

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

Ex. J. 92-1

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS
AND THE DAITO ISLANDS

OCTOBER 27, 28 AND 29, 1971



Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1971

68-092

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(III)

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1971

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Symington, Aiken, Case, Cooper, Javits, Scott and Pearson.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today the committee opens its public hearings on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

The treaty represents the end of an era in United States-Japan relations. It settles the last remaining major issue between the two countries arising out of World War II, returning to Japan the remaining occupied territory which has been promised it. Ratification of this treaty would remove the last vestige of occupying power status now held by the United States and would formalize a relationship of equality between the two states.

In his letter transmitting the treaty to the Senate, the President has urged that the return of Okinawa "is essential to the continuation of friendly and productive relations between the United States and Japan."

The treaty comes before us against a backdrop of strained United States-Japanese relations, stemming primarily from many long suppressed economic tensions and aggravated by the developments of the past few months regarding China. The United States has now stated that it seeks to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, a change in policy apparently taken without consultation with Japan. And the People's Republic has now been seated as the representative of China in the United Nations. These important steps naturally have a substantial impact affecting U.S. security interests throughout Asia, including Okinawa.

In considering the reversion treaty, the committee will be interested in examining the general effect of the treaty on United States-Japanese relations as well as its implications for U.S. treaty commitments and security interests in Asia.

We are very pleased this morning to welcome the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, who will initiate the presentation of the administration's position.

If I may add, Mr. Secretary, speaking personally, although there has been much criticism of the action of the United Nations and I regret that our position was not fully supported, nevertheless I personally feel that this action over a long period may prove to be beneficial to the policies of this administration. And I am not a bit discouraged as to the future of your efforts to bring about much better relations with China and the rest of the world.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE;
ACCOMPANIED BY U. ALEXIS JOHNSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; I appreciate those remarks.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here today to explain why this administration considers it very important that the Senate should advise and consent to the ratification of the agreement between the United States and Japan. The agreement, signed on June 17, 1971, provides for the return of the Ryukyu Islands to the administrative control of Japan.

This agreement can, I believe, truly be called an historic document. It would resolve the last major U.S.-Japanese issue arising from World War II. The agreement provides for the return to Japanese administration of an area which has been historically associated with Japan and whose population strongly desires to be united once again with its native land. The Ryukyus are also an area of significant strategic importance to the United States. The agreement takes full account of this; indeed, one of my purposes today is to explain why we believe that this agreement and its related arrangements would protect and promote the U.S. security interests in the Far East. Deputy Secretary Packard will discuss its security aspects in greater detail in his testimony.

REAFFIRMATION OF NOVEMBER 21, 1969, COMMUNIQUE

The agreement specifically reaffirms that the reversion of the islands to Japan shall be carried out on the basis of the joint communique issued by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato on November 21, 1969. In that communique Japan recognized that the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The communique also reflected Japan's serious concern for the security of countries in the Far East. Prime Minister Sato specifically stated that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security" and that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was * * * a most important factor for the security of Japan."

The Prime Minister further recognized in the communique that the U.S. forces in Okinawa played a vital role in the present situation in the Far East. He agreed that the return of administrative rights over Okinawa should not hinder the effective discharge of international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries

in the Far East including Japan and that the United States would retain such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries. The use of such bases will be governed by the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and related documents which now govern the use of our bases in Japan proper.

**ARGUMENTS CONTENTS AS DESCRIBED IN SEPTEMBER 5, 1971 LETTER TO
PRESIDENT**

I have described the contents of the reversion agreement in general terms in my letter to the President of September 5, 1971, a copy of which has been sent to this committee by the President.

This letter summarizes, among other things, the specific agreements reached. It notes, for example, that the Japanese will pay us \$320 million as compensation for civil assets to be transferred to the Japanese Government and for certain reversion-related costs. It also describes the arrangements reached with the Japanese to protect American business and professional interests in Okinawa after reversion. The provisions of these arrangements were worked out after close consultations with the business community on Okinawa. I believe that they should provide a satisfactory basis for the post-reversion period.

**CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO USE OF OKINAWA
BASES**

Under Secretary Johnson is here to discuss the provisions of the reversion agreement in more detail should you desire him to do so. I would like to comment, however, on one major provision of the agreement, that dealing with our use of the bases on Okinawa following reversion.

There is one principal difference between our present tenure of bases on Okinawa and our tenure of bases in Japan proper. In Japan proper we are required by the Mutual Security Treaty to consult with the Japanese Government in the case of use of bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan, major changes in deployment of U.S. forces into Japan, and major changes in equipment. In 1960, President Eisenhower, in a joint communique issued during the visit of Prime Minister Kishi to Washington, said that the U.S. Government had no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Government of Japan and with respect to matters involving prior consultations under the treaty. Such consultation is not presently required with respect to the use of our bases in Okinawa; after reversion it will be.

Any other agreement would be incompatible with the close relationship which should exist between two great allied powers like the United States and Japan. The provisions of our Mutual Security Treaty have worked well with Japan proper. I am confident they will work well in Okinawa also. We and Japan nevertheless have a common interest in the peace and security of the Far East, an interest which the Government of Japan has confirmed on numerous occasions, most specifically in the joint communique of November, 1969, to which I have just referred.

OKINAWA SITUATION NO LONGER TENABLE

It was clear in 1969, and it remains clear today, that continuance of a situation in which a million Japanese are still living under U.S. military administration more than 25 years after the end of World War II has subjected our position in the Ryukyu Islands and our relationship with Japan to increasing strain.

Such a situation is no longer tenable. It is not in keeping with our national character or our national interest; nor is it consistent with history.

ESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OVER OKINAWA

Okinawa was one of the 47 prefectures of Japan before World War II. It was separated from Japanese administration in January 1946 by order of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, and it has been under U.S. control ever since. U.S. administrative authority over Okinawa was confirmed in article III of the Japanese Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951, which gave the United States the right to exercise "all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands."

MOVEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN

However, a movement for reversion of Okinawa to Japan started even before the peace treaty was signed.

In March 1951, when negotiations for the treaty were just beginning in San Francisco, the Okinawa Assembly adopted a resolution requesting reversion to Japan. The vote was 17 to 3. The three opposing votes were in favor of independence for the Ryukyus. Two months later, in May 1951, Chief Executive Chobyō Yara, the islands' present chief executive, was elected the first chairman of the "Association for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan." He has been at the forefront of the reversion movement ever since and he was elected to his present post in 1968 on a platform strongly advocating immediate reversion to Japan.

JAPAN'S RETENTION OF RESIDUAL AUTHORITY

On September 5, 1951, in presenting the draft of the peace treaty to the Peace Conference, Ambassador John Foster Dulles noted that some of the allied powers had urged that the treaty require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over the Ryukyus in favor of U.S. sovereignty. Others had proposed that the islands be restored completely to Japan. "In the face of this division of allied opinion," Ambassador Dulles said, "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority."

It was decided at that time that although the United States had long-term security interests in the Ryukyus, the "peace of reconciliation," which we and most of our allies sought with Japan, would be vitiated by the islands' enforced, permanent detachment from Japan.

The "residual sovereignty" formula was clearly designed to convey the thought to Japan and to the world that although the United States was obliged to retain control of the Ryukyus temporarily for security reasons, what had been Japanese territory was not being permanently detached from Japan and the principle of no U.S. territorial acquisitions as a result of war was being observed.

RECOGNITION OF JAPAN'S RESIDUAL AUTHORITY

In December 1953, the United States returned the northern portion of the Okinawa Island chain, the Amami Islands, to Japanese jurisdiction.

In June 1957 President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi reaffirmed "Japanese residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus.

In June 1961, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda did likewise.

In March 1962, in connection with an Executive order concerning the administration of the islands issued on the basis of a U.S. Government task force study of the Ryukyus policies and programs, President Kennedy recognized the Ryukyus "to be a part of the Japanese homeland." He added that he "looked forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty."

In November 1967, President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington and agreed on the establishment of an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner "to promote the integration of the Ryukyus with Japan and thus help to minimize the stresses that would accompany reversion." President Johnson also stated at the time that he "fully understood the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of the islands." The President and the Prime Minister agreed to conduct joint and continuous review of the status of the Ryukyu Islands, "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these islands to Japan." They also agreed on reversion of the Bonin Islands to Japan. This left Okinawa, the Daito Islands, and the more southerly islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago as the only territories listed under article III of the peace treaty, which were still under U.S. administration.

Finally, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato, in their communique of November 1969, announced that "The two Governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan.

"The President and the Prime Minister," the communique continued, "agreed to expedite the consultations with a view of accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

Thus Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa has been recognized by every American President and every U.S. administration since the end of the occupation. The agreement before you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the agreement before you and its related arrangements are the logical and timely culmination of an historic progression set in motion over 20 years ago.

BY 1969 TIME HAD COME FOR REVERSION

By 1969 the time had clearly come for the residual sovereignty so long recognized to become a reality. The 10-year, first term of the Mutual Security Treaty which would end in 1970 and the treaty would then become subject to termination by either party on 1-year's notice. Strenuous debates in the diet and possibly violent demonstrations against our bases on this anniversary were anticipated. That they did not occur may well be due largely to the announcement of the Nixon-Sato communique of November 1969, that active negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 were about to begin.

There was also reason to believe that the longer the reversion was delayed, the greater the chance would be of an open clash between demonstrators demanding reversion and American military forces protecting our bases. The 1968 election of Chief Executive Yara on a platform of immediate reversion and the growing militancy of student and leftist radicalism on Okinawa had made it apparent that to further delay a reversion agreement would be to erode rapidly the acquiescence of the local population necessary to the continued effective operation of our base structure in the islands.

The local population furnishes a large proportion of the labor force for base operations, particularly on the densely populated island of Okinawa itself. The military communities are not isolated enclaves. On the contrary, military and Okinawan communities are interspersed closely with one another. Hence it would be extremely difficult and probably impossible to operate a base structure on Okinawa effectively if the local populace were actively opposed to our continued presence. At best, a continued U.S. presence under these conditions could be maintained only by vigorous police control that would be both highly undesirable and extremely costly. General Lampert, the U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyus since 1969, will have more to say on this point, based upon his personal experience in administering the islands.

It was against this background, then, Mr. Chairman, that the United States joined the Japanese Government in issuing the 1969 joint communique.

EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO CARRY OUT AGREEMENT

In Japan proper, the Japanese people are solidly convinced of the justice of the reversion of Okinawa no later than 1972. For us to disappoint this expectation and to fail to carry out this agreement, which—both to them and to us—is so fair and so necessary, would have extremely unfortunate effects on our whole relationship with Japan. It would, for example, give a strong weapon to those political forces in Japan who do not favor the kind of close relationship with the United States which now exists and who seek to replace the present leadership of the country with others less favorable to such a relationship.

Differences between our two countries in trade and monetary matters have subjected our economic relations to strain in recent months, as the chairman has pointed out. But our basic political and security

relationship continues to be stable and cooperative. Our national interest requires that we do everything possible to maintain that cooperation which President Nixon has called the linchpin for peace in the Pacific.

REVERSION IS FURTHER STEP IN CARRYING OUT NIXON DOCTRINE

In the larger framework of our international relations, reversion would be a further step in carrying out the principles of the Nixon doctrine, which recognizes and encourages the greater capacity of our allies to assume the primary responsibility for their defense. In this agreement, Japan agrees after reversion to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa against outside attack.

For our part, as contemplated under the Nixon doctrine, we will continue to honor our commitments to Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty and we will continue to provide the protection of the U.S. nuclear shield to Japan in case there is a nuclear threat to Japan's freedom. The emphasis we place on the importance of remaining a Pacific power is reflected in the continued maintenance of our base structure in Japan and in the Ryukyus.

EARLY AND FAVORABLE ACTION URGED

Mr. Chairman, the provisions of the agreement will not become effective until the President has deposited the instrument of ratification. He will not take such action until after the Japanese Diet has enacted the necessary implementing legislation. The step currently required on the part of the United States is advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

I urge early and favorable Senate action on the agreement before you. It protects and advances U.S. interests and it is essential, particularly essential at this time, in view of the relations with Japan that have been referred to by the chairman, it is essential to the continuation of a viable and harmonious relationship with one of our major allies in the years ahead.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I might say for the benefit of the press that I believe the copies of the Secretary's statement have not yet arrived but they will be here for the press. We don't have time to make copies.

SUBMISSION OF AGREEMENT TO SENATE COMMENDED

First, Mr. Secretary, I want to compliment you for the decision to submit this agreement for the reversion of Okinawa in the form of a treaty for approval of the Senate rather than to do it by an executive agreement, which possibility was troubling us very much. I hope I can take this as a sign of renewed confidence in better relations between the Department of State and the Senate, especially this committee. In any case, I am very pleased that you have taken this route.

Secretary ROGERS. Rather than renewed confidence, it is continuing confidence.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very pleased that you have submitted it and I think it is a good statement.

HEARING PROCEDURE

In view of the very good attendance this morning, we ought to operate under the 10-minute rule so that everyone will have an opportunity to ask a question, if the clerk will keep us advised.

JAPAN'S DEFENSE OF OKINAWA IN VIEW OF U.S. BASES

There is one aspect which strikes me at the beginning. Would you elaborate on your statement that Japan agrees after reversion to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa against outside attack. Just what does that mean because, as I understand it, we retain quite a large acreage and quite a number of bases on Okinawa?

How does that fit in with this statement you made about Japan having the responsibility for the defense of Okinawa?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, under the terms of the treaty, Japan has assumed this responsibility and it will provide defense forces, self-defense forces to carry out this function.

We can go into detail on the numbers and location of those forces, but they will depend primarily on the defense of Okinawa against outside attack. We will have no responsibility for this as such. Of course, as you have indicated by your question, because we do have a Mutual Security Treaty with Japan, I suppose that if that, if the provisions of that treaty were implemented then our Far East forces might be called upon to play a role. But the primary and initial responsibility would be on Japan; and they have agreed to assume that. And they will increase—well, they will develop a military capability on Okinawa which does not now exist.

U.S. RETENTION OF BASES AND AREA

The CHAIRMAN. Is the retention of the bases under our control? Is that set out in the treaty? How many are there? Is that a matter that you wish to elaborate on?

Secretary ROGERS. I think that is all set out. I don't have it in my—

The CHAIRMAN. We had 74,000 acres there. How much of that do we retain control of under this agreement? That is quite a lot for a small island.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes. We retain a good deal.

If you will look at the printed document, printed by this committee, which refers to the agreement, you will see at pages 10 and 11 there are set forth there the areas that we will retain. It sets forth both the areas that we retain and the areas being returned to Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I ask. It is very substantial. We retain a very substantial number of bases and area.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, then, that the primary responsibility is Japan's but we are there in case of emergency of a much broader war? Is that about the proper way to describe that?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; that is correct.

RETENTION AND FUNCTION OF VOICE OF AMERICA

The CHAIRMAN. What purpose is there in our retaining the Voice of America and what is the function of the Voice of America operating from Okinawa? The reason I ask is that I had assumed this had been directed primarily at China. If we are, as I hope and believe, changing our attitude and our relations with China, what justification is there for the continuation of the Voice of America on Okinawa?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we think of the Voice of America as performing a very useful function in our foreign policy in presenting facts, hopefully objective facts, and we think it is very useful.

We do hope, of course, that we will improve our relations with the People's Republic of China; but the fact that the President is taking a trip to Peking, as he said on several occasions, does not necessarily mean that we are beginning to have too rapid an improvement. It will depend on events. He doesn't want us to be too euphoric about the prospects merely because of the trip that is taking place. He emphasized that in his recent speech—I think it was on last Sunday, I believe; so we want to continue our Voice of America programs.

We are going to continue to present the news.

The CHAIRMAN. The Voice of America, like Radio Free Europe, was a product of the cold war. They were originated at that time and that was their original purpose.

The Senator from New Jersey has raised the question, I think, in a most appropriate manner, of the continuation of Radio Free Europe. It costs a lot of money and what does it achieve? It really was a tool of the cold war.

I am not saying that we have suddenly reached a millennium and that everything is fine, but our attitude strikes me as a bit ambiguous or ambivalent. We say we wish to improve our relations and yet we continue certain activities which are designed not to improve them, to irritate them or to prolong, I may say, the cold war.

I assume this is a very costly operation and what use does it serve? I don't quite see why it should be retained the same as I don't see the utility of retaining Radio Free Europe. To me, they are much in the same class. They are propaganda agencies and there is no dearth of access to news with modern satellite communications. Certainly they are not doing anything that the private communication systems are not doing also. That was not so true when they started. In this treaty you don't have to retain them; you have the right to retain them?

Secretary ROGERS. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. If you wish to discontinue them you may?

Secretary ROGERS. Oh, sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I read recently of, to me, certain discrepancies on the Voice of America about certain aspects of international relations from your own views. There seems to have been some lack of communication between the head of the Voice of America and the Secretary of State. Not recently; this occurred—

Secretary ROGERS. I don't believe that is correct recently, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. He takes a much harder line than you take, I would say. His statement has been much harder and it is commented upon by everybody. He seems to be much more determined to maintain the cold war than you are and I assume you certainly speak more for the administration.

I would think it is one of those small irritants.

I don't want to pursue it. You have the right to do it, but you don't have to maintain it.

AUDIENCE OF VOICE OF AMERICA

Secretary ROGERS. I think we also, Mr. Chairman, should point out that—I suppose the great listening audience is not in the Communist countries. I mean, the listening audience from this particular station is all around in that area in friendly countries as well as in Communist countries.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very big station. It is capable of reaching most of China or a great part of it and I thought that was what it was there for. It is part of the same cold war.

VOICE OF AMERICA IS NOT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCY

Of course, I suppose the Voice of America is not an intelligence gathering agency?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned nuclear weapons. I think this treaty contemplates the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa; does it not? That has been stated in the press.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I did send you a letter yesterday on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary ROGERS. And we will be glad to go into it in detail in security session with you. I think the decisions that we have made in connection with it are decisions which will meet with approval by members of this committee.

EFFECT OF SECRECY ON DETERRENT ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. It has been a very sensitive subject. Again, certain inherent inconsistencies puzzle me a bit. Their existence has always been said to be as a deterrent; in other words, to avoid their use, not to actually use them. To keep them secret, it seems to me, minimizes their role as a deterrent.

If they are a deterrent and goodness knows they ought to be, I always thought it would be more logical for everybody to know about it. If they knew they were there, it would be more of a deterrent. I should think most people know where they are, not just in Okinawa. I think their presence in Europe has been publicized time and again. We have so many thousands in Europe. It is no secret. I don't understand quite the sensitiveness of not wishing to discuss it more openly because I think that might enhance their role as a deterrent. But perhaps I see these things in a different light.

IMPORTANCE OF U.S. PRIVATE BUSINESS INTERESTS IN OKINAWA

I am told you had a good deal of difficulty in negotiating the American business interests.

How important are our private business interests, in Okinawa?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, they are not very large in terms of numbers, but after all, they are American businessmen and we have a responsibility to protect their interests. I think we worked out an arrangement that is by and large quite satisfactory to them. Obviously there are always a few people who don't feel they are entirely satisfied, but Mr. Snyder who is here and negotiated this treaty will, I am sure, be prepared to address himself to the question and he cooperated very closely with the businessmen in Okinawa, American businessmen in Okinawa, and also the American Chamber of Commerce in Tokyo and I believe by and large we have made their requests.

In fact, I think that we have provided very good assurances for most of them, even including lawyers.

The CHAIRMAN. One last question—including lawyers. [Laughter.]

Secretary ROGERS. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a big business for lawyers over there?

Secretary ROGERS. It is pretty good.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it?

Secretary ROGERS. It is pretty good.

SOVEREIGNTY OF ISLAND OF SENKAKU

The CHAIRMAN. One last question before I turn you over, and my time is up.

There is this troublesome question that I have seen in the paper and I wondered if you wanted to comment on it. I believe it concerns the island of Senkaku.

Is that left as is without an attempt to determine its sovereignty? There was a piece in the paper the other day indicating that there may be some difficulty over the sovereignty of that island.

Secretary ROGER. Mr. Chairman, I am glad you asked that question because we have made it clear that this treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands at all. Whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. In any case, that is not a reason to object to this treaty, whatever one may think about it. Is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is right. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not affect it.

My time is up.

Senator Sparkman?

PHASING OUT OF INSTALLATIONS AND LAND AREAS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, I want to express my appreciation for the statement that you have given us. I want to go back to the question the chairman asked about the installations and the size of land area we are going to continue to occupy in Okinawa.

You referred to pages 10 and 11 of the President's message. Are all those listed on pages 10, 11, and 12 retained by the United States?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Ten, 11, and 12.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. There is the listing also on page 13. I think that is the short listing right at the top of page 13. That says those will be returned to Japan after reversion. A listing underneath that list is (c) and those are installations and sites now used by us, the whole or part of which will be released on or prior to reversion.

Does that mean that our holding of those will be phased out over a period of time and not all of them released at the same time?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is carried over on page 14, also.

Secretary ROGERS. That's right.

INCREASE IN JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES

Senator SPARKMAN. With reference to the responsibility of Japan to defend Okinawa, will Japan have to increase her military forces in order to meet that capability?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, Senator Sparkman, there will have to be an increase and they are prepared to do that.

Senator SPARKMAN. It still will stay within the prohibition contained in article IX of the Japanese Constitution?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; it will not violate that at all, now that reversion has taken place.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there any move on the part of Japan or some of the people of Japan to modify article IX or will it be retained, in your opinion, just as it is?

Secretary ROGERS. Not that we are aware of, certainly no major move in this direction. I think article IX will be continued for the foreseeable future so far as we know.

Senator SPARKMAN. There has been comment, I believe, in various announcements that have been made in the press and so forth, about increasing the responsibility of Japan in that area of the world. Will that not necessitate changing their military posture?

Secretary ROGERS. No; I don't think so. I think they can increase their defense capabilities under article IX to a considerable extent by increasing their budgetary amounts available for military equipment and manpower and so forth without in any way violating article IX: and certainly they can do it so far as Okinawa is concerned because it does not create a problem at all.

SENTIMENT AGAINST MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY IN JAPAN

Senator SPARKMAN. There is protest from time to time against the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan. If there should be a change of government, do you think that would affect that situation?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think we have to be careful; I certainly have to be careful about making predictions about what would happen in the event of a change in government.

Senator SPARKMAN. Probably you could tell us how strong that sentiment is in Japan.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think—

Senator SPARKMAN. That treaty comes up for renewal sometime?

Secretary ROGERS. Oh, no; you see, a treaty was renewed at the time. I think it was 1970.

Senator SPARKMAN. About 2 years ago; wasn't it?

Secretary ROGERS. The 10-year period during which it could not be renounced expired in 1970, so that when it was—as a result of the Nixon-Sato communique and the fact we are making progress on this, it was not renounced and from now on it will continue unless either Japan or the United States should renounce it, so the fact that—they thought there might be some major opposition developing at the end of that 10-year period but it didn't develop to anything, but it worked out very smoothly.

Senator SPARKMAN. So it is not just a matter of having to fight for its extension? In other words, those against it would have to take action to denounce it?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct; that is really one of the advantages of the communique to which I referred and one of the advantages of this treaty. I think it will solidify our relations with Japan, certainly in the security field, to a considerable extent; and, as I said in my statement, I think it will make the relations between our two countries very close for the foreseeable future.

✓ U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe under the treaty the United States would agree not to keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, except with the agreement of Japan; is that right?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. There is no agreement to that effect carried in the treaty, is there, that the United States may keep nuclear weapons there?

Secretary ROGERS. No, no; not at all.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is an open question?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, there is nothing dealing with the matter except what appears in the treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all right. Very well. I believe that is all. I can think of many questions, but I think I will give way at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Sparkman have done an excellent job in asking the questions which I would have asked. I have a couple of supplementary questions.

CHINESE BROADCASTING AND COUNTERACTIVE OF VOA IN AREA

Does China broadcast regularly and extensively in that area covering Korea and Japan?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And southeastern Asia?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. They do?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Then the Voice of America would in a sense counteract the voice of any other nation which might be broadcasting over the same territory?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; it could be stated that way.

JAPANESE PROTECTION OF U.S. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS

Senator AIKEN. And as I understand it, Japan agrees to protect American business interests and professional interests, including lawyers, who might be presently on Okinawa?

Senator CASE. And veterinarians.

Senator AIKEN. For how long a period of time does this agreement carry?

Secretary ROGERS. It is indefinite.

Senator AIKEN. Indefinite?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Then second generation and third generation Americans also might be protected if they inherited—

Secretary ROGERS. It certainly wouldn't apply to lawyers.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

CRITICISM OF ENTERING INTO AGREEMENT

Senator Sparkman said we were under considerable criticism for entering into this agreement. How extensive and how effective that criticism is I don't know, and I don't suppose you know at this time.

Secretary ROGERS. I don't believe it is, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Perhaps you had better not speculate on what would happen if Sato should lose his position over there and a new government would come into effect in Japan.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, my own judgment is that conditions would stay about as they are. I don't think it would affect—I am speaking now about our security arrangements with Japan—I do not think they would be affected adversely.

Senator AIKEN. It would be as binding on any future Japanese Government as it is on any future U.S. Government?

Secretary ROGERS. Oh, yes; sure.

Senator AIKEN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

ADMINISTRATION POLICY CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES AND BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, is it the policy of the administration to urge Japan to modernize its armed forces or to expand its military budget?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. That is a snappy answer.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, it is a snappy question.

Senator CHURCH. Why?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, because we have in past years provided a great deal of money and manpower for the security of that area of the world and we did it for obvious reasons, principally because we were

the Nation that was in a position to do it. Since that time, Japan has made a remarkable recovery, as you know. It is now the third strongest economic power in the world.

It has tremendous abilities in terms of technology and industry and so forth, and particularly in view of that development and in view of the problem we have in the balance of payments, we think it is important for Japan to carry a larger share of the burden of the security of that area; and we do encourage them to increase their military budgets. They have given us assurances that they would do that; and we think that can be done without in any way violating article IX of the Constitution.

Senator CHURCH. You believe that this policy conforms with the overall thrust of the Nixon doctrine?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; I do, Senator.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION CONCERNING REPEAL OF FORMOSA RESOLUTION

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Secretary, yesterday a question arose on the floor of the Senate concerning a provision in the Foreign Aid bill by which the Formosa resolution would be repealed. As you know, this resolution does not affect in any way the formal Mutual Defense Treaty, but is in line with an effort we have been making to repeal *carte blanche* delegations of authority of the Gulf of Tonkin character. The administration previously had taken no position for or against this repealer, raising no objection to it. Has the administration's position changed as a result of the vote at the U.N. Monday or do you adhere to the same position?

Secretary ROGERS. No; our position has not changed.

U.N. VOTE ON CHINA

Senator CHURCH. Apropos of the vote at the U.N. on Monday, you have been through a very hard week and perhaps a word of encouragement is in order. I hope that neither you nor the administration or the American people should be excessively dismayed about the outcome of the vote. I myself think that the viability of a two-China concept is questionable. I understand why we did it; I honor the obligation that we felt toward Formosa. In the long run, however, it is possible that the outcome of this vote will better serve the interests of the United States and the realities of our posture toward Asia than the opposite result.

I don't ask you to comment on that. I simply want to make that observation.

ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY CHANGES COMMENDED

Second, I think the administration deserves more credit than it is getting for major changes in American policy in Asia, which, to my mind, that this treaty will contribute significantly toward healing a wound that has long existed in our relationship with Japan.

No country in Asia is more important to the United States than Japan, nor does any country in Asia have greater potential to con-

tribute to the peace and stability of Asia. I compliment you, therefore, for this treaty and for bringing it here in this form.

Third, you deserve credit for the substantial reductions of American forces in Vietnam that have taken place; more than 300,000 troops have been removed, and the President himself has expressed the hope that we can achieve a complete disengagement of American ground forces. I certainly share in that hope; I also hope that the Congress can find a way to join with the President in a policy for ending totally our participation in the war there, a policy that can command very broad support throughout the country in both parties. This would help to cement the wide breach that has developed between the executive and congressional branches of the Government.

Fourth, the reduction of forces in Asia has not been limited simply to Vietnam, but, in line with the general thrust of the Nixon doctrine, you have made significant reductions in our forces elsewhere in countries like Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan itself.

Secretary ROGERS. And Korea, 20,000.

Senator CHURCH. And Korea. These reductions are to be commended. In the future, dependent governments should be on notice that they must look to their own troops rather than to ours to protect themselves against insurrection and internal subversion.

And, finally, in the upcoming trip to Peking, the President of the United States is making an enormously significant gesture toward peace. It demonstrates how determined he is to try to find a way to relax tensions in Asia, and it also may one day be looked upon as the great turning point in American policy in Asia.

I commend him for it; he is coming to terms with reality in Asia.

It is hard to change course, particularly in a Government like ours. We have lived with our myths too long. Whatever differences there are between this committee and the administration, I think the time is ripe to say something in the way of commendation for the major changes in direction that you have made, all of which, I think, serve the best interests of the United States.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator. I just want to thank you very much. I appreciate what you have said. I do not think the differences between the executive branch and this committee are as great as they have seemed to be, and I appreciate particularly what you said because I think it does represent a very constructive statement which will make it much easier in the dealings that we will have in the future. I do not suppose from the foreign policy field the world has ever been in a more dynamic stage, more fluid stage, and the opportunities for peace, I think, are great, and if we can together, as a Nation working together, take advantage of these opportunities it is possible, I think, just possible that we could have a generation of peace, a generation where we had no major wars; and I thank you very much for the statement that you have made.

Senator CHURCH. Most welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from New Jersey.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

I want to thank our colleague from Idaho, too. I think he made a very fair and very correct statement in regard to the policy of the administration and the way you are handling matters.

I am sorry that the U.N. vote went as it did on the question of Taiwan, but I do not, as the chairman indicated, regard this as a major defeat or a matter for us to get out the crying towel. We did the right thing, and I presume the other countries did the right thing as they saw it, and we go on from here. I certainly do not think that those politicians who are in some snide, backhanded way trying to blame the administration because it started this whole thing by saying the President was going to Peking, are entitled to anything but contempt, and I pour my own contempt on them right now. The action of the President in this regard, I think, is altogether the right course. He has been fortunate to have your help and his other advisers' assistance in the matter.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNING REARMAMENT OF JAPAN

I do want to relate to one point that was discussed in your colloquy with Senator Church. It is not our policy to do anything at all to bring Japan back to the warlike status which prevailed before World War II, and we are conscious of the possibility that withdrawal of American presence in the Far East or hostile actions by us in regard to Japan might this result, are we not?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I suppose it is in the back of our minds. I do not think it is a possibility, certainly not now. We have made it quite clear in announcing the Nixon doctrine, and in all discussions we have had about it, that it is not a program of withdrawal as such. It is a program of reduction, reduction of our forces in a way that is not destabilizing, and I think Japan understands that. But we have in our discussions with Japan, been encouraged by the fact that they realize that article IX is important to them. They point out to other nations' particularly, that article IX was drafted as the result of encouragement by the United States, and they are quite conscious of the fear that exists in the minds of some people of a revival of militarism in Japan. We do not think it is possible now, we do not think it is likely in the future, and you are perfectly correct, Senator, in the colloquy that I had with Senator Church, I was referring to the fact that we think they should spend more money for defense purposes, not to create an overseas defense capability.

Senator CASE. I would like to pursue that one step further. In our policies and in our dealings with Japan and other nations in that part of the world, we are thoroughly conscious of the extreme undesirability of seeing Japan isolated and thus making herself strong enough to stand alone against all possible enemies for her protection and for her economic or political security.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right, and I think that is one of the reasons, Senator, why we are particularly anxious to have this treaty ratified quickly. I think it would be a very important signal to Japan that we are serious, not only the administration, but the whole Government of the United States is serious about maintaining the very important alliance we have with Japan.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

NO SECRET PARTS OF TREATY WITH JAPAN

I have a few questions about a collateral matter, Mr. Secretary, if I may, in the time remaining. Are there any parts of this treaty with Japan that are secret?

Secretary ROGERS. No; there are not. Now there obviously, as in any treaty—well, first, let me say so there is no misunderstanding. My answer is no, there are no secret agreements.

Two, as on any long negotiation of this kind, there are many conversations and so forth that relate to the interpretation of the treaty just as there is in legislative history on statutes, but there is no secret agreement and we would be prepared to discuss anything in connection with this treaty that you would like to have us discuss.

Senator CASE. I appreciate that. I just wanted to have your assurance that not only this committee, but the American people will not have the feeling that we are not going into anything that is not on the surface.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

ARE THERE OTHER AGREEMENTS RELATED TO TREATY?

Senator CASE. Are there any other agreements related to the treaty, not necessarily secret, but executive agreements, which the United States considers to be binding and which are not included in the material you have presented to us?

Secretary ROGERS. No; certainly no executive agreements. As I say, I would not want to—we can discuss this in detail, if you want. There are no secret agreements, no executive agreements. There may be one or two minor things where the provisions of the treaty are interpreted by the discussions that we had about those provisions, if you follow me, and that, all of that information is available to the committee so that you can have it if you would like to read it over, and those who worked on it will be glad to point out the areas where that exists.

Senator CASE. I appreciate that. My concern was whether there was any matter of substance that is not embraced within the treaty or the documents that you have sent up to us.

Secretary ROGERS. No, no.

WILL OKINAWA FACILITIES BE REPLACED IN MICRONESIA?

Senator CASE. There have been reports that we plan to replace the loss of some of our military in Micronesia. I have a news release from a group calling themselves Friends of Micronesia, concerning a number of these questions and I would like to have your response. Is it true we plan to replace our military facilities on Okinawa with similar or comparable facilities in Micronesia?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, to be on the safe side, I would like to have you ask Deputy Secretary Packard when he comes here. I do not think so. No major changes, if that is what you have reference to. But as I say, I would prefer to have you ask him.

Senator CASE. I would be happy to do that. I had several other questions as regards an air base on Tinian, submarine and shipbuilding

facilities at Malakat and an A-bomb and H-bomb storage, and guerilla training facility on an island called Babelthuap or some such thing.

Secretary ROGERS. I do not know about that.

EFFECT OF MICRONESIA'S TRUST TERRITORY STATUS ON FUTURE PLANS

Senator CASE. I will ask these questions of the Undersecretary, as you suggest. But does the fact that Micronesia is a trust territory under the U.N. have any effect on our future plans there? Do you have any comment about that aspect of it?

Secretary ROGERS. We have had long discussions with Micronesians about their future status and we have been attempting to work something out. So far we have not worked anything out satisfactory to both sides.

Senator CASE. We have made a general commitment to let the Islands of Micronesia determine their future status including independence if they so choose, have we not?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, certainly, we are trying to work out something along those lines, that is correct. I am not up to date on the latest negotiations because we have had a very active negotiation.

Senator CASE. I am thinking not so much in that connection of what we have talked about with Micronesia, but our general obligation to the United Nations in this matter. Is that not a part of the broader question?

Secretary ROGERS. In a broad sense I would like to refresh my recollection on the precise terms of the relationship between our country and Micronesia. In a broad sense that is correct. We are trying to work out something that will provide them with the right of self-determination but will not be inconsistent with our security interests.

Senator CASE. If there is anything you want to add to this after you or your staff look into the matter, I would be happy to have the record show that.

Secretary ROGERS. Fine.

Senator CASE. I take it, whatever promise we have made we will honor in this respect.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

✓ INFORMATION CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON JAPAN AND OKINAWA

Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you are not prepared to discuss this morning what has been agreed on with respect to Japan and Okinawa re nuclear weapons, correct?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, we prefer to do it in executive session. We have, of course, I have answered the questions that we are going to, that the chairman asked, that we will not have nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the Senate should approve a treaty with Japan about its relationship with Japan and Okinawa, when we give unilateral military protection to Japan, without our people knowing what was agreed on in this nuclear field?

Secretary ROGERS. So far as Japan is concerned, well, no, we will not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I do not want to get any semantics about it, but say with respect that it would not help our trade and other relationships with the Japanese people if there was no true understanding about the nuclear weapons situation in their part of the world. We seem to have trade troubles with the Japanese at this time. To follow up the chairman's question, would it not be constructive to have more of this information a matter of public knowledge?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, so far as the Japanese are concerned, Senator, they know and they are entirely satisfied we are not going to have nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

RESULTS OF NUCLEAR SECRECY

Senator SYMINGTON. No one is more anxious to have an adequate military posture than I, but especially after becoming a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, a committee which by law must be given nuclear information that is withheld from the Armed Services Committee and this committee by this administration, I am now convinced that the principal result of all this nuclear secrecy has been the purchase of many billions of dollars of unnecessary military equipment. If the secrecy is continued, based on the some \$80 billion military budget just recommended, and which the Senate has just authorized, I am also convinced that this waste is going to continue at the taxpayers' expense. For what it is worth, I also believe this secrecy has been a major factor in preventing this country from making proper progress in the handling through the force contained in the atom, of such problems as lack of adequate energy—electric power—pollution, our decreasing fresh water, and so forth and it seems to me the world should look at this country from the standpoint of solving those peacetime problems, which are now international as well as national scope, just as much as it looks to us for military leadership. As illustration, this year the administration is asking for \$7,900 million for research and development on weaponry. Those problems mentioned which do not have to do with war could very possibly be solved by further research success in the nuclear field by using the force in the atom. Authorities on this subject such as Glen Seaborg are so convinced. We are asking for less than 10 percent of that, around \$700 million for peacetime research and development in the atom field, so I would hope inasmuch as your Department not only embraces military problems, but also the broad problems of our relationship with foreign countries, you would give consideration to the relative importance as expressed in the money that the taxpayers are putting up for R. & D. in these two fields.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Senator.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS HANDLING OF PROBLEMS AT U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would also join my colleagues in respectfully commending you for the superb way you handled our problems recently in the United Nations. I was a delegate to the U.N. with Senator Cooper in 1968, and I believe one of the chief reasons we ran into all these problems up there this time is because of the rigid attitude we were taking as late as last year in refusing to think of getting the People's Republic of China into the United Nations. That must have had at least some effect on some of those people who voted the way they did against what we desired.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much, Senator. I think there is one other fact I might comment on, and that is, that the People's Republic of China has established diplomatic relations with a number of countries this year, and as a result of that, those countries switched their votes, and that was just a fact that there was no way to overcome. In fact, a lot of them, in many cases that happened sometime ago. So, there was a considerable number of nations that had established diplomatic relations since the last vote.

Thank you very much.

CONSIDERATION OF BETTER RELATIONSHIPS WITH CUBA SUGGESTED

Senator SYMINGTON. Speaking of diplomatic relations, I notice there are some 18 or 19 Cubans in New Orleans today who will not leave and we will not allow them access to this country because they do not have visas. If it is so important for the United States to improve our relationships in the Far East, as evidenced by the President making a trip all the way over there, not picking a neutral place like Teheran or Yalta, we might give some consideration to better relationships with Cuba, especially as the hijacking continues. I hope you would give consideration to this. Perhaps there is some dichotomy in our approach to the problem of Cuba as against our approach to China.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS AND ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FILED

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I join with all members of this committee in thanking you for a very clear statement on the treaty. I think it will better relations between the Government of the United States and Japan, now that they have entered into this agreement. I note you have filed with the treaty, specific information of the understanding between Japan and the United States on all of the articles of the treaty. Also, you have designated specifically the facilities which would be returned to Japan, and those which we will continue to administer, including the facilities of the Voice of America. You have also included full exchange of notes.

UNITED STATES DID NOT TAKE SOVEREIGNTY

You have already touched on the question of sovereignty, but it is a fact, is it not, that in the peace treaty after the war between Japan and the allied powers, the United States did not take sovereignty of any Japanese possession?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; that is right.

Senator COOPER. So this treaty does not transfer any sovereignty because we never had any.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

TREATIES CONTROLLING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Senator COOPER. Any kind of security arrangements then are controlled wholly by the treaty between Japan and the United States?

Secretary ROGERS. That is right, and this treaty.

Senator COOPER. Now, it becomes applicable to Okinawa.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. The same as is already applicable to the mainland of Japan.

Secretary ROGERS. Exactly.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES UNDER BILATERAL TREATY

Senator COOPER. Then, I will come to an important question at issue. The bilateral treaty with Japan provides in the event of any aggressive action against Japan that our countries will consult and that any action taken by the United States will be according to "constitutional processes."

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think so. Or words similarly. I do not have them in front of me, but that certainly is the substance.

Senator COOPER. I have the text of the treaty here.

Secretary ROGERS. Here it is.

Senator COOPER. It uses the words "constitutional processes."

Secretary ROGERS. Declares that it would act to meet the "danger in accordance with the constitutional provisions and processes."

Senator COOPER. Yes, "constitutional processes."

Well, I think you know we have been considering the question of constitutional processes for several years. At the time these treaties, such as the treaty with Japan, were agreed to by the Senate, many members raised the question as to what the phrase meant, and said "constitutional processes" meant we would not enter into any war without the authority of the Congress. I thought it would be a good time to state that legislative interpretation once again, and I hope you would agree.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I do not want to amend the treaty by any comment I make, but I think that the provisions are quite clear in the treaty itself which would—

RUSSIAN ADMINISTRATION OF NORTHERN ISLAND

Senator COOPER. In the peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Union did require that sovereignty to the Ryukyu Island be ceded by Japan to the Soviet Union.

Secretary ROGERS. I do not—Senator, Secretary Johnson advises me that there has not been any kind, so far as we know, there has not to the Soviet Union.

Senator COOPER. Sovereignty was ceded by Japan to the Soviet Union.

Secretary ROGERS. I do not believe sovereignty was ceded, but the Soviet Union continues to occupy the northern island and that is why there has not been a treaty. Japan has discussed the matter with the Soviet Union on several occasions in attempting to get the Soviet Union to do what we are doing in connection with Okinawa and so far with no success.

Senator COOPER. You are not aware of any disposition on the Soviet Union to return the administration of those islands to Japan?

Secretary ROGERS. No, as far as we know on the basis of our present information, what we have been advised, there is no flexibility manifested by the Soviet Union on the northern islands.

Senator COOPER. I thought it would be wise to contrast the position of the two governments and not to overlook it.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS AND PRESIDENT FOR POLICY CHANGES

I would like to join other members to congratulate you on the effort you made in the United Nations. I think your position was right and honorable, and I do agree with you that having lost an issue we should not move away from our association with the United Nations in any respect.

Senator Church and others have said our association with the United Nations should remain firm. The change in policy in Southeast Asia and the changes that have taken place in our policy in Europe mark a transition from our post World War II policy. I believe that the President and you deserve great credit and honor for the changes that are taking place which we hope will be successful.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I would like to first associate myself with Senator Church in the fine things he said about you and the Department. More especially I wish to emphasize the fact that your tone yesterday indicates that you would not be one of the parties to acts of petulance such as would result from a punitive cutoff of funds to the U.N. It hardly befits the dignity of our country and its place in the world. I have rather a suspicion that many votes were engendered against us precisely by such crudities as the threats implied.

CUT DOWN IN U.S. PAYMENTS TO UNITED NATIONS

Incidentally, I see what you said about our paying too much. I would rather hope that you would save that for another day. You know, as a highly expert lawyer, it is not necessarily what the facts are, it is what the judge thinks they are. The other nations and the world will never write down the fact that we had to cut down where we are paying too much right now. It will simply be charged to petulance and resentment.

Secretary ROGERS. I appreciate what you said. Senator, I think in that connection I should point out that before I made the comment that I made, that you referred to, I pointed out that there are arrearages of \$176 million in the United Nations and the budget year by year has been increasing at a rate that I think is rather difficult to justify, and I think that the American people feel, believe that we may have been paying too much. I did not want to leave the impression that I thought that as Secretary of State I thought we should just continue on this way. What I tried to say as clearly as I could that categorically it was not in retaliation, it was not in that spirit and it should not be. I also pointed out we are a democratic nation. We are accustomed to being bound by the majority view, and the fact that you lose once in a while, particularly when the stand is right, I do not think causes a loss of prestige at all. In fact, I think most of the people in this country—and I certainly think most of the people in Japan—agreed with the stand we took. The fact that we lost is, I do not believe, a great defeat for the United States. I think we fought for what we believed in. And it happened we lost. We lost by a very close vote and I do not think we have to apologize for it or feel we have been defeated as a nation.

