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Marguerite K. Kennedy

MARGUERITE K. KENNEDY
Chief, Archives Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
Research Center

Billie H. Hix

BILLIE H. HIX
Chief, Technical Systems Branch
The Albert F. Simpson Historical
Research Center





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

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

JULY 1955 – DECEMBER 1955

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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1955

William G. Hipps

WILLIAM G. HIPPS
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Prepared for the 313th Air Division Historical Division by the following personnel:

Mr. Wayne G. Peterson	Command Historian
Mrs. Ruth N. Broyles	Clerk-Typist
Mrs. Jimmie G. Yelton	Clerk-Typist

(14 August 1956)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239)

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
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Kin Tranning and Camp
Kin Mumbi
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Ishikawa Beach (Recreational Facilities)
Okinawa Engineer District
Camp Kue
Camp Sukiran Area
Kadena Air Base
Futema Airfield
Yontan Airfield
Yomitan Airfield
Naha Port
Naha Military Compound
Naha Port Area
Naha Airport
Naha Post Office
Naha Dependent High School
Kokusai Housing Area
Kokusai Dori
Kadena-Chatan Highway
Kadena-Yomitan Highway
Kadena-Kin Highway
Kadena-Ishikawa Highway
Kadena-Gushikawa Highway
Kadena-Yonabaru Highway
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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1955

6 July — Major General Thomas A. Wornham assumes command of the 3d Marine Division, vice Major General James P. Riseley.

11 July — Curtis Delano Sluman, Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division, assumes command of the 313th Air Division, vice Major General Fay Roscoe Upthegrove, who rotates to the ZI, per 313th AD GO 25, dtd. 11 July 1955.

The 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing moves PCS to Clark AFB, Philippine Islands.

15 July — The 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, moves PCS from Clark AFB to Kadena AB, where it is attached to the 18th FBW for all purposes. The 18th FBW remains assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force, though attached to the 313th Air Division for all purposes.

18 July — Detachment 3, 6932d Communications Security Squadron, 6920th Security Wing, is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administrative and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 26, dtd. 18 July 1955 and GO 37, dtd. 6 Oct. 1955.

21 July — Wilber M. Brucker succeeds Robert T. Stevens as Secretary of the Army.

25 July — General Isaac D. White assumes command of Army Forces, Far East/Eighth Army, vice General Lyman L. Lemnitzer.

30 July — The first six U.S. atomic cannon to appear in the Eastern Hemisphere are unloaded at Naha Port. The 280-mm guns are assigned to the 663d Field Artillery Battalion, an Army unit previously stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C. The 663d is composed of three firing batteries, a headquarters battery, and a service battery. The new battalion is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roy S. Geiger, son of Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, U.S.M.C., Commanding General of the III Amphibious Corps during World War II and Commanding General of the Tenth Army on Okinawa from the time of the death of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner on 18 June 1945 until

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the arrival of General Joseph W. Stilwell on 23 June 1945.

8 Aug. The weather detachment on Iwo Jima, hitherto a unit of the 20th Weather Squadron is organized as Detachment 6, 15th Weather Squadron, per 15th WS GO 80, dtd. 8 Aug. 1955.

9 Aug. Brigadier General Vonna F. Burger succeeds Colonel Walter H. Murray as Civil Administrator, U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus.

13 Aug. Harold E. Talbott resigns as Secretary of the Air Force.

15 Aug. The weather observing network at Okino-Erabu Shima is removed, because of the observer shortage.

16 Aug. Donald A. Quarles is sworn in as Secretary of the Air Force.

22 Aug. Detachment #1, 22d Crash Rescue Boat Squadron, is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistics support and administration, per 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 22 Aug. 1955. This GO rescinds the previous attachment of this unit for administrative and logistical support under the provisions of 313th AD GO 2, dtd. 1 March 1955.

26 Aug. Detachment #5, 6926th Radio Squadron, Mobile, USAFSS, is attached to 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 29, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.

The 51st Tactical Hospital is attached to the 6351st USAF Dispensary for all purposes, per 51st FIW GO 16, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.

3 Sept. Brigadier General William G. Hipps assumes command of the 313th Air Division, vice Colonel Curtis D. Sluman, per 313th AD GO 31, dtd. 3 Sept. 1955.

10 Sept. All recreational facilities on Kadena Air Base hitherto bearing the designation "Lackland" are re-named "Keystone." All those designated "McChord" are re-named "Olympic." All recreational facilities in the 313th Air Division Area are re-named "China Sea."

The 733d Engineer Aviation Supply Point Company is relieved from active military service, and the 264th Engineer Aviation Supply Point Company is activated concurrently, per FEAF GO 109.

20 Sept. The 33d Air Rescue Squadron is relieved from assignment to the 2d Air Rescue Group and is reassigned to the 3d Air Rescue Group, per MATS GO 164, dtd. 6 Sept. 1955.

28 Sept. Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, Advanced, closes at APO 140, Formosa.

1 Oct. The 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) is attached to the 581st Air Resupply Group for operational control and administration and to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 22 Aug. 1955. Simultaneously, Detachment 2, 8th Air Base Group, is discontinued at Camp Eta Jima, Japan, the unit equipment being transferred to the Commander, 313th Air Division. Other supplies and equipment rendered surplus by this action revert to control of the Commander, 8th Air Base Group. Personnel are reassigned in accordance with special instructions of the Commander, 43d Air Division, per 43d AD GO 21, dtd. 23 Aug. 1955.

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is relieved from assignment to Headquarters, FEALOGFOR, and is reassigned to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, per FEAF GO 118, dtd, 30 Sept. 1955.

5 Oct. The 6157th Operations Squadron (Standardization and Indoctrination) is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administration and logistical support to include assignment and promotion of personnel, per 313th AD GO 36, dtd. 3 Oct. 1955. Headquarters, 313th Air Division, retains operational control.

5 Nov. The AN/FPS-6 Range-height-indicator radar is given technical acceptance at Site 54, Kume Shima.

14 Nov. Colonel John H. Bell relieves Colonel Edwin C. Ambrosen as Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Squadron.

16 Nov. The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is further assigned to the 313th Air Division for administrative and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 110, dtd. 16 Nov. 1955, and 5th AF GO 118, dtd. 22 Dec. 1955.

5 Dec. The weather observing facility on Miyako Jima is deactivated, because of the shortage of observer personnel.

8 Dec. The 13th Communications Squadron, Air Force, is redesignated the 13th Communications Squadron, Division, per 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 8 Dec. 1955.

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is reorganized to include five Weapon Maintenance Teams (instead of the four assigned at the time of transfer from FEALOGFOR), per 5th AF GO 112, dtd. 21 Nov. 1955.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION

Activated on 1 March 1955 as the successor to the Twentieth Air Force in operational control of the Ryukyu Islands area, the 313th Air Division remained without a mission other than that implicit in the legacy left it by the vanished Twentieth. This omission was remedied on 16 August 1955, however, when Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, parent unit of the fledgling 313th, issued its Regulation No. 23-4.

The mission of the 313th Air Division, according to the new Fifth Air Force Regulation, was "to conduct defensive and offensive operations in the Division's operating areas and the areas adjacent thereto."[1] The nature of these "operating areas" had already been neatly wrapped up by Fifth Air Force Regulation 55-18 of 26 April 1955, which defined the 313th Air Division area of responsibility as being contained within the following lines: 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 145° E., thence east to the starting point. The 313th Air Division was organized as a Non-Table of Organization unit, assigned to Fifth Air Force. To carry out its mission and multifarious responsibilities, it was provided a headquarters and such other units and facilities as were considered necessary by the Commander, Fifth Air Force, and approved by the Commander, Far East Air Forces.

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Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4 also stated that the Commander, 313th Air Division, would exercise command control over all units assigned or attached, and would be directly responsibile to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, for:

1. Organization, administration, training, equipping, and preparation and combat of assigned and/or attached units.

2. Preparation, coordination, and implementation of general emergency plans.

3. Planning and conducting joint training and operations with friendly forces.

4. Development of tactics and techniques of aerial warfare, requirements for new weapons, and improved utilization of current weapons.

5. Exercising operational control over all Army AAA units for air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine AAA units when shore-based, and control of AAA gunfire from ships' batteries when such fire was in support of defense of shore installations within the air defense sector.

6. Operational control of all shore-based Naval and Marine fighter aircraft made available for air defense or offensive operations.

7. Supervision of maintenance, engineering, operations, internal security, and local ground defense of all assigned facilities.

8. Exercising continuous review of communications and electronics requirements, and initiation of programming action necessary to obtain required equipment.

9. Maintaining assigned and/or attached units at the highest possible state of combat readiness.

10. Supporting Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations.

11. Supporting special activities, tenants, and/or attached units.

12. Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence data.

13. Controlling tactical air traffic within assigned area.

14. Controlling passive air defense measures in the 313th Air Division area of responsibility, comprising:

a. Area electronic emission control.

b. Illumination control procedures for the area.

15. Supervising organizational and personnel training programs.

16. Supervising organizational and field maintenance of assigned equipment and/or equipment of attached units.

17. Issuing mission directives for all assigned units.

18. Monitoring ground control for the utilization of the air space, within the limits of the assigned area.

19. Operating an Air Defense Control Center (ASCC).

20. Coordinating with the appropriate local United States governmental authorities all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil affairs.

21. Coordinating with appropriate local Army and Navy commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used utilities and installations.

22. Supporting the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands in the discharge of United States Civil Administration responsibilities, except as otherwise prohibited.

23. Operating and maintaining all ranges within the 313th Air Division area of responsibility and executing all other directives which

might be assigned by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.[2]

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

By a strange anomaly, the largest and most important subordinate unit of the 313th Air Division was not assigned to it at all-though it must be admitted that such a situation was not without precedent in the history of military organizations. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing--to identify the wayward outfit--was stationed at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa only a stone's throw from the division headquarters, was attached to the 313th Air Division for all purposes; the dependents of its personnel occupied housing on the base or that assigned by the base; its commander was the Base Commander; and the misfortunes of its aircraft or the misdoings of its people could prove embarrassing for the Division Commander. In spite of all this, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing remained firmly assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force, just as it had done during the Korean War, when its headquarters and two of its tactical squadrons--the 12th and 67th--forsook the old homestead at Clark AFB, Philippine Islands, to do battle in Korea. Only the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron had remained at Clark throughout that conflict and during the days that followed.

On 1 November 1954, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, minus the 44th FBS, packed its effects at K-55 and migrated to Kadena Air Base, simultaneously being relieved from its four years' attachment to Fifth Air Force for all purposes and re-attached to Twentieth Air Force in the same way.[3]

With the inactivation of the Twentieth Air Force and its supersession

on 1 March 1955 by a new organization, the 313th Air Division, which had been called into being especially to meet this situation, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing abruptly found itself back under the control of Fifth Air Force, after only four months' absence.[4] The latter headquarters, having received the attachment of the 18th FBW (except for the 44th FBS) for operational control, administration, and logistic support, delegated these responsibilities to the 313th Air Division. However, the individualistic 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, because of its location, was attached to the parent Thirteenth Air Force for administration,[5] and further attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for this same function.[6] Subsequently, all units of the 18th FBW were reunited for the first time since the start of the Korean War, when the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron moved in a permanent change of station (PCS) from Clark AFB to Kadena AB on 15 July 1955, to be relieved from attachment to the Thirteenth Air Force for all purposes and similarly attached to the 18th for operational control, logistic support, and administration.[7]

The basic mission of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was to prepare the 18th Fighter Bomber Group--comprising the 12th, 44th, and 67th Fighter Bomber Squadrons--for combat in both fighter bomber and fighter interceptor roles, with emphasis on the fighter bomber role.

The Commander, 18th FBW, was made responsible for exercising command jurisdiction of all assigned units and units attached for all purposes. In addition, he would administer, provide administrative and logistical support, and/or exercise operational control, as directed, of such other units as might be attached. Also, he would be directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for:

1. The maintaining of all assigned tactical units and their support elements as a highly mobile, combat-ready force.

2. Providing combat-ready aircraft and crews for active air defense, as directed.

3. Commanding Sector E in accordance with the joint Rycom-313th Air Division Standing Operating Procedure on the subject, Damage Control, to include:

(a) Keeping current the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing damage control plan.

(b) Preparing, testing, and executing the various phases of this plan as outlined in current 313th Air Division and 5th Air Force directives.

4. Maintaining a forward operating base with the necessary personnel, equipment, and facilities for the purpose of immediate and adequate support of the Strategic Air Command, tactical elements of the Far East Air Forces, and the Military Air Transport Service to include:

(a) Administrative and logistical support of the units of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as a matter of first priority, in accordance with current plans, regulations, directives, or policies.

(b) Administrative and logistic support of Far East Air Forces (FEAF) units, in accordance with the priority established by 313th Air Division.

(c) Administrative and logistical support of attached Military Air Transportation Service (MATS) units.

5. The administration, operation, and maintenance of Kadena Air

Base and assigned off-base installations, in accordance with Air Force Regulation 24-1.

6. Providing an air terminal at Kadena AB for military aircraft.

7. Maintaining optimum organizational, administrative, and operational efficiency to include proper utilization, classification, and assignment of personnel.

8. Conducting continous training programs to develop and maintain maximum professional qualification of personnel and maximum capability of organizations which may be assigned or attached.

9. Issuing a mission directive to each unit assigned and/or attached for all purposes.

10. Furnishing administrative and logistical support, as required, to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

11. The maintenance of current general emergency plans for the defense of Kadena AB and assigned off-base installations; coordination of these plans with Army, Navy, and other Air Force commanders as appropriate, and with civilian agencies as directed; and the maintenance of a state of readiness to execute these plans.

12. Joint planning, training, and operations with friendly forces, as required.

13. Security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment other than for internal equipment of special activities.

14. Internal security of assigned installations, and defense of these installations against acts of sabotage or organized attack by enemy agents, units, or groups, to include organizing, equipping, and training assigned troops for ground defense.

15. Adequate passive defense measures for installations, equipment, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 18th FBW.

16. Control, as directed, of construction programs and staff supervision of air installations activities.

17. Providing aircraft for and supervising the combat proficiency flying of Air Force personnel assigned within the area of responsibility to activities without organic facilities for the accomplishment of such flying.

18. Preparing plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare as directed.

19. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accoreance with plans formulated by Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

20. Conducting the aerial spray programs for the Ryukyu Islands.

21. Administration and supervision of the Air Force civilian personnel program for Okinawa.

22. Administration of Port Accounting Activities (Pipeline) for Air Force personnel arriving and departing Okinawa.

23. Providing and maintaining in a current status a Target Intelligence Center.

24. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.[8]

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, which had been deployed at Chia-Yi, Formosa, as its role in a continuing training exercise for units of the 313th Air Division, commenced the return trip to Naha AB on 30 June and completed the move on 2 July, except for a single F-86D grounded awaiting an engine change. To

replace the 26th FIS on Formosa, this headquarters dispatched the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron to Chia-Yi, the first three aircraft taking off on 2 July, to be followed by the balance of the F-86F's of the squadron, until 5 July saw all of them in place at the Chinese Nationalist base.

A more extensive mobility exercise involving Formosa took place early in September, when the F-86F's of the 12th and 44th Fighter Bomber Squadrons deployed to Tainan and Taoyuan respectively between the 3d and 5th of the month, while those of the 67th remained in place at Chia-Yi, where they were joined by the headquarters elements of the 18th Wing. Thanks to the deployment, complemented by good weather, the 18th Fighter Bomber Group flew 2,243 hours during September--the best percentage of allocated time achieved in 1955.[9]

At the end of September, the 44th and 67th Fighter Bomber Squadrons returned to Kadena, leaving the 12th FBS behind at Tainan until 1 December, when the latter unit also began to redeploy to the home base. Its place on Formosa was taken by the 311th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 58th Fighter Bomber Wing, from Itazuke AB, Japan, the 18th FBW having discharged its tour of garrison duty on the Chinese Nationalist island stronghold for the time being. Its next scheduled visit to Formosa was not to be until August 1956, when it would again be expected to furnish the mobility squadrons.[10]

In addition to the 18th Fighter Bomber Group, the 18th FBW possessed two non-tactical support groups--the 18th Air Base Group and the 18th Maintenance and Supply Group--as well as the 18th Tactical Hospital. Component parts of the 18th Air Base Group were the 18th Communications Squadron, the 18th Air Police Squadron, the 18th Installations Squadron, and the 18th Food Service Squadron. The 18th Maintenance and Supply

Group was made up of the 18th Field Maintenance Squadron, the 18th Supply Squadron, and the 18th Motor Vehicle Squadron.

