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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY Department of the Army Washington, D. C. 20315 HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE	CALL NUMBER OCMH-127
TITLE American Military Government and Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, 1945 - 1972	
OFFICE OF ORIGIN Department of the Army Office of the Chief of Military History Histories Division Prepared by: Edward O'Flaherty	
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

CMH-127
Acc# 8533

Final
25 JAN 1971

MEMORANDUM THRU: DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR RYUKYUAN AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE

SUBJECT: Project Directive

1. Effective immediately, you are assigned the task of preparing a fully documented historical monograph tentatively entitled "American Military Government and Civil Administration, Ryukyu Islands, 1945 - 1972." This monograph will cover the period of U. S. Navy Military Government, 1945 - 1946; the period of U. S. Army Military Government, 1946 - 50; and the period of U. S. Civil Administration, Ryukyus, 1950 - 72.
2. The study will explore the entire framework of Military Government and Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands and will include reversion planning and negotiations. It will focus principally on the development and implementation of policies and techniques during the period of Civil Administration against the backdrop of the Military Government phase of U. S. occupation of the Ryukyus. Insofar as possible, the monograph will exclude discussion of purely military activities in the Ryukyus. However, significant policy and planning differences between the military forces and Military Government/USCAR should be covered. In general, the emphasis should be on problems, solutions, and accomplishments, but failures will not be glossed over -- the monograph is to be an objective historical treatise. The approach should be selective and analytical in nature and the narrative should focus on highlights rather than on an account of day-by-day operations.
3. Classified material up to and including TOP SECRET will be no bar to the contents of the work. Moreover, your research need not be limited to purely U. S. Army sources, but should include, as necessary to present a balanced and accurate account, research into DOD and State Department sources as well as those of the other Services.
4. It is expected that your text will be supplemented by appropriate charts, tables, and photographs. Exclusive of such supplementary material the text probably should not run more than 1,000 double-spaced, letter-sized pages.

SUBJ: Project Directive

5. It is desired that your basic manuscript be completed by 30 January 1973. It is requested that by 30 April 1971 you submit a proposed outline for the monograph, together with a brief, narrative statement of the monograph's projected scope and coverage.

for *Glenn D. Walker*
RICHARD G. STILWELL
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

GLENN D. WALKER
Major General, GS
Acting Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

DAMH-HDG

6 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, HISTORIES DIVISION

SUBJECT: General Remarks on O'Flaherty Manuscript, Chs. I - XIV

1. This partial MS covers the Ryukyus occupation story from planning during WW II to the establishment of the GRI in April 1952, which leaves another 20 years of the story to be told. The basic merit of these chapters is that they begin to bring together material from diverse sources concerning the Military Government (MG) and Civil Administration (USCAR) periods of the U.S. presence in the Ryukyus.
2. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of this MS is that it is based largely upon readily available secondary sources, such as the USCAR annual reports. The relatively narrow base of research inevitably tends to avoid critical analysis of MG/USCAR policies and operations. For instance, the author once hints that MG/USCAR made mistakes, but provides no examples of such mistakes. I fear, therefore, that we may be presented with a somewhat distorted picture of the MG/USCAR period. Revisions will require research into basic primary source materials (now available at the Suitland records depot) not only into MG and USCAR records but also into the records of other agencies concerned with the Ryukyus--Tenth Army, Navy MG, PHILRYCOM, FEC, RYCOM, USARYIS, etc.
3. Another difficulty lies in obtaining a good picture of how MG/USCAR actually operated. Routine day-by-day activities are not, of course, desired, but it is presently difficult to get a "feel" for what went on and for how MG/USCAR decisions were implemented. An exception to this criticism is the rather good description of how MG/USCAR recruited Okinawans for positions of responsibility. In a related matter, more needs to be said about the organization of MG/USCAR headquarters, as well as the how and why of changes in organization.
4. Another missing piece of the puzzle is a good analytical discussion of the relationships between the Japanese and the Ryukyuans before, during, and after WW II. At one point in the MS the author leaves the impression that the American forces landing on Okinawa were virtually greeted as liberators, but later in the MS we are faced with an overwhelming majority in favor of reversion to Japanese control. To me, at least, this indicates

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6 August 1975

SUBJECT: General Remarks on O'Flaherty Manuscript, Chs. I - XIV

that something may have gone seriously wrong with our occupation policies, and I think further analysis is called for. A related matter is the teaching of Japanese, rather than English, as a second language in the Ryukyuan schools. I am not entirely happy with the author's treatment of this matter, and I come away from the discussion with a feeling that there is more to this than has so far met the eye.

5. In matters of presentation and style, it is obvious that some "polishing" is going to be necessary. There are, for example, too many long quotations. While some of the quotations certainly add pith to the story, too many get rather distracting. Moreover, two or three of the chapters are in rather rough shape, representing little more than "note drafts" rather than finished narratives.

6. About a third of the content of these chapters is devoted to long-range strategic military/political questions, undoubtedly resulting from the direction that the volume would include reversion planning and negotiations. However, so much of such material dilutes the focus on MG/USCAR activities and breaks into the MG/USCAR story. Perhaps the military/political material could be left to the chronological point at which USCAR becomes deeply involved in reversion planning.

7. While these 14 chapters represent a good start, a goodly amount of more work needs to be accomplished, especially in the area of research into primary source materials as well as in the area of critical analysis.

8. The chapter and part titles are a sheer delight!

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ROBERT R. SMITH
Chief, General History Branch



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAMH-HDG

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, HISTORIES DIVISION

SUBJECT: Review of O'Flaherty Manuscript, Chs. I - XIV

1. General. This partial manuscript consists of 288 pages, 101 of them triple-spaced and the rest double-spaced. Many of the 14 chapters are quite short (cf. XIII at 11 pp.) and one (XII, at 12 pp) is really a non-chapter, being a rather repetitious extension of remarks in Ch. IX. The 14 chapters cover the Ryukyus story from planning during World War II to the establishment of the indigenous Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) in April 1952. This leaves another 20 years of the story to be covered, assuming the volume is to stop with the reversion of the islands to Japanese control in 1972.

The remainder of this review generally follows the "Order of Discussion" format the "formal" Review Panel employs for completed draft manuscripts.

2. Distinctive Merits vs Defects. The basic merit of these 14 chapters is that they begin to draw together material from a variety of sources concerning the Military Government (MG) and Civil Administration (USCAR) periods of the U.S. presence in the Ryukyus. It is, however, the opinion of this reviewer that this basic merit in no way outweighs the defects of the manuscript. These defects are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

3. Adequacy of Coverage.

a. Glaring omissions. One disturbing aspect of the manuscript is that no picture of how MG/USCAR actually operated emerges except, perhaps, in the selection of native leaders. While routine, day-by-day actions are not desired, one ought to be able to get some feel for what went on and how MG/USCAR decisions were implemented -- it is not enough to say that most of the basic work was carried out by the Okinawans themselves, for there must have been follow-up actions by MG/USCAR. In addition, no place is there any real discussion of how MG/USCAR headquarters was organized and what changes in organization (and why) took place during the period covered. By the same token, the relationships between MG/USCAR headquarters and the military command are virtually ignored, and the fact that all was not peaches and cream fails to emerge.

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Related to the latter is the fact that there is no coherent discussion of the military command in the Pacific and Far East during and after World War II, along with all the changes thereto that had to have some effect on MG/USCAR operations. One important command, the Philippines - Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM), is not even mentioned. Related to this are the variations in the military population of Okinawa after World War II. Such variations had to have some effect upon the operations of MG/USCAR, but the whole subject is avoided. For instance, when a major unit moved off the island, some or all of the land it occupied usually reverted to the Okinawans (via MG/USCAR), but these chapters give the reader only a bare mention of the problems accruing.

A more serious omission is a good, analytical discussion of the relations between the Japanese and the Okinawans before, during, and after World War II. Early in the manuscript the reader is told that after the initial shock of the invasion wore off, the Okinawans cooperated gladly with the Americans, virtually greeting us as liberators from three generations of Japanese exploitation. In Chapter X the reader is suddenly informed that by mid-51 the Ryukyuans were voting huge majorities in favor of reversion to Japanese control, but we are not told how and why the change from 1945 developed. For one thing, the author fails to come to grips with the fact that many, if not most, of the men MG/USCAR selected for indigenous leadership positions were Okinawans who had "had it made" under the Japanese before and during World War II. Inevitably, those men would be pro-Japanese and pro-reversion, but the author ignores such obvious implications. It seems almost incredible that MG invited the native head of the Imperial Rule Association to become a member of the Okinawan Advisory Council, but the author apparently feels that the action was quite proper, and again fails to deal with the implications of the re-ascendancy of the pro-Japanese faction. The author also fails to discuss the (perhaps sub-rosa) re-establishment of the nefarious neighborhood association system, by which the "new" leaders reimposed tight control and stifled free public opinion. All these related aspects are simply ignored.

Another omission is an adequate explanation of why an early CINCPAC directive regarding the teaching of English in Okinawan schools, more or less as a second language, was largely ignored. Why, in brief, did MG/USCAR make no serious effort to introduce English into the Ryukyuan school system? The limited reasons the author presents are not convincing. (For more on this see below, para. 6, and the comments on Ch. VII).

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Ch. V states that MG authorities saw little prospect for resuming sugar cane growing on Okinawa; that MG tried to convert sugar cane lands to soy bean production; and that the latter effort was a failure. Omitted is any explanation of the "why" behind the three related facets.

Ch. V also informs the reader that civil relief ration shortages arose by September 1946, but no reasons are forthcoming. This points up the fact that virtually nothing is said in the manuscript about MG/USCAR logistical planning and procedures.

b. Cuts Without Serious Damage. The sections (and chapters) on military/political planning about the status and ultimate fate of the Ryukyus could be cut sharply, at least in the 14 chapters herewith reviewed. Fuller discussion of this matter is to be found in paragraph 4, below, as well as the General Comments on a number of the chapters.

4. Balance and Emphasis (Focus). The directive for this manuscript clearly states that the basic focus was to be the MG/USCAR periods of the U.S. presence in the Ryukyus. Perhaps unfortunately (in retrospect), the directive also contained a strong proviso that the study would also "include reversion planning and negotiations." Certainly, material on reversion will ultimately have to be covered, for USCAR became deeply involved. However, the reversion proviso has led to an excess of military/political material at the expense of the MG/USCAR focus. Thus, fully a third of this partial manuscript is devoted to long-range, strategic military/political questions. The basic trouble is that the military/political material does not suffice for a needed in-depth study such as would be contained in "The U.S. Army in the Pacific and Far East, 1953-65," now in abeyance, and the volume on the occupation of Japan, 1945-52, also in abeyance. But at the same time the military/political material is given too much coverage for a volume that should be focused more on MG/USCAR, while much of the military/political material is only indirectly related to the reversion question. Moreover, the insertion of so much military/political material breaks up the MG/USCAR story, leading to some disorganization and a necessity for "dropping back" when the MG/USCAR story is resumed. One solution would be to eschew the military/political material until USCAR becomes well-involved in the reversion question, and then drop back in a final section of the volume to pick up the high-level strategic and political material from the end of World War II. This would permit the major portion of the manuscript to stick to the MG/USCAR last without significant interruption. Whatever the case, the present manuscript should present the minimum possible on the high-level military/political aspects, leaving the bulk of that story to volumes better designed to cover the material.

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5. Accuracy. My remarks here must be tempered with the realization that I have only a nodding acquaintance with MG/USCAR basic source materials. On the other hand, my knowledge of military and political strategy and planning for the period covered in these chapters is more extensive.

a. Evidence Used. The presumption has to be made that the material on purely MG/USCAR activities is accurate to the extent that the sources employed are accurate. In other areas, however, some serious questions arise. For example, Ch. I presents a badly garbled version of the strategic planning for World War II operations in the Western Pacific. The reader is left with the impression that the basic strategic argument was Formosa vs Okinawa, when, in fact, the argument was Formosa vs Luzon. (See Comments on Ch. I). To my mind, Ch. I also presents a misleading relationship between the Potsdam Declaration and the Ryukyus. A few more examples: In Ch. I General Buckner is placed in command of the Joint Expeditionary Force for the Okinawa operation; actually the JEF commander was Admiral Turner. Ch. III contains a discussion of command arrangements for Military Government that is at best confusing. My research indicates that the USN retained overall responsibility for MG until 1 July 46, while delegating field responsibility to Army commands from time to time. But Ch. III has the command of MG operations bouncing back and forth between the USA and the USN. Civilian casualty figures in Ch. III date back to sources of the late 1940's -- it would appear that by 1975 some more accurate and complete figures would have been developed. In Ch. IV no final, accurate figure is produced for Ryukyuan repatriates. In Ch. VII the author states that USCAR had no reason to believe that the Ryukyuan-American relationship would be long-lasting, when in fact anyone remotely concerned with military/political planning had to have known that the U.S. fully intended to remain in the islands a very long time, if not permanently. In Ch. IX a Marshall memo is mis-dated and mis-titled; in the same chapter a JCS paper is incorrectly cited. Throughout, descriptions of military command arrangements are inaccurate, confusing, and incomplete (cf. the absence of PHILRYCOM). Sometimes the titles of military commands are incorrect. Many footnotes to sources are not entirely accurate or are incomplete (see further, para 7 below). In all, sufficient inaccuracies exist to indicate that a time-consuming, careful checking process is called for.

b. Evidence Not Used. Discussion of this matter falls better under the headings of Objectivity and Documentation, Paras. 6 and 7 below.

6. Objectivity. Basically, this manuscript is non-critical and non-analytical. No place in these 14 chapters is there any criticism of MG/USCAR activities, organization, or personnel. Only once is it even hinted that MG/USCAR could make a mistake, and none are described. Too often the author reaches subjective, value judgments unsupported by any

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evidence or rationale in the text or footnotes. For example, the author concludes that it was entirely proper that Japanese -- as opposed to English -- was a required second language at all levels of Ryukyuan schools, but produces no evidence or rationale to support such a conclusion. In this regard, the author also fails to produce opposing points of view and fails to analyze adequately the reasons why the provision of an early CINCPAC directive concerning English instruction were not carried out (see comments on Ch. VII). Again, in discussing the beginnings of the reversion movement, the author fails to point out that the leaders of that movement were mainly Okinawans who had "had it made" under the Japanese before and during WWII. In Ch. X, the author, without any supporting evidence, asserts that there was no popular support for either political independence or a permanent association with the U.S. In Ch. XI the author employs an abbreviated MG/USCAR chronology to refute charges of neglect and indifference. This is unscholarly, for a chronology can only tell what happened; not the how, the why, and the long-term results. Generally, little attention is devoted to opposing points of view and when such viewpoints are voiced they are condemned out of hand with no attempt to analyze those viewpoints and no real evidence to support the condemnations. In brief, the reader ends up with the impression that all was for the best in this best of all possible MG/USCAR worlds. To voice the "Order of Discussion," the author has made many assumptions that are not recognized or treated as such.

An additional objectivity problem is that the author fails to come to grips with the proposition that had MG/USCAR operated differently, with different policies, we could have had the Ryukyuans clamoring for at least commonwealth status (as per Puerto Rico) within the American system rather than clamoring for reversion to Japan. Some obvious questions are avoided: What went wrong? How did we manage to lose such an opportunity?

7. Documentation.

a. Enough Evidence? Except for JCS and State Department papers cited in those sections concerning military/political matters, these 14 chapters are based largely on easily available secondary sources, such as MG/USCAR after-action or yearly reports. Archival investigation suggests that high level USCAR records after 1960 were not available in CONUS when the author was working on these chapters; but the same investigation also suggests that MG/USCAR records before 1960 should have been available in CONUS. There is, in brief, scant evidence that the author "got his hands dirty" in the basic, primary sources except for some MG/USCAR directives (DCSOPS was on distribution for these).

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More disturbing is the fact that the author makes so little use of material -- mostly secondary in nature -- that is critical of MG/USCAR policies and actions. While I am not at all well-acquainted with the MG/USCAR secondary literature, I have taken note of enough to convince me that much more needs to be presented about dissenting points of view -- i.e., those that do not present MG/USCAR in the best possible light. (This, of course, relates to the Objectivity question).

b. Correct Use of Evidence. This, again, requires a subjective analysis of the matter of objectivity (Para. 6, above). My subjective opinion is that the author has carefully selected his evidence to present MG/USCAR in the best possible light, and has glossed over any contrary evidence.

8. Presentation. The status of most of these 14 chapters is that of a "note draft," a very preliminary status at best. Many of the chapters, indeed, are little more than quotations strung together with a minimum of connecting material. The basic organization of MG/USCAR material is acceptable, but the intrusion of so much military/political strategic material breaks up the real story. There are entirely too many single-sentence paragraphs, and too many convoluted sentences. Paragraphing in general could use improvement. Where quotations are not used for the content of directives or reports, the text too often still reads like a directive or field manual.

A considerable problem is the over-use of the passive voice, which makes it impossible for the reader to pin responsibility for actions. The entire manuscript is badly marred by a plethora of long and short quotations, including in one case (Ch. IV) an obviously amateurish translation. Quotations have their place (cf. the Marshall quotation on p. 3, Ch. IX) but their excess use results in a rather deadly presentation.

The general story too often becomes too impersonal -- it could be enlivened by giving more names and attaching individual responsibility.

9. Miscellaneous.

The footnotes need a great deal of work. They do not adhere to the CMH system, nor to any other system of which I am aware, while the system employed in this partial manuscript is internally inconsistent. Many footnotes are incomplete as far as information about a source is concerned; others (as noted previously) are erroneous. In some cases, no sources are given for specific quotations.

Punctuation is not always proper, and much editorial work is needed in this area as, for instance, in the use of commas. "Which" is too often used where "that" is called for, and there are many indefinite antecedents for "it" or "its." Tenses (past and present) are sometimes mixed up

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
within the same paragraph. Dates should be set forth in military style, but most are not. Capitalization of "Military Government" is inconsistent.

A whole host of other editorial problems confront us.

10. A General Conclusion. This partial MS does not begin to measure up to minimum CMH standards and in its present form, and with its present approach, is simply unacceptable. Whether this material is salvageable within a reasonable length of time is, to say the least, open to question. My feeling is that we need a completely new approach to a volume that very definitely needs to be written.

11. Attached are General and Detailed Comments on each chapter.

14 Incl
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ROBERT R. SMITH
Chief, General History Branch

Chapter I

General Comments

This chapter presents the background of military government in the Ryukyus, starting with the national policy position vis-à-vis the islands and winding through the military strategic planning for the Ryukyus operation. The latter half of the chapter develops the military government staff organization and general plans for military government.

The first part of the chapter (pp 1-10) on national policy winds up with the Potsdam Declaration, seeking to relate that Declaration to U.S. policy regarding the Ryukyus. This strikes me as attaching too much importance to the Declaration in regard to the islands, and may be putting the cart before the horse. As is made clear by the subsequent section on military strategy (pp 11-16), the U.S. was going to occupy the Ryukyus and establish post-war bases on those islands with or without UN sanction and with or without any Potsdam Declaration. In brief, any direct relation between the Potsdam Declaration and the Ryukyus is, at best, tenuous. Finally, the national policy section (pp 1-10) contains material that is not germane to the Ryukyus story (see p 9, about the secret agreement concerning Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands), as well as other passages. The whole section needs tightening and reduction.

The military strategy section (pp. 11-16) paints a badly garbled version of the development of the strategy for the Western Pacific. The strategic argument is presented as one of Formosa vs Okinawa. This is completely incorrect. The basic strategic argument was Formosa vs Luzon. Okinawa had been in the strategic program since early 1944, and would have seized whether or not the Formosa operation took place. The Okinawa operation had not originally been envisaged as a substitute for Formosa, and became such a substitute (to a degree) only after Formosa was cancelled. More accurately, perhaps, the Luzon-Okinawa combination substituted for Formosa. See Ch. I, Okinawa: The Last Battle, and Ch. I, Triumph in the Philippines.

The section on the development of military government staff and plans is interesting enough, but much of it, especially the latter part reads like a field manual or a policy directive.

The entire chapter is marred by too many quotations and "near" quotations. Much of the quoted material could be more clearly and more briefly presented by paraphrasing.

On p. 17 failure of "higher echelons" (what does this mean?) to decide which Service was to be primarily responsible for military

government is mentioned, but no decision is reached in Ch. I. One presumes the decision will be covered in a later chapter.

A host of lesser deficiencies in Ch. I (style of dates, footnotes, use of commas, passive voice, inconsistent capitalization, that" vs "which," and others are common to most chapters and will be covered in the general review of the extant MS.

Chapter I

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) "machinations" and "conspiracy" bear unfortunate connotations. We need a slightly better choice of words.
(2) Too strong a word.
- p. 2 (1) "portentious" and "significant" are rather redundant. Suggest using one or the other.
(2) What was so "portentious" or "significant" about this?
(3) An indefinite antecedent.
(4) "Expanding" would be better.
(5) This is overdoing it.
- p. 3 (1) This could be left out. We can assume the reader will know something of the territories Japan conquered, and the deletion makes the sentence read more easily.
(2) Date is needed.
- p. 4 (1) Need some word on what these meetings were all about and who attended.
(2) Extraneous information not needed for the basic story.
(3) A non-sequitur, and extraneous.
- p. 5 (1) This sentence is a bit incoherent -- it badly needs to be broken up.
(2) The "however" makes one part of the sentence contradict the other. Clarify.
- p. 6 (1) Needs explanation. What was it? Who was on it? What importance? Etc.
(2) Not understood.
- p. 7 (1) I don't see the necessity or impact of quoting all of this. The points could be made more briefly and clearly without the quotes.
- p. 8 (1) Does Liuchiu refer to the Pescadores or the Ryukyus? I know, but would the average reader?
(2) Again, no necessity for the long quote.
- p. 9 (1) "among" or "within", but never "between."
- p. 10 (1) An unhappy choice of words. Even "dramatized" would be better.
(2) This may be overdoing the importance of the Potsdam Declaration in regard to the Ryukyus. The JCS, at least, had long been in agreement that the US would have to have exclusive

base rights in the Ryukyus, demilitarizing those islands except for the US bases. I think what you need to stress here is that Article 8 excluded Japan from any sovereignty over the Ryukyus. Perhaps my real point is that even without the Potsdam Declaration the U.S. was fully prepared to remain on Okinawa after the war, with or without UN sanction.

- p. 13 (1) Reconstruction to avoid passive voice.
(2) Reconstruction to avoid the obvious.
- p. 14 (1) This rather gives away the whole story.
- p. 15 (1) (and from last few lines on p. 13). This is a misinterpretation of the situation. The basic fight was over Luzon and Formosa. Once the decision to take Luzon instead of Formosa was made, then Okinawa became in effect, a substitute for Formosa. See Triumph in the Philippines (U.S. ARMY IN WW II), Ch. I.
(2) But the same directive instructed MacArthur to seize Luzon, which has to be mentioned to complete the picture.
(3) Buckner did not command the Joint Expeditionary Force; that was Admiral Turner; Buckner commanded, in the amphibious phase, the Expeditionary Troops.
- p. 16 (1) This mixes up Formosa and Okinawa; Buckner was originally designated the commander for Formosa.
(2) Where had MacLean had experience in military government? Certainly not in the Pacific by July 1944. Might be an interesting point.
- p. 21 (1) An authorized abbreviation?
(2) Lamentable usage.
- p. 22 (1) Inconsistency in capitalization. Probably should stick to upper case.
- p. 24 (1) Not understood. Is the "area" the Ryukyus or some "arcane aspect"?
- p. 27 (1) Editorializing. We don't have to hit the reader over the head. Entire paragraph should be recast.
- p. 28 (1) Not clear at all. Needs to be recast.
(2) This all reads like a Field Manual, or a directive.
- p. 29 (1) Ditto.
- p. 30 (1) Not understood.

Chapter II

General Comments

This chapter presents a general description of Okinawa and the Okinawans, along with a taste of the initial reactions of the Okinawans and the Americans to the occupation and military government. I find the chapter rather superficial and lacking in analytical content.

Perhaps the key to the problem is the complete lack of mention of the feeling of the Japanese toward the Okinawans and vice versa. The chapter does not come to grips with those basic feelings. Certainly the Japanese considered the Okinawans second class citizens or, as per Okinawa, p. 9, "inferior rustics." There had to be considerable anti-Japanese sentiment among the Ryukyuan islanders, but we get no inkling of that from this chapter. Anti-Japanese resentment probably went far toward the Okinawan acceptance of American military government and the co-operative attitude of the Okinawans, but we get no analysis of this factor. In brief, it appears to me that the islanders were pro-American from the start. Whatever the case, we have a gap that badly needs coverage.

The chapter is marred by an excess of quotations -- in fact, the latter half of the chapter is little more than quotations strung together. Other parts of the chapter suffer from some "loose" writing.

Detailed comments attached; see also editorial markings on pages of the chapter.

Chapter II

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) Need full name of the admiral. Should also indicate that the Fast Carrier Task Force at this time was part of the Third Fleet.
- p. 2 (1) This certainly looks like a dubious translation.
- p. 3 (1) Why quote?
(2) Published works should be underlined, not in quotation marks. I won't mention this again, but the citation is wrong throughout the MS. Moreover, it is not necessary to cite the author and publisher every time a source is set forth. If the source is to be used that often, just Okinawa would be sufficient.
- p. 4 (1) Needs to be identified in the text.
(2) It is unusual to mention sources in the text.
- p. 5 (1) "whose" should be reserved for people or, perhaps, organizations; but never for terrain features.
- p. 6 (1) Tenses are badly mixed here.
- p. 7 (1) A rather indefinite antecedent.
- p. 8 (1) "latter" here literally means that the fertile uplands served as staple food.
- p. 9 (1) The rest of the sentence is a non sequitur to the bracketed clause.
- p. 12 (1) I don't know who "they" or "their" was.
(2) Full name of division should be used at least the first time.
(3) This is a bit distorted. While one of the objectives was to destroy the suicide boats, the principal objectives were to secure a seaplane base and fleet anchorage.
- p. 14 (1) I know that Okinawa, p. 58, says Japanese but I wonder if that is not a mistake for Okinawan. In other words, I think you have to differentiate between Japanese civilians and Okinawan civilians.
- p. 16 (1) Could not this be construed as a reflection of anti-Japanese feeling -- i.e., that the Americans were more welcome occupiers than the Japanese?

- p. 17 (1) Too much quoting in this chapter.
- p. 18 (1) This information should go in a footnote, along with the name, etc. of the publication.
(2) Should be written out as: Tenth.
- p. 19 (1) Need full first name of the colonel.
(2) Again, could not this be construed as anti-Japanese sentiment?
(3) Ditto.
- p. 21 (1) Something appears to be left out here.

Chapter III

General Comments

This chapter starts with a section explaining (pp. 1-5) how the U.S. came to have sole responsibility for the occupation of the Ryukyus. The section is rather sketchy and thorough analysis is lacking. The basic point is that the UK, the Soviet Union, and China simply didn't want any part of the occupation.

PP. 6-20 contains a discussion of command and control arrangements for military government. I find this section confusing, and it is still not clear to me who was responsible for military government at various points. Reading this section, and various mentions of the command arrangement in previous chapters, I get the impression that the Navy had overall responsibility until 1 July 1946, delegating that responsibility to Army commands at various times. Yet, reading this section literally, the reader cannot avoid the impression that responsibility bounced back and forth between the Army and Navy. The whole problem badly needs further analysis and clarification.

The last few pages introduce the reader to relief problems and the number of Ryukyuan casualties. It would appear that by 1975 more complete and accurate figures on casualties (civilian) could be obtained, and much of the material in this section dates back to sources of the late '40's.

There are other holes in the coverage. For instance, various commands are introduced (e.g., Ryukyus Command) with no provenance for their existence and no description of their places in the chain of command.

The passive voice is again overly employed, very often making it impossible for the reader to pinpoint responsibility for decisions and policy.

And again the chapter is badly marred by the over-employment of quotations, many of them so lengthy as to get the impression that the chapter is simply a series of quotations strung together. This sort of writing is amateurish and not up to CMH standards.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter III

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) Why the passive voice? -- makes the sentence awkward.
(2) Editorializing.
(3) Bad word.
(4) But the point really is that the Chinese were in no position to help in the Ryukyus. Witness their problems in Indo-China and in mainland China.
(5) Meaning not clear.
(6) Unhappy choice of words -- "responsibility" would be better.
- p. 2 (1) Perhaps never "counted upon," but certainly hoped for during various periods of the war.
(2) Misleading. Britain's main commitment was in Southeast Asia (as Burma), not in the Pacific. Australian forces did operate in the Southwest Pacific Area.
(3) Yes, but the point should have been made on p. 1 where you speculate about the Chinese.
- p. 3 (1) Editorializing. Not necessary.
- p. 4 (1) I don't see the point of this. It really adds nothing.
(2) I don't see the point of this, either. The quotation says nothing about what country is to occupy the Pacific Islands. In any case, it is typical Rooseveltian rhetoric before a powerless body.
- p. 5 (1) But this doesn't follow at all from what's gone before.
- p. 6 (1) Why this long quote, which continues to top of p. 7? This is not good historical writing.
- p. 7 (1) But we still don't know which is responsible, the Army or the Navy.
(2) Again too much quoting.
- p. 8 (1) The passive voice construction evades the issue -- who formulated the plans?
(2) All this passive construction makes it impossible for the reader to learn who did what.
- p. 9 (1) But at whose direction and under what authority? This is the sort of information the reader needs, but the passive construction deprives him of the information.
(2) But we still don't know which Service was, at this point, responsible!

- pp. 10-11. This long quote from Patterson should be eliminated, and the material paraphrased.
- p. 10 (1) Middle initial is needed.
- p. 13 (1) Need full name and title; also proper rank (he was a BG at this time).
(2) Needs subject and date.
(3) Needs subjects and addressees.
(4) Must find out who this was. (Probably Col. J. M. Reynolds).
- p. 14 (1) Finally!!! This should have been made clear in Ch. I.
(2) Why the quote? Could shorten by paraphrasing major points.
- p. 15 (1) Ditto.
(2) The subject of JCS papers should always be included in the citation.
- p. 16 (1) and (2) But why? This reverses previous Navy policy. You explain the change in the following sentences, but this is putting the cart before the horse.
(3) You could enliven the story by giving the names of CINCPAC and the CNO.
(4) Likewise for the Chief of Staff.
- p. 17 (1) Why the quote?
(2) How and when did this come into being? And do you describe PHILRYCOM anyplace?
- p. 18 (1) But from what has gone before, the reader will have a firm conviction that the Navy had overall responsibility for military government in the islands until 1 July 46. Navy delegated responsibility to Army organizations but, as far as I can tell from your account, never gave up overall control until 1 Jul 46.
- p. 19 (1) Need full name.
(2) Why quote?
- P.
- p. 20 (1) I still don't get this. You've failed to explain the command situation adequately.
- p. 21 (1) Entirely too much quoting.
- p. 22 (1) Ditto.
(2) This needs attribution.
(3) This is an unpublished after action report.

Chapter. IV

General Comments

This chapter contains some interesting information about the number of Ryukyuan islanders under the military government system and especially the repatriation of Okinawans from other islands and places in the Pacific. However, no final figure is made available. The closest we get is that during 1946 155,376 Ryukyuans were repatriated and continued to return at a rate of about 1,000 per month during 1947. I think we should be able to do better than that.

We get some insight into the problems caused by the repatriates, but we are not given any explanation as to why the problems (mainly shortages of food, etc.) arose. It appears that there must have been some poor planning on the part of Military Government types.

On p. 12 of the chapter we get some inkling that the Ryukyuans began early to change their apparently happy acceptance of U.S. hegemony to one of waning confidence in the U.S. This is not developed sufficiently.

Again the chapter is marred by a plethora of quotations. Especially noted is the long quote from a biography of Kotaro Kokuba, with at best an amateurish translation.

In this chapter we finally get a clear-cut exposition of which Service was in charge of Military Government, the Army or Navy. This is refreshing after the confusing picture in previous chapters.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter IV

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) I can't find this gunto; does it have another name?
(2) Not understood. Whose acceptance?
(3) Was Stilwell acting as military governor or CG Tenth Army?
- p. 2 (1) Translate the first time.
(2) But why did the Amami area remain under SCAP?
(3) "There" has an indefinite antecedent.
(4) What is a SCAPIN? I know, but would the reader? Also, I think it would be better to use "SCAPIN No. 677, 29 January 1946."
- p. 3 (1) When; by what unit? Air strikes can't occupy an island.
(2) Repetition.
(3) But why did it take so long? How was Miyako run from the Japanese surrender to 8 December?
(4) But why did it take so long?
- p. 4 (1) We don't need this sort of thing. Just begin the sentence at "By".
- p. 5 (1) Why the quote?
- p. 6 (1) Weren't there probably as many "liaisons" as marriages?
- p. 7 (1) Don't need this sort of thing.
(2) Why? An important piece of the puzzle is missing.
(3) Why all the quoting?
(4) But why did the Japanese evacuate these people?
- p. 8 (1) Why the long quotation?
- p. 10 (1) No. And why quote?
- p. 11 (1) Why all the quoting?
- p. 12 (1) Is this the mot propre?
- p. 13 (1) Where is this?
- pp 13-17 We now go into about 4 1/2 pages of quotation. Why?
- p. 19 (1) Not the way it's usually done.

- p. 23 (1) Indefinite antecedent.
- (2) Any chance of figuring out how many of these 110,000 were actually Okinawans drafted into the Japanese Army? Okinawa provides some analysis, but it would appear that more information should have surfaced since that volume was sent to the printer in 1947.
- (3) Would not this indicate that well over 100,000 Okinawans lost their lives during the battle?

Chapter V

General Comments

This by far the best written and best organized chapter of the five read so far. The chapter covers the start of Okinawan economic life, public health progress, and financial aspects.

The chapter is generally informative and interesting, but too often raises more questions than it answers. For example, a ration (civil relief) shortage arose by September 1946, but the chapter does not really come to grips with the reasons for that shortage. It seems to me that more has to be said about military government planning and supply procedures.

Another case refers to sugar cane (p. 6). The chapter states that MG authorities saw little prospect for the early re-establishment of cane growing; tried to convert cane acreage to soy bean production; and that the latter effort was not successful. No place is the reader told the "why" of the three related facets.

In brief, we get a fair picture of the what that went on during the period covered by the chapter, but too little on the how and why.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter Five

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) But why the problems? Poor planning; inadequate supply machinery? This is the sort of thing that needs further examination.
- p. 2 (1) But why the transportation problem? Why wasn't it solved?
(2) No source given for quotation.
- p. 3 (1) Why?
(2) No undercurrent of grumbling?
- p. 5 (1) From outside the Ryukyus or just on the islands?
- p. 6 (1) But why? Too many unanswered questions.
(2) Why?
- p. 7 (1) This is somewhat repetitious of and somewhat contradictory to material appearing on p. 9 of Ch. II.
- p. 8 (1) By whom?
- p. 9 (1) Indefinite antecedent.
- p. 11 (1) What does this mean? Unless you are going to develop the research programs maybe they better not be mentioned here.
- p. 14 (1) Full name needed.
(2) From whom and to whom?
(3) Need title of JCAC paper.
- p. 17 (1) What's this?
(2) What's this?

Chapter VI

General Comments

A fairly good chapter that focuses on the problems of financing the occupation and the revival of the Ryukyus economy. It is rather a transitional chapter, from a period of rather ad hoc administration to a more firm, continuous program.

As usual, the chapter is marred by an excess of quotations.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter VI

Detailed Comments

- p. 3 (1) As you point out, the Civil Administration "noted," but that isn't the same as making the notation a fact, as you present it. It is true, of course, that many Americans got "buck fever" about the Communist takeover in China.
- p. 4 (1) Tenses mixed up.
(2) I'm not sure I understand this.
- p. 5 (1) And so much for another MacArthur fiat.
(2) How come?
- p. 6 (1) Isn't State here hedging about possible reversion?
- pp 8-10 Too much quoting. Whole message could be made clearer by synthesis.
- p. 9 (1) Are you sure RYCOM existed as a separate entity in 1949? I thought the command was PHILRYCOM until 1952. In any case, I believe the title is wrong and should read "Ryukyus" rather than Ryukyuan.
- p. 12 (1) Need more identification than this.
(2) First name required.
- p. 13 (1) Do we have to use this word at all?
- p. 14 (1) I don't understand this.
- p. 15 (1) Why quote?
(2) Why this?
(3) Bad word.
(4) This is the first time this has come up. Needs explanation much earlier.
(5) Not necessary.

Chapter VII

General Comments

This chapter covers the re-opening of schools in the Ryukyus, the establishment of a university, and various U.S. supported scholarship programs.

The most important part of the chapter (pp. 8-16) is that covering English language instruction. Here, I feel rather strongly, the author has fallen down, and actually misleads the reader by reaching conclusions not supported by the evidence presented. The point is, had the occupation been run differently, the islanders, instead of clamoring for reversion to Japan, would have been clamoring at least for commonwealth status within the U.S. system (as Puerto Rico), if not status as the 51st state.

An early CINCPAC-CINCPOA directive (Dec 45) stated that "instruction in the English language . . . is a prime necessity." To my mind, the author does not satisfactorily explain why the terms of this directive were never carried out. The author concludes (p. 15) that a mammoth Peace Corps-type program would have been necessary to make English a compulsory second language, but he presents no solid evidence to back up that assertion. Indeed, the Philippine experience (1898-1941) indicates that such a broad program would not have been necessary.

The author refers to a directive issued for the Philippines, and points out, correctly, that portions of the December 1945 directive were almost identical to the turn-of-the-century Philippine directive. However, he never cites the Philippine directive, and it should be cited to complete the picture.

On p. 15 the author states that no grounds existed for USCAR to assume that the Ryukyuan-American relationship would be a long-lasting one. This is contrary to fact, and, indeed, contradicts to a large extent material the author presents about bases in Ch. I. The fact is that at least as early as late 1943 the U.S. had plans for permanent bases in the Ryukyus, which certainly indicates a long-term relationship. Documentation to this effect is readily available (in fact, I have some of it in my own files).

The author concludes the chapter with the observation that it was entirely proper that Japanese was a required subject at all levels of the Ryukyuan educational system. This is a subjective value judgment that is completely unsupported by any evidence the author presents. If Japanese could be made a required second language, why not English instead?

Incidentally, the author does not make it clear as to whether basic instruction in the schools was carried out in Japanese or Luchuan.

Chapter VII

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) Too many quotes.
- p. 2 (1) What is this? If you introduce an organization you've got to explain it.
- p. 3 (1) This is not the way to do this. This is lazy writing. Too many quotes.
- p. 4 (1) Which?
(2) Why in quotation marks?
(3) You mean the entire physical plant or just that for PhyEd?
- p. 5 (1) Yes, but wasn't that a mistake to so limit the English schools? Why wasn't this program expanded to take care of English in all schools?
- p. 6 (1) How funded?
(2) Wasn't the castle destroyed during the fighting? Was it ever rebuilt?
(3) How funded?
- p. 7 (1) How funded?
(2) What's this?
- p. 8 (1) Indefinite antecedent.
(2) Why "so-called"? It's either called that or not.
(3) Why in quotes.
- p. 9 (1) A subjective judgment without supporting evidence.
(2) Why not name the university?
(3) Another subjective judgment. And man should be named in the text.
(4) Bad word.
- p. 10 (1) Bad word.
(2) What does this mean?
(3) This type of presentation is unacceptable and needless.
(4) In the footnote you might identify Warner's later job: Historian, USARJ, with station on Okinawa.
- p. 12 (1) Full first name, please.
(2) You present no evidence that Warner saw only a "truncated version." To the contrary, your quote here and that quoted by Warner on p. 11 are virtually identical.
- p. 13 (1) Misuse of this word. It means "to stretch" when what you want is something with the sense of "consolidate."

A very disappointing chapter about a very important subject, and one again marked by long quotations.

Detailed comments attached.

- p. 13 (2) I don't see what this has to do with making English a compulsory second language.
- p. 14 (1) But why only 65?
- p. 15 (1) But why less than 200; the explanation in the last sentence is not a satisfactory rationale.
(2) But no such broad program was carried out in the Philippines.
(3) This is an incorrect assumption. As you point out in Ch. I, since 1943 the U.S. expected to have permanent bases in the Ryukyus.
- p. 16 (1) But why was Japanese a required subject; and if Japanese could be required, why not English. And who required the Japanese teaching? Also, was basic instruction carried on in Japanese or Luchuan?
(2) This is an unwarranted, subjective judgment on your part, and cannot be supported by anything you've set forth in the rest of the chapter. It seems to me that just the opposite should have been the case; if USCAR had acted properly it would have knocked out the Japanese in favor of English.

Chapter VIII

General Comments

This chapter covers the revival of self-government in the Ryukyus to early 1950. Rather informative and interesting, despite excesses of quotations. Definitely one of the better chapters, although the chronology is sometimes obscure, or a bit confused.

The chapter would be improved by a discussion of the U.S. chain of command during the period covered.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter VIII

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) I still don't know what a wake-of-battle directive is.
(2) Need a title for JCS papers, at least first time they are mentioned.
- p. 3 (1) Must be identified.
- p. 4 (1) Not the proper method of citation.
(2) The term "mura" was introduced a couple of chapters ago. Now we finally get the translation.
(3) These MG districts have yet to be satisfactorily described.
- p. 5 (1) First name required.
(2) Deputy Commander of what?
(3) What's your authority for this statement?
- p. 6 (1) A little bit of quoting from Marumoto might be OK, but this goes on to p. 12. Unacceptable.
- p. 7 (1) Must make it plain you are talking about Okinawans -- the Japanese civilian leaders did evacuate.
- p. 8 (1) Must be identified, with full name.
- p. 9 (1) I don't believe this.
- p. 12 (1) Someplace in the text you've got to explain the chain of command fully, along with the changes in the chain of command. This is yet to be satisfactorily accomplished.
(2) Date of change from Mil Gov to High Commissioner has to be covered in text.
(3) Is it explained anywhere that as High Com he reported direct to DA, while as CG USARYIS/IX Corps reported to FEC, then USARPAC?
- p. 13 (1) This is all repetition of what's already been told on previous pages.
- p. 14 (1) Might give a couple of examples.
(2) I don't understand. There's nothing illusory about the establishment of the Departments.
- p. 16 (1) This is at least the 3d time this word has been misused. Here you want something like "eased."

p. 19 (1) Repetition from previous chapter.

p. 20 (1) Are these formal, official titles?

p. 22 (1) This quotation over to p. 24 cannot be justified. The whole would be much clearer if paraphrased.

(2) Why the "sic"? To many Okinawans the occupation was indeed a liberation from Japanese rule, a point you consistently fail to make.

p. 26 (1) Why quote?

p. 29 (1) Editorializing.

