy "and condolence messages," at a time when they were "in dire want of shelter, food, and clothing." The military having done nothing, the son authorities had found it necessary to provide the victims with canned food and flour, while the wives' club collected clothing. Even now, the Fukuharas were still in need of expense money, bedding, kitchen utensils, and school supplies. Moreover, they were especially hard hit financially, as the large sum of cash which they had laid by to pay for the new house they were having built at the time of the accident had gone up in flames along with their home. (They evidently did not have much faith in the reliability of banks.)[25]

To imply that the Fukuharas and Seiko Arasaki had received no aid, other than from Kadena-Son, as the newspapers, crash relief headquarters, and Left-wing Legislators were all doing, was to be guilty of some misrepresentation of the facts, though it seems that the Air Force did not respond to the emergency which it had created with the alacrity and energy which might reasonably have been expected of it.

On 21 December, the very next day after the accident, for example, the Koza City Lions' Club had donated $25.00 to both the Fukuhara and Arasaki families, while Colonel Pierce had, as we have seen, presented solatium to Seiko Arasaki on the 22d, on behalf of Kadena Air Base. This was followed on the 23d by a GRI contribution of $31.40 to the 13 members of the Fukuhara family for the purchase of bedding, clothing, and kitchen utensils.[26]

Then, on the afternoon of the 24th, the Kadena Base Information Officer took three members of the Fukuhara family shopping at the Yamagataya Department Store in Naha, where he bought them some 150 items of clothing, blankets, furniture, and school supplies worth approximately $400.00, in all, to replace the corresponding articles lost in the fire. The money for this mission had been raised from among the officers, airmen, and civilians of Kadena Air Base on the 23d and 24th.

Besides this, various civic organizations in Kadena-Son and the municipal assemblies of the Central District raised $350.00, the Okinawa Lions' Club donated $225 and some clothing, and Zenko Kinjo, Ku-Cho of Kawasaki Village, which had suffered its own aircraft crash a year earlier, presented cash. On top of this, the GRI Welfare Department contributed three 100-lb. bags of rice and 18 pounds of cooking oil from RIVAC stocks.

(It being the Christmas season, the Welfare Department was unable to find any USCAR officials in their offices to approve this slightly irregular, but surely justifiable, diversion of the RIVAC goods. Hence, the department commendably took the initiative and sought official sanction after the action.)

On Christmas Day, Chief Executive Seisaku Ota, Vice-Speaker Yasukuni Yamagawa of the Legislature, and Director Shochi Ota of the GRI Administrative Services Department called at the crash relief headquarters to inquire about the extent of the damage and the measures already taken or still required to assist the victims. Respecting the temporary shelters so badly needed, Chief Executive Ota explained to Mayor Irei of Kadena-Son that GRI had asked USCAR and the U.S. military units to provide prefabricated shelters. Shochi Ota (no relation to the Chief Executive) added that his department would see that food supplies and bedding were furnished.

From Kadena-Son the three officials proceeded to visit the two bereaved families, presenting $40 for each deceased in token of sympathy. Then they gave the sum of $20.00 to each of the nine injured Okinawans, both those hospitalized at Camp Kue and the less-seriously injured being treated as out-patients. In addition, the two Otas and Yamagawa presented the victims an undisclosed sum of money collected from the GRI department directors as a personal donation.

Evidently unaware of the purchases made on 24 December by the Kadena Information Officer and three of the Fukuharas, the GRI Education Department announced that it would provide the necessary school supplies for the three junior high school and two primary school children of the Fukuhara family. It was also stated that plans were being studied to provide the

family with medical assistance, extend it a rehabilitation loan, and furnish food and clothing from RIVAC (Ryukyu Islands Voluntary Agencies Committee) supplies donated on a continuing basis by charitable organizations in the United States.[27]

At 1000, Christmas morning, Major General Robert M. Stillman, the 313th Air Division Commander, and Colonel Pierce paid a visit to the Army Hospital at Camp Kue to visit Airman Winzer and the six Ryukyuan victims still sufficiently injured to require in-patient treatment--Chiyoko Arasaki, Seijo Arasaki, Emiko Arasaki, Choshin Fukuhara, Yoshi Fukuhara, and Nae Shinzato. Colonel Pierce presented $40.00 as solatium to Choshin Fukuhara--$10.00 for the injuries to himself, $10.00 for those of his wife, Yoshi, and $20.00 for the death of his son, Choki. In addition, the Base Commander presented $10.00 to Mrs. Nae Shinzato and to 19-year-old Chiyoko Fukuhara, one of the nieces living with Choshin Fukuhara's family who had been injured, but not seriously enough to require hospitalization. This brought the total of the solatium payments to $110.00.

The most seriously injured of the patients was Chiyoko Arasaki, who was suffering from burns over a large portion of her body. Although she could barely speak, the Army doctor said that her condition was improving.[28] Less critically injured, but still seriously burned on both their hands and legs, were her two surviving children--Seijo and Emiko.* The husband

*On 3 January 1963, the Army Hospital issued a diagnosis of the condition of these same patients. The burns on the face, body, hands, and legs which Chiyoko Arasaki had sustained were being prepared for grafting, as were the burns on the legs and body of her young daughter, Emiko. As for her injured son, Seijo, the burns on the hands, legs, and face which he had received were healing and might not require grafting. Choshin Fukuhara had been burned on the body, hands, and legs, but all wounds were healing so well that the doctors believed that they might not require grafting. His wife, Yoshi, had been burned on the legs, and her wounds, too, were

and wife--Choshin and Yoshi Fukuhara--and Nae Shinzato were able to sit up in bed and talk to visitors.[29]

While the Air Force commanders were calling on the hospitalized victims of the Kadena KB-50 crash on Christmas Day, officials of Kadena-Son and Koza City were arranging the details of a joint funeral service to be held on the playground of the Kadena Elementary School at 1400 hours the following day. The memorial tablet for Morio Arasaki was in the custody of his father, Seiko, at the family home in Koza. That for Choki Fukuhara, a piece of board which had previously been part of a simple box, was set up in a room normally used as a general store at the home of Masatake Yamauchi in Kadena Village, where the nine surviving Fukuhara children were staying.

Accordingly, at 1400, 26 December, Mayor Shunsho Irei of Kadena-Son began the service before an altar on which were placed photographs of the victims and white boxes containing their ashes. Also on the altar were bouquets presented by the deceased Choki's hospitalized mother, his former classmates of the Chubu Agricultural High School, the Kadena-Son Youth Association, the Kadena-Son Wives' Club, Koza City, Chief Executive Ota, Speaker Akio Nagamine of the Legislature, and Major General Stillman. In addition, various fruits which Morio had liked were placed on the altar by his father.

Priest Nakamata of the Gokoku Buddhist Temple officiated over the ceremony, which opened with everyone's rising to his feet and offering a one-minute silent prayer. The first condolence speech was that of Mayor

healing and might not require grafting. (Bulletin issued by U.S. Army Hospital for possible use by the various Information Offices, 3 Jan. 1963.)

Irei, but roaring jet aircraft from nearby Kadena AB drowned out the greater part of it. He was followed by Mayor Oyama of Koza City, the president of the Central District Mayors' Association, the president of the Central District Municipal Assembly Chairmen's Association, the president of the All-Okinawa Mayors' Association, Eiharu Nakamura, Chief Executive Ota, Speaker Nagamine, High Commissioner Caraway, and General Stillman. The 313th Air Division Commander's brief address contained a comment that "these two innocent victims of the untimely crash of a military aircraft are just as much victims of the cold war as are the crewmen who died in the wreckage." At the close of the service, Mayors Irei and Oyama thanked all those who had attended.

Among the estimated 1,500 persons present were Civil Administrator Shannon B. B. McCune, Colonel Pierce, Vice-Speaker Yasukuni Yamagawa, Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga, and many other high-ranking military officers and civilians. It was natural that children from the Kadena Elementary School should be present, but there was a suspicious odor of politics in the attendance of a contingent of children from the Miyamori Elementary School in Ishikawa--the chief target for the F-100D which crashed with such disastrous consequences on 30 June 1959. There was really no good reason for pupils from a distant school, one of whose relatives were known to have suffered from the latest aircraft accident, to be present. The fact that they were present makes one suspect a desire on the part of their teachers to stir up the emotions of those present by reviving memories of the earlier tragedy which took 17 lives and injured more than 100 other Okinawans--most of them school children. In their ghoulish fashion the members of the Left-leaning Okinawa Teachers Association were prepared to

use their young charges to gain political ends!"[30]

That same day, Chief Executive Ota submitted to the USCAR Liaison Officer a list of eight questions which he and his department directors wished answered. These were (1) the type of aircraft involved in the crash; (2) the unit to which the aircraft had been assigned; (3) the number of crew members; (4) the extent of the personal injuries to the crew members; (5) the proposed takeoff and landing bases; (6) the cause of the crash; (7) the compensation measures that were to be taken; and (8) other points.[31]

It was well that Mr. Ota and his associates were not impatient men; for it was not until 25 January 1963 that he received an answer from Lieut. Colonel Kenneth F. Hitch, the USCAR Director of Administration. It advised that (1) the type of aircraft had been an Air Force KB-50 fuel transport, assigned to the 41st Air Division at Yokota AB, Japan (all this had been related in the newspaper accounts of the accident); (2) of the seven personnel aboard the plane, six had been killed, while the seventh had sustained burns on his face and hands which still hospitalized him; (3) the KB-50 had taken off from Kadena AB on a training flight and was supposed to return to the same base; (4) the cause of the accident was "not immediately known;" however, the wreckage of the aircraft had been collected and preserved, and the case was "presently under investigation by U.S. Air Force authorities" (in this answer the Air Force was something less than ingenuous, since the investigation had been concluded some time before and the causes assigned, as we have seen above); (5) as to compensation for the victims of the accident, "proper compensation" would be paid after

the claims were filed through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate at Kadena Air Base; and (6) the U.S. Military Claims Commission (USMCC) in Japan had already sent two representatives to Okinawa to conduct a preliminary investigation of the crash scene; although they had formed a conclusion before returning to Japan, the Kadena Claims Officer was still awaiting the results of a joint investigation of property damage which the GRI Land Section and the Real Estate Section of the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO) had conducted before releasing any information for public dissemination.[32]

The funeral services were over, but the survivors of the Kadena crash were not forgotten. On the evening of December 27th, Captain Massis Der Garabedian, the 6313th ABW Information Officer, called at the Fukuhara home to present personal gifts of a bag of rice, a sack of flour, and a box of noodles. The following day, a little Okinawan girl, Nobuko Nakamura, a first-grader in the Miyamae Elementary School, Kadena Village, visited the police box a short distance from the scene of the accident and presented the policemen with a bag of candy which she desired them to give to the plane crash victims. Then, on the 29th, Speaker Akio Nagamine of the Legislature appeared at the crash relief headquarters to present $150.00 on behalf of the Legislators. Mayor Irei briefed his distinguished visitor on the circumstances of the crash, the condition of the patients in the hospital, and the personal circumstances of the others who had been left homeless. Thus, Nagamine learned that Nae Shinzato, who had received a cut on the head and a burn on her back, had been released from the hospital the previous afternoon, 28 December. The mayor also conveyed

the interesting information that to Colonel Pierce's offer to provide temporary shelters for the Fukuhara family "as soon as Mayor Irei requests them," he (the mayor) had been obliged to reply that he would not seek them just then.

The reason for this embarrassing change of front was not as complex nor as sinister as it might seem at first blush. Actually, this declination had its origin in the belief of the Fukuharas that acceptance of the two T-huts (whose plumbing and electricity had already been disconnected, typhoon shutters nailed shut, and all furniture removed in anticipation of their imminent presentation to the homeless family) would cause the Air Force to deduct their value from the total compensation settlement. Such would not have been the case, in reality, but the Fukuharas could not be convinced ot it. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the numerous tribe were enabled to have a temporary house of their own, yet not be troubled by the fear of "selling a portion of their birthright" too cheaply and without realizing it. Under this arrangement they rented a home in Kadena Village with the understanding that whatever it cost could be added to their claim for compensation and would be paid by the Air Force when the balance of the claim was processed and paid.[33]

## THE FIRST COMPENSATION PAYMENTS ARE MADE

Although a total of $110.00 had been given to the various injured and next of kin as solatium, it was not until 29 December 1962 that the first compensation payment was made. The Fukuhara family had not yet submitted their compensation claims, but on that date Major Timothy G. O'Shea of the 313th Air Division Staff Judge Advocate's Office, acting in

his capacity of Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12, with authority to approve settlements as high as $1,000.00, delivered to Choshin Fukuhara a check for $1,000.00 at the latter's hospital bed, as an advance payment on the injuries to Choshin himself. This advance was made in the supposition that the Fukuharas might need the money for New Year's Day expenses, and on the almost certain assumption that the claim would be well in excess of that amount. On 31 December, having received approval to do so from Headquarters, USAF, Major O'Shea returned to the Camp Kue Hospital to hand Choshin Fukuhara a second check in the amount of $500.00 to be applied against the compensation claim for the death of his son, Choki. Then, on 4 January 1963, the Foreign Claims Officer presented a check for $1,000.00 to Seiko Arasaki as an advance payment on the latter's pending claim for the death of the latter's infant son, Morio.

At 1100 hours on the last day of the year, 14 property damage claims were submitted to Major O'Shea, who studied them hurriedly, so that those individuals whose claims were approved might receive their payment the same day and thus have the money in hand for the new year. Thirteen of the 14 were approved in the amounts asked, and by 1600 on the 31st, all of them had been paid by Major O'Shea at the Kadena-Son Office, the total sum coming to $693.46, including the checks made out to two of the 13 successful claimants who did not appear for payment. (These two were paid the next week.) As for the fourteenth claim, that of the Fukuharas, since it exceeded the maximum sum which the local claims commission could approve, Major O'Shea forwarded it for consideration to the claims commission in Japan, together with a request for prompt action.[34]

The successful claimants and the amounts paid them were as follows:[35]

| | |
|---|---|
| Yamashiro, Shoichi | $334.71 |
| Yogi, Chotei | 93.93 |
| Tokumoto, Jiho | 45.00 |
| Morimisato, Choko | 43,64 |
| Ikehara, Sanae | 43.05 |
| Tawata, Shinichi | 41.90 |
| Arakaki, Yukichi | 32.50 |
| Nakamoto, Kenji | 19.81 |
| Tobaru, Chuei | 10.30 |
| Okuma, Seiyu | 9.00 |
| Oshiro, Chokyo | 7.92 |
| Tokomoto, Nabe | 7.80 |
| Yamanoha, Ushi | 3.90 |

As for the families of the six crew members of the doomed KB-50 who perished in the Kadena crash, they received only the six months' pay provided by law, plus whatever life insurance the deceased had been carrying. Airman Winzer received nothing for his suffering except, it may be, a feeling of thankfulness for having survived.

Future volumes of this history will carry the story of the compensation claims deriving from the Kadena KB-50 crash to its conclusion.

FOOTNOTES

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| | 14 | testimony before Board of Investigation by A/1C Calvin C. Callahan, 3d OMS. |
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| | 16 | B. Allan, 421st Air Refueling Squadron (AREFS), 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334; Statement #2 (Captain Garfield E. |
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| — | 87 | Statement #12 (Major Charles W. Osburn, 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG), 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 88 | Statement #13 (Capt. Eugene Collier, 6313th Support Squadron, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 89 | Statement #14 (S/Sgt Norman R. Ross, 3d OMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| — | 90 | Statement #15 (A/1C Calvin C. Callahan, 3d OMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 91 | Statement #16 (A/1C Otto H. Barmettler, 3d Bomb. Wing (BW), 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 92 | Statement #17 (S/Sgt Robert L. Witter, 3d Field Maintenance Squadron (FMS), Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 93 | Statement #18 (A/1C Walter F. Slicer, 3d FMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 94 | Statement #19 (A/1C Leodis Buckley, 3d FMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 95 | Statement #20 (Capt. William L. McCord, Jr., 15th TRS, 22 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 96 | Statement #21 (Mr. Arthur S. Hyde, 18th OMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 97 | Statement #22 (A/2C Tony J. Passmore, 3d OMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 98 | Statement #23 (A/2C James J. O'Brien, Hq. Sq., 3d BW, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 99 | Statement #24 (A/2C David L. Johnson, 3d OMS, 20 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 100 | Statement #25 (A/1C James R. Bailey, 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron, 21 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 101 | Statement #26 (A/1C Harold A. Wheeler, Transient Alert, 22 Dec. 1962): Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 102 | Orders Appointing Aircraft Accident Investigating Board, 20/0801Z Dec. 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| — | 103 | Board Proceedings: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 104 | Testimony of A/1C Luther J. Winzer, 421st AREFS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 105 | Testimony of S/Sgt John A. Derks, 18th A&E Maint. Sq., Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 106 | Testimony of A/1C Dale M. Lewis, 18th A&E Maint. Sq.: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 107 | Testimony of Capt. Bill B. Boyd, Senior Controller, 1962d Comm. Gp.: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 108 | Testimony of 1st Lieut. George H. Peackcock, 44th TFS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 109 | Testimony of 1st Lieut. Frank J. Tullo, 12th TFS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 110 | Testimony of A/1C Marvin Hamilton, 1962d Comm. Gp.: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 111 | Testimony of Major Charles W. Osburn, 498th TMG: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 112 | Testimony of A/1C Otto H. Barmettler, 3d BW: Report of Major Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 113 | Testimony of S/Sgt Robert L. Witter, 3d FMS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 114 | Testimony of A/1C Walter F. Slicer, 3d FMS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 115 | Testimony of A/1C Leodis Buckley, 3d FMS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| — | 116 | Testimony of Capt. William M. McCord, 15th TRS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| -- | 117 | Testimony of A/2C Tony J. Passmore, 3d OMS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 118 | Testimony of A/2C James J. O'Brien, Hq. Sq., 3d BW: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 119 | Testimony of A/2C David L. Johnson, 3d OMS: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 120 | Testimony of A/1C James R. Bailey, 6313th Civ. Engr. Sq.: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 121 | Testimony of A/1C Harold A. Wheeler, Transient Alert: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 122 | Statement of Damage to Private Property and Injury to Civilian Personnel: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 123 | Certificate of Damage: Report of Major Aircraft Accident Involving KB-50J, SN 49-334. |
| -- | 124 | UNCLAS/EFTO/FS 23-M-01, 6313th ABWG to CSAF, Deputy IG for Safety, PACAF, 5AF, 313th Air Div., 3d BW, 23 Dec. 1962. |
| -- | 125 | UNCLAS/EFTO/FS 28-M-01, 6313th ABWG to CSAF, Deputy IG for Safety, PACAF, 5AF, 313th Air Div., 3d BW, 28 Dec. 1962. |
| -- | 126 | UNCLAS/EFTO/FS 03-A-01, 6313th ABWG to CSAF, Deputy IG for Safety, PACAF, 5AF, 313th Air Div., 3d BW, 3 Jan. 1963. |
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# CHAPTER III

# THE F-105 CONVERSION PROGRAM

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THE GENESIS OF THE F-105 AIRCRAFT

The tasks to be performed by tactical air in a general war of global dimensions or in small, localized wars are much the same--the gaining of air superiority, the interdiction of enemy forces, and the close support of friendly ground elements. However, the magnitude of each of these tasks varies in accordance with its war milieu. While Air Force planners of the mid-fifties and early sixties were persuaded that tactical atomic weapons would have to be used in appropriate situations, they also recognized that certain circumstances might dictate reliance on conventional high explosive and incendiary weapons. Consequently, USAF tactical capability was designed to cover this wide spectrum of targets and weaponry as effectively and as thoroughly as possible.

In a general war it would be of prime importance to obtain air supremacy, since the battle would be an endeavor to destroy both the manned and the unmanned atomic delivery capability of the enemy through nuclear attacks against his operational bases. The tactical air forces would engage in air-to-air combat during this endeavor only to the extent required to penetrate to and return from the target. Successful penetration to the target would require high speed performance equal to or surpassing that of the enemy, in order to avoid aerial combat insofar as possible, and to conclude successfully that which proved unavoidable. High speeds would also be necessary to shorten the aircraft's exposure to enemy defense

systems and hasten completion of the tasks.

On the other hand, the air battle in a small war could run the gamut from pure air-to-air combat through attacking enemy bases with high explosive weapons, and on to destroying the enemy air capability with atomic attacks.

Although it could be expected that the Soviet manned air threat would diminish, high level USAF planners believed that in 1965 the USSR would still possess 13,000 jet fighters, of which about 5,700 would be of supersonic capability. This meant that the air battle phase of either a general or small war would require high performance aircraft with a top speed of mach 2 or higher.

From this attampt to paint the picture of future war emerged a set of performance requirements for the associated tactical aircraft. Firstly, for either a general or a small war, the air superiority mission required high supersonic performance; yet, conversely, the interdiction and close support functions in both types of conflict demanded the ability to operate also at the same low sub-sonic speeds utilized by aircraft in World War II and Korea. Secondly, all of these missions required an all-weather navigation capability, plus the ability to locate and attack targets under either all-weather or adverse weather conditions. Thirdly, tactical air must be capabile of delivering the entire spectrum of tactical weapons. And, finally, characteristics such as speed and maneuverability would be not merely desirable but even essential in reconnaissance aircraft, in order to insure mission accomplishment.

Having established these desiderata, the Air Force perforce turned to an examination of just how they might be best realized. The problem

had become apparent to the Air Force some years earlier, and two basic approaches were adopted. On the one hand, a particular aircraft could be built for each of the separate tactical tasks, somewhat in the way that the F-80 had been designed as a pure air-to-air day fighter and the F-84 as a fighter-bomber or tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In these cases, the best possible basic airframe and engine had been developed and specialized equipment installed to fulfill a specific task.

On the other hand, various developments served to strengthen USAF planners' conviction that specialization was not a satisfactory solution for providing the tactical aircraft needed. Among these were the rising cost of weapons systems, budget restrictions, the logistical problems created by the possession of a variety of aircraft, advancements providing flexibility in weapon yields, range extension by in-flight refueling, and more sophisticated navigation and bombing systems.

Bolstering this conviction that in the versatility of a single aircraft lay salvation was the consideration of the cost involved in developing different types of aircraft with only limited production runs. For it was an ineluctable fact of life that the unit cost of aircraft on a small production run was disproportionately high. Thus, any attempt to pursue the concept of specialization would spread the development and procurement money too thin to give the Air Force a quantitatively useful product.

As USAF gained experience in the development and procurement of the more modern weapons, the concept of integrated weapon system development emerged. As a consequence of this, the Air Force embarked upon a program of developing the first weapon system designed to provide adequate effectiveness for all tactical missions without undue impairment of any one.[1]

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE F-105

The F-105, a single-place aircraft which emerged from this concept, was specifically designed to possess a number of important and versatile characteristics. To begin with, its supersonic mach-2 top speed performance would enhance its survivability in either a general or a small war. Moreover, it could perform effectively all of the tactical air tasks previously performed by day fighters, fighter-bombers, tactical bombers, and tactical reconnaissance planes. It was equipped with an all-weather navigation system, and had a capability of attacking any target with a suitable weapon even under very adverse weather conditions. In contrast to its supersonic capability, the F-105 also included excellent subsonic flight control characteristics, enabling it to operate over a wide range of speeds, as circumstances might dictate.

From the time of its original conception through its tedious development, the close air support function of the F-105 was accorded a high priority, with numerous features incorporated in the basic airframe and the fire control system specifically to provide an optimum close air support capability in addition to the inherent nuclear delivery potential. In providing close support, the F-105 would operate at speeds between 200 and 400 knots, which was the same speed range employed by aircraft of World War II. The Thunderchief, as the F-105 was dubbed, could carry both nuclear weapons and a full arsenal of conventional high explosive ordnance.

Extending 64'5" in length, 19 feet in height, and with a wing span of 35'8", the F-105 had an internal bomb bay for atomic ordnance and could carry such weapons over a combat radius of 909 nautical miles. In

addition, it had five external stations for transporting high explosive ordnance of up to 12,000 pounds in weight. Almost any imaginable combination of ordnance and fuel could be carried, depending upon the type of target to be attacked and the distance from base to target. The high explosive ordnance suitable to the aircraft included 2.75" rockets; napalm; 500, 750, 1,000, and 2,000-pound GP bombs; MABFRAG, a new, highly effective anti-personnel weapon; the GAM-83 (or Bullpup) air-to-surface missile, which could be fitted with a wide range of high explosive or atomic warheads; and, finally, the GAR-8 (or Sidewinder) air-to-air infra-red heat-seeking missile. In addition, the F-105 was fitted for a 20-mm. Vulcan automatic cannon, a throwback to the ancient Gatling gun with its rotating six barrels, which could fire 6,000 rounds a minute.

With the internal fuel tank full, 390 gallons in the bomb bay, 650 gallons in a centerline fuel tank, and 450 gallons in each of the two fuel tanks on inboard pylons, the F-105 could carry two 750-lb. GP (general purpose) bombs, or two napalm tanks, or two 2.75" rocket launchers, or two Bullpup air-to-surface missiles, or two 750-lb. MABFRAG's, or two 1,000-lb. GP bombs, or any combination of these on the outboard pylons.

The high thrust of the F-105, in conjunction with its extremely effective dive brakes, drag chute, flap, and wheel brake systems, permitted short takeoffs from and landings on marginally satisfactory airfields at high gross weights. The aircraft had no pitch-up or stability problems, and the slow speed handling characteristics and lack of undesirable spin features were "remarkable." On the other hand, some types of ordnance, such as napalm, required high speed delivery for greatest effectiveness. For example, napalm delivered at a speed of 500 knots

was approximately 30 per cent more effective than the same substance delivered at 200 knots.

In any aircraft the question of delivery accuracy of either atomic or high explosive weapons was inevitably an important one. The stability and performance of the F-105, coupled with the fire control system which had been designed specifically for this versatile plane, provided the Air Force with inherent accuracy markedly superior to that of previous aircraft. It was expected that the toss bombing and dive bombing delivery accuracy for atomic weapons would be improved. In addition, the new drogue-retarded weapon and the forthcoming lay-down weapon would soon provide even greater accuracy, since they could be delivered supersonically, if desired, from low altitudes, while in straight and level flight, without employing the well-known LABS (Low Altitude Bombing System) technique.

The visual delivery of the high explosive weapons for close support and interdiction included all of the well-known techniques of dive bombing, dive-toss, and skip bombing. The first efforts of the F-105 yielded a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 110 feet with conventional dive bombing before any attempts were made to utilize the known techniques to cancel out the cross-wind factors. In the case of 2.75" rockets, CEP's on the order of 20 to 30 feet were obtained. Furthermore, the F-105 was equipped to deliver the GAM-83 air-to-surface missile, whose effective 30-foot CEP with a 250-lb. atomic warhead made it a formidable weapon indeed. In summary, then, the F-105 could deliver its multifarious weaponry against any ground target with greater accuracy than had been possible by any previous delivery agency.

An outstanding feature of the F-105 was its navigation equipment, which enabled the pilot to arrive at his assigned target location even under very adverse weather conditions. The "heart" of this all-weather navigation system was the NASARR (North American Search and Ranging Radar) radar equipment and the APN-105 Doppler dead-reckoning computer. The former gave the F-105 a selection of modes including ground mapping for navigation, terrain clearance radar for let-downs in mountainous terrain during adverse weather, and an all-weather air-to-air capability never before possessed by a tactical fighter. The Doppler dead-reckoning computer provided accuracy with approximately only one per cent error on low-level navigation missions relying solely on the computer.

With respect to the ability of the F-105 to locate targets by the use of its radar, there were definite limitations. For those fixed targets which provided a reasonably strong radar return, the NASARR would "paint" them with sufficient effectiveness to permit a complete all-weather attack, including the delivery of an atomic weapon without visual reference to the ground from the time of takeoff until the moment of landing. On the other hand, there was no all-weather target acquisition capability for targets which did not yield a reasonably strong radar return. Thus, certain types of bridges were easily identifiable with the radar, at the same time that it was doubtful that an immobile column of less than 10 or 12 tanks could be identified under all-weather conditions.

Pilots using the NASARR set had been able to identify a single C-119 aircraft parked in the center of an airfield while the attacking aircraft were flying at an altitude of 200 feet and an indicated airspeed of 300

knots. Moreover, the identification had been made with enough time and sufficient confidence in its identity to have skip-bombed, strafed, or napalmed the target visually in the final 10 seconds.

Another piece of equipment important to the close support function of the F-105 was the UHF homer. This enabled the pilot to home in on a forward air controller or an Army ground unit while being provided target attack information. As important as this ability was under visual flight conditions, it was, needless to say, of far greater importance when coupled with the navigation equipment already described, which enabled the pilot to fly to the target area under all-weather conditions and accomplish an instrument let-down through extremely adverse condition of low ceilings and visibilities, even in mountainous terrain. This UHF homer itself was accurate enough to bring a pilot within one-half mile of the ground controller, and operated within a 100-mile line-of-sight radius from the transmitter. After utilizing the homer to locate the forward air control party, the F-105 pilot could use it to track outbound on a bearing given by the forward air controller, to assist in the location of small pinpoint targets.

Some of the miscellaneous features of the F-105 are worthy of mention. Two which were of importance in a close support environment were the ease of maintenance and the quick turn-around capability. Actual sorties had been run with as little as 15 minutes' turn-around time, and as many as 50 landings had been made on one set of main gear tires, at high gross weight takeoffs, with short field landings.

The reliability of the fuel, hydraulic, electrical, and flight control systems, as well as other basic aircraft components, was unusual,

surpassing previous weapon systems. In addition, the ruggedness of the aircraft was notable, possessing a high load factor of 8.67 G's. The F-105 could carry 12,000 pounds of external stores. It was compatible with dispersed operations and package mobility, because of such features as the integral cartridge starter, which would reduce logistic problems at austere sites.

All in all, the ability to perform effectively throughout the entire range of flight maneuvers with safety and ease made the F-105 extremely well suited for close support operations, while still fulfilling requirements for a modern high speed nuclear delivery vehicle and effective air-to-air fighter. Thus, the F-105 completely justified the Air Force preference for versatility over specialization.

The Thunderchief, with its single Pratt and Whitney J-75 dual-axial turbojet engine and afterburner, was capable of mach 2.1 at high altitudes and down to 200 knots at low altitudes in an external stores combat configuration. It was capable of operating at 50,000 feet and zooming up to 70,000. While its combat radius was 900 nautical miles, targets more remote could be reached by aerial refueling.[2]

EARLY PLANS

The first intimation the 313th Air Division had that F-105 aircraft would be assigned to Okinawa came in the form of a secret message from Fifth Air Force in July 1958, advising that the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing would be re-equipped with three F-105 squadrons beginning in the Fiscal Year 2/62 (October - December 1961). Fifth's information was based on a program document received from USAF, which reflected revised

production rates obtained from Republic Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the F-105.[3]

An F-105 Weapons System Support Conference was scheduled to be held at Wheeler AFB, Hawaii, on 25-26 August 1959, but this headquarters was informed shortly before that date that it had been canceled for lack of agenda items. It was also learned that the F-105 program for the 18th TFW had been set back to the second quarter of the Fiscal Year 1963 (October - December 1962), just one year later than originally scheduled.[4]

Still another change in the conversion date was conveyed to 313th in February 1960, when word was received that it had been moved forward to the fourth quarter of the Fiscal Year 1962 (April - June 1962) and the first quarter of FY 1963 (July - September 1962). The same message advised that the GAM-83 guided air missile would be introduced into this theater concurrently with the F-105, the 12th and 44th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing both being scheduled for equipment with this weapon upon conversion.[5] More specific details of the programmed conversion were received in March 1960, this headquarters being instructed that the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) would change from F-100's to F-105's in the fourth quarter of FY 1962, while the 44th and 67th TFS would convert in the first quarter of FY 1963.[6] Confirmation of these conversion dates as representing "firm" USAF and PACAF plans was received in May 1960, together with directions that they were now to be used "for all conversion planning and programming actions."[7]

Further confirmation of the conversion dates, in more explicit form, obtained in July 1960, stated that the 12th TFS would begin changing over to the F-105 in April 1962, followed by the 44th and 67th TFS's. The

target date for complete conversion would be September 1962.[8]

Finally, in September 1960 a number of details concerning the F-105 conversion were received, including one change in the scheduled arrival of the aircraft themselves. Under the latest program, the 44th TFS would join the 12th TFS in receiving its new planes during the fourth quarter of FY 1962, leaving only the 67th TFS to acquire its aircraft in the first quarter of FY 1963. The aircrews for the Thunderchiefs would train at Nellis AFB, Nevada, for 60 days, with only those pilots on hand at Kadena with eight or more months' retainability to be involved. Each squadron would send one pilot back to Nellis AFB for training in the GAM-83; then, upon his return to Kadena, he would conduct a training program in his unit.

Having been informed that the F-105 Mobile Training Detachment (MTD) would be in place on 1 November 1961, this headquarters requested Fifth Air Force to phase out the F-100 Flight Simulator 120 days before the arrival of the first F-105 and have the F-105 Flight Simulator installed 90 days prior to that event. This was regarded as necessary, since the same building would be used, and certain modifications would have to be made in it before the new simulator could be installed.

It was also determined that the existing hangar and nose dock floors were strong enough to support the F-105, but a number of modification and repair projects for existing facilities were found to be necessary.

As a result of conversations with Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, the latter agreed to assume responsibility for determining the requirements for the storage of cartridge starters, to appeal PACAF's reduction in the size of the projected GSE building, and to request Department of

Defense (DOD) approval for air-conditioning the MTD buildings.

Representatives of the Republic Aviation Corporation (RAC) visited 313th Air Division Headquarters in September 1960 to present an up-to-date briefing, with films, on the F-105D's development. While the RAC team members were generally pleased with this command's capability for receiving and supporting the new weapon system, they did point out that an enlarged battery shop and increased power within certain maintenance facilities were needed. They stated that the 18th TFW should receive two squadrons of Thunderchiefs in April and May 1962 and the third squadron soon after 1 July 1962. Furthermore, the mobile training detachment should arrive at Kadena in November 1961 and the flight simulator during the third quarter of FY 1962.

The Republic people also advised that 32 technical representatives were to be furnished with the weapon system. 313th Air Division staff planners were additionally told that the F-105D model which this command was to receive would be equipped with a tail-arresting hook, and that tests were being conducted in the use of a new 650-gallon centerline auxiliary fuel tank, which, if adopted for the aircraft, would give it a total capacity of 3,120 gallons and a target range of 750 nautical miles.

The F-105D was to have installed a rocket catapult which would enable pilots to bail out from ground level. The visiting team also indicated that 90 per cent of the starts would be made by means of a cartridge.

Republic Aviation Corporation was said to be conducting a feasibility study concerning ZEL capability of the F-105D. (Zero-Length Launch, or ZEL, was a concept which had attained its greatest vogue in 1955-56, envisaging the dispersal of fighter-bomber aircraft at a number of

off-base points, whence they would be launched after an initial enemy nuclear strike had knocked out the main bases, using JATO units to get them into the air.) The RAC team added that recent test flights of the F-105D had been made at 2.18 mach.