Besides these organic elements of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, a number of other organizations were linked to it in various ways at the beginning of the period on 1 July 1955. Attached for all purposes were the 8953d Air Reserve Squadron and the 6332d USAF Dispensary;[11] while attached for logistic support only were Detachments #56 and #58 of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron.[12] Attached for administrative and logistical support, except for those items peculiar to special weapons, were the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron,* the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron, and Teams "A" and "D", 403d-1009th Special Weapons Squadron.[13]

A far greater number of units were attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for both administrative and logistical support at the start of the historical period. These comprised the following: Headquarters, 313th Air Division; 13th Communications Squadron; the 17th Communications Construction Squadron; Headquarters, 581st Air Resupply Group and its two subordinate elements—the 581st Air Resupply Squadron and the 581st Airborne Materials Assembly Squadron; Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron; the 1503-1st Air Terminal Squadron; the 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; the 80th Fighter Bomber Squadron; the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF; District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; Headquarters, 11th Air Postal Squadron; B-29-11 Mobile Training Detachment;

*On 1 October 1955, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was relieved from assignment to Headquarters, FEALOGFOR, and was reassigned to Headquarters Fifth Air Force, per FEAF GO 118, dtd. 30 Sept. 1955.

the 6927th Security Flight (USAFSS); the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot; and the 930th Engineer Aviation Group, together with its subordinate unit, the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion.[14]

At the start of the period the 733d Engineer Supply Point Company (FEAF) was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistical support and to the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion for administrative support; however, on 10 September 1955, the 633d was relieved from active military service.[15] The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 930th Engineer Aviation Group, which had been reorganized with a strength of one officer and one enlisted man on 25 May,[16] was ordered to move from Kadena AB to Showa Auxiliary Air Base in Honshu, Japan, in a permanent change of station on 15 September.[17] As of 31 July 1955, attrition had reduced the strength of the 930th from an authorized 24 officers and 158 airmen to an assigned strength of 19 officers and 99 airmen.[18]

On 26 August, Detachment #5, 6926th Radio Squadron, Mobile, USAF Security Service, was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistical support.[19]

The 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) was attached to the 18th FBW for logistical support simultaneously with its organization and activation on 1 October 1955. At the same time, the new organization was attached to the 581st Air Resupply Group for operational control and administration.[20]

On 8 December, the 13th Communications Squadron, Air Force, whose name had fallen into the category of the obsolete with the passing of the Twentieth Air Force on 1 March 1955, was finally redesignated more appositely as the 13th Communications Squadron, Division.[21]

The F-86-11 Mobile Training Detachment (MTD), which arrived at Kadena AB from K-55 AB, Korea, on 5 July for 60 days' temporary duty, was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistic support during that period.[22]

The 581st Air Resupply Group.

The mission of the 581st Air Resupply Group at Kadena Air Base, by the very nature of the organization, was divided into two classifications--peacetime and wartime. The peacetime mission called for the 581st ARG to attain the highest possible state of operational readiness by training for its wartime mission, and, after activation of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) on 1 October 1955, the group was made responsible through that organization for the survival training of all FEAF aircrew members. The wartime mission of the 581st ARG was the preparation and delivery of cargo by aerial means behind enemy lines--"cargo" being a general cover word by which a wide variety of things, both animate and inanimate, could be implied.[23]

The 581st Air Resupply Group was assigned to the 313th Air Division and attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administrative and logistic support.[24] Operational control of the organization, however, remained vested in Headquarters, Far East Air Forces.[25] The 581st Air Resupply Group had assigned to it an unusual variety of aircraft, including 12 B-29's, four C-119's, four SA-16A's, a C-54, and a C-118.

The 581st Air Resupply Squadron: One of the three subordinate units of the 581st Air Resupply Group, this organization's mission was similarly divided into two parts. The peacetime mission was as follows: (1) to

train for the squadron's wartime mission; (2) to develop low-level penetration and navigation techniques; (3) continually to study the aircraft assigned to assess their adaptability to the squadron mission, forwarding any resulting recommendations on changes of the aircraft, methods, or techniques of operation; (4) to maintain in a current status all general, emergency, operational, tactical, mobility, and defense plans, and a maximum state of operational readiness to execute such plans as required; (5) to perform the administrative and logistical requirements for the assigned personnel; and (6) to conduct missions and other functions as directed by the Commander, 581st ARG.

The wartime mission of the 581st Air Resupply Squadron was as follows: (1) to airlift personnel, equipment, and supplies into prepared or unprepared landing areas, either by parachute or by air landing, and to resupply such forces as required; (2) to provide special airlift for personnel, equipment, and supplies for military and/or special units, as directed by higher headquarters; (3) to provide airlift for the evacuation of personnel and materiel.

The functions inherent in the wartime mission of the 581st ARS were twofold: (1) to maintain assigned personnel, aircraft, and equipment in a state of operational readiness; and (2) to provide aircrews and aircraft for aerial delivery of personnel, equipment, and supplies, as might be directed.[26]

The 581st Airborne Materiel Assembly Squadron: Another of the three subordinate units of the 581st Air Resupply Group, this organization's mission also made a distinction between the squadron's responsibilities in time of peace and in time of war. Its peacetime mission consisted of

the following: (1) training and preparing for its wartime mission; (2) maintaining in a current status all general, emergency, operational, tactical, mobility, and defense plans, and keeping the squadron in a maximum state of combat readiness for the execution of such plans; and (3) conducting missions as directed by the Commander, 581st Air Resupply Group.

The wartime mission of the 581st Airborne Materials Assembly Squadron was fivefold: (1) to receive, warehouse, and issue all classes of supplies destined for aerial delivery; (2) to prepare for air transport and parachute delivery all classes of supplies; (3) to receive, inspect, repair, clean, dry, pack, store, and issue all types of personnel and cargo parachutes; (4) to fabricate non-standard harnesses, slings, and containers for cargo to be delivered by parachute; (5) to deliver to and load on aircraft the prescribed number and type of packed cargo containers and to attach and secure the parachutes properly thereto; and (6) to perform squadron administration and supply functions for the squadron and for Headquarters, 581st Air Resupply Group.[27]

The 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival): The third and youngest offspring of the 581st Air Resupply Group, the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) was organized and activated with an authorized strength of 15 officers and 53 airmen on October 1955, but found itself occupying a position somewhat like that of a step-child, since it was assigned to the 313th Air Division rather than to the 581st ARG itself. However, operational control and administration were functions for which the 6333d was attached to the 581st ARG, while it was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for logistical support, as we have seen.[28]

Unlike the other elements of the 581st Air Resupply Group, the 6333d Technical Training Squadron did not have a wartime mission to which it was expected to shift at the drop of a bomb. The primary responsibility of the squadron was to train, in accordance with FEAF policies, all FEAF tactical air crew personnel in the basic principles, tactics, and techniques of evasion, escape, conduct after capture, survival, recovery, rescue, and emergency communications that would apply to FEAF's area of interest. In addition to this primary mission, the 6333d TTS was made responsible for establishing training and proficiency standards for FEAF tactical crew members in the fields of survival and evasion and escape, and was to develop and revise the basic principles, tactics, and techniques in those related matters through field and documentary research. Besides this, the 6333d was to compile additions and revisions to FEAF Manual 50-2 pertaining to evasion and FEAF Manual 50-3 on the subject of escape. Furthermore, the squadron was to conduct field and documentary research, then prepare and forward to FEAF its recommendations on barter items; evasion aids; survival equipment, gear, and aids; and recovery, rescue, and communication aids derived therefrom. Finally, the 6333d TTS was to train designated FEAF Unconventional Warfare (UW) personnel for their wartime mission, including them in peacetime operational training exercises as a means to this end.[29]

Subsequently, on 15 December 1955, this headquarters issued a new regulation to govern the mission of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron. This directive deleted the squadron's responsibility for training FEAF UW personnel for their wartime mission at the same time that it omitted recovery, rescue, and communication aids from the items on which the

6333d was to carry out field and documentary research.[30]

The total initial strength of the 6333d Technical Training Squadron at the time of its activation on 1 October was three officers and 25 airmen--roughly 20 per cent and 50 per cent of the authorized officer and airman strengths respectively. By the end of the period on 31 December, the assigned personnel numbered eight officers and 52 airmen, leaving it short seven officers and one airman.

The formative months of the 6333d TTS were devoted to preparations for carrying out the mission assigned it in a new line of work for which there was very little precedent. First, it was determined that a 14-day program was the minimal period which could be allocated for a class--seven days to be occupied in classroom training in the squadron area at Kadena AB (the former 18th Air Police Squadron area) and seven days spent in field training on the rugged Motobu Peninsula. The Commander and his superiors had planned a 36-hour "compound" problem involving a $10,000 POW stockade and interrogation buildings in which student "captives" would be confined, interrogated, and otherwise treated to the same procedures which they might reasonably expect to face if actually downed in enemy territory. The contract for construction of the compound had all but been agreed upon when a directive from USAF arrived, prohibiting any interrogations, either military or political, of students undergoing training at the school.

Although the school was not scheduled to have its formal opening until 9 January 1956, three "test" or"dry run" classes were held during the last quarter of 1955. The first, which commenced on 31 October and ended on 5 November, revealed that the apprentice level instructor personnel

themselves needed considerably more training. In this, as in the two succeeding classes, men of the 9th Regiment, Third Marine Division, United States Marine Corps, served as the aggressor forces in the field exercise, after being briefed on the Rules of Capture and the trespass rights and restrictions imposed by USCAR. The second class commenced on 21 November, training being conducted on 12 days during a 14-day period, of which six days were spent in the field. The third and final test class began on 12 December and terminated on the 22d, the time being divided equally between classroom and field activity. It was during this third class that the TWX arrived from FEAF, informing local officials that interrogation would not be permitted as a part of the school training. Thereafter, the Marines participating as aggressor forces were still allowed to capture "evading" airmen, but they could not hold them.

The schooling was made even more realistic during this preliminary period by participation of the 581st Air Resupply Squadron, which made air resupply drops, short field landings on the old Motobu Auxiliary Airstrip, pick-ups, and short field takeoffs with JATO units by SA-16 type aircraft. In addition, a 33d Air Rescue Squadron H-19 was utilized in rescue demonstrations on 25 November and 15 December.

Aside from the intrinsic value of this preliminary training to the individuals involved, officials of the organization were confident that it would enable the 6333d Technical Training Squadron to execute its mission to the fullest extent when the first official class opened early in 1956.[31]

Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

The mission of Detachment #1, which was assigned to the 313th Air Division but attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administrative and logistic support, was to operate the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) located at Naha AB, and, in addition, the 313th Air Division Combat Operations Center, Air Defense (ADCOC). The mission of the ADCC was to provide the Air Defense Commander or his representative information on all air activity in and approaching the area of his responsibility, to provide the facilities for directing the air defense of the Ryukyus area, and to act as coordinator of all necessary allied activities for mutual advantage.

The mission of the Air Defense Combat Operations Center was to carry out its operations in accordance with air defense policies established by the Deputy for Air Defense, 313th Air Division. In addition, the ADCOC would prepare operation procedures pertaining to air defense as required by the air defense system to carry out the policies, directives, and regulations of the 313th Air Division or higher headquarters.[32]

The 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

Assigned to the 529th AC&W Group almost since the dawn of history, the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons suddenly found themselves in possession of an independence more frightening than welcome when the parent organization was inactivated on 15 March 1955. The official firmans issued in connection with the act of dissolution left no doubt that both squadrons would hence forth be assigned directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and on the subject of operational control they at least gave the impression that future guidance would be provided by this headquarters.

In the matters of logistical support and administration, however, the documents were far less specific--it could even be said that they were silent. As a result, each headquarters assumed that a higher or a lower counterpart was ministering unto the needs of the two orphaned AC&W squadrons. Eventually, though, this unfortunate situation was straightened out, with the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing being given responsibility for providing both logistic and administrative support for the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons. Its headquarters was in the Bisha-Gawa area.

The 623d AC&W Squadron was responsible for detection, identification, and direction of interceptor aircraft against unidentified aircraft and other aerial objects entering the prescribed area of responsibility. In addition, it provided facilities and personnel for an alternate ADCC and was responsible for providing navigational assistance to friendly aircraft.[33] The 623d AC&W Squadron was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for the operation and maintenance of radar, radio, telephone, and teletype equipment and associated equipment in support of the assigned mission. It was also responsible for reporting all information obtained by radar surveillance to the ADCC, as directed by the Deputy for Air Defense, Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

The 623d AC&W Squadron operated two on-island radar sites within the Ryukyus Air Defense System--Site R-51 on Yontan Mountain and Site R-52 on Yae Take. The former operated as a Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) and alternate ADCC station, employing an AN/CPS-1* with AN/GPS-12 IFF as

*According to the 623d AC&W Squadron historian, this AN/CPS-1 set was turned over to the Army Air Forces in 1945 by the Marines, who had already used it for an undetermined length of time. (HR, 623d AC&W Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, p. 2). I would see them, that the government has gotten its money's worth from this set.

the surveillance radar, and an AN/CPS-4 as the height finder. Site R-52 operated only one radar, the AN/FPS-3 search set, during the latter half of 1955, the interim AN/FPS-4 height finder having been dismantled and turned into Supply on 6 June, in order to make room for erection of the permanent AN/FPS-6 height finder. Inasmuch as the AN/FPS-4 had been inoperative since March 1955, its loss did not hurt a great deal. Site R-56 on top of Yuza Dake in southern Okinawa was scheduled to replace Site R-51 and its ancient equipment early in 1956, but the AN/FPS-3A and AN/FPS-6 radar sets which would operate there were still in the realm of future wonders as the historical period ended.[34]

The 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

As we have seen, the 624th AC&W Squadron was assigned directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, from which it also received operational control. At the same time, its logistical and administrative support was the responsibility of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, to which it was attached for these purposes. Its headquarters was at Naha Air Base.

The primary mission of the 624th AC&W Squadron was to maintain and operate three Early Warning off-island detachments whose raison d'etre was to detect, identify, and direct interceptors against unidentified or unfriendly aircraft on a 24-hour basis to the maximum extent within the prescribed area of responsibility. The squadron also provided VHF/DF homings, bearings, and navigational assistance to friendly aircraft--operating and maintaining radar, radio, telephone, teletype, and associated equipment in support of the assigned mission. Finally, it reported all information obtained by radar surveillance to the ADCC, as directed by the Deputy for Air Defense, Headquarters, 313th Air Division.[35]

Site R-53 at Miyako Jima had an AN/FPS-3 with AN/GPX-7 IFF set as its primary surveillance radar and an AN/TPS-1B as the back-up search set throughout the six months' period. Site R-54 at Kume Jima was also equipped with an AN/FPS-3 with AN/GPX-7 IFF for surveillance, but possessed no back-up radar. On the other hand, it did have an AN/TPS-10D light weight height-finding set which served as one of the only two height finders in the Ryukyus Air Defense System, although the permanent AN/FPS-6 range-height-indicator radar did receive technical acceptance on 5 November. However, the latter set was non-operational because of a ruptured wave guide. Site R-55 at Okino-Erabu Shima functioned from 1 July through 31 December 1955 with a hoary AN/TPS-1B IFF as the primary surveillance radar, backed-up by an AN/TPS-1C which might just as well have been in Patagonia or Timbuktu for all the support it gave, being inoperative during the entire six months. Many of the parts vitally needed to restore the AN/TPS-1C to operation and to keep the AN/TPS-1B functioning had been on requisition for a long period of time, ubt, as with so many other things urgently required in the Ryukyus, no response to the repeated requisitions and pleas was vouchsafed. The AN/TPS-1B had not had the benefit of depot maintenance for more than two years, since the site had never been able to spare it for the length of time such work would have necessitated. Finally, in November, detachment personnel, despairing of ever obtaining the needed parts, dismantled the AN/TPS-1C and painted it in preparation for returning it to the depot. A permanent AN/FPS-3A was expected early in 1956; therefore, there was littly point in attempting further to restore the decrepit old set to operation.[36]

The 17th Communications Construction Squadron.