Chapter IX

General Comments

This chapter covers the development of attitudes toward the retention of the Ryukyus, more or less permanently, by the U.S. The chapter is informative and generally interesting; it also makes clear the dichotomy between State Department views and JCS/NSC views.

But, despite its merits, the chapter leaves me with a sense of something missing. For one, the whole is largely cast in terms of State vs the JCS, and, very often, the Army vs State. DOD (except in the persona of the JCS) is completely missing from the picture. Certainly, the SecDef must have had something to do with final decisions.

Again, upon close re-reading of the chapter, it appears that the JCS (& NSC?) moved from a position of retaining base rights in the Ryukyus to one of retaining complete control over the entire archipelago on a permanent basis. This should be made to emerge more clearly and positively; as it is, some chronological jumping around rather obscures the issue.

Finally, one wonders if all the strategic background material in this chapter -- the arguments leading the position of more or less permanent administration of the islands -- is really germane to the basic USCAR story. Probably it is, but the story could be presented in a much more concise manner. The detailed story should probably be left for fuller treatment in the volume, now in abeyance, "The U.S. Army in the Pacific and Far East, 1953-65."

By chance, I have in my files notes on some of the source documents cited in the footnotes of this chapter. Checking these notes against the footnotes in this chapter, I found what appear to me to be serious discrepancies or incorrect citations. See detailed comments p. 3(3); p. 4(1); p. 7(2). Taken together with previous comments on other chapters concerning incorrect methods of citation and incomplete citations, this indicates that there is going to be a major problem in checking all footnotes.

Another growing problem is that the author has yet to come to grips with the command and control situation in the Pacific and Far East and the various changes thereto. In this chapter, for example, the position of PHILRYCOM and RYCOM does not emerge, nor is the relationship of USCAR to PHILRYCOM/RYCOM made clear.

Again this chapter is marred by a plethora of long quotations. However, the Marshall quotation beginning at the bottom of p. 3 is an example of properly employed quoting.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter IX

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) JCS citations should include title of the JCS paper, at least the first time mentioned.
(2) This certainly contradicts the statement on p. 15 of Ch. VII that USCAR had no reason to believe that the Ryukyuan-American relationship would be long-lasting.
(3) If the NSC papers have titled, the titles should be cited the first time, at least.
(4) Date and title required.
(5) This oversimplifies the command structure. The position of PHILRYCOM (and later RYCOM) needs to be explained. True, MacArthur was Military Governor, but he exercised that function through CG PHILRYCOM and then CG, RYCOM. Position of USCAR vis-à-vis PHILRYCOM and RYCOM needs to be explained.
- p. 2 (1) What is the source of this quotation?
(2) What is meant here? Who is the hindmost?
(3) By whom?
(4) Awkward way of putting it.
(5) These references should not be in the text.
(6) See comment (2) for p.1, as above.
- p. 3 (1) Actually, much earlier. See JCS 570 and 973 series, and JPS 684 series.
(2) Memorandum from whom? And if the memo has a subject, that subject should be included in the citation.
(3) My notes indicate that the proper date for Marshall's reply was 30 June 1945. See OPD File 336 TS, Case 126.
(4) This is one of the few cases wherein, it seems to me, it is important to quote in extenso.
- p. 4 (1) My notes indicate that the full title of the memo was "Memorandum Concerning U.S. Post-War Pacific Bases." This must be checked out. Date?
(2) Why should he? At the time Marshall was the CofSA and was acting in that capacity alone. He had no idea he would become Sec State, and at the time would have no business interfering in international politics. This sort of aside misleads the reader.
- p. 6 (1) Who is he? Full name required.
(2) Not understood.
- p. 7 (1) Almost universally the case.
(2) This is an incorrect citation. JCS 570/40 is dated 25 October, not 23. JCS 570/40 was not amended. Rather, JCS 570/40 is JCS 570/34 as amended and approved by the JCS. JCS 570/34

was dated 23 October, not 570/40. See papers in OPD File, ABC 686 (6 Nov 43), Section 1-C.

- p. 9 (1) Who is he? Full name required.
- p. 11 (1) Too much quoting.
- p. 12 (1) What does this mean?
- p. 13 (1) This is definitely not the best way to present this.
- p. 14 (1) What does this mean? What are you trying to say?
Innuendo has no place in scholarly history.
 - (2) Footnote is misplaced.
 - (3) Too much quoting.
- p. 15 (1) Ditto.
- p. 16 (1) What does this mean?
 - (2) Too much quoting.
- p. 17 (1) Wrong way to cite these documents.
 - (2) What year? -- I'm getting lost.
 - (3) Wouldn't this be the Secretary of the Army by now?
 - (4) Better enlighten the reader.
- p. 18 (1) Who says it was "premature?" Looks like another subjective judgment on the part of the author.
 - (2) What's this?
 - (3) Incorrect method of citation.
 - (4) Wrong tense.
 - (5) Entire sentence is awkward and hard to understand.
- p. 19 (1) "Staff" elsewhere; why Group here?
 - (2) Full name required.
- p. 20 (1) No justification for this long quote.
- p. 21 (1) No source is provided for this quotation.
- p. 22 (1) Wrong tense.
 - (2) Not a good word.
 - (3) Full name required.
 - (4) P&P Group of what?
- p. 23 (1) No source given for this quotation.
 - (2) An odd usage for this word, which is usually reserved for biology and chemistry.

p. 23 (3) Wrong tense.

p. 24 (1) Another contradiction of the statement on p. VII-15 that USCAR had no reason to assume a long relationship in the Ryukyus.

(2) Are you going to explain why someplace?

(3) Bad usage.

p. 25 (1) If you undertake a quotation, you have to give a source.

(2) Something is wrong here. The Ryukyus Command did not exist as a separate entity in 1950 -- it was PHILRYCOM until 1952.

p. 26 (1) No justification for this long quotation.

p. 27 (1) Is this correctly quoted? Should it not be "Islands"?

(2) See remark for p. 25 (2).

(3) Editorializing.

Chapter X

General Comments

This chapter covers the 1950 change from Military Government to USCAR; the beginnings of agitation for reversion to Japan; the establishment of the GRI; and the development of a new financial structure in the Ryukyus.

The section on the beginning of the reversion movement is especially disturbing to me, and it seems to me that the author has not completely analyzed the situation and its leaders. Reading this chapter, and re-reading Ch. VIII, it becomes apparent that the politicians leading the reversion push were those very Okinawans who had "had it made" under the Japanese, before and even during WW II. Naturally, they wanted their own power and prestige restored, and probably felt they had a better chance to do so under the Japanese than under the Americans. Nothing, however, is made of this in the chapter.

Again, the author cites (p. 7) large majorities in favor of reversion in mid-51, under the auspices of two "voluntary associations." The author does not analyze just how "voluntary" the signature campaign may have been. The aspect is that Military Government and USCAR appointed and accepted leadership in the restoration of civil government mostly people who had had some degree of responsibility under the Japanese. These people, I have been told, re-established (more or less sub rosa) the neighborhood associations at the local level. These associations kept the people in line, and the people normally did what their local government told them. But again no analysis.

Early in the MS, the author indicates that after the initial shock of invasion many Okinawans greeted U.S. forces as liberators from three generations of Japanese exploitation if not repression. The author offers (p. 10) an unsupported assertion that there was no popular support for either political independence or permanent affiliation with the U.S. I found that hard to swallow after three generations and the early reactions to our occupation. Some popular support must have been present after three generations of being kicked around, but I suspect that the reimposition of the Imperial Rule Assistance system (however sub rosa) made it impossible for popular support to surface.

Also missing from the picture is some description of the organization of USCAR headquarters. Likewise, the position of USCAR vis-à-vis the military command chain is not clear; nor is the purely military organization yet described in clear terms.

The section on finances is broad brush. We learn in brief what was done, but we don't know if more could and should have been done. We are told nothing about the efficiency or inefficiency of GRI financial institutions. Again, no real analysis.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter X

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) I don't see anything necessarily incompatible in the two missions or concepts.
(2) Too much quoting, and repetitious of Ch. IX.
- p. 2 (1) Too much quoting.
- p. 3 (1) Better remind reader what this was -- it's been a couple of chapters since you last "translated."
(2) Emigration or immigration? We went to a lot of trouble to bring Okinawans back from the Pacific Islands and Japan. How come we now promoted emigration?
(3) I don't understand this. You have previously indicated that the Japanese Government had been kicked out of the islands (south of 30 degrees) lock, stock, and barrel. If so, how come the Japanese government still had real estate in the islands? This whole subject badly needs clarification.
- p. 4 (1) Trusteeship over what?
(2) Editorializing.
(3) What is the source of this quotation?
(4) Not an allowable word.
(5) Approved by whom?
(6) Believe the name of the command requires an "s." Again, we need further explanation of the command structure. How, for instance, did PHILRYCOM fit into the picture? Was there a separate RYCOM and a separate PHILCOM under PHILRYCOM?
(7) Probably won't be familiar for long except to a few scholars.
(8) Must explain how many "hats" Beightler wore at this time. Also, I believe that MacArthur, from the start, had been Military Governor, with Beightler as his deputy on the ground.
- p. 5 (1) Need to go further into the relationship between Hinds and Beightler. For example, was USCAR headquarters separate from that of RYCOM?
(2) What years?
(3) Why use the date 1945 at all? -- the context is 1950.
- p. 6 (1) I am dissatisfied with this "some Okinawan leaders." Reading on, and referring back to Ch. VIII, it looks to me like most of the pro-reversion leaders were those Okinawans who had "had it made" under the Japanese. Their views must have been slanted by their past prestige and positions.

- p. 7 (1) I wonder just how "voluntary" these associations really were. For two generations before WW II the Ryukyus had been ruled and run through the Imperial Rule concept, down to the neighborhood associations. Under this system little was really voluntary. The fact is that by setting up local governments early in the game, MG and USCAR helped reestablish the system, and again people did exactly what they were told. This whole business of "voluntary" badly needs further examination.
- p. 8 (1) All of which tends to prove the point that the politicians who pressed for reversion had the most to gain -- the restoration of their pre-war power. It appears to me that consciously or not, MG and USCAR elevated leaders who were pro-Japanese.
- p. 9 (1) I find this hard to take. For nearly three generations the Okinawans had been kicked around by the Japanese, and there is certainly strong indications that after the shock of the initial invasion many Okinawans tended to view us as liberators. It would seem to me more logical to examine how the reestablished neighborhood associations (under the local governments) stifled the real will of the natives.
- p. 10 (1) "Unpopular" with whom? -- the stifled natives or the pro-Japanese politicians?
(2) I still can't buy this.
(3) Editorializing.
- p. 12 (1) And just how many of these people had "had it made" under the Japanese?
(2) (and on to p. 14) Too much quoting.
- p. 15 (1) This assertion needs further development.
(2) Improper usage.
(3) Not previously capitalized.
- p. 17 (1) Poor word.
(2) Who or what established the fund? The passive voice tells nothing.
- p. 18 (1) Indefinite antecedent.
- p. 19 (1) Editorializing.
(2) Too much quoting. (and on through p. 20).

- p. 21 (1) This is all very well, but it is hardly analytical. Should more have been done? Could and should the program been larger? How efficiently were the RRFF and the RDLC run? No problems?
- p. 23 (1) If Ryukyuans felt they were being sacrificed as a defense for Japan, how come they were so anxious to revert to Japan? You can't have it both ways.

Chapter XI

General Comments

This chapter purports to be an evaluation of military government in the Ryukyus, 1945 - 50. This it most definitely is not. The author making subjective, value judgments with no real analysis to back up his conclusions.

An abbreviated chronology of Military Government, 1945 - 50, is employed in an unsuccessful attempt to refute charges of neglect and indifference on the part of Military Government. The chronology cannot be so employed. It merely outlines certain actions and in no way refutes the neglect and indifference charges. One would have to have an extended discussion of the follow-up and results of each action listed to make the chronology refute any adverse criticism.

The chapter is another example of the non-critical, non-analytical approach that pervades the MS so far.

Detailed comments attached.

Chapter XI

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) This sort of editorializing is not necessary.
(2) I would certainly agree that this chapter attempts to be an apologia rather than an evaluation. There is no real evaluation or analysis in the chapter.
(3) It would be well to name a few and describe their opinions. How come all their opinions are classed as "none commendatory."
(4) This is a subjective value judgment unsupported by evidence and one that has no place in historical writing.
- p. 3 (1) Position(s) and background should be described. Without that you are being unfair to the man.
(2) Is there something wrong about taking it or leaving it?
(3) I don't see what's unclear and unexplained about "military fiat." A "fiat" is simply an order, a sanction, or an authorization. Why make something sinister out of the use of the word?
(4) Even "benign" military rule would have to make use of "fiats."
- p. 6 (1) Is this man's background given elsewhere?
- p. 7-14. I don't see the point of the chronology in this place. A chronology per se can do nothing to refute charges of indifference and neglect. To make it do so, you would have to expand on the results and effects of every action mentioned.
- p. 8 (1) What is this?
- p. 9 (1) What is this?
- p. 10 (1) If everything was so great, why did it take from 21 July 1945 to 26 May 1947 to inaugurate foreign postal service?
- p. 15 (1) It would be nice if the MS had so far taken a look at some delays and mistakes in policy and action.
(2) You have yet to prove to me that the appraisal is not valid.

Chapter XII

General Comments

This short chapter (12 pp.) is essentially nothing more than a slight extension of the strategic and political planning covered in Ch. IX. It presents little new from Ch. IX and, indeed, is rather repetitious of Ch. IX. The two chapters should and easily could be combined into a single entity.

This again brings up an organizational problem of the entire MS. We have, essentially, two separate stories. On the one hand the strategic/political planning for the ultimate fate of the Ryukyus and on the other hand the activities of Military Government/USCAR. Very often, the connection between the two is rather obscure. And in any case, as stated previously, there is too much detail on strategic/political planning for a volume that is supposed to focus on MG/USCAR. As it is now, the chapters on strategy/politics break up the MG/USCAR story, and vice versa. I think the two can be separated more or less into parts of the entire MS. Serious consideration should be given to this solution, with an occasional short chapter or section tying the two stories together when necessary.

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) Why this weird fiscal year?
- p. 2 (1) "concluding" would be better.
(2) There were other uses for Okinawa.
(3) Editorializing.
- p. 4 (1) Full name needed. Probably ought to name the ambassador, too.
- p. 5 (1) Contrast this with the State Dept. attitude in 1946, as set forth in Ch. IX, pp. 10-11. How come the change?

Chapter XIII

General Comments

This short chapter (11 pp.) continues the strategic/political coverage and focuses on the Japanese peace treaty and the phrase "residual sovereignty."

Again, we have too little detail for full analysis of the subject and too much detail for an MS that is to focus on MG/USCAR activities. Further on this matter in the general review of the MS.

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) This clause certainly cries out for explanation.
- p. 3 (1) Does he have a middle initial -- if so, it must be used.
- p. 5 (1) What is needed here (or on the next page) is an explanation of how, why, and when Dulles (or his minions) dreamed up the term "residual sovereignty." And from this comes another question -- why was the term applied only to the Ryukyus and not to the Japanese mandated islands in the Central Pacific?
- p. 6 (1) Again the status of the mandated islands should come into the picture, which is incomplete without the comparison to the Ryukyus.
- p. 7 (1) But this is rather contradictory, isn't it? The Potsdam Proclamation limited Japanese sovereignty quite specifically, but Younger is saying, in effect, that the Ryukyus are not under the terms of Potsdam.
(2) Something wrong here.
- p. 8 (1) But is this true or not? One reading of Potsdam would be that a "previous Allied agreement" indeed provided for the separation of the Ryukyus and Bonins.
- p. 10 (1) Of course Yoshida would pick up the phrase -- it was what the Japanese wanted.

Chapter XIV

General Comments

This short chapter (15 pp.) covers changing military attitudes toward retention of the Ryukyus, the ratification of the Japanese peace treaty, and the inauguration of the native Govt of the Ryukyus (GRI). This latter section does not belong in the chapter, but should be part of a chapter on USCAR activities.


Again the same problem -- too much on strategic/political affairs for a volume that is supposed to focus on MG/USCAR and too little on such affairs for a volume on strategy and command in the Pacific and Far East after WW II.

Detailed comments attached..

Chapter XIV

Detailed Comments

- p. 1 (1) Editorializing. Don't hit the reader over the head.
- p. 2 (1) I don't understand this sentence.
(2) Acknowledged by whom?
- p. 3 (1) So we have learned before.
(2) Not understood. Why political embarrassment?
- p. 4 (1) Why, in the midst of the Korean War, did Ridgeway suddenly introduce the reversion concept? Background sorely needed.
- p. 5 (1) How did Ridgeway reach this conclusion?
- p. 6 (1) Why this word?
(2) Who?
- p. 7 (1) Proper rank.
- p. 8 (1) Can we find out why the G-3 took a position contrary to the JSSC?
(2) Not understood.
- p. 9 (1) Not a sentence.
(2) Is this the best word?
- p. 10 (1) How many readers will be able to translate this?
(2) Editorializing.
(3) Indefinite antecedent.
- p. 14 (1) Editorializing.
(2) When and why did the change from RYCOM to USARYIS occur?



RPS

PART ONE MILITARY GOVERNMENT

- Chapter 1. Summits and Scenarios.
Chapter 2. Okinawa, The Island and Its People.
Chapter 3. "... for the benefit of the populations."
Chapter 4. More Islands, More People.
Chapter 5. "To Prevent Disease and Unrest" Is Not Enough
Chapter 6. "The Unsettling Wind..." (S)
Chapter 7. "Reading, Writing and Arithmetic."
Chapter 8. The Revival of Self-Government.
Chapter 9. ~~Strategic versus Philosophical~~
~~Strategic and Political~~ (S)
Chapter 10. Exit Military Government
Chapter 11. The Military Government, An Evaluation
Chapter 12. "Peace and Security"
Chapter 13. Artful Article Three
Chapter 14. Elementals and Accidentals

Part I. Military Government.

Chapter One

Summits and Scenarios.

DRAFT

PPS

Report I Summary and Summary
Basic Policy Development

The unique phenomenon of twenty seven years of United States retention of civil authority in the Ryukyu Islands was based upon neither the

① visionary [machinations of one or two of a conspiracy] of American militarists, nor the happenstance of a global Allied Powers' chess game in which those small islands were treated as lightly expendable pawns.

The long-time United States stewardship of the Ryukyu Islands basically eventuated from the [phenomenal] coincidence of the aspirations of two world leaders, Roosevelt and Churchill, to "see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." ()

② Joining in this expression of high principles were the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia, the Free French and, finally, and

③ The Atlantic Charter, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941

significantly, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain,

however, in signifying his government's agreement with the Charter on

① September 24, 1941, made a [portentious and significant] qualification:

② "Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the government and peoples of the Soviet Union." ^{Y/C}

~~The Price of Peace~~

^{American}

were

At that point ~~in~~ time, our political planners/relatively free to

devote their thoughts and efforts toward planning and attempting to gain

the accord of the belligerents as to the kind of a world system ^{that} ~~which~~

should be established to attain the goals of the Atlantic Charter when the

war was over. Then came Pearl Harbor, and with it the total immersion

of the Nation in its prosecution of the war against the Axis. [Its] rapidly (

④ ~~expanding~~ ^{expanding} military machine [was plunged into the white hot heat of struggle] ^{JS}
for victory in the West and in the East.

Only when the Allied Powers, foreseeing a successful outcome of the struggle in Europe, were on the offensive ^{along} ~~in~~ the outer perimeter of Japan's conquered empire, [Burma, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands,] (1) did they make a solemn declaration regarding their determination and intentions as to the Japanese Empire. [At Cairo,] President Roosevelt, (2) Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek agreed on broad policies as to the war against Japan, which were announced to the world on December X 1943X as the "Cairo Declaration." They were "fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion." Japan would be stripped of all the islands seized or occupied since World War I and all the territories stolen from the Chinese and all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. In due course, Korea would become free and independent. Japan would have to accept unconditional surrender. X/ ()

Although the Cairo statement makes no explicit reference to the ~~British~~

(2) The Cairo Conference, statement, December 1, 1943, regarding the Occupation of Japan, Policy Planning Staff, Dept. of State, Pub. Wash DC, undated.

related documents cast some interesting and somewhat enigmatic side-
lights on the subject as discussed at the [Cairo and Teheran meetings.] (1)

The first represents the Chinese, not the American, version of
~~concern~~ discussions at a dinner meeting hosted by President Roosevelt
for Generalissimo and Madame Chiang [at Roosevelt's villa in the Mena (2)
district of Cairo] on ²³ November ~~22~~ 1943. Apparently, no official American
record of the conversation was prepared, ~~since the only Americans present~~
~~in addition to the President were Harry Hopkins, and, possibly, Colonel~~ (3)
~~Elliott Roosevelt~~. In any event, the Chinese summary record, provided
to the U.S. Government, contain^{ed} the following excerpt, "The President
...referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and inquired more than
once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The Generalissimo replied
that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by
China and the United States, and eventually, joint administration by
the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization."

Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: "The
Conferences at Cairo and Teheran" 1943
1st Session, House Document 100, 77th Congress, 2d Sess., 1940

Again at the Teheran Conference during a dinner meeting on November 29, 1943, attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin, the President referring "to the occupation of bases and strong points in the vicinity of Germany and Japan..said those bases must be held under trusteeship...Marshal Stalin agreed with the President."⁵

At a luncheon meeting on the following day, Foreign Commissar Molotov remarked to his companions, Mr. Harry Hopkins and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, that the "strong points which will be taken from...Japan ...could be under the control possibly of Great Britain or the United States or both." Mr. Hopkins commented that the United States wanted no sovereignty over any islands which will be freed from Japanese domination, though the problem of the type of bases and who ^{would} ~~will~~ operate them ^{would} ~~will~~ be one of the most important post-war problems, indicating

(2) in the same general context, [however,] that the United States interest in bases in the Pacific would be important.⁶⁷

(57) (1b) (Foreign Relations of the US, etc. - House Document No. 144, Washington 1961) p. 554

(21) 1b, 1p 270-371.

President Roosevelt reported to the [Pacific War Council] meeting in the Executive Offices of the White House on January 12, 1944, the salient features of his discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Marshal Stalin at Cairo and Teheran, respectively. The Pacific War Council consisted of representatives of those signatories of the [Declaration by United Nations] which were fighting in the Pacific and met from time to time under the chairmanship of President Roosevelt at Washington. The President's statement to the Council is of sufficient significance to warrant quotation here, as excerpted from the Minutes of the January 12 meeting. (2)

"...President Roosevelt informed the Council that his discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Marshal Stalin were highly satisfactory--in that both had agreed that Japan should be stripped of her island possessions and that the civil control of the islands north of the equator should be taken over by the United Nations, while the policing of the Western Pacific and, therefore, the necessary air and sea forces should be provided by those powers capable of exercising

effecting ~~the~~ military control. Marshal Stalin had specifically agreed that Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores should be returned to China; that the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage; that Russia, having no ice-free port in Siberia, is desirous of getting one and that Marshal Stalin looks with favor upon making Darien a free port for all the world...he wishes all of Sakhalin to be returned to Russia and to have the Kurile Islands turned over to Russia in order that they may exercise control of the straits leading to Siberia.

"President Roosevelt stated that it was extremely gratifying to him to find that the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin saw "eye to eye" with him on all major problems of the Pacific and that he felt that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreements about the control of the Pacific once Japan had been completely conquered.

...

"President Roosevelt also recalled that Stalin is familiar with the history of the [Liuchiu] Islands and that he is in complete agreement that they belong to China and should be returned to her and further that the civil administration of all islands now controlled by Japan should be taken over by the United Nations with, as stated before, military control of specific strong points assigned as necessary to maintain the peace. President Roosevelt stated that he believed that everyone agreed that the civil administration of the Pacific Islands should be carried out for the benefit of the populations and that their administration will always be a source of expense rather than profit." 2/6

Although United States post-war foreign policy was being developed intensively, based on the conviction of Secretary of State Hull that there could be no "enduring peace unless the real interests of this country, the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union and China are harmonized and unless they agree and act together," fourteen months elapsed until Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met again. This conference

2 (77) - 363-370.

took place at Yalta on the Crimean Peninsula, February 4-11, 1945.

With expectations of imminent victory over Germany and the concentration of the entire Allied war effort against Japan, the conferees enunciated basic policy decisions that were to have a far-reaching effect on post-war arrangements. For ^{the} purposes of this record, the most significant and haunting ^{that} was the price which was to be paid for Stalin's pledge to enter the war against Japan. This included a secret agreement

① ^{among or within} ~~between~~ the triumvirate that not only the southern part of Sakhalin and adjacent islands would be returned ^{but also} and that the Kurile Islands would be handed over to the Soviet Union. ^(8/)

President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 and Harry S. Truman succeeded to the Presidency that evening. The next day Secretary Stettinius announced that the new President had authorized him to say that "there will be no change of purpose or break of continuity" in United States foreign policy...and President Truman began to learn

⑧ "in Quest of Peace and Security," February 11, 1945, Agreement Regarding Japan, p. 18, Dept. of State Publication 4241, General Foreign Policy Series 53.

for the first time much about our foreign policy, and to take a firm hand in its development and implementation.

On July 17, 1945, President Truman sat down at a great oaken table in Cecilienhof Palace at Potsdam outside of Berlin with Churchill and Stalin and their principal advisers and presided over deliberations which were to be [signalized] on July 26 with a proclamation defining the terms for Japanese surrender. It is to be noted that the Soviet Union, not yet at war with Japan, did not participate in the proclamation, while the absent Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek cabled his approval and participation in its issuance. [This proclamation (popularly known as the Potsdam Declaration) was to be an important point of reference in the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty and in the determination of pre- and post-treaty US policy respecting the Ryukyus. Most pertinently, Article (8) of the proclamation declared; "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine"]

Strategic and Tactical Planning

The policies ^{that} ~~which~~ Presidents Roosevelt and Truman enunciated at successive summit meetings both reflected and gave direction to the labors of the military and political planners in Washington and the overseas theatres of operations.

In 1944, with the vision of victory looming more and more distinct, post-war occupation plans and policies received increasing attention.

As early as February of that year the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the Occupied Areas Section of the Navy Department requested the Department of State to draft policy statements on twenty crucial questions concerning the occupation of Japan and Korea. ^{27/} ()

The Joint Chiefs of Staff established in pursuance of Presidential directives a Joint Strategic Survey Committee to represent the Services in furnishing to the State Department the military guidance as to the "maxima desired and the minima acceptable" in the course of negotiations of international agreements on requirements for post-war bases. ^{10/} ()

^{27/} ~~X~~ Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan ~~X~~ by Professor S. E. Morison, Princeton University Press

^{10/} JCS 570/8, Letter from Admiral William D. Leahy for the JCS to the Secretary of State, 15 March 1944. (encl.)

identify
About two weeks later Admiral Leahy further informed the Secretary of State that the committee was to represent the Joint Chiefs of Staff "in furnishing to the State Department the necessary military guidance on the matter of the formulation of post-war policies," as well as base requirements. ^(N/) Thus, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff were conducting a victorious global war, and the State Department, under the leadership of Secretary Hull, was straining to bring about the creation of a world security organization, necessity compelled the best of both bodies to devote most serious consideration to the policies of United States ~~of~~ military occupation of ^{conquered} captured enemy territories. The forum in which emergent disagreements on cardinal problems of the occupation and post-occupation era were to be reconciled was the formal State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) established on ¹ December ~~1~~ 1944. James C. Dunn of the State Department was designated chairman, and the War and Navy Departments were represented by Assistant Secretaries John J. McCloy and Artemus L. Gates, respectively. Advisers and deputies were

Admiral Russell Wilson, Major General John H. Hilldring, Colonel R. A.

Cutter and John D. Hickerson of State. In January 1945, a Far East

subcommittee was created and began the formulation of basic policy papers

with respect to the problems of surrender and occupation of Japan. *The Joint*

~~decisions were reviewed by the Joint~~ Chiefs of Staff and the full

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, *revised subcommittee recommendations,* with revisions as appropriate,

before approval by the President. *(12/)*

The United States' role in the war ~~was global and exceedingly complex.~~ *(1)*

and involved strategic, political, logistical, tactical problems unparalleled

in the experience of the nation. To assign an order of precedence to

these diverse, sometimes conflicting factors required the establishment

of numerous groups representing the specific responsibilities, interests,

and judgments of all concerned agencies of the government, and the

measurement of each factor against the common denominator of victory and

(12/) Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, Department of State
Publication 3580, 1950, page 372.

a secure peace.^{13/} It was to this end that it became national policy for the United States to take control of the Ryukyu Islands, to retain the necessary degree of control for over a quarter of a century, and finally to relinquish it to Japan in an act of mutual respect and trust. (i)

The ultimate objective of American ^{military} operations in the Pacific was the subjugation of Honshu, the heartland of Japan. Because that was an area of American strategic responsibility, the decision as to how best to reach that goal was up to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two principal options were available. The first was to invade Formosa after establishing firm positions in the Central and Southern Philippines, thence to the Amoy region of the China coast from which the Japanese home islands would become a feasible target. An alternative to this scheme of operations which involved major logistical and tactical problems, as well as political considerations,

(13/ Detailed information regarding the multitude of United States Government and Allied bodies established to develop postwar policies and instruments for the maintenance of world peace is contained in numerous works. Among the most authoritative of these are the 1945-1946 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication "Postwar Planning," 1945, and the 1945-1946 "Washington, 1945, and Beyond," and "The Operations Division," Department of the Army, 1951.

was to bypass Formosa and the China coast and jump on to islands in the Okinawa prefecture of Japan itself. After months of study by the planners in Washington, in consultation with the Service Commanders in the Pacific and close observation of the progress of the war in both the Pacific and Europe, the Joint Chiefs reached the decision to shelve Operation CAUSEWAY, as the Formosa invasion plan was designated, and capture Okinawa, 850 miles southwest of Tokyo. On 3 October 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPAC) to seize one or more positions in the Ryukyus by 1 March 1945. There is a melancholy irony in the fact that the code name ICEBERG was given to the Okinawa campaign for which Lt General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., USA, had been called from a four year tour in command of the Alaskan Department to command the Tenth Army, [the Joint Expeditionary Force,] and subsequently all the forces in the Ryukyus, and finally, to lose his life on that subtropical island.

JCS 713/19, 3 Oct 44; See also: Okinawa, The Last Battle, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1948; also "Command Decisions, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1960." In this connection, "Typhoon of Steel: The Fight for Okinawa," James and William Bolton (Harper & Row, 1971) is an interesting reading.

On 10 July 1944, Admiral Nimitz (CINCPAC) informed LTG Robert C.

Richardson, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Pacific

Ocean Areas (USAFPOA) that he had designated General Buckner to command

the expeditionary troops for [the invasion and of his intention to make

General Buckner responsible for planning the conduct of civil affairs

in the Ryukyus.

Formosa
①

(15/)

When General Buckner assumed command of Tenth Army at Schofield

Barracks, Oahu, T.H., in September, he found on his staff a small team

of civil affairs military government planners, who had preceded him by

a month, busily engaged in planning for CAUSEWAY. As was the organiza-

tional pattern of Tenth Army, the military government section was a joint

unit consisting of four Army and fifteen Navy officers. The latter had

been engaged for several weeks in the military government section of the

Office of Chief of Naval Operations. The entire section consisted of

established specialists in medicine, sociology, engineering, business,

public safety, public welfare, agriculture, fisheries, public finance,

15/ Ltr, Serial 0083, 10 July 1944. Richardson.

law, supply, political affairs, education, public relations, and administration. Nearly all had received training in military government at the Naval School of Military Government and Administration at Columbia University, the Army School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, or the Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Chicago. Only a few, including notably the Chief of the Section, Lieutenant Commander Malcom S. MacLean, USNR, had any [extensive experience in the conduct of military government.] Several of the Navy officers had spent some time on research projects for the Navy's Civil Affairs Office, with some special emphasis on the islands mandated to Japan after World War I.

Despite reported handicaps of inadequate professional staff and logistical support--attributed principally to the failure of higher echelons to decide which of the Services was to be primarily responsible for military government in the target area--the section made creditable planning progress. (X)

16/ History of Military Government, Island Command Okinawa (ISCOM) of Okinawa (First Draft), typed and dated 1945, but unpublished.

The importance which General Buckner attached to the civil affairs/ military government mission was brought to the attention of the other staff sections in a revealing fashion when he issued Staff Memorandum Number 4, 21 August 1944. It may be sufficient to quote the first two paragraphs:

"1. In all invasion actions to date, Civil Affairs operations have been inadequately manned and supplied during the early stages. This is due primarily to the "orphan" status enforced upon this activity by combat commanders who are naturally primarily concerned with operations against enemy forces. The field is still open for a demonstration of the "approved solution" to this problem.

"2. It is necessary to revise the prevailing attitude of unit commanders from the view that Civil Affairs are a nuisance and hinderance to the performance of their missions. If the organization is correct, the Civil Affairs becomes a valuable aid to the commander of each echelon from the Commanding Officer of Battalion Landing Teams on up, in that he takes off of the commander's shoulders the burden of handling civilians and their affairs as soon as they become a problem, and that

is inevitably during the very early stages of the assault, probably

before the Commanding Officer of the Regimental Combat Team goes ashore." ¹⁴⁷

Military Government personnel must have derived considerable wry satisfaction and a measure of stimulus from those words, however lightly some general staff sections and unit commanders may have taken them.

Although the Tenth Army did not shift its planning from Formosa to Okinawa until 15 October 1944, the Military Government Section had begun to estimate the situation for the new target several weeks earlier and submitted its first formal estimate to G-1 on 26 October, one day after CINCPAC issued a Staff Study for ICEBERG, outlining the mission assigned to Tenth Army. The CINCPAC Staff Study contemplated three main phases for the Ryukyuan Operation: Phase I, the capture of ~~southern~~ Okinawa, and adjacent islands; Phase II, seizure of the remainder of Okinawa and Ie Shima; and Phase III, the occupation and development of additional positions in the island chain. ¹⁴⁸ () The military government estimates were time

(¹⁴⁷ Staff Memorandum Number 4, "Concept of Organization of Civil Affairs Operating in Combat Areas," 21 Aug 44, Hq Tenth Army, Office of the Commanding General.

(¹⁴⁸ History of Military Government, Island Command Okinawa (ISCOMG) of Okinawa (First Draft "provisional")

However,
/ Military Government planning cannot be comprehensive and sound

without basic information regarding not only the target and its defenses and tactical estimates of its seizure but, more importantly, reliable data about the civilian society, its numbers, geographic disposition, attitudes, mores, resources, social characteristics, political structures, religious beliefs and practices, standard of living, medical and sanitation practices, education, industry and material values, and much more.

In its initial estimate, lacking directives and detailed facts, with no overall frame of reference or specific policy guidance, the military government planners were strongly influenced by what they were able to learn of the Marianas' experience. They calculated that half the original population would be casualties, killed or wounded, in the assault area, that organized government would have ceased to exist, and that extensive civilian medical care and construction of shelters would be required.

The Tenth Army G-2 staff took several notable exceptions to the Military Government estimates; civilian casualties were overestimated,

while available native labor force figures were too low. The anticipated need to establish camps for care of the civilians/^{was}superfluous because G-2 assumed, native communities could be restored "with relative ease."

On all but the last point the Military Government staff revised its estimate. G-2 had estimated that no more than 20,000 civilians would come through the US lines by D-day plus 20 as contrasted to the MG figure of 117,000; a compromise was reached at 65,000. However, on the issue of whether civilian camps would be required to care for the dislocated Ryukyans or whether they could be expected to reestablish themselves in their native communities, the (MG) staff took a firm position. It did not agree that warning the civilian population by dropping leaflets and other psychological warfare devices would keep the people away from the US lines or induce them not to hide in caves, thus obviating the necessity for the establishment of camps. In the final estimate of the situation of 26 November 1944, provision was made for the contingent requirement for civilian camps. This proved to be a paper victory, however, as details of the tentative base development plan were [finalized.] Military government would be left with only the

land for care of the civilian population that other command units did not request. Whether these would be the landing beaches or mountain ridges would be determined only by developments in actual operations.

①

The military government section found other aspects of the planning equally unsatisfactory. Cited particularly were the unrealistic planning limitations on the number of personnel required to operate camps and supervise community relief programs, a basic misunderstanding of the role of the welfare officer himself, and the scope and character of the medical program involving the allocation of medical and paramedical personnel, interpreters, facilities and shipping space. Of particular concern were the War Department estimates of MG personnel requirements, influenced largely by the experience in the European Theater, where the Allies were able to make maximum use of local medical personnel and facilities and where governmental and other institutional civilian structures could be employed. The Military Government staff found that even their proponent agency, the War Department's Civil Affairs Division, was unable to prevail in the competing demands from Europe and other

Pacific areas in allocation of personnel, supplies, and shipping space. ^{18/}

The original Military Government planners at Oahu were not long without help, however. On 15 November 1944, the Navy issued OPNAV13-31, a Civil Affairs Handbook for the Ryukyu Islands, "by far the most comprehensive and accurate compilation of material in English on the area." ^{20/} As its ₇ preface acknowledges, "More than 95 per cent of the information presented has been derived from publications in the Japanese language...Sources written in European languages...have proved of little assistance, being for the most part either out of date or unreliable..." The social scientists lawyers, and economists who put this impressive work together constituted an important element of the Military Government staff at Oahu. Several of their number conducted a survey of the attitudes of selected members of the 30,000 Okinawans living in Hawaii for the purpose of trying to ascertain what the attitude of the Okinawans was likely to be toward the U.S. forces and its military government arm in various situations.

- () ^{18/} History of Military Government, Island Command Okinawa (First Draft),
from 11/1/44.
- () ^{20/} Hq, US Naval Military Government, Ryukyu Islands, Report of Military Government Activities for Period from 1 Apr 1945 to 1 July 1946, to Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Office, Ryukyus, from Deputy Commandant for MI. Issued at: July 1946, hereafter called "M.G. Report, 1 July 1946." (encl.)
p. 23

Thus, some of the more arcane, intangible aspects of the problem were subjected to advance estimates. ^{21/} ()

Lieutenant Commander , later,
The Military Government Staff under / MacLean, and/Brigadier

General William E. Crist, USA, who assumed the duties of section chief

on 17 November 1944, endeavored to generate as much light, without too much heat, as could be focused on [this relatively little known area.] (i)

They prepared the following directives and plans prior to departure from Hawaii:

- a. Operational Directive No. 7 for Military Government of the Commanding General, Tenth Army, 6 January 1945, known by the short title "GOPER." This document outlined the basic concepts and principles for the control of enemy civilian populations in areas under Tenth Army jurisdiction;
- b. Tenth Army Technical Bulletin on Military Government, 25 February 1945, a manual of instructions for the conduct of military government under GOPER; and

c. Annex 15 to Operation Plan 1-45, which more specifically applied the principles of the foregoing documents to the Okinawa Operation and allocated military government units to the Island Commander.

All of these documents were drawn up with the benefit of prior review of and comments on JCS and CINCPAC directives which were not formally issued until later. ^{22/ 130} On ^{amended} 12 January 1945, the JCS approved "DIRECTIVES FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE JAPANESE OUTLYING ISLANDS," covering political, ~~(economic)~~ economic and financial matters. CINCPAC issued, in turn, a "POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE OCCUPIED ISLANDS OF THE NANSEI SHOTO AND ADJACENT WATERS," 1 March 1945--just one month to the day before the actual assault on Okinawa was to begin.

In actual application, GOPER and the supplementary technical bulletin were the field manual for military government operations. As the Deputy Commander for Naval Military Government was later to evaluate the planning, "it had its merits and its weaknesses; in general, it was about as operable as the corresponding tactical plan, fully as subject to miscalculation and unpredictable developments in the local situation, faulty

imported to house them. This was blueprint planning. Though instructed to avoid damaging certain native towns, our troops leveled many of them. Moreover, areas that looked poor from the air for construction purposes looked much better from the ground. In addition, the fighting groups felt that they need so much of the island for military purposes that practically no space remained for the natives. I can still hear a Navy captain at our Okinawa headquarters saying, 'What do they expect us to do, hang them from sky-hooks?' "24/ ()

① [It is hoped that the reader will appreciate] the need to ^{generally} limit an examination of deficiencies or inequities in the military government planning and ^{early} execution of the Okinawa operation to those which created or failed to resolve a serious temporary problem in US-Ryukyuan relations or caused a wound which was to fester and persist for some years to follow.

The basic Washington directives were severe, austere, and general.

Their underlying philosophy was to conform to the accepted international codes of conduct for the treatment of enemy civilians in time of war.

The CINCPAC was directed to establish military government in such of the Japanese Outlying Islands as ^{might} ~~may~~ be occupied by the forces under his command. He was to be the supreme authority, possessed of all rights, powers and responsibilities vested in the commander of an occupying force in time of war by international law, and he was authorized to delegate such authority to subordinates [which he could also authorize to be subdelegated to their subordinates.] (1)

(2) The objective of military government was to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the accomplishment of the military mission. Administration by military government was to be stern but just. The degree of severity to be exercised was to be determined by the conduct and attitude of the people and their willingness to cooperate with the military authorities. Civilian populations in whole or in part might be moved and placed in restricted areas or refugee camps, if military considerations or the interests of such civilians so required. Essential government functions were to be continued, using local inhabitants, governmental machinery, and techniques of administration, so far

as feasible. The Commander and his forces were to refrain from any expression of opinion concerning the future status of the Emperor or of the institution of the Emperor. Freedom of religious worship consistent with military security, maintenance of law and order, and the interdiction of ultra-national propaganda and secret societies was ~~to be~~ permitted. All historical, cultural, and religious objects were to be preserved and protected, so far as military expediency would permit.

The basic economic policy of the JCS directive was to develop maximum use of existing resources and productive facilities for the following purposes:

- a. To support the military occupation and military operations.
- b. To assure food and other essential supplies for the civilian population to the degree necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to the objectives of the mission.
- c. To minimize the importation of civilian supplies. *PP* The directive called for the establishment of equitable wage levels which might be paid in kind. Except when essential for purposes of emergency relief

civilian supplies were to be offered for sale under military control and if possible through commercial channels, at prices consistent with the current domestic internal economy.

In the financial area ~~the use of~~ supplemental military yen (type B, or "B Yen"), issued pursuant to military proclamation, and regular yen currencies, interchangeable on a one to one basis, were to be used. If necessary, regular or Hawaiian Series US dollars might be used temporarily and exchanged at the "established rate" unless otherwise directed.