Senator JAVITS. I thoroughly agree, Mr. Secretary. I would only hope that we can show our true character by giving notice that we expect the U.N. to enforce all its regulations on everybody, and then to cut, if we have to cut, for a very high and proper policy reason rather than to let these mixed motives prevail now.

U.S. POSITION CONCERNING MAINLAND CHINA AND TAIWAN

Mr. Secretary, I have just one major question I want to ask you. I am going to give you a simplistic parallel and I do it to get you to knock down a stock proposition which is bound to come up. If we are yielding Okinawa to Japan out of our desire to restore the sovereignty over Japanese territory to Japan, to strengthen her position in the world and her national dignity, will not the argument very promptly be made that as Chiang Kai Shek and Mao Tse Tung agree, that Taiwan is part of China, the next thing you know we will be agreeing to yield Taiwan to mainland China? I think the sooner the Secretary knocks that down for the United States, and gives his reasons, the better.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Well, Senator, I did that yesterday in the statement that I made. I pointed out this vote in the U.N. did not in any way change the policy of the United States vis-a-vis the Republic of China. I said our relations with the Republic of China were unaffected by that vote. By that I mean the defense arrangements we have with Taiwan will continue. We will continue to have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and that the vote in the United Nations which really deals with who represents what population, as we see it, is totally unrelated to our bilateral relationship with the Republic of China. We have told the Republic of China that our relations are going to continue as they have in the past. We consulted very closely with them during this whole discussion about the United Nations representation question. I think they feel, in fact, they have advised me that they feel, that we as a na-

tion did everything we could to succeed. They naturally are very disappointed but I do not think they felt we abandoned them in any sense of the word. I think they were very pleased by the aggressiveness of our effort to succeed in the United Nations. So, I appreciate your calling this to my attention, and I repeat that our relations with the Republic of China are unaffected by the vote in the United Nations.

Senator JAVITS. Now, the converse of that proposition is, Mr. Secretary, is it not, that we adhere to President Truman's declaration that we will not in any way join or abet the Republic of China on Taiwan in its designs on the mainland?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. So that our position in both respects must be consistent.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

JAPAN'S FUTURE ROLE IN ASIA

Senator JAVITS. Now, the last question I had is this: We are making a major contribution to Japan's standing and prestige in the world in yielding back Okinawa, and incidentally, I shall vote gladly for that ratification of the treaty.

Now, we are doing that, fine. What do you visualize as Japan's role in Asia as we strengthen her in her national standing?

Secretary ROGERS. We hope and expect that Japan will play an increasingly important role in Asia. I have referred to the military aspects of increased budget for military purposes with Japan within Japan proper, so I will not repeat that.

We expect that our security arrangements with Japan will continue. I think they are—I think their condition is very good now for the reasons I have indicated.

Now, I think, too, that Japan will play, and I hope they will play, an increasingly important role in helping the development of some of the less-developed countries in Asia.

Senator JAVITS. Does that include mainland China?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I would rather put it in broader terms, Senator. [Laughter.]

But we certainly have done nothing to discourage any of the Asian nations from improving their relations with the People's Republic and I think anything of that kind that reduces tensions in the area is desirable and that is one of the reasons that the President is taking the trip that he is taking.

But going back to the question you asked, we see an increasingly important role for Japan in Asia, particularly in the economic aid field, economic assistance. They have committed themselves to a greater contribution to this end over a 5-year period. We hope that they will contribute increasing amounts to international organizations, particularly in Asia, Asian Development Bank, and so forth, so we see down the road a role for Japan which will be more important. That does not mean that we expect to, as I said earlier, withdraw, we are not going to create any vacuum there. We are going to maintain our interest in Asia and in the Pacific area. We are going to continue to play a very important role in the area, but we can see an increasingly important role for Japan to play.

PRIORITY OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND MAINLAND CHINA

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, my last question. In the priorities of the United States in terms of relations with foreign countries, do our relations with Japan rank equally with our relations to mainland China?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, yes, of course, Senator. I think it is a little difficult to compare, to make that comparison.

Senator JAVITS. I think it is very important to the people of Japan.

Secretary ROGERS. It is very difficult to make that comparison. The President has said he considers our relations with Japan as our line of opinion in the Pacific and we worked very diligently for 25 years to create that alliance with Japan which has worked out so successfully.

The fact we are having some difficulty in the economic field is because we are competitors; it does not mean we are unfriendly competitors. We are friendly competitors. The success of Japan is a success we hoped they would achieve. That has been the purpose of our foreign policy vis-a-vis Japan is to help them recover, to help them become an important factor in the Pacific area and they have succeeded and they have succeeded in cooperation with us, and for us for a moment to retrogress in that respect would be a serious mistake. We consider our relations with Japan of the utmost importance.

Senator JAVITS. I thank the Chair. I thank the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

IMPORTANCE OF RATIFYING TREATY

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Secretary, I am, of course, very anxious for the Okinawa reversion treaty to be approved expeditiously. It is in our interest, as you point out, and it is very much in theirs. The diet is meeting and everything we say here is a matter of intense interest in Japan. I have been to Japan 16 times and I know the leaders of all four of the political parties. We discussed this in the delegation about 2 years ago at great length with all of these leaders. There was unanimity in Japan on reversion. Some wanted to go further, but there was certainly unanimity on reversion of Okinawa as an integral part of Japan to be restored as one of the Japanese prefectures.

I was in Japan again in May briefly and I found a growing sentiment of good will toward the United States with regard to the treaty. I have had many visits from Japanese leaders on the same subject. It is my impression that onerous as they may find our new economic policy to be, it is of far greater importance to Japan that we ratify this treaty than that we take any specific particular economic step because economic steps are temporary and can be accommodated to and that is the process that is going on. I have been told by some of the leaders over there that this treaty will go a long way toward making very clear to Japan that we have the utmost friendliness to that country and that we do have, as you say, a great pride in their achievement. If they have been too successful with regard to some of their industries, we have, after what I thought was some delay, moved to rectify that imbalance. I do not think we are doing anything other than helping our overall

relationships with Japan in the total of what we are doing and, of course, I will do all I can to get early ratification of the agreement once it is reported to the floor.

COMMENDATION OF AMBASSADOR BUSH AND WITNESS

On the other matter that involves all of us, we have only the highest regard, which I have already heard some 35 or 40 Senators express, for the work done by Ambassador Bush at the United Nations. We so advised Ambassador Bush. It is a bipartisan feeling. We have also great pride and dignity in the alertness with which you have sought to obtain a difficult result. I think it is regrettable that our NATO allies did not remain with us, for example.

EXPULSION OF TAIWAN FROM U.N. QUESTIONED

I wanted to ask you two particular questions. One, is not Taiwan under the U.N. structure entitled to retain or return to its seat in the General Assembly if it so desires?

In other words, does it not take the two-third's vote to expel Nationalist China from its seat in the General Assembly? The chairman was arguing that yesterday if I understood him correctly. Is that right?

The CHAIRMAN. It was not an expulsion. It does take two-thirds to expel a member. The only question really before the U.N. was the question of credentials, who represented China, a charter member. It was not a question of expulsion. We tried to make it such, but it did not gibe with the legal requirements of the charter.

Senator SCOTT. I wanted to clarify that.

I think the Secretary commented that it was a question of credentials, as to who represented the country of China, which has a seat on the Security Council. Is that not the technical question?

Secretary ROGERS. I would rather not here get involved in the technical. This is a big argument. The Albanian resolution which finally succeeded referred to the expulsion, but it referred to the expulsion of the representatives of the Republic of China, but as I say, I do not think there is any particular advantage in discussing it.

The CHAIRMAN. All I mean to say is, the charter says it takes two-thirds to expel a member; does it not?

Secretary ROGERS. Correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the point I made, that it was not a question of expulsion. It was a question of recognizing who represents the country of China.

Secretary ROGERS. What we said, Mr. Chairman, was that in effect this amounted to the expulsion of the Republic of China and was not a matter that should be decided by a majority vote. Those on the other side said that article 9 did not apply, and this was a question of who had China's seat in the United Nations.

The important question that was voted upon was precisely to decide whether it was, whether it required a two-third vote or required a majority vote. The General Assembly voted 59 to 55 that a majority vote was sufficient.

Senator SCOTT. I was only trying to find out whether Taiwan had to make formal application to return to the General Assembly or whether or not it had certain residual rights, but I will not pursue it if you would rather comment on that at some other time.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I do not think, as I said, I do not know as I want to get into that this morning. I think as far as Taiwan is concerned that it has left the General Assembly and as far as I know they do not have any immediate plans to do anything that I know of.

U.N. PROVISION DENYING VOTE TO MEMBER IN ARREARS

Senator SCOTT. I have had a number of people already raise the question of why the United Nations does not enforce its provision which would deny a vote to a member who is in arrears. We have had a lot of countries with bad credit and worse credibility, behaving contrary to reasonable or logical expectations in the U.N. Does the United States have a position on the provision barring a vote to members who are in arrears after due notice and lapse of time?

Secretary ROGERS. I would rather put it this way, Senator: I think that the United Nations has to get its financial house in order, and I do not say that without taking into consideration the problem that they have, but the Secretary General himself has said that they are on the verge of bankruptcy, and there is an air of unrealism, and as Senator Javits said, I do not want to, I think maybe this is the wrong time to do it because it is going to appear maybe that this is a retaliation, which it is not. I made clear yesterday in my statement that I do not think that way, I do not think we should act that way, but I have said this thing before. I think there is an air of unrealism about some aspects of the United Nations and I think the sooner that they can face up to some of these problems more realistically, the stronger the organization would be.

Also, you know there is nothing novel, it has been said repeatedly over the years, and there have been a lot of studies made about it and so forth, that financing is one of the areas to be faced up to.

U.S. MINIMAL OBLIGATION TO U.N.

Senator SCOTT. What is the minimal obligation of the United States in its contribution to the United Nations as distinguished from its auxiliary organizations?

Secretary ROGERS. I think, and I would want to check on this, but I think our obligation at the moment amounts to 32.9 percent.

Senator SCOTT. That is the agreed obligation, but I mean under the charter, is there not a floor that we are committed to, something like 25 percent?

Secretary ROGERS. I will have to get that answer. I do not think so. The fact is, we have been providing roughly 32.9 percent for general operation of the United Nations, and the specialized agencies approximately, to go with private contributions, approximately about 40 percent.

REVIEW OF COMMITMENTS SUGGESTED

Senator SCOTT. It is about 30 percent to UNESCO and about 40 percent to the Interparliamentary Union, and about 50 percent to the World Health Organization and 80 to 83 percent in some of the other organizations where we seem to be carrying almost the whole burden.

I think the position you take on behalf of the government is, of course, the correct one. We should not act in a spirit of retaliation, but I am certain that I sense in the Senate at this time a feeling that we ought to be reviewing our commitments, that we are after all responsive to the people and that there is an enormously strong popular feeling which may go away or may not. But currently popular feeling is that we are paying too much for a service and participation in international organizations.

I do say that I think if an amendment were offered at this time to cut down some of our contributions, I am afraid it would pass. This is apart from the fact that we ought not to be in a retaliatory spirit, but there is something called enlightened self-interest and that enlightened self-interest I think raises the question as to how far we can go in an organization where countries with a population of a hundred thousand can, without paying their bills, rejoice in the opportunity to consistently vote against the United States.

CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SENTIMENT TOWARD UNITED NATIONS

This worries me because we have just put in the very substantial amount of \$250 million for Pakistan relief, which I support and would support on the floor, but I think even the relief funds are now in jeopardy. I raise these questions for the record so that those who are reporting back to the United Nations will know that there exists no real friendly sentiment for the United Nations in the Senate of the United States today. There is the cautionary sentiment expressed by Senator Cooper and Senator Javits that we should not proceed to tear down these organizations, that they have a utility, but there is a strong sentiment in the Congress, and I am bound to say, and I would not be faithful to my own responsibility if I did not, that almost any motion at this point to cut down funds for the United Nations would pass the Senate.

For this reason, I rather would actually cool the whole foreign aid bill right now if I had to, but I think some of it is regrettable. I do not think we ought to act in anger or out of pique, but I am fearful of the situation as it is presented and I think many of these tiny countries, rejoicing in the fact they have the same vote and therefore the same power in the General Assembly as the United States, did not fully realize that they have affronted popular sentiment in America, and while the Government has not suffered a loss of prestige, the people of this country have suffered an enormous sense of angry reaction. I do not know how we are going to counter that.

I do not see how you could have said other than what you did, but I am bound by my own conscience to say what I said.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I expressed these views to many foreign ministers that I talked to, and I think one of the things that was difficult about it was that they did not believe us because we have in the past always done probably more than our share. Any humanitarian matter that develops, we take the lead. Everyone has gotten accustomed to the fact we are going to do the right thing, and I do not think there was a realization of this public attitude.

I did everything I possibly could. I am sure the minutes of these conversations will reflect it, but I do not think they believed it.

Now, I also—

Senator SCOTT. I think that is probably the correct estimate, but they had better believe it because I have never voted against the U.N. before and I am fully prepared to do it now.

Secretary ROGERS. I think that the other argument that is troublesome so far as the American public is concerned is that some of these very small nations just admitted really in effect were not helpful in the expulsion issues. In other words, expel a government that represents 14 million people, some of them on the first vote, or at least that vote gave that effect.

Senator SCOTT. The effect of the United Nations is that the entering member of the freshman class is immediately given an opportunity to expel one of the five ranking members of the senior class. That is what they joyfully did.

They had better realize that this kind of thing has consequences, and I am one who is prepared to vote those consequences under reasonable and proper circumstances because I think the American people are paying an enormous sum of money which is not appreciated throughout the world. I would include some of the NATO countries in that, particularly the one that influenced three votes against us.

Senator COOPER. Will the Senator yield for one moment?

Senator SCOTT. Yes.

CUTTING U.N. AUTHORIZATION ADVISED AGAINST

Senator COOPER. He is the leader of our party in the Senate, so I say this with all due respect. I think it would be very bad if we cut our authorization to the U.N. at this time. Such an action would be considered a petty retaliation and it would not help to strengthen our position, influence, or power at the U.N.

It is true, of course, we pay more than anyone else. The original scale of payments was first based on GNP at the beginning of the U.N. Since then the Soviets and many other nations have moved up in wealth. Yet they do not subscribe any more. But I think it would be bad if we took such adverse action against the U.N. on this bill. I cannot believe we will.

These inequities have been with us for years and efforts have been made to correct them. I think that there should be more equitable burden sharing of the cost of the U.N., but in a constructive way and not to show ill feeling through petty retaliation at this time. That is my own view.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott, are you through?

Senator SCOTT. I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. Mr. Chairman, I previously apologized to the Secretary that other responsibilities took me to other committees this morning, but I will not only read but study his statement.

TREATY AND ADMINISTRATION POLICY COMMENDED

I would like to say that I happened to be with Senator Scott and I think Senator Case when we had discussions with the Japanese political leaders 2 years ago. Since then I do recognize this treaty has its legal and moral basis in the Peace Treaty Conference and in the representations of our Government through several administrations. I think it is in the best interests of Japan and in the best interests of the United States. I think ratification of this treaty will be another bright chapter in the administration's foreign policy, which includes revitalization of NATO, SALT talks, initiatives in the Middle East, winding down the war as best we can in Vietnam, and the new China policy. It seems to me that whatever happened in the U.N. last night seems to me will be in the shadow of these achievements.

GETTING U.N.'S FINANCIAL HOUSE IN ORDER

I was recalling when I first came to the Senate in 1962, Mr. Secretary, the first issue I voted on. I think, pertaining to foreign policy was a \$100 million bond for the U.N. I do not now whether it was a guarantee or whether we agreed to purchase these bonds or not, but it was the unanimous opinion then and all the talk was, "Let's do this and then we will get the U.N.'s financial house in order."

I would say that the time is overdue to do it, but I am not constrained to say with proper respect to all those who differ that if, in the climate now, we cut the appropriations or support of the U.N., I personally would feel very much like a little boy who had told his neighborhood companion he could not play in his back yard any more or ride his bike. I think it is the wrong track, but there are 10 years, in my experience in the Senate, where we ought to have been about the business of trying to straighten out the affairs and find a way of financing the U.N.

I thank the Secretary for his statement and I thank the chairman.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, could I make one comment about Senator Scott's remarks?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, I hope you do. I was going to pursue it. [Laughter.]

I welcome it.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as long as you were going to ask me about it, will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. No, go ahead and then I will ask you.

CARE IN ACTING AS NATION RECOMMENDED

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think that we have to be careful how we act as a nation because it can be misunderstood, and it could set back our foreign relations to a considerable degree.

For example, we have to be sure that we do not sound as if we are saying, "Well, we pay more for the United Nations and therefore we expect them to do what we want." And every time we lose, we say we are paying too much and we did not get the votes. That is not what I am saying.

I think we have got to be careful about that. We believe in the democratic principle. Now, I think that the point you are making, Senator Scott, about the mini states is a very valid point. Some question about the wisdom of having very small nations that represent 130,000 people, that never show up.

Senator SCOTT. They are not mini states. I call them hot pants principalities. I do not think they amount to very much.

Secretary ROGERS. We have four small groups this year. Now I know those are very valid questions that the United Nations should face up to, which they have not done. They have just ignored them.

On the question of financing, I think the principal question is whether the United Nations should continue to expand at the rate that they have expanded in terms of personnel and activities, a lot of which I think is probably nonproductive, and I think those things should be looked at, and before I said anything in my press conference, I carefully weighed the pros and cons.

Now, it is true, as Senator Pearson says, we have to be careful not to act as if we are retaliating.

OPPORTUNITY FOR U.N. TO FACE UP TO REALISM

On the other hand, this is a good opportunity for the United Nations to face up to realism. If we miss this opportunity, if the United Nations does not ask itself how is it going to pay its bills, if it runs out of cash at the first of the year, then the organization itself will be seriously damaged. So, whereas I think it is important not to conduct ourselves in a retaliatory spirit, and act as if that is really what we are doing, I think it also would be a shame to miss this opportunity to make it clear to the United Nations we expect more realism, particularly in the expenditure of money, particularly when we are providing so much of it, and also, you know over the years most people do not pay much attention to the United Nations and there is not any way to focus attention on it.

Now we have a way of focusing attention on it and I think they ought to ask themselves, "How are we doing, we have the problem of selection of a new Secretary General, a very important matter. Obviously there should be some administrative efforts made to improve, many administrative improvements that are needed. So I think it is a good opportunity for the United Nations to face up to it, it does not mean right now or immediately, but certainly during the next several months to get its own house in order, and I think it would be too bad to miss that opportunity.

On the other hand, I think we, the United States, should be careful we do not conduct ourselves in the petulant manner of, we are going to get even with you because you did not vote for us.

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question to clarify it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

U.S. FINANCIAL COMMITMENT IN VIEW OF U.N.'S GROWTH

Senator SCOTT. With the admission of the People's Republic of China, with its 800 million people, would it in any way operate to reduce the commitment of the 200 million people of the United States to the United Nations financially?

In other words, as we add more millions or more thousands of people, do we continue to pay the same amount or do we get any benefit from the growth of the U.N. in other areas?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think that is one of the questions that the United Nations has to ask itself.

Then also, I think they have to ask themselves, is the formula for payments that was established some time back, are they going to continue indefinitely or should they be altered depending on the circumstances when other nations are growing and succeeding economically, should the formula be the same as it was some time back?

These are realistic questions that I do not think have been asked, at least they have not been answered and I think it is a good time to answer some of them.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you.

MAJOR PARTS OF U.N. ARREARAGES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I think much that you have said has great value. I am glad attention is being focused on this, but let's explore a little more of this. You mentioned arrearages. Actually the major parts of these arrearages are not with the small countries. Do not the major parts of arrearages consist of peacekeeping operations with which certain large countries did not agree, such as Russia, France, and others?

Is that not where a major part of the arrearages developed?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not because the little countries did not pay their dues. It was because of extraordinary expenditures of which we approved. The Russians and the French and I think some others did not, and they declined to pay those special assessments. Is that not the major part of the arrearages?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is not quite fair. It sounds as if all these small countries are just not paying their dues.

Secretary ROGERS. Oh, no; I did not mean to suggest it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean you did. I am trying to clarify the situation.

Secretary ROGERS. No; you are right, you are right.

ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN U.N. IN PRESENT BILL

The CHAIRMAN. You said they are spending too much money. I regret you said it because, what are they spending too much money for? Many of these activities in this present bill, and the Senator from Pennsylvania, I think, has in mind the bill because we had this argument yesterday, do not go to the ordinary operations of the organization of the United Nations. These are special projects which we ourselves have had a very special interest in.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. UNICEF and others are not United Nations. We call these voluntary, peripheral, or associated organizations: The UNESCO, the ILO. Recently we had this flap about the ILO. Mr. Meany disagreed with the policy of a person who was appointed there because he did not like him, and he persuaded the House to cut it. But this is not the U.N. as such. It is not the regular operations.

ARREARAGES OTHER THAN ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES

On the regular operations, leaving out all of the associated activities, these arrearages are not all this great. If you leave out the peacekeeping and the Congo and the Middle East—these were the major ones where large costs were accrued. They were activities in which we ourselves were particularly interested. Is that not right?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to get it in perspective.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean to understand it, and I certainly agree with what the Senator from Kentucky said. I think it would be a disaster for us to now say, "Well, you did not vote as we liked, and therefore we are going to cut out our contributions."

If we want to stop UNICEF or want to stop UNESCO, of course, that can be done. That does not destroy the U.N. The actual financing of the U.N. organization as such is not in this foreign aid bill.

RETALIATION, IF VALID, SHOULD NOT BE AT U.N.

In this foreign aid bill, there is a lot of money for constituent members of the U.N. If there is any validity at all to retaliation, it should not be at the U.N. It should be country A, B, C, D, the boys that we have been paying all these years and then they do not reciprocate. Some of them are the largest recipients of our aid.

I personally, not because of the way they voted—I tried in the committee before they voted to cut these because I think we cannot afford it. Just as you said a moment ago, our circumstances have changed. Why do we not recognize that when we come to continuing the foreign aid bill? There are a number of countries, who are the biggest recipients under the bill. You can see who they are. If there is any disposition to cut it, I do not know why the logical way would not be to say, "Well country A, you did not come through. We have been giving you \$300 or \$400 million a year. It is you that we have a quarrel with, not with the United Nations, if there is anything to that argument at all.

Is that not the logical way to look at it, if there is anything to it?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

DIFFICULT CASH POSITION OF U.N.

Mr. Chairman, on the—it is true that the arrearages are consisting of items some of which you mentioned, but it is also true that the United Nations is in a difficult cash position.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Secretary ROGERS. Just cash, they just have difficulty in paying the bills.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

LOOK AT PRESENT AND FUTURE U.N. FINANCING SUGGESTED

Secretary ROGERS. What I am suggesting is not any one field. What I am saying, there should be a good hard look taken at the financing, present and future financing.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sympathetic with that, too, because we have had for many years and up until recently, bragged every day about being the richest and most powerful and the most moral and finest people in the world. People took us at our word, and we assumed this large part of the financing. We had a larger part after the war. It used to be about 40 percent, and now we have it down to 32 percent.

I agree with you we have overextended ourselves. We wasted our money on vain foreign policies that go back 25 years, long before this one, and it is high time we corrected it. But it would most unfortunate to take it up in the atmosphere that we are retaliating against a vote.

Secretary ROGERS. I agree.

IMMEDIATE CUT IN FUNDING U.N. AFFILIATED ACTIVITIES UNTIMELY

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to it. I think we ought to review that just as we ought to review these other expenditures and commitments we assumed when we were not in such financial difficulties. There is nothing wrong with that, but it would be most untimely, if today or tomorrow, on the floor of the Senate in an atmosphere of retaliation, they undertook to cut some of these items in the bill, which really go not to the U.N. as an institution, but to specific activities affiliated with the U.N. That is what apparently is in the air, and I would hope you would knock this down as best you can.

I think it would be very bad for you and for the administration and the country if that is what takes place. I am afraid it may.

There was a motion made yesterday to recommit. The motion was withdrawn. I heard this morning purely by rumor that that motion may be renewed or a motion to table may be brought up. If it is, it will certainly be interpreted as a response to this U.N. vote.

There is nothing else I think that could account for it, and I hope you would lend your prestige to discouraging such an effort.

I think you agree this would be bad; do you not?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I tried to make my position clear. I want to reserve judgment on any particular action of the Senate until I know more about it. I made my position quite clear, I think.

I do not think we should act in such a way that it would appear we are petulant or retaliatory.

QUESTION OF EXPULSION

The CHAIRMAN. There is confusion about this question of expulsion. After all, for 25 years approximately, we ourselves insisted there was only one China, and it was a question of who represented it. We said Chiang represented it.

I do not tax you with it, but this really goes back to a mistaken judgment made around 1944 and 1945 under the auspices of a democratic regime with Mr. Patrick Hurley and Mr. Dean Acheson playing an important part. We are now paying for a mistake policy. It finally became so unrealistic that the whole world had to recognize it.

I think you did the right thing. You did the best you could and the Government did. I certainly am in no way criticizing what you or the administration did, but eventually things catch up with us. It has been utterly unrealistic to say there is one China, and Chiang Kai-shek represents it, and you finally have been cut up with that fact.

There is no use crying about it. I think it is a healthy thing it has been recognized. I think it is unfortunate the compromise even in the face of that unrealistic policy could not be worked out. I certainly think it would have been better if it could have been, but it was not. I predict it will be.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD U.N.

I reiterate, you said, and I agree, attention has been focused on the U.N. It is an important institution, and it would be a further and disastrous mistake for this country if it, as the Senator from New York said it so well, were to do it petulantly.

When we dominated it, when there were 53 members and 20 we could count on, we never complained about paying all the bills. It was our organization. They did as we pleased. They jumped through the hoop whenever we said jump. Now that it has changed and we have to play it on a more democratic basis, it is foolish to take this as a great rebuff to the country as such. It is a development which is a natural development and I think it can be made a very effective organization if we accept it and go on to work with it as we should.

The truth is when we lose control of it we begin to lose interest in it and that is not the way we should ever have been. We should have greater interest in it and we should have, I hope, greater interest now. I also agree with you now after reexamination under proper circumstances we must decide whether this distribution of costs is a proper one. I think we have paid a larger part than we should, certainly under our present circumstances.

INCONSISTANCY OF ADMINISTRATION POSITIONS ON U.N. AND AID BILL

I feel the same way about the foreign aid bill, and I did before, when it was in committee. I think it is too big in relation to our capacity to service it. The administration on that point does not agree with me.

Why do you not feel we are giving too much money to some of these countries, which we have been for a long time, because of our changed circumstances, instead of coming and asking us for more than we gave in 1970? This is inconsistent. Why pick on the U.N.

After all, it is small potatoes compared with what we are paying out in bilateral aid. The arrearages are still small. It is \$172 million. My goodness, we are giving one little country alone of 2 million people over \$400 million in this bill on the floor—one little country of inconsequential significance, in my opinion.

So there ought to be some sense of perspective. Why should we spend \$500 million on Laos. Laos did not vote with you either, but that is what you are proposing to spend. [Laughter.]

I mean it is an absurdity, and then to talk about \$172 million being a significant amount. We could take that out of Laos and pay all the arrears and we would not miss it, but I think it has gotten all out of perspective because of the fact we lost a vote.

What if we did that in the Senate? If every time we lost a vote we would all quit, there would not be any Senate. I lost lots of votes and I do not like it either, but I stay along.

Secretary ROGERS. You gave me a great opening.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Unfortunately, that is for the people of Arkansas to determine. [Laughter.] And they are very discriminating people.

ATTITUDE OF U.S. PUBLIC TOWARD U.N. VOTE

I do not agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania that all the people are up in arms over this vote. I have not taken a poll, but I have not had any avalanche of telegrams protesting from Arkansas. I do not think they are all that upset about it. I think they are much more interested in ending the war and getting on with your business of Peking and Moscow.

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING

Incidentally, you said you met with the President and Mr. Kissinger. Can you tell us when the President is going to Peking? You should have found that out this morning.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, you do not expect me to tell you when he is going.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? I think it would be very interesting. [Laughter.] It would give us all something to think about and be encouraged.

Secretary ROGERS. That is why I am not going to tell you. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I hope it is soon.

U.N. SPENDING ON ORDINARY OPERATIONS

You do not really think the U.N. is spending too much on its ordinary operations as distinguished from whether or not we are paying a higher percentage of that cost than we ought to because of our depleted Treasury?

Secretary ROGERS. I do not want to go into it now. I think there are many things that I can say later on.

I agree with you in overall terms of our budget it is not that significant. It is more a sense of unrealism about some facets of the U.N., and I do not—this is not the time to go into it, I do not want to now, but as you know, I support the United Nations, always have; President Nixon does. We think there are many improvements that should be made.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Secretary ROGERS. And we think this is a good time to start thinking about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. I agree with all of that that you said. It is a good time to review it. We have neglected it, ignored it, and I agree with what you said. This is a good time to begin to review it but not to take the kind of action that indicates we are kind of petulant about it and we are no longer going to play ball with it.

Secretary ROGERS. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that and I would also say the bill on floor is not the one which is directed at the institution at all, and its specific activities, which we are for.

Thank you very much.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

U.S. POLICY CONCERNING TAIWAN SELF-DETERMINATION

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, under the changed conditions now affecting Formosa or Taiwan, would the Department begin to give some thought to American policy as to self-determination on Taiwan? After all, we have lived with the situation of no elections there, 2 million from the mainland running the country, et cetera. I would hope that Formosa would be admitted to the U.N. one day as an independent, integrated country, with self-determination by its people.

It will be perfectly understanding if the Secretary does not choose to say anything.

Secretary ROGERS. I think this is a bad day to answer that question, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. OK.

INTERFERENCE IN CHINESE PROBLEMS ADVISED AGAINST

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I did not mean to say anything further, but we had some very good hearings before this committee by some of the most thoughtful scholars on China. They warned us, and I think it is true, that we cannot be expected to solve all these problems. The United States really is not competent in many respects to solve them. This is the sort of thing they advised us. I think the record is very clear that you are going to have to leave this to the Chinese. The Chinese are not new people. They are not these newcomers. They are very sophisticated people in both Taiwan and on the mainland. I have great hopes they will be able to accommodate themselves to the realities of the situation, and I think if we mess in it and try to tell them what to do and just how to regulate this relationship, we only make it more difficult for them to do it.

That was the advice of some of the best witnesses we had who were really the most knowledgeable people in this country on China, and I think it is good advice. I think we have been too much of a busybody for too long and we cannot get out of the habit. I think you are correct to leave it.

I would not attempt to do it and I think you are correct. There was already a piece in the morning paper. We cannot prove it, but there are reported to have been secret negotiations, between leaders in Taiwan

and in Peking. Of course I do not know whether that is true or not, but in any case, thank you very much.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think you need worry about the committee's attitude on the Okinawa reversion.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1971

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Symington, Spong, Cooper, Javits, and Pearson.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This morning the committee continues its hearings on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, focusing on the military and security implications of the treaty. Some concern has been expressed that reversion of Okinawa may place burdensome restrictions on the use of U.S. bases which in turn could adversely affect the U.S. ability to meet its treaty commitments in Asia. The potential effect of the treaty on the security interests of the United States is a matter which the committee must examine in connection with its review of the treaty. We are pleased to have before us to testify on these questions Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard and Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, who is the U.S. High Commissioner in Okinawa.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID PACKARD, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Let me say I am pleased to be here to be able to testify on this issue which I consider to be very important, almost an historic event.

We are here today to testify in support of the agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

This agreement, as Secretary Rogers has described to you, is the culmination of long and detailed negotiations between our two governments, as called for by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in their joint communique of November 21, 1969. That historic understanding between the President and the Prime Minister, that it was

time to return the administrative control of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands to Japan, in turn represented the fulfillment of a longstanding U.S. policy.

TIME HAS COME FOR REVERSION

As you know, Okinawa represents a major element of the U.N. defense posture in Western Pacific. We have nearly 50,000 military personnel deployed on Okinawa, and this includes important units of all the branches of the Armed Forces. The combat and support forces on Okinawa are a major part of our forward based military units in East Asia. With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, these forces will remain on Okinawa and continue to be ready to perform their missions. However, instead of being able to use these forces with the freedom equal to that available from U.S. territory, our military activities will be subject to the understandings we have with Japan, the host country. While it is much easier and ideally preferable not to be concerned with the wishes or views of a foreign government in the conduct of our Armed Forces, when these forces are deployed in the territory of a foreign country, it is only realistic to expect that certain conditions must be agreed to. To date, Okinawa has been an exception to this general rule because of its unique history, first as war-conquered territory, then as an area administered by us under the treaty of peace with Japan. But the time has come to normalize this aspect of our relations with Japan and with the people of Okinawa, and to respond to the desires of the Japanese and Okinawans for reversion.

Simply stated, after reversion our military forces on Okinawa will be subject to the same conditions as govern the military forces we have deployed in Japan proper. These conditions are set forth in the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements. It is an excellent treaty which serves well the security interests of both the United States and Japan. We currently have over 30,000 military personnel stationed in Japan who, like their comrades in Okinawa, serve as an important element in our Western Pacific defense posture.

PRIOR CONSULTATION FORMULA

Under the terms of the mutual security treaty and related exchanges of notes, we can use our Armed Forces for the defense of Japan and for other military activities related to the maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East, except that under the prior consultation formula we need the affirmative approval of the Japanese Government prior to making major changes in the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to Japan, major changes in their equipment, or using our bases in Japan for direct military combat operations, except for the defense of Japan.

In practical terms, these three limitations mean that, first, the United States cannot initiate a substantial buildup of U.S. forces in Japan without that Government's permission. However, small units can be deployed into Japan, and this happens on a fairly regular basis, with only notification to the Government of Japan. In terms of moving our

units out of Japan, there is no requirement for prior consultations with the Japanese Government.

The second category of prior consultation concerns major changes in military equipment. The Japanese insisted on this provision as assurance that the United States would not act contrary to the wishes of the people of Japan. This of course applies to the storing of nuclear weapons in Japan. That is, the United States cannot store nuclear weapons in Japan without the permission of the Japanese Government. Following reversion this same condition will apply to the Ryukyus.

The third category of the prior consultation formula requires the approval of the Japanese Government prior to undertaking military combat operations from our bases in Japan, and on Okinawa after reversion. Thus, for example, launching of air strikes directly against an enemy target from bases in Japan would require prior consultation and approval. The deployment of combat aircraft from Japan to operate in a zone of hostilities, however, would not. Similarly, the myriad of logistic support operations provided to our combat forces from facilities in Japan and Okinawa would not and do not require prior consultation.

ABILITY TO OPERATE BASES AFTER REVERSION

Even though subject to the consultative procedures outlined above, we do not believe that reversion will significantly impair the effectiveness of our military forces on Okinawa as an important element in our Western Pacific defense posture. This statement is premised on shared United States-Japanese security interests and in turn a general agreement on the purposes for these forces, as embodied in the mutual security treaty. At the time of Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington in November of 1969 he declared that the security of South Korea was essential to the security of Japan. He also stated that the security of Taiwan was most important to Japan. Thus, in the event of a contingency we believe we would, if necessary, be able to operate our bases in Japan and Okinawa effectively.

SUPPORT OF JOINT CHIEF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been consulted fully during the Okinawan negotiations and have participated fully in these negotiations. Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is away from Washington today, asked me to assure you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the agreement and urge your favorable consideration of it.

Let me turn now to the functions now performed by our military forces on Okinawa which will be turned over to the Japanese and the provisions of the United States-Japan Status of Forces Agreement which will apply to Okinawa after reversion: Specifically (1) the mission of providing for the immediate defense of Okinawa, (2) the civil administration of Okinawa, and (3) the application of the United States-Japan Agreement Regarding Facilities and Areas and the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan.

IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION

As part of the November 1969 joint communique, Prime Minister Sato agreed that Japan would gradually assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa. One aspect of the negotiations with Japan leading to the agreement before you has centered on the modalities for transferring that responsibility to Japan. An associated arrangement was negotiated by Vice Adm. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., the military representative to the Okinawa Negotiating Team, and representatives of Japan's defense agency. This defense arrangement describes the ground, maritime, and air self-defense forces that Japan will deploy to Okinawa following reversion.

The objective is for the Japanese self-defense forces to assume primary responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa by July 1978. We believe the defense agency's plans for the forces to be deployed to Okinawa are adequate to fulfill the defense mission to be assumed.

These negotiations have been characterized by a spirit of close cooperation which typifies the relationship between the United States and Japanese defense establishments.

When the Japanese self-defense forces assume the defense mission of Okinawa, this will make available about \$35 million a year for other DOD missions. This assumes that some of our forces will be withdrawn and assigned to other missions, and to the extent that is done we will be able to realize savings in the neighborhood of \$35 million a year.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AFTER REVERSION

As you know, the Defense Department, through the Executive Agent of the Department of the Army, administers the Ryukyu and Daito Islands for the U.S. Government. The current High Commissioner, Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, U.S. Army, a very able officer, is here today as a witness for this committee. He is prepared to explain in detail the specific plans for relinquishing to Japan our administrative functions and responsibilities for Okinawa, and what effect reversion, or a denial of reversion would have on the daily operations of our bases on Okinawa. I would simply like to state here that upon reversion the U.S. Government, and specifically the Department of Defense, will cease to have any responsibility for the civilian affairs of Okinawa. The governing of Okinawa will become the responsibility of the Japanese Government and the new Okinawa Prefectural Government.

Transfer of administrative responsibility will mean a savings to the United States of about \$20 million per year. This was the cost of running the U.S. Civil Administration including its aid appropriations prior to the decision to begin reversion negotiations. The figure has been sharply reduced already in anticipation of reversion.

CHANGES RESULTING FROM APPLICATION OF U.S.-JAPAN SOFA

Upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the United States-Japan Agreement Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan will apply to Okinawa as well as to Japan

proper. This agreement is commonly referred to as the United States-Japan SOFA. Let me briefly outline some of the changes that will result from the application of this agreement and the Mutual Security Treaty.

We are currently leasing the private land which we use for our bases on Okinawa. Under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty and the related SOFA, Japan provides to us free of charge our required facilities and areas. Thus the land rentals on Okinawa which currently cost us over \$10 million a year will be assumed by the Japanese Government upon reversion.

The current practice on Okinawa is for the military services to hire directly the required local national employees. In Japan, however, we have a master labor contract with the Japanese Government for the provision of the required local national employees. Thus our local national employees in Japan are hired indirectly through the Japanese Government. This system has the great advantage of reducing tremendously labor disputes with our local national employees in Japan. The annual wage negotiations we have on Okinawa will be terminated, as the wages and benefits we pay under the master labor contract will be essentially the same as those paid by the Japanese Government to its own employees. It also means, however, that at reversion our employees on Okinawa will receive an increase in wages and benefits, as the wage scale in Japan proper is higher than it has been in Okinawa. This will create some additional costs to the Defense Department, although eventually we would probably have had to pay the higher wages since the gap in wages between Japan and Okinawa has been steadily closing.

We currently have on Okinawa various programs to provide training to the military personnel of other Asian allies. Under the terms of the SOFA, these programs for the training of third country nationals will have to be terminated. The major unit affected by this requirement is the U.S. Army Pacific Intelligence School. This school will be relocated to Guam, or another location in the Pacific, before reversion takes place.

MILITARY FACILITIES TO BE MAINTAINED AND RELEASED

The final subject I would like to discuss with you is the military facilities we will maintain on Okinawa and those that will be released to the Government of Japan.

First, we will maintain all those facilities essential to the performance of the missions of our military units deployed on Okinawa. Those facilities that will be released are either no longer required by our forces, or will no longer be required once, and as, the missions for the immediate defense of Okinawa are transferred to the Japanese self-defense forces.

The largest facility being returned to Japan is Naha Airport. As the airport is the civilian air terminal for Okinawa as well as a U.S. military base, and as the U.S. military activities there have been reduced to a U.S. Navy ASW patrol and utility squadrons, it was judged appropriate to agree to the Japanese request to release the facility completely. The financial arrangement worked out with the

*Savings
\$35 million*

*Savings
\$20 million
per year*

Land \$10 million

Japanese Government is covering the costs of relocating these naval flying activities. The relocation of these Navy units will not impact on their mission performance.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would note that Okinawa is a small island roughly 70 miles long and 5 miles wide, with a population of about 1 million—100,000 Americans and 900,000 Okinawans. The smooth functioning of our bases there depends upon the continued goodwill of the Okinawan people, for it is impossible to totally isolate the bases from the rest of the island.

The Okinawan people strongly desire to be reunited with Japan after a separation of over 25 years. It is a desire that we, as Americans, can completely understand. Responding to the desire of the Okinawans to rejoin Japan, and of the Japanese who wish to welcome back the Okinawans, is an historically unprecedented act but one which is in keeping with the best in our political heritage. I urge you to consider favorably and quickly this agreement for the reversion of Okinawa.

Now, Mr. Chairman, with your permission I think it might be well to allow General Lampert to make his statement, then we will respond to questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Proceed, General Lampert.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES B. LAMPERT, HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

General LAMPERT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is also a privilege to appear before you today to testify in support of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

WITNESS' THREE POSITIONS IN OKINAWA

I serve in three positions in Okinawa, which I have held since January 1969. As High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, I am responsible for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands under the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense and, by delegation, to the High Commissioner by Executive Order 10713. I exercise these responsibilities through the U.S. Civil Administration, or USCAR as it is commonly known. My primary missions as high commissioner are to promote the welfare and well-being of the people of the Ryukyus and to maintain a favorable environment for the effective operation of our military bases, which are located for the most part on the main island of Okinawa.

As the local representative of the commander in chief, Pacific, Admiral McCain, I have the responsibility for coordinating local activities of the military services, reporting directly to Admiral McCain in Hawaii.

My other position is commanding general, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands, in command of the Army Forces in the Ryukyus, under the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, in Hawaii.

RECORD OF U.S. ADMINISTRATION

The United States has administered the Ryukyu Islands since the end of World War II in 1945. The record of our administration is one in which I believe our country can take considerable pride. The Ryukyuan people have an effective and responsible government of their own, the government of the Ryukyu Islands, which is based on democratic principles and which for the most part runs its own affairs. They have a freely elected chief executive and a legislature as well as a court system of their own. Economically, the Ryukyu Islands have achieved one of the highest standards of living in Asia; and the economy has continued to grow each year at an impressive rate. A full-scale educational system, together with extensive social and welfare facilities have also been developed under the U.S. administration.

OKINAWAN'S DESIRE TO JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION

There is little doubt, however, that the great majority of the people of the Ryukyus, who call themselves Okinawans but consider themselves Japanese nationals, strongly wish to return to the administration of their motherland, Japan. The Ryukyu Islands were an integral part of Japan until 1945. Reversion to Japan at the earliest possible time has been repeatedly requested by their elected chief executive and by unanimous resolutions of their legislature, and there have been few expressions of a desire to remain under U.S. administration. The statement by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in November 1969, that the United States and Japan would enter into negotiations with a view to accomplishing reversion some time in 1972 was welcomed by the Okinawan people as a response to their strong desire for reunion with Japan.