Another matter of interest to planners of this command was that of the gust load limits of the F-105D and whether or not typhoon covers would be furnished. A survey team from the Mobile Air Materiel Area (MOAMA) was expected to advise this headquarters on these points.[9]

On 14 October 1960 a modification project for the MTD was submitted to Fifth Air Force. That same month, the Base Engineer wrote a follow-up letter concerning reclama action on the required floor space for the GSE building. October also saw a decision made to include the modification of tie-downs on the run-up pads, of the floor in the flight simulator building, and of the runway barriers in the FY 1962 Financial Plan.[10]

The Fifth Air Force Civil Engineer notified this headquarters in a radphone conversation of November 1960 that he approved the redesignation of Building No. 859 from a warehouse to a mobile training unit, although he had earlier denied a request for such action. This was expected to satisfy the space requirements for the MTD.

The thrust requirements which the new aircraft would impose were received in November 1960, enabling the 6313th Base Engineer and the 18th Director of Materiel to begin drawing up specifications for the requisite modifications of the Shaw Estes Engine Test Stand. At about the same time, it was learned that a new building for the battery shop would not be needed; however, modifications would have to be made to the existing building. The 18th DM was instructed to furnish the 6313th Base Engineer

with the requirements. The same two offices were to conduct a survey to determine the power requirements for the armament and electronics (A&E) shop, the instrument shop, the periodic maintenance hangar, the field maintenance hangar, the ground-powered equipment shop, the MTD building, and the nose docks, then take whatever action was necessary if they determined that modifications were required.

This headquarters also received definitive drawings for three small buildings which would house the 10,000 cartridge starters that were expected to be kept on hand. Each building was to be 10 x 12 feet in size and "strategically located."

As a result of the survey made of the requirements for the ground-powered equipment (GPE) building, the 6313th Base Engineer joined Fifth Air Force Headquarters in appealing for an increase in its size to approximately 10,000 square feet.

It was also decided during November 1960 that the 313th Civil Engineer would query Fifth Air Force concerning the requirements for modification of the MA1A runway barriers for use by the F-105D aircraft.[11]

As of 31 December 1960, the status and beneficial occupancy dates of the various projects directly related to the F-105 conversion were as follows:[12]

| Title | Cost | Date Scheduled To Start | Date Scheduled To Complete | Required BOD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mod Bldg 856 MTU | $75,000 | 1 Apr 61 | 1 Oct 61 | 1 Oct 61 |
| Mod Bldg 859 MTU | 50,000 | 1 Apr 61 | 1 Oct 61 | 1 Oct 61 |
| Const Battery Shop | 12,000 | 1 Sep 61 | 1 Apr 62 | 1 May 62 |
| Const Start Cart. Bldgs. | 3,000 | 1 Sep 61 | 1 Mar 62 | 1 Apr 62 |
| Mod. Tie-down Rings | 1,000 | 1 Sep 61 | 1 Mar 62 | 1 Apr 62 |
| Mod. Floor Flt. Sim. Bldg. | 2,000 | 1 May 61 | 1 Aug 61 | 1 Sep 61 |
| Mod. Runway Barrier | 5,000 | 1 Nov 61 | 1 Dec 61 | 1 Jan 62 |

SECRET

It was only the next month, January 1961, that word was received that the beneficial occupancy date for the mobile training unit would slip 30 days to 1 November 1961 as the result of additional requirements established by the Air Training Command representative. However, it did not appear that this would cause any serious impact, since the MTD facilities were scheduled to be complete six months before the first aircraft were actually received at Kadena AB.

One consequence of the MTU slippage, however, was seen in the establishment of new conversion dates for the three tactical squadrons. Under the new schedule, only the 12th TFW would still receive its F-105D aircraft in the fourth quarter of FY 1962; while the 44th TFS would be re-equipped in the first quarter of FY 1963, and the 67th TFS in the second quarter of FY 1963.[13]

On 23 January 1961 the PACAF Evaluation Panel visited Kadena Air Base to familiarize themselves with existing facilities, review future construction projects, and coordinate with their local counterparts such important problems as were encountered in the military construction program (MCP). Lieutenant Colonel Carl C. Machemer, of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at PACAF Headquarters, a member of the panel, presented a modification of the proposed Wing Intelligence Building, original plans for which had been drawn up in August 1960. These plans were further modified by the 18th TFW Intelligence people, then forwarded to Colonel Machemer in February.

The modification in question was designed to provide housing for the T-6 target trainer, which would support the F-105 program. The original plans had been for an immediate construction of the trainer

portion, with the remainder of the building to be constructed upon approval by Headquarters, USAF. In June 1961, however, local officials learned that the Wing Intelligence Building had been approved for FY 1962's MCP, and that it would be necessary to build a separate structure to house both the T-6 target trainer and the MB-7 flight simulator for the F-105 aircraft. Both trainers had to be located in the same building to permit joint use of one set of relief and planar maps, the cost of which ran close to $500,000 per set. At the end of the month, the plans for the target trainer building were still on the drawing board in the office of the Kadena Base Civil Engineer.[14]

During March 1961, PACAF OPLAN 194-60 and PACAF Program Plan 60-2 (Revised) were received by 313th Headquarters. From these documents officials of this headquarters learned that the operationally-ready date for the 18th TFW was to be 120 days after the receipt of 50 per cent of its aircraft. Also, the F-100D MTD was scheduled to depart Kadena in the second quarter of FY 1962; the F-105D flight simulator was scheduled to arrive in January 1962, with the old F-100D simulator bowing out in December 1961; and the GAM-83 pilot trainer was scheduled to appear in February 1962.[15]

In April 1961, Captain Emmerson D. Price, heretofore Officer-in-Charge of the 18th Field Maintenance Squadron's Aero Repair Branch, was assigned as Conversion Project Officer for the 18th TFW. That same month, for reasons unknown, the schedule for conversion was revised to call for the 67th TFS--formerly slated to be the last to convert--to make the initial changeover in the fourth quarter of FY 1962, with the 12th TFS and the 44th TFS following in the first quarter of FY 1963 and

the second quarter of FY 1963 respectively.[16]

The conversion concept of operations was initially developed by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force in May 1961, then presented to the 18th TFW for evaluation and comment. That same month conversion action problems began to manifest themselves in the materiel area. Complete AGE listings had not been received from Mobile Air Materiel Area (MOAMA) for review and identification of those items necessary to support the program. When this phase fell 45 days behind schedule, PACAF was moved to request MOAMA to expedite the matter. However, a "firm" aircraft delivery date was received, according to which the first F-105's were due to arrive at Kadena in June 1962. The new planes were to arrive at a rate of approximately 15 per month for five months, giving the 18th Wing a total of 75 aircraft.[17]

On 19-20 June 1961 a conversion conference including representatives from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 41st Air Division, the 313th Air Division, and Fifth Air Force was held at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, for the purpose of developing a concept of operations.

The following week--27-29 June--Colonel Hines and a group of officers from Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) and Republic Aviation Corporation visited Kadena to discuss F-105 matters. Even at this late date, complete AGE listings had not been received from MOAMA, notwithstanding the numerous requests which this headquarters had made and the weight of its prestige which PACAF had thrown into the scales.[18]

During July, Fifth Air Force presented its concept of operations for the conversion program to the 18th TFW for evaluation and comment.

The changes which the latter recommended in response to this invitation consisted of only minor refinements of the basic concepts of the Fuchu headquarters. The AGE listings had still not been received at the month's end, making them 75 days behind schedule. The 18th TFW thereupon did the only thing it could do under the circumstances—namely, advise PACAF that the conversion program could not be fully supported if the listings were not received within the very near future.[19]

August 1961 went by, and still the much-needed AGE listings did not materialize on the local scene; however, Fifth Air Force did indicate that the problem should be solved by 10 September.[20]

One tangible product of a conversion conference held at Headquarters, PACAF, from 5 to 9 September 1961, was the development of a new program action directive (PAD) reporting manual. Once it became effective, the 18th TFW and this headquarters found themselves tasked with the preparation of comprehensive monthly reports called for by the extremely detailed manual.[21]

On 15 September 1961 the final plans were approved for the Target Trainer Building, which was to house both the T-6 target intelligence trainer and the MB-7 flight simulator for the F-105. Considerable difficulty had been experienced in squeezing both pieces of equipment into the building originally designed for just one of them, but the necessity for keeping the construction cost under $50,000 made it impossible to increase the size of the structure. Construction finally began in November, and by the end of the year the foundation and vertical columns had been poured and the roof forms were in place. The beneficial occupancy date (a theoretical sort of thing, seldom realized in the

event on Okinawa) was to be 15 April 1962.

On 22 September 1961, in response to repeated demands from the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Commander, a captain was transferred from the 18th Wing Intelligence Office to fill a vacancy for an 8054 position. This left only two officers in the latter division--an 8016 and an 8086. Following the earlier transfer of officers and airmen from the Wing Intelligence Office to the three tactical squadrons of the 18th as it did, this loss left the Wing Intelligence Division in such a decimated condition that the program within the wing "almost ceased to exist."

When matters were thus at their bleakest, a letter dated 18 September was received from Fifth Air Force, changing the entire complexion of things. According to this missive, both the MB-7 flight simulator and the T-6 radar intelligence trainer contained features which would require Intelligence support. However, such support could not be provided adequately unless there were "an integrated, centralized Intelligence structure" laid out along the lines of the realignment envisaged by the Fuchu headquarters. In addition to its existing functions, the 18th Intelligence Division would thus acquire a radar prediction capability built around a radar scope presentation which would require supervisory personnel to assist the pilot in its interpretation. In addition, the integral relief map would have to be modified as new intelligence information became available. Moreover, the T-6 trainer would be fitted with a scope recording camera, which would be used in training and insertion of the resulting photographs in target folders.

According to the July 1961 Unit Manning Documents, only recently

received, the 18th Wing Headquarters was itself authorized an 8016 Intelligence Staff Officer (a major), an 8054 Intelligence Officer (a lieutenant), an 8086 Air Targets Officer (a captain), three enlisted Intelligence Operations Specialists (of AFSC's 20450 and 20470), a 20650 enlisted Photo-Interpretation Specialist, and a 70250 enlisted Administrative Specialist. In addition, each of the three tactical squadrons was authorized an 8054 lieutenant Intelligence Officer and a 20470 enlisted Intelligence Operations Specialist, thus giving the wing a total of 14 Intelligence personnel.

Now, however, the Fifth Air Force Intelligence officials had determined that the withdrawal of these authorizations from the tactical squadrons was "essential to the concept of centralized intelligence support to the F-105 by the wing."

Under the realignment and concentration of Intelligence personnel at wing headquarters level which Fifth now proposed, the total would be increased to 16, disposed of as follows: an 8095 Chief of the Intelligence Division (a lieutenant colonel), two 8086 Air Targets Officers (one a major, the other a captain), an 8054 Combat Intelligence Officer (a captain), a 1525 Prediction Chief (also a captain), two 8044 Radar-Photo Interpreters (both first lieutenants), two 20470 enlisted Combat Intelligence Specialists, two enlisted Target Materials Specialists (20450 and 20470), three enlisted Prediction Specialists (20650 and 20670), and two 70250 enlisted Administrative Specialists.

Fifth <u>did</u> say, though, that "This action will not preclude the identification of specific Wing Intelligence personnel to provide intelligence support for or to deploy with specific squadrons under a tactical

situation."

As a result of the proposed realignment, which, rather inconsistently, came within 30 days of the complete breakup and decentralization of the Intelligence function, the latter was presumably to be centralized once more. However, any satisfaction which the 18th Wing's Chief of Intelligence may have experienced at learning of the new policy and the addition of two "bodies" to the total authorization of the 18th strength was immediately tempered by his realization that the number of Intelligence Officers (AFSC 8054) had been reduced from four to one.

Fifth Air Force added that the proposed realignment was further justified by the addition of the prediction function, which was "a significant change of responsibility." With this pronouncement the Chief of the 18th's Intelligence Division could find no fault, in all probability. Not so palatable, it may be suspected, was the further observation that the change in AFSC from 8016 to 8095 and in grade from major to lieutenant colonel would "place as Chief of the Intelligence Section a highly qualified individual with an experience depth capable of performing over-all supervisory capacity in the varied Intelligence activities." (A bit awkwardly worded this, but the gist of what Fifth was trying to say is clear.) The incumbent was himself a lieutenant colonel, promoted to this grade only the previous month and carrying the unappreciated 8016 AFSC. Thus, if he were at all inclined to be thin-skinned, he could interpret the Fifth Air Force comment as a direct slap in the face!

The letter went on to say that, since the prediction function would be new to the 18th Wing, the latter should be advised that this branch would conduct interpretation and profile instruction on the

simulator and the trainer, obtain radar scope photography from the latter and process it for cockpit use, prepare radar predictions for use in navigation and bombing missions, conduct instruction to develop the individual pilot's ability to prepare radar predictions, perform maintenance, modification and annotation on radar targeting maps, and participate in developmental programs to provide F-105D radar target materials.

Fifth concluded by saying that it was aware that current 18th TFW and Fifth Air Force resources could not support the desired grade structure outlined in the letter; therefore, PACAF would have to approve and assign the additional personnel.[22]

The first two officers under this proposed manning, incidentally, arrived late in December after having attended the T-6 target intelligence trainer course at Nellis AFB.

On 2 October 1961 PACAF published its Conversion Guide No. 60-2 as "a detailed check list outlining those actions necessary to insure orderly conversion of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena AB, from the F-100D/F to F-105D aircraft."

To take care of pilot training in the new aircraft, USAF had established a centralized facility at Nellis AFB, with a total of 118 spaces reserved for Kadena AB. Each class would consist of 20 spaces, with the first class commencing on 2 April 1962. The duration of a class would be 60 calendar days, comprising 273 hours of academic and ground training, 45 hours of flying training in the F-105D and 20 hours in the T-39B. Then, prior to departing Kadena for formal training, all crews would be given 61½ hours of Mobile Training Detachment (MTD) instruction on the

F-105D and 15 hours in the F-105D simulator. In the event the latter was not available for one reason or another, a traveling team from Nellis AFB could be substituted to provide radar familiarization for the pilots. Notwithstanding the detailed arrangements to be prepared at Nellis, it was considered essential that pre-training be conducted at Kadena beforehand to insure optimum utilization of the formal instruction at the CONUS school. Additional training in accordance with PACAF Manual 51-10 was also directed at unit level to achieve an alert and/or combat-ready status.

Headquarters, Air Training Command (ATC) had already established formal training courses at Lowry AFB (Armament and Electronics) and at Amarillo AFB (Jet Engine) to support USAF requirements in these areas. These schools were expected to produce a cadre of 54 "five" and "seven" level A&E and 20 J-75 engine specialists for Kadena AB. In addition, a cadre of 150 operationally-trained airmen, in "across-the-board AFSC's," would be provided in advance of the 18th's receipt of its first F-105D's. Mobile Training Detachment-5 had been approved for deployment to Kadena and was scheduled to begin training the personnel there in February 1962. This MTD would have a complete training capability, including GAM-83. In addition, ATC traveling teams would be provided to conduct training in the GAM systems, maintenance, and missile handling and loading. Pre-MTD courses in mathematics and basic electronics would also be given.

A total of four diagnostic teams would be provided for each wing, the team composition being as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 - 322X0N | Fire control system |
| 1 - 301X1 | Electronic and Navigational Equipment |

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1 - 423X3 Flight Control/Automatic Pilot

1 - 431X1C Aircraft Maintenance

Each team would be broken into three elements for training: Fire control personnel (CONUS resources, ATC-trained) would be given three weeks of MTD training at Nellis and five weeks of integration training at Republic Aviation Corporation. The second element, consisting of electronics and navigation equipment, as well as flight control/automatic pilot personnel, would receive on-site field training detachment (FTD) training and five weeks of integration training at Republic. Both of these elements would receive 30 days of operational training at Nellis AFB, after which they would join the third element (aircraft maintenance technicians), which had meantime been trained on-the-site at Kadena.[23]

Another by-product of the conversion from F-100's to all-weather F-105's was the need it created for a new series of maps and radar prediction techniques. Already the USAF, Navy, and RAC were combining their efforts to make the existing charts as good as possible and to develop prediction capabilities for employment with the F-105D. Special radar training capabilities had been incorporated in the MB-7 flight simulator and the T-6 radar pilot trainer. Maintenance and operational support personnel for these two trainers would be supplied from CONUS resources and trained by ATC. In order to bring target folder material and radar trainer maps up to date, the 18th Wing was to be provided a prediction team consisting of one AFSC 1525 (navigator-bomber), two 8044's (photo-radar intelligence specialists), and two 206X0's (photo interpreters). The complete team would be provided from CONUS resources and would be trained by TAC/ATC.[24]

The Assistant Chief of Staff (AC/S) for Operations, PACAF, would be responsible for monitoring the over-all planning and progress of the program. This responsibility was then further delegated to the Operations sections and project officers at the subordinate levels of command for early recognition and attempted correction of potential problem areas.

Following their graduation from the F-105 training course at Nellis AFB, the PACAF crews would report to Mobile (Brookley AFB) for processing and acceptance of the aircraft for delivery to Kadena. Always provided, of course, that the new aircraft were accepted by USAF, they were expected to become available at Mobile in May 1962, and special delivery arrangements were being made for the delivery of four aircraft that same month. However, the regular "Flying Fish" schedules would not begin until June 1962, and it was expected that a total of 75 unit equipment (U.E.) aircraft would have been delivered by the end of October. F-100 aircraft made excess to PACAF by the conversion would be ferried to SMAMA beginning in August 1962. Tanker support for the movement of both F-100 and F-105 aircraft would be provided by TAC from Mobile to Midway and by PACAF south of Wake Island. Route stops would be Guam and Hickam. Tanker support would be made available two weeks of each month during the operation.

Upon arriving at Kadena, all crews would be required to complete certain ground and flight training before engaging in operational flying. One important aspect of this requirement was that the provisions of Chapter 3, PACAF Manual 51-10 were to be complied with before a pilot could be upgraded to Alert Ready status. Once this qualification was achieved, he might be assigned "follow-on targets." However, it would

be necessary for a pilot to complete the requirements outlined in Chapter 4 of PACAF Manual 51-10 before he could be upgraded to an Operationally Ready status. And only Operationally Ready pilots were authorized to hold "static alert targets."

The 18th TFW would be relieved of all semi-annual training requirements (as outlined in Chapter 5, PACAF Manual 51-10) effective April 1962, in accordance with Chapter 5, PACAF Manual 51-6. During the conversion period, priority was to be given to the F-105D training program, and every effort would be made to provide 12 hours' training per month for all residual F-100 crews. This meant that "Extraordinary care must be taken to insure equal distribution of flying hours among all crews."

As a tentative planning goal, the PACAF Conversion Guide 60-2 of 2 October 1961 carried the following chart:

| MONTH | F-100 FLYING HRS | STATIC/FOLLOW-ON TARGETS | F-105 FLYING HRS | STATIC/ FOLLOW-ON TARGETS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| APR | 1212 | 18/42 | - | - |
| MAY | 972 | 18/22 | 28 | - |
| JUN | 696 | 18/12 | 150 | - |
| JUL | 492 | 18/0 | 320 | 0/12 |
| AUG | 360 | 12/3 | 550 | 6/9 |
| SEP | 312 | 10/0 | 830 | 8/12 |
| OCT | 200 | 7/0 | 1050 | 11/12 |
| NOV | 100 | 6/0 | 1350 | 12/32 |
| DEC | - | - | 1500 | 18/42 |
| | | | O/R | O/R |

PACAF recognized that during the later stages of the conversion

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program it might be necessary to augment the Kadena F-100 inventory from within its own assets in order to insure maintenance of the "desired target posture." Accordingly, it was tentatively planned to provide six additional F-100 aircraft during the months of October and November 1962, in addition to augmentation already requested from TAC's Composite Air Strike Force (CASF).[25]

In the region of supply, the PACAF Conversion Guide 60-2 provided that support of both the F-105D aircraft and the GAM-83 missile would be "in accordance with Volumes XX and XXIII, AFM 67-1," with weapon system spares, tools, and test and ground handling equipment being forwarded initially by Air Force Shipping Directive (AFSD) action by F-105 and GAM-83 Logistic Support Managers (LSM's). Resupply would be by Volume XX procedures. Common item supply would be provided to the 18th TFW by the 6313th ABW base supply.

The various logistic organizations which would work with the 18th in the conversion program were Headquarters, MOAMA, at Brookley AFB, Alabama, which was to be the F-105 LSM; Headquarters, San Antonio Air Materiel Area (SAAMA), at Kelly AFB, Texas, which was to be responsible for special weapons and J-75 engines; Headquarters, Warner-Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA), at Robins AFB, Georgia, which was to be responsible for the armament systems; Headquarters, Middletown Air Materiel Area (MAAMA), at Olmsted AFB, Pennsylvania, which was designated as the LSM for the GAM-83 weapon system; and Headquarters, Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA), at Hill AFB, Utah, which was designated as the LSM for trainers, simulators, and conventional munitions.

The F-105 and GAM-83 LSM's would insure that all required AGE and technical data were in place 60 days prior to receipt of the first F-105.[26]

In the matter of maintenance engineering, MOAMA would be responsible for the over-all control of F-105 weapon system maintenance and would provide support for the movement of F-105D's to PACAF.

Flightline squadron maintenance, except for armament-electronics (A-E) sub-systems, would include pre-flight and post-flight inspections, servicing, and unscheduled organizational maintenance, as well as the inventory and storage-maintenance of loose equipment not associated with the A-E sub-systems.

Field maintenance squadron support would include specialist assistance, repair and authorized overhaul of aircraft engines, accessories and ground support equipment, fabrication of aircraft maintenance parts and equipment, processing of reparable items, and performance of periodic and special inspections using procedures contained in T.O. 00-20A-1.

Armament and electronic squadron maintenance would include flightline and field maintenance support of A-E sub-systems, specialist assistance, processing of reparable A-E equipment, and performance of periodic and special inspections on A-E equipment, using procedures prescribed by T.O. 00-20A-1.

The maintenance of F-105D aircraft, aircraft-installed GAM-83 missile system items, and all direct support items, common and peculiar, would be performed in accordance with AFM 66-1 and supplemental directives, AFR 66-1, AFR 66-17, PACAFR 66-1, and such technical data as should be developed.

Contractor Technical Services Personnel requirements would be established in accordance with AFR 66-18.[27]

The earliest possible recognition of requirements for facilities to be used in the F-105 program and their inclusion in programming actions was "prerequisite to the timely provision of facilities," according to the Civil Engineering portion of the Conversion Guide. This was so because of the lead time necessary to any construction or repair of consequence. Projects requiring the authorization of Congress could be expected to take an average of three years from their initial programming to completion. Minor construction and alteration projects costing in excess of $25,000 and less than $50,000 required the approval of the Secretary of the Air Force, while those costing from $50,000 to the statutory limit of $200,000 had to have the approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which frequently entailed a time lapse of six months, even when favorably considered. In connection with this last, OSD had imposed limitations requiring that projects costing more than $200,000 receive its approval.[28]

Early in November 1961, General Wood, of the Amarillo Technical Training Center, visited the 18th Wing Operations Center (WOC) to review facilities, programs, training requirements, and training schedules. The WOC personnel briefed him on the F-105 training that would be required, as well as the vital importance of keeping training for the aircrews on schedule. The general assured the wing that he would personally insure that instructor assignment was kept on a timely basis.[29]

On 14 November, Major Jack Hawley, Chief of the WOC, was appointed as project officer to work out the siting, funding, construction, communications, and personnel requirements for a consolidated operations

center. This center would incorporate the existing 313th Air Division Air Operations Center (AOC), the 18th TFW WOC, the 498th Tactical Missile Group Missile Operations Center (MOC), and the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), currently located at Naha AB. The initial concepts and building plans were approved by Major General Robert M. Stillman, 313th's newly-arrived Commander, and Colonel Francis S. Gabreski, the 18th Wing Commander.

On 15 December 1961, General Stillman held a conference on the subject of the proposed center, indicating his desire to include all AOC, WOC, MOC, ADCC, Intelligence, Special Security Office (SSO), Radio Group Mobile (USAFSS), Communications, Reconnaissance, Mobility, Computer, and Weather personnel facilities and job functions in one combined Operations Center. Funds in the amount of $193,000 were available for the project, and plans were drawn up, receiving the 313th Air Division Commander's approval. The Kadena Base Civil Engineer was then instructed to prepare engineering data and contract for the construction at the earliest possible date.[30]

A Republic Aviation Corporation team arrived on 26 November 1961 for an on-the-spot study of the 18th TFW program for conversion to the F-105. As a result of their advice and assistance, procedural concepts were brought up to date, aircraft performance data were finalized, and generation rates were computed.

Both PACAF and USAF approved involuntary extensions of F-100 aircraft commanders if it were found that such action was necessary to enable the wing to meet its target requirements during the conversion period.[31]

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In December 1961, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Greenhalgh, Jr., the 18th Wing's Intelligence Chief, spent three days at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, for the purpose of learning as much as possible about the T-6 target intelligence trainer. The principal information gained, aside from routine training material, was that USAF had approved a new and different personnel structure for Intelligence under the F-105 concept. The new manning document was to increase the total strength of the Intelligence Division to 20, with the distribution of grades and AFSC's as follows:[32]

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Lt Col | 8016 or 8095 | 1 MSGT | 20470 | 1 Amn | 70250 |
| 1 Major | 8086 | 1 MSGT | 20670 | | |
| 2 Captains | 8054 | 4 TSGTs | 20470 | | |
| 1 Captain | 1525 | 1 TSGT | 20670 | | |
| 2 Lieuts | 8054 | 2 Amn | 20450 | | |
| 2 Lieuts | 8044 | 1 Amn | 20650 | | |

As the year 1961 came to a close, it was possible to say that the F-105D conversion program in the 18th TFW was "progressing satisfactorily" with the exception of facilities construction. In the latter case, recent changes in approval authority limitations had required the resubmission of certain construction projects to the Department of Defense, naturally causing considerable delay in their completion.[33]

Meantime, on 5-6 December 1961 an F-105D Phasing Group Meeting had been held at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, to discuss various problems that were hindering F-105D units from becoming "fully effective, combat-ready" forces in-being. It was generally agreed by the conferees that

the major problems remaining were (1) the high failure rates of some sub-systems, which resulted in excessive unscheduled maintenance; (2) probably unrealistic inspection requirements, which also resulted in high unscheduled maintenance (e.g., the F.O.D. criteria and inspection interval for F-105D pylon jettison guns); (3) low skill levels assigned, as opposed to the higher ones authorized--an excess of 3-level airmen and a shortage of 5, 7, and 9 levels plagued all units, resulting in poor trouble shooting, base level repair, and high unscheduled maintenance; (4) the marginal training provided by the Nellis pilot training course.

A 45-hour course with adequate training in all-weather modes had always been recognized as essential, in order quickly to attain full combat capability in converting wings. The inability to furnish this training to aircrews of the 36th TFW from Bitburg AB, Germany, as an example, was expected to restrict that unit to a C-3 status until the pilots were rescheduled through Wheelus AB the following spring. Since TAC did not anticipate that it would provide a 45-hour course before July 1962, this inadequate training would have a similarly adverse effect on the "C" rating of the 18th and 49th Tactical Fighter Wings; and (5) the F-105D simulators and radar interpretation trainers appeared to have operational problems limiting full mission simulation, besides which, spares support appeared to be quite inadequate. Since there was no two-place aircraft in the F-105 program to correspond to the F-100F, ground training devices would have to be brought to their full operational capability, then maintained there to fill the gap.[34]

Among more specific problems discussed at the F-105D Phasing Group Meeting was the devising of means to protect the R-14A radar from both

ECM (Electronics Counter-Measures) and interference on its fixed frequency of 9375 mcs. Tests conducted at Nellis AFB had confirmed that the R-14A could be jammed; however, they had also demonstrated that it could be operated under jamming conditions by the application of various pilot techniques, such as doppler, navigation aids, antenna tilt, and the like.

Another problem presented was the need for a simulated bomb scoring device for the F-105 weapon system, there being no satisfactory method available for measuring a pilot's proficiency in all-weather delivery of the various weapons. A radar scope camera was being installed in the aircraft as a partial measure, but the attendants recognized that this would not satisfactorily meet the need for a full simulated bomb-scoring device. If such an instrument were developed, it should record presentations on the radar scope, then be able to "play them back." Also, it should record air speed, altitude, "G" forces, and aircraft attitude at pickle and simulated release point to permit circular error probability (CEP) computations. Less essential, but still highly desirable, considerations were the ability of the system to provide a "readout" of the pilot's ability and the aircraft system's capability of delivering a nuclear weapon under all-weather conditions; the system should not require extensive installation time on the part of either ground or aircraft installed equipment; it should be available for Air Force-wide use; and it should be usable under wartime conditions in order to permit bomb damage assessment.

A third specific problem brought up at the Wright-Patterson meeting had to do with the in-flight refueling configuration of the F-105D. The

plane had originally been designed to employ the probe-drogue refueling system with KB-50 tankers. When KC-135 tankers were introduced into the refueling picture, however, the original design criteria had to be changed to include a boom receptacle on the F-105D. Flight tests of the latest slipway design had already been completed and the configuration approved by ASD. This slipway configuration would be used if USAF directed either dual capability or boom refueling only.

SPO had received no formal directive from Headquarters, USAF specifying whether it should proceed with the dual capability, employ only a boom, or stay with the new probe configuration. In the event dual capability were desired, Republic Aviation Corporation had engineered a configuration which would permit the incorporation of a boom capability without disturbing the new retractable probe configuration. This new dual capability design had been reviewed and engineering approval granted by ASD, and it was recommended by the SPO, should USAF direct the incorporation of a dual refueling capability in the F-105D.[35]

Although not a mechanical problem, the F-105D pilot training program was a subject of at least equal importance with the problems previously described. It was brought up to the attention of the conferees that pilots graduating from the F-105D CCTS at Nellis AFB were not receiving the complete training specified by the course curriculum. Graduates of the recent September 1961 class had in fact received an average of only 30 hours per pilot, versus the 45 hours programmed. In addition, the pilots were not receiving weapon system training in terrain avoidance-contour mapping radar modes of operation, as specified by the training

curriculum. The consequence of this attenuated training was that the capability of the tactical fighter wings converting to the F-105D of attaining full weapon system combat effectiveness was impaired. It was generally agreed that a 54-training day requirement was unavoidable if the 45-hour training program prescribed were to be achieved. TAC's position was that the 45-hour course could not be completed in 61 calendar days. No allowance was made for bad weather, holidays, and ineffective or aborted sorties.

Nellis AFB proposed that a 45-hour syllabus be introduced and scheduled for completion in 54 training days. The TAC position, based upon current forecast utilization rates, was that the 45-hour program could not begin before 15 July 1962, and even then was predicated on Nellis AFB's having the requisite logistic support to sustain the 25-hour aircraft utilization rate that would be required, plus related T-39B and training device requirements.

An interim 30-hour course was extracted from the 45-hour course, to be accomplished in 38 training days. The current 30-hour course was the maximum student time which could be given in 38 training days (approximately two months).

Unfortunately, current PACAF planning did not permit the phasing of pilots into the 45-hour/54-training-day course. Therefore, all that headquarters could do was announce its intention to study all conversion factors, in order to determine the manner and timing in which student flow might be phased into the 45-hour/54-day course. However, the 30-hour/38-training-day course was approved by all the conferees and was to commence with Class 62-H on 2 January 1962.

Another subject discussed at the Wright-Patterson AFB conference was AFM 50-5 (USAF Training Prospectus) in connection with prerequisite qualification for entry into Course 101506E. All conferees agreed that the manual should be changed to require that the pilot:

1. Be a graduate of the 111105B course within the past 90 days or

2. Have a total of 500 jet hours, of which 150 would have been in century series TAC fighter aircraft or

3. Have a total of 1,000 jet hours, of which 150 would have been in jet fighter aircraft (T-33 not included) and be current in jet aircraft.[36]

F-105D starter unreliability was another item taken up on the agenda of the December 1961 meeting. The STU 12/A34 starter had not attained the goal of 400 cartridge and 600 pneumatic starts prescribed in the specifications, the latter method proving both difficult and time consuming, thus producing an excessive workload of unscheduled maintenance. Air Research ECP-24, which modified the current STU-12/A34 starter to the STU-15/A34 configuration, had already been reviewed by ASD and disapproved for the following reasons: (1) Qualification tests were to be run with new gear boxes as well as the new ECP-24 parts. This would not provide representative data that would apply to life or characteristics of retrofit of old starters, using old gear boxes and new starter parts. (2) Tests would not provide a valid indication of service life. (3) The magnitude of the changes to the gear box which would be required at overhaul was unknown. (4) ECP-24 did not specify the costs or who would perform the retrofit.

In addition to these disqualifying factors, ECP-24 was similar to

ECP-21, which had previously been disapproved by ASD pending qualification tests of the new STU-15/A34 starter being procured in accordance with ASD specification ASNSP-6, dated 15 August 1961. However, a test program for the STU-15/A34 starter had been authorized, and the program was scheduled to commence 15 January 1962 and be completed by mid-April 1962. If this starter were found to be satisfactory, GFAE procurement for the FY-62 airframe buy would be initiated.

Mobile Air Materiel Area (MOAMA) reported that the kits used for the retrofit of in-service starters, in accordance with ECP-24 had been procured, but that procurement of the kits required for aircraft change would be held in abeyance until completion of the ASD tests.

The "flaming start" condition previously reported had been alleviated by the use of starter cartridges manufactured by the Olin Matheson Corporation, in lieu of the MC-2 AMOCO cartridges. In addition, Ogden Air Materiel Area (OAMA) had issued instructions restricting the MC-2 cartridges to emergency use only, with appropriate safety and fire prevention measures to be taken in every such case. The conferees were told that 150 cartridge starts were possible with the current starters, provided only the Olin Matheson cartridges were employed.[37]

Still another subject introduced at the Wright-Patterson conference was the genuine value of the F-105D simulator (the MB-7). Heretofore, the Air Force had accepted F-105D simulators from the manufacturer, ACF Industries, with the assumption that a training device which would satisfy the requirement for a full F-105D mission simulation was being provided. However, information more recently received from TAC and USAFE cast some doubt upon the accuracy of this supposition. Obviously, the

simulator would have to be fully and effectively utilized by each operating wing if the versatility of the F-105 were to be translated into the most effective operational capability.

While the SPO had received no formal acceptance evaluations on the MB-7 simulator as yet, information contributed by users indicated that full and effective utilization was not being obtained for a variety of reasons. TAC's problems included supply support, long lead times in the incorporation of essential ECP's into the trainers, difficulty in bringing in the picture on the 13-mile range, and map problems. It was realized that some of the problems encountered at Nellis AFB with the -1 and -2 MB-7 might be peculiar to those two early production trainers, since most of the discrepancies noted on the -4 MB-7 at Seymour-Johnson AFB had been eliminated by adjustment. In view of unofficial information received by the SPO regarding the unsatisfactory operation and utilization of MB-7 simulators possessed by TAC, the former had requested the latter command on 29 November 1961 to submit its recommendations for improvements, other than the already considered ECP's. No reply had been received at the time the conference got underway.

