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"Reversion Agreement -
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OKINAWA REVERSION

Selected Working Documents

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

September 25, 1971

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Authority NND 947022
By IC, NAPA Date 7/25/99

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

PREFACE

This booklet contains selected working documents produced during the Okinawa reversion negotiations, March 1970 - January 1971. The information herein supplements documents in "Okinawa Reversion Agreement of June 17, 1971 and Related Documents" of July 1, 1971 published by the United States Embassy, Tokyo.

Documents contained in this booklet are internal diplomatic negotiating documents. They are not intended for publication and are classified CONFIDENTIAL.

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31. USG Talking Paper regarding the Fund
of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian

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
RECORD OF DISCUSSION

Detailed identification of the installations and sites listed in the attachment to the Memorandum of Understanding concerning Article III of the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today are as set forth in the attached list.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971.



Richard L. Sneider
Minister
Embassy of the United
States of America



Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General
American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

FOR LIST A

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
1	<u>Northern Training Area</u>	Grid Coord DE 2553 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67 FEC Drawing 1316388 Dec 69	98
2	<u>Aba Training Area</u>	Grid Coord DE 2855 * Multiplex Map Sheet 3727 II SW Series 1891 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	
3	<u>Kawata Training Area</u>	Grid Coord DE 1845 * Multiplex Map Sheet 3726 IV NE Series 1891 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	
4	<u>Okuma Rest Center</u>	Grid Coord DE 1657 * 15-09-11 30 June 69 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	64
5	<u>Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield</u>	Grid Coord CE 7855 * Master Plan, Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield (2 sheets) Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67 US Navy Map H.O. 192 11th Ed, Feb 67 US Air Force Map ONC H-13 3rd Ed, Apr 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC DOD Flight Information Publication	3

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
6	<u>Yaetake Communica- tion Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 9245 15-09-121 30 June 69	79/32/23
7	<u>Gesashi Communica- tion Site</u>	Grid Coord DE 1542 * 973202 9-28-62 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	120
8	<u>Sedake Training Area</u>	Grid Coord DE 0636 * Multiplex Map Sheet 3726 IV SW Series 1891 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	
9	<u>Camp Schwab</u>	<u>Camp Schwab</u> Grid Coord DE 0433 * 1227525 thru 1227528 10 Feb 69 US Navy Map No. 2582 4th Ed, Sep 44	94
		<u>Camp Schwab Training Area</u> Grid Coord DE 0034 Overlay of multiplex map sheets No. 3626 I SE and 3726 IV SW US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	93
		<u>IST Ramp Camp Schwab</u> Grid Coord DE 0533 * 16-06-557 9 Feb 62 Navy Map H.O. 2338 Navy Map No. 2482	110
10	<u>Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot</u>	<u>Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot</u> Grid Coord DE 0434 * 15-09-120 31 Mar 70 US Navy Map No. 2,582 4th Ed, Sep 44 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC 16-01-573 Mar 68	66/116

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
		Henoko Navy Ammunition Storage Facilities Grid Coord DE 0434 16-01-573 May 68	116
11	<u>Camp Hansen</u>	<u>Camp Hansen</u> Grid Coord CE 8927 Drawings 1227524, 1227520 and 1227521, all dated 10 Feb 69 unnumbered drawing DOD Flight Information Publication Grid Coord CE 8929 1227522 10 Feb 69	89
		<u>Camp Hansen Training Area</u> Grid Coord DE 9631 1152746 10 Feb 69	91
12	<u>Kushi Training Area</u>	Grid Coord DE 0131 * Multiplex Map Sheet 3726 IV SW Series 1891, US Navy Map No. 2582 4th Ed, Sep 44, US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	
13	<u>Onna Communication Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 8530 * Master Plan Onna Point Admin Annex Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70 Engr USARPAC	101
14	<u>Camp Hardy</u>	Grid Coord DE 005290 * 15-09-86 30 June 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	50

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
15	<u>Onna Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 8427 and 8326 15-09-112 30 June 69	57
16	<u>Yaka Training Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 8526 Multiplex Map Sheet 3626 II NW Series 1891	
17	<u>Gimbaru Training Area</u>	<u>Gimbaru Training Area</u> Grid Coord CE 9526 * 1152745 5 Jul 69 and over- lay US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan '70, Engr USARPAC DOD Flight Infor- mation Publication	100/33
		<u>Kaduna Site No. 3</u> 15-09-34 June 69	10
18	<u>Yaka Rest Center</u>	Grid Coord CE 8625 * 15-09-34 30 June 69 18-02-5210, Mar 64 US Navy Map H.O. 6131 1st Ed, Dec 57 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan '70, Engr USARPAC	84
19	<u>Kin Red Beach Training Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 9125 * 16-06-639 2 June 66 US Navy Map H.O. 6131 1st Ed, Dec 57 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	111

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
22	<u>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</u>	<u>Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7719 Master Plan Kadena Ammo Storage Annex Tab No. C-1, 4 (3 sheets) 15 Aug 67	6
		<u>Site Hizagawa</u> Grid Coord CE 7616 15-09-80 June 69	73
		<u>Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7521 * Master Plan Hanze Ammo Storage Annex Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	
		<u>Joint Ordnance Explosive Demolition Area, Yomitan</u> Grid Coord CE 7521 * 15-09-69 30 June 69	45
		<u>Army CSG Ammunition Storage Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7920	118
		<u>Chibana Ordnance Ammuni- tion Depot</u> Grid Coord CE 7918 15-07-58 30 June 69	65
		<u>Kadena VORTAC Site</u> Grid Coord CE 8017 Army Map, Ryukyu Retto 1:25,000 Kin SW, sheet 3626 II SW 1891	14

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
		<u>Kadena TACAN Site</u> Grid Coord CE 7917 Master Plan Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	13
		<u>Higashionna Ammunition Storage Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 8219 1227533 and 1227534 10 Feb 69	96
23	<u>Chibana Site</u>	<u>Chibana Army Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7921 15-09-125 30 June 69 Multiplex Map Sheet 3626 II SW Series L891	12/35
		<u>Kins Radio Relay Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7921 15-09-125 30 June 69	12/35
24	<u>Ishikawa Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 8319 and 8320 15-09-113 30 June 69	58
25	<u>Yomitan Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 7321 15-09-124 30 June 69	34
26	<u>Sobe Communication Site</u>	<u>Naval Communications Site, Sobe Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7320 NAVFAC Drawing No. 1049966 13 Oct 69	109
		<u>Sobe Direction Finder Site, East</u> Grid Coord CE 7319 18-04-331 Mar 69	80

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
27	<u>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield</u>	<u>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield</u> Grid Coord CE 7419 * Master Plan, Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	17
		<u>Site Nakano</u> Grid Coord CE 7519 15-09-97 30 June 69	76
28	<u>Tengan Pier</u>	Grid Coord CE 8520 * NAVPAC Drawing No. 1049963 13 Oct 69 US Navy Map H.O. 6131 1st Ed, Dec 57 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	103
29	<u>Camp Courtney</u>	Grid Coord CE 8618 * Index of Structures USMC Drawing 1227518 10 Feb 69 Two USMC unnumbered drawings	86
30	<u>Tengan Communication Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 8617 15-09-97 30 June 69	81
31	<u>Camp McTureous</u>	Grid Coord CE 8417 1227531 10 Feb 69 and unnumbered drawing	87
32	<u>Camp Shields</u>	Grid Coord CE 8116 NMCB 3 Dwg. No. 300569 6 Oct 69	102
33	<u>Camp Hauge</u>	Grid Coord CE 8216 Index of Structures NAVPAC Dwg. No. 1227535 10 Feb 69 and unnumbered drawing	88

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
34	<u>Deragawa Communica- tion Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 8615 15-09-131 30 June 69	31
35	<u>Hanza Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 7318 15-09-68 30 June 69	72
36	<u>Torii Communication Station</u>	<u>Torii Station, Sobe</u> Grid Coord CE 7417 • 15-09-64 30 June 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	26
		<u>Starcom Receiver</u> <u>Station, Sobe</u> Grid Coord CE 7416 15-09-83 (2 sheets) 30 June 69	80
37	<u>Kadena Air Base</u>	<u>Kadena Air Base</u> Grid Coord CE 7714 • Master Plan Tab C-2 (4 sheets) 31 Dec 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	1/71/75
		<u>Camp Nansone</u> Grid Coord CE 7515 15-09-76 30 June 69	71
		<u>Army Housing Area</u> Grid Coord CE 7512 Master Plan Tab C-1, Sheet 3 of 4	1
38	<u>Kadena Housing Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 7516 Master Plan Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	7
39	<u>Sunabe Warehouse</u>	<u>Warehouse Sunabe</u> Grid Coord CE 7512 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
		<u>Air Force Furniture Repair Shop</u> Grid Coord CE 7512 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
40	<u>Sunabe Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 7512 15-09-77 30 June 69	78
41	<u>Kashi,ji Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 7512 15-09-88 30 June 69	74
42	<u>Koza Communication Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 8112 Master Plan Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	15
43	<u>Camp Kue</u>	Grid Coord CE 7610 * 15-09-48 dtd 30 June 69	29
44	<u>Camp Sukiran</u>	<u>Camp Sukiran</u> Grid Coord CE 7708 * 18-02-5235 15-Dec 66 US Navy Map H.O. 1917 1st Ed, Apr 66 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC 15-09-52 Drawings (4 Sheets) dtd 30 June 69 15-07-05 (Sheet 1.9 of 2) dtd 15 Nov 68	30
		<u>Camp Foster</u> Grid Coord CE 7607 NAVFAC Index of Structures No. 1227529 10 Feb 69 and unnumbered drawing	85
45	<u>Sukiran Communication Site</u>	Grid Coord CE 7811 15-09-07 30 June 69	82

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
46	<u>Awase Communication Station</u>	<u>Awase Communications Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 8309 * Master Plan Tab No. C-1 (2 sheets) 6 Oct 69 and Tab C-2 15 Aug 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	4
		<u>Naval Air Facility Transmitter Unit, Awase</u> Grid Coord CE 8410 * NAVFAC Drawing No. 1153855 13 Oct 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	108
47	<u>Nishihara Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CE 8811 and 9110 15-09-114 30 June 69	59
48	<u>White Beach Area</u>	<u>Naval Port Facility, White Beach</u> Grid Coord CE 9108 * 1050516 13 Oct 69 US Navy Map H.O. 2338 5th Ed, Aug 67	105
		<u>Kachin Hanto Army Area</u> Grid Coord CE 9008 * 15-09-40 30 June 69 US Navy Map H.O. Anch CE 2nd Ed, Oct 51 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	46
		<u>White Beach Tank Farm</u> Grid Coord CE 9009 Unnumbered and undated DE drwg	124
		<u>Kadena Site No. 2</u> Grid Coord CE 9009 Basic Layout Plan Mace Site No. 2 Tab No. C-1 15 Nov 63	9

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
		<u>Nishihara Army Annex</u> <u>No. 2</u> Grid Coord CE 9009 15-09-126 30 June 69	36
49	<u>Awase Storage Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 8009 NAVFAC Drawing No. 1152763 10 Feb 69	95
50	<u>Kubasaki School Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 8107 15-09-46 30 June 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	28
51	<u>Futenma Air Station</u>	<u>Marine Corps Air Station,</u> <u>Futenma</u> Grid Coord CE 7505 * NAVFAC PWO Dwg No. 70-1 9 Oct 68 (2 sheets)	92
		<u>Futenma Army Annex</u> Grid Coord CE 7504 and 7405 15-09-115 30 June 69	60
		<u>Marine Corps Air</u> <u>Station Communications</u> <u>Annex, Futenma</u> NAVFAC Drawing No. 1152995 13 Oct 69	106
52	<u>Camp Mercy</u>	Grid Coord CE 7405 * 15-09-33 30 June 69 15-03-13, 20 Mar 63 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	47

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
53	<u>Camp Boone</u>	Grid Coord CE 7305 * 15-09-32 30 June 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	48
54	<u>Machinato Warehouse</u>	Grid Coord CE 7205 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
55	<u>Machinato Service Office</u>	Grid Coord CE 7205 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
56	<u>Machinato Service Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 7003 * 15-09-26 (2 sheets) 30 June 69 US Navy Map H.O. 6132 2nd Ed, Aug 67 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC	49
57	<u>Machinato Service Area Annex</u>	7th PSYOP Group Warehouse Grid Coord CE 7104 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC Navy Warehouse, Machinato Grid Coord CE 7104 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
58	<u>Machinato Purchasing and Contracting Office</u>	Grid Coord CE 7104 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
59	<u>Urasoe Warehouse</u>	Grid Coord CE 6902 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
60	<u>Deputy Division Engineers Office</u>	Grid Coord CE 7403 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
61	<u>Machinato Housing Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 6900 15-09-28 30 June 69	54
62	<u>Naha Cold Storage</u>	Grid Coord CD 6799 Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	25
63	<u>Harborview Club</u>	Grid Coord CD 6898 15-09-37 Undated	53
64	<u>Naha Port Facilities</u>	Grid Coord CD 6798 * 15-09-55 30 June 69 US Navy Map No. 1,912 8th Ed, Dec 63 US Army Multiplex Map Sheet 139, 1st Ed, 1948	68
65	<u>Naha Service Center</u>	Grid Coord CD 6799 US Army Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC	
66	<u>Naha Air Force / Navy Annex</u>	Grid Coord CD 6697 * Air Force Basic Layout Plan Naha Air Base Tab No. C-1 dtd 10 Mar 71	
67	<u>Naha Site</u>	Grid Coord CD 6497 and CD 6596 15-09-118 30 June 69	63

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
68	<u>Chinen Site No. 1</u>	Grid Coord CD 7893 15-09-128 30 June 69	38
69	<u>Chinen Site No. 2</u>	Grid Coord CD 8194 and 7993 15-09-116 30 June 69	61
70	<u>Shinzato Communica- tion Site</u>	Grid Coord CD 7693 Feb 66 Topographical Map	118
71	<u>Chinen Service Area</u>	Grid Coord CD 7891 Unnumbered bldg lay- out plan, dtd 13 Jan 69 and unnumbered Ammo storage plan dtd 20 Jan 69 US Army Map No. 6,005 Jan 70, Engr USARPAC unnumbered and undated drawing of Camp Chinen showing commo/power/ sewer/water ROW	118
72	<u>Yozadake Air Station</u>	Grid Coord CD 7089 and 7289 Master Plan Yozadake Air Station Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67	22
73	<u>Yozadake Site</u>	Grid Coord CD 7188 15-09-129 30 June 69	59
74	<u>Yozadake Army Annex</u>	Grid Coord CD 7287 and 7289 15-09-117 30 June 69	62
75	<u>South Ammunition Storage Area</u>	Grid Coord CD 7286 * and 7387 15-09-119 30 June 69	55

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NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	IDENTIFICATION	FOLDER NUMBER
76	<u>Army POL Depots</u>	<p>Camp Kue Tank Farm Nos. 1.2.) 67 Chimu-Wan Tank Farm)122 Nos. 1.2.3.)123 Tengan Booster Station)125-128 Camp Kue Booster Station)130 General POL Map * 18-02-5234 1 June 66</p> <p>Unnumbered and undated drawing Camp Kue Tank Farm Nos. 1.2.</p> <p>Unnumbered and undated drawing Chimu-Wan Tank Farm Nos. 1.2.3. 78-10-10 dtd 4 April 1964</p> <p>Unnumbered and undated drawing Camp Kue Booster Station Overlay of Ryukyu-Retto Multiplex Map Sheets 1 and 2 Scale 1:25,000</p>	
77	<u>Tori Shima Range</u>	<p>Located approx 65 miles * 16 NW of City of Naha in the East China Sea 126° 50' long 26° 36' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Master Plan Ryukyu Air Range Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67</p>	
78	<u>Irisuna Shima Range</u>	<p>Located approx 35 miles * 5 West of Okinawa in the East China Sea 127° 5' long 26° 24' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Master Plan Irisuna Shima Air Range Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67 US Air Force Map ONC H-13 3rd Ed, Apr 67</p>	

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
79	<u>Kume Shima Air Station</u>	Located approx 70 miles NW of the City of Naha in the East China Sea 126° 46' long 26° 22' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Master Plan Kume Shima Air Station Tab No. C-1, 4, 15 Aug 67 US Navy Map H.O. 2581 4th Ed, May 67 US Air Force Operational Navigation Chart ONC H-13 3rd Ed, Apr 67	18
80	<u>Kume Shima Range</u>	Located in the East * China Sea approx 50 miles West of Okinawa 126° 40' long 26° 31' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC & Vicinity Map Scale 1:50,000 US Navy Map H.O. 2581 4th Ed, May 67	114
81	<u>Ukibaru Shima Training Area</u>	Located approx 4 miles * East of Okinawa in the Pacific Ocean Grid Coord CE 9908 Multiplex Map Sheet 3625 I NE Series L891	
82	<u>Tsukun Jima Training Area</u>	Grid Coord CE 9404 * 1152745 5 July 66 and Kouza Map US Navy Map H.O. Anch CE 2nd Ed, Oct 51 88-06-03 Sep 53 (2 sheets) Multiplex Map Sheet 3625 I NE Series L891	99
83	<u>Mae Shima Training Area</u>	Located approx 25 miles * West of Okinawa in the East China Sea Grid Coord CD 4599 Multiplex Map 3525 I AMS Series L791	

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATION</u>	<u>FOLDER NUMBER</u>
84	<u>Kobi Sho Range</u>	Located in the East * China Sea approx 195 miles SW of Okinawa 123° 40' long 25° 50' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC US Air Force Map ONC H-12 4th Ed, Apr 66	
85	<u>Sekibi Sho Range</u>	Located in the East * China Sea approx 190 miles SW of Okinawa 124° 40' long 25° 50' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Map No. 5,187 May 69, G2 USARPAC US Air Force Map ONC H-12 4th Ed, Apr 66	112
86	<u>Miyako Jima</u> <u>VORTAC Site</u>	Located approx 168 miles SW of Okinawa in the East China Sea, Hirara-shi Miyako Jima, 16-06-664 30 Aug 66	20
87	<u>Miyako Jima</u> <u>Air Station</u>	<u>Miyako Jima Air Station</u> <u>Miyako Jima NDB Site</u> Tab No. C-1, 4 15 Aug 67 Located approx 168 miles SW of Okinawa in the East China Sea 125° 17' long 24° 12' lat US Navy Map H.O. 5308 2nd Ed, March 69	19
88	<u>Okino Daito Shima</u> <u>Range</u>	Located in the Pacific * Ocean approx 240 miles SSE of Okinawa 131° 20' long 24° 29' lat DOD Flight Information Publication Multiplex Map Sheet 4520 III Series I791 US Air Force Operation Navigation Chart ONC H-13 3rd Ed, Apr 67	117

Note 1: In view of the release, total or partial, of certain installations and sites by the United States armed forces prior to reversion, as well as in the light of other considerations, geographical identification may be adjusted by both sides in Joint Committee process.

Note 2: With respect to the U.S. POL pipelines connecting the POL depots, the U.S. submarine cable under the territorial waters of Japan connected to Camp Sukiran, and the U.S. telecommunications cables connected to the facilities and areas, the Government of Japan will take measures necessary for the use by the United States armed forces under SOFA.

Note 3: The installations and sites with asterisk in the above list will have as necessary restricted water and/or air areas, to be provided in the territorial waters of Japan or to be agreed upon on the high seas, the details of which will be further discussed, on the basis of the information furnished and boundaries indicated by the U.S. side, in conjunction with the problems of detailed conditions of use (including types of weapons or exercises, hours of use and prior notification,

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etc.) giving due regard to the Japanese interests of fishing, maritime safety, harbor control and development, navigation and aviation, with a view to reaching agreement in the Joint Committee on the day of reversion.

The following sea or air maneuver areas will also be dealt with in the same manner as stated above:

Area	India	India
Area	Mike	Mike
Area	Golf	Golf
North	Range	
South	Range	

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1971

Dear General Lee,

With respect to the preambular paragraph of List A, I wish to inform you that the Government of Japan will make every effort to complete the preparatory work, including documentation for agreement through the Joint Committee, at least one month before the date of entry into force of the Agreement.


I hope that the Government of the United States of America will also make every effort toward that end.

Sincerely yours,

B. Yoshino
Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General
American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Major-General
Richard M. Lee
USA

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Authority NND 947022
By IC, NARA Date 7/25/92

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN
APO San Francisco 96525



17 June 1971

Mr. Bunroku Yoshino
Director, American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Mr. Yoshino:

I appreciate your letter dated 17 June 1971 informing me that the Government of Japan will make every effort to complete the preparatory works, including documentation for agreement through the Joint Committee, at least one month before the date of entry into force of the agreement.

I can assure you that the Government of the United States of America will also make every effort toward that end.

Sincerely,

Richard M. Lee
RICHARD M. LEE
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Memorandum of Understandings

The attached documents on (I) Labor, (II) Air Traffic Control, (III) Telecommunications and (IV) Frequencies contain the understandings reached between the representatives of the two Governments which will be adopted as appropriate through the Joint Committee provided for in Article XXV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

Tokyo, June 15, 1971

(I) LABOR

1. Application of MLC, MC and IHA

Upon reversion, with the application of the SOFA to Okinawa without modification, the Japanese employees of the United States armed forces (including non-appropriated fund organizations) on Okinawa will come to be employed under the Master Labor Contract, the Mariner Contract or the Indirect Hire Agreement in mainland Japan.