① Insotar [as operations related] to the provision of yen currencies for civil administration, military government would supply supplemental yen or regular yen from available currency and record the debt against itself. Moreover, military government would control all funds to be used by the forces in the concerned area, other than US dollars to be disbursed by Army or Navy finance and disbursing offices; and military government was to maintain such accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of all currencies and funds as well as financial


data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations and activities involving participation of military forces. The directive authorized the closing of banks and financial institutions, to be reopened when the concerned commander was satisfied that certain control measures were effectively established. It provided for the issuance of controls on the purposes, terms and conditions of the extension of credit. Existing laws and regulations for the assessment and collection of revenues, and the control of governmental budgets were to be enforced to the extent considered practicable and desirable by the commander of the area. The respective military government staffs were enjoined to furnish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments, periodic reports on a variety of financial and supply matters. 25/ ()

The military government planning staff, which had built its operational ~~documents~~ ^{examinations} on the principles outlined above, was to have the opportunity of testing first-hand the accuracy of its estimates and the practicability

25/ (U) JCS 1231, "Directives for Military Government in the Japan and Ryukyu Islands" 30 January 1943. The subject Islands were in the Ryukyu Islands. The Directive included "(b) the Ryukyu Islands, including the Ryukyu or LooChoo Islands."

of its instructions; it was to be transplanted to Okinawa as the headquarters staff. Meanwhile, almost four hundred officer personnel for the Military Government field detachments had begun assembling at Fort Ord, California, at Christmas time, 1944. Equally divided between the Army and the Navy, most of these specialists had received training in Military Government schools established at selected US universities, and received further instructions in the details of the Okinawa operation at Fort Ord or at the staging areas. Between 1000 and 1400 Naval enlisted personnel, none of whom had received any previous military government training, assembled at Fort Ord in time to embark with their teams. ^{26/} In addition, one hundred Army enlisted personnel were assigned to Tenth Army headquarters beginning in January, 1945. Some 800 medical corps enlisted men were assigned to Military Government in the assault and early garrison months.

26/ Some apparent discrepancies in numbers are found in the "Naval Field of Operations Report," 1 Jan. 1946; see p. 128 and on.



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Chapter Two

Okinawa, The Island and Its People

Ch 2, 1

Although the assault on Okinawa was not mounted until the dawn of Easter Sunday, ^{Wednesday} 1 April 1945, "L-Day" (landing day), the Japanese garrisons and the Okinawan people had already experienced the devastating might of American air power. Those who saw and survived never forgot the horror of the tenth of October 1944 when for twelve hours Vice Admiral Mitscher's ⁽¹⁾ [Fast Carrier Task Force] sent wave after wave of carrier planes over Okinawa. In 1,356 strikes, Naha, the capital city, was ~~by various estimates, 90 to 99 percent~~ 90 percent destroyed. The planes bombed, rocketed and strafed airfields at Yontan, Kadena, Ie Shima, and Naha, and shipping installations and harbor facilities, most of which were sited at or near Naha. Reconnaissance planes also obtained important aerial photographs. ^{24/} Jugo Thoma, Mayor of Naha and head of the Okinawan Branch of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, ^{(and} who was some years later to be appointed by General Lyman Lemnitzer the second Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands) tells it this way in his 'Memoirs':

7-27/ "Okinawa, The Last Battle." Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army. Washington, D. C., 1948.

Ch. 2, 1

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727/ "Okinawa, The Last Battle." Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948.

"The Imperial Rule Assistance Association was scheduled to meet at Tokyo, and I had to...attend. But I could not get a seat on Japan Airlines, so finally I went by submarine-tender to Kagoshima, and from there on by train to Tokyo. It was the third or fourth day after I returned from that meeting that we had the first big American air raid. That was the so-called "10-10 Raid"...which took place on October 10, 1944. Dozens of American planes bombed and strafed in formation. That was an attack in which the planes came over in waves again and again.

Naha was completely burned up in this so-called "blanket bombing attack."

(1) It was such a [splendid] holocaust that it left us simply amazed that the city could change this much in the space of one night and one day. ^{28/}

Other air attacks followed during January, February and March 1945, though none was as concentrated and sustained as the "10-10 Raid." ^{29/}

() ^{28/} "Jugo Thoma's" Memoirs," privately published in Japanese by Judge Thoma's friends; working script translated by Leo Kanner Associates, Redwood City, California, for Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 1971. Unpublished.

(2) ^{29/} Okinawa: The Last Battle, Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948.

The Island

2,3

^{While} Although the American forces eventually seized the entire Ryukyu Island chain (extending southwest of Japan proper in an arc nearly 800 miles long between Kyushu and Formosa), Okinawa was the primary target. It was the largest and most important of the islands, with sufficient suitable terrain to base an estimated 780 bombers, together with the necessary number of fighters, and an advanced fleet anchorage was available there. "From these airfields and naval bases American air and naval forces could attack the main islands of Japan and, by intensified sea and air blockade, sever them from the Japanese conquests to the south. The captured bases could be used to support further operations in the regions bordering on the East China Sea. Finally, the conquest of the Ryukyus would provide adequate supporting positions for the invasion of Kyushu and, subsequently, Honshu, the industrial heart of Japan." ^{30/} () (See map)

The peculiar shape and geographic features of Okinawa have led some writers to liken it to a "dragon" floating on the surface of the sea.

② 30/ ² Okinawa, The Last Battle, Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948.

This similitude may have some tenuous relationship to the two Chinese

characters which were used for the islands which, as [Dr. Shannon McCune] (1)

observes, could poetically be considered to depict "a floating or drifting

dragon." (31/) From the variations in measurements given in several different

sources, it would appear that the dragon stretches from time to time.

While it is generally agreed that it is 2 to 18 miles wide, figures given

for its length vary from 60 to 67 miles. (32/) (This could account for the

variations in total area figures which range in official Army publications

from 454 square miles [as reported in the USCAR Facts Book, FY 1971.] to

485 square miles as in [Okinawa: The Last Battle.] (2)

The island's widest point is to the north where the rugged Motobuu

Peninsula points westward to the small flat-topped nearby island of Ie

Shima, best known to his soldier comrades and American readers as the

place where the ever-present war

() 31/ Shannon McCune, "Research and Information Papers," Number Ten, The Ryukyu Islands of the Ryukyus, The University of Florida, January 20, 1972.

() 32/ See e.g., Okinawa: The Last Battle, 1948 (page 7), and Department of Army Pamphlet 690-5, 1958.

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correspondent Ernie Pyle was killed. The narrowest part of Okinawa island is the Ishikawa Peninsula from ^{the} [whose] vantage points ^{of which} one can see both the Pacific Ocean and the East China Sea. This narrow strip of land divides Okinawa into two contrasting regions. The wooded two-thirds of the island to the north is marked by a rugged spinal ridge with elevations of more than 1000 feet, to the east and west of which are numerous ravines and watercourses spouting out to the seas. The southern third of Okinawa is lower, rolling, hilly country broken by terraces, slopes, and its share of gullies. Except toward the lower tip of the island where the plateaus end in steep escarpments, the shorelines provide some smooth sandy beaches. Okinawa's southern third has about 50,000 acres composed of a mixture of alluvial clay and organic matter, the richest even though only moderately fertile part of the land. ^{33/} This was the "bread basket", where the hills, plateaus and valleys were intensively cultivated. There three-fourths of the island's population lived and worked and built their urban centers--

Naha, Shuri, Koza, Itoman, Ishikawa and Yonabaru. The population density of this area exceeded 1000 persons per square mile in 1940 when the last

pre-war census was taken by Japan. *(41) The Islands total population at this time was approximately 450,000 ().*

The Japanese current warms and humidifies Okinawa and gives it a semi-tropical climate. The humidity, which averages 80 percent throughout the year, is alleviated to some extent by ~~very~~ generally constant monsoonal winds. The average annual rainfall on the island is 83 inches, heaviest during May and June. Lying within the typhoon belt of the East China Sea, it is an exceptional year when from three to six typhoons do not strike Okinawa and its small island satellites--usually between April and October. *35/ (*

Despite the heavy annual rainfall it was of less than maximum value to agriculture since so much of the soil, heavily weighted with clay and limestone, *refuses to take the water to its heart.* *The abundant ^{poor} ~~rich~~ ~~water~~* Nor did ~~it~~ provide a source of hydro-electric power because the island, which is the peak of a submerged mountain range, is not endowed with the topographical characteristics

① mixed texture
) *34/* "Civil Affairs Handbook," Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, OPNAV 13-31, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, 15 November 1944, []

() *35/* "Facts Book," USCAR, FY 1971.

required for such exploitation. Neither does the soil hold any mineral deposits in commercially exploitable quantities when compared to other areas of the world. Its land resources are extremely limited and of low use capabilities.

After the annexation of Okinawa into the Japanese state as a part of Kagoshima Prefecture in 1871, and despite [its] constitution as the seat of a separate Okinawa prefecture in 1879, the central government accomplished little toward assimilation of the community into the Empire until the close of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Only after China formally recognized Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus did Japan move vigorously to inaugurate a program of development there.

Of all the economic programs which Japan did undertake, the development, utilization, and conservation of land resources was given major emphasis. The most important and difficult aspect of that program was the task of converting the traditional communal land, which constituted most of the area of the Ryukyus, to private ownership. This far-reaching undertaking,

begun in 1898, required five years to complete and is regarded as one

(If it had not occurred, perhaps the United States would have been spared the agonizing ^{later years} 'land' of the most significant events in Ryukyuan history. Although individual

farm families received very small holdings, averaging 1.66 acres in

size as of 1939, land tenancy in Okinawa was the lowest of any Japanese

prefecture. The individual farmer had found a new incentive to produce,

since it was his own land which he was working. Sugar cane became the cash

crop which could be grown alternately with sweet potatoes even on the

marginally fertile uplands. The [latter] served as a staple food for the

people and, supplemented by canefodder, as the principal livestock feed.

Experts were sent from Japan to assist in the improvement of agricultural production and the introduction of superior breeds of livestock

and new varieties of grains, tubers, and vegetables. However great their

efforts, ^{the experts} ~~they~~ never succeeded in advancing the production of rice, the

principal staple of the Orient, to the point where it was adequate to

satisfy more than fifty percent of local needs. Irrigated paddy lands

were limited and the yield was poor. Nevertheless, the establishment

of agricultural schools and courses in the

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regular schools did much to help the Okinawan farmer maximize the productivity of his meager land.

The marine life in the seas surrounding them provided the only significant natural resources--besides their own energies and talents--within reach of these island people. The surrounding waters are excellent fishing grounds and yet their own fishing enterprise was confined to coastal waters, while Japanese fishing companies exploited the abundant off-shore areas. Except for the production of dried skipjack, there were no fish processing or refrigerating facilities in the Ryukyus.

new seq

[Despite Japanese efforts to promote agricultural production,] fishing was left alone as primarily a subsistence undertaking and did not supply any major portion of protein requirements for the diet of the people. ^{38/}7 (

26/ "The Ryukyu Islands; Prewar and Postwar" (through 24 June 1945)
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands

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The Island People

Finley Peter Dunne, the journalist and humorist of an earlier age, once said something to the effect that before the Spanish-American War most Americans didn't know whether the Philippines were a fruit or a salad. ^{A much} ~~AN~~ even smaller proportion of Americans, including the seamen, airmen, and ground troops from every state, territory, and possession of the nation, who participated in what Admiral King called "the most difficult operation ever undertaken by our forces in the Pacific," had any ~~firm~~ knowledge of what the Ryukyus, its occupiers, and ^{its} occupants were like. A few, particularly among the military government specialists who had primed themselves for this event, knew that in 1853 Commodore Matthew Perry had mounted an expedition to this land which he too looked upon as a stepping-stone to the great, inhospitable Japanese Empire. They recalled that although Perry, dispatched with a show of military might but a mission of commercial aggrandizement, had proposed the establishment of reciprocal trade with the islands and the rental of space for a US naval base at Naha or Tonori port and that King the Pri. 1853

2,11

last Ryukyuan ruler, had declined these advances. Perhaps they also knew that the redoubtable ~~Commodore~~ had confidently informed the Secretary of the Navy by dispatch dated ²⁵ January 25th 1854, of his grand plan. Perry declared it to be his "intention/should the Japanese Government refuse to negotiate or to assign a Port of resort for our Merchant and Whaling ships/to take under the surveillance of the American Flag/ upon the ground of reclamation for insults and injuries committed upon American citizens/this Island of great Lew Chew, to be held under such restraint, until the decision of my government shall be known, whether to avow or disavow my acts." He declared it to be "certain that if I do not take preliminary steps before leaving this Port (Naha) for Yedo, for adopting such course, the Russians, or French, or probably the English will anticipate the design." To this "embarrassing" suggestion, they would recall, the Secretary replied, on May 30th 1854, "The subject has been laid before the President who, while he appreciates highly the patriotic motive that prompts the suggestion, is disinclined, without

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2,11.

the authority of Congress, to take and retain possession of an island in that distant country, particularly, unless more urgent and potent reasons demanded it than now exist. If, in future, resistance should be offered and threatened, it would also be rather mortifying to surrender the Island if once seized, and rather inconvenient and expensive to maintain a force there to retain it." Now, nearly a century later, [they] were approaching that island to take it at all costs. [Their] mission would be to deal with the civilian population about whom, despite tentative conclusions drawn from interviews some of them had conducted with some of the 30,000 Ryukyans living in Hawaii, [they] must have been wondering "What sort of people are these Okinawans?"

Some were soon to get their first impressions - albeit misleading. They were soon to find out.

X On the morning of 26 March four bat-
talion landing teams of the 77th ^{Infantry} Division, with military government detachments, invaded the Kerama Islands, fifteen miles west of Okinawa,

(3) ^{no} to [seize seaplane and suicide boat bases there.] On that date, United States military government was established on Japanese soil. ^{37/} The

first impressions which the military government perceived of

(37/ "Selected Chronology of the US Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 Mar 1945-30 Jun 1975," USCAR, 1971. 83

2, 13

their future wards must, indeed, have given them pause. Military historians suggest that no contact was made with civilians until the troops had established themselves on Tokashiki, the largest island of the Kerama group. There, it is recorded, troops of the 306th Regimental Combat Team, camping for the night of 28 March, a mile from the north tip of the island, heard explosions and screams of pain in the distance.

II, 13

2,14

In the morning they found a small valley littered with more than 150 Japanese, most of them civilians. Fathers had systematically throttled each member of their families and then disemboweled themselves with knives or hand grenades. Under one blanket lay a father, two small children, a grandfather, and a grandmother, all strangled by cloth ropes. Soldiers and medics did what they could. The natives, who had been told that the "barbarians" would kill and rape, watched with amazement as the Americans provided food and medical care; an old man who had killed his daughter wept in bitter remorse.

direct
from
Okinawa
p. 5

①²

"Only a minority of the [Japanese], however, were suicides. Most civilians straggled into American positions, worn and dirty. In all, the 77th ^{Division} took 1,195 civilian and 121 military prisoners." ^{38/} ()

The Japanese propaganda machine sometimes worked too well.
The tragedy of the terror which led many Kerama Islanders to destroy their families and themselves lest they be subjected to the vilest horrors and torture by the American troops was seen again and again after the invasion of Okinawa itself was launched on Easter Sunday, the

387 ~~X~~ Okinawa: The Last Battle, ~~X~~ Historical Division, Dept. of Army, 1945.

2,14

2,15

"Low Day" or "L Day", as the Japanese called it.
first of April 1945. The Japanese propaganda machine was not one
hundred percent effective however. One first hand observer, a profes-
sional medical scientist, wrote in 1946 that one of the differences
between Okinawans and Japanese was the objectivity of the former "faced
with facts refuting much of the false Japanese propaganda and indoc-
trination to which they have been subjected in recent years. Destroyed
have been the fostered notions that the Japanese armed forces are in-
vincible; that it is the divine destiny of Japan to rule the world;
that Japan would protect them; that Japanese soil would never be violated,
and that American troops are beasts who would rape the women and kill
all the inhabitants".... "That deep fear of torture or death was uppermost
in the minds of most of them was apparent to any who watched civilians
enter our custody, particularly in the first few days and weeks. Aged
Okinawan obasans (grandmothers) discovered in caves were often hiding in
deep recesses covered head and foot with quilts, and when uncovered by
marines would kneel and bow their foreheads to the deck time after time
with hands prayerfully pressed palms together before them, beseeching
their discoverers most piteously to spare their ancient lives. Their

II, 15

2,16

relief on being reassured and kindly treated was so marked and apparent as to leave no doubt of the validity of their expressed emotions. In like manner, mothers or old folks entering our lines in desperation because of the intolerable conditions of cave life often displayed on first contacting troops such apprehension and fear as to cause them to tremble; yet after a day or two in the security of the concentration area their attitude would change visibly and they would relax and smile and cooperate happily in the camp routine.

"...It has struck many observers as remarkable that the Okinawans appear to accept philosophically discomforts, inconveniences, and hardships resulting from administrative foul-up or necessities of war, whereas similar experiences would set an occidental population into seething resentment and unrest!"^{39/} ()

- () ^{39/} "The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa," Commander Henry Stanley Bennett (MC), U.S.N.R., United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 72, 1946.

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Military historians had this to add about the Ryukyuan people:

"One of the most puzzling questions confronting the planners of the Okinawa operation had been the probable attitude of the civilian population. It was very soon apparent that the behavior of the Okinawans would pose no problems. In the first place, only the less aggressive elements of the populace remained, for the Japanese Army had conscripted almost all males between the ages of fifteen and forty-five. Many of those who came into the lines were in the category of displaced persons before the invasion began, having moved northward from Naha and Shuri some time before. Others had been made homeless as the fighting passed through their villages...

"The initial landings brought no instances of mass suicide of civilians as there had been on the Kerama Islands, although some, particularly of the older inhabitants, had believed the Japanese terror propaganda and were panic-stricken when taken into American custody. While there appeared to be only a few cases of communicable diseases and little malaria, most civilians, living in overcrowded and unsanitary caves, were infested

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with lice and fleas.

"...The Okinawans docilely made the best of the disaster which had overtaken them. With resignation they allowed themselves to be removed ...to the special camp areas which soon supplanted the initial stockades as places of detention."

Dr.
Authoritative and interesting are some observations of Clellan S.

Ford, Ph.D., associate professor of anthropology at Yale University,

① *for* [which appeared in a prestigious publication in 1950.] As a Lieutenant,

USNR, Dr. Ford participated in military government planning and opera-

tions for the Okinawa campaign. His ~~article~~ *observations were* was basically a critique of

the role of the social scientist in such an undertaking. He ~~tells~~ *told* how

x ② such specialists gathered at [10th] Army Headquarters and "wrestled with

problems posed by the future military occupation of an area with a

native population of some 450,000 semicivilized Okinawans." That word

is underlined here because it ~~does not fit~~ *is incongruous* into the context of his

article and would best seem to suggest that before personal contact

was established it had been assumed that Okinawans were somewhat

than civilized human beings. In point of fact, Dr. Ford uses several

ad "Okinawa. The Last Battle," Historical Div, Dept of the Army, Wash DC

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specific experiences to illustrate the resourcefulness, skill, and fortitude of the Okinawans. Although the Okinawans had been "socially disrupted" they were found to be "far from...malleable, helpless creatures," rather "persons with clearly formulated patterns of thought and action," whom disaster had done little to change. "The fact," Dr. Ford wrote, "that the Okinawans were a self-reliant, sophisticated people, ready to spring back into an organized way of life when given the opportunity, seemed quite clear to the social scientists and their experienced business colleagues who were performing their military government function." 41/ ()

() 41/ "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," Clellan S. Ford, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 267, Philadelphia, January 1950.

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A number of more or less profound studies of the ethnic, geographic, political, religious, and cultural forces which gave a special homogeneity to the Okinawan/Ryukyuan people have been published since 1945. But it is of ^{basic} special importance to know how these people were regarded by the American military men under whose ^{direct} stewardship they came. Colonel C. I. Murray, Deputy Commander for Military Government, ^{recorded his own} wrote a clear, ~~simply~~ ^{first-hand observations} worded summation on the attitudes and characteristics of the people as seen by military government after more than a year of closest observation.

"...The Okinawan people from the very beginning proved unexpectedly and gratifyingly willing to cooperate and indisposed to oppose American policies. There have been no proven and few suspected cases of sabotage or obstructionism. [There have been few cases in military government controlled areas of aid and sympathy for the Japanese.] There has been on the other hand every evidence of complete willingness and even eagerness of the Okinawans to work in conformity with American policy for the relief, control, and rehabilitation of the Okinawan population. The Okinawans have proved themselves a tough and resilient people under the most trying of war circumstances, trustworthy and ungrudging in their performance of duties assigned to them by the American Force, and obedient to the reconstruction of a desolated society.

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"...The attitude and characteristics of the Okinawans, which have in a great measure conditioned all military government operations, are subject to complex analytical study, but a few factors stand out. Historically, the Okinawans are a proud and independent people with a thousand years' documentary record, the traditions of an oriental state in microcosm with their own dynasty of Kings, flourishing trade and diplomatic relations with the rest of the Orient, an indigenous and distinctive culture which their neighbors admired and appreciated. Although the island was highly Japanized after it became an imperial prefecture in 1879, it retained local pride and flavor. Politically, the Okinawans were accustomed to managing their local administration with supervision of the Japanese only at the prefectural level. Economically, they were fairly prosperous and in one very important respect far better off than the rest of the Japanese imperial subjects--they were independent operators, not tenant farmers or factory workers; no more than 10% of the population (as compared with 46% in Japanese proper) were tenant farmers,

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and only a few thousand persons were paid laborers. Socially, they had a well-adjusted family system, which was conspicuously free from class consciousness; there were no extremes of wealth and poverty, of privilege and oppression. In the course of many centuries the Okinawans had developed a non-hurried and non-harried sort of rural or semi-urban life, the families living in substantially built homes and sheltered home compounds, being possessed of a considerable accumulation of furnishings and tools, producing for themselves or in their communities the large part of their requirements of food and clothing and building materials, leading not a primitive or depressed but--by oriental standards at least--a pleasant and comfortable life. Practically all persons under forty had received six to eight grades of elementary school education, though probably no more than five percent had gone beyond. Medical facilities were adequate and health and sanitary conditions, [for an oriental] were remarkably good. Communications were well developed and the people were surprisingly well traveled. In brief, the people of Okinawa enjoyed

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a level of life comparable to that of a prosperous rural community in any civilized country. When they became charges of military government they had lost practically everything they had ever possessed, and the problem of restoring them even to an approximation of their former way of life has been one of first magnitude not only because their standard of living was relatively high--certainly higher than that of the average farmer in Japan--~~but~~ but also because there is no undestroyed hinterland or reserve upon which the people can draw for their own reconstruction. ~~"~~ ()

~~(142/ This is a moot point concerning which more will be said.~~

(143/ "Report of Military Government Activities for period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946," from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Office, Ryukyus, 1 July 1946."

As indicated earlier, a number of scholars, scientists, and educators, as well as a variety of less erudite individuals have written about diverse aspects of the Ryukyu Islands--the land, the people, and their relations with others over the centuries. The student of anthropology can ponder some fascinating theories as to the origin of the Ryukyuan people, their ethnic ties to the Japanese, Korean, and other Asian national groups. Historians will find fascinating the record of how as early as the seventh century A.D. both the Chinese and Japanese looked covetously on those islands and in a slow motion, centuries-long contest sought to establish primacy of conflicting claims, to be technically resolved no earlier than 1895. There are writings of interest for the stimulation of most specialists, the geographer, the geologist, the political scientist, the economist, the botanist, the archeologist, the philologist, and, richest of all, the sociologist whose primary aim is to understand the evolution of a society so as to explain why a people are as they are.

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The point of concern here, however, is to reflect the Ryukyuan character as seen by those men entrusted with their stewardship, the US Military Government, and how, in turn, the Ryukyans regarded their American stewards. The contemporary reports of military government observers cited above convey a clear-cut impression of the attitudes of the people in the early stages of the long United States tenure of authority in the islands, and of their adjustment to the painful situation in which they found themselves. Nowhere has a contradictory evaluation by military government observers been found regarding the Okinawan people, their stalwart character, and their remarkably resilient acceptance of the authority of their foreign conquerors in a war which was not of their seeking. It would be fallacious to assume that all Ryukyans regarded the Americans in precisely the same way or that these general attitudes were not to change as year followed year of the ever present dominance of the United States forces in their islands. It is pertinent to recognize, moreover, that between island clusters, between islands, and even between villages on the same island there were differences in the physical characteristics

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in their speech, customs, and historical past, and consequently, their

attitudes and ways of expressing or dissimulating their genuine feelings;

Yet what has been said of the acceptance of the American presence by

the people of Okinawa Island is consistently reflected in the official

reports and personal diaries of military government officers stationed

in the other Ryukyuan island clusters ^{or} of "guntos," as they are called.

These Ryukyuan were a special people, it appeared. As the eighty-two days of intense fighting went on around them and the requirements of military necessity placed greater strain on their entire beings, those first favorable impressions stood up well and were even enhanced in the minds of their stewards, the American military government.

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Chapt. Three

"...for the benefit of the population."

~~Record~~

The Ryukyus
For Better or Worse: The US and Okinawa

With all the analyses [made by scholars of the US-Okinawa situation,
1945-1972, none has come to hand which tells why the United States
became the sole administrator of the Ryukyu Islands. Nor, [so far as
(2) is known], have any [fantacizers] (3) conjured up a picture as to how different
this story might have been if, as could have eventuated from the Roosevelt-
Chiang Kai-shek conversations at Cairo in 1943, "joint US-Chinese (4)
occupation and eventually joint administration by the two countries" had
become an actuality. X ()

The dreaming is left to a brave creative writer with good wishes.

(5) [The former] is an appropriate subject for a brief review in the present
context.

As a matter of military strategy, the ^{U.S.} Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted
(6) the principal [onus] for the conquest of Japan and the outlying islands
as a United States share of the global war. Meaningful Russian participation

() ~~44~~ See p. _____ supra.

III

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[was never counted upon] by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Britain's forces were heavily engaged in other [Pacific areas] although a British carrier force struck at the Sakashima Islands (Miyako and Yaeyama) on 26, 27 and 31 March and rendered valuable assistance to the American assault forces by aerial reduction of Japan's air capability from the Sakashima airfields.^{45/} Moreover, Combined Chiefs of Staff consideration being given to deployment of a "British Task Force and supporting units based on Okinawa" was precluded by the capitulation of Japan.^{46/} Chiang was in no position to make even a token military contribution to Operation ICEBERG. (3)

Military government of an occupied area is an integral part of the assault and conquest, as General Buckner reminded his Tenth Army Staff.^{47/} The Okinawa operation was, with the exception of the British support

() ^{45/} "Okinawa, The Last Battle," Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948.

() ^{46/} Msg CM-IN 15977, 16 Aug 45; subejct, "CINCAFPAC Requirements." (initials)

() ^{47/} See p _____ supra.

III, 2

noted above, exclusively an American operation, and the occupation and subsequent civil administration would normally be expected to follow the same pattern - subject only to subsequent agreements. In this peculiar instance, however, the agreements, although only inferred, preceded the military action. At Cairo, [it will be recalled,] Roosevelt virtually invited Chiang Kai-shek to participate ~~at least~~ in the occupation of the Loochoos and Japan.⁴⁶ () The Generalissimo indicated at a dinner meeting with the American President that "China was not equipped to shoulder this considerable responsibility, that the task should be carried out under the leadership of the United States and that China could participate in the task in a supporting capacity should it prove necessary by that time."⁴⁷ (•) Six days later at Teheran, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin agreed that bases and "strong points" in the vicinity of Germany and Japan should be occupied and held under "trusteeship," (whatever their

() ~~46~~/ See p. 4 supra.

() ~~47~~/ Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, "The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943," Department of State, 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Doc #144, Washington, 1961, pp. 323-324.

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respective interpretations of that term might have been).

Churchill allowed that Great Britain, "if asked to do so, might occupy certain bases...provided others would help pay the cost of such occupation."^{50/} () The record is silent as to Stalin's reaction. [(It is safe to presume that it would have been made an explicit matter of record if he had suggested Allied or United Nations' participation in the ^{control} occupation of the southern Kurile Islands.)] Thus, Chiang, Churchill, Stalin - no volunteers.

It should be sufficiently meaningful then, to recall one sentence from the report of the President's debriefing of the Pacific War Council, January 12, 1944, on the Cairo and Teheran Conferences: "President Roosevelt stated that he believed that everyone agreed that the civil administration of the Pacific Islands should be carried out for the benefit of the populations and that their administration will always be a source of expense rather than profit."^{51/} ()

Il., p 554

5) ^{150/} Foreign Relations of the US, Diplomatic Papers, "The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943," Dept of State 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Doc. #144 (p. 554).

(^{151/} Ib., page 870.

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[So it came about,] for better or worse, that the Okinawan and American people were joined in an officially close but never entirely relaxed relationship which, for want of more precise words, most nearly approximated that of steward and protege. ^{52/} () As in all close relationships there were good times and bad, periods of greater and lesser mutual trust and confidence; and ceaselessly, although generally imperceptibly, over the years the very nature of the relationship was in the process of evolution.

() ^{52/} This terminology is selected with acute awareness that Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, professor, lecturer, writer and former Ambassador to Japan, characterized the United States' position in the Ryukyus as "American military rule." [(X) Japan, Story of a Nation, (X) Knopf, 1970).] Dr. Reischauer's views on various aspects of this subject will be recorded from time to time in this ^{text} ~~report~~, not so much because of his role as an articulate authority on the Japanese viewpoint but, more importantly, because at one point in history ~~his~~ ^{the} ~~views~~ ^{of the Ambassador to Japan} on the US civil administration of the Ryukyus were heard at the highest level of our government.

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The Steward

The military government section of the Tenth Army under the Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) was ~~initially~~ charged with the stewardship of the Ryukyuan people ^{during the assault stage.} Its mission was "to prevent civilians from interfering with military operations, to discharge the obligations imposed by international law with regard to treatment of civilian populations, and consequently to take whatever measures were necessary to preserve order and to prevent unrest and remediable hardship.... Naturally, as circumstances changed, the emphasis and scope of military government has been subject to reinterpretation. In the combat stages military government had of necessity to concentrate upon enabling the civilians to survive under conditions which were frequently most adverse. During the period when the island was being developed into a powerful base of operations against Japan, military government endeavored speedily to transplant the population into the Okinawan hinterland and to adjust the people to new and greatly

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restricted ways of life. With the cessation of hostilities, the vast curtailment of the military development of the island, and the consequent reduction in military personnel, it became feasible and even imperative for military government actively and materially to encourage the rehabilitation of the island socially, economically, and politically." ~~30/~~ ()

In the assault phase, Military Government was ~~a command function of~~ Tenth Army, [jointly staffed by Army and Navy personnel.] ^{Secret} "The organiza- 7 (1)

~~insert p 65, after first line of text, insert the following:~~

Military Government units were augmented by some 800 Medical Corps enlisted men and could also avail themselves of a ^{share of} ~~share of~~ one hundred Army enlisted Nisei interpreters.

activities behind the fighting front; the third administered the refugee civilian camps; and the fourth administered the military government districts... As the campaign progressed, minor shortages of cooks, military police, and medical corpsmen developed in the camps for displaced civilians. In spite of these shortages, detachments that

"Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."

~~30/~~ "Report of Military Government Activities for period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946," from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operations Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Office, Ryukyus, 1 July 1946.

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restricted ways of life. With the cessation of hostilities, the vast curtailment of the military development of the island, and the consequent reduction in military personnel, it became feasible and even imperative for military government actively and materially to encourage the rehabilitation of the island socially, economically, and politically." ~~33/~~ ()

In the assault phase, Military Government was ~~a command function of Tenth Army,~~ [jointly staffed by Army and Navy] ^{Insert} personnel. ~~"~~ The organization provided for four types of detachments, each consisting of a number of teams. The first type accompanied assault divisions and conducted preliminary reconnaissance; the second organized military government activities behind the fighting front; the third administered the refugee civilian camps; and the fourth administered the military government districts... As the campaign progressed, minor shortages of cooks, military police, and medical corpsmen developed in the camps for displaced civilians. In spite of these shortages, detachments that

98/ "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."
~~"Report of Military Government Activities for period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946," from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operations Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Office, Ryukyus, 1 July 1946.~~

were originally designed to operate camps containing 10,000 civilians often found it necessary to care for as many as 20,000." ~~54/~~ ()

Okinawa was declared officially secured on 21 June 1945, when organized Japanese resistance was broken, and the so-called "garrison

Insert

p. 66

Insert as continuation of first sentence of first full paragraph the following:

and became the responsibility of the Island Command. Two days later General Joseph W. Stilwell was designated Military Governor in lieu of Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC who had assumed the responsibility when General Buckner was killed.

were organized into district teams, eleven on Okinawa and five on the nearby outlying islands. The district commanding officers exercised considerable authority and responsibility in their respective geographic areas until May 1946 when a consolidation of Military Government was effectuated. This consolidation and closing of the district offices which took place over a period of months was attributed to the withdrawal

54/ "Okinawa, The Last Battle," Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948, p. 417.

were originally designed to operate camps containing 10,000 civilians often found it necessary to care for as many as 20,000." ~~54/~~ ()

Okinawa was declared officially secured on 21 June 1945, when organized Japanese resistance was broken, and the so-called "garrison phase" of military government began, ^{Insert} The military government situation ^{had} appeared ~~to have~~ reached a degree of stabilization likely to continue as long as the island remained a base for operations against the main islands of Japan. [Plans were formulated] for reorganizing military government to better adapt it to the existing situation. The four types of teams utilized in the assault phase were dissolved and their personnel were organized into district teams, eleven on Okinawa and five on the nearby outlying islands. The district commanding officers exercised considerable authority and responsibility in their respective geographic areas until May 1946 when a consolidation of Military Government was effectuated. This consolidation and closing of the district offices which took place over a period of months was attributed to the withdrawal

54/ "Okinawa, The Last Battle," Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1948, p.417.

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of personnel and the principle of indirect administration, a basic objective of military government.

By 15 September 1945, the entire complement of [Army officers was transferred to military government duty in Japan and Korea,] leaving the Navy unit and the Army enlisted interpreters. With the beginning of the Navy demobilization program soon after peace was declared, Naval personnel withdrawal reached a ~~rate~~ *rate* which ~~was~~ *exceeded that of* ~~began to be withdrawn at a~~ considerably ~~greater rate than~~ replacements were furnished. By 1 July 1946, military government staff had declined from a peak of 498 Army and Navy officers one year earlier to 44 officers. Enlisted personnel had declined from 2389 to 177 on 1 July 1946.

In the meantime, competing demands on both ~~arms~~ *branches* ~~of~~ *arms* the military forces had caused considerable concern in Washington as to whether the Army or the Navy should carry the burden of military government in the Ryukyus. Stated another way, it was a moot question as to which Service had paramount interest in terms of the relative demands which would be levied upon it if it should become necessary to resort to arms again to maintain peace in the Pacific--once that goal had been achieved.

As Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson wrote to Secretary of the Navy

① James Forrester on November 29, 1945, ... "I am concerned over the continued failure of the War and Navy Departments to come to an understanding with reference to the government of the islands in the Pacific that were won from the Japanese and are to be retained primarily for military bases. The question does not strike me as a difficult one, but discussion has been under way for many weeks without visible progress."

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"The Navy position, as I understand it, has been that government of all islands except the Ryukyus should be vested in the Navy Department."

"I am in full agreement with the necessity of control of the seas in the Pacific and the need for Naval bases in connection with such control. But I am not persuaded that these considerations lead to the conclusion that civil government of all the islands (except the Ryukyus) should be supervised by the Navy. Sea power is vital in the Pacific, but so is control of air over the Pacific. While Naval bases are vital,

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that fact does not require that there must be Naval supervision of civil government on islands where the major base is not Naval but is, for example, a base for Army Air Force operations....

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"I suggest the following policy:

1. On islands where there is a large civilian population, such as Okinawa, the Department of the Interior to supervise civilian government, unless the State Department has objections on the ground of foreign relations.

2. In all other cases such government as may be required to be the responsibility of the Service having the major military base on the particular island.

"In explanation of the second point, it seems to me that our reason for retaining control of the islands is not territorial expansion..

[but] purely for national security ... government of such civilians as may reside on the islands will be a problem incidental to the maintenance of the bases...

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"The War Department is not desirous of taking on functions of this type. It seems clear enough, however, that unnecessary and undesirable complexities would be introduced if the principal base on an island were an Army responsibility but government of the island as a whole was a matter for the Navy to administer. The same would be true where the principal base was Navy but government of the island was to be directed by the Army."

~~"I shall be glad to discuss the matter at your convenience, in the hope that a decision can be worked out without further delay."~~

Secretary Patterson's suggestion that, subject to State Department acquiescence, the Department of the Interior supervise civilian government of Okinawa was not the genesis of that concept. Rather, the record clearly indicates that Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes had been "pressuring the President" on that point, and that the President "had instructed Secretary Byrne [sic] get some action from the Committee

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of Four. ^{52/} () The Committee of Four, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Interior, was appointed by ^{Truman} ~~the~~ President on 20 October 1945, with instructions to make recommendations to him satisfactory to all four Secretaries on the problems arising from the administration of Pacific Islands. The Secretaries of War and Navy solicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ^{who} ~~which~~, while agreeing that military control of the areas should be continued, split on the question as to which Service should exercise dominance. ^{56/} ()

) The Committee of Three, composed of the members of the Committee of Four minus the Secretary of Interior, authorized Secretary Byrnes to inform the President that they did not consider it timely to take any action with regard to the proposal of Secretary Ickes. Such decision was "based on the thought that a change from military control to the control of a civilian agency would have the appearance of settling down to a long period of occupation." ^{54/} () Thereafter, the Interior

- ① () ^{55/} Memorandum for [General Lincoln], 29 January 1946, initialed ["J.M.R."] ^{WJ}
- ② () ^{56/} [JCS 1524/3: Dest.]
- () ^{57/} [Memoranda] of 14 and 16 February 1946 by Lt. Colonel Daniel C. Fahey, Jr., Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

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Department ceased to be considered as an appropriate agency for administering the civil affairs of the Ryukyu Islands.

The matter of primary Service responsibility for military government in the Ryukyus seems to have been almost as unclear at the JCS level as it was in the field. The Chief of Naval Operations in a Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 March 1946, outlined the sequence of events as follows:...

"2. By JCS 819/5, operational command of the Ryukyus, and the administration of military government [was made a Navy responsibility.] ①
By JCS dispatch 181409 of July 1945..., operational control of the Ryukyus, except for certain naval installations [] passed to the Army in order to facilitate preparations for OLYMPIC [] plan to assault Kyushu on November 1, 1945[7]. Steps were taken to transfer military government to the Army [] the latter requested that the Navy continue to administer military government in the Ryukyus in order that Army personnel could be made available for duty in Japan. ②

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This uncertainty at various levels was not permitted to continue unresolved indefinitely, however. On 8 February 1946, [The Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) recommended that military government in the Ryukyus be transferred to the Army.] [The Chief of Naval Operations, in the memorandum to the Joint Chiefs quoted above, endorsed that recommendation.] The Navy Department, he explained, had changed its original plans to develop Buckner Bay as a naval base and planned only to maintain a post-war anchorage with minor facilities there. "On the other hand," he continued, "the Ryukyus are garrisoned by Army troops and it is understood that considerable development of very heavy bomber airfields by the Army is in progress." He recommended, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendation of CINCPAC to transfer the administration of military government of the Ryukyus to the War Department. 60/ ()

(4) [The ^{Army} Chief of Staff, ~~US Army~~ concurred in the proposal, subject to retention of Naval Military Government personnel until replaced by

60/ JCS 819/11, 6 March 1946. ()

Note to
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suitable Army staff, and provision of necessary administrative shipping by the Navy until replaced by Army craft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the arrangement on 1 April 1946. ^{61/} Accordingly, "administration of military government of all islands of the Ryukyus south of 30 degrees north latitude...was transferred from the United States Navy to the United States Army at 0001, 1 July 1946. Lieutenant General William D. Styer, Commanding General, Army Forces Western Pacific, assumed the office of Military Governor of the Ryukyus and designated Brigadier General Frederic L. Hayden, Commanding General, [Ryukyus Command] as Chief Military Government Officer. Colonel William H. Craig, Infantry, was designated Deputy Commander for Military Government." ^{62/} ()

A recapitulation of the command structure in the Okinawa operation reflects the somewhat confusing sequence of events.

() ^{61/} JCS 819/12. (Ded)

() ^{62/} "Report of Military Government Activities for July 1946," Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, 1 August 1946. (Ded)

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In the preassault period and until organized Japanese resistance ended on 21 June 1945, the Commanding General, Tenth Army was the Chief Military Government Officer for the Ryukyus, reporting to the Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA).

On 21 June 1945, the Island Commander, Okinawa (ISCOM) assumed full control of Okinawa and the Deputy Commander for Military Government reported to him.

In August 1945, ^{the} ISCOM was broken up into several units and military government came under the Commanding General, Army Service Command I (later designated the Okinawa Base Command).

On 21 September 1945, when Military Government [?] [was again] placed under Navy, the Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa (CNOB) became responsible for military government carried out under the Deputy for Military Government.

1 July 1946 found the Army [once more] charged with carrying out the stewardship.

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In concluding his report on military government in the Ryukyus from "L Day" to 1 July 1946, Colonel C.S. Murray, the Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Military government recorded these general observations on organization:

... "From the day the Okinawaⁿ operation was conceived, the organization for the Military government mission had to be adapted continuously to a constantly changing set of conditions. Some of these shifting factors were:

(1)...Where the native population would be located. This uncertainty has never ceased to exist and only within the last two or three months was it being resolved.

(2) Transition from combat to garrison to armistice^X phase which shifted emphasis in the mission from security to rehabilitation.

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(3) Demobilization of practically all of the highly trained, experienced, mature, and specialized military government personnel without adequate provisions for replacement.

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(4) Rapid movement of personnel through key positions in the organization during the demobilization period, accentuated by the seniority system.

(5) Shifting from Army responsibility to Navy, back to Army, then back to Navy, during the first six months".

Colonel Murray then gave a brief estimate of the situation and concluded:

"In the meanwhile, the area of responsibility had greatly expanded." ^{82/}

The Population Explosion

The first practical problem of military government was to move the civilians from the battle zones, both to prevent them from interfering with military operations and to "enable them to survive under conditions which were frequently most adverse". ^{64/}

- () 6X/ "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946"
"Report of Military Government Activities from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946," from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operations Base, Okinawa, and Chief Military Government Office, Ryukyus, 1 July 1946.
- () 6X/ 1b.
"Report of Military Government Activities for Period From 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946," from Deputy Commander for Military Government", 1 July 1946.