OKINAWAN ANXIETIES AND OTHER PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS

We are now in a complex and difficult period, marked by Okinawan uncertainties and anxieties over how reversion will affect them personally. Many Okinawans would like to see greater reductions in our bases, but at the same time they fear that there will be large-scale reductions in the jobs provided by our bases without other jobs being available. Our Okinawan base labor force has reacted strongly to substantial curtailments in our work force required by reductions in the U.S. defense budget. The Okinawan economy and standard of living have been heavily dependent on our bases as well as on U.S. economic assistance. Our economic aid has been sharply reduced and will of course terminate on reversion. Okinawans are concerned that Japan may not continue to provide the economic assistance required to maintain and eventually raise the economy to levels comparable with the rest of Japan. In recent months they have been apprehensive that they might suffer serious economic losses as a result of recent U.S. measures to protect the dollar and Japan's decision to float the yen.

Serious problems and tensions have also resulted from occasional unlawful acts of U.S. servicemen and from accidents involving Okinawans and Americans. Strong resentment against our exclusive U.S.

criminal jurisdiction over military personnel has increasingly found expression. This is because Okinawans believe the time is approaching when the United States should no longer possess police and other powers of government.

The presence of military chemical munitions on Okinawa, which have just recently been completely removed, was another major factor contributing to Okinawan feelings of anxiety and tensions.

There is a vocal minority which vigorously opposes the presence of our military bases and which takes every opportunity to exploit these existing tensions and the various activities of our bases which unavoidably cause inconveniences and irritation, such as jet aircraft noises and military use of farmlands.

The return of the civil administration to Japan and the application to Okinawa of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Japan are expected to reduce sources of friction and tension and to provide a more stable and favorable basis for the future. Our military bases and U.S. forces personnel will be placed in the same situation, with the same status and privileges, as in mainland, Japan, including the application of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the SOFA. This is expected to remove a major source of Okinawan feelings of unequal treatment. In addition, as has been stated by Secretary Packard, relations should improve when base workers, whom the U.S. forces have been hiring and dealing with directly, are employed by the Japanese Government under an indirect hire system as in Japan. The Japanese Government will become responsible for public safety outside our bases, including police, fire protection, and traffic control. Under the SOFA, the United States will be relieved of responsibility for the leasing of privately owned land, which has long been a sensitive issue in our relations with the Okinawan people.

WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ORDERLY TRANSFER

The Japanese Government has cooperated closely with us in the handling of various difficult problems that have arisen and in the working out of arrangements for a smooth and orderly transfer of administration.

Following President Nixon's and Prime Minister Sato's November 1969 communique, the United States and Japanese Governments established special governmental machinery to negotiate detailed reversion arrangements and to initiate reversion preparatory measures. The United States/Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo was charged with overall responsibility for conduct of the negotiations. The preparatory Commission in Okinawa was established "for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights * * *"

As the administrative authority in Okinawa, the United States took the lead in presenting to the Preparatory Commission in July 1970 a comprehensive plan to facilitate the transfer of administrative responsibility to Japan. The essence of that plan was that the transfer should, to the largest practicable extent, be gradual and progressive, avoiding an abrupt and painful shift at reversion. As a framework for a pro-

gressive relinquishment of U.S. civil administrative functions to Japan, under continued United States overall authority, the period until reversion was divided in the plan into three phases. The first was from the date of the plan's adoption until a United States-Japan Reversion Agreement had been signed; the second was from then until necessary legislative support was obtained; and the third was from then until reversion day.

Pursuant to this plan, the United States presented in the preparatory Commission specific proposals for the full or partial relinquishment to the Japanese Government of a number of functions in phase one. Most of these functions were USCAR functions of advice and assistance to the Ryukyuan Government.

We are currently in phase II of the transfer plan, when we have proposed the relinquishment to the Ryukyuan Government of several operational civil administration functions. During phase III we plan to relinquish to the Ryukyuan Government additional operational civil administration functions, such as administration of quarantine, customs and other related controls. During that final phase many actions will be taken in connection with the turnover of U.S. public corporations, the sale of our controlling interest in the Bank of the Ryukyus, and other aspects of our civil control preparatory to the complete relinquishment of that control to Japan on reversion day.

EXPECTATION OF OKINAWAN PEOPLE AS TO DATE OF REVERSION

Although the Okinawan people seem aware that reversion will not take place without the approval of the U.S. Senate and the Japanese Diet, they nonetheless generally expect that reversion will occur by July 1, 1972 if not earlier. Chief Executive Yara and the GRI Legislature have expressed the desire that reversion take place on April 1, 1972. There can be no decision on the date of reversion, however, until after the treaty is approved by the Senate and the Diet. We foresee a number of practical problems in preparing for a smooth reversion and for planning purposes we are thinking in terms of July 1, 1972.

OKINAWAN REACTION TO DELAY BEYOND JULY 1, 1972

Should reversion be delayed much beyond July 1, 1972, I believe we would see a strong adverse reaction from the Okinawan people. I would expect rapid intensification of anti-American sentiment and activity which could make it very difficult to exercise U.S. administrative authority and to maintain a favorable environment for our bases and American personnel. The longer the delay the greater the adverse reaction which is to be anticipated since it is evident that U.S. bases in Okinawa require at least the acquiescence of the Okinawan people.

CONTINUED U.S. MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE ON OKINAWA

While a minority of Okinawans continue to demand immediate and complete removal of the American bases, the majority appear to accept the fact that the United States will continue to maintain a military base structure on Okinawa. Irritations and problems will of

course continue to arise from the presence of our bases and from two people of such different language and culture living so close to each other in a small, densely populated geographic area. The Okinawans, nevertheless, are basically warm, friendly people. I continue to find in my frequent travels throughout the Ryukyus and in my personal contacts with Okinawans substantial goodwill toward the United States and an appreciation for what the United States has done since World War II to promote the welfare of the people of Okinawa. Individual Okinawans frequently go out of their way voluntarily to express these sentiments to me. I think that with intelligent management of our bases we can preserve these friendly sentiments.

I believe that with the continuing support of our Japanese ally, and with a smooth reversion, our military bases on Okinawa will continue after reversion to be of major value to the United States. Because of the strategic location of Okinawa, our extensive and highly developed complex of military bases there are extremely important in U.S. defense arrangements. They contribute in a major way to our ability to fulfill U.S. commitments to the security of Japan and our other allies in the Pacific.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

MISSION OF BASES AND THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY INVOLVED

I don't know which of you to ask. Perhaps the general, would be best. Would you describe in a little more detail what you consider to be the mission of these bases and what threat to our security is involved?

Secretary PACKARD. I will let General Lampert describe the specific mission. I may have a comment also.

General LAMPERT. Mr. Chairman, on Okinawa there are bases of all of the U.S. military services. The U.S. Army in Okinawa, of which I am the commander, operates primarily a large logistical base, a very fine physical plant, constructed over the years, consisting of extensive warehouses and shops and storage areas, staffed partly by American military personnel and largely by Ryukyuan civilian employees.

The Army in Okinawa also has certain additional organizations, including antiaircraft defense missile forces which will give way after reversion to the Japanese self-defense forces.

The U.S. Air Force has two large air bases. The principal one is Kadena Air Base, one of the most efficient and largest air bases in that part of the world. Stationed at Kadena are tactical fighter aircraft, jet tanker aircraft, and various administrative aircraft.

The U.S. Air Force also has the overall responsibility for the air defense of Okinawa, and in that role they control the Army air defense forces. The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa has the largest service complement. They brought back to Okinawa from Vietnam nearly 2 years ago the 3d Marine Division, which is stationed on Okinawa; it is supported by Marine helicopters and like aircraft stationed at a Marine air base on Okinawa, the Futenma Airfield.

The U.S. Navy in Okinawa has the smallest representation of the services. It operates limited shore facilities for naval vessels calling at

Okinawa and also provides support for naval antisubmarine warfare patrol craft.

The total military strength today in Okinawa, American military strength, is approximately 50,000 Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. 50,000 in the service. I understood there were about 100,000 Americans.

General LAMPERT. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, there are about 50,000 Americans in uniform, counting their families, and about 2,000 American Government civilian employees and their families. Then adding into that the American business community and their families, brings the total up to about 85,000.

ANTICIPATED SAVINGS AFTER REVERSION

The CHAIRMAN. I noticed you said that you anticipated \$35 million in savings. Later you referred to \$20 million in addition. Is that \$20 million in addition to the \$35 million or included in it?

Secretary PACKARD. That is in addition to the \$35 million. The \$35 million is our estimate of the savings that we will have when the Japanese Self-Defense Forces take over the defense of the island. This involves taking over some surface-to-air missiles and some fighter squadrons. It is just a round figure. Assuming that that takes place means we will have to take out about 2,700 people in order to achieve that saving.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the \$35 million. Then the \$20 million is in addition, from civilian administration costs?

Secretary PACKARD. That is civilian administration cost.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that you estimate an overall savings of some \$55 million a year? Is that about right?

Secretary PACKARD. There will be some modification of that. One of them is the compensating factor which has to do with the increased labor costs that we talked about. How much that is going to be is speculative. As I have already said, I think we would probably have had to make those increases in some reasonable time in any case. It is estimated to be about \$17 million a year.

U.S. INVESTMENT OTHER THAN PAYROLLS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an estimate of what our total physical investment is in these installations other than the payrolls? What have we spent on the actual installations upon the island?

General LAMPERT. The approximate investment, Mr. Chairman, over the years is something over \$600 million in money expended. This, of course, is not an up-to-date index because of price increases in the years since, but that is the approximate total investment.

MISSION OF INSTALLATION AND THREAT INVOLVED

The CHAIRMAN. Coming back to my first question, I am not quite clear as to what the mission of this installation is. What is the threat against which it protects us? Is it solely for the protection of Okinawa as such or Japan? Could you describe this? After all, we are not mili-

tary men. We would like to have some idea of why we want to maintain these bases at all.

Secretary PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, these bases have to do with our responsibility in terms of the security of the western Pacific area, and I think it has to be looked at in that larger role. I think it has to be looked at also in terms of the importance of deterring any military activities there. Korea, of course, is one of the important areas, and this facility did have an important role to play in our involvement in Korea. The forces located there include a marine unit which would be available to move into whatever area it might be required. It was returned to Okinawa from Vietnam.

NEED FOR INDEFINITE MAINTENANCE OF BASES

The CHAIRMAN. I understand its utility in Vietnam, in the case of hostilities such as we have been going through, but I was assuming that this particular activity is coming to an end. I was wondering about how you foresee the need for the maintenance of these bases indefinitely, which, of course, this reversion provides for. There is no termination now provided for on the continued occupation of the bases; is there?

Secretary PACKARD. I think, Mr. Chairman, the best way to look at this question as of now—

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to get you to explain.

Secretary PACKARD. We are going through a period of substantial change.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope so.

Secretary PACKARD. And that involves substantial change in relation to a friendly country like Japan. Our President, in opening the door to the People's Republic of China, is taking a new step. I don't think we can assess at this time the level or the length of time that our military presence will be required there, but I do think it is very important for us to maintain our military presence at this time, until we are able to work out an arrangement which may be dictated.

I think we are going through a very important change in our foreign policy, one that I thoroughly support, and I think particularly at this time it is important for us not to give any signals that we are renegeing on our responsibility in that part of the world. What that responsibility will be in the long run depends upon the development of events; it will depend upon the role that Japan may take, it will depend upon what we may be able to do in working out better arrangements and a different kind of a policy with the People's Republic of China. We are at the end of two decades, as I see it, that reflect the post-World War II period in our foreign relations. I think we are beginning a new era, and I think we have to be very careful in moving at this point because we don't know yet what problems we are going to face.

The CHAIRMAN. So it is fair to say we are in a transitional period. While this is indefinite, you can't say it is 10 years or 20 years or 5 years. It is a transitional period and you feel it is necessary to maintain these bases?

Secretary PACKARD. I think that is precisely the case, Mr. Chairman, and I think reversion is an important step in the implementation

of President Nixon's doctrine. I think we are indeed moving from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiation and I think we must do this from a position of strength. I think we must recognize that these changes are really momentous changes, not only for us but for other people, and we must be very careful about the rate at which and the degree to which we give any signals that we are not going to take our share of responsibility on a worldwide basis in the future.

MEASUREMENT OF RYUKYU ISLANDS' STANDARD OF LIVING

The CHAIRMAN. General, I was interested in your statement that the Ryukyu Islands achieved one of the highest standards of living in Asia. How do you measure that? What is the basis for that statement?

General LAMPERT. Our civil administration has amassed statistics over the years and has attempted to follow trends and draw comparisons with other countries in that part of the world, and I might cite two examples. In the last 10 years, the average personal per capita income in Okinawa has increased from about \$264 to about \$925, something over a threefold increase.

The CHAIRMAN. What period of time?

General LAMPERT. In 10 years. And, in the same period, the gross national product of the Ryukyu has had a similar increase from \$265 million in 1962 to an estimated almost \$1 billion in the current fiscal year. I base my statement on statistics—those statistics and similar statistics, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary PACKARD. If you compare this on the per capita gross national product, it is the second highest, second only to Japan in that whole area. It is a very high level. One of the easy ways to remember it is that there are a million people and the gross national product is a billion dollars. So it is a thousand per capita.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO RYUKYU GNP

The CHAIRMAN. Is this primarily due to our expenditures?

General LAMPERT. Mr. Chairman, our expenditures have played a gross national product which our expenditures represent has decreased major part in the continued development. The portion of the total each year. There has been a substantial increase in business imports, there has been a very large increase in economic aid given by the Japanese Government, there has been an increase in foreign investment. Our current contribution to the gross national product we estimate at something on the order of 25 or 30 percent.

To be more specific, Mr. Chairman, we estimate that the presence of our military bases today contributes 25 to 30 percent of the gross national product.

DIRECT U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Have we given them economic assistance aside from the cost of operation of the bases? I mean any direct economic assistance?

General LAMPERT. Yes, under the so-called Price Act, which the Congress enacted some years ago, we have contributed economic assist-

ance each year. The largest contribution was \$17½ million in fiscal 1970.

The CHAIRMAN. 1970?

General LAMPERT. Yes, sir; and it has been decreasing since then.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECT OF PULL OUT ON U.S. INVESTMENT IN OKINAWA

You mentioned a few minutes ago that one of the contributing factors to their gross national product, I believe, is the American business or American investment in Okinawa. How will that be affected as we pull out, the extent to which we do?

General LAMPERT. Mr. Chairman, Senator Sparkman, the reversion agreement signed in June was accompanied by a letter to the American Ambassador signed by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Aichi, providing detailed assurances with respect to the future status of American business in the Ryukyus. This letter was developed following very detailed and intense negotiations and discussions over nearly 2 years, and I believe it is correct to say that in our view this letter and the accompanying assurances provide a solid basis for continued operation of American business in the Ryukyu Islands.

I should say, sir; that there will, of course, be additional constraints placed on American business due to the operation of the body of Japanese law, since the Ryukyus will become a prefecture of Japan and there are a number of specific business considerations which are important to the business communities that have not yet been settled and are still under discussion. We believe that the outlook is favorable for their continued satisfactory operation.

EXTENT U.S. BUSINESS DEPENDS UPON U.S. PRESENCE

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder how much of that business depends in a substantial degree to the presence of American activities there?

General LAMPERT. Sir, a good deal. A large part of the American business in Okinawa is made up of small business concerns, service establishments, soft drink establishments, electronic dealers, electronic repairmen, dry cleaners, businesses of that type, and they do depend to a considerable extent on the presence of the American bases and the families of the American military men. However, a very large portion of the American business activity there is oriented toward the local population and toward markets and business contacts outside of Okinawa.

For example, there has been extensive investment in the last 3 years by three American oil companies which are now constructing refineries on Okinawa and they in general will receive oil from elsewhere, generally from the Middle East, and refine it in Okinawa and then ship it from there to markets in that part of the world.

Senator SPARKMAN. They use that as a refinery base?

General LAMPERT. Yes, sir.

MAINLAND JAPANESE IN OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. Are there very many Japanese in Okinawa now? I mean from the mainland.

General LAMPERT. Sir, they are a rather small element of the population, but there is a segment of the population who are Japanese citizens. There has been for a number of years a small Japanese Government Liaison Office established in Okinawa which has grown considerably since the agreement between the Prime Minister and the President in 1969, and this office is a base for the people with whom we work in planning for reversion.

There are a fair number of Japanese businessmen. There are other Japanese residents in Okinawa for other reasons, a wide variety of reasons, but altogether they make up a small part of the population.

WILL GOVERNMENT BE CARRIED ON BY OKINAWANS OR JAPANESE?

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the government be carried on by the Okinawans or by Japanese sent there from the mainland?

General LAMPERT. Well, sir, the Ryukyu Islands until the end of the war, were one of the 47 prefectures of Japan and operated under prefectural government system, and they return to that status. The present government, we understand, will be temporarily continued in office after reversion as the prefectural government, and we understand that very shortly there will be new elections and that the elections will be contested by candidates, all of whom must be residents of Okinawa prefecture.

I believe we just don't know, sir, the numbers of Japanese national government officials who may be posted in Okinawa or in each of the Japanese prefectures. It is my understanding, as is true in our States, there are local offices representing various ministries and agencies of the national government, and I presume that sort of thing would develop.

Senator SPARKMAN. It would be the same structure generally that prevails in other parts of Japan.

General LAMPERT. That is correct, and we believe that the prefectural government will be an Okinawan Government.

PROPORTION OF U.S. FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN FROM OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. In what proportion are our forces being withdrawn from Okinawa? I understand, of course, we continue to operate bases, but I suppose some part of the strength will be taken out. Is that right?

Secretary PACKARD. Well, of the 50,000 troops we have there, there will be a rather small part taken out because of the particular reversion requirements. It has to do with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces taking over the defense responsibility for Okinawa and, as I have indicated, that is on the order of 2,700 people. We will move the Army Intelligence School somewhere else, which will be another small

amount. I guess, in round figures, about half of the forces there relate to the Marine unit that is stationed there. That will stay.

Senator SPARKMAN. There is a Marine division there?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir; a Marine division. That division will stay. The other activities, the logistic activities, hospitals, transportation, antisubmarine warfare unit, will be moved from Naha—we don't know exactly where the move will be—but there will be not a substantial reduction in the some 50,000 military personnel as a result of reversion.

We are continually addressing the presence of the U.S. military forces all over the world in relation to the larger considerations, and what reductions will occur beyond these minor ones that I have indicated in relation to reversion is, I think, a question we have not really addressed yet.

CONDITIONS JUSTIFYING U.S. PRESENCE IN OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, the provisions relating to Okinawa were contained in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That gave the United States the right to exercise the control over Okinawa that we have been exercising and to have the forces there and, if I recall correctly, there was some statement that said so long as the threat remains to peace in that part of the world, something along that line. Am I right in that?

Secretary PACKARD. I don't remember the precise wording. We can look that up for you. But I think the intent was that the Japanese were to retain what was called "residual sovereignty." In other words, we did not consider this as captured territory that would be permanently taken away from Japan.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

Secretary PACKARD. So I think our position here is entirely in accord with, as I said in my statement, the long-standing policies of the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, you think the conditions that justified our being there continue at the present time?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, I think they do, and particularly as I have indicated in response to an earlier question, because of the changing times we are going through I think it will be a great mistake to make a substantial change in the deployment of our forces in Okinawa at this time.

STATUS OF U.S. FORCES IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask one more question.

General, I suppose this goes to you. The status of U.S. forces in Okinawa will be the same as prevails throughout Japan now; is that right?

General LAMPERT. Yes sir; that is correct. It will be exactly the same as prevails throughout Japan, since Okinawa—

Senator SPARKMAN. That was set up by a treaty between our countries, I believe. Certainly it was an agreement.

General LAMPERT. The Status-of-Forces Agreement, I wasn't there at the time, sir, but that accompanied the Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1960.

Senator SPARKMAN. My recollection is that we first set up a status of forces in Europe and then we extended it and made the same agreement in Japan. That will continue just as it is on the mainland now?

General LAMPERT. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Senator COOPER. I want to say the testimony of Secretary Packard and General Lampert has been very informative and helpful. It follows logically Secretary Rogers' testimony yesterday.

RELINQUISHMENT IS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL, NOT SOVEREIGNTY

I think it is to the credit of our country that in the Treaty of Peace following World War II with Japan, signed with Japan and our allies, that the United States did not ask Japan or did not require Japan to cease sovereignty over any of its possessions. We are not returning sovereignty, we are just relinquishing our administrative control; is that right?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir.

SOVIET UNION'S REQUIREMENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Senator COOPER. I must say in contrast that the Soviet Union required Japan to cede sovereignty over a large part of its possessions, the Kurile Islands and others.

U.S. FORCES LEFT IN OKINAWA

You say there will be 50,000 of our forces left in Okinawa?
Secretary PACKARD. A little under 50,000.

U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

Senator COOPER. What is the number of our forces in Japan proper?
Secretary PACKARD. It is about in the neighborhood of 30,000, a somewhat smaller number than Okinawa.

U.S. FORCES IN TAIWAN

Senator COOPER. How many are on Taiwan?
Secretary PACKARD. I do not have that figure now. We believe it is 9,000.

Senator COOPER. Ninety?
Secretary PACKARD. Nine thousand.

U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Senator COOPER. How many are now left in Korea?
Secretary PACKARD. We have about 40,000 there. We had 60,000. As you know, we have made a significant withdrawal from forces in Korea.

Senator COOPER. The forces in Korea have been reduced?
Secretary PACKARD. Yes, there were 60,000 before the reduction.

IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA AREA IN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

Senator COOPER. Has Okinawa been considered the most important area in defense arrangements in that part of the Pacific?

Secretary PACKARD. Okinawa is a very key location, simply because of its geographical location. It is centered so that it is within range of South Korea. Of course, it is below Japan, and if you look at a map, it is an excellent place to locate military capability that might be needed in that part of the world.

There is no place that is ideal, but Okinawa has been, in my view, a very key position and I am very pleased we are going to have it available in the future.

Senator COOPER. No one knows what is going to happen, but in the event that Taiwan made some arrangements with mainland China, would this increase the importance of Okinawa as a base to the United States?

Secretary PACKARD. I think we have to assess the importance of Okinawa in relation to any possible developments in that part of the world. We have, fortunately, a number of good friends still remaining in that part of the world, and those friends are important.

Our base in Okinawa is just one of the elements in an important position we have, and, as I have said earlier, I think it is extremely important, particularly in this period of changing times in our international affairs, that we maintain a position of strength in the Western Pacific.

JAPANESE ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. BASES IN OKINAWA

Senator COOPER. General Lampert has mentioned anti-American sentiment in Okinawa and opposition to our bases there. In Japan proper, is there a similar sentiment for the removal of our bases and opposition to our bases, in Okinawa?

General LAMPERT. Sir, though I do not serve in Japan, I visit there frequently and I am, I think, relatively well-informed about the matter you refer to. Of course the American bases in Japan are far more dispersed than is the case in Okinawa, so as you suggest, the amount of attention to them in Japan is much less than is the case in Okinawa.

There is very great interest throughout Japan in Okinawa. This has been the case since I have served in Okinawa, and I think it reflects the importance of the Okinawan issue in the minds of the people of Japan. So that, whenever anything occurs in Okinawa which is sufficiently important to be picked up by the press in Japan, it attracts strong attention.

In addition to that, as I am sure you know, last year by agreement between the two governments, the Okinawans were invited to elect representatives to the Japanese Diet. Those gentlemen now have taken their seats, and they provide a voice in the Diet, an Okinawan voice. They are very effective in bringing Okinawan matters before the people of Japan and the government.

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER U.S. FORCES

Senator COOPER. With respect to the status of forces agreement that Senator Sparkman referred to, jurisdiction, criminal jurisdiction over American forces will now adhere to the courts there with respect to offenses committed off the bases?

General LAMPERT. The status of forces agreement, as I understand it, permits the Japanese Government to assume jurisdiction over most but not all cases of offenses committed by U.S. military personnel off base, off duty. However, the location of the offense is not controlling.

Senator COOPER. Suppose there was an offense against a Japanese on one of our bases by a member of the Armed Forces, would that offense be subject to military jurisdiction or to civil jurisdiction?

General LAMPERT. Sir, I am sorry, I just do not know. I will be glad to try to provide that information.

(The information referred to follows:)

JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

The U.S.-Japan Status-of-Forces Agreement gives the Japanese Government the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over most but not all classes of offenses committed by U.S. military personnel, whether committed off base or on base. The location of the offense is not controlling. The U.S. retains jurisdiction over all offenses that: (1) arise from an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, (2) are solely against the person or property of another member of the U.S. armed forces or a member of the civilian component or a dependent, or, (3) are solely against the property or security of the U.S. The Japanese have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses punishable under Japanese law. In those cases, however, the Agreement provides that the Japanese will give sympathetic consideration to a U.S. request for waiver of the Japanese primary right to exercise jurisdiction. So far experience in Japan with requests for waiver has been more than satisfactory. In the latest year for which statistics are available, the Japanese granted 87 percent of our requests for waiver of their primary right to try U.S. military personnel. Of the cases, the Japanese did try, 82 percent were sentenced to a fine or reprimand, 14 percent were sentenced to suspended confinement and only 4 percent were sentenced to confinement unsuspended.

Senator COOPER. Whatever is provided for Japan would be provided?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, the same situation as in Japan would prevail.

There is always a good deal of concern by the local citizenry, and that is a continuing problem. But I think we have had no serious problems in Japan. I do not anticipate that we will have any great difficulty in Okinawa, but, at the same time, I think we need to expect that there might be some problems in this regard.

Senator COOPER. Just a few more questions.

RIGHT TO REDEPLOY FORCES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION

In your statement, Mr. Secretary—perhaps the General could also respond to this—you talk about the third category of the prior consultation formula which requires the approval of the Japanese Gov-

ernment prior to undertaking military combat operations from our bases in Japan and on Okinawa after reversion. Thus, for example, launching of air strikes directly against an enemy target from bases in Japan would require prior consultation.

This is the sentence I want to ask you about:

"The deployment of combat aircraft from Japan to operate in a zone of hostilities . . ." Does that mean that while an aircraft could not launch a strike from Okinawa, an aircraft could be sent from there, deployed in another country, another area.

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, we have the right to withdraw forces without prior consultation, so we could take an air unit which was stationed in Okinawa or stationed in Japan and move that unit to Korea, to Taiwan, to any other place that we might choose, without having to get permission from the Japanese Government.

At that time, that unit could then engage in whatever activities were appropriate. It is simply that the use of the bases in Okinawa, as in Japan, to fly combat sorties would not be permitted without the agreement of the Japanese Government.

U.S. LOGISTICAL ACTIVITIES IN OKINAWA

Senator COOPER. In essence then, it is a logistical base?

Secretary PACKARD. We are supplying material to Southeast Asia from Okinawa. We will be able to continue to do that under the terms of the agreement.

We are repairing the equipment in Japan now and, I guess, also repairing equipment in Okinawa.

General LAMPERT. Yes, and that will be allowed under the reversion agreement.

PRINCIPAL BASE SUPPORTING U.S. FLEET

Senator COOPER. What is the principal base of the support of our fleet?

General LAMPERT. I believe it is Yokosuka, just south of Tokyo in Japan. The base is not in Okinawa.

Senator COOPER. Okinawa is not the principal—

General LAMPERT. There is a small naval support base in Okinawa, but it has limited facilities for ships.

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Senator Javits?

EFFORTS TOWARD CONTINUED GOODWILL OF OKINAWAN PEOPLE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I have just one or two questions I would like to ask the Secretary and the general.

I think the whole point is contained in one sentence of Mr. Packard's statement. He says:

The smooth functioning of our bases there depends upon the continued good will of the Okinawan people.

This, it seems to me, is the whole essence of what we are talking about. I agree that reverting or ceding back Okinawa is a far-sighted magnanimous political act. I am very pleased to be U.S. Senator of a country which is capable of such statesmanship.

The security aspects on Okinawa are very important if we are going to continue there at all. I would like to ask both of you gentlemen to answer, in whatever detail you think is appropriate, how the reversion—and the way in which the reversal works, continuing a large number of U.S. personnel, one-tenth of the population on a small island, continuing U.S. military administration, but substituting Japanese civil administration, including the turning over of the airport which is an important item—how this complex will work in terms of better relations between the U.S. personnel, and the Okinawans? Second, whether there are any suggestions you have in that regard to further enhance that. What we can do about American activities on the island which would be the most conducive to good relations? Of course, this would have to be juxtaposed to the relations which exist, which, as the general and Senator Cooper have indicated, show some strength between the Okinawans and the Americans.

Secretary PACKARD. Senator Javits, let me give you perhaps a general answer to this question.

I think General Lampert has been there and has a more specific understanding of the problem.

I think we have to recognize that this reversion agreement will eliminate some of the things that have been present in the situation and provide, at least in the short term, a more attractive environment for our presence.

In the long term, I think we have to recognize that our presence in Japan, just as our presence in any other country, is going to be determined by the extent to which our interests coincide with the interests of Japan. In other words, I think any country has to put its own self first in considering its international relations. The extent to which the Japanese people perceive that it is to their advantage to have us there as a strong friend and cooperative ally, I think that will be the necessary condition for our continued presence. I think that is the overlying fact we have to assess in terms of not only this presence in Okinawa but also in terms of our presence in any other foreign country, which, in the final analysis, is dictated by the same general consideration.

I would like to have General Lampert talk about some of the specific issues.

MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATELY GOOD RELATIONS WITH OKINAWANS

General LAMPERT. Senator Javits, I think I would first specify that it is going to require continued effort on the part of all of the American authorities and the American people there in the future, to hope to maintain adequately good relations with the local people. I think the reversion will produce some very beneficial immediate effects.

I hope, as I mentioned in my statement, that our management there in the immediate future is intelligent enough to capitalize on this favorable immediate effect and carry it forward.

If I recall, sir, I think that the mere fact that we give up our control of the civil government is going to have a very beneficial effect with respect to the self-esteem and pride of the Okinawans. There are specific factors which have been alluded to which will also help.

The American military man who gets into trouble off base, off duty, will be subject to Japanese law. This will meet a long-standing Okinawan complaint.

As a military commander, I am convinced that it will make the young military man all the more careful of his conduct when he is off base, because he knows this is a possibility.

We now employ directly some 25,000 Ryukyuns who work for us, and in industrial labor relations we deal with them directly.

The Japanese Government, after reversion, will employ these people for us and the direct relationships will be between the Japanese Government and the workers and their union organizations, so that we will be able to step back from the seats right at the table to at least be in the second row. I think that is going to be beneficial to us.

We are relinquishing certain land. You referred to the Naha Airport. Speaking now strictly from the point of view of local relations, this is beneficial, because Okinawa is a small island. Over the years we have occupied something like 25 percent of the total land on Okinawa, and it has just always been a very sensitive issue; at any time that we can return some land, it is beneficial.

With respect to how we will try to insure that Americans behave themselves in such a way as to contribute to good relations, this, of course, is just the essence of the job of the military commander. We all work at it all the time in every way we know how, and I know our successors will continue to work at it. We certainly do not always succeed. We frequently fail, when unfortunate events occur. However, in many ways, by instruction of newly arrived young soldiers and airmen and marines on local customs, emphasizing the great respect that the family enjoys in the Orient for example, the particular importance in the Orient of courtesy with woman, all of these things we try to make clear.

We endeavor to maintain recreational facilities on base so that to some extent this will reduce the propensity to go off base and look for entertainment and perhaps get into trouble. All of these things which any intelligent military supervisor has to do, we must continue to do and work on it every way we can.

EFFORTS TO BE USEFUL TO COMMUNITY IN OKINAWA

Senator JAVITS. Just one other question, General.

My own experience and that of others who have similarly served has always been where you make people useful to the community, the community enjoys their presence.

We have tremendous means regarding public works and many other things, even moving picture shows. Would you wish to tell us anything about whether we do intend to try to make life happier for all of the Okinawans through the fact that we are there, so that they are happier there, so instead of feeling we are a military presence and a necessary evil—

General LAMPERT. We have a very extensive community relations program, Senator Javits. We have any number of high school bands whose band instruments have been purchased and donated to them by American military units.

Two weeks ago, before coming here, I spent 3 days in the southern Ryukyu Islands where people in a number of villages had very severe damage from a recent typhoon, many small thatched houses totally destroyed. We have some of our Green Beret troops down there now, building new houses for these people. It is a very inspiring experience, I might say, to see these sergeants—one sergeant in particular involved in a little work group, told me that the little Okinawan lady about 80 years old, who was going to live in this house after it was finished, the house they were building, was temporarily camped out with some neighbors, and he said she brings us tea and cookies every 2 hours to make us work hard.

There has been a great deal of this sort of thing and it certainly has been beneficial.

The extent to which that can be continued after reversion, sir, I am sure will depend on the views and the wishes of the Japanese Government and prefectural government. We know it will take place, because Americans are generous people and they do it, but formal civic action programs will have to be reegated to accord with the wishes of the Japanese.

Senator JAVITS. Are we going to be activists or passivists in this regard? Are we going to go out and originate and think up ideas and try to get the Japanese authorities to let us go ahead and do it so the local people know we are trying anyhow, or are we going to sit around waiting to be invited?

General LAMPERT. Sir, I do not expect to be there, but I would bet that we will be activists. We always are.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, you will probably be in command, what do you say?

Secretary PACKARD. Well, I would say certainly we will be activists and I think our experience is, particularly in the last 2 or 3 years, that we find more and more of our military people are anxious to get out and take a more active part.

We have had some trouble in some areas getting this idea over as firmly as I thought it should be. They thought they should not waste any energy on anything except their primary mission. But I think we have made great progress in all areas here in the United States, as well as overseas, in this regard.

Senator JAVITS. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, by saying unless we have locked compounds, the more we live in association with the people, the less you have to emphasize this particular concern. I hope very much that we will take that lesson to heart and that we will be very keen cooperators, community-minded citizens, and boosters for the Okinawans. That is the way to get along. I hope our people will do that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. General, it is pleasant to see you. I have one line of questioning.

IGNORANCE OF U.S. POSITION CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA

Regardless of whether we do or do not have nuclear weapons on Okinawa, is our position known to anybody in the government of Okinawa outside of—

General LAMPERT. Our standard response in all discussions in answer to all questions with all foreigners, and this includes of course all officials of the government of Okinawa, is that we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons nor do we discuss the subject with them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does that include the highest people in the government of Okinawa?

General LAMPERT. That is including the highest people.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is this also true of our position in Japan?

General LAMPERT. Sir, I am not qualified to comment on that since I do not serve in Japan.

Senator SYMINGTON. So whatever the position is with respect to nuclear weapons, if any, in Okinawa, the people in the government of Okinawa are ignorant of that position. Correct?

General LAMPERT. They have been given no information in response to any question; yes, sir.

EFFECT OF SECRECY ON PEACETIME APPLICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Senator SYMINGTON. I worry about all this secrecy because as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard knows, we are asking for \$7.9 billion for defense research and development, and less than 10 percent of that amount is being requested for the peacetime applications of nuclear energy. If experts in the administration are right in what they are telling us, re this latter field, it might solve the problem of adequate energy, perhaps the greatest problem we have today.

Our requirement for energy, electric power has doubled every decade for four decades. This might also solve the problems of pollution, of clean fresh water, and not only handle waste but recycle it. So one might say that in the power which lies in the atom could well be the hope of a peacetime world. But we have surrendered this whole subject with so much secrecy that the people do not know just how much we have slighted these problems as against the problems of weaponry. When you find great universities, with budgets running almost to a billion dollars a year, half of which comes from the Federal Government, hundreds of millions of dollars to run one university; then when you see people from those universities come back here and defend in open session weaponry and gadgets which many of us do not think is needed for our security, you wonder why we do have all of this secrecy, why we cannot break it out, so the people will understand what we might be able to do in these peacetime fields. That is why I asked the question.

REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA

Secretary PACKARD. Let me just say this: I believe Secretary Rogers said "yes" in response to the question. "Will nuclear weapons now on Okinawa be removed on reversion day?" I am going to put it in these terms, if you wish. While agreeing with what the general said is our policy, I can assure you that if there are nuclear weapons on Okinawa, they will not be there on reversion day.

SECRECY CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTIONED

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, but we have also developed a sudden and commendable interest in the People's Republic of China being better friends with us. If we are going to take those weapons off of Okinawa, for example, and this is strictly hypothetical, and put them in other countries based on recent events at the United Nations in New York, we are not solving the problem of more and better friends. I cannot understand why we have so much secrecy about these weapons when just about everybody now knows about the nuclear art.

Since the Smythe report came out in the mid forties, there has been no reason for all this secrecy. It may have helped some munitions makers, also those who could be overemphasizing various types of weapons instead of making decisions as to which one is the best and so forth; but there is no question about the fact it has seriously retarded peacetime nuclear effort. Have you any comments?

Secretary PACKARD. I would agree, Senator, this is an important issue and I assure you we give consideration to all of the things you have alluded to.

I think in terms of the subject we are discussing today, however, that this is a separate issue. We have essentially agreed to do what I think is necessary and proper in terms of the reversion agreement, and I do not believe that what we have done here in any way limits or commits us to whatever we may want to do in terms of the things you are talking about.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, this is the Foreign Relations Committee and we are interested in our relationship with all countries.

Somebody wrote not too long ago that we must have credibility to obtain consent, and must have consent to achieve democracy. The longer we put up with unnecessary secrecy to the extent we have in this field, the more we are going to regret it.

Secretary PACKARD. I am sure you know, Senator, we are taking some steps in the general direction of trying to reduce the secrecy. We have not gone far enough to know all the problems, but I think we recognize there is something worthy of consideration in this area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Pearson?

Senator PEARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General, I think your testimony is essential for the ratification of this treaty, which I think is in the best interests of Japan and our country, too. Most everything has been covered.

PRIOR CONSULTATION

Let me see if I understand the essential element of your testimony. The reversion treaty will place our military presence in Okinawa under the mutual defense treaty which involves prior consultation on the number of troops, types of weapons and military operations, to some extent. I think in your testimony you made reference to the fact that

some communique or note of the heads of government had indicated that the Defense Department would have no question about prior consultation, which is an affirmative consent, as you say, as to Taiwan or Korea.

Does the Department of Defense have any question about prior consultation as to Indochina or as to the Philippines?

Secretary PACKARD. Well, Senator Pearson, I think that while there has been some indication that consent would be forthcoming in relation to Korea or Taiwan, indicating that there is some common interest there. We have to assess this question in the longer terms that I have alluded to. It is going to depend entirely upon what the mutuality of interest is at the time.

I think the Prime Minister was addressing the question as he viewed it then, and I think we must recognize that those conditions might change and recognize that there may be some constraints after the agreement that were not present before the agreement. But I am confident that the mutuality of interest between the United States and Japan is such that we can work well under this arrangement, just as we have worked well under the arrangement which governs our troops now stationed in Japan.

Senator PEARSON. Particularly so since we have a legal and moral obligation to go forward with this treaty, I suppose.

U.S. SAVINGS AFTER REVERSION

I sort of mentally added up substantial savings, \$35 million in military costs and, as you said, \$20 million in administrative costs and an additional \$10 million on land rent, as I recall.

Subtracting higher wages, we really get a substantial savings of perhaps \$60 million?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir.

Senator PEARSON. Or something in that range. Is that correct?

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Obviously there has to be some consideration as to what is a fair arrangement on reversion and we have taken into consideration two things:

One, a cash payment, which is \$320 million: and, two, these savings which accrue, as you have listed, over a period of time. I think in terms of the fact we have had these bases for a long time and the fact we have some mutuality of interest in being there, that this is in every way a fair arrangement, both for the United States and for Japan. I am quite satisfied with it.

PROTECTION OF U.S. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

Senator PEARSON. The only other issue that I recall that is going to be raised has to do with the protection of American commercial interests. I understand that has been worked out as far as you know. Perhaps we should have asked the Secretary of State this yesterday.

Secretary PACKARD. That has been worked out in what I believe to be an entirely satisfactory way. I cannot assure you there will not be some minor irritations, but the Japanese Government has given the people who are now there the assurance that they can continue to oper-

ate in about the way they have been. I think this is an entirely satisfactory arrangement and, as far as I know, the people involved are satisfied with the arrangement.

Again, there may be some minor irritations here and there but I think, all in all, it is a good arrangement.

Senator PEARSON. I thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Spong?

Senator SPONG. Thank you.

IS EXPANSION OF JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES EXPECTED

Yesterday Secretary Rogers was asked: Is the administration policy to encourage Japan to modernize or expand its Armed Forces and do you expect an expansion. He answered "Yes."

Do you expect an expansion of Japan's military forces?

Secretary PACKARD. We would expect an expansion of Japan's military forces.

I think the responsibility that they have in taking over for the defense of Okinawa, is in a sense an expansion of their military forces. They are constrained by their constitution in that they cannot develop or deploy military forces for use outside of the defense of Japan, for use overseas. Over the years, military forces in Japan has had as one of their roles aid and assistance in the defense of Japan. As Japan can pick up a larger share of this responsibility with a larger capability, I think it is entirely appropriate, and we would hope this can be done within the constraints of the constitution, their constitution.

Senator SPONG. Thank you. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Gentlemen, I want to ask two or three questions.

EARLY OPPOSITION TO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

Let me say this: With reference to the Status of Forces Agreement that we have with Japan. Back when it was first put into effect we had a good deal of opposition here in this country. In 1957 I was in Japan and the Chief of Staff of this committee, Dr. Marcy, was with me. We were invited to go to what is the naval base.

General LAMPERT. Yokosuka.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think that is where we went, to the prison there.

We were given the privilege of talking to any prisoner that they had with reference to the treatment they had received in being tried, sentenced and cared for in the prison, under the Status of Forces agreement. I visited quite a number of them.

I suppose I still have the notes that I made. I put down on paper the things they said to me. I got their names and addresses. All of them were American servicemen. Without exception, they said they were completely satisfied with the treatment that they had received in connection with arrest and imprisonment, trial, conviction, sentencing, and the care that they were getting in the prison.

I thought that was an interesting little thing to throw in in connection with it. As a matter of fact, even though we did have a good bit of opposition to the agreement when we first put it into effect as I recall, in Germany or in Europe where our forces were stationed. I

do not know of any opposition that I have heard in a good many years now. So I feel quite confident it will work all right as applied in Okinawa.

I want to ask a couple of questions. Then I want to ask three or four that Senator Case wanted to put to you.

There have been several questions asked about our situation with Taiwan.

PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN TO SECURITY OF JAPAN

In the Nixon-Sato communication of 1969, Japan stated that Taiwan was the most important factor to the security of Japan. Do you think there has been any reassessment of that position by Japan in view of the change of the United States-China policy and even more recently the vote in the U.N.?

Secretary PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, I cannot say whether there has or has not been a reassessment of that policy, but I think we must recognize that there will be a reassessment of policies of this nature by Japan and our other allies. I think we do not know the extent to which there has been any change there, but we are in a period of change in our foreign relations and we have to recognize that there will be changes in terms of assessments that were made several years ago and in a great many situations.

Senator SPARKMAN. General, do you have any comment?

General LAMPERT. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if either one of you could express your opinion as to whether or not that same situation prevails.

Secretary PACKARD. You mean the situation—

PRESENT U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN

Senator SPARKMAN. Our opinion aside from Japan.

Secretary PACKARD. As far as I assess the situation, we are very sorry about the U.N. vote. We do not see this as changing our relations with Taiwan. We think this has been an important relationship over the years and I think we will want to maintain that relationship.

Now, here again I do not think anyone wants to project into the future too great a distance. We hope that there can be improvement in the relationships among all countries over what has prevailed during the past two and a half decades.

I think for the time being our position has to be that Taiwan has been a very good strong friend of ours and I would hope and, as far as I am concerned, intend that we would maintain that friendship.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course we have a security agreement with Taiwan.

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I assume there would be no thought of discontinuing or changing that. Would you agree?

Secretary PACKARD. I would agree with that.

IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN IN VIEW OF OKINAWA REVERSION

Senator SPARKMAN. In fact, the thought occurs to me that with the reversion of Okinawa, Taiwan might become even more important as a security base in that area of the world.

Secretary PACKARD. I think we can say in general terms that, with the reversion of Okinawa, Taiwan may become more important, South Korea may become more important and other areas which we depend on for allies or for military operations of our own will tend to have some increased importance. But I would not want to assess or put any measure on what these changes are likely to be.