2. Administrative Costs

With respect to administrative costs incurred by the Government of Japan in providing personnel and assuming administrative responsibilities under the Master Labor Contract and the Mariner Contract which are paid by the Government of the United States of America under these Contracts and with the efficiency of such administration increasing with the cooperation of the Government of the United States of America, the costs to be paid to the Government of Japan by the Government of the United States of America will be calculated on the basis of a ratio of one labor administration employee to one hundred Japanese employees of the United States armed forces to which will be added the mutually agreed non-personnel expenses for labor administration.

3.

3. Health Insurance Society

With respect to the application of the Health Insurance Law of Japan to the Japanese employees of the United States armed forces on Okinawa (including non-appropriated fund organizations) after reversion, a health insurance society may be established to administer health insurance for such employees apart from the Health Insurance Society for the Japanese employees of the United States armed forces in mainland Japan, provided that it fulfils the requirements set forth under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

4. Preparations for Reversion

The two Governments will consult each other as necessary in order to proceed smoothly with the measures to be taken in preparation for the application of the Master Labor Contract, the Mariner Contract and the Indirect Hire Agreement to Okinawa upon reversion, including the training of those who will be employed by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in Okinawa upon reversion.

(II) Air Traffic Control

1. Basic Concept

Upon reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the Government of Japan will have the authority for administration and operation of Air Traffic Control System in Okinawa. Until such time, however, when performance of Air Traffic Service and operation and maintenance of air navigation facilities by the Government of Japan become possible, these functions will be carried out by the United States Government under the current Air Traffic Control procedures.

2. Enroute Traffic Control

a. The Government of Japan will perform Enroute Traffic Control Service after necessary measures are taken, including establishment of its own Enroute Traffic Control facilities with radar equipment for Air Route Surveillance, deployment and training of the required personnel and completion of necessary procedures.

b. Enroute Traffic Control Service by the Government of Japan will commence not later than two years after the day of reversion. Should the commencement be delayed beyond the above period, interim measures will be worked out through consultation between the two Governments.

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Air Traffic
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By K.C. NAPA Date 7/25/90

- 2 -

c. The Okinawa Flight Information Region (FIR) will be maintained as a separate FIR from Tokyo FIR. However, the boundaries of Okinawa FIR will be subject to necessary adjustments.

3. Approach Control ✓

It is agreed that the United States Government perform Approach Control Service at airfields as may be used as Facilities and Areas by the United States forces in Okinawa after reversion. As to the extent that such Approach Control Service is to be performed, consultations will be held between the two Governments taking into consideration the air traffic safety in the area.

4. Naha Airport

The Government of Japan will perform Air Traffic Control Service at Naha Airport. Detailed arrangements will be worked out through consultations between the two Governments.

5. International Aeronautical Communications System

a. Upon reversion, the Government of Japan will perform International Aeronautical Communications Service in Okinawa.

b. With respect to facilities necessary for the above service, the Government of Japan will acquire their ownership upon reversion and will thereafter maintain such facilities.

6.

G. Operation and Maintenance of Air Navigation Facilities

a. Of the Air Navigation facilities established mainly for Enroute Traffic Control in Okinawa, the Government of Japan will undertake the operation and maintenance of NDBs (Okino NDB and Miyako NDB) and VORTACs (Okino VORTAC and Miyako VORTAC) not later than six and twelve months after reversion respectively. The necessary details concerning equipment related to the above Air Navigation facilities will be subject to further consultations between the two Governments.

b. The following Air Navigation facilities related to airports on remote islands will be transferred to the Government of Japan upon reversion, and the Government of Japan will thereafter conduct the operation and maintenance of these facilities:

- (i) NDBs on Minamidaito Jima, Kume Jima, Ishigaki Jima and Yonaguni Jima; and,
- (ii) Air-ground communications facilities and inter-islands communications-navigation system on the above islands and Miyako Jima.

7. Responsibility for Flight Inspection

The Government of Japan will perform flight inspections

for

for Air Navigation facilities which the Government of Japan operates and maintains.

8. Others

a. The United States Government will cooperate with the Government of Japan in conducting the necessary on-the-job training of personnel to be assigned for Air Traffic Service and in taking other measures including on-the-spot surveys needed for establishment of Air Navigation facilities and coordination with the local U.S. authorities.

b. Detailed arrangements concerning the preceding paragraphs will be worked out at the STG/ATC Subcommittee or between other designated Government authorities of Japan and the United States.

(III) Telecommunications

(1) Telecommunications Services

Telecommunication services for the U.S. forces in Okinawa after reversion will be rendered by the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTTPC) in accordance with the Report from the Technical Working Group of the Telecommunications-Electronics Subcommittee, SOFA Task Group, dated 17 May 1971, and the Basic Understanding attached thereto.

(2) Inter-base Telecommunications Cables

In accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement and the Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement concluded thereunder:

- (a) the Government of Japan will take necessary measures within the scope of applicable laws and regulations to provide rights of way for the existing U.S.-owned telecommunications cables between the facilities and areas to be provided for use by the U.S. forces in Okinawa after reversion; and,
- (b) the U.S. Government will have the responsibility for operation and maintenance of the cables and the right of access thereto for the purpose of maintenance, modification, inspection, replacement and removal of the cables.

For the implementation of the above, the detailed arrangements will be made between the two Governments concerning the necessary liaison and coordination for the operation and maintenance of the cables by the U.S. forces and for the maintenance and improvement of roads and other measures to be taken by the Japanese authorities.

(3) Electronic Interference

In accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement and the Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement concluded thereunder, the Government of Japan will, within the scope of applicable laws and regulations, take all reasonable measures to avoid or eliminate interference with telecommunications electronics required by the U.S. forces in Okinawa after reversion.

(a) The U.S. forces telecommunications electronics mentioned above will be those operated in the following 5 communications facilities, and such other communications facilities as may be mutually agreed upon, to be provided for use by the U.S. forces in Okinawa after reversion.

Bolo Point Trainfire Range
Sobe Communication Site
Torii Communication Station
Shinzato Communication Site
Onna Communication Site

(b) Technical criteria and conditions necessary for avoiding or eliminating interference with telecommunications electronics will be decided on a case-by-case basis through mutual consultation.

(c) An appropriate procedure for liaison and consultation will be established with a view to dealing with such interference with telecommunications electronics.

(4) Radio Propagation Blockage

In accordance with the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement and the Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement concluded thereunder, the Government of Japan will, within the scope of applicable laws and regulations, take all reasonable measures to avoid or eliminate radio propagation blockage of radio transmission paths of U.S. military communication systems in Okinawa after reversion. For this purpose:

- (a) The Government of the United States of America will provide the Government of Japan with the appropriate information concerning radio transmission paths of U.S. military communication systems in Okinawa.
- (b) The Government of Japan will notify the U.S. of planned construction of buildings and other structures higher than 31 meters on the ground projection of those paths. The U.S. will evaluate the planned construction and notify the Government of Japan whether blockage will occur.
- (c) In case it is found that the planned construction will cause radio propagation blockage to radio transmission paths, the two Governments will consult for the purpose of finding possible and necessary measures of solution.

(IV) Frequencies

(1) Allocation of Frequencies

With respect to frequencies to be allocated for use by the U.S. forces in Okinawa after reversion, the Government of Japan and the United States Government will compile a list of the agreed upon assignments in accordance with the existing procedures and conditions specified in Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement concluded under the Status of Forces Agreement.

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By IC NAPA Date 7/25/96

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(2) Auxiliary Military Radio Stations

The provisions of Article III (Auxiliary Military Radio Stations Operating in the Amateur Band), Chapter II (Frequencies) of Telecommunications-Electronics Agreement concluded under the Status of Forces Agreement will be applicable to auxiliary military radio stations operated in the amateur band by personnel of the U.S. forces, including the civilian component thereof, in Okinawa after reversion, with the following understanding:

Of paragraph 7. of the above Article,

- a. "US Houses" is to be construed to mean "houses in which such stations are located at the time of reversion";
- and,
- b. "in the near future" is understood to mean "within 2 years after reversion".

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

With respect to the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, the representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan have reached the following understandings on the questions of air services to and through Okinawa, in both directions, by the United States airlines and of the amendment to the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and Japan of August 11, 1952, as amended:

1. The Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, will be amended in accordance with an exchange of diplomatic notes which enter into force upon the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

2. The United States airlines shall not have the right to carry cabotage traffic between Japan proper and Naha after the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

3. During the five-year period to commence on the date administrative rights over Okinawa are returned to Japan, the value of traffic rights at Naha of the United States airline services described below shall not be taken into account when reviewing the overall balance of benefits under the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended.

(A) Northwest Airlines

From the United States via the North Pacific and the Central Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.

(B) Flying Tiger Line

From the United States via the North Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.

(C)

(C) Trans World Airlines

From the United States via the Central Pacific to Naha and beyond to Taipei and Hong Kong and beyond.

(D) Continental Airlines/Air Micronesia

From United States points in the Central Pacific, including Guam, via points in Micronesia to Naha.


(Other than non-stop services between the points in Hawaii and Naha.)

4. Following the five-year period described in paragraph 3, the overall balance of benefits under the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, will include the value of the United States traffic rights at Naha. Both Governments will consult prior to the end of this five-year period to determine any necessary modification of the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, through the granting of such additional traffic rights to the Government of Japan as are warranted by the overall balance of benefits at the end of the five-year period including the value of the United States traffic rights at Naha.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971.



Richard L. Sneider
Minister,
Embassy of the United
States of America.



Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General,
American Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Proposed Exchange of Notes

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding dated June 17, 1971, signed by Mr. Richard L. Sneider, Minister, Embassy of the United States of America and Mr. Bunroku Yoshino, Director-General, American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the representatives of the Government of the United States of America and of the Government of Japan have agreed to exchange the attached diplomatic notes which enter into force upon the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

June 17, 1971

(Draft)

(Japanese Note)

Translation

Tokyo, _____, _____

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions concerning air transport services with respect to the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. The representatives of the two Governments agreed to recommend to their respective Governments the deletion of the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement between Japan and the United States of America which was signed at Tokyo on August 11, 1952, as amended, and the insertion of a new Schedule to that Agreement, which is enclosed with this note.

I have further the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of Japan accepts the new Schedule and to propose that this note and your reply thereto, indicating the acceptance of the new Schedule by the Government of the United States of America, will constitute an agreement between the two Governments further amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, which will enter into force on the date administrative rights over Okinawa are returned to Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

SCHEDULE

(A) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of Japan shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

- (1) From Japan to Honolulu, San Francisco, and:
 - (a) New York and beyond New York to Europe (including the United Kingdom) and beyond.*
 - (b) beyond to Mexico and Central America.**
- (2) From Japan to Honolulu and Los Angeles and beyond to South America.**
- (3) From Japan via Anchorage to New York.
- (4) From Japan via Saipan to Guam.

(B) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Japan at the points specified in this paragraph:

- (1) From the United States via the North Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.
- (2) From the United States via the Central Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.

(C) Except as otherwise indicated, points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airline be omitted on any or all flights.

* Any flight operating eastbound from Japan which makes a scheduled landing at New York, and any flight operating westbound to Japan which makes a scheduled departure from New York, must make a scheduled stop at San Francisco.

** Passengers, cargo, and mail destined for or originating at points beyond the United States may not make a stopover or be picked up or discharged at United States points on these routes.

ANNEX TO SCHEDULE

Both Governments will consult prior to the end of the five-year period to commence on the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan to determine any necessary modification of the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, through the granting of such additional traffic rights to the Government of Japan as are warranted by the overall balance of benefits at the end of the five-year period including the value of the United States traffic rights at Naha.

(Draft)

(United States Note)

Tokyo, _____, _____

1. Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of _____ in which Your Excellency has informed me as follows:

" (Japanese Note) "

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States of America accepts the proposal contained in Your Excellency's Note which, with this reply, constitutes an agreement between the two Governments further amending the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, which will enter into force on the date administrative rights over Okinawa are returned to Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

CONFIDENTIAL


AGREED MINUTE TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
OF THE QUESTION OF AIR SERVICES FOR OKINAWA

With reference to paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding of June 17, 1971 on the question of air services at Okinawa, it is agreed that the Government of the United States of America may replace Continental Airlines/ Air Micronesia with a substitute airline to be named by the United States Aeronautical Authorities before the date of reversion as a result of the Pacific Islands local service investigation.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971



Richard L. Snelder
Minister
Embassy of the United
States of America



Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General
American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING PAPER

Tokyo, June 17, 1971

With reference to the letter of June 17, 1971 from Foreign Minister Aichi to Ambassador Meyer concerning the treatment after reversion of foreign nationals and firms in Okinawa, the Government of Japan wishes to confirm the following:

1. With reference to paragraph I:

(1) With reference to 2 (b) of the said paragraph, the following firms must make the adjustments requested by the Government of Japan in accordance with the understandings reached through discussions between the Japanese authorities and these firms:

- a) Esso Standard (Okinawa) Ltd.
- b) Esso Standard Sekiyu (Okinawa) Ltd.
- c) Shell North West Pacific Ltd.
- d) Caltex (Asia) Ltd.
- e) Alminum Company of America
- f) Gulf Asian Terminals, Inc.
- g) Gulf Sekiyu Seisei Co., Ltd.
- h) Fairchild Corporation

(2)

(2) Security and insurance firms including their agents in Okinawa may be required, where necessary, to make certain adjustments so that they may maintain their businesses after reversion in accordance with the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. With reference to paragraph V (1):

In order for foreign lawyers to be granted the treatment referred to in the said paragraph they must maintain both a residence and an office in Okinawa and have been actually engaged in their profession in Okinawa continuously since January 1, 1971. The above, however, would not disqualify a lawyer with a regional practice who makes periodic business trips to mainland Japan and other countries in Asia.

3. With reference to paragraph V (2)(a):

The term "a considerable length of period" means at least five years from the date of reversion. The conditions under which foreign doctors and dentists licenced under the laws of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands may qualify for continued practice after reversion will be not less favorable than those conditions which the Government of Japan will impose on Okinawan doctors and dentists licenced under the laws of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

4. With reference to paragraph VII:

(1) The policies mentioned in the said paragraph will not be applied with respect to the state-traded items under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

(2) Quotas may not be allocated to foreign firms in Okinawa for import of wheat flour and refined sugar for which no import quota has been, in principle, allocated in mainland Japan in recent years, unless import of such items are recognized necessary to the manufacture of food products in Okinawa.

Tokyo, Japan

June 15, 1971

Mr. Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General
American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo

Dear Mr. Yoshino:


With reference to the agreement of the United States to remove the remaining military aircraft from Naha Airport by the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the consequent listing of Naha Airport on "List C" containing the installations and sites which the Government of the United States intends to release upon or before reversion, the understanding of the Government of the United States is as follows:

The U.S. requires time to permit completion of arrangements so that the military aircraft now at Naha Airport can be transferred elsewhere. Despite the fact that both Governments will make the utmost efforts to complete such arrangements before reversion date, there is a possibility that arrangements cannot be completed by then. If said arrangements in fact are not complete by reversion date, it may be necessary for military aircraft now using Naha Airport to continue using that installation; and, if necessary, the two Governments will take action pursuant to the SOFA to allow such continued use.

I would appreciate your letter in reply confirming that these understandings are also the understandings of the Government of Japan.

Yours truly,

Richard L. Sneider
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.



GAIMUSHO

SECRET


Tokyo, June 15, 1971

Mr. Richard L. Sneider
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.
Embassy of the United States of America

Dear Mr. Sneider:

I would like to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 15, 1971, and would like to confirm that the understandings of the Government of the United States contained therein are also the understandings of the Government of Japan.

Sincerely yours,


Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General,
American Affairs Bureau.

Min. Snider

Tokyo, Japan

June 17, 1971

Mr. Dunrobu Yoshino
Director-General
American Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Mr. Yoshino:

In connection with our discussions on the question of imports into Okinawa, it is noted that you have referred to the Cabinet decision of November 20, 1970 to alleviate any impact which the application of Japanese laws and regulations may have on the livelihood of residents in Okinawa as well as on the business activities of firms in Okinawa. It is our understanding that, in allocating quotas to individual American firms in Okinawa, the Government of Japan will respect past import levels, unless the firms in question attempt to circumvent this policy by such measures as stockpiling goods prior to reversion or transshipping such goods to other parts of Japan after reversion in a manner which would disturb existing markets in these areas.

Sincerely,

D
Richard L. Snider
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

E/COUNS:WLDutton:bc:6/14/71

cc: Min. Snider
Mr. Schmitz

A true copy of
the signed original.
W

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TOKYO, JAPAN

CONFIDENTIAL

June 17, 1971.

Dear Mr. Sneider:

I have received your letter dated June 17, 1971, concerning the question of imports into Okinawa and I would like to state that your understanding on the matter in the said letter corresponds to my own.

Sincerely yours,

B. Yoshino

Bunroku Yoshino
Director-General,
American Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Richard L. Sneider,
Minister,
Embassy of the United States
of America,
Tokyo.

Confidential

April 5, 1971

(Judicial Jurisdiction: Criminal Proceedings)

The gist of major legislative measures the Ministry of Justice is contemplating to seek in the field of criminal jurisdiction is as follows:

1. Matters concerning criminal laws:

The criminal laws existing in Okinawa at the time of reversion (hereinafter referred to as the criminal Laws of Okinawa) will be made applicable to those who have prior to reversion committed crimes which are punishable under the criminal laws of Okinawa. Exception, however, will be made of certain specific provisions in the criminal laws of Okinawa by Government Order.

(The specific provisions in the criminal laws of Okinawa with respect to which exceptions are to be made by the above Order, will be limited to those which are contrary to or incompatible with the Constitution as well as the basic concept of the criminal laws of Japan.)

2. Necessary measures will be taken on the criminal laws of Okinawa, such as making the provisions for certain types of crimes applicable to those who commit them after reversion or clearly defining which laws are applicable to the crimes the commitment of which spans over reversion.

(The "certain types of crimes" referred to in the preceding paragraph means those acts, committed after reversion and thus no longer punishable under the criminal laws of Okinawa, and yet unpunishable under the laws of Japan, and which, nonetheless, ought not to be neglected.)

3. The measures will be taken enabling the punishment of such pre-reversion acts punishable under the criminal law of Japan as would become unpunishable due to reversion.

II. Matters concerning laws of criminal procedure:

1. The laws of criminal procedure of Japan will be made applicable to matters related to the laws of criminal procedure of Okinawa existing prior to reversion. In such instances, effects produced by certain provisions of the laws of criminal procedure of Okinawa which have corresponding provisions in the laws of criminal procedure of Japan will be deemed by Government Order as having been produced by such corresponding provisions.

(Criminal cases pending at the time of reversion in GRI as well as in USCAR courts will be deemed by the above Order as having been accepted by corresponding courts of Japan, except that those, if any, pending at the USCAR Appellate Court will be deemed as having been accepted by the court of first instance of Japan.)

2. With respect to the execution of sentences and other

treatment of those persons sentenced under the criminal laws of Okinawa prior to reversion, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Prison Law and other Japanese laws concerning correction and rehabilitation will be made applicable mutatis mutandis.

III. Other matters:

The Amnesty Law of Japan will be made applicable mutatis mutandis to amnesty in respect of the persons who have committed crimes under the criminal laws of Okinawa.


Confidential

Reviewed

May 4, 1971

Talking paper

In connection with Article II of the Japanese draft dated December 12, 1970, the Japanese Government wishes to confirm that multilateral treaties to which Japan is a party will apply to Okinawa upon reversion. There may be instances in need of transitional adjustments of technical nature such as in the application of the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949.




May 22, 1971

Talking Paper

(Criminal Jurisdiction)

It is the intention of the Japanese Government to seek a legislative measure under Article ____ of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, whereby judgements of acquittal in criminal cases rendered by the USCAR courts prior to reversion shall be deemed as final judgements rendered by the courts of Japan. (It is understood that judgement of acquittal becomes final upon pronouncement thereof by the USCAR courts.)

With respect to such final judgements, Article 39 of the Constitution guarantees against double jeopardy.



利

Talking Paper
(Judiciary)

In connection with draft Article V of the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, the Japanese authorities wish to give the following views:

1.

A. The applicable rules of procedure will be those provided for in the laws of procedure of Japan.


B. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to seek legislative measures to the effect that in case different periods should exist in criminal cases between the statutes of limitations prevailing in Okinawa prior to reversion and those in Japan proper, the applicable periods of limitations will be those which are more favorable to the suspects concerned.

The periods of limitation of actions in civil cases will be determined according to substantive law, and it is expected that they will not be affected by reversion, subject, of course, to judgment of the Japanese court seized of the case.

C. ^{A.} Injunction rendered by a court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to reversion will be continued in force where there are corresponding provisions in the Japanese law.

2.

The jurisdiction of the Japanese courts will extend to all civil ^{uses} ~~controversies~~ falling under their competence pursuant to the Japanese law, even if the causes for such ^{uses} ~~controversies~~ occur before reversion.



CONFIDENTIAL

June 8, 1971

USG Talking Paper for Response, if Necessary, to Senate
Inquiries Regarding Transfer of Court Jurisdiction Upon
Reversion of Okinawa to Japan (Suggested revision)

In order to insure that "final judgments rendered
in criminal cases before the entry into force of the
Agreement by any court in the Ryukyu Islands" will have
the same effect as if they had been rendered by Japanese
courts, the Japanese Government is seeking appropriate
legislation.

With respect to such final judgments, having the
same effect as if they had been rendered by Japanese
courts, Article 39 of the Constitution of Japan guarantees
against double jeopardy.

The jurisdiction of the Japanese courts will extend
in principle to civil cases in which the causes for contro-
vercies have occurred but proceedings have not been instituted
prior to reversion. Understandably, there may be a few
exceptions such as in cases where USCAR civil jurisdiction
may be slightly different from that of the Japanese courts.