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Eyewitnesses give a graphic collage of the situation. "In the first days of the assault, the entire island was a land of the dead, no human life could be discerned anywhere and it seemed as if the entire land had been returned to the bones and ashes of many generations of the past..."

"As the fighting moved forward the civilians began to come forth from their hiding places. At first in twos and threes and then larger parties. They were zombies...The very old, the very young, the sick, and the insane...(All able-bodied men had been conscripted and were behind the Japanese lines).....^{66/} ()

"...A very high percentage required medical care. The old were particularly pitiful. Half starved, utterly exhausted, harried from pillar to post during the 80-day-old campaign, always fleeing ahead of the on-coming American Army, their faces were solid in misery. These poor people were rounded up by the troops, and given what food and drink was available. Trucks were brought up as soon as possible and the old and the injured were loaded in and taken to the rear. Those who were able to walk started

() ^{66/} "Okinawa Operation", Captain E.E. Paro, U.S.N., United States Naval Proceedings, Vol. 72, January 1946, (pp 69, 65), published by United States Naval Institute, Menasha, Wisconsin.

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back from the front. In the last two or three days of the battle, especially 21 and 22 June, the refugees stretched out in lines more than a mile long immediately back of the fighting front. These people truged along, mostly with heads bent down, carrying on their backs and heads their last worldly belongings, a few scraps of clothing, a piece or two of pottery, a wicker basket--that was all..."^{65/} ()

"The number of Okinawans under control of Military government rose rapidly in the first month of the invasion until by the end of April 1945 it amounted to 128,876... By the conclusion of the fighting the number totaled approximately 196,000".^{67/} The figure would have been from 46,000 to 100,000 higher had not so many civilians lives been crushed out between

② [^{one writer} what ~~someone~~ described as 'the hammer and the anvil'.]

While the toll of human casualties suffered by the armed forces of both sides is generally agreed (12,520 Americans killed or missing and

③ [^{66/} "The XXIV Corps in the Conquest of Okinawa", Major Roy Appleman publisher ?, date ?]?

^{67/} ~~X~~ Okinawa: The Last Battle, Appieman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Wash. D.C., 1948 (pp. 417, 419)

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36,631 wounded, and approximately

110,000 Japanese dead and 7,400 captured), there is a wide divergence of

estimates of the number of civilian fatalities on Okinawa in the last battle

of World War II. The number has been placed as low as 46,000 by some sources

and as high as 160,000 by others. ~~68/~~ ()

The greatest Okinawan civilian casualties were suffered in the central and southern parts of the island where the fighting was fiercest. With the battle finished, military government activities reached beyond those critical areas to encompass the entire population of Okinawa and its small

- (1) nearby island ^{Satellites} ~~Satellites~~. (1) It found itself responsible then for approximately [330,000] persons of all ages and stages of physical and mental health. Most of them were homeless, impoverished, in need of food, clothing, shelter and medical care. All yearned for the for the restoration of their cherished family and community life.
- (3)

68/ "Civilian Casualties in the Battle of Okinawa, 1945" Norman H. King, edited and published by Dr Shannon McCune as Ryukyu Islands Project Research and Information Paper Number Nineteen, November 20, 1972, Department of Geography, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida. Military government was making distinct progress in meeting these

needs and aspirations of the people when two major developments swelled

the number of Ryukyans under its charge to 734,000 by 1 July 1946. ^{68/} (1)

(1) "Naval Military Government Report 1 July 1946"

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Ch. J. H. H.

More Islands - More People

ca 4, 1

②

Before the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945 and its submission to the Allied Powers, the Okinawa Prefecture of Japan consisted of the guntos, or island groups, of Okinawa, ^MNiyako, and [Yaeyama] and their surrounding islands. [By ~~its~~ acceptance] of the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, limiting Japanese ~~Sovereignty~~ to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, ^UShikoku and such minor islands as the Allied Powers should determine, the Okinawa Prefecture as such ceased to be. Five days later, when the Japanese could send an officer of appropriate rank to surrender to General Joseph W. Stilwell, [Military Governor], all Japanese forces in the Ryukyus, ^{specifically} the terms of surrender ~~definitely~~ established the northern boundary of the Ryukyu Islands at thirty degrees north latitude

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thus encompassing Amami gunto to the north in the island complex. Never-

theless, the Amami area continued to be administered under [SCAP] as a part

of Kagoshima Prefecture until 13 March 1946, where a military government

team was established [there]. This action, delayed because of a lack of

experienced personnel, was taken in implementation of [SCAPIN] 677^{70/} which

directed the Japanese Government "to cease exercising or attempting to

exercise governmental authority over any area outside of Japan..." specifying

"the Ryukyu Islands south of 30° North Latitude." Thus, Amami Oshima became,

at least for the time being, a part of Okinawa.

The Southern Ryukyus, like the Amami group, had suffered comparatively negligible damage in the combat phase. One of the most important operations

planned for Phase III of ICEBERG was the capture of Miyako for air base

development; however, in view of the adequacy of Okinawa and Ie Shima

70/ Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers "Memorandum for the Japanese Government", 29 January 1946.

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for this purpose, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved abandonment of this action in favor of a more intensive base construction program on Okinawa. Miyako and Yaeyama guntos [were taken] with minor resistance as a result of air strikes launched by a British carrier force, [the only Allied participant in the entire Ryukyuan operation] ^{71/}

The basic needs of the local people were not so pressing ^{therefore} as on Okinawa and while the U.S. Navy established military administration [in Miyako on 8 December 1945], it was largely a liaison function. ^{72/} However, a severe drought which commenced in January 1946 ^{ed} threatening a serious food shortage, ^{while} and uncertainties as to government financing ^{combined to} converted these islands into problem areas ^{also} and demanded the diversion of military government personnel and resources. ^{73/}

(4) [On 19 March 1946] a resident military government team was established in the southern Ryukyus.

^{71/} "Okinawa, The Last Battle", Appleman et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington D.C., 1948, pp. 62, 66

^{72/} "Background Information Booklet, Hirara-Shi", USCAR, 1967; see also "Report of Military Government Activities for February 1946", from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operation Base, 22 February 1946, pp. 19 and 20

^{73/} "Report of Military Government Activities for February 1946"

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With these expansions of the Okinawa military government zone came the responsibility for an additional three hundred thousand human beings-- over two hundred thousand in the northern Ryukyus and nearly 100,000 in Sakishima^{ima}, the southern islands.

And More To Come-----

Meanwhile, there was developing in the Pacific a massive ~~movement~~^{movement} of people which was to create a series of incoming waves of repatriates to Ryukyuan shores, adding another two hundred thousand persons to compound the massive problems confronting military government. ^{74/} [General MacArthur's staff has recorded that by the end of the war over six million Japanese were scattered throughout the islands in the Western Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland; and that their early return to Japan was desirable for purely humanitarian reasons as well as to ease the economic burden of the liberated countries. Additionally, there were approximately 1,170,000 aliens in Japan, many of whom had been forcibly removed from their home-

74/ "The Ryukyu Islands, Prewar and Postwar (through 30 June 1958)", The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, (p. 22). However, two disparate figures are attributed to USCAR: Civil Administration "activities" Volume 1, number 1, 1953, says "approximately 1,170,000" "Post War Okinawa" by F.R. Pitts, W.P. Libra and ...P. ... Science Branch, Washington 1955, attributes a figure of 153,344 to USCAR. (p.95)

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lands. They wanted to go home, as early as September 1945, and many of them ^{had} flocked to the ports in southern Honshu and Kyushu, hoping thereby to be selected for early repatriation. The resultant congestion created threats to the public health and welfare in Japan. "Recognizing this urgent problem, SCAP promptly initiated a program for mass repatriation, placing it under the staff supervision of G-3 in conjunction with the Naval High Command". ^{75/}

Although the problem of the eventual repatriation of civilians in the Pacific had been discussed as early as the fall of 1943 by a group of Far Eastern specialists, no firm US policies were adopted until December 22, 1945, when the State-war-Navy Coordinating Committee finally agreed upon most of the basic principles in the resolution of this complicated problem. ^{76/}

^{75/} Reports of General MacArthur, "MacArthur In Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase", Vol I Supplement, prepared by His general staff, Department of the Army, July 1966

^{76/} "United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands", Vol II, Dorothy E. Richard, Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1957

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In essence, the ^{established} ~~general~~ policy ^{repatriate} ~~was to return to Japan~~ all Japanese from

the areas separated from the Japanese Empire and from the Far Eastern countries

occupied by Japan, but to repatriate from other parts of the world, in-

cluding the United States, only those Japanese who were judged to be ob-

jectionable. ^{77/} There were, however, politically meaningful variations and

mutations of that simple formula, such as whether Okinawan and Formosan

civilians should be regarded as Japanese nationals and the same policy

applied to them as to Japanese from the home islands. Natives of Korea,

as well as those of Kararut^o and the Kurile Islands presented a variation,

as did, for example, the native Micronesian wives and children of Japanese-

① native [marriages.]

To the responsible military commanders in the Pacific the SWNCC decision

of December 1945 was perhaps irritatingly late, but in point of practical

fact it made no substantial difference. The limited shipping available was

preempted for repatriation of Japanese Military personnel from the areas of

^{77/} "The Allied Occupation of Japan", Edwin M. Martin, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1948 ✓

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their capture or surrender, in accordance with the Potsdam proclamation setting forth the terms for Japanese surrender. It provided in pertinent part that "the Japanese military forces, after being disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

"Initially, military government in the Ryukyus south of 30° north latitude was exercised by CINCPAC, [The MacArthur reports.] "As such, that headquarters was responsible for the return of some 69,200 Japanese military personnel. A ferry service was established to the Ryukyus in October 1945 to transport only the Japanese military... [These] were returned to Japan by the beginning of 1946, with the exception of 14,000 whose return was temporarily suspended until the last quarter of the year." During this period their services were utilized to repair war damaged facilities and to assist the native population to return to their former homes."

"The return of displaced Ryukyuans was not so easily achieved. There were approximately 160,000 Ryukyuans in Japan [who had been hurriedly evacuated from their homes just prior to the invasion by the United States]

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forces. They had been permitted to carry with them little in the way of baggage, clothing or funds. Their situation in Japan rapidly became worse from a social and economic standpoint. It was therefore to the interest of General MacArthur's headquarters to return them to their former homes." ^{78/}

MacArthur cabled the War Department on 28 February 1946, "Most of the..

[Okinawan group who desire repatriation] is destitute and ill-equipped for the colder climate of Japan. There is a critical shortage of food, clothing, and shelter in Japan constantly being accentuated by the arrival of large numbers of Japanese repatriates. Six months have now gone by since the occupation. There is short range transportation now available to effect the evacuation to Okinawa which is ~~in~~ excess of other repatriation tasks. Morally this issue must now be met, and I am drawing plans which will permit this evacuation to be accomplished in equal monthly increments covering a period of about six months starting as soon after the first of March as is practicable. This plan should allow the repatriated

78/ ¹⁴ "Reports of General MacArthur, MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase," Vol I Supplement.

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Okinawans to be settled before the winter of 1947. In view of civil government being under Naval auspices, it is desirable that Navy concurrence be obtained." ^{79/}

The War Department Civil Affairs Division (CAD) presented this matter to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC), an Army-Navy advisory body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CAD pointed out that in view of the long range strategic interest of the United States in the Pacific Islands, including Okinawa, it was probable that Okinawa would not remain under Japanese sovereignty; therefore, it was in the US. interests to do everything possible to carry out the desires of the Okinawans ^{including those who wished to be repatriated,} in this regard in order to promote their good will toward the United States. This position was supported by Army members of the JCAC. ^{80/}

^{The} Navy ^{rejected} ~~demurred~~, however, arguing that it was already costing the Navy "in the neighborhood of 2 million dollars per month" to administer military government in the Ryukyus. Noting that there was then pending before the

^{79/} Message Number C58336, 28 February 1946, CINCPAC to War Dept. from SCAP to WARCOS. Signed MacArthur, Enclosure B to JCS 1661.

^{80/} J.C.A.C. 91, 9 March 1946.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff a recommendation that responsibility for civil administration in the Ryukyus be transferred to the Army, Navy members of the JCAC recommended that final decision on MacArthur's proposal be deferred pending action by the Joint Chiefs on the transfer of military government responsibility.^{81/} That is what transpired. On 25 April, JCAC recommended to the Joint Chiefs that since transfer of the administration of the Ryukyus from the Navy to the Army had been approved, MacArthur be informed that "you may now make arrangements for repatriation of Okinawans who desire to return to Ryukyus from Japan."^{82/}

(i) Actually, [MacArthur reports,] "Early agreements with CINCPAC were reached under which repatriates from Japan destined for localities in the Ryukyus other than Okinawa would be accepted. ~~Consequently, Ryukyus were loaded on shuttle ships which were returning Japanese.~~ [However,] CINCPAC with considerable justification, refused to accept the Okinawans on the grounds that food and shelter were not available locally to support the

^{81/} J.C.A.C. 91/1, 14 March 1946.

^{82/} J.C.S. 1661, 25 April 1946.

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added increase in population."^{83/} Following the decision ~~of 1 April 1946~~ to transfer administration of military government of the Ryukyus to the War Department, ~~communicated to CINCPAC/SCAP on 5 April~~, representatives of those two commands met in Tokyo and "agreed upon a plan for repatriation of all Ryukyans in Japan who were willing to return home."^{84/}

"This plan, published late in July, was quite complicated because of conditions in the Ryukyus. It provided that repatriation would begin on 5 August 1946....The rate of repatriation to Okinawa was established at 4,000 per week until 26 September, after that at 8,000 per week until the program was completed."^{85/}

Thus, the issue which MacArthur said in his message of 25 February 1946, "must now be met" had remained unresolved until July-August 1946.

Unhappily, procrastination in the resolution of ^{a number of} ~~many~~ important issues in the administration of the Ryukyus, particularly those involving inter-departmental interests, was to become too frequently a characteristic of

^{83/} Reports of General MacArthur, "MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase," Volume I Supplement.

^{84/} WAR 83400, 5 April 1946.

^{85/} Report of General MacArthur, "MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase," Volume I Supplement.

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Washington decision making. Some such delays were to be disadvantageous to the best interests of the United States, as well as to compound the problems of the responsible heads of the civil administration, and to

①

[~~attenuate~~ alternate] in the minds of the Ryukuan people their confidence in American assertions of deep interest in their welfare and well-being.

In this particular instance the Okinawans in Japan, anxious to return home, suffered mental and moral, if not physical hardships. At least two honorable and later distinguished Ryukyuans found the delays too much. They felt it their duty to be among their people ~~working~~ ^{working} for the reestablishment of Okinawa, their homeland.

STET

One of these was a young student, ^{Senaga} Hiroshi Senaga, who was to become a leader in the government of the Ryukyu Islands, a highly respected and influential force in promoting mutual respect and good will between the Ryuky^{an} and American peoples, And a businessman and banker of stature. Hiroshi took advantage of the fact that CINPAC had agreed to accept repatriates destined for localities in the Ryukyuans other than Okinawa.

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residence of Ishigaki.

Ishigaki

guise

and became a nominal Miyakoan. He reached Miyako in that way and used

his ingenuity to find a way back north to Okinawa. ^{86/} He arrived at Kubasaki, came ^{many letters for people on Okinawa} ~~The island was all over, no green~~ ^{remained. "A year later it was all green."}

Kotaro Kokuba was another such man. Already established as a con-

struction contractor, Kotaro was engaged by the Japanese government to

construct airfields, roads, barracks and all manner of military em-

placements ^{on both Okinawa} ~~on both Okinawa~~ ^{on the} ~~in which Kotaro found himself~~ and of his

main islands. His biographer tells of the dilemma in which ^{solution.} Kotaro found himself, and of his solutions.

.... "The evacuees [sic] from Okinawa had to live among the mainland people feeling humiliated and deprived, for they had lost all contact with their native land by then.

"It was very encouraging to the evacuees that Kotaro Kokuba happened to be among them. He had been called to the Army Air Strategy Headquarters in Tokyo shortly before the attack on Okinawa, thus missing the chance of going back home. Hearing the miserable plight of the Okinawa people in Kyushu, Kotaro rushed to their rescue."

86/ Interview with the author, May 1974

1972

Meaning "rescue"

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"His sincere spirit and love for the native land were already legendary, and besides, he knew a lot of leading people in Kyushu, having done much construction business in the region. In addition to that Kotaro fortunately had a ready cash with him worth tens of thousands of dollars, which he had received as payment for the work for the military."

① "Kotaro didn't think it a nuisance when he had to call at the Kyushu government office in Fukuoka several times, nor did he consider it troublesome to prod the Branch Office of ^O Ikinawa Prefecture established locally in every prefecture in Kyushu district. Building houses and dormitories was a simple matter once he got through red tapes. Kotaro devoted whatever time was left in organizing fishing co-ops, agricultural co-ops, or training the young people in the art of carpentry. Setting up his temporary office in Yatsushiro City, right in the middle of Kyushu, Kotaro worked energetically, hopping from place to place looking for the need of the people.....

"Selflessly devoting all his time and energy for the relief work, Kotaro gave 100,000 yen (an astonishing amount when we do the exchange rate of those days) in order to form the Relief work Center for

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evacuators. Numerous other causes received gifts of money ranging from five to ten thousand yen each. The greatest concern on the people's mind, however, was that they wanted to return to Okinawa as soon as it became possible. Kotaro tried everything to prod the negotiation with the American military government, and thanks partly to his tireless effort, 2,500 people or so were able to return to ^MNiyako ~~Island~~ and Yaeyama Islands as early as January of 1946. Perhaps, it was because these islands were fortunately spared the total destruction of the war, but the return to ~~the~~ Okinawa Island seemed a remote possibility.

"Seeing the relief works in Kyushu carrying themselves out, more or less on a stable basis, Kotaro's concern for Okinawa grew larger as the days progressed. After more than a year since the close of the war, he had not seen the native land of Okinawa. Kotaro determined that he should go back home, at whatever cost, and he vowed he would work there for an early repatriation of the evacuators.

~~"Kotaro is such a person he can not contain himself once he sets his~~
~~course of action before him, and this is a serious drawback as a~~

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~~as a strong point at the same time.~~

"A ^{****}~~drawback indeed because in this case~~ he was ~~thus~~ willing to risk everything in an attempt to smuggle himself into Okinawa, when there was a strict military order against such an action. But since this was not motivated by any selfish interest or desire, Kotaro was frank in admitting his plans to everyone. The preparation was carefully made, and a certain day of July of 1946 was set as the day of departure for Kotaro and his devoted followers."

"When they assembled at Hinaku port in Kumamoto Prefecture, it was the ^astrongest stowaway to behold. The city government officials and even the police officers whose duty it was to arrest such people, were all lined up on the shore."

"God bless your voyage, and good luck, Mr Kokuba," they called out as the small boat started on its course."

"Quite an adventurous attempt it was, to risk their lives in such a small boat. But they were all in high spirits, knowing that they were

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on their way to the native land. Some were much experienced fishermen and sailors, so they sailed confidently. Favored by ^{the} five weather, the boat safely landed at ^{Kagamiji} ~~Kagami~~ of Kunagami in the northern part of the island^{87/}.

Mr Kokuba's biographer tells how, far from being prosecuted for illegal entry, he shortly met "Rear Admiral Hayden and his assistant Major Grave", meaning, no doubt, Brigadier General Frederick L. Hayden and Colonel William H. Craig, chief military government officer, and Deputy Commander for military government, respectively^{87/}..and from that day they became friends".
~~Since Kotaro Kokuba was not a politician, this review may not provide another occasion to note the fact that Kotaro Kokuba, together with his four brothers,~~
continued to be helpful to the United States authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities for the Ryukyuan people, as well as to provide leadership in Ryukyuan economic and social development.

87/ "True Okinawa Spirit-The Life of Kotaro Kokuba", by Kyoh Katoh, Kamakura, Japan; published by Sanshū Shobō Co., Ltd, Tokyo, Japan, undated

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While the tide of Okinawan repatriates from Japan was relatively slow to rise, it flowed in from the former Japanese ^{mandates} ~~mandated~~ islands and the ^{other} ~~the~~ Pacific islands in numbers sufficient to have taxed the military government beyond its capabilities were it not for the cooperation of those ^{Okinawans} who had survived the war at home. Beginning in January 1946, nearly 30,000 Okinawans from the Mandated Islands reentered their homeland at a rate as high as 3,000 persons in two ^{88/} During the year approximately 155,376 Ryukyans were repatriated and they continued to return at the rate of about 1,000 per month in 1947. ^{89/}

All observers of the period recognized that military government authorities in the Ryukyus already ^{had} faced critical problems. "The development of that island into a United States base and the consequent relocation in a limited area of some 320,000 inhabitants who had to be provided with food, clothing and shelter left little land and facilities for an influx of additional

^{88/} "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946"
"Report of Military Government Activities for Period 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946" from Deputy Commander for Military Government to Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, 1 July 1946.

^{89/} "Military Government under US. Army control"
mimeographed brochure, 1 July 1947

Army

Okinawa
29

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~~left little land and facilities for an influx of additional displaced~~

persons", [a naval Historian reports] ^{90/} [MacArthur's staff observed] ¹ the

military government authorities in the Ryukyus were faced not only with the

task of receiving the repatriates but of transporting them to their homes ^{at}

and providing shelter and food for them. Inter-island transportation was

provided by small native and United States craft, including LSTs made

available by SCAP. Overland transportation was furnished from the meager

resources of the military government authorities in the Ryukyus". Con-

siderable quantities of construction material, food, and tentage were

provided by SCAP. ^{91/} Two receiving stations on Okinawa and three small camps on

Amami Oshima were set up under military government supervision. However,

in accordance with the occupation policies mentioned earlier, military

government used ^{local Ryukyuan} local inhabitants to administer their own affairs in so-

far as feasible, and, in handling the repatriates, this was the sine qua

^{90/} "United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands", Vol II, Dorothy E. Richard, Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N. (p.39)

More appropriately, "to their home areas" because in most instances local houses had been destroyed in the war.

^{91/} Reports of General MacArthur, "MacArthur In Japan The Occupied Military Phase", Vol 1 Supplement, prepared by his general staff, 1946

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non of getting the job done. Although it is reported in a low key, matter-
of-fact manner by the military government authorities, there is no doubt
as to where the credit goes. Of the earliest stage Colonel Murray, Deputy
Commander for Military Government stated succinctly, "These repatriates
were brought to Okinawa on naval vessels, accommodated temporarily at
Camp Costello, a former CB camp, and resettled from there at a rate of as
high as 3,000 persons in two day periods; the program being managed almost
entirely by an Okinawan staff".^{92/}

The military government brochure "report" of 1 July 1947, states that
the receiving stations were "staffed completely with native personnel,
~~and~~ fourteen doctors and 26 nurses, all natives, were made available in
the camps for medical processing of repatriates".^{93/} Thus, ~~the~~ military

^{92/} "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946"
~~"Report of Military Government (Activities for period from 1 April
1945 to 1 July 1946", from Deputy Commander for Military Government
to Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa, 1 July 1946"~~


^{93/} "First Anniversary, Military Government under U.S. Army Control",
mimeographed brochure, 1 July 1947

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government personnel were largely freed to devote their efforts to the urgent problems of providing shelter, food, transportation, clothing, and reestablishing a viable society. The repatriates were welcomed by their neighbors, and melded into the great mass of dislocated, homeless, needy people.

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CHAPTER FIVE

"To Prevent Disease and Unrest" Is Not Enough

The Okinawans emerging from the caves behind the American lines during the early days of the battle enjoyed one blessing which was also a matter of relief to the military government. Sweet potatoes, beans, cabbage, squash and other vegetables had just come into harvest and there was little need to draw on the stocks of civilian supplies which had been brought ashore by the invading forces. Under military police guard, working parties went out daily from the detention camps and harvested the produce which was then distributed by ration boards set up in each camp.

Relief, Rations, and Resettlement

When the displaced civilians were moved out of the relatively rich farmlands to the hilly, unfertile northern part of this island, however, the situation called for large scale distribution of Military Government food stocks. By September 1946, the dependence on relief rations was so great, the weather so bad, and the competing requirements in Japan so imperative that it was not possible to meet fully the demand. As a consequence, the people were given only half the normal rations for a period of several weeks.

Even after the maritime supply situation was improved, the difficulties of transporting foodstuffs to the northern encampment areas and the mounting number of people coming under military government care were so great that it was necessary to issue less than the fully authorized rations for some months. This condition was ameliorated when the resettlement program was begun. The basic diet, established by CINCPAC in August 1945, ranged from 782 calories per day.

under one year to 3000 per day for persons fifteen years of age or older. Military Government also devised a system which would ensure that its proteges would draw a proper proportion of fats, proteins and carbohydrates. This was accomplished through the combination of standard military rations, augmented by imported rice and locally produced sweet potatoes. [The distribution of food rations, at the rate of 4000 tons per month, presented for military government a major transportation problem, requiring the constant use of a fleet of thirty-five 2-1/2 ton assigned trucks and as many supplemental vehicles as could be "scrounged."] Ration dumps in each district served to supply the local ration office and required constant replenishment.

Pillar to Post

② Military Government "camps" were not fixed situations for long. According to the dictates of military necessity, particularly the base development program, the displaced civilians were squeezed out of one collection area after another. They were said to have been ["shunted about dizzily, for orders were given, then countermanded, areas were opened then closed and opened again."] The base development plan "was expanded, modified, curtailed, suspended, and in constant process of reconsideration. And civilians were meanwhile always on the move. The 6,000 civilians who had been concentrated in the town of Shimabaru, for instance, were evacuated during 15-20 May to make room for an airfield; they were moved to the Taka area, 19 miles away and a month later were moved again to make way for a U.S.

camp. In the Katsuren Peninsula, 23,000 civilians were first concentrated, then moved out altogether the last week in May." In late June the Motobu Peninsula was cleared of all civilians.

The people were moved to relatively undamaged villages or sections of villages and sheltered in whatever structures could be found or improvised. Lean-to shelters cropped out from standing walls, or tarpaulins were suspended over pig-pens. Shelter was imperative to protect the health of the already weakened refugees from the hazards of the torrential Okinawa rains. Ingenuity, improvisation, and resourcefulness were Military Government assets of prime value in the situation. Any extensive semi-permanent construction would have been impracticable even if possible. Impracticable because Military Government had no assurance that any area permitted for use today for a civilian camp would be available tomorrow for such purpose---- the eternal spectre of military necessity. [In any case it was not possible because construction materials were available neither locally nor from military supplies. Tents were the best shelter the American troops could find for themselves.]

The problem of providing shelter was "ten times intensified" when requirements of the expanded military base plan reflected the necessity to move some 250,000 civilians into the northern third of the island where no more than 40,000 had lived before the war. The only option which Military Government had was to dismantle the housing still standing in the central and southern parts of the island and move the masses north to permit construction of emergency shelters there. The Okinawans [cheerfully] carried out the cannibalizing and

building operation under the guidance of Military Government personnel. Yet they were not building homes, merely make-do shelters, because their hopes were to return to their home town or region, to find their families and relatives and settle down to begin life anew.

Resettlement

With the capitulation of Japan and retrenchment in the intensive and extensive military base construction, Military Government submitted to the Commanding General, Army Service Command, a program for returning the people to their home areas. Although the program was approved, its execution was seriously impeded by the requirement that separate and explicit authorization had to be obtained for each strip of land to be resettled. "Both the Army and the Navy reserved great tracts of land for permanent military installations and were reluctant to release even the bordering lands for civilian settlement." Once the military services had staked out their potential land needs they were disinclined to release land for civilian use, whether it had never been used or had been used and later abandoned. As of 1 July 1946, approximately two thirds of the 92,000 acres of arable soil on Okinawa were reserved by the military. An uncounted number of acres fit for construction but not cultivation was also marked off for military use. "The goal of military government in this matter has been to secure for the civilian population the maximum amount of land compatible with military necessity." 94 ()

94 "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946"
 foregoing unattributed quotations and most of the substance of the

portion on the early resettlement program have been drawn from this source.

That simple statement is like a small moss-covered plaque on a garden wall bearing the inscription "A Devil was Created Here." It marks the inception of one of the most difficult dilemmas in the chronicle of the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands, "The Land Problem." It grew into such a pervasive, politically irritating, trouble-spawning thing that it requires scrutiny from all sides in a chapter of its own.

① Despite numerous difficulties, [nearly 140,000 civilians had been returned to their home areas] by 1 July 1946, when the Army assumed Military Government responsibility. By the end of 1946, "land released by the Army, Navy and Air Corps installations on the island of Okinawa amounted to 7,539 acres released for cultivation and 13,956 acres released for resettlement.....full advantage has been taken in re-establishing villages on their former town-sites." During the latter part of 1946, the influx of repatriates compounded the problem but with the Okinawans managing details of the resettlement program its momentum was sustained. Military Government personnel give full credit to the civilians for the progress of the work. To replace the tents and jerry-built shacks initially employed, they designed a "standardized house with sidewalls and floor requiring 3,100 board feet of lumber...almost completely prefabricated. (which) can be erected by a skilled crew in an hour."

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"First Anniversary, Military Government Under US Army Control," brochure dated 1 July 1947, US Military Government Okinawa.

The resettlement program offered the best hope for agricultural rehabilitation. Initially, all cultivation was communal with the various communities benefitting equally from the seeds, fertilizer, breeding stock, insecticides, and implements which the United States provided.

Despite such measures as the early establishment of an experimental farm, a large portion of which was allocated to the production of seed, and the importation of breeding cattle, chickens, and hogs for use at agricultural schools established by the military government, the outlook was bleak. The Ryukyus had never been self-sufficient in food production; they had imported nearly two thirds of their rice requirements, about one-half of the soybeans, and one fourth of the wheat and barley used. Notably, sugar cane production had exceeded local consumption by 900 percent because the Japanese Government subsidized this crop. [Military Government authorities saw little prospect for the early reestablishment of a post-war sugar cane products export industry, and encouraged the conversion of former cane acreage to soybean cultivation.] This effort, however, was [not a resounding success] and the wisdom of the policy was to be a moot question for some years to come.

(2)

While arable land on Okinawa had been insufficient for years to

provide for the people's needs, alleviated only by pre-war emigration to overseas areas, the seas that washed its thousand-mile coastline offered greater potential. Fish had constituted a primary item of the Okinawan diet, comparable to the place which fresh meat occupies on the American table; moreover, they had supplied an exportable surplus before the war. Pre-war, Okinawans had 100 powered craft and 1,500 small craft, mostly canoes used for inshore subsistence fishing. Except for skipjack drying on a limited scale, however, they had no facilities for fish processing and preservation. (1)

In preparing for the occupation of Okinawa, Military Government planners had recognized the importance of reestablishing the fishing industry as rapidly as feasible. Among the obstacles to be overcome were the virtual annihilation of the fishing fleet, serious depletion of the fish supply during the war years when fishermen were allowed to use dynamite, and the lack of nets, lines, hooks, floats and other paraphernalia. Absent also was an organization to handle the business affairs of the industry, including provision of supplies and disposition of the catch.

Some 75 military landing craft were obtained from the Navy and converted for fishing in a deactivated PT base, which itself required some conversion and expansion. To supplement equipment obtained from the United States, material was salvaged from decommissioning military units. Five gallon bottles were used as floats, camouflage nets served as bait nets, and gunnetting provided the material required to make fish hooks in blacksmith shops set up by the military. To unify and coordinate activities of the industry, an island-wide

①

[fisheries association was organized.] Within one year after the battle was over, the Okinawan fishing industry was operating on a sound basis and was to continue to prosper for years to come.

Fisheries in the northern and southern islands had not experienced the war-damage suffered in the Okinawa Gunto but, until Military Government assumed control, they lacked fuel to power their boats. This problem was soon overcome and the local industry became an important source of food for its inhabitants. ()

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"Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."

Public Health

The carefully researched Civil Affairs Handbook on the Ryukyus issued by the Navy in 1944 had concluded that "the inhabitants of the Ryukyu archipelago do not enjoy particularly good health. A number of factors combine to keep their health at a low level. These factors include overcrowding, general undernourishment (caused by an insufficiency of locally produced foodstuffs on most of the islands), ineffective sanitary inspection of food and dairy products, inadequate sewage disposal, and the prevalence of disease-bearing insects. There is, moreover, little to mitigate these conditions, for public health, hospital, and medical facilities are for the most part inadequate." ()

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"Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands, OPNAV 13-31," Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept, 15 November 1944; p. 125.

Such was the public health situation prewar (1938-39). For

thousands of the Okinawan civilians coming within the United States combat lines had been existing in what must be described as most unsanitary conditions at best, and most perilous, at worst. Those who had taken refuge in the hillside caves breathed fetid, noxious air; others had been exposed for days or weeks without shelter of any kind. They had been vulnerable to the same intense battle action as the military, subjected to bombing, strafing and shelling. Ill-clothed and ill-fed, they suffered from shock and exhaustion; they were covered with sores and infested with lice and fleas. Victims of battle wounds were numerous and their condition was worsened because their wounds and injuries had received no adequate medical attention and had been aggravated by exposure and secondary infection.

(98) "Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."

Medical officers of the Military Government began treatment and care of the Okinawans on "L Day" and for the next six months continued direct treatment of civilian patients. On 1 July 1945, at the peak of its strength, the Military Government medical department had a total of 98 medical, 6 dental, 18 hospital corps officers, and 815 enlisted men.

Indicative of the scope of medical activities performed by Military Government are the consolidated figures for the first five months of occupation. [It] operated two temporary five hundred-bed hospitals, staffed by thirty officers and three hundred enlisted men. Additionally each of twenty mobile dispensaries was staffed by one medical officer and six corpsmen. The hospitals were set up

at Koza and Jinuza, while the mobile dispensaries, which came ashore with the Military Government field teams and began operations under front line conditions, later moved from location to location as the civilian camp areas changed. For months they continued to function in all large centers until medical services were gradually turned over to native civilian doctors using the dispensary equipment. In the first five month period Military Government provided 826,488 outpatient treatments and admitted 30,484 patients for an aggregate of 383,394 days of hospitalization.⁹⁹()

()⁹⁹ Ib.

While these statistics are formidable and reflect grievous human suffering and disturbance, Military Government authorities reported that medical requirements on Okinawa were "never so great as had been anticipated." This was attributed "in large part to the physical resistance and hardiness of the Okinawan people, their fortitude in suffering, and their resiliency in recovery. It is attributable also to the willingness of native doctors and nurses to cooperate with American authorities."¹⁰⁰()

()¹⁰⁰ Ib.

Military Government medical personnel established a permanently housed 500 bed hospital at Goya, and two permanent modern 150 bed dispensaries which were turned over to the Okinawa Health Department. They also reconstructed a leper hospital on Aguni Island off the Motobu Peninsula. The leper hospital had been destroyed by bombing and the

patients took refuge in hovels in the the ruins. Equipment and supplies were provided from those brought in by Military Government and still larger stocks obtained from deactivated military units. Combined, these provided an inventory in the Military Government medical warehouse sufficient to support medical activities in the Ryukyus until July 1947.

Military Government's public health responsibilities did not cease with the organization of an Okinawan medical service, however. One of its major activities was the establishment of public health services, including the organization, training, and surveillance of a corps of Ryukyans charged with upgrading and enforcing standards of basic community sanitation. This group was engaged in village inspections, programs of insect and rodent control, improvement of drainage, sewage and garbage disposal.

Medical personnel under Military Government auspices [later] conducted a number of scientific research projects which were to serve as a basic contribution to programs which eventually resulted in raising life expectancy of the Okinawan people by two decades.

Clothing

The Spring of 1945 brought no crop of clothing, as it provided a food harvest on Okinawa, and most of the people had managed to salvage little more than what they wore. Yet the weather was clement in the early months of the invasion so that the want of clothing caused no great hardship. In September the arrival of some requisitioned stock and the salvage of military

clothing was sufficient to meet the most urgent needs. The wartime Okinawan women's custom of wearing pajama-like blouse and trousers made the use of GI shirts and trousers not unacceptable. For many months the predominant Okinawan grab was not only monochromatic but, in the colloquial of a later day, "unisex" as well.

In the later spring of 1946, sixty tons of clothing contributed by the people of Hawaii and shipped to Okinawa by the American Red Cross provided not only a solution to the dwindling salvage stocks but a welcome relief from the ubiquitous GI style and color.

Transportation

The fluid situation which obtained during the combat phase and for some months thereafter emphasized the dependence of the Military Government elements on other military units for transportation on both land and water. The imperative to move many thousands of civilians from place to place, especially the mass exodus from the South to Northern Okinawa, the transportation of food supplies from beachheads to detention camps, and the hauling of tentage and salvage lumber for shelters far exceeded the Military Government's organic vehicle capacity. Without the help of the Army Engineers and Quartermaster truck elements and the Navy Seabees, the problem would have been insurmountable. Its solution was realized only when the Military Government had inherited equipment of deactivated units and had developed a capability in the Okinawans to operate and maintain the heavy motor vehicles. Military Government had no ORIGINALLY yet water transportation proved to be an important consideration.

Virtually no Japanese or Okinawan vessels emerged from the battle in operable condition and those which could be salvaged were used for fishing rather than transportation. Yet, contact had to be maintained with outlying islands on some of which Military Government teams operated for months, and supplies and civilians had to be moved by sea, even in-aisland when foul weather made the roads impassable. Until its operations in Okinawan waters became minimal in April 1946, the Navy met the urgent needs of the Military Government, which by then had assisted in the revival, particularly in the Amamis and the Southern islands, of small scale interisland shipping. As circumstances permitted, these limited resources were augmented by the assignment and donation of various types of US Naval craft, and, gradually, the Okinawan Water Transportation Department was reconstituted with an aim to restore eventually local Okinawan shipping. 101 ()

101
() Ib.

Restoration of Prewar Standards of Living

By early 1946, it was recognized in Washington that the "wake of battle" directives for administering the Pacific Islands had become obsolete and required overall review by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC), the advisory body to the JCS on such matters. As expressed by Captain Lorenzo S. Sabin, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Island Governments), "Although Military Government is making every effort to improve the living conditions of the indigenous people, the so-called "disease and unrest" formula

and other restrictions imposed by the presurrender directives render it difficult to carry out a continuing progressive program for the general improvement of native welfare."¹⁰² ()

¹⁰²
() Enclosure to JCAC [88/1,] 13 February 1946. (3)

Recognizing that a comprehensive review would be time-consuming the JCAC recommended and the JCS approved a message to [Admiral Towers,] (1) CINCPAC/POA, and Teneral MacArthur, CINCAFPAC, authorizing "with respect to food, clothing and other essential supplies, housing, education and welfare ... such action as availability of supplies and funds will permit to restore to the population of these areas standards of living consistent with those existing prior to the war." (Underlining supplied)¹⁰³ ()

(2) ()¹⁰³ [Message "WARX 80815,"] 16 March 1946.

This action, predicated on a "long term US interest in the areas" and "the protracted nature of Military Government responsibility," set higher standards for living for the people "until such time as the international status of the areas had been determined and the future administration of the islands establish."¹⁰⁴ () Thus, as Captain Sabin

¹⁰⁴
() JCS 1231/8, Enclosure "B", 7 March 1946.

rationalized, treatment of the people of these islands was "measured by a different yardstick from that imposed upon the Japanese."

¹⁰⁵
() JCAC 88/1, 13 February 1946.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff established a policy which recognized that the provision of food, clothing, medical care, and shelter were not enough to discharge the responsibility of the United States toward its proteges.

Considering that little more than eight months had passed since ~~the~~ U.S. forces captured Okinawa, this first perceptible manifestation of evolving occupation policies, it should be noted, was self-generated--the logical action of responsible authorities. It clearly was not "administration by reaction," as some writers have rather indiscriminately labeled United States administration policies in the Ryukyus.

The metamorphosis of the relationship between the Ryukyuan^{an} people and U.S. entities, variously called "Military Government," "Civil Affairs," and "civil administration" was to be constant in process, though not in pace, through the twenty-seven years of American authority over the Ryukyus. Except for the cardinal fact that during all of that time the United States retained the right to exercise the powers of the sovereign, there was little in the economic, social, and political character of the relationship which escaped this process of evolution.

Reentering the Age of Money

The JCS goal of March 1946 to restore, ^{to} servotis sewandis, prewar standards of living to the people called for aggressive action on all fronts. Essential to achievement of this objective was the reestablishment of a medium of exchange. As Judge Thomas expressed it, "a war of a size unprecedented in history had destroyed the economy, and the people were forced into a primitive existence where

money did not exist. But this primitive existence did not consist in exchanging things for things, it depended upon U.S. military supplies. The population was divided into squads - a Sanitation squad, an Agricultural Squad, a Labor Squad, and various other squads - which supplied labor to the American forces, in exchange for which the U.S. forces gave them food, clothing, and housing. However, after the free ration system had lasted for one year, it destroyed the people's will to work and created an inertia. In April of 1946, "B" Yen Scrip issued by the U.S. forces and New Japanese Yen issued by the Bank of Japan became the legal tender of Okinawa; and Okinawa once again entered the Age of Money. The old Japanese yen were no longer seen; the exchange began on April 15 and was completed on the 28th.... Now that the currency had been established - next, wages... This salary system went into effect on May first." ()

() Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

Military Government had used one island in the Kerama Retts group as an "experimental laboratory" for obtaining data on the acceptability of Type "B" military yen, wage and price levels, rationing, and other pertinent matters. This experience proved useful when the U.S. Forces began giving cash wages in lieu of payments in kind. It suggested the wisdom of establishing a central banking facility on Okinawa, which was accomplished in May 1946. The facility was rather extravagantly titled the "Central Bank of Okinawa" and would, according to plans, have branches throughout the island. The capital was subscribed by the Okinawa Department of Finance and the

- ① [mura] governments through a loan from Military Government. In actuality, it did little more than act as a depository of funds and as an agency of the [Okinawa Civilian Administration] for the payment of the salaries of administration employees.
- ②

At the same time Military Government authorized the mura stores, which had distributed supplies for work chits or relief coupons, to sell food and other goods at fixed but substantially subsidized prices.