REPEAL OF FORMOSA RESOLUTION

Senator SPARKMAN. We are probably reaching a vote in the Senate. This quorum call may be for that purpose. If it is, I understand it is on an amendment proposing to strike from the foreign aid bill a provision repealing the Formosa resolution. I do not suppose you have any thought to express on that.

Secretary PACKARD. I personally would hope it will not pass.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are hopeful it will pass?

Secretary PACKARD. If the vote is repealing, I would hope—

Senator SPARKMAN. The amendment is to strike out that provision, which would repeal.

Secretary PACKARD. I would be in favor of the amendment in that case.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am inclined to agree with you.

If I have time I want to ask you three or four questions that Senator Case wanted propounded if he was not able to get here. Also I believe there are several other questions that he may want to ask you to answer in writing. I do not know whether he wants to submit them. If so, he will send them.

Secretary PACKARD. We will be pleased to respond to questions from Senator Case or from any other member.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to suggest that we will certainly give the staff of this committee permission to submit questions to you. We hope you will agree to answer any questions.

Secretary PACKARD. We will do our best to respond to your questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.

REPORTED REPLACEMENT OF OKINAWA FACILITIES ON MICRONESIA

There have been reports that the United States plans to replace loss of certain military facilities in Okinawa with new or expanded bases in Micronesia. Is this true? You may have seen that article.

Secretary PACKARD. Yes, sir; I have seen that.

We have not made any specific decisions as to the extent to which any facilities in Okinawa will have to be replaced elsewhere nor where those might be. We are looking at various areas, but no decision has been made on this matter.

Senator SPARKMAN. We would have the right to; would we not? What is our position? Is it a trusteeship?

Secretary PACKARD. It is a trusteeship and we would have the right to do that, but here again I think we must recognize that we are in the process of negotiations with the Micronesians and I think as a practical matter it is very important that we take into account not just our legal requirements, but other considerations in this matter.

EFFECT OF MICRONESIA'S BEING A U.N. TRUST TERRITORY

Senator SPARKMAN. Does the fact that Micronesia is a trust territory under the U.N. have any effect on our future plans there?

Secretary PACKARD. Well, here again I cannot give you a precise answer to that question. I think we have to take into account that fact and other considerations in determining what we might do, whether we might do anything in terms of replacing facilities in various Micronesian locations that would be related to this issue at hand.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think the matter as to what we can do and cannot do depends on the terms of the trusteeship and I do not know offhand what those are.

HAS UNITED STATES PLEDGED TO PERMIT MICRONESIA TO CHOOSE FUTURE STATUS?

Has the United States made a pledge to the U.N. that we would permit the islanders of Micronesia to choose their future status, including independence?

Secretary PACKARD. This situation with Micronesia under the U.N., this is a Strategic Trust which is irreversible and we do not need to get permission from the United Nations to put forces there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the United States honor this? I do not think you answered that last question.

Has the United States made a pledge to the U.N. that we will permit the islanders of Micronesia to choose their future status, including independence?

It may be that question should be addressed to the State Department.

Secretary PACKARD. The negotiations with Micronesia are under the Department of Interior and I will have to provide an answer to—

Senator SPARKMAN. It should be addressed to the Department of Interior then. Fine.

The next question is: Will the United States honor this pledge and, if so, when?

I suppose that ought to go to the Interior, too.

Very well. I will give the file back to Senator Case and if he wishes to submit the other questions to be answered in writing, he will do so and members of the committee and our staff members may address questions to either or both of you for your written answers.

HEARING SCHEDULE

This concludes the hearing on the part of the administration witnesses. Commencing tomorrow at 10 o'clock we shall start hearing public witnesses. Until 10 a.m. tomorrow, the committee is recessed.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, October 29.)

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY—(Ex. J. 92-1)

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1971

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:15 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.
Present: Senator Sparkman.
Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

I am sorry we are late starting, but we have been in a roll call, a live quorum call over in the Senate.

This morning the committee continues its public hearings on the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. We have quite a list of witnesses. We will call them in the order that they are set forth.

We have requested the witnesses to limit their oral presentation to approximately 10 minutes or even less. Additional or more elaborate statements may, of course, be submitted for the record. If you have a prepared statement, your entire statement will be printed in the record and you can present it as you see fit.

As you know, the Senate is in session, has been for some time, and it is impossible to tell when we may get a call back to the Senate. In the event that business on the floor of the Senate makes it impossible to hear all of the witnesses this morning, the hearings will be adjourned either until this afternoon or, if that appears impractical, until Monday morning at 10 o'clock.

Let me ask, has Senator Tunney come in? He was scheduled to be our first witness. As soon as Senator Tunney comes in, we will hear him and after we have heard him we will proceed to hear the out-of-town witnesses first so if we do have to carry over, it will be easier on them.

Come right around, we are glad to have you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN V. TUNNEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. If you are prepared to go, we will appreciate it.

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly appreciate your delaying the proceedings so I could answer the live quorum.

Senator SPARKMAN. I had to do the same thing. I just came in.

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you.

TREATY IS TURNING POINT IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to have this opportunity to testify today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a subject which I consider to be of vital importance to the United States, the ratification of the treaty calling for the reversion of Okinawa to the Japanese.

We should be utterly clear that the decision of the Senate whether or not to ratify this treaty promptly will be a turning point in Japanese-American relations and will therefore be decisive with respect to our deepest national interests in the Far East during the 1970's and after.

American-Japanese relations have had a tangled and at times a tragic history during this century, and there seems to me no more important task at this moment for us in the Far East than to treat our relations with Japan with the greatest care.

We are undergoing vast changes in our policies toward Southeast Asia and the People's Republic of China. These changes are founded on an overdue recognition of political realities in that area of the world. It is essential that during these changes we remain firmly in touch with the ultimate reality facing American policy in the Far East: that we can and must maintain a firm alliance with Japan.

Since the impact of any decision to ratify or not to ratify this treaty will have so large an impact on Japanese-American relations, I will point out some of the central political, economic, and military questions in our Japanese policy which the treaty raises. From these perspectives, we can talk plainly about Japanese-American relations generally, about the role of the reversion of Okinawa within those relations, and about the consequences of the proposed treaty for our deepest interests of national security.

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

First, then, I shall discuss our relations with Japan. Here we must remember above all that our relations with Japan are more important than our relations with any other Asian nation, including China. The administration has appeared to lose sight of that fact in the past few months. Yet it is a fact that must not be forgotten.

The benefits of good relations with Japan are substantial and they touch on vital elements of American policy. Japan and the United States are each the other's largest overseas trading partner with a total annual volume of over \$8 billion. Japan is the only Asian nation with the capacity to support substantially the economic and political development of smaller countries in Asia whose economic and political stability are vital goals of American policy. And American bases in Japan serve not only to strengthen the American deterrent against China and the Soviet Union, but also to allow Japan to maintain a

credible defense posture without developing an independent nuclear capability.

Hence, Mr. Chairman, it is evident that the dangers of a deterioration in relations between the United States and Japan are considerable. A trade war would be costly. It would not only affect our economic relations; it could also be expected to lead to political competition with Japan, competition which might cause Japan to distrust American military guarantees. Such a trade war could escalate into a determination by Japan that she needed a vast increased defense effort, that she could not longer rely upon the American nuclear umbrella.

While a deterioration in Japanese-American relations is hardly inevitable, Mr. Chairman, preventing it will require careful American attention and a major change in the manner with which we deal with the Japanese.

In the past several months, however, we have witnessed a classic example of how not to deal with Japan. The manner in which President Nixon advised the Japanese Government of his August economic proposals reflected a callous disregard for the sensitivities of our Japanese friends. And President Nixon's failure to consult with Japan before announcing his visit to Peking is inexcusable—especially after the United States had been responsible for Japan's initial decision to recognize Taipei rather than Peking and had convinced Japan that U.S. policy toward China would be coordinated with Japan. It reflected an insensitive style of diplomacy that is inappropriate and unproductive.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, I believe that a new diplomacy is necessary in the Far East. This diplomacy requires a recognition that American policy in the Far East affects Japanese interests as dramatically as it affects American interests.

This diplomacy requires a recognition that—if stability in Asia is to be maintained—the cooperation of four nations is critical. These four nations are the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

This diplomacy requires a recognition that we have made a profound moral commitment to Japan, that we have dissuaded Japan from developing an independent nuclear deterrent, and that, consequently, in this quadrangle of four Asian superpowers, three of which possess nuclear weapons, the United States assumes the role of military and nuclear linchpin between Japan on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other hand.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, this diplomacy requires a recognition that, to ignore our relationship with our Japanese ally is to ignore the security, stability, and peace of the Far East. It is deleterious to our own interests to take actions which jeopardize our relations with Japan and which threaten the stability of Asia.

Therefore, I believe that this new diplomacy requires that the United States should take no action which affects the security of the Far East without close consultation with Japan, should consult fully with Japan on all matters of vital interest to her, and, if possible, should move in those areas only in full agreement with Japan.

IMPACT OF OKINAWA REVERSION ON JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

It is from within this general context of Japanese-American relations that the Okinawa reversion treaty must be viewed.

Within that context, the most outstanding fact that we must continuously remember is that the United States has always acknowledged Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa. On September 5, 1951, at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, Ambassador John Foster Dulles first enunciated that doctrine, and Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon have reaffirmed it.

And still, more than a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War, the United States continues to occupy the Territory of Okinawa and an American general exercises executive authority over one million Japanese people. It is hardly startling that the Japanese people insist upon the termination of this inappropriate relationship.

The agreement itself is hardly a one-sided document. It is the careful product of long negotiations and it involves compromise by both sides.

The United States has clearly compromised in voluntarily granting reversion of those islands which constitute Okinawa, the Ryukyu and Daito Islands, to Japan.

The Japanese have also compromised. They have granted the United States the continued use of military facilities in Okinawa, they have agreed to pay the United States \$320 million to compensate us for costs we are expected to bear and for the transfer of assets to Japan, and they have agreed to a communique which linked the security of Japan to the security of Korea and Taiwan.

Mr. Chairman, Japan has also set forth, in a letter of June 17, 1971, from Minister of Foreign Affairs Aichi, important assurances to the American business community in Okinawa. I trust that the Japanese Government recognizes the importance of those assurances and will not allow them to be modified in a way which will be detrimental to American investment.

OKINAWA REVERSION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY

As I mentioned earlier, important military consequences also attach to the ratification of the reversion treaty. The military consequences both of reversion and of refusal should be considered. If the reversion treaty is ratified, no one has seriously suggested that American security interests would be damaged. The support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for ratification should be sufficient proof that the reversion agreement is in America's security interest and does not threaten our ability to meet our commitments.

But, what are the military consequences of nonratification? Those consequences could be devastating.

For it must be recognized that the United States could not, in the 1970's or beyond, effectively use bases in Okinawa without Japan's consent, with or without the ratification of the treaty. The United States can effectively maintain an overseas base in any given country only so long as that country believes that it is in its interests to have a base there.

It makes no political or military sense to attempt to occupy a base in another sovereign nation against the will of that nation. Such a course of action would require force and would destroy amicable relations between the two countries.

Yet such a posture would be necessary if we were to attempt to continue to occupy our bases in Okinawa in the absence of reversion. That posture would be untenable.

Furthermore, if we were to hold Okinawa against the wishes of Japan and also against the wishes of the Okinawan people, Japan could retaliate by abrogating the Mutual Security Treaty and expelling us from the home islands. That result would jeopardize our ability, not only to protect Japan, but to meet many of our other military commitments to Asia.

Mr. Chairman, we have nothing to gain, and much to lose, in the way of national security by retaining title to Okinawa.

END OF POSTWAR ERA

One additional fact cuts through all of the others and it is the final argument I wish to stress. Prime Minister Sato has stated that the reversion of Okinawa will mark the end of the postwar era in Japanese-American relations. He has argued that reversion will remove the last remaining tangible reminder of war between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Chairman, even if this belief is primarily psychological, even if we believe that the postwar era has already ended, it is well that both sides put that period to rest.

It is well that both sides remove from their relations all vestiges of the war, that they each determine that they are prepared to begin to develop a full partnership with each other, and that the prompt ratification of this treaty signal the inception of that postwar relationship.

We in the United States will welcome a full postwar relationship with Japan. We should encourage its inception. We should anticipate a fuller partnership in that period—not just politically and militarily, but economically as well. We should now expect Japan to increase her contribution to the economies of the developing countries.

While the American nuclear shield and military presence contributes to Japan's security, it also contributes to Japan's prosperity. The American defense umbrella has spared Japan considerable defense burdens.

It is in Japan's interest as well as ours to divert some of those into projects which will aid the less-developed countries of Asia. For stability in Asia will contribute to maintaining the peace in Japan.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, with the ratification of this treaty and the reversion of Okinawa, I believe that we should expect Japan to expand her economic contributions to the development of less-developed Asian nations.

PROMPT REPORTING AND RATIFICATION OF TREATY URGED

Mr. Chairman, for all of those reasons, and to indicate that the U.S. Senate attaches very high priority to our relations with Japan, I urge prompt reporting and ratification of the reversion treaty. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Tunney. We do appreciate it.

Senator TUNNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. C. N. Yang, State University of New York, Stonybrook, N.Y.

We are very glad to hear from you. We have your prepared statement and, as I said, it will be printed in full in the record. You present it as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF C. N. YANG, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, STONEYBROOK, N.Y.

Mr. YANG. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Foreign Relations Committee: First of all, let me state that I am testifying before your committee as an individual citizen and not as a representative of any group. I welcome this opportunity to testify because I am deeply concerned about future involvement of the American people and of the U.S. Government in what may become a troublesome territorial dispute between China and Japan.

TERRITORIAL DISPUTE BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

I personally agree with the statement that in general the Okinawa Reversion Treaty is in the interests of the United States but the specific issue concerns a group of eight small uninhabited but oil-rich islands northeast of Taiwan known as the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese. These islands are at present included in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty which your committee is considering during this series of hearings.

There are decisive arguments by both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan claiming that these islands are geographically, historically, and politically part of the territory of Taiwan, which both governments agree is a province of China. These arguments are summarized in the presentations by the Concerned Citizens for Tiao-Yu Tai and will not be repeated here at this time. I urge you to examine carefully these arguments, and I think you might reach the conclusion, which I reached, that the Chinese claim is irrefutable.

POSITION OF U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT IN DISPUTE

What is the position of the State Department in relation to this particular dispute? In various statements the position has been that the U.S. Government maintains neutrality. However, is that the understanding of the Japanese Government? There appeared in the Washington Post on June 19, 1971, after the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed, a column which included the following statement:

Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi rejected the Taiwan Government's latest claim to the disputed Senkaku Islands yesterday . . . Aichi said the Okinawa Agreement had settled the matter (of Tiao-Yu Tai) completely as far as the United States and Japan were concerned.

So Japan evidently does not regard that the United States is taking a neutral position in the dispute. They have, in fact, been encouraged

in their view by the plan of the U.S. Navy to retain gunnery ranges which are "infrequently used." I quote a news transcript by our Government:

The U.S. Navy has gunnery ranges at Kobisho and Sekibisho in the Senkakus. The gunnery ranges are infrequently used for training purposes and are the only facilities that the U.S. will retain on the Senkaku Islands.

The question is, why retain them at all? Is it merely a ruse urged upon our Navy by Japan? Is Congress aware of the fact that the Navy is implicating us in a position diametrically opposite to that of the stated principle of neutrality? Is Congress being asked to ratify a treaty without spelling out its views on a geographically small but potentially troublesome arena of international tension? Are the people of the United States being asked, in an implicit way, to assume a position which will severely limit our options in future Asian politics? Are the people of the United States being asked, in an implicit way, to assume a position that may not be in the best interests of the United States? These are questions that deeply trouble me.

CHINESE CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

Three months ago I had occasion to visit the People's Republic of China for 4 weeks. It was an extremely educational trip because it revealed to me the many misconceptions that I had about the People's Republic. But for our present discussion, let me mention only that I could confirm the report by James Reston that the Chinese people and the Chinese leaders are deeply concerned about the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism.

One afternoon in Peking I saw two movies, two Japanese movies. From Reston's column I gathered he had seen the same two. Apparently copies of these movies were obtained from Japan and were duplicated in China.

The two movies I saw were entitled "The Great Sea Battle of the Sea of Japan" and "Yamamoto." Both were wide screen affairs produced by the Toho Seihen, a big Japanese company. The producer for both of them was Tanaka. The first of these two movies described from the Japanese viewpoint the annihilation of the Russian fleet in 1905 by the Japanese Navy. The second one was a story of the naval encounters between Japan and the United States during the Second World War, starting from a little before Pearl Harbor. Yamamoto, you undoubtedly remember, was the Japanese admiral who planned the Pearl Harbor attack. The main thrust of both movies was to glorify the Japanese Navy.

Do these two movies show the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism? My evaluation is that they definitely do. The people who made these movies and the people who backed them are evidently among those who are urging Japanese naval rearmament. That in itself, however, was not the big surprise to me. The real revelation was a transparent mentality which exhibits a total lack of the historical judgment that past Japanese "glorious" military exploits were immoral and disastrous to the world and to the Japanese people. Mr. Tanaka and his friends are clearly individuals who have not learned the les-

sons of history and who are not living in the realities of the present world. Just to give a simple example, in the movie about the sea battle of 1905, there was the sentence brandished about by one of the generals: "Manchuria is the lifeline of Japan." This sentence was later not picked up in the movie and discussed explicitly or implicitly in any way. The effect is perhaps like that of, say a German movie today, with a dangling pronouncement that Czechoslovakia is a part of Germany, not explicitly endorsed, to be sure, but also not refuted, let alone condemned.

In this same movie I noticed a curious fact which could not possibly be an accident. The Russian Baltic fleet had come around through the Indian Ocean, and the Japanese were very anxious to know its precise location. According to the movie, it was first spotted by a couple of Japanese fishermen in a small fishing boat. The name of the fishing boat was conspicuously displayed. It was Senkaku, the Japanese name for the uninhabited Tiao-Yu Tai Islands.

I observed during my trip that Chinese leaders and the Chinese people are very well-informed about world affairs. There is a newspaper called Reference News that keeps people abreast of things. I was told its circulation is 5 million copies. For example, they are evidently impressed by the clarity of thinking in the columns of Walter Lippman which were oftentimes featured in translation in the Reference News when Lippman was still active. They are impressed by the bold initiative of President Nixon in attempting to normalize Sino-American relationships. By the way, I asked Premier Chou En-lai what his impression is of Mr. Kissinger. He smiled and said, "He and I could talk because he is not a professional diplomat."

ARE PRESENT ACTIONS IN LONG-RANGE INTEREST OF U.S.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, at this time of total reorientation of our diplomacy in Asia, is it in our interest to antagonize the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan Government alike by ignoring their claim, which is impressive, to say the least?

Is it in our long-range interest to leave ambiguities in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty so as to allow for Japanese claims that the United States sides totally with Japan in this dispute?

Is it consistent to proclaim neutrality while we allow our Navy to implicate us in a de facto recognition of Japanese sovereignty over these islands?

Is it in the interest of world peace to sow the seed of future U.S. involvement in this controversy?

In any case, let me put it bluntly, what are we buying by not explicitly defining American neutrality in this issue?

I examined these questions and found a number of issues are involved. Time does not permit me to develop these points in detail here. Allow me only to summarize them for your consideration:

First, it seems to me that history, geography of the continental shelf, legal records, and usage by Taiwan fishermen all indicate decisively that the Tiao-yu Tai Islands are a part of Taiwan.

Second, they were not included in the Japan Peace Treaty of 1951.

Third, it seems that the U.S. Navy later had mistakenly treated

them to be a part of Ryukyus. If that is correct, then Congress is now being asked to ratify, among other things, this error.

Fourth, I urge you to examine the case in the long-range view of U.S. involvement in the Asia of the future. This point causes me great anxiety.

Fifth, may I suggest that the least the Senate could do is to totally disassociate itself from this mistake by making explicit the neutrality position of this country relative to the dispute, and stopping what amounts to a U.S. Navy-Japan alliance to establish de facto recognition by the United States of Japanese sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands.

Thank you very much.

(The witness's biography follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF C. N. YANG, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, STONY BROOK, N.Y.

Professor Yang was born in Hofei, Anhwei, China, September 22, 1922 and is a naturalized citizen of the U.S. He received his Ph. D. degree in physics from the University of Chicago in 1948 and was awarded honorary degrees of Doctor of Science by Princeton University (1958), Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute (1965). He was an Instructor of Physics at the University of Chicago in 1948-49 and a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton 1949-66, where he became a Professor in 1955. In 1966 he was appointed to the Albert Einstein Professorship by the State of New York at the State University of New York, Stony Brook. He also serves as the Director of the Institute for Theoretical Physics on that campus. Dr. Yang has lectured extensively in this country and abroad. He is a consultant to the Brookhaven National Laboratory since 1953. He has served on various panels on high energy physics formed by the A.E.C. He is one of two U.S. representatives on the Commission of Particles and Fields, the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics.

Dr. Yang was a Guggenheim Fellow 1962-63. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences. He won a Nobel Prize (1957) and an Albert Einstein Award (1957).

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Yang. It was a very good and forceful statement.

WITNESS' VISIT IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

How long a stay did you have in Peking?

Mr. YANG. I was in China 4 weeks.

Senator SPARKMAN. I did not mean Peking, I meant in China.

Mr. YANG. Of that, two were spent in Shanghai and two in Peking.

CHOU EN-LAI WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

Senator SPARKMAN. Did Chou En-lai indicate to you at any time that the United States should retain a close contact with Japan perhaps to restrain any resurgence of Japanese militarism?

Mr. YANG. Premier Chou En-lai was clearly preoccupied (a) with the future position of Japan in the balance of power in Asia, and (b) with America's position relating to that. It was the topmost issue evidently on his mind.

As he stated I believe to James Reston or maybe to Simon Toppin, he is very much impressed with the great achievements of Japanese

people, but past history weighs too heavily on the memory of China, and evidently he was doing the right thing to be worried about the possible resurgence of Japanese militarism.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND PEKING

Senator SPARKMAN. What is your opinion as to the continuing relations between the United States and Taiwan or perhaps the idea I want to make is this: What should the United States do in relation to its commitments with Taiwan?

Of course, we do have commitments—and with our relations with Peking?

Mr. YANG. I am concerned about that, too. I frankly do not know how the political situation in Taiwan would develop in the next few months. I am afraid, I may be wrong, but I am afraid there may be great instability due to economic reasons. There may be great instability due to the differences between the 2 million Chinese who moved over to Taiwan and the 12 million so-called native Taiwanese.

I am deeply concerned, but I do not know enough to express an opinion about how things should be done.

POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN TAIWAN AND PEKING

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course it is pure speculation on anybody's part. Do you think there is a possibility that perhaps within a reasonable span of time Taiwan and Mainland China may be able to work out some kind of arrangement perhaps to have Taiwan as an independent government, or I suppose we could go to the other extreme, even have a merger of the two?

Mr. YANG. I definitely think that is a possibility.

Premier Chou En-lai's statement at the dinner party that he gave for me when this question came up was that he believes that Taiwan today is dominated by Japanese economic interests and he is afraid that unless an accommodation is worked out between the Taiwan Government and the Peking Government, Taiwan would become in the not too distant future an outpost of Japan.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Senator SPARKMAN. You were born in China?

Mr. YANG. Yes, I was.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are now an American citizen?

Mr. YANG. Yes. In fact, I was in China, I grew up in China and I lived in China until 1945, when I was 22, and I came over to this visit, it was a very interesting one, because I observed the country that I left 26 years ago.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, you have given us some very fine testimony, some things to think about, we certainly appreciate it.

Mr. YANG. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. I may say for the benefit of the audience, who may not know Dr. Yang was awarded the Nobel Prize, what year?

Mr. YANG. 1957.

Senator SPARKMAN. Physics, was it not?

Mr. YANG. Yes.

In fact, if I may add something to that, I had the great honor to be elected, together with Senator Church of this committee, to the 10 outstanding young men award in the year 1957.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine. Thank you very much.

Mr. YANG. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Maj. Gen. Dale O. Smith, retired, of Reno, Nev.

General Smith, if you will come around, we will be glad to hear from you. We have a copy of your statement, it will be printed in full. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DALE O. SMITH, USAF (RET.) OF RENO, NEV.

General SMITH. Senator Sparkman, I deem it a distinct privilege to be allowed to express my views before this august committee regarding the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

I served on Okinawa as Commander of the 313th Air Division, the senior Air Force position in the Ryukyu Island, from 1957 to 1960. In this capacity I was not only responsible for the air defense of Okinawa, both Army and Air Force, but for air offensive operations against the Communist mainland had my country ordered such action.

WHY OKINAWA WAS CALLED "KEYSTONE OF THE PACIFIC"

While serving there, it became increasingly apparent to me that Okinawa truly was the "Keystone of the Pacific," as we called it.

Because our forces there were free to be deployed anywhere, immediately upon orders from Washington, we were always the first to be called upon. For example, in 1958 we discouraged a Red Chinese invasion of Quemoy, Matsu, and the Pescadores by sending the 51st Fighter Wing to Taiwan along with naval forces based at Naha. This was done in less than 24 hours.

You recall that recently we were unable to go to the rescue of the *Pueblo* because of Japan's reluctance to let us use our forces in this manner.

Because Okinawa was American territory, we could keep any kinds of weapons on the island in any numbers. So we had vast and secure weapons storage areas. This was our major munitions dump in the Far East.

Because we administered the islands and because the Okinawans were generally loyal and trustworthy employees, we had no problems of sabotage or pilferage and fewer labor problems than in America itself. As you know, Okinawa provided a great logistics storage area for the Vietnam war.

REVERSION WILL DRASTICALLY RESTRICT U.S. FORCES ON OKINAWA

With reversion, our forces on Okinawa will be as drastically restricted as our bases now are on the home islands of Japan. We closed 50 bases in 1968, including our finest air base, Itazuke. We simply will not be able to protect Okinawa from air attack or utilize it as a logistics or staging base, as we have in the past.

AIR AND NAVAL DEFENSE OF ISLANDS BY JAPANESE INEFFECTIVE

The Japanese self-defense force is scheduled to take over air and naval defense of the islands next year. This will include their defensive fighters on Naha Airbase and Nike-Zeus missiles.

It will not work. An effective air defense of such a small area requires the use of nuclear air-to-air rockets and ground-to-air missiles. Japan will have no nuclear weapons and I am sure this committee would not support the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Similarly, we have provided a nuclear deterrent and umbrella for Japan with quick-strike fighter bombers and Mace guided missiles. After reversion, this umbrella will be shot full of holes. And we will be pushing Japan into a nuclear posture of her own in order to protect herself against nuclear Red China and Soviet Russia.

JAPAN COULD REARM IN 2 OR 3 YEARS

Japan is a rich, dynamic, industrial country. She could rearm in 2 or 3 years, and with the most modern weapons of the age. I am haunted with the parallel of Nazi Germany's military resurgence and that we had to fight Germany twice within one generation.

ASSURANCES REGARDING MEETING U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS QUESTIONED

Some Senators have informed me that they have been assured by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense that our military commitments will be adequately met in the Western Pacific after reversion.

I need not tell this committee that the Secretary of Defense is a loyal member of the administration, which is pushing this reversion treaty, and that the Chairman of the JCS is his subordinate. I served several years in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and am well aware of the pressures put upon the Department of Defense to support programs of the executive department.

You will recall, too, that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman in 1964 supported the buildup in South Vietnam to propagate a no-win war. I am sure you will agree with me that the consequences of that policy have been disastrous and tragic, and that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs are not always correct in their judgments.

I submit that the reversion of Okinawa will open a Pandora's box even more tragic than the Vietnam mistake—and one from which we will not be able to retreat. Out of the box will rise an expanding Red China and a rearmed, nuclear Japan.

U.S. NEED FOR OKINAWA

It has long been American policy to return the Ryukyus when they were no longer needed for the defense of our allies in the Far East. But, gentlemen, there has hardly been a time since 1945 when we needed Okinawa more.

We are now pulling out of South Vietnam and have yet to learn whether the domino theory will materialize.

Communists are surging into Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

Red China, despite the proposed visit of President Nixon, remains warlike and bellicose, and she is rapidly building nuclear weapons.

Soviet Russia is arming at breakneck speed.

Japan is already toying with the idea of rearming. As a matter of fact, in the next 5 years she will be doubling her arms over the last 5 years. Should we push her into it by emasculating our forces on Okinawa through reversion?

I submit, gentlemen, that this is a most inappropriate time to return Okinawa and that reversion should be postponed for a year or two, at least until we can see the future better.

DESIRES OF OKINAWANS REGARDING REVERSION

I am not at all sure that the Okinawans themselves would be eager to return to Japan if they had any other choice. There has been no plebiscite, and we have encouraged no other action.

The President's letter to the Senate mentioned that 1 million Japanese are anxious to return to their "motherland."

First let me say that the Okinawans are Japanese only because Japan seized the islands in 1874. Up to that time the Okinawans were an independent people. In fact, Americans were there first, before the Japanese. Adm. Matthew Perry based his Black Fleet there in 1853 and 1854.

So it seems rather anomalous to refer to Japan as Okinawa's "motherland", and Okinawans never called themselves Japanese when I was there. Although they speak Japanese, their ethnic background is quite unique.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD OKINAWA

Our policy has been to offer Okinawans no association with the United States whatever. We have treated them like orphans. Nor have we suggested that they might be independent. So they have been ripe for the blandishments of Japan, and Japan in turn has been goaded by the Communists, who are well aware that American forces on Okinawa have contained Red expansion.

U.S. INVESTMENT AND RETURN

We have invested from \$2 to \$5 billion in Okinawa, depending on how it is figured. When I was over there we figured \$4 billion, but now the administration says it is only \$2 billion. Japan will pay just \$320 million for these installations, or from 6 to 16 cents on the dollar. This is hardly a shrewd economic deal.

SUBSTITUTE INSTALLATIONS

No mention is made in the President's letter of the cost of substitute installations, possibly in Micronesia. And these will be far from satisfactory. Guam is too small and 1,000 miles too far away. Remember how quickly we lost it in 1942?

EFFECTS OF REVERSION

Reversion will further advertise American weakness and lack of resolution; it will encourage Communist expansion and the rearming of Japan. It will lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I might add, Japan has not ratified the proliferation treaty.

It is not so important that we keep friendly relations with Japan as that we keep peaceful relations. And a disarmed Japan has no choice but to remain peaceful.

Thank you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, General.

IS ANY MEMBER OF JCS OPPOSED TO REVERSION?

Let me ask you this question: You mentioned the support by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Do you know whether or not there is any opposition by any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General SMITH. I am not prepared to answer that, sir.

As I say, I am speaking as an individual who has been there and I am a fair expert of air defense, but I have not discussed this with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any member of it.

RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY OF OKINAWA

Senator SPARKMAN. You, of course, recognize the fact that in the Japanese Peace Treaty we were given the right to occupy Okinawa, but residual sovereignty remained in Japan?

General SMITH. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was recognized in that peace treaty, and I gather from what you say that what you would advocate would be a postponement of the treaty, not its probable ultimate approval?

General SMITH. As I recall, sir, the residual sovereignty aspect was not in article 3. It was a statement made by Mr. Dulles at another time and it does not appear in article 3.

Senator SPARKMAN. You may be right, but it has been our policy.

General SMITH. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. From that time. I was under the impression that it was in the treaty itself, but I am not sure, because, of course, the treaty was among many nations and did not just pertain to the United States and Japan as being a part of the subsequent agreement between the United States and Japan. It could have been a part of our security treaty, I am not sure.

ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF OKINAWANS

I was interested in what you said about the Okinawans being of a definite different ethnic background. I believe you used the word "interesting." I am not sure.

What is the ethnic background? Are they Polynesians?

General SMITH. The best things that can be said is they are partly Polynesian, partly Chinese, and partly Japanese. They are a distinct race and they have been independent for centuries, of course, until the 19th century.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, that is interesting. I did not know that

part of the Okinawan history. Thank you very much, General, we appreciate your presentation.

Next is Jack C. Stolle.

Come around, Mr. Stolle. Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF EDWARD H. REEVES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF OKINAWA

Mr. REEVES. Senator Sparkman, I am not Mr. Stolle, I am Mr. Reeves, executive director from the chamber, and I am representing the chamber.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are substituting for him?

Mr. REEVES. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. What is your name?

Mr. REEVES. Edward H. Reeves.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, we will be glad to hear from you.

TREATMENT OF AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON OKINAWA AFTER
REVERSION

Mr. REEVES. Gentlemen, I have just completed 22 hours of air travel covering some 12,000 miles because there are some American citizens in Okinawa who appreciate very much the interest by members of this committee in their future. I want to speak to you today on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States on Okinawa.

Our American chamber represents what is usually called the "Foreign Business Community" on Okinawa. That is, the businessmen and professional men living and working there. Since the islands will soon pass from American to Japanese jurisdiction, you can imagine that we are concerned about our treatment after reversion.

Can we remain in business?

Can we continue to earn our livelihood and practice our professions?

Can we own property?

Can we freely convert yen to dollars?

These are our very basic concerns.

We have worked actively on this problem for 2 years both with our own State Department and with the Government of Japan. You probably know that the post-reversion status of private business and professional interests was negotiated as a separate "track" by our Embassy and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The result of this negotiation is what is known as the Aichi letter of assurances—that is, a letter from the then Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi explaining the Japanese Government's policy for the treatment of foreign nationals and firms.

As a representative of most of the foreign nationals and firms who are members of the American Chamber of Commerce, I wish to state that we have accepted this letter of assurances as dealing satisfactorily, in a general way, with the major problem areas that we foresee after reversion. We also wish to acknowledge the friendly and sympathetic spirit with which the Japanese Government has provided these assurances. At the same time, we must express our apprehension over whether the spirit and intent are fully understood at the levels in the Japanese Government where implementation will occur.

We further are aware and concerned that certain laws must be enacted or changes to existing laws must be made to implement the assurances of the Aichi letter. We have been told these changes are now before the Japanese Diet for action. We have not yet seen a translation of this legislation and so cannot judge the sufficiency thereof.

We urge you, who must give consent to the basic treaty, to satisfy yourselves that the proposed measures are adequate to fully implement all of the provisions of the Aichi letter in protecting our interests.

AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN OKINAWA

Before I discuss the Aichi letter in a bit more detail, you might be interested to know something of the nature and extent of the membership of the American Chamber of Commerce in Okinawa. We like to think of our businesses and professionals as pretty representative of what you would find in many typical communities back home.

We have the American Bottling Co.—Bireley's—run by the McGuire family for many years; Bill Baxter's Trading Co., Clar Sager's Insurance and Securities Office; Mike DeMauro's Construction Co.—he has been working on Okinawa since 1945—several American attorneys, the VFW and American Legion, Foremost Dairies, the Morning Star Newspaper, Mrs. Krebs' Weekly Magazine, the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital, Susie Gross's Travel Agency, the American Drug Company. We also have big business: Bank of America, Fairfield Camera, Gulf Oil, American Express, and five U.S. airlines. These are some of our members.

All of these people and all of these businesses have come to Okinawa with the assurance and expectation of freedom to transact business normally, including the freedom to compete. We expect the same under Japanese jurisdiction.

POSITION PAPER

More than 2 years ago, before the Nixon-Sato communique, our group prepared a position paper—all of the members of the committee have seen this document. It dealt in detail with what we felt then and now are legitimate rights that should continue after reversion—the rights that should continue after reversion—the right to do business as at present, necessary work permits and professional licenses, protection of property and leases, conversion and protection of dollar assets, the right to continue to import items that might come under quota restriction in Japan, application of the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, and equitable tax treatment.

We are satisfied that this position paper played an important part in the subsequent negotiations concerning the treatment of foreign nationals and firms.

ACTIVITIES OF BUSINESS ADVISORY GROUP

In June of 1970, at the suggestion of Ambassador Meyer, the so-called Business Advisory Group was formed as a channel of communication between the U.S. Government's negotiators and the foreign business community in Okinawa. This group met regularly until ne-

gotiations ended in June of this year and this full year of effort was successful, we think. Not easily so, but the result—the Aichi letter was good, as far as it went. We said at the time we first saw the Aichi letter that it was a satisfactory general statement but—and this is important—everything would depend on subsequent interpretation of the letter and the infinite number of small bureaucratic decisions which would eventually comprise what it really meant. Most of these small implementing decisions we will know come after reversion.

We are now talking on a regular basis with all Japanese ministries concerned. Their understanding of what Minister Aichi said in his letter is not always the same as ours. This makes us apprehensive—but we are talking, and progress is being made.

EIGHT SECTIONS OF AICHI LETTER

I would like to take a few moments to go through the eight sections of the Aichi letter and indicate some areas still undefined.

The sections dealing with broadcasting, private property, and leasing of state and prefectural lands are satisfactory as they stand and as they have been defined in subsequent discussion.

The section dealing with remittance of foreign currency has, after some considerable work, also been found generally acceptable.

This leaves four sections: business activities (or licensing), import quotas, taxation and professionals.

(1) Professionals—that is, doctors, attorneys, dentists, veterinarians, and CPA's. What concerns us here is the transition period—the interregnum between reversion day and the issuance of new licenses—there must be no lapse in the legality of the activities of these individuals, of their professional license to do business. This, we are told, will be covered by the legislation now before the Diet—we hope so and urge you to satisfy yourselves that it is.

(2) Taxation—much work has been done here—two problems which we think can be worked out.

(3) Business Activities: This pertains to the issuance of foreign investment licenses or other authorization required to continue in business. The Aichi letter assures us that these will be issued upon application, after reversion, in accordance with presently valid licenses and other authorization. We understand this is to mean that any business activity currently authorized will also be authorized after reversion.

The difficulties involved in direct investment in Japan are well known. The instinctive reaction of many Japanese officials is to examine closely, and restrict or make difficult, any foreign investment where possible. We expect that for our existing enterprises on Okinawa, this will not be the case, but we worry about it. We are expecting our licenses to be issued promptly and to contain no changes of substance, in the spirit of and as specifically guaranteed in the Aichi letter.

(4) Import Quotas: Since almost all regulation of import quotas is done administratively, few if any changes in the Japanese law are required. We have so far very little information on the details of how quotas needed by our businesses will be granted.

The Aichi letter says this will be on the basis of past records and will take into account the necessity for a reasonable increase of such

imports in the light of the market situation and other relevant factors. This is pretty vague. Our understanding is that imports of no less than existing levels will be allowed with a provision for future growth.

We further understand this is to mean that a business activity authorized by license will not be restricted by the manner in which quotas are granted. Much needs to be clarified in this sensitive area. We are actively discussing this with the Japanese in a friendly way, and we are hopeful but nervous.

EFFECT OF REVERSION ON CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MEMBERS

The American Chamber of Commerce on Okinawa has worked hard to see that the effect of reversion on its members is minimized. Our members have contributed enormously to the growth and present health of the Okinawan economy. We want to continue to see Okinawa prosper and us with it. We do not oppose reversion. We look ahead to it as a challenge and an opportunity.

Japan is an exciting, dynamic nation, and we who will remain in her newest prefecture as foreigners only wish to have fair, equal, and reasonable treatment. We are told that the Government of Japan shares this feeling—we hope so. We hope that this “spirit of common cause”—as a Japanese foreign ministry official recently called it—this “spirit of common cause” will be reflected in all Japanese actions toward us as reversion occurs.

We urge you to convince yourselves through these deliberations that this will happen.

EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION

I wish to thank you and your colleagues and staff members for the considerable attention and very substantial help given us in the past. The effectiveness with which our representative system of government has dealt with our relatively minor problems on a tiny distant island makes us truly proud.

Thank you, too, for this opportunity to put our thoughts on the record of these hearings.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Reeves. We appreciate your testimony, and it is very helpful.

Next is Mr. Robert Morris, on behalf of Mrs. Grace Hsu.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MORRIS, OF RICE & RICE, DALLAS, TEX., ON BEHALF OF MRS. GRACE HSU

Mr. MORRIS. I confine my statement to one page.

CLAIM OF GRACE HSU TO ISLANDS INCLUDED IN REVERSION

I would like to present for the record of this committee the documents that make up the claim of Grace Hsu of New York City, a U.S. citizen, to the islands of Tiaoyutai, Huang Wei Yu, and Chih Yu, and two small surrounding islets. These islands are uninhabited but are used by fishermen and collectors of herbs which abound on the islands. Other plants that grow on the islands are rattan, palm trees, and banyan trees.

In 1893, the Dowager Empress of China, Tze Shih, made a grant of the islands to Miss Hsu's grandfather, Sheng Hsuan Wai. The latter willed them to Miss Hsu.

I would like to introduce at this point the four Chinese documents, the most important of which is the grant from the Empress in 1893, and may I just read that?

Senator SPARKMAN. We shall be very glad to have it.

Mr. MORRIS [reading].

The medicinal pills submitted by Sheng Hsuan Huai, Tai Chang Szu Cheng,¹ have proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the pills are said to have been collected from the small island of Tiao Yu Tai, beyond the Seas of Taiwan. Being made of ingredients from the sea, the prescription is more effective than that available in the Chinese mainland. It has come to my knowledge that the said official's family has for generations maintained pharmacies offering free treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is really most commendable. The three small islands of Tiao Yu Tai, Huang Wei Yu, Chih Yu are hereby ordered to be awarded to Sheng Hsuan Huai as his property for the purpose of collecting medicinal herbs. May the great universal benevolence of the Imperial Dowager Empress and of the Emperor be deeply appreciated.

Mr. MORRIS. And you will notice, Senator, on this original grant you have the official seal of the Imperial Dowager Empress, and this seal on the right is a symbol of a grant being made, and I would like to offer these four in the record, together with the translations.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very glad to have them.

(The Chinese versions of the letters are in the committee files. The translations follow:)

DEAR SIR: I have in my possession an Imperial Edict, a sketch map and two letters proving that the islands of Tiao Yu Tai, Huang Wei Yu and Chih Yu were awarded to my family by Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi in 1893.

Since these islands are the properties of my family, the United States must not transfer them to Japan together with the Ryukyus. I submit herewith facsimiles of the original documents together with translations.

I shall be grateful if the Department of State will take appropriate measures to inform all parties concerned of the legal status of these islands.

Faithfully yours,

GRACE YI HSU,
a/k/a GRACE YI SHENG,
(Certificate of Citizenship No. 8525415).

TRANSLATION

(A sketch map of Tiao Yu Tai with an explanatory note)

Tiao Yu Tai, Huang Wei Yu, and Chih Yu are three small islands located beyond Keelung, Taiwan. They stand out above in the middle of the ocean. They have never been inhabited and are the sheltering places of fishermen from the northern part of Taiwan. Though they belong to our family, they are only used for collecting medicinal herbs and are not developed. Towards the end of the Ching dynasty, based on a record written by the Honorable Li Ting Yuan, deputy to the Honorable Chao Chia Shan, our family sent someone to draw a map which was used to be kept in my study. . . . Later all the books and manuscripts in my study were donated to the National Chiao Tung University, formerly the Nanyang College, which was founded by my father. The sketch map is in that collection.

Written by Sheng En I (courtesy name Che Cheng).

¹Tai Chang had control of the Imperial Court Infirmary. Tai Chang Szu Cheng was an official in Tai Chang Szu.

TRANSLATION OF AN EXCERPT FROM A LETTER OF SHENG EN I (COURTESY NAME CHE CHENG TO HIS DAUGHTER SHENG YU CHENG DATED 5TH DECEMBER THE 36TH YEAR OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1947

* * * There are three small islands beyond the seas of Taiwan, namely Tiao Yu Tai, Huang Wei Yu and Chih Yu. They are all barren and were mentioned in the writings of The Honorable Chao Wen Chia (courtesy name Chia Shan) who visited the Liuchius (Ryukyu) as imperial envoy. Though uninhabited, the islands produce abundant medicinal herbs. When our family was at its zenith we had Kuang Jen Tang pharmacies in Chefoo, Shanghai and Changchow offering free treatment and medicine. It was well known everywhere. The Empress Dowager awarded the three islands to your grandfather for the purpose of collecting herbs. The Imperial Edict has been kept in our family. The islands belong to us. We also have in our possession a map with an explanatory note. I am mailing these to you, hoping that you will find some way to visit the islands one day. But you must not go if the trip should be considered dangerous * * *.