- 2 -

References to "any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" do not include the USCAR land tribunal.

CONFIDENTIAL

May 26, 1971

Talking Paper

Confirmation by the U.S. Government on the following points is requested:

1. The debts owed by the Post Office Department of the United States of America to the Postal Services Agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands under the Convention for the Unilateral Exchange of Postal Money Orders between the United States of America and the Ryukyu Islands and outstanding as of the day of reversion will be paid to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of Japan. Procedural details of the payment will be worked out between the competent authorities of the two Governments.
2. Pre-paid rentals received under High Commissioner's Ordinance Number 20 by landowners have no bearing at all on negotiations to be conducted between the Defence Facilities Administration Agency and the landowners concerned on the rents to be paid for the facilities and areas to be provided in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under the SOFA. The Government of the United States will not request the Japanese Government to reimburse such portions of the pre-paid rents as may cover periods after reversion.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

June 9, 1971

TALKING PAPER

In response to a talking paper of the Government of Japan dated May 26, 1971, the United States Government confirms that any debts owed by the Post Office Department of the United States of America to the Postal Services Agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands under the Convention for the Unilateral Exchange of Postal Money Orders between the United States of America and the Ryukyu Islands and outstanding as of the day of reversion will be paid to the Government of Japan. Procedural details of the payment will be worked out between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

The United States Government expects that the Government of Japan will pay to the United States Government any debts owing to the Post Office Department by the Postal Services Agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and outstanding as of the day of reversion.

June 14, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

With respect to the second paragraph of the Talking Paper of the Government of the United States of America dated June 9, 1971, concerning the payment of any debts owing to the Post Office Department of the United States of America by the Postal Services Agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, the Government of Japan also expects that the United States Government will pay to the Government of Japan any debts owing to the Postal Services Agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands by the Post Office Department of the United States of America and outstanding as of the day of reversion.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

June 11, 1971

TALKING PAPER

In response to a talking paper of the Government of Japan dated May 26, 1971, the United States Government understands that prepaid rentals received under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 20 by landowners have no bearing at all on negotiations to be conducted between the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the landowners concerned on the rents to be paid for the facilities and areas to be provided in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under the SOFA. The Government of the United States will not request the Japanese Government to reimburse such portions of the prepaid rents as may cover periods after reversion.

The United States Government clarifies that the prepaid rentals subject of the paragraph above are not the annual advance rentals paid by the United States Government at the first of each fiscal year for the whole of that fiscal year.

CONFIDENTIAL

May 26, 1971

Talking Paper

Confirmation by the U.S. Government on the following points is requested:

1. With respect to U.S. economic assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands under the agreements concluded and to be concluded between the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, and U.S. direct economic assistance to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, the U.S. Government intends to expedite the implementation of those projects under the said assistance by the day of reversion.
2. Should there remain any undisbursed portions of such assistance as of the day of reversion, they will be disposed of in such a manner as will be consistent with the objectives of the said assistance. The details of procedures for such disposition are the subject of further discussion between the Japanese and U.S. Governments.
3. With respect to the Ryukyuan scholarship programme, the U.S. Government intends to continue its financial support to those students who were granted scholarship in and before U.S. Fiscal Year 1971 until the completion of their individual programmes.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

June 14, 1971

TALKING PAPER

The Embassy of the United States of America, Tokyo, confirms its view that the points contained in the Government of Japan Talking Paper of May 26, 1971, concerning U. S. economic assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, and the Ryukyuan scholarship program, are correct.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

June 9, 1971

TALKING PAPER

The disposition of United States archives in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands will be the subject of further consultation between the two Governments through an appropriate channel. Such consultation will identify that part of the archives which will be transferred to the Government of Japan upon reversion and that which will be made available to the Government of Japan in some other appropriate manner.

With reference to draft Article V of the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, the necessary judicial records and evidentiary materials related to the undertakings of the Japanese Government in said Article will be transferred to the Government of Japan in accordance with arrangements to be worked out between the two Governments.

June 4, 1971

Statement by Foreign Minister Aichi
concerning memorials

The Government of Japan appreciates the emotional significance of the Buckner Memorial to the United States. Although the memorial will no longer be maintained by United States Forces after reversion, the Government of Japan intends to make suitable arrangements for its preservation and maintenance after reversion.

I understand that the American Legion Okinawa Post is caring for the Ernie Pyle Memorial. You can be assured that the Government of Japan will facilitate the American Legion post's continuation of its arrangements.

The Government of Japan shares with the United States the appreciation of the deep historical significance of the Naha International Cemetery in terms of United States - Japan relations. As you know, Naha International Cemetery has been in existence for over 100 years and the Government of Japan wishes to see it preserved in its traditional sense.

Oral Statement

June 5 , 1971

With regard to Okinawa-Taiwan Submarine Cable, the MOPT holds the view that this kind of telecommunications service should more properly be provided by international telecommunications companies.

In the light, however, of the fact that the submarine cable in question will already be in existence and operation at the time of Reversion without any other international submarine cable immediately available, the Japanese side is prepared to take, upon reversion, necessary measures under SOFA to enable the post-reversion use of the cable in question by the U.S. forces while retaining the title thereto.

In so doing, the Japanese side wishes the U.S. side to clearly understand that it is without prejudice to the views stated above and that, therefore, the solution reached at this time will not foreclose further consideration of the question of the status of the submarine cable between the two Governments, including the possibility of the purchase of the cable in future.

June 14, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

The Government of Japan confirms that the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article IV of the reversion Agreement apply to acts of the USCAR corporations whose properties are transferred to Japan under Article VI of the said Agreement and of their officials when such acts are done under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, or authorized by existing law during the period of U.S. administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

June 14, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

With reference to a certain question raised by the United States Government in respect of draft Article VI of the reversion Agreement, it is the understanding of the Japanese Government that the provisions of draft Article VI, paragraph 1 contemplate the repayment to the Commodity Credit Corporation of the loans extended to the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation representing the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

June 14, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

With respect to the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Exchange of Notes concerning the continued operation of the Voice of America in Okinawa Island, the understanding of the Government of Japan is as follows:

1. As regards sub-paragraph (3), the languages presently used are: Chinese, Korean, English and Russian.

2. As regards sub-paragraph (4):

(i) The existing characteristics referred to therein are as shown in the attached list;

(ii) In approving the basic characteristics upon reversion, the Japanese authorities may request some adjustments to the frequencies to be used by the relay station. In particular, necessary adjustments will have to be made with respect to two of the frequencies presently used, namely, 157.0 MC and 158.5 MC.

Attached List of Existing Characteristics
of the VOA Relay Station in Okinawa

Medium Wave Broadcasting

Frequency (kc/s)	Power (kw)	Hours of Operation (G.M.T.)	Zone(s) or Area(s) of Reception (CIRAF)	Characteristics of Transmitting Antenna		Remarks
				Azimuth of Maxi- mum Radiation	Antenna Gain in db	
		11:00 - 13:30	43, 44	315°	9	
		13:30 - 14:00	44	17°	8.6	
		14:00 - 17:00	43, 44	315°	9	

Note: Frequency and power for the medium wave broadcasting are as set forth in paragraph 2 (1) a and b of the Exchange of Notes.

DECLASSIFIED

 Authority NN 947020
 By K.C. NAPA Date 7/25/02

Short Wave Broadcasting

Frequencies (kc/s)	Power (kW)	Hours of Operation (G.M.T.)	Zone(s) or Area(s) of Reception (CIRAF)	Characteristics of Transmitting Antenna		Remarks
				Azimuth of Maximum Radiation	Antenna Gain in db	
6,010	15	11:00 - 16:00	43, 44,	308°	9	
7,165	35	11:00 - 17:00	34, 35	10°, 190°	17	
7,255	100	10:00 - 17:00	42, 43, 44	328°	14	
9,560	35	21:30 - 22:00	43, 44	10°, 190°	19	
"	"	22:00 - 01:00	43, 44	308°	13	
11,830	35	21:30 - 22:00	44	352°	19	
"	"	22:30 - 23:00	44	"	"	
11,930	100	22:00 - 01:00	43, 44	328°	19	
15,210	35	11:00 - 16:00	50, 54	217°	20	
15,365	35	08:00 - 10:00	22, 23, 32, 33	10°, 190°	22	

Communication

Frequencies	Necessary Band width (kc/s)	Class of Emission	Power (KW)	Class of Station	Location		Remarks
					Transmit	Receive	
14,526 ^{kc}	2	F1	35	FX	A	Outside Japan	radio teletype transmission
21,490	2	F1	15	FX	"	"	"
151.7 ^{Mc}	180	F9	0.25	FX	"	B	Communication
153.3	180	F9	0.25	FX	C	"	"
157.0	180	F3	0.25	FX	B	A	Program relay
158.5	40	F3	0.25/0.06	FX, FB/ML	A, C,	B	Communication
161.0	180	F3	0.25	FX	B	A	Program relay
163.0	180	F3	0.25	FX	"	"	"
167.5	180	F3	0.25	FX	"	"	"
170.4	180	F3	0.25	FX	"	"	"
173.0	180	F3	0.25	FX	"	"	"
175.0	180	F3	0.25	FX	"	"	"
178.0	180	F9	0.25	FX	"	C	Communication
187.0	180	F9	0.25	FX	A	B	"

Note: A, B and C in "Location" column respectively represent the three facilities set forth in paragraph 1 of the Exchange of Notes.

June 14, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

Confirmation by the U.S. side on the following is requested:

Facilities of the Integrated Island Water System presently owned by the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands will be transferred without any cost to the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation by the day of reversion.

ENCE 22

CONFIDENTIAL

June 14, 1971

TALKING PAPER

In response to a talking paper of the Government of Japan dated June 14, 1971, the Embassy of the United States of America, Tokyo, confirms its view that facilities of the Integrated Island Water System presently owned by the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands will be transferred without any cost to the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation by the day of reversion.

CONFIDENTIAL

Talking Paper

June 15, 1971

Operations of the U.S. Army Open Mess System on Okinawa, which includes the Harborview Club in Naha, will be conducted under provisions of Article XV of the SOFA commencing at the time of reversion. It will provide essential mess facility support to all members of the system consisting of U.S. military personnel, civilian components and their dependents.

Confidential

June 15, 1971

Talking Paper

The Naha Service Center listed on List A will be agreed to by the Government of Japan in the Joint Committee upon reversion as facilities and areas provided that such Center will be or will have been established at reversion at 3 Chome, Tondo-cho, Naha as a non-appropriated fund organization authorized and regulated by United States military authorities as provided for under Article XV of the SOFA.

June 15, 1971

Confidential

Talking Paper

The United States Government is requested to confirm the following understanding of the Government of Japan:

The appropriate authorities of the two Governments will continue to discuss for the purpose of finding a mutually acceptable solution with regard to the Fund of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian before the day of reversion.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 15, 1971

TALKING PAPER

As requested by the Government of Japan in its talking paper of June 15, 1971, the United States Government hereby confirms that the appropriate authorities of the two Governments will continue to discuss for the purpose of finding a mutually acceptable solution with regard to the Fund of the Ryukyuan Property Custodian before the day of reversion.

CONFIDENTIAL
*****DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

57

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RATCYUW RUEKJCS8614 3150513-CCCC--RUEADWD.
ZNY CCCCC
R 110513Z NOV 71
FM JCS
INFO RUEADWD/CSA
RUENAAA/CND
R 110652Z NOV 71FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2593
BTC O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TOKYO 11261
INDEX: PDEV/ETRD/JA.

SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION; EFFECT OF TEXTILE AGREEMENT

1. DEPTUTY DIRECTOR AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU FONOFF (TACHIBANA)
HAS REQUESTED INFO REGARDING WHETHER TEXTILE AGREEMENT NOW
BEING FINALIZED IN WASHINGTON WILL CONTAIN ANY PROVISION FOR
ADJUSTMENT OF QUANTITIES INVOLVED AT TIME OF OKINAWA REVERSION.
IF NOT, TACHIBANA REQUESTS INFO AS TO WHETHER ANY SUCH
ADJUSTMENT IS CONTEMPLATED.2. EMB UNDERSTANDS THAT RESPONSE TO TACHIBANA MIGHT BEST
BE MADE THROUGH JAPANESE EMB WASHINGTON. IF SO, PLEASE INFORM
US OF TENOR OF RESPONSE.

MEYER

BT

#8614

NNNN

SCD080 ANNOTATIONS

DAMO 8//DACS 8, DAJA 4, DALO 10, DAMI 8, SAOSA 3

CONFIDENTIAL
*****Reversion Agreement Backoff 4
Box 24

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STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISIONVZCZCSCD346 QS#F523 REUP 035600 3512110
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P 172109Z DEC 71
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RUENAAA/CHD
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P 172104Z DEC 71
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TO CINCPAC
BTSPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS
CLASSIFIED BY
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 79SECRET NOFORN 5792
J5 SENDS

SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION DATE (U)

REFS: A. CINCPAC 110413Z JUN 71; B. AMEMB TOKYO 170712Z DEC 71

1. (S-NF) REF A REAFFIRMED CINCPAC POSITION THAT R-DAY SHOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED EARLIER THAN 1 JULY 72 AND CITED REASONS, TO INCLUDE: TIME REQUIRED FOR NECESSARY CONSTRUCTION RELATED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMOVAL; PROBABLE FORFEITURE OF PREPAID LAND RENTAL MONEYS SHOULD REVERSION OCCUR PRIOR TO 30 JUNE 72; AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH JOINT COMMITTEE DOCUMENTATION OF FACILITIES AND AREAS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US UNDER SOFA WHICH COULD PREJUDICE US HOLDINGS IN THE POST-REVERSION PERIOD. REF B STATED THAT PRIME MINISTER SATO IS EXPECTED TO SEEK US AGREEMENT FOR OKINAWA REVERSION AS EARLY AS 1 APRIL 1972 AND RECOMMENDED THAT REVERSION DATE BE AS CLOSE TO 1 JULY 1972 AS POSSIBLE BUT NOT EARLIER THAN 15 MAY IN ORDER THAT ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE RESOLVED OR AMELIORATED WITH MINIMUM COST AND MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE TO THE US.

2. (S-NF) IN VIEW OF PROGRESS MADE IN PREPARATION FOR REVERSION SINCE SUBMISSION OF REF A CINCPAC COMMENTS FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF 1 APRIL OR 15 MAY 1972 DATES AS OPPOSED TO JULY 1972 PLANNING DATE UTILIZED BY US PLANNERS, WOULD BE USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING FIRM US POSITION COMPATIBLE WITH US DEFENSE INTERESTS. ACCORDINGLY REQUEST CINCPAC VIEWS IN LIGHT OF PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 21 DEC 1971.

GP-4
BT

REF B IS AMEMB TOKYO 170712Z DEC 71 DAMO

71356/10231 ANNOTATIONS

DAMO-8//DACS-8, DAJA-4, DALO-10, DAMI-8, SAOSA-3

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECRET~~

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TALKING PAPER

DAMO-IAR
Dr. Neuland/mes/50221
19 November 1971

SUBJECT: Status of Okinawa Reversion Treaty

1. (U) Background. On 10 Nov, Senate ratified Okinawa Reversion Treaty (ORT) by 84-6 roll-call vote. While agreement provides for retention of US military base, it involves some degradation of military capability--a factor outweighed by political gains and by fact that situation which would exist on Okinawa if reversion were not approved would be even less favorable to operation of US bases.

2. (U) Developments on Okinawa. Senate action was paralleled by long-planned, 24-hour, island-wide general strike. It was marked by sporadic violence, fire bombing and killing of Ryukyuan police sergeant. Target of strike was allegedly militaristic nature of ORT. Demonstrations continued throughout week, with objective of having Diet force renegotiation of ORT. Chief Executive Yara went to Tokyo on 17 Nov to make final appeal to this end.

3. (U) Developments in Japan. Public reaction to Senate approval of ORT welcomed it as improving US-Japanese relations and realizing long desire of Japanese people. However, headlines were quickly

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SA/RA

captured by demonstrations against continued US military presence on Okinawa after reversion. Demonstrations were scheduled to culminate in massive two-hour general strike on 19 Nov, when opposition forces were to make all-out effort to embarrass Prime Minister Sato into resigning. Police were expected to be able to contain demonstrations, but widespread opposition to military aspects of ORT was naturally expected to help opponents of ORT in Diet.

4. (C) Diet Consideration of ORT. Senate action has spurred Diet to accelerate its consideration of ORT. Committees principally concerned are "Ad Hoc Committee on ORT" and "Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories Problems." Opposition questioning has sharply focused on nuclear issues (safety and removal guarantees), base structure, special units, and Voice of America. Catching opposition by complete surprise, Japan Liberal-Democrat Party called for vote on ORT in "Ad Hoc Committee" on 17 Nov (one day earlier than anticipated); predictably, it passed. Opposition was outraged, charged "democracy violated," submitted censure motions in Lower House. Nevertheless, FONOFF anticipates that Lower House will approve ORT by 22 Nov and implementing legislation by end of session on 24 Dec. FONOFF likewise expects Upper House to approve complete package by end of session on 24 Dec.

NOTED:

C.T.B.
MG Baldwin

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COVER SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTROL NUMBER

OFFICE SYMBOL

DAMO-IAR

DATE

19 November 1971

Status of Okinawa Reversion Treaty

ACTION REQUIRED

Talking Paper for Weekly SECDEF/CSA Meeting

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify the action without recourse to other sources.)

ORIGIN OF ACTION:

1. a. Origin: By SACO Tasking Action dtd 18 Nov, OPS IA RA was given a "Weekly Talker Requirement" to provide a paper on "Okinawa Reversion."b. Summary: This action satisfies the above requirement.

WHAT APPROVAL WILL ACCOMPLISH:

2. It will transmit the requested Talking Paper to SACO.

NONCONCURRENCES:

3. None.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

4. Approve Talking Paper.

1 Incl
Talking Paper

(Continue on reverse side)

IMPLICATIONS	CINFO	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	PRIM PROG	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>	BUDGET	YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
COORDINATIONS						
OFFICE	NAME	PHONE	DIV	INITIALS	DATE	
OPS IA PM	<i>James T. O'Brien</i>	<i>53152</i>	IAR	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>19 Nov 71</i>	
			DIR			
			EX			
			DCSOPS			
SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE			FILE	DISPATCH		
			<input type="checkbox"/> ALT HQ	<input type="checkbox"/> AWC		
ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)						
Dr. Paul Neuland/mes/50221			<i>[Signature]</i>			

OPS FORM 20
1 JUL 62REPLACES OPS FORM 20, 19 OCT 56
WHICH MAY BE USED

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT

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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

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 ZNY CCCCC
 R 011656Z FEB 72
 FM JCS
 INFO RUEADWD/CSA
 RUENAAA/CND
 RUEHC/SECSTATE
 RUEKAAA/ANMCC
 R 011643Z FEB 72
 FM JCS
 TO CINCPAC
 BT

 CLASSIFIED BY
 SCHEDULE 1 GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 AUTOMATICALLY
 YEAR INTERIM
 DECLASSIFIED ON: 3/4/94

 57
 ACTION
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 INFO
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 IAP
CONFIDENTIAL

8427

 DJS SENDS
 SUBJ: DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION OF OKINAWA REVERSION
 DOCUMENTS (U)
 REFS: A. CINCPAC 200256Z JAN 72; B. DOD DIRECTIVE 5210.47, AS
 AMENDED BY CHANGES 1 THROUGH 7; SUBJ: SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
 OFFICIAL INFORMATION; C. DOD DIRECTIVE 5105.35, SUBJ: RESPONSIBILI-
 TIES OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS MATTERS.
 1. (C) REF A REQUESTS GUIDANCE BE PROVIDED WITH REGARD TO
 SELECTIVE DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION OF OKINAWA REVERSION
 RELATED DOCUMENTS IN VIEW OF RECENT MEDIA RELEASES AND OFFICIAL
 PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND HEARINGS ON OKINAWA REVERSION. REF B
 PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES, STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES
 FOR THE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION FOR UNIFORM
 APPLICATION THROUGHOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. REF C OUTLINES
 RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS IN PUBLIC
 AFFAIRS MATTERS.
 2. (U) IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND
 DECLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS
 OF THE USING AGENCY, CONCUR THAT SELECTIVE DOWNGRADING/DECLASSIFI-
 CATION MAY BE APPROPRIATE. IN THIS REGARD, REF B APPLIES. HOWEVER,
 SELECTIVE AS OPPOSED TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
 ACTION IS NORMALLY LIMITED TO SITUATIONS IN WHICH THERE IS A
 FIRM REQUIREMENT FOR UTILIZING SUCH INFORMATION IN UNCLASSIFIED
 DOCUMENTS OR ACTIVITIES OR FOR ISSUING NEWS RELEASES ABOUT
 HITHERTO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. FOR SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS, THE USING
 AGENCY IS NORMALLY IN THE BEST POSITION TO IDENTIFY SUCH
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

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REQUIREMENT.

3. (U) CAREFUL DISTINCTION SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS AND AUTHORITY FOR ISSUING NEWS RELEASES. REQUESTS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROPOSED NEWS RELEASES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE FORWARDED TO APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS FOR APPROVAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH BASIC GUIDANCE IN REF C AND ESTABLISHED PUBLIC AFFAIRS PRACTICES.