Another organization assigned directly to the 313th Air Division and receiving operational control therefrom was the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, although it was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administrative and logistic support, as we have seen. The mission of the 17th was to provide the necessary communications construction support of tactical and administrative operations of the 313th Air Division. The specific functions of the squadron were as follows:

1. Construction, installation, maintenance, and repair of open wire, underground and aerial communications cable, lead cable, field wire, and rubber net. Wire maintenance and repair functions would normally extend from the various main frames to the various terminals, excluding subscriber drops, line protectors, and sub-sets.

2. Providing surveying missions, as required.

3. Planning, designing, and constructing communications facilities, as directed.

4. Operating and maintaining assigned equipment.

5. Performing other functions, as directed.

During the latter half of 1955, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron worked on a variety of jobs. In the Kadena area, one of the largest was the installation of some 3000 feet of 1212-pair cable along Highway #20 (the main traffic artery running through the heart of the base) to a terminal point on a frame in the new base telephone exchange building. Approximately 1,500 man-hours were expended on this project, which, when completed, would eventually feed such important areas as the flight line, 313th Air Division Headquarters, and Bisha-Gawa, among others.

Another project of some significance was the routing of 51-pair cable into the new post exchange and commissary area.* Other jobs included running cable to the new Kadena elementary school, putting in a new leg of cable to the Kadena Officers' Club, and routing local cable from the control tower to the new RATC (Radar Approach Traffic Control) building. In a more destructive vein, the 17th CCS removed two miles of 52-quad aerial cable in the 546th ASSD (Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot) storage area from terrain so rugged that it was impossible to use trucks or other regular equipment, making it necessary to complete the job by dint of sheer manual labor.

*On the surface of things, it might seem that this should have been simply another routine job. However, many unforeseen problems arose to bedevil the squadron as the project progressed. One, in particular, which left its scar on the psyches of the men performing the job was the case of "The Missing Duct Rods". It seems that one of the 17th CCS crews was rodding ducts through a particular manhole system--a routine operation regarded as one of the simpler phases of a communications construction man's daily life--and everything was proceeding quite uneventfully. Then someone noticed an odd departure from the norm. Although the rods were going into one end of the duct with little effort required on the part of the men, no rods were emerging from the other end, despite the lack of resistance. The obvious question on every tongue was, "Where are the rods going?" As with such other long-sealed mysteries as what is the proper utensil to use in cracking an atom?, was Shakespeare really--or was he Marlowe?, what really happened to Amelia Earhart?, did Marshal Ney actually die before a firing squad:, what happened to the 10 lost tribes of Israel?, who was the Man in the Iron Mask?, did John Wilkes Booth really die in the burning barn?, who killed Cock Robin?, where is the Lost Chord?, the crew could surmise that a logical answer existed. The only question was, would they be around to learn it? As luck would have it, they were. Mother Nature finally relented and unlocked her secret. It was discovered that someone had neglected to reflect on the prints being used by the 17th CCS the existence of a third manhole located between the two of which they knew. Consequently, the rods were simply dropping into the unknown manhole, instead of coming out the other end of the duct as they were expected to do.

One of the more difficult off-base projects carried out by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was the erection of antennas for the Awase GLOBECOM Transmitter Station. Several rhombic antennas were installed on poles ranging in height from 60 to 110 feet, while a peculiar challenge was presented by the single integral discone-type antenna erected because of its dissimilarity to any other antennas installed previously. Making the task of sowing these antenna poles at Awase uncommonly difficult was the swampy nature of the terrain. Since much of the work was performed during rainy weather, such as prevails on Okinawa for days on end, the crews first had to construct roads to the points where the actual work on the various antennas was to be accomplished. Even then, the vehicles often operated in mud up to their axles.

At Naha, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron re-surveyed the base on behalf of the telephone exchange--tracing existing cable, utilizing good pairs whose existence had been forgotten, clearing bad terminals and minor faults, compiling new cable records, and ridding the base of dead cable. One of the biggest jobs at Naha was the installation of 2,000 feet of 404-pair cable and 1,000 feet of 303-pair cable along the perimeter road as replacement for a corresponding amount of old aerial cable to provide better service to the new Base Operations building and the Navy area. Approximately 2,050 hours went into this project. Other jobs of importance were the routing of 51-pair cable from the telephone exchange to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Headquarters and the laying of 2,800 feet of 26-pair direct burial from Manhole #4 along the flight line to the south alert shack. On the latter assignment, the crew were able to utilize their Barber-Greene trenching equipment over

most of the distance, although it was necessary to employ jack hammers to dig through the coral in a number of spots.

Another job, consuming 1,105 man-hours, was the routing of 202-pair cable from the old ADCC building into the new ADCC.

Installing cable and erecting antennas was old hat to the men of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, but during the historical period they were handed a different type of task completely new to their ken. This consisted of the erection of steel towers for the AN/FPS-6 range-height indicator radars scheduled to arrive in the near future for the various AC&W sites, including those at Miyako, Kume, and Okino-Erabu. Even before actual construction got underway, the squadron had to overcome the problem of transporting cumbersome materials and equipment over extremely hazardous terrain, with far from enough qualified personnel on hand to ship and receive these items. Again, as at Awase, the weather did its best to hinder progress, and on occasion even injected the possibility of disaster, the winds often blowing at 40 or more knots, with rain serving as a frequent accompaniment, as the men balanced precariously 50 feet above the ground, maneuvering quarter-ton beams into place. Because of the strangeness of the work, the crews did not progress very rapidly at first; but, as they gradually gained experience and the confidence which goes with it, their speed began to pick up, and every element of the job became markedly easier. By the end of December, two steel towers had been completed, and a considerable amount of outside plant work accomplished. As of that date, four full line crews and two splicing crews were assigned to Project "Airtight", as the permanent Ryukyus Air Defense System construction program was known.

Besides its regular work performed at the behest of the Communications Division at this headquarters, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was called upon to send technical advisors to Formosa during the latter half of 1955 for the purpose of assisting the Chinese Air Force in constructing microwave towers. By the very nature of microwave communications, which is dependent on line--of-sight, each tower had to be erected on the peak of some mountain. However, since there were no roads which vehicles could use to carry the structural steel to the top of the mountain, every bit of this work had to be accomplished by the sturdy backs of the Chinese coolies, a task that would have proved practically impossible to a Westerner. Thanks, in large part, to the knowledge and supervision of these borrowed USAF personnel, the Chinese Nationalists were able to complete six microwave towers, ranging from 25 to 90 feet in height, within a period of 45 days.[37]

The 13th Communications Squadron, Division.

Effective 8 December 1955, the 13th Communications Squadron, Air Force, was redesignated as the 13th Communications Squadron, Division.[38] As in the past, however, the 13th Communications Squadron was assigned directly to the 313th Air Division, to which it was also attached for operational control, while being dependent on the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for administrative and logistic support. The mission of the 13th was to provide electrical communications facilities to the following organizations located at or near Kadena Air Base: Headquarters, 313th Air Division; the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing; the 9th Bombardment Wing (a SAC B-47 outfit which stayed at Kadena AB on temporary duty from 7

to 18 October); the 49th Fighter Bomber Group Detachment; the 581st Air Resupply Group; the 930th Engineer Aviation Group; the 6007th Reconnaissance Group; the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron; the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron; the 11th Air Postal Squadron; the 13th Communications Squadron itself; the 15th Weather Squadron; the 17th Communications Construction Squadron; Detachments #56 and #58 of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron; the 80th Fighter Bomber Squadron; the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot; the 623d AC&W Squadron; the 744th Troop Carrier Squadron (M); the 1503-1st Air Terminal Squadron; the 1962d AACS Squadron; Detachment #5, 6926th Radio Squadron, Mobile; the 6927th Security Flight; the 315th Air Division Liaison Office; Team 403, Special Security Office; District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; the Marine Liaison Office; the Courier Transport Station; and the American Red Cross.[39]

On 24 December 1955, the 13th Communications Squadron Transmitter Site at Deragawa (as the Air Force spelled and pronounced it, although the correct name for the village on whose outskirts it was located was Tairagawa) was added to the island-wide electric power system, and the three 75-kilowatt diesel generators which had been used to develop all electrical power used by the site for the past 10 years were relegated to a stand-by status. These generators were to be moved into the new auxiliary power building at the transmitter site and installed for emergency use at any time the regular island power failed to meet the electrical power demands made on it.

During the months of August and September the 13th Communications Squadron underwent the following minor internal reorganization:

1. The Plans, Requirements, and Training Section was redesignated

Operations and Maintenance, and all personnel assigned at that time were reassigned to the newly-established section. The Operations and Maintenance Section was established to provide specialized maintenance functions throughout the squadron's individual sections and to handle project requirements which were periodically assigned to the squadron.

2. The 313th Air Division Transmitter and Receiver Sites were placed under the operational control of the squadron Operations Officer and an Officer-in Charge was appointed for each of them.[40]

The 15th Weather Squadron.

Assigned to the 1st Weather Wing, the 15th Weather Squadron at Kadena AB was attached to the 313th Air Division for that most important of all functions: operational control. Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron, and Detachment #4, both located at Kadena AB, were attached to the 18th FBW for administrative and logistic support, while Detachment #7 at Naha AB was attached for these two functions to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

The mission of the 15th Weather Squadron was to provide meteorological service as required in the area of the Ryukyus, Bonins, Philippines, and Marianas, in conformity with Air Force Regulations 105-3 and 105-9, and as directed by the Commander, 1st Weather Wing. The functions of the 15th Weather Squadron included the following:

1. The provision of meteorological technical advice and assistance to the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands in the operation of the Ryukyuan Weather Service.

2. The provision of weather service to civil agencies in accordance

with ICAO procedures within the limits of AFR 55-18.

3. The provision of staff weather officers to Air Force and Army units as required.

4. The maintenance of Pacific typhoon warning centers at Andersen AFB, Guam, and Clark AFB, Luzon, Philippine Islands.

5. Conducting an easterly wave program with the assistance of the 57th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron.

6. Assisting the Staff Weather Officer serving Fifth Air Force (the Commander, 20th Weather Squadron) in accomplishing actions directed by the Fifth Air Force, insofar as they pertain to 15th Weather Squadron Detachments serving Fifth Air Force bases.

7. Taking observations, as required, to support the world-wide meteorological observation network.

On 8 August 1955, the weather detachment at Iwo Jima, heretofore a part of the 20th Weather Squadron, was transferred to the 15th Weather Squadron and designated as Detachment #6.[41] Hardly had the 15th Weather Squadron inherited this new responsibility when Iwo Jima was smashed by the full force of Typhoon Louise on 25-26 September. The Rawinsonde section was completely destroyed and all equipment lost. The weather station itself sustained interior damage from water, with some loss of weather records and interior displays occurring. However, the permanent equipment suffered no great damage. The toal rainfall accompanying the typhoon, incidentally, was 12-90 inches. New Rawinsonde equipment was flown in by the 1st Weather Wing, and the Rawinsonde Section resumed operations within three days after the passing of the storm, making it one of the first units on Iwo Jima to return to commission. Besides

restoring their own detachment to commission, the weather people on the stricken island also put in many hours assisting the base personnel to get back on their feet.

Although Detachment #7 at Naha continued to labor under communications difficulties, stemming for the most part from the deteriorated condition of the base cable, it was expected that much of this trouble would be eliminated with the installation of new cable in January 1956. Because of this lack of firm communications support, full-time weather operation at the ADCC was delayed, only radio-teletype facilities being available in that agency--and those but intermittently.

The Kadena Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC)-Radar Approach Traffic Control (RATC) facility was still not operative at the end of December. The 15th Weather Squadron had sent a letter to the 1st Weather Wing in July, requesting definite word on the status of the BE cell which had been previously programmed and authorized to provide weather support to this facility. The wing's reply indicated that austere manning problems in the Air Weather Service would not permit the establishment of a separate weather facility in the ARTC; furthermore, any support would have to be furnished by the Kadena Base Weather Station (Detachment #4). At such time as the ADCC and the ARTC were combined, one BE cell would be established to support both facilities. The new target date for operation of the Kadena ARTC was thereupon set as March 1956.

In August the severe shortage of weather observers made it necessary to retrench personnel-wise in the off-island observing site network. After coordinating with this headquarters, the 15th Weather Squadron removed the weather observing facility at Okino-Erabu, doing so with the knowledge

that the Japanese weather station at Naze, on the nearby island of Amami-O-Shima, could supply the information of which this command would otherwise have been deprived. On 5 December, the observing site at Miyako Jima was similarly deactivated, in view of the squadron's knowledge that reliable weather reports could still be obtained from this island through the Ryukyuan Weather Bureau Station there. The third observing site at Kume Jima was retained on an 18-hour operational basis.

The 15th Weather Squadron continued to provide staff weather officer and landing observation service to the various tactical units rotating through Formosa on a monthly basis. From July through September, such service was furnished at Chia-Yi, and from October through December it was provided at Tainan. In addition, weather service, including the full TMQ-1 portable weather station for forecasting and observing, was provided to support the mobility move of a tactical unit to Yontan for a 20-day period. Although the responsibility for providing this weather service was assigned to the 15th WS, the personnel required to operate the mobile facility were loaned by the 20th Weather Squadron on a temporary duty basis. Until these TDY personnel arrived, the 15th WS was compelled to limit its service to initial landing observations, since it had available only the PMQ-4 portable pack weather station, which was incapable of forecasting.

In September 1955, the entire 18th Fighter Bomber Group rotated to Formosa on a 30-day mobility move. The 15th Weather Squadron was given responsibility for providing weather support for this exercise. Again, staff weather officer and runway observation service was provided at the three Formosan bases, as well as staff weather officer support for the

Thirteenth Air Task Force in Taipei.[42]

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

If the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, with respect to composition, was "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma", the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB was a straightforward, transparent organization which not only acknowledged its direct assignment to the 313th Air Division, but was also completely attached to the parent organization for operational control, administration, and logistic support. The threefold mission of the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, in order of general priority, was as follows:

1. To administer, equip, train, and prepare for combat those units and personnel who might be designated, assigned, or attached to the 51st FIW.

2. To maintain operating bases and other assigned installations with the necessary personnel and equipment for the purpose of immediate and adequate support of the air defense mission of the 313th Air Division.

3. To maintain facilities and necessary equipment to support tactical elements of the Far East Air Forces, Military Air Transport Service, Naval Air Facility, and such other forces as might be allocated by this or higher headquarters to carry out the missions of the Far East Command.[43]

The Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing exercised command jurisdiction over all assigned units and units attached for all purposes. In addition, he administered and/or exercised operational control, as appropriate, of such other units as happened to be attached. He was also directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for

the following:

1. Providing aircraft and/or personnel incidental to the air defense mission as directed.

2. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

3. Logistical support of such units engaged in the air defense mission of the 313th Air Division, as directed.

4. The preparation and maintenance of such defense plans as might be necessary to support plans and directives issued by the Commander, 313th Air Division; the coordination of these plans with Army, Navy, and other Air Force Commanders as appropriate, and with civilian agencies as directed; and the maintenance of a state of readiness to execute these plans.

5. Submitting recommendations concerning the requirement for personnel and equipment of units to be employed in the air defense operations assigned as an integral part of his organization.

6. Joint planning, training, and operations with friendly forces.

7. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel or such other training programs as might be directed.