For reasons which are not clear, Army Forces Western Pacific ordered Military Government Okinawa as early as July 1946 to convert all Type "B" Military Yen held by Ryukyuans^S to New Imperial Yen. On August 27, however, it ordered the operation suspended, then reinstated the directive to proceed with the conversion, which was announced by Military Government Special Proclamation No. 11, effective 1 September 1946. The sole legal tender for a year thereafter were new issue Bank of Japan notes, and old Imperial Yen notes and coins in denominations of less than 1 Yen. Why all this was done does

() "Ryukyu Islands Facts Book, November 1961, USCAR

not emerge clearly from available records. There appear to have been two considerations involved. The go-stop-go instructions may have been involved with the timing of the introduction of military payment certificates for exclusive use of the military within the military establishment, instead of the Type "A" Yen invasion notes originally used. The reason for the more significant move "B" Yen military certificates from legal tender status in the civilian

community probably was to protect that currency from the continuing devaluation of the interchangeable new Bank of Japan notes being brought in by repatriates. Jugo Thomas^y says that, "people coming back from other prefectures were allowed to bring Y 1000 each with them of new Japanese Yen. However, since human beings are not foods, they would come back bringing with them more than the limit, sewn inside their collars, with the idea that they might be able to use it one way or another... Things might have worked out nicely for the individual by that method, and they were determined to succeed by fair means or foul; so by fair means or foul the whole society was affected, and the currency became inflated." () Too much money, too

() Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

few goods.

Yet, on 1 September 1947, Military Government again issued Type "B" Military Yen which, together with new Bank of Japan notes, constituted the legal tender. Again, the reason for this action can only be surmised. It is not unreasonable to relate it to the enactment for FY 1947 of a special appropriation titled "GARIOR"^A (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) to provide for the supplies and services needed in occupied countries throughout the world to enable the Army to discharge U.S. occupation responsibilities. In that year the requirements for the Ryukyus were drawn up by SCAP headquarters in Tokyo^y and included with those for Japan. The total value of supplies provided for both areas was \$294,760,487. The portion assigned to

() "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, Volume I, Number 1, 31 December 1952, USCAR, p. 2.

Okinawa was estimated at \$9,260 million, the bulk of which consisted of food and grains. However, if Military Government economists

() "Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands," Vol VI, Number II, 30 September 1958, p. 59.

counted upon the input of that amount of consumer goods to stabilize the currency, including the reintroduced "B" Yen, they failed to recognize that so long as Japanese Yen continued to be legal tender, effective monetary management by Military Government was impossible. With a currency common to both areas, the inflation prevailing in Japan was easily transmitted to the Ryukyus. Not only were large amounts of new Japanese yen brought in by repatriates from Japan but, with the same currency in circulation, smuggling between the two areas was easily accomplished.

"The chaotic monetary condition confused the people and caused them to lose confidence in the currency. Military units were compelled to supplement cash wages with subsistence or other payments in kind to maintain a native labor force adequate for their essential needs." The people wanted goods; virtually any item, new or old, was of some use locally or could be sold profitably in the smuggling trade.

The opportunities for theft of inadequately guarded military supplies, and black marketing were fully exploited. Since many items

of military supply had been legitimately distributed in the local economy, fences and black market operators had an effective cover for their transactions. This condition of inflation and scarcity impelled the people to grow foodstuffs and improvise ways of producing agricultural tools and household items from war scrap.

Positive Stabilizing Actions

More importantly, ^{inflation} ~~the~~ eventually caused the American authorities to take some positive financial and economic actions beginning with the establishment of a single, unified currency and the establishment of a genuine commercial bank endowed with certain characteristics of a central bank. ()

() "The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar," USCAR, 1958 pp. 26, 27.

Military Government Ordinance No. 1 dated 4 May 1948, established the Bank of the Ryukyus, the first postwar private financial institution. It absorbed the assets and liabilities of the "Central Bank of Okinawa," and was chartered as a full-fledged commercial bank and government depository and fiscal agent. Initial capitalization of the Bank was provided by an issue of 200,000 shares of stock with a stated value of 100 "B" Yen to which the Military Government subscribed 51 percent, receiving 102,000 shares at a cost of the equivalent of \$85,000. The balance of the shares were sold to the public and the Bank was operated, however, as a private bank with the Military Government and its personnel to advise on monetary policy, from over

its voting rights.

A virtually concomitant action of lasting importance was the announcement by Special Proclamation Number 30 that all Japanese Yen and all Type "B" military Yen must be exchanged for a new "B" Yen issue between 16 and 20 July 1948. Thereafter only the new "B" yen would be honored as legal tender.

One event occurred during the 1948 currency exchange which was to cause considerable concern in Washington nearly a decade later when United States dollars and coins were to replace "B" Yen as the legal tender. It developed that the Army Finance offices did not have and were not able to obtain in time a sufficient supply of new issue "B" Yen to exchange for the outstanding military Yen and Bank of Japan notes presented for conversion. It was decided therefore that all Japanese notes would be exchanged, and all old issue "B" Yen which exceeded the ^{quantity} quality of new notes available would be validated by a rubber stamp imprint. However, no record was kept of the total value of ^{old issue} "B" Yen notes so stamped. ^{Consequently} As a consequence, when the Department of the Army later determined to exchange dollars for the "B" Yen in circulation there was an uneasy concern as to the sufficiency of dollars available in free Civil Administration accounts to make the exchange without seeking a Congressional Appropriation. That worry was limited to a few Army officials in Washington, however, and did not materialize into reality. In any case, lest the Finance Corps personnel on Okinawa be limited too severely, it is not surprising the ^{large} quantity of new "B" Yen required for the conversion because, as mentioned earlier, vast quantities of Bank of

Japan Yen had been smuggled into Okinawa.

These two basic actions, ^{the} ~~viz.~~ introduction of "B" Yen as the sole legal tender and establishment of a sound, United States-sponsored commercial bank did not immediately result in elimination of inflation or restore the full purchasing power of the currency, but confusion as to the currency disappeared and inflation was contained, as the decline of essential commodities prices during the latter part of 1948 evidences. Although smuggling continued until private foreign trade was reestablished (1951), it was made more difficult as it had to be accomplished through currencies other than "B" Yen which circulated only the Ryukyus, or on barter basis. Restrictions on domestic and inter-island trade were relaxed and commerce with Japan on a government-to-government basis was initiated. Although private importation of merchandise was not permitted, the variety and quantity of consumer imports under the GARIOA program increased and, to encourage private enterprise, personal consumption items, other than staple foodstuffs, were sold to authorized wholesalers for resale at fixed prices. At the same time, military roll-up materials were turned over to fisheries, agricultural and industrial associations, and other meritorious enterprises at approximately ten percent of the original cost. The proceeds of sale of both GARIOA and surplus military materials were used initially to meet the expenses of local government administrations.

The USCAR report from which most of the foregoing account is drawn offers this conclusion: "No long range economic reconstruction was accomplished or even attempted during these early post war years."

Such a program was not provided for in the GARIOA appropriations of FY 1947 or 1948 and there was no other source of funds or industrial goods for this purpose. War devastation and dislocation was so complete that Military Government was faced with the task of reconstituting a society as well as developing an institutional framework that could ^{meet} the critical needs of the populace. These early post war years, including most of calendar year 1948 must be regarded merely as a period of re-establishment of simple home and community life.

"... By this time, however, the critical and chaotic conditions of earlier years no longer existed. Limited programs for basic reconstruction and development could now be undertaken. The United States aid program for fiscal year 1949 was, therefore, expanded to include approximately twelve million dollars of fertilizer, other agricultural supplies, petroleum products, fishing vessels and supplies, motor vehicles other than passenger cars, basic equipment, replacement parts, building materials for the construction of warehouses, some raw materials for processing and more education supplies."^{*}

(^{*}) "The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar," USCAR, 1958 (pp 26-28).

Chap II

225
19 June

Mr O'Flaherty,

I rounded Chapter 6,
but left your marks so you
will know where the correction
was. I will erase them after
you have looked over. Some for Chap 6
Chap 9, has been added. Yours
Percy

Should this chapter be
for you "Secret" 2.

Indicators:

1) Dance

2) Set a Sec. description

... ..

CHAPTER VI

"IT'S AN ILL WIND. . ."

Okinawa's geographic situation makes it vulnerable not only to foreign occupation as a strategic outpost, but also to destructive tropical typhoons. During 1948 and 1949, the Ryukyu Islands were struck by five severe typhoons which formed south of the Tropic of Cancer and moved in a clockwise direction across the islands. Typhoon "Libby" struck Okinawa, October 2-5, 1948, with winds up to 125 miles per hour; and, typhoon "Della" followed in June 1949 with winds of up to 112 miles per hour. In both the military installations and the civilian community, neither of which consisted of typhoon-resistant structures, the destruction of buildings, supplies and vessels was extensive. "More than half of the native fishing fleet was sunk, and many U.S. and Japanese vessels in the harbors were sunk or driven on tremendous waves over the reefs and finally scrapped due to the impossibility of their being borne seaward over the reefs again."

1952

"Civil Affairs Activities," Volume 1, Number 1, 1953, pp 4,5.

While emergency repairs were being accomplished in both the local economy and the military enclave by reprogramming GARIOA and military contingency funds, a new visitor, "Gloria" arrived on Okinawa "0930 to 1700 hours, 23 July 49. It is apparently the worst storm

since occupation. Large buildings such as warehouses, shops, messes, theatres and chapels are severely damaged; approximately 50 percent are complete loss. Power lines and many poles are down. Pumping station buildings destroyed . . . Approximately 25 percent of old quonset type barracks . . ., fifty percent of old quonset dependent quarters destroyed or severely damaged. . .

"Air Force and Naval facilities on Okinawa suffered severe similar damage . . .

"Of American personnel, 2 were killed and 15 injured seriously, requiring hospitalization.

"Damage to native buildings were severe. Reports thus far indicate 16,095 dwellings, 555 public buildings, 7546 other buildings and 187,600 square feet warehouse space totally destroyed. 14,839 dwellings, 149 public buildings and 3,317 other buildings, 50 percent damaged. 624 animals and fowls killed, 27 fishing craft destroyed and 25 beached and damaged. 36 natives killed and 236 injured."

Msg CX 51675, 29 July 49, CINCFE Tokyo, Japan to Dept of Army

Two other typhoons, "Fay" and "Patricia," visited Okinawa on 15-16 July and 26-27 October 1949, respectively. While they did not match the 175 miles per hour winds of "Gloria," they were sufficiently severe to be classified as major typhoons. The devastation caused by this series

of tropical storms was so grave as to create "an emergency situation and set the infant economy as well as U.S. facilities back to a state not a great deal better than at the cessation of hostilities."

"Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands," Volume I, Number 1, 31 December 1952, USCAR, pp 4-5.

And what "good" did these destructive winds bring with them? While all of the developments described below are not directly attributable to the typhoons of 1948 and 1949, some of them were, and all such events contributed to a clarification of U.S. policies concerning the Ryukyus and a more positive approach toward the welfare of the Ryukyuan people. The former will be treated here only tangentially; the latter calls for fuller examination in the present context.

The Civil Administration [noted that]

"at this period the course of events in the Ryukyus was profoundly affected by serious developments on the international scene and natural disaster. By 1949 the Communist program for world domination by armed aggression and active subversion became manifestly clear. The importance of Okinawa as a vital link in the security of the free world and in particular as a bastion for the protection of Japan and other areas of

the Far East was pointed up by the victory of Communist arms and subversion in China. Security considerations now required that the United States retain control of Okinawa and others of the Ryukyu Islands until tensions in the Far East subsided."

"The Ryukyu Islands, Prewar and Postwar," USCAR, 1958, pp 28, 29.

On 1 February 1949, President Truman approved a new policy with respect to the Ryukyus, and directed that it be implemented by all appropriate Executive Departments and Agencies. He declared that the United States intends to retain on a long-term basis such facilities at Okinawa and elsewhere in the Ryukyus south of 29° North as are judged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary. Such bases should be developed accordingly.

1) The President further declared it to be United States national policy to relieve the people of that area of the burden of contributing to occupation costs, to the extent necessary to establish political and economic security. Therefore, he ordered that the United States Armed Forces and other government agencies there would pay their way so that the program for Ryukyuan economic and social well being could be carried out. The deficit in the economy of the natives ^{had to} ~~must~~ be eventually reduced to a minimum. The pay-as-you-go policy was to be effective sixty days after the President's declaration and the Ryukyu Islands ^{were} ~~must~~ no longer ^{to} be financially dependent upon or obligated to Japan.

Msg WAR 84301 (S), Department of Army to CINCPAC, 15 February 1949

This last provision was a major victory for General MacArthur. He had been appealing to the War Department since 1947 to relieve Japan of the economic burden of providing commodities, materials, and services to the Ryukyus [without reimbursement as a part of occupation costs.] (C)

In an especially forceful message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 8 January 1948, MacArthur had argued that that Japan's economic recovery was precarious; that its collapse, or even material regression would be far more costly to the United States than payments to Japan from GARIOA funds for materials and services provided to meet Ryukyuan requirements. He expressed his conviction that "while the status of the Ryukyus may be undetermined as to certain particulars, [it is inconceivable they will revert to Japan.] The strategic situation in the Pacific is such," he said, "that any concept other than having the Ryukyus in the orbit of the United States would be unsound and unrealistic." He concluded that with a potent political punch: United States long range policy appeared to contemplate developing Okinawa into a permanent United States base; if such were the case, the other Allied Powers, notably the USSR, could make a serious issue of the U.S. requiring Japan to bear part of the expense. (1)

Msg C57842, SCAP, signed MacArthur, to JCS, 8 January 1948.

MacArthur received support from the State Department in this matter. Responding to Army's request for that Department's views, State agreed with SCAP that costs for Ryukyuan rehabilitation should be defrayed from U.S. appropriated funds and not be borne by the Japanese economy. State did not consider that the "as yet undetermined status of the

Ryukyus" justified treating those islands as a part of Japan ["as far as the costs of supporting the Ryukyuan economy is concerned."]

Letter from Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, Department of State, to Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, March 5, 1949.

However, neither that nor further letters from State, in which the latter acknowledge^d that the prospects of retention of the Ryukyus by Japan appeared to be slight, were considered sufficient to provide a legal basis for using appropriated funds to reimburse Japan for materials and labor provided for the Ryukyus.

Exchange of letters between Assistant Secretary of State Charles E. Saltzman and Under Secretary of the Army William E. Draper, July 9 and October 22 and 18 August 1948.

The Army considered that nothing less than a definitive policy statement by the President as to the firm intention of the United States to treat the Ryukyus as separate from Japan would provide the necessary legal basis. As has been noted, the President approved such a policy decision on 1 February 1949.

So it was that the "pay-as-you-go" policy was instituted for the Ryukyu Islands as of 1 April 1949. Thenceforth, U.S. Government agencies purchased B-Yen with dollars and paid for indigenous services, supplies

and facilities provided by the local economy. The dollars thus accrued were to be used for the benefit of the Ryukyuan people. It was the Army's expectation that these funds would be additive to the \$25 million appropriated for ^G~~G~~ARIOA and its companion grant for industrial machinery, parts and other economic rehabilitation needs, "EROA" for FY 1949.

However clear it may have been to the Army that the pay-as-you-go dollars were to supplement appropriated funds, the Bureau of the Budget chose to interpret the policy otherwise. Thus began what was to become a series of annual "Ryukyuan Budget Battles" between the Bureau of the Budget and responsible Army, and at times, Department of Defense officials. Since the "Dob" was within the Executive Office of the President, the Ryukyuan patrons from the Pentagon won some important skirmishes but lost all of the budget battles.

In a message dated 14 June 1949, General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) noted with dismay that an examination of the fiscal year 1950 GARIOA and EROA appropriation recommended to Congress, totalling \$26,442,000, indicated that \$12,401,000 of this amount had been requested for economic rehabilitation in the Ryukyus with \$5.1 million of the amount to be met from nonappropriated (pay-as-you-go) funds. He urgently recommended that the requirement for application of nonappropriated funding toward meeting GARIOA and EROA needs for FY 50 be eliminated. The arguments, which MacArthur advanced to support this

position were cogent and, if similar subsequent Army-BOB debates offer any criterion, must have been virtually identical with those already advanced by the Army's Civil Affairs Division. MacArthur argued the case essentially as follows:

"The basic concept is that dollars made available to the Ryukyuan economy would be used for purchase of both consumer and capital goods which would benefit the Ryukyuan people and act as a revitalizing force not only to the economy of the islands but to the morale of the people. Using these funds to reduce GARIOA and EROA appropriations violates the intent of both the original budget request and the spirit of the Presidential decision. Factors leading to this conclusion are as follows:

1. Use of Ryukyuan labor by U.S. Government agencies is concentrated in Okinawa. This area, as a result of complete devastation suffered during the war, can offer as its only appreciable exportable commodity the labor of the people.

2. From the date of surrender to April 1949, a period of nearly 4 years, a substantial part of this labor and about one-fourth of the productive acreage of Okinawa have been utilized by U.S. Military Agencies without recompense.

3. Deprivation of its ability to manufacture or process consumer goods from outside markets has forced the Ryukyuan people, particularly Okinawans, to exist throughout this long period of time without items normally necessary to the barest minimum of reasonable comfort. They have, for a variety of reasons, been allowed only the most basic necessities of life and even these have been principally of a nature unsuited to their tastes and habits because of the extensive utilization of Army and Navy excess subsistence, clothing and equipment in order to economize on U.S. dollar expenditures and [because of inadequate programming, procurement and supply prior to FY 1949.]

4. In addition, the present view is the reduction of the native labor force employed by U.S. agencies, the principal source of these dollars, combined with difficulties of indigenous production for export will substantially reduce total nonappropriated funds for FY 1950. Internal inflation - which can only be reduced by increased supply of goods - results in extremely high yen prices being demanded for Ryukyuan exportable products. If continued, this will contravene the objective of reducing yen circulation by sale of consumer goods as an integral step in a carefully planned stabilization program.

5. Department of the Army recently expressed this policy to utilize Ryukyuan appropriated funds for purchases in the Japanese market to the maximum extent possible. Allocation of pay-as-you-go dollars for purchase of Japanese consumer type goods now in marked surplus, rather than for hard and semi-critical goods which require the import of dollar-purchased raw materials, principally at the expense of the U.S., will provide a market for Japan. Expenditure of Ryukyuan dollars for consumer goods from Japan will serve a double-edged purpose - offering critically needed physical and psychological benefits and reducing in some measure the need for raw material imports into Japan from the U.S."

Therefore, General MacArthur asserted that while "stringent economic measures are recognized as being both necessary and desirable, it is believed that with recent increased activities of a critical segment of the people led by Communists, the psychological benefits to be derived from dividing nonappropriated fund purchases as recommended . . . cannot be overlooked. It is urgently recommended that requirements for the application of nonappropriated funding toward meeting GARIOA and rehabilitation needs . . . be eliminated."

Msg CX 50782, 15 June 1949, CINCPAC Tokyo to Department of Army

The Department of Army reply to MacArthur, with an information copy to the Commanding General, [Ryukyuan] Command, said in effect that the Bureau of the Budget had set an overall ceiling for Japan and the Ryukyus; that the division of funds as between Japan and the Ryukyus could be changed, if justified on the basis of relative needs; that the Bureau of the Budget specifically cited pay-as-you-go income as a reason for reducing the amount requested; that GARIOA and other aid furnished since the beginning of the occupation should be counted as at least partial recompense; that prior to 1949 supply responsibility rested with SCAP whose judgement as to the relative needs of Japan and Ryukyus was assumed to be accurate; and, that reprogramming of funds eventually to be appropriated by Congress would be left up to SCAP and Military Government Ryukyus.

Msg WARX 90527, 22 June 1949, Department of Army to CINCFE, Tokyo;
Info: COMGENRYCOM, Okinawa.

Exactly one month after receipt of that message in Tokyo and Okinawa, Typhoon "Gloria" struck the Ryukyus, and its repercussions were felt in Washington. The Services were faced with the fundamental decision as to their respective strength requirements for Okinawa, recognizing that the extensive reconstruction of facilities needed must be permanent and typhoon-resistant. As early as March 1946, the Navy had reversed its original plan to make Ruckner Bay a major naval base. It did not alter that decision and its requirements were

negligible. The Army estimated that "total funds required to bring

JCS 819/11, 6 March 1946, and JCS 1380/66, 8 June 49 (S).

construction back to that which existed before typhoons in June and July, utilizing typhoon resistant type facilities, is, for the DA \$40,610,000. Similar AF requirements is \$32,000,000."

Memorandum, 16 September 1949, [Lt Col Walsh, GS,] USA.

"Gloria" resulted not only in a virtual "windfall" of dollars for Okinawa but, even more important, it elicited an on-the-spot inspection in September 1949 by the Under Secretary of the Army, Tracy S. Voorhees, who carried the major responsibility for the Army in matters pertaining to occupied areas. This visit was to have some immediate and some long range consequences of mutual benefit to the Ryukyus and to the United States.

The Nold Mission

Among the immediate results of the Under Secretary's visit was the dispatch to Okinawa of a group of ^{prominent} ~~top flight~~ Army and Air Force engineers, headed by Brigadier General [G. J.] Nold, who developed a "master plan" for U.S. military construction requirements with special attention to certain facilities which would provide joint benefit to both the military and native economy. These included roads, harbors,

(1)

and other joint use projects — frequently, but not entirely accurately, referred to as ["infrastructure."] General Nold's report was approved by concerned Congressional committees to be carried out as the integrated construction program under the aegis of the Okinawa District Engineer, U.S. ⁶

Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyus Islands," Vol I, No 1, 31 Dec 1952, USCAR, p.5.

As a corollary to the plan to use military construction funds for joint use projects, the Under Secretary perceived advantages in combining with them the programming of GARIOA appropriations, to accomplish both military objectives and economic improvements. In this regard he strongly endorsed the Chief of Engineer's judgment that improvement of Naha Harbor was prerequisite to any plan for the economic development of Okinawa, and would be an appropriate project for GARIOA. Similarly GARIOA could cover improvements for expanding production of construction materials, and for building structures required for Military Government offices and staff quarters.

One of Mr. Voorhees' visionary programs was the creation of a quasi-public corporation to hold title to renovated quonset huts and new housing for American families to be rented to the military services and thus provide a source of revenue to be used for promoting the Ryukyuan economy. In fact, such an entity was chartered by Military Government and designated the Okinawa Housing Corporation. It was the

recipient of 438 dilapidated quonsets which were rehabilitated and rented to the U.S. Forces. To these were later added some quarters constructed with GARIOA funds on military master plan land and rented to the military. Unfortunately, the military standards for quarters' furnishings and maintenance were more costly than the aggregate rental allowances provided by the Services, and the Corporation never realized a net gain for the local economy. (1)

Nevertheless, Under Secretary Voorhees' visit and the dynamic concepts he supported added a bright spark of vitality to the Ryukyuan economy. As B. G. John H. Hinds, Deputy Commanding General, Ryukyuan Command, wrote to MG Carter Magruder, Special Assistant for Occupied Areas, Department of the Army, "prior to Mr Voorhees' visit the program was more of a relief . . . than a recovery program."

The Vickery Report

In addition to the Nold Mission, as the engineers' survey group was called, Under Secretary Voorhees arranged for dispatch to Okinawa of a small "Mission" to study food and agricultural condition in the Ryukyus, as had been requested by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command. This group, under the general leadership of Mr. Raymond E. Vickery, Agricultural Economist in Mr. Voorhees' office, was comprised of agricultural engineers from the Department of Agriculture, a nutritionist from the Army staff, and an agronomist from the University of California. The group departed from Washington on 14 September 1949


and spent ["several weeks of intensive study of agricultural conditions in Okinawa, the northern and southern Ryukyus."] (1)

"Agricultural and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus," Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, November 1949.

(3) The so-called "Vickery Report", [an unclassified document,] went considerably beyond the usual scope of a technical agricultural study, recommending actions on "administrative problems" as the sine qua non of [maximized] agricultural production. Important among these were:: the immediate formation of a central Ryukyuan government and a substantial reduction in the power of the [four local native governments;] the appointment of a Civilian Administrator to establish and carry out overall military government policies for economic reconstruction; and, the establishment of foreign trade channels. The survey group also made some important recommendations regarding emigration and land ownership and use, especially by the U.S. Forces. [These subjects will be examined later, in context.] (4) Coming as it did upon the heels of Mr. Voorhees' visit, the Vickery Report provided some imaginative concepts for consideration by those in Washington who determined U.S. occupation policies.

To the Under Secretary's visit may be attributed in no small part also the decision of the Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, to visit the Ryukyus in October 1949, and the subsequent -- and consequent -- inspection of the area by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1950.

The most immediate result of all the "good" which was attributable, in part at least, to the ill-winds of 1948 and 1949 was the appropriation of \$50 million for aid to the Ryukyuan economy (GARIOA and EROA) for fiscal year 1950. Of this amount, \$19.5 million were utilized for construction. With a \$73 million military installations and facilities reconstruction program inaugurated at the same time, Okinawa became the scene of unprecedented peacetime activity . . . the physical reconstruction of the Ryukyus was underway.



CHAPTER VII

"READING, WRITING AND ARITHMETIC"

The battle of Okinawa had hardly ended when, with their traditional regard for education, the people endeavored to resume the formal teaching of their young. In parts of the island, sporadic fighting was continuing, while teachers who had survived gathered the children together in the various camps and held classes under the open sky, or in partially destroyed buildings to pick up the threads of their schooling.

School Facilities

Of the twenty-three hundred classrooms standing before the war only a few were spared destruction or irreparable damage. Nevertheless, education was among the first of the basic community services to be resumed.

"Immediately upon resettlement of the people in or near their former homesites, a 'school' of some type was constructed from whatever materials could be salvaged, or in some instances, established out of doors.

The Ryukyu Islands, Prewar and Postwar, USCAR, 1958.

"In some cases schools were built only of poles and thatch. Some were made with old sheets of galvanized iron and scraps of tarpaulins

fastened to every conceivable framework from poles to discarded steel beams from landing barges. Each typhoon leveled most of this temporary construction, but the people would patiently salvage what was usable out of the wreckage and patch together another makeshift building."

Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, Vol I., No. 1, USCAR 1953.

By January 1946, in consultation with the [Okinawa Advisory Council,] Military Government plans for the revival of the school system were firm. (1)

On 2 January, Military Government set forth general education policies, lines of responsibility, procedure for personnel actions, and curricula standards. A Ryukyu Islands Department of Education was established, to be staffed by Ryukyuan officials under the policy supervision of the Military Government Education Officer, but endowed with broad administrative responsibility and authority. Commanders of the Military Government Districts were held responsible for securing school facilities, for cooperating in local administration of the educational program, and for maintaining the physical welfare of the teachers and students. They were to be kept informed by Ryukyuan education officials regarding educational developments which were other than routine.

USNMG Directive No. 89, 2 January 1946.

More specific guidance was issued two days later. It read, in part:

"In connection with this announcement of a native Department of Education, District Commanders are instructed to give all possible assistance to local school principals in securing adequate school shelter. Three steps are recommended: first, that all school buildings now standing but used for other than educational purposes be made available as soon as possible for school use; second, that local schools be permitted to make use of quonset huts and other shelter which has been abandoned by military units nearby and turned over to Military Government; third, that temporary shelter of frame and canvas be provided when other shelter is unavailable The present program is to provide eight grades of elementary school education for all children of the six to fourteen age group, attendance to become compulsory when school facilities are adequate to provide for all; the minimum curriculum amounts to three hours of instruction per day, six days per week in reading, writing and arithmetic. Provision is being made at

Headquarters for adequate if not voluminous text materials materials and for a gradually expanding program to include material on a greater variety of subjects and for more advanced students."

Directive No. 89, U.S. Naval Military Government, 4 January 1946.

The new Education Department was severely handicapped and, in order to set and maintain minimal standards, was forced to require that classes be held in two and, sometimes, three shifts a day.

Before the war the Okinawan Prefecture had 300 elementary schools, six middle schools for boys, eight high schools for girls, nine vocational schools and two normal schools. About two-thirds of [these] (1) were on Okinawa. These were not built in a five-year period and it took many more than five years to replace those which were destroyed.

Yet, the Ryukyuan people so highly prized education that, from the inception of local provisional governments, "Education" (2) was always the largest budgetary item, and these governments were financed principally by Military Government grants derived from the sale of GARIOA and surplus military supplies. However, construction of the

(3) [physical educational] network, begun under Military Government, was to take two decades to complete, notwithstanding sizeable annual grants-in-aid by the United States. During that time the requirements expanded due, in part, to the post-war population explosion and, later

to the natural, unimpeded birth rate and decreased rate of infant mortality.

Teachers

By the end of the war approximately half of the trained teachers had been drafted into the Japanese armed forces or for other war-related services outside the Ryukyus. Many of those who remained or returned after the battle took other important positions. Some of them spoke English and consequently their services were in demand by the military, the civil administration, and concerns doing business with the military.

In early 1946 a teacher training school was established at Gushikawa. Satisfactory completion of a one-year course there entitled the graduate to an elementary teacher certificate, while those finishing the two-year course were granted junior high school certificates. Also, Okinawa Gunto established four short-term normal schools, offering six-month refresher courses, most using elementary and junior high school texts.

① English language schools were established by Military Government to upgrade the capabilities of translators and interpreters for employment by the U.S. Forces. They offered a six-months course devoted exclusively to oral and written English.

For all schools, Military Government provided the textbooks and courses of study which were distributed free. Virtually all of the

physical equipment such as desks, tables, seats and the like were provided by the U.S. Forces.

A University is Born

[Military Government sent many Ryukyuan students to Japan for college training.] However, in proportion to the requirement for qualified teachers and the cost of such a program, the number whose capabilities could be developed in this manner was far from adequate. In order to resolve this problem and to provide a long term benefit to the entire society, Military Government established the first indigenous university in the history of the Ryukyu Islands. (1)

The University of the Ryukyus was formally opened on 22 May 1950 with an enrollment of 562 young men and women. Site preparations, on the grounds of the [old royal castle at Shuri,] and construction of the first buildings, twenty-six in number, were financed from GARIOA sales proceeds. (2) The university was to become the center of teacher training

"Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands," Vol I, No. 1, USCAR, 1953

in the Ryukyus, and a matter of pride for the Ryukyuan people. GARIOA FUNDING

In 1949, Military Government [inaugurated a program of scholarships] to United States colleges for outstanding Ryukyuan students. From the modest beginnings of one-year undergraduate study awards, this program, like the University of the Ryukyus, was to develop into an inestimable influence in the promotion of the overall standards of Ryukyuan life and (3)

Ryukyuan-American relations. It was acknowledged that the latter goal was a major objective in the establishment of this program, which enabled a limited number of students to become oriented to the American people and way of life and to return home with a better understanding of the foreign authorities who occupied their land. However, lest this fact vitiate for some the motivation in all the efforts of the United States to advance the educational opportunities of the people, it is also to be noted that in March 1949 a program was set up for Ryukyuan students to pursue graduate work in Japanese universities on scholarships provided by the Military Government. [Scholarships were awarded] for the length of time necessary to receive degrees, particularly in the fields of medicine, law, and engineering. (1)

The year 1950 marked the initiation of a technical assistance program by Military Government. American technical consultants in agriculture and forestry were assigned to Okinawa for this purpose through agreements with the [Pacific Science Board,] the Department of Agriculture, and other agencies of the United States Government. These experts provided instruction and guidance in agricultural extension, home economics, botany, and numerous other aspects of agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry. (2)

While not purely educational in nature, two other related programs initiated by the Military Government ^{merit} mention, in this context. The first, a group of United States information centers, was begun as early as April 1947; by the end of 1950 four centers were in operation at

Naha, Nago, Amap^Ni O'Shima, and Ishkawa, all staffed by Ryukyuan employees of the Military Government. The centers provided library facilities, English language classes, lectures, movies, concerts, and other cultural activities. After school hours, students used [them] extensively as study halls and research facilities. (1)

The other education-orientation activity undertaken by Military Government was the [so-called] "National Leaders Program." It provided for visits to the United States of small groups of influential individuals to inspect American facilities and methods in their particular fields of occupation. This program and that of the information or ["cultural"] centers were to continue throughout the years of U.S. administration of the Ryukyu Islands, both on a substantially expanded scale. (2) (3)

Ibid., pp 163-181; 195, 196 and 205-207.

English Language Instruction

One subject of particular interest because of its potential political, as well as practical and cultural implications is the degree to which the U.S. Military Government promoted the position of English language instruction in the postwar Ryukyuan curricula. From all available records it appears that Military Government policy was one of non-intervention. As USCAR expressed it, ^{in 1963,} "The English language program for the Ryukyuans.... has always been a amorphous and incidental (2)

one, lacking cohesion, integration and a financially underwritten organized approach." This USCAR evaluation of ~~1963~~ reflects the

Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Vol X, 1963, p. 254,
USCAR.

view of the then High Commissioner, Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway ^{OK}
and applied to the civil administration under his predecessors, as
well as to the earlier military government period. General Caraway
approached the situation with [typical forthrightness] and established ^①
a modern English Language Training Center staffed by experts, and
also arranged for an English language educationist from the faculty
of a [distinguished American university] to serve as consultant to the ^②
University of the Ryukyus.

Some "old Ryukyu hands" have retrospectively concluded that it
was politically shortsighted of the United States Military Government
and early Civil Administration not to have taken the measures needed
to make English a second language for the Ryukyuan of school age at
least. [One thoughtful man,] a civilian who had spent many years in ^③
the Ryukyus with the Army Corps of Engineers, USCAR, and as a private
consultant, [faulted] United States policy on politico-psychological ^④
grounds for this omission. His long-time close and informal rela-
tionship with the Ryukyuan people, by whom he was warmly regarded, led
him to say that the United States should have taught the people to
understand, if not to embrace American ideals and ways of thinking and
ways of acting, by establishing the English language as a common bond.

Such a bond, he [opined,] would not only have facilitated the U.S. civil administration, but might ultimately have led to an expressed desire of the Ryukyuan people to retain their identification with the United States, rather than return to Japanese administration. (1)

Walter F. Pinckert, conversation with the author, Okinawa, May 1971.

(4) Dr. [Gordon Warner,] long-time resident of Japan, teacher at two Japanese universities, and a Director of the Education Department, USCAR, citing an [unidentified wake-of-battle] directive of the Military Governor has written: (2)

"One directive provided the following guidance on education:

'The type and extent of educational facilities will vary in different localities according to the needs and the native capability for assimilation. The primary consideration is to develop an educational system which will benefit the children of the inhabitants and which will assure a progressive development of each community along lines which will raise the inhabitant's standards by improvement in health and hygiene and by betterment of the methods of food production and also which will equip the inhabitants for the conduct of their own government and for the management of their own trade and industry.'

"The directive added, 'The educational program

should foster and encourage instruction in the native language and history and in the native arts and crafts.' This sentence illustrates a major weakness of this program," Dr. Warner writes, "since it did not make any provision for encouraging the study of the English language. If English language instruction had been provided, it would have assisted the oncoming generations immeasurably. Near the start of this century, when the United States Forces occupied the Philippines, their directive stated, 'Instruction in the English language for the inhabitants of all ages is a prime necessity but it is not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native languages and culture.' The lessons learned in the occupation of the Philippines were apparently lost in the pages of history. "Educators would be quick to point out the logic and the advantages of the policy followed in the Philippines. There are obvious advantages in providing young and old with the opportunities to become acquainted with a second language which has worldwide use. It is also significant that the old policy did not attempt any control of the native language, which could have caused hardship to the local population and could have prevented the younger generation from gaining adequate knowledge

of their cultural heritage. As a matter of pragmatic application of educational techniques, it would not have been too difficult to develop an English language training program."

History of Education in Postwar Okinawa,² Gordon Warner, Nihon Bunka Kagakusha, Co., Ltd., Tokyo, Japan.

(1) The portion of the directive quoted by Dr. Warner, above, appears to have been excerpted from a letter directive issued on 12 December 1945 by Admiral [R.] A. Spruance, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, to all subordinate commanders. Unfortunately, however, it appears that Dr. Warner had access to only a [truncated version] of the actual directive which does ^{go} on to read, in part: (2)

"12. . . Instruction in the English language for natives of all ages is a prime necessity but this is not to be construed as discouraging instructions in native languages . . ."

Letter directive CINCPAC/POA, Serial: 52855, 12 Dec 1945;
subject: "U.S. Naval Military Government, Pacific Ocean Areas."

Rather than "lost in the pages of history," not only the lessons learned in the occupation of the Philippines, but the very text of the directive for the occupation of those islands apparently was drawn upon directly

by the drafters of the 1945 directive. The question then is why the U.S. Military Government of the Ryukyus did not insist on instruction in the English language as "a prime necessity."

Few, if any, would gainsay the advantages pointed out by Dr. Warner which would have accrued to the Ryukyuan people from learning a second language which has worldwide use. Also, most, if not all observers would agree with Mr. Pinckert's view that the stresses and strains of U.S. administration of the islands would have been [attenuated] by the bond of a common tongue. There must have been good and compelling reasons for Military Government, Ryukyus not to have followed the firm and explicit guidance of the CINCPAC/POA directive. There were. ①

The directive itself recognized that there would be situations in which the compulsory introduction of English as a second language might be impracticable or inappropriate. It was designed to cover a number of heterogeneous land areas whose principal common denominator was geographic; they were all in the Pacific Ocean area. It stated, therefore:

"Military Government is a command function and the responsibility for the accomplishment of its mission devolves upon the several Area, Atoll and Island commands. The principles set forth are to be considered as a general guide for the commanders concerned subject to modifications made necessary by conditions peculiar to a particular locality. ②

Letter directive cited.

Conditions on Okinawa were uniquely peculiar to that locality. It was the most heavily populated and devastated area in the Pacific. It was nearly bereft of school buildings and equipment, and, most crippling of all, of teachers, especially of qualified English instructors. Hence, "Education policy as determined at that time was to restore as soon as possible the first six grades of elementary school for all children of school age (6-14) and high school for an initial several thousand and an eventual six-thousand pupils. The main subjects of instruction were to be reading, writing, and arithmetic. English, Okinawan history, and geography, world history and geography, hygiene, and good manners were to be taught whenever facilities permitted."

"Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."

By December 1948, there were over 210,000 pupils enrolled in the Ryukyuan school system, of whom nearly 100,000 were attending high schools and technical institutions. [Yet only sixty-five English teachers attended an all-Ryukyu two-week English language seminar held on Okinawa in September 1948, and this was despite the foundation of a Foreign Language [English] School in January 1946, which by December 1948 had four branches.] The total number of Ryukyus taking

advantage of these special English language training facilities at any one session was [less than two-hundred,] and a number of these were taking abbreviated courses to qualify as interpreters. The main language

"Military Government Activities in the Ryukyus," Summations Numbers 23 and 26, September and December 1948.


school, located at Gushikawa, was housed in four quonsets, the kind of shelter which most of the branches occupied. Teacher and interpreter students lived in tents and flimsy frame structures near the schools. Life for them was difficult and drab; learning the English language sufficiently well to teach it to others was a formidable undertaking.

In the light of these realities it appears self-evident that, without a mammoth Peace Corps-type program, it would have been impossible--however desirable-- for military government or the civil administration to have made English a compulsory second language for Ryukyuans of school age, much less those "of all ages" as the directive prescribed.

Most important, perhaps, is the fact that throughout most of these years the United States Government was going through the difficult process of decision making as to the future of the Ryukyuan-American relationship. [No grounds existed for the administering authorities to assume that it was to continue to be an intimate one for a decade, two decades, and more.]

①
[In the meantime, the Japanese language continued to be a required
subject at all levels of the Ryukyuan educational system.] [That was as
it should have been.]

②



CHAPTER VIII

THE REVIVAL OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

The JCS policy modification of 16 March 1946 implicitly reinforced the permissive and progressive provisions of the ["wake of battle"] directives in such matters as the participation of the people in government, ^{as well as} ~~and~~ the preservation of social and cultural values. (

U.S. Military Government principles long dictated that, wherever possible, administration of an occupied area should be accomplished through existing governmental organs and personnel, as well as techniques to which the people were accustomed. These principles were embodied in the JCS and theater directives for administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

FM 27-5, OPNAV 50 E-3, United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs, and JCS 1231, ² amended, January 30, 1945, and CINCPAC ltr to COMGEN Ten, Serial 00825, 1 March 1945.

The American forces invading Okinawa found that all governmental organs were more nearly annihilated than the physical structures. The Tokyo-appointed Chiji or governor who, like all his predecessors and their ranking subordinates were not Okinawans, had fled with his staff to Japan proper. These prefectural officials had been responsible for all matters of primary interest to the central government such as

finance, education, economics, police affairs, courts, postal services, and other communication media. They were gone. The flight of these officials, the dispersion of the people, and the destruction of war had atomized community life and local government institutions.

Groups to Camps to . . .

Military Government, Building from scratch, put the first piece of local government substructure in place by appointing "honchos" or foremen to look after groups of their displaced fellows varying in number from sixty to one-hundred. When camps were established, local mayors and councilmen were appointed and charged with the supervision of such activities as camp sanitation, labor, land cultivation, rationing, and other matters of common concern.

"The Ryukyus Islands Prewar and Postwar," The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1958.

As soon as feasible after Okinawa was declared secure, the separate camps were consolidated into eleven military districts. This provided a framework for geographical community identification within which the people could choose their "mayor" and "council," subject to disqualification by the immediate Military Government District Commander. District elections of councilmen and mayors, respectively, were held on 20 and 25 September 1945.

"Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946."

These leaders assumed their peacetime duties with good will and accepted responsibilities ungrudgingly. They organized their

"The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Okinawa,"
H.S. Bennett, United States Naval Proceedings, LXXII (1946), p.273.

groups, endeavoring to bring together separated families and former neighbors in some semblance of prewar community cohesiveness. When it became possible to move the people back to or near their home areas, they led advance parties of men a week or so before the group movement to clear away the rubble, salvage usable items, repair standing buildings, pitch tents, and commence erecting some new structures. The Okinawan leaders themselves managed the details, the location and layout of the new settlements, the rate of timing of family resettlement, the allocation of land for farming, the establishment of community projects such as schools, labor pools, and administrative centers.

Not all was smooth, however. [Commander Bennett] records that at times guerrilla bands of . . . remnants of defeated enemy troops made some forays into the camps, killed some of the headmen and carried off food from civilian stocks. A number of headmen were intimidated and resigned and signs of apprehension became apparent. "It is noteworthy," he observes, "that these guerrilla activities did not serve to turn the Okinawans . . . but rather brought resentment down on the Japanese

themselves. On the other hand, some 14,000 Japanese prisoners of

Op. Cit., p. 273

war, whose return was suspended until the latter part of 1946 to augment the meager Okinawan labor force, were used to repair war damaged facilities and assist in the resettlement program."

"MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation, Military Phase." Reports of General MacArthur, Vol I, Supplement, p. 169.] (i)

Family and community stability advanced in direct proportion to the progress of resettlement. The elected local leaders relieved Military Government of the day-to-day details of administration and, using the techniques to which the people were accustomed, contributed to the gradual restoration of prewar tranquility.