(Signed) -----

TRANSLATION

IMPERIAL EDICT OF EMPRESS DOWAGER TZU HSI ISSUED ON THE 10TH MONTH OF THE 19TH YEAR OF EMPEROR KUANG HSU, 1893

The medicinal pills submitted by Sheng Hsuan Huai, *Tai Chang Szu Cheng*¹ have proved to be very effective. The herbs used in making the pills are said to have been collected from the small island of Tiao Yu Tai, beyond the seas of Taiwan. Being made of ingredients from the sea, the prescription is more effective than that available in the Chinese mainland. It has come to my knowledge that the said official's family has for generations maintained pharmacies offering free treatment and herbs to destitute patients. This is really most commendable. The three small islands of Tiao Yu Tai, Huang Wei Yu, Chih Yu are hereby ordered to be awarded to Sheng Hsuan Huai as his property for the purpose of collecting medicinal herbs. May the great universal benevolence of the Imperial Dowager Empress and of the Emperor be deeply appreciated.

TREATY PROVIDES ISLANDS IN QUESTION BE RETURNED TO JAPAN

Mr. MORRIS. Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895, but returned it to the Republic of China in 1945. I would like to point out the acquisition by Japan of the Ryukyu Islands antedated their receiving Taiwan from the Chinese in 1895. Now, Miss Hsu has believed that with the return of Taiwan to the Republic of China, the islands which had come under Japanese sovereignty with Taiwan would have reverted back with it.

However, the treaty before this committee provides that these islands of the Taioyutai group, whose Japanese name is the Senkaku Islands, will be returned to Japan.

STATE DEPARTMENT EXPLANATION

The State Department explanation for this action is set forth in a letter to me from Robert I. Starr, Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, dated October 20, 1971. The relevant paragraph of that letter reads:

Under Article III of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States acquired administrative rights over "Nansei Shoto" south of 29 degrees north latitude. This term was understood by the United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands, which were under Japanese administration at the end of the Second World War and which are not otherwise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty.

¹ Tai Chang Szu had control of the Imperial Court Infirmary. Tai Chang Szu Cheng was an official in Tai Chang Szu.

In addition, I would like to read the conclusion of the State Department letter, which says:

The Governments of the Republic of China and Japan are in disagreement as to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. You should know as well that the People's Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over the islands. The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.

I would like to offer that whole letter for the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. We will be glad to have it.

(The information referred to follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., October 20, 1971.

ROBERT MORRIS, Esq.,
Rice & Rice,
Mercantile Dallas Building, Dallas, Tex.

DEAR MR. MORRIS: Secretary Rogers has asked me to reply to your letter of September 28, 1971, concerning the claim of Grace Hsu to ownership of the Tiao-yutai, Huang Wei Yu, and Chih Yu islands. We assume that you that by "Huang Wei Yu" and "Chih Yu", you refer to Huang-wei-chiao and Chih-wei-chiao, two islets in the Tiao-yu-tai group. The Japanese names for these two islands are respectively Kobi-sho and Sekibi-sho, and the entire group is known in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands.

Under Article III of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States acquired administrative rights over "Nansei Shoto" south of 29 degrees north latitude. This term was understood by the United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands, which were under Japanese administration at the end of the Second World War and which are not otherwise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty.

In accordance with understandings reached by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato of Japan in 1969, the United States is expected to return to Japan in 1972 the administrative rights to Nansei Shoto which the United States continues to exercise under the Peace Treaty. A detailed agreement to this effect, on the terms and conditions for the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including the Senkakus, was signed on June 17, 1971, and has been transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Governments of the Republic of China and Japan are in disagreement as to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. You should know as well that the People's Republic of China has also claimed sovereignty over the islands. The United States believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, nor can the United States, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. The United States has made no claim to the Senkaku Islands and considers that any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned.

I hope that this information is helpful to you. If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT I. STARR,
Acting Assistant Legal Adviser
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. MORRIS. My client is not raising the question of sovereignty here. That is an action to be taken by the respective governments involved. But she would like to offer for the record the basis of her claim to ownership of the islands and to ask the committee to affirm that the treaty causes no change in her right thereto.

All that Miss Hsu is asking of the committee is that there be a statement that her underlying claims are not affected by the treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. Very interesting, very interesting testimony you have given us and we are glad to have it.

Mr. MORRIS. I made one spelling mistake on this. She spells the name Tzu and it is Hsi instead of Shih.

Senator SPARKMAN. The next witness is Mr. Shien-Biau Woo; is that right?

**STATEMENT OF SHIEN-BIAU WOO, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE,
NEWARK, DEL.**

Mr. Woo. That is close enough, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. I cannot make out the middle name.

Of the University of Delaware. Very, very glad to have you. You may proceed.

Mr. Woo. I am here as one of thousands of persons of Chinese extraction in the United States who is concerned over the dispute of Tiao-Yu Tai Islands—Senkaku in Japanese—between China and Japan. As a physicist, I have no formal training in discussing these matters. I can only speak as a layman who has studied this issue rather diligently ever since the first dispute first came to my attention last year.

I want to tell you why we think this is such an important mission to us. I want to inform you of a few crucial facts concerning the U.S. involvement in this dispute.

MAP PRESENTED

In the map I have prepared, China proper is in this corner and Taiwan is right in here. Japan is in the upper right corner in here and these small specks of lands are usually referred to as Okinawa Island. The islands in dispute are right here in the small circle, situated in that position.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is that heavy line going around, are those the coordinates that are set forth in the reversion?

Mr. Woo. These lines refer to the boundary drawn up by the treaties that I will come to later on.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.

Mr. Woo. And this gray line here indicates where the continental shelf stops.

(The map referred to is in the committee files.)

ARE DISPUTED ISLANDS INCLUDED IN JAPANESE PEACE TREATY?

Let me ask, does the original document which gave the United States administrative rights over the Okinawa Islands specifically refer to or include the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands which China claims? No; emphatically no. Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan states that the United States will acquire sole administrative rights over Nansei Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude, including Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands. Tiao-Yu Tai was not specifically mentioned,

nor was there a grid map which included these islands. Senators, in this map before you—see enclosed figure—I have indicated the original demarcation line in red. China proper is here. Taiwan is here. Japan proper is here. The Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, are here. The Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are here.

DOES OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY INCLUDE THESE ISLANDS?

Now, does the present Okinawa Reversion Treaty specifically refer to or include the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands? Yes. I have indicated in this map the six points which define the area affected by the present treaty. Article 1 of the Okinawa Treaty states that all islands, islets, atolls, and rocks situated in an area bounded by the straight line connecting these six points will be reverted to Japan. Therefore, there exist drastic differences between the original document and the treaty before you and the difference is to the expense of China.

CHANGE IN DEMARCATION

One might ask, how does such drastic change in demarcation at the expense of China come about? What is empowered by any international agreements? No. This change was not empowered by any international agreements. It was instead established by Proclamation No. 27 of the Civil Administration of Ryukyu. Even the State Department seems to admit that legally such a proclamation amounts to nothing more than an "understanding between the U.S. and Japan." Let me quote a letter from Mr. Harrison M. Symmes, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations:

Under Article III of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. acquired administrative rights over Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude. This term was understood to include the Senkaku Islands.

OBJECTIONS FROM CHINA

Has such a capricious act at the expense of China aroused objections from China? Of course. The People's Republic of China in editorials written by the commentator, which usually means a very high party official, states:

* * * The Chinese people have always maintained that the U.S. should return Okinawa to the Japanese people. But we will never permit the U.S. and the Japanese reactionaries to annex China's sacred territory Tiaoyu and other islands by making use of the Okinawa Reversion swindle . . . and make it a fait accompli. The Chinese Government and people will absolutely not tolerate these crimes of encroachment upon China's sovereignty * * *

The Republic of China on Taiwan was also adamant. A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry termed the upcoming transfer of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands to Japan as "completely unacceptable."

POSITION OF STATE DEPARTMENT

In the face of such strong protest from China, what is the position of the State Department? The State Department's position is very ambiguous, to say the least. She proclaims her neutrality with regard

to this territorial dispute on the one hand, and consigns these islands to Japan on the strength of a proclamation of the civil administration of Ryukyus on the other hand. Indeed, the State Department even seeks Japanese permission to use two of the islands as bombing ranges.

Application to Japan to use these islands render the stated neutrality of the United States totally meaningless. As was reported in the Washington Post on June 28, 1971, a spokesman of Japanese Foreign Ministry used this application as evidence that the United States supported Japanese contentions. Furthermore, the renting of these islands places the United States in the middle of a territorial dispute between China and Japan, which is potentially prone to armed conflicts.

STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION DAMAGING TO U.S. INTEREST

Senator, I honestly feel that the present State Department position is damaging to the U.S. interest. Allow me to first conjecture how it would affect the normalization of the United States-China relationship. A proverb I remember states: "Well begun is half done." The dispute of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands is the first concrete case involving China's interest and the United States, since President Nixon's imaginative initiative to China. Thus far the United States has handled it with apparent duplicity.

Does this convey the best American image?

Does this convey sincerity?

Does this convey the American sense of world stability?

Next, allow me to conjecture how a truly neutral U.S. position would affect the United States-Japan relationship, which one so often heard being described these days as at its lowest ebb. In answering this question, I think one ought to make a distinction between United States-Japan relationship and United States-Japanese Liberal Democratic Party relationship. If the United States now modifies the treaty to honor the original line of demarcation, a large fraction of the Liberal Democratic Party, in particular Premier Sato, might be quite unhappy. But the interest of the Japanese people will, in my view, definitely be served.

A few years back, the world saw China risk armed conflict with a superpower, Russia, over a small island, Chen Pao Tao (Damansky) in the Ussuri River between Russia and China. That island is uninhabited, has no strategic value, has no oil. If China was willing to risk Russia to defend a small island for a principle, then will Japan really believe that she can occupy Tiao-Yu Tai simply on the strength of a proclamation of the civil administration of Ryukyus?

My feeling is that the Japanese people, together with the Chinese people, want to see this matter handled in a fair and judicious manner at the very early stage so that China and Japan can work out their differences peacefully. Otherwise, many Japanese and Chinese will feel, perhaps justly, that the United States is intentionally sowing the seeds of conflict between China and Japan. Whether intentional or not, a border conflict between China and Japan is an extremely grave matter. The treaty before you for ratification has in it such a built-in instability against world peace.

NEUTRAL POSITION URGED

I realize that the United States-Japanese Liberal Democratic Party relationship is a pressing immediate concern for you, but I trust that you will place the peace and tranquility of East Asia before this immediate problem. I urge you to take a truly neutral position and eliminate the built-in instability in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate your contribution.

Next is Mr. Mark Selden, department of history, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.

We are glad to have you, sir. We do have a copy of your statement and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MARK SELDEN, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. SELDEN. I will try to be brief.

CONDITIONS OF REVERSION CHALLENGED

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here today to challenge those provisions of the agreement between the United States and Japan which perpetuate a U.S. military fortress on Okinawa and which intensify United States-Japan confrontation with China. Let me at the outset underline my support for the immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. The critical issue is not, however, whether Okinawa should revert to Japanese sovereignty, but the conditions of reversion.

I would like to suggest that provisions for continued use of Okinawa as a U.S. base blatantly violate the interests and expressed desires of the peoples of Okinawa and Japan; that the agreement embodies the bankrupt assumptions of a quarter-century of American policy which has reaped disaster in Indochina, Korea, and elsewhere; and that above all, by strengthening a United States-Japan military alliance directed against China, it effectively torpedoed hopes for a relaxation of tensions in East Asia.

EFFECT OF AGREEMENT ON OKINAWAN PEOPLE

It is striking that administration spokesmen appearing before this committee nowhere touch upon the effect of the agreement on the Okinawan people. Okinawa has long been a pawn in big power politics in East Asia. The initial staging area a century ago for Japan's imperial outward thrust toward China and Southeast Asia, Okinawa was caught in the jaws of United States-Japan confrontation and the island devastated in the final great battle of World War II. Twenty-five years of U.S. military rule has seen Okinawa's agrarian way of life literally bulldozed to make way for the base complexes and airstrips which made it the keystone of America's Pacific strategy and gave it a pivotal role in the destruction of Indochina. The Okinawan economy has been turned into a parasitic appendage of the U.S. mili-

tary machine. This committee has heard ample discussion of U.S. global responsibilities, but scarcely a word has been uttered about the responsibilities to the people of this land who have suffered grievously under direct American military rule.

INTERESTS AND DESIRES OF MAJORITY SACRIFICED FOR MILITARY EXPEDIENCY

The interest and desires of the great majority of Okinawans and Japanese are being sacrificed for military expediency by the Japanese and American Governments. The New York Times front page photos following conclusion of the agreement last June conveyed the story vividly. Secretary of State Rogers and Ambassador Ushiba celebrated with champagne while Japanese riot police beat to a pulp opposition demonstrators protesting the military provisions of the agreement. The intensity of anti-American rioting in Okinawa earlier this year, the refusal of Okinawa's chief executive Yara to attend the signing, despite the fact Yara came to office specifically on the plank of bringing Okinawa reversion to Japan, and the continued resistance of Okinawan farmers to military seizure of their land all reflect the broad-based hostility to the terms of reversion. This oversight in which the peoples of Asia are overlooked in the calculations of great power politics—most vividly and tragically illustrated in the Pentagon Papers—suggests a critical area in which American policy in Asia is fundamentally flawed.

U.S. POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

There are, of course, larger issues than the welfare of 1 million Okinawans, not to mention 100 million Japanese. But analysis of the strategic implications of the agreement reinforces the conclusion that Okinawan reversion should be premised on the elimination of American military installations. The agreement, the cornerstone of United States-Japan military arrangements in the seventies, is based on the following explicit and implicit U.S. policy assumptions:

One. That American military bases on Okinawa are essential to the security of Japan and the Pacific;

Two. That United States-Japan military arrangements will provide the bulwark for security in Asia, safeguarding both American and Asian interest by confronting China and checking wars of national liberation wherever they may occur;

Three. That Japan must assume an increasing, if still subordinate, share of the military burden in Asia, allowing a phased reduction of U.S. ground forces but not of air and sea power.

Four. That the harmonious relationship between the United States and Japan will continue and that China remains the primary threat in East Asia.

OKINAWA SIGNIFICANT AS STAGING AREA

American military power on Okinawa is no longer necessary, however, for the defense of Japan. The significance of Okinawa as a military base lies in its utility as a staging area for actions in Southeast

Asia or China. The entire structure of the United States-Japan military alliance is offensive rather than defensive.

ASSUMPTIONS OF MILITARY ALLIANCE UNCHALLENGED

The striking fact about these bedrock assumptions of United States-Japan military alliance is their faithful adherence to official assumptions unchallenged since the reverse course of the Occupation—and their obliviousness to the lessons of Indochina. In 1947 the United States initiated the remilitarization and economic expansion of Japan as its junior partner in Asia. In 1971 the recognition of Japan's increasing power at a moment of waning American strength has, to be sure, led to a redistribution of military responsibilities characteristic of the Nixon doctrine's emphasis on Asianization. This may reduce some immediate costs to the U.S. taxpayer, but repetition of the themes of cold war diplomacy leads ineluctably to heightened tensions and future disasters for American diplomacy in Asia. The same grandiose goals are to be achieved with fewer American soldiers and at lower cost—this means in effect the increased risk of war.

SITUATION RIPE FOR CREATIVE, NEW DIPLOMACY

At no moment in the last quarter-century has the situation been as ripe for a creative diplomacy. We stand at this moment poised at the brink of a new era. During the past 6 months we have witnessed the end of U.S. hegemony in Asia and globally. No longer does the dollar stand supreme among the currencies of the world, no longer can apparently limitless U.S. military means be marshaled to patrol the globe, no longer can the U.S. call the shots in the United Nations, no longer can China be effectively isolated, and no longer will Japan, fueled by a dynamic economy and mounting nationalism, accept a position as a silent partner of American power. A world dominated by a Pax Americana has become more fluid.

The time has come for a new diplomacy which jettisons anti-Chinese confrontation, ends U.S. reflexive intervention in Asian land wars, and moves immediately toward withdrawal from Indochina, which reorders U.S. priorities away from global military involvement and toward long neglected social and economic problems at home. The time has come for abandoning a diplomacy of war predicated on a forward American military posture in Asia in favor of genuine attempts to reach accommodation with China.

AGREEMENT TORPEDOES GOALS FOR NEW DIPLOMACY

The agreement before us torpedoes these goals by seeking to refurbish a United States-Japan alliance predicated on hostility toward China and continued intervention in the affairs of other nations. Nowhere have these principles been stated more explicitly than in the Sato-Nixon Accord of November 1969 in which it declared that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security" and that "peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan." Not only are these former

colonies of the Japanese empire, as well as areas which once again have fallen under Japanese economic domination, but one, as the world recently recognized, is a province of China, and the other is perhaps the most sensitive area on China's border. United States-Japan agreements predicated on Japanese military hegemony in these areas, coupled with continued efforts to speed up the already rapid pace of rearmament, set Japan once again squarely on the road of conquest and pose an immediate military threat to a China which a generation ago lost 30 million lives in resisting Japanese conquest.

The passage of this agreement in short sabotages hopes for a genuine reduction of tensions in East Asia through rapprochement with China. There are alternatives, but they require critical reexamination of American policy premises. The United States can and should abandon efforts to drive a wedge between China and Japan in favor of a policy of reconciliation and increased trade among the three nations. It should abandon the dream of stabilizing Asia through United States-Japan military power. Above all, it should cease to aid and encourage Japan's rapid militarization. Here General Smith and I seem to agree. Okinawa should be returned to Japan free of U.S. military bases. Indeed, U.S. bases abroad, which provide the structure for a system in which the United States, at such immense cost, attempted to play the role of global gendarme, should be eliminated. Such policies will not, of course, end war and instability in the world; they will, however, eliminate major areas of conflict, reduce immensely American military involvement, and enable the United States and other countries to turn their attention to priority problems in their own societies.

Thank you very much.
(Witness's biography follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF MARK SELDEN

Mark Selden is assistant professor of history at Washington University (St. Louis) and the author of *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (Harvard University Press, 1971). He is an editor of *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays in Asian-American Relations* (Pantheon, 1971) and *Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine and Asia* (forthcoming, Harper & Row). He is presently co-editor of the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, an international quarterly of Asian affairs. He conducted research in Japan most recently in 1969-70. The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars is an organization of teachers, students, journalists, writers and others interested in Asian affairs and critical of American Asian policy. As sponsor of numerous recent studies of Asian and American Asian policy it is at the center of the effort to critically evaluate and transform American policy in Asia. A group of 15 CCAS representatives toured China this summer, the first U.S. Asian specialists to visit China in twenty-two years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, sir.

We appreciate the very good and interesting presentation. I wish time granted we could do some questioning of all of the witnesses, but we will have to move along.

Mr. E. Raymond Wilson, executive secretary emeritus, Friends Committee on National Legislation. Mr. Wilson is an old friend with whom I have worked for many years.

We welcome you to this committee and we will be glad to hear from you now.

STATEMENT OF E. RAYMOND WILSON, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EMERITUS, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

I would like to file this testimony and speak to it more briefly.

SUPPORT FOR ARTICLE 1, OPPOSITION TO ARTICLES 2 AND 3

We, as a committee, support article 1 of this Okinawa agreement providing for the political reversion of Okinawa to Japan, but I want to call the attention of the press and the people who have had the printed copy that there is a change in the next statement.

We definitely oppose articles 2 and 3, providing for the retention of military bases in Okinawa and we would ask for a postponement of the ratification until negotiations are undertaken for the demilitarization of Okinawa and adoption of a program of complete withdrawal of all American forces and bases from the Ryukyus.

The least that this Senate committee ought to do is to say in this treaty action that this program should follow rapidly and urgently.

We do welcome the political reversion after 26 years and the removal of poison gas from Okinawa, but I wonder why it was not detoxified instead of merely transferred.

TREATY OF RETENTION RATHER THAN REVERSION?

I would call this, Mr. Sparkman, a treaty of retention rather than reversion because if we keep 88 out of the 120 bases and facilities, that is not reversion in any real sense; that is retaining 73 percent.

I was not at the testimony yesterday, but I understand there was no definite promise or statement regarding timing of military withdrawal. This looks like another Tonkin Resolution, Formosa Resolution, of a complete blank check, and I think that is not the responsibility of the Senate in this kind of a situation.

A great deal of time was taken up on Wednesday talking about the U.N. and its relation to the present situation with regard to both China and Japan. We have heard General Smith say this morning that our investment in Okinawa runs somewhere between \$2 and \$5 billion. He would use the figure of \$4 billion. I want to really bear down on that relationship between our current total expenditures for the U.N. which, as near as we can figure them out for the United Nations, for all of the special agencies, for all of the programs, amounted last year, contributions and appropriations from the Congress, of \$270 million. That is a tiny, tiny sum compared to these vast military expenditures and I think it was very unfortunate that we have had to move in the Senate already for cutting back on U.N. appropriations at a time when we need to do more things cooperatively.

I will say to you in all seriousness, Mr. Sparkman, that this is a formula for continual trouble and not a formula for the settlement of our disputes with Japan.

The matter of political reversion, of course, will be taken out of the argument, but it does not remove the grievances that are caused by the retention of military bases and military personnel.

INCREASE IN JAPANESE MILITARY EXPENDITURES QUESTIONED

Now, the real interest of Japan is in trying to develop much better relations with its neighbors, including Taiwan, the People's Republic of China, and the people of China and the Soviet Union and Korea, and not in remilitarization or building up a huge military establishment. Yet we heard the Secretary of State say here day before yesterday that the United States was expecting the Japanese Government to increase its military expenditures. I think that is a major mistake.

We ought to encourage the Japanese Government to work for demilitarization and international political and economic cooperation. Japan ought to be in a sense, this is not a very apt illustration perhaps, kind of a Switzerland of Asia instead of being the cockpit of Asia, we have seen in our lifetime the effect of Japanese militarization, its attack on Manchuria, its attack on China, its attack on the United States, and we do not want to see the revival of either that kind of Japanese nationalism or that kind of Japanese militarism.

Now, there is no provision for a complete withdrawal from either Japan or Okinawa. The U.S. Security Treaty is not before us because it was automatically continued, but somebody said you cannot win a war any more than you can win a fire. We are learning that lesson slowly in Vietnam.

U.S. RETENTION OF BASES AND FACILITIES IN JAPAN

According to the hearings last year, we are retaining 125 bases and facilities in Japan. There has been a notable reduction both of bases and facilities, but this makes over 200 bases and facilities in Japan 26 years after the conclusion of the war and projecting an indefinite future.

I say again I think that is a major mistake in American and Japanese military policy because I do not need to stress to you that foreign troops almost always in a country over a period of time cause irritation and trouble.

I remember when I was in Japan a few years ago talking with one of the men in the Adjutant General's section of the Army and he was saying one of their largest troubles, and what he spent practically all of his time on, was trying to settle claims of accidents by military vehicles, driving tanks or trucks or automobiles in these narrow streets and highways of Japan.

Now, take Okinawa, for example, that we have been talking about this morning. Eighty-seven percent of the population of Ryukyu live on Okinawa and that is an average of 1,492 persons per square mile. But if you take out the military bases, which occupy some 12 percent or more of the island of Okinawa, this means 2,000 people per square mile exclusive of the bases are on Okinawa and you retain 88 bases and facilities in that kind of crowded island and, as I say, that is a formula for continued and persistent trouble.

EFFECT OF MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWANS

I have been in Okinawa, I have talked to Okinawan visitors. We have them in our office from time to time. I have gone around with some of them to see members of the Senate and the House, and their objection

was to the number of accidents, often to children, which had little or no indemnification to the victim and little or no punishment to the driver of these vehicles.

Japanese and Okinawans have demonstrated against stationing of B-52's on Vietnam bombing runs and the American stockpile of atomic weapons on the island. In one demonstration in Tokyo last year, nearly 100 policemen were injured.

I was talking, day before yesterday, with a friend of mine who is just back this week from 6 years in Japan and I said to him, how many demonstrations and protests have there been in Okinawa and Japan on this policy of military involvement. Well, he said, they have been almost continuous during the period that he had been there, one place or the other or both, in Okinawa or in Japan.

One of our Okinawan visitors took a bottle out of his pocket and poured into it some of the water from a well near Kedena Air Base and took his cigarette lighter and this water lit because it was heavily polluted with the gasoline running out of the gas line storage tanks on the Kedena Air Base, and that is what was happening to the facility, to the people on Okinawa.

Surrounding most installations are honky-tonks, bars, and brothels and a bevy of prostitutes. What kind of respect does this engender for the Americans?

REMOVAL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA

I hope that the statements of the Secretary of State and the spokesman for the Defense Department that atomic weapons have been or will be completely removed from Okinawa is a firm promise because any atomic weapons on Okinawa, and they will be known because of the thousands of Okinawans that work on these bases, that there will be a categorical assurance that they are going to be removed because they would be a source of increasing and major irritation because of the psychology of Japan going back to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

LANGUAGE CONCERNING KOREA, TAIWAN, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

One aspect of this treaty gives some concern where we talk about Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. I quote in this testimony that paragraph. The language sounds fine as it is expressed, but does this mean in effect that the Japanese are expected to take a considerable part in possible intervention in Korea or Taiwan or Southeast Asia?

I do not need to remind you, Senator Sparkman, these three countries are all headed by very strong dictatorships and there is unrest in every one of them, so far as the denial of liberties is concerned.

TREATY SHOULD NOT PREJUDGE CLAIMS OF CHINA

You have heard a lot this morning about the islands, the Senkaku Islands and a variety of claims for them. We say that we hope that this committee will make it crystal-clear that the treaty does not in any way prejudice or prejudge the claims of China to these islands.

We hope that this question may be speedily and amicably resolved either by negotiation between the parties or submission to an appropriate international tribunal.

Why does not this Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the United States move more decisively toward reversing this insanity of piling arms upon arms, and encouraging the Japanese to do the same?

ALLOCATION OF MONEY AND MANPOWER TO DIFFERENT GOALS

We should be allocating our money and our manpower toward building the institutions of peace and international social and economic development instead, and I want to pay tribute to you, Senator Sparkman, for your interest over the years beginning especially in 1953 in pressing for more attention on the part of the United States for greater efforts toward general disarmament and reducing this burden, political and military, psychological, of arms.

We could make the difference in helping see that a hungry world is fed. We could lick the problem of dire poverty in the United States, really tackle the problems of our decaying cities, and put up a monstrous fight against pollution. Our true security rests on building a world where peace is possible—not pouring our billions down the barrel of a gun. This treaty is not an answer. It is an opportunity to do what we ought to do to demilitarize and neutralize Okinawa and help Japan become a leader for peace in the Far East, and live up to the ideals of article IX in the Constitution which MacArthur and his staff helped write as a beacon toward a different world.

Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

(Prepared statement follows:)

TESTIMONY OF E. RAYMOND WILSON ON BEHALF OF FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE JAPAN-U.S. AGREEMENT ON REVERSION OF OKINAWA, BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 20, 1971

My name is E. Raymond Wilson, executive secretary emeritus of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. While the FCNL is made up of representative Friends from more than three-fourths of the Quaker Yearly Meetings across the country, it does not presume to speak officially for the whole Society of Friends, each of whom cherishes the right to his own political and religious opinions. We rest our case on the merits of our arguments and not the number of those for whom we speak, although our constituency are deeply concerned about the issues of peace and justice.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom have asked to associate themselves in principle with this testimony also.

SUPPORT POLITICAL REVERSION AND OPPOSE MILITARY RETENTION

We support Article I of the Reversion Treaty now pending before your Committee which provides for the political return of Okinawa to Japan, recognizing that this still leaves many economic and other problems unsolved.

We definitely oppose Articles II and III providing for the retention of military bases in Okinawa, and would ask for postponement of the ratification until renegotiations are undertaken for the demilitarization of Okinawa and adoption of a program for rapid and complete withdrawal of all American armed forces and bases from the Ryukus.

POLITICAL REVERSION LONG OVERDUE

We welcome the long overdue political reversion of Okinawa to the political sovereignty of Japan.

We also hail the removal, as reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1971, of 13,000 tons of mustard and nerve gas from Okinawa. But, if Presi-

dent Nixon means what he says about outlawing chemical and bacteriological warfare, why weren't these munitions detoxified and destroyed rather than having been merely transferred to some other site?

A TREATY OF RETENTION RATHER THAN REVERSION

I want to look at the fine print rather than just the fine phrases in this treaty and the serious implications of the agreements which are before the Senate for consideration. The Memorandum of Understanding lists 88 military bases and facilities to be retained by the United States. This is out of the 120 listed on page 1513 of the printed hearings of your Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad dated January 1970.

Retaining 73% of the military facilities is not reversion in fact but should more properly be called *retention*.

The U.S. News and World Report of June 28, 1971, estimates that a military complex valued at more than \$2 billion will remain in U.S. hands. According to this report, SR-71 "spy planes" based on the island will continue to fly along the Red Chinese coast. Maybe the growing detente with Mainland China will halt this eventually. The Voice of America may continue to beam programs to Asian countries for at least another five years.

A dispatch on July 4 from the capital city, Naha, says that the United States is planning a \$60 million construction program at its bases over the next several years, according to Air Force Col. Thomas I. Murphy. This doesn't look like reversion.

COMPARE THIS CONTINUED INVESTMENT WITH THAT GIVEN TO THE U.N.

A great deal of time was spent in the hearings with Secretary of State Rogers on Wednesday bewailing the amount of money that the United States spends on the United Nations and its many programs for peace and human welfare. Compare the amount of money appropriated last year by Congress for U.N. and the Specialized Agencies of less than \$270 million with the alleged investment of \$2 billion by the United States in Okinawan military properties and the astronomical sums spent every year in the Ryukyus, mostly on Okinawa.

A FORMULA FOR CONTINUAL TROUBLE

I say to you in all seriousness that I believe this proposed agreement is a formula for continued irritation and trouble. While return to the political sovereignty of Japan will remove one major cause of irritation that has bedeviled Okinawa for more than two decades, it doesn't remove the military grievances, to which I will return in a moment.

THE REAL INTEREST OF JAPAN

The real interest and future security of Japan, and of the United States in the Far East, lies in developing better political and economic cooperation with its neighbors, in working for a strengthened United Nations and general disarmament, not in pursuing an arms race which will revive Japanese nationalism at the cost of the confidence of their neighbors who still remember the aggression and brutality of the Co-Prosperity program culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Secretary of State, day before yesterday, in his testimony, stressed the desire of the United States that the Japanese should increase their military budget.

Moritoku Arasaki, one of the foremost experts on Okinawa, urged in a *Mainichi Daily News* column on December 15, 1969, regarding Japanese rearmament, "In order to check the Government's policy, we should make a bridge-building effort toward Mainland China to relax tension in the Far East."

NO PROVISION FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM JAPAN AND OKINAWA

While technically the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty continues in force, unless renounced, and is not before the Senate at this time, the Security Treaty and the Okinawa Agreement are part and parcel of the same military security package. The Senate had no opportunity to act on the continuation of the Security Treaty.

Somebody has said, "You can't win a war any more than you can win a fire." The United States is slowly learning that lesson in Vietnam. And last year, according to U. Alexis Johnson (Hearings, page 1153), the United States was

still retaining some 125 bases and facilities in Japan. Added to the Okinawa installations, that makes over 200 bases and facilities, 26 years after the end of the war with Japan, which we are projecting into an indefinite future.

FOREIGN TROOPS USUALLY CAUSE IRRITATION

No country can keep troops on foreign soil for a long period of time without serious consequences and conflicts with the local population. One of the major causes of friction is the number of accidents on narrow streets and roads caused by military vehicles. Eighty-seven percent of the population of the Ryukus live on Okinawa, an average of 1,492 persons per square mile in which the United States is retaining nearly one hundred bases and facilities. This means that about 2,000 people are crowded on each square mile of land exclusive of the bases. The entire area of the Ryukus is less than 850 square miles.

One of the biggest complaints from one of our Okinawan visitors was the number of serious accidents, often to children, with little or no indemnification to the victim and little or no punishment of the driver of the auto, truck or military vehicle.

Japanese and Okinawans have demonstrated against stationing of B-52's used on Vietnam bombing runs and the American stockpiling of atomic weapons on the island. In one demonstration in Tokyo last year, nearly 100 policemen were injured.

One of our Okinawa visitors last year poured out some water from a well near the Kadena Air Base. He lit a match to it and it went up in flames—it was so polluted from gasoline that had leaked from the base.

Surrounding most major military installations are the honky-tonks, bars and brothels and a bevy of prostitutes. What kind of respect for the Americans does this kind of situation engender?

ATOMIC WEAPONS

I hope our understanding is correct that all atomic weapons have been, or will be, removed from Okinawa before reversion takes place.

EXPANSION OF JAPANESE RESPONSIBILITY TO KOREA, TAIWAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

In the past, under the Japanese constitution and under the U.S. occupation policy, Japan's defense efforts were restricted to the defense of Japan.

The Joint Communiqué between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato, dated Nov. 21, 1969, in paragraphs four and five talks about Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

"4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan . . . The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she should play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area." The communiqué goes on to deal with the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. While these phrases sound fine on the surface, many Japanese are asking if this is a "commitment" or an implied commitment for Japan. All three of these countries are headed by strong and repressive dictators, and all of these countries have been or, in the case of Vietnam, are in the throes of civil wars. Given the history of this area of the Far East, the military pressure of the United States upon Japan in the past twenty-five years, the proclivity of diplomats for double talk, the fact of Article Nine in the Japanese Constitution, just what do these two paragraphs in the Joint Communiqué really imply?

THE SENKAKU (TIAO YU TAI) ISLANDS

We note that the treaty raises the question of the sovereignty of the Senkaku (Tiao Yu Tai) Islands, and we hope that the Committee in its report or in its interpretations of the treaty will make it crystal clear that this action in no

way prejudices or prejudices the claims of China to these islands. We hope that this question may be speedily and amicably resolved either by negotiations between the parties or submission to an appropriate international tribunal.

WHY DON'T WE LEARN FROM HISTORY?

Why doesn't this Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the United States move more decisively toward reversing this insanity of piling arms upon arms, and encouraging the Japanese to do the same? We should be allocating our money and our manpower toward building the institutions of peace and international social and economic development instead. We could make the difference in helping see that a hungry world is fed. We could lick the problem of dire poverty in the United States, really tackle the problems of our decaying cities, and put up a monstrous fight against pollution. Our true security rests on building a world where peace is possible—not pouring our billions down the barrel of a gun. This treaty is not an answer. It is an opportunity to do what we ought to do to demilitarize and neutralize Okinawa and help Japan become a leader for peace in the Far East, and live up to the ideals of Article IX in the Constitution which MacArthur and his staff helped write as a beacon toward a different world.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. This committee should be aware that many of Japan's most thoughtful citizens are extremely apprehensive about this Okinawa reversion treaty. Rather than continuing that island as an armed camp, they have called for the demilitarization of Okinawa. This statement, signed by 165 distinguished Japanese citizens, including the Governors of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto has been sent to us. We believe it would be of great interest to members of this committee, the Senate, and the general public, and I therefore ask that it be inserted in the hearing record at this point.

A STATEMENT REQUESTING THE DEMILITARIZATION OF OKINAWA

The Extraordinary Diet Session, to be convened on 16 October, is to decide on Japan's basic attitude on the question of the reversion of Okinawa. We take this occasion, prior to the opening of this Diet Session, to make clear, as regards this problem of the reversion, our fundamental line of thinking on which we, undersigned, have agreed, and to submit concrete proposals to the National Diet and to the Sato Government.

It goes without saying that the reversion of Okinawa to Japan has been the aspiration of the people of Okinawa which they have sought to realize, for the past twenty six years, with desperate hopes and efforts, and which has been supported no less by the people residing in Japan proper. We, however, must point out that there exist two grave problems concerning the course of negotiations on the reversion and the contents of the reversion agreement.

The first of these is the basic posture which the Japanese Government has taken in the course of negotiations with the U.S. Government. The Government claims that Prime Minister Sato obtained a promise from Washington, at the Japan-U.S. summit conference in the fall of 1969, that the island chain would be returned to Japan "without nuclear arms and with a status basically similar to that of Japan proper." Yet, no confirmation of this pledge had been made at the time of the signing of the reversion agreement in June of this year. Actually, our suspicion is deepened that through the negotiations the re-entry of nuclear warheads into Okinawa and free sorties by U.S. forces from Okinawa, as well as from Japan proper, might have been acknowledged. The reason that such ambiguity still remains in the Government notion as regards the Okinawa reversion is due to its basic posture of seeking a mere "return of administrative rights" over the island chain without changing in any way the premise of maintaining the U.S. military bases there. Also the fact that the Sato Government had carried on the reversion talks entangling the Okinawa problem with other issues pending between Japan and the United States has thickened this ambiguity even further.

Therefore, we hereby request the Government to make public in full, at the forthcoming Diet Session, the details of negotiations on Okinawa.

The second problem concerns the position of the Government in their grasp of the current international situation which could not but affect their policy in the negotiation process. As is explicit in the Sato-Nixon joint communique issued in Washington in 1969, the Sato Government has tried to handle the Okinawa issue on the basis of a philosophy which assumed the continuation of hostile confrontation between U.S. and China and which bound them to the toeing of the line of Washington's policies. This is nothing more than an extension of the logic of cold war which has consistently been maintained by the postwar conservative governments in Japan.

Against this policy, it has been our contention since some time ago that inasmuch as Japan has the responsibility and capability for the easing of tension in Asia—above all, through the reopening of diplomatic relations with China—the Government should exert their efforts to the utmost in having Okinawa reverted to Japan as a “keystone of peace” in Asia; and for this reason we did oppose the Government notion on the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa. The clock of history moves, however. And now with an apparent policy switch of the United States, as reflected in the recent U.S.-China rapprochement, the basic premise of the Government conception has been shaken from the bottom, and it is evident that a fundamental rethinking on their part is now called for. This new development provides a golden opportunity for Japan to widen the scope of its own choice as befits an independent nation.

What is the road which we Japanese people should follow at this juncture of history? We are convinced that the best alternative open to us is (a) to bring into effect the demilitarization of Okinawa, that is, to have the United States pledge herself to remove all the military bases from Okinawa, and (b) for the Japanese Government to make unequivocally clear that Japan will not deploy any Self-Defense Forces there.

Voices have been gaining ground lately of apprehensions over “the resurgence of Japanese militarism” among the peoples of China, Korea and other Asian countries. In this context, the complete removal of American bases from Okinawa and the decision not to deploy Japan's own Self-Defense Forces there would be the best way to prove to the peoples of these nations Japan's determination that she neither follows the American cold-war strategy nor allow “the revival of Japanese militarism.” Today, there are many among high on the political scene who advocate the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China. If the Sato Government as well as the both Houses of the Diet are really sincere in pursuing friendly ties with Peking, it is the high time for them to show Japan's sincerity by taking this decision in the direction of the demilitarization of Okinawa. The demilitarization of Okinawa, moreover, is obviously in accordance with the interests of the United States in the light both of her desire for the easing of tensions between herself and China and of her need for the defense of the dollar.

Above all, the demilitarization of Okinawa would be an indispensable condition for the securing of peace and human rights for the people of Okinawa. It is their voice, more than any others', that shall have priority on matters concerning their reversion to Japan.

The people of Okinawa were compelled of these few countries to endure a series of sacrifices of various kinds, experienced hardships beyond expression during the Second World War, and further have spent an agonizing quarter of a century under the control of U.S. forces after the end of the war. For them, the basic aspiration intensely expressed in the slogan of “return to mother country” has been none other than this demilitarization of the island chain. The fact that the reversion agreement gives them little prospect of the removal of U.S. bases from Okinawa has caused to the people of Okinawa a profound disappointment and distrust in the program of reversion to Japan. Moreover, the projected dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces is giving rise to a stronger resistance than to U.S. forces on the part of the island residents, which is a clear indication as to where their wishes lie. In other words, not only is the idea of demilitarization of Okinawa of great significance from the standpoint of international politics, but, more important, it meets the desires of the people of Okinawa islands.

For the reasons stated above, we make the following proposals to the National Diet:

(1) The National Diet adopt a resolution proclaiming the demilitarization of Okinawa, while at the same time (a) requesting the United States to remove

her bases from Okinawa as soon as possible after the reversion agreement comes into force, and (b) pledging itself not to deploy the Self-Defense Forces on Okinawa Islands.

(2) The National Diet request the Government that the latter shall reopen negotiations with the United States after making necessary amendments to the present text of the reversion agreement in accordance with the resolution under (1) above, and resolve that it will ratify the reversion agreement only after it will satisfy itself with the result of renewed negotiations.

We hereby urge that the National Diet and the Government should start taking their actions for the easing of tensions in Asia in the manner befitting an independent nation, and through such actions meet the fervent wishes of the Okinawan people. The essential step to this, we believe, is to carry out immediately the proposals we presented above.

OCTOBER 7, 1971.

The Proposals Initiated by:

YOSHIO NAKANO,
Literary Critic.

KENZABURO OYE,
Writer.

YOSHIKAZU SAKAMOTO,
Professor, the University of Tokyo.

SHIGETO TSURU,
Professor, Hitotsubashi University.

SAKAE WAGATSUMA,
Professor Emeritus, the University of Tokyo.

HIDEKI YUKAWA,
Professor Emeritus, the University of Kyoto.

LIST OF SIGNATORIES

Asukata, Ichio, Mayor of Yokohama.
Kuroda, Ryoichi, Governor of Osaka.
Minobe, Ryokichi, Governor of Tokyo.
Ninagawa, Torazo, Governor of Kyoto.
Abe, Tomoji, Writer.
Abe, Osamu, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology.
Akutagawa, Yasushi, Composer.
Aochi, Shin, Critic.
Aoyama, Michio, Professor Emeritus, Kyushu University.
Ariyama, Kanson, Critic.
Ariyama, Kanetaka, President, Nagoya Municipal Women's Junior College.
Asano, Jun'ichi, Clergy.
Ashibe, Nobuyoshi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
Awazu, Norio, Poet.
Banno, Masataka, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
Domon, Ken, Photographer.
Egami, Fujio, Director, Mitsubishi-Kasei Institute of Life Sciences.
Eguchi, Bokuro, Professor, Hosei University.
Fukuda, Kan'ichi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
Fukutake, Tadashi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
Fukushima, Yoichi, Agricultural Economist.
Hanayama, Yuzuru, Assistant Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology.
Hatada, Takashi, Professor, Tokyo Metropolitan University.
Hidaka, Rokuro, Critic.
Hirano, Ken, Literary Critic.
Hori, Toyohiko, Political Scientist.
Horigome, Yoza, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
Hotta, Yoshie, Writer.
Ichii, Saburo, Professor, Seikei University.
Ichikawa, Fusae, Critic.
Ienaga, Saburo, Professor, Tokyo University of Education.
Ino, Kenji, Professor, Kobe University.
Inoue, Takeshi, Professor, Kyoto University.
Inoue, Mitsuharu, Writer.
Inoue, Yoshio, Lecturer, Waseda University.