8. Providing air facilities for the training of anti-aircraft artillery personnel and such other units as might be necessary.

9. Furnishing administrative and logistic support, as required, to other Air Force Commanders utilizing installations under command of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

10. Logistical support of tactical elements of Far East Air Forces, as directed.

11. Insuring that passive air defense measures were provided for installations, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

12. Security of all assigned and attached personnel and equipment except that internal equipment of special activities.

13. Maintenance, operation, and internal security of assigned installations and defense of these installations against acts of sabotage or organized attack by enemy agents, groups or units, to include organizing, equipping, and training assigned troops for ground defense.

14. Preparing plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare, as directed.

15. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.

16. Providing an air terminal at Naha Air Base for military aircraft. Facilities for commercial air operations were to be provided, as required.

17. The control of entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation, in accordance with policies established by this or by higher headquarters.

18. Maintaining and operating assigned installations, in accordance with the provisions of AFR 24-1.

19. Acquiring and maintaining necessary off-base real estate to support assigned and attached units.

20. Control, as directed, of construction programs and staff supervision of air installations activities.

21. Convening Special and Summary Courts-Martial for all assigned or attached Air Force units and personnel stationed on and under the jurisdiction of Naha AB.

22. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by this headquarters, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

23. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.[44]

At the beginning of the historical period on 1 July 1955, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was composed of the Headquarters; the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group--comprising the 16th, 25th, and 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons; the 51st Air Base Group; the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group; the 51st Tactical Hospital. Shortly afterward, however, on 11 July, the fighter strength of Naha Air Base was reduced to two squadrons, when the 26th FIS was transferred in a permanent change of station to Clark AFB, taking with it Unit Mission Equipment (UME) and personnel--32 officers and 167 airmen. Upon arrival at Clark AFB, the 26th was attached for all purposes to Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force, but remained assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[45] This marked the second time since the start of the Korean War that the 26th FIS had been separated from the other elements of the 51st FIW, the balance of the wing having deployed to Itazuke AB, Japan, on 16 September 1950, and thence to Korea, while the 26th remained at Naha AB. As we have seen above, the loss in defensive strength for the Ryukyus which the 26th's departure entailed

was compensated for just four days later, when the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron joined its parent organization, the 18th FBW, at Kadena AB on 15 July.

The 51st Tactical Hospital, assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, was attached to the 6351st USAF Dispensary for all purposes on 26 August 1955.[46] The 6351st USAF Dispensary was a non-tactical, non-mobile unit designed, staffed, and equipped to operate the fixed medical treatment facility at Naha AB, where it was assigned to the 313th Air Division and attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes.

The 51st Air Base Group was made up of the 51st Installations Squadron, the 51st Communications Squadron, the 51st Air Police Squadron, and the 51st Food Service Squadron. Component elements of the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group were the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron, the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron, and the 51st Supply Squadron.

In addition to these integral parts of the 51st FIW, the following units were attached for administrative and logistic support at the beginning of the period: Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; the 623d and 624th Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadrons; Detachment #3, 6932d Communications Security Squadron, 6920th Security Wing (USAFSS); Detachment "A", District Office #3, 6001st IG Special Investigations Squadron; the 1233d Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) Squadron (MATS); Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron (MATS); Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron; the Naha Resident Officer, Auditor General, USAF; the 33d Air Rescue Squadron; and Detachment #1, 22d Crash Rescue Boat Squadron.[47]

The 6157th Operations Squadron.

On 5 October 1955, the 6157th Operations Squadron (Standardization and Indoctrination), having completed its move to Naha AB that date, was relieved from its previous assignment to the 314th Air Division and reassigned to the 313th Air Division.[48] This headquarters retained operational control of the new squadron, but it was attached to the 51st FIW for logistical and administrative support, including the assignment, reassignment, and promotion of personnel.[49] The movement of the 6157th Operations Squadron from K-55 (Osan-Ni, Korea) to Naha AB was directed on 3 October 1955.[50] If plans then under consideration were carried out, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing would be divested of its responsibility for administrative support early in 1956 and would retain only the responsibility for logistic support. Whenever that change took place, the 313th Air Division would provide all administrative support for the 6157th Operations Squadron.[51]

The mission of the 6157th Operations Squadron was to conduct standardization and indoctrination training of selected key personnel of the Fifth Air Force in instruments, communications, aerial gunnery, ground gunnery, dive bombing, rocketry, and air tactics, in order to increase the combat effectiveness of the units assigned and to reduce the accident potential inherent in the operation of aircraft.

In addition, the 6157th would provide instruction in the conduct of the Fifth Air Force Flying Standardization Program, and would maintain an aerial acrobatic demonstration team at the highest possible state of performance.[51]

The 6157th Operations Squadron was equipped with 11 T-33 aircraft

for use in accomplishing its instrument and transition training. The Standardization and Indoctrination School run by the squadron began its first class on 31 October 1955.

The 33d Air Rescue Squadron.

On 20 September 1955, the 33d Air Rescue Squadron at Naha Air Base was relieved from assignment to the 2d Air Rescue Group and was reassigned to the 3d Air Rescue Group.[53]

The F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment.

On 10 November 1955, the F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment arrived at Naha AB from Yokota AB, Japan, for approximately 60 days' temporary duty. For the period of its stay, the detachment was relieved from attachment to the 41st Air Division and was attached to the 313th Air Division. As the year ended, it looked as though the F-86-24 MTD would remain at Naha until early February 1956, in order to accomplish its mission before returning to Yokota AB.

At the time of the detachment's arrival, an acute need for such an organization existed, this headquarters having been informed early in August 1955 that approximately 5,900 hours of training were required for the 431XX and 112XC fields. The natural reaction was to send the men to Yokota AB for the required training, but such a solution was rendered impracticable by the prevailing shortage of personnel. Despite the lateness of its coming, the detachment had completed approximately 7,388 student man-hours of training by the end of December, appreciably improving the combat effectiveness of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[54]

SURVEYS OF 313TH AIR DIVISION SUBORDINATE UNITS

Manpower Survey of the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron.

The Mission of the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron: The 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron at Naha AB was responsible for providing support, including the operation of all general and special purpose vehicles; the field maintenance of all general purpose, special purpose, materials handling, and construction vehicles; and organizational maintenance support for an air base group comprising four squadrons, a maintenance and supply group containing three squadrons, an aircraft control and warning squadron, a fighter interceptor group made up of three squadrons, a USAF hospital, two separate squadrons or comparable units, and nine detachments or comparable organizations. In addition, the 51st MVS performed organizational maintenance on organic equipment.

Findings of the 313th Air Division Manpower Team: One of the fundamental principles in the matter of economy of motion is that work should be arranged within the normal work area. Nevertheless, the Manpower team which studied the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron from 16 to 21 June 1955 found that this basic tenet was violated quite palpably. To begin with, the work was not arranged within a work area bearing any relation to the work "normal". Crowded conditions were the order of the day both inside and outside the maintenance shop. Whenever it rained--and on Okinawa there are not too many days on which it does not rain--outside maintenance, lubrication of vehicles, and outside painting all ceased. To compound the confusion further, the personnel forced to move indoors by the rain merely added to the already congested conditions inside.

Another important principle connected with motion economy was that consideration must be given to the most efficient use of the feet and legs and other parts of the body. Yet, when the Manpower team turned its spotlight on the application of this principle in the vehicle maintenance shop, it ascertained that disregard of it was the rule rather than the exception. Scarcely anything was located in such wise as to minimize effort and time consumption. The equipment belonging to the fabric shop was scattered "all around the place", while the storage bins located in the parts shop were nearly inaccessible.

Any organization seeking economy of motion should also ensure that its tools and materials are arranged in an operational sequence or regular pattern within the normal work area. So runs the theory, but such was not the situation encountered by the Manpower team which visited the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron. For one thing, the work area was too small and too crowded, and, perhaps more important, the vehicle maintenance shop had been designed as a steam room (wash rack) rather than for the purpose it was serving, with the natural result that the ideal "simultaneous, symmetrical, and rhythmic motions" so essential to the production of efficient work were rendered impossible. An efficient machine shop should be organized with the location, installation, and operation of its requirements in mind--and this one had not been. Of the 400 vehicles maintained and processed through the vehicle maintenance shop, only seven could be worked on inside the shop at any given time, while work performed outside the shop was subject to the vagaries of the all-too-frequently inclement weather. With an average rainfall of 30 inches for June, July, and August on Okinawa, and the winter months offering

very few rainless days, it was obvious that the mission of motor vehicle maintenance could not be effectively accomplished unless inside shop space was provided. In view of this situation, the Manpower team recommended that the 11,500 feet of additional floor space scheduled for the Fiscal Year 1957 be constructed earlier than that date.

The lack of supporting floor space for performing motor vehicle maintenance was further emphasized as follows:

1. There was no space for a machine shop, the present equipment being housed in a steam room.

2. There was no space for the storage of special tools, although a closet for that purpose was provided for in the projected maintenance shop. The tool crib in current use was located in a hot, stuffy, cramped 26-foot trailer-van borrowed from the 51st Supply Squadron, and was earmarked for salvage. Working conditions inside that "hot box" were most unpleasant.

3. There was no adequate space for a body and welding shop. The present location was the driveway.

4. There was no adequate provision for a lubrication rack. Since the present location was outside, rain halted work completely. If it rained for five days, vehicles requiring lubrication were brought to a standstill for that same number of days.

5. No space was provided for a fabric and leather shop, although it was necessary, in consequence, to perform such work in the motor vehicle maintenance floor area. Equipment for the fabric and leather shop was spaced around the shop against the four walls, with vehicle repair going on in the center. Such an arrangement left much to be desired.

6. No space was provided for the electrical shop, such work being performed in the machine shop, nee steam room.

7. No space was provided for the battery shop; therefore, such work had to be performed in the aircraft maintenance shop located a mile-and-a-half away.

On the basis of these findings, the Manpower team concluded that the mission of the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron could be effectively carried out and its capabilities increase half again, if it were given adequate facilities.

The Manpower team also learned that Unit Supply would not issue tool kits to Okinawan employees, since the latter could not be held pecuniarily liable for any missing items. This restriction obviously prevented full utilization of the potential skills of the native workmen, it being impossible for them to undertake special projects without the tool kits. The visitors recommended, therefore, that Supply work out with Civilian Personnel a system whereby Okinawans might be required to reimburse the government for lost tools.

Still another field which the team explored with considerable interest was that of vehicle types in use. A quick check disclosed that most of the vehicles at Naha AB--all of which found themselves seeking the mechanical ministrations of the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron, sooner or later--were of the new M-series, general purpose, or World War II type. Actually, however, the requirements imposed on Okinawa were such that, in most cases, commercial type vehicles could be better used to perform the assigned mission. Almost the only exceptions to this generalization were the Air Police vehicles, the radar site vehicles, and the vehicles

used at the off-island sites, where roads were too primitive for an unreinforced, commercial-type vehicle to enjoy a long life.

The M-series and World War II-type military vehicles had hundreds more moving parts than corresponding commercial-type cars, which meant that there were more parts to wear out. This presented a serious supply problem, since the procurement of parts was a slow process and quite costly to the Air Force. Additionally, the M-series vehicle was very difficult to work on, in view of its having been made completely waterproof to permit the fording of streams and shallow lakes. As a result, approximately 12 hours were required to perform a major inspection on an M-series 2½-ton cargo truck, while a similar inspection of a 1½-ton commercial-type vehicle would consume only some six hours. Short-handed as it invariably was, the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron could ill afford to expend an extra 50 per cent man-hour effort if it were not absolutely necessary.

Another unsolved problem had to do with the Okinawan employees of the maintenance section. All too often, after they had completed their training at the expense of the Air Force, they accepted jobs with private industry, which paid more money. Such ungrateful conduct might be annoying, but it could not be considered reprehensible, since it was precisely the same sort of thing that American employees did to their employers every day, both at home and overseas. On the other hand, it might be the human thing to do, but it certainly did not contribute toward the Air Force's attainment of a 137-wing goal by 1957--a goal which was expected to be made possible, in part, by the substitution of civilian labor for military personnel in as many positions as practicable. The

only answer to this dilema, decided the team, was to work out a better balance between the Air Force rate of pay for indigenous employees and that of local private industry.

Upon putting the Body and Paint Shop under the microscope, the Manpower people determined that its mission was definitely not being carried out. Four of the eight personnel assigned were untrained and malassigned for accomplishment of the mission, in addition to which the shop space allocated for painting was so small that by far the greater part of it had to be performed outside. There the frequent rainfall worked havoc with all attempts to keep abreast of the schedule of vehicles requiring paint jobs. As long as such a situation continued, the Body and Paint Shop could be regarded as a money-losing proposition for the Air Force. The only answer appeared to be the construction of a larger shop for this function and the authorization of more skilled personnel.

We have seen that the work of the non-existent battery shop was being performed in the Aircraft Maintenance Shop rather than by the motor vehicle maintenance section; yet there was no provision for a battery shop in the new Vehicle Maintenance Shop, nor were there any qualified personnel. After studying the existing situation and the prospects for the immediate future, the Manpower team recommended that the motor vehicle maintenance section should be relieved of this responsibility, unless space and personnel for a battery shop could be provided.

Turning to the sufject of methods improvement, the Manpower team found that an average of two buses per day were being requested from the motor pool for the transportation of baseball teams, during the period of the survey. This worked out to an average of 76 miles each day, or

532 miles per week, driven between Naha and Kadena Air Bases. The fuel consumption averaged 91 gallons per week. In addition to constituting a drain on the motor pool reserve, both in buses and drivers, the ball games forced the latter to work extra hours. Why, asked the survey team, could not more ball games be played at Naha Air Base? The total transportation allocated for the troop mess accommodations consisted of seven trucks or buses; therefore, the excessive use of these vehicles for transporting the baseball team and its followers to and from Kadena or other off-base points inevitably created a drain on the vehicle pool required for the more important assignment of getting the men fed.

Another place in which the Manpower team declared that trucks and personnel were not being utilized economically was the commissary run. An average of from one to eight 6x6 trucks were dispatched to the commissary each day to transport supplies. Since considerable time was generally lost in the loading and unloading of trucks because of the time wasted waiting in line, it could be anticipated that the better part of a working day would be consumed. While one truck was loaded or unloaded, two or three others sat idly by awaiting their turn. The Manpower surveyors recommended that a 26-foot van semi-trailer be substituted, thus eliminating the need for three or four 6x6 trucks and the same number of drivers.

Although an average of 1,500 requests for transportation were received every month, the dispatch office had only one telephone. Consequently, approximately 500 persons seeking transportation but finding the line busy called the main transportation office. The dispatch of vehicles was not the business of the motor transportation office--rather, its

mission encompassed supervision of the motor pool, dispatch, the drivers' school, and motor vehicle operations proper. The upshot of this situation was that the motor pool officer and the NCOIC found themselves in the dispatch business against their will and contrary to their better judgment; for military courtesy forbade that VIP's be directed to call the proper--but busy--dispatch number. The solution, as the Manpower people saw it, was to install two or more phones in the dispatch office on a truck system, a second phone ringing if the first number dialed proved to be busy.

Another finding of the Manpower team--albeit, one falling more properly within the purview of the Inspector General--was that organizational drivers of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had failed to perform daily preventive maintenance on assigned vehicles. As a result of their neglect, the life of many a vehicle had been unnecessarily shortened for lack of a check of loose bolts, fan belts, oil leaks, proper tire inflation, and the like. In addition to abridging the life span of the affected trucks and cars, this omission of preventive maintenance had thrown an overload on the automotive maintenance shop and cost the Air Force thousands of dollars which could have been better spent for actual defense equipment. The team recommended that the various unit commanders place special emphasis on the preventive maintenance concept and that a particular individual be made responsible for seeing that it was carried out.