U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE) had also been experiencing simulator supply support problems, inoperative systems due to excessive Synchro failures, attributed in part to excessive heat exposure before the air conditioning became operational after ducting installation. Facility wiring and power problems had also been factors in developing effective utilization of the 36th TFW simulator.[38]

On 20 December 1961, Captain Emmerson D. Price, the 18th TFW F-105D Conversion Program Project Officer, informed the interested agencies

of the wing that, according to current information, the pilots would first receive ground training at Kadena, transition training at Nellis AFB, and operational readiness training after their return to Kadena. The ground training at Kadena would consist of approximately 36 hours of MTD instruction and radar training on the R-14A set. F-105 MTD-5 was scheduled to be in place at Kadena around 1 February 1962. The pilot classes would be two weeks in length, four days per week, beginning on 12 February. Each class would accommodate approximately 10 pilots. Since the MB-7 simulator would not be operational until July 1962, simulator training prior to the pilots' departure for Nellis was impossible. However, 16.5 hours of simulator time was included in the Nellis training, and this was expected to provide adequate procedural training prior to a pilot's actual checkout in the F-105. A special radar training team from Nellis was to arrive on or about 1 March 1962 to provide instruction on the R-14A radar, but no information concerning the length of this training was available, though it was known that it was to be scheduled after completion of MTD training.

The 18th requested four spaces in the Nellis school starting in March, in order to allow its own pilots to deliver the first increment of four F-105D's scheduled to arrive at Kadena in May 1962. Upon their return to Okinawa, these four pilots would be utilized as instructors and to establish the operational readiness training program for pilots completing training at Nellis.

The Nellis training theoretically included 45 hours' flying time in the F-105, 20 hours of radar training in T-39B aircraft, and 260 hours of academic training; however, previous classes had been receiving

only about 30 to 35 hours of F-105 time and less than 20 hours of radar training. Even so, Captain Price believed that these problems would be minimized by the starting dates assigned the 18th, so that its pilots should receive "something close to the programmed 45 hours."

At the time he wrote this, the Nellis classes were lasting for 61 days. Pilots scheduled to attend them would depart Kadena five to seven days before the starting dates. Upon completion of the Nellis training, 15 to 18 pilots out of each class would proceed to Brookley AFB, Alabama, and fly 18th TFW F-105's back to Okinawa under the so-called "Flying Fish" project. Consequently, when departing for Nellis, pilots should plan on an 80-90 day period of TDY, including the travel to Nellis, transition training, and the subsequent delivery of aircraft to Kadena. Pilots completing the Nellis training might be assigned to follow-on targets upon their return to Kadena.

Current plans required the 18th TFW to maintain responsibility for a total of 30 targets during the conversion period, the program phasing-down from the present 60 targets to 52 in January 1962, 40 in April, 35 in May, and 30 in June, with 16 Quick Strike targets being maintained throughout the entire period. F-105 target coverage was scheduled for 12 targets in July 1962, and would continue to increase until the entire 60-target program was resumed in January 1963.

The phase-down of F-100 aircraft had begun that same month (December 1961) and would continue until all F-100's were redistributed in October 1962.

Under the current target program, the wing would have a definite shortage of F-100 pilots during the period from June through October

1962. To help alleviate this situation, all pilots scheduled to rotate from April through November had been extended for periods of 30 to 90 days. Still, this would not solve the problem entirely; therefore, the 18th had requested that either the Quick Strike program be reduced in scope or the wing be augmented by additional F-100 aircrews during this critical period. These proposals were being weighed by Fifth Air Force at that time.

Captain Price further advised that the present schedule for the delivery of F-105D's to Kadena was as follows:

| MONTH | ACFT DELIVERED | TOTAL ON HAND |
|---|---|---|
| May 1962 | 4 | 4 |
| Jun 1962 | 17 | 21 |
| Jul 1962 | 16 | 37 |
| Aug 1962 | 15 | 52 |
| Sep 1962 | 15 | 67 |
| Oct 1962 | 8 | 75 |

Besides these 75 F-105D aircraft, an additional eight would be assigned in February 1963 to serve as attrition equipment.[39]

Field Training Detachment (FTD) training was to begin at Kadena on 12 February 1962, provided the training equipment and training aids were shipped from the factory on 15 January 1962 as scheduled. The previously-planned on-the-job training (OJT) at Nellis AFB had been canceled, inasmuch as that base was unable to provide FTD training for the 18th's personnel and the wing could not conduct FTD training at Kadena to meet the required time schedule.

Diagnostic team training for Air Force personnel would not be

completed before the aircraft delivery date, but a diagnostic team of contract personnel were to arrive at Kadena in June 1962, remaining there until the Air Force personnel were completely trained.

The 18th Conversion Project Officer anticipated that difficulties would be encountered because of a lack of certain F-105 facilities ready for use when the aircraft began arriving in May 1962. One such facility was the Power Check Pad (Trim Pad), the beneficial occupancy date (BOD) for which, following modification, was the late fall of 1962. Anyway, approval and funding for the project had not yet been received from higher headquarters. Another item was the installation of 440-volt electrical power in the maintenance nose docks and hangars for the operation of hydraulic mules, motor generators, and required test equipment. It was "definitely required for F-105 systems maintenance." Only a relatively short time would be required for construction, once approval and funding were received from higher headquarters, but, since neither of these had yet been forthcoming, 440-volt power could yet short-circuit the carefully-laid plans of so many headquarters and individuals.

A third potential obstacle took the form of FTD Buildings 856 and 859. The actual construction and modification of the two buildings would be completed by 15 January 1962, which would be in time for FTD installation. Nevertheless, an associated problem of "sound deadening" had arisen. In their present form, each room was in effect an echo chamber, obviously making it almost impossible to conduct instruction therein; but funds were not available for total acoustical treatment of both buildings. Under the circumstances it was decided to rig target

cloth around the walls and, perhaps, on the ceiling to absorb the ricocheting sound waves, if additional funds could not be secured.

The facility for housing the MB-7 flight simulator and the T-6 target trainer was expected to be ready on approximately 1 May 1962, while the delivery of the trainers themselves was currently scheduled for January and March 1962.

The armament and electronics building was approximately 30 per cent complete, with a BOD of April 1962.

The battery shop was under construction, and the BOD was set for 1 May 1962. Since the installation of equipment and check-out time would consume about two weeks, little time would be left for final preparation.[40]

The Problem of Jet Engine Noise.

The problem of aircraft noise which was expected to attend the arrival of F-105's on Okinawa was not new to the island, nor, for the matter of that, new to any place in the world situated near to an air base or a commercial airport. However, the problem was rendered more delicate on Okinawa than it was in many localities by the basically hostile attitude of the greater part of the populace.

That the problem was not peculiar to the F-105 had been demonstrated on a number of occasions in recent months. On 10 June 1961, for example, a flight of jet aircraft which took off from Naha Air Base repeatedly roared over adjacent sections of Naha City for some eight hours, flying so low, according to complaining citizens, that one "could see the pilot's face." The window panes of private homes were rattled, and the teachers of the Oroku Junior High School and the Takara Elementary School

found it practically impossible to conduct classes. Principal Itosu of the former school was so indignant at the violent disturbance which continued so long that he had the noise tape-recorded, with the idea of having the officials of GRI's Education Department listen and, being convinced of the unendurable volume of the sound by the evidence of their own ears, "file a strong protest with the military authorities."[41]

On 7 August 1961, one Shintaro Arasaki of Naha City had complained in the Dokusha no Shucho ("People's Voice) column of the Okinawa Times that the noise of the U.S. military jets which flew over almost every day not only disturbed book reading and the enjoyment of radio programs, but also irritated the people's nerves. Moreover, the belief apparently held by the U.S. Forces that Ryukyuans would live contentedly and happily under military rule if material benefits were bestowed upon them under the banner of "American-Ryukyuan friendship" was not based on reality. For, declared Arasaki, "Fruitful results can be attained only when consideration is also given to the mental aspect." The insensibility of the American military, which failed "to give consideration to the disturbance of the citizens' livelihood," inevitably gave rise to sentiment against military bases.[42]

Arasaki's letter had been followed the very next day by another from a Naha housewife, Masako Jo, who voiced her annoyance at having been awakened by low-flying jet aircraft at 0500 hours for the past three mornings. Were these flights over heavily-populated Naha City really necessary? If not, why couldn't the Air Force authorities change the track, so as to take the thundering jets out over the sea? Also,

harking back to the promise made by the U.S. military in the wake of the Ishikawa jet crash tragedy of 30 June 1959 that no flights would be made over land except when absolutely necessary and unavoidable, Mrs. Jo demanded to know whether the Air Force intended to observe the safety measures so readily agreed to at that time.[43]

On August 9th the Okinawa Times reported that aircraft noises had disturbed the city from morning until night the previous day, causing a restaurant operator in the Namino-Ue area to exclaim that "The noises which begin as early as 5 a.m. are driving me mad." Among others who complained about the constant flights were firemen of the Naha Fire Station, who declared that they could not even hear telephone conversations, and asked if some corrective measures might not be taken.

By this time the tide of resentment on the part of the Naha citizenry had attained such proportions that the 313th Air Division Information Officer, Lieut. Colonel Henry A. McPhillips, could ignore the issue no longer, much as he was inclined to. The upshot was an official statement that "The Air Force is exercising caution not to make low-altitude flights over residential areas, and this warning is observed faithfully. This measure is designed to minimize damages as much as possible, in the event of an accident."

His avowal of the Air Force's innocence came rather late, however, for it had already been learned that it was the Navy which was to blame for the quotidian shattering of the people's repose. Informed of its culpability in the matter, the Naha Naval Air Facility announced that the flight path would be changed forthwith.[44]

Thus far, the subject of aircraft noise has been concerned with Naha City and jets in flight out of Naha Air Base. On 16 August 1961, however, the Ryukyu Shimpo carried an article from its Kadena Village correspondent, describing the annoyance caused people of that locality by the Kadena AB jet engine test stand. Whenever an engine was run-up, the windowpanes of nearby buildings rattled, and it became impossible to understand a person only some three feet away. Formerly, the tremendous roar of the jet engines being run-up had disturbed the adjacent classrooms of the Kadena Village schools to such an extent that the teachers often had to suspend classes until the noise had died down. The complaints made through the Kadena Ryukyuan-American Friendship Committee had resulted in the test cell blocks' being moved in February 1961 from the part of the airfield just across the highway from Kadena Village to an area near Highway No. 1 opposite no inhabited area.

After being relocated, the Test Cell Section of the 18th Field Maintenance Squadron had attached sound suppressors to the J-57 jet engines of the F-100 aircraft tested in the test cell blocks. This projected operation had been delayed by a water shortage on Okinawa which directly affected any utilization of the suppressors, since they required more than 500 gallons of water per minute. It had been anticipated, however, that once the suppressors were installed, "sleep and work [would] no longer be interrupted."

Sixty engines were tested each month by the Test Cell Section, each engine requiring approximately three to four hours to check out. After the engine was pulled from its aircraft, it was loaded on a dolly,

hauled to the test cell area, set in the test cell dolly, and readied for testing. A series of gruelling tests was then initiated, such as checking the degree of vibration and thrust of the engine, evaluating the performance of generator and emergency systems, and general trouble shooting.

The test control building itself was a remarkable piece of construction, designed to contain the ear-splitting roar from the jet engine. Built with two sets of walls, one filled with sand and the other with fiberglas, it was regarded as "an effective barrier to sound."[45]

Now, however, the jet engine thunder was again pealing so loudly that the people of Kadena suspected that the test stand might have been moved back to the vicinity of the village. (In this suspicion they were justified by the facts, as will be shown hereafter.) Furthermore, the hours chosen for the nerve-racking engine testing appeared to have been selected with a perverse desire to disturb everyone's sleep as much as possible; for it was now conducted between 2300 and 0200 hours nightly! According to the Ryukyu Shimpo's Kadena reporter, the sleep of the Kadena citizens had been shattered so frequently and so violently that the victims had, in at least some cases, fallen "into a neurotic state."

Deputy Mayor Shimabukuro of Kadena-Son told the reporter that the problem had been presented to the High Commissioner through the Okinawa Shi-Cho-Son Mayors' Association and the district school board, but the reply received could assuredly not be described as satisfactory. Nevertheless, he still hoped that appropriate measures would be adopted "by taking the feeling of the inhabitants into consideration."[46]

By the end of August the outcry emanating from Kadena Village against the jet engine noise had reached such proportions that it almost rivaled the latter in volume! In hopes of stilling the clamor, Colonel George B. Simler, the 6313th Air Base Wing Commander, and his Deputy, Colonel Charles H. Pierce, accepted an invitation to attend a meeting of the Ryukyuan-American Community Relations Committee in the Kadena-Son Assembly Hall on the 31st. Although other topics may have been discussed, the subject on everyone's mind was that of aircraft engine noise.

The Ryukyuan side pointed out that the jet plane noise, bad enough at any time, had become considerably worse of late, with landings and takeoffs occurring with noticeably greater frequency. Even more disturbing was the increased tempo of engine testing. They pointed out that whenever trouble broke out at some place in the world, it was reflected in a greater frequency in the occurrence of aircraft noise at Kadena AB. Following this train of reasoning, the local officials believed that the recent increase in aircraft disturbance had some connection with the crisis in Berlin. Moreover, the people reported that the number of aircraft had also increased rapidly.

More specifically, the Ryukyuan representatives present declared that the aircraft disturbances interrupted classroom routine on the average of four or five times every day, without fail, and were so loud that, although the roar itself lasted only a couple of minutes, the pupils were so stunned by the noise and accompanying vibration that another five minutes were required to recover from their shock.

However, the Okinawans in attendance at the meeting made it plain

that the problem was not confined to the schools; for the greater part of the Kadena populace were regularly disturbed by the roaring jets--especially during the night, when they were sleeping.[47]

A writer in the Daigen Shogen column of the Okinawa Times noted on 23 September 1961 that in metropolitan areas people were liable to be subjected to the sounds of the horns and engines of automobiles, to public address systems employed for advertizing or political purposes, and to other raucous sounds. And it was for the purpose of protecting the people from such noises that "control laws" were enacted and enforced. Nevertheless, such legislation was helpless against the loudest and most damaging of all noises--the roar of jet aircraft. He then went on to say that "Teachers often tell us that their pupils are getting used to them, but the damage done to mental and physical well-being is invisible and is cumulative, we feel. Such invisible damage to mental and physical well-being is more dreadful than that which is visible. Such effects are a subject with which modern science will have to learn to deal."

The contributor to the Daigen Shogen column went on to note that in Japan, where a similar problem beset the people, the Self-Defense Force was reported to be increasing the allocation of funds for dealing with aircraft noise from a figure of 700,000,000 yen ($1,944,444) for the current year to one of 2,400,000,000 yen ($6,666,666) for the following year, as a result of the assignment of F-104 jet fighters. With this appropriation the Japan Self-Defense Force would install such sound-proof facilities as double window panes for nearby schools, hospitals, and other critical buildings in the areas most affected.

As for Okinawa, the people there possessed "an absolute right" to claim compensation for whatever damage was done to them and must be conscious of such rights.[48]

The figures mentioned as allocated for sound-proofing by the Japan Self-Defense Force are quite handsome, and indicate a surprising liberality on the part of the government. However, another source cited a figure of 200,000,000 yen ($555,555).

In Japan 70 decibels was considered to be the minimum figure for purposes of consideration. The Self-Defense Force stated that schools whose classes were disturbed by a volume of 70 decibels oftener than 10 times in one class hour or by a noise of over 90 decibels more often than 10 times during a school day should be fitted with sound-proofing devices. A total of 229 Japanese schools met these criteria.

The school most sorely affected by aircraft noise was the Michi Elementary School, located near Komaki AB in Aichi Prefecture, where the F-86D's produced a volume of 100 decibels of sound. While not quite so badly off as Michi, other schools which recorded aircraft noises in excess of 85 decibels were the Aoba Elementary School, near Chitose AB, Hokkaido; the Oguchi Minami Elementary School, adjacent to Misawa AB, also in Hokkaido; and the Consolidated Junior High School, near Hamamatsu AB, Shizuoka Prefecture.

This same source noted that with the 200 million yen the Japanese Government had begun installing sound-proofing devices at 20 schools, and planned to do the same at 40 more which had been disturbed by a noise volume of more than 80 decibels during the Fiscal Year 1962.

These latter schools were located in Itazuke, Fukuoka Prefecture; Yokota, Saitama Prefecture; Iwakuni, Hiroshima Prefecture; and Atsugi, Kanagawa Prefecture. Furthermore, as more funds became available in the future, the government planned to install similar devices at the hospitals and kindergartens in the same areas.

On Okinawa approximately 30 per cent of the schools--i.e., 90 facilities--were allegedly disturbed by military-originated noises, in consequence of which the authorities complained that classwork was falling behind schedule because of the loss of stability and the feeling of anxiety engendered in the pupils. Although jet aircraft--either taking off or undergoing engine testing--were the worst offenders by far, helicopters, large trucks, Nike missiles, and heavy artillery could by no means be exculpated.[49]

From 18 through 29 September 1961, the Military Requisitioned Land Federation, headed by Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) Legislator Choko Kuwae, conducted extensive tests to measure and determine the effects of jet aircraft noise on classes in the Kadena Junior High School. This institution, a two-story concrete structure, was situated about 800 yards from the Kadena flight line and only some 180 yards from the airfield perimeter fence. Selected for the tests were the first-year students who attended classes in a room on the second floor of the school from the first hour in the morning through the sixth and last period in the afternoon. The tests were conducted daily except for Sunday and were based on the readings provided by a BTC audiometer. In addition, all sounds were tape-recorded.

As a result, it was found that 70-decibel noises intruded as often as 15 times in an hour in some instances, while noises in the 80-90-decibel range were dominant during the test. When aircraft noises reached 85 decibels, the voice of the teacher became almost inaudible, and at 95 decibels it could not be heard at all. During these moments of maximum noise intensity, teacher and pupils could "only stare at each other silently."

Even when the noise was not this loud, the teachers were compelled to conduct their classes in a near-shouting voice--a condition little calculated to assist their instruction or to relax the pupils.

The purpose behind all this tedious testing was to establish scientifically and beyond the possibility of cavil that the schools adjacent to U.S. air bases on Okinawa were being disturbed to such an extent that the military could not honestly deny the need for soundproofing measures at the schools themselves, in addition to sound-suppressing devices for jet engine test cells. And, of course, it would be the responsibility of the military to subsidize these very expensive alterations. Chairman Kuwae told reporters in this connection that

> In Japan compensation is paid on the basis of scientific data, and I would like for it to be materialized here at any cost. I asked the School Facility Section of the Education Department, GRI, to make an estimate of the cost to build, let us say, double window panes, as sound-proofing devices. With this estimate, we will decide the amount of claim to be asked. I am going to present the estimate before the U.S.-Ryukyuan Land Advisory Committee meeting which will be held in November.[50]

About this time the Okinawa Times commented editorially on the subject of aircraft noise and its elimination as a disturbing factor. Admittedly, the deafening sound of aircraft was "a necessary evil . . .

ordained by fate," and it was, of course impossible to eliminate the roaring sound itself. However, the problem had been palliated in Japan by the installation of sound-proof facilities in the schools and hospitals situated near air bases. In Okinawa, on the other hand, there was no instance where compensation had been paid for the damage caused by the noise of jet planes. This, suggested the Times, may have been a result of "the weak-kneed attitude" with which negotiations concerning the payment of compensation had been conducted by GRI officials with the U.S. authorities.

Now that the energetic, even aggressive, Military Requisitioned Land Federation had taken up the cudgel on behalf of the long-suffering schools, there was hope that something tangible would materialize in the near future. After all, said the writer, there could be little argument as to the deleterious effects of the jet engines. Therefore, there should be no long, involved negotiations, as had been the case with the problems of requisitioned land and spoliation of the fishing grounds by military maneuvers and construction. In fact, the problem should be remedied in short order, provided "the American authorities concerned should have the will to pay compensation."[51]

Meantime, on 1 October 1961 the White House had announced that a U.S. Government survey team would arrive in Okinawa on the 5th "to review the major economic and social welfare problems facing the people of the Ryukyus." The major objective of this mission, to be headed by Mr. Carl Kaysen, a member of the President's White House Staff, would be to gather information needed in the formulation of U.S. policies and

programs which would more effectively improve the island's living conditions.*

This survey, which the High Commissioner had been urging, was in consonance with the United States Government's policy which had been reaffirmed the previous summer, following a top-level conference between Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda of Japan and President John F. Kennedy. At the conclusion of that meeting, a joint communique had been issued, stating that "The President affirmed that the United States would make further efforts to enhance the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts. The Prime Minister affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end."

On the afternoon of 19 October, L. Albert Wilson, representing the Agency for International Development on the Kaysen survey team, visited the Kadena Elementary School to conduct a personal investigation of the noises caused by military planes. Voluntarily sharing with him the ordeal by jet were 25 other American and Ryukyuan officials, including Bonner M. Crawford, Director of USCAR's Education Department; all the members of the GRI Legislature's Education and Social Affairs Committee; Business Manager Seiei Kyan of the Okinawa Teachers Association, a staunch adversary of the United States and all its works, including the Civil

*The other members of the survey group were Mr. John H. Kaufmann, an economist and consultant to the chairman; Brigadier General Benjamin F. Evans, Jr., of the Department of the Army; Mr. Kingdon W. Swayne, of the Department of State; Mr. L. Albert Wilson, of the Agency for International Development; Mr. James D. Hoover, of the Department of Labor; Colonel Edward G. Allen, of the Department of the Army; and Lieutenant Colonel John D. Sitterson, also of the Department of the Army.

Administration of the Ryukyus; Mayor Shunsho Irei of Kadena-Son; School Superintendent Inamine of the Central Okinawa Union School District; and Kadena School Board Chairman Ikehara.

A teacher of the school named Miyagi, who had been in charge of recording and measuring the volume of the aircraft noises, answered Mr. Wilson's questions, for the most part. Even as he and other school authorities were plaintively describing the conditions which conspired to make life intolerable and proper instruction impossible, the roar of jet aircraft taking off interrupted them several times. In fact, before they concluded their appeal, the audiometer, which Legislator Kuwae had helped the school obtain, had recorded noises of more than 80 phons* for jet planes 11 times and for propeller-driven aircraft six times.

Although he probably required no verbal convincing, Wilson was informed by Miyagi that any noises measuring over 80 phons completely interrupted the classes, and then four or five minutes more went by before they could be resumed. In consequence of the frequent interruptions, the teachers found it necessary to repeat class work, and this situation in turn fatigued the instructors and caused the pupils to "lose their self-possession." Curiously, too, it had been found that the sound of aircraft taking off in a southerly direction was worse than that of those taking off in a northerly direction. He then played the tape-recording of the noise to show the average duration of noises.

Miyagi explained that, although the recordings of aircraft noise

*A "phon" is the unit of loudness level of a sound, defined as numerically equal to the sound pressure level in decibels, relative to 0.0002 microbar, of a simple tone of frequency 1,000 cycles per second which is judged by the listeners to be equivalent in loudness. (International Dictionary of Physics and Electronics.)

had been made during the hours in which the children were in school--i.e., from 0800 to 1600 hours--the even more unnerving noise of jet engines being tested was sometimes heard between the hours of 1900 and 2300, and, occasionally, even at 0200 in the morning. This deafening, head-splitting roar sometimes lasted as long as 15 minutes without surcease.

To a query by Mr. Wilson as to how long the aircraft noises had been plaguing the Kadena Elementary School, Chairman Ikehara of the Kadena School Board responded that they had been a problem since 1956 or 1957. Furthermore, as a result of a request by the Kadena-Son P.T.A. and son officials that Kadena Air Base move the engine testing stand from its location near the village, the test control building had been reinstalled on the other side of the base, near the sea. However, the test cell had been moved back near Kadena Village recently, and the noises had acquired their former violence. It was bad enough that the residents were now disturbed in their sleep and that the character of children "still at the growing stage" might be affected deleteriously, but even more atrocious was its traumatic effect on local livestock. In the case of a certain family living hard by the school, it had been found that the chickens laid fewer eggs when the noises became very loud. And, Ikehara hastened to say, he was much concerned about how the din would affect people.

Mr. Crawford, the USCAR Education Department Director, wanted to know how many schools were affected by the noise problem. Kunihiro Ohama, the OLDP Legislator representing the 28th Electoral District (Ishigaki Jima and Yonaguni Jima in the Yaeyama Island Group), took it

upon himself to provide the answer, evidently having primed himself on the subject beforehand. A total of 90 schools had been disturbed by one form of military-generated noise or another. In Kin-Son, for example, the Kin Primary and Junior High Schools and the Nakagawa Primary School had been bothered by the roar of guns and bombs emanating from the Camp Hansen Firing Range. Thus, it was clear that a school did not have to be situated adjacent to an air base to find itself hampered in its work by military activity.

An assistant to the Legislators produced clippings from Japanese newspapers to describe the experiments in sound-proofing already carried out in that country. It had been found that a double wall inside the classrooms of a wooden building could reduce the volume of sound by as much as 15 to 20 phons, while a similar double wall installed in the classrooms of a concrete building could reduce it an almost complete amount, so that the sound was scarcely audible. For the maximum effect, the walls should be installed parallel to the runway, and any rooms so reinforced against the sound waves would have to be air-conditioned, since there would no longer be any windows to admit fresh air.

The Okinawan side probably suspected that Mr. Wilson had by now been persuaded by both the evidence they had presented and that of his own ears that something needed to be done about the aircraft noise problem. However, to clinch the point, Principal Owan handed him six of the 58 compositions beseeching the United States to put an end to the disturbing of their classes which the teachers had foresightedly had the sixth graders write in anticipation of his visit.

Before departing, Wilson remarked that the problem of aircraft noise

was not peculiar to Okinawa, nor was it confined to military aircraft; for in many localities of the world civilian aircraft offended, as well. In West Chicago, where he lived, in fact, approximately 200 aircraft took off daily from a nearby airport. Even so, the fact that the problem was a familiar one did not mean that any handy panacea had been found, though he did make it plain that he "grasped the real situation" on Okinawa and desired "to strive for the settlement of the trouble." Having once been a teacher himself, he could sympathize with the plight of the instructors in the two affected Kadena schools. But it was obvious to all concerned that more than sympathy and understanding would be needed to bring peace and quiet to Okinawa's "halls of ivy!"[52]

On 3 January 1962, Captain Price, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's Conversion Project Officer, wrote Headquarters, Fifth Air Force that notwithstanding the fact that the F-100's assigned to the wing had long caused a problem of noise for Kadena AB and the contiguous inhabited areas, there was no plan in hand for supplying sound suppressors for the much higher-powered and noisier F-105's scheduled for arrival. The areas of major importance affected by the high noise levels were

> Security--Emergency contact between security guards, or between security guards and command post via radio communication was virtually impossible during trim pad operation. This created a weak link in the security of the strike force aircraft. Voice communications being disrupted caused unnecessary time-consuming procedures in personnel identification.
>
> The command and response method used during nuclear weapon loading was directed by Fifth Air Force, and could not be used due to extreme noise levels in this area. Many loadings, actual and practice, were temporarily suspended before completion, due to the inability of the crews to understand each other when aircraft were being run up on the trim pad. To insure load crew proficiency, practice loadings must be conducted at all hours, both

daylight and darkness. Maintenance scheduling of alert force aircraft required reconfiguration of weapons load. Such weapons loading must be accomplished as rapidly as possible to maintain the required combat posture. Postponement of weapons loading during engine trimming operations was not feasible.

C-130 'High Gear' loading was also located within the strike force area and was faced with the same problem of extreme noise saturation. Voice communication was impossible, causing an undesirable delay in loading, resulting in degradation of strike force capabilities.

Quick Strike crew quarters were highly vulnerable to extreme noise saturation, due to their location down wind from the trim pad. The winds were predominant from the NE on Okinawa, and noise levels within the Alert Quarters precluded adequate sleep and rest for alert aircrews.

Technical instruction in the Field Training Detachment (FTD) was brought to a standstill whenever an aircraft was operated on the trim pad. Instructors could not be heard, student attention was lost, and class learning was severely hampered. Class schedules were tight, and delays in the course would not provide fully trained personnel within required time limits.

Trim pad location coupled with the predominant north easternly [sic] winds caused high noise levels in virtually every maintenance shop or area, administrative office, and all of the flight line. Maximum decibel readings from 98 to 100 had been recorded in maintenance areas during trim pad operations.

Readings of 100 decibels were frequent in the flight line fire station. Crews were on duty 24 hours per day and slept in the fire station quarters. Such noise levels disturbed sleeping, and in the opinion of medical personnel contributed greatly to overall audio-medical effects causing nervousness and tension.

From past experience with the F-100, 18th TFW officials knew that trim pad operations were required 24 hours per day for that aircraft, and maintenance figures obtained from bases already equipped with the F-105 revealed that engine trimming requirements for the Thunderchief were comparable to those for the Supersabre.[53]

Captain Price went on to say that relocation of the engine trim pad was not considered feasible, notwithstanding its obvious desirability.

When it had been relocated on previous occasions, efficient maintenance became impossible, as the extreme distances involved in moving aircraft to the trim pad from the maintenance areas had resulted in a waste of man-hours and damage to engine bearings, seals, and the like from being towed.

In the light of these facts, the F-105D Conversion Project Officer asked that Fifth Air Force consider the assignment of sound suppressors to Kadena AB for use with the F-105, since such devices would materially alleviate noise conditions at the trim pad.[54]

To leap ahead of our story a bit, subsequent to the arrival of the first F-105's at Kadena, a self-propelling sound suppressor manufactured by the Air Logistic Corporation of Pasadena, California, was received as a part of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's AGE inventory. The very first time it was employed at the test cell section, however, the screens intended to contain the jet engine's roar burst under the terrific pressure of the J-75's power. Local maintenance personnel replaced the shattered screens with new and stronger ones of local manufacture, but as soon as the suppressor was again attached to an F-105 engine, they gave way like so much tissue paper.

With this second failure, the 18th Wing abandoned the unequal struggle, at least for the time being. It is worthy of note, however, that even if the Air Logistic Corporation's sound suppressor had proved an unqualified success, it is not at all certain that it could have been utilized indefinitely in the days that lay ahead. An important ingredient of the device's operation was a constant and heavy flow of

water, which vanished as rapidly as it was introduced, in the form of steam. The latter half of 1962 had already begun to see the early stages of the unprecedented drouth that was to make the entire year 1963 an unpleasantly memorable one in the history of Okinawa. Thus, it is unlikely that the large-scale waste of precious water which operation of the sound suppressor entailed would long have been permitted. Even noise would be preferable to thirst.

The Republic Aviation Corporation, manufacturers of the F-105, had produced an elaborate sound suppressor resembling a small building for use at their own Farmingdale, Long Island, airfield, and for somewhat more than $3,000,000 they were willing to sell a similar model to the Air Force. The latter, however, much as it desired a device which would effectively conquer the noisy enemy, lost most of its enthusiasm upon reading the price tag.[55]

The last word on the subject, as this was being written, was that a jet noise suppressor for the J-75 engine test cell in the form of a fixed installation costing approximately $400,000 was being requested in the FY-1965 Military Construction Program. Only time would tell whether or not higher headquarters would approve the expenditure.[56]

Current planning by higher headquarters did not provide for the furnishing of sound suppressors for Kadena AB. Consequently, the 18th began to press PACAF and Fifth Air Force to change the base assignment of the three sound suppressors assigned PACAF to include Kadena.

Information received from Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) and higher headquarters still contained a delivery date of October 1962

for the 18th's jet engine test stand. However, AFLC added that it was attempting to obtain earlier delivery or the reassignment of a test unit from ZI sources to Kadena.

Thirty-two technical representatives, Captain Price went on to say in his letter of 20 December 1961, would be assigned to Kadena to support the F-105D weapons system in accordance with the following schedule:

| SPECIALTY | SOURCE | QUANTITY | DATE OF ARRIVAL |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electronics Systems | RAC | 1 | Jun 62 |
| Airplane General | RAC | 1 | May 62 |
| APG | RAC | 1 | Jun 62 |
| APG (Structures) | RAC | 1 | Mar 62 |
| APG (Hydraulics) | RAC | 1 | Jun 62 |
| APG (Armament) | RAC | 1 | Mar 62 |
| APG (Electrical & Instruments) | RAC | 1 | Mar 62 |
| APG (AGE) | RAC | 1 | Dec 61 (on site now) |
| Supply | RAC | 1 | Jan 62 |
| AN/ASQ 37 (CIN) | RAC | 1 | Mar 62 |
| AN/ASQ 37 (CIN) | Collins | 1 | May 62 |
| APN-131 (Doppler) | LFE | 3 | Mar, May, Jun 62 |
| Auto Pilot | GE | 2 | Apr, May 62 |
| Engine | P&W | 2 | Mar, May 62 |
| Fire Control (General) | RAC | 3 | Mar, May, Jun 62 |
| CADC | Eclipse-Pioneer | 1 | Apr 62 |
| GAM-83 Missile | Martin | 1 | Apr 62 |
| R-14 Radar | NAA | 3 | Mar, May, Jun 62 |
| TBC & Sight Head | GE | 3 | Mar, May, Jun 62 |
| Trainers | ACF | 1 | Apr 62 |

Three additional personnel--one each in PMEL, armament, and electrical and instruments--had been requested but were not yet approved.

Finally, there would be an extreme shortage of maintenance personnel during the conversion period as a result of the heavy FTD training schedule and an almost double workload brought about by the wing's flying both F-100 and F-105 aircraft during this period. Some personnel would perforce be involuntarily extended during this period; however,

very few, if any, extensions would exceed a 90-day period.[57]

Scheduled for attendance at the first Nellis AFB F-105 class affecting the 18th TFW, beginning 2 April 1962, would be, among others, Colonel George B. Simler, Commander of the 18th TFW, Major Dean E. Salmeier, Chief of the 18th Tactical Evaluation Section, Lieut. Colonel Floyd White, Commander of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, and Lieut. Colonel John C. Neill, the scheduled replacement for Lieut. Colonel Frank M. Haynie as Commander of the 67th TFS (actually, the plans were changed upon the former's arrival from the ZI, and he was made Assistant Director of Operations, 18th TFW). Subsequent classes would follow on 30 April, 28 May, 25 June, 23 July, and 27 August 1962.[58]

In January 1962 this headquarters was informed that the tempo of delivery for the F-105's had been accelerated, so that the first 40 aircraft would be received in May, June, and July that same year. Thus, if this schedule were adhered to, there would be no problem in connection with the planes themselves. However, despite strenuous efforts to remedy the situation, the old problems of serious delays in the construction of electrical power buildings, engine shops, and calibration shelters continued to plague the conversion program.[59]

Another action of January 1962 saw the 18th requesting Fifth Air Force for the reassignment of certain contingency requirements from its squadrons to other Fifth Air Force units during the conversion period. The wing specifically requested that the following changes become effective on 1 April: (1) reduction of the 18th TFW requirement under the 25-series plan to 18 F-100 aircraft; (2) cancellation of all 18th TFW F-100 aircraft

requirements under the 32-series plan. At the same time, no change in the 18th's reconnaissance responsibilities was sought.