Villages

As early as 4 December 1945, Naval Military Government Directive Number 58 made the former village ["mura"] structure the basis for local political organization, under the military government districts. By 1 May the "mura" administrative mechanism was functioning sufficiently well to permit the dissolution of the [military government districts.] Surviving prewar mayors and assemblymen resumed their offices and military government appointees filled remaining vacancies. This principle of re-establishing local governments along the

political-social lines which the people themselves had evolved offered a number of advantages. It placed less demand on the U.S. Forces for personnel, for elaborating new codes of administrative law, and the means to interpret and enforce such superimposed codes. Most importantly, it ensured a minimum of friction and frustration on the part of the Okinawans by permitting them to operate in familiar ways and it placed them in a well-understood position vis-a-vis higher authority, from which smooth progress could be made toward a larger degree of self-government when the situation permitted.

A Central Government Must Begin Somewhere

On a broader level, steps had been taken to establish a representative group of capable and reliable Okinawans to serve as a line between Military Government headquarters and the civilian population. The way in which they were selected reflected both the prudence of the military government and the willingness of the Okinawans to co-operate toward the common good. On August 15, 1945, more than a hundred outstanding Okinawans gathered at Ishikawa to meet with Colonel (1) [C.] I. Murray, USMC, the [Deputy Commander] for Military Government, to (nominate fifteen of their number for appointment to an Advisory Council, the forerunner of an eventual central Okinawan government. How this was accomplished and what transpired at that meeting is recalled clearly by the Honorable Masaji Marumoto, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Hawaii. Lieutenant Marumoto, as he was then, was the (3) [only Japanese-American to graduate from the Judge Advocate General's Officer Candidate School during the war.] One of more than 2,000 Nisei

in Hawaii who volunteered for the later renowned 442d Regimental Combat Team, he was accepted for limited service only, on the grounds of defective vision, and assigned to Military Government, Okinawa. His exceptional talents were promptly recognized and he was used as an organizer-diplomat with a special mission.

"My job," he narrated, "was to locate and interview civilians with leadership background, who were willing to participate in the [Advisory Council] plan. I was to be assigned a jeep and to operate entirely on my own without further direction.

"During the ensuing five weeks, I was on the road every day from early in the morning . . . until late in the afternoon, and many times late at night. I visited all of the compounds, and also every village which was rumored to harbor any person with leadership background.

"I tracked down rumors more or less methodically because many persons who were reported to me as being leaders were not found in the compounds, and one rumor or another placed them in remote villages.

"As a matter of fact, two of the most outstanding leaders were found by tracing the rumors. These leaders were Koshin Shikiya and Chosho Goeku.

"In my early rounds, everywhere I went, the persons whom I met said that Mr. Shikiya was the most respected person on Okinawa. . .

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" . . . Mr. Goeku was a grandson of the last Okinawa prince. In addition to being of royal blood, he was the leading business ^{man} /of Okinawa at the time of the American landing . . .

① " . . . In my trips, I was surprised to find that most of the [civilian] leaders remained on Okinawa, instead of evacuating to the main islands of Japan, and that all of the persons whom I interviewed, with one exception, were most willing to cooperate with the military government. The exception was Jugo Toma.

"Mr. Toma was a graduate of the faculty of law of the Kyoto Imperial University. He had served as district court judge in Nagasaki and Naha, and later as mayor of Naha. At the time of the American landing, he was the Okinawa district director of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the civilian arm of the wartime totalitarian government of Japan.

"I met him in a compound near Naha 10 days after he came out of a cave in the south. He told me very candidly that, because of his background, he was in a state of confusion and could not in all honesty give an affirmative answer to participate in the program of the military government, although he deferred to no one in his desire to be of assistance to his people."

Justice Marumoto compiled a list of those he had interviewed which was forwarded by the chief political affairs office of the Military Government, [Commander Murdock,] to Counter Intelligence for clearance. The list contained 130 to 150 names. (1)

It "came back from CIC," he continues, "with two names rejected. One was Mr. Toma. The other was Tatsuo Taira, who stood next to Mr. Toma in leadership background. Mr. Taira had a son who was an officer in the Japanese Army. The rejections were understandable because Japan had not yet surrendered and the invasion of the Japanese mainland was still very much talked about.

"The military government designated the remaining persons on the list as delegates to the convention held on August 15 at Ishikawa, a compound about three miles east of its headquarters. The delegates were gathered in several assembly points the day before, and were brought to the meeting place on military trucks and jeeps on the morning of the convention.

"By coincidence, the date of the convention fell on the day Japan surrendered. For the delegates, the day began on a festive note. They had not yet heard about the surrender. They felicitated each other on being alive and well. At the appointed hour, the civilian "mayor" of Ishikawa called the convention to order, and 124 delegates responded to the roll call. They unanimously elected Mr. Shikuya as chairman.

① "Mr. Shikiya introduced Colonel Murray, who caused a dramatic impact by announcing that Japan had surrendered that morning. For a moment, there was stunned silence. After all, the delegates were Japanese subjects, and [reverently loyal] to the Emperor.

"I sensed that their feeling was a mixed one of sadness on one hand and relief on the other, sadness that their country had lost though defeat was inevitable and relief that the holocaust was over.

"After announcing the Japanese surrender, Colonel Murray expressed his confidence that the victors would be fair to the vanquished, reassured the delegates of the intention of the military government to redouble its efforts to rehabilitate their society and economy and outlined the plan for the formation of a civilian advisory council.

"In explaining the functions of the council, he stated that it was conceived for the benefit of the people rather than as an instrument of military government, and emphasized the importance of electing thereto persons who could stand their ground and not be merely "yes" men.

"He then withdrew, with the statement to the delegates that the convention was theirs, that he was leaving Commander Murdock and me with them merely to act as liaison and to answer any questions they might have and not for the purpose of surveillance or

"The delegates spent the rest of the day discussing organizational matters, and adjourned to August 20, when they elected 15 of their number as members of the council.

"In the election, Mr. Shikiya received 116 of the 117 valid votes cast, and Mr. Goeku received 108 votes. The votes for the others were scattered. Mr. Shikiya became chairman of the council, and later served as the first civilian governor of the Ryukyus.

"Among the members elected to the council were Seiho Matsuoka and Genwa Nakasone. Mr. Matsuoka was a [Hawaii] laborer at Waipahu Plantation/in his younger days. Later, he worked through universities on the mainland and received a bachelor's degree in engineering from the University of Indiana. He served as chief executive of the Ryukyus immediately before Chobyō Yara, the present incumbent.

"Mr. Nakasone was a member of the prefectural legislature at the time of the American landing. In 1955, he published a book entitled From Okinawa to Ryukyus, which contained a detailed account of the formation and activities of the council and a supplement consisting of the minutes of the convention and the address by Colonel Murray to the delegates, as translated into Japanese by me.

"Upon the formation of the council, its headquarters were set up in Ishikawa and its members were quartered there. Then, to acquaint the members with the problems confronting them, I took them on a two-day inspection tour of the entire island, spending one day in the south and one day in the north.

"I was not able to do very much for the council, for on September 3, I was included in a list of Army officers to be transferred to Korea. The military government succeeded in having my name stricken from that list, but the respite was not for long. On September 25, exactly three months after my arrival, I received my final transfer order.

"The delay of my departure at least enabled me to work with the council on its first big project, the holding of elections for mayors and councilmen in 12 consolidated civilian areas, which were euphemistically called cities.

"The elections were held on September 20.

"In connection with the elections the council asked me whether Mr. Toma and Mr. Taira could run. The war being over, I saw no reason for keeping them out. Upon consultation with Commander Murdock, I gave the affirmative answer. Mr. Toma was elected chairman of the city council of Maebaru. Mr. Taira was elected mayor of the city of Taira.

"These events put them back into the mainstream of Okinawa politics. Mr. Taira succeeded Mr. Shikiya as the second civilian governor. Mr. Toma was later appointed by General Lyman Lemnitzer, High Commissioner of the Ryukyus, as chief executive, and, in that capacity rendered signal service to the people by patiently negotiating a formula for the settlement of the emotionally charged land problem with the American military authorities."

"Okinawa Revisited: A Look at Past, Future," Masaji Marumoto, address to the Social Science Association, reprinted in the Sunday Star Bulletin & Advertiser, Honolulu, February 14, 1971. General Lemnitzer, ^{as} CINCPAC, ^{the} was last Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. He was succeeded in the latter capacity by LTG James Moore, ^{was the to have} who first ^{had} the title "High Commissioner." General Lemnitzer was Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, when he presided over the land negotiations in Washington, D.C., in 1958, to which Justice Marumoto refers.

An interesting sequel to Justice Marumoto's story is found in the memoirs of Jugo Thoma (or "Toma," as the Justice rendered the name) who as Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands visited Hawaii enroute home from "land problem" conferences in Washington in 1958.

"In Honolulu I met Lt Marumoto Masaji for the first time in thirteen years," recalled Judge Thoma. "He was no longer a young lieutenant, but was an imposing Supreme Court Justice. When he was practicing law in Hawaii, he had enjoyed great public confidence as one of the most outstanding lawyers in civil cases, and this was the reason why he was appointed to the Supreme Court.

"At the time of the battle of Okinawa, he was a Lieutenant. He had played a role in rebuilding post-war Okinawa by gathering together talented men and organizing an advisory commission. I also was requested to collaborate with the U.S. military, but I refused, saying 'I am not yet prepared psychologically.' Several months after that, he appeared again just before he went to Korea and asked me whether I was still unprepared.

"There are many people in Okinawa who knew him. I went to visit Justice Marumoto on the way home after paying a call on the mayor [of Honolulu]. Our talk was only about fourteen or fifteen minutes, but both of us were delighted at our reunion and reminisced about 'old times'."

Thoma, op. cit.

Both of these distinguished men must have found some mutual satisfaction in the fact that the Okinawa Advisory Council and Mr.

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Shikiya's role at least faintly foreshadowed the Government of the Ryukyu Islands whose representatives, headed by Mr. Thoma, had just completed in Washington lengthy discussions of their current problems with high ranking members of the executive and legislative branches of the American government.

The Advisory Council provided [useful advice] to the Military Government and some of its committees assumed certain functions of a central government, with the sanction of the Military Government, but without real executive or administrative powers. However, on 2 January 1946, an Okinawan Department of Education was established and given authority to administer education matters island-wide, under cognizance of the Military Government Education Officer. By the end of January the police and public health functions were given similar status and before the end of April these other functional bodies were constituted: Departments of Agriculture, Industry, Finance, Fisheries, Commerce, General Affairs, Postal Affairs, Judicial Affairs, Arts and Monuments, and Labor. Thus was created the [illusion of centralization of government functions] before the existence of a central government. However, the Military Government provided the overall coordination and general supervision which would normally be the responsibility of a chief executive. In any case this situation was regarded as merely a transitional arrangement.

On 11 April 1946, the Deputy Commander for Military Government convened the members of the Advisory Council, the mayors, and a cross section of other Okinawan leaders to nominate three men from among whom he might appoint a governor or "Chiji." Mr. Koshin Shikiya

was nominated on the first ballot by an overwhelming majority. The second nominee was Matayoshi Kowa and the third, Jugo Thoma. On 24 April the Deputy Military Governor appointed the first two as "Chiji" and Vice Governor ("Fuku Chiji"), respectively. An installation ceremony was held on the following day.

Naval Military Government Report, 1 July 1946", and Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

Almost concomitantly, a directive establishing a Central Okinawa Administration in lieu of the Advisory Council and tying together its component departments was issued by the Military Government. The

Naval Military Government Proclamation Number 146, 22 April 1946.

directive provided that, in accordance with Military Government Proclamation Number 1, the Okinawa administration was to be conducted under the provisions of existing local laws "except insofar as it may be necessary . . . to change them."

The Chiji was made accountable to the Deputy Commander for Military Government for the proper execution of all governmental functions. He was authorized to appoint department heads, subject to the confirmation of the Deputy Commander.

The Directive not only established an executive branch but also made provision for reconstituting the prewar Okinawa Prefectural Assembly by extending in office the surviving members and filling

vacancies by military government appointment. (The five members who had formerly represented Miyako and Yaeyama guntos were excluded since the these islands had not yet been reintegrated under military government. Nor was any effort made to seat representatives from Amami Gunto, which continued to regard itself as a part of Kagoshima prefecture. Hence the members of the Assembly numbered only twenty-five).

Since the four year terms of the incumbents were to expire in April 1946, it would appear that military government might have gained a psychological advantage by employing the democratic process of an assembly election at that time. A major consideration weighing in favor of postponement, however, was the plan for the imminent restoration of a monetary economy with the attendant problems of prices and wages which had been in limbo ever since the invasion over one year earlier. This was regarded as "an operation so fraught with unforeseeable difficulties as to require the full attention of the Okinawans and to render inadvisable the holding of elections and the diverting of attention to political matters."

Whether there was a cause-and-effect relationship between the seemingly casual reactivation of the assembly and subsequent unfavorable developments cannot be determined from available sources but perhaps some conflicts might have been avoided if the people had been given the opportunity to elect a new assembly. Alternatively, problems might have been [attenuated] if the assembly had been accorded a greater degree of recognition by the Chiji. The directive specified that the role of the assembly was limited to providing advice to the Chiji. The latter

was authorized by Military Government to convene monthly meetings of the advisory body lasting not more than a day or two each. In actuality

Naval Military Government Report," 1 July 1946. (The Central Okinawa Administration was redesignated by Military Government Directive Number 20, 1 December 1946, as the "Okinawa Central Administration.")

the assembly was convened by the Chiji at irregular intervals until November 1947, and for a period of three months appears to have lapsed into administrative oblivion.

In late February 1948, the assemblymen made the first relatively restrained but significant demand for what some might characterize as "autonomy." Irritated by indifference and concerned over such matters as a sharp increase in the prices of food supplied by the Military Government, they decided to resign en masse. On 2 March, twenty-three assemblymen presented the Deputy Commander for Military Government their formal resignation, stating "We demand the establishment of a strong Civil Administration which will be responsible to the people, and of a new Okinawa Assembly as an organization with power to make decisions."

"Memoirs," by Jugo Thoma.

The Deputy Commander refused to accept the resignation, stating that Military Government does not look with favor on mass resignation by organized groups. He indicated, however, that he would consider

individual resignations submitted to him. He endeavored to assure the members that Military Government relied heavily on the Assembly.

When the Assembly ignored Governor Shikiya's call to meet on 8 March, the Deputy Commander addressed a letter to the members, dated 11 March, in which he stated:

"The manner in which you absented yourselves in a body leads me to the conclusion that it was done willfully and as the result of a conspiracy. You have both an obligation and an opportunity to serve and improve the conditions of the people of Okinawa and this privilege must not be taken nor treated lightly. If I have to use drastic measures to cause the government to function I shall not hesitate, but I rely upon your good judgment and patriotism to cast aside petty differences and get the job done."

Development of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands,"
Colonel Norman D. King, USCAR, 1952 (#443 in DA Pamphlet 550-4).

The Assembly continued to express dissatisfaction with its role and, on 15 March, the Deputy Commander invited the members to recommend changes in its operating procedures. He commented and made decisions on each point raised, to the apparent satisfaction of the body which convened on 26 March. The Assembly met monthly thereafter until October 1949, when Military Government Directive Number 20 provided for its replacement by an Assembly for the Provisional

Government of Okinawa.

Under this directive "the new Assemblymen were appointees, and the main island of Okinawa proper had been divided into ten districts, with one man from each of the Minor Districts (selection districts rather than election districts), and one from each of the major selection districts of Kunigami, Nakagimi, and Shimajiri -- a sort of "double feature." This was a new attempt patterned after the national district and the regional districts of the Japanese Diet, I believe."

Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

The assemblymen were appointed by the Chiji, with prior approval of the Military Government, for terms of two years. Their function was to assist the Chiji in an advisory capacity based upon "the principal interests and existing conditions of the people of the district represented by the member." The Assembly held its first meeting on 27 October 1949.

Although Military Government Ordinance Number 2, effective 1 January 1950, rescinded Military Government Directive Number 20, it perpetuated the Provisional Government Assembly of Okinawa, which continued to function without interruption or change. The purpose of the new MG Ordinance was to achieve a uniform pattern for the indigenous political structure in the four Gunto governments, Okinawa, Amami Oshima, Yaeyama, and Miyako.

While the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in the Ryukyus on 7 September 1945, and subsequent instructions established the northern

SCAPIN 677, 29 January 1946.

boundary of the Ryukyu Islands at thirty degrees north latitude and embraced Amami Oshima, as well as the islands south of Okinawa, the prewar local governmental agencies outside of Okinawa were allowed to continue their functions uninterrupted.

Amami Oshima was treated as if it continued to be a part of Kagoshima Prefecture until June 1946 when the Okinawa Military Government established a team office there. One of its early actions was to call for municipal mayoralty and assembly elections to be held on 1 July.. This marked the first election ever held in [Northern Okinawa] in which women were allowed to vote. Military Government established a Gunto-wide government, to supplant the Oshima Branch Office of Kagoshima ^{Prefecture} in October 1946, under an appointed Chiji or Governor, and designated it the Provisional Government of the Northern Ryukyus. (1)

In the Miyako and Yaeyama Gunto municipal governments generally had continued to operate, as did the local branch offices of the old Okinawa Prefecture. These latter offices evolved into the Provisional Governments of Miyako and Yaeyama, respectively. Each had a Gunto Governor or Chiji and advisory assembly until creation of and elections for the respective gunto assemblies in 1950. Meanwhile, municipal elections were held in the [Southern Ryukyus] in 1948, as in Okinawa. (1)

In the first elections held in those areas under U.S. Military Government, there were surprises for both the Ryukyuans and the Americans. For the former, two features were unique and represented a firm first step toward self-government: Women were given suffrage, and the communities chose their mayors by direct election. Before the war, women were not allowed to vote and mayors were selected by the assemblymen. On the other hand, Military Government observers were impressed by

several phenomena; the enthusiasm of the voters, particularly the women; the orderliness with which the elections were conducted; the negligible influence of political parties; and, the high percentage of voters who exercised their franchise.

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In this somewhat jigsaw puzzle approach, working with pieces and bits of pieces in various conditions of preservation or mutilation, Military Government had put together by 1949 four distinct but articulated geographical components with uniform administrative profiles but no cohesive, solidifying element. To bring them together, an eleven member Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council was established by Military Government Ordinance Number 1, effective 20 January 1950. Its purpose was to consider "such matters as may be referred to it by the Military Governor of over-all interest to the four Provisional Governments of the Ryukyus Islands, including the granting of limited self-government to the people thereof; and . . . advise the Military Governor with regard to such matters." Thus, for the first time native personnel began working together on a Ryukyu-wide governmental basis. The members of this council were chosen by the respective Chijis with prior approval of the Military Governor, on the basis of one representative for each 100,000 persons or fraction thereof.

As the abilities of the Council were demonstrated the matters referred to them for study and advice by Military Government were more difficult and varied. They all bore on the Ryukyus as a whole rather than upon any single area, since the Gunto government bodies were, up to a point, autonomous in their respective areas.

Agenda items given the Council included review of the adequacy for the Ryukyus of the Japanese Penal Code, Ryukyuan food and agriculture plans and policies, civilian court personnel requirements, and, most importantly, a comprehensive plan for establishment of a central government in the Ryukyus. The long-range objective of the Department of the Army was to replace the provisional governments by elected Gunto governments, by elected governors and legislators and, eventually, to achieve the institution of an elected central government.

When the Department of the Army suggested to General MacArthur in March 1949, the timeliness of further extension of self-government in the Ryukyus, he belatedly replied as follows:

"On basic authorization contained in paras 11 and 12, enclosure A, JC/S 1231, propose to extend self-government in Ryukyu Island to maximum extent possible consistent with U.S. objectives in area and abilities of Ryukyans to govern themselves.

② "Since liberation [sic] of Ryukyans, natives have been granted local self-government on mayor and local municipal council level. Four provisional area governments and assemblies on next higher level are appointed by military government on recommendation local leaders. ①

"In general, local native officials have performed fairly well in difficult period of continuing destitution and rehabilitation, taking previous lack of political

freedom under Japan in due consideration. Anticipated favorable effect on Ryukyuan economy of "pay-as-you-go" program authorized by DA Msg W84301, 18th Feb 49, and resulting upsurge of morale and interest in elections indicate that it is now propitious time to implement plans long under consideration for broadening base Ryukyuan self-government.

"Propose to take following action:

1. Hold elections for governors and members of assemblies in 4 provisional areas during calendar year 50.
2. Stage a comprehensive pre-election information campaign. Successful elections with long-range viewpoint uppermost in mind depend largely upon pre-election indoctrination, including lessons in democracy from primer stage upward, significance of democratic elections, and election procedures, carefully and slowly spelled out.
3. Grant local autonomy to maximum extent possible to local governments; retain veto and executive power in hands of MG [Military Governor].

"Considered neither feasible nor desirable at present is establishment of provisional central Ryukyus Government as suggested part 6, DA Msg WX 86170, because of present immaturity of Ryukyans. Propose an interim action, however,

to establish Ryukyus advisory council which will provide representative native participation at highest level government on advisory basis."

Msg CX 51849, 8 Aug 49, CINCPAC Tokyo to Department of Army, replying to message WX86170, 25 March 1949.

The process of political education and detailed preparation included the expansion of information media, drafting laws setting forth the governmental structures and election procedures, the mapping of districts, registration of voters and candidates, and, finally, the setting of election dates and announcement of legal campaign periods.

Special Proclamation Number 37, "Election of Governors and Assemblymen for the Gunto Governments," 30 June 1950; Military Government Ordinance Number 17, "Election Law for Assemblymen and Mayors of Cities, Towns and Villages, Revised," 7 July 1950; and, Military Government Ordinance Number 19, "Election Law for Governors and Gunto Assemblymen," 10 July 1950. Source: "Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945 - 30 June 1970," USCAR, 1971.

Terms of office of Gunto mayors and assemblymen were set at four years, beginning on 17 and 24 September 1950, respectively. The official campaign period was limited to forty-five days. Gubernatorial elections for all Gunto except Amami were set for 17 September; the election was to take place on October 22.

Even before the election dates were announced, strong public interest became evident, with the press, limited as it was, focusing on the political intentions and outlook of the three gubernatorial candidates on Okinawa. These men had clearly identifiable partisan support but the gubernatorial and assembly aspirants in the other guntos ran on their own personal appeal rather than as members of a political party.

"Civil Affairs Activities," Vol I, No. 1, USCAR, 1953.

After a lively campaign, Tatsuo Taira was elected Governor of Okinawa, defeating Seiho Matsuoka, later Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands, and Kamejiro Senaga, who was to become a thorn in the side of the U.S. administration and, eventually, an elected representative of the Ryukyus in the Japanese Diet. The other gunto governors were Yoshichi Nishihara, Miyako, and Tsumichiyo Asato in Yaeyama. The Amami O'Shima election awarded the gubernatorial office to Jikko Nakae. "Thus," wrote Jugo Thoma, "with the inception of the Island Governments, a popularly-elected Governor and a popularly-elected assembly became a reality; the activity of political parties became lively, and the interest in self-government increased."

Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

The Judiciary

Jugo Thoma, a [highly] distinguished Ryukyuan jurist, also recorded a number of comments on the Ryukyuan judicial system under U.S. Military Government. While his recollection of the chronological sequence of developments is occasionally difficult to reconcile with the official record, some of his observations reflect the Ryukyuan impression of how the Military Government managed such matters.

For example, Judge Thoma reflects that the Nimitz proclamation of military government rendered inapplicable in the Ryukyus the laws of Japan; "instead the Military Government would issue the laws and the laws should be obeyed." Yet he writes of the same early period,

"Under the Nimitz proclamation, once the U.S. Army had occupied the country, the jurisdiction of all Japanese courts was to be terminated; but since the old Japanese laws were to continue to be applicable in the case of petty crimes, our [Legal Affairs Council of the Okinawa Advisory Council] work was to study ways of setting up police courts and a Public Prosecutor's Office based on this proclamation. I was at Maehara so I became Justice at Maehara. But it wasn't until April 16, 1946 that police courts were finally set up in seven locations throughout the islands. And that was after I had moved to Itoman in February and I was

acting as justice in both Naha and Itoman at the same time. Thus the legal affairs matters with which I was connected soon were in readiness, and I started in on other areas - education and social matters. That was at a time when the whole society was searching for a new order." _

Jugo Thoma, op. cit.

USCAR records show that Military Government Proclamation No. 5 establishing inferior criminal courts, known as "Municipal Courts" was issued on 25 February, effective 1 March 1946.

"Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," 26 March 1945 - 30 June 1970, USCAR; and "The Ryukyu Islands, Prewar and Postwar," USCAR, 1958.

On July 13, 1950, by Special Proclamation No. 38, a new system of Ryukyuan courts was created, providing for a Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts and Magistrate Courts, each with civil and criminal jurisdiction. These were the Ryukyuan complements of Military Government courts established on 28 July 1949, which exercised jurisdiction over cases affecting United States personnel or interests, or actions which were considered of such significance as to warrant subjecting them to Military Government adjudication.

Judge Thoma complains that Ryukyuan authorities" were not consulted on the contents of this proclamation on the Civil Court System before it was published . . . - all they did was to ask our opinion on such things as the registration of attorneys, and on the organization of the bar association." He does describe in some detail, however, how the Military Government requested each of the Island Governors to propose candidates for the position of Judge of the Court of Appeals and


how he himself was nominated by Governor Shikiya, along with an alternative nominee, Mr. Yoshimoto Tomiyama, for selection to that high post on Okinawa.

In this same context, Thoma tells "the behind the scenes story of how a difference of only a few days determined the future political course of Mr. Tsumichiyo Asato, who is the present Committee Chairman of the Socialist People's Party." Thoma first met Asato in Taipei when, as prewar mayor of Naha, Thoma visited Taiwan and became acquainted with the outstanding lawyers there. After the war Asato was repatriated to Yaeyama and frequently visited Judge Thoma on Okinawa, where he eventually planned to move. Thoma regarded his fellow lawyer so highly that he arranged to have him nominated from Yaeyama for the Court of Appeals, and planned to have him named as Presiding Judge. However, just at that time Military Government announced that popular elections for the Gunto Governors would be held in September and Mr. Asato succumbed to the urgings of his friends to enter the Yaeyama gubernatorial race. As has been indicated, Asato was elected to that office -- in preference to an assured nomination to the Court of Appeals. "But," Thoma concluded sagely "if Asato had gone to the Court of Appeals as I had urged him to, the political history of postwar Okinawa might have been quite different from what it was."

Jugo Thoma, op cit.

Judge Thoma did not speculate in his memoirs as to how the political history of Okinawa might have been different if Mr. Asato had foresaken the ranks of partisan politics to serve on the bench. His implication that Asato had a marked impact on Ryukyuan politics, which meant, essentially, Ryukyuan-American relations, was substantiated by subsequent events, [some of which will be reviewed in later chapters.] (1)

In any case, by the close of 1950, which marked the termination in the Ryukyu Islands of the classical form of United States military government, an indigenous governmental structure with distinct profiles of executive, legislative and judicial branches had evolved. The extent to which the Ryukyuan people could exercise political choice had also grown to an unprecedented degree.



CHAPTER IX

STRATEGIC VERSUS POLITICAL EXIGENCIES

On 4 October 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved for issuance to General MacArthur a "Directive for the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Islands." It was based upon a decision

JCS 1231/14, 4 October 1950 ✓

of the National Security Council approved by the President, previously cited, which stated that the United States intends^{ed} [to retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa and other islands] of the Ryukyus south of latitude 29° North, and that, accordingly, the United States agency responsible for administering these islands should formulate a "a long-term program for the economic well-being of the natives with a view to reducing to a minimum the deficit in the economy."

(3) [NSC 13/3] para 5 amended, approved by the President, 1 February 1949; (JCS 1380/57); (See Chapter 6, above).

(4) The JCS directive outlined the responsibility under international law of the U.S. Government for the administration of the area and delegated such responsibility to the Commander in Chief, Far East, who was thereby appointed Governor of the Ryukyus Islands. The United States Government's interest in the area was to be to

oversees by

"United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Islands."

The new directive, [as shall be seen in the following chapter,] provided specific guidance as to how the civil administration was to be conducted "so as to foster the economic and social well-being of the civil population subject to the necessity for military security."

Why So Slow?

Of immediate interest is an examination, cursory though it must be, of the major factors which contributed to the seemingly inordinate delay of official acknowledgement that Ryukyuan-American relationships had changed in five years to such a degree that old "codes of conduct" no longer fitted the realities of the situation. It has been charged sometimes to MacArthur's [preoccupation with becoming the Savior of Japan] and indifference to the [hindmost] More frequently, [it has been ascribed] to almost callous unconcern on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was neither of these. It was, rather, [an example of the complications of timely action by our system of governmental processes in a world in constant flux.] While all concerned recognized that outstanding directives for Military Government of the Ryukyus Islands [(JCS 1231 and JCS 1231/8)] were outmoded, the fundamental problems involved were strategic and political -- compounded by uncertainties as to the attitudes and intentions of other nations.

③ — [The NSC decision that the United States intended to retain on a long-term basis] the facilities of Okinawa and the other islands south of latitude 29° North, basic to the issuance of a new set of guidelines

on U.S.-Ryukyuan relations, had its inception [as early as April 1945.] ①

Admiral E. J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Nansei Shoto be designated as an area in which the United States should have "exclusive military rights, except as modified by agreement."

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: U.S. Requirement for Post-War Bases, Serial 00804, 1 April 1945.

When the word filtered up to the President, he directed Colonel Harry H. Vaughn, his military aide, to request of the Army a "brief memorandum as to what their ideas are regarding exclusive military rights the United States should require in the Ryukyus. . ."

② [Memorandum] for the Chief of Staff, 16 June 1945.

General George C. Marshall's reply of [3 July 1945] stated that

"the Ryukyus and the Bonins should be demilitarized except for suitable U.S. bases . . . Since the United States has a continuing military commitment in the Far East and this can most effectively and economically be discharged in peacetime by primary reliance upon air power complemented by naval surface power, we should retain or acquire rights in areas around the perimeter

of the Pacific designed to control the approaches thereto and to prevent surprise attacks on vital strategic areas such as the Philippines, the Marianas, or Hawaii.

Adjacent to these areas, secondary bases will be needed as outposts to our main bases and as flank guards to our strategic lines of communication across the Central Pacific. This interlocking system of bases will not only secure our position in the Pacific but will also enable the U.S. to project its military power into any troubled area and should discourage aggression by other powers and therefore contribute materially to maintenance of world peace.

"The mere possession by the U.S. of positions within range of troubled areas should be a useful influence for peace and stability. Among the areas of potential trouble after the war is that bordering the Yellow Sea. A base in the Ryukyus, therefore, is particularly desirable, with the remainder of those islands demilitarized and in friendly hands . . ."

"Memorandum for the Military Aide to the President, subject: [Pacific Bases," from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 3 July 1945.]

It is interesting to observe that [the future Secretary of State made no recommendations as to how the retention] of these necessary

①
date & title

②

U.S. strategic positions should be politically presented to the world. However, he sent to Secretary Byrnes a copy of his memorandum, following a mutual discussion of the subject on 22 July 1945, and stated:

"As I understand it, the State Department keeps these studies and military requirements under active consideration with a view to selecting an appropriate time for introducing the U.S. needs into international discussions.

Memorandum for Mr. Byrnes, from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
23 July 1945.

Nor did President Truman suggest the solution to the politico-strategic problem when, on August 9, 1945 -- one month and one day before the formal surrender of the Japanese forces in the Ryukyus -- in a broadcast reporting on the Berlin Conference, he declared:

" . . . though the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire . . ."

State Department Bulletin, Vol XIII, No. 320, 12 August 1945.

The strategic concept of a defense perimeter in the Pacific was the subject of a New York Times article, dated September 6, 1945, which purported to express the Navy views on the importance of the Ryukyus. It read in part:

"The Navy recommended today that the United States retain a vast post-war ring of naval bases spanning the Pacific . . .

Nine major bases were included in the list, which Assistant Secretary of Defense Struve Hensel characterized as "limited to those we shall intend to maintain and which are susceptible to defense . . ."

Questioned about suggestions that Okinawa, the costliest conquest in the Pacific in terms of lives, be placed under the joint jurisdiction of the United Nations, [Mr. Hensel] said that he would "rather keep Okinawa as one of our own." (1)

The times correspondent raised with Mr. Hensel the question which was to be ^{the} critical politico-strategic problem regarding the Ryukyus for several years to come [- the UN or the US?] (2)

The strategic aspect of the problem was the essentiality of the requirement for bases in the Ryukyus and the nature and magnitude of such bases. This was a matter for the judgement of "the military experts," the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. As General Marshall had suggested to Secretary of State Byrnes, the political aspect was

essentially a matter for the State Department to resolve: how to obtain international acceptance of an exclusive U.S. military position in the remote Pacific islands.

Theoretically, this distinction would seem a relatively clear-cut delineation of responsibilities. Yet, in the light of international developments, the line of demarcation became difficult to discern and sometimes seemed to be critically obliterated. There were occasions when the movement of outside forces in unpredictable directions scrambled strategic and political perspectives into a shifting kalidescopic jumble in which [it was virtually impossible to separate the one from the other.] (1)

President Truman had spoken of the retention and acquisition of "military bases" necessary to protect our interests and world peace. Two months later the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they considered that all Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan including the Bonins and the Ryukyus should be brought under exclusive United States strategic control.

no! [JCS 570/40 as amended, 23 October 1945.] (1)

The dilemma which the military faced, at that time, together with some of its practical implications is well stated in an internal War Department memorandum by B. G. George A Lincoln, Chief Strategy and Plans Group, OPD, dated 15 April 1946:

"1. Here is my estimation on the present situation in the Ryukyus: The Joint Chiefs of Staff set down in JCS 570/40 that the Ryukyus were desired as a primary Base area for the United States. This view is unchanged as of the present time. However, there are complicating political factors on the horizon.

2. The disposition of Okinawa and the Ryukyus is a matter for the peace treaty for Japan. U.S. policy at the present time is to handle all matters in conformity with the charter and underlying principles of the United Nations organization. Hence, the Ryukyus will reasonably become a trusteeship. The nature of the trusteeship remains to be determined and there is always the chance that political expediency will result in the United States agreeing to some trusteeship arrangement which would give the U.S. less military rights than those defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as needed.

3. The Ryukyus are needed in the interim period to support the occupation of Japan. Also there is the occupation commitment of the Ryukyus themselves.

4. Hence, until the political situation develops further, the War Department, while continuing plans for the Ryukyus as a primary base, is pursuing a conservative policy in expending funds and materials in the Ryukyus.

①
Memorandum for [Colonel Westphalinger,] subject "Policy in the Ryukyus," 15 April 1946, signed "G.A.L."

A few weeks thereafter the Joint Chiefs of Staff, skeptical as to the adequacy for U.S. security purposes of placing the Japanese Mandated Islands under some UN trusteeship arrangement, proposed ^{their} outright annexation and a strategic trusteeship for Okinawa and Iwo Jima. The Secretary of War did not fully agree, however, commenting that, "There are very strong reasons why the President and the Secretary of State might feel compelled to apply the trusteeship concept to the Pacific Islands formerly under Japanese control." "The United States," he continued, "has repeatedly renounced any desire for territorial aggrandizement. Our representatives took the leading role in pressing for inclusion of the trusteeship system in the United Nations Charter.. The attitude of the United States toward Pacific territories has a considerable bearing upon our over-all relations with the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth of Nations. The facts that we are now in possession of the islands in question, that our agreement will be essential to any trusteeship agreement (or amendments thereof) and that we exercise a veto power in the Security Council provide the basis for obtaining the freedom of action we would need within a trusteeship agreement."

JCS 1619/2, "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific,"

8 June 1946

If the Joint Chiefs were disappointed in the reaction of the Secretary of War to their proposed national policy position, a counter proposal of the State Department undoubtedly evoked considerably stronger feelings in the military experts. The State representative on the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concluded an analytical twenty-eight page report with the concepts, among others, that the United States place the Japanese Mandated Islands under a special selective international "consultation agreement" within the trusteeship system of the United Nations, and that "the Ryukyu Islands should [therefore] be considered minor islands which should be returned to Japan and demilitarized." The basic rationale for returning the

SWNCC 59/1, 24 June 1946, and JCS 1619/5, 27 June 1946. The term "minor islands" is drawn from the Potsdam Declaration.

Ryukyus to Japan went along these lines:

For the United States to take over any part of the Ryukyu Islands would be contrary to its policy of opposing territorial expansion whether for itself or for other countries. From a practical point of view, control of the Ryukyus would in all probability require a considerable financial outlay by the United States for the support and development of the islands and "would involve the United States in the thankless task of governing three-quarters of a million people of totally alien culture and outlook."

Moreover, the establishment by the United States of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryukyus would be likely to provoke serious international repercussions and would be "politically objectionable. The existence of such a base, in addition to the other Pacific bases to be held by the United States and in such proximity to the China coast, might come to be resented by China and would probably be regarded by the Soviet Union as a provocative threat rather than as a proper defensive move by the United States. If the United States should acquire such a base, it would be considered by other states as stepping outside the zone of its legitimate political and regional interests."

As above, SWNCC 59/1.

The Joint Chiefs replied to SWNCC, in part, as follows:

"A careful consideration of these proposals does not change the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the necessity for obtaining United States sovereignty over the Japanese Mandated Islands, nor their view as to the necessity for obtaining sole trusteeship in the Ryukyus. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel particular concern over the proposal to return Okinawa to Japanese control . . .

"The United States currently possesses strategic control of the Pacific by reason of our necessary and extremely costly conquest of the islands and areas in question. This control can be relinquished, weakened, or in any way jeopardized only at the expense of our security."

Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject "Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and Other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan," SM-6245, 11 July 1946.

That was it. No arguments, no point-by-point rebuttal.

Two months later, the Joint Chiefs expressed to the President their concern over the State Department proposal which the Secretary of State had already provided to him. They recommended that the question regarding disposition of the Ryukyus be considered apart from the other Pacific islands involved; and that the necessary degree of control in the Ryukyus could be obtained by a strategic trusteeship. They restated the singular strategic importance of Okinawa, "the best, if not the only, hope for a bastion against Soviet progress to the southward which could within two-decades extend to the Malay barrier by war or even by means short of war . . . Certainly, with the world situation what it now is, the basic essentials of U.S. long-range military security require that no action be taken to relinquish

our ultimate possession of Okinawa as a military base." They requested that no action be taken in the matter prior to complete presentation of the problem to the President.

Memorandum for The President, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, signed by Fleet Admiral Leahy, 10 September 1946, JCS 1619/9.

A "memorandum for the Acting Chief of Staff, subject "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific" appears in the record at this point. It reads in part:

"General Eisenhower, at the JCS luncheon on 20 September 1946, indicated his belief that it might be advisable for the JCS to modify their stated position as respects the necessity for the U.S. annexation of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands. He suggested the advisability of advancing military requirements in connection with the islands, and thereafter permitting the State Department to determine the political means by which the those requirements might best be satisfied." It goes on to recommend that the JCS take no further action on this matter pending completion of study of a draft strategic trusteeship agreement recently forwarded by SWNCC for JCS comment. It is particularly interesting to note that, in addition to reporting the views of Eisenhower, a future President, the memorandum, as did many previously

cited, shows Dean Rusk - a future Secretary of State - as coordinating for the Office, Assistant Secretary of War. (1)

Memorandum from General Lincoln, dated 25 September 1946 (JCS Series 1619). (2)

By 18 October the Joint Chiefs of Staff had, with obvious reluctance and clearly articulated reservations, concluded that the SWNCC draft trusteeship agreement for strategic areas, considered by itself, appeared adequately to protect the security interests of the United States insofar as the Ryukyus were concerned. They were not prepared at that point to accept such arrangements for the Mandated Islands as sufficient to either guarantee indefinitely the degree of control the U.S. required there, nor deny these locations and areas to a potential enemy. They answered the obvious question as to why they would be willing to accept trusteeship for Nansei Shoto and at the same time were not willing to accept trusteeship for the Mandates in these words:

"Actually they would prefer, from the security point of view, exclusive and permanent control of all of these places, but they would accept trusteeship where populations and land areas ^{are} of consequence, and whose annexation might, therefore, be reasonably considered an attempt at territorial aggrandizement. Yet they reaffirmed the essentiality of firm U.S. control over (3)

the Ryukyus by posing a situation which may quite possibly face us in the not-too-distant future.

"Assume that China has become Communist and a satellite of Russia and that the Soviets in pursuance of their expansionist policies have obtained or seized base rights in the demilitarized Nansei Shoto in the event they are returned to Japan. Under such circumstances the United States would be confronted with two alternatives: (a) Expend tremendous funds really to build up our own remaining holdings in the Pacific or (b) Follow the process which we adopted before and during World War II with all the cost of lives and treasure that process involved.

"In such a case, not at all beyond the realm of possibility, the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly with reference to denying an enemy a foothold in the Pacific Islands, constitutes the most economical method of assuring our future security in the Pacific."

JCS 1619/19, 19 October 1946, transmitted to the President under cover of memorandum signed by Fleet Admiral Leahy, same date, and to the Secretary of State, 21 October 1946.

"Minor Islands"?

Nearly one year later - [not inactive] - the JCS recorded in part: (1)

"7. Meanwhile, the question as to whether control by the United States of ex-Japanese Mandated Islands should be assured by our assumption of sovereignty over these islands, or by establishment of a strategic trusteeship with the United States as sole administering authority, was resolved by the President in favor of strategic trusteeship . . .

"With certain minor changes, the draft trusteeship was approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on 2 April 1947 and strategic trusteeship of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands with the United States as sole administering authority is now in effect. (2)

8. The question as to the disposition of the Ryukyus (Nansei Shoto) was not resolved, however . . . The Ryukyus question would continue to require active consideration by the SWNCC. In this connection, the President stated in part on 6 November 1946, "The United States is prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumes responsibility as a result of the second World War."

9. ... a tentative draft treaty of peace for Japan, dated 5 August 1947 and prepared in the Department of State, classifies the Ryuku Islands as minor islands and includes them in the proposed territorial limits of Japan . . . Although the draft treaty is tentative, its proposed disposal of the Ryukyus would, if confirmed, deny the control recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that area." (Underlining supplied.)

[JCS 1619/24, Enclosure "B", 12 September 1947.]

② On 13 September, ② the Joint Chiefs requested the Secretaries of War and Navy to transmit to the Secretary of Defense a comprehensive and persuasive expression of views as to the essentiality of retaining under United Nations strategic trusteeship, administered by the United States, ^{the} Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees North. They emphasized that their earlier recommendation to this effect was given added weight by

③ [④ "the trend of the world situation."]