4. (C) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, AS WELL AS THE LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL ON THE SUBJECT OF OKINAWA REVERSION AND THE MANY ORIGINATING AUTHORITIES, SELECTIVE DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES IS CURRENTLY IMPRACTICAL. THEREFORE, AT THIS TIME DECLASSIFICATION OF OKINAWA REVERSION DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE HANDLED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

GP-4

BT

#8540

NNNN

NOTE: REF A IS CINCPAC 200256Z JAN 72 DAMO

DAMO-8//DACS-8, DAIO-3, DAJA-4, DALO-10, DAMI-8, SAOSA-2,
DACS-XSC-1

011643Z FEB 72
PAGE 2

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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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 RQTCZYUW RUEAAIA0791 1751105-CCCC--RUEADWD.
 DE RUEIKD 6172D 1750952
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 R 270926Z JUN 71
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9783
 INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
 RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC
 RUADJKA/COMUSJ
 RUEADWD/DA
 RUEKJCS/DOD
 RUADADA/HICOMRY
 BT

 ACTION
 RAD
 INFO
 GEO
 IA
 FM
 AOC

CLASSIFIED BY
 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO
 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFY ON: 31 Dec 71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 6172

USIAC JOINT USIS EMBASSY MESSAGE; DA FOR DUSA; DOD FOR ISA.
 REF: TOKYO 5644

SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: EMBASSY SUGGESTS REVISED ANSWER IN
 TWO PARTS TO QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE CONCERNING PUBLIC
 NATURE OF REVERSION AGREEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. EMBASSY - USIS HAS DEVISED FOLLOWING GUIDANCE ON
 QUESTION OF "SECRET AGREEMENTS" AND RECOMMEND THAT IT
 BE SUBMITTED FOR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION (QUESTION
 SEVEN) IN REFTTEL'S Q AND A'S:

QUESTION: WERE THERE ANY AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO
 REVERSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN OTHER THAN
 THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AND THE MEDIA?
 ANSWER: THE TREATY PACKAGE AS IT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE
 SENATE HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC. THIS INCLUDES THE TREATY AND
 RELATED AGREEMENTS.

3. IF QUERIED FURTHER ON THIS SUBJECT, WE WOULD RESPOND:
 ANSWER: AS IS USUAL IN SUCH INSTANCES THERE HAS BEEN SOME
 INTERIM, EXPLANATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE PAPER WORK IN THE
 NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE FINAL AGREEMENTS, AS THEY WILL BE
 SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

4. THE FIRST REPLY SUGGESTED ABOVE WAS PROPOSED BY
 DCM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE. WE PROPOSE THE ADDITIONAL REPLY,
 ON A QUOTE IF PRESSED UNQUOTE BASIS, TO ROUND OUT THE PICTURE.

5. ADVISE. GP4.

CARTER

BT

NOTE: REF 5644 IS AMEMB TOKYO [121140Z JUN 71] DCSOPS

ACTION: DCSOPS-12

DISTR : OCSA-8, OSA-3, DCSLOG-10, ACSI-8, CINCPAC-3, TJAG-4
 270926Z JUN 71

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 DE RUEIKD 94300 2670440
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH

R 240435Z SEP 71

 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1590
 INFO RUADADA/HICOMRY
 RUEKJCS/DOO
 RUEADWD/DA
 BT

 CLASSIFIED BY
 EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO 9430

DOO FOR ISA

DA FOR DUSA

 SUBJECT: OKINAWA REVERSION - GOJ PRESS REPORTS ON
 SUBMISSION TO SENATE OF OKINAWA REVERSION
 AGREEMENT.

1. JAPANESE PRESS SEPT 23 GAVE GOOD FACTUAL COVERAGE OF WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PRESIDENT SUBMITTED OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT AND RELATED DOCUMENTS TO SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. SEVERAL PAPERS CARRIED FULL TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S TRANSMITTAL LETTER AND ALSO RAN PORTION OF WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY'S COMMENTS, IN PARTICULAR RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE.
2. NO EDITORIAL OR ANALYTICAL COMMENT HAS YET APPEARED IN PRESS.

SNEIDER

BT

NNNN

DAMO-B//DACS-B,DAIO-3, DAJA-4, DALO-10, SAOSA-2

240435Z SEP 71

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

57

VZCZCSCD112 QS#A267 REUP 620826 2602040
RATCZYUW RUEKJCS8310 2602040-CCCC--RUEADWD.
ZNY CCCCC
R 172040Z SEP 71
FM JCS
INFO RUEADWD/CSA
RUENAAA/CND
R 171905Z SEP 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6226
BT

CLASSIFIED BY GP
EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 171227
SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION: PROPOSED NOTE VERBALE RE VOA AND
SUBMERGED LANDS
REF: TOKYO 9032
THE DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION TO PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES
VERBALE. CHANGES INDICATED IN DRAFT NOTES ALREADY HAS BEEN MADE
IN DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR TRANSMISSION TO SENATE.
POSSIBILITY THAT TREATY AND PROPOSED DOCUMENTS WILL BE TRANSMIT-
TED TO SENATE ON SEPTEMBER 17.
IRWIN
BT
#8310
NNNN

NOTE-REF IS TOKYO 140706Z SEP 71 DAMO
DAMO-B//DACS-B, DAJA-4, DALO-10, SAOSA-2

CONFIDENTIAL

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 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

 VZCZCSCD656 QS#A445 REUP 613435 2570831
 RATCZYUW RUEKJCS8799 2570829-CCCC--RUEADWD.
 ZNY CCCCC
 R 140829Z SEP 71
 FM JCS
 INFO RUEADWD/CSA
 RUENAAA/CNO
 R 140706Z SEP 71
 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1375
 BT

 GA
 CLASSIFIED BY
 EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 9032

 SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION: FONOFF PROPOSED NOTE VERBALE RE
 VOA AND SUBMERGED LANDS EXCHANGE OF NOTES
 EA/J FOR SCHMITZ

 1. FONOFF (ARIMA, DEP HEAD TREATIES DIV) PROPOSES EXCHANGE
 NOTES VERBALE CONCERNING CITATION OF TITLE OF GOJ
 FOREIGN MINISTER IN EXCHANGES OF NOTES REGARDING VOA AND
 SUBMERGED LANDS AT TIME OF SIGNING OF OKINAWA REVERSION
 AGREEMENT. DRAFT TEXTS FOLLOW:

 QUOTE THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRESENTS ITS
 COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF THE USA AND HAS THE
 HONOR TO REFER TO THE NOTES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE GOJ
 AND USG AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT
 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE USA CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS
 AND THE DAITO ISLANDS.

 THE MINISTRY WISHES TO CALL THE ATTENTION OF THE EMBASSY
 TO THE FACT THAT THE TITLE OF THE ADDRESSEE WAS REFERRED
 TO IN THE US NOTES AS FOLLOWS:

US NOTE CONCERNING SUBMERGED LANDS:

"MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS";

US NOTE CONCERNING VOICE OF AMERICA:

"FOREIGN MINISTER OF JAPAN".

 WHILE THE GOVT OF JAPAN DOES NOT SEE ANY NECESSITY TO
 RECTIFY THE SIGNED TEXT ITSELF, IT WISHES TO REGARD THE
 TITLE OF THE ADDRESSEE AS BEING READ IN CONFORMITY
 WITH THE FORMAL TITLE, THAT IS "MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
 AFFAIRS OF JAPAN".

 THE MINISTRY WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE EMBASSY WOULD
 INFORM THE MINISTRY WHETHER THE USG IS WILLING TO TREAT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

THE SAID TEXT IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY THE MINISTRY. END QUOTE.
QUOTE THE EMBASSY OF THE USA PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS
TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAS THE HONOR TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF THE LATTER'S NOTE VERBALE
NO.----- DATED SEPT. -----, 1971, CONCERNING THE TITLE
OF THE ADDRESSEE REFERRED TO IN THE US NOTES SENT AT THE
TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND
JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS.
THE EMBASSY HAS FURTHER THE HONOR TO INFORM THE MINISTRY
THAT THE USG WILL ALSO TREAT THE TEXT CONCERNED IN THE
MANNER SUGGESTED IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED NOTE VERBALE.
END QUOTE.

2. ARIMA TOLD EMBOFF THAT GOJ MOST ANXIOUS TO HAVE
FORMAL FONMIN TITLE IN DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY GOJ TO
DIET AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY USG TO SENATE. ARIMA
SAID FONOFF WISHES USG SUBMISSION TO SENATE OF VOA AND
SUBMERGED LANDS NOTES TO BE EXACTLY AS CONTAINED IN
EMBASSY BOOKLET QUOTE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT OF
JUNE 17, 1971 AND RELATED DOCUMENTS UNQUOTE. THAT IS,
WITH CORRECT FORMAL TITLE OF FOREIGN MINISTER, DELETION
OF QUOTE TOKYO UNQUOTE AT LOWER LEFT FOLLOWING TITLE, AND
DELETION OF QUOTE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA UNQUOTE AT UPPER RIGHT CORNER OF NOTES.

3. EMBASSY SEES NO RPT NO PROBLEM IN ACCOMMODATING GOJ
REQUEST BUT WOULD APPRECIATE WASHINGTON GUIDANCE. GP-3.
SNEIDER

BT
#8799
NNNN

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EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DAMO 8//DACS 8, DAJA 4, DALO 10, SAOSA 3

140706Z SEP 71
PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

57

VZCZCSCD558 QS#D470 REUP 533545 2082017
RATCZYUW RUEKJCS8336 2082018-CCCC--RUEADWD.
ZNY CCCCC
R 272018Z JUL 71
FM JCS
INFO RUEADWD/CSA
RUENAAA/CND
R 271916Z JUL 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5260
BT

ACTION
RAD
INFO
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IA
PM
AOC

CLASSIFIED BY
EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 135720
SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION: DOCUMENTATION
REF: (A) TOKYO A-511
(B) TOKYO A-504

1. RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED OF DOCUMENTS TRANSMITTED
REF (A).
2. DEPARTMENT ALSO REQUIRES US ORIGINAL OF ARRANGEMENT
CONCERNING ASSUMPTION BY JAPAN OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA AND ORIGINAL OR
CERTIFIED COPY, AS APPROPRIATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
WITH 11 FAM 725 AND 735, OF EACH OF RELATED
DOCUMENTS SIGNED, INITIALED, OR EXCHANGED IN CONNECTION
WITH REVERSION AGREEMENT. THIS INCLUDES DOCUMENTS
LISTED IN PARTS III AND IV OF BEVANS TABULATION
TRANSMITTED REF (B).

ROGERS
BT
#8336
BT
#8336
NNNN

NOTE- REFS ARE NOT IDENTIFIED

ACTION- DCSOPS-12
DISTR - OCSA-8, OSA-3, DCSLOG-10, ACSI-1, TJAG-4

271816Z JUL 71

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTION
RAD
INFO
GEO
IA
FM
AOE

VZCZCSOD116 05#2807 REUP 405579 1312205
POTCZYUW RUEAMAF0553 1312205-CCCC--RUEADWD,
DE RUEIKO 4289D 1311315

724 CCCCC ZZH
P 111102Z MAY 71
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8648
INFO RUEKJCS/ODD PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA PRIORITY
RUHHHQA/CINCUSARPAC PRIORITY
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RUADJKA/USEJ PRIORITY
RUADADA/HICOMRY PRIORITY
BT

CLASSIFIED BY
EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L * TOKYO 4289

ODD FOR ISA; DA FOR DUSA

SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION: DRAFT GENERAL AGREEMENT: ARTICLE VI
REF: TOKYO 4288

1. FOLLOWING IS INCOMPLETE TEXT (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED)
GOJ DRAFT ARTICLE Y, DATED MAY 8, 1971, AS SUBMITTED MAY 10,
1971: QUOTE: CONSIDERING, IN PARTICULAR, THAT UNITED STATES
ASSETS ARE TRANSFERRED TO JAPAN UNDER ARTICLE X OF THIS
AGREEMENT, THAT GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CARRIES
OUT RETURN OF RYUKYU ISLANDS AND DAITO ISLANDS TO JAPAN IN
MANNER CONSISTENT WITH POLICY OF GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AS
SPECIFIED IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 21,
1969, AND THAT GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL
BEAR EXTRA COSTS IN AREA OF EMPLOYMENT AFTER REVERSION, GOVERN-
MENT OF JAPAN WILL PAY TO GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN UNITED STATES DOLLAR (SIC) TOTAL AMOUNT OF -----
UNITED STATES DOLLARS OVER PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS FROM DATE OF ENTRY
INTO FORCE THIS AGREEMENT IN FOLLOWING MANNER: END QUOTE.

GP-3.
MEYER
BT
NNNN

NOTE- REF IS NOT IDENTIFIED

ACTION- DCSOPS-12

DISTR - OCSA-8,OSA-3,DCSLOG-10,ACSI-8,TJAG-4,DCSPEX(12 MAY 71) PER CLM

111102Z MAY 71

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

ACTION
RAD
INFO
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IA
FM
AOC

VZCZCSCD539 OS#4112 REUP 459234 1641408
OQTCZYUW RUEAAIA0130 1641408-CCCC--RUEADWD.
DE RUEIKD 5655D 1641420
ZNY CCCCC-ZZH
O P 131415Z JUN 71
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC//SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9657
INFO RUEADWD/DA IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/IMMEDIATE
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC PRIORITY
RUADADA/HICOMRY PRIORITY
RUADJKA/USFJ/PRIORITY
BT

CLASSIFIED BY
EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 5655
REF: TOKYO 5383

SUBJ: OKINAWA REVERSION: ARTICLE VI -- AGREED MINUTE

1. SUBSEQUENT TO TRANSMISSION OF REFTEL, EMBASSY SUGGESTED TO FONOFF THAT WORDING OF PARA 1 OF AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE VI SEEMED MORE NEGATIVE THAN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE GOJ PURPOSE AND THAT RESULT WOULD BE MORE PRESENTABLE IF WORDING WERE MORE NEUTRAL AND BALANCED. EMBOFF ALSO SUGGESTED THAT PROPOSED WORDING MIGHT DEPRIVE US FORCES OF LEGITIMATE ADVANTAGE IF OKINAWAN UTILITY RATES TURN OUT TO BE LESS THAN RATES IN PARTS OF MAINLAND JAPAN AFTER REVERSION. ACCORDINGLY, EMBOFF SUGGESTED FOLLOWING REWORDING THAT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY FONOFF:
QUOTE 1. THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND DAITO ISLANDS WILL BE ENTITLED TO THE USE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SERVICES ONLY UNDER CONDITIONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE PRESENTLY ENJOYED BY SUCH FORCES IN MAINLAND JAPAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN JAPAN SIGNED ON JAN 19, 1960.
UNQUOTE
2. DUE TO URGENT TIME PRESSURES ON PRINTING OF AGREED MINUTES, NEED URGENTLY APPROVAL OF AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE IV. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY RECORDS, AGREED MINUTE ABOVE SLIGHTLY AMENDED MINUTE TO ARTICLE IV BEING TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY ARE ONLY MINUTES REMAINING FOR WHICH WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE IS STILL NEEDED. SNEIDER
BT

NOTE- ADV CY SENT TO DCSOPS AT 131422Z JUN 71

ACTION- DCSOPS-12

DISTR - OCSA-8, OSA-3, DCSLOG-10, ACSI-8, TJAG-4 131415Z JUN 71

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
*****DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISIONACTION
FAD
INFO
GEO
IA
PM
EOGVZCZCSCD738 QS#C802 REUP 459431 1650358
PQTCZYUW RUEAAIA0150 1650358-CCCC--RUEADWD.
DE RUEIKD 5669D 1650503
ZNY CCCCC 7ZH

P R 140450Z JUN 71

FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5404
INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC
RUADJKA/COMUSFJ
RUEADWD/DA
RUEKJCS/DOD
RUADADA/HICOMRY
BT

CONFIDENTIAL TOKYO 5669

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

DA FOR DUSA

DOD FOR ISA

SUB: OKINAWA REVERSION: ARTICLE VI ---- AGREED MINUTE

REF: TOKYO 5655

AS ADDRESSEES ARE NO DOUBT ALREADY AWARE, REFERENCES
IN REPTEL BODY OF TEXT TO QUOTE AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE IV
END QUOTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN, IN EVERY CASE, TO QUOTE
AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE VI. END QUOTE. GP-3.

SNEIDER

BT

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CLASSIFIED BY _____
EXCLUDED FROM THE GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

NOTE: REF IS TOKYO C 131415Z JUN 71 F DCSOPS

ACTION: DCSOPS-12

DISTR: OCSA-8, OSA-3, DCSLOG-10, ACSI-8, TJAG-4.

140450Z JUN 71

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

VZCZCSCD601 QS#E649 REUP 459296 1641742
DATCZYUW RUEKJCS8332 1641742-CCCC--RUEADWD.
ZNY CCCCC
O 131742Z JUN 71
FM JCS

INFO RUEADWD/CSA
RUENAAA/CND

O R 131732Z JUN 71 ZFF4

IN STATE WASHDC

TO RUEIKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 436

INFO RUADADA/HICOMRY

RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUADJKA/COMUSJ

BT

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 104914
SUBJ OKINAWA REVERSION: ART 6 AGREED MINUTE
REF TOKYO 5655
REVISION TRANSMITTED REFTEL APPROVED. ROGERS
BT
#8332
NNNN

NOTE- ADV CY SENT TO DCSOPS AT 131811Z JUN 71
REF IS TOKYO 131415Z JUN 71 DCSOPS

ACTION- DCSOPS-12
DISTR - OCSA-B, OSA-3, DCSLOG-10, ACSI-B, TJAG-4

131732Z JUN 71

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NNI 9617020
 By K.C. NARA Date 7/25/97

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971 - 414 - 395

NUMBER	FROM	DATE RECEIVED	CLERK	FILE	SUSPENSE DATE
<i>Secret</i> SECRET					
SUMMARY (Type, file number, source, date and subject or short title)					
<i>Okinawa Reversion, Elements of Agreement</i>					
ROUTING	TO	TO	TO	TO	TO
	DATE	DATE	DATE	DATE	DATE
	PRINTED NAME	PRINTED NAME	PRINTED NAME	PRINTED NAME	PRINTED NAME
	SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE	SIGNATURE
ACTION TAKEN			REMARKS		

DA FORM 1203 (6-PART)

PREVIOUS EDITIONS
 OF THIS FORM ARE
 OBSOLETE

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT MAIL CONTROL RECORD
 AND RECEIPT
 (AR 380-5)

1

- Sato (in speech) if Korea attacked, the security of Japan would be seriously affected...the policy of the GOJ in prior consultations would be to decide position positively and promptly...the determination of the U.S. to uphold treaty commitment to the GRC should be appreciated...if treaty commitments have to be involved because of attack, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan.
- 2. U.S. will maintain essential bases on Okinawa under MST.
U.S. will release:
 - Facilities to JSDF to assume local defense ASAP.
 - Facilities not needed (small numbers; optics).
 - Army Intelligence School (not covered by SOFA); possibly SR-71's.

WORKING PAPER

SECRET

SECRET

OKINAWA REVERSION

ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT

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I. MILITARY

1. Security Treaty applies and nuclear weapons withdrawn

- Prior consultations provision requires consultation (in effect GOJ agreement) concerning major changes in deployments of U.S. forces into Japan, major changes in their equipment (read: nuclear weapons) and the use of bases in Japan for combat operations. Does not cover logistic or support operations.
- Sato (in communique) stressed USG should be in a position to carry out its obligations; security of Korea essential to Japan's security; peace and security in Taiwan area also important; reversion should be carried out without detriment to the security of the Far East.
- Sato (in speech) if Korea attacked, the security of Japan would be seriously affected...the policy of the GOJ in prior consultations would be to decide position positively and promptly...the determination of the U.S. to uphold treaty commitment to the GRC should be appreciated...if treaty commitments have to be involved because of attack, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan.

2. U.S. will maintain essential bases on Okinawa under MST.
U.S. will release:

- Facilities to JSDF to assume local defense ASAP.
- Facilities not needed (small numbers; optics).
- Army Intelligence School (not covered by SOFA); possibly SR-71's.

WORKING PAPER

SECRET

-2-

SECRET

II. FINANCIAL PACKAGE

1. \$320 million in cash made up of following elements

- \$175 million for civil assets
- ✓ - \$ 75 million for increased labor costs
- ✓ - \$ 50 million for special weapons
- \$ 16 million for VOA relocation (not agreed)
- \$ 4 million for claims (US not agreed)

\$320 million to be paid in five installments "front loaded" (early installments larger) to maximize U.S. benefits .

- ✓ 2. \$65 million for facilities improvements (P-3's not included; estimated cost if included \$20 million).
- ✓ 3. \$10 million - credit to GOJ for reducing Master Labor Contract Costs.
- 4. \$112 million - estimated value of currency conversion arrangements. GOJ will deposit dollars converted (or \$60 million, whichever greater) for 25 years at no interest in Federal Reserve.
- 5. \$3 million - sale of Bank of Ryukyus. (Estimate)

TOTAL \$510 million (of which \$378 million attributable to DOD)

In addition reversion will result in over \$300 million savings for DOD over the first 5 years.

TOTAL PAYMENTS AND SAVINGS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DOD - \$678 milli
(Estimate)

III. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS

- 1. GOJ will validate GRI investment licenses. Exceptions limited to specified firms working out specific arrangements with GOJ. Latter firms generally satisfied with these arrangements.

-3-

SECRET

2. Firms will be able to do business throughout Japan and may establish sales offices for this purpose. Manufacturing branches will require authorization as is the case in general for foreign investors in Japan.