This request failed to bear the fruit hoped of it. Fifth Air Force did make some changes in the 18th's contingency requirements, but in no case was it entirely exempted from participation in one of the plans.[60]

A Radar Prediction Branch was formed in the 18th Wing's Intelligence Division during January 1962 and was rapidly manned at its full strength of three officers and five airmen as graduates of a special course of instruction at Nellis AFB were received. The purpose of this branch was to maintain and modify, as required, the relief maps (RIMS) for the MB-7 flight simulator and the T-6 target intelligence trainer, to operate the T-6 trainer, and to conduct radar prediction and training in connection with Combat Mission Folder preparation and study. One officer was later transferred to Fifth Air Force Headquarters, but the vacancy could not be filled, since the Fuchu headquarters was also using the vacancy to fill their requirement for a staff officer with prediction training.

The building to house the MB-7 and the T-6 was completed during the first half of 1962, enabling the two pieces of equipment to be installed. However, word was finally received in June that the first Radar Intelligence Maps (RIMS) would not be delivered until late in August. Since the trainers were ready for a check-out, the Radar Prediction Branch immediately began construction of a small RIM, using local materials and improvised methods.[61]

## AUGMENTATION OF THE 18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING DURING CONVERSION

PACAF advised this headquarters in February 1962 that one F-105B

squadron, complete with flyaway kits, would be deployed to Kadena AB from May 1962 until January 1963 by the Tactical Air Command (TAC) as an augmentation to maintain the single integrated operational plan (SIOP) posture of the 18th TFW and the 8th TFW (assigned to Itazuke AB, Japan) during the period of their conversion from F-100D's to F-105D's. Then, in January 1963, this TAC F-105B squadron would be replaced by an F-105D squadron at Itazuke until June of the same year. This was a change from the original plan, which had called for one F-105 squadron to be based at Kadena AB and a second one at Itazuke AB throughout the entire conversion operation. Under this new arrangement, though, only one squadron would be available.

Upon receipt of this intelligence, PACAF requested TAC to furnish 313th with the following planning information:

(1) The date the F-105B unit would deploy to Kadena AB, and the date this squadron would be re-equipped with F-105D model aircraft.

(2) The unit designation, type, and number of the aircraft involved.

(3) The support required from PACAF during the flight from the ZI to Okinawa.

(4) Would the squadron be equipped with complete flyaway kits?

(5) The number of spare engines to be provided by TAC.

(6) The level of spares to be airlifted with the unit.

(7) The material support required from PACAF while the unit was in place at Kadena AB.

(8) The status of organizational, field maintenance, and armament and electronics (A&E) equipment.

Besides these questions, PACAF requested that TAC Manuals 400-1 and 400-2 be provided for the F-105 aircraft. Additionally, the Hickam headquarters advised TAC that the interim squadron must deploy with all necessary field and organizational maintenance personnel, as well as tools and equipment peculiar to the aircraft employed.

At such time as the deployment directive should be issued, PACAF recommended that a team from the squadron which was to be deployed to Kadena should meet with Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division at Kadena AB to refine the support requirements.[62]

On 14 March 1962, PACAF informed Air Force Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, that the proposed concept for TAC augmentation of PACAF for a 14-month period called for the 306th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), of the 31st TFW, from George AFB, California, to deploy to Kadena AB on 24 April 1962, with an in-place date of 1 May. The present intention was for the 306th to remain at Kadena through December 1962, then move to Itazuke AB in January 1963 for augmentation of the 8th TFW. The squadron would deploy with 18 F-100D/F aircraft, which were to remain at Kadena for the full period, though other squadrons would supply personnel only at 3-1/2-month intervals. The route to be taken by the 306th TFS would be via Route 50 to Hickam AFB, where they would remain overnight, then continue on the same route to Andersen AFB, Guam, for another overnight stop, thence onward via Route 52 to Kadena.

Headquarters, Fifth Air Force was to furnish PACAF not later than

23 March 1962 a list of equipment in TAC Manual 400-2 by stock number, nomenclature, and quantity which it would not be necessary to deploy with the rotational squadron. TAC and 306th TFS representatives would then meet with Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division at Kadena to resolve the question of materiel support.[63]

Up to this point all of the planning for the augmentation of the 18th and 8th Tactical Fighter Wings by the loan of rotational F-105 or F-100 squadrons from the ZI had been predicated on the assumption that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would acquiesce in such deployment. On 16 March 1962, however, the JCS approval was made official by a TWX to CINC Strike Force directing that one tactical fighter squadron be released to Headquarters, USAF for further assignment to Pacific Command (PACOM). The Air Force Chief of Staff was simultaneously instructed to "take immediate action required to augment PACOM forces by one rotational tactical fighter squadron."[64]

With plans changing almost as fast as they were formulated, this headquarters was informed in late March 1962 that the TAC squadron to be brought into Kadena to reinforce the base offensive capabilities during conversion to the F-105D would comprise 227 personnel--27 more than were normally deployed as a Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) package. The reasoning behind this augmentation of the unit was that the additional personnel would insure adequate manning to accomplish the assigned mission, even though it might not function with optimum efficiency, this being the first rotational fighter unit loaned to PACAF. If no changes in the plans occurred, the 306th TFS would take

off from the ZI on or about 23 April and arrive at Kadena around 1 May 1962.[65]

An advance notice of a formal change to the Fifth Air Force Contingency War Plans was received by 313th on 15 March 1962. In addition to relieving the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB of responsibility for peacetime deployment to the three contingency areas and concentrating its efforts on the defense of Okinawa, this change similarly relieved the 18th TFW of responsibility for F-100 deployment to the same three contingency areas. (The 18th TFW would, however, continue to furnish F-100 aircraft for operations from Kadena itself, as specified in 5AF OPLAN 25-61.) These reservations, insofar as the 18th was concerned, did not represent permanent Mobile Strike Force changes, but were simply measures necessitated by the forthcoming conversion to F-105 aircraft.[66]

In the event, the 306th TFS took off from its home base at George AFB on 24 April 1962, and the last contingent put down at Kadena on 4 May. Here it quickly became fully operational and fulfilled its portion of the wing combat mission throughout the remainder of the time it remained on Okinawa. The 18th, incidentally, had to furnish movement control teams to Wake Island and Andersen AFB on 18 April to assist the aircraft of the 306th in their transit of the broad Pacific.[67]

On 16 May 1962, USAF advised PACAF that it had established a priority for the delivery of F-105D aircraft in accordance with which USAFE would receive its planes first, PACAF second, and TAC third. The impact on the F-100 IRAN (Inspection and Repair As Necessary) program and the subsequent return of F-100's to TAC, in consequence

of the delay of F-105 deliveries, was appreciated. Nevertheless, until the Republic Aviation Corporation (RAC) strike, which had commenced on 1 April, was ended and a definite flow of F-105's from the assembly line could be assured, USAF found it impossible to provide additional guidance on the schedule of the F-100 IRAN program. Moreover, USAF could not, on its own responsibility, furnish the additional F-100 rotational squadron sought by the Hickam headquarters. Such a request would have to be channeled through CINCPAC, CINSTRIKE, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Informal inquiries made of TAC had, however, indicated that that command was unable to support an additional rotational squadron for PACAF.[68]

On 5 June Fifth Air Force recommended to PACAF that the TAC F-100 rotational squadron be redeployed to Itazuke AB as soon as the 18th TFW had its full complement of authorized F-105 aircraft and was capable of assuming operational commitments. PACAF answered on June 15th that it concurred with this suggestion.[69]

In relaying this plan to TAC, the Hickam headquarters ticked off several benefits which would accrue from such a move. For one, it would eliminate the F-100 assets at Kadena and permit the 18th to concentrate on the F-105 program. For another, it should insure better maintenance and supply support for the TAC rotational squadron. Thirdly, it would allow the TAC squadron to take over a portion of the 8th TFW's targets without the necessity of a revision of the present and planned SIOP coverage. And, finally, it would facilitate coordination between the TAC rotational squadron and the 8th TFW. The date of this redeployment to Itazuke was unknown at that time, but it would be possible to

8th TFW at Itazuke AB, and two from Fifth Air Force Headquarters departed Yokota AB, Japan, for Headquarters, USAFE, to observe F-105 operations and maintenance activities. The team personnel were to gather on-the-spot data which would reduce anticipated conversion problems in the PACAF theater.

In preparation for the new weapons system, meanwhile, the Maintenance Division of the 18th Materiel Directorate devoted a total of 17,967 man-hours to formal classroom training during the month of April alone. At the same time, a course for supervisors was started. All instructors completed the first class, and 20 top-level supervisors were entered in the second.

Although the 18th Maintenance Complex was 90 to 96 per cent manned--well above the Air Force level--during the first half of 1962, the skill level remained quite unsatisfactory, with far too many three-level airmen, possessing no previous experience on aircraft, being assigned. This resulted in an unusually heavy training load and a continuing requirement for constant close supervision. However, the imminent change in the weapon system gave the complex an excellent opportunity to increase the skills of all personnel, and, be it said, maximum utilization was made of this opportunity.

Field Training Detachment 911A became operational in February 1962 and immediately began classes on the F-105. By the end of March, one-third of the maintenance personnel were engaged in some type of training for the new aircraft.[75]

PACAF advised this headquarters in May that the best estimate of the date for potential delivery of the first increment of F-105D

in the program commenced in February, and by the end of June all personnel intended for duty with the new aircraft had received training on the systems and components of the F-105D. The first 11 pilots departed for F-105 training at Nellis AFB on 10 April, and large numbers of pilots left every fortnight thereafter. Transfers of unit aircraft also began in March, leaving the 18th short of F-100D's by the end of June, even with the augmentation provided by the 306th TFS.

Since the first increment of pilots for the training program was from the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, that organization was relieved of all training requirements in March 1962. The first class to complete the F-105 training at Nellis AFB returned to Kadena on 12 June. Among the graduates of the course was Colonel George B. Simler, who assumed the duties of Commander of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on the 19th of that month. However, the wing had received none of its F-105's at the half-year mark.[73]

Headquarters, PACAF sent off a TWX to USAF in April 1962, seeking "firm guidance" from the latter on F-105 conversion planning information. The major subjects brought up were the strike at Republic Aviation Corporation, F-105/F-100 aircrew upgrading and retention, F-105/F-100 maintenance support, the flying hour program, the CTS program, and the F-100 IRAN schedule.

It was learned in April that the GAM-83 pilot trainer (#6) was enroute to Kadena AB from the ZI. This information was received without undue perturbation, since the facilities for installation of the trailer were already set up and in readiness for the new equipment.[74]

On 25 May 1962, three officers from the 18th TFW, three from the

8th TFW at Itazuke AB, and two from Fifth Air Force Headquarters departed Yokota AB, Japan, for Headquarters, USAFE to observe F-105 operations and maintenance activities. The team were to gather on-the-spot data which would reduce anticipated conversion problems in the PACAF theater.

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PACAF advised this headquarters in May that the best estimate of the date for potential delivery of the first increment of F-105D

aircraft--in view of the indefinite strike then tying up production at RAC--was 25 in July 1962.[76]

The following month, PACAF notified Fifth Air Force that the TAC rotational squadron at Kadena (it chanced to be the 306th TFS at the time this message was sent) was to move to Itazuke AB whenever the 18th TFW had on hand its full complement of authorized F-105D aircraft and was capable of assuming operational commitments.[77]

TAC complained to PACAF in June that several students of Class 62-L had reported to Nellis AFB without benefit of previous completion of the F-105 Field Training Detachment (FTD) course, even though this was supposed to be a prerequisite to matriculation at the Nevada school. In consequence of their lack of preparation, these students had required special handling.

PACAF responded to this complaint by admonishing Fifth Air Force and the two wings concerned that all future students were to have completed an F-105D FTD aircrew familiarization course before attending the 111506E course. If this were not possible or practical, then the students without without such training should report three training days before the starting date of the course for this purpose and have their orders annotated accordingly.[78]

TAC's protest appeared reasonable enough, and one can hardly find fault with PACAF's support of it. Nevertheless, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing declined to take the implied criticism lying down. On the contrary, on 26 June 1962 they notified PACAF that the class completion rosters maintained at the 911A FTD at Kadena AB showed that every 18th Wing pilot

who had reported to Nellis for Training Course 111506E in Class 62-L had actually completed the Kadena F-105D FTD aircrew familiarization course before departing Kadena on 9 May 1962. Then followed a subtly sarcastic thrust--though it may have been entirely unintentional and even unconscious--in the form of a promise that the 18th "will continue to insure that all organizational pilots have completed the local F-105D familiarization course prior to reporting to Nellis for Training Course 111506E." The 18th further recommended that Headquarters, USAF be advised to have any pipeline personnel report to Nellis three days early, so that they might receive the MTD training at that base.[79]

In passing this information on to TAC, PACAF added that all of the students in Class 62-L were from PACAF, with the exception of one CONUS pipeline student, Major Dennis J. Clark, who was scheduled for duty with the 18th TFW upon graduation. Moreover, all pipeline pilots in the ZI whose orders called for assignment to the 18th or 8th Tactical Fighter Wings, but who were not yet in training at Nellis, had been advised of this requirement, and all future assignment instructions issued by PACAF would contain specific reference to FTD training.[80]

The conversion program was dealt another body blow in June 1962. On the 19th of that month, two 18th pilots in F-105 training at Nellis AFB--Captain Douglas D. Brenner and First Lieutenant Emil E. Cwach--were forced to eject from their aircraft. Approximately half of the 44th and 67th TFS pilots, as well as 18 of the 12th TFS, were attending the Nellis school at the time, and the class had completed more than 50 per cent of the check-out. The next day, all operational F-105's were

grounded as a safety precaution. This was followed on 29 June by an agreement of the conferees at a USAF meeting that no aircraft of the F-105 type should be delivered to the units to which they were to be assigned until all "fly safe" measures had been taken. As a corollary to this action, PACAF advised that the pilots previously sent to the ZI for F-105 training were to be returned to Kadena until the problem of the grounded aircraft was resolved.[81]

On 3 July 1962, PACAF informed Fifth Air Force that it had been learned from TAC and Headquarters, USAF that F-105 Class 63B would be held in abeyance until the present grounding order was rescinded. As for Classes 62L and 63A, which were already in session, the former was two training weeks behind schedule and the latter one week behind. Under the circumstances, the orders for the trainees attending these classes should be extended "for at least 30 days." Any pilots hitherto intended for Class 63B, which had been scheduled to start on 11 July, were now not to depart for Nellis until further notice from PACAF. As for anything definite, all the Hickam headquarters could promise was that it would forward any additional information "as soon as it becomes available."[82]

Eight days later, PACAF notified Fifth Air Force, as well as this headquarters, and the 18th Wing, that it was contemplating the immediate return of PACAF pilots attending Class 63A to their home bases because of the indefinite F-105 grounding and the "extremely limited flight training" these people had thus far received. In any case, these students could be returned to Nellis on two weeks' notice. Any comments the three subordinate headquarters might have were solicited.[83]

At the same time, PACAF requested TAC to furnish an estimate of the date flight training could be resumed, in order that it might weigh the advisability of recalling the pilot students in Class 62L, who were farther advanced in their F-105 training than were those in Class 63A.[84]

Fifth Air Force responded to the PACAF message on July 11th by requesting the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB to furnish its comments on the immediate return to the 18th TFW of the pilots attending Class 63A at Nellis AFB. Not that Fifth would wish to influence the reply of the 6313th, but the latter was advised in the same TWX that "we strongly concur with PACAF proposal . . ." With respect to Class 62-L, the Fuchu headquarters would await TAC's estimate as to when the flight training program could be resumed.[85]

Although Fifth's query of 12 July had, for some inexplicable reason, been addressed to the 6313th Air Base Wing, it was the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (an information addressee for the same message) which supplied the desired comment. On 16 July the latter recommended that Class 63A be returned to Kadena as soon as possible, but that Class 62L remain at Nellis until the re-evaluation of the current F-105 grounding scheduled for 21 July had been completed. As soon as the results of the studies of that date were known, the 18th desired to make a further recommendation regarding Class 62L.[86] In conveying these recommendations to PACAF, Fifth expressed its concurrence with their tenor.[87]

On 19 July PACAF informed the 4520th CCR Training Wing at Nellis AFB that since it was now reported that the TAC restriction on the flight of F-105 aircraft would not be lifted until approximately 30 November 1962, it was arranging to return the PACAF students of Classes

62L and 63A to their home stations.[88] Actually, as it turned out, the delay was not quite so long as expected, and it was possible for a group of 18th pilots to resume training at Nellis AFB on 14 November 1962.[89]

Meanwhile, satisfactory progress had been made throughout the first six months of 1962 in the receipt, storage, and monitoring of the F-105 AFSD (Air Force Shipping Directive) equipment. As of 30 June, the CME (Controlled Mission Equipment) was 87.5 per cent and the non-CME 74.4 per cent on hand, with shortages being closely monitored to insure the timely receipt of required items. While these percentages were considered satisfactory, officials placed emphasis on insuring that shortages did not fall within the category where they could have an adverse effect upon the support of the F-105D aircraft. As a result, the F-105D monitor began to prepare a list of shortages to the AFSC which were to be given special attention.[90]

Because the initial contribution of pilots to the F-105 training program was from the 67th TFS, the Mobile Strike Force commitment was transferred to the 44th TFS on 13 March. About half of the 12th TFS pilots departed for Nellis AFB on 2 June, and all but four or five of the remainder were scheduled to follow on 3 July. As a result of these and similar losses on the part of the other two squadrons, all remaining wing pilots were temporarily pooled into a single operational unit for scheduling purposes at the end of May.

In April all aircraft of the three tactical fighter squadrons were consolidated in the 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron (Provisional), and thereafter records on the time and number of sorties were

maintained by that organization.

The transfer of F-100 aircraft to other PACAF organizations made it quite difficult for the pilots left at Kadena to get in their flying time. The difficulty was overcome in part by having the Wing Operations assign the available aircraft equitably throughout the organization, but flaws inevitably developed in the system. Particularly noteworthy among these abrasive factors was the annoying frequency with which aircraft were assigned to sorties, although the same aircraft had previously been declared out of commission. Though this situation was obviously the result of a simple communications problem between the 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron (Provisional) and Wing Scheduling, it occurred alarmingly often, frequently producing sympathetic aborts which resulted from low experience levels on the part of the wingmen.[91]

The kaleidoscopic conversion schedule shifted once more in August 1962 with an announcement by PACAF that the first four F-105D's would arrive in September, the next 12 in October, 14 more in November, and an additional 17 in December.[92]

However, when September rolled round, the familiar refrain of manana (or perhaps it should be ashita, that being the Japanese word for "tomorrow") was heard again in the land. This time the substance of the information vouchsafed by PACAF was that the first Thunderchiefs would not be delivered until October. Local officials may be pardoned if by now they began to regard the F-105D's as a mirage which would always retreat from the attempted approach![93]

Nevertheless, the inevitable could not be postponed forever, and at last, on 30 October 1962, the first three-plane increment of F-105D

aircraft landed at Kadena Air Base, the pilot of the lead plane, yclept The Irish Rose, being Colonel George B. Simler, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander. (The other two pilots in this pioneering flight were Captain Martin M. Mahrt and Captain Lloyd J. Anders, Jr., both of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron.) As the new aircraft approached Kadena Airfield, they were met and escorted by four-ship flights of F-100's, RF-101's, and F-102's (the last from Naha AB). Colonel Simler's plane was parked with its nose between the lines of air police and Ryukyuan guards, while the aircraft piloted by Captains Mahrt and Anders were drawn up on either side. Following brief speeches by Major General Robert M. Stillman, the 313th Air Division Commander, and Colonel Simler, the spectators were allowed to inspect the long-awaited aircraft.[94] Thereafter the 18th was supposed to receive four F-105D's each week, until a total of 75 had been delivered by the second week of March 1963.

In order to insure smooth conversion to the new aircraft and the earliest possible operationally-ready status, Colonel Simler initiated a time-phased conversion plan as part of the over-all conversion project. This time-phased plan specified times when each action had to be completed in order to meet the desired readiness date, and also provided for the listing of problem areas and actions required to solve the problems.

The aircraft utilization factors contained in 5AF PP 62-P-2 (18th Tactical Fighter Wing Conversion Plan) were used to compute the flying hours available by month as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| November | 63 hours |
| December: | 232 hours |
| January: | 464 hours |

| | |
|---|---|
| February: | 716 hours |
| March: | 1,024 hours |
| April: | 1,315 hours |
| May: | 1,450 hours |

The number of aircrews available at Kadena for F-105D flying training was predicated on the past and future completion dates of the F-105 Operational Training Course, minus those aircrews involved in ferrying aircraft from the ZI to Kadena. The number forecast to be available by month was as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| November: | 24 aircrews |
| December: | 35 aircrews |
| January: | 43 aircrews |
| February: | 61 aircrews |
| March: | 75 aircrews |
| April: | 89 aircrews |
| May: | 103 aircrews |

Before entering into the alert ready flying phase, the 18th had to have sufficient flying hours available to provide each aircrew 15 hours of flying time per month. This meant that the number of aircrews beginning the flying program would be determined by the forecast monthly flying hours as indicated above. The number of aircrews forecast to commence the flying training phase was as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| November: | 4 aircrews |
| December: | 15 aircrews |
| January: | 31 aircrews |
| February: | 47 aircrews |

March: 61 aircrews

April: 76 aircrews

May: 90 aircrews

The forecast number of aircrews who would complete the alert-ready and operationally-ready flying training phases, would qualify in accordance with AFR 55-25 and AFR 55-89, and would fly a minimum of 15 hours per month was as follows:

| | ALERT READY | OPERATIONALLY READY |
|---|---|---|
| December: | 4 aircrews | |
| January: | 15 aircrews | 4 aircrews |
| February: | 31 aircrews | 15 aircrews |
| March: | 47 aircrews | 31 aircrews |
| April: | 61 aircrews | 47 aircrews |
| May: | 76 aircrews | 61 aircrews |

With all the foregoing considerations in mind, Colonel Jones E. Bolt, the 18th TFW Director of Operations, estimated that the wing operational readiness date would be 20 May 1963.[95]

Before entering the alert-ready flying training program, each aircrew had to be current in the Thunderchief and have completed the F-105D Operational Training Course. The flying training program for this phase consisted of six sorties involving approximately 12:30 flying hours. Certain events, such as day refueling, might be considered optional if the aircrew ferried an aircraft from the ZI. Also, any event completed successfully while the pilot was in training at Nellis AFB could be considered as fulfilling the minimum requirements for alert-ready status. Qualification in the weapon delivery modes of visual laydown, retarded

time pull-up, and BIP (Blind Identification Point) was mandatory.

Aircrews would be expected to complete the alert-ready flying training phase prior to their entry into the operationally-ready flying training program. However, this requirement was not mandatory and would depend on gunnery range availability and other operational considerations.

The operationally-ready phase consisted of six sorties comprising approximately 8:30 flying hours. Any events accomplished and scores recorded at Nellis could be used to satisfy the minimum established requirements for becoming operationally ready. However, qualification in conventional delivery in accordance with AFR 55-89 was mandatory.

In order to be certified as operationally ready, each aircrew also had to complete satisfactorily various ground training requirements set forth in AFM 51-105. Some of these would be completed on a one-time basis, such as water survival and theater bomb commander school; some would be on a continuing basis, such as the MB-7 Flight Simulator and the GAM-83 Trainer; and others would be on an aircrew proficiency basis.

Approximately 15 hours of training per aircrew were required in the MB-7 flight simulator, including NASARR (North American Search and Ranging Radar) familiarization, ground map/doppler familiarization, ground map/contour map/terrain avaoidance plus weapon delivery, and radar target identification plus weapon delivery. The T-6 Radar Intelligence Trainer would augment the radar prediction portion of the training.

In connection with the GAM-83 Trainer, each aircrew was required to complete 150 runs. Sufficient trainer time was available for the satisfaction of this requirement.

In the matter of weapons, all aircrews were required to attend the PACAF Bomb Commander School upon their initial assignment to the theater. Subsequently, a local bomb commander refresher course had to be conducted and each aircrew re-certified every six months. The first class was to begin in January 1963; thereafter, the course would be conducted once a month.

Each aircrew was required to spend two hours each month in target route study.[96]

The installation of radar reflectors for use in blind delivery modes was to be completed by 16 November 1962, a total of 24 reflectors having been contracted for by the Base Civil Engineer. Foundations for the first 12 reflectors had been laid at the Ie Shima Range, eight being located at the target center of the special weapons target and four adjacent to the conventional target. Final installation would satisfactorily accommodate both blind and visual delivery under the laydown and TIP (Target Identification Point) methods.

The Ie Shima Range did not provide an adequate capability for VIP (Visual Identification Point) and BIP (Blind Identification Point) deliveries, the selected IP's (Identification Points) being either too close or too far away. R-174 (Irisuna Jima Air Range) was considered the best alternative, using Tonaki Jima as the IP. Since Tonaki was a natural identification point, the 12 remaining reflectors would not be installed there, but would serve as replacements for those located on Ie Shima.

The existing bombing patterns were satisfactory for visual bombing only; hence, they had either to be amplified or new patterns devised to

incorporate the blind delivery capability of the F-105.

Upon receipt of the GAM-83, the aircrews would be expected to qualify by a live firing of this missile. This meant that a range must be established and range procedures devised to accommodate this training. The estimated completion date for this was 1 March 1963.

A problem which would have to be solved had to do with the maintenance of security during GWP simulator missions. In order for a pilot to utilize the MB-7 simulator to its full capacity, he must perform his entire GWP mission, including flying the prescribed routes, utilizing doppler and radar, and terminating with a radar run-in and weapon delivery. However, for him to fly this type of profile would require the use of target folders. The security classification of the folders would restrict admittance within the area of the simulator to those personnel who were not only properly cleared but who also had a "need to know." It could be expected that this dilemma would be solved by 10 January 1963.[97]

The assumption of F-105 targets would be based on the receipt of this type aircraft and the number of alert-ready bomb commanders gained each month. The tentative date for assuming the first F-105 target was 7 January 1963. From this time forward, F-105 targets would be picked up until July, when the end position was attained. The phase-out of F-100 targets would parallel the monthly increases in F-105 targets. The rotational squadron on loan from TAC would be responsible for six alert and six non-alert targets until its departure, scheduled for around 1 May 1963.

| | F-105 TARGETS | F-100 TARGETS | TAC SQDN TARGETS |
|---|---|---|---|
| November: | 0/0/0 | 12/6/5 | 6/0/6 |

| | F-105 TARGETS | F-100 TARGETS | TAC SQDN TARGETS |
|---|---|---|---|
| December: | 0/0/0 | 12/6/5 | 6/0/6 |
| January: | 2/2/0 | 10/4/5 | 6/0/6 |
| February: | 5/6/3 | 6/0/2 | 6/0/6 |
| March: | 10/6/5 | 2/0/0 | 6/0/6 |
| April: | 12/6/5 | 0/0/0 | 6/0/6 |
| May: | 18/6/11 | | |
| June: | 18/6/21 | | |
| July: | 18/6/31 | | |

The new armament and electronics building #733 was, unfortunately, constructed for an antiquated aircraft system. The electrical power installed in the structure included 440-volt, 60-cycle, 3-phase, and 220-volt, 60-cycle, single-phase. The former would be used to run the MC-1A motor generator, which in turn would generate both 28-volt DC power and 400-cycle, 115-volt, three-phase power for the new ASG-19 fire control and doppler benches. The power room designated for the MC-1A generator had only one 440-volt outlet, with a working output capacity of 100 amperes. The output panels were set up for only one MC-1A generator. The weapon system support in the building would require approximately 299 amperes of 400-cycle and 358 amperes of 28-volt DC power. Since load factors were computed with all systems and equipment operating, the present requirement for power outlets to operate MC-1A generators in the power utility room could accommodate only two units. The Base Civil Engineer was apprised of this situation and promised to take "immediate action to increase the capabilities."

Another shortcoming associated with Building #733, though not an

intrinsic part of it, was the absence of a road leading from the structure to the flight line, despite its having been designed for the armament and electronics maintenance of assigned aircraft. The Chief of Maintenance submitted a letter to the Base Civil Engineer on 23 October 1962 requesting that such a road be constructed.

A 3,080-square-foot addition to the Precision Measuring Laboratory was under construction in November 1962, and, although it ran slightly behind schedule, by 1 April 1963 it was complete except for air-conditioning and tile. The contractor was installing a 40-ton air-conditioner at that time and would lay the tile immediately after, with a new target date of 15 April 1963 replacing the old, unattainable BOD of 1 January 1963.

Plans for an addition to Building #870 (the communications/navigation shop) had long since been approved, and the 6313th Base Engineer had been advised that funds would be forthcoming. Before any contracts could be let, however, the Defense Department-wide program for halting the outflow of gold had caused all funds to be frozen. As of 5 November 1962, they were still not available. As a result, it could be anticipated that approximately one more year would pass before Building #870 would actually be ready for use.

Originally, on the basis of information furnished by Republic Aviation Corporation concerning the requirements for fire control system (FCS) maintenance on the F-105, the 18th TFW calculated that it would need approximately eight FCS calibration shelters. In the resulting programming, Phase I was designed to provide four aircraft spaces in temporary shelters, because of the lack of sufficient lead time for

permanent construction. Phase II was programmed in the FY-63 military construction program (MCP) for six permanent aircraft spaces which would, in time, replace the interim shelters.

The 18th's purpose in programming in this fashion was "to respect the financial outlay" and, at the same time, protected by the existence of the temporary shelters on hand, be in a position to augment the permanent shelters as required. At such time as the actual requirements were revealed through experience, additions could be made in an orderly programming fashion. The cost of this project was estimated at $343,000 and would provide 23,800 square feet.

Upon submission of the FCS project to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for approval, however, it was returned, drastically cut to 6,300 square feet, only enough space to shelter two aircraft while they were undergoing maintenance. Thus, although the 18th had a total of six aircraft spaces in November 1961, with temporary shelters comprising four of the number, it appeared that the efforts to economize in this direction had backfired to the point where the 18th would "be unable to support the F-105 from the standpoint of fire control system maintenance."

In desperation, therefore, Colonel Francis S. Gabreski, the 18th Commander at the time, wrote the 313th Air Division to apprise them of this "serious deficiency" in the program and ask the latter's assistance through command channels in obtaining restoration of the original program. In conclusion, he said, "Inasmuch as the time element is now insufficient to meet the FY-63 MCP approval requirements, in my opinion our only recourse is the 341 program or a request for emergency funding."[98]

An increment of four docks was in the FY-1965 MCP in support of

the F-105D, while two additional docks were included in the FY-1965 MCP in support of programmed replacement aircraft for the RF-101C. MCAMA had provided six Butler type docks, and PACAF had directed their erection on an expedited basis. By 5 November 1962 these shelters were sitting in a dismantled condition at Kadena, and local officials were only awaiting the citing of funds to push their erection. As it was, the 18th's only radar calibration shelters as of that date were four steel-frame, canvas-covered docks, which would have to be evacuated during rainy weather.

Maintenance officials were concerned with the high maintenance costs that would be associated with the Butler-type structures, since they were of all-steel construction, and the corrosive atmosphere of Okinawa was such that they would require constant maintenance. An additional four concrete-type shelters would be included in the FY-1966 MCP to replace the temporary Butler shelters, making a total of 10 permanent docks in place.

On 3 December 1962, Fifth Air Force queried both the 18th and 8th Tactical Fighter Wings as to whether or not they had received the six radar calibration shelters which Republic Aviation Corporation was supposed to purchase for each of them.[99]

The 18th Wing replied two days later that all six shelters had indeed been received at Kadena, but that the cost of erecting them was so great that it would require approval of the Department of Defense. And, as a matter of fact, the requisite programming documents had been forwarded to Fifth on 26 November.[100] Besides needing immediate approval for erection of the six Butler-type shelters, the 18th urgently desired

recognition of its eventual requirement for 10 permanent docks constructed of concrete.

Two of the Butler-type radar calibration shelters were actually ready for occupancy on 1 April 1963, and target dates were established for two additional ones to be ready on 15 April, with the final pair to be completed on the 30th. The 8th TFW was to use the first two at Itazuke AB, Japan, as the integrated acceptance check maintenance area.[101]

All the problems besetting the 18th Wing were not related to materiel, however. On 4 December 1962, the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB, which was responsible for the personnel aspect of the 18th's operations, radioed PACAF to request that the latter review the records of personnel arriving in the theater, with a view to programming men qualified in the F-105 to Kadena.

The planning information originally received had indicated that 105-qualified personnel would be provided in the AFSC's 301X0, 201X1, 422X1, 423X0, 32290, 42190, 421X2, 421X3, 423X3A, 43190, 431X1C, 432X0, and 462X0. As it turned out, though, the only men with 105 qualifications that had been received were cadre personnel, and the slippage of the F-105 program resulting from the RAC strike and the grounding of all aircraft for safety modifications had created a critical manning situation. The non-cadre personnel were sent through the F-105 FTD training, but some of them were due to rotate to the ZI during 1963, and qualified F-105 personnel were not being programmed as replacements. Because of the necessity of maintaining an operational capability, the 18th was unable to send incoming personnel through the F-105 FTD training.

The 6313th believed that the problem could be solved if Card Column 7 under the 6-AF-P6 System were coded "F" and qualified F-105 personnel applied against these allocations. Additionally, the air base wing requested that the records of men reporting for duty with other PACAF units be screened, and that those personnel found to be qualified in the F-105 be diverted to Kadena. Without citing the source of its information, the 6313th noted that an AlC Ernest H. Baker and two other F-105-qualified airmen were currently assigned to the 3d Bomb Wing at Yokota AB, Japan (which was equipped with B-57 aircraft), while some six or eight other men were programmed for the same organization. The seriousness with which the 6313th and 18th Wings looked upon the problem is indicated by the concluding comment that "Failure to program qualified personnel will result in loss of operational capability."[102]

Apparently no action on the part of PACAF followed on the heels of this plea for assistance; for on 15 December the 6313th ABW notified both PACAF and Fifth Air Force that the former's "failure to provide F-105-qualified personnel as originally planned has placed this base in an untenable position which will progressively deteriorate if projected inputs are not F-105-qualified." Since the 6313th did not feel that "the scope and magnitude" of the problem could be adequately described in correspondence, the wing Director of Personnel requested that representatives from the Maintenance and Personnel Directorates of both PACAF and Fifth visit Kadena immediately, so that the problem could be reviewed and a plan of action completed.