The lack of a centrally-located point from which materials-handling equipment such as forklifts, tugs, and cranes could be dispatched was resulting in a loss of control over their preventive maintenance. Since daily return of this equipment to the motor pool would cause unnecessary wear and tear, as well as fuel consumption, it was left at the using

organization each night and was redispatched the following morning by the simple process of charging it out to an organizational driver on DD Form 110 (trip ticket) at the motor pool. Although this arrangement had its advantages, it resulted in a complete loss of control by the motor pool over the daily and weekly maintenance inspections which were required by the rules of good management; and, in most cases, the using organizations themselves did not feel any obligation to see that the equipment was inspected. Even when the latter did take an interest in the matter, the motor vehicle squadron had no way of gauging the quality or measuring the extensiveness of the inspections. The obvious result of this lack of control was an addition to the workload already crushing the automotive maintenance section. The Manpower team recommended that space for the dispatch point be provided near the new aircraft maintenance hangar, as the location closest to the area of operation and also available for the purpose.

The 31 May 1955 manning authorization (both T/O and T/D-A) for the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron was 290 positions. On the basis of its survey, the Manpower team recommended that this number be increased to 300--all 10 of the additional positions to be in the Motor Vehicle Operations Section. One airman and three Okinawans were required in the tire shop, two Okinawans were needed in the dirvers' school, two more in the wash rack, and two in preventive maintenance.[55]

General Survey of the Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons.

After the inactivation of the 529th Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Group and the 851st AC&W Squadron on 15 March 1955 and the reassignment of the 852d AC&W Squadron to the Seventh Air Force that same

date, the 313th Air Division found itself with only two such organizations--the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons. Detachment #1 of the 623d AC&W Squadron manned Site 51 at Yontan Mountain, while Detachment #2 manned Site 52 at Yae Take--both located on Okinawa proper. In the case of the 624th AC&W Squadron, all of its detachments were situated on smaller islands of the Ryukyus spreading fanwise from southwest to northeast in such a way as to provide early warning against aerial attack from the direction of Red China, North Korea, or Russia. Detachment #1, 624th AC&W Squadron, manned Site 53 at Miyako Jima; Detachment #2 manned Site 54 at Kume Jima; and Detachment #3 manned the only EW site on foreign soil, Site 55 on Okino-Erabu Shima, which had reverted to Japan along with the other islands of Amami Gunto on 25 December 1953. The Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) was a part of Detachment #1, 313th Air Division, and was entirely separate from the AC&W organization.

At the time of the Manpower team's survey of the AC&W organizations--which was carried out between 18 July and 18 August 1955--the five detachments mentioned above were reporting through their respective squadrons directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, for command and administration, and directly to the ADCC for operational control. This situation had its origin in the deactivation of the former 529th AC&W Group, in which all of these functions had previously been centralized, and produced a division of responsibilities and confusion as to the chain of command and over-lapping and duplication of duties and responsibilities.

The physical separation of the headquarters of the two squadrons and of the ADCC from one another, as well as from this headquarters, was

a source of some inconvenience by reason of the communications problems it created. In addition, it multiplied the correspondence required to carry out the various missions of the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons. In the endurance of these difficulties, however, they were certainly not unique. While squadrons normally have a group headquarters or wing headquarters intervening between them and the air division headquarters to serve as a shock absorber and mentor, such an arrangement is far from universal. A much greater obstacle to smooth operations, insofar as the 623d AC&W Squadron was concerned, was the physical separation of its headquarters by some 21 miles from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, to which it was attached for administrative and logistic support, the former being located at the Bisha-Gawa area north of Kadena AB, while the 51st FIW was the base organization at Naha Air Base.

Although three of the detachments had an identical mission and the other two had like missions, the team found that manning authorizations varied greatly from site to site. The existing manning authorization for the respective detachments was not sufficient to operate and maintain the new equipment being installed, to maintain the new buildings being erected at the sites, to correct the deficiencies in the personnel actually assigned, or to carry out the recommendations being made by the Manpower team. For example, despite a shortage of communications and electronics (C&E) type personnel, there was not an equal distribution of personnel in these fields among the sites, and there was a prevalent shortage of rank, experience, and high skill levels.

Under the prevailing policy, married personnel were required to serve nine months on the off-island sites or at Yae Take before they

could have their families join them. By contrast, officers assigned to Okinawa proper (other than at Yae Take) could get their families over in approximately seven months, while airmen could count on a maximum of eight or nine months' separation. Moreover, both categories of Air Force personnel could reduce this waiting period to a mere three or four months by finding private rental, buying a house, or building one. The difficulty lay in finding positions other than those at the early warning sites to which these married people could be assigned after their families arrived. There were four such sites which had to be manned; whereas there were only the ADCC, the Yontan GCI station, and a few staff communications positions to absorb the men brought in from the four EW sites upon the arrival of their families. As a result, personnel were being extended involuntarily at the off-island sites, creating a serious morale problem which could be expected ultimately to result in a low re-enlistment rate in these critical fields.

As their answer to the first of these vexing problems, the Manpower team recommended that all of the AC&W organizations having the same missions should have similar authorizations. Also, the tour of duty for the four isolated EW sites should be one year, without dependents; furthermore, proper action should be taken to obtain higher headquarters' approval of this recommendation. Finally, higher headquarters should be made aware of the critical shortage of AC&W type personnel and asked to make a survey of the entire command, with a view to bringing the assignments for the 313th Air Division in line with similar units within Fifth Air Force.

The survey team found that under existing rules, any requisition originating at one of the AC&W sites first had to go through the squadron

before it could proceed to Base Supply for possible action. Similarly, the materials or equipment so obtained could not be taken directly to Transportation for delivery to the sites, but had to be called for by the squadron or delivered to it. Only then could the requested items be prepared for shipment by the squadron, which arranged for their delivery to the sites. Such a procedure, besides being at complete odds with the dictates of common sense, was actually contrary to Air Force Regulation 67-95 and in conflict with the correct service stock procedure outlined in Air Force Manual 67-1, which made delivery of the articles to the sites the responsibility of the Base Supply Officer. Normal service stock procedure did not require the submission of 104B requisitions such as were currently in vogue, and items were supposed to be issued on a recapitulation basis direct from Base Supply to the service stock.

To correct this bad situation, the survey team recommended that the 51st FIW establish service stocks in accordance with current directives and that the 51st FIW designate one supply officer as service stock officer in charge of the five service stocks and as radar monitor. They recommended further that the 51st furnish one technical sergeant (AFSC 64175), two airmen first class (AFSC 64152), and one airman second class (AFSC 64130) to run the service stock at each site.

Turning their scrutiny on the post exchange situation at the five AC&W sites, the surveyors found that there was an unacceptable variation among them. The Rycom Central Exchange had assigned a civilian manager whose responsibility it was to administer the exchanges at all five of the sites, and, in addition, each detachment had designated one officer

as its Post Exchange Officer, as an additional duty. The chief cause of the disparity was found to be the failure of the civilian manager to make the monthly visits to the sites which plans had originally called for. As a result of his dereliction, the burden of insuring that the various detachment post exchanges were properly stocked had devolved by default on the multi-dutied Post Exchange Officers at the respective sites. In those cases where these officers displayed initiative and aggressiveness in obtaining the items to which they were entitled, the site post exchanges were well stocked. On the other hand, where they evinced little interest in this subsidiary job or were prevented by the press of more vital duties from "riding herd" on the Rycom Central Exchange on Okinawa to see that the latter provided the many articles which went to create a good post exchange, it could be predicted that the facility would be completely inadequate. Site 54 at Kume Shima was an example of the first kind, while Site 53 at Miyako Jima represented the opposite type. That this disparity was due to the efforts or lack of efforts of the officers involved is testified to by the respective circumstances of the two sites mentioned. The detachment at Miyako was serviced at least once each week by a 624th AC&W Squadron C-47, which flew in with supplies and mail, not to mention personnel; while Kume, not similarly blessed with an airstrip, had to be content with the occasional calls of Army surface vessels and Air Force crash rescue boats.

It was also learned that the personnel being employed by the post exchanges at the off-island sites were not being paid on time. Exemplifying this bad situation, the Ryukyuans working in the P-X at Kume Shima

had not received their pay for April and May until 25 July, and at the time of the team's visit on 2 August 1955, they still had not been paid for March and June.

On the basis of their findings anent the detachment post exchanges, the survey team recommended that the Detachment Commanders take a personal interest in these facilities and that one of the officers be given the additional duty as P-X Officer; that every effort be made to see that proper requisitions were submitted to guarantee an adequate P-X inventory at all times; that the 313th Director of Materiel work very closely with the Rycom Central Exchange Officer to insure that the civilian designated as manager for the AC&W post exchanges did his job and improved these facilities; and that the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadron Commanders report to the 313th Director of Materiel any difficulties they might encounter in securing proper support for the five site post exchanges.[56]

The three off-island sites were authorized one medical officer and a medical technician; however, this was purely a paper authorization, insofar as Site 55 at Okino-Erabu Shima was concerned, for it not only did not have a doctor at the time of the survey team's visit, but it never had had one. Such a situation would have been bad enough at any of the off-island sites, but, in view of prevailing transportation difficulties and the inaccessibility of Okino, Site 55 needed a doctor assigned as a part of its organization more urgently than any other AC&W unit. The team recommended that immediate action be taken to secure a doctor for Okino-Erabu and that a doctor be authorized for Site 52 at Yae Take, as well, because of the distance involved and the time lost by personnel having to be brought to Kadena for medical treatment. Furthermore, the

313th Air Division Surgeon should supervise the medical program for these organizations--a responsibility which he had neglected in the past.

Turning their attention to the Special Services program at the AC&W sites, the survey people found that Detachments #1 and #2 of the 623d AC&W Squadron had one recreational specialist between them authorized on their manning document. For its part, the 624th AC&W Squadron had no such authorization, notwithstanding its possession of three off-island sites. There was no indication of any central guidance in connection personnel services activities; however, some of the organizations had done quite a bit to provide recreational facilities through their own initiative. Nevertheless, there was no official personnel services program at the AC&W sites. After considering the problem, the team recommended that a representative of the support base personnel services section visit all of the radar sites with a view to implementing a controlled and planned recreational program, including the establishment of a hobby shop with facilities for leather work, wood work, model aircraft construction, and a stock of necessary supplies for sale to patrons of the hobby arts. In addition, a special services position should be authorized at the three off-island sites.

The motor vehicle situation at the various sites was in keeping with the sorry conditions the visiting team uncovered in most of the other areas studied. The existing system called for all vehicles being sent back to the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron for major repairs to be released without replacement, and, inasmuch as all of the detachments were short of vehicle repair personnel, minor ailments often grew into major troubles, for lack of attention at the critical time. Then, too,

the detachment personnel themselves were often responsible for vehicle breakdown by their neglect to connect the front wheel drive system when operating the trucks on a steep grade, such as was an inevitable element at each site. Because of the rough roads, steep hills, and heavy loads, the engines of the site vehicles were under a constant strain, and, unless every precaution was taken to care for them and keep them in a high state of repair, it could not be expected that they would last very long. Even if there had been enough repair personnel, it was doubtful that the vehicles could have been properly maintained, as there were neither sufficient tools or supplies for this purpose at the sites.

In consideration of these circumstances, the survey people recommended that each AC&W organization be authorized two 3/4-ton pick-up trucks and three 2½-ton 6x6 trucks, pending completion of a new water system which would eliminate the need for hauling water to the site. Further, they recommended that two additional M-35 6x6 trucks be assigned to Okino-Erabu (where water supply was a perennial problem of utmost importance) and that a 1,000-gallon Navy cube be placed on one of these trucks before sending it out there. At the same time, the 1,000-gallon tank currently bedded on a World War II 6x6 truck at Okino-Erabu would be transferred to the second M-35 6x6, thus permitting the return to Naha AB of all the ancient and decrepit vehicles which had been used for hauling water to Detachment #3. More generally, the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron should adopt a policy of sending a replacement vehicle to the AC&W site whenever it turned in a vehicle for repair. As a note to the detachment personnel themselves, they should connect the front wheel

drive on all 6x6 trucks at all of the sites.[57]

It might be thought that the maintenance of communications and electronics equipment was the most important problem connected with an AC&W organization. And that supposition would be quite correct. Nevertheless, the two squadrons were alike in suffering from a paucity of qualified personnel who could maintain this vital and very expensive equipment. Further militating against the survival and usefulness of this equipment, the various detachments did not have the test equipment necessary to carry out field maintenance at the sites. To top it off, the priority section of Naha Base Supply had been so remiss in monitoring Project "Airtight" (the program under which the Ryukyus Air Defense System was being re-equipped with late model AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 surveillance and range-height finding radar sets) that many component parts and items of test equipment necessary to keep the prime equipment operational had not been received. However, the detachments themselves could bear a share of the blame for this situation through their failure to follow up their requisitions until the items were actually received.

The survey team recommended that the Base Service Stock Officer of the 51st Supply Squadron be made responsible for monitoring the "Airtight" program for all of the AC&W organizations. Also, full utilization of contract technicians and technical representatives of American firms should be made in training, maintenance, and supply. There should be full coordination between these technical representatives and Base Supply on all supply matters, and the former should be allowed to go direct to their sources of supply, with information copies furnished Base Supply, in the case of emergency requisitions. Finally, requisitions for radar

and communications equipment should be handled with the least possible delay.

Although the matter of security was one of greatest importance at the radar sites, the team found that not only did the number of personnel authorized for providing it vary from site to site, but the security authorizations were not fully manned in any case. To protect the five sites, there were presently authorized 49 airmen, 33 Ryukyuans, and 12 Japanese (at Okino-Erabu Shima, which was Japanese soil), but there were not actually this many men. It was true that once the new installations were completed, the critical area at each site would be fenced, but this would not in itself insure security or protection against theft. It would only make the commission of sabotage or theft more troublesome. If even partial security were to be provided, three or four guards would need to be on duty at all times at these sites. Almost equally important, the security personnel assigned should be of the highest type, because of "the tremendous value of the AC&W equipment and . . . the mission of these organizations."

In order to make this ideal a reality, the Manpower surveyors recommended that each of the five sites be authorized six airmen and 15 indigenous personnel for security duty. Since this would total 105 people, as compared with the 94 currently authorized, the surveyors thought to keep the cost of the increased security within bounds by reducing the airmen involved from 49 to 30 and replacing them with the readily available and inexpensive indigenous--Ryukyuan and Japanese.

A study of the plumbing facilities at the AC&W sites revealed that the present water supply was inadequate, because of old pipes; however,

it was expected that this condition would be improved by completion of the new water systems then under construction and the installation of new pipes. With the addition of these new facilities there would simultaneously be created a maintenance problem of greater magnitude in connection with the pipe and sewer lines. Even then, all of the detachments should have some equipment for hauling water in an emergency or in case some of the water sources should prove inadequate at certain times of the year.

With these things in mind, the team recommended that each detachment should be authorized one 1,000-gallon Navy cube type tank, which could be mounted on a 2½-ton 6x6 truck to haul water in emergencies, and a portable water pump to transfer water from these tanks to the storage tank.

Turning their scrutiny on the construction program at the sites, the team found--as any superficial observer of the local scene might have foreseen--that it was generally running far behind schedule, although Yuza Dake and Okino-Erabu could be said to be showing the greatest progress. At these two places the Okinawan contractor, Kokuba Gumi, appeared to be making a greater effort to complete its projects, and, although the team members made no claims to being construction experts, it seemed to them that the quality of work was far better than at the other sites. At Kume Shima, where the Japanese firm of Sanko Kensetsu had the contract, the work was progressing slowly, while at Miyako Jima and Yae Take--being done by the same firm--the only discernible activity consisted of chipping concrete. Nothing whatever seemed to be going forward toward completion of the project. This was probably necessary,

since quite a bit of work w[illegible] having to be torn out and done over, because of poor construction and failure on the part of Sanko Kensetsu to follow the specifications contained in its contracts (FEC-463 and FEC-479).