Ishigaki, Junji, Doctor.
 Ishii, Momoko, Lecturer in Juvenile Literature.
 Ishikawa, Shigeru, Professor, Hitotsubashi University.
 Ishimota, Tadashi, Professor, Hosei University.
 Ishimoto, Yasuo, Professor, Osaka City University.
 Ito, Mitsuharu, Economist.
 Itsuki, Hiroyuki, Writer.
 Iyanaga, Shokichi, Professor, Gakushuin University.
 Jodai, Taro, Former President, Japan Women's University.
 Jugaku, Bunsho, Lecturer in English Literature.
 Kaino, Michitaka, Lawyer.
 Kamishima, Jiro, Professor, Rikkyo University.
 Kanazawa, Kaichi, Student of Juvenile Education.
 Kanzaki, Kiyoshi, Critic.
 Kawana, Kenji, Professor, Kyoto University.
 Kawada, Tadashi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Kaya, Seiji, Former President, The University of Tokyo.
 Kido, Mataichi, Professor, Doshisha University.
 Kikuchi, Isao, Former President, Kyushu University.
 Kimura, Ihei, Photographer.
 Kimura, Kihachiro, Economic Writer.
 Kinoshita, Hanji, Professor, Meiji University.
 Kinoshita, Junji, Playwright.
 Kitazawa, Masakuni, Professor, Toho Gakuen School of Music.
 Kiyomiya, Shiro, Professor, Dokkyo University.
 Kobayashi, Naoki, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Kondō, Koji, Doctor.
 Kozai, Yoshishige, Lecturer in Philosophy.
 Kuno, Osamu, Lecturer in Philosophy.
 Kuwabara, Takeo, Professor Emeritus, Kyoto University.
 Maki, Jiro, Professor, Kyoto University.
 Maruyama, Masao, Political Scientist.
 Masaki, Hiroshi, Lawyer.
 Matsuda, Michio, Doctor.
 Matsuda, Tomoo, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Matsui, Kiyoshi, Professor, Kyoto University.
 Matsumoto, Sannosuke, Professor, Tokyo University of Education.
 Matsumoto, Seicho, Writer.
 Matsushima, Eiichi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Matsushita, Keiichi, Professor, Hosei University.
 Matsuyama, Zenzo, Movie Director, Playwright.
 Miyake, Yasuo, Professor, Tokyo University of Education.
 Miyamoto, Ken'ichi, Professor, Osaka City University.
 Miyata, Mitsuo, Professor, Tohoku University.
 Miyazaki, Yoshikazu, Professor, Yokohama National University.
 Mori, Kyozo, Critic.
 Miritaki, Ichiro, Professor Emeritus, Hiroshima University.
 Muchaku, Seikyo, Teacher, Myojo Gakuen Junior High School.
 Muramatsu, Takashi, Journalist.
 Mutai, Risaku, Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University of Education.
 Nagasu, Kazuji, Professor, Yokohama National University.
 Nagazumi, Yasuaki, Professor Emeritus, Kobe University.
 Nakamura, Akira, Director, Hosei University.
 Nakano, Shigeharu, Writer.
 Naramoto, Tatsuya, Historian.
 Nasu, Ryosuke, Cartoonist.
 Nawa, Toichi, President, Gifu College of Economics.
 Nishikawa, Jun, Lecturer, Waseda University.
 Nogami, Mokichiro, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Nogami, Yaeko, Writer.
 Noma, Hiroshi, Writer.
 Nomura, Heiji, Professor, Waseda University.
 Nomura, Koichi, Professor, Rikkyo University.
 Obata, Misao, Critic.
 Oda, Makoto, Writer.
 Odagiri, Hideo, Literary Critic.

Ogawa, Iwao, Professor, Rikkyo University.
 Okabe, Itsuko, Essayist.
 Okamoto, Taro, Artist.
 Okazaki, Kaheita, Chief Director, Japan-China Memorandum Trade Office.
 Ono, Masao, Lawyer.
 Osaragi, Jiro, Writer.
 Otsuka, Hisao, Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo.
 Ouchi, Hyoe, Former President, Hosei University.
 Ouchi, Tsutomu, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Ozaki, Hotsuki, Critic.
 Royama, Michio, Professor, Sophia University.
 Saito, Makoto, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Saito, Takashi, Professor, Gakushuin University.
 Sakuma, Kiyoshi, Professor, Hiroshima University.
 Sasaki, Kiichi, Critic.
 Seki, Hiroharu, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Senda, Koreya, Producer.
 Shinmura, Takeshi, Professor Emeritus, Nagoya University.
 Shinohara, Hajime, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Shiraishi, Bon, Critic.
 Shiraki, Hirotsugu, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Shiroyama, Saburo, Writer.
 Suekawa, Hiroshi, Professor Emeritus, Ritsumeikan University.
 Sugi, Toshio, Director, Tokyo Metropolitan Hibiya Library.
 Sugiura, Minpei, Writer.
 Sumiya, Mikio, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Tada, Michitaro, Assistant Professor, Kyoto University.
 Takagi, Takeo, Critic.
 Takahashi, Kohachiro, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Takahashi, Toru, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Takahashi, Masao, Professor, Tohoku Gakuin University.
 Takano, Yuichi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Takashima, Zenya, Professor, Kanto Gakuin University.
 Takeuchi, Yoshimi, Lecturer in Chinese Literature.
 Takeda, Kiyoko, Professor, International Christian University.
 Takizawa, Osamu, Actor.
 Tamamushi, Bun'ichi, Professor, Musashi University.
 Tanaka, Shinjiro, Critic.
 Tanikawa, Tetsuzo, Former President, Hosei University.
 Tezuka, Osamu, Cartoonist.
 Tomonaga, Shin'ichiro, Former President, Tokyo University of Education.
 Toyama, Hiraku, Mathematician.
 Toyama, Shigeki, Professor, Yokohama City University.
 Toyoda, Toshiyuki, Professor, Nagoya University.
 Tsuji, Kiyooki, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Tsurumi, Kazuko, Professor, Sophia University.
 Tsurumi, Shunsuke, Critic.
 Uchiyama, Shozo, Professor, Hosei University.
 Uemura, Tamaki, Honorary President of Japan Y.W.C.A.
 Umene, Satoru, President, Wako University.
 Usami, Seiji, Professor, Hosei University.
 Ushioni, Toshitaka, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Usui, Yoshimi, Critic.
 Uzawa, Hirofumi, Professor, The University of Tokyo.
 Watanabe, Kazuo, Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo.
 Yamada, Eiji, Professor, Kanazawa University.
 Yamakawa, Kikue, Critic.
 Yamamoto, Susumu, Journalist.
 Yamamoto, Yasue, Actress.
 Yasugi, Ryuichi, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology.
 Yasuoka, Shotaro, Writer.
 Yoshino, Genzaburo, Critic.

Senator SPARKMAN. We are very glad to have that point of view.
 Next will be Mr. Joseph L. Vicités. Is he here?
 (No response.)

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Thomas C. Dunn, Wilmington, Del. We have your statement. You just proceed.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS C. DUNN, WILMINGTON, DEL.

Mr. DUNN. Mr. Chairman, as a naturalized American citizen, I want to say at this time I feel especially proud of my citizenship because I am deeply aware of the fact that only in the land of the free like this one can a private individual be allowed to speak on very important international matters to this august body.

PURPOSE OF WITNESS' APPEARANCE

I am here to (1) explain why the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands belong to the Chinese (2) express my alarm over the possible revival of Japanese militarism, and (3) urge the adoption for a truly neutral stand by excluding these islands from the Okinawa Reversion Agreement Treaty.

BASIS OF CHINESE CLAIMS FOR TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS

The Chinese sovereignty claims for the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are based on the following four points.

1. GEOGRAPHY

Geographically, Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are intimately related to the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. They are about 120 miles from Taipei and 240 miles from Okinawa. The surrounding waters are less than 200 meters deep. These islands therefore are within the confines of the Chinese continental shelf. In contrast, the water which separates these islands from the Ryukyus is over 1,000 meters in depth.

2. USAGE

The oceanic currents and prevailing winds of the area make passage by sail from the Ryukyus to Tiao-Yu Tai extremely difficult. That is why the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands were discovered and used exclusively by the Chinese until 1884. The islands are very important to Chinese fishermen both as storm shelters and as bases from which to carry out their fishing operations.

3. HISTORY

The name Tiao-Yu Tai first appeared in a Chinese voyage record Shun Feng Hsiang Sung in 1403. Since then it appeared in numerous mission reports. For example, all the major islands in this group had been properly identified and named by envoy Chen Kanin 1534 in his book Shih Liu-Chiu Lu.

In 1884 a Japanese, Tatsushiro Koga, claimed to have discovered the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. Even though Japan annexed Tiao-Yu Tai into her territory after the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, every world atlas published before that year used the romanized Chinese name, Tiao-Yu Tai to describe these islands and treated them as part of China.

4. LAW

As a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, China ceded Taiwan, all islands appertaining (obviously including the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands) and the Pescadores to Japan. However, the Cairo Declaration in 1943 stated in part:

All territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese . . . shall be returned to the Republic of China". The Potsdam Declaration of 1945 further stated that ". . . the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out . . .

The formal instrument of surrender was signed by Japan at Tokyo Bay in 1945. It reads:

"We hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued at Potsdam. * * * With the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and the Allied Powers in 1951, and the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in 1952, the legality of the annexation of Taiwan, all islands appertaining (obviously Tiao-Yu-Tai) and the Pescadores became null and void. Therefore, the sovereignty over the Tiao-Yu-Tai Islands belongs to China.

CHINESE POSITION ON ISLETS

The Chinese position can be best summed up by this statement of the Republic of China in Taiwan:

. . . in terms of geography, usage, history and law, the Chinese Government deems that these islets belong, without the slightest doubt, to the territorial sovereignty of China and that they should be returned to the Republic of China upon the completion of the administration by the United States . . .

Even the People's Republic of China, who disagrees with everything the Republic of China stands for, expressed her views in this way, that the Tiao-Yu-Tai and other islands are China territory over which China inviolable sovereignty.

WHAT IS SEEN ON TIAO-YU-TAI TODAY

What do we see on Tiao-Yu-Tai today?

We see the eviction of Chinese fishermen by force from these islands by the Japanese police in September 1970, and the removal and mutilation of a flag of the Republic of China. We learn about the Japanese intention to operate 11 patrol boats carrying 3-inch guns and 40-millimeter machineguns covering a 110,000-square-mile area of the Ryukyu Island chain adjacent to Taiwan. The Japanese have stated that these boats will eventually be equipped with ship-to-ship missiles. We note with grave concern the announced draft of Japan's "fourth arms expansion plan" for \$16 billion U.S. dollars for the period of 1972-76. This figure exceeds the sum total of her previous three arms expansion plans by \$5 billion.

FEAR OF REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

As someone who lived through the horrors of the Japanese occupation in China during the last war, I cannot help being alarmed at the growing military posture taken by the present Japanese Government. This fear of a revival of militarism in Japan is shared, I am sure, not only universally by Chinese everywhere, but also by many Americans

who experienced the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. The January 1971 Harris poll showed that a majority of Americans feel the Japanese fell under the control of the military before World War II, and that the same thing could happen again. Senator Inouye now of Hawaii said the possibility is not farfetched that Japan may some day be tempted again to use military force in the Pacific. Senator Goldwater certainly shared this view when he said at the Kansas City Republican Party dinner about a month ago: "I predict Japan will become the world's greatest military power and will pose more of a problem for the United States than the Soviet Union or China. * * *" While we come to talk about Okinawa reversion today, let us not forget the price we paid for Japanese militarism in Okinawa in World War II was 12,500 American lives. George Santayana once said, "He who forgets the past is condemned to relive it." Let us make sure that America does not have to relive the bitter lesson which history has taught us about Japanese militarism. We must prevent a resurgence of this militarism, whether it be in Tiao-Yu-Tai or elsewhere.

ISLANDS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY

On the basis that the Tiao-Yü Tai Islands are claimed by China, and on the basis of our fear of a revived Japanese militarism, we believe the proper posture of the United States is to take a truly neutral position on the issue of these islands, by excluding them from the Okinawa Reversion Agreement Treaty. We believe such action will eventually be instrumental in promoting a peaceful negotiation between Japan and China, and is definitely in the interest of world peace.

As private U.S. citizens, we strongly support the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, but we are equally opposed to the inclusion in this treaty of a group of Chinese islands.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. We are glad to have it, sir.

Our last witness, Professor Fincher, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. We have your paper and it will be printed in full in the record. I hope you can condense it some.

STATEMENT OF PROF. JOHN FINCHER, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, BALTIMORE, MD.

Mr. FINCHER. Yes, sir; particularly the introduction. I think I will skip a few points.

I am pleased at this opportunity to testify before you on the possible impact of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty on China's relations with the two signatories, the United States and Japan, and I wanted in the introduction mainly to emphasize my being impressed as a scholar by the quality of research that has gone into this on the part of Chinese-Americans. It is a very impressive body of research indeed and I hope it gets into the right channels as the issue continues, and I am sure it will continue.

I want to say that as a former State Department official, that I feel very strongly this is one issue connected with the 1951 United States-Japanese Peace Treaty on which Mr. Dulles, so often praised for his

thorough works, did not do his homework. At least I hope that is the explanation. It could always be argued that he and his staff deliberately ignored these islands because they wanted to give the Japanese a chance to build up some claims with the assistance of the U.S. military.

I stand neutral on those two interpretations of why they did not do their homework.

CHINESE FEAR OF UNITED STATES-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Now to turn to the larger question of China-Japan and United States and these small islands, after both the signature of a textile agreement and the defeat America and Japan took this week in the U.N., it is perhaps not genteel to talk about Chinese fear of the United States-Japanese alliance. It is, however, still necessary.

In the first place, I suspect that the People's Republic of China, like our allies in Taiwan, and in Korea, and our friends in Hong Kong, sees the textile agreement as collusion between American and Japanese textile makers against rivals in other parts of Asia, Japan has complained loudly and at length, but they know full well that in a little while they will have lost their economic advantages over Korean, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong textile firms. Without an agreement in the United States, such competition would have been harder to meet. Textile makers in the People's Republic—except in certain specialties—are really left out of this picture, political considerations apart.

This takes me to my main point: I suspect the Chinese fear the combination of the United States and the Japanese military—as they would, as exporters to the United States, fear that of United States and Japanese textile makers—more than they fear either separately. They fear that the United States-Japanese alliance brings out the worst in both countries. When they talk about the evils of militarism in the United States and Japan, they think of it as a kind of twin disease; something which is worse for being reinforced by the association between the two victims of the disease.

The Chinese are not the only ones who fear the Japanese. Some of the strongest American proponents of a close military partnership between the United States and Japan argue that this is a good way to prevent Japan from building a nuclear bomb. With all due respect to these proponents—many are close friends and colleagues of mine—may I repeat my own fear of the persistence in this idea of a strain of the "yellow peril" kind of thinking which has so long bedeviled our relations with China.

The greatest upsurge of this fear was, of course, provoked in part by the dropping of Japanese bombs on Pearl Harbor. But I think you have to look in much deeper and darker places of the American mind for the treatment accorded so many Japanese-American farmers and storekeepers after that event and some American inhospitality to Japanese today.

ANTI-JAPANESE FEELING

I personally have enjoyed very warm treatment by Japanese and worry much about anti-Japanese feeling. The history of that one surprise attack, coming from afar and from the air, is the only experience of Americans with war on their own territory since the Civil War.

It rouses deep popular fears of Oriental aliens and reinforces another basic ingredient of American thinking about the Japanese bomb. This ingredient is what Senator Fulbright has called the arrogance of power.

ATOMIC WEAPONS—MONOPOLY OF POWER SYMBOL

It hurts the United States no end to think of giving up its monopoly of power, and in the post-World War II era, the main symbol of such power has long been atomic weapons. Our attitude toward DeGaulle's bomb has been part of our dislike of his "arrogance" in trying to take France in its own direction, in forcing as well as reminding us of the inevitable decline in our relative power in the world.

The Russians seem to have had something of the same problem in their relations with China and this helped produce the Nonproliferation Treaty. Now, I happen to abhor the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are even more expensive than other weapons, and ever so much more dangerous.

But, I also believe that in the end, the only way to control them is for their principal manufacturers—the United States and the U.S.S.R.—to reduce or eliminate their own reliance on nuclear weapons. This is an extraordinarily complicated task, but until the United States and the U.S.S.R. back down from their monopoly, as the Chinese would say, of sophisticated delivery systems and atomic warheads, they can expect concerted interest among even Japanese in breaking that monopoly.

CHINESE FEAR CONVENTIONAL REARMAMENT OF JAPAN

The Chinese, of course, join Americans in deploring Japanese nuclear rearmament. But they do it out of a deeper understanding, I think, of the uneasiness and ambivalence about the nuclear game among the Japanese people generally. Where the Chinese differ strikingly from the Americans is in their great fear of the conventional rearmament of Japan.

Americans talk about Japan picking up "Japan's fair share of military burdens in Asia," preferably through purchase of U.S. weapons, but also through the training of more Japanese who can use conventional weapons, wherever they may be manufactured. In particular the past 2 years or so the Chinese have repeatedly warned about the danger of a Japanese capability to "send troops abroad." One particularly long and agitated article on the revival of militarism (Peking NCNA, March 22, 1970) devotes, for example, 21 paragraphs to conventional rearmament and only one paragraph to the danger of nuclear rearmament.

The Japanese have a long history in this century of enmity with China. From 1895 to 1945, Japan held Taiwan, a Chinese province, and surrounding islands as a colony won through outright war.

But also important in their thinking now, I believe, is their experience in war with American troops in Korea and their fear of Soviet troops from the North. America and the U.S.S.R. are the only nations with large standing armies that they can use in great numbers very far beyond their borders, and particularly overseas.

A number of "powers" have atomic weapons and are therefore "great powers;" only the United States and the U.S.S.R. presently have this great overseas capability.

As this committee knows from testimony on the China issue the People's Republic of China could not now sustain even an expedition across the Taiwan Straits. As Prof. Franz Schurmann, of the University of California, suggested recently, it may be that this conventional capability is precisely what the Chinese mean when they talk about "superpowers."

UNITED STATES-JAPANESE ALLIANCE SEEN IN STRATEGIC AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

We can now see in strategic as well as historical perspective the Chinese attitude toward the United States-Japanese alliance and the distinction between their fear of Japanese militarism and our own fear, and I submit that this is a perspective much appreciated also by a very great number, if not in some sense a true majority, of the Japanese people. The combination of the U.S. nuclear capability and a Japanese conventional capability is a more immediate and in the end more serious threat than a simple military great power which might, like France, have a bomb, but which would not be able to launch a so-called "limited war" against China.

They remember well that much of Japan's postwar anti-Chinese policy has been stimulated by U.S. policy. U.S. occupation policy in Japan while China was turning Communist in the civil war of the late forties stimulated Japan to become increasingly anti-Communist. China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union explicitly directed against a revival of the Japanese threat. They mentioned only Japan in there, they did not name any other possible friends of Japan.

Finally, she also joined the Soviet Union in the Korean war in 1950, but only after forces based in Japan threatened her northeast border and blocked access to the province of Taiwan where Chiang Kai-shek took refuge. Japan followed the United States in concluding a separate peace treaty with Chiang's government, and as recently as this week lobbied hard to keep Chiang's government in the U.N.

CHINESE CONSIDER TIAO YU TAI ISSUE EXAMPLE OF COLLUSION

This is why they are so agitated by the growth of Japan's conventional naval force at the same time as the expansion of Japan's army (see June 13 NCNA comments on joint United States and Japanese naval exercises). And it is why they have fastened, like Chinese elsewhere, on the Tiao Yu Tai issue as a particularly dangerous example of what they consider collusion between United States and Japanese militarists (May 14, 1971. NCNA). Referring to a Japanese (Kyodo) dispatch of May 11, it attacked Japanese use of a military map drawn by the United States.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS ON ISSUE

I think there is plenty of room in the history of this whole issue for simple mistakes and blundering. I am perhaps too familiar with the process of how government statements get made or not made, but it is

instructive to note how these mistakes have grown out of cooperation and consultation between Japanese and American military authorities.

It is good reason not to dismiss out of hand as insignificant and propagandistic Chinese statements on this issue. The administration occasionally does unmake mistaken statements. It seems reluctant to do so on this issue. So the reversion treaty seems inevitably to add to the Japanese case—the Japanese have been notably and understandably reluctant to comment and officially clarify their interpretation of this aspect of the treaty. The administration feels reluctant to press the Japanese for public explanation, let alone renegotiation.

This week so also, I would guess, would the Congress.

Yet I would hope the U.S. Senate is prepared to consider developing its own independent view of the dispute and making that clear.

JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FEARS OPPOSITION IN DIET TO TREATY

The Japanese Government fears opposition in its own diet to the treaty premised mainly on the argument that the treaty is too anti-Chinese. Why should it fear so the U.S. Senate's trying to make it, on this issue, a little less anti-Chinese? The change would show that the United States can be willing to help Japan think of herself as a world rather than just an Asian power.

Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, sir.

(The witness' prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. FINCHER *

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I am pleased at this opportunity to testify before you on the possible impact of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty on China's relations with the two signatories, the U.S. and Japan. I intend to discuss the Tiao Yu Tai or Senkaku Islands issue in that light, and want to point out immediately that my interest in that issue stems partly from the fact that it is one issue on which virtually all Chinese—those of the Mainland, and those on Taiwan who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek as well as those who were there because they or their ancestors emigrated earlier, those in Hong Kong and—as is obvious from the testimony of other witnesses today—those in the U.S.—on which all Chinese seem to agree.

My being here at all apparently has something to do with the shortage of American China or Japan specialists who have any detailed knowledge of this issue. Although I think that situation has begun to change, I hope you will tolerate some explanation of what seems to me a general gap in American expertise on Asia which the shortage illustrates. My early interest in the Tiao Yu Tai affair is partly an accident: While in the State Department's Foreign Service from 1963 to 1970, I had the happy fate to be assigned, after service in Washington, successively to Hong Kong as a China watcher and to Japan as a Japan watcher; though personnel policies may have changed, encouragement of this wise combination of specialties seemed mostly accidental when I got my assignments.

The accident of this combination of assignments made me a follower of the Hong Kong Chinese and of the Japanese press as well as of the Peking press

*Mr. Fincher has been Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies since September 1970. He was born in Gary, Indiana in 1936 and received a Harvard BA in 1959 and attended the University of London and the University of Washington, from which he received a Ph. D. in History, from 1959 to 1963. From 1963 to 1970 he was in the State Dept. Foreign Service in Washington, Hong Kong and Japan. He has been a Research Fellow at Harvard's East Asian Research Center.

(and sometimes the Taipei press) which pre-occupy most U.S. China watchers. The habit continued when I returned to the U.S. to be a Professor a year ago; I thus learned from the Hong Kong and the Japanese papers that Chinese in America were very agitated over this issue of the Tiao Yu Tai Islands. Their reports turned me to the papers that I had not before noticed very much which are, so to speak, on my doorstep: publications in Chinese by Chinese in America. These publications include a great deal of what I as a scholar regard as first rate, objective research by Chinese in America into this issue of the "oil islands." I commend to American scholars as well as to the Senate the English digests of much of this work from not only the Tiao Yu Tai Committee of the University of Delaware, but from other groups in New York and elsewhere, including one established by Columbia University Students as the "International Research Society." I know of a massive study by the latter group, still in Chinese, which should be of interest to specialists in the now fashionable field of oceanic studies as well as to those in East Asian Affairs.

If somebody had done this work in the early fifties—Taipei, Tokyo, or Washington in particular—I very much doubt if there would be such a thing as the Tiao Yu Tai controversy. But hardly anybody worried about these islands, it appears, except Chinese fishermen from Taiwan who used them for shelter, as had their ancestors for centuries past.

This is one issue connected with the 1951 U.S. Japanese Peace Treaty on which Mr. Dulles, so often praised for his thorough works, did *not* do his homework. At least I hope that is the explanation: it could always be argued that he and his staff deliberately ignored those islands because they wanted to give the Japanese a chance to build up some claims with the assistance of the U.S. military.

CHINA, JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND SMALL ISLANDS

After both the signature of a textile agreement and the defeat America and Japan took this week in the UN, it is perhaps not genteel to talk about Chinese fear of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. It is, however, still necessary.

In the first place, I suspect that the Peoples Republic of China, like our allies on Taiwan, and in Korea, and our friends in Hong Kong, sees the textile agreement as collusion between American and Japanese textile makers against rivals in other parts of Asia. Japan has complained loudly and at length, but they know full well that in a little while they will have lost their economic advantages over Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong textile firms. Without an agreement with the U.S., such competition would have been harder to meet. Textile makers in the Peoples Republic—except in certain specialties—are really left out of this picture, political considerations apart.

This takes me to my main point: I suspect the Chinese fear the combination of the U.S. and the Japanese military (as they would, as exporters to the U.S., fear that of U.S. and Japanese textile makers) more than they fear either separately. They fear that the U.S.-Japanese alliance brings out the worst in both countries. When they talk about the evils of "militarism" in the U.S. and Japan, they think of it as a kind of twin disease, something which is worse for being reinforced by the association between the two victims of the disease.

The Chinese are not the only ones who fear the Japanese. Some of the strongest American proponents of a close military partnership between the U.S. and Japan argue that this is a good way to prevent Japan from building a nuclear bomb. With all due respect to these proponents—many are close friends and colleagues of mine—may I repeat my own fear of the persistence in this idea of a strain of the "Yellow peril" kind of thinking which has so long bedeviled our relations with China. The greatest upsurge of this fear was, of course, provoked in part by the dropping of Japanese bombs on Pearl Harbor. But I think you have to look in much deeper and darker places of the American mind for the treatment accorded so many Japanese-American farmers and storekeepers after that event and some American inhospitality to Japanese today. I personally have enjoyed very warm treatment by Japanese and worry much about anti-Japanese feeling. The history of that one surprise attack, coming from afar and from the air, is the only experience of Americans with war on their own territory since the Civil War. It rouses deep popular fears of oriental aliens and reinforces another basic ingredient of American thinking about the Japanese bomb. This ingredient is what you, Senator Fulbright, have called the arrogance of Power: It hurts the U.S. no end to think of giving up its monopoly of power,

and in the post World War II era, the main symbol of such power has long been atomic weapons. Our attitude towards DeGaulle's bomb has been part of our dislike of his "arrogance" in trying to take France in its own direction, in forcing as well as reminding us of the inevitable decline in our relative power in the world.

The Russians seem to have had something of the same problem in their relations with China and this helped produce the Nonproliferation Treaty. Now, I happen to abhor the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are even more expensive than other weapons, and ever so much more dangerous. But I also believe that in the end, the only way to control them is for their principle manufacturers—the U.S. and the USSR—to reduce or eliminate their own reliance on nuclear weapons. This is an extraordinarily complicated task, but until the U.S. and the USSR back down from their "monopoly" as the Chinese would say, of sophisticated delivery systems and atomic warheads, they can expect concerted interest even among Japanese in breaking that monopoly. The "superpowers" write the rules of the nuclear game the other atomic powers, or would-be atomic powers, are trying to play.

The Chinese, of course, join Americans in deploring Japanese nuclear rearmament. But they do it out of a deeper understanding I think, of the uneasiness and ambivalence about the nuclear game among the Japanese people generally. Where the Chinese differ strikingly from the Americans is in their great fear of the conventional rearmament of Japan. Americans talk about Japan picking up "Japan's fair share of military burdens in Asia". Preferably through purchase of U.S. weapons but also through the training of more Japanese who can use conventional weapons, wherever they may be manufactured. In particular the past two years or so the Chinese have repeatedly warned about the danger of a Japanese capability to "send troops abroad." One particularly long and agitated article on the "revival of militarism" (Peking NCNA, Mar. 22, 1970) devotes, for example, 21 paragraphs to conventional rearmament and only one paragraph to the danger of nuclear rearmament.

The Japanese have long history in this century of enmity with China: From 1895 to 1945, Japan held Taiwan, a Chinese province, and surrounding islands as a colony won through outright war. Beginning with her victory in war over the Russians in 1905, Japan expanded for forty years her influence over China's mainland provinces. By the 1930's she got up a puppet state, Manchukuo, in Manchuria. Then she established, by military conquest, puppet regimes in Peking and Nanking which ruled all of Eastern and soon Southern China.

But also important in their thinking now, I believe, is their experience in war with American troops in Korea and their fear of Soviet troops from the North. America and the USSR are the only nations with large standing armies that they can use in great numbers very far beyond their borders, and particularly overseas. A number of "powers" have atomic weapons and are therefore "great powers;" only the U.S. and the USSR presently have this great overseas capability. (as this Committee knows from testimony on the China issue, the Peoples Republic of China could not now sustain even an expedition across the Taiwan Straits). As Professor Franz Schurmann of the University of California suggested recently, it may be that this conventional capability is precisely what the Chinese mean when they talk about "superpowers."

We can now see in strategic as well as historical perspective the Chinese attitude towards the U.S.-Japan alliance and the distinction between their fear of Japanese militarism and our own fear; and I submit that this is a perspective much appreciated also by a very great number, if not in some sense a true majority, of the Japanese people. The combination of the U.S. nuclear capability and a Japanese conventional capability is a more immediate and in the end more serious threat than a simple military Great Power which might, like France, have a bomb, but which would not be able to launch a so-called "limited war" against China.

They remember well that much of Japan's post war anti-Chinese policy has been stimulated by U.S. policy. U.S. occupation policy in Japan while China was turning Communist in the Civil War of the late forties, stimulated Japan to become increasingly anti-communist. China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union explicitly directed against a revival of the Japanese threat. Finally, she also joined the Soviet Union in the Korean War in 1950, but only after forces based in Japan threatened her Northeast border and blocked access to the province of Taiwan were Chiang Kai-shek took refuge. Japan followed the U.S.

in concluding a separate peace treaty with Chiang's government, and as recently as this week lobbied hard to keep Chiang's government in the U.N.

This is why they are so agitated by the growth of Japan's conventional naval force at the same time as the expansion of Japan's army. (see June 13 NCNA comments on joint U.S. and Japanese Naval exercises). And it is why they have fastened, like Chinese elsewhere, on the Tiao Yu Tai issue as a particularly dangerous example of what they consider collusion between U.S. and Japanese "militarists" (May 14, 1971 NCNA). Referring to a Japanese (Kyodo) dispatch of May 11, it attacked Japanese use of a military map drawn by the U.S. to support its claim to the Tiao Yu Tai islands, a map which shows that (in the words of the Japanese dispatch) "in the Senkaku Islands west of Okinawa proper, there are two firing ranges of the U.S. Navy stationed in Okinawa."

I think there is plenty of room in the history of this whole issue for simple mistakes and blundering. I am perhaps too familiar with the process of how government statements get made or not made. But it is instructive to note how these mistakes have grown out of cooperation and consultation between Japanese and American military Authorities.

It is good reason not to dismiss out of hand as "insignificant" and "propagandistic" Chinese statements on this issue. The administration can and occasionally does unmake mistaken statements. It seems reluctant to do so on this issue. So the Reversion Treaty seems inevitably to add to the Japanese case—the Japanese have been notably and understandably reluctant to comment and officially clarify their interpretation of this aspect of the Treaty. The administration feels reluctant to press the Japanese for public explanation, let alone, renegotiation. This week so also, I would guess, does the Congress.

Yet I would hope the U.S. Senate is prepared to consider developing its own independent view of the dispute and making that clear. The Japanese government fears opposition in its own Diet to the Treaty premised mainly on the argument that the Treaty is too anti-Chinese. Why should it fear so the U.S. Senate's trying to make it, on this issue, a little less anti-Chinese. The change would show that the U.S. can be willing to help Japan think of herself as a world rather than just an Asian power.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now may I say the committee has received a number of statements for the record. We will include them. If anyone else has any statement he wishes to place in the record, it will be received.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

STATEMENT OF DR. MORTON H. HALPERIN*

Mr. Chairman: I very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before this distinguished committee in support of prompt ratification of the treaty providing for the return of administrative control over Okinawa to Japan. My judgments are based on a close association with this problem in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1966-68, on the staff of the National Security Council in 1969, and since then as a student of American-Japanese relations.

This is, I believe, one of those actions which, when taken, leads one to wonder why and how we could have waited so long. It is remarkable that more than a quarter century after V.J. Day, more than a million Japanese still live under American occupation. Okinawa has been occupied territory for too long and there is no doubt that we should now permit the Okinawans to return to Japanese rule.

The principal effect of reversion on U.S. base rights—leaving aside for the moment the question of nuclear storage—is that we will have to secure Japanese permission to launch combat operations directly from these bases. The Japanese Government will be obliged to provide the bases that we require and we will continue to be free to use the bases, as we use those in Japan, for logistics, ship repair and all other missions short of the launching of combat operations. What are the consequences of giving up the legal right to launch combat operations without Japanese permission?

It seems inconceivable to me that, in the 1970's or beyond, the United States would even contemplate launching combat operations from Japanese territory without Japanese concurrence. Indeed, I would argue that we should not do so. Certainly the United States will not lightly commit its troops to combat in Asia again. Before the President recommended such action and before Congress approved, we would want to consult with Japan. If the Japanese oppose military action and object to the use of their bases, the case against American intervention would be overwhelming. Only if Japan favored American intervention, was prepared to speak out publicly in support of intervention, and welcomed the use of her bases, should we even contemplate military action again in Asia. Reversion will remove the temptation of a Japanese government to hide behind our legal right to act without consultation, and will eliminate any possibility that we would be foolish enough to act without Japanese support.

The people of Okinawa present another obstacle to unilateral American action. As things now stand, the United States is responsible for the security of the bases. In the event of massive demonstrations that the miniscule local police could not handle, American troops would have to be used. If such action led to civilian fatalities or even serious injuries, further use of the bases would be in grave jeopardy. Following reversion, the efficient and effective Japanese National police will be responsible for base security.

Moreover, after reversion, the Japanese will assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa as they have long since done for the main Japanese islands. This means that we will be able to draw down our forces in the area, confident that Japanese military power is protecting the bases. Burden sharing will thus be advanced by reversion.

*Dr. Halperin is one of 24 natural and social scientists and engineers who are elected Council Members of the Federation of American Scientists. The Executive Committee of the Federation has endorsed Dr. Halperin's conclusion—in support of President Nixon's decision—that the Okinawa treaty ought to be ratified.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, that current security regulations make it impossible for me to discuss here the issue of nuclear storage rights on Okinawa. I believe that the entire policy of not confirming or denying the presence of nuclear weapons overseas is a mistake and I would hope that this committee would explore this subject at a subsequent time. In connection with Okinawa, let me just assert, on the basis of a very detailed look at this operation, that the loss of the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa in no way harms the security of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, thus far I have attempted to show that our military capability would not be reduced by reversion. If we examine the broader implications, it becomes clear that our security will, in fact, be enhanced. Until now I have considered the question of the security implications of reversion as if there were a real choice; that is, as if we could continue with our existing relations with Japan with or without reversion. That is clearly not the case. Had President Nixon not wisely agreed to reversion, or if the Senate should fail to ratify the treaty now before you, American-Japanese relations would do so severely damaged that our current difficulties would seem trivial.

The only controversy in Japan is whether the Sato regime made too many concessions to the United States in order to get President Nixon to agree to reversion. No Japanese will accept any longer American occupation of Japanese soil. If this treaty is not promptly ratified, political forces in Japan working against alliance with the United States would be greatly strengthened. Reversion of Okinawa is not sufficient to keep this alliance viable, but it is necessary.

Maintenance of the Japanese-American alliance is, in my view, absolutely essential to American security in Asia. A break-up of the Alliance would not only rob us of important bases in the area, but would confront us with a new and potentially powerful adversary. A rearmed Japan would be a matter of grave concern not only in Peking and Moscow, but in Washington and the capitals of every other Asian nation. Tensions in the area would increase and the possibilities for conflict into which we would ultimately be drawn, would be great. To reduce the probability of this nightmare coming true, we will have to begin to treat Japan as an equal partner. Reversion of Okinawa is a first step in that direction. The Senate has a responsibility to act promptly and to demonstrate that it understands the priority that should be attached to our relations with the most important nation in Asia.

TEXT OF UNDER SECRETARY U. ALEXIS JOHNSON'S BACKGROUND PRESS CONFERENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE, NOVEMBER 21, 1969

Under Secretary Johnson was introduced by Mr. Ziegler.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Ziegler.

My purpose in that regard is not to add to or subtract in any way from what has been said, but simply to help you point out what might be the highlights.

First, without being rhetorical or oratorical, I think it is fair to say that this is an historic occasion. This has not been the usual protocolaire, Chief of Government visit, with a communique which contains little of substance, but this has been a negotiation and it is a negotiation which was only completed after the Prime Minister and the President met together.

As the President just said out on the lawn, this opens a new era in our relations. As far as our relations with Japan are concerned, I would say that this is the most important event that has taken place since the Treaty was concluded in 1951, and as you see in the communique, it is a recognition of the fact that this marks the end, you might say, of the post-war era, and as the President said, opening up a new era in relations between the two countries.

Just as a little help in background on this, in some ways you can say that this meeting today, and this communique, goes back to the Prime Minister's visit here in November of 1967, at which time he met with President Johnson.

You will recall at that time that it was in substance agreed that we should seek to achieve the reversion of Okinawa within a few years, and certain steps were taken at that time, looking toward eventual reversion.

You will recall that President Johnson and the Prime Minister at that time said that they should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over those islands to Japan and in the light of the discussion that has been held.

As one of the concrete things that was done, you will recall an advisory committee was formed with one of the highest commissions in Okinawa looking toward reversion and helping to ease the transition toward reversion.

As far as the meaning of the communique today, there are two elements, first the communique which you have, and at the Press Club at noon today. I suggest that those of you who will be doing your deep-think pieces of these things will want to read his speech at the Press Club today, together with the communique, because the two things very much go together.

His speech is going to be released at that time. I will refer to some of the things that he is going to say in that speech, but I would ask you not to use it, or embargo it, rather, until the speech has been made and has been released there.

First, in going through the communique, I simply want to point out a few of the highlights. In paragraph three, you have for the first time in an official Japanese government statement, the recognition that the security of Japan is related to the peace and security of the Far East and directly related to the ability of the United States to carry out its obligations with regard to other countries in the Far East. That is a general statement relating to Japanese security and our security obligations elsewhere in the Far East to the security of Japan.

Then you go on to paragraph four. I want, at this point, to say that that point is also being reaffirmed in the Prime Minister's speech at the Press Club. He is there going to say specifically, "In the real international world, it is impossible adequately to maintain the security of Japan without international peace and security in the Far East."

He is also going to say there, as far as that general statement is concerned, "It would be in accordance with our"—that is, Japanese national interest—"interest, for us to determine our response to prior consultation regarding the use of these facilities—that is, American facilities in both Japan and Okinawa—and areas in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan."

Then in paragraph four of the communique, you first have the specific reference to Korea, in which the flat statement is made that the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security.

In his speech at the Press Club, the Prime Minister is going to say that if there is an armed attack against the Republic of Korea that the security of Japan would be seriously affected. He goes on to say, "Therefore, should an occasion arise for United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as a basis for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the government of Japan and toward prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition."

Then in paragraph four, the next mention specifically is Taiwan, in which the statement is made that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan.

In his speech at the Press Club, the Prime Minister is going to say, "That the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for our own security."—that is, repeating that statement.

"I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments in the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should unfortunately a situation ever occur in which such treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from the outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan."

"Therefore, in view of our national interests, we would deal with that situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition in connection with the fulfillment by the United States of its defense obligations."

Then the next specific mention in paragraph four is of Vietnam. I call your attention to the language there in which it states that if peace should "not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at the time, so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people," etc.

I want to note there that that consultation is consultation that would take place prior to the time of reversion, rather than under the consultation that is provided for under the security treaty.

Next I want to note in paragraph five, the expression of intention on the part of both governments to continue the security treaty in effect indefinitely. This is the first formal reaffirmation by both governments of the intention to continue the security treaty indefinitely.

As you know, the security treaty provides that as of January 23, 1970, it becomes the same as most treaties we have, and that is, it has a renunciation clause. In the absence of the act of renunciation by either government, the treaty does continue and continues indefinitely, and this is the expression of the intention on the part of both governments that it should do so.

Next, in paragraph six, there is a specific recognition of the importance of our forces in Okinawa as far as the situation in the Far East is concerned. Down about the middle of that paragraph, I will point out that this communique is not the final agreement on Okinawa, but provides that the two governments will immediately enter into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for the reversion of Okinawa and that the target date would be 1972, and that this reversion at that time—I will point out a very important clause in there—"Is subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

We have not taken a position with regard to what we would consider necessary here in the way of legislative support. You are familiar with the Byrd Resolution suggesting that it be ratified by the Senate. Other possibilities are present, of course. You could have a joint resolution, but we really do not face this issue until these specific arrangements have been concluded. Negotiations of these arrangements will be long and detailed and under the best of circumstances I would not expect that negotiations would be completed at least until the middle of 1971.

It is only at that time that the issue is faced of what Congressional action would be taken.

Paragraph 7 is also an important paragraph, but I think it is quite evident on the face of it.

Now, paragraph 8 with regard to the nuclear issue:

In effect, this paragraph says that the United States would not exercise the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa at the time reversion takes place, that is in 1972, but you will note that the paragraph very carefully preserves our right to consult with Japan, if, in the case of an exceptional situation, we would feel it necessary to do so, and this applies specifically to nuclear weapons.

If an emergency were to arise in this connection, I might say, which would cause us to consider this problem, we do not necessarily assume that if we took that serious a view of the situation the Japanese would not take an equally serious view of the situation and the consultation in the paragraph does not necessarily assume that in every case Japan's answer would be no.

Consultation means that they can decide either way, yes or no. I think the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have several times spoken on this subject.

Paragraph 9 notes that there is going to be a large number of very technical and financial and economic problems to be settled between the two governments and this paragraph also specifically takes account of American business interests

now in Okinawa and that those interests will be properly the subject of the detailed negotiations that will be taking place from now on.

Paragraph 10 places the responsibilities for the detailed negotiations upon the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo. This is formed of an Ambassador, Ambassador Meyer and the Foreign Minister, but in addition, sets up a Preparatory Commission in the Ryukyu Islands to work at this of which a representative of the Japanese Government is of an Ambassadorial rank and the United States High Commissioner which is now General Lampert, that you know, who will now participate with the government of the Ryukyu Islands also having a role.

I call your attention to paragraph 12 in which the Prime Minister specifically indicates the intention of the Japanese Government to accelerate the reduction of their trade and capital restrictions and makes some definite statements in that regard, and paragraph 13 in which the Prime Minister expresses the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia as well as in the last sentence of that paragraph, the intention of the Japanese Government to make a substantial contribution to post-war rehabilitation in Vietnam.

Some of these themes will also be repeated in the Prime Minister's speech today.

I should have said at the outset that this communique has been the result of long negotiations, going back really to April of this year when, as you know, there was a meeting of the National Security Council on the subject of our relations with Japan and Okinawa, and certain tentative decisions were reached at that time.

Subsequently, Mr. Sneider in the State Department was sent out to work with Ambassador Meyer and the Japanese Government in negotiating on this and the point of negotiations has been in Tokyo primarily with Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Sneider. But the final decisions on it were not made until after the President's conversations here with Prime Minister Sato which you know have extended over many hours and have been very intimate.

For the most part it has been just the two of them talking together. As you also know, the two of them have known each other for many years and there was a close personal relationship here which I think has greatly facilitated the complicated problems that both governments face on this issue.

Having said this, I will open myself for questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is no reference in the communique to textiles. Can you tell us what was talked about on this?

Mr. JOHNSON. As you know, Spence, negotiations are going on in Geneva on textiles at the present time. We feel that some progress is being made there.

Q. Is the target date or removing nuclear weapons if all goes well the date of reversion?

Mr. JOHNSON. The date of reversion—I want to point out that until reversion takes place, until it actually takes place, the United States continues to exercise all the rights and all the privileges that it now enjoys. I think, of course, it is quite clear from the communique that following reversion there is no question of the United States withdrawing from its bases in Okinawa, but we will continue to utilize the bases and facilities there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any effort made to define more carefully what "prior consultation" means?