As examples of the untrained personnel being received, the 6313th cited 17 301X0's due in through April 1963, of whom two were "F" prefixed;

six 42lX2's due in February and March, with none "F" prefixed; and 126 431X1C's due in through April 1963, of whom none carried the "F" prefix. In fact, the only "F" prefixed personnel currently projected to arrive were two 30170's due in April 1963. The training load involved in converting the personnel already on board was "far greater than normally experienced," so that this additional training burden was beyond the 6313th's capability. Besides, supervisory personnel were not available in sufficient numbers to conduct training or render proper supervision. Even with adequate supervisors, in fact, the wing could not accept all untrained personnel unless overmanning were established to permit performance of the primary mission at the same time that the new arrivals were being trained.[103]

The response from PACAF was reasonably prompt, but not calculated to afford much comfort to the beleaguered wings at Kadena. On 18 December, PACAF advised that a study of the records at that headquarters indicated that the total number of F-105-qualified and trained airmen had been provided as programmed. The catch, though, was that "some skill level substitutions were made . . . . in accordance with Air Force-wide averages," as Headquarters, USAF explained it. No specific guidance concerning a subsequent assignment of "F" prefix personnel had been provided by USAF, but a review of the Air Force program indicated that PACAF might expect a "very limited" receipt of F-105-trained airmen within the next year. The majority of the new assignees would almost certainly be unqualified in the F-105.

With respect to the 6313th's request that extra personnel be assigned to the 18th, in order that the wing mission could be met at the same

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time that the new men were being trained, PACAF not unexpectedly answered that "Command resources will not permit over-manning, as manpower spares and personnel are not programmed for this purpose." Having thus parried the 6313th's first two desperate thrusts, the Hickam headquarters requested Fifth Air Force to evaluate the situation at Kadena and provide specific recommendations for the solution of the problems there.[104]

PROJECT "FLYING FISH"

General Plans.

Headquarters, USAF established Project PAF-2F-83--or "Flying Fish," to give its less mnemonic-racking appellation--for the purpose of delivering F-105D aircraft from the ZI to the bases in PACAF where these aircraft were to be employed. It was originally planned that aircraft participating in "Flying Fish" would fly non-stop from the Mobile Air Materiel Area (MOAMA) at Brookley AFB, Alabama, to Hickam AFB, Hawaii, by use of air refueling. After the pilots had rested at Hickam, the flight would continue non-stop to Andersen AFB, Guam, again employing air refueling. Here the pilots would pause for more rest before going on to their destinations at either Kadena or Itazuke Air Base. Experience having taught that, in addition to these two scheduled stepping stones, "fallout" bases should be selected beforehand for use in the event of an aircraft malfunction or deterioration in weather, MOAMA identified Nellis AFB, Nevada, and Wake Island for this purpose.

At each of the scheduled relay points and fallout stations (except Wake Island), servicing and maintenance support for the F-105D's would be provided in the following manner:

(SECRET)

Such aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and spare parts as were peculiar to the F-105 or were non-standard, and which were necessary to the continued movement of the aircraft, would be stockpiled at the above bases not otherwise having the ability to support F-105D aircraft on rest stops or fallouts. Equipment would be required for servicing the aircraft with fuel and liquid oxygen (LOX), and spares would be needed to replace tires, wheels, brakes, and drag chutes.

Twelve skilled maintenance technicians would be stationed at Hickam and eight at Andersen to augment the base maintenance forces, remaining at these places throughout the delivery period to trouble-shoot and perform routine maintenance on the F-105D's passing through.

MONA (Colonel Ernest W. Pate, Chief of the F-105 Weapon/Support Systems Management Division in the MOAMA Materiel Directorate) would deploy in advance at each of the scheduled enroute bases the required peculiar and non-standard AGE necessary to isolate major aircraft system malfunctions of the F-105D. This flight line test equipment would be of the "go-no go" type for each major aircraft system which conceivably might cause an in-flight abort. The MOAMA maintenance technicians waiting there for that specific purpose would use this equipment to trouble-shoot the malfunctioning system.

MOAMA would also provide specialist teams which, together with the necessary spares and test equipment to correct the malfunction, would be airlifted to the enroute or fallout base requesting their services within 18 hours after receipt of the request. However, the team would not depart until it was assured that the essential AGE and spares were already available or would be on hand when the team arrived.

The scheduled enroute and fallout bases were to provide common and standard AGE to perform servicing and maintenance. In the event a "Flying Fish" F-105 was forced by aircraft malfunction or bad weather to land at Wake Atoll, the requisite personnel, spare parts, and AGE would promptly be airlifted from either Hickam AFB or Andersen AFB to place it back in a flyable status.

The over-all responsibility for both the preparation of operations plans and the delivery of the F-105D aircraft to PACAF was assigned to TAC and the task organizations listed in TAC OPLAN 12-60 of 1 November 1960.

The MOAMA F-105 Weapons System Monitor (WSM) would be responsible for preparing the aircraft for flight delivery, providing maintenance enroute, and furnishing materiel support in accordance with AFR 65-47 and AFLCR 66-11. Aircraft spares to bolster this project would be provided by an enroute support kit as determined by Colonel Pate and TAC. Kits were also to be prepositioned at each enroute base, in accordance with AFR 65-47; however, the enroute and fallout bases would both be expected to provide whatever transient aircraft maintenance and supply support were necessary for the "Flying Fish" aircraft.

Three spare J-75-19W engines were to be built up to support the project, two of these being stored at Hickam and the third retained at MOAMA.

The 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group would notify MONA, PACAF, and the enroute and fallout stations of the progress of each F-105D being ferried to Okinawa or Japan, giving the serial number of the plane and the time and date of the various arrivals and departures.

All AGE and materiel deployed at the scheduled enroute and fallout bases by the F-105 WSM were to be returned to MOAMA upon completion of the delivery project, when directed by the MOAMA supply representative.[105]

The Question of Using Nellis Graduates in the F-105D Ferrying Project.

Almost every conceivable question and problem that might arise in ferrying the new F-105D's to Kadena and Itazuke had been anticipated in MOAMA's "Flying Fish" Plan. Nevertheless, it had dealt with the matter of pilots for the aircraft in only the most general terms, leaving unsettled the question of where they would come from. Since this subject could not be left in limbo indefinitely and the time was rapidly approaching when the first F-105D's would be coming off the Republic Aircraft assembly line and processed for the flight across the Pacific, it was obvious that a decision must be made without undue delay.

On 5 June 1962, Colonel Ernest W. Pate, Chief of the F-105 Weapon/Support Systems Management Division, MOAMA, wired PACAF a preliminary query as to the latter's attitude toward the use of PACAF crews in ferrying the new Thunderchiefs from Republic Aviation Corporation to the Mobile Air Materiel Area at Brookley AFB, Alabama.[106]

PACAF held off an answer to Pate's question until the views of Fifth Air Force, as a level of command more intimately affected by the request, could be ascertained.[107]

The Fuchu headquarters radioed PACAF on 14 June that it did not object to the proposal for having Fifth Air Force pilots ferry F-105's from Farmingdale, L. I., to MOAMA, "provided that this procedure will accelerate delivery of aircraft to PACAF and that the TDY period is not extensively extended for 5AF pilots." This latter qualification was

important, because the pilots needed to return to their units at an early date after graduation from the Nellis school, in order to complete the home station training necessary for the attainment of an operationally-ready status.[108]

Before PACAF could make a decision on the basis of Fifth Air Force's stand, a second TWX came in from MOAMA on 19 June furnishing details of Colonel Pate's concept for the utilization of F-105 graduates from Nellis. To begin with, the services of these PACAF F-105 pilots was desired only for the period of time between their graduation and the scheduled departure of Flying Fish aircraft from Brookley AFB. In the case of a typical graduation class of 16 pilots, the first four would be scheduled immediately for Flying Fish duty. The second four would be utilized for delivery of aircraft from Republic to Brookley for a week or less. The third four would be utilized for two weeks, and the last four would be employed for three weeks. Orders placing the pilots on further TDY from Brookley AFB to Republic Aviation Corporation and return would be issued by MOAMA, with the funds coming from the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group.

In order to utilize PACAF pilots in this wise, the PACAF TDY orders issued the pilots should be amended to authorize MOAMA to place them on further TDY to Republic for delivery of the aircraft to Brookley. Experience with F-105 crews from USAFE had shown that approximately 50 per cent of those graduating from Nellis took leave enroute to Brookley, thus arriving three to five days prior to their scheduled departure. The remaining 50 per cent had reported directly to Brookley and were utilized in delivering aircraft from Republic while awaiting the scheduled delivery mission.

Colonel Pate assumed that a similar number of PACAF pilots would desire leave enroute from Nellis to Brookley; therefore, MOAMA would adopt the following procedure for requesting crews from Nellis: Approximately two weeks before graduation, MOAMA would advise the Nellis school secretary of the Flying Fish schedule for that class. The senior PACAF officer in the class would assign the pilots by name to fill the flights, authorizing leave as desired to those pilots whose Flying Fish mission was two to four weeks after graduation. Any officers not desiring leave would proceed directly to Brookley AFB, and those not scheduled for current Flying Fish missions would be utilized to deliver aircraft from Republic to Brookley. In no case would such shuttle flights from RAC to Brookley AFB be permitted to delay a Flying Fish flight.[109]

PACAF informed Fifth Air Force on 26 June that it intended to concur with the MOAMA plan. However, the Brookley headquarters would not be advised of this acquiescence until Fifth Air Force had had an opportunity to comment on the ability of the 18th and 8th Tactical Fighter Wings to support the proposal.[110]

Rather sensibly, Fifth Air Force recognized that no one should be able to comment as intelligently on the capabilities of the 18th and 8th Tactical Fighter Wings as the wings themselves; therefore, both were requested in a radiogram of 27 June to submit their views.[111]

Two days later, on June 29th, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing notified Fifth Air Force of its concurrence with the concept of using wing pilots for the delivery of F-105D's from Republic Aviation Corporation to Brookley AFB, Alabama, provided there was "no extensive delay of pilots in the ZI." Owing to the present and projected shortage of combat crews during the conversion period, as well as the uncertainty of the

F-105 production schedule, it was "imperative that pilots completing F-105 training be returned to [the 18th] with minimum delay." Thus, any delay enroute following completion of the Nellis course would not be authorized. Under the circumstances, the 18th recommended that the pilots completing the training course be utilized for ferry duty from RAC to Brookley AFB only if their scheduled departure for PACAF as Flying Fish participants fell within two weeks of the completion date of the training course. Such pilots as would be required for Flying Fish departures more than two weeks following a class completion date would be provided by the 18th TFW.

This plan should provide sufficient pilots for ferry duty from RAC to Brookley--the more easily, as some could make two or more trips--and return the 18th's pilots to Kadena without undue delay.[112]

On 26 June 1962, PACAF was advised by USAF that F-105 delivery to this theater would be in accordance with the following schedule:

| | |
|---|---|
| July: | 2 |
| August: | 3 |
| September: | 20 |
| October: | 21 |
| November: | 20 |
| December: | 15 |
| January: | 10 |
| February: | 10 |
| March: | 10 |
| April: | 10 |

May: 10

June: 10

July: 10

August: 10

September: 4

The delivery of aircraft to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Itazuke AB would commence in December 1962, when the 18th TFW had received its full complement of 75 F-105D's. The above schedule was premised on the assumption that the strike which then had the Republic Aircraft Corporation shut down would end during the Taft-Hartley Law compulsory 80-day "cooling off" period. However, just to be on the safe side, PACAF had requested USAF to furnish a second schedule based upon the assumption that the strike would be resumed after expiration of the 80-day period.

In addition, a meeting at which PACAF would be represented was to be held at USAF on 29 June 1962 to weigh the arguments for and against grounding the entire F-105 fleet to perform flight control and fuel chafing corrections. Obviously, the decisions reached at this meeting "could seriously affect USAF's projected schedule" detailed above. For the time being, until the course of the strike at TAC and the results of the USAF meeting were known, no reprogramming action would be taken.[113]

On 4 July 1962, PACAF had to notify Fifth Air Force that a recent decision to halt the acceptance of new production F-105D's until the specified technical orders (TO) and engineering change proposals (ECP) were complied with had invalidated the previously-announced delivery

schedules, according to USAF. Moreover, a new delivery schedule was not immediately available. All that could be said with any certainty was that the best estimates of the delivery schedule would "be forwarded as soon as possible."[114]

In a message of 11 July 1962 summarizing the status of the conversion program, PACAF informed Fifth that on 20 June TAC had grounded its F-105 fleet, primarily because of fuel/hydraulic line chafing and flight control problems. Furthermore, it recommended that the fleet remain grounded until a package modification program eliminating all known safety-of-flight hazards could be instituted.

As of 2 July, TAC was recommending that the package modifications program include the following 13 fixes:

(1) IF-105-747: Inspection and repair of chafing in the engine compartment (127 man-hours).

(2) IF-105-752: Inspection and repair of chafing in 12 critical areas (150 man-hours).

(3) IF-105-704: Complete inspection and repair of chafing throughout the entire aircraft (1,500-2,000 man-hours).

(4) IF-105-711: Installation of a hydraulic relief valve in the P1 and P2 flight control systems to prevent "stick lock" if the RAT selector valve were inadvertently placed in the intermediate position (10 man-hours).

(5) IF-105-670: Installation of a trailing edge flap safe position (118 man-hours).

(6) IF-105-685: Installation of a revised lateral control feel trim actuator and heat shield to prevent stick binding (5

man-hours).

(7) IF-105-664: Installation of a surge relief valve and redesigning of the air refueling manifold (man-hours unknown).

(8) ECP 30D.29: Installation of a redesigned control stick assembly to facilitate removal of the auto-pilot force switch (15 man-hours).

(9) ECP 80D.83: Installation of voltage limiting resistors in the speed brake in the afterburner circuitry (12 man-hours).

(10) ECP 60D.132: Installation of an additional safety feature in the speed brake/afterburner system to prevent closure of the speed brake by the open engine exhaust (35 man-hours).

(11) ECP XK1-8P: Installation of an improved gyro and monitoring circuit to prevent pitch transient when the auto-pilot system inadvertently disengaged (man-hours unknown).

(12) ECP 113938: A.B. fix (man-hours unknown).

(13) ECP 117693: A.B. fix (man-hours unknown).

PACAF went on, in its 11 July TWX, to tell Fifth that at the USAF world-wide F-105 meeting held on 29 June, it had concurred with TAC in the latter's grounding of the Thunderchiefs and had stated that "for the time being" it would not accept delivery until all of the foregoing modifications were made. Items 1 through 9 above already had been or would be completed on the PACAF aircraft prior to their release; hence, they would not affect the delivery schedule cited on 28 June. Because programming action had not been completed on items 10 through 13, delays in aircraft deliveries would be unavoidable should they be accomplished prior to release. Consequently, AFSC was conducting an evaluation to

determine which of the modifications would have a bearing on safety of flight. As a corollary to this evaluation, it would endeavor to expedite kit delivery and accomplishment of those modifications considered to be safety of flight. Once the study was completed, AFSC would present its recommendations to TAC and PACAF. Since this study was expected to be completed around 21 July 1962, it would be impossible to provide a reasonably firm delivery schedule until after that date.[115]

In November 1962, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing "urgently" requested Fifth Air Force to exercise its influence toward having a standby aerial tanker stationed at Kadena AB whenever "Flying Fish" F-105's were enroute from Guam to Okinawa. By the time the first seven F-105's arrived over the "high station"* at Kadena, their total remaining fuel had been less than 4,000 pounds. This was an amount entirely too small for safety, since polar front activity over Kadena in November and December was frequently known to create extreme ceiling and wind variations in short periods of time, and less than 4,000 pounds of fuel was insufficient to get the aircraft to an alternate field. Therefore, the 18th considered it "mandatory" that a standby tanker be made available during the time "Flying Fish" F-105's were inbound from Guam.

The notification for such an aerial tanker to depart for Kadena could be transmitted from Guam by the 4440th-11 Aircraft Delivery Group upon the arrival of a flight of F-105's at Andersen AFB for the regular 24-hour stopover. The tanker could then expect to remain at Kadena from Friday to Monday of each week.[116]

*"High station" was a term used in connection with jet operations denoting a point 20,000 feet over a radio fix and constituting the primary entry point to an instrument landing.

PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH F-105 NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND WEAPON DELIVERY

The problems connected with F-105 nuclear capability which the 18th TFW encountered in the process of conversion could be divided into two categories: internal configuration and external configuration.

As PACAF saw it, on 11 December 1962, the status of the internal configuration situation was as follows: In the matter of safety rules, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) interim safety rules had been forwarded to Fifth Air Force, 313th Air Division, and the 18th TFW on 23 November 1962. Respecting loading check lists, PACAF had been informed on 11 December by its representative at the Bitburg AB, Germany, F-105 loading conference that F-105 Block 25RA internal loading procedures were being airmailed to PACAF, Fifth, and the 18th. PACAF thereupon requested USAF for approval to use them as soon as they arrived.

As for test equipment, one RAC 901 tester was already on hand at Kadena AB, and an additional one was scheduled for shipment from RAC on 30 December 1962. Also, an AWM-13 tester was scheduled to be shipped by TEMCO on 10 December, and PACAF was trying to learn its estimated time of arrival (ETA). Although PACAF did not know the delivery schedule for additional AWM-13's, the contractor had promised that the complete shipment would be on its way to USAF users by 15 January 1963. In any event, the 18th TFW would not be able to use the AWM-13 testers until adapter kits currently being produced by Republic were received. RAC had promised that these adapter kits (the quantity unknown) would likewise be shipped not later than 15 January 1963. On 11 December the Hickam headquarters requested USAF to increase its supply priority for both the AWN-13 and adapter kits, as well as to increase the authorization

of the 18th TFW to 18 testers. This number would be needed to comply with the requirement for 18 simultaneous loadings which had been levied by both PACAF itself and USAF PS 64-4 (Green Dragon).

TAC, USAFE, and PACAF representatives at the Bitburg loading conference had developed single station loading procedures, using the GWM-4 tester; however, AFSWC had not indorsed the UE (unit equipment) of this tester, and USAF had requested AFSWC to validate and approve GWM-4 procedures. In the event these were approved, there were enough GWM-4 testers on hand to satisfy internal mass loading requirements.

On the basis of all these factors, PACAF concluded that the 18th TFW could "attain an internal ground alert capability during the latter part of December 1962." At the same time, PACAF realized that a mass loading capability was based upon the premise that AFSWC would approve the use of the GWM-4 tester in place of the RAC 901 tester. Should AFSWC not approve use of the GWM-4, then the F-105 nuclear mass loading capability of the 18th TFW in an internal configuration would perforce be delayed until receipt of AWM-13 and Republic adapter kits. It was further realized by PACAF that the turn-around capability of the 18th would be greatly impaired until such time as proper and adequate testing equipment was on hand and operational at Kadena AB.[117]

Apropos of the external configuration status, USAF Headquarters had informed PACAF that interim JCS safety rules for F-105 external configuration were awaiting approval of the Secretary of Defense, and that every effort was being made to expedite early approval of these rules. In worse case was the external loading check list, the status

of which was unknown as of 13 December 1962, though the PACAF representative to the F-105 loading conference at Bitburg was being queried as to its anticipated completion and/or USAF/AFSWC approval. This loading list should also be airmailed upon final approval. It was estimated that the JCS safety rules and check list would be available before mid-January 1963 at the latest. The same problems concerning test equipment which beset the conversion program under conditions of internal configuration were afflicting external configuration as well.

In conclusion, PACAF wanted it understood that it had approved the F-105 internal configuration only on an interim basis pending the 18th Wing's achieving the capability of employing an external configuration. This preference for the latter was based on a belief that an internal configuration did not "provide for the rapid turn-around of PACAF flyable alert F-105's nor the rapid uploading of PACAF F-105 non-alert aircraft in accordance with present generation rates." Consequently, PACAF would tolerate the SIOP degradation required by an internal configuration only as a temporary stopgap to allow the 18th to assume its SIOP commitment on the "C" schedule in accordance with the current and approved conversion program.[118]

Apparently in response to a request by the 313th Air Division Plans Branch for data on the conventional weapon capability of the F-105D, Lieut. Colonel Floyd White, the 18th TFW Director of Operations, provided a number of interesting facts to the former in a letter of 3 January 1963. Assuming a strength of 18 F-105's, one could expect 30 to 34 sorties per day to be flown for a short operational period of seven

to 10 days. However, in the case of extended operation of up to three months, the expectation would be 32 sorties per aircraft per month, according to the Wartime Planning Factors. This worked out to an average of 19 sorties per day for each of the 18 aircraft. After three months, the utilization rate would regress to 14 sorties per F-105 each month.

Another subject introduced was that of the radius of action of the F-105 when flying a "Hi-Lo-Hi" interdiction mission. Assuming that the aircraft configuration consisted of a bomb bay tank and four wing pylons, the latter could be loaded with a maximum of four 750-lb. bombs, or two 750-lb. bombs and two LAU 3/A rocket launchers, or two GAM-83's and two LAU 3/A rocket launchers, or two GAM-83's and two 750-lb. bombs. Since the gross weight and drag factors were approximately the same for each configuration, Colonel White assumed only one profile, while using 1,500 pounds of fuel as the minimum quantity over the recovery base. The radius of action was 332 nautical miles, with a flight time of one hour and 14 minutes.

A third subject analyzed by the 18th D/O was that of the radius of action for a close support mission. Assuming the configuration to be the same as that for the above interdiction mission, he planned the flight altitude for 10,000 feet to and from the target and introduced a loiter time of 30 minutes in the target area. The radius of action under these circumstances would be 125 nautical miles, with one hour and 12 minutes of flight time.

The F-105 could also be equipped with the multiple ejector rack (MER) on the inboard wing stations and the center line station. The

inboard wing MER was capable of carrying two rocket launchers, two 750-lb. bombs, or two fire bombs. The center line MER would carry two rocket launchers, six 750-lb. bombs, or three fire bombs. With the MER's installed, the radius of action was greatly decreased, owing to the increased drag. Colonel White added that cruise control data for MER configurations were not available at that time.[119]

On 5 February 1963, the 18th Wing Director of Operations radioed PACAF that his organization was progressing ahead of the PAD schedule in picking up targets with the F-105.[120] Although PACAF found this news "gratifying," it also noted that the 18th had "not yet reached complete O/R status with four pilots as programmed." Ergo, the Hickam headquarters advised Fifth Air Force that it "would appreciate a brief resume of problem areas or limitations in this respect" as well as the latter's best estimate of a "get well" date.[121]

The 18th TFW supplied Fifth the information PACAF sought in a TWX of 13 February, first simply citing the necessity for a pilot's qualifying in accordance with Air Force Regulations (AFR) 55-25 and 55-89 in order to be deemed combat ready (C/R). Then, for the benefit of such benighted souls as might not be familiar with the requirements set forth in that best seller, AFR 55-89, the 18th explained that for a pilot to comply with its terms, he must complete seven non-nuclear events. These included qualification in the GAR-8, the GAM-83, Dart firing, and air-to-ground rocketry. Unfortunately, while having authority to expend GAR-8's, the 18th would not have a certified load team until about 22 February, and no authority had been granted to expend war reserve (WR) GAM-83's. In addition, a problem existed in the tester area of

the GAM-83, though it was expected that this would be resolved within 10 to 15 days. The 18th possessed no capability for Dart towing at the time, nor did it have the authority to expend WR LAV-3 rocket launchers.[122]

That same day, 13 February, Lieut. Colonel White, the 18th D/O, in an endeavor to assist logistic planning, set forth the configurations of the F-105 which would be employed for each contingency plan. Any F-105 deploying from Kadena would carry two GAR-8 adapters on the outboard wing stations, and two of these "Sidewinder" heat-seeking weapons on each adapter, except in the case of deployments to Southeast Asia. On the inboard wing stations, two 450-gallon drop tanks would be installed, and a 650-gallon drop tank would be installed on the centerline station. Besides these, an internal bomb bay fuel tank would be installed and a full load of API (armor-piercing incendiary) ammunition put aboard.

In addition, a number of items of "780 equipment" would have to be airlifted for each deploying F-105. In a first priority category would be two GAM-83 ("Bullpup") outboard station adapters, two inboard multi-weapon pylons, two wing multiple ejector racks, and two outboard conventional pylons. In a second priority category would be two GAM-83 inboard station adapters, one centerline multiple ejector rack pylon, and a centerline multiple ejector rack.

The 44th TFS, when operating from Kadena in support of OPLAN 25-year, would be initially configured in accordance with the GWP. However, if directed to conduct high explosive (HE--i.e., conventional weapon) strikes, the squadron would reconfigure the aircraft as necessary.[123]

On 14 March 1963, PACAF passed on to Fifth Air Force, as well as

to the 313th Air Division, the 18th TFW, and the 8th TFW, the results of a series of tests conducted by ASD at Wright-Patterson AFB from 10 January through 13 February for the purpose of determining various data concerning F-105D external centerline nuclear weapon carriage.

In connection with flutter problems, a total of 16 test flights had been conducted between 10 January and 13 February on D-4 for approximately 14 data hours to demonstrate freedom from flutter to maximum safe carriage speed with various configurations of nuclear weapons carried on inboard multiple weapon pylons (MWP's). The object of the experiments was to demonstrate the maximum carriage capability of both symmetrical and asymmetrical configurations of ballasted and unballasted stores.

As a result of this program, it was deemed judicious to publish a new safety of flight supplement, in accordance with which the maximum allowable speeds (knots computed air speed: KCAS) for asymmetric carriage on inboard multi-weapon pylons were set forth as follows:

1. Any one store with the opposite station clean: 650 knots.

2. Any one store with a full 450-gallon tank on the opposite station: 575 knots or .9M, whichever was higher. An exception to this rule was the BDU-4/B under the same conditions, in which case the maximum allowable speed would be 680 knots.

3. Any one store with empty tanks on the opposite station: 625 knots.

The foregoing limits would apply to parent weapons and practice stores, ballasted or unballasted.

A flutter restriction of 550 KIAS (knots indicated air speed) for MN-1A wing carriage would be applicable when the MN-1A dispenser was carried on the B/D universal inboard pylon equipped with a 14-inch bomb rack. A maximum carriage speed of 600 KIAS had been published for wing carriage of the MN-1A when it was mounted on a 30-inch suspension of the new inboard multi-weapon pylon.

Although the F-105 automatic flight control system (AFCS) had not been designed for asymmetric flight, the only AFCS limitations imposed by asymmetric loading were that the "autos" could not be performed nor the automatic wings-level feature utilized. Category I flight tests had indicated that stabilizer augmentation performed satisfactorily in all flight situations, including an Immelmann turn with asymmetric loading. Furthermore, all pilot relief modes of the AFCS might be used. Satisfactory automatic Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches with asymmetric loadings had been performed.

Following a series of Category I tests of the carriage and delivery of BDU-4/B, BDU-8/B/long and /short nose, and MD-6 in asymmetric configurations, the pilots reported no adverse control effects. As a result of this experience, it was concluded that "no aircraft stability or control problems were encountered with either of the stores."

Preliminary Category II results indicated a possible problem might be encountered in the asymmetrical configuration. The "autoss" pullup was not possible with an asymmetric load; hence, the pilot would have to make a manual pullup, in order to keep the wings level. Under certain conditions, it appeared that the pilots' reaction to the "hi-toss pullup light," combined with the delay in moving the stick back to

start the pullup, could cause the aircraft to pass the point of low toss release and enter the desired maneuver closer to the target. The plane would then enter the safe separation envelope, enabling the pilot to complete a "high toss release."[124]

On 23 March 1963, PACAF notified Fifth Air Force that the recommendations concerning standardization of F-105 training/SIOP configurations which Fifth and the 18th TFW had jointly presented at a recent Hickam AFB conference had subsequently received "extensive review and consideration by the PACAF staff." As a result, CINCPACAF's position was as follows:

The requirement to accept an interim training configuration and an average sortie length of 1:45 minutes with an MN-1A wing carriage dispenser was concurred in, as was the recommendation that centerline carriage of the MN-1A be adopted as the optimum training configuration. In this connection, PACAF had taken action on 15 March to obtain the required approval for such a Class I modification.

PACAF also agreed that centerline nuclear weapons carriage was the optimum SIOP configuration, and added that it would continue to support the required Class V modification when the 18th TFW study was received. Respecting the problems of correcting the bomb bay door chattering and chafing situation, PACAF agreed that something would have to be done and promised that "continued follow-up action" would be taken.

18th's recommendation that the flyable alert concept be eliminated temporarily was approved, "in view of [the] excessive generation time required." Also, the ground alert force requirements should be held

at the present figure of 18 aircraft, but the need to relax current alert aircraft replacement criteria was recognized. Therefore, the time limitation specified in PACAFM 55-8, which required the replacement of non-O/R aircraft on alert pads, was changed to 12 hours for F-105's.

Perhaps most importantly of all, however, PACAF flatly stated that the 18th TFW's recommendation that internal nuclear weapons carriage be used exclusively as the standard SIOP configuration was not approved. The decision to adopt an external weapons (wing) carriage as the standard interim SIOP configuration, explained the Hickam headquarters, was based primarily on force generation and weapons system flexibility requirements and considerations. Another influencing factor had been the foregoing message received from the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) at Wright-Patterson AFB on 13 March concerning multiple weapon wing pylon capabilities as determined from the Category I and II tests recently conducted. PACAF emphasized that employment of external (wing) carriage as a primary interim configuration would remain in effect "unless user participating in Ref (E) Cat I/II tests results or operational use requires later alteration of this position." However, the Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was authorized to employ an internal weapon carriage configuration for mission profile accomplishment "if overriding range problems exist and if proper weapon is available."

PACAF added that, in addition to the matter of weapons carriage configuration, it was pressing for several other actions. One of these was for a maximum of 16 aircraft of the 18th TFW to be "in work" with a 12-month completion time during the FY-1964 F-105 modification program. The 8th TFW command support aircraft would be used to augment the 18th

TFW while the modification program was in progress. Another subject was the proposed modification of the F-105D to increase the fuel capacity of the bomb bay tank. (A Class V modification would be initiated after the various configurations were studied further.) Still another subject was the assignment of an internal carriage full-fuzing-option nuclear weapon with a wide yield spectrum.

The PACAF message went on to say that sorties 19 through 24 would continue to be the first follow-on generated sorties for SIOP launch. In the event SIOP launch times could not be met for the generated follow-on force, target free times would be used. The relaxation of time in replacing alert aircraft was intended to increase aircraft availability for combat crew training. In connection with this, PACAF desired that the Fifth Air Force and 18th TFW Commanders would "supervise closely results of this relaxation of standards and assess the value of the increased flexibility provided relative to the conduct of flying training programs."[125]

Despite the lofty eminence occupied by PACAF in the chain of command vis-a-vis 313th Air Division, the latter did not passively accept the bitter pill of the former's rejection of internal nuclear weapons carriage as the standard SIOP configuration. Just three days after receiving the above PACAF message, Major General Robert M. Stillman, the 313th Commander, sent a personal TWX to Major General Charles M. McCorkle, the Fifth Air Force Vice Commander, on 26 March 1963, conveying his disappointment at PACAF's stand. While agreeing with CINCPACAF's decisions on all of the other points discussed at the Hickam conference, General

Stillman felt that PACAF had somehow "missed the entire point of the briefing." The question of SIOP configuration was of such vital importance, in his opinion, that he was prepared to do his utmost to persuade the higher headquarters to reverse its decision and adopt internal nuclear weapons carriage as the standard procedure. However, he was also sufficiently the realist to recognize that at his level of command he was unlikely to succeed in his endeavor unless he had the backing of Fifth Air Force. And, quite naturally, before the latter was likely to throw its support to the cause he advocated, he would have to convince high officials at the Fuchu headquarters that he was right. Therefore, General Stillman mustered the following arguments in favor of internal weapons carriage:

First, the 18th TFW had to have a training configuration compatible with GWP requirements that would permit "safe and efficient" training. Yet, a training configuration compatible with external GWP weapons carriage did not permit safe dart firing, conventional dive bombing, rocket firing, or high and low toss nuclear weapons delivery. More specifically, training in this asymmetrical configuration was restricted by both airspeed and "G" limitations on the MN-1A dispenser mounted on the wing and the 650-gallon tank. On the other hand, the "optimum training configuration" comprised two 450-gallon tanks at the inboard stations, an empty bomb bay prepared to accept the weapon, and an MN-1A dispenser on an adapted multiple ejector rack or center line special weapons pylon. From this optimum training configuration it required "less time to generate for internal carriage" than it did for external carriage.

Second, the recent "test of fuel consumption for external carriage" conducted at the direction of PACAF had revealed that fuel consumption in this configuration was nine per cent greater than F-105D tech order cruise control figures. Tech order cruise control figures had been used for all target planning at the October 1962 SIOP extension planning conference because of the lack of any contradictory cruise control data for asymmetrical (external) weapon carriage. Figures derived from the 18th's test program for external weapon fuel consumption, which had been completed earlier in 1963, showed that external weapon carriage would "reduce the fuel available for GWP strikes by an average of 1100 pounds per sortie." 313th Air Division officials considered 1,500 pounds to be "the minimum GWP recovery fuel for an F-105D," as it would provide enough reserve fuel for a weather recovery. On the basis of current SIOP targeting, an 1100-pound reduction in available fuel would mean that only 17 of the 18th Wing's GWP strikes would recover with 1,500 pounds or more of fuel. Eleven sorties would recover with 1,500 to 1,000 pounds, nine with 1,000 to 500 pounds, 17 with 500 to 0 pounds, and six with 0 to -200 pounds. In short, the employment of external weapons carriage would extend the 18th's marginal range capability beyond the limit in the case of more than half of the strikes.

Realizing that "seeing is believing" for many people, General Stillman then requested General McCorkle to "invite doubting members of the PACAF staff, along with representatives of Fifth Air Force and the 8th TFW, to Kadena for demonstrations of actual loadings from the various configurations." After all, he considered it "imperative" that

those PACAF officials who were insisting on the use of external carriage come and see for themselves that what he said was so. Only by being so convinced could they be persuaded "to arrive at an acceptable decision."[126]

General McCorkle responded with alacrity to General Stillman's plea, radioing PACAF on 29 March the nature of the problem and the grave consequences that could result if the Hickam headquarters remained adamant in its insistence on employment of asymmetric carriage. Profile cruise control data compiled by the 18th TFW indicated, he said, that, with external weapons carriage, a portion of the F-105D's assigned to SIOP missions would return with less than enough fuel for a safe recovery. This meant that these particular sorties would require internal weapons carriage, resulting in two GWP configurations. This in turn would necessitate two training configurations, since pilots would have to be trained for both symmetrical and asymmetrical delivery. Aircraft scheduling and configuration changes would be further complicated, since the training configuration compatible with external nuclear carriage--i.e., an MN-1A dispenser and an empty 450-gallon tank on the wing pylons, a fueled bomb bay, and a 650-gallon centerline tank--could not be used for conventional weapons training or for high or low toss nuclear delivery, because of "G" limitations and airspeed restrictions.

To generate the required flying program with the F-105 weapons system, declared General McCorkle, PACAF and the concerned subordinate commands would have to take advantage of every possible method to keep day-to-day operations as simple and productive as possible. The requirement for dual GWP configuration and consequent dual training configuration

would "seriously complicate training, weapon alignment, and aircraft selection."

The data retained by PACAF after the Fifth Air Force/313th Air Division briefing on this subject might be helpful in evaluating the complexities of this problem. Any additional detailed data which PACAF might desire in order to reach a decision on this highly important question would be forwarded by mail or even presented by a representative from Fifth Air Force, if requested.