3. Profits and capital can be remitted.

4. Private property will be respected.

5. Quotas - U.S. businessman may continue to import items covered by GOJ quota restrictions and GOJ will permit reasonable growth in such imports. (We understand that the GOJ will also permit continued imports by Okinawans of citrus fruit, a sensitive item, but will make no commitments since US business interests on Okinawa are not involved.)

6. Professionals - Lawyers - Foreign Lawyers in Okinawa will be able to continue their practice there providing they have been in continuous practice since Jan 1, 1971. (One lawyer, Marshall Hendricks, is not covered. He is not a "foreign lawyer" having been admitted to full membership in the Okinawa Bar. Members of the Okinawa Bar are subject to special legislation which permits them to continue practice for only five years or until they pass the Japanese bar.)

- Doctors - Doctors can continue their practice for at least five years (no American doctor plans to stay that long). They may take Japanese medical exams at any time in Japanese or in English. If in English, their practice restricted to Okinawa. In any event they will receive no less favorable treatment than Okinawan doctors for whom the GOJ will probably waive all exams.

- 7th Day Adventists - Doctors coming to Okinawa after reversion will be able to take the Japanese medical exam in English.

SECRET

-4-

SECRETIV. VOA

Japan will permit VOA to continue relay broadcasting for 5 years. After 2 years governments will consult. GOJ will pay for relocation if needed. GOJ reserves right to express views on VOA broadcasting and USG will respect these views.

V. CLAIMS

GOJ has agreed to give US a waiver of claims except for those recognized by US or local law applicable during our Administration. GOJ however wants US to pay certain claims for restoration costs arising in the pre-peace treaty period. The U.S. recognizes no obligation to meet these claims and the Congressional history of previous claims settlements appears to bar further claims payment. The GOJ has offered to provide \$4 million to the US to pay these claims.

VI. REVERSION AGREEMENT

Agreement will consist of relatively short treaty, together with related agreements on the various matters involved in reversion. The related agreements will be available when the Senate considers the reversion treaty.

VII. CIVIL AVIATION

U.S. airlines may continue to provide international service through Naha. The U.S. gives up cabotage rights (i.e. service between Okinawa and Japan). Benefits obtained from Naha service not included in calculating relative benefits under bi-lateral aviation agreement until 5 years after reversion.

SECRET

Revised 5/26/71

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 17, 1971

FOR THE PRESS

No. 133

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE AT 8:30 A.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1971. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
AND
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS KIICHI AICHI
SIGN RYUKYU ISLANDS AGREEMENT

Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Aichi today signed the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands. They signed the Agreement simultaneously here and in Tokyo in ceremonies televised to both countries via INTELSAT.

The Agreement provides for the U.S. to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands acquired under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at San Francisco September 8, 1951. The Agreement will enter into force two months after the instruments of ratification are exchanged in Tokyo. Although no specific date has been set for the actual reversion, it is contemplated to take place in 1972 subject to final approval of the Agreement by the two Governments in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Administration plans to submit the Agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Today's Agreement culminates over one year of intensive negotiations conducted in Tokyo in accordance with the November 1969 decision of President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato to "enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa to Japan without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan." They further agreed at that time "to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

The return of Okinawa to Japanese administration will fulfill a longstanding United States pledge. From the time of the Peace Treaty with Japan, which gave us administrative rights over Okinawa, the United States has recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa. Ambassador John Foster Dulles first enunciated this doctrine on September 5, 1951, at the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, and it has been confirmed since then by every American President.

Although the U.S. will relinquish its administrative rights over Okinawa, it will retain its essential military bases there under the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements which will be fully applied to Okinawa without change after reversion. The U.S. will, however, release some of its facilities and areas no longer required, and Japan will acquire a number of civil assets as set forth in the Agreement signed today.

"Reversion Agreement - Borkhoff"
folder #57

*Box 24, History of the Civil Admin.
of the R. I.
RG 319*


PR #133

-2-

In addition to the Agreement signed by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Aichi, a number of related agreements were signed or initialed in Tokyo by United States Ambassador to Japan, Armin H. Meyer, and Foreign Minister Aichi and by other officials of the two Governments.

Attachments:

- No. 1 - Agreement between Japan and the U.S. Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands
- No. 2 - Agreed Minutes to the Agreement
- No. 3 - Exchange of Notes:
 - a. Re Article IV: Settlement of Submerged Land Claims through Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
 - b. Re Article VIII: Description of VOA Facilities; Present Operations; Occasional Extra Length Broadcasts; Government of Japan Approval of VOA Operational Changes; Frequency Registration; Claims; Respect for Government of Japan's Views on Broadcasts
- No. 4 - Foreign Minister Aichi's Assurances Concerning U.S. Businessmen and Professionals (Letter from Foreign Minister Aichi to Ambassador Meyer)
- No. 5 - Memorandum Concerning Civil Aviation
- No. 6 - SOFA Agreements Re Article III:
 - List A (Facilities to be Agreed on Day of Reversion)
 - List B (Facilities to be Turned Over to Government of Japan Post Reversion)
 - List C (Installations to be Released in Whole or Part Prior to Reversion)
- No. 7 - Joint Communique Between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan
- No. 8 - Text of Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson's Background Press Conference, The White House, November 21, 1969



Attachment No. 1

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE RYUKYU
ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS

Japan and the United States of America,

Noting that the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States of America reviewed together on November 19, 20 and 21, 1969 the status of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, referred to as "Okinawa" in the Joint Communique between the Prime Minister and the President issued on November 21, 1969, and agreed that the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands to Japan;

Noting that the two Governments have conducted such consultations and have reaffirmed that the reversion of these islands to Japan be carried out on the basis of the said Joint Communique;

Considering that the United States of America desires, with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, and thereby to have relinquished all its rights and interests in all territories under the said Article; and


Considering further that Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands;

Therefore, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term "the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means all the territories and their territorial waters with respect to which the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction was accorded to the United States of America under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan other than those with respect to which such right has already been returned to Japan in accordance with the Agreement concerning the



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Amami Islands and the Agreement concerning Nanpo Shoto and other islands signed between Japan and the United States of America respectively on December 24, 1953 and April 5, 1968.

ARTICLE II

It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between Japan and the United States of America, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of America signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953, become applicable to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. Japan will grant the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement the use of facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and its related arrangements.

2. In the application of Article IV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960 to the facilities and areas the use of which will be granted in accordance with paragraph 1 above to the United States of America on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, it is understood that the phrase "the condition in which they were at the time they became available to the United States armed forces" in paragraph 1 of the said Article refers to the condition in which the facilities and areas first came into the use of the United States armed forces, and that the term "improvements" in paragraph 2 of the said Article includes those made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

2. The waiver in paragraph 1 above does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United

Attachment No. 1

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States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands. The Government of the United States of America is authorized to maintain its duly empowered officials in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in order to deal with and settle such claims on and after the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures to be established in consultation with the Government of Japan.

3. The Government of the United States of America will make ex gratia contributions for restoration of lands to the nationals of Japan whose lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, while placed under the use of United States authorities, and were released from their use after June 30, 1961 and before the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Such contributions will be made in an equitable manner in relation to the payments made under High Commissioner's Ordinance Number 60 of 1967 to claims for damages done prior to July 1, 1950 to the lands released prior to July 1, 1961.

4. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, or authorized by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

ARTICLE V

1. Japan recognizes the validity of, and will continue in full force and effect, final judgments in civil cases rendered by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, provided that such recognition or continuation would not be contrary to public policy.

2. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights and positions of the litigants concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over and continue to judgment and execution any civil cases pending as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement in any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

3. Without in any way adversely affecting the substantive rights of the accused or suspect concerned, Japan will assume jurisdiction over, and may continue or institute proceedings with respect to, any criminal cases with which any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands is seized as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or would have been seized had the proceedings been instituted prior to such date.

4. Japan may continue the execution of any final judgments rendered in criminal cases by any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

ARTICLE VI

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1. The properties of the Ryukyu Electric Power Corporation, the Ryukyu Domestic Water Corporation and the Ryukyu Development Loan Corporation shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and the rights and obligations of the said Corporations shall be assumed by the Government of Japan on that date in conformity with the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. All other properties of the Government of the United States of America, existing in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement and located outside the facilities and areas provided on that date in accordance with Article III of the Agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on this date, except for those that are located on the lands returned to the landowners concerned before the date of entry into force of this Agreement and for those the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America after that date with the consent of the Government of Japan.

3. Such lands in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands reclaimed by the Government of the United States of America and such other reclaimed lands acquired by it in these islands as are held by the Government of the United States of America as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement become the property of the Government of Japan on that date.

4. The United States of America is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement to the lands upon which the properties transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraphs 1 and 2 above are located.

ARTICLE VII

Considering, inter alia, that United States assets are being transferred to the Government of Japan under Article VI of this Agreement, that the Government of the United States of America is carrying out the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands to Japan in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as specified in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communique of November 21, 1969, and that the Government of the United States of America will bear extra costs, particularly in the area of employment after reversion, the Government of Japan will pay to the Government of the United States of America in United States dollars a total amount of three hundred and twenty million United States dollars (U.S. \$320,000,000) over a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Of the said amount, the Government of Japan will pay one hundred million United States dollars (U.S. \$100,000,000) within one week after the date of entry into force of this Agreement and the remainder in four equal annual installments in June of each calendar year subsequent to the year in which this Agreement enters into force.

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ARTICLE VIII

The Government of Japan consents to the continued operation by the Government of the United States of America of the Voice of America relay station in Okinawa Island for a period of five years from the date of entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with the arrangements to be concluded between the two Governments. The two Governments shall enter into consultation two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement on future operation of the Voice of America in Okinawa Island.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Tokyo. This Agreement shall enter into force two months after the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tokyo and Washington, this seventeenth day of June, 1971, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

For Japan:

For the United States of
America:

Attachment No. 2

AGREED MINUTES

The representatives of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States of America wish to record the following understanding reached during the negotiations for the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, signed today:

Re Article I:

The territories defined in paragraph 2 of Article I are the territories under the administration of the United States of America under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, and are, as designated under Civil Administration Proclamation Number 27 of December 25, 1953, all of those islands, islets, atolls and rocks situated in an area bounded by the straight lines connecting the following coordinates in the listed order:

<u>North Latitude</u>	<u>East Longitude</u>
28 degrees	124 degrees 40 minutes
24 degrees	122 degrees
24 degrees	133 degrees
27 degrees	131 degrees 50 minutes
27 degrees	128 degrees 18 minutes
28 degrees	128 degrees 18 minutes
28 degrees	124 degrees 40 minutes

Re Article IV:

1. The claims of Japanese nationals including the municipalities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands which the Government of the United States of America will deal with and settle pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV include the following:

(1) Claims arising from damages done to land and those relating to Declarations of Taking the settlement for which is provided for in High Commissioner's Ordinance Number 20 on Acquisition of Leasehold Interest;

(2) Claims falling within the competence of the United States Land Tribunal for the Ryukyu Islands established by High Commissioner's Ordinance Number 19;

(3) Claims the settlement for which may be sought under the laws of the United States of America respecting foreign claims;

(4) Claims of employees of the Government of the United States of America or its instrumentalities protected under the laws of the United States of America respecting compensation for work injuries or under High Commissioner Ordinance Number 42 on workmen's compensation benefits;

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(5) Claims of the employees of the Government of the United States of America or its instrumentalities relating to remuneration and other benefits; and

(6) Others.

2. The procedures to be established under paragraph 2 of Article IV will also provide for a suitable arrangement for the ex gratia contributions to be made under paragraph 3 of Article IV as well as for that through which the Government of the United States of America or its instrumentalities will complete the payments of their debts owed to Japanese nationals including the municipalities of the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands outstanding on the date of entry into force of the Agreement.

3. The Government of the United States of America will in consultation with the Government of Japan take necessary measures to secure sufficient public knowledge and early availability of the procedures.

Re Article V:

1. The words "final judgments" referred to in paragraph 1 of Article V include final decrees and orders.

2. The words "any court in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands" means the courts of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and of the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

3. The military authorities of the United States will exercise criminal jurisdiction over the members of the United States armed forces with respect to offenses committed in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands prior to the date of entry into force of the Agreement in accordance with relevant provisions of Article XVII of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and Japan will not exercise criminal jurisdiction over such cases.

Re Article VI:

1. The United States Armed Forces in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands will be entitled to the use of public utilities and services only under conditions comparable to those presently enjoyed by such forces in Mainland Japan in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960.

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2. The properties of the Government of the United States of America to be transferred to the Government of Japan under paragraph 2 of Article VI include:

- (1) Naha Airport facilities including the Miwa non-directional beacon;
- (2) Administrative structures including:
 - (a) Justice Building at Naha;
 - (b) English Language Center at Naha;
 - (c) Naha, Nago, Ishikawa, Miyako and Yaeyama Cultural Centers;
 - (d) The Government of the Ryukyu Islands Executive Building at Naha;
 - (e) Yaeyama Civil Administration Headquarters; and
 - (f) Miyako Civil Administration Headquarters;
- (3) Road structures including traffic lights, road signs, bridges and other fixtures of the following routes:

Route	Approximate length
1	66 km;
5	13 km;
6	7 km;
7	9 km;
8	10 km;
13	62 km;
16	8 km;
24	13 km;
44	12 km; and

Others

- (4) Air navigation facilities related to airports:
 - (a) Non-directional beacons on Minamidaito Jima, Kume Jima,

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Ishigaki Jima and Yonaguni Jima;

- (b) Air-ground communications facilities and inter-islands communications - navigation system on the above islands and Miyako Jima;
- (5) Navigation aids:
 - (a) Short range aids to navigation;
14 light structures, 17 lighted buoys, 2 sets of channel range lights and others; and
 - (b) LORAN-A transmitting station on Miyako Jima;
- (6) Installation at Naha Wheel Area and on those parts of the areas at White Beach, Naha Air Force Annex and Tokashiki Army Annex to be released for use by the Government of Japan.

3. The properties the title to which will be retained by the Government of the United States of America include the housing for State Department personnel at Hamakawa, Chatan Village.

Re Article VII:

With respect to computation and payment of the separation payments to be made to the Japanese employees of the United States armed forces in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (including non-appropriated fund organizations) after reversion, the Government of the United States of America will pay the amount computed for the entire employment periods of such employees beginning from April 30, 1952, including their pre-reversion employment periods, applying the computation formula provided for in the Master Labor Contract, the Mariner Contract and the Indirect Hire Agreement in mainland Japan.

Re Article VIII:

In case of relocation of the Voice of America outside Japan and in the event it would be found that a substitute facility will not be completed within the five year period referred to in Article VIII due to unforeseen circumstances, the Government of Japan is prepared to give full recognition to the need for continued operation of the Voice of America in Okinawa Island after the said five year period until completion of the substitute facility.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971

(Signed)

(Signed)

Attachment No. 3

U.S. NOTE CONCERNING QUESTIONS ARISING
OUT OF THE SUBMERSION OF LANDS AT NAHA

I have the honor to refer to the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today and have further the honor to confirm the understanding reached between the two governments that the Government of the United States of America will undertake, in consultation with the Government of Japan to complete necessary preparations as expeditiously as possible, for settlement of the question arising out of the submersion of lands in the military port of Naha through disposition of the lands reclaimed and now held by the Government of the United States of America in these islands to the extent necessary for this purpose.

I should be appreciative if your Excellency would confirm the foregoing on behalf of your Government.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Attachment No. 3

JAPANESE REPLY

Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of today's date, which reads as follows:

(U.S. Note)

I have further the honor to confirm the foregoing understanding on behalf of the Government of Japan. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Attachment No. 3

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100 KW - 1
 35 KW - 2
 15 KW - 1
 5 KS - 1

b. Frequency-hours per day: not exceeding 32.5 hours.

c. Number of antennas: not exceeding 6.

3. Languages used

No languages other than those presently used.

(4). Matters concerning frequencies and other basic characteristics of emission used by the relay station for broadcasting, radio teletype and communication links other than those listed above will be approved by the competent authorities of the Government of Japan on the basis of the existing characteristics. Any subsequent changes in the characteristics thus approved will be subject to approval of the competent authorities of the Government of Japan. In exceptional cases, the relay station may extend, on an ad hoc basis, its broadcasting hours beyond the limits provided for in (1) c and (2) b above with the approval of the competent authorities of the Government of Japan.

(3). The Government of the United States of America will notify the International Frequency Registration Board of frequency assignments, including seasonal high frequency broadcasting schedules, for the relay station in accordance with the Radio Regulations attached to the International Telecommunication Convention. The competent authorities of the Government of the United States of America will inform those of the Government of Japan of the particulars of such notification.

4. The Government of the United States of America will take necessary steps to remove, as quickly as possible, any jamming or interference caused by the relay station to radio stations or radio receiving facilities regulated by the relevant radio laws of Japan.

5. The Government of the United States of America shall be responsible for just and expeditious settlement of all claims against the relay station or its employees arising from or in connection with its activities.

6. Sole responsibility for the programs relayed through the relay station will rest with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of Japan, however, reserves the right to express its views on the said programs as it considers necessary, and the Government of the United States of America will respect the views so expressed.

7. Details for the implementation of these arrangements will be agreed upon as may be necessary between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NNI 947020
By K.C. NARA Date 7/25/97

Attachment No. 3

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I have further the honor to propose that the present Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply confirming the foregoing arrangements on behalf of the Government of the United States of America shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments, which will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Attachment No. 3

U. S. NOTE

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"(Japanese Note)"

I have further the honor to confirm the above arrangements on behalf of the Government of the United States of America and agree that Your Excellency's Note and this reply shall be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments, which will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Attachment No. 4

June 17, 1971

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

With reference to Paragraph 9 of the Joint Communique between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon issued on November 21, 1969, and to the recent talks between the representatives of the two Governments concerning the treatment after reversion of foreign nationals and firms in Okinawa, I wish to inform you that the Government of Japan, desirous of treating the matter in a sympathetic manner, has decided on the following policies.

I. Business activities:

1. Each firm will be requested to make application, within a reasonable period of time after reversion, for validation under the Foreign Investment Law and, with certain business activities, for license or permit under other laws of Japan. Individual entrepreneurs will not be required to obtain validation under the Foreign Investment Law.

2. The GOJ will promptly accord the said validation, license or permit through the above-mentioned procedure to those firms and individual entrepreneurs which are legitimately engaged in business in Okinawa as of this date, in order to ensure the continuation of their businesses in accordance with presently valid GRI licenses or other authorization, provided that:

(a) the said validation, license or permit will not cover the establishment of a new branch and the removal of their fixed base of business to any other place in Japan outside Okinawa, for which a separate application will be required, and

(b) certain firms will have to make the adjustments requested by the GOJ in accordance with the understandings between the Japanese authorities and the firms concerned.

3. Pending the completion of the procedure mentioned in preceding paragraphs, necessary transitional measures will be taken under which the firms concerned will be allowed to continue their business operations in the meantime.

4. Subject to the conditions mentioned in paragraph 2 above, these firms and individual entrepreneurs may engage in transactions throughout Japan after reversion in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

II. Private properties:

1. The private properties of foreign individuals and firms in Okinawa, including the ownership and leases of private lands and houses duly acquired, will be respected after reversion under the Japanese laws and regulations as in the case of such properties of foreign

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individuals and firms in mainland Japan.

2. Those foreign investors desiring assurances that principals of and profits accruing from technical assistance contracts, beneficiary certificates, debentures, claimable assets and stock acquisition not affecting business management be paid in foreign currency should apply after reversion for the validation of such contracts or rights under the Foreign Investment Law. Such validation will promptly be given.

III. Leasing of state and prefectural lands:

With respect to the leasing of state and prefectural lands in Okinawa, necessary measures will be taken so that such leasing may continue for a period of one year after reversion under the same conditions as in the present.

The leasing of such lands for the period to follow will be subject to arrangements to be made between the parties concerned during the said one year period.

The leasing of state and prefectural lands in Okinawa after reversion will be made under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan, and no discrimination will be made against U.S. lessees for the reason that they are foreign lessees.

IV. Remittance in foreign currency:

1. With respect to the investment validated under the Foreign Investment Law, conversion into convertible foreign currency as well as free remittance to foreign countries of principals and profits accruing from the investment are guaranteed under the said law. Remittance of profits or funds generated through liquidation in the case of individual entrepreneurs will automatically be approved upon verification.

2. Foreign individuals who hold dollar deposits in an Okinawan bank at the time of reversion may continue, after reversion, to hold dollar accounts or may convert them into yen accounts.

The remittance abroad of such accounts will be governed by the provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.

V. Professionals:

The treatment of foreign professionals in Okinawa after reversion will be as follows:

(1) Lawyers

Foreign lawyers who have been continuously practicing in Okinawa prior to January 1, 1971, will be allowed to practice, as

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in the present, concerning foreign laws after reversion subject to the approval by the Supreme Court of Japan, provided that each lawyer will maintain his office in Okinawa.

(2) Doctors and dentists

(a) Foreign doctors and dentists licensed under the pertinent laws in Okinawa as of the date of reversion will be allowed, for a considerable length of period, to practice, after reversion, as in the present within Okinawa prefecture, and will be qualified to take the National Medical Examination or the Preparatory Examination for the National Medical Examinations for doctors or dentists under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan during the said period of time. If necessary, such examination will be given in English, provided that those who will have passed the National Medical Examination in English will be allowed to practice in Okinawa Prefecture.