Although it could be said, with little fear of contradiction, that living conditions at all of the sites were undesirable, the personnel at some of the detachments had displayed more initiative and imagination than those at others in fixing up and making habitable the temporary building in which they were forced to live for a time. Until such time as the permanent concrete block barracks were completed under Phase II of Project "Airtight", the standard living facilities consisted of rows of squad tents stretched over floored wooden frames. At Kume Shima, however, the men had not been content to accept such squalid quarters as their homes for a year or longer, but had installed walls to bisect the 32-foot-long tents, forming two rooms capable of housing four men each in reasonable comfort. Into the walls they had built closets and shelves, and in many cases, where the men had grown weary of looking at the too-familiar GI folding steel cots, they removed the legs and braces and built the frames into bunk-like cabinets.

Again, this time to a man, they had devised hot lockers of some sort, in the form of an enclosed space with a low-watt light bulb burning constantly, to keep the atmosphere inside free of the pervading humidity which would otherwise rot shoes, mildew cameras and books, stain clothing, and corrode any metal objects not housed within. Hot lockers were an indispensable element of life on Okinawa, even in the expensive permanent structures built as dependent quarters and BOQ's and in tent homes such as were in vogue at the radar sites they were even more necessary

to the preservation of personal possessions.

In certain cases at Kume, men with some skill as carpenters had built themselves separate rooms within the tent hutments. Complete little cubicles were floored and panelled in native pine; while beds, desks, bookcases, and shelves were built into the walls. Reading lights and radios were installed under the supervision--and with the blessing--of the engineering and fire prevention personnel. A final touch of "home in the Orient" was provided by the installation of native tatami, or straw, mats on the floors to keep the cubicles clean and warm. Oftentimes, a shallow well was built into the floor at the door frame as an invitation for the guest or official visitor to remove his footgear--a practice that their Oriental cousins had found conductive to tidy living areas in the field.[58]

Despite all the work on the part of the men themselves which went into making the quarters at the early warning sites more livable, the temporary nature of the buildings made it necessary for the occupants to evacuate them during every typhoon alert, after first striking the tents lest they be torn to shreds or blown down, carrying the wooden cubicles with them. This arrangement, quite naturally, caused loss of time and considerable confusion. Furthermore, it certainly did not contribute to good morale. All in all, the obvious construction lag was playing the role of major villain in hindering the AC&W organizations in the performance of their assigned mission. Because of the great importance of this mission, the team recommended that 313th Headquarters take immediate action to insure that OKED placed proper emphasis on the completion of construction at the EW sites.

One of the most reprehensible situations uncovered had to do with the air conditioning units in the Operations buildings at the sites. Despite

the fact that large sums of money had been expended on this equipment, not a single one was in operation. For lack of the requisite governing devices, the units had lain dormant ever since their installation, with the result that the intense humidity of a year-and-a-half had left its indelible mark on the buildings. Acousticon tile installed at considerable expense throughout the interior was black with mould beneath the surface and, to the probing finger, proved to have the consistency of soft cheese. Worse yet, whole patches of the facing material were dropping off the disintegrating tile. Nor were the buildings themselves alone in suffering from the absence of air conditioning. The personnel who had to work in these buildings without ventilation existed in a state of perspiring misery, the Operations structures having been designed without windows, since it was expected that air conditioning would serve in their place. Finding it necessary to leave the door open in order to get some air, the operating personnel by so doing inadvertently illuminated the scope excessively, thus reducing their ability to read it properly. Since the detection of enemy aircraft was the only reason for having a radar site in the first place, the inability of an operator to pick up a blip on his scope through the presence of excessive light nullified the basic purpose in having an AC&W system. Besides, the lack of air conditioning shortened the life of the electronic equipment in the building and detracted from its efficient operation, the equipment having been designed to function in an air-conditioned building.

The team recommended that the 51st FIW take immediate action to place these air conditioning units in operation and that the Okinawa Engineer District (OKED) make a preliminary check and test of any air conditioning

units and buildings under construction to insure that the former were properly installed and fully operational before accepting them from the contractor. In no case should either buildings or equipment be accepted by the using Air Force agency until they were proved to be both complete and operational.[59]

The Need for an Airstrip at Kume Shima: Another subject to which the 313th team turned its attention was that of the accessibility of the various AC&W sites--or the lack of it. Site 53 on Miyako Jima left little room for improvement, being situated near the commercial port of Hirara and having a sod airstrip capable of accommodating C-47 or SA-16 type aircraft, though only in the daytime and even then only under VER conditions, inasmuch as there were no aids to navigation or landing in the form of instruments or a control tower.

Site 54 at Kume Shima had long labored under an isolation broken only broken by the infrequent--and somewhat--hazardous--overwater sorties of an Air Rescue H-19 helicopter, an Army FS vessel, a Military Sea Transport Service AKL, or a crash rescue boat. As far back as 29 June 1953, the Commander of the 529th AC&W Group had sought to have the 6351st Air Base Wing at Naha AB construct coral aircraft landing strips at both Kume Shima and Okino-Erabu Shima to support the AC&W operations at those places. By was of encouragement, should the mere idea of undertaking such a project appall his superiors, Colonel Nestor E. Cole declared that not only was there a great need for the landing strips, but the task of building them should prove to be far from insuperable. The heavy equipment already present at the sites, engaged in constructing the permanent type buildings and preparing the radar hills for the programmed AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 sets, could be deiverted to the construction of airstrips capable of

accommodating C-47 and smaller type aircraft. If budgetary considerations forbade the building of airstrips at Kume and Okino-Erabu even under these favorable circumstances, Colonel Cole suggested that the existing access roads might be widened sufficiently to permit their limited use by smaller aircraft for emergency purposes, such as the delivery of ROCP items and the evacuation of ailing personnel.[60]

There had been a World War II Japanese airstrip on the east side of Kume Shima, southwest of the villages of Higa and Janado, but when an examination of the approximate site was made in 1951 no vestige of the old strip was found. Still, the area was practically level, with a maximum fill of not more than three feet needed to level the cuts. The clear area for the proposed strip was roughly 4,500 feet long and 500 feet wide. Obstructions to aircraft approaching from the northeast were negligible, the worst being a 174-foot hill approximately half a mile south of the southwest end of the airstrip area, had an elevation of about 415 feet, while a second hill 1½ miles from the end of the airstrip area rose some 947 feet into the air.

The Detachment Commander of that period (1951) had estimated that it would take 90 days to build a hard-surface strip, provided personnel (other than the tortoise-like Ryukyuans) and necessary heavy equipment were available. The entire area was of soft, fine sand, and the nearest supply of coral or rock was several miles distant. He added that although there may have been a Japanese runway on Kume at one time, it was now only a sandy strip of beach where an airstrip might conceivably be built. Before a definite decision to construct the landing strip was made, however, the 624th AC&W Squadron Commander recommended that OKED survey the beach area to determine the amount of work which would be involved and estimate the

time, labor, and cost of such construction.[61]

It might be expected that all of this interest in the subject and its attendant research would have led to some tangible results in the months which followed. Nothing of the sort occurred, however. The inertia and procrastination which seemed to emanate from the oppressive humidity of the Ryukyus like the dreamy forgetfulness of Homer's Lotus Eaters inevitably asserted their dominion, and the years 1951, 1952, and 1953 went by without the airstrips at Kume and Okino-Erabu progressing beyond the correspondence stage. In the only specific action taken in this direction, this headquarters did advise the Commander of the 6351st Air Base Wing at Naha AB on 22 July 1953 that it had requested the District Engineer to consider incorporating helicopter landing pads into the Project "Airtight" construction program at both Kume and Okino.[62] But a helicopter was far from being the ideal type of aircraft required for supporting an off-island site.

Finally, on 30 June 1954, the Assistant Director of Installations for the Twentieth Air Force, acting at the behest of the Director of Communications, addressed a memorandum to the Chief of the Management Division requesting that sufficient real estate be acquired on both Kume Shima and Okino-Erabu to provide landing facilities for L-20 aircraft. In addition, he desired that some type of option be concluded which would make it clear that these strips might be enlarged at some future date to accommodate C-47 aircraft, provided the terrain permitted it.[63]

Around this same period, Major Richard G. Kidd, Jr., the Chief of FEAF's Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Force Projects Section, spent a few days' temporary duty at this headquarters. After learning of the plans for laying out airstrips at the two off-island sites, he directed that no firm

commitments should be made for any purpose until ground surveys had been completed; however, if it appeared that any such contemplated surveys might interfere in any way with completion of the Fiscal Year 1956 Project Planning Reports, they should be postponed until the latter had been submitted.[64]

Further evidence of interest on the part of FEAF in the runway projects for the two off-island sites was revealed on 8 July when Twentieth received a dispatch requesting that it submit a detailed cost breakdown for materiel and labor required to provide the 1200-foot runways at Kume and Okino-Erabu.[65]

This headquarters replied that it was planning to ask the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade to work up the necessary project drawings and estimates for the two runways, as a training project for the latter organization. Twentieth had recently received L-20 aircraft, which required a minimum runway 1,200 feet in length. Therefore, if the strips could be provided, this command would be able to meet the urgent requirement which had long existed at both Sites 54 and 55 for the delivery of critically-needed equipment and the evacuation of personnel in need of medical attention. Just as soon as FEAF's approval was in hand, this headquarters would initiate action to obtain permission to conduct the necessary surveys of Kume Shima. A strip 700 feet long and 90 feet wide already existed there, but whether it could be extended the requisite amount would be known only after completion of the study.[66]

Six days later, on 19 July, FEAF radioed its approval of the runway projects for both Kume and Okino-Erabu, specifying that any requests for either design or construction in the guise of training projects should be submitted to the Commanding General, 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade.[67]

Just what happened at this point to dampen the enthusiasm with which officials of the Twentieth Air Force had taken the preliminary steps toward creating airstrips at the two off-island AC&W sites is not certain. Probably, it was the summer heat. Be that as it may, it was not until 7 October 1954 that this headquarters finally radioed the 417th EAB in Japan, asking that the 930th Engineer Aviation Group on Okinawa be directed to design airstrips for Kume and Okino-Erabu suitable for L-20 aircraft. The designs should contain the possibility of expanding the runways to a length capable of receiving C-47 type planes. However, if the preliminary survey revealed that an L-20 strip could be developed immediately from an existing road or strip, but with no possibility of substantial expansion at a later date, the 930th EAG should stake out C-47 strips elsewhere on the two islands. Such an eventuality would make two designs necessary for each island--one for an L-20 strip and another for a C-47 runway.

In the same TWX this headquarters requested the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade to direct the 930th EAG to design an emergency air strip on Miyako Jima for use by fighter aircraft.[68]

Meantime, the detachment personnel and indigenous employees of Site 54, working under instructions from the 529th AC&W Group, had turned their attention to the beach area on the northwest side of the island, where they began to remove rocks, fill in holes with granulated coral, and otherwise level a stretch of sand which could be used by L-20 aircraft under favorable weather and wind conditions. The first L-20 made a successful landing on the enlarges, 1100-foot makeshift runway on 19 July 1954. In time, the native shiba grass, with some encouragement from the AC&W people, enlarged its foothold on the strip and eventually provided a resilient layer of

padding several inches thick, which the Kume farmers helped to keep trim during the months that followed by turning it over to their cattle for pasture. This was not the full-fledged runway which AC&W officers of the past had sought so earnestly, but it did serve as a means of bringing in high priority spare parts for the radar sets and evacuating ill or injured personnel.[69]

In due time, the 930th Engineer Aviation Group prepared the design drawings for the off-island runways, but ere these could be transformed into reality, some unknown factor--most likely a lack of funds or of interest--was introduced into the situation, and nothing more was said about a 1,200-foot L-20 airstrip, let alone a C-47 runway.

This was the situation which obtained when the 313th Air Division survey team disembarked at Kume Shima in the summer of 1955 with a view, at least in part, to considering the accessibility of Site 54 for supply purposes. Although their conclusion were deprived of some of their value by their derivation from an investigation that was but cursory at best, they had no hesitancy in declaring that only a little time and effort need be spent to extend and widen the runway sufficiently to permit its receiving C-47's. Having learned that the road leading from the airstrip to the radar site was impassable during heavy rains, they recommended that the access road be improved at the same time that the runway was lengthened and widened to C-47 dimensions. Otherwise, any vehicles seeking to reach the airstrip had to be driven along the beach over heavy sand which could easily entrap the heavy trucks, despite their four-wheel drive. As for the existing dock facilities, they were adequate for the type of supply vessels currently being used.[70]

Okino-Erabu and the Need for a Runway: In far worse case was Site 55 Okino-Erabu Shima, 85 miles north of Kadena. As far back as 13 November 1951, Dr. C. J. Salinas, the Twentieth Air Force site planner of that period, had studied the island with an eye to discovering one or more areas which would lend themselves to airstrip construction. As a result of his investigation, he found one area which might possibly be used for a 6,000-foot airstrip, though he doubted if it was wide enough for a parallel taxiway. Working in its favor, the area was in the direction of the prevailing winds, and no major obstacles to the landing of aircraft were apparent.* As Dr. Salinas saw it, the area would require only minor rough grading and almost no artificial drainage, since that provided by nature was generally good.[71]

The United States Geological Survey was the next agency to study Okino-Erabu for possible airstrip sites in the summer of 1952, finding, quite optimistically, that three runways could be laid out. Two of these would be fighter strips running northeast and east-northeast respectively on the northern tip of the island. Both sites were easily accessible and had ample taxiway and dispersal space, with no important obstructions. In addition, the cost of construction would probably be moderate. The third runway would be a bomber strip extending possibly 8,500 feet along the east-central side of the island. It, too, would be easy of access, with no obstructions and

*The reliability of Dr. Salinas' testimony is laid open to question, however, by the inaccurancy of his statement in the same report that "Deep well spring water of good quality is abundant. No chlorination is necessary." Every year after the AC&W site was opened at Okino-Erabu, the problem of adequate and potable water was to prove a most pressing one, and not infrequently minor epidemics at Site 55 were to be attributed by medical authorities to the unsanitary nature of the scarce water supply.

ample space for taxiways and dispersal areas. The cost, in the opinion of the U.S.G.S., should be moderate.[72]

On 29 June 1953, in the same letter which had urged the necessity of building a C-47 airstrip at Kume Shima, it will be remembered that Colonel Nestor E. Cole, Commander of the 529th AC&W Group, had also sought to have the 6351st ABW construct a coral runway on Okino-Erabu which could accommodate C-47 and smaller type aircraft. As an argument for building the strip, he had deposed that the 14-day schedule on which the Army FS-type ships were operating in supplying the off-island sites was "entirely inadequate to support present air defense activities." Furthermore, "the expansion of the Ryukyus Air Defense System, both in equipment and personnel" would undoubtedly tax the surface transportation to its limit, "thereby making air deliveries an essential element of support to off-island activities."[73]

Early in May 1954, the Installations Directorate at FEAF Headquarters took the unusual step of sending its own people down to Okino-Erabu to investigate the possibilities of locating an L-20 landing strip on that tiny island. On the basis of their findings it would seem that they were either less diligent than the members of the U.S. Geological Survey who had visited the island two years before, or else they were more demanding in their evaluations. In any event, where the earlier group had found three fighter runway sites on Okino, the FEAF surveyors uncovered only two L-20 sites--and both of these were evaluated as uneconomical for development. Site "A" would require cuts up to 15 feet in size and fills of 22 feet, involving an estimated total excavation of 62,000 cubic yards, which, at $1.00 per yard, would amount to $62,000. In addition, $7,200 would have

to be expended for liquid asphalt and $12,000 for SC2 asphalt mix laid three inches thick. Thus, the total cost of Site "A" would come to $81,200. Besides its inordinate cost, a runway built at that location would have only 100 feet of clearance from the center line of the strip and would be approximately 75 degrees off the direction of the prevailing winds.

Site "B" would be even more expensive, requiring cuts up to 30 feet and fills in excess of 40 feet, so that the excavation would amount to 74,000 cubic yards. Since the liquid asphalt and SC2 asphalt mix which would go on the proposed runway would naturally be the same as at Site "A", the difference in cost between the two was contained entirely in the $12,000 in additional expenditures which the 12,000 more cubic yards of excavation would involve. However, aside from the excessive $93,200 cost, the only fault that could be found with Site "B" was that a runway built there would cross the main access road. This was not a very serious obstacle, however; it was the financial aspect of the business which weighed most heavily against the selection of Site "B".