Changing the subject somewhat, General McCorkle informed PACAF that Fifth had evaluated the MK-43 inventory required to permit internal carriage on all GWP sorties. The majority of the weapons required were available from MK-43's in the Fifth Air Force inventory not already committed to SIOP targets. Yield degradation resulting from weapons substitution would be negligible, since laydown delivery would provide increased accuracy, resulting in a better probability of target destruction.

In the light of these factors, he hoped PACAF would reconsider Fifth's recommendation concerning internal carriage and thus permit a standardized aircraft configuration for GWP and training sorties.[127]

Meanwhile, Colonel George B. Simler, the 18th's Commander, had written an old friend, Colonel Robert L. Delashaw, who was commanding the 36th TFW at Bitburg AB, West Germany, an organization which had been equipped with F-105's some time since and should be able to provide answers to at least two of the problems which were plaguing the 18th--aircraft configuration and range.

On 4 March 1963 Colonel Delashaw answered Simler, prefacing his specific suggestions with the comment that he could appreciate that the

latter had "reasons that make any configuration of doubtful value." He felt that "the biggest single problem rests on a training configuration that will leave the aircraft in a condition that is mission responsive at a moment's notice." The 36th TFW was now conducting all of its training with an empty bomb bay, with all of the checks performed on the aircraft and system. This had produced an average training sortie of only 1.6 hours for the past year; however, Delashaw felt that the sorties could have been increased to two hours in length if his Thunderchiefs had been allowed to carry a bomb-bay fuel tank. This would have been "a much more economical operation." The crux of the problem, as he saw it, was mission responsiveness. Colonel Delashaw added that "We have made a real good study of the dash 25 and feel that we will likely continue our present procedures. I figure that the man-hours spent on configuration, or lost to changing with our present mode, are worth about $150,000 per month."

Admittedly the problem of range was vexing where the F-105 was concerned, but he believed that the bomb-bay tank would supply the additional fuel needed for the vital operation of aircraft recovery. The 36th TFW Commander remarked that he would like to fly some missions in which the tanks were dropped, as a means of providing empirical substantiation for the theoretical calculations already worked out on paper, but thus far they had been unable to spare either the tanks or the aircraft to do it properly. It would be necessary to conduct such experiments from Africa, and the transportation of tanks to fields down there tended to become "a big problem." Colonel Delashaw was aware that Eglin AFB had run some tests along this same line, but he had never

received the data resulting therefrom, and, besides, these experiments didn't "fit exactly what we need anyhow."[128]

On 28 March 1963, Colonel Simler wrote again to Delashaw, now a brigadier general, but still commanding the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing. Opening on a bright note, he informed his friend that the configuration and range problems which he had mentioned earlier had been presented to PACAF, and the response had been favorable. The Hickam headquarters had agreed to the requirement for a centerline rack, not so much for wartime carriage as for training with the MN-1A dispenser, because of the additional flexibility that it provided. Nevertheless, he was convinced that the best wartime configuration for the Far East Theater was a 650-gallon and two 450-gallon external tanks, with the weapon itself carried internally. Undoubtedly there would be mission response problems with this configuration, but much progress in reducing generation time had already been made. The 18th had developed a method of hanging the 650-gallon tank, using the MB-5 bomb cradle, which practically eliminated damage to the seal between the tank and the fuselage, "thereby greatly speeding up the loading." The MB-5 bomb cradle, although designed originally as a dolly for the MK-7 weapon, offered much greater stability than the MJ-1 for loading the 650-gallon tank, its casters providing adequate mobility and its screw jacks allowing fine adjustments when positioning and raising the tank. The 18th had "experienced no leaks from any tanks installed with the MB-5." In summary, this method provided ease of handling and practically eliminated the possibility of damage to the tank or its fittings.

Until the centerline rack became available, the 18th would be faced with the problem of a suitable training configuration that was mission responsive to internal carriage. Location of the MN-1A in the bomb bay was unsatisfactory because of the bomb bay door chafing problem and the aircraft system checkout required during generation. The 18th was locally manufacturing for this purpose an adapter for the centerline MER similar to the one developed by the wing at George AFB. One unit was complete and had been test flown with excellent results, except for the necessity of adding ballast to handle the aft C G problem. If the 36th TFW had added ballast to its F-105's Colonel Simler wished to know where it had been placed.

The 18th Commander also related that his aircraft had recently suffered a series of bent pitot booms, the incidents invariably occurring during ground strafing. While poor quality materials were suspected, he was more inclined to blame the asymmetrical configuration which the F-105's were flying. The 18th hoped to solve the riddle, but it might be that General Delashaw could supply the answer readymade from his own experience, or at least a theory as to the cause of this difficulty.[129]

On 2 April 1963, PACAF passed on to the office of the Air Force Chief of Staff the results of an evaluation of external nuclear wing carriage based upon 10 sorties. The purpose of the evaluation had been twofold--first, to determine asymmetrical flight characteristics of the F-105D when nuclear weapons were carried on the external wing station, and, second, to obtain actual profile data. The evaluation missions had been planned so as to duplicate actual SIOP target profiles. The external fuel tanks were jettisoned when empty, and practice shapes were

released on all of the sorties.

The findings of the asymmetrical flight portion of the tests were as follows: (1) During the take-off roll, additional concentration on the part of the pilot was required for him to maintain directional control. And the problem was aggravated when a crosswind condition existed—which would be the case at Kadena a high percentage of the time. (2) During lift-off, a combination of aileron and rudder control was required to overcome the weight/drag differential between the weapon and the 450-gallon tank. This, too, was aggravated by a crosswind. (3) While the aircraft was in flight, the pilot had to make frequent and extensive changes in trim as the external fuel was consumed, the tanks jettisoned, airspeed changes made, and one "G" flight exceeded. (4) During bomb release an abrupt roll and yaw change was experienced. (5) During in-flight refueling, the asymmetrical problem was especially serious, because IFR (instrument flight rules) was accomplished at a minimum control speed with an empty wing tank. This problem was also intensified in turbulent air when rapid flight control responses were required. Because of this, the possibility of performing in-flight refueling in turbulent air was questionable.

While realizing that all aircraft have to be retrimmed during flight, PACAF regarded the magnitude of the trim changes required for an asymmetrical F-105 as "excessive." Moreover, this problem could reasonably be expected to be "extremely dangerous" in actual weather, particularly during the run-in bomb release; for the pilot would have to monitor not only the trim but also his airspeed, to insure that the speed restrictions were not exceeded. Undoubtedly, the bombing accuracy

would, under these circumstances, be appreciably impaired as the result of freeze or pickle errors.

In addition to the trim problem, all F-105 aircraft were still experiencing automatic flight control system (AFCS) malfunctions. Since November 1962, the 18th TFW had experienced 18 apparently unconnected AFCS incidents, including pitch-downs, abrupt one-and-a-half rolls, hard-over rudder failures, and others. Because they were random failures, it had been impossible to establish a specific trend. Hence, positive corrective action was extremely difficult. Nevertheless, it was safe to say that asymmetrical flight would certainly not improve the AFCS problems. In fact, "if some of the malfunctions had occurred during asymmetrical low altitude/high speed flight, an aircraft and pilot could have been lost."[130]

Turning to the subject of carrying nuclear weapons externally on the wings, the Hickam headquarters assessed this system as "marginal at its best." However, PACAF had been compelled, as a stopgap measure, to configure a portion of the F-105 ground alert force with external weapons for two reasons: First, all the PACAF stockpiled nuclear weapons were not compatible with the F-105 bomb bay; and, second, an excessive amount of time was required to change from a trailing configuration to an internal alert configuration. These two factors made external nuclear carriage mandatory. In view of these considerations, PACAF strongly recommended that the external centerline nuclear modification be approved. In addition to resolving the aforementioned problems, the proposed centerline modification should enable the using commands to carry the MK-57 nuclear weapon.

As a result of the 18th's experiments, it had been found that the range of the F-105D was reduced by six per cent when a weapon was carried on the external wing station. Since there was a difference of only 60 gallons of fuel between the two configurations, officials believed that drag caused by the asymmetrical arrangement was responsible for most of the range diminution. The nuclear external centerline configuration would have 260 gallons less fuel than the internal configuration. This would, of course, also reduce the F-105's range. If the F-105 were to be effectively employed in a non-nuclear role, additional internal fuel would also be required for conventional ordnance carriage.

In conclusion, PACAF urged that the Air Force Chief of Staff approve and fund the external centerline nuclear modification "at the earliest possible date" and that a larger removable bomb-bay fuel tank be provided at the same time.[131]

On 5 April 1963, the 18th TFW passed on to Fifth Air Force some of the same information which Colonel Simler had conveyed to Brigadier General Delashaw on 28 March, with additional details provided. The message began with an explanation that the wing had devised a new method for loading the 650-gallon external centerline fuel tank, utilizing the MB-5 bomb cradle. Not only had this reduced the time previously required to generate and upload the F-105, but it had practically eliminated damage to the seal between the fuel tank and the fuselage. In fact, the employment of this tank loading method had "resulted in 100 per cent reliability" thus far.

The 18th felt that this reliability would justify elimination of the engine run-up and leak test of the 650-gallon tank during mass

generation. Heretofore, the business of partially refueling the 650-gallon tank, running-up the engine to test for leakage, then completing refueling had averaged one hour. By eliminating the engine run-up to test for leakage would reduce the total tank loading and refueling time to approximately 25 minutes.

To determine the total time involved in generating the first aircraft, one should add 20 minutes for removal of the centerline MN-1A and an average internal weapon loading time of 40 minutes to the 25 minutes required for tank loading and refueling. This meant that a total time of one hour, 25 minutes would be entailed in aircraft generation. The 18th TFW recommended that Fifth use this shorter turnaround time as a lever for persuading PACAF to adopt an internal configuration for the loading of F-105 weapons.[132]

On 25 April 1963, the 18th Wing radioed Fifth Air Force that, inasmuch as F-105 combat readiness requirements necessitated the conventional delivery qualification of all pilots, the necessity for a mobile strike force (MSF) squadron within an F-105-equipped wing was thereby obviated. Consequently, the 18th requested that in the future all requirements for forces be levied on the wing itself, rather than on specific squadrons within the wing. If this policy were followed, the 18th Commander would enjoy "greater flexibility and ease in meeting requirements," and the ability of the 18th TFW to meet its GWP responsibilities while deploying in support of a contingency plan would be greatly enhanced.[133]

FOOTNOTES

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | — | Ltr., Hq., 5th AF (5FOOT-T) to 313AD, sub.: Role of the F-105 in the Tactical Modernization Program, 16 Dec. 1960. |
| 2 | — | Ibid. |
| 3 | — | History, Director of Operations (D/O), Hq., 313th Air Div., July 1958, p. 3. |
| 4 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., Aug. 1959, p. 11. |
| 5 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., Feb. 1960, p. 7. |
| 6 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., March 1960, p. 1. |
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| 10 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., Oct. 1960, p. 1. |
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| 15 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., March 1961, p. 1. |
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| 18 | — | History, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., June 1961, p. 1. |
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| 22 | 128 | Ltr., Hq., 5th AF to Comdr. 18th TFW, sub.: Proposed Realignment of Intelligence Manning To Support F-105D Aircraft, 18 Sept. 1961. |
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| 42 | 130 | People's Voice column, "Trouble Caused by Noise of Jet Planes," Okinawa Times, 7 Aug. 1961. |
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| 46 | 133 | News Article, "Jet Plane Noise Disturbs Kadena Inhabitants," Ryukyu Shimpo, 16 Aug. 1961. |
| 47 | 134 | News Article, "Kadena-Son Complains of Jet Noises at Community Relations Meeting," Okinawa Times, 2 Sept. 1961. |
| 48 | 135 | Commentary, "Aircraft Noises," Daigen Shogen column, Okinawa Times, 23 Sept. 1961. |
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| 56 | --- | Telephone conversation by Command Historian with Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann, Deputy Base Civil Engineer, Kadena AB, 13 Nov. 1963. |
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| 60 | --- | History, 18th TFW, 1 Jan.-30 June 1962, p. 22. |
| 61 | --- | Ibid., p. 25. |
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| 64 | 142 | PFOOP 62-1237-C, PACAF to 5AF, 18/0003Z March 1962. |
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| 68 | --- | AFODC-OP 88866, PACAF to 5AF, 17/2355Z May 1962. |
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| 70 | 144 | PFODC-ORQ 968-62, PACAF to TAC, 15/1300Z June 1962. |
| 71 | 145 | PFODC-ORQ 970-62, PACAF to CINCPAC, 20/1811Z June 1962. |
| 72 | --- | History, 18th TFW, 1 July-31 Dec. 1962, pp. 13, 30. |
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| 78 | 146 | PFPTR-S 494, PACAF to 5AF, 23/0121Z June 1962. |
| 79 | 147 | 18OCC 1654, 18TFW to PACAF, 26 June 1962. |
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| 82 | 149 | PFOOT 320, PACAF to 5AF, 03/0110Z July 1962. |
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| 86 | 152 | 18OCC 0773, 18TFW to 5AF, 16 July 1962. |
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| 88 | 154 | PFPTR-S 578, PACAF to 4520 CCRTNGWG, 19/0018Z July 1962. |
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| 99 | 157 | 5FMME-AEA-62 2767M, 5AF to 18TFW and 8TFW, 03/0036Z Dec. 1962. |
| 100 | 158 | 18DMMS 3238, 18TFW to 5AF, 10/0001I, 5 Dec. 1962. |
| 101 | 155<br>159 | 18th TFW Time Phase Actions Plan, sub.: Conversion to F-105D Aircraft, dtd. 5 Nov. 1962; 5FCCS-141, 5AF to 313AD, 41AD, 21/0230Z May 1962. |
| 102 | 160 | PMCA 04-M-03, 6313ABW to PACAF, 04/0730I Dec. 1962. |
| 103 | 161 | PMCA 15-M-03, 6313ABW to PACAF and 5AF, 15/1200I Dec. 1962. |
| 104 | 162 | PFDAL 149, PACAF to 5AF, 18/0344Z Dec. 1962. |
| 105 | 163 | Ltr., Hq. MOAMA (MONATP) to Hq., 313th Air Div., sub.: Flying Fish Plan F-105D Aircraft, 27 March 1962, with atch: MOAMA DMM Plan 11-1 "Flying Fish," dtd. 15 Nov. 1961, revised 1 March 1962. |
| 106 | --- | MOAMA MONA 62-0496, 5 June 1962. |
| 107 | --- | PACAF PFOCO 322, 8 June 1962. |
| 108 | --- | 5AF 5FOOT-O-T 0515F, 14 June 1962. |
| 109 | --- | MOAMA MONA 337, 19 June 1962. |
| 110 | 164 | PFOCO 359, PACAF to 5AF, 26/0006Z June 1962. |
| 111 | 165 | 5FOOT-O-T 0543F, 5AF to 18TFW and 8TFW, 27/0250Z June 1962. |
| 112 | 166 | 18OCC 0720, Hq., 18th TFW to 5AF, 29 June 1962. |
| 113 | 167 | PFORQ 825, PACAF to 5AF, 28/0110Z June 1962. |
| 114 | 168 | FOOP TA WS 65192, PACAF to 5AF, 04/0117Z July 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| 116 | 170 | 18DOC 1303, 18TFW to 5AF, Nov. 1962. |
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| 120 | --- | 18DOC 0108, 18TFW to PACAF, 5 Feb. 1963. |
| 121 | 173 | FPODC 1-269, PACAF to 5AF, 07/1902Z Feb. 1963. |
| 122 | 174 | 18DOC 0139, 18TFW to 5AF, 13 Feb. 1963. |
| 123 | 175 | Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18DOC) to 3130C-P, 18DM, 18DMM, 18MM, 12CR, 44CR, 67CR, sub.: Contingency Plan Deployment Configuration for F-105 Aircraft, 13 Feb. 1963. |
| 124 | 176 | ASZFO-12-3-49, PACAF to 5AF, 14/2023Z March 1963. |
| 125 | 177 | PFCVC 186, PACAF to 5AF, 23/0508Z March 1963. |
| 126 | 178 | 313ADCR 0306, 313th AD to 5th AF (Personal from Maj. Gen. Stillman to Maj. Gen. McCorkle), 26/0842Z March 1963. |
| 127 | 179 | 5FCVC 0080, 5AF to PACAF, 29/0824Z March 1963. |
| 128 | 180 | Ltr., Col. Robert L. Delashaw, Comdr. 36th TFW, to Col. George B. Simler, Comdr. 18th TFW, 4 Mar. 1963. |
| 129 | 181 | Ltr., Col. George B. Simler, Comdr. 18th TFW, to Brig. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, Comdr. 36th TFW, 28 Mar. 1963. |
| 130 | 182 | PFODC 5-529, PACAF to HQ/CSAF, 02/0026Z Apr. 1963. |
| 131 | 182 | Ibid. |
| 132 | 183 | 18DOC 0337, 18TFW to 5AF, 5 Apr. 1963. |
| 133 | 184 | 18DOC 0416, 18TFW to 5AF, 25 Apr. 1963. |
| 134 | 185 | BS-PA 23-A-01, 6313ABW to MOAMA, 23/0928Z Jan. 1962. |
| --- | 186 | MONATA-2422, MOAMA to WPAFB, 26/1627Z Jan. 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| --- | 187 | BS-PA-F-29-A-01, 6313ABW to MOAMA, 29/1120Z Jan. 1962. |
| --- | 188 | MOAMA to MAAMA, 02/2004Z Feb. 1962. |
| --- | 189 | BS-PA-F 05-B-02, 6313ABW to MOAMA, 05/1350Z Feb. 1962. |
| --- | 190 | MAM-ST 008-B, PACAF to 5AF, 06/2041Z Feb. 1962. |
| --- | 191 | OCNTSE-2 27325, PACAF to 5AF, 10/0825Z Feb. 1962. |
| --- | 192 | Ltr., Maj. Gen. Robert M. Stillman, Comdr. 313th Air Div., to 18TFW (CR), sub.: Positive Control of Airborne Aircraft, 15 Feb. 1962. |
| --- | 193 | MCSDT 19980, PACAF to 6313ABW, 02/0102Z March 1962. |
| --- | 194 | Ltr., Hq. PACAF to 5AF, 8TFW, 18TFW, sub.: Hydraulic System Contamination, F-105 Aircraft, 14 Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 195 | MONATA 3059, MOAMA to AFLC, 20/2100Z Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 196 | PFMSS-AS 930, PACAF to 5AF, 23/2327Z Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 197 | PFODC-ORQ 423-62, PACAF to 5AF, 25/0013Z Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 198 | MONACA-570, MOAMA to PACAF, 29/2316Z Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 199 | PFMSS-ER 4306, PACAF to MOAMA, 31/0052Z Mar. 1962. |
| --- | 200 | Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (MCS) to 18MCM, sub.: MB-17 Generators, 3 Apr. 1962. |
| --- | 201 | Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18MCMS) to 18MC, sub.: MB17 Generators, 12 Apr. 1962. |
| --- | 202 | Ltr., Hq., PACAF to 5AF, 18TFW, sub.: Interference between Access Door FF97 and Refueling Probe, F-105D Aircraft, 12 Apr. 1962. |
| --- | 203 | PFMOC 175, PACAF to 5AF, 19/0329Z Apr. 1962. |
| --- | 204 | DF, 18FMR to 18MCM, 18MCMM, sub.: F-105D Equipment, 20 Apr. 1962. |
| --- | 205 | Ltr., MOAMA to TAC, PACAF, et al., sub.: Tire Requirements for F-105D Aircraft, 7 May 1962. |
| --- | 206 | Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18MCSS) to 18MCM, 18FMCR, et al., sub.: F-105 Requirements, 10 May 1962. |

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| --- | 207 | Ltr., George C. Estridge, MOAMA F-105 Tech. Rep., to 18TFW, sub.: Central Air Data Computer Deficiencies--F-105D-25RE A/C, 11 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 208 | SANUSE 288038, SAAMA to MOAMA, 14/2330Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 209 | DF, 18DMM to 18DMMC, 18OMM, 18AFM, sub.: F-105D Angle of Attack Transmitters, 15 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 210 | DF, 18DMM to 18DMMS, 18MMMS, et al., sub.: Installation of Safety Pin in Canopy Auxiliary Jettison Handle, |
| --- | 211 | MONASE-1-5293, MOAMA to SAAMA, 19/2150Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 212 | DF, 18DM to 18DMP, 18DMM, 18DMS, 19 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 213 | 18DMMQ 3413, 18TFW to MOAMA, 20/1400Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 214 | 18DMMWSM 3430, 18TFW to MOAMA, 22/0325Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 215 | DF, 18DMMS to 18DM, sub.: Ground Modular Cooling Unit, F-105 Aircraft, 22 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 216 | DF, 18DMMQ to 18OMM, 18AEM, 18FMB, sub.: F-105D Static Converters, 26 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 217 | DF, 18 FMS to 18DM, sub.: Replacement of Parts, F-105, 29 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 218 | MONASE-2-5211, MOAMA to 18TFW, 31/1723Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 219 | MONA-796, MOAMA to 18TFW, 31/UWWZ Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 220<br>221<br>222<br>223 | PACAF Programmed Action Directive (PAD) No. 60-2 (Revised), sub.: F-105D Conversion, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 Mar. 1961; PAC No. 60-2A (Revised), 24 May 1961; PAC No. 60-2B (Revised), 6 Oct. 1961; PAD No. 60-2C (Revised), 6 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 224 | 5FADM-0167, 5AF to 313AD, 25/0700Z May 1961. |
| --- | 225 | AFODC-OP 88866, PACAF to 5AF, 17/2355Z May 1962. |
| --- | 226 | PFPMO-M 3438, PACAF to 831st Air Div., 31/2354Z May 1962. |
| --- | 227 | PFDOP 3074, PACAF to Hq. CSAF, 04/2038Z June 1962. |
| --- | 228 | 6313PC-M 0580, 6313ABW to 5AF, 25/1400I June 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
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| --- | 229 | MC 01-K-01, 6313ABW to 5AF, 01/0730I Oct. 1962. |
| --- | 230 | 6313MB 23-1-01, 6313ABW to PACAF, Nov. 1962. |
| --- | 231 | PFMTR-V 2208, PACAF to 6313ABW, 09/0055Z Nov. 1962. |
| --- | 232 | Ltr., Mundy I. Peale, President, Republic Aviation Corp., to Maj. Gen. Robert M. Stillman, Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Report of recent visit to Pacific theater, 6 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 233 | DF, 18DMMQ to 18DMMC, sub.: Rudder Rigging Fixture, F-105D Aircraft, 15 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 234 | OS-12-0418, 4th TACFTRWG to Hq. CSAF, 27/2150Z Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 235 | 18DMMC 3492, 18TFW to PACAF, 28 Dec. 1962. |
| --- | 236 | F-105 Equipment Specialist Program, n.d. |

# APPENDIX 1

## KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

| POSITION | NAME |
|---|---|
| Commander | Major General Robert M. Stillman (1 July - 31 December) |
| Vice-Commander | Colonel John H. deRussy (1 July - 31 December) |
| Protocol Officer | Major John E. Eckstein* (1 July - 23 July) |
| | First Lieutenant Marvin Rosenglick** (23 July - 31 December) |
| Aide de Camp | Captain Crawford O. Shockley (1 July - 31 December) |

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

| | |
|---|---|
| Director of Administrative Services | Lieut. Colonel Robert M. De Bord (1 July - 31 December) |

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Inspector General | Colonel Dexter L. Hodge (1 July - 20 November) |
| | Lieut. Colonel George C. Edwards (20 November - 31 December) |
| Director of Security and Law Enforcement | Lieut. Colonel Theodore J. Newnam*** (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Dependent Schools Officer. Major Eckstein was promoted to this rank effective 15 July 1962.

**Promoted to the rank of captain effective 20 September 1962.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Security and Law Enforcement, 6313th Air Base Wing. Promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel effective 15 July 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Chief, Maintenance Inspection Division | Lieut. Colonel Frank A. Downey (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Supply and Services Inspection Division | Lieut. Colonel George C. Edwards (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Personnel Inspection Division | Major Thomas E. Wynne (1 July - 11 December) |
| | Vacant (11 December - 31 December) |
| Chief, Operations Inspection Division | Major Frank B. Brown (1 July - 31 December) |
| **JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION** | |
| Staff Judge Advocate | Lieut. Colonel William C. Craft (1 July - 9 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel William H. Yates (9 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF INFORMATION** | |
| Information Officer | Lieut. Colonel Merritt G. Garner (1 July - 31 December) |
| Command Historian | Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December) |
| Deputy Information Officer | Mr. Robert L. Lansche (Civilian)* (25 November - 31 December) |
| OIC, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa | Major Henri L. Tapie** (1 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY** | |
| Safety Officer | Major John W. Brunson (1 July - 31 December) |

*Mr. Lansche was the first incumbent of this position, which was established effective 25 November 1962.

**Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Ground Safety Officer | Mr. Jack B. Stephens (Civilian)* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Nuclear Safety Officer | Captain Bruce E. Graham (1 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON** | |
| Staff Surgeon | Colonel Paul V. Davis** (1 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN** | |
| Staff Chaplain | Major Norman C. Folkers*** (1 July - 4 September) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Kenneth G. Parks*** (4 September - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER** | |
| Staff Comptroller (Accounting and Finance Staff Officer) | Lieut. Colonel Norman W. Todd (1 July - 31 December) |
| **TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE** | |
| Director of Telecommunications | Colonel James L. Caselli**** (1 July - 31 December) |
| **OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE** | |
| Director of Operations | Colonel Wallace R. Jordan (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Ground Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6332d USAF Dispensary, and Director, Base Medical Service, Kadena Air Base.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Base Chaplain, Kadena Air Base.

****Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 1962d Communications Group.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Assistant Director of Operations | Lieut. Colonel Charles V. Garino* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division | Major Robert J. Morris (1 July - 2 October) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith (2 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Plans Branch | Major Ray A. Ragsdill** (1 July - 19 October) |
| | Major Gerald D. Fitzgerald (19 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch | Major Gerald D. Fitzgerald (1 July - 19 October) |
| | Major Colin J. Walker (19 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Logistics Branch | Major Robert J. Morris (2 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Operations and Training Division | Lieut. Colonel Charles V. Garino*** (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Current Operations Branch | Major Raymond A. Williams (1 July - 1 August) |
| | Major William O. Lighty**** (1 August - 31 December) |
| Chief, 313th Air Division Air Operations Center | Major John H. Bowers (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief, Operations and Training Division.

**Promoted to the rank of major effective 15 July 1962.

***Returned from extended temporary duty on 7 August 1962.

****Left on extended temporary duty on 14 August 1962. Returned on 30 October 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Passive Defense Officer | Captain Donald D. Bendell* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Special Operations Activities | Lieut. Colonel Lawrence P. Smith (1 July - 20 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Erick O. Linden (20 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Electronics Branch | Captain Neal C. Brigham (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Intelligence Division | Lieut. Colonel Russell Powell** (1 July - 11 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel R. C. Miller** (11 July - 21 August) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Russell Powell (21 August - 31 December) |
| Chief, Operations Intelligence Branch | Captain Johnny W. Shanks (1 July - 17 July) |
| | Vacant (17 July - 28 September) |
| | Captain Clark E. Williams (28 September - 31 December) |
| Chief, Manpower and Organization Division | Colonel Bernard A. Minnehan (1 July - 24 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel David W. Thompson (24 July - 31 December) |
| Manpower Management Officer | Lieut. Colonel David W. Thompson (1 July - 24 July) |
| | Major Robert E. Seekins (24 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Assistant Chief, 313th Air Division Operations Center.

**Lieut. Colonel Powell was on extended temporary duty from 11 July to 21 August 1962. During his absence Lieut. Colonel Miller, from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, acted as the Chief, Intelligence Division.

***

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Organization and Management Engineering Officer | Major Robert Jones (1 July - 25 July) |
| | Vacant (25 July - 2 August) |
| | Captain Roland F. Crim (2 August - 31 December) |
| **MATERIEL DIRECTORATE** | |
| Director of Materiel | Colonel George S. Roberts (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Supply and Services Division | Lieut. Colonel Francis Sikorski (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Inter-Service Supply and Services Branch | Vacant (1 July - 21 July) |
| | CWO (W-3) Bryan R. Howerton (21 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Supply and Seaweed Branch | Major Edward H. Freedman (1 July - 31 December) |
| PACAF Regional Fire Protection Specialist (Okinawa-Korea) | Mr. Victor B. Robinson, Jr. (Civilian)* (1 July - 6 November) |
| Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus, and POL Officer | Captain Isaac E. Alexander (1 July - 19 November) |
| | Captain Alvin G. Crawford (19 November - 31 December) |
| Chief, Maintenance Division | Major Evan L. Stoll (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Armament Division | Major Edward Newman (1 July - 31 December) |
| Air Force Representative with the Ryukyus Exchange System | Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks (1 July - 31 December) |

*Office transferred to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 6 November 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Chief, Transportation Division | Major Joseph A. West, Jr.<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Air Traffic Coordinating Officer | Captain Louise N. Miller<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING** | |
| Civil Engineering Officer | Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby*<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Assistant Civil Engineering Officer | Mr. Lloyd H. Hellmann (Civilian)<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Civil Engineering Liaison Officer for Air Force Operational Facilities | Lieut. Colonel Joseph E. Mills<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| **OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT** | |
| Procurement Officer | Major Lynn J. Corp<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Deputy Procurement Officer | 1st Lieutenant Alexander H. Newlands<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Deputy Procurement Officer | CWO (W-2) Willie M. Johnson<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| **PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE** | |
| Director of Personnel | Colonel Robert H. Workman<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| Assistant Director of Personnel | Major Bruce B. Bright<br>(1 July - 25 October) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Robert J. Thornton<br>(25 October - 31 December) |
| Inter-Service Affairs Officer | Major John E. Eckstein**<br>(1 July - 21 September) |
| | Vacant<br>(21 September - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering.

**Promoted to the rank of major effective 15 July 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Civilian Personnel Officer | Mr. Louis W. Conroy, Jr. (Civilian)<br>(1 July - 31 December) |

OSI DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 6001ST SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) PACAF

| | |
|---|---|
| Commander, OSI District Office #43 | Lieut. Colonel James T. Emott<br>(1 July - 31 December) |

DETACHMENT NO. 2, 1045TH OPERATIONAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING GROUP

| | |
|---|---|
| Detachment No. 2 Commander | Captain Basil V. Bazzell (Acting)<br>(1 July - 12 July) |
| | Colonel Alpheus W. Blizzard<br>(12 July - 31 December) |

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander | Colonel George B. Simler<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Deputy Commander | Colonel Jones E. Bolt<br>(28 December - 31 December) |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer | Major Thomas B. Huddleston, Jr.<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Operations | Colonel Jones E. Bolt<br>(1 July - 28 December) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Floyd White<br>(28 December - 31 December) |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Materiel | Colonel John W. Carpenter<br>(1 July - 31 December) |
| 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Floyd White<br>(1 July - 28 December) |
| | Lieut. Colonel John C. Neill<br>(28 December - 31 December) |
| 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Toivo L. Akkola<br>(1 July - 31 December) |

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Grady Morris (1 July - 31 December) |
| 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander | Major Russell F. Crutchlow (1 July - 12 August) |
| | Major Alexander P. Butterfield (12 August - 31 December) |
| 18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Billy B. Wilson (1 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6018th Organizational Maintenance* Squadron (Provisional) Commander | Major Wilfred N. Joyal (1 July - 8 September) |
| 18th Organizational Maintenance* Squadron Commander | Major Wilfred N. Joyal (8 September - 31 December) |
| 658th Tactical Hospital Commander | Captain William H. Greendyke (1 July - 31 December) |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Commander | Colonel Warren E. Vinzant (1 July - 31 December) |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Deputy Commander | Lieut. Colonel Malcolm A. McNall (1 July - 31 December) |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Executive Officer | Major Norman C. Bausch** (1 July - 31 December) |
| 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron (PACAF) Commander | Major Kenneth C. E. Titmus (1 July - 31 December) |
| 873d Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander | Lieut. Colonel Harold K. Boutwell (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Commander | Colonel Charles H. Pierce (1 July - 31 December) |

*The 6018th Organizational Maintenance Squadron was discontinued effective 8 September 1962, and in its place was constituted and activated the 18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, per PACAF Special Order G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Staff Administrative Officer.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 6313th Air Base Wing Deputy Commander | Colonel Arthur G. Durbeck (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer | Lieut. Colonel Raymond S. Barnes* (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Operations | Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Williams (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Materiel | Lieut. Colonel Max A. Pinkerton (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Personnel | Lieut. Colonel Walter C. Kurowski (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Materiel Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds (1 July - 12 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Nimmo (12 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Deputy for Engineering | Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby** (1 July - 27 November) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering | Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby** (27 November - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Deputy for Services | Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds*** (1 July - 27 November) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Services | Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds*** (27 November - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Security and Law Enforcement | Lieut. Colonel Theodore J. Newnam (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Douglas C. Oldershaw (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief of Administrative Services, 6313th Air Base Wing.

**The duty title of Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby was changed from Deputy for Engineering to Director of Engineering effective 27 November, per 6313th Air Base Wing Special Order P-378, dtd. 27 Nov. 1962.

***The duty title of Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds was changed from Deputy for Services to Director of Services effective 27 November 1962, per 6313th Air Base Wing Special Order P-378, dtd. 27 November 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 6313th Air Police Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Nimmo (1 July - 11 July) |
| | Major Charles N. Dungan (11 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Support Squadron Commander | Major Knox B. McKee, Jr. (1 July - 15 October) |
| | Captain Garland G. Griffith (15 October - 1 November) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Donald S. Irwin (1 November - 31 December) |
| 6332d USAF Dispensary Commander | Colonel Paul V. Davis (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 4, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander | Captain Richard B. Crabb (1 July - 31 December) |
| 15th Physiological Training Flight Commander | Major George S. Johnson (1 July - 21 August) |
| | Captain Joseph C. Devincentis (21 August - 4 October) |
| | Captain Frederick F. Thimm (4 October - 31 December) |
| 7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 7th Tactical Depot Squadron Deputy Commander | Major Ernest S. McDonald (1 July - 31 December) |
| 1962d Communications Group (AFCS) Commander | Colonel James L. Caselli (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6922d Radio Group, Mobile (USAFSS)* Commander | Colonel Robert T. Engle (1 July - 1 September) |
| 6922d Security Wing (USAFSS) Commander* | Colonel Robert T. Engle (1 September - 31 December) |

*The 6922d Radio Group Mobile was redesignated the 6922d Security Wing effective 1 September 1962, per USAFSS Special Order GB-10, dtd. 14 Aug. 1962.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 6927th Radio Squadron Mobile (USAFSS) Commander | Lieut. Colonel Edward E. Grant (1 July - 20 July) |
| | Major Robert G. Sandstrom (20 July - 31 December) |
| 1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander | Lieut. Colonel George E. Bye (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing Commander | Lieut. Colonel Henry Baldi (1 July - 31 December) |
| 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander | Major Clifford L. Martin (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics* Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) Squadron Commander | Captain Marvin D. Meadows (1 July - 1 November) |
| Detachment 2, 2875th Ground Electronics* Engineering Installation Agency (GEEIA) Squadron Commander | Captain Marvin D. Meadows (1 November - 31 December) |

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander | Colonel William W. Ingenhutt (1 July - 3 July) |
| | Colonel Dale S. Sweat** (3 July - 24 July) |
| | Colonel Lester C. Hess (24 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Operations | Colonel Dale S. Sweat (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Materiel | Colonel Ralph S. Fuhrmeister, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Administrative Staff Officer | Major Robert C. Allphin (1 July - 31 December) |

*Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron was redesignated Detachment 2, 2875th GEEIA Squadron effective 1 November 1962.