(b) Recognizing the necessity of continuation of operations of the Adventist Medical Center in Naha City, doctors or dentists who will come to Okinawa after reversion to practice at the Adventist Medical Center will be qualified to take the National Medical Examination or the Preparatory Examination for the National Medical Examination for doctors or dentists under the relevant laws and regulations of Japan. If necessary, such examination will be given in English, provided that those who will have passed the National Medical Examination in English will be allowed to practice at the said facility.

(3) Veterinarians

Those veterinarians licensed under the pertinent laws in Okinawa will be allowed to practice after reversion in Okinawa.

(4) Certified public accountants

Those certified public accountants who have been legitimately operating in Okinawa, have been certified in a foreign country such as the United States with requirements corresponding to those of Japanese CPA's and who possess sufficient knowledge of Japanese laws and regulations concerning accounting, will be allowed to practice upon the approval of their qualifications by the Minister of Finance and the registry of their names with the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Such approval will promptly be given after reversion.

VI. Taxation:

1. The Government of Japan confirms that it has no intention to impose after reversion any retroactive taxation under Japanese tax laws and regulations in respect of activities or property in Okinawa before reversion. This does not mean that the Government of Japan renounces the right to impose taxation in accordance with the provisions

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of the tax laws in Okinawa (including USCAR Ordinances), which will be deemed as having the validity as Japanese tax laws and regulations, in case where taxation which should have been imposed on activities or property of foreign firms in Okinawa prior to reversion under the tax laws in Okinawa (including USCAR Ordinances) have not been imposed properly in accordance with such laws.

2. (a) With respect to the business losses based upon the filling of Blue Returns, for which a carry-over could have been approved under the GRI Corporation Tax Law but has not actually been applied, the Government of Japan will in principle permit a carry-over thereof after reversion in accordance with the provisions of the Japanese Corporation Tax Law. The same treatment will be extended with respect to net losses presented in Blue Returns, carry-over of deduction of which is permitted under the GRI Income Tax Law.

(b) Paragraph (1) above will be also applied with respect to Enterprise Tax and Local Inhabitants Tax imposed by the local authorities.

VII. Import Quotas

The GOJ, as indicated in the Cabinet Decision of November 20, 1970, will give special consideration, where necessary, with respect to the importation of goods into Okinawa on an item-by-item basis, with a view to alleviating any impact which the application of the relevant laws and regulations of Japan may have on the livelihood of residents and the business activities of firms in Okinawa.

With respect to imports of goods under quantitative restrictions, the GOJ will, in the light of the above-mentioned decision, grant quotas to individual foreign firms on the basis of the past records of imports of such goods into Okinawa and also take into account the necessity for a reasonable increase of such imports in the light of the market situation and other relevant factors.

In implementing the policies mentioned in the said Cabinet decision and granting such quotas, the GOJ will not discriminate against foreign firms.

VIII. Broadcasting:

With respect to the operation of the Far East Broadcasting Company, the Government of Japan will take the necessary measures concerning the licensing after reversion of radio waves for the Far East Broadcasting Company as follows:

(1) The Government of Japan will ~~permit~~ broadcast in the Japanese language by the Quote Zaidan Hojin Kyokuto Hoso Unquote in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

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(2) With respect to broadcasting in the English language now conducted by FEBC, such operation will be authorized to continue for a period of five years after reversion. The operation will be carried out under the conditions provided for by the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

Kiichi Aichi
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Attachment No. 5

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CIVIL AVIATION

With respect to the return of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, the representatives of the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America have reached the following understandings on the question of air services to and through Okinawa, in both directions, by the United States airlines and of the amendment to the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement between Japan and the United States of America of August 11, 1952, as amended.

1. The Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, will be amended in accordance with an exchange of diplomatic notes effective with the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.
2. The United States airlines shall not have the right to carry cabotage traffic between Japan proper and Naha after the date of reversion of Okinawa to Japan.
3. During the five-year period to commence on the date administrative rights over Okinawa are returned to Japan, the value of traffic rights at Naha of the United States airline services described below shall not be taken into account when reviewing the overall balance of benefits under the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended.

(A) Northwest Airlines

From the United States via the north Pacific and the central Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.

(B) Flying Tiger Line

From the United States via the north Pacific to Tokyo, Osaka and Naha and beyond.

(C) Trans World Airlines

From the United States via the central Pacific to Naha and beyond to Taipei and Hong Kong and beyond.

(D) Continental Airlines/Air Micronesia

From United States points in the central Pacific, including Guam, via points in Micronesia to Naha.
(Other than non-stop services between the points in Hawaii and Naha.)

4. Following the aforementioned five-year period, the overall balance of benefits under the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, will include the value of the United States traffic rights at Naha. Both Governments will consult prior to the end of this five-year period to determine any necessary modification of the Schedule attached to the Civil Air Transport Agreement, as amended, through the granting of such additional traffic rights to the Government of Japan as are warranted by the overall balance of benefits at the

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end of the five-year period including the value of the
United States traffic rights at Naha.

Attachment No. 6

FACILITIES TO BE PROVIDED THE UNITED STATES UNDER ARTICLE III
OR RELEASED BY THE UNITED STATES

* * *

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The attached represent the results of discussions held between the representatives of the Government of the United States of America and of the Government of Japan concerning Article III of the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands signed today.

Tokyo, June 17, 1971

Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentialy of
the United States of
America to Japan

Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Japan

List A

The following are the installations and sites which the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America are prepared, unless otherwise agreed between them, to agree in the Joint Committee, within their present boundaries, or as indicated in the remarks, as facilities and areas pursuant to Article II of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan signed on January 19, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the "SOFA"), for the use by the United States armed forces as from the date of reversion. The agreements in the Joint Committee will be concluded on the day of entry into force of the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, and every effort will be made to complete the preparatory works well in advance of that day.

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	<u>Northern Training Area</u>	<u>Marine Northern Training Area</u>	
2	<u>Aha Training Area</u>	<u>Aha Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
3	<u>Kawata Training Area</u>	<u>Kawata Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
4	<u>Okuma Rest Center</u>	<u>Okuma Rest Center</u>	
5	<u>Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield</u>	<u>Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield</u>	
6	<u>Yaetake Communication Site</u>	<u>Yaetake/FPTS Communications Site</u>	

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NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT NOMENCLATURE	REMARKS
7	<u>Gesashi Communica- tion Site</u>	<u>LORAN Station Gesashi</u>	
8	<u>Sedake Training Area</u>	<u>Sedake Training Area No. 1</u>	SOFA II-4-b
9	<u>Camp Schwab</u>	<u>Camp Schwab</u>	
		<u>Camp Schwab Training Area</u>	Cf. List C.
		<u>1ST Ramp Camp Schwab</u>	
10	<u>Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot</u>	<u>Henoko Ordnance Ammo Depot</u>	
		<u>Navy Ammo Storage Facilities</u>	
11	<u>Camp Hansen</u>	<u>Camp Hansen</u>	Cf. List C.
		<u>Camp Hansen Training Area</u>	Cf. List C.
12	<u>Kushi Training Area</u>	<u>Kushi Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
13	<u>Onna Point Communi- cation Site</u>	<u>Onna Point Admin Annex</u>	
14	<u>Camp Hardy</u>	<u>Camp H. F. Hardy</u>	
15	<u>Onna Point Site</u>	<u>Onna Point Army Annex</u>	Cf. List B.
16	<u>Yaka Training Area</u>	<u>Yaka Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
17	<u>Gimbaru Training Area</u>	<u>Gimbaru Training Area</u>	
		<u>Kadena Site No. 3</u>	
18	<u>Yaka Rest Center</u>	<u>Yaka Rest Center</u>	
19	<u>Kin Red Beach Training Area</u>	<u>Kin Beach (Red Beach)</u>	
20	<u>Kin Blue Beach Training Area</u>	<u>Kin Blue Beach</u>	
21	<u>Bolo Point Train- fire Range</u>	<u>Bolo Point Trainfire Range</u>	
		<u>Kadena Site No. 1</u>	
		<u>U.S. Army Annex Bolo Point</u>	
		<u>Yomitan Army Annex No. 1</u>	

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
22	<u>Kadena Ammunition Storage Area</u>	<u>Kadena Ammo Storage Annex</u> <u>Site Hizagawa</u> <u>Hanza Ammo Storage Annex</u> <u>Joint Ordnance Explosive Demolition Area, Yontan</u> <u>USA CSG Ammo Storage Area</u> <u>Chibana Ordnance Ammo Depot</u> <u>Kadena VORTAC Site</u> <u>Kadena TACAN Annex</u> <u>Higashionna Ammo Storage Annex</u>	Cf. List C.
23	<u>Chibana Site</u>	<u>Chibana Army Annex</u> <u>Kina Radio Relay Annex</u>	Cf. List B.
24	<u>Ishikawa Army Annex</u>	<u>Ishikawa Army Annex</u>	
25	<u>Yomitan Army Annex</u>	<u>Yomitan Army Annex No. 2</u>	
26	<u>Sobe Communication Site</u>	<u>Naval Communications Site, Sobe Annex</u> <u>Direction Finder Site Sobe, East</u>	Cf. List C.
27	<u>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield</u>	<u>Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield</u> <u>Site Nakano</u>	
28	<u>Camp Courtney</u>	<u>Camp Courtney</u>	Cf. List C.
29	<u>Tengan Communication Site</u>	<u>Starcom Transmitter Site, Tengan</u>	
30	<u>Tengan Pier</u>	<u>Tengan Pier</u>	

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
31	<u>Camp McTureous</u>	<u>Camp McTureous</u>	
32	<u>Camp Shields</u>	<u>Camp Shields</u>	Cf. List C.
33	<u>Camp Hauge</u>	<u>Camp Hauge</u>	Cf. List C.
34	<u>Deragawa Communica- tion Site</u>	<u>Deragawa Transmitter Site</u>	
35	<u>Hanza Army Annex</u>	<u>Site Hanza</u>	
36	<u>Torii Communication Station</u>	<u>Torii Station, Sobe</u>	
		<u>Starcom Receiver Station, Sobe</u>	
37	<u>Kadena Air Base</u>	<u>Kadena Air Base</u>	
		<u>Camp Sansone</u>	
		<u>Kadena Housing Area State Department</u>	
		<u>U.S. Army Housing</u>	
38	<u>Sunabe Warehouse</u>	<u>Warehouse Sunabi</u>	
		<u>Air Force Furniture Repair Shop</u>	
39	<u>Sunabe Army Annex</u>	<u>Site Sunabe</u>	
40	<u>Kashiji Army Annex</u>	<u>Site Kashiji</u>	
41	<u>Kadena Housing Area</u>	<u>Kadena Housing Annex</u>	
42	<u>Koza Communication Site</u>	<u>Koza Radio Relay Annex</u>	
43	<u>Camp Kue</u>	<u>Camp Kue</u>	
44	<u>Camp Sukiran</u>	<u>Camp Sukiran</u>	
		<u>Camp Foster</u>	
45	<u>Sukiran Communi- cation Site</u>	<u>Sukiran Propagation Annex (Sukiran Area "C")</u>	
46	<u>Awase Communi- cation Station</u>	<u>Awase Communications Annex</u>	
		<u>Naval Air Facility Naha Transmitter Unit Awase</u>	

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
47	<u>Nishihara Army Annex</u>	<u>Nishihara Army Annex No. 1</u>	
48	<u>White Beach Facilities</u>	<u>Naval Port Facility White Beach</u> <u>Kachin Hanto Army Area</u> <u>White Beach Tank Farm</u> <u>Kadena Site No. 2</u> <u>Nishihara Army Annex No. 2</u>	Cf. List C Cf. List B.
49	<u>Awase Storage Area</u>	<u>Awase Ammo Storage Area</u>	
50	<u>Kubasaki School Area</u>	<u>Camp Kubasaki</u>	Cf. List C.
51	<u>Futenma Air Station</u>	<u>Marine Corps Air Station Futenma</u> <u>Futenma Army Annex</u> <u>Marine Corps Air Station Futenma 800 Compound</u>	
52	<u>Camp Mercy</u>	<u>Machinato Area "H" (Camp Mercy)</u>	
53	<u>Camp Boone</u>	<u>Machinato Area "J" (Camp Boone)</u>	
54	<u>Okinawa Regional Exchange Dry Storage Warehouse</u>	<u>Okinawa Regional Exchange Dry Storage Warehouse</u>	
55	<u>Machinato Service Office</u>	<u>Post Services Office</u>	
56	<u>Machinato Service Area</u>	<u>Machinato Service Area</u>	
57	<u>Machinato Service Area Annex</u>	<u>7th PSYOP Group Warehouse</u> <u>Navy Warehouse, Machinato</u>	
58	<u>Machinato Purchasing and Contracting Office</u>	<u>Purchasing & Contracting Office</u>	
59	<u>Urasoe Warehouse</u>	<u>USA STRATCOM Warehouse</u>	

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NUMBER	NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT NOMENCLATURE	REMARKS
60	<u>Deputy Division Engineers Office</u>	<u>Deputy Division Engineer Western Pacific</u>	
61	<u>Machinato Housing Area</u>	<u>Naha Area "H" Machinato/Kaha Housing Area</u>	Cf. List B.
62	<u>Okinawa Regional Exchange Cold Storage</u>	<u>Okinawa Regional Exchange Cold Storage</u>	
63	<u>Harborview Club</u>	<u>Harborview Club</u>	
64	<u>Naha Port Facilities</u>	<u>Military Port of Naha</u>	
65	<u>Naha Service Center</u>		
66	<u>Naha Air Force/ Navy Annex</u>	<u>Naha Air Force/ Navy Annex</u>	Cf. List C.
67	<u>Naha Site</u>	<u>Naha Army Annex</u>	Cf. List B.
68	<u>Chinen Site No. 1</u>	<u>Chinen Army Annex No.1</u>	Cf. List B.
69	<u>Chinen Site No. 2</u>	<u>Chinen Army Annex No.2</u>	Cf. List B.
70	<u>Shinzato Com- munication Site</u>	<u>Shinzato Com- munication Site</u>	
71	<u>Chinen Service Area</u>	<u>US Army Composite Service Group</u>	
72	<u>Yozadake Air Station</u>	<u>Yozadake Air Station</u>	Cf. List B and C.
73	<u>Yozadake Site</u>	<u>Yozadake Army Annex No.1</u>	Cf. List B.
74	<u>Yozadake Army Annex</u>	<u>Yozadake Army Annex No.2</u>	Cf. List B.
75	<u>South Storage Area</u>	<u>South Storage Area</u>	
76	<u>Army POL Depots</u>	<u>Camp Kue Tank Farm No. 1</u> <u>Camp Kue Tank Farm No. 2</u> <u>Chimu-Wan Tank Farm Nos. 1, 2, 3.</u>	

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
		<u>Tengan Booster Station</u>	
		<u>Camp Kue Booster Station</u>	
77	<u>Tori Shima Range</u>	<u>Ryukyu Air Range</u>	
78	<u>Irisuna Shima Range</u>	<u>Irisuna Shima Air Range</u>	
79	<u>Kume Shima Air Station</u>	<u>Kume Shima Air Station</u>	Cf. List B and C.
80	<u>Kume Shima Bombing Range</u>	<u>Kume Shima Bombing Range</u>	
81	<u>Ukibaru Shima Training Area</u>	<u>Ukibaru Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
82	<u>Tsukun Jima Training Area</u>	<u>Tsukun Jima Training Area</u>	
83	<u>Mae Shima Training Area</u>	<u>Mae Shima Training Area</u>	SOFA II-4-b
84	<u>Kobi Sho Range</u>	<u>Kobi Sho Gunnery Range</u>	
85	<u>Sekibi Sho Range</u>	<u>Sekibi Sho Gunnery Range</u>	
86	<u>Miyako Jima VORTAC Site</u>	<u>Miyako VORTAC</u>	Cf. List B.
87	<u>Miyako Jima Air Station</u>	<u>Miyako Jima Air Station</u>	Cf. List B and C.
		<u>Miyako Jima NDB Site</u>	Cf. List B.
88	<u>Okino Daito Shima Range</u>	<u>Okino Daito Shima</u>	

Note 1: With respect to the U.S. POL pipelines connecting the POL depots, the U. S. submarine cable under the territorial waters of Japan connected to Camp Sukiran, and the U.S. telecommunications cables connected to the facilities and areas, the Government of Japan will take

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measures necessary for the use by the United States armed forces under SOFA.

Note 2: There are certain facilities and areas among those listed above which will require that restricted waters be provided contiguous thereto.

Note 3: With respect to the Sea Maneuver Areas to be provided in the territorial waters of Japan and those to be agreed upon on the high seas, the two Governments will continue preparatory works.

LIST B

The following are the facilities and areas which will be returned to Japan after reversion as indicated in the remarks.

	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	Onna Point Site (No. 15)	Onna Point Army Annex	On takeover by JSDF*
2	Chibana Site (portion described under the "PRE- SENT NOMENCLATURE" only) (No. 23)	Chibana Army Annex	
3	White Beach Facilities (portion described under the "PRE- SENT NOMENCLATURE" only) (No. 48)	Nishihara Army Annex No. 2	

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	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>PRESENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
5	Naha Site (No. 67)	Naha Army Annex	On takeover by JSDF
6	Chinen Site No. 1 (No. 68)	Chinen Army Annex No. 1	"
7	Chinen Site No. 2 (No. 69)	Chinen Army Annex No. 2	On takeover by JSDF
8	Yozadake Air Station (No. 72)	Yozadake Air Station	"
9	Yozadake Site (No. 73)	Yozadake Army Annex No. 1	"
10	Yozadake Army Annex (Site "A" only) (No. 74)	Yozadake Army Annex No. 2	"
11	Kume Shima Air Station (No. 79)	Kume Shima Air Station	"
12	Miyako Jima VORTAC Site (No. 86)	Miyako VORTAC	On takeover by MOT**
13	Miyako Jima Air Station (No. 87)	Miyako Jima Air Station	On takeover by JSDF
		Miyako Jima NDB Site	On takeover by MOT

* Japan Self Defense Forces

** Ministry of Transport

NOTE: The question of releasing the Machinato Housing Area
(No. 61) upon completion of alternate facilities will
be a specific subject of further discussion.

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LIST C

The installations and sites now used by the Government of the United States of America the whole or part of which will be released on or prior to reversion include the following:

1. Naha Airport
2. Miwa NDB Site
3. Naha Air Force/Navy Annex (Japanese Government use portion)
4. Naha Tank Farm No. 2 (Yogi Gasoline Tank)
5. Naha Wheel
6. White Beach Facilities (Japanese Government use portion)
7. Oku Training Area
8. Sedako Training Area No. 2
9. Motobu Quarry
10. Motobu Auxiliary Airfield
11. Ishikawa Beach
12. Tokashiki Army Annex
13. Haneji Army Annex
14. Kadena Site No. 4
15. Site Oki
16. Site Akamichi
17. Site Kuba
18. USA Police Sub Station Koza
19. Koza Field Office
20. Protective Shelter Awase
21. Naha Field Office
22. Direction Finder Site Sobe, West
23. Kume Shima Air Station (10.99 acres)

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24. Miyako Jima Air Station (24.15 acres)
25. Yozadake Air Station (17.93 acres)
26. Camp Hansen (96.53 acres)
27. Camp Hansen Training Area (43.84 acres)
28. Camp Hauge (13.24 acres)
29. Camp Schwab Training Area (257.76 acres)
30. Higashionna Ammo Storage Annex (234.04 acres)
31. Camp Courtney (97.90 acres)
32. Camp Shields (149 acres)
33. Camp Kubasaki ~~Annex~~ (16 acres)

Note: There are also other installations and sites to be released by virtue of Article VI of the Agreement concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

Attachment No. 8

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN
 PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND
 HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER
 SATO OF JAPAN

1. President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington on November 19, 20 and 21, 1969, to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan.
2. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that both the United States and Japan have greatly benefited from their close association in a variety of fields, and they declared that guided by their common principles of democracy and liberty, the two countries would maintain and strengthen their fruitful cooperation in the continuing search for world peace and prosperity and in particular for the relaxation of international tensions. The President expressed his and his government's deep interest in Asia and stated his belief that the United States and Japan should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister stated that Japan would make further active contributions to the peace and prosperity of Asia.
3. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the current international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to by the President. He further expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.
4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Viet-Nam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Viet-Nam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of

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the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.

5. In light of the current situation and the prospects in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that they highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed the intention of the two governments firmly to maintain the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two governments should maintain close contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion it was agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

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8. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

9. The President and the Prime Minister took note of the fact that there would be a number of financial and economic problems, including those concerning United States business interests in Okinawa, to be solved between the two countries in connection with the transfer of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan and agreed that detailed discussions relative to their solution would be initiated promptly.

10. The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Japanese Government in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both governments. They agreed that the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake overall responsibility for this preparatory work. The President and the Prime Minister decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission in place of the existing Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Preparatory Commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands with the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations to the two governments through the United States-Japan Consultative Committee.

11. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution of the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which is the last of the major issues between the two countries arising from the Second World War, would further strengthen United States-Japan relations which are based on friendship and mutual trust and would make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.

12. In their discussion of economic matters, the President and the Prime Minister noted the marked growth in economic relations between the two countries. They also acknowledged that the leading positions which their countries occupy in the world economy impose important responsibilities on each for the maintenance and strengthening of the international trade and monetary system, especially in the light of the current large imbalances in trade and payments. In this regard, the President stressed his determination to bring inflation in the United States under control. He also reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the principle of promoting freer trade. The Prime Minister indicated the intention of the Japanese Government to accelerate rapidly the reduction of Japan's trade and

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capital restrictions. Specifically, he stated the intention of the Japanese Government to remove Japan's residual import quota restrictions over a broad range of products by the end of 1971 and to make maximum efforts to accelerate the liberalization of the remaining items. He added that the Japanese Government intends to make periodic reviews of its liberalization program with a view to implementing trade liberalization at a more accelerated pace than hitherto. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that their respective actions would further solidify the foundation of overall U.S. -Japan relations.

13. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that attention to the economic needs of the developing countries was essential to the development of international peace and stability. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia commensurate with the economic growth of Japan. The President welcomed this statement and confirmed that the United States would continue to contribute to the economic development of Asia. The President and Prime Minister recognized that there would be major requirements for the post-war rehabilitation of Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to make a substantial contribution to this end.

14. The Prime Minister congratulated the President on the successful moon landing of Apollo XII, and expressed the hope for a safe journey back to earth for the astronauts. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the exploration of space offers great opportunities for expanding cooperation in peaceful scientific projects among all nations. In this connection, the Prime Minister noted with pleasure that the United States and Japan last summer had concluded an agreement on space cooperation. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that implementation of this unique program is of importance to both countries.

15. The President and the Prime Minister discussed prospects for the promotion of arms control and the slowing down of the arms race. The President outlined his Government's efforts to initiate the strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union that have recently started in Helsinki. The Prime Minister expressed his Government's strong hopes for the success of these talks. The Prime Minister pointed out his country's strong and traditional interest in effective disarmament measures with a view to achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

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Attachment No. 9

TEXT OF
UNDER SECRETARY U. ALEXIS JOHNSON'S BACKGROUND PRESS CONFERENCE
THE WHITE HOUSE
NOVEMBER 21, 1969

Under Secretary Johnson was introduced by Mr. Ziegler.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Ziegler.

My purpose in that regard is not to add to or subtract in any way from what has been said, but simply to help you point out what might be the highlights.

First, without being rhetorical or oratorical, I think it is fair to say that this is an historic occasion. This has not been the usual protocolaire, Chief of Government visit, with a communique which contains little of substance, but this has been a negotiation and it is a negotiation which was only completed after the Prime Minister and the President met together.

As the President just said out on the lawn, this opens a new era in our relations. As far as our relations with Japan are concerned, I would say that this is the most important event that has taken place since the Treaty was concluded in 1951, and as you see in the communique, it is a recognition of the fact that this marks the end, you might say, of the post-war era, and as the President said, opening up a new era in relations between the two countries.

Just as a little help in background on this, in some ways you can say that this meeting today, and this communique, goes back to the Prime Minister's visit here in November of 1967, at which time he met with President Johnson.

You will recall at that time that it was in substance agreed that we should seek to achieve the reversion of Okinawa within a few years, and certain steps were taken at that time, looking toward eventual reversion.

You will recall that President Johnson and the Prime Minister at that time said that they should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over those islands to Japan and in the light of the discussion that has been held.

As one of the concrete things that was done, you will recall an advisory committee was formed with one of the highest commissions in Okinawa, looking toward reversion and helping to ease the transition toward reversion.

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As far as the meaning of the communique today, there are two elements, first the communique which you have, and secondly, the Prime Minister's speech that he will be making at the Press Club at noon today. I suggest that those of you who will be doing your deep-think pieces on these things will want to read his speech at the Press Club today, together with the communique, because the two things very much go together.

His speech is going to be released at that time. I will refer to some of the things that he is going to say in that speech, but I would ask you not to use it, or embargo it, rather, until the speech has been made and has been released there.

First, in going through the communique, I simply want to point out a few of the highlights. In paragraph three, you have for the first time in an official Japanese government statement, the recognition that the security of Japan is related to the peace and security of the Far East and directly related to the ability of the United States to carry out its obligations with regard to other countries in the Far East. That is a general statement relating to Japanese security and our security obligations elsewhere in the Far East to the security of Japan.

Then you go on to paragraph four. I want, at this point, to say that that point is also being reaffirmed in the Prime Minister's speech at the Press Club. He is there going to say specifically, "In the real international world, it is impossible adequately to maintain the security of Japan without international peace and security in the Far East."

He is also going to say there, as far as that general statement is concerned, "It would be in accordance with our" -- that is, Japanese national interest -- "interest, for us to determine our response to prior consultation regarding the use of these facilities" -- that is, American facilities in both Japan and Okinawa -- "and areas in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan."

Then in paragraph four of the communique, you first have the specific reference to Korea, in which the flat statement is made that the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan's own security.

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In his speech at the Press Club, the Prime Minister is going to say that if there is an armed attack against the Republic of Korea that the security of Japan would be seriously affected. He goes on to say, "Therefore, should an occasion arise for United States forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas within Japan as a basis for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the government of Japan and toward prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition."

Then in paragraph four, the next mention specifically is Taiwan, in which the statement is made that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan.

In his speech at the Press Club, the Prime Minister is going to say, "That the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for our own security." -- that is, repeating that statement.

"I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments in the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should unfortunately a situation ever occur in which such treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from the outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan."

"Therefore, in view of our national interests, we would deal with that situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition in connection with the fulfillment by the United States of its defense obligations."

Then the next specific mention in paragraph four is of Vietnam. I call your attention to the language there in which it states that if peace should "not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at the time, so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people," etc.

I want to note there that that consultation is consultation that would take place prior to the time of reversion, rather than under the consultation that is provided for under the security treaty.

Next I want to note in paragraph five, the expression of intention on the part of both governments to continue the security treaty in effect indefinitely. This is the first formal reaffirmation by both governments of the intention to continue the security treaty indefinitely.

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As you know, the security treaty provides that as of January 23, 1970, it becomes the same as most treaties we have, and that is, it has a renunciation clause. In the absence of the act of renunciation by either government, the treaty does continue and continues indefinitely, and this is the expression of the intention on the part of both governments that it should do so.

Next, in paragraph six, there is a specific recognition of the importance of our forces in Okinawa as far as the situation in the Far East is concerned. Down about the middle of that paragraph, I will point out that this communique is not the final agreement on Okinawa, but provides that the two governments will immediately enter into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for the reversion of Okinawa and that the target date would be 1972, and that this reversion at that time -- I will point out a very important clause in there -- "Is subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

We have not taken a position with regard to what we would consider necessary here in the way of legislative support. You are familiar with the Byrd Resolution suggesting that it be ratified by the Senate. Other possibilities are present, of course. You could have a joint resolution, but we really do not face this issue until these specific arrangements have been concluded. Negotiations of these arrangements will be long and detailed and under the best of circumstances I would not expect that negotiations would be completed at least until the middle of 1971.

It is only at that time that the issue is faced of what Congressional action would be taken.

Paragraph 7 is also an important paragraph, but I think it is quite evident on the face of it.

Now, paragraph 8 with regard to the nuclear issue:

In effect, this paragraph says that the United States would not exercise the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa at the time reversion takes place, that is in 1972, but you will note that the paragraph very carefully preserves our right to consult with Japan if, in the case of an exceptional situation, we would feel it necessary to do so, and this applies specifically to nuclear weapons.

If an emergency were to arise in this connection, I might say, which would cause us to consider this problem, we do not necessarily assume that if we took that serious a view of the situation the Japanese would not take an equally

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serious view of the situation and the consultation in the paragraph does not necessarily assume that in every case Japan's answer would be no.

Consultation means that they can decide either way, yes or no. I think the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have several times spoken on this subject.

Paragraph 9 notes that there is going to be a large number of very technical and financial and economic problems to be settled between the two governments and this paragraph also specifically takes account of American business interests now in Okinawa and that those interests will be properly the subject of the detailed negotiations that will be taking place from now on.

Paragraph 10 places the responsibilities for the detailed negotiations upon the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo. This is formed of an Ambassador, Ambassador Meyer and the Foreign Minister, but in addition, sets up a Preparatory Commission in the Ryukyu Islands to work at this of which a representative of the Japanese Government is of an Ambassadorial rank and the United States High Commissioner which is now General Lampert, that you know, who will now participate with the government of the Ryukyu Islands also having a role.

I call your attention to paragraph 12 in which the Prime Minister specifically indicates the intention of the Japanese Government to accelerate the reduction of their trade and capital restrictions and makes some definite statements in that regard, and paragraph 13 in which the Prime Minister expresses the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia as well as in the last sentence of that paragraph, the intention of the Japanese Government to make a substantial contribution to post-war rehabilitation in Vietnam.

Some of these themes will also be repeated in the Prime Minister's speech today.

I should have said at the outset that this communique has been the result of long negotiations, going back really to April of this year when, as you know, there was a meeting of the National Security Council on the subject of our relations with Japan and Okinawa, and certain tentative decisions were reached at that time.

Subsequently, Mr. Sneider in the State Department was sent out to work with Ambassador Meyer and the Japanese Government in negotiating on this and the point of negotiations has been in Tokyo primarily with Ambassador Meyer and Mr.

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Sneider. But the final decisions on it were not made until after the President's conversations here with Prime Minister Sato which you know have extended over many hours and have been very intimate.

For the most part it has been just the two of them talking together. As you also know, the two of them have known each other for many years and there was a close personal relationship here which I think has greatly facilitated the complicated problems that both governments face on this issue.

Having said this, I will open myself for questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, there is no reference in the communique to textiles. Can you tell us what was talked about on this?

MR. JOHNSON: As you know, Spence, negotiations are going on in Geneva on textiles at the present time. We feel that some progress is being made there.

Q Is the target date for removing nuclear weapons if all goes well the date of reversion?

MR. JOHNSON: The date of reversion-- I want to point out that until reversion takes place, until it actually takes place, the United States continues to exercise all the rights and all the privileges that it now enjoys. I think, of course, it is quite clear from the communique that following reversion there is no question of the United States withdrawing from its bases in Okinawa, but we will continue to utilize the bases and facilities there.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there any effort made to define more carefully what "prior consultation" means?

As you know in the past the Japanese have tended to interpret this as getting their approval and the Americans have tended to interpret it as "informing the Japanese Government."

MR. JOHNSON: In the Kiichi-Eisenhower communique of 1960 it was agreed that prior consultation meant agreement between the two governments. There was no attempt to change that, in fact, it wasn't discussed. But you will see the whole background of the communique is based around the Japanese Government taking certain positions or making certain statements of intention of what its attitude would be on specific questions if the question of consultation should arise.

I think it is quite clear from the whole context of the communique that Japan is saying that consultation does

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not necessarily mean that its attitude is going to be negative in these particular situations.

Q Mr. Secretary, this was the same area that I wanted to ask about, but I would like to be absolutely clear on this, does this mean then that the United States is now agreeing that in case of an emergency and we feel that we need nuclear weapons on bases in Japan and Okinawa and the Japanese Government, after consultation, says no, we agree not to bring nuclear weapons in and will not do so?

MR. JOHNSON: I would say that we would only do so if we had the agreement of the Japanese Government and that has always been the situation. It doesn't change that situation at all.

But I would also point out that these general statements here with regard to Japanese attitudes in consultation with respect to Korea and Taiwan and so on apply not only with respect to Okinawa, but also to our base in Southeast Japan proper, which makes somewhat of a change in that regard.

Q In reference to the nuclear provisions what ~~was~~ the understanding with Japan on signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?

MR. JOHNSON: They have expressed their intention of signing it shortly. We have no specific statement in the communique on that, but I would expect that they would be signing it shortly.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any indications that in the event of an attack on Korea and Formosa the Japanese would go beyond their implicit agreement to permit you to move nuclear weapons and troops from Japanese bases and Okinawa bases?

MR. JOHNSON: No, we do not.

Q Nothing more than that?

MR. JOHNSON: Nothing more than that. But I would point out very importantly that the communique notes that at the time the reversion takes place the Japanese will take on the same responsibilities gradually for the defense of Okinawa as they have for the defense of Japan proper.

As you know, Japan does have and does exercise the prime responsibility for the immediate conventional defense of Japan proper. This will mean an extension of Japanese defense responsibilities to the area of the Ryukyus. This means a further geographical extension.

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Q I was not referring to an attack on Okinawa.

MR. JOHNSON: I understand that.

Q What provision was made here for sharing of nuclear weapons similar to NATO?

MR. JOHNSON: There is none.

Q Is there a complete renunciation of nuclear weapons?

MR. JOHNSON: This was not discussed. There is no such arrangement here.

Q Paragraph 7, in the last part you referred to the effective discharge of international relations. What connotation do you put on the word of "effective discharge"? Does it apply to the effective use of nuclear arms?

MR. JOHNSON: I would not say that. It does imply that whatever is required to make the bases effective. In some cases, it may be nuclear arms, in some cases, it may not.

Q How much of an expansion of these armed forces would be necessary to take over the defense of Okinawa?

MR. JOHNSON: They are making budgetary plans on this now. I think there have been some announcements on it. Exactly what it will require, I don't know.

As you know they are already expanding somewhat their budget on defense matters. As I recall it, their defense budget this year is about \$1.4 billion. The present five-year defense plan ends in 1972 at which time another five-year plan will go into effect.

I have seen public statements by them that the next plan will be double the last plan. In this connection, I might point out that the popular impression that Japan, you know, is defenseless as far as its own forces is concerned, is simply not correct.

I refer to the statement I made that they now have the primary responsibility for their immediate conventional defense. They have some 13 divisions of ground forces. They have some 800 jet aircraft, including an F-104 that has been built there. They are now working on building the F-4. They are working on the Nike, Hercules and Hawk there. They have about 150,000 tons in their naval forces at the present time.

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As far as its own immediate direct conventional defense is concerned, Japan has a very considerable force. It undoubtedly will require some expansion but they are taking account of that. To the degree of course that they take on that role with respect to Okinawa, it will somewhat relieve us as far as that role is concerned.

Q Japanese forces will be charged with the responsibility for defending American bases in Okinawa?

MR. JOHNSON: Perhaps you can say so in the same sense that they are in Japan proper. The immediate conventional defense in Japan proper -- the American bases are present in Japan. Japan has a role as far as its own defense is concerned and as far as it exercises that role this is protecting American bases also.

Q Is it your understanding that whatever understanding is arrived at will have to be approved by the Japanese Diet?

MR. JOHNSON: I haven't discussed this in detail. I think that their assumption is that it does. I think that they expect they will have to obtain Diet approval.

Q Is there any distinction being made between offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. The wording here in paragraph 8 --

MR. JOHNSON: I will interrupt to say no, there has been no discussion or distinction made between them. But if the question of consultation would arise, of course that distinction might possibly arise but there was no discussion of that.

Q Is it your understanding that the Japanese Government's thinking right now is shifting in the direction which might make it possible for them to want to have anti-aircraft weapons or anti-missile weapons?

MR. JOHNSON: We are talking about two different things. We are talking about an American weapons system and a Japanese weapons system. I am discussing only the American weapons system.

Q If the Japanese thinking is that the nuclear weapons of a defensive capability could be held in Japan would that raise the possibility of Americans having them in Japan for their bases?

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MR. JOHNSON: Japanese thinking has not gone that far yet. Although the subject is being very vigorously discussed.

Q This communique by saying the way the Prime Minister described it here sort of pins you down to a position. If the position changes, would a further communique come out later?

MR. JOHNSON: The consultation formula leaves it open. That is the purpose of the consultation formula.

Q Was there any discussion of which specific product will be removed from the quota restrictions and was there any discussion of how much percentagewise the Japanese Government would contribute to the remobilization of Vietnam?

MR. JOHNSON: As far as the quotas are concerned, there have been a lot of detailed discussions on the economic level on that. Mr. Trezise was out there a month or six weeks ago. There was some further discussion here at what you might call the technical level on this.

Frankly, I am just not entirely clear to what degree specific items were identified. There has been a lot of discussion about specific items, but I am not clear exactly as to what degree it has been identified.

As far as the additional aid is concerned, no, this was not tied down in exact dollars and exact percentages, but it is a serious statement of intent on the part of the Japanese government that we accept and think that it does have substantial content.

Q Does this also include the possibility of a Japanese peace-keeping force in Vietnam under international supervision?

MR. JOHNSON: I should have mentioned that in his speech at noon today, the Prime Minister is going to specifically say -- this will be also something new, in addition -- "I believe that Japan's role should be, naturally, to cooperate in the rehabilitation and development of the economy of the Indo Chinese peninsula, and if we are asked to participate in and to cooperate with, in the manner best suited to Japan, any international peace-keeping machinery which may be set up after the cessation of hostilities, -- I have left something out here. "I believe that Japan's role should be naturally to cooperate in" -- What he is saying here is that Japan will participate in any international peace-keeping machinery which may be set up in Vietnam.

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That is in the speech, yes. Again, I want to emphasize that that is embargoed until he gives it. I am taking the liberty of using it so as to try to help you unite these things together.

MR. ZIEGLER: I think there are some of those here who would like to leave to go to the luncheon which was referred to. Feel free to leave at this time.

Those who want to remain for a few additional moments, may stay. We have time for only a few more questions. The Under Secretary has about five more minutes and we will take a few questions.

Q Is there an implication here that Japanese troops could be used in the defense of Korea?

MR. JOHNSON: No, I would not read that into this communique. It just doesn't deal with the subject at all. But I think the important thing is that Japan is specifically recognizing that the defense of Korea is directly related to its own security.

Q What does that mean, then?

MR. JOHNSON: As far as the purposes of this communique are concerned, it means the use of American bases and facilities in both Japan and Okinawa. I think it would be wrong to read more into that at this time, but I would note that this represents a somewhat considerable change in Japanese public position on these matters.

Q Mr. Secretary, when the agreements are written up on the reversion, will the writing include some reference to the defense of Korea and defense of China?

MR. JOHNSON: Exactly how the detailed arrangements we talk about here are going to be written up and how it will incorporate the material that is contained here remains to be worked out. This is going to be the job that Ambassador Meyer and Mr. Sneider are going to have out in Tokyo to work out with the Japanese foreign office. We have not really come to grips with that problem.

Q But the principle is established here that unless the Japanese specifically agree that there is a emergency which the United States thinks it is, unless they specifically agree, our hands are tied as far as the use of Okinawa for defense operations?

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MR. JOHNSON: No. I don't quite get your question. It doesn't change that situation at all. As you recall, as far as the consultation clauses of the treaty are concerned, and its associated documents, that applies primarily to the introduction of nuclear weapons or to combat operations mounted directly from Japanese territory.

Now, during the Vietnam war, of course, we have been utilizing our bases in Japan, not for mounting combat operations directly into Vietnam, but for the support of our forces there. Units are rotated back and forth and logistic support is maintained from Japan.

I don't want to get into the theology on this, but in general, combat operations have been understood by both governments, may I say implicitly understood by both governments, to mean clearly and specifically an American aircraft taking off from a Japanese base, bombing another area and coming back to a Japanese base. Otherwise, movements of forces, movements of aircraft, movements of ships not involving mounting combat operations directly from Japan are not involved and do not require consultation or agreement by both governments.

Q That is what I was referring to, the side of the aircraft taking off from Japanese territory, or Japan, and bombing another craft. That, after 1972, would have to have specific agreement of the Japanese?

MR. JOHNSON: That is correct.

Q And if they did not agree, then we could not do it?

MR. JOHNSON: That is correct, but this document sets forth the standards the Japanese will use and apply in determining what their answer is going to be. That is the importance of this document.

Q How important is it that they will not automatically say no? That is the framework you put your contention in, considering it is considerably more of a strategic value in this case than the bases in Mainland Japan.

MR. JOHNSON: Well, I don't know whether in some ways it is more strategic in regard to some areas and not in others. Up to now, as you know, Japan has generally taken the attitude that the treaty and our bases apply only to the defense of Japan and that Japan was not interested in the defense of anything else. That is the important thing that has taken place, that Japan is interested and involved in the defense of other areas.

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Q So it is the whole ball of wax?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes. In one degree you can say our theoretical form of action, in part theoretical because we have to take account of political realities both in Okinawa and Japan, theoretically our actions may be curtailed with respect to Okinawa, but our theoretical action with respect to bases in Japan is theoretically enlarged. So you have to balance these things off.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have made the Prime Minister's speech at the Press Club today a document of almost equal importance with the communique?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, I have.

Q I find it somewhat unusual to get a White House briefing about a speech by a Foreign Minister that is being given somewhere else. Can you tell us why the sentiments that are expressed in the speech are not expressed in the communique itself?

MR. JOHNSON: Let me make it clear that the speech at the Press Club has not been a subject of negotiations between us. The Prime Minister has said in the course of our negotiations that he intended to say these things and we have taken account of the fact that he does intend to say these things.

It is one thing for the Prime Minister of a country to make unilateral statements of policy on his own. It presents another kind of a program for the Prime Minister to make statements jointly in a communique of this kind. He feels -- and I agree -- that in many ways it has more force for the Prime Minister to be making these statements as a Head of Government, as a statement of Japanese Government policy, than it does to mix it up in a communique. That is the reason I have referred to both of these items, because the two things go together and in agreeing to what we agreed to in the communique we did take account of the fact that he was also going to make this statement of policy on behalf of the Japanese Government.

Q Within the realities of nuclear warfare these days, how realistic is it to talk about prior consultations on the basing and storing of weapons in that area?

MR. JOHNSON: I think it is realistic. These things don't develop ---

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Q You are assuming a strategic warning time?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes. In general, of course, as you know, the importance of our right to store nuclear weapons in Okinawa relates more importantly to the tactical type weapon than it does to the strategic type weapon. So, I think it should be clear that whereas there might be some increase in reaction time, that as far as our posture in the whole area is concerned, we can make new dispositions and new arrangements that will minimize the problem as far as deterrence is concerned.