As you know in the past the Japanese have tended to interpret this as getting their approval and the Americans have tended to interpret it as "informing the Japanese Government."

Mr. JOHNSON. In the Kiichi-Eisenhower communique of 1960 it was agreed that prior consultation meant agreement between the two governments. There was no attempt to change that, in fact, it wasn't discussed. But you will see the whole background of the communique is based around the Japanese Government taking certain positions or making certain statements of intention of what its attitude would be on specific questions if the question of consultation should arise.

I think it is quite clear from the whole context of the communique that Japan is saying that consultation does not necessarily mean that its attitude is going to be negative in these particular situations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this was the same area that I wanted to ask about, but I would like to be absolutely clear on this, does this mean then that the Unit-

ed States is now agreeing that in case of an emergency and we feel that we need nuclear weapons on bases in Japan and Okinawa and the Japanese Government, after consultation, says no, we agree not to bring nuclear weapons in and will not do so?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would say that we would only do so if we had the agreement of the Japanese Government and that has always been the situation. It doesn't change that situation at all.

But I would also point out that these general statements here with regard to Japanese attitudes in consultation with respect to Korea and Taiwan and so on apply not only with respect to Okinawa, but also to our base in South-east Japan proper, which makes somewhat of a change in that regard.

Q. In reference to the nuclear provisions what was the understanding with Japan on signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Mr. JOHNSON. They have expressed their intention of signing it shortly. We have no specific statement in the communique on that, but I would expect that they would be signing it shortly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any indications that in the event of an attack on Korea and Formosa the Japanese would go beyond their implicit agreement to permit you to move nuclear weapons and troops from Japanese bases and Okinawa bases?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, we do not.

Q. Nothing more than that?

Mr. JOHNSON. Nothing more than that. But I would point out very importantly that the communique notes that at the time of the reversion takes place the Japanese will take on the same responsibilities gradually for the defense of Okinawa as they have for the defense of Japan proper.

As you know, Japan does have and does exercise the prime responsibility for the immediate conventional defense of Japan proper. This will mean an extension of Japanese defense responsibilities to the area of the Ryukyus. This means a further geographical extension.

Q. I was not referring to an attack on Okinawa.

Mr. JOHNSON. I understand that.

Q. What provision was made here for sharing of nuclear weapons similar to NATO?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is none.

Q. Is there a complete renunciation of nuclear weapons?

Mr. JOHNSON. This was not discussed. There is no such arrangement here.

Q. Paragraph 7, in the last part you referred to the effective discharge of international relations. What connotation do you put on the word of "effective discharge"? Does it apply to the effective use of nuclear arms?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would not say that. It does imply that whatever is required to make the bases effective. In some cases, it may be nuclear arms, in some cases, it may not.

Q. How much of an expansion of these armed forces would be necessary to take over the defense of Okinawa?

Mr. JOHNSON. They are making budgetary plans on this now. I think there have been some announcements on it. Exactly what it will require, I don't know.

As you know they are already expanding somewhat their budget on defense matters. As I recall it, their defense budget this year is about \$1.4 billion. The present five-year defense plan ends in 1972 at which time another five-year plan will go into effect.

I have seen public statements by them that the next plan will be double the last plan. In this connection, I might point out that the popular impression that Japan, you know, is defenseless as far as its own forces is concerned, is simply not correct.

I refer to the statement I made that they now have the primary responsibility for their immediate conventional defense. They have some 13 divisions of ground forces. They have some 800 jet aircraft, including an F-104 that has been built there. They are now working on building the F-4. They are working on the Nike, Hercules and Hawk there. They have about 150,000 tons in their naval forces at the present time.

As far as its own immediate direct conventional defense is concerned, Japan has a very considerable force. It undoubtedly will require some expansion but they are taking account of that. To the degree of course that they take on that role with respect to Okinawa, it will somewhat relieve us as far as that role is concerned.

Q. Japanese forces will be charged with the responsibility for defending American bases in Okinawa?

Mr. JOHNSON. Perhaps you can say so in the same sense that they are in Japan proper. The immediate conventional defense in Japan proper—the American bases are present in Japan. Japan has a role as far as its own defense is concerned and as far as it exercises that role this is protecting American bases also.

Q. Is it your understanding that whatever understanding is arrived at will have to be approved by the Japanese Diet?

Mr. JOHNSON. I haven't discussed this in detail. I think that their assumption is that it does. I think that they expect they will have to obtain Diet approval.

Q. Is there any distinction being made between offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. The wording here in paragraph 8—

Mr. JOHNSON. I will interrupt to say no, there has been no discussion or distinction made between them. But if the question of consultation would arise, of course that distinction might possibly arise but there was no discussion of that.

Q. Is it your understanding that the Japanese Government's thinking right now is shifting in the direction which might make it possible for them to want to have anti-aircraft weapons or anti-missile weapons?

Mr. JOHNSON. We are talking about two different things. We are talking about an American weapons system and a Japanese weapons system. I am discussing only the American weapons system.

Q. If the Japanese thinking is that the nuclear weapons of a defensive capability could be held in Japan would that raise the possibility of Americans having them in Japan for their bases?

Mr. JOHNSON. Japanese thinking has not gone that far yet. Although the subject is being very vigorously discussed.

Q. This communique by saying the way the Prime Minister described it here sort of pins you down to a position. If the position changes, would a further communique come out later?

Mr. JOHNSON. The consultation formula leaves it open. That is the purpose of the consultation formula.

Q. Was there any discussion of which specific product will be removed from the quota restrictions and was there any discussion of how much percentagewise the Japanese Government would contribute to the remobilization of Vietnam?

Mr. JOHNSON. As far as the quotas are concerned, there have been a lot of detailed discussions on the economic level on that. Mr. Trezise was out there a month or six weeks ago. There was some further discussion here at what you might call the technical level on this.

Frankly, I am just not entirely clear to what degree specific items were identified. There has been a lot of discussion about specific items, but I am not clear exactly as to what degree it has been identified.

As far as the additional aid is concerned, no, this was not tied down in exact dollars and exact percentages, but it is a serious statement of intent on the part of the Japanese government that we accept and think that it does have substantial content.

Q. Does this also include the possibility of a Japanese peace-keeping force in Vietnam under international supervision?

Mr. JOHNSON. I should have mentioned that in his speech at noon today, the Prime Minister is going to specifically say—this will be also something new, in addition—"I believe that Japan's role should be, naturally, to cooperate in the rehabilitation and development of the economy of the Indo Chinese peninsula, and if we are asked to participate in and to cooperate with, in the manner best suited to Japan, any international peace-keeping machinery which may be set up after the cessation of hostilities."—I have left something out here. "I believe that Japan's role should be naturally to cooperate in"—What he is saying here is that Japan will participate in any international peace-keeping machinery which may be set up in Vietnam.

That is in the speech, yes. Again, I want to emphasize that that is embargoed until he gives it. I am taking the liberty of using it so as to try to help you unite these things together.

Mr. ZIEGLER. I think there are some of those here who would like to leave to go to the luncheon which was referred to. Feel free to leave at this time.

Those who want to remain for a few additional moments, may stay. We have time for only a few more questions. The Under Secretary has about five more minutes and we will take a few questions.

Q. Is there an implication here that Japanese troops could be used in the defense of Korea?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I would not read that into this communique. It just doesn't deal with the subject at all. But I think the important thing is that Japan is

specifically recognizing that the defense of Korea is directly related to its own security.

Q. What does that mean, then?

Mr. JOHNSON. As far as the purposes of this communique are concerned, it means the use of American bases and facilities in both Japan and Okinawa. I think it would be wrong to read more into that at this time, but I would note that this represents a somewhat considerable change in Japanese public position on these matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the agreements are written up on the reversion, will the writing include some reference to the defense of Korea and defense of China?

Mr. JOHNSON. Exactly how the detailed arrangements we talk about here are going to be written up and how it will incorporate the material that is contained here remains to be worked out. This is going to be the job that Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Sneider are going to have out in Tokyo to work out with the Japanese foreign office. We have not really come to grips with that problem.

Q. But the principle is established here that unless the Japanese specifically agree that there is an emergency which the United States thinks it is, unless they specifically agree, our hands are tied as far as the use of Okinawa for defense operations?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I don't quite get your question. It doesn't change that situation at all. As you recall, as far as the consultation clauses of the treaty are concerned, and its associated documents, that applies primarily to the introduction of nuclear weapons or to combat operations mounted directly from Japanese territory.

Now, during the Vietnam war, of course, we have been utilizing our bases in Japan, not for mounting combat operations directly into Vietnam, but for the support of our forces there. Units are rotated back and forth and logistic support is maintained from Japan.

I don't want to get into the theology on this, but in general, combat operations have been understood by both governments, may I say implicitly understood by both governments, to mean clearly and specifically an American aircraft taking off from a Japanese base, bombing another area and coming back to a Japanese base. Otherwise, movements of forces, movements of aircraft, movements of ships not involving mounting combat operations directly from Japan are not involved and do not require consultation or agreement by both governments.

Q. That is what I was referring to, the side of the aircraft taking off from Japanese territory, or Japan, and bombing another craft. That, after 1972, would have to have specific agreement of the Japanese?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct.

Q. And if they did not agree, then we could not do it?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is correct, but this document sets forth the standards the Japanese will use and apply in determining what their answer is going to be. That is the importance of this document.

Q. How important is it that they will not automatically say no? That is the framework you put your contention in, considering it is considerably more of a strategic value in this case than the bases in Mainland Japan.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I don't know whether in some ways it is more strategic in regard to some areas and not in others. Up to now, as you know, Japan has generally taken the attitude that the treaty and our bases apply only to the defense of Japan and that Japan was not interested in the defense of anything else. That is the important thing that has taken place, that Japan is interested and involved in the defense of other areas.

Q. So it is the whole ball of wax?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. In one degree you can say our theoretical form of action, in part theoretical because we have to take account of political realities both in Okinawa and Japan, theoretically our actions may be curtailed with respect to Okinawa, but our theoretical action with respect to bases in Japan is theoretically enlarged. So you have to balance these things off.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have made the Prime Minister's speech at the Press Club today a document of almost equal importance with the communique?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I have.

Q. I find it somewhat unusual to get a White House briefing about a speech by a Foreign Minister that is being given somewhere else. Can you tell us why the sentiments that are expressed in the speech are not expressed in the communique itself?

Mr. JOHNSON. Let me make it clear that the speech at the Press Club has not been a subject of negotiations between us. The Prime Minister has said in the

course of our negotiations that he intended to say these things and we have taken account of the fact that he does intend to say these things.

It is one thing for the Prime Minister of a country to make unilateral statements of policy on his own. It presents another kind of a program for the Prime Minister to make statements jointly in a communique of this kind. He feels—and I agree—that in many ways it has more force for the Prime Minister to be making these statements as a Head of Government, as a statement of Japanese Government policy, than it does to mix it up in a communique. That is the reason I have referred to both of these items, because the two things go together and in agreeing to what we agreed to in the communique we did take account of the fact that he was also going to make this statement of policy on behalf of the Japanese Government.

Q. Within the realities of nuclear warfare these days, how realistic is it to talk about prior consultations on the basing and storing, of weapons in that area?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it is realistic. These things don't develop—

Q. You are assuming a strategic warning time?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. In general, of course, as you know, the importance of our right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa relates more importantly to the tactical type weapon than it does to the strategic type weapon. So, I think it should be clear that whereas there might be some increase in reaction time, that as far as our posture in the whole area is concerned, we can make new dispositions and new arrangements that will minimize the problem as far as deterrence is concerned.

I don't think either Peking or Pyongyang should assume that this is going to result in any serious degradation of our deterrent posture in that area.

Q. In the light of the EC-121 and PUEBLO cases, did the subject of reconnaissance missions from Japanese bases come up at all and did we take the position that we did not need to consult with them about this?

Mr. JOHNSON. No, the subject did not come up.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 22, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am enclosing copies of a letter I have received from Mr. Jack C. Stolle, President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Okinawa, and a statement of understanding of the assurances given in the June 17, 1971 letter of Japan's Foreign Affairs Minister Kiichi Aichi to United States Ambassador Armin H. Meyer with respect to business and professional activities of foreign nationals in Okinawa after reversion.

I call attention to the suggestions (1) that the meaning of the assurances be clarified with respect to American businessmen and professionals in Okinawa and (2) that Senate ratification come only after necessary legislation has been passed by the Japanese Diet; and I ask that the enclosures be made part of the Committee's hearings record.

With aloha—

Sincerely yours,

HIRAM L. FONG.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN OKINAWA,
September 30, 1971.

HON. HIRAM L. FONG,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FONG: In late April of this year I visited your office to discuss with you the protection of American businesses and professionals on Okinawa after reversion to Japan. This letter is to explain what has happened since and where we stand now that the Okinawa reversion agreement has been submitted for Senate approval. It also makes two specific requests:

1. The ratification process of the Okinawa reversion agreement establish in an appropriate manner specific understandings of the meaning of the general assurances given American businessmen and professionals.

2. That final ratification action come only after various necessary legislation has been passed by the Japanese Diet.

On June 17 the reversion agreement was initiated. On the same date a letter from then Foreign Minister Aichi was sent to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer concerning treatment of foreign nationals and firms. This letter dealt with the business issues we have considered vital to our survival. After seeing this letter and various related papers, our Chamber of Commerce accepted it as a satisfactory general assurance, however, we stated that although satisfactory in a general sense, everything would depend on how it was interpreted in practice by the various Japanese bureaus that administer our interests.

Unfortunately the Japanese have been reluctant to make specific interpretations in most cases and where they have made them, some have been most unsatisfactory. We submitted specific questions to the Japanese over a year ago in response to their request—we have received no answers despite repeated promises. Various Japanese officials have visited a number of us since the "Aichi letter" and have known nothing of its contents and have further indicated that various rights we now enjoy would have to be given up after reversion. These "straws in the wind" make us apprehensive.

For these reasons we feel it is vital that the Senate in its hearings and deliberations clarify the meaning of the Aichi letter of assurances. We have prepared the attached list of understandings as to the meaning. We had hoped this would not be necessary—that administrative action by the Japanese would have made this clear. We would appreciate your effort in making these understandings a part of the record of the Senate ratification procedure or request the State Department obtain these interpretations in some binding form prior to Senate ratification.

The second request, concerns Senate ratification after the Japanese Diet has passed the necessary "enabling" legislation. This is necessary so that you can be assured that the Japanese legislative action is sufficient to guarantee the treatment promised and the agreements they have made. Minister Sneider told us on May 27th that Diet action would precede Senate ratification "and thus can take into account the nature of Japanese reversion related legislation." We agree that this is essential to your deliberations.

Thank you for your continued interest in our protection. The time and effort expended by you and your staff earlier was most helpful. If we can provide more information, by mail or in person, we will do so promptly.

Sincerely yours,

JACK C. STOLLE, *President.*

Understandings of letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Kiichi Aichi, Government of Japan to Honorable Armin H. Meyer, Ambassador of the United States of America, dated June 17, 1971, dealing with business and professional activities of foreign nationals on Okinawa after reversion.

General: It is understood that the policies enumerated in the Aichi letter are fully binding on the Government of Japan and that this document is an integral part of the reversion agreement to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

1. *Business activities*

A. It is understood that validation under Japanese law (Para. 1.1.) means that firms and individual entrepreneurs will continue operations without modification of the terms and conditions of licenses and permits granted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus. Validation will not be limited to kind or scope of actual activity in Okinawa at any date but will validate the activity authorized in the license or other authorization that existed prior to reversion.

B. It is understood that "legitimately engaged in business in Okinawa as of this date" means that an appropriate valid license or other authorization existed on June 17, 1971. There is to be no further test such as size or physical presence or sales to substantiate who was engaged in business.

C. It is understood that the prompt validation described in Para. 2 means automatic validation with the exceptions described in Para. 1, 2. (b). The ten firms listed in the GOJ talking paper are the only firms and the adjustments required were known in their entirety prior to the Aichi letter. This validation is to change only the format of existing licenses but not the substance.

D. It is understood that the validation and the "licenses—or other authorization" discussed in this section refers to any and all permits and licenses necessary for continued operation of the firm or individual profession including such things as driving licenses, residence permits, import licenses, etc.

E. It is understood that the assurance of the continuation of business given in Para. 1, 2. means the continuation of practices essential to the operation of that business. There is to be no administrative interpretation or administrative guidance that will curtail rights existing in revalidated licenses or enjoyed under licenses or other authorization prior to reversion.

F. It is understood that the continued operation assured by Para. 1.3. after reversion and prior to revalidation explicitly includes any activity authorized by the license or other authorization whether or not this was actually being engaged in at the time of reversion or any other time.

G. It is understood that Para. 1, 4. gives Okinawan foreign investment firms and individuals unrestricted business and professional access to any area of Japan except as enumerated specifically by GOJ prior to June 17, 1971.

2. *Private properties*

This section adequately protects the private property rights of foreign firms and individuals on Okinawa.

A. It is understood that the treatment assured in Para. II, 1. will be no less favorable than presently exists in Okinawa.

B. It is understood that foreign personnel not engaged in business presently on Okinawa may continue to hold property and maintain residence.

3. *Leasing of state and prefectural lands*

It is understood that new leases must be written and that this section guarantees that equal treatment will be given to both Okinawan and foreign leases.

4. *Remittance in foreign currency*

A. It is understood that the "law concerning foreign investment" referenced in Para. 4.1, is the law of Japan.

B. It is understood that the guarantee concerning conversion and transfer of principle and profits given in Para. 4, 1. will exist from reversion day. The mechanical process of having foreign investment licenses or other authorization revalidated (see Section I, Business Activity: Aichi letter) will not affect the guarantee of free conversion and transfer.

C. It is understood that "Okinawan banks" referred to in Para. 4, 2. includes local banks and branches of foreign banks.

D. It is understood that the phrase "hold dollar accounts" assures the continued freedom to operate a dollar checking account on Okinawa in the normal way, i.e. to reduce balances by drawing checks and to increase balances by making dollar deposits. It is further understood that such accounts will be operable as at present for an indefinite period of time.

E. While "the remittance abroad of such accounts will be governed by the provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law," it is understood that, where the funds in such accounts are traceable to principal investments or profits, approval of the remittance will still be guaranteed as indicated under Para. 4, 1. existing provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control not withstanding.

5. *Professionals*

A. Lawyers: It is understood that the approval of the Japanese Supreme Court required in Para. 5, (1) will be granted automatically to the foreign lawyers practicing on Okinawa January 1, 1971 prior to or simultaneously with reversion. There is to be no lapse in their authorization to practice.

B. Doctors and Dentists: It is understood that appropriate modifications in Japanese law will be made prior to or simultaneous with reversion to allow doctors and dentists referred to in Para. 5 (2), (a) to continue to practice with full legal status under Japanese law after reversion and without having taken the national medical exam.

C. It is understood that the medical exam mentioned in Para. 5, (2), (a) will not be required for foreigners unless it is also required of Okinawan doctors and dentists.

D. It is understood that the "considerable length of period" mentioned in Para. 5, (2), (a) will not be less than 5 years.

E. It is understood that Para. 5, (2), (b) means that the Government of Japan will allow the doctors and dentists who have passed the national medical exam in English to practice at the Adventist Medical Center and any satellite clinics operated wholly by the Adventist Medical Center.

F. It is understood that the approval of the Ministry of Finance and registry of the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants discussed in Para. 5, (4) will be done automatically prior to or simultaneously with reversion. There is to be no lapse in their authorization to practice.

6. Taxation

A. It is understood that the right of GOJ (given in Para. 6, 1) to assess taxes where such taxes had not been collected in accordance with GRI or USCAR laws and ordinances does not apply to years for which a GRI audit has been completed. The completed audit will be taken as proof by the GOJ that firm and individual taxes were settled.

B. The principle of non-retroactive tax liability as expressed in Para. 6, 1, is understood to apply to the provision of Japanese law which automatically establishes a full tax liability for foreigners who have resided in Japan for five years continuously. Such period of time for those resident on Okinawa will begin no earlier than the actual day of reversion.

7. Import quotas

A. It is understood that foreign firms may continue to import goods that may be under quantity restrictions in Japan at no less than the level that existed in the year preceding June 17, 1971.

B. It is understood that "reasonable increase of such imports in the light of the market situation . . ." will allow a firm to maintain its present market share (percentage) as a minimum.

C. It is understood that for those goods for which no past records exist GOJ will grant quotas consistent with reasonable business planning as regards introduction of new products or services. In no case will GOJ by the administrative application of import restrictions, curtail, preclude, or limit business activities authorized by valid licenses of GRI or other authorization.

D. It is understood that no restrictions will be imposed upon imports which will be inconsistent with business plans of foreign firms on Okinawa provided those plans are consistent with valid licenses and were made in consultation with appropriate Japanese ministries as prescribed in the GOJ talking paper mentioned above. In other words production or business growth otherwise acceptable to GOJ will not be limited by the imposition of any type of import restriction.

U.S. SENATE.

Washington, D.C., October 26, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to share with you a communication which I have received recently from the President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Okinawa. I know that this matter will receive your careful attention and consideration. I am hopeful that we will be able to achieve a satisfactory resolution and equitable treatment for American business interests as a part of the reversion agreement.

Sincerely,

DANIEL K. INOUE,
U.S. Senator.

Enclosure.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN OKINAWA,
September 30, 1971.

HON. DANIEL K. INOUE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR INOUE: In late April of this year I visited your office to discuss with you the protection of American businesses and professionals on Okinawa after reversion to Japan. This letter is to explain what has happened since and

where we stand now that the Okinawa reversion agreement has been submitted for Senate approval. It also makes two specific requests:

1. The ratification process of the Okinawa reversion agreement establish in an appropriate manner specific understandings of the meaning of the general assurances given American businessmen and professionals.

2. That final ratification action come only after various necessary legislation has been passed by the Japanese Diet.

On June 17 the reversion agreement was initialed. On the same date a letter from then Foreign Minister Aichi was sent to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer concerning treatment of foreign nationals and firms. This letter dealt with the business issues we have considered vital to our survival. After seeing this letter and various related papers, our Chamber of Commerce accepted it as a satisfactory general assurance, however, we stated that although satisfactory in a general sense, everything would depend on how it was interpreted in practice by the various Japanese bureaus that administer our interests.

Unfortunately the Japanese have been reluctant to make specific interpretations in most cases and where they have made them, some have been most unsatisfactory. We submitted specific questions to the Japanese over a year ago in response to their request—we have received no answers despite repeated promises. Various Japanese officials have visited a number of us since the "Aichi letter" and have known nothing of its contents and have further indicated that various rights we now enjoy would have to be given up after reversion. These "straws in the wind" make us apprehensive.

For these reasons we feel it is vital that the Senate in its hearings and deliberations clarify the meaning of the Aichi letter of assurances. We have prepared the attached list of understandings as to the meaning. We had hoped this would not be necessary—that administrative action by the Japanese would have made this clear. We would appreciate your effort in making these understandings a part of the record of the Senate ratification procedure or request the State Department obtain these interpretations in some binding form prior to Senate ratification.

The second request, concerns Senate ratification after the Japanese Diet has passed the necessary "enabling" legislation. This is necessary so that you can be assured that the Japanese legislative action is sufficient to guarantee the treatment promised and the agreements they have made. Minister Sneider told us on May 27th that Diet action would precede Senate ratification "and thus can take into account the nature of Japanese reversion related legislation." We agree that this is essential to your deliberations.

Thank you for your continued interest in our protection. The time and effort expended by you and your staff earlier was most helpful. If we can provide more information, by mail or in person, we will do so promptly.

Sincerely yours,

JACK C. STOLLE, *President.*

Understandings of letter from Minister of Foreign Affairs Kijichi Aichi, Government of Japan to Honorable Armin H. Meyer, Ambassador of the United States of America, dated June 17, 1971, dealing with business and professional activities of foreign nationals on Okinawa after reversion.

General: It is understood that the policies enumerated in the Aichi letter are fully binding on the Government of Japan and that this document is an integral part of the reversion agreement to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

1. Business activities

A. It is understood that validation under Japanese law (Para. 1, 1.) means that firms and individual entrepreneurs will continue operations without modification of the terms and conditions of licenses and permits granted by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands or the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus. Validation will not be limited to kind or scope of actual activity in Okinawa at any date but will validate the activity authorized in the license or other authorization that existed prior to reversion.

B. It is understood that "legitimately engaged in business in Okinawa as of this date" means that an appropriate valid license or other authorization existed on June 17, 1971. There is to be no further test such as size or physical presence or sales to substantiate who was engaged in business.

C. It is understood that the prompt validation described in Para. 2 means automatic validation with the exceptions described in Para. 1, 2. (b). The ten firms listed in the GOJ talking paper are the only firms and the adjustments required were known in their entirety prior to the Aichi letter. This validation is to change only the format of existing licenses but not the substance.

D. It is understood that the validation and the "licenses—or other authorization" discussed in this section refers to any and all permits and licenses necessary for continued operation of the firm or individual profession including such things as driving licenses, residence permits, import licenses, etc.

E. It is understood that the assurance of the continuation of business given in Para. 1, 2. means the continuation of practices essential to the operation of that business. There is to be no administrative interpretation or administrative guidance that will curtail rights existing in revalidated licenses or enjoyed under licenses or other authorization prior to reversion.

F. It is understood that the continued operation assured by Para. 1, 3. after reversion and prior to revalidation explicitly includes any activity authorized by the license or other authorization whether or not this was actually being engaged in at the time of reversion or any other time.

G. It is understood that Para 1, 4. gives Okinawa foreign investment firms and individuals unrestricted business and professional access to any area of Japan except as enumerated specifically by GOJ prior to June 17, 1971.

2. Private properties

This section adequately protects the private property rights of foreign firms and individuals on Okinawa.

A. It is understood that the treatment assured in Para. II, 1. will be no less favorable than presently exists in Okinawa.

B. It is understood that foreign personnel not engaged in business presently on Okinawa may continue to hold property and maintain residence.

3. Leasing of state and prefectural lands

It is understood that new leases must be written and that this section guarantees that equal treatment will be given to both Okinawan and foreign leasees.

4. Remittance in foreign currency

A. It is understood that the "law concerning foreign investment" referenced in Para. 4.1, is the law of Japan.

B. It is understood that the guarantee concerning conversion and transfer of principle and profits given in Para. 4, 1. will exist from reversion day. The mechanical process of having foreign investment licenses or other authorization revalidated (see Section I, Business Activity: Aichi letter) will not affect the guarantee of free conversion and transfer.

C. It is understood that "Okinawan banks" referred to in Para. 4, 2. includes local banks and branches of foreign banks.

D. It is understood that the phrase "hold dollar accounts" assures the continued freedom to operate a dollar checking account on Okinawa in the normal way, i.e. to reduce balances by drawing checks and to increase balances by making dollar deposits. It is further understood that such accounts will be operable as at present for an indefinite period of time.

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"NEW JAPAN," AMERICA'S BIGGEST MISTAKE

(By David Condé, Tokyo)

For the past two years Japan's Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has repeatedly stated that the "return of Okinawa" will mark the end of the "post-war period" but he has failed to state the more obvious fact that it will also be the beginning of the "pre-war era."

As a lifetime student of Japan and a wartime "Japan specialist" in General MacArthur's Headquarters in both Australia and the Philippines engaged in Psychological Warfare directed against Japan, it is my opinion that Okinawa should *not* be given to Japan. Certainly not now when Japan's political and economic structure remains unchanged; when Okinawa is being "paid" to Japan as the price of assuming military obligations in Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The image of Japan as the Pentagon's "super-mercenary" in Asia is not an image the world will welcome. And certainly the Okinawa people have already protested that they do not wish to be placed under Japan's domination under these circumstances.

To understand why Japan is not and should not be an ally of the United States, I detail the important and still little-considered history of Japan since 1945 which will some day be fully explained in "secret" *Japan Papers*.

In early 1945 WWII Germany surrendered "unconditionally" on the terms laid down by President Roosevelt but the war in the Pacific continued, as the Japanese leaders sought a way to end the war, revising these terms, that they could retain Emperor Hirohito, as the nucleus of a future imperial rising. President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945 and weak and petulant Harry Truman moved from the Vice Presidency into Roosevelt's chair. During these vitally important months Truman's leading adviser in Asian policy guidance was the disturbed Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and soon to be rewarded by Truman in being named the (First) Secretary of Defense, controlling Army, Navy and Air Force.

In May 1945, as the war raged on against Japan, this question arose in the burning brain of Forrestal: Should we really defeat Japan or should we save it to serve the United States. The question posed in the May 1st Forrestal Diary entry was: "Do we desire a counterweight to that (red) influence and should it be China or Japan?"

At this time the China experts in Washington still believed that Chiang Kai-shek could be the U.S. "ally" on the continent but there were many doubters. By mid-May 1945 it was decided in the White House that Japan should be groomed as the alternative "counterweight." This was decided even though the killing in the Pacific continued and the toll of American dead in the taking of Okinawa were still to be counted. It could not be told then, the bitter irony that American soldiers were killing Japanese who, if they managed to survive, would have been "allies." More horrendous was the U.S. act of atom bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki while planning to make Japan the "Counterweight" against the Soviet Union and China.

In this same period in 1945 the United Nations organizing committee met in San Francisco to plan the post-war world, although the shooting was to continue until August 15th, 1945 when Emperor Hirohito read his strange end-of-war Rescript. The Asia of today is largely the work of three men, James Forrestal, President of *Dillon, Read and Company*, investment bankers closely allied to the Rockefellers, and the two top American delegates to the U.N., Nelson Rockefeller (now Governor of New York State) and John Foster Dulles, long the top attorney for the Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company.

With such key advisors President Truman permitted the French to return to Vietnam in 1945, to again impose their colonial rule by force of arms, and in violation of President Roosevelt's ATLANTIC CHARTER. This was the first aggressive act on the part of the United States in Asia, directed at the southern periphery of China.

At the same time and regarding the area north of China, other decisions were made that were to lead to equally bloody results. One of these reversed the U.S. pledge made in the Cairo Declaration by President Roosevelt. President Truman decided instead that Korea should *not* be permitted to regain its independence, because as in the Vietnam decision, the Korean people might go "communist".

The U.S. course in Korea was determined in 1945 when President Truman permitted Syngman Rhee, a 35-year long resident of the United States and possibly a United States citizen, to be flown to Seoul, Korea in October 1945, in a U.S. Air Force plane, to become the south Korea president and the first WWII puppet.

It was the betrayals by the United States of the wartime policies of FDR that led to the U.S. war in Vietnam and in Korea, and not some nebulous machinations of so-called "reds". It was these policy reversals of 1945 that began the "cold war" and not the some supposed acts of Moscow in 1947 that began two decades of U.S. prompted war and terror.

THE MAKING OF THE JAPAN "ALLY"

The decision to retain the "zaibatsu" was made in 1945 and in spite of the headline-capturing announcement in September 1946 that the "Zaibatsu has been smashed" by the U.S. Occupation, this was to permit their "reconstruction" and enlargement. Pledges were made by the U.S. State Department that Japan would "not be aided" for the sufferings of Japan were due to its own aggressive guilt, still, by 1947 the United States was making credits and loans available to

these same super-monopolists. Ot Mitsui, Sumitomo, Yasuda (now Fuji Bank) and Mitsubishi, the Mitsubishi Oil Company were long-time partners of Rockefeller's Standard Oil.

When Forrestal convinced Truman that Japan should be a U.S. "counterweight" in Asia it naturally followed that this meant that the large, cartel monopoly firms were essential for defense. That they soon become price-cutting trade rivals seemed to have been overlooked.

In September 1947 the "Draper Mission" arrived in Japan to appraise and approve the perpetuation of big industry in Japan. Within this Mission were representatives of Dillon, Read and Company and a member of the Rockefeller family. It was soon apparent that Japan, without oil supplies of its own and with the continuation of the big monopoly firms, would soon be the world's top oil consuming nation.

With this decision reached it was but a few hours after General-Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and a few "militarist" partners were executed in December 1948, that Nobusuke Kishi was freed from the same Sugamo Prison where he had been held for several years as a Class A war criminal.

Nobusuke Kishi was the Minister of Trade and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet formed in October 1941, and had the principal responsibility for weapons production. He was the man closest to the Zaibatsu firms in giving them orders and in allocating raw materials to them. The largest weapons-maker was Mitsubishi. Prior to that Kishi had been a senior architect in organizing the economy of captured Manchuria. In Manchuria he became friends with General Hideki Tojo and returned to Japan he was a senior planner of the National Mobilization Law. There are reasons to believe that Kishi was freed from Sugamo Prison in some deal between the U.S. authorities and the Japanese monopoly firms and that the details of this plot are buried in some strong room in Washington. It is believed by some experts that when the secrets are revealed of the U.S. control of post war Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and or Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (1957-1960) the secrets will equal those of the "Pentagon Papers".

In June 1950 when the United States intervened in the Korean civil war, this proved two things to the Japanese business leaders: that the United States was willing to fight "Communism" in a shooting war and that this promised a prosperous period ahead.

THE JAPAN "PEACE" TREATY

In 1951, in the middle of the Korean war, after John Foster Dulles had worked for two years in preparation, a Japan Peace Treaty was ready for signing. Assisting the Esso attorney in this task was John D. Rockefeller III, serving as his most important aide. This Dulles-devised Treaty was signed in San Francisco on September 8th 1951 and although the misgivings of the British, Australia, and New Zealand were overcome by Dulles' persuasiveness, both India and the Soviet Union refused to sign this treaty.

This document was supposed to grant Japan its "independence" but a few hours later and some miles away in the San Francisco Presidio Military Headquarters, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida signed a shackling U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In order to get the "Peace Treaty" prize Japan was compelled to commit itself to a military alliance with the United States.

In the light of subsequent developments and the foundation role this "Peace Treaty" is supposed to play in the organization of a peaceful Asia, it is most illuminating to learn that the original ideas of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida were so strongly expressed in his original speech prepared in Tokyo for delivery to the Peace Treaty delegates that the U.S. State Department deemed that the speech must be re-written. U.S. Ambassador William J. Sebald and his State Department aides in San Francisco, censored and revised and improved the speech for Prime Minister Yoshida. It was this diplomatic U.S. product that was presented to the cheering Peace Conference delegates who thought they were hearing Japan's own peace sentiments.

Ambassador Sebald wrote later regarding Yoshida's speech: saying "portions of it would unwittingly have undone much of the good will already engendered by the Conference, especially among the Asian countries." When the sanitized Sebald-Yoshida speech was finally made Japan pledged that "it has no intention of concluding a treaty with Communist China"; that it would take "adequate security measures" to protect Japan from the "Communist menace". This should

not raise any fear of the "Japanese menace" said Yoshida for Nippon "was purged of untoward ambition".

As part of this shackling process, three months later John Foster Dulles arrived in Tokyo. Already the Yoshida Government had been told that it would be "difficult" for the U.S. Senate to ratify the Japan Peace Treaty unless Japan made further commitments. Dulles announced "American officials wanted to know whether Japan's foreign policy would parallel that of the United States or would be inimical to it". If Japan did not agree then the U.S. would be forced to review its whole attitude. This was dauntless Dulles at his blackmailing best. In his talks with Prime Minister Yoshida, Dulles, according to Ambassador Sebald said "Japan should conclude a treaty with Taipei . . ." Sebald continues: "On December 18 Dulles and I again called upon Yoshida. One result of the meeting was the preparation of a letter by the Prime Minister outlining Japan's policies along the above (Dulles) lines". As a result of this pressure, Yoshida drafted a letter on December 24th, 1951, which stated that "Japan had no intention of concluding a treaty with Communist China".

What Dulles asked for is exactly what Yoshida promised. Today, some twenty years later, Japan is still bound by this Yoshida "letter" and refuses to have a peace treaty with China.

1960—EISENHOWER STAY HOME

The true peace sentiments of the Japanese people and their fear of a Government's plan to involve them once again in war—this time allied with the United States—against a Communist mainland made up of China and the Soviet Union and other Socialist lands stretching from Burma to Korea, was seen in 1960.

In 1957 freed war criminal Nobusuke Kishi became Prime Minister with strong support from the Zaibatsu firms, particularly Mitsubishi. (Japan's peculiar price-marked "democracy" made it possible for the conservative "Liberal-Democratic party" member able to secure the greatest financial backing from the Zaibatsu firms to buy the support of other factional leaders and thus buy his way in as head of the party.) The head of the party automatically became the Prime Minister. Money always wins and since 1945 money has defeated the people's will.

Kishi has always been an illiberal, nationalist bureaucrat and when he became Prime Minister the first task he set himself was the enactment of a greatly enlarged *Police Powers Law*. The Diet members, well aware of the war record of Kishi, refused to enact this proposal intended to crush Kishi's enemies and perpetuate himself in office. The second law Kishi set out to enact was to please his American sponsors in Washington by the extension of the *U.S.-Japan military alliance*. This "security" law was greatly desired by the United States in its balance-of-power scheme for Asia against China and had already determined that Japan's role should be "front-man" nearest to Chinese—and Soviet—guns protecting American interests in Asia. In the eyes of many—if not most observers—the Japanese people opposed "Ampo" as the *U.S.-Japan Security Treaty* was called.

Early in 1960 Kishi announced that he intended to have the Diet approve the "Ampo" treaty, extending it until 1970. His plan was to have it passed by the Diet in June and then to invite President Dwight Eisenhower to Japan to attend the "celebrations."

These celebrations were never held for almost from the beginning of the year, the Japanese in their millions, in every part of Japan, demonstrated their opposition to the U.S.-Japan Treaty. All the newspapers opposed the treaty, almost every teacher, educator and student; the entire labor movement and all the opposition political parties. In the eyes of many observers, more than half of the adult Japanese population opposed this Ampo treaty and yet it was imposed upon them by the reactionary Government of Nobusuke Kishi.

While the various Diet Committees were still questioning the Government party on the meaning and significance of various parts of the "Security Treaty," Committee Chairmen ordered debate halted. As the Socialist Party members were still seeking to force the Kishi Government to explain the bounds of the term "Southeast Asia" wherein the Treaty applied, all questioning was halted. At this time it was obvious that Kishi proposed to force the Treaty through the Diet in defiance of even pedestrian democracy. As the Treaty had not been enacted by the Regular session of the Diet, on May 19th a Government Party Motion was introduced to extend the Diet Session by 50 days. Late in the afternoon a meeting

was held for the purpose of passing this Motion but the Socialist Party Members and the Democratic Socialist Party members denounced the plan as illegal and walked out. Kishi's party voted to approve the Diet extension and the stage was set for Kishi to "force" the "legalization" of the United States military treaty.

It was announced that a Plenary Session of the Diet would be held to approve the Diet Extension, but the opposition party members did not know that it was Kishi's plan to approve the Diet extension *and* the Treaty at the same time.

As the Socialist members sat before the doors of the Diet chamber, seeking to prevent the convening of this special session, at 11 pm the Speaker of the Diet, war-responsible purgee Ichiro Kiyose, for the first time in recent history, summoned 500 police who picked up all the Socialist members and carried them bodily to the basement and held them in a room. At 11.48 "Kiyose, flanked by a squad of Diet guards . . . opened the session in the presence of LDP members only" And, in the words of George R. Packard in "Protest in Tokyo," "The fifty-day extension was quickly approved, and Kiyose then announced that a new session would be convened 'tomorrow' just after midnight. The session ended at 11.50 pm and exactly 15 minutes later, at six minutes past midnight, a new plenary session opened . . . Kiyose called for a rising (standing) vote on the treaty and related bills". All present rose and at 12.19 pm the session ended. In this way the dangerous U.S. military treaty was forced on the Japanese people.

The reaction of the Japanese public to this forceful trickery was to rise in such massive protest that not only was the invitation to President Eisenhower withdrawn but Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi was forced to resign. Fearful that the people might proceed too far in their opposition to traditional rule, the "Liberal-Democratic Party", guided by the massive donations of Mitsubishi, et al, selected Hayako Ikeda as a mild "low posture" Prime Minister who would do nothing to upset the aroused voters. It was his task to maintain calm waters until 1964 when the Tokyo Olympics would open, to restore "pride in Japanism". In October 1964 Eisaku Sato the younger brother of Nobusuke Kishi was named Prime Minister and the "hard, pro-American, remilitarization line" of Kishi was re-imposed.

ENFORCED "FRIENDSHIP WITH SOUTH KOREA"

It was when Prime Minister Sato first began his long term as Prime Minister, in 1965, that the *Japan-south Korea "friendship treaty"*, was forced through the Diet with similar contempt for the spirit of democracy. At the behind-the-scene demand of the United States this treaty was "rammed" through the Japanese Diet and through the south Korean Assembly.

It is already widely reported in the Japanese press that the reactionary Sato government will "ram" the Okinawa return bill through the Diet in similar fashion in October 1971.

As the previous pages have indicated, a vast portion of the Japanese have opposed every significant step made by the ultra-conservative regimes that have ruled Japan since 1951 and Japan became "independent". The people have opposed the military alliance with the United States which was made a condition to secure the "peace treaty". They opposed the extension of this in 1960. They opposed equally the dangerous Japan "friendship" treaty with the military dictatorship of south Korea—all made "law" under tremendous pressure of the United States.

NOW OKINAWA

The Japanese people—and the Okinawa people—equally oppose the Japan-Okinawa Return agreement because it has become apparent that under the terms of the Sato-Nixon Communiqué of November 1969, in order to secure the return of Okinawa the Sato Government has agreed to spread Japan's "responsibility" into the undefined limits of Southeast Asia.

A few hours after Sato returned from Washington on November 26, 1969 it was announced that a national election would be held almost immediately. The political and military strategists had determined that Prime Minister Sato could win a sweeping re-election with the slogan "I got back Okinawa."

To make the election certain and "confirm" the agreements he had just made with President Nixon regarding Okinawa and Japan's future stepped-up military role, it was decided to hold the Diet (Congressional) election during the year-end holiday season on December 27th. This was considered a lucky time for Sato because hundreds of thousands of city-dwellers would be returning to their country-side homes for the holidays.

Polls have shown that the cities with their many industrial workers who have recently migrated from the country are strongly anti-Government in their political thinking. Millions of these young workers under the influence of the leftist labor unions return to visit their former homes in the villages and farms for the year-end holiday. This is a tremendous, traditional migration back to the ancestors. For this reason December 27th was selected as the date as a way of avoiding opposition electors. As the Diet was not in session and the Socialist and other parties had no opportunity to question Sato in an attempt to discover *what* he had promised to the United States, this seemed like a "clever" way to win an election while the people did not know what they were voting for. Who knew that a vastly increased militarization of Japan was concealed within the "Return of Okinawa" 'gift wrappings'.

Prime Minister Sato's "sneak attack" election, gave the opposition parties a mere three weeks to organize a nationwide campaign against the Liberal Democrats and their dark record. Of course they failed, in fact it seemed that to assure their defeat was the reason this unseemly date had been deliberately selected.

The largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party lost 44 seats, dropping from 134 Diet seats to 90. The Liberal-Democratic government party of Prime Minister Sato captured 16 new seats, giving it an absolute majority with 288 seats, with power to rule undisturbed until the next election. The political trickery made it possible for the Sato government to greatly accelerate Japan's militarization and involvement without the people or the opposition parties having any voice or knowledge of what was at stake.

This was the political reality within this new ally of the United States as Washington prepared to turn Asia over to this "junior" partner, Nippon.

Whether the U.S. knew that this "election" was a travesty of the "democracy" that both President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato proclaimed existed in Japan is not known. The former Ambassador in Japan and currently Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the Department of State and expert on CIA activities seemingly sought to mislead the US Senate on Sato's trick election. Before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 26, 1970 Undersecretary Johnson stated:

"As far as general Japanese attitudes toward the treaty are concerned . . . (you) are aware that following Prime Minister Sato's return from Washington, general elections were held of December 27th, 1969. During the campaign leading up to that election, a major part of Prime Minister Sato's Liberal Democratic Party's foreign policy plank was the continuation of the treaty, and that party won the election by the largest majority of seats in the Diet it has held since 1960."