Having failed in its endeavor to present a ready-made runway site to the Twentieth Air Force for development at a moderate cost, FEAF had to ask this headquarters to conduct a study of its own to determine if a more economical site for a 1,200-foot L-20 site might exist.[74] FEAF's impatience to see a strip constructed on Okino-Erabu was evinced shortly after, when Twentieth received a TWX on 3 June requesting that the higher headquarters be given the site information as soon as possible.[75]

The following day, the Twentieth Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations suggested in a memorandum to the Director of Installations that

the site survey requested by FEAF be carried out without further delay, particularly in view of the fact that the command was scheduled to receive L-20's for use in off-island support in July. Before actually undertaking the survey, however, he thought it might be wise to obtain the views of the Commander, 529th AC&W Group, as to the best location of an airstrip on Okino. If at all possible, the DCS/O wanted the strip located in an area where it could subsequently be expanded to accommodate C-47 cargo aircraft.[76]

Meantime, on 28 May, this headquarters had conducted an aerial reconnaissance of Okino-Erabu as a preliminary to more detailed study on the ground aimed at discovering one or more potential L-20 runway sites. Although staff planners realized that what might look like an excellent site from the air could easily reveal many shortcomings when viewed at close range, they felt rewarded in part for their efforts by the discovery that there were several suitable sites in the vicinity of Tamina Village on the west coast of Okino, where the engineering firm of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill had recommended in its study of 16 November 1953 that a new harbor be built. Before any construction could be performed, however, a ground survey would first have to be made; then, if the site proved favorable, the difficult task of acquiring the necessary land on an island belonging to a foreign sovereign power--in this case--Japan--would have to be negotiated. In any event, the results of the complete study would be forwarded to FEAF as soon as possible.[77]

Having had an opportunity to digest the findings resulting from the aerial reconnaissance of 28 May, Colonel Paul W. Stephens, Twentieth's Director of Installations, wrote FEAF that he concurred in their belief that construction of a flight strip at either Site "A" or Site "B" would

involve too much moving of earth to render their utilization feasible. In fact, he doubted that a 1,200-foot runway could be located immediately adjacent to the site at all, inasmuch as all ravines ran in that direction, and the small amount of existing level area was already occupied by roads and buildings. What seemed far more practicable was to lay out the proposed airstrip in the vicinity of the projected access road which would run from the new harbor to the AC&W site when completed under Phase III of Project "Airtight". Colonel Stephens closed his letter with the promise that preliminary cost estimates would be prepared and forwarded for FEAF's consideration just as soon as a site reconnaissance survey was completed.[78]

In a memorandum which the Chief of Twentieth's Engineering Division addressed to the Director of Installations on 8 July 1954, he declared that a decision should be made as to whether the 1,200-foot L-20 runway was to be included in a future 5,000-foot C-47 strip, or was to be considered separately. This point, he emphasized, had a direct bearing on site selection; for the longer runway would in most cases eliminate consideration of possible hilltop locations or integration with the access road, both of which might be not only feasible but even desirable where the L-20 runway was concerned.[79]

On 19 July, FEAF radioed this headquarters that it approved the projects for providing runways at Kume and Okino-Erabu "in principle" and that any request for design and construction as training projects should be submitted to the Commanding General, 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade. The normal procedure for obtaining the right to enter Okino for a survey would be to request approval of the joint committee;

however, the Japanese Government's Procurement Bureau had no representative at that island, so FEAF suggested that Twentieth negotiate with the local government or the landowners for informal permission to perform a survey. If this proved unsuccessful, FEAF would then submit a formal request to the Japanese Government.[80]

After a long delay, a survey team of the 930th Engineer Aviation Group belatedly proceeded to Okino-Erabu on 18 October 1954, where it conducted a preliminary reconnaissance of the runway situation for three days. After careful consideration of the matter, the team selected an area some 500 yards north of the AC&W site adjacent to the village of Shimajiri. Located approximately 1,000 yards from the shoreline with an unobstructed glide angle, the level area under consideration was covered with a small undergrowth and was roughly 5,000 feet long by 500 feet wide. As was generally true of any point in the Ryukyus, the land consisted of a clay top soil with coral outcroppings which would have to be blasted or otherwise eliminated. Ample sand and coral would be available for surfacing the strip, though the bad condition of the dirt roads would make their rehabilitation a prior necessity, if the fill materials for the runway were to be hauled from source to destination. Anyway, it was not believed that a great quantity of fill would be needed. In addition to being reasonably close to the radar site, the proposed runway was expected to consume considerably less cultivated land than would any of the other potential locations.

More than a month went by before the results of this preliminary reconnaissance were transmitted by the 930th EAG to this headquarters, but when the former finally got around to this matter on 26 November,

they included a request for permission to send a follow-up team to Okino to carry out a topographic survey of the runway site.[81]

Even then the location of the proposed airstrip remained unsettled, despite the findings and recommendations of the preliminary reconnaissance party sent out by the 930th EAG. On 3 December 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Bert E. Pettitt, the Assistant Director of Installations, wrote the Chief of Engineering that he felt there were three factors which must be considered in selecting a runway site on Okino-Erabu Shima. They were as follows:

First, if two sites were reasonably equal in respect of the amount of earth which would have to be moved, the type of sub-base, and other topographical or geological considerations, preference should be shown that location having the smallest area under cultivation, even though this site might be situated farther from the main route to the EW site. It would be necessary for the engineer troops to construct an all-weather link with the main road--which, in the hypothetical case presented, would be from the site selected for the runway to the harbor. Any additional time required to travel the extra distance would be insignificant when weighed against the importance of farm land to the natives. (This was a humanitarian approach to the problem of military land acquisition all to seldom encountered in Air Force and Army officials in the Far East. More often the idea of saving a mile's drive or acquiring a scenic location for an officers' club or a dependent housing project was given priority over the preservation of a farmer's or even a village's livelihood. That Colonel Pettitt should have kept the Golden Rule in mind and remembered the well-being of the natives even in dry, official

correspondence is not surprising, however, to one who saw him derive considerable enjoyment from reading aloud from an elementary textbook to seven or eight little Okinawan school boys encountered by chance in the course of a Sunday's outing to the northern end of the island. There can be little doubt that the United States' post-war policy of constructing expensive advance bases in the Western Pacific as launching sites for retaliatory attack against Communist Asia would have been more effective, by being less vulnerable to sabotage from within, if those in charge of land acquisition had asked themselves what they would do if this were their land and their homes. Just as "no man is an island, entire of itself," no island is a bastion which teems with a hostile population for its labor force and even much of its security. A thousand individual acts of kindness and official benevolence can be counteracted by one ill-considered piece of selfish land acquisition).

But to return to Colonel Pettitt's admonitions, he laid down as the second consideration the amount of work which would be involved in the case of the various proposed sites. As it happened, the site selected by the 930th EAG preliminary reconnaissance team met this requirement, involving, as it did, the movement of only a very moderate volume of earth.

Thirdly, Twentieth Air Force planners must avoid myopic thinking. True, the present specification set forth by FEAF was for an immediate 1,200-foot strip expandable to 5,000-foot length at a later date for C-47 operations--and the site recommended by the engineers fulfilled this requirement admirably. This would not be enough, however, if a decision were to be made at some future time, to build a dispersal strip for

fighter type aircraft on Okino-Erabu Shima. It might then develop that the 5,000-foot area contained no possibility for expansion, either longitudinally or laterally, in which case an entirely new site would have to be found, acquired, and converted into a small airfield.[82]

That same week, the Director of Installations received an official communication from the Fukuoka Procurement Bureau in Kyushu, relaying a request from their own superiors that the results of the 930th's survey of 18-21 October be reported to them. Since circumstances had prevented them from participating in the survey, as they would have preferred, they had asked the Mayor of China Village, Okino-Erabu, to report the result of the study; however, this technical information had proved to be beyond his comprehension. Under the circumstances, the Fukuoka Procurement Bureau hoped that this headquarters would furnish the mayor the data for direct transmittal to their office.[83]

As it happened, the main reason why this headquarters had not informed the Mayor of China Village or any other Japanese official of the results of the survey was that they had not yet been collated and assessed. On 17 December 1954, therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Roy E. Skipton, Chief of the Engineering Division, wrote the Director of the Fukuoka Procurement Bureau that just as soon as the data had been evaluated and assembled, the Mayor of China would be supplied with any information in connection with the survey which he might wish to have.[84]

Again, as at Kume Shima, there occurs at this point a sudden hiatus in the Okino runway story. One day the airways and mails are hot with communications on the subject going back and forth between this headquarters and that at FEAF. The next they are silent. The L-20 airstrip

issue abruptly becomes as dead as the dodo bird. Whether Air Force officials' inexplicable loss of interest was due to the difficulties which they had encountered in securing land rights is not certain. It is known, however, that since 25 December 1953, Okino-Erabu had belonged to Japan, which meant that the United States Forces could no longer expropriate any land they might deem desirable. To acquire any property in addition to the AC&W site would entail negotiations with the Japanese Government so involved that real estate officials quailed at the mere thought of them.

A tentative revival of interest in the matter was shown by this headquarters--no longer the Twentieth Air Force, but now the 313th Air Division, as of 1 March 1955--on 5 March 1955, when the 930th EAG was requested to furnish a site plan of the airstrip proposed for Okino-Erabu, showing all the information necessary for land acquisition. The purpose in this was to acquire a parcel of land 2,000 feet long and 300 feet wide, with the airstrip centered within the parcel. It was desired that the plan show the bearings and distance of the lines bounding the proposed acquisition, together with the ties necessary for the establishment of survey points.[85]

In a display of energy and alacrity remarkable for somnolent Okinawa, the 930th Engineer Aviation Group handcarried the requested information to the Installations Directorate the very same day that the need for it was indicated.[86]

A few days later, the Engineering Branch of the 313th Installations Directorate sent the site plan and a map on which the airfield location was shown to the Real Estate Office with a request that the area marked

be acquired immediately. Once this land was acquired, 313th would direct the construction of a graded and surfaced runway 80 feet wide and 1,500 feet long centered within the parcel outlined. Since the actual runway would not utilize 110 feet of land on either side along its entire length, as well as a block of land 500 feet long and 200 feet wide at one end of the runway, officials had no objection to the native farmers' continuing to cultivate this land, so long as the crops were not of a type which would obstruct the airstrip in any way.[37]

When the 313th Air Division survey team visited Okino, in the summer of 1955, they found that no airstrip had been constructed, despite the extensive planning which had gone into the preparations for one and the long-time realization that one was needed. As a result, Site 55 was still dependent upon FS-type supply vessels, AKL's, crash rescue boats, and helicopters for physical communication with Okinawa. Worse yet, the harbor facilities were inadequate for any craft larger than LCU's.

Attempts to Improve the Surface Supply of Site 55: Although reams of correspondence eloquently describing the need for a new port at Okino-Erabu had been written by commanders of the 624th AC&W Squadron and the 529th AC&W Group almost since the day Site 55 first became operational on 6 December 1950, the native port of Kogome was still the only place at which supplies could be unloaded. Engineering firms had carried out exhaustive studies of the coastline of Okino and had recommended other, better locations for the harbor, together with rough estimates of the cost. Nevertheless, everything was just about as it had been five years before. Any items which went ashore still had to be lightered from the seagoing vessel to shore by means of native boats or LCM's--a procedure extremely dangerous in normal swells, and completely impracticable in a

rough sea. The actual transfer of supplies and equipment to the LCM or other boat was performed by hand.

The first LCM's had been assigned to Site 55 in January 1951, but Typhoon Marge came along on 18 August that same year to deal the already limping supply system a heavy blow, sinking LCM-3 and lifting LCM-4 some 30 feet above the normal water line, where she left her high and dry on a mass of jagged coral from which extrication was nearly impossible. Luckily, a replacement LCM was available at Naha and arrived at Kogome Port before the end of the same month. Shortly afterward a second boat made its appearance. The AC&W detachment had scarcely got back on its feet, however, when Typhoon Ruth struck on 14 October 1951. In a strange re-enactment of the August disaster, LCM-19 foundered in shallow water, her bottom stove in, while LCM-20 was stranded well inland, far from her proper element, much like Robinson Crusoe's canoe. Since this series of misfortunes understandably left the Rycom Port Command in no mood to turn over any more boats for the Air Force's use--and consumption, it was necessary to contract with a native firm, the Ryukyu Kaiun Kaisha, for the lighterage service required to get supplies ashore.

Following an inspection trip to Okino-Erabu early in July 1952, the Commanding Officer of the 624th AC&W Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hays, recommended to his superior in the 529th AC&W Group that at least one LCM be assigned to Site 55 to meet the FS ship and the Rycom tanker on the north side of the island during inclement weather or periods of strong southerly winds. If such a craft were assigned, a crew to operate it should also be included. From his observation, the native boats which had been used ever since the destruction of the LCM flotilla in October

1951 were simply not sturdy enough to stand up to the beating which any lighter was bound to take under existing procedures.

Colonel Hays' letter received the blessing of the 529th AC&W Group and the 6351st Air Base Wing, but when it reached this headquarters, some cold realist pointed out that all the advantages in the world which an LCM could offer a remote AC&W detachment would sway the Army Transportation Corps very little, unless facilities for the removal of the boats from the water to a place of security on the beach were first installed. The memory of the four LCM's lost in Typhoons Marge and Ruth was still too fresh. If and when such facilities were in operation, however, the Army had promised that it would readily dispatch both an LCM and the necessary personnel for its operation to Okino-Erabu Shima.[88]

At Kume Shima a river ran inland for a considerable distance, providing excellent protection against the weather during unloading operations. No such sanctuary existed at Okino-Erabu, where the coastline was unbroken by a stream of any size. (It was this same lack of sizeable water courses which created perennial problem of water shortage at the radar site). To unload the freight ship, the crude native boats furnished by the Ryukyu Kaiun Kaisha under its contract with the Air Force had to row all the way out to the vessel and back to the beach with their cargo. Even on a calm day the swells on the sindward side of the island were such as to produce a continual variation of 12 to 20 feet between the freight ship and the native boat, making the job not only extremely hazardous but quite strenuous, as well. If the sea were rough, the ship had to by-pass Okino and go on to Amami-O-Shima, where USCAR had a Civil Administration team at that time, since unloading was out of the question. Should the sea continue

rough upon return of the vessel from Naze port, then Okino-Erabu had to be omitted altogether. It would have been possible to perform the unloading operation in much smoother water on the lee side of the island in many of these instances, but the native boats were unable to row such a distance.

Nasty as was the business of unloading the FS-179, the task of delivering POL products to either Okino or Kume Shima was far more arduous. Since it was desired to maintain a 12,500-gallon stock level of gasoline at the latter detachment, 250 drums of 50-gallon capacity each were required for storing it. Just before the tanker was due to arrive at the island, the detachment hauled all empty drums down to the beach, 12 at a time, in the two trucks belonging to the site-provided both were in operating condition. The LCM lighter which the Army still operated at Kume Shima could carry 80 barrels per trip--each trip requiring approximately 2½ hours. To fill the drums, it was necessary for the LCM to pull alongside the tanker, run lines from the latter to the boat, then fill the drums. In the process, a considerable quantity of gasoline and oil was invariably spilled. This contaminated fuel then had to be pumped from the LCM into the ocean by means of a bilge pump. Once the drums were all filled, the LCM returned them to the beach, where they were manhandled into a waiting truck. This process was repeated three or four times until all the drums had been filled. In spite of all the precautions and the locally-rigged divices for facilitating the operation, the drums took a great deal of punishment and sustained frequent leaks and other damage.