I don't think either Peking or Pyongyang should assume that this is going to result in any serious degradation of our deterrent posture in that area.

Q In the light of the EC-121 and PUEBLO cases did the subject of reconnaissance missions from Japanese bases come up at all and did we take the position that we did not need to consult with them about this?

MR. JOHNSON: No, the subject did not come up.

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GIST

—A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations primarily for Government use. Not intended as a comprehensive U.S. policy statement.



BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OKINAWA REVERSION: U.S. POLICY

No. 53

What are the probable consequences of the return of Okinawa to Japan?

1. Background: The United States and Japan, on June 17, signed a treaty calling for the return of Okinawa to Japanese rule. The treaty, which must be confirmed by the U.S. Senate and the Japanese Diet, will bring to an end more than twenty-five years of U.S. occupation, dating back to Japan's surrender in World War II. (The 1951 peace treaty between the U.S. and Japan called for U.S. retention of the Daito and Ryukyu Islands, of which Okinawa is the largest.)
2. Basis for Decision.
 - The reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule is essential to the preservation of good relations with Japan, our most important Asian ally. In the quarter of a century since World War II, Japan has become the world's third largest economic power, and is now the largest overseas customer for U.S. goods.
 - It is understandable that both the people and the government of this important ally and trading partner wish to see an end to U.S. administration of these islands with their one million Japanese residents.
3. Treaty Provisions: The treaty calls for:
 - The U.S. to relinquish rights to the Ryukyu and Daito Islands;
 - The application to Okinawa of all U.S.-Japan treaties now in force.
 - Japan to provide the U.S. with military areas and facilities on Okinawa under terms of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; (The U.S. will carry out reversion in a way that is consistent with Japanese policy in regard to nuclear weapons. That policy prohibits the manufacture, possession or introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory).
 - Japan to pay the United States \$320 million to compensate the U.S. for stationary assets as well as for reversion-related costs;
 - Japan to permit the Voice of America to continue relay broadcasting for five years after reversion, with consultation on future VOA activities two years after reversion.

(over)

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4. No Major Policy Shift: The reversion of Okinawa is not a give-away of American territory. From the time of the peace treaty with Japan we have recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa. John Foster Dulles, as an adviser to President Truman in 1951, first enunciated this policy. It has been confirmed by every succeeding American President. The U.S. has long been committed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japanese administration.
5. Military Implications of Treaty.
 - The U.S. will retain all its essential bases under provisions of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security, which both governments have decided to continue indefinitely.
 - Both countries recognize their mutual security interests in the Far East. In the joint communique issued after the November 1969 meeting of President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato, the Japanese Prime Minister stressed the importance to Japan of U.S. ability to carry out fully its security obligations in the area. He called for the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out without detriment to the security of the Far East.
 - Japan will assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa itself. (This will result in yearly savings to the U.S. of about \$35 million.) To assist Japan to do so the U.S. will turn over some of its facilities to Japan as soon as possible after reversion.
6. Financial Implications: The \$320 million payment is largely for Japanese acquisition of civil assets such as highways and utilities that the U.S. built during the occupation. It also covers such other items as increased labor costs, and the relocation of U.S. military facilities. In addition:
 - The reversion will relieve the United States of on-going costs which will result in savings of over \$300 million during the first five years after the reversion.
 - Legitimate American private and professional interests are protected and continued; no significant reduction in the activities of U.S. firms now operating on Okinawa is expected after reversion. American lawyers resident in Okinawa will be able to continue to practice; and American doctors can do so for five years, or until they pass the Japanese medical examination (given in English or Japanese). American airlines will maintain their international routes through Okinawa with no charge for five years after reversion, under our bilateral aviation agreement.

FURTHER REFERENCE: . Dept. of State press release No. 133, June 17, 1971 concerning the signing of the Ryukyu Islands Agreement by Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign Affairs Minister Kiichi Aichi.

OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY1. Reversion Policy

- Reversion means Okinawa's return to Japanese administration and under full Japanese sovereignty.
- Reversion is not a give-away of something American. From the time of the Peace Treaty with Japan, which gave us administrative rights over Okinawa, we have recognized Japan's residual sovereignty over Okinawa. John Foster Dulles first enunciated this policy in 1951, and it has since been confirmed by every American President. Thus the U.S. has long been committed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan's administration.
- The reversion treaty is essential to the preservation of good relations with Japan, our major Asian ally. The political mood in Japan makes it clear that a sound and enduring relationship with Japan could not exist in the presence of continued U.S. administration of one million Japanese on Japanese soil. It would be too much to ask of the pride of a nation, now the world's third economic power, to permit this status to continue beyond a quarter of a century after the end of hostilities.
- Reversion is also the goal of the overwhelming majority of the Okinawans, who are Japanese culturally and ethnically. They have made this clear in a variety of ways, including numerous resolutions by their elected legislators, the campaign platforms of all their parties, and large scale public demonstrations. A decision by the United States to deny or significantly delay, reversion would be met by widespread unrest and hostility in Okinawa, making it extremely difficult, and probably impossible, to effectively operate our base structure there.

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2. Military Implications of Reversion

- The U.S. will retain all its essential bases under the provisions of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (so-called Security Treaty) and its related arrangements. Both governments have decided to continue this treaty indefinitely. The treaty has provided a satisfactory foundation for our bases in Japan proper and should do so for Okinawa as well.
- U.S. bases on Okinawa can continue to operate effectively after reversion under the only major condition on their use under the Security Treaty: The Prior Consultation Formula. This formula provides for: (1) Prior Consultation with Japan (in effect Japanese agreement) concerning the use of bases in Japan for combat operations. The prior consultation provision does not apply to logistics or support operations. (2) Prior consultations concerning major changes in deployments of U.S. forces into Japan. (3) Prior consultations concerning major changes in their equipment (e.g., nuclear weapons). The U.S. thus foregoes its present right unilaterally to introduce or store nuclear weapons in Okinawa.
- In view of Japan's increasing awareness of its stake in the security of the Far East, the prior consultations provisions are not expected to hinder the continued effective operations of our Okinawa bases.

(In the joint communique issued after President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met November 19-21, 1969, Prime Minister Sato stressed that the U.S. should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations; he stated that the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan; that the security of Korea is essential to Japan's security and that peace and security in the

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Taiwan area were also important. He stated that reversion should be carried out without detriment to the security of the Far East.

In a major policy speech in Washington immediately after that meeting with the President, Prime Minister Sato stated that if Korea were attacked, the Security of Japan would be seriously affected...and that the policy of the GOJ in prior consultations would be to decide its position positively and promptly. He stated that the determination of the U.S. to uphold its treaty commitment to the Government of the Republic of China should be appreciated...and that if the treaty commitments have to be invoked because of an attack, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan.)

- Japan will assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa. This will result in substantial savings for the U.S. (about \$35 million per year). The U.S. will turn some of its facilities over to the Japanese so that they can assume these responsibilities as soon as possible after reversion.

3. Financial Implications

- The reversion agreement includes a substantial Japanese payment of \$320 million to cover the Japanese acquisition of civil assets such as the utilities companies and highways which the U.S. built and owns and to cover costs which the U.S. incurs as a result of reversion; e.g., increased labor costs, and relocation of military facilities.
- Reversion also will relieve the U.S. of substantial costs:
 - defense costs (mentioned above): about \$35 million/year.
 - land rentals: about \$10 million/year. Until reversion we pay to rent land on which our bases

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are located; after reversion the Japanese Government must, in accordance with the Security Treaty, provide these bases rent free.

- administrative costs: About \$20 million/year. This was the cost of running the U.S. Civil Administration including its aid program prior to the decision to begin reversion negotiations. The figure has been drastically reduced already in anticipation of reversion.
- and restoration costs: unknown figure, but estimated to be \$20 million. U.S. is now obligated to restore to its original condition land used for bases when we eventually return the land to its owners. The Japanese will have this obligation after reversion.

4. Private American Business and Professional Interests

- The reversion arrangements provide for the protection and continuation of legitimate American private and professional interests. With few specific exceptions, Japan will automatically revalidate the business licenses of American companies on Okinawa. The exceptions are large companies which are by their own choice working out special arrangements with the Japanese authorities.
- American lawyers resident on Okinawa and having a continuous practice there prior to January 17, 1971 will be able to continue their practices.
- American doctors will be able to continue their practice for at least five years after reversion. (None of the American doctors presently on Okinawa plan to remain as long as five years.)
- American airlines will maintain their international routes through Naha with no charge under our bilateral aviation agreement for the first five years after reversion.

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5. Voice of America

- The Voice of America will be able to continue its relay broadcasting for five years after reversion. Two years after reversion the U.S. and Japan will consult on the question of further operations. If it is decided that VOA should cease operating after five years, the Japanese will pay for construction of a comparable station elsewhere.

SUMMARY OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION
AGREEMENT AND RELATED ARRANGEMENTS

The Agreement consists of a preamble and nine articles. The preamble recalls President Nixon's meeting with Prime Minister Sato in November 1969 and notes that the two Governments have reaffirmed that the reversion of Okinawa is to be carried out on the basis of the Joint Communiqué issued on November 21, 1969. A copy of that Communiqué is attached. It expresses inter alia the intention of both Governments to maintain the United States - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (which will also apply to Okinawa after reversion), Japan's recognition of its stake in the security of the Far East, and Japan's view that Okinawa reversion should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan.

The preamble also recites the willingness of the United States to relinquish its rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace and Japan's willingness to

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assume full responsibility and authority over the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

Under paragraph 1 of Article I the United States relinquishes in favor of Japan its rights and interests with respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, and Japan assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all governmental powers over these islands. Paragraph 2 of Article I defines these islands for the purpose of the Agreement. An agreed minute to Article I describes the territory by geographical coordinates.

Article II confirms that treaties and other agreements between the United States and Japan become applicable to the Islands upon reversion.

Paragraph 1 of Article III commits Japan to grant the United States upon reversion the use of military facilities and areas in Okinawa in accordance with the 1960 United States - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements. By a Memorandum of Understanding concerning Article III, the two Governments have agreed upon the specific facilities and areas to be granted for use by the United States armed forces upon reversion, pursuant to the provisions of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of

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Mutual Cooperation and Security, regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (the so-called SOFA).

Paragraph 2 of Article III refers to the provisions of the SOFA which exempt the United States from any obligation to restore facilities and areas to their original condition upon their return and which exempts Japan from any obligation to compensate the United States for any improvements made by the United States on facilities and areas which are returned to the Government of Japan. This paragraph fixes the condition of the property for purposes of these exemptions as that existing at the time United States armed forces first used the facilities and areas. It also clarifies that Japan need make no specific compensation to the United States for improvements in facilities and areas made prior to reversion.

Under Article IV Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the United States and its nationals and against local authorities arising out of the United States administration of the Islands, except for certain claims specifically recognized under United States law or local laws applicable during the United States administration (which include the claims set forth in the Agreed Minute to Article IV).

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Paragraph 2 of Article IV grants authority to the United States to maintain a claims office on Okinawa to settle any claims remaining after reversion. Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that the United States will make ex gratia contributions to Japanese nations whose lands in the Islands were damaged prior to July 1, 1950, and were released from the use of United States authorities after June 30, 1961. The United States has made ex gratia contributions in respect of such lands released prior to July 1, 1961. In Paragraph 4 of Article IV Japan recognizes the validity of all official acts and omissions of the United States during the period of its administration.

Article V concerns civil and criminal jurisdiction. Paragraph 1 provides Japanese recognition of the validity of final judgments rendered before reversion in civil cases. It obligates Japan to continue such judgments in full force and effect. Paragraph 2 and 3 provide for the assumption by Japan of jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases pending at the time of reversion without in any way affecting the substantive rights involved. Paragraph 4 provides that Japan may continue the execution of any final criminal judgments rendered prior to reversion. An agreed minute to Article V deals with the question of exercise of criminal jurisdiction

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over members of United States armed forces with respect to offenses committed prior to reversion: Japan will not exercise jurisdiction over such cases.

Article VI transfers to the Government of Japan certain properties of the United States. The major part of such properties consists of public utility corporations. During the period of its administration the United States created certain new lands by reclamation from the sea, or otherwise acquired such lands. These reclaimed lands also will become the property of the Government of Japan upon reversion. The United States is not obliged to compensate Japan or its nationals for any alteration made prior to reversion to lands upon which properties to be transferred to the Government of Japan are located.

Article VII constitutes the payment provision of the Agreement. Considering, inter alia, the transfer of assets to the Government of Japan under Article VI, the fact that reversion will be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Government of Japan as described in paragraph 8 of the Joint Communique of November 12, 1969, and certain extra costs borne by the Government of the United States resulting from reversion, the Japanese Government will pay the United States \$320 million in stated installments within five years of reversion. The first installment of \$100 million is

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to be paid within one week after reversion.

Article VIII contains authority for the Voice of America relay station on Okinawa to continue in operation for a period of five years after reversion, with consultations regarding future operation of the station to begin two years after reversion. Additional details regarding the operation of the Voice of America station are contained in an exchange of notes concerning the Voice of America facility on Okinawa.

Article IX provides for ratification of the Agreement and for its entry into force two months after the instruments of ratification are exchanged. In accordance with Article I, reversion will take place on the date the Agreement enters into force.

Certain important arrangements involved in Okinawa reversion are dealt with in other documents. These include arrangements concerning the treatment of foreign nationals and firms on Okinawa, the assumption by Japan of the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa, and commercial air services to and through Okinawa.

The arrangement concerning the treatment of foreign nationals and firms is contained in a letter of June 17, 1971, from the Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi to Ambassador Meyer.

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The letter sets forth the policies decided upon by the Japanese Government respecting points that were of major concern to American business and professional interests in Okinawa. The provisions of the letter were worked out after close consultations with representatives of the business and professional community on Okinawa, and we believe that the arrangement should provide a satisfactory basis for their continued operations in the post-reversion period.

The Arrangement concerning Assumption by Japan of the Responsibility for the Immediate Defense of Okinawa, signed on June 29, 1971 on behalf of the United States Department of Defense and the Japan Defense Agency, sets forth the agreed modalities for necessary coordination in connection with the deployment of Japanese Self Defense Forces in Okinawa after reversion. The Arrangement provides for Japanese takeover or joint use of certain installations or sites now used by United States forces on Okinawa, describes generally the missions and strengths of the Japanese forces to be deployed to Okinawa following reversion, and sets timetables for full assumption of the missions described.

A Memorandum of Understanding of June 17, 1971 concerning air services to and through Okinawa after reversion preserves

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existing traffic rights for American commercial air carriers now serving Okinawa. In addition there will be a five year "no charge" period following reversion during which the benefits American carriers receive by serving Okinawa will not be taken into account in calculating the overall balance of benefits which the United States receives under the bilateral Civil Air Transport Agreement with Japan.

The Agreement and related documents take account of essential American interests in Okinawa and the Far East. Under the Agreement the United States will retain its essential military bases on Okinawa under provisions of the United States - Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has proved very satisfactory in Japan proper. The treaty arrangements and Japan's recognition of its own stake in the security of the Far East should ensure effective operation of our bases on Okinawa and contribute to peace and security in the region.

More fundamentally, Okinawa's reversion will resolve the last remaining issue between the United States and Japan arising from World War II. Reversion is essential to the preservation and further development of relations with Japan. It will fulfill our pledge to the people of Japan and Okinawa and will enable them to realize their goal of reunifying Okinawa with Japan. It will, in short, be a unique historic act reflecting both the strength of the ties between the United States and Japan and the

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

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SUBJECT: OKINAWA REVERSION: THIRD PHASE OF GOJ OKINAWA REVERSION
COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM ADOPTED
AT CABINET MEETING SEPTEMBER 3, GOJ ADOPTED THIRD PHASE
OF OKINAWA REVERSION COUNTERMEASURES PROGRAM. THIS
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Okinawa Pact

Secretary of State Rogers signs Okinawa treaty while Japanese Ambassador Ushiba looks on. In the background are, from left, Adm. Moorer, Army Secretary Resor, Undersecretary Johnson and Defense Secretary Laird. Story, Page A20.

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exit from the premiership as the removal of nuclear weapons as part of a total \$145 million for military and justice. But Sato's opponents in his expansion of the island in the foreseeable future.

U.S., Japan Sign Pact on Return of Okinawa

By Selig S. Harrison
Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, June 17—The United States formally pledged to return Okinawa to Japan today in a controversial agreement reaffirming the continued role of the island as the pivotal American base complex in the western Pacific.

Demonstrators protesting the military provisions of the accord snake-danced through the streets here while Secretary of State Rogers and foreign Minister Aichi put the final seal on 18 months of delicate negotiations in simultaneous, televised ceremonies linked by satellite relay. Prime Minister Sato also attended the signing in Tokyo.

Japanese officials made no secret of their irritation that President Nixon had decided against attending the White House signing ceremonies.

Despite Japanese official explanations dismissing the decision as a matter of protocol, government sources pointed out that the United States did not send final word on the President's plans until late last night.

The general belief here is that Nixon meant to convey continuing displeasure with Japanese trade policies.

[A high State Department official said in Washington that President Nixon did not attend the signing ceremony because it is not customary since he is not only the head of the government but also head of the state.]

In the Tokyo proceedings, the ghost at the banquet was Okinawa's popular governor, Chobyo Yara, who politely but firmly rejected an invitation from Sato to attend the signing.

Yara won landslide election

in 1968 on a platform demanding removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa. He voiced regret in a statement today that the agreement left most key U.S. military installations on the island untouched and did not "directly, specifically, and unambiguously" promise the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons.

In the unprecedented, trans-Pacific signing ceremonies, Rogers signed two copies of the agreement in English, and Japanese signed by Aichi here earlier this week at the same moment that the foreign minister in Tokyo added his signature to another set already completed by Rogers.

Sato, and his entire cabinet watched the signing in the grand hall of his heavily guarded official residence. Unsmiling, Sato said in a brief speech that he hoped ratification of the agreement by the Diet (parliament) and the U.S. Congress would "take place at the earliest opportunity in 1972."

Japanese leaders are increasingly nervous in the face of reports that the agreement is under fire from members of Congress seeking to curb Japanese textile imports. The Japanese government hopes Okinawa will be returned by next April in time for the start of the fiscal year here but appears reconciled to the possibility that congressional scheduling might delay the return until July.

Sato, whose term expires in September, 1972, has been telling intimates that he might call national elections immediately following the island's return and make a triumphant exit from the premiership as the man who got Okinawa back for Japan.

But Sato's opponents in his

ruling liberal Democratic Party are seeking to force him out sooner, pointing to trade disputes with the United States, China policy and high prices as reasons for an early change of leadership.

Police reported that 329 demonstrators were arrested in Tokyo tonight, including 62 women, and that 25 riot policemen were injured, three seriously, when students threw explosives. The turnout of some 50,000 was relatively small in contrast with past demonstrations here at the time of Sato's departure for his Okinawa discussions with President Nixon in November, 1969.

The most immediate political impact of the reversion agreement will come in the forthcoming elections for the Upper House of the Diet on June 27.

Government supporters have assumed that the signing would give psychological lift to their campaign but find that the opposition, too, sees potential political paydirt in the agreement.

The nuclear issue is still explosive here 25 years after Hiroshima, and opposition campaigners are asking why the agreement fails to spell out reported U.S. plans to remove nuclear weapons now deployed or stored on the island.

There is no direct reference to the issue of any kind in the agreement. However, Japanese and U.S. officials point to article seven of the agreement in response to queries on the nuclear question, suggesting that Japan's \$320 million payment cited there to cover "extra" costs associated with reversion includes a \$70 million item for the removal of nuclear weapons as part of a total \$145 million for military readjustment on the island in the foreseeable

future. Out of 74,000 acres currently held by the United States for military bases, only 12,800 will be returned to Japan. Article seven also states that the United States is carrying out reversion "in a manner consistent with" Japanese policy as set forth in paragraph eight of the 1969 Nixon-Sato communique. This paragraph, in turn, refers to Japan's "particular sentiments" regarding nuclear weapons and implies that the United States would remove nuclear weapons prior to reversion, provided that this was "without prejudice to the prior consultation system" under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Since the "prior consultation" system would give the United States the right to reintroduce nuclear weapons if the Japanese government agreed, opposition critics make a double-barreled attack on the agreement. Mace-B missiles now on the island are removed, they warn against possible secret storage of tactical nuclear weapons, and even if these cannot be uncovered, they warn that the United States might reintroduce nuclear arms someday with the connivance of hawkish elements in the Japanese military.

One of the major focal points of suspicion on the nuclear issue is that three companies of nuclear-capable Nike-Hercules ground-to-air missiles with 36 launchers are being transferred to the Japanese self-defense forces by the United States under an annex to the agreement.

Apart from continuing nuclear suspicions, the major area of controversy surrounding the agreement is the fact that U.S. military installations and military personnel will not diminish substantially on the island in the foreseeable

future. Out of 74,000 acres currently held by the United States for military bases, only 12,800 will be returned to Japan.

The agreement gives the United States the indefinite continued use of 54 major military installations, including the giant Kadena air base, and provides for the transfer to Japan of portions of 34 others, 22 at the time of reversion and the remainder when the Japanese self-defense forces are ready to take them over.

At present, the United States maintains 51,000 military personnel on the island. The rapid growth of pro-China sentiment here is one of

the major factors accounting for the political sensitivity of the agreement. Several commentators on the semigovernment Japan Broadcasting Corporation networks stressed tonight that Japan might be drifting into rigidly anti-Peking posture as a result of its military links with the United States on Okinawa.