Critics of U.S. policy regarding Japan who were in Japan during this "election" farce—as I was—say that the "election victory" of Sato was based upon many of the voters being away from the cities and the year-end holiday mood precluded any serious thought being given to an election held just a few days before New Years. The hired voters and the agricultural rice-price subsidized voters of the LDP did their part while the millions of opponents were on trains and enroute to their natal homes.

During the campaign the question of Okinawa was mentioned by Sato in only the vaguest terms and only now, more than a year later, have details of the Okinawa return been revealed. No newspaper or magazine published the Nixon-Sato Communique or the speech made by Prime Minister Sato to the *National Press Club* on November 21st in Washington. Thus, even today the Japanese people do not know what pro-American role Japan is pledged to play by Prime Minister Sato. For the past two years the "Liberal-Democratic" party elections have been able to secure less than half the total votes. It is a minority party whose public support is declining and the danger approaches that it will use its contacts with rightist gangsters to harrass the opposition. This is the road of danger. Undersecretary Johnson said that the reason Japan refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was that "looking down the long road" they wanted to "keep their options open" so that they might possess atom bombs. In the eyes of this observer, his "long road" is now only a short step.

OLD CONCLUSIONS

It is against this dictatorial imposition of a dangerous foreign policy upon Japan by rightist leaders who represent the same oligarchy that has ruled Japan from 1868 onward, that one must appraise the patently dishonest words in the

Nixon-Sato Communique: "guided by their common principles of democracy and liberty" we seek to establish "peace" in Asia. The U.S. "yes". Japan "no". on the common principles.

Against this pious hope I would again turn to the wise words of U.S. Ambassador Grew, who spent many years in Japan and came to a deep understanding of nation, government and people. Ambassador Grew spoke of "a vast heritage of almost prostrate subservience to birth and authority". *this has not changed.*

Today, when we have seen the United States impose a 10% surcharge on low-priced imports we should note carefully these words of Ambassador Grew: "the Japanese worker in his gloomy factory can . . . live on a diet so meager that any American on the same diet would soon collapse." "The conditions I have described would lead free Americans to revolt . . . Under these conditions the Japanese workers have docilely toiled to build a military machine which (swept) across Asia . . . The Japanese people have been accustomed to regimentation since the moment of the very birth of their nation".

These words of Ambassador Grew in 1942 are as true today as when they were written.

Today, relatively unchanged Japan, pretends to be an ally while it acquires U.S. technical secrets and soon, when the United States, flooded by low-cost exports, is forced to further curb the job-taking influx, Japan will once more go its own way. As seen from late 1971 it seems that Japan hopes to put together a military empire in Asia in which a military dictator will preside over south Korea, south Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand and perhaps the Philippines. Japan will be a "democratic" military state operating under the newest militarists with Public Relations counsellors provided by "your friendly Zaibatsu". The goal of this Asian complex will be "trade expansion" only and the accompanying Japanese military will be to provide the marching music and "Peace Corp" atmosphere only as envisaged in the "Civic Action" program as devised by the Pentagon. Initially there will be anti-American overtones and this will become explicit as the (anti-communist) slogans for "Asian Co-prosperity" increase in intensity. The rest of the programming is now being prepared.

If and when the top-secret "Japan Papers" are ever released in Washington they will surely document every episode listed in these pages as part of the clever (foo'ish) policy of the State Department and the Pentagon to have Japan serve as an American "counterweight". By that time the officials involved will have retired and it will be "in the national U.S. interests to de-classify these "Japan Papers" in order to arouse patriotic fervor. At this point in the United States it will be recognized as a "pre-war period".

THE JAPAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY,
October 11, 1971.

HON. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senator

DEAR SIR: I am writing to you as the newly elected Chairman of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party.

My firm conviction is that the maintenance of a friendly relationship based on mutual trust is vital, not only to Japan and the United States but also to the security and prosperity of Asia.

The Japanese people welcome and pay high tribute to the U.S. Government for its decision to return Okinawa to Japan despite many problems. However, I am seriously concerned because the Japanese people are not completely satisfied with the Reversion Agreement on following grounds:

- (1) There is no provision in the Agreement on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons.
- (2) Most of the existing U.S. military bases, including special units, will remain.
- (3) VOA broadcasts will not be discontinued.

I am gravely concerned over the growing frustration among our people in case the Agreement becomes effective in its present form since it may lead to an anti-American sentiment.

The Japanese Parliament will soon sit in extraordinary session to consider ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. I feel, it is my duty to ask you to exercise your influence on the U.S. Government and public opinion so that a mistake would not be made in settling the problem of Okinawa.

My thinking is more fully explained in the enclosed attachment. Here, I would like to summarize the most important points.

1. *Withdrawal of nuclear weapons*

It is absolutely necessary to convince the Japanese people that nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Okinawa. For this purpose, (a) the U.S. President must make a public announcement that nuclear weapons will be removed, and (b) a system must be set up to let Japan check the removal of nuclear weapons.

2. *Military bases*

U.S. military bases on Okinawa must be reduced drastically in numbers and their status made the same as those on mainland Japan.

3. *VOA broadcasting*

VOA broadcasts from Okinawa infringes on the Radio Law and the Broadcast Law of Japan. They also undermine the basic posture of Japan's diplomacy which is to strengthen friendship and co-existence with our neighbors. VOA broadcasts must, therefore, be discontinued simultaneously with the reversion of Okinawa.

I would have liked very much to visit the U.S. to explain my views in person. But the convening of the extraordinary session of our Parliament prevents me.

There are many other subjects which I wish to discuss with you such as the problems of the dollar and yen, textiles, foreign trade, China and security. This time, I confined myself to the Okinawa problem because this is going to be debated soon both in the U.S. Senate and the Japanese Parliament. I hope that you will give urgent and sympathetic consideration to my views on Okinawa which are those of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and of the majority of the Japanese people.

Sincerely yours,

IKKO KASUGA,

Chairman, The Japan Democratic Socialist Party.

ATTACHMENT

The effect on Japanese American relations brought about by the textile issue, the announcement of President Nixon's visit to China and the President's new economic policy worry me a great deal. Never before have our relationships ebbed so low.

To settle the pending issues between the two nations, it is the duty of both Japanese and Americans to do their utmost to avoid any attitudes that might aggravate misunderstanding and cause new difficulties.

In this context, I have many doubts about the Agreement on the Reversion of Okinawa signed by the U.S. and Japanese Governments and now being considered for ratification by the National Diet.

I am writing this in the hope that the U.S. would take fair and constructive steps to help solve the problem of Okinawa in a way most beneficial to the two nations.

As you may perhaps already know, the Japan Democratic Socialist Party, as early as August, 1967, clearly stated its stand that the Okinawa islands should be returned to Japan with all nuclear weapons removed and with the U.S. military bases placed on the same footing as on mainland Japan. Our Party was the first to take this position. This position was supported by 68% of the population of Okinawa and by 77% of the population of the Japanese mainland, according to public opinion surveys then conducted.

Subsequently, the Japanese Government adopted the viewpoint of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and pressed the U.S. to agree to the removal of nuclear weapons and the downgrading of Okinawa basis to the same footing as U.S. bases on mainland Japan.

Now, what is the reaction of the Japanese people to the agreement on the Reversion of Okinawa? 70% of the people on the mainland and 65% of those in the Okinawa islands have expressed their dissatisfaction and distrust of the

Agreement. This was made clear by a public opinion survey whose findings were reported in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper on 27th September this year.

I would like emphasize that the majority of the Japanese people and our Party are opposed to the Agreement in its present form only because it appears that the Agreement does not guarantee that upon reversion of Okinawa, the U.S. military bases there will be reduced to the same footing as on mainland Japan.

The major points of dissatisfaction of the Japanese people are as follows:

1. There is no provision at all in the Agreement which sets forth the condition demanded by the entire the Japanese people that Okinawa be returned with all nuclear weapons removed.

2. The Agreement does not provide for the reduction of the military bases on Okinawa to the same status as those on the mainland. Most of the bases on Okinawa remain the same as before with their numbers still being as many as 88.

3. VOA broadcasts will be continued from Okinawa even after reversion to Japan. This means that Japanese territory will be used to broadcast propaganda to communist countries with the Japanese people having no control over this activity.

4. There will remain in Okinawa some special military units that are not allowed to be stationed on the main Japanese islands.

5. Of the 10 items of request on the part of Japan (including the return of or reimbursement for military sites), only one item has so far been met.

If the U.S. Government takes the view that it is making, while tension still exists in the Far East, such an important decision as to return Okinawa to Japan and that, therefore, Japan, on her part, must make some concessions, I must say the U.S. is taking the wrong attitude. Any action taken on the bases of such an attitude will, for certain, pose new problems harmful to the interests of U.S.-Japan relations and lead the Japanese people towards anti-Americanism. This will erode the good-will of the American people towards the Japanese. If this happens, it will be most unfortunate for the two nations.

For the U.S. to hold on to its military rights in Okinawa even after its return to Japan on the grounds that they are vested rights is not at all fair and just. I will ignore the minimum request of the Japanese people. The Japanese people appreciate the return of Okinawa but, at the same time, they are dissatisfied with the reversion formula. I am afraid that the reversion formula as it stands now is detrimental to U.S.-Japan friendly relations.

I have taken up my pen in the hope that I might be able to inform you better of the sentiment in this country and to ask you to exercise your influence on the U.S. Government so that it would not make a mistake in settling the problem of Okinawa.

The Agreement on the Reversion of Okinawa must be reviewed in respect to the following points:

1. *Withdrawal of nuclear weapons*

(1) To ensure the complete withdrawal of the nuclear weapons, there must (a) a Presidential announcement that such weapons would be withdrawn and (b) a system to enable Japan to check the withdrawal of such weapons.

2. *Military bases*

(a) The number of military bases on Okinawa must be reduced drastically and their status reduced to that of the mainland bases, and (b) special units that are not stationed on the mainland should not be stationed on Okinawa.

3. *VOA broadcasting*

The continuance of VOA broadcasts from Okinawa after reversion violates the Radio Law and the Broadcast Law of Japan. It also undermines the basic posture of our diplomacy which is to maintain and strengthen friendship and co-existence with our neighbouring countries. The broadcasting must, therefore, be discontinued as early as possible. At present, the understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments provides for VOA broadcasts to continue for a period of five years after the reversion of Okinawa.

The three points mentioned above are the minimum requirements that should be met. If they are not met, the Agreement that should be a blessing for the Japanese people would hardly be welcomed and supported by them.

With President Nixon's impending visit to China, the international situation is undergoing a drastic change—a change towards the detente in the Far East. The reversion of Okinawa must be in harmony with this trend.

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY COORDINATORS FOR THE TIAO-YU TAI OPEN LETTERS

DEAR SENATOR: Presently, you are considering the ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement Treaty, signed by the representatives of the U.S. and the Japanese governments on June 17, 1971. We, the undersigned, would like to call your attention to a neglected but important aspect of the Agreement, namely, the issue of whether the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands ("Senkaku" in Japanese) belong to China or to Japan. The Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are a group of eight tiny uninhabited, but oil-rich islets northeast of Taiwan.

Sovereignty over these islands has been claimed in strong and clear terms by the governments of China (the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China) and Japan. Our State Department, perhaps concerned with matters of more immediate interests, has decided to include Tiao-Yu Tai as part of the Ryukyus to be reverted to Japan. We believe that this position is extremely ill-advised. In the first place, it openly flouted Chinese claims in a time when the administration is attempting to further the friendships between the American and Chinese people. Secondly, it indicates a lack of realization of the explosive nature of this issue for years to come, and of the harm it will do to the prospects of peace in Asia.

We should not be misled by the lack of concrete actions of the governments of China on this issue up to now. Both are at the moment preoccupied with intensive diplomatic maneuvering. But when the time comes, neither will fail to respond to or exploit the deep resentment against Japan and the U.S., on the part of the ordinary Chinese people, as a result of this action.

This is not "just another territorial dispute" for the following two reasons: (1) To a remarkable extent, after decades of wars between Japan and China, there is little present enmity between the Japanese and the Chinese people, and, up to this point, no territorial dispute between the two nations. The matter of Tiao-Yu Tai promises to be the single issue that will stir emotions, revive old enmity, and inevitably lead to future confrontations. (2) This is a dispute in which the U.S. does not have to get involved, but is now involved by the language of the Treaty. In spite of claims of neutrality by our State Department spokesmen, Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi stated unequivocally that "the Okinawa Agreement had settled the matter (of Tiao-Yu Tai Islands) completely as far as the U.S. and Japan were concerned". (*Washington Post*, June 19, 1971)

Unless a rider is attached to the ratification motion excluding these islands from the consideration of the Treaty, it will be hard to avoid creating the impression in the minds of Chinese everywhere that we are deliberately sowing the seeds of conflict, and that the U.S. is willing to fan the revival of Japanese militarism in the name of containing communism. The U.S. Senate has the unique opportunity to correct a serious blunder of the Executive Branch. *We appeal to you to seek a truly neutral position.* The Senate should—as it can—prevent use of the Okinawa and Ryukyu Reversion Agreement in a way prejudicial to Chinese claims to the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands.

Sincerely yours,

(Names on following page)

Petition to the Honorable _____, U.S. Senator from _____
concerning Sovereignty Over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands*
(The submitted signatures are in the committee file.)

*Signatures on this page mean that the persons are in full agreement with this letter. They are not responsible for the accuracy of the materials enclosed in the ensuing pages.

The Delaware Tiao-Yu Tai Committee has prepared this material to provide you with the relevant facts and views concerning this issue. In preparing it, the committee tried to be accurate and impartial. All references are documented in detail, and whenever possible, accompanied by call numbers of the Library of Congress.

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SECTION I. THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS

The Tiao-Yu Tai Islands are a group of eight islands located in East China Sea between 25°40' and 26° N latitude and 123°25' and 123°45' E longitude. They are about 120 nautical miles northeast of Taipei, Taiwan, and about 240 nautical miles west of Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands.¹ The romanized Chinese names of these islands² which are found in all world atlases printed before 1900 are listed in the second column below. The name Senkaku was not officially registered in Japan until 1900.³ The corresponding Japanese names⁴ are listed in the third column below. The location of these islands are denoted by their numbers on the map on page 2.

| Tiao-Yu Tai Islands | Senkaku Gunto |
|---------------------|------------------|
| Tia-yu (Tia-u-su) | Uotsuri-shima |
| Ho-pin (Hoa-pin-su) | Tobi-se |
| Pei-hsiao | |
| Nan-hsiao | Okino-kita-iwa |
| Pei-ta-hsiao | Kita-koshima |
| Nan-to-hsiao | Minami-Koshima |
| Huang-wei | Okino-minami-iwa |
| Chih-wei | Kobi-sho |

Geologically, the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands and the island of Taiwan are on the continental shelf of mainland China, i.e., the depth of sea water between these islands and mainland China does not exceed 200 meters. Whereas both Tiao-Yu Tai and Taiwan are separated from the Ryukyu Island by a deep underwater trench of more than 1000 meters. Oceanic current flows all year round past the east shore of Taiwan in a north-east direction. Northeast wind in winter and southwest wind in summer prevails in this area.⁵


¹ Army map, entitled Senkaku Gunto, Southern Japan, 1:250,000, sheet 13 Area code AS, prepared by the Army map service, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1944. (G.1019.R475.G7)

² *Twentieth Century Atlas of the World*, p. 138, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1896. (G.1019.R475.1896)

³ *Gazetteers of Japan*, by Yoshida Toga, first published in 1909, revised new edition 1970, vol. 8, p. 618. (DS805.Y6153 Orien Japan)

⁴ *Cosmopolitan World Atlas*, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1951. (G.1019.R24)

⁵ *National Geographical Society Atlas of the World*, National Geographical Society, Washington, D.C., 1963. (G.1019.N28)



SECTION I. THE RELEVANT HISTORY OF TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS

The name Tiao-Yu Tai first appeared in a Chinese voyage and navigation record, *Shun Feng Hsiang Sung*, in 1403.⁶ Since then it has appeared in numerous mission reports. Among them is the *Shih Liu-Chiu Lu* (Report of a Mission to Ruykyu⁷ written by Chen Kan, envoy of the Ming Dynasty in 1534.

As far as Japanese records are concerned, the detailed Japanese gazetteer published in 1909⁸ quoted the description in *Shih Liu-Chiu Lu*, mentioned above, as the earliest discovery or account of these islands. In the same gazetteer, the name Senkaku is reported to have been officially registered in Japan in 1900.

In 1884, Tatsushiro KOGA, a Japanese residing in Ryukyu Islands, claimed to have discovered Tiao-Yu Tai Islands.⁹

In 1885, the Japanese Foreign Minister in a letter to the Minister of Domestic Affairs expressed his concern about annexing Senkaku Islands into Japanese territory at that time. He argued that since these islands were very close to China and the commentaries of the major Chinese newspapers were accusing the Japanese of territorial expansionist intentions, it would be wise to wait for a better opportunity.¹⁰ Subsequently, the Minister of Domestic Affairs replied and stated that he rejected the request of Okinawa local government for the permission to erect boundary markers on Tiao-Yu Tai Islands.¹¹

In 1895, after the Sino-Japanese war, the Japanese Cabinet annexed Tiao-Yu Tai into Japanese territory.¹² This annexation was legalized when China and

⁶ *Shun Feng Hsiang Sung*, (LC DS 339 92).

⁷ *Shih Liu-Chiu Lu*, by Chen Kan, 1534. This mission report is included in a book entitled *General Edition of Reports*, which is available at the Columbia University Library. Call number #9100.2822. The English title of this book is supplied by us.

⁸ *Gazetteers of Japan*, by Yoshida Togo, first published in 1909, revised new edition 1970, vol. 8, p. 618 (DS805.Y6153 ORIEN Japan).

⁹ *Tokyo Shinbun* (Tokyo News), April 5, 1971. Translation provided in the "Daily Section. Translation Service Branch.

¹⁰ *Summary of Japanese Press*, published by the American Embassy, Tokyo. Political Foreign Affairs Documents, vol. 18, pp. 573-576.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 313, vol. 18, pp. 575-576.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 245, vol. 23, pp. 531-532.

Japan concluded the Treaty of Shimonoseki in May, 1895, whereby China ceded Taiwan and its surrounding islands to Japan.¹³

After the Second World War, as a result of the Cairo Declaration (1943), Potsdam Declaration (1945) and Sino-Japanese Treaty (1952), the sovereign rights of Tiao-Yu Tai were returned to China.

SECTION II. (A) POSITION OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT

Before the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of June 17, 1971:

According to communications received from the officials of the Department of State, the position of the United States government on Tiao-Yu Tai islets was:¹⁴

"Under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. has full administrative rights over "Nansei Shoto", including the Ryukyus, south of 29 degrees north latitude. The term "Nansei Shoto" was understood to mean all islands under Japanese administration at the end of the war which were not otherwise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty. The term, as used in the Treaty, was intended to include the Senkaku Islands.

"As a result of an understanding reached by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in November 1969, the United States expects to return to Japan in 1972 all the rights it acquired over these islands under the Treaty of Peace. In short we will return to Japan rights which we obtained from Japan, and this action, by itself will neither enhance nor diminish any claim to sovereignty over the islands.

"The U.S. has consistently maintained that any dispute over sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands should be settled by the parties themselves (or, if they wish, by third party adjudication). Neither the Peace Treaty nor the Reversion Agreement will dispose of such a dispute."

After the signing of the treaty:

"The United States government is aware that a dispute exists between the governments of the Republic of China and Japan regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. The U.S. believes that a return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan from which those rights were received can in no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of China. The U.S. cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to the U.S. nor can the U.S. by giving back what it received diminish the rights of the Republic of China."^{15, 16}

SECTION II. (b) POSITION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Before the signing of the treaty:

The People's Republic of China expressed her position on Tiao-Yu Tai through articles published in *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*). Relevant quotes are given below:¹⁷

"The Tiaoyu and other islands are China's territory, over which China has inviolable sovereignty. The question of U.S. imperialism having so-called 'administrative rights' over these islands which belong to China simply does not exist. . . . It is obvious that U.S. imperialism's aim in doing so is to connive at and encourage Japanese militarism to carry out expansion abroad and use the Japanese reactionaries as an instrument for pushing the 'Nixon doctrine' in Asia. This is a fresh crime in U.S. imperialism's hostility towards the Chinese people. . . . The Chinese people have always maintained that U.S. imperialism should return Okinawa, which it has occupied by force, to the Japanese people. But we will never permit the U.S. and the Japanese reactionaries to annex China's sacred territory Tiaoyu and other islands by making use of the 'Okinawa Reversion'

¹³ U.S.A. Department of State, *Occupation of Japan*, by Fearey, Robert A., N.Y. MacMillan 1950, pp. 51-52 (app. 1). Cited from *Survey of International Affairs*.

¹⁴ Letter to Mrs. K. Woo of Delaware on May 4, 1971, by Mr. Howard M. McElroy, Country Officer for Japan, Dept. of State.

¹⁵ We consider the above statement a legalistic smokescreen. When the U.S. says that the dispute over sovereignty should be settled by the parties themselves, and then gives the islands to one of the parties, she is fueling the fires of international tension. Note that Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi stated unequivocally that "the Okinawa Agreement had settled the matter (of Tiao-Yu Tai islands) completely as far as the U.S. and Japan were concerned." (Quoted from *Washington Post*, June 19, 1971, pp. A19)

¹⁶ Department of State telegram unclassified 594, State: 10/8253.

¹⁷ Our italics.

swindle. . . We want to warn the Japanese reactionaries once again: Gone for ever are the days when China was compelled by armed force to cede territory and waive sovereignty. China's sovereignty over the Tiaoyu and other islands brooks no encroachment by anybody. In the face of the great Chinese people, all your intrigues to annex China's territory in collusion with U.S. imperialism are futile and bound to be dashed to pieces." For complete translation see Peking Review, p. 14, no. 19, 1971.

After the signing of the treaty:

"What makes one extremely indignant is the fact that in the Okinawa 'reversion' agreement, the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries even incorporate China's territory the Tiaoyu and other islands into the area to be 'returned' to Japan in a vain attempt to seek 'grounds' for the annexation of China's territory by the Japanese reactionaries and make it a fait accompli. . . . Sato government has even . . . set up an '11th maritime safety district headquarters' . . . patrolling . . . the waters around China's territory the Tiaoyu and other islands. . . . The Chinese Government and people will absolutely not tolerate these crimes of encroachment upon China's sovereignty perpetrated by the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries. Once again we warn the U.S.-Japanese reactionaries: No insidious stratagems on your part can alter the fact that the Tiaoyu and other islands are an inalienable part of China's sacred territory. . . ." For complete translation see *Peking Review*, p. 6, No. 26, June 20, 1971.

On June 23, 1971, Premier Chou En-lai declared to his American guests: "Once [the Taiwan] problem is solved, then all other problems can be solved. The People's Republic would then be able to establish diplomatic relations with the United States."¹⁸ To illustrate how the issue of Tiao-Yu Tai Islands is intimately related to this matter, we quote: "Taiwan Province and the islands appertaining thereto, including *Tiao-yu, Huangwei, Chih-wei, Nanhsiao, Peihshiao and other* thereto, including *Tiao-yu, Huangwei, Chih-wei, Nanhsiao, Peihshiao and other*

SECTION II. (C) POSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)

Before the signing of the treaty:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China issued a solemn statement on June 11, 1971, to make her position known to the world on the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands and the Tiao-Yu Tai Islets. Relevant quotes are given below:^{20 21}

"Having learned that the United States Government and the Japanese Government are going to sign in the immediate future formal instruments for the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands, and together therewith, the Tiao-Yu Tai Islets, over which the Republic of China exercises its territorial sovereignty, the Chinese government considers it necessary to emphasize once again its position, and make its views known to the world. . . .

"These islets belong to the Chinese Province of Taiwan and thus constitute part of the territory of the Republic of China. They are closely linked to the latter by reason of geographical location, geological structure, historical association, and, above all, by reason of the long and continued use which the inhabitants of Taiwan have made of these islets. *Bound by the sacred duty to defend its national territory, the Chinese government will never relinquish any particle of its territorial sovereignty under any circumstances.*

"Thus, it has continuously informed the United States Government and the Japanese Government that in terms of history, geography, usage, and law, the Chinese Government deems that these islets belong, without the slightest doubt, to the territorial sovereignty of China and that they should be returned to the Republic of China upon the completion of the administration by the United States. . . ."

After the signing of the treaty:

A spokesman of the Foreign Ministry termed the upcoming transfer of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands to Japan as "completely unacceptable".

¹⁸ *Newsweek*, July 5, 1971, p. 48.

¹⁹ *Remin Ribao (People's Daily)*, Dec. 29, 1970. For complete translation, see *Peking Review*, no. 1, 1971, p. 22.

²⁰ *Our Italic*.

²¹ *News from China*, (Daily news report from Taipei provided by the Chinese Information Service), June 11, 1971.

SECTION II. (D) POSITION OF JAPAN

Before the signing of the treaty:

Foreign Minister Aichi stated on September 10, 1970²² that "There is no room for doubt that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japanese territory. With regard to the territorial status of the Islands, therefore, Japan has no intention to negotiate with any nation."

After the signing of the treaty:

Washington Post, June 19, 1971, pp. A9: "Japanese Foreign Minister Kijichi Aichi rejected the Taiwan government's latest claim to the disputed Senkaku Islands yesterday. . . . Aichi said the *Okinawa Agreement* had settled the matter (of *Tiao-Yu Tai*) completely as far as the United States and Japan were concerned." (our italics)

Washington Post, June 28, 1971, pp. A17: ". . . Japanese . . . intention . . . to operate 11 patrol boats carrying three-inch guns and 40-millimeter machine guns over a 110,000-square-mile area embracing the southern defense perimeter of the Ryukyu island chain adjacent to Taiwan. . . . these boats will eventually be equipped with ship-to-ship missiles. Since these *patrols will cover the disputed Senkaku Islands, claimed as Chinese territory by Peking and Taipei alike, this patrolling is expected to have a delicate effect on our relations with China and Taiwan, Mainichi* declared," (*Mainichi* is a leading Japanese newspaper)

SECTION III. (A) ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE JAPANESE PRESS IN SUPPORT OF ITS GOVERNMENT'S CLAIM THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (TIAO-YU TAI) BELONG TO JAPAN

Although the Japanese government has not published any detailed statements explaining the basis of her claim to the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands, a number of Japanese newspapers have published articles on this subject. Their contents are very similar. Here, we quote an editorial published in the Tokyo Shimbun on April 5, 1971.¹

"There is no room for doubt that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japanese territory. . . . There are three major reasons why the Government says that definitely.

"The first reason is the historical fact that the Senkaku Islands were discovered by Tatsushiro KOGA, who was born in Fukuoka Prefecture and who was a "lover of exploration," in 1884. . . .

"Afterward, KOGA constructed factories for the production of bird feather, tortoise-shell, shellfish, bird droppings, and dried bonito, on the Senkaku Islands, and operated them until around the middle of the Taisho Era (1912-1926). Sea areas around the Islands are also said to have been areas for fishing operations by Okinawa fishermen. Zenji, KOGA's son, is now living in Naha City, as the landowner of Utsuri Islands, Kubato Islands, Minami Kojima Islands, and Kita Kojima Islands, all islands are of the Senkaku Island Group.

"The second reason is Imperial Ordinance No. 13 of April 1, 1896. The Government, which received an application for permission for acquisition of the right of lease, from KOGA, the discoverer, once rejected this application, on the grounds that "It is not clear whether the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan or China under the Ching Dynasty." However, *on the occasion of Taiwan's having come into the possession of Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, the Cabinet decided on Jan. 1, 1899 that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japanese territory.* (Our italics)

"Imperial Ordinance No. 13 was issued on the basis of this Cabinet decision. Thus, the Senkaku Islands came to be regarded as a Japanese possession, both in name and in reality, and it was decided that they would belong to Ishigaki Village (now Ishigaki City), Yaeyama-gun, Okinawa Prefecture. . . ."

"The third reason is USCAR Ordinance No. 27 which went into effect on December 25, 1953. This Ordinance demarcates the "geographical border of the Ryukyu Islands," in connection with the fact that the US-Japan Agreement concerning the reversion of the Amami Island Group went into effect on the same day. The Government emphasizes that even in view of the fact that the Senkaku Islands are situated within the scope of the Ryukyu Islands, it is clear that the Senkaku Islands will be included among the areas to be returned."

²² This has been reported by several major news wire services.

¹ Translation provided in the "Daily Summary of Japanese Press" published by the American Embassy, Tokyo, Political Section, Translation Service Branch.

SECTION III (b). ARGUMENTS USED BY OUR STATE DEPARTMENT IN SUPPORT OF HER POSITION THAT THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (TIAO-YU TAI) IS A PART OF THE RYUKYUS

Mr. Howard M. McElroy, who is the country officer for Japan, State Department, stated that: "Under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. has full administrative rights over "Nansei Shoto," including the Ryukyus, south of 29 degrees north latitude. The term "Nansei Shoto" was understood to mean all islands under Japanese administration at the end of the war which were not other-wise specifically referred to in the Peace Treaty. The term, as used in the Treaty, was intended to include the Senkaku Islands."²

SECTION III. (c) ARGUMENTS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS' CLAIM TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF TIAO-YU TAI

"He who forgets the past is condemned to relive it"—George Santayana

For this reason, the Chinese people, who have lived through repeated Japanese military and economic aggressions since the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894, are very much alarmed, when they detect this new territorial expansionist design of the Japanese government. For the same reason, we, who lived through the shock of the Pearl Harbour and the agony of the Second World War, are much in sympathy with their feelings.

Although the governments of China have not given any detailed statement substantiating the basis of China's claim to Tiao-Yu Tai, the Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the overseas Chinese in the United States, Canada, Japan, West Germany, Philippines, and Belgium have documented historical, geographical and legal reasons pertaining to why the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands belong to China. In the following paragraphs, we summarize their findings:

(i) From the geographical viewpoint

Geographically, Tiao-Yu Tai is intimately related to the China mainland and Taiwan. It is about 120 miles from Taipei and 240 miles from Okinawa. Its surrounding waters are far less than 200 meters deep and hence it is within the confines of the Chinese continental shelf.³ The strait between it and Taiwan is also less than 200 meters deep. In contrast, the water which separates it from the Ryukyus is over 1,000 meters in depth (see map, p. 2). This makes the Ryukyus *oceanic islands* while the Tiao-Yu Tai islands are *continental islands*. Geographically speaking, then, Tiao-Yu Tai is considered an island appertaining to Taiwan.

(ii) From the usage viewpoint

The oceanic currents and prevailing winds of the area make passage by sail from the Ryukyus to Tiao-Yu Tai extremely difficult. That is why Tiao-Yu Tai was discovered and used exclusively by the Chinese until 1884.⁴ The islands are very important as a refuge for Chinese fishermen who have to cope with frequent storms in the area. They built rudimentary cart-tracks, sheds and a pier. Their fishing operation in the area amounted to a yearly intake of 12,000 tons, totaling \$1.75 million.

² Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan states that: "Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nampo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosaruo Islands and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Islands . . ." Note that the *Tiao-Yu Tai Islands were not specifically mentioned in the Treaty, nor was there a grid map attached to the Treaty to define the boundaries of the Ryukyu or the Daito Islands . . . etc.* Note also that neither the Republic of China nor the People's Republic of China participated in the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

³ "Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. Signed at San Francisco on September 1951", United Nations—Treaty Series No. 1835 (1952), pp. 216-219. (JX 170, U35)

⁴ Definition of the Continental Shelf: ". . . the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area of the territorial sea, but to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superficial waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of said area." Quoted from the United Nation's Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, 1958, article 1, No. 5578. *U.S. Treaties and other International Acts Series*, Department of State Series. (JX 235, 9.832)

⁵ *Tokyo Shimbun*, April 5, 1971.

(iii) From the historical viewpoint

The following table disproves the claim by Japan that the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands were first discovered by a Japanese individual in 1884. Also it shows that historically these islands were a part of China, not that of the Ryukyu Islands.

| Year | Event |
|------|--|
| 1403 | The first documented Chinese recording of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands— <i>Shun Fung Hsiang Sung</i> , 1403, a recording of voyages between China proper and the Ryukyus. It described a journey to Tiao-Yu Tai. (Library of Congress D330/S92) |
| 1534 | All the major islands in that group had been properly identified and named by China— <i>Shih Liu-Chiu Lu (Report of a Mission to Ryukyu)</i> , 1534. This and many other mission reports of the Ming Dynasty inferred that these islands were a part of China, separate from the Ryukyus. (Columbia University Library #9100.2822) |
| 1783 | The first Japanese mention of Tiao-Yu Tai— <i>Map of Japan</i> , by a Japanese, Asano Yahee. It used the same color for both China proper and Tiao-Yu Tai, distinct from the Ryukyus and Japan. (Lamont Library, Harvard University. Classified as 2217.2) |
| 1879 | Japan incorporated the Ryukyu Islands (as a prefecture) into its Empire. (Encyclopedia International, vol. 16, pp. 66, Grolier Inc., N.Y. 1963. Library of Congress AE5.E447) |
| 1884 | The "discovery" of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands by a Japanese, named Tatau-shiro KOGA. |
| 1885 | The Japanese government rejected application from Mr. KOGA for permission for acquisition of the right of lease, on the grounds that "It is not clear whether the Senkaku Islands belong to Japan or China under the Ching dynasty." ^{5 6} |
| 1894 | Sino-Japanese war of 1894, beginning in August and ending in March, 1895, with the defeat of China. <i>Not a single world atlas</i> , published before that year, was found which did not use the romanized Chinese names to describe these islands. |

(iv) From the legal viewpoint:

The preceding table shows that the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands belonged to China before 1894, the year of the first Sino-Japanese war. In the following table, we document how Japan annexed these islands into her territory as a result of that war, and how the declarations and treaties of the allied nations during and after the Second World War have completely voided the legality of that annexation. Therefore the sovereignty rights of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands belong to China.

| Date | Event |
|------|---|
| 1894 | China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. |
| 1895 | The Japanese Cabinet annexed Tiao-Yu Tai into her territory in January. Her army occupied the Pescadores Islands in March. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ⁷ was concluded between China and Japan in May, whereupon China ceded Taiwan, all islands appertaining or belonging to Taiwan, and the Pescadores Islands to Japan. (Obviously including the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. Otherwise the annexation of these islands by Japan would be unilateral and hence illegal in terms of international laws.) We quote <i>Tokyo Shimbun</i> : "On the occasion of Taiwan's having come into the possession of Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, the Cabinet decided on Jan. 14, 1895 that the Senkaku Islands belong to Japanese territory." ⁸ |

⁵ *Tokyo Shimbun*, April 5, 1971. Translation provided in the "Daily Summary of Japanese Press", published by the American Embassy, Tokyo, Political Section, Translation Service Branch.

⁶ Copies of the original of these Japanese documents are enclosed as footnote 1 at the end of this section.

⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, U.S. Department of State, 1895, vol. 1, pp. 200-1. (LC JX 233, A3.)

⁸ *Tokyo Shimbun (Tokyo News)*, April 5, 1971. Translation provided in the "Daily Summary of Japanese Press", published by the American Embassy, Tokyo, Political Section, Translation Service Branch.

- Dec. 1943.—Cairo Declaration stated that: "... all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese ... shall be returned to the Republic of China ..."³
- July 1945.—Potsdam Declaration, article 8 stated that: "... The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out ..."⁴
- Sept. 1945.—The formal Instrument of Surrender was signed at Tokyo Bay. It reads: "We, . . . , hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued . . . at Potsdam . . ."⁵
- 1951.—The Treaty of Peace with Japan, signed by Japan and the Allied Powers (except the U.S.S.R. and China) at San Francisco. Article 2. (b) reads: "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores . . ."⁶
- 1952.—Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was concluded. Article 4 reads: "It is recognized that all treaties, conventions and agreement concluded before December 9, 1941, between China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of that war."⁷

(v) *Rebuttal To State Department's Argument:*

(1) The State Department cites Article 3 of the Peace Treaty as the sole legal document supporting its claim that the U.S. had acquired administrative rights over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands from Japan. But the fact of the matter is that neither the Treaty, nor any document attached to the Treaty, mentioned the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands, let alone specifying them as a part of the Ryukyus.

(2) USCAR Ordinance No. 27⁸ issued by the United States Civil Administration of Ryukyus on December 25, 1953, was cited in the Okinawa Reversion Treaty as the document which defines the boundaries of Ryukyus, which included the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands. Note that this document represents only the unilateral decision of the U.S. Civil Administration of Ryukyus. It can in no way be equated to the Peace Treaty of San Francisco, signed by the Allies in 1951. The Civil Administration had no business defining the boundaries of Ryukyus, especially when in so doing, it included a piece of another nation's territory. Our nation has already had our hands full playing the role of the world's policeman. Do we really want to take on the additional role defining the boundaries of Ryukyus, which ultimately involves defining the boundaries of China and Japan?

(3) From the evidence presented in the preceding tables, it seems clear that after the Allies' acceptance of the Formal Instrument of Surrender by Japan, all powers and rights of the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands rest with China. Therefore, whatever de facto rights the U.S. might have over these islands in the ensuing years, the U.S. could only have derived them from China, either explicitly or implicitly.

(4) As a consequence of the above, the State Department's position that we are "returning to Japan whatever rights (over the Tiao-Yu Tai Islands) which we obtained from Japan", seems completely untenable. As a minimum, the State Department should truly prevent the use of Okinawa Reversion Treaty in a way prejudicial to Chinese claims to these islands.

(5) When the State Department says that the dispute over sovereignty of these islands should be settled by the parties themselves, and then signs the islands over to one of the parties, it is fueling the fires of international tension.

SECTION IV. FEELINGS OF AMERICANS OF CHINESE DESCENT

The feelings of Americans of Chinese descent concerning the sovereignty of Tiao-Yu Tai are partially reflected by the following:

1. Within six months of the news of the Japanese claim, Chinese-Americans throughout the nation organized local Action Committees to Defend Tiao-Yu Tai. There are presently more than 100 committees in over 36 states.

³ Copy on file at the office of Mr. Howard McElroy, Country officer, Japanese Desk, Department of State.

⁴ U.S. Dept. of State, *Occupation of Japan*, by Fearey, Robert A., N.Y. Macmillan, 1950. Pp. 51-52 (app 1). (LC DS02.J3 F4.) Cited from *Survey of International Affairs*. (LC D440. S94.)

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-55 (app 5).

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63 (app 8).

⁷ *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 3, part 3, 1952, p. 3172. U.S. Dept. of State. (LC JX 231. A34.)

⁸ Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (Signed at Taipei, on April 28, 1952). Cited from *Conflict and Tension in the Far East—Key Documents, 1894-1960*, by John Maki, 1962, P. 146. (LC DS 503. M2S.)

2. Two series of demonstrations were held in support of the islands:
- (a) January 29-30, 1971, in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle and Chicago. There were over 1,000 demonstrators in New York alone.
- (b) April 9-10, 1971, in Washington, D.C. and other cities. According to the *New York Times*, "A dispute . . . brought thousands of Chinese and Chinese-Americans into the streets in Washington and other cities this weekend. . . . The demonstrations involved over 2,000 Chinese, a figure that, taking into account the size of the Chinese community in the country, is proportionately equivalent to a million Americans. . . ."
3. A full page Open Letter to President Nixon published in the *New York Times* on May 23, 1971, signed and financed by over 700 professors and professional people. A copy of that advertisement is enclosed.

AN OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT NIXON AND MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS

We write to call your attention to the violation of Chinese sovereignty over the Tiao Yu Tai islands by the Japanese and Liu Chiu (Ryukyu) governments. This took place after a 1968 United Nations geological survey had revealed that the continental shelf in the East China Sea might hold rich oil reserves. We urge you to respect and to take appropriate measures to ensure Chinese sovereignty over these islands. Such action by you will remove a source of conflict in East Asia and will further the friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.

The Tiao Yu Tai islands (called "Senkaku" in Japanese) are a group of eight uninhabited islands located about 120 miles northeast of Taiwan on the continental shelf and separated from the Liu Chiu islands by a deep underwater trench. Chinese historical records detailing the discovery and geographical features of these islands date back to the year 1403. For several centuries they have been administered as part of Taiwan and have always been used exclusively by Chinese fishermen as an operational base, both before and after World War II.

The Province of Taiwan, including these islands, was ceded to Japan in 1895 after the first Sino-Japanese war. These territories were returned to China at the end of World War II according to the 1943 Cairo Declaration which stipulated that Taiwan be returned to China. This was later reaffirmed by the Potsdam Agreement.

Despite China's undeniable sovereignty over the Tiao Yu Islands, the Japanese and the Liu Chiu governments have tried repeatedly to assert claims to these islands since the 1968 oil survey. These governments have committed a series of extremely unfriendly acts against China, including the forcible ejection of the Chinese fishermen from the area and the mutilation of the Nationalist Chinese flag on the islands. These provocations have enraged all Chinese, who until the end of World War II were the victims of prolonged Japanese aggression. Equally important, this conflict is regarded by the Chinese as just one aspect of the over-all effort to revive Japanese militarism.

The extent and depth of their feelings can be illustrated by the actions taken by the Chinese people in the United States. On January 29 and 30, 1971, some three thousand students participated in protest marches held in New York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu. On April 10, 2,500 people, representing a wide cross-section of the Chinese community, gathered in Washington, D.C. to protest the support of Japan's claims by the United States, which had stated its neutrality on the issue. At about the same time, another 1,500 Chinese also demonstrated to show their great concern over this issue in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Montreal. These events have been widely reported in the press for example, most recently in the *Washington Sunday Star* on April 11 and the *New York Times* on April 12.

We therefore ask you to reconsider the United States' policy on this issue. State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey stated on September 10, 1970, that the United States would remain neutral. Any attempt to turn the Tiao Yu Tai islands over to Japan in the forthcoming "Okinawa Reversion Agreement" will contradict the principle of neutrality. Specifically, we ask that you

(1) Disavow any claims that the Tiao Yu Tai islands are part of the American-administered Liu Chiu islands or Nansei Shoto.

⁹ *New York Times*, April 12, 1971, Section C, p. 9.

(2) Recognize Chinese sovereignty over these islands.

(3) Censure actions by the Japanese and the Liu Chiu governments which violate Chinese sovereignty and condemn attempts by these governments to resolve the issue through the use of force.

We appeal to you to use your initiative and moral authority to assure that the legitimate rights of the Chinese People will not be sacrificed as an expedient to international politics. Your just action in this matter will improve the prospects for peace in the Pacific area.

COORDINATORS FOR THE TIAO YU TAI OPEN LETTERS

Wu-chung Hsiang, Yale University; Ding-Yu Hsieh, Brown University; Hung-Hsi Wu, University of California at Berkeley; Wo-Yen Lee, Columbia University; Chi Yuan, City University of New York.

(Submitted signatures are in the committee files.)

SECTION V. RESULTS OF THE HARRIS POLL

The attitude of the American people towards Japan, the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, and the possible revival of its militarism have been reported by Louis Harris and Associates in a survey conducted for the *Asahi Shimbun* during January, 1971:¹

The return of Okinawa to Japan is supported by a slim margin of 49 percent for and 39 percent against.

54% agreed that "the Japanese fell under the control of the military before World War II. The same thing could happen . . . [again] some day." (36% disagreed with this statement while 10% were "not sure".)

To quote *Asahi Evening News* (March 17, 1971) once more, "the American public is not interested in seeing Japan re-emerge as a strong military force in the Pacific."

Only nine percent of American public believe "The U.S. should 'encourage Japan to build up her own military strength to become a first-class power.'"

68% believed that the rise of Japanese militarism was the major cause of World War II.

44% of the American people still feel fairly strongly or very strongly about Pearl Harbour.

¹ *Asahi Evening News*, p. 1, March 15, 1971; *Asahi Evening News*, pp. 6-7, March 17, 1971.