**Colonel Sweat acted as Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing from 3 to 24 July 1962 without formal orders reassigning him from his regular position as Deputy Commander for Operations.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Chief, Combat Operations Division, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing | Lieut. Colonel Cecil V. Steed (1 July - 31 December) |
| 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Craig H. Fairburn (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Frank W. Allen (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Jesse W. Simpson (1 July - 26 December) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Ernest D. McDonald (26 December - 31 December) |
| 6051st Organizational Maintenance* Squadron (Provisional) Commander | Lieut. Colonel Robert W. Heggenberger (1 July - 8 September) |
| 51st Organization Maintenance Squadron* Commander | Lieut. Colonel Robert W. Heggenberger (8 September - 31 December) |
| 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Edward A. Sanders (1 July - 6 August) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Roland L. Wolfe (6 August - 31 December) |
| 6351st USAF Dispensary Commander | Lieut. Colonel Robert H. Epler** (1 July - 13 December) |
| | Captain William H. Greendyke (Acting)** (13 December - 31 December) |
| 51st Air Base Group Commander | Colonel Edwin R. Bane (1 July - 31 December) |
| Special Assistant to the 51st Air Base Group Commander | Lieut. Colonel Jesse W. Simpson (26 December - 31 December) |
| 51st Air Base Group Executive Officer | Lieut. Colonel Robert E. Woody (1 July - 31 December) |

*The 6051st Organizational Maintenance Squadron (Provisional) was discontinued effective 8 September 1962, and in its place was organized the 51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron, per PACAF Special Order G-76, dtd. 15 Aug. 1962.

**Additional duty as Director, Base Medical Service, Naha Air Base.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 51st Air Base Group Director of Personnel | Lieut. Colonel Robert J. Thornton (1 July - 19 October) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Harris L. Jenson (19 October - 31 December) |
| 51st Air Base Group Director of Security and Law Enforcement | Lieut. Colonel John A. Webster (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Support Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Garnet D. Page (1 July - 9 December) |
| | Lieut. Colonel James V. Merritt (9 December - 31 December) |
| 51st Materiel Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Sam L. Almon (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Civil Engineering Squadron Commander | Captain Dallas H. Pope (1 July - 3 August) |
| | Major Paul Heath (3 August - 31 December) |
| 6051st Air Police Squadron (Provisional) Commander | Lieut. Colonel John A. Webster* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 5, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander | Captain John R. Rogers (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 315th Air Division Commander | Colonel Jack L. Crawford, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander | Lieut. Colonel Ned M. Letts (1 July - 31 December) |
| 817th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander | Lieut. Colonel George F. Owen (1 July - 31 December) |
| 345th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander | Lieut. Colonel Richard D. Cote (1 July - 31 December) |
| 2152d Communications Squadron Commander | Major John C. Morton (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Security and Law Enforcement, 51st Air Base Group.

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| 33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Ernest M. Magee (1 July - 8 November) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Robert P. Ash (8 November - 31 December) |
| Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing Commander | Major Horace W. Meredith (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 3, 313th Air Division Commander | Captain William B. Etheridge (1 July - 11 September) |
| | Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa (11 September - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division, Commander | Captain John L. Gordon (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron Commander | Major Oscar W. Yetez (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander | Captain Ralph H. Middlebrook* (1 July - 31 December) |

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS (ADDENDA)

| Position | Name |
|---|---|
| Detachment 1, Headquarters PACAF (Standardization/Evaluation Team) Commander | Colonel Joel D. Thorvaldson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, Headquarters PACAF (Standardization/Evaluation Team) Deputy Commander | Lieut. Colonel Milton E. Nelson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 2, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Commander | Major Richard N. Kosman (1 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to the rank of captain effective 1 October 1962.

# APPENDIX 2

## CONTRACTS LET BY THE

## 313TH AIR DIVISION OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

## 1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

July: Thirty-five numbered contracts totalling $592,226.00 and 98 unnumbered contracts totalling $37,012.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-2032 for $68,500.00 was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for the repair of hardstands at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-2035 for $105,191.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the replacement of furnaces at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-2036 for $15,782.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for the rehabilitation of Warehouse 243 at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-2041 for $21,071.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for the repair of roofs at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-2043 for $20,500.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the repair of air conditioners at Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-2044 for $16,800.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the repair and installation of an electrical emergency power plant at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-2045 for $14,888.00 was awarded to Ueki Paint Co. for painting of permanent type officers' BOQ's at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-2048 for $13,913.00 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc., for an addition to Motor Pool Building 242 at Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-2050 for $20,500.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the replacement and repair of air conditioners at Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-2062 for $24,900.00 was awarded to Tokai Electrical Installation Co. for the construction and repair of POL operations and administration buildings at Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-2063 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Maeda Gumi for the replacement and repair of three quonsets at Kadena Air Base.

July: (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2066 for $17,407.00 was awarded to Kanahisa Kensetsu for grass cutting at Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-2067 for $1,110.00 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for inspection and repair of Thermo-fax machines at Kadena and Naha Air bases.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-2068 for a maximum of $1,000.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply Co., Inc., for the delivery of hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-2069, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for the delivery of chemicals to Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-2070, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to the Ryukyu Central Exchange for the delivery of general merchandise to Kadena Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-2071, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for the delivery of rubber stamps to Naha Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-2072, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for the delivery of rubber stamps to Kadena Air Base.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-2073, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Showa Electric Co. for the delivery of electrical supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-2074, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Matsuyama Shokai for the delivery of plumbing supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-2075, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Yamashiro Shokai for the delivery of miscellaneous supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-2076, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Horikawa Hardware for the delivery of hardware supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-2077, a blanket purchase agreement contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Furugen Brothers for the delivery of building supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-2078, for $24,582.00, was awarded to Furugen Brothers for the delivery of asphalt to Kadena Air Base.

July: (y) Contract AF 62(321)-2080 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Isao Oshiro Co. for grass cutting at Kadena Air Base.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-2081 for $4,680.00 was awarded to Kinjo Shokai for the delivery of cement to Kadena Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-2082 for $9,098.00 was awarded to Nakayama Enterprise for the delivery of cement and sand to Kadena Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-2083 for $17,900.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the construction of a squadron operations building at Kadena Air Base.

(cc) Contract AF 62(321)-2084 for $5,014.00 was awarded to Sochin Kayo for the delivery of gravel aggregate to Kadena Air Base.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-2085 for $28,620.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for custodial services for Kadena Air Base.

(ee) Contract AF 62(321)-2089 for $672.00 was awarded to Mr. Mutohiko Tanaka for piano tuning at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(ff) Contract AF 62(321)-2090 for $9,986.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the replacement and repair of air conditioners at Naha Air Base.

(gg) Contract AF 62(321)-2091 for $6,492.00 was awarded to Shinkai Kensetsu for the installation of radar reflectors at Kadena Air Base.

(hh) Contract AF 62(321)-2093 for $1,650.00 was awarded to Tokai Electrical Installation Co. for maintenance of the AFRTS radio transmitter tower in the Machinato Service Area, the AFRTS television tower, and the AFRTS transmitter antenna in the Plaza Area.

Fifteen numbered contracts were closed during the month of July 1962.

Three salvage contracts totalling $28,934.40 were awarded during the month of July 1962.

A total of $4,434.00 was expended for 136 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of July 1962.

August: Eight numbered contracts totalling $169,251.00 and 87 unnumbered contracts totalling $34,181.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

August: (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2088 for $117,000.00 was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for the repair and construction of a transient apron at Kadena Airfield.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-2092 for $22,500.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the installation of underground cable at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-2094 for $3,700.00 was awarded to Yukichi Tomari Co. for grass cutting at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-2095, a requirement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Konan Industrial Shop for the repair of lawn mowers for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-2096 for $15,768.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for construction and installation of 40 ramp floodlights at Kadena Airfield.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-2097 for $4,914.00 was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for the delivery of Carboblast and paint remover to Naha Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-2100 for $10,525.00 was awarded to Nankai Doboku for repair of the 6332d USAF Dispensary at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-2099 for $10,612.00 was awarded to Daniel Buck Co. for custodial services for Naha Air Base.

Nine numbered contracts were closed during the month of August 1962.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of August 1962.

A total of $5,419.00 was expended for 178 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of August 1962.

September: Six numbered contracts totalling $138,143.00 and 87 unnumbered contracts totalling $41,735.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-2086 for $1,048.00 was awarded to D. F. Fisher and Sons for the construction of an antenna support for the single side band (SSB) radio in the 313th Air Division Operations Center at Kadena Air Base.

September: (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2087 for $112,450.00 was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for the repair of the operations apron at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-2101 for $1,300.00 was awarded to Yamashiro Shokai for supplying glass to Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-2102 for $1,185.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for electrical rewiring of Building T-1515 at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-2103 for $6,160.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for air conditioning of Building T-751 at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-2104 for $16,000.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for modification and installation of various fixtures in the meat cutting room of the commissary at Kadena Air Base.

Six numbered contracts were closed during the month of September 1962.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of September 1962.

A total of $6,270.00 was expended for 210 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of September 1962.

October: Sixteen numbered contracts totalling $39,922.00 and 87 unnumbered contracts totalling $35,399.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-2098, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to the Ryukyu Central Exchange for general merchandise for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-2105, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Island Builders Supply Co., Inc., for the delivery of building and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-2106, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for the delivery of Carboblast and paint remover for Kadena Air Base.

October: (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2112, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Horikawa Hardware Co. for the delivery of building and hardware supplies to Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-2113, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Furugen Brothers Co., Ltd., for the delivery of building and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-2115 for $7,238.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply Co., Inc., for maintenance of the sprinkler system at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-2116 for $3,745.00 was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for the delivery of Turco cleaner and compound to Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-2117 for $14,000.00 was awarded to Ryukyu Asphalt Co. for hot mix asphalt for Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-2118 for $8,376.00 was awarded to Tokai Electrical Installation Co. for repair of electrical cable at Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-2119 for $2,438.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for custodial services at the 6332d USAF Dispensary at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-2120 for $4,125.00 was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for ready mix concrete for Naha Air Base.

Nine numbered contracts were closed during the month of October 1962.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of October 1962.

A total of $4,167.00 was expended for 102 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of October 1962.

November: Two numbered contracts totalling $5,600.00 and 83 unnumbered contracts totalling $26,501.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-2121, a blanket purchase agreement type contract of no fixed dollar amount, was awarded to Okinawa Oxygen Co. for dry ice for Naha Air Base.

November: (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2122 for $5,600.00 was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for the repair of a vehicle parking lot at Naha Air Base.

Six numbered contracts were closed during the month of November 1962.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of November 1962.

A total of $4,114.00 was expended for 100 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of November 1962.

December: Eight numbered contracts totalling $72,938.00 and 70 unnumbered contracts totalling $25,925.00 were awarded to local contractors and businesses for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyus.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-2123 for $8,921.00 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc., for restriping the runway and taxiways at Naha Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-2124 for $3,870.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for installation of a hydro-lift at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-2125 for $8,471.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for construction of weather detachment facilities at Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-2126 for $15,457.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for repair of the ground power equipment (GPE) parking lot at Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-2127 for $22,963.00 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc., for construction of a general aircraft shop at Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-2128 for $6,722.00 was awarded to Ie Kensetsu for delivery of beach sand to Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-2129 for $4,784.00 was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for the delivery of metal cleaner compound to Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-2130 for $1,750.00 was awarded to Shinkai Kensetsu for repair of a water main at Onna Point.

December: Twenty-one numbered contracts were closed during the month of December 1962.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of December 1962.

A total of $2,840.00 was expended for 87 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of December 1962.

# APPENDIX 3

## SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

## SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

### KADENA AIR BASE

| | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales | $ 7,196.43 | $ 7,840.96 | $ 7,560.08 |
| Category 22 (Health and Appearance) | 39.90 | 129.82 | 21.80 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | 65.20 | 887.45 | 2,580.70 |
| TOTAL | $ 7,301.53 | $ 8,858.23 | $10,162.58 |

| | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales | $10,097.60 | $ 9,737.90 | $ 9,294.03 |
| Category 22 (Health and Appearance) | 137.85 | 14.30 | 124.98 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | 1,699.60 | 896.40 | 223.65 |
| TOTAL | $11,935.05 | $10,648.60 | $ 9,642.66 |

## SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

### NAHA AIR BASE

| | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales | $3,217.91 | $6,001.83 | $3,343.28 |
| Category 22 (Health and Appearance) | | 129.10 | |
| Category 63 (Discharged Prisoners in Confinement) | 35.95 | | |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | 232.50 | 6.65 | |
| TOTAL | $3,486.36 | $6,137.58 | $3,343.28 |

| | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales | $5,547.67 | $4,635.42 | $4,736.53 |
| Category 22 (Health and Appearance) | | 71.86 | 33.30 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | | 13.30 | 135.00 |
| TOTAL | $5,547.67 | $4,720.58 | $4,904.83 |

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

TOTAL COMBINED INVENTORY VALUE FOR KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

| | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulk Warehouse | $42,248.60 | $43,754.95 | $40,261.40 |
| Retail Outlets | 33,532.14 | 34,597.76 | 32,111.74 |
| | $75,780.74 | $78,352.71 | $72,373.14 |

| | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bulk Warehouse | $43,707.70 | $ 81,396.20 | $ 74,824.72 |
| Retail Outlets | 32,726.20 | 32,059.92 | 29,752.30 |
| | $76,433.90 | $113,456.12 | $104,577.02 |

# APPENDIX 4

## OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

1962

MONTHLY COMPARISON PROFIT AND LOSS

| | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $7,597 | $3,696 | $13,109 | $3,811 | $9,717 | $4,707 |
| Aug | 4,521 | 1,058 | 9,936 | 1,800 | 7,480 | 5,493 |
| Sept | 4,012 | (284) | 6,072 | 793 | 3,992 | 2,129 |
| Oct | 4,335 | 3,158 | 9,345 | 1,570 | 6,665 | 3,768 |
| Nov | 6,059 | 2,377 | 6,646 | 1,660 | 966 | 219 |
| Dec | 4,443 | 783 | 5,491 | 4,992 | 2,442 | 695 |

NET PROFIT AND LOSS

CALENDAR YEAR TO DATE

| | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $63,488 | $ 6,841 | $76,778 | $24,890 | $46,071 | $20,267 |
| Aug | 68,009 | 7,899 | 86,714 | 26,690 | 53,551 | 25,760 |
| Sept | 72,023 | 7,615 | 92,785 | 27,483 | 57,543 | 27,889 |
| Oct | 76,356 | 10,773 | 102,130 | 29,053 | 64,280 | 31,657 |
| Nov | 82,415 | 13,150 | 108,776 | 30,713 | 65,174 | 31,876 |
| Dec | 86,858 | 13,933 | 114,267 | 35,705 | 67,616 | 32,571 |

## OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

### MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1962

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **July:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $61,557 | $29,098 | $68,254 | $40,433 | $70,254 | $34,001 |
| Food Sales | 29,368 | 16,696 | 21,863 | 11,496 | 17,046 | 6,347 |
| Beverage Sales | 10,209 | 3,563 | 14,249 | 9,909 | 13,283 | 8,798 |
| Package Goods Sales | 9,595 | 4,536 | 15,673 | 8,036 | 1,166 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 3,999 | 854 | 4,130 | 1,107 | 2,055 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 8,386 | 3,449 | 12,339 | 9,885 | 36,704 | 18,856 |
| Other Activity Income | 15,589 | 10,981 | 20,914 | 14,792 | 17,426 | 7,322 |
| Dues Income | 4,370 | 1,761 | 2,339 | 147 | 2,191 | 1,171 |
| Other Misc. Income | 215 | 203 | 61 | 495 | 2,130 | 280 |
| **August:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $61,243 | $29,955 | $67,882 | $44,296 | $75,233 | $36,236 |
| Food Sales | 28,161 | 16,007 | 20,966 | 12,526 | 18,473 | 7,110 |
| Beverage Sales | 10,240 | 3,891 | 13,462 | 10,571 | 15,382 | 9,383 |
| Package Goods Sales | 9,378 | 5,049 | 17,217 | 9,751 | 1,503 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 5,441 | 1,300 | 3,294 | 1,482 | 1,322 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 8,023 | 3,708 | 12,942 | 9,966 | 38,553 | 19,743 |
| Other Activity Income | 15,001 | 8,308 | 20,142 | 13,268 | 16,234 | 7,423 |
| Dues Income | 4,665 | 1,923 | 2,409 | 64 | 2,304 | 1,388 |
| Other Misc. Income | 68 | 170 | 1,307 | 638 | 219 | 413 |
| **September:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $60,018 | $31,411 | $67,375 | $41,334 | $70,772 | $34,781 |
| Food Sales | 29,049 | 17,448 | 22,019 | 12,673 | 17,380 | 6,818 |
| Beverage Sales | 8,752 | 4,004 | 13,788 | 9,549 | 14,782 | 8,183 |
| Package Goods Sales | 9,057 | 5,115 | 16,345 | 7,276 | 1,610 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 4,298 | 912 | 3,510 | 1,838 | 1,843 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 8,862 | 3,932 | 11,713 | 9,998 | 35,157 | 19,780 |
| Other Activity Income | 15,713 | 5,762 | 19,924 | 14,476 | 16,160 | 6,493 |
| Dues Income | 4,885 | 1,902 | 2,430 | 72 | 2,455 | 1,331 |
| Other Misc. Income | 995 | 260 | 248 | 531 | 148 | 388 |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1962

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **October:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $65,114 | $31,847 | $66,794 | $42,626 | $69,885 | $33,404 |
| Food Sales | 29,562 | 17,269 | 22,035 | 12,136 | 17,975 | 7,386 |
| Beverage Sales | 9,579 | 4,304 | 13,400 | 10,169 | 13,607 | 9,565 |
| Package Goods Sales | 9,863 | 4,688 | 14,008 | 8,584 | 1,786 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 4,930 | 1,093 | 3,998 | 1,613 | 2,293 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 11,180 | 4,493 | 13,353 | 10,124 | 34,224 | 16,453 |
| Other Activity Income | 15,385 | 8,244 | 20,184 | 13,986 | 15,253 | 8,774 |
| Dues Income | 4,790 | 2,010 | 2,478 | 120 | 2,367 | 1,372 |
| Other Misc. Income | 202 | 202 | 83 | 596 | 2,479 | 306 |
| **November:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $67,714 | $30,538 | $67,188 | $46,702 | $73,229 | $32,949 |
| Food Sales | 33,507 | 16,117 | 20,556 | 12,557 | 16,811 | 6,313 |
| Beverage Sales | 10,358 | 3,720 | 13,724 | 11,877 | 14,455 | 8,496 |
| Package Goods Sales | 10,683 | 5,831 | 16,676 | 10,365 | 1,986 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 1,684 | 298 | 3,067 | 1,917 | 1,194 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 11,482 | 4,572 | 13,165 | 9,986 | 38,783 | 18,140 |
| Other Activity Income | 14,224 | 8,925 | 19,393 | 13,962 | 12,941 | 6,220 |
| Dues Income | 4,750 | 2,010 | 2,421 | 103 | 2,259 | 1,318 |
| Other Misc. Income | 234 | 183 | 1,418 | 361 | 650 | 308 |
| **December:** | | | | | | |
| Total Sales | $72,449 | $31,047 | $74,978 | $48,506 | $75,895 | $32,345 |
| Food Sales | 32,043 | 16,843 | 21,075 | 15,012 | 17,326 | 6,347 |
| Beverage Sales | 9,680 | 3,615 | 13,353 | 10,828 | 15,202 | 8,490 |
| Package Goods Sales | 14,991 | 6,571 | 23,157 | 14,066 | 3,257 | -0- |
| Bingo Sales | 2,971 | 302 | 4,925 | 1,705 | 1,651 | -0- |
| Other Sundry Sales and Services | 12,764 | 3,716 | 12,468 | 6,895 | 38,459 | 17,508 |
| Other Activity Income | 14,089 | 9,459 | 21,092 | 16,128 | 16,675 | 7,416 |
| Dues Income | 4,790 | 1,992 | 2,478 | 47 | 3,221 | 1,429 |
| Other Misc. Income | 93 | 186 | 295 | 453 | 311 | 136 |

## OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

### MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1962

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **July:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,395 | $ 837 | $ 2,622 | $10,556 | $ 1,880 | $ 1,252 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 831 | 308 | 561 | 1,346 | 208 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 13,613 | 8,377 | 13,121 | 208 | 15,495 | 7,182 |
| Entertainment | 7,525 | 3,490 | 6,667 | 8,244 | 10,348 | 5,150 |
| Depreciation | 2,068 | 1,121 | 3,156 | 1,555 | 2,390 | 1,194 |
| Miscellaneous | 838 | 1,379 | 1,182 | 1,419 | 2,895 | 553 |
| **August:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,607 | $ 893 | $ 2,435 | $ 1,376 | $2,107 | $ 1,367 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 674 | 302 | 617 | 207 | 216 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 14,363 | 8,669 | 13,393 | 9,601 | 15,968 | 7,789 |
| Entertainment | 7,410 | 3,834 | 8,420 | 7,968 | 9,893 | 5,218 |
| Depreciation | 2,263 | 1,129 | 3,212 | 1,701 | 2,445 | 887 |
| Miscellaneous | 2,296 | 1,557 | 2,413 | 1,743 | 2,565 | 540 |
| **September:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,474 | 873 | $ 2,721 | $ 1,557 | $ 2,033 | $ 1,318 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 553 | 297 | 905 | 205 | 595 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 15,372 | 8,719 | 13,930 | 9,937 | 16,395 | 7,832 |
| Entertainment | 8,460 | 4,022 | 7,628 | 8,483 | 11,739 | 5,602 |
| Depreciation | 2,369 | 790 | 3,254 | 1,769 | 2,457 | 800 |
| Miscellaneous | 993 | 1,491 | 935 | 1,757 | 1,961 | 1,162 |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1962

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **October:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,550 | $ 682 | $ 2,584 | $1,468 | $ 1,785 | $1,225 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 604 | 277 | 1,223 | 209 | 400 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 13,995 | 8,224 | 13,830 | 9,370 | 15,967 | 7,824 |
| Entertainment | 8,107 | 3,684 | 6,724 | 8,312 | 10,772 | 6,625 |
| Depreciation | 2,439 | 1,003 | 3,464 | 2,020 | 2,444 | 743 |
| Miscellaneous | 813 | 483 | 1,083 | 571 | 1,959 | 422 |
| **November:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,510 | $ 985 | $ 2,876 | $1,575 | $ 1,968 | $1,287 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 1,027 | 417 | 1,201 | 339 | 500 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 16,101 | 9,215 | 15,464 | 9,907 | 18,585 | 9,012 |
| Entertainment | 7,190 | 3,273 | 7,145 | 8,950 | 10,605 | 6,808 |
| Depreciation | 2,447 | 970 | 3,526 | 2,072 | 2,447 | 752 |
| Miscellaneous | 963 | 397 | 1,648 | 625 | 2,381 | 392 |
| **December:** | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | $ 1,378 | $ 959 | $ 2,597 | $1,485 | $ 2,090 | $1,259 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 1,140 | 421 | 1,226 | 192 | 500 | -0- |
| Salaries (Ryukyu) | 16,575 | 9,596 | 16,383 | 10,280 | 18,414 | 8,933 |
| Entertainment | 7,752 | 3,884 | 9,593 | 8,486 | 15,714 | 5,911 |
| Depreciation | 2,442 | 957 | 3,433 | 2,025 | 2,447 | 812 |
| Miscellaneous | 860 | 416 | 966 | 854 | 2,905 | 395 |

## NUMBER OF MEMBERS

| | KADENA | | | NAHA | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Month | Officers Open Mess | NCO Open Mess | Airmen's Open Mess | Officers Open Mess | NCO Open Mess | Airmen's Open Mess |
| July | 960 | 2,339 | 2,191 | 578 | 1,688 | 1,503 |
| Aug | 978 | 2,409 | 2,304 | 629 | 1,628 | 1,514 |
| Sept | 979 | 2,430 | 2,455 | 666 | 1,674 | 1,459 |
| Oct | 1,030 | 2,478 | 2,367 | 681 | 1,732 | 1,533 |
| Nov | 1,021 | 2,421 | 2,259 | 686 | 1,714 | 1,421 |
| Dec | 1,025 | 2,478 | 3,221 | 680 | 1,643 | 1,556 |

## OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1962

### NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

| Month | Kadena Officers Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Kadena NCO Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Kadena Airmen's Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena Off | NCO | Amn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | 20 | 8 | 261 | 31 | 3 | 249 | 18 | 1 | 314 | 3.6:1 | 8.3:1 | 6.5:1 |
| Aug | 18 | 4 | 259 | 11 | 3 | 234 | 9 | 1 | 315 | 3.4:1 | 9.7:1 | 7.1:1 |
| Sept | 18 | 4 | 273 | 6 | 3 | 239 | 9 | 1 | 312 | 3.3:1 | 9.7:1 | 7.6:1 |
| Oct | 18 | 4 | 268 | 6 | 3 | 251 | 9 | 1 | 321 | 3.5:1 | 9.5:1 | 7.3:1 |
| Nov | 17 | 4 | 267 | 6 | 3 | 251 | 9 | 1 | 312 | 3.5:1 | 9.3:1 | 7.0:1 |
| Dec | 2 | 2 | 259 | 6 | 3 | 251 | 9 | 1 | 321 | 3.8:1 | 9.5:1 | 9.7:1 |

| Month | Kadena Officers Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Kadena NCO Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Kadena Airmen's Club Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena Off | NCO | Amn |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | 18 | 3 | 144 | 11 | 1 | 148 | 13 | -0- | 123 | 3.5:1 | * | * |
| Aug | 6 | 1 | 144 | 8 | 1 | 159 | 6 | -0- | 126 | 4.2:1 | 9.7:1 | * |
| Sept | 6 | 1 | 145 | 8 | 1 | 147 | 6 | -0- | 126 | 4.4:1 | * | * |
| Oct | 6 | 1 | 142 | 8 | 1 | 146 | 6 | -0- | 130 | 4.6:1 | * | * |
| Nov | 6 | 1 | 141 | 8 | 1 | 146 | 6 | -0- | 137 | 4.6:1 | * | 9.9:1 |
| Dec | 6 | 1 | 142 | 8 | 1 | 150 | 6 | -0- | 138 | 4.6:1 | * | * |

KUME SHIMA NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit And Loss | Net Profit and Loss CY to Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees Mil | Civ | Ind/O | Ratio Members to Employees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $ 48 | $ 3,678 | 91 | $1.00 | 4 | -0- | 4 | * |
| Aug | 240 | 3,918 | 94 | 1.00 | 2 | -0- | 3 | * |
| Sept | 334 | 4,252 | 101 | 1.00 | 2 | -0- | 3 | * |
| Oct | 47 | 4,299 | 103 | 1.00 | 2 | -0- | 4 | * |
| Nov | 148 | 4,446 | 112 | 1.00 | 2 | -0- | 4 | * |
| Dec. | (218) | 4,228 | 114 | 1.00 | 2 | -0- | 4 | * |

*Ratio over 10:1.

MIYAGO JIMA NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit and Loss | Net Profit and Loss CY to Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees Mil | Civ | Ind/O | Ratio Members to Employees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $ 18 | $ 580 | 89 | -- | 3 | -0- | 11 | 6.4:1 |
| Aug | 141 | 721 | 89 | -- | 2 | -0- | 6 | * |
| Sept | 169 | 890 | 85 | -- | 2 | -0- | 6 | * |
| Oct | 484 | 1,374 | 92 | -- | 2 | -0- | 6 | * |
| Nov | 26 | 1,401 | 93 | -- | 3 | -0- | 6 | * |
| Dec | 881 | 2,282 | 98 | -- | 3 | -0- | 6 | * |

*Ratio over 10:1.

YOZA DAKE NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit and Loss | Net Profit and Loss CY to Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees Mil | Civ | Ind/O | Ratio Members to Employees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $ 150 | $ 3,185 | 207 | .50 | 5 | -0- | 22 | 7.7:1 |
| Aug | 309 | 3,494 | 151 | .50 | 3 | -0- | 23 | 5.8:1 |
| Sept | 1,027 | 4,521 | 152 | .50 | 3 | -0- | 25 | 5.4:1 |
| Oct | 717 | 5,238 | 181 | .50 | 3 | -0- | 20 | 7.9:1 |
| Nov | 403 | 5,641 | 136 | .50 | 3 | -0- | 21 | 5.7:1 |
| Dec | 370 | 6,011 | 190 | .50 | 3 | -0- | 20 | 8.3:1 |

*Ratio over 10:1.

OKINO ERABU SHIMA NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit and Loss | Net Profit and Loss CY to Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees Mil | Civ | Ind/O | Ratio Members to Employees |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| July | $ 93 | $2,001 | 85 | $1.00 | 4 | -0- | 9 | 6.5:1 |
| Aug | 205 | 2,206 | 81 | 1.00 | 5 | -0- | -0- | * |
| Sep | 252 | 2,458 | 84 | 1.00 | 5 | -0- | 3 | * |
| Oct | 446 | 2,904 | 90 | 1.00 | 5 | -0- | 4 | * |
| Nov | 217 | 3,121 | 94 | 1.00 | 5 | -0- | 4 | * |
| Dec | (15) | 3,106 | 95 | 1.00 | 5 | -0- | 4 | * |

*Ratio over 10:1

# APPENDIX 5

## RATIONS ISSUED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMISSARIES

## ON OKINAWA

## 1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1962

KADENA AIR BASE

| Ration Issues | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field Ration "A" | 108,582 | 114,434 | 99,803 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 2,112 | 2,198 | 1,632 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 205 | 338 | 257 |
| Frozen Meals (Pre-cooked) | 343 | 4 | --- |
| Bit Size Snacks | 206 | 803 | 294 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 850 | 1,005 | 779 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 28 | 203 | 142 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 153 | 140 | 157 |
| Thailand AF Personnel - Meals | 67 | 59 | 21 |
| Philippine AF Personnel - Meals | 61 | 169 | 79 |
| Republic of Korea AF Personnel - Meals | 38 | --- | -- |
| Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel - Meals | -- | --- | 13 |

| Ration Issues | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field Ration "A" | 99,556 | 99,789 | 103,457 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 2,481 | 2,219 | 2,120 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 244 | 383 | 475 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 1,012 | 925 | 1,276 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 257 | 371 | 421 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 139 | 100 | 183 |
| Thailand AF Personnel - Meals | 83 | 164 | 134 |
| Republic of Korea AF Personnel - Meals | -- | --- | 6 |
| Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel - Meals | 22 | 29 | 24 |

NAHA AIR BASE

| Ration Issues | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field Ration "A" | 60,345 | 62,145 | 64,871 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 1,354 | 1,258 | 934 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 245 | 160 | 118 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 25 | 71 | 34 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 616 | 734 | 711 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 27 | 14 | 283 |
| Philippine AF Personnel - Meals | 52 | 55 | 17 |

| Ration Issues | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field Ration "A" | 65,408 | 65,541 | 62,430 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 1,144 | 1,174 | 1,471 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 87 | 77 | 100 |
| Sandwich Meals - U.S. Army Personnel | --- | --- | 7 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 232 | 55 | 47 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 676 | 667 | 721 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 944 | 736 | 589 |
| Thailand AF Personnel - Meals | --- | --- | 3 |

## KADENA AIR BASE

| Commissary Sales | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales (Store) | $172,284.80 | $186,437.52 | $195,450.02 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 39,406.17 | 51,614.12 | 44,792.07 |
| Troop Issue | 129,559.94 | 130,790.98 | 113,549.70 |
| TOTAL | $341,250.91 | $368,842.62 | $353,791.79 |

| Commissary Sales | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales (Store) | $194,809.82 | $219,058.43 | $209,317.03 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 47,474.67 | 59,565.02 | 41,029.42 |
| Troop Issue | 111,208.21 | 124,287.44 | 115,902.77 |
| TOTAL | $353,492.70 | $402,910.89 | $365,249.22 |

## NAHA AIR BASE

| Commissary Sales | JULY | AUGUST | SEPTEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales (Store) | $ 83,045.95 | $ 89,869.20 | $ 82,930.65 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 18,717.41 | 23,775.67 | 17,604.85 |
| Troop Issue | 69,131.49 | 65,280.41 | 68,370.76 |
| TOTAL | $170,894.85 | $178,925.28 | $168,906.26 |

| Commissary Sales | OCTOBER | NOVEMBER | DECEMBER |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Sales (Store) | $104,574.48 | $ 99,829.41 | $106,310.87 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 23,860.42 | 17,324.50 | 23,641.86 |
| Troop Issue | 76,579.68 | 70,716.00 | 65,693.06 |
| TOTAL | $205,014.58 | $187,869.91 | $195,645.79 |

# APPENDIX 6

## SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

JULY 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap Received During July | 366,116# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 2,390# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 6,085# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 1,181,186# |
| Scrap on hand 1 July | 2,639,531# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during July | $537,591.59 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 228,697.04 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 1,637.79 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 239,934.81 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 99,682.62 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 July | 783,862.71 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 5,165.90 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 7,472.76 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 20,742.17 |
| TOTAL | $ 33,380.83 |

During the month of July one Spot Bid Sale and three Seal Bid Sales were conducted.

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

AUGUST 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap received during August | 318,007# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 300# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 1,235# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 1,167,049# |
| Scrap on hand 1 August | 1,815,986# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during August | $454,063.04 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 46,375.00 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 9,648.61 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 263,040.43 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 133,530.34 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 August | 751,502.04 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 14,004.32 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 3,640.37 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 21,407.98 |
| TOTAL | $ 39,052.67 |

During the month of August three Spot Bid Sales were conducted.

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

SEPTEMBER 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap Received during September | 250,052# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 850# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 9,680# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 227,079# |
| Scrap on hand 1 September | 965,409# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during September | $414,346.47 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 5,420.50 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 1,480.51 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventories | 190,696.31 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 194,589.70 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 September | 752,970.65 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 15,386.98 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 6,749.90 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 1,307.43 |
| TOTAL | $ 23,444.31 |

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

OCTOBER 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap Received during October | 341,250# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 247# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 9,680# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 648,670# |
| Scrap on hand 1 October | 977,852# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during October | $401,051.42 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 12,207.99 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 19,249.06 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 152,122.62 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 48,382.36 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 October | 775,130.10 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 16,429.97 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 4,614.80 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 2,526.67 |
| TOTAL | $ 23,571.44 |

During the month of October two Spot Bid Sales were conducted.