In the meantime, the State Department Planning Staff had been studying in consultation with other officials of State, and representatives of the Army and Navy, "the problems connected with the Japanese peace treaty." As a result, they had reached some important tentative conclusions. They saw "great risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control over Japan . . . If Japan is not politically and economically stable when the peace treaty is signed, it will be

difficult to prevent communist penetration. Nevertheless . . . the occupation is in many ways entering on a period of diminishing returns. Furthermore, we are already committed to proceed with peace discussions by the invitations we have issued to other governments." [This refers to a [premature] invitation extended by the United States on July 11, 1947, to the ten other members of the [Far Eastern Commission] ② to a preliminary conference of deputies and experts, for the purpose of preparing a draft of a treaty with Japan.] On the other hand, the

Department of State Bulletin, XVII. No. 421, July 27, 1947. For an informative and enlightening discussion of this subject see ["Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan," Frederick S. Dutton, pages 62-70, Princeton University Press, 1963.] ③

Planning Staff considered that the United States should not force the peace and should keep the treaty talks exploratory until a firm judgment could be reached on certain basic issues. Substantive discussions [should not begin] until after the first of January 1948 at the earliest; if the other drafting powers would not agree on a two-thirds rule -- so as to preclude the USSR obtaining a veto power, the whole question [should be allowed] to carry over to the next spring before resuming the talks. In general, it appeared unlikely that the U.S. would be able soon to get agreement on a treaty "which would satisfy our minimum requirements." As to security requirements, it was assumed that military facilities would be required on Okinawa; and, future study by SWNCC

should be made as to whether the United States should obtain these by a strategic trusteeship, or a long-term lease of base areas.

If the United States were to honor its commitment to the demilitarization of Japan, the Planning [Group] felt, then Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity of sufficient U.S. armed strength to make plain our determination to prevent Moscow-controlled communists from filling the vacuum. Hence, the need to retain military forces in the Ryukyus, as well as control over the former Japanese mandates. ①

In fine, the State Planning Staff saw many unresolved problems whose answers required further study and consultation with MacArthur before substantive progress could be made toward a treaty of peace with Japan.

Memorandum and enclosure, for Under Secretary Lovett and Secretary of State Marshall, from George F. Kennan, October 14, 1947.

Of the several significant concepts -- some regarded as "concessions" by the Army -- contained in the State Department paper, one of exceptional historical interest had its origin in the court, if not in the mind, of Emperor Hirohito. On September 20, 1947, [W. J. Sebald,] ② United States Political Advisor to Japan, reported to MacArthur the gist of a conversation with Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, an advisor to the Emperor, who had called by appointment for the purpose of conveying "the Emperor's ideas concerning the future of Okinawa." Sebald's

report reads in part:

"Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor's opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan. The Emperor feels that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia; but, after the occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an "incident" which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.

"The Emperor further feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be required) should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease - 25 to 50 years or more - with sovereignty retained in Japan. According to the Emperor this method of occupation would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs on the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly Soviet Russia and China, would thereby be stopped from demanding similar rights . . ."

(S) Memorandum for General MacArthur from W. J. Sebald, 20

September 1947.

As of 18 December 1947, the Policy Planners of the State Department had not yet received clearance from the Secretarial level to discuss with MacArthur the tentative conclusions they had reached with respect to problems involved in developing a satisfactory treaty basis and procedure. State Department treaty drafters went ahead with the preparation of a new draft treaty however. In addition, State was continuing to exchange views with the principal Far Eastern Nations in an effort to break the deadlock over procedures to govern the conduct of a peace conference. Russia insisted on handling treaty negotiations within the Council of Foreign Ministers and favored the veto procedure in any event. China, ["desirous of avoiding a situation similar to Yalta wherein the other principal powers made major decisions affecting China's future without her consent, definitely favors the veto privilege; but she is inclined also to favor treaty negotiations being handled by the eleven Far Eastern Powers rather than by the Foreign Ministers of the principal powers only."]

The American Embassy in Moscow had reported, about that time, that the Soviets evidently felt that, with conditions in Asia working in their favor, peace with Japan was of little importance to Soviet strategy and that by remaining outside of any peace settlement they could gain propaganda advances, incur no responsibilities, and win new opportunities for sabotage and infiltration. The Embassy felt that the U.S. should be most wary of a peace settlement boycotted by Russia and should be in no hurry to sign a peace and withdraw from Japan. Also, the U.S. should be sure that the U.K., China and the majority of the other Far Eastern

powers agree with the U.S. before the Soviet Council of Foreign Ministers proposal is rejected.

Commenting on the Moscow Embassy's observations, the U.S. Political Adviser to SCAP, with MacArthur's concurrence, opined that an early peace with Japan would offer many advantages to the U.S.; that, given strong internal police powers and moderate economic stability (not yet at hand), the Japanese Government could successfully resist Communist encroachment. He cautioned, however, that if the Soviets did not join the peace conference the concept of post treaty control ^{had to} ~~must~~ be designed to afford adequate protection to Japan against Soviet encroachment in the post treaty period.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, subject "Status of Japanese Peace Treaty," from Brigadier General [C. V. R.] Schuyler, Chief, Plans and Policy Group, 18 December 1947.

Ryukyu Islands - Something Special

So, the near and long-term disposition of the Ryukyu Islands and the formal adoption of congruent U.S. civil administration policies were involved in the increasingly complex irresolution of international affairs. Important though this matter was on its own merits, it had become a corollary to the relatively labyrinthine issue of a treaty of peace between Japan and the erstwhile allied powers. That it was not permitted to linger on in such a subordinate status is attributable

to a combination of developments, some of which have been previously identified.

General MacArthur's insistence that the frail Japanese economy should not be called upon to bear any part of the burden of reviving the Ryukyus, agreed to by State in March 1948 notwithstanding [the as yet undetermined status of the Ryukyus,] was a catalyst in the crystallization of the 'Okinawa problem' and its precipitation out of the hazy admixture of elements involved in the treaty issue. ①

Other major disassociating agents were the polarization of Communist/Free World ideologies typified by the Berlin blockade of April 1948, the destruction wrought in the Ryukyus by the 'ill winds' of October 1948, and, finally, the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950. Influenced by these and other developments (such as the rising power of the Mao regime in China) not all of which bore the same political and psychological [valence,] there evolved a governmental consensus that, however, international acceptance of the principle might be achieved, the retention of major United States installations in the Ryukyu Islands was essential. ②

This was not enough, however, to satisfy the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They now insisted that exclusive control of the Ryukyus Islands by the United States is vital to U.S. security interests and that early action by the State Department to secure international sanction was desirable. They also recommended a public announcement indicating United States intentions. Even after the Presidential approval of NSC 133 on 1 February 1949, the military experts pressed ③

for this position, particularly as the possibility of ominous developments with respect to Formosa grew graver. Nor were the Joint

JCS 1966/7, 16 August 1949.

Chiefs comforted when, on 12 January 1950, [the Secretary of State publicly announced that the United States holds important defensive positions in the Ryukyus and that we intend to continue to hold these positions.] However, in the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will, at an appropriate time, offer to hold these islands under a trusteeship of the United Nations." That is where the

(1)

OK JCS [Briefing for Far East Trip], 24 January 1950.

matter stood, however, and was to remain. [An appropriate time" never came.]

(2)

Unable to obtain a more categorical definition of the future disposition of the Ryukyus, the JCS finally moved, on the basis of NSC 13/3, to revise the existing directives governing Ryukyuan-American relations. [Due to] the delays endemic to the Washington coordinating processes, the promulgation of such a code did not occur until 4 October 1950, when the JCS issued to MacArthur the new directive for the civil administration of the Ryukyu Islands. A new relationship had been evolving but the period of metamorphosis appeared much longer where viewed from the Washington Monument than it did on the remote islands

(3)

where it was taking place. There was so much to be done on the spot. Everyone was busy because on Okinawa ["there was no place to sit down," as one participant wrote.] (1)

In the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, however, there were places to sit down, and most members of MacArthur's staff had been at their desks eighteen or more hours every day since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. In the absence of any other reasons, and none have been identified, the Korean crisis is probably sufficient to account for the fact that the JCS directive to MacArthur was not transformed into a Far East Command directive to the [Ryukyu Command,] (2) giving effect to the basic policy decisions reached in Washington, until two months later. MacArthur should have been fairly well satisfied with the JCS document since, in the coordinating process, most of his views had been adopted, even some to which the State Department expressed informal but firm opposition. These differences were pointed out in a memorandum from the Chief of Staff, Army to the Joint Chiefs:

"Although the operation of military government in the Ryukyus is strictly the responsibility of the Department of Defense, the directive was informally submitted to the Department of State. The Department of State informally concurred in the directive, but suggested certain changes, all of which have been incorporated in the attached draft with the exception of the following:

- a. The use of the term "Military Governor," and
- b. Giving the Military Governor authority to appoint members of the court of last resort and having them serve at his pleasure.

The Department of State believes that the title "Military Governor" is unsuitable in view of the fact that the proposed directive does not call for absolute military government, and that giving the Military Governor the power of appointment and termination of appointment of members of the court of last resort is undemocratic, and not in keeping with the objectives of the United States as outlined in the directive.

"The [first] change proposed by the Department of State . . . was not accepted since the CINCPAC recommended the use of the title "Military Governor." It is felt that this objection by the Department of State does not have sufficient foundation to override the recommendation of CINCPAC. The [second] change . . . was not accepted because this government is in the last analysis a Military Government. Elsewhere in the directive the Military Governor is definitely made the ultimate authority on executive and legislative matters. Authority to remove a member of the court merely facilitates the Military Governor's ability to discharge his functions as ultimate authority in judicial matters."

Enclosure to JCS 1231/14, 9 September 1950.

Yet, with all the semantic pulling and hauling, when the JCS directive was issued it stated that "the Commander in Chief, Far East . . . is hereby appointed Governor of the [Ryukyu Island] and . . . is authorized to appoint a subordinate official [Commanding General,

② [Ryukyu] Command] who will be known as Deputy Governor."

State had wanted "Governor General"; MacArthur argued for "Military Governor"; the JCS took the one term acceptable to both and MacArthur had to settle for the simpler title, just plain "Governor."

As to the Governor's authority to appoint and remove members of the court of last resort, the JCS adopted the Army recommendation that such power be vested in the Governor.

So a new directive for the civil administration of the Ryukyus was delivered. The period of gestation was painfully protracted. But,

③ [as has been seen,] there were serious complications.

CHAPTER X

EXIT MILITARY GOVERNMENT

① The 1950 Directive for the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a document in which two [seemingly incompatible concepts] were merged. On the one hand, Okinawa was to be retained as a "fortress" garrisoned by military forces of the United States, the Occupying Power; on the other, the civil administration of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands was to be conducted "so as to foster the economic and social well being of the civil population."

The Goals

The directive charged the Civil Administration with furthering:

- ②
- a. The establishment of a standard of living comparable with that which existed prior to the war.
 - b. The establishment of a sound governmental financial structure.
 - c. Self-government through legislative, executive and judicial organs established in accordance with democratic principles.
 - d. Cultural and educational development with due regard to the existing culture of the inhabitants.

It specified how some of these objectives were to be achieved, and set forth a bill of rights, as follows:

"The Ryukyuan people will be guaranteed, as far as is

consistent with the military occupation, the basic liberties of democratic countries, including freedom of speech, assembly, petition, religion and the press; and security from unreasonable searches, seizures and deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law."

Then, to protect the military security interests of the United States as an occupying power, the directive stated:

"The Governor will retain power to:

a. Veto, or to prohibit or suspend the operation of, any laws, ordinances or regulations enacted by any of the above governments;

b. Order the promulgation by any of the above governments of any law, ordinances or regulations he may deem advisable;

c. Resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority in the Ryukyus if instructions by him are not carried out, or if he considers such action essential to security."

Recognizing that the powers thus vested in the governor verged perilously close to the establishment of government by man, rather than by law, the Joint Chiefs admonished:

"The Governor will exercise the above powers with the greatest restraint."

The Means

Supplementary instructions to the Governor directed, inter alia, the development and initiation of long-range economic plan, the restoration of private foreign trade as soon as feasible, establishment of an equitable tax system and ^{establishment of} a counterpart fund derived from the sale of [GARIOA] supplies to be used for specified purposes, including payment for rental of private property used by the United States prior to 1 July 1950.

The ~~Directive~~ contained a policy statement to the effect that the United States would not expect the people of the Ryukyus to repay to the United States funds used for the prevention of disease and unrest, for government of the area, and ^{for} economic recovery. (This remission of any obligation of GARIOA repayment by the Ryukyuan people was an important exception to the general policy; other occupied areas were called upon to repay such funds, albeit not all at 100 percent on the dollar)

Freedom of travel and communication to and from the Ryukyus was directed, subject to the requirements of military security and availability of facilities. The Governor was also called upon to encourage [emigration].

Significantly, the directive, in treating of the use of [Japanese Government-owned real property], declared it to be the intention of the United States, upon "the coming into effect of a treaty of peace or until the State of war between the United States and Japan."

① over what
otherwise terminated," to accept a United States trusteeship under
the United Nations.

Guidance was given with respect to the acquisition of land required permanently by the United States and the rental of land required temporarily. [This aspect of the directive will be reviewed later when the subject of the U.S. land use in the Ryukyus is examined.] ②

The foregoing conveys the substance of the directive, and suggests why many months were required to draft and coordinate such an unprecedented and comprehensive charter - even after the basic decision had been made ["to retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus."] ③ same

④ [Timewise,] the JCS directive to MacArthur [was approved on 4 October] ⑤ 1950; MacArthur's unclassified adaptation for dispatch to Major General R. S. Beightler, Commanding General, [Ryukyu^s Command] was issued on 5 ⑥ December 1950. Implementation in the Ryukyus of some of the provisions

FEC GO No. 79, 5 December 1950.

of the directive required considerably more time.

⑦ On 15 December, Military Government headquarters ^{was} ~~were~~ formally redesignated "U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Office of the Deputy Governor." The organization itself was soon known by the [still familiar] acronym "USCAR." While General MacArthur was designated Governor, [the former Military Governor, Major General Robert S. Beightler became the first Deputy Governor] and a new position. ⑧

relationship
①

that of Civil Administrator, was first occupied by Brigadier General John H. Hinds. The latter position has been described as that of Chief-of-Staff for Civil Affairs, to which the full time of the incumbent was to be devoted.

②

The establishment of the Civil Administration in lieu of the Military Government organization which had been responsible for the conduct of civil affairs since "L Day" in 1945, represented more than a change in titles. It gave formal recognition and official sanction to the amicable relationship between the U.S. administrators and the Ryukyuan people which had evolved during [those] years. ~~It went further,~~ in that it went far beyond conventional bounds in asserting positive programs and goals for the advancement of the people's welfare. Their status, according to the Rules of Land Warfare, was still that of enemy nationals under military occupation. Yet they were "encouraged to express a voice in the determination of their local affairs, greater than they had ever before enjoyed. They were also given financial assistance to establish and own enterprises in a free, competitive economy, subjected to no tax or tribute on behalf of an outside power, a condition which never existed in the Ryukyus before [1954.]"

why the date!

"The Ryukyus Island, Prewar and Postwar, USCAR (1958). The date in the last sentence "1954," an obvious transposition, should read "1945."

As Jugo Thoma reminisced, "At that time, in my opinion, it was effective in breathing a new spirit into the Okinawan people which

was showing recovery for the first time since the war; the change in the signboard over the Civil Administration following upon the popular election of a [Gunto] Governor was proof of the deep interest the United States had in the extension of Okinawa's self-determination."

Thoma, Jugo, op. cit. See also Chapter 8, hereof.

Freedom of Speech Invites Dissent

Paradoxically, this "deep interest the United States had in the extension of Okinawa's "self determination" opened the gates for overt advocacy of "reversion" or administration reunification with Japan. The well-known Okinawan political scientist, Mikio Higa reports and analyzes this development from his point of view. He notes the United States Army's decision to replace the typhoon-destroyed facilities with permanent installations, prompted largely by the cold war and the victory of the Chinese Communists, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and the enhancement of Okinawa as an ^[a base] ~~an airborne~~, with finally the transfer of all "operational functions of military government" to USCAR. Then, Mr. Higa observes:

"As the U.S. intention to retain Okinawa indefinitely became increasingly clear in 1950, ^[some] Okinawan leaders began to advocate the administrative reunification of Okinawa with Japan. ^{[In the absence of definite U.S. policy concerning the future}

10

① disposition of the Ryukyus before this time, advocacy of reversion was not permitted. By early 1951, however, the so-called 'reversion movement' emerged into the open. In mid-1951, two [voluntary associations] had been established to promote this movement and they jointly launched a non-partisan signature campaign. Within about three months, more than 199,000 eligible voters, 72.1 percent of the total, signed a petition circulated throughout Okinawa. The same campaign was carried out in the Miyako Islands, where about 33,000 signatures, 88.5 percent of the entire electorate, were collected in five days. These petitions were forwarded immediately to American and Japanese delegates at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference. In late August, the Okinawa Gunto Governor and Assembly also urged the Conference to expedite the political reunion with Japan."

"Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa," Mikio Higa, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, 1963, pages 8,9. The "Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands," 26 March 1945-30 June 1970, USCAR, carries the following entry: "28 Aug 51 - Okinawa Gunto Chiji (Tatsuo Taifu) sent a cable requesting reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan (addressed to Prime Minister Yoshida, Special

Envoy John F. Dulles, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson). Speakers of the Gunto Assemblies sent wire to Prime Minister Yoshida requesting early reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan."

These statements of Jugo Thoma and Mikio Higa, placed in juxtaposition, invite - if not require some comments.

Judge Thoma, who for a number of years held various political offices, but professed no rigid party affiliation, spoke of the broad reaction of the Ryukyuan people. Professor Higa, writing of politics and parties, addressed himself to the perceptions of "some Okinawan leaders," that is, some politicians.

Mr. Thoma, whose fealty to Japan is attested by his long-time prewar leadership of the Okinawa Branch of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, viewed the situation realistically. He recognized that

See Chapter 2, supra.

the "deep interest" of the United States in the extension of Okinawa's self-determination was unique in the history of conqueror's treatment of their enemies. On the other hand, the politicians, of whom Mr. Higa wrote, perceived in the newly-accorded and generally unprecedented freedom of speech a license to surface, mount and ^{encourage} drive a popular until it became the celebrated "Reversion Issue." The politicians made the issue, and the issue made the politicians.

① [Parenthetically it should be noted that there was in the postwar years no broad-based desire or popular sentiment in the Ryukyus for separation from Japan.] Two political parties which had been established in 1947 were opposed to reversion. As Higa recounts it,

"The Socialist Party headed by Ogimi Chotoku proposed to have the Ryukyus designated as a trust territory with the United States as the administering authority. This 'one-man party' intimated that the Cairo Declaration should apply to Okinawa, for Japan 'took it [Okinawa] by force', and there would inevitably 'reappear the past tragedy' of Japanese 'exploitation' in case of reversion to Japan. The party also argued that Ryukyuans would benefit by supporting U.S. policy which the party leadership thought aimed at placing the islands under a trusteeship because of the changed international situation.

"The Democratic Alliance [founded by Nakasone Genwa] advocated the establishment of an independent Ryukyus Republic. This party later merged into the Republican Party which retained an 'independence' plank in its platform. Its basic views were that the United States was unlikely to withdraw from Okinawa and that Japan had impoverished Okinawa in the past. The Ryukyus were considered to be too advanced to be placed under a trusteeship, so the only alternative was independence."

Mr. Higa concludes, "However, the fact that these parties had very little popular support was shown in the gubernatorial election of 1950; the defeat of their coalition candidate was due primarily to the [unpopular platform which embraced Ryukyuan independence.]"

Higa, Mikio, op. cit., p. 36.

A further important development which is foreshadowed by a side-by-side reading of the Thoma and Higa statements is that a great number of Ryukyuans perceived a distinction between self-determination or "autonomy", and "reversion." This is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that there was [no popular support] for either political independence from Japan nor permanent affiliation with the United States. While all important Okinawan political parties were to be advocates of reversion, sooner or later, many Ryukyuans supported the Democratic Party concept of concentrating upon achievement of 'the prosperity of the inhabitants through the expansion of autonomy.' Granted that party lines were often drawn on the basis of modalities: timing, emphasis, and [the means to achieve a goal], nevertheless these were considered sufficient grounds for establishing separate partisan camps.

Such being the case, and for convenience of presentation, the distinction between reversion and autonomy will be observed later when examining the major problems or issues which were to confront USCAR.

At this point it is clear that the Directive for the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands was, indeed, to have consequences far exceeding the mere "change in the signboard over the Civil Administration."

The most significant programs initiated by the Civil Administration were directed toward the development of the political, economic, and social viability of the islands. A good beginning had been made under Military Government sponsorship and with United States assistance, but a review of the JCS Directive suggests how much remained to be done.

A Central Government Evolves

USCAR inherited from Military Government a body politic which could point to popularly elected governors in the four Guntoes or island groups, each of which also had its popularly elected assembly, and a court system presided over by judges nominated by the respective governors.

See Chapter 8, *supra*.

There was, however, no central civil government; the only unifying body was the Military Government, assisted by the advice of the Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council in matters of inter-gunto interest. The JCS Directive of 4 October 1950 had specifically stipulated that

"provision will be made for the establishment under democratic processes by the inhabitants of the Ryukyus of the following governmental structure, which shall be subject to general supervision of the United States Civil Administration:

- a. Responsible government at the municipal level.
- b. Responsible government at the provincial level,
if desired.
- c. Responsible central government . . ."

On 1 April 1951, a Provisional Central Government of the Ryukyu Islands was established, as a step toward the directed objective. The transition was smooth because the members of the Interim Ryukyus Advisory Council recommended from among their members the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive who were appointed by the Deputy Governor; the other nine members of the Council constituted the Legislature of the Provisional Central Government.

"During the first eight months of its existence this government considered only those responsibilities which had not in any way been delegated to the gunto governments.

"A complete structure of this Provisional Central Government began to unfold after it was decided in November 1951 to abolish all gunto governments and to unify all functions not delegated to municipalities within a single central government. This action . . . had been recommended or endorsed by all gunto governments and the mayors' council prior to its announcement by the Deputy Governor. By February 1952, the appointed Legislature had established ten departments, along with the necessary executive offices and bureaus, within the Provisional Central Government.

"Civil Administration Ordinance No. 57, entitled 'Election Law for the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands' was promulgated on 18 December 1951. This ordinance established eight electoral districts for the entire Ryukyus, from which thirty-one legislators were to be chosen; 3 March 1952 was set as the date of these elections.

In this first election of central government legislators, party platforms were again transcended by the vote for favorite candidates. As could be anticipated all four of the ex-Gunto governors had little difficulty in being elected to the Legislature. Of the twenty ex-Gunto assemblymen who ran for the Legislature, ten were elected, while two of the three Provisional Central Government legislators who ran were elected. Other candidates elected included two mayors, two school principals and four businessmen. The other seven legislators comprised a miscellaneous governmental and political grouping, and included the leader of the Ryukyu Peoples Party [Senaga, Kamejiro].

"With the elected legislature of a central government, the four Gunto governments and the Provisional Central Government were replaced by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) on 1 April 1952; the Gunto governments

actually continued in existence until 30 June 1952 to wind up their affairs. The same persons who served as Chief Executive [Shuhei Higa] and Deputy [Yuhei Izumi] were reappointed to these positions in the new GRI. The executive departments, Bureau^s and offices of the former, as well as the personnel, were continued in the Executive branch of the GRI."

The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar," USCAR, pp 58-59.

Similarly, the Ryukyuan Court Systems had been consolidated into the central governmental framework by January 3, 1952 and became the Judiciary of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Thus, by April 1952, the central government was functioning "along the lines of the presidential system with the three separate, but coordinate branches, the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive." The formal

Ibid., p. 59.

inauguration of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was proclaimed on 29 February, effective 1 April 1952.

Civil Administration Proclamation No. 13 and Ordinance No. 68.

" . . A Sound Governmental Financial Structure"

That is one of the goals which the JCS directed USCAR to achieve in the Ryukyus; another was the establishment of a standard of living comparable to that which existed prior to the war. Means to achieve one of these goals negated at times progress toward accomplishment of the other. The needs for economic development and the welfare of the people sometimes outweighed the requirement for generating tax revenues. In order to provide ~~an adequate~~ ^{adequate} staple food and materials for use in construction or production, for example, it was necessary for the government to levy little or no duty on a variety of imports. [Progress toward a sound fiscal system was, of necessity, retarded.] ①

② [Prior to] the formation of the GRT, each Gunto government prepared its own budget and collected its own taxes, which were supplemented by financial grants from the U.S. administering authorities for specific projects. In addition to the Gunto administration, there existed a total of eighty-six separate city, town, and village governments. The expenses of these were initially financed through a handling charge on GARIOA goods^s which the local governments were responsible for distributing to the public through the so-called ["MURA"] stores. In April 1949, ③ this practice had been discontinued and replaced by a system of taxation. Gunto governments relinquished to the municipalities their right to levy taxes on lands, houses, and boats; these revenues were later supplemented by taxes on ^bicycles, telephones, real estate acquisitions, ^asurtaxes on incomes, and certain other assessments.

One of the most significant steps toward Ryukyuan economic development and, at the same time, the establishment of a base for a sound public financial system was the Military Government promulgation in November 1950 of an ordinance looking toward reestablishment of foreign trade. This was followed in February 1951 by USCAR action to make

Military Government Ordinance No. 26, "Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange in the Ryukyu Islands", 20 Oct. 1950.

available to private traders dollars from the Ryukyuan Dollar Commercial Account, which was built up from the sale of goods and services to the U.S. Forces and used for the government-to-government import program. Ryukyuan legal tender, the "B" Yen, was of no value in international exchange markets. However, by freely converting such local currency into dollars for almost unlimited purchases abroad, the B Yen became as good as U.S. money. The immediate effect was to enable the people to buy from Japan much needed personal and household goods which had been unavailable or in short supply since the outbreak of the war; at the same time, the purchasing power of the B Yen at home reached its full value of the existing rate of 120 Yen to \$1.00. The B Yen purchasing power was stable.

An important collateral result was the stimulus given to the Bank of the Ryukyus which was designated to administer the Dollar Commercial Account, later called the "Ryukyu Foreign Exchange Fund", in accordance with quarterly foreign exchange budgets prepared by the Ryukyuan

government and approved by USCAR. Thus, the Bank of the Ryukyus entered the foreign exchange field on behalf of private entrepreneurs and gained recognition abroad as well as in its domestic operations.

The combination of economic gains flowing from the reestablishment of private foreign trade, facilitated by the availability of the Ryukyu Foreign Exchange Fund, were not its only benefits. Of major importance, also, was the source of revenue which it provided to the central government.

① 1 With the [actualization] of foreign trade, the central government enacted legislation to levy taxes on tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and some other non-essential imports. This was to be a major source of GRI tax revenue in the years to come. Yet, while Ryukyuan government internal revenue receipts began a steady rise in Fiscal Year 1952 (beginning 1 July 1951), United States grants-in-aid were required for the support of fifty-one percent of the budget for that year.

"The Ryukyu Islands Prewar and Postwar", USCAR, 1958. Most of the substance of the foregoing regarding public finance and economic developments is drawn from this source.

The Counterpart Fund

2-1 ② The source of much of this financial assistance was the so-called "Counterpart Fund," [established] as a separate fund on 1 April 1951 in which the proceeds of the sale of GARIOA and other United States aid

goods were deposited. The JCS directive authorized the use of counterpart funds for certain specified purposes, including essential expenses for the operation of the central government, pending the establishment of an adequate tax system. "With the establishment of an adequate tax system," USCAR reported, "it was possible to use these grants to the government primarily for essential public rehabilitation projects rather than for defraying the cost of administrative operations. This fund has also be used [in consonance with the directive] to meet local currency expenses of the United States Civil Education and Information program; to establish the Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund; to finance rice and fertilizer subsidies, which were necessary during the early years of the rehabilitation program; and to build up foreign exchange balances, i.e., sale of yen to U.S. Forces, [which] were required to initiate private foreign trade. (1

"The counterpart fund has been extremely important as a balancing effect, in the economy. Through the use of this fund, it has been possible to grant financial assistance to those areas of the economy which require stimulation. It has been especially effective in providing long-term credit to private enterprise through RRFF. Neither the government nor private sources of credit were able to satisfy this vital need . . ."

Id., pp 54,55.

The "RRFF"

① [Acronyms are used so frequently in this chronicle that a list ^{appended to} is included ^{at the} assist the installment-plan reader.] This particular one, "RRFF" identifies the Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund, which capitalized the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation (RDLC) in 1959. The latter institution published its history in 1972 which tells, in its own style, of the genesis of the RRFF:

"With the reestablishment of free enterprise system, the land and marine transportation businesses and staple food ^{business} ~~distinction~~ businesses, which had theretofore been controlled by the government, were transferred to private companies. As the commercial activities became active, the demand for funds in the private sector increased rapidly. On the other hand, MG's [Military Government's] balanced Yen budget policy coupled with the limitation of the currency in circulation to the BY 500 million level ever since the third currency conversion in July 1948 caused a fund shortage and by the latter part of 1949, tight money situation prevailed.

"Under the circumstances, demands for long-term loans continued to increase, and there was felt a dire need for long-term financing. In response to such need, MG established Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund (RRFF), the first and only source of long-term, low interest

loans in post-war Okinawa, by proclaiming MG Ordinance Number 4, dated April 10, 1950. Article I of the ordinance read: 'Whereas, the economic rehabilitation of the people of the Ryukyus requires increased financial assistance of a long-term nature to certain essential commercial, industrial and construction activities, there is hereby created a public benefit trust designated 'The Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund.'

"The operation of the Fund was entrusted to BOR [Bank of the Ryukyus], and MG in June 1950 delivered B¥ 100 million (about US \$830,000) thereto out of the Counterpart Fund for Assistance to the Ryukyus as the initial capital of RRFF. BOR, as the trustee, established a Reconstruction Finance Fund Bureau within its organization and started RRFF operation in August 1950.

"As noted above, the initial capital of RRFF was B¥ 100 million; however, this was far short of meeting the high loan demands then existing. And MG made additional investments every year thereafter. By the time RRFF was succeeded by Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation (RDLC) on December 31, 1959, the total capital of RRFF had increased to \$20.26 million, or 24 times the initial amount. As the earnings from RRFF operations were all retained and ploughed back into the RRFF's loaning resources, the total loaning resources of RRFF amounted to a sizeable \$24.73 million as of the end of 1959.

Ten-Year History of the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation,"
published by RDLC, 1972.

It is noteworthy, in passing, that the same source places RDLC's net worth as of 31 December 1971 at over \$54 million. The establishment and operations of these tandem institutions was the most effective economic program conducted without recourse to U.S. appropriated funds by the American authorities during the twenty-seven years of United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands. The RRFF and its successor, the RDLC, approved 41,000 loans and guarantees amounting to \$189 million during the period 1950-1970. They financed the construction of over 30,000 private homes to the extent of more than \$31 million, benefitting approximately 180 thousand Ryukyuans. Manufacturing and processing industries, commerce, agriculture, water transportation, public utilities, fisheries, municipalities, disaster relief, and tourism, were the beneficiaries of the other long-term, low cost loans. Rather than competing with the few existing financial institutions, the RRFF/RDLC stimulated their activities by using them as agents and offering participation and loan guarantees; they did not engage in the banking business and would extend no loans which could be obtained from conventional sources. It is significant to note, further, that while the U.S. administration set the policies, the officers and staff of the RDLC were Ryukyuan. During the eleven and a half years of its existence, the RDLC had three distinguished presidents: Hiroshi Senago,

Nobuo Takaramura and Teruo Teruya. It is further noteworthy that the Military Government had established the RRFF before the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the counterpart fund would be used, inter alia:

"To promote economic rehabilitation, including the extension of long-term loans to agriculture and private enterprises which will increase domestic production and promote economic self-support."

JCS 1231/14, 4 October 1950.

The only Ryukyuan financial institutions in being on Okinawa at that time, other than the BOR and the RRFF were two uniquely Oriental-type organizations called "Mujins" which later formed the nuclei of Sogo banks. These private, initially family, organizations combined deposit and loan operations with a type of lottery for loan privileges to members.


The Postal Savings System, with its extensive network of offices, had been widely used for "banking," especially in the rural areas. However, it had become trapped in the postwar quagmire of financial "settlements" problems and was moribund.

The private sector of the economy and its revenue dependent, the Government, had then virtually no financial and credit base except the Bank of the Ryukyus and the Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Yet, the financial system would grow with the

establishment of the Bank of Okinawa, the Government's Central Bank for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, some Sogo banks, and insurance companies and other financial institutions. However, this area was endowed with too few natural resources to sustain by itself a firm financial base for the government structure and services it required. It was dependent upon the U.S. base expenditures and assistance.

The principal concern of thoughtful Okinawans at that time was how long this dependence was to continue. Under a relatively benign military government they were making a recovery, a return to political and economic well being. Nevertheless, "the change in the signboard over the Civil Administration" had an uneasy significance to some and they were soon made aware that they were to have no part in the ~~final~~ decision as to their political future. By August 1951, thanks to their "bill of rights" and their degree of self-government they were able to voice their concern to the Japanese and Allied diplomats who were presumably discussing that matter at the San Francisco peace conference.

They did not know that it was already too late. The decision had been made by consensus of all concerned -- except those most intimately affected. At that point in history their islands were too valuable, their spots on the globe too strategic; their preferences must yield to the overriding principle, the preservation of peace in the Pacific. Yet, [some Ryukyuans felt that as Japan had sacrificed them in the defense of the homeland, they were again being sacrificed to serve as a defense outpost for the Western world - (and Japan.)



CHAPTER XI

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AN EVALUATION

sp² Although the transition from U.S. Military Government to U.S. Civil Administration was a natural process of evolution, it marked, nevertheless the end of a classifical form of military occupation. That it does not appear more trenchant is due less to the frequently lamented "military" complexion of the civil administration than to the benign character of the Military Government. However, it was a milestone - the beginning of a new era.

① Normally, an evaluation of the U.S. administration under Military Government might be covered adequately in a final retrospective overview. In the absence of provocation it would be so treated. However, ample grounds exist to occasion separate treatment -- possibly enough to characterize this chapter as an apologia, rather than an evaluation. ②

③ [Some American pundits] have dismissed the Military Government period with few words - none commendatory. Conclusions, sometimes harshly adverse ones have been published, without supporting examination and exposition. A few have been quoted previously, [most merit no special attention -- at least not through this medium.] ④ In fairness, and to the extent the individual facts may warrant, it could be that some publicists had read one sentence which appears in an unclassified official government report of 1949, and paraphrased that statement.

The sentence -- startling when read out of context -- is this, "Okinawa has remained in a particularly deplorable state." The source is a report by a prestigious agricultural mission to the Ryukyus composed of agricultural economists, an agronomist and a nutrition adviser dispatched by the Department of the Army in September 1949 "to study food and agricultural conditions in the Ryukyus." The report

"Agriculture and Economic Reconstruction in the Ryukyus, A Report," Agricultural Mission to the Ryukyus, November 1949. Mimeographed. This is also known as the "Vickery Report" after Raymond E. Vickery, Agriculture Economist, Office of the Under Secretary of the Army, the mission leader.

was a valuable contribution to the Army authorities responsible for development of a definitive reconstruction program for the Ryukyus. The cited statement is strictly within the mission's competence and terms of reference. It relates specifically to the slowness of postwar reconstruction of "the all important agriculture and fishing industries," emphasis on food production and population pressure with special mention of the continued use of arable land by "the military units." These points were well made and substantiated but they do not lead to the validity or acceptability of an overall conclusion that "Okinawa had remained in a deplorable state." Those writers, if any, who based their adverse conclusions on that source may have been guilty of nothing more than a lack of thoroughness.

①

There is one instance, however, which claims special notice. History is indebted to [Professor Robert A. Scalapino] for what must be the most widely-read summary dismissal of this important episode in American foreign affairs ever given official dissemination. In a special report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959, the professor discharged the subject in one sentence. "For many years after 1945, we courted disaster in Okinawa by a policy that was much too heavily laden with neglect, indifference, and military fiat."

[This is all there was to that. Take it or leave it.] ②

Regrettably, Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations took it, and gave it prestige and, presumably credibility by inclusion in a Senate publication titled "United States Foreign Policy," March 15, 1961.

Senate Document No. 24, 87th Congress, 1st Session (p. 500), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Section No. 5, which includes Professor Scalapino's views, some of which have considerable merit, is also known as the "Conlon Report."

As used by Professor Scalapino, the meaning of the phrase ["military fiat"] is unclear and unexplained. [In the context it is suggestive of something sinister, less than cruel perhaps, but also less than benign military rule.] ④

Against that opinion and the charges of "neglect" and "indifference" stand the facts and the words of the chosen leader of the Okinawan people.

The Facts

As Japan's last frontier outpost, Okinawa was devastated by the most destructive land, sea and air attack launched in the Pacific. . .

The capital city, Naha was 90 percent reduced to ruins . . .

Civilian casualties exceeded 100,000 . . .

Most of the civilian survivors were ill or wounded . . .

All were hungry. No food. No homes. No community life . . .

The economy was annihilated. No agriculture. No fishing fleet.

No jobs. No money. No banks.

The survivors were fed; the sick and wounded were cared for . . .

Essential clothing and make-shift shelter were provided. . .

Families were reunited to the maximum extent possible . . .

Community life was restored . . .

Work units and projects were organized. . .

The moribund school system was revived. . .

Seeds for planting and tools for farming obtained -- almost literally, swords became plowshares . . .

Damaged military craft were repaired and converted into fishing boats . . .

Participation in self-government was solicited. . .

Universal suffrage was instituted.

These facts relate to the combat and early post-combat days, many before Okinawa was "officially secured."

The Words

On 23 August 1946, nearly one year after the surrender of the Japanese forces on Okinawa, the Governor or "Chiji" of the Okinawa Civil Administration wrote to the Deputy Commander for Military Government these words:

'History, we Okinawans feel, has rarely known such an uncommon affair as the establishment of a civilian government in an occupied zone as that of Okinawa even before a year has passed since the end of the war and even before the beginning of the peace treaty conference.

These circumstances are due to nothing but tolerance and the geniality of the United States Government and its Naval and Army Military Government here on Okinawa for which I hereby express, on behalf of all the people of Okinawa, our heartfelt appreciation. We the Civilian Government of Okinawa, entreat the United States Government and its representatives for their further showing of deep understanding, pertinent guidance and kind assistance. We swear that we will do out utmost in the interest of the rehabilitation of Okinawa and in the promotion of the public welfare in compliance with the policies of the United States

Military Government.

[Sikiya, Koshin
Chiji, Okinawa Gunto"] (1)

Report of Military Government Activities to Commanding General, Ryukyus Command from Deputy Commander for Military Government, 1 September 1946.

"Heartfelt appreciation" from the representative of the Ryukyuan people, speaking on their behalf, suggests that in the first year of United States administration at least, the Military Government did not pursue "a policy that was much too heavily laden with neglect, indifference, and military fiat."

Nor does the record of subsequent years provide a basis for such a conclusion. The following abbreviated chronology indicates some of the constructive actions which Military Government took, sponsored, or approved during the years of its existence. Particularly important facts are identified by an underlining of the pertinent dates.

Summary Chronology

1945

- 21 July: Hostilities ended on Okinawa. Island declared "officially secured."
- 15 August: Approximately 100 representatives of various districts met at Military Government to discuss establishment of an Okinawa Advisory Council.
- 20 August: Representatives elected fifteen member Advisory Council.
- 28 August: First weekly issue of Uruma Shimpo, predecessor of Ryukyu Shimpo, published by authority of Military Government.
- 7 September: Formal surrender of all Japanese forces in the Ryukyus south of 30 degrees took place near Kadena.
- 20 September: Ryukyus divided into 16 districts, and men and women over 25 years of age given right to vote. Elections for councilmen held.
- 25 September: Elections for 16 districts mayors held on Okinawa.
- 27 September: Meetings of recently elected mayors with Military Government officials held to settle details of standard local government organization in 16 districts.
- 6 December: Directive No. 63 called for preservation and assembly of all land records.

1946

- 8 January: Indigenous Okinawa Police Department organized under Military Government Provost Marshal's direction.
- 29 January: SCAPIN 677 separated Nansei Shoto south of 30 degrees from Japanese control and administration; Ryukyu Islands became a composite entity.
- 25 February Special Proclamation No. 5 established local criminal courts ("Municipal Courts"), effective 1 March 1946.
- 28 February: Lands claims committees for "muras" and ["azas"] directed to be established. (Directive No. 121). ①
- 13 March: Military Government established in Northern Ryukyus. Local administration prior to this date was conducted by prefectural branch office of the Japanese Government.
- 19 March: Military Government established in Southern Ryukyus, previously administered by prefectural branch office of Japanese Government.
- 22 March: Hourly wage rates set for Okinawa labor, but cash payments were not to be made until authorized. (Directive No. 136).
- 8 April: Okinawan Civilian Labor Department established. (USNMG Directive No. 143)

8 April: Okinawa Advisory Council instructed to establish Central Okinawan Administration.

11 April: Koshin Shikiya nominated Chief Executive by Advisory Council members and 86⁸⁶ [shi-cho-son] mayors.

17 April: Okinawan Civilian Departments of Postal and Cultural Affairs established.

22 April: Central Okinawan Administration inaugurated. Functions of Okinawa Advisory Council assumed by the Chief Executive and his department heads. (USNMG Directive No. 156).

24 April: Koshin Shikiya installed as first Chief Executive of the Central Okinawan Administration.

26 April: Okinawa Advisory Council dissolved and Okinawa Assembly established.

1 May: Money payment of wages began in Okinawa Gunto.

12 May: Miyako Democratic Party formed.

22 May: Chief Executive given responsibility for publication of Uruma Shimpō.

23 May: New Okinawa Assembly convened by Chief Executive.

1 June: Koza Hospital opened.

1 June: Central Bank of Okinawa (Okinawa Civilian Administration depository) established.

1 October: System of Municipal Courts established Ryukyu-wide.

1947

- 10 February: Leprosaria officially established by Special Proclamation No. 13.
- 31 March: Procedure for levying taxes in Okinawa Gunto established by Military Government Directive No. 7.
- 1 April: Military Government authorized private management of Uruma Shimpō.
- 9 May: Okinawa Civil Administration instructed to draft laws for election of assemblymen and mayors.
- 26 May: [Foreign postal service inaugurated.]
- 15 June: Okinawa Democracy Union (later renamed Democratic Alliance Party) formed.
- 1 July: Magistrate Courts established by Special Proclamation No. 19.
- 20 July: Okinawa People's Party (OPP) formed.
- 28 July: Chief Executive directed to establish a bus system on Okinawa. Twenty two-and-one-half ton Army trucks authorized.
- 1 August: Use of type B military yen authorized throughout the Ryukyus in addition to legal tender already established by Special Proclamation No. 11. (Special Proclamation No. 21).