313th AD, 1962-II

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

November 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap Received during November | 2,551,807# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 851# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 1,796# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 236,587# |
| Scrap on hand 1 November | 664,544# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during November | $1,398,845.25 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 4,537.00 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 35,731.23 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 1,216,098.75 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 88,869.51 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 November | 944,219.49 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 3,597.28 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 6,232.55 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 1,728.08 |
| TOTAL | $ 11,557.91 |

During the month of November one Spot Bid Sale was conducted.

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 1962

(1) Scrap and Waste

| | |
|---|---|
| Scrap Received during December | 266,256# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 580# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 696# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 236,851# |
| Scrap on hand 1 December 1962 | 2,977,117# |
| Scrap on hand 1 January 1963 | 3,005,246# |

(2) Surplus and Excesses

| | |
|---|---|
| Total excesses received during December | $478,261.70 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 15,862.50 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 36,116.60 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 99,765.83 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid and Retail) | 337,337.84 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 December 1962 | 997,828.25 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 January 1963 | 987,007.18 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|---|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | $ 21,551.64 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 4,856.00 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 1,701.88 |
| TOTAL | $ 28,109.52 |

During the month of December two Spot Bid Sales were conducted.

# APPENDIX 7

## TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

JULY

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,606 | 2,131 | 359 | 195 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,239 | 1,319 | 250 | 136 |
| Water - All Channels | 169 | 158 | 8,028 | 2,143 |

AUGUST

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,457 | 1,786 | 377 | 192 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,191 | 1,048 | 280 | 125 |
| Water - All Channels | 105 | 138 | 4,715 | 2,146 |

SEPTEMBER

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,957 | 1,387 | 434 | 138 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,591 | 708 | 340 | 104 |
| Water - All Channels | 120 | 112 | 8,573 | 3,753 |

OCTOBER

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,522 | 1,428 | 484 | 207 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,258 | 734 | 375 | 155 |
| Water - All Channels | 95 | 145 | 6,260 | 1,864 |

NOVEMBER

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,570 | 1,317 | 419 | 236 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,147 | 690 | 320 | 139 |
| Water - All Channels | 99 | 115 | 6,716 | 2,627 |

DECEMBER

| | PASSENGERS | | CARGO (TONS) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Inbound | Outbound | Inbound | Outbound |
| Air - All Channels | 1,486 | 1,629 | 267 | 224 |
| Air - Okinawa/CONUS | 1,049 | 1,076 | 170 | 148 |
| Water - All Channels | 152 | 214 | 2,467 | 3,623 |

Note: Air cargo indicated in short tons. Water cargo indicated in measurement tons. Inbound airlift figures based on allocations only.

# APPENDIX 8

## AOCP, ANFE AND ANOR/S RATES

PER CENT AOCP RATE

July - December 1962

| Unit | July | August | Sept |
|---|---|---|---|
| **6313th AB Wg** | | | |
| T-33 | 0 | 0.004 | -- |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-54 | 0 | 0 | 0.10 |
| **18th Tac Ftr Wg** | | | |
| F-100 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 0.010 |
| RF-101 | 3.8 | 0.0007 | 0.60 |
| **51st Ftr Intcp Wg** | | | |
| F-102 | 0.02 | 0.043 | 0 |
| T-33 | 0.082 | 0 | 0 |
| C-130 | 0.004 | 0.0022 | 0 |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SA-16B | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SH-19B | 0 | 0 | 0 |

*The Materiel Directorate ceased supplying these figures after September.

# APPENDIX 9

## RAINFALL DATA FOR 1962

## RAINFALL DATA FOR 1962

| Month | Det. 8 Kadena AB | Det. 14 Naha AB |
|---|---|---|
| July | 2.44" | 2.94" |
| August | 7.98 | 8.30 |
| September | 4.35 | 4.66 |
| October | 3.49 | 3.10 |
| November | 8.85 | 7.48 |
| December | 4.37 | 5.49 |
| TOTALS | 31.48" | 31.97 |

# APPENDIX 10

## ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

## AT KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

July 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,519,211 | 901,588 | 11,131 | 24 | 528 |
| Naha | 2,212,205 | 355,750 | -0- | 84 | 1,904 |
| TOTAL | 4,731,416 | 1,257,338 | 11,131 | 108 | 2,432 |

August 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,555,898 | 779,957 | 9,028 | 24 | 822 |
| Naha | 1,536,194 | 313,584 | 926 | 90 | 1,326 |
| TOTAL | 4,092,092 | 1,093,541 | 9,954 | 114 | 2,148 |

September 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,271,796 | 719,200 | 7,276 | 144 | 733 |
| Naha | 1,132,468 | 309,696 | 762 | 96 | 1,494 |
| TOTAL | 3,404,264 | 1,028,896 | 8,038 | 240 | 2,227 |

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

October 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,374,532 | 956,395 | 10,429 | 54 | 692 |
| Naha | 1,701,666 | 554,988 | 438 | 144 | 1,794 |
| TOTAL | 4,076,198 | 1,511,383 | 10,867 | 198 | 2,486 |

November 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,272,980 | 180,892 | 8,130 | 186 | 1,007 |
| Naha | 1,416,123 | 295,126 | 508 | 92 | 1,398 |
| TOTAL | 3,689,103 | 476,018 | 8,638 | 278 | 2,405 |

December 1962

| Base | JP-4 | 115/145 | 1100 Oil | 1010 Oil | 7808 Oil |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kadena | 2,201,461 | 825,367 | 7,123 | 84 | 420 |
| Naha | 1,642,723 | 259,225 | 412 | 160 | 1,068 |
| TOTAL | 3,844,184 | 1,084,592 | 7,535 | 244 | 1,488 |

# APPENDIX 11*

## BASE POPULATION FIGURES

## FOR

## KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

KADENA AIR BASE As of 26 January 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Hq 313th Air Div | | 55 | | 98 | 28 | 30 | 2 | 2 |
| Hq 6313 AB Wg | | 51 | | 263 | 67 | 64 | 144 | 138 |
| 6313 Mat Sq | | 20 | | 500 | 23 | 23 | 638 | 627 |
| 6313 AP Sq | | 6 | | 524 | 2 | 2 | 330 | 288 |
| 6313 Sup Sq | | 18 | | 194 | | | 147 | 144 |
| 6313 Civ Eng Sq | | 11 | | 162 | 92 | 873 | 84 | 852 |
| 6332 USAF Disp | | 25 | | 64 | 3 | 29 | 3 | 30 |
| Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg | | 54 | | | 4 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| 12 Tac Ftr Sq | | 39 | | | | | | |
| 44 Tac Ftr Sq | | 39 | | | | | | |
| 67 Tac Ftr Sq | | 36 | | | | | | |
| 18 Fld Maint Sq | | 10 | | | 1 | 50 | 1 | 64 |
| 18 A&E Maint Sq | | 14 | | | | | 4 | 2 |
| 15 Tac Rec Sq | | 31 | | 87 | | | | |
| 7 TDS | | 28 | | 156 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 15 Phy Tng Flt | | 1 | | 16 | | | | |
| 558 USAF Band | | 1 | | 19 | | | | |
| Det 4, 1 Med Svc Wg | | 3 | | 5 | | | | |
| 658 Tac Hosp | | 3 | | 24 | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 445 | | 3778 | 221 | 1078 | 1057 | 2151 |

KADENA AIR BASE As of 26 January 1961

| Organization Attached | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | OFF & WO Asgd | Enlisted Auth | Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIANS Citizens Auth | Citizens Asgd | Non-Citizens Auth | Non-Citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq | | 1 | | 4 | | | | |
| 724 (F-100) MTD | | 1 | | 14 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen | | 1 | | 2 | 2 | 1 | | |
| Dist Off 43, 6001 OSI | | 9 | | 17 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| 1962 AACS Gp | | 29 | | 629 | 12 | 13 | 45 | 40 |
| Det 8, 1st Wea Wg | | 10 | | 32 | | | 5 | 6 |
| 1505 Sup Sq | | 18 | | 146 | | | 53 | 59 |
| 6927 Radio Sq (M) | | 12 | | 488 | | | 0 | 3 |
| 2703 ECD Sq (Det 3) | | 1 | | 16 | | | | |
| 11 Air Postal Sq | | 4 | | 23 | | | 4 | 2 |
| 6922 Radio Gp (M) | | 24 | | 450 | | | | |
| Det 3, 7651 ACIS | | 1 | | 5 | | | | |
| AMC | | | | | 2 | 2 | | |
| SMAMA | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| Det 1, 3d Mun Maint Sq | | 3 | | 46 | | | | |
| TOTAL | | 114 | | 1872 | 21 | 21 | 112 | 114 |
| GRAND TOTAL | | 559 | | 5650 | 242 | 1099 | 1169 | 2265 |

KADENA AIR BASE As of 30 June 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Hq 313th Air Div | 53 | 54 | 77 | 82 | 28 | 30 | 2 | 2 |
| 6313 AB Wg | 45 | 49 | 234 | 327 | 65 | 65 | 155 | 151 |
| 6313 Mat Sq | 23 | 19 | 606 | 582 | 24 | 23 | 619 | 625 |
| 6313 AP Sq | 10 | 8 | 654 | 636 | 2 | 2 | 292 | 291 |
| 6313 Sup Sq | 18 | 16 | 213 | 239 | | | 132 | 134 |
| 6313 Civ Eng Sq | 8 | 9 | 201 | 178 | 90 | 79 | 881 | 852 |
| 6332 USAF Disp | 28 | 28 | 74 | 76 | 3 | 3 | 30 | 29 |
| Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg | 54 | 57 | 219 | 266 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 9 |
| 12 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 39 | 121 | 109 | | | | |
| 44 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 38 | 121 | 115 | | | | |
| 67 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 40 | 121 | 105 | | | | |
| 18 Fld Maint Sq | 12 | 10 | 731 | 741 | 6 | 3 | 68 | 79 |
| 18 A&E Sq | 17 | 15 | 525 | 496 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 15 Tac Rec Sq | 31 | 28 | 93 | 89 | | | | |
| 7 TDS | 29 | 26 | 172 | 170 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 15 Phy Tng Flt | 3 | 2 | 19 | 18 | | | | |
| 558 USAF Band | 1 | 0 | 19 | 15 | | | | |
| Det 4, 1 Med Svc Wg | 2 | 2 | 6 | 8 | | | | |
| 658 Tac Hosp | 4 | 3 | 26 | 27 | | | | |
| Hq 498 TM Gp | 24 | 23 | 95 | 100 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 498 Msl Maint Sq | 2 | 4 | 105 | 106 | | | | |
| 873 Tac Msl Sq | 13 | 9 | 44 | 98 | | | | |
| 874 Tac Msl Sq | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 494 | 479 | 4477 | 4584 | 226 | 213 | 2189 | 2177 |

KADENA AIR BASE — As of 30 June 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Attached | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evad Sq | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | | | | |
| 724 (F-100) MTD | 1 | 1 | 11 | 13 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | |
| 6001 Spec Invest Sq | 10 | 11 | 17 | 22 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| 1962 Comm Gp | 19 | 25 | 750 | 668 | 12 | 13 | 45 | 42 |
| Det 8, 1st Wea Wg | 12 | 10 | 30 | 34 | | | 5 | 5 |
| 1505 Sup Sq (MATS) | 22 | 23 | 173 | 184 | | | 61 | 61 |
| 6927 Radio Sq (M) | 12 | 11 | 476 | 561 | | | | |
| 2703 EOD Sq | 1 | 1 | 17 | 19 | | | | |
| 11 Air Postal Sq | 4 | 4 | 25 | 23 | | | 2 | 2 |
| 6922 Radio Gp (M) | 33 | 31 | 372 | 412 | | | | |
| Det 3, 7651 ACIS | 0 | 1 | 7 | 5 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 6 | 6 | | |
| Det 2, 1045 CE&T Sq | 13 | 15 | 36 | 41 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 130 | 136 | 1920 | 1988 | 24 | 24 | 117 | 112 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 624 | 615 | 6397 | 6572 | 250 | 237 | 2306 | 2289 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 6566

NAHA AIR BASE As of 30 June 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citzens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Hq 51 Ftr Intcp Wg | 33 | 32 | 190 | 198 | 8 | 6 | 8 | 10 |
| 51 Fld Maint Sq | 9 | 9 | 488 | 451 | 4 | 4 | 52 | 52 |
| 51 A&E Maint Sq | 12 | 11 | 269 | 255 | | | | |
| 16 Ftr Intcp Sq | 45 | 41 | 94 | 79 | | | | |
| Hq 51 AB Gp | 32 | 35 | 135 | 157 | 18 | 17 | 53 | 49 |
| 51 Support Sq | 11 | 11 | 247 | 245 | | | 271 | 270 |
| 51 Materiel Sq | 17 | 15 | 290 | 284 | 17 | 17 | 304 | 293 |
| 51 Civil Engr Sq | 5 | 5 | 129 | 133 | 61 | 60 | 404 | 403 |
| 623 ACW Sq | 60 | 59 | 570 | 585 | | | 139 | 137 |
| 6351 USAF Disp | 22 | 20 | 46 | 48 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 23 |
| Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | | |
| 817 TC Sq | 52 | 57 | 92 | 116 | | | 20 | 15 |
| 21 TC Sq | 66 | 68 | 140 | 154 | | | 20 | 12 |
| Det 1, 315 Air Div | 15 | 20 | 36 | 49 | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 380 | 384 | 2629 | 2757 | 111 | 107 | 1298 | 1268 |

NAHA AIR BASE As of 30 June 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Attached | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Det 3, 313th Air Div | 3 | 3 | 22 | 23 | | | | |
| Det 14, 1st Wea Wg | 7 | 5 | 16 | 14 | | | 3 | 3 |
| Det 2, 11th Air Post Sq | 1 | 0 | 12 | 12 | | | 1 | 0 |
| 2152 Comm Sq | 8 | 8 | 205 | 213 | 3 | 3 | 33 | 33 |
| 1038 Audit General | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | | | | |
| Det 1, 43d OSI Dist | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | 2 | 2 |
| Det 1, 5th Comm Sq | 1 | 1 | 19 | 17 | | | | |
| Det 1, 7th Aerial Port Sq | 0 | 5 | 49 | 52 | | | 29 | 27 |
| C-130-3 FTD | 1 | 1 | 11 | 12 | | | | |
| 33d ARS | 31 | 39 | 92 | 108 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 2 | 2 | | |
| Coast Guard | | | | | | | 5 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 55 | 69 | 433 | 453 | 5 | 5 | 73 | 70 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 435 | 453 | 3062 | 3210 | 116 | 112 | 1371 | 1338 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 3,376

KADENA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Hq 313th Air Div | 52 | 50 | 76 | 84 | 27 | 27 | 2 | 1 |
| 6313 AB Wg | 46 | 48 | 256 | 329 | 65 | 67 | 184 | 175 |
| 6313 Mat Sq | 23 | 18 | 598 | 582 | 24 | 24 | 630 | 630 |
| 6313 AP Sq | 10 | 9 | 661 | 659 | 2 | 2 | 291 | 292 |
| 6313 Sup Sq | 17 | 19 | 199 | 207 | | | 128 | 133 |
| 6313 Civ Eng Sq | 9 | 9 | 208 | 183 | 89 | 77 | 867 | 849 |
| 6332 USAF Disp | 28 | 26 | 74 | 73 | 3 | 2 | 33 | 27 |
| Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg | 53 | 58 | 238 | 262 | 5 | 7 | 15 | 9 |
| 12 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 40 | 109 | 114 | | | | |
| 44 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 37 | 109 | 110 | | | | |
| 67 Tac Ftr Sq | 39 | 39 | 109 | 110 | | | | |
| 18 Fld Maint Sq | 12 | 10 | 710 | 690 | 6 | 5 | 79 | 80 |
| 18 A&E Sq | 16 | 16 | 480 | 555 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 15 Tac Rec Sq | 32 | 30 | 93 | 87 | | | | |
| 7 TDS | 29 | 25 | 171 | 172 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 15 Phy Tng Flt | 2 | 2 | 19 | 19 | | | | |
| 558 USAF Band | 1 | 1 | 19 | 17 | | | | |
| Det 4, 1 Med Svc Wg | 2 | 2 | 6 | 7 | | | | |
| 658 Tac Hosp | 4 | 3 | 25 | 23 | | | | |
| Hq 498 TM Gp | 24 | 26 | 125 | 123 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| 498 Msl Maint Sq | 3 | 4 | 177 | 165 | | | | |
| 873 Tac Msl Sq | 24 | 34 | 124 | 160 | | | | |
| 874 Tac Msl Sq | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 504 | 506 | 4587 | 4732 | 224 | 213 | 2233 | 2201 |

KADENA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1961

| Organization Attached | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | OFF & WO Asgd | Enlisted Auth | Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIANS Citizens Auth | Citizens Asgd | Non-Citizens Auth | Non-Citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Det 1, 2876th GEEIA Sq | 1 | 1 | 25 | 21 | | | | |
| Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | |
| 43 OSI | 10 | 8 | 17 | 17 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
| 1962 Comm Gp | 27 | 30 | 708 | 685 | 13 | 14 | 45 | 42 |
| Det 8, 1st Wea Wg | 12 | 7 | 38 | 39 | | | 5 | 5 |
| 1505 Sup Sq (MATS) | 23 | 22 | 175 | 234 | | | 61 | 60 |
| 6927 Radio Sq (M) | 14 | 13 | 585 | 656 | | | | |
| 2703 EOD Sq | 1 | 1 | 17 | 19 | | | | |
| 11 Air Postal Sq | 4 | 3 | 25 | 22 | | | 2 | 2 |
| 6922 Radio Gp (M) | 35 | 30 | 312 | 396 | | | | |
| Det 3, 7651 ACIS | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 6 | 5 | | |
| Det 2, 1045 OE&T Sq | 13 | 17 | 36 | 45 | | | | |
| 911A Fld Tng Det | 1 | 1 | 13 | 25 | | | | |
| Det 911L 3415 Tech Sch | 1 | 1 | 27 | 13 | | | | |
| 6003 Sup Sq (HAFB) | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 146 | 138 | 1990 | 2184 | 26 | 25 | 117 | 111 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 650 | 644 | 6577 | 6916 | 250 | 238 | 2350 | 2312 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH FOR KADENA AB: 6,821

NAHA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Hq 51 Ftr Intcp Wg | 34 | 35 | 223 | 224 | 8 | 8 | 11 | 11 |
| 51 Fld Maint Sq | 8 | 8 | 481 | 467 | 4 | 4 | 51 | 51 |
| 51 A&E Sq | 10 | 10 | 263 | 257 | | | 4 | 5 |
| 16 Ftr Intcp Sq | 46 | 40 | 94 | 91 | | | | |
| 51 AB Gp | 32 | 33 | 138 | 147 | 19 | 16 | 53 | 51 |
| 51 Support Sq | 10 | 12 | 233 | 246 | | | 270 | 265 |
| 51 Materiel Sq | 19 | 18 | 299 | 298 | 16 | 17 | 307 | 294 |
| 51 Civil Engr Sq | 4 | 4 | 122 | 122 | 61 | 60 | 402 | 403 |
| 623 ACW Sq | 56 | 50 | 443 | 468 | | | 139 | 138 |
| 6351 USAF Disp | 22 | 22 | 47 | 47 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 23 |
| Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | | |
| Det 3, 313 Air Div | 3 | 3 | 22 | 21 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 245 | 236 | 2368 | 2391 | 110 | 107 | 1260 | 1240 |

NAHA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1961

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIANS | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Attached | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| 817 TC Sq | 63 | 57 | 129 | 141 | | | 20 | 5 |
| 21 TC Sq | 63 | 68 | 128 | 176 | | | 20 | 5 |
| Det 1, 315 Air Div | 17 | 22 | 41 | 43 | 1 | 1 | | |
| Det 14, 1st Wea Wg | 4 | 5 | 16 | 14 | | | 3 | 3 |
| Det 2, 11 Air Postal Sq | 1 | 0 | 12 | 13 | | | 1 | 1 |
| 2152 Comm Sq | 8 | 13 | 202 | 336 | 3 | 3 | 33 | 33 |
| 1038 Audit General | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| Det 1, 6001 Spec Inv | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | 2 | 2 |
| Det 1, 5 Comm | 1 | 1 | 19 | 15 | | | | |
| Det 1, 7 Aerial Port | 5 | 5 | 70 | 53 | | | 29 | 28 |
| 909F (C130) FTD | 1 | 1 | 11 | 11 | | | | |
| 33d ARS | 35 | 41 | 100 | 117 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 2 | 2 | | |
| Coast Guard | | | | | | | 5 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 204 | 220 | 732 | 921 | 6 | 6 | 113 | 82 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 449 | 456 | 3100 | 3312 | 116 | 113 | 1373 | 1322 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 3902

KADENA AIR BASE — As of 30 June 1962

| Organization Assigned | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | MILITARY OFF & WO Asgd | MILITARY Enlisted Auth | MILITARY Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIAN Citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Citizens Asgd | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hq 313th Air Div | 50 | 54 | 52 | 74 | 27 | 25 | 2 | 2 |
| 6313 AB Wg | 49 | 59 | 448 | 503 | 65 | 67 | 318 | 294 |
| 6313 Mat Sq | 21 | 18 | 499 | 451 | 25 | 24 | 608 | 609 |
| 6313 AP Sq | 10 | 9 | 609 | 594 | 2 | 2 | 231 | 229 |
| 6313 Sup Sq | 17 | 14 | 205 | 229 | | | 116 | 120 |
| 6313 Civ Eng Sq | 9 | 8 | 210 | 205 | 89 | 86 | 811 | 827 |
| 6332 USAF Disp | 30 | 29 | 79 | 84 | 3 | 3 | 33 | 31 |
| Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg | 57 | 59 | 271 | 329 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 10 |
| 12 Tac Ftr Sq | 38 | 38 | 102 | 97 | | | | |
| 44 Tac Ftr Sq | 38 | 36 | 102 | 100 | | | | |
| 67 Tac Ftr Sq | 38 | 41 | 102 | 97 | | | | |
| 18 Fld Maint Sq | 10 | 12 | 697 | 659 | 5 | 5 | 79 | 79 |
| 18 A&E Sq | 16 | 16 | 664 | 721 | | | 1 | 1 |
| 15 Tac Rec Sq | 31 | 28 | 89 | 96 | | | | |
| 7 TDS | 29 | 27 | 171 | 168 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 15 Phy Tng Flt | 2 | 2 | 19 | 19 | | | | |
| 558 USAF Band | 1 | 1 | 19 | 19 | | | | |
| Det 4, 1 Med Svc Wg | 2 | 2 | 6 | 6 | | | | |
| 658 Tac Hosp | 4 | 4 | 25 | 26 | | | | |
| Hq 498 TM Gp | 24 | 27 | 125 | 185 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| 498 Msl Maint Sq | 4 | 5 | 223 | 210 | | | | |
| 873 Tac Msl Sq | 35 | 44 | 186 | 220 | | | | |
| 874 Tac Msl Sq | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 515 | 533 | 4904 | 5093 | 224 | 221 | 2212 | 2205 |

KADENA AIR BASE — As of 30 June 1962

| Organization Attached | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | MILITARY OFF & WO Asgd | MILITARY Enlisted Auth | MILITARY Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIAN Citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Citizens Asgd | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Det 1, 2876 GEEIA Sq | 1 | 1 | 25 | 23 | | | | |
| Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | |
| 43 OSI | 10 | 10 | 17 | 18 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| 1962 Comm Gp | 27 | 34 | 706 | 803 | 13 | 14 | 51 | 42 |
| Det 8, 1st Wea Wg | 12 | 9 | 38 | 36 | | | 5 | 4 |
| 1505 Sup Sq (MATS) | 23 | 22 | 175 | 175 | | | 71 | 65 |
| 6927 Radio Sq (M) | 14 | 14 | 585 | 689 | | | | |
| 11 Air Postal Sq | 4 | 14 | 25 | 125 | | | 2 | 2 |
| 6922 Radio Gp (M) | 35 | 37 | 312 | 406 | | | | |
| Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq AFLC | 1 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | | |
| Det 2, 1045 CE&T Sq | 20 | 18 | 57 | 59 | | | | |
| 911A Fld Tng Det | 1 | 1 | 27 | 26 | | | | |
| Det 911L 3415 Tech Sch | 1 | 1 | 14 | 14 | | | | |
| 6003 Sup Sq (HAFS) | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| Det 2, 315 AD | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | | |
| Det 1, Hq PACAF (PACAF STAN/EVAL Team) | 13 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 166 | 177 | 1996 | 2390 | 29 | 31 | 134 | 116 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 681 | 710 | 6900 | 7483 | 253 | 252 | 2346 | 2321 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH FOR KADENA AB: 7,355

NAHA AIR BASE  As of 30 June 1962

| Organization | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | MILITARY OFF & WO Asgd | MILITARY Enlisted Auth | MILITARY Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIAN Citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Citizens Asgd | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Auth | CIVILIAN Non-citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Assigned** | | | | | | | | |
| Hq 51 Ftr Intcp Wg | 35 | 37 | 200 | 218 | 8 | 8 | 21 | 19 |
| 51 Fld Maint Sq | 8 | 8 | 434 | 412 | 3 | 4 | 85 | 81 |
| 51 A&E Sq | 10 | 11 | 243 | 248 | | | 4 | 4 |
| 16 Ftr Intcp Sq | 37 | 37 | 68 | 76 | | | | |
| 51 AB Gp | 32 | 34 | 142 | 173 | 19 | 21 | 54 | 51 |
| 51 Sup Sq | 12 | 13 | 274 | 271 | 1 | 1 | 270 | 264 |
| 51 Materiel Sq | 18 | 17 | 285 | 277 | 16 | 15 | 305 | 294 |
| 51 Civil Engr Sq | 5 | 4 | 130 | 131 | 60 | 58 | 400 | 397 |
| 623 ACW Sq | 56 | 55 | 438 | 436 | | | 139 | 144 |
| 6351 USAF Disp | 22 | 23 | 47 | 48 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 23 |
| Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | | |
| Det 3, 313th Air Div | 3 | 3 | 22 | 20 | 1 | 1 | | |
| TOTAL | 239 | 243 | 2286 | 2313 | 110 | 110 | 1301 | 1277 |

NAHA AIR BASE — As of 30 June 1962

| Organization | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | OFF & WO Asgd | Enlisted Auth | Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIAN Citizens Auth | Citizens Asgd | Non-citizens Auth | Non-citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Attached | | | | | | | | |
| 817 TC Sq | 63 | 63 | 129 | 142 | | | 5 | 5 |
| 21 TC Sq | 63 | 76 | 128 | 171 | | | 5 | 5 |
| Det 1, 315 Air Div | 17 | 21 | 41 | 45 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 345 TCS Sq | 65 | 65 | 129 | 262 | | | | |
| Det 14, 1st Wea Wg | 4 | 7 | 16 | 19 | | | 3 | 3 |
| Det 2, 11 Air Postal Sq | 1 | 1 | 12 | 10 | | | 1 | 1 |
| 2152 Comm Sq | 8 | 13 | 202 | 364 | 3 | 2 | 33 | 31 |
| 1038 Audit General | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| Det 1, 6001 Spec Inv (OSI) | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | 2 | 2 |
| Det 1, 5 Comm | 1 | 1 | 19 | 17 | | | | |
| Det 1, 7 Aerial Port | 5 | 4 | 70 | 59 | | | 29 | 29 |
| 909F (C130) FTD | 1 | 1 | 11 | 16 | | | | |
| 33rd ARS | 35 | 40 | 100 | 113 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 3 | 2 | | |
| Coast Guard | | | | | | | 5 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 269 | 299 | 861 | 1220 | 7 | 5 | 83 | 81 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 508 | 542 | 3147 | 3533 | 117 | 115 | 1384 | 1358 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 3,949

KADENA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1962

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIAN | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| 313th Air Division | 47 | 50 | 70 | 84 | 27 | 28 | 2 | 2 |
| 558 USAF Band | 1 | 1 | 19 | 18 | | | | |
| 6313 AB Wg & Detachments | 51 | 68 | 453 | 338 | 65 | 65 | 329 | 318 |
| 6313 AP Sq | 10 | 7 | 619 | 591 | 2 | 2 | 231 | 229 |
| 6313 Civ Eng Sq | 10 | 9 | 227 | 208 | 90 | 88 | 790 | 801 |
| 6313 Mat Sq | 21 | 18 | 547 | 558 | 30 | 29 | 603 | 597 |
| 6313 Sup Sq | 12 | 3 | 217 | 126 | | | 113 | 111 |
| 6332 USAF Disp | 30 | 33 | 80 | 80 | 3 | 3 | 33 | 32 |
| 15 Phy Tng Flt | 2 | 2 | 19 | 20 | | | | |
| Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg | 54 | 56 | 254 | 285 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 10 |
| 12 Tac Ftr Sq | 36 | 32 | 12 | 8 | | | | |
| 44 Tac Ftr Sq | 36 | 30 | 17 | 8 | | | | |
| 67 Tac Ftr Sq | 36 | 34 | 5 | 6 | | | | |
| 15 Tac Rec Sq | 30 | 30 | 36 | 32 | | | | |
| 18 Fld Maint Sq | 9 | 10 | 571 | 593 | | | 95 | 91 |
| 18 A&E Maint Sq | 16 | 17 | 669 | 888 | | | 1 | 1 |
| 18 Org. Maint Sq | 6 | 8 | 371 | 376 | | | | |
| 498 Tac Mis Gp | 27 | 24 | 124 | 137 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| 873 Tac Mis Sq | 46 | 46 | 246 | 264 | | | | |
| 874 Tac Mis Sq | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| 498 Mis Maint Sq | 5 | 6 | 217 | 201 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 485 | 484 | 4774 | 4822 | 224 | 222 | 2205 | 2195 |

KADENA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1962

| Organization Attached | MILITARY OFF & WO Auth | OFF & WO Asgd | Enlisted Auth | Enlisted Asgd | CIVILIAN Citizens Auth | Citizens Asgd | Non-Citizens Auth | Non-Citizens Asgd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg | 2 | 2 | 6 | 6 | | | | |
| 7 TDS | 29 | 30 | 171 | 161 | 1 | 1 | | |
| 9 Aero Med Sq, Det 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | | | | |
| 11 Air Post Sq | 4 | 18 | 25 | 155 | | | 2 | 2 |
| Dist Off 43, OSI | 10 | 10 | 16 | 22 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 |
| Det 2, 315 Air Div | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | | | | |
| 658 Tac Hosp | 4 | 3 | 25 | 21 | | | | |
| Det 1, PACAF | 13 | 14 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | | |
| PACAF Manpower Val Team | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | |
| Det 8, 1 Wea Wg | 12 | 9 | 38 | 40 | | | 5 | 4 |
| 1505 Sup Sq | 23 | 21 | 175 | 205 | | | 71 | 71 |
| 7651 AC&W Sq, Det 3 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 5 | | | | |
| Det 12, 4440 Air Del Gp | | 2 | | 1 | | | | |
| 6922 Sec Wg | 38 | 38 | 415 | 376 | | | | |
| 6927 Rad Sq (M) & Det | 9 | 13 | 566 | 702 | | | | |
| 3415 Tech Sch, Det 911L | 1 | 1 | 14 | 13 | | | | |
| FTD 911A | 1 | 1 | 27 | 28 | | | | |
| 2876 GEEIA, Det 1 | 1 | 1 | 25 | 24 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | |
| 1045 OE&T Sq, Det 2 | 20 | 20 | 57 | 57 | | | | |
| 1962 Comm Gp | 32 | 33 | 731 | 802 | 13 | 14 | 42 | 42 |
| 6003 Sup Sq (HAFS) | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| 27 Comm Sq, Det 2 (SAC) | | | 7 | 8 | | | | |
| SAC Liaison Team | 2 | 2 | | 1 | | | | |
| AFLC | | | | | 8 | 8 | | |
| 307 Tac Ftr Sq (TDY) | | 30 | | 158 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 208 | 255 | 2315 | 2801 | 31 | 32 | 124 | 122 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 693 | 739 | 7089 | 7623 | 255 | 254 | 2329 | 2317 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 8,616

NAHA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1962

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIAN | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Assigned | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| 51 FIW | 42 | 41 | 205 | 208 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 18 |
| 16 FIS | 35 | 35 | 7 | 12 | | | | |
| 51 Fld Maint Sq | 7 | 6 | 447 | 505 | 3 | 3 | 84 | 84 |
| 51 A&E Maint Sq | 10 | 12 | 254 | 252 | | | 2 | 4 |
| 51 Org Maint Sq | 7 | 9 | 10 | 364 | | | 10 | 10 |
| 51 AB Gp | 33 | 35 | 158 | 158 | 20 | 19 | 58 | 53 |
| 51 Sup Sq | 14 | 13 | 298 | 247 | 1 | 1 | 269 | 262 |
| 51 Mat Sq | 17 | 12 | 326 | 292 | 16 | 15 | 299 | 298 |
| 51 Civ Eng Sq | 5 | 4 | 129 | 131 | 60 | 58 | 404 | 402 |
| 623 AC&W Sq & Detach | 56 | 54 | 438 | 463 | | | 139 | 136 |
| 6351 USAF Disp | 22 | 24 | 47 | 51 | 2 | 2 | 23 | 23 |
| TOTAL | 248 | 245 | 2319 | 2683 | 110 | 107 | 1302 | 1290 |

NAHA AIR BASE As of 31 December 1962

| Organization | MILITARY | | | | CIVILIAN | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OFF & WO | | Enlisted | | Citizens | | Non-Citizens | |
| Attached | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd | Auth | Asgd |
| Det 1, 315 Air Div | 18 | 18 | 42 | 52 | 1 | 2 | | |
| 21 TC Sq (315 AD) | 77 | 77 | 176 | 99 | | | | |
| 345 TC Sq (315 AD) | 64 | 62 | 129 | 47 | | | | |
| 817 TC Sq (315 AD) | 63 | 65 | 129 | 46 | | | | |
| 33 ARS (MATS) | 36 | 39 | 97 | 103 | | | | |
| 2152 Comm Sq (AFCS) | 12 | 11 | 387 | 363 | 3 | 3 | 27 | 32 |
| 5 Comm Sq (315 AD) | 1 | 1 | 19 | 15 | | | | |
| Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | | | | |
| Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq | 1 | 1 | 12 | 15 | | | 1 | 1 |
| Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq | 5 | 5 | 70 | 58 | | | 29 | 29 |
| Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | | 2 | 1 |
| Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS) | 4 | 6 | 16 | 18 | | | 3 | 3 |
| 909F FTD (ATC) | 1 | 1 | 11 | 29 | | | | |
| 1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd) AFLC | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | | |
| Coast Guard (Treas. Dept) | | | | | | | 5 | 5 |
| Det 3, 313 Air Div | 4 | 3 | 22 | 18 | | | | |
| TOTAL | 293 | 297 | 1117 | 868 | 6 | 7 | 67 | 70 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 541 | 542 | 3436 | 3551 | 116 | 114 | 1369 | 1361 |

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 4,741