6 August: Workmen's Compensation for employees of military installations inaugurated by Special Proclamation No. 18.

10 September: Okinawa Socialist Party formed.

13 October: Ryukyu Socialist Party organized.

20 October: Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP) formed through merger of Okinawa and Ryukyu Socialist parties.

2 December: Special Proclamation No. 25 announced elections for mayors and assemblymen Ryukyu-wide to be held on dates to be established by Military Government.

11 January: ¹⁹⁴⁸Yaeyama Democratic Party organized.

12 January: Fair labor practices and right to organize proclaimed by Military Government.

1 February: Popular elections for shi-cho-son mayors held.

8 February: Local assemblymen elected by popular vote.

11 February: Yaeyama People's Party formed.

24 February: MG Directive No. 15 established passenger and cargo tariff.

7 April: Office of Ryukyuan Property Custodian established by MG Directive No. 19.

4 May: MG Ordinance No. 1 established the Bank of Ryukyus which assumed the assets and liabilities of the Central Bank of Okinawa. MG subscribed 51 percent of capital.

26 June: Special Proclamation No. 30 directed that all Japanese yen and type B military yen be converted for new B yen between 16 and 20 July 1948. New type B yen to be sole legal tender after 21 July 1948.

1 July: First edition of Okinawa Times published.

25 August: Kin Tuberculosis Sanitarium established.

1949

5 March: Kin Neuropsychiatric Hospital opened.

1 October: Assembly for Provisional Government of Okinawa--
a provisional all-Ryukyus body--established by
Military Directive No. 20.

29 October: Travel from Ryukyus Islands to Japan and return
authorized for compassionate reasons (Military
Government Directive No. 23).

1950

1 January: Four gunto governments established by Military
Government Ordinance No. 2.

20 January: Interim Ryukyu Advisory Council established
pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 1.

5 April: Military Government Ordinance No. 5 established
the Okinawa Housing Corporation.

- 10 April: Ryukyu Reconstruction Finance Fund (RRFF) established; first source of long-term, low interest credit in post-war era.
- 14 April: Special Proclamation No. 36 provided for the conclusion of land title investigation by local land committees and the issuance of title certificates; further land claims to be filed no later than 30 June 1950 or be made the subject of court action.
- 22 May: University of Ryukyus established.
- 26 May: American-Ryukyuan Friendship Day observed for first time on 97th anniversary of Commodore Perry's landing at Naha in 1853.
- 30 June: Special Proclamation No. 37 authorized elections of governors and assemblymen in four guntos.
- 1 August: Revised civilian court system, consisting of magistrate and circuit courts, and Court of Appeals established.
- 17 September: Elections of gunto governors held in Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama.
- 24 September: Elections of gunto assemblymen held in same guntos.
- 20 October: Resumption of foreign trade authorized.
(Military Government Ordinance No. 26).

- 22 October: Gubernatorial election held in Amami Gunto.
- 28 October: Okinawa Republican Party formed by merger of Okinawa Democracy Union (Democratic Alliance Party) and Socialist Party.
- 29 October: Amami Gunto assembly election held.
- 31 October: Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP) organized.
- 4 November: Okinawa Gunto Government established; Tatsuo Taira assumed office as Okinawa Governor (chiji).
- 13 November: Gunto assemblies established.
- 15 December: U.S. Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands succeeded by U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Office of the Deputy Governor.

Source: Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945 - 30 June 1970. Mimeographed. Prepared by the Research and Evaluation Division, Public Affairs Department, USCAR.

This bare-bones chronicle of political, social, economic, and financial developments during the Military Government period of United States administration represents innumerable man hours of consideration, consultation, and, frequently, execution by the Military Government staff. While there was, indeed, a generous layering of "military fiat," "neglect" and "indifference" are not discernable ingredients to one who has any appreciation of the horrendous problems faced in attempting to re-establish simple home and community life in that afflicted area.

① [Let there be no misunderstanding; delays and mistakes in policy formulation and its execution were made.] Some have been mentioned; the reasons for some, such as the seemingly inordinate delay in determining the future status of the Ryukyus have been examined. There were others, and these will be accorded an appropriate autopsy. [But let not the officially published characterization of "neglect" and "indifference" stand as a valid appraisal of American policy during those years of military government.] ②

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Part II
A Decade of Dynamics

CHAPTER XII

A DECISIVE START

The year 1950 was a portentous one for the Ryukyus. Major events occurred at home and abroad which were to affect profoundly the Island's political, economic, and social future.

It has been noted that in 1950 the United States inaugurated a mammoth integrated construction program to provide drastically needed common-use facilities to meet both civilian and military needs. The GARIOA appropriation for [Fiscal Year 1950 (1 April 1949-31 March 1950)] reached an all-time peak of \$50 million, a portion of which was applied to projects such as the improvement of Naha Harbor, rehabilitation of the Naha City water treatment facilities, construction of a steam powered electric generating plant and island-wide transmission system, and warehouses, including a refrigerated storage plant for the fisheries industry. Military construction appropriations were programmed to finance complementary public works such as highways, harbor works, and the like.

In 1950, Gunto Governors and assemblymen were elected. An interim Ryukyus Advisory Council concerned with Ryukyu-wide affairs was established. Finally, Washington issued a directive of far-reaching effect, giving official expression to many concepts for Ryukyuan development which had been forming, and which were receiving tentative testing by Military Government. The same directive recognized a new stage in the evolution of US-Ryukyuan relationships by establishing a

Civil Administration to carry forward the advances made by the Military Government.

External events of major significance to the Ryukyus which occurred that year included the invasion of South Korea, and -- in spite of that disturbing development and, perhaps, partially because of it -- the United States moved positively toward [accomplishing] a treaty of peace with Japan. (1)

Both of these political developments were of major importance to the Ryukyus. The Korean War was to test and demonstrate the strategic value of Okinawa, [because from that stationary "flight deck" bomber missions would take off nightly for North Korean targets and, generally, return intact at dawn.] The forming of an American position on the elements of a peace treaty included the need to retain that valuable base under United States strategic control for the indefinite future. (2)

(3) [As has been seen,] this latter development had been a troublesome problem with which, and about which, the Pentagon and the State Department had wrestled for some time. Dean Acheson, recounting the difficulties which he, as Secretary of State, had encountered in moving toward a peace treaty, wrote:

"In planning content and method, four groups had to be reckoned with: the Communists, the Pentagon, our allies, and the former enemy. Of these, the Communists gave the least trouble. Their opposition to any tenable ideas was predictable and irreconcilable. It could only be ignored. The most stubborn and protracted opposition

to a peace treaty came from the Pentagon. Until a way was found around that, we were inhibited from discussion with both our allies and our late enemy, the Japanese Government. It took until September 1950 to find the detour."

Dean Acheson, "Present at the Creation," (p. 428), W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1969.

At the close of 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reaffirmed their view that "negotiations now, leading toward a peace treaty with Japan are still premature." Their reasons were essentially these:

a. The United States required, inter alia, "exclusive long-term strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north . . ." and,

b. The "minimum military requirements and the requirement that the USSR be a party signator to the document are probably mutually exclusive." Ergo, treaty negotiations would be "premature."

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 22 December 1949. Defense Secretary Johnson forwarded a copy to the Secretary of State and expressed his concurrence in the JCS opinion, 23 December 1949.

①
On Christmas eve 1949, Secretary Acheson handed the British Ambassador a note for Foreign Secretary Bevin, in which he stated that "the basic problem underlying a treaty is security; that is, to avoid any peace settlement which would weaken the United States security position in the western Pacific and therefore the security of all like-minded powers in that area. The treaty must be so framed to provide security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against Soviet-Communist aggression." He pointed out the dilemma confronting the United States in making internationally acceptable arrangements to retain US bases and forces in Japan, including the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.

The Secretary recalled that "The United States and British Governments, as well as others, attempted in 1947 to bring about a peace conference and failed." He concluded "within the United States Government we intend to continue to work intensively at formulating a definite United States Government position," and assured his opposite number that he would keep in the closest possible touch with the British Government in the matter.

Informal memorandum for Mr. Bevin handed by Secretary Acheson to the British Ambassador, 24 December 1949.

Secretary Acheson publicly announced United States policy and intentions on 12 January 1950, in reply to a question before the National Press Club as to U.S. policy in regard to military security of the Pacific area. He stated:

"In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security . . . I can assure you that there is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained.

"This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and these we shall continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific and they must and will be held.

*contract w/ State
made in 1946
IX-10/11*

(1)

State Department Bulletin XXII, No. 551 (January 23, 1950).

Secretary Acheson did not pretend to know when "an appropriate time" might come about for the United States to offer to hold the Ryukyu Islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. He knew, however, that nothing less than a strategic trusteeship would be

accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as adequate to satisfy American security requirements.

Little more than one week after Secretary Acheson's public policy statement before the Press Club the Joint Chiefs reiterated the necessity of preserving strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands. Their reasons included the deterioration of stability in specific areas in the Pacific, the increased control of China by the Communists, and, finally, "increased tension between the United States and the USSR, coupled with evidence of increased Russian military capabilities."

JCS 1380/87, 20 April 1950, Enclosure A (S).

On 6 April 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed as Foreign Policy Advisor to the Secretary of State, and, on 18 May, was assigned to handle the treaty. By mid-June he was prepared to discuss the subject thoroughly with MacArthur.

Dulles' visit to Japan, 14-29 June, was propitious. He found that his views and those of the Supreme Commander regarding the urgency and basic principles of a treaty were in harmony. Additionally, his visit coincided with a mission to Japan of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley. This afforded Dulles the opportunity to discuss with these Pentagon principals his fundamental concepts of a peace treaty, and to profit by the support of MacArthur on most points at issue. (Neither Johnson nor Bradley was unaware, of course, that as long ago as 1945

had told a Tokyo press conference that there should be a peace treaty "as soon as possible.").

During this visit Dulles met with many Japanese and gained an insight into their attitudes toward various facets of a peace settlement. While Mr. Dulles was in Tokyo, 25 June 1950, Communist North Korean forces invaded South Korea. He returned to Washington and, as a keen analyst expressed it, "stepped up his timetable for the negotiations of the treaty."

"Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan," Frederick S. Dunn; Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963. This work contains an illuminating account of the progress of treaty negotiations some of which are of direct import to the Ryukyu.

Dulles pursued his goal persistently in Washington, at the United Nations, and in overseas capitals. It was undeniably due in large measure to his efforts that by 7 September 1950, the Secretaries of State and Defense signed a memorandum for the President recommending that the United States "should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty."

The memorandum specified certain security requirements which should be regarded as vital. One of these was negotiation of a separate bilateral United States-Japan security agreement, to come into effect simultaneously with the coming into effect of the treaty. The Secretaries further agreed, with regard to the peace treaty, that:

"Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north . . ."

They recommended that the President give his approval and that the Secretary of State immediately take the necessary steps to carry out the recommendations.

Memorandum for The President, September 7, 1950, signed by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense.

The President approved the memorandum on 8 September 1950 and directed the Secretary of State immediately to take steps to implement it. This is the "detour" around the Pentagon opposition to a

NSC 60/1, September 8, 1950 (TS).

peace treaty which Dean Acheson memorialized in his informative book, cited earlier in this chapter.

Shortly thereafter on 14 September 1950, the President informed a press conference that the State Department was authorized to initiate further discussions with member nations of the Far Eastern Commission regarding a treaty of peace with Japan. The State

New York Times, September 15, 1950.

Department acted promptly to inform the Far Eastern Commission members

of the views on the substantive content of a treaty. Among the seven points covered, one was of particular pertinence. It specified that Japan would "agree to United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands."

While various nations took exception to certain elements, the USSR was the only one which expressed general opposition, presented in the form of leading questions. In regard to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the Kremlin preceded the question with the statement that at neither Cairo nor Potsdam had there been any allusion to depriving Japan of sovereignty over these areas. The question then was, 'on what basis was it proposed that these island groups be placed under United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as administrator?' In the same aide-memoire the Kremlin both endeavored to solidify its own acquisition of Sakhalin and the Kuriles and to suggest that a trusteeship would be merely a cloak for usurpation of sovereignty over the Ryukyus and the Bonins.

Department of State Bulletin, XXIII, No. 596, December 4, 1950.

The State Department reply, published on 28 December 1950, countered in pertinent part that the United States had always held that the territorial agreements made at Yalta were subject to confirmation in a peace treaty to be concluded in consultation with nations that had taken part in the war against Japan. Moreover, it was entirely within the powers of the victors to place the Ryukyus and

Bonins under a United Nations trusteeship. The United States did not understand the Soviet concept that the nation chosen to administer a U.N. trust would be guilty of "territorial expansion." The reply

Department of State Press Release No. 1267, December 28, 1950.

was intended not so much to change the views of the Kremlin leaders, as to counter the propaganda ploy which their aide memoire represented.

The British Commonwealth governments, with initial reservations by India, had no difficulty with the concept of United States retention of strategic control in the Ryukyus and Bonins. Neither did the Philippine and the Chinese Nationalist governments.

Nevertheless, on 13 December 1950, Secretary Acheson sent to Secretary of Defense Marshall a memorandum outlining policies to be pursued in negotiating a peace treaty as directed. The memorandum included four "departures or additions, upon which it is desired to receive the opinion of the Department of Defense." The memorandum proposed, inter alia, that "the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands would be returned to Japan provided that the provisions of any military security agreement apply to these territories in the same manner as to Japan proper."

Parenthetically, Secretary Acheson's letter also invited Defense views on a contemplated recommendation to the President that John Foster Dulles be appointed to head a Presidential Mission to Japan to begin peace treaty discussions. Defense recommendations on the mission was proposed.

Letter from Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense with inclosures, December 13, 1950 (S).

The Joint Chiefs elicited MacArthur's opinion on the State Department memorandum submitted by Secretary Acheson. His reply admits of no doubt as to the Supreme Commander's convictions about the Ryukyus:

"Leaving the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty is highly objectionable from a military point of view. The Japanese are fully resigned to the loss of these areas as a penalty for waging war. They form a vital segment of our lateral defense line and our control thereof is formally established and universally recognized. It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration. It would be but to transform strength to weakness without the slightest moral or legal reason for so doing."

CINFE Msg C52202, signed MacArthur, to Department of Army for JCS, 28 December 1950 (S).

The Department of State was informed of the Defense establishment views in line with the JCS position. In this respect, therefore, the United States Government, at the close of 1950, moved toward a peace treaty (and security agreement) with Japan on the unequivocal basis of the Presidentially approved State-Defense memorandum of 7 September 1970:

"Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north . . ."

Chapter XIII

ARTFUL ARTICLE THREE

The then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson reflecting considerable satisfaction with the agreement which he and Defense Secretary Johnson signed on September 7, 1950, noted that, "Exactly one year later, on September 8, 1951, the peace and defense treaties with Japan were signed in San Francisco. . . . [What made this possible was the replacement of Secretary Johnson by General Marshall] and the President's unwavering support of Mr. Dulles and myself throughout the negotiations. But in September 1950 it was no small achievement to reach without casualties or bitterness a government decision that a peace treaty was no longer "pre-mature".()

() Dean Acheson, op. cit., p. 434.

On January 1951, President Truman established a Japanese Peace Mission under the leadership of John Foster Dulles, and authorized discussions with the Japanese Government of the basic concepts of a treaty. Among other things, the Japanese expressed the "desire that the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands should continue to be treated as Japanese subjects and economic and other relations be maintained as before".() However,

() YOSHIDA, SHIIEGURA, "The YOSHIDA Memoirs", Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass., 1962, p. 253.

in accordance with his terms of reference, Dulles declined to discuss with the Japanese any status for the Ryukyus other than a United States trusteeship. At the same time, Mr. Dulles began to have "some doubts as to whether a trusteeship could be obtained from the United Nations which would give to the United States the military rights which it desires. A strategic trusteeship would be vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council and, although an ordinary trusteeship requires action only by the General Assembly, Mr. Dulles ^{was} ~~is~~ not sure that the necessary two-thirds vote ^{could} ~~can~~ be secured for a trusteeship granting special military rights to the United States.

"A study of this matter is being made in the Department of State at the present time. In the event that it appears improbable that the necessary rights can be secured, Mr. Dulles may recommend to the Department of Defense that these rights be obtained from Japan or through some other method than through the United Nations." ()

() "Memorandum For: Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson, Defense Department Representative on the Dulles Mission", from Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, Dulles Mission Staff Member, 7 March 1951.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Mr. Dulles and his staff produced a draft of proposed treaty which was flexible as to the trusteeship concept for the Ryukyus, yet considered by the Dulles Mission to be specific enough to ensure United States strategic control over the area pending the establishment of a trusteeship. While the reaction of some military officials

was to the effect that United States control over the Ryukyus should be expressed in terms "as unmisakable as those which propose that Japan will 'hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands'", the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the Dulles formula as minimally satisfactory. () With the

() JCS2180/11, 9 April 1951, Encl A, and "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, from Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, JCS, 13 April 1951.

principle agreed, inter-departmental word-smithing resulted in the mutually accepted language eventually adopted at San Francisco as Article 3 of the Peace Treaty.

① The road to San Francisco was a long one for Ambassador Dulles and John Allison, his deputy, and the other members of the mission. Either because of a desire to ensure that Japan would be treated with consideration and so be won as a friend, or to obviate a foreseeable time-consuming clash with the Soviet Union, the United States adopted an unconventional technique to develop a multilateral treaty. Rather than follow the accustomed conference method, it was decided to negotiate on a bilateral basis through established diplomatic channels (). Dulles, not yet

() Acheson, op. cit., p. 434; Dunn, op. cit., 172-174.

Secretary of State, set a minor precedent for the "shuttle diplomacy" made famous by Secretary Kissinger in the 1970's. Dulles and Allison logged hundreds of thousands of air miles visiting concerned capitals to

prepare the way for a generally unified position by the non-Communist nations. Dulles termed this undertaking an "eleven months peace conference. With assurance of British co-sponsorship of a peace conference, Dulles, the "architect" of the treaty, had designed a firm foundation to build upon when the concerned powers came together on a memorable day in San Francisco.

Delegations from fifty-two nations, including Japan, met at the "Gateway to the Pacific" for the opening ceremony on 4 September 1951. The setting was the Opera House, where six years earlier, the United Nations organization ^{had been} was born. President Truman in greeting the attendees, traced the development of the proposed treaty through "a year of cooperative effort and concluded that the conference would "show. . . who seeks to make peace, and who seeks to prevent it; who wishes to put an end to war, and who wishes to continue it."

At the First Plenary Session, on the following day, Secretary Acheson explained that the signing of the treaty was preceded by a conference to accommodate those Allied Powers which desired to make formal statements regarding the treaty or their aspirations for peace which the treaty is designed to realize. The obvious intent was to preclude debate but, as the minutes reflect, the Communist delegates managed to inject some disputation into the first formal session.

The record of the proceedings, with the bloc cleavage being progressive more unabashadely revealed, is fascinating. However, the focus here is on Article 3, which pertain^{ed} most importantly to the disposition of the Ryukyus and provided:

"Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands). . . Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters".

At the Second Plenary Session, 5 September 1951, following a morning session marked by Soviet efforts to forestall substantive discussions, Mr. Dulles made a lucid presentation of the specific provisions of the treaty and the reasons why they took the form in which they were presented. The lucidity ^{that} ~~which~~ generally characterized the address ~~x~~ went into considerable eclipse, unfortunately, when he undertook to explain the import of Article 3. Mr. Dulles spoke as follows:

"Article 3 deals with the Ryukyus and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan. These, since the surrender, have been under the sole administration of the United States.

"Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over these islands in favor of United States sovereignty. Others suggested that these islands should be restored completely to Japan.

① "In the face of this division of Allied opinion, the United States felt that ~~the~~ best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority.

Caroline
You will recall that the Charter of the United Nations contemplates extension of the trusteeship system to 'territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War' (article 77). The future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out article 84 of the Charter, which provides that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace security." ()

() "Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan", San Francisco, California, September 4-8, 1951 (Department of State Publication 4392), p. 78.

In the event the obfuscation has not been discerned, it is suggested that the words "to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty" be marked for special consideration. Better, perhaps, just remember the words
① ["residual sovereignty"] because that phrase became for the Army, as the administering authority, an elusive quasi-policy to reckon with, for concerned members of the Congress an enigma of sorts, and for most proponents of reversion a shibboleth. The phrase did not appear in the treaty and, yet, having been used in the context of the Peace Conference by the spokesman of the United States delegation, it acquired in time the character of a commitment as though a part of the treaty itself.

The phrase "residual sovereignty" was novel; until then it had no place in international usage. Yet not one of the parties to the Conference questioned its meaning. Probably, if it had been questioned, Mr. Dulles would have reiterated his previous statement that "the future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan". In other words, he might have said that the degree of sovereign authority which Japan would exercise in the Ryukyus will be determined at a future date in a formal trusteeship agreement. As of the moment it was a useful and specious, but not an unambiguous, phrase.

The next speaker was Kenneth C. Younger, a Delegate from the United Kingdom, co-sponsor of the treaty. In pertinent part, he told the assemblage:

① You will not expect me now to dwell in detail on all the territorial provisions of the treaty. They are based on the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be confined to the four main islands and such other islands as the powers which signed that Declaration might subsequently determine. As regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the treaty does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude; that is to say that those islands nearest to Japan itself are to remain not only under Japanese sovereignty, but under Japanese administration as well. This is in marked contrast with the provision for the complete renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, the other principal group which approaches close to the main islands of Japan, and which is now occupied by the Soviet Union. We have agreed to the renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, but we think that this comparison should be borne in mind by those who criticize the provisions relating to the more southerly of the Ryukyus, and the Bonin Islands,"()

() Ib., pp. 93, 94.

The remarks of the United Kingdom spokesman shed no light on the meaning of the term "residual sovereignty", or the further status of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus in relation to Japan. They were rather a thinly veiled admonition directed at the Soviet bloc not to challenge the notion of residual sovereignty.

The Delegate of the U.S.S.R., however, taking the floor shortly thereafter, declared that "the American-British draft provides for the exclusion of the Islands of Ryukyu, Bonin. . . from the sovereignty of Japan and their transfer under the administration of the [United States Nations." Since, he argued, the severance of those islands from Japan.

②

①
true or not

[was not provided for by previous Allied agreements,] nor approved by the U. N. Security Council, the American-British draft was arbitrary and illegal. To remedy this, he attempted to amend the treaty to provide specially that these islands continue under the sovereignty of Japan, and-contrariwise- that, "Japan recognizes full sovereignty" of the USSR over ~~SAKHALIN~~ and the ~~KURILES~~. ()

() Ib., pp. 113 and 119.

While the Russian reaction was both antagonistic and self-serving, that of the non-attending Government of India on this point might be measured on another scale. It was expressed in a statement of its position communicated in writing to Mr. Dulles, declining the invitation to participate in the Peace Conference. The pertinent exchange of notes between the Indian and U.S. Governments was circulated at the Conference following Gromyko's lengthy statement.

An Indian Prophecy

The Indian Government's reservations regarding the treaty provisions for the Ryukyus may seem today to contain an element of mystic foresight: ". . .the Treaty proposes that until United States Government seek and obtain trusteeship over these Islands they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the Government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people and

must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East. On the other hand, the Indian Government favored transfer of full sovereignty over the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.

The United States, on its part, found "it difficult to understand" how India could be confident that future arrangements regarding the Ryukyus, "the terms of which are not yet formulated", would be a source of dissatisfaction to many of the Japanese people. Nor could it understand why India applied different tests as between the Kuriles and the Ryukyus. ()

() *Ib.*, p. 267.

An "Imposed Pax Americana"?

The Seventh Plenary Session on the afternoon of 7 September was neither enlightened nor dignified by the "statement" of the Delegate of Poland, who charged, in the course of an anticipated diatribe, that, "the United States is trying to impose a Pax Americana in the Far East." ()

() *Ib.*, p. 267.

In effect, the Polish delegate seconded the abortive Russian attempt to amend certain treaty provisions, including Article 3.

That night, the head of the non-voting Japanese Delegation, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs ~~SHIGERU YOSHIDA~~ made a tactful, dignified statement. He was the only speaker in the entire session to

① of course

[repeat verbatim Mr. Dulles' phrase "residual sovereignty".] Speaking of the treaty provision regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin islands, he said, "with diffidence. . . I welcome in the name of the Japanese nation the statements by the American and British Delegates on the residual sovereignty of Japan over the islands south of the 29th degree, north latitude. I cannot but hope that the administration of these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the reestablishment of world security- especially the security of Asia." ()

() Ib., p. 277.


Without any further direct reference to the Ryukyus the session adjourned. On the following day, 8 September 1951, the Treaty of Peace was signed by all the attending delegations, excepting the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and including, of course, the Government of Japan. ()

() Ib., p. 278, ss.

When the Japanese delegation had concluded the signing, Secretary Acheson closed the conference with an appropriately brief address. Thereupon, the Secretary tells us, "Senator Alexander Wiley jumped to his feet shouting, "Everybody up!" and led a tumultuous ovation. . . . With the peace treaty signed, our delegation for the Japanese security treaty gave a luncheon for the Japanese and went on in the afternoon to sign it." ()

([Dean Acheson, op. cit., p. 549.

So, while the Cold War was spilling warm blood in not too distant Korea, it forced the Ryukyus, because they were of singular strategic importance, into a political situation unprecedented in the annals of international relationships, virtually a land without a country.



Chapter XIV

ELEMENTALS AND INCIDENTALS

It was a successful Conference. So thought most of the members of the fifty-one visiting delegations as they departed the St. Francis, the Fairmont, Mark Hopkins, Sir Francis Drake and lesser San Francisco hostelryes for their respective homelands to report to their various heads of State, parliaments, congresses, assemblies, and, not least, the Diet. This was the sentiment of Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Senators Tom Connally ^{DT} and Alexander Wiley, the U.S. Delegates, and their six Senate colleagues who served as Alternate Delegates, as well as the thirty Advisers and nine Congressional Observers. No less satisfied and relieved were the technical and administrative officials and staff members. Events of the Conference had unfolded in surprising conformity to the meticulously prepared scenario credited to Dulles and finely orchestrated by the Department of State.

Various events were to occur before the Senate ratification of the Treaty on 28 April 1952. Some were implicit in the script, some unforeseen, a few important, others relatively insignificant. [The first of these, while of itself deserving little more than a footnote, demands examination because of the way it is recorded in at least one official document.]

Revision, Not Reversion

A chronology of U.S. administration of the Ryukyus prepared and mimeographed by USCAR, but given limited circulation, contains the following

entry:

"24 Nov 51 [sic] TOKARA RETTO (Jitto-son) north of 29 degrees reverted to Japan." ()

() "Selected Chronology of the U.S. Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 26 March 1945-30 June 1970", Research and Evaluation Division, Public Affairs Department, USCAR.

Standing alone in the chronology, without explanation or elaboration, this entry could cause some wonderment, particularly because of the ponderous significance which the term "reversion" assumed. Did the United States Government not know~~x~~ what areas of Japan it wanted, or needed, to discharge its security responsibilities in the Pacific? Was this the beginning of a piecemeal program of territorial return? What, in the delicately balanced jurisdictional situation, was its real significance?

① [Its significance was negligible but the requirement for it was self-evident.] It signified nothing more than the revision of some paperwork ~~which~~^{that} had been accomplished by SCAP in 1945, and which was long since

② [acknowledged] to be inoperative. The sequence of events which brought it about was as follows:

The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP for the Occupation Control of Japan provided that the area over which SCAP would exercise control and authority would include the four main islands of Japan and about 1,000 smaller adjacent islands. ()

() Enclosure to JCS 1380/15.

On 29 January 1946, MacArthur issued a "SCAPIN" or instruction to the Japanese Government enjoining it from exercising its delegated administrative authority in those islands south of 30 degrees, except for KUCHINOSHIMA. The area below that line was under exclusive control of the United States Military Government, Ryukyus. ()

() SCAPIN 677, 29 Jan 46.

On 6 May 1949, the National Security Council, in defining U.S. policy toward Japan, stated that the United States intended to retain on a long term basis such facilities in the Ryukyus south of 29 degrees north latitude as the Joint Chiefs of Staff deemed necessary. The JCS, in due course, informed SCAP of this decision. ()

() JCS 1231/14, 4 October.

At that time, however, MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that with his SCAPIN outstanding, a change of control of the islands situation between 29 and 30 degrees north latitude "would require new directives to the Japanese Government and would result in [considerable publicity with political embarrassment to the existing government.]" (2) Nothing that these islands had no strategic importance, MacArthur suggested that public revision of the boundary be left to the time of the peace

treaty.() So the matter was deferred until after the treaty was signed,

() CINCFE to DEPTAR Msg C50092, 30 Nov 50.

On 26 November 1951, with State Department concurrence, the JCS established the southern boundary of Japan - and the northern boundary of the US-controlled Ryukyus at 29 degrees north latitude.() To keep the record

() JCS 1231/19, 26 Nov 51.

straight, CINCFE informed the Deputy Governor in Okinawa of the change in the northern boundary of the Ryukyus, 28 November 1951.()

() CINCFE Msg CX58148, 28 Nov 51 to CG RYCOM.

Thus,"ten very small, sparsely populated islands, which have no military value" came to be recorded as having "reverted to Japan."

A Somewhat Pregnant Staff Study

Although the "reversion" of TOKARA RETTO was incidental, another event accrued during the same period which had considerable significance. In October 1951, General Matthew Ridgway, MacArthur's successor as CINCFE, sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for approval, an unsolicited staff study which resulted in a thorough JCS reassessment and a new attitude on the part of the Army, the administering agency, as to the political future of the Ryukyus Islands.

The top secret staff study undertook, "to analyze the soundness, from a long range viewpoint and in the light of the developing situation in the Far East, of the currently approved U.S. objectives (J.C.S. 1380/62) with respect to the Ryukyus Islands, viz:

"a. To retain on a long-term basis the facilities on Okinawa and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° N latitude, MARCUS Island and the NANPO SHOTO south of SOFUGAN,

b. To obtain international sanction for U.S. long-term control of the above listed islands, and

c. To formulate a program for the economic and social well-being of the natives."

The conclusions which CINCPAC recommended for the Joint Chiefs' approval "as a basis for implementing action at an appropriate later date" were these with underlining supplied:

how ① "The security of the strategically vital U.S. position along the off-shore island chain in the Western Pacific is in no way dependent upon the perpetuation of U.S. political control, by virtue of a U.N. trusteeship or other device, over the Ryukyu Islands. Having done so in the Peace Treaty with Japan and also in the Mutual Assistance and Bases Agreements with the Republic of the Philippines, there is no reason to suppose that an adequate agreement between the U.S. and Japan could not be arrived at to retain under U.S. long-term control such facilities in the Ryukyu Islands as are deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The effectuation of permanent U.S. political control-or political responsibility, to use a more expressive term - over the Ryukyu Islands will serve not only to burden the U.S. with an economic liability for the indefinite future, but will stand as a denial of the principle of self-determination, to which the U.S. has traditionally subscribed, and might at a later date develop into an irritant to the Japanese of such proportions as to contribute to

a break-down in U.S.-Japanese mutual confidence and friendship,

"In direct contrast to the foregoing, a U.S. sponsored movement for the return of control over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan would constitute an additional step toward cementing of the already interlocked U.S.-Japanese security objectives in the Far East; however, initiatory action by the U.S. to this end should be deferred until the Treaty has been ratified and must be absolutely conditional upon a firm agreement with Japan to retain under our exclusive control such military facilities in the subject islands as are deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."()

() Letter AG 014.1 (17 Oct 51) GC-P, from CINCFE, thru Department of the Army, to Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: "Staff Study on United States Long-Term Objectives with Respect to the Ryukyu Islands," 17 October 1951.

①
As military staff studies are usually constructed, the array of "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and a section [euphemistically] labelled "Discussion" form the bridge leading from the problem to the conclusions; they carry the weight. The bridge of the CINCFE study was well founded, well constructed. While too lengthy to be repeated here the conclusions, cited above, suggest the reasons why Ridgway considered that his proposal should be adopted as United States policy. CINCFE had an exceptionally able staff, an outstanding [Political Adviser,] and, very importantly, the respect of his uniformed colleagues as a distinguished soldier. Although Ridgway, unlike his predecessor, was not characterized as a "statesman", he was wise enough to assume that, if the Joint Chiefs agreed, the State Department would be highly unlikely to raise "overriding political considerations" contrary

who ②

① to his recommendations. Yet he was fully aware that some frowns and grimaces would appear on friendly faces when that staff study reached Washington. Reportedly, he said as much, when he told his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant ^{General} Doyle O. Hickey to sign and dispatch the document to the Pentagon.

As was the custom with matters of this nature and importance, the Joint Chiefs referred the CINCFE study to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) for comment and recommendations. () That the problem

() J.C.S. 1380/129, 5 December 1951.

presented was not taken lightly is suggested by the date of the response ¹ six weeks later ¹ in which the JSSC reported a number of specific conclusions, ^M with supporting data and considerations. () As briefed for the Chief of

() J.C.S. 1380/135, 14 January 1952.

OR Staff by the Army "planners" [(G-3, Plans Division), some of the JSSC conclusions were contrary to views of CINCFE:

"a. Political control of subject islands is fundamental to the strategic control which U.S. security interests require.

b. The economic burden of administering these islands is trivial in view of their importance to U.S. security and the cost in blood and treasure of their conquest and possible reconquest.

c. No sound justification exists for deviation from past policy, which requires retention of control (presumably meaning political) over the

subject islands until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East."

cont
by SSC ①

The Army G-3 then presented a proposed memorandum to the Joint Chiefs expressing accord, generally, with the CINCFE conclusions reached but characterizing certain of them as establishing "a somewhat extreme view"; some should be modified for reasons stated. General Hull, the Acting Chief of Staff signed and sent the papers forward. [Its essential thrust was that political control of the Ryukyus is not fundamental to strategic control,] as is evidenced by our strategic position in both Japan and the Philippines. Moreover, the Army memo stated, because Japan occupies a preeminent position in U.S. strategic considerations, not only with respect to the Ryukyus but the Far East as a whole, the U.S. might someday secure more important advantages from Japan by eschewing now an inflexible policy regarding political control of the Ryukyus. Finally, the Army proposed, the JCS should limit its response to CINCFE to state its position not in terms of "the foreseeable future" but rather, "the immediate post-treaty position". ()

() Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to JCS, 21 Jan 52, J.C.S. 1380/135.

The J.C.S. conclusion which emerged from "the tank", that highly restricted area of the Pentagon where the Service Chiefs and their representatives debated and resolved-or adopted a "split position" - their differences, [gave the Army and CINCFE little discernable ground.] (2)

The decision ^{that} ~~when~~ the Army Chief of Staff, as executive agent for the JCS, was to communicate to CINCFE was that his staff study "had been noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who believe that action with respect to his recommendations should not be undertaken now or in the foreseeable future". It also authorized the Army Chief of Staff to inform CINCFE of the conclusions which the Joint Chiefs had reached in making the decision. The most important of these were that strategic control of the Ryukyus ^{was} ~~is~~ vital to the security interests of the United States; its necessity ^{was} ~~is~~ greater ~~was~~ than ever before; therefore, the Joint Chiefs would not concur in action to return these islands to Japan; there has been no deviation and no sound justification for deviation from the policy of U.S. retention of control of these islands since first recommended by the JCS during World War II; and, current policy is sound, and no change "should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East." ()

() J.C.S. 1380/135, 22 January 1952.

What then did all the expenditure of effort and time consumed in studying, drafting and discussing this proposal, first in Tokyo, then in Washington, by the highest military officials and their concerned staffs accomplish? [Apparently, not much.] Actually, however, the [gains] were considerable, if viewed in the long range.

First of all, the fact that the unorthodox position was actually proposed, particularly by the respected armed forces commander most directly

concerned, compelled the responsible military leaders to reevaluate the accepted politico-military concept as to the future of the Ryukyus. (This was particularly timely because^X the State Department solicited their views on the identical subject a short time later. Sufficiently later it should be added, as to allay any suspicions of a [post hoc, ergo propter hoc] relationship.)

Secondly, [as has been seen,^② ^③it] moved the Army Staff from a static posture to a cautiously active one in terms of the nature and extent of control deemed essential in the Ryukyus. Next, the Joint Chiefs were presented an explicit option to accept or reject the principle that "political control of these islands is fundamental to the strategic control which our security interests require." On the record they neither accepted nor repudiated this principle, but they rejected its inclusion in their decision.

Finally, the Joint Chiefs set two precedents pertaining to this subject: they acknowledge^d in a negative way, that United States policy in regard to the Ryukyus could change; and, more importantly, provided a formula¹—however general¹—for such possible change. In the light of the facts¹ ~~cited above~~¹, one might infer that their last conclusion represents reasonable progress toward a less monolithic position on Okinawa's future:

" . . . No change in United States policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East."

that Ridgway's Staff Study and the Pentagon reaction constituted more than an incident. In some respects it was a prototype. Many times in the years which followed the administration would be involved with the problem, in one form or another, which CINCPAC raised, i.e., return of the Ryukyus to Japanese political control. Sometimes, the conclusion would be publicly expressed in a formula strikingly similar to that to which the Joint Chiefs subscribed in 1952, yet progressively less preclusive in substance.

For Advice and Consent

The State Department was responsible for presenting to the Senate for ratification the four treaties signed in connection with the San Francisco Conference, namely, the Japanese Peace Treaty, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and the Tripartite Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. John Foster Dulles was again the prime mover and was authorized by the President to call upon other Executive Departments and agencies for any needed assistance.

In communicating States' views and plans on the procedural and timing aspects of certain questions afflicting our future relations with Japan, special considerations were advanced concerning the Ryukyu Islands.

"Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty", State wrote, in part, "envisages further United States action with respect to permanent arrangements for the Ryukyus and other islands named therein. The Department of State believes that it would be a mistake to move so promptly on this matter as to inject the Ryukyus into debates on ratification of the Japanese Peace Treaty either in the United States or in other countries." ()

() Letter from Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, October 29, 1951.

The hearings on the Japanese Peace Treaty and other treaties relating to Security in the Pacific were held before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 21-25, 1952. The reception accorded the representatives of the Executive Branch reflected the care with which Dulles had prepared the committee members for these hearings. Not only were key members of the committee among the Delegates and Alternate Delegates to the San Francisco Conference, but the committee had been kept informed of pertinent developments both before and after the signing of the Treaty. As Dulles stated in his opening remarks before the Senators, ". Mr. Chairman . . . your committee is very familiar with these treaties. . Indeed, it can properly be said that you have helped write these treaties."

As might be assumed then, there was no in depth discussion of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. Dulles reaffirmed that the Government had not determined whether it would even seek a U.N. trusteeship over the Ryukyus, nor even what rights it would elect to exercise pending application for a trusteeship.

General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked whether the provisions of the treaty in regard to Okinawa accorded with the wishes of the Defense Department; whether national security required that these islands be placed under trusteeship; or whether the necessary bases could not be acquired without at the same time "taking those islands and their populations under trusteeship". He replied, "we believe, from the security viewpoint, that this arrangement is better than any other. It would be very difficult for us to come before you and ask for funds to build security installations of Okinawa and other islands unless we had a

clear-cut right to be there and to stay there for some time. I understand from the question that the idea is we might make some arrangement with Japan for fortifications there, wven though the islands might be returned to Japan. We do not believe that would be as good an arrangement as this one." The preferable-not the only possible arrangement.

A more interesting concept was advanced when Bradley was asked whether the security of the United States would suffer if the resolution of ratification were to include a limitation on the term of U.S. trusteeship and provide for an eventual plebiscite by the Okinawans in order that they might express their own choice either for independence or return to Japan. To this General Bradley replied that he did not think such a provision should be adopted. If "later on, several years from now" it was desired to reconsider the matter, it could be done in the light of pertinent facts at that time. From a security point of view, however, that provision should not be made in the context of the treaty. ()

() "Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific", Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952.

In due course, a resolution of ratification reached the Senate floor. On 28 April 1952, both the Treaty of Peace and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty were ratified.

"A Fine Ceremony"

Even before the Senate had ratified the Treaty of Peace, with its amorphous Article 3, the Army pursued its directed objective to establish a Ryukyuan central government, while the United States pressed the concomitant development of Okinawa into a powerful fortress. [The various stages through which the internal governmental structure had evolved have been indicated earlier.] It reached a significant benchmark on 1 April 1952 with the formal establishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. ()

() See Chap. X, supra.

Precisely seven years to the day after the American Forces landed on the beaches of Okinawa, American military and Ryukyuan officials and spectators gathered at the University of the Ryukyus to mark "the inauguration," as the program called it, of the "Government of the Ryukyu Islands." While the distinguished guests arrived and were ushered to their respective places an Army Band and the Ryukyuan Police Band rendered stirring selections. The principal addresses were by Major General Robert S. Beightler, Deputy Governor and Commanding General [U.S. Army Ryukyu Island^g (USARYIS)], and (e) Shuhei Higa, Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Brigadier General James M. Lewis, Civil Administrator, was Master of Ceremonies and following the mutually laudatory speeches, he called upon YHEI IZUMI, the appointed Deputy Chief Executive and exofficio Speaker of the Legislature to introduce the thirty-one legislators who had been

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elected by popular vote on March ~~1944~~, and to lead them in the "Acceptance of Office". An omen of difficulties to arise in the administration's dealings with the newly elected body came in the dramatic refusal of the leading leftist member, Kamejiro Senaga, to acknowledge the pledge taken by the rest of the body to perform their duties sincerely and faithfully. There were other indications that some of the elected members of the legislature were entering office with feelings of antagonism toward the appointed Chief Executive and the Deputy Chief Executive, who also served as Speaker of their body. Their resentment toward the latter arrangement was to lead shortly to amendment by the Deputy Governor of the basic ordinance so as to permit the legislators to select one of their own elected members as the Speaker.

) As to the third branch, the Judiciary, Chief Justice Jugo Thomas was scheduled to make the closing address at the GRI Inauguration, thus giving recognition to the three distinct branches of the new government. However, Mr. Thomas recalls that he was in the United States at the time so one of the other justices ^{presumably} made appropriate remarks. This is regrettable in that it would have been illuminating to read his retrospective analysis of the legislators' posture, especially his appraisal of the defiant gesture of Seuaga. But, he notes merely that, "on April first the Ryukyu Government was established; and a fine ceremony was held at the University of the Ryukyus. I only heard about it, because I was in the United States." ()

() op. cit.