The trucks, having been loaded with about 12 drums each, drove to the top of the radar hill over a seven-mile road. Each truck carried an

assistant armed with a fire extinguisher in addition to the driver, but this was at best only a feeble gesture in the event of a blaze. Nor was fire an infrequent occurence. On one occasion, three fires broke out during a single trip, as the result of leaking diesel oil's dripping on a hot exhaust. Had any one of these fires been caused by leaking gasoline instead, the result would have been the loss of one truck, a load of fuel, and the probable death of two men. And gasoline was transported to the site in exactly the same way as was the diesel oil. As soon as the first trip had been completed, the detachment repeated the process, continuing until all the filled drums were again stored at the site, some 10 to 20 hours from the time the operation had originally been begun.

At Okino-Erabu the procedure was much the same, but it was far more laborious, since each native boat could carry only 20 drums per trip. Every drum had to be manhandled six times-as an empty drum onto the truck, and off the truck at the site—which meant that all site activities were practically halted until the tanker was unloaded. Colonel Hays suggested that if the tanker were to resume the former practice of visiting the sites every 30 days, instead of interposing 60 days between appearances, the operation would not be so strenuous, as only half as many drums would have to be unloaded. Even so, it would not be satisfactory from the standpoint of labor and danger involved.[89]

On 8 December 1952, Colonel Nestor E. Cole, the 529th AC&W Group Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Hays called on the Chief of Marine Operations, Ryukyus Command, to see if something could not be worked out which would improve the existing situation. One thing they learned was that an LCM was going to be sent to Site 55 the following week and that

would remain there until the approach of the typhoon season the following summer.[90]

This arrangement was an improvement over the existing one which included no LCM's at all. However, it was not the answer to the problem. The typhoon season extended from June through November; hence, Detachment No. 5 would be dependent upon the native boats for half the year, even after Rycom's limited change of heart.

True to his word, Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Jaggio, the Chief of Marine Operations, assigned LCM-2 to perform ship-to-shore lightering service at Okino-Erabu Shima on 30 December 1952, with the understanding that she would be returned to Naha prior to the normal advent of the typhoon season. He had finally agreed to waive this restriction if the 624th AC&W Squadron could show that a storm haven at least as secure as that at Naha would be available at Okino-Erabu.[91]

Responding to the reiterated pleas of the 624th AC&W Squadron, this headquarters instructed the 6351st ABW on 2 March 1953 to obtain and install immediately a 32" diameter winch, a gas-powered engine of not less than 19 horsepower, 250 feet of 3/4" wire rope cable, and a dozen six or eight-inch steel or wooden rollers each 16 feet in length. These items would be utilized in removing the LCM from the water during typhoon conditions. If the 6351st preferred, however, there would be no objection to its substituting a D-6 caterpillar tractor or a 6x6 cargo truck with a pulley system to haul the boat out of the water.[92]

Apparently the 6351st Air Base Wing was not to enthusiastic about the suggested winch-roller system of pulling the LCM to safety; for the instructions given to the 6351st Base Services Squadron were to determine the

feasibility of removing the craft from the water by use of a tractor or 6x6 truck in coordination with the rollers. It was the wing's belief that either of these methods would be superior to that of employing a winch, cable, and rollers, as the cost of installation would be lower and the equipment would be more readily available.[93]

Learning of the measures being taken by this command to tow the LCM onto the beach at the first hint of a typhoon, the Rycom Transportation Service advised Twentieth that if the installation were not completed by 30 April 1953, they must insist that the LCM be returned to Naha for security.[94]

If the Rycom Transportation people had known the nature of the findings which the 6351st Base Services Squadron would submit to the 6351st ABW after making a "thorough investigation" of the two possible methods of removing an LCM from the water, they could have saved themselves the trouble of writing. The persons charged with looking into this matter had found that six-inch steel pipe made the best rollers, and block-and-tackle, utilizing pre-formed steel cable, was likewise available. Nevertheless, the 6351st BSS gave as its considered opinion that the scope of such a job was beyond the capacity of the Air Force and should not be made its responsibility.

In support of this view, the squadron urged that it was inconsistent for the Army to assume responsibility for transporting Air Force supplies to the off-island sites, yet decline to see them safely through right onto the dock. Granted that the Rycom Transportation Service was doing this at Miyako and Kume, at Okino-Erabu, where the need was greater and the task far more difficult, it was left to the site commander to provide

a lightering service. Now, in a change of heart, the Army had expressed its willingness to furnish an LCM for Okino, but it expected the Air Force to guarantee the boat's safety from the wind and waves--or it would be withheld. The Commanding Officer of the 6351st Base Services Squadron maintained that the lightering service properly came under the control and jurisdiction of the Army, and that the role of the Air Force should be limited to "recovering the aforementioned supplies after the Army has located them on the site facilities."

Another argument for making this service the responsibility of the Army was the Air Force's exiguity of personnel trained in the removal of LCM's from the water. Air Force officials should realize that if they accepted the responsibility for beaching landing craft, they would also be accepting pecuniary liability in the event the boat were damaged through some unforeseen accident. Since it could not be expected that the Army would find it at all convenient to dispatch a work party to the sites to secure their equipment every time Condition III was proclaimed in anticipation of a possible typhoon visit, the 6351st BSS suggested that the Army could station personnel with the necessary training on temporary duty at the various off-island sites. In this manner, the Rycom Transportation Service could be assured that the vessels for which it was accountable were being cared for in accordance with organizational handling procedures.[95]

The Commanding Officer, 6351st Air Base Wing, concurred in the arguments contained in the indorsement received from his subordinate, but expressed his readiness to furnish the equipment needed in the beaching operation, even while responsibility for the physical beaching for the

LCM should be vested in the Army.[96]

In mid-April 1953, this headquarters instructed the 6351st ABW that if the equipment for beaching the LCM at Okino-Erabu had not been assembled and made workable by the end of the month, LCM-2 should be returned to Naha Port. Although the likelihood of a typhoon's occurring in May was very slight, officials of the Twentieth Air Force were apparently taking no chances of the Army craft's being lost or damaged for lack of the proper facilities for removing it from the water. Needless to say, when 30 April rolled around, everything was just as it had been at Site 55 before the subject of beaching equipment was ever put on paper.[97]

The last lines of the beaching facility story were written on 7 May 1953, when the Twentieth Air Force Deputy for Materiel requested the concurrence of the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, in any one of the proposals for placing the LCM in a place of safety--by means of a caterpillar tractor, a 6x6 truck, or a block-and-tackle, plus rollers in any of the three cases. In the event Rycom approved of any of these plans, this command was prepared to act at once to provide the type of facility selected.[98]

It may be that the reader's interest in the beaching facility has been sufficiently piqued by this time to cause him to wonder what the outcome of these investigations and exchanges of correspondence actually was. The present writer's was, at least. It was with some disappointment, then, that his researches brought him to the following conclusion: Somewhere along the way between the years 1953 and 1955, it appears that "Okinawa-itis" set in,* as we have already seen it do in so many other

*"Okinawa-itis" is a morbid condition of lethargy and lassitude endemic to the island of Okinawa--from which it gets its name--marked by apathy

instances, causing both correspondence and activity in connection with the LCM beaching facility to fade inobtrusively into the mists of time. There was no decision that can be found announcing that further study of the problem would be abandoned. Neither is there any official acceptance by the Army of the proposal that they continue to furnish the crew for the LCM, as they had done in the past. Whether the boat was actually withdrawn to Naha on 30 April 1953 is equally impossible to determine. All that can be learned is that at some time subsequent to that date a procedure different from any of those suggested in the copious correspondence described above was adopted and was still being followed as this history was written. This procedure was as follows:

At the first warning of an impending typhoon, the four-man Army detachment at Okino-Erabu would take the LCM a sufficient distance out from the beach to work up to top-speed--being careful to choose the precise time at which the tide was highest--them run it full tilt onto a predetermined spot on the shore. This done, the crew then secured the boat as tightly as possible with steel cables run to heavy stakes driven into the sand. The idea was that when the huge waves accompanying the typhoon

and procrastination on the part of its victims. Its symptoms are recognizable in unanswered correspondence, postponed decisions, "buck passing", unsubmitted requisitions, extended "coffee breaks", frequent passes, tardy reports, unplanned programs and faulty planning, unreturned telephone calls, addiction to liquor, clock and calendar watching, quixotic policies, and general laziness, both physical and mental. Strangely enough, although few Americans on Okinawa escape its effects--differing from one another, in fact, only in the degree of their infection--the natives themselves seem to be immune to the malady, unless they are employed by the United States Forces or by the American-sponsored Government of the Ryukyu Islands. In the latter cases, they exhibit the symptoms described above even more violently than do their American counterparts.

swept over the spot where the LCM was tethered on its leash, it would be so safely fastened that the waters would leave it undisturbed in its sanctuary despite their greatest efforts to smash it.[99] One suspects, however, that this makeshift method would prove completely inadequate when subjected to the test of a typhoon of any real size, and that the LCM would shortly be smashed like a piece of chinaware. Luckily for all concerned, 1955 brought no typhoons.

The 313th Air Division survey team which visited Okino in July 1955 recommended that all vessels carrying supplies to Site 55 be equipped with a cargo boom and hoist, so that supplies might be transferred to the LCM without endangering the lives of the men as the existing stevedoring system of manhandling them did. Also, steps should be taken to improve the harbor, so as to facilitate the docking of larger type vessels at Okino. Finally, an airstrip capable of accommodating C-47 type aircraft should be constructed.[100]

The Survey of Sites 52 and 56: The problems connected with the two on-island sites assigned to the 623d AC&W Squadron were not nearly so numerous or so difficult of solution as were those at the three off-island sites already described. Nevertheless, they were worthy of consideration and attempted improvement. The chief complaint in connection with Site 52 at Yae Take was actually one over which neither the 623d AC&W Squadron nor the 313th Air Division itself had any jurisdiction. The road leading from the town of Nago at the base of the Motobu Peninsula to the point where it wasjoined by the site access road was both extremely crooked and in a poor state of repair. To correct this situation, the survey team recommended that the highway surface be improved and that some of the

more dangerous blind curves be eliminated. Since the highways of Okinawa fell within the province of the District Engineer, however, the decision to make these improvements would be entirely the latter's. If the Air Force could convince them of the necessity for this work, well and good; but there was no assurance that OKED would see eye to eye with the 313th Air Division. In this nebulous status the matter had to be left.

Again, in connection with the spanking new Site 56 at Yuza Dake, which was, in fact, not due to become operational for several more months, the chief complaint of the team was with the road. Here they found that the thoroughfare running from Naha City to the site area was extremely rough and otherwise unsatisfactory. By all laws of physics in effect at the time, it could be expected, then, that any Air Force vehicles having to traverse it frequently would suffer sad deterioration and eventual breakdown. Investigation revealed that this road was a part of the island-wide highway system for whose repair and upkeep OKED was responsible. However, when the matter was broached to this agency, officials were emphatic in declaring that they had no funds on hand for this purpose; therefore, unless money was provided by the Air Force, the road could not be repaired in the immediate future. The team's reaction to this was to recommend that the matter be carried to the Far East Command (the Army headquarters having service-wide sovereignty in the theater) to settle the money problem and get the road repaired.

General Observations: In a more general vein, the team observed that three of the five sites were commanded by lieutenants, even though a major was authorized as the commander for each detachment. Also, there was a wide variation in the quality of command administration among the

various sites, resulting from the difference in experience level of the individual detachment commanders and the personnel assigned to each site. It was found that a problem in funding and in the auditing of expenditures was created from time to time by the practice of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing in providing some support for the AC&W organizations, despite the fact that the 51st FIW had been designated as the support base. The result of this was uncertainty as to who would provide the various types of support. To eliminate this confusion, the team recommended that the 51st FIW should furnish all support required for the AC&W organizations. Most important, because of the isolated situation of the sites, the detachment commander had a greater responsibility than the average squadron commander, in that he was the highest ranking military official representing the United States Government in that particular area. This made it essential that officers of high caliber and with considerable experience in command be chosen to head the AC&W sites.

Recommendations of the Survey Team: In summing up what they had found at the different radar sites, the 313th Air Division survey team advised that the AC&W organization should be headed by experienced officers with strong qualities of leadership. If the two squadrons were to retain key personnel and insure efficient organizations capable of carrying out their missions, it would be necessary for higher headquarters to improve the conditions under which they are working. At the same time, though, the squadrons and detachments themselves were not doing as much to improve their operation as they might. Again, a lack of certainty as to their exact responsibilities to the AC&W organizations had often caused the support organizations to be remiss in assisting and backing up the 623d

and 624th AC&W Squadrons as they were meant to do. The team also warned that the tour of duty at the off-island sites and at Yae Take would have to be adjusted if it were hoped to keep them manned, making the minimum one year.

Generally speaking, problems involving logistic support and operational problems were not being coordinated within proper command channels, and attempts to bring about such coordination had met with little success in consequence of the cumbersome liaison procedures made necessary by the physical separation of units and the duplication of command, operations, and support channels. However, there were four possible solutions to this problem:

(1) Combine the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons into one organization.

(2) Make each of the detachments a squadron and set up a group headquarters.

(3) Make each of the five detachments into a squadron but place the five squadrons under Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, for all purposes.

(4) Make the five detachments squadrons, and augment Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, to form an AC&W Group.

Solution (1) would simplify command channels, and there would be just one squadron to handle all administrative and supply problems instead of two squadrons, such as existed under the present organization. The disadvantage of this plan was that it would place five detachments under one squadron, an arrangement making the latter responsible for approximately 1,000 officer, airman, and civilian personnel. This was far too large a

number to be desirable.

Solution (2) would put all of the AC&W organizations under one command and would strengthen their organization; however, this would actually be a species of retrogression, since a group headquarters would require additional spaces and would constitute a resurrection of an organization which had been liquidated as recently as 15 March 1955 with the inactivation of the 529th AC&W Group.

Solution (3) would conserve manpower spaces and would place the ADCC and AC&W under one headquarters, but Manpower officials were not all convinced of the wisdom of bringing together all of these functions within a headquarters detachment.

In view of the undesirability of the first three solutions, Number (4) might be expected to win favor by default, if not through its own intrinsic merits. As it happened, though, such left-handed acceptance was not necessary; for it was really the most logical solution from the view point of both economy and conservation of manpower spaces. It would place the ADCC and the AC&W organizations under one command; it would make the detachment commanders squadron commanders, thereby giving them full administrative authority over their personnel; it would simplify the existing supply procedures; it would eliminate Detachment #1, 313th Air Division; and it would reduce the number of personnel currently authorized for command and administration by seven officers, 19 airman, and two indigenous spaces, while requiring an increase of only one graded civilian space. The Manpower people further recommended that if this solution were adopted, the new AC&W group be assigned directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, for command and operational control and to the 51st Fighter Interceptor

Wing for administrative and logistic support.[101]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	5th Air Force Regulation (AFR) 23-4, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, 16 Aug. 1955.
2	1	Ibid.
3	--	FEAF General Order (GO) 164, dtd. 2 Nov. 1954.
4	--	FEAF GO 35, dtd. 25 March 1955.
5	--	Ibid.
6	--	5th Air Force (AF) GO 25, dtd, 25 Feb. 1955.
7	2	Ltr., Hq. 6200th Air Base Wing (ABW) to Comdr. 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron (FBS), sub.: Movement Orders, 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 1 July 1955.
8	3	313th Air Division Regulation (ADR) 23-2, sub.: Organization--Field: 13th FBW, dtd, 12 Apr. 1955.
9	-- 4	History, Director of Operations (DO), Hq, 313th Air Div., July 1955, p. 3, Sept. 1955, p. 2; Daily Journal (DJ), DO, 6 Sept. 1955.
10	4	DJ, DO, 6 Oct. 1955 and 1 Nov. 1955; History, DO, Nov. 1955, p. 2.
11	--	313th AD GO 15, dtd. 16 May 1955.
12	--	Ibid.
13	--	313th AD GO 14, dtd. 16 May 1955.
14	--	313th AD GO 15, dtd. 16 May 1955.
15	--	313th AD GO 17, dtd. 20 May 1955; FEAF GO 109.
16	--	417th ENGRAVBRIG GO 19, dtd. 25 May 1955.
17	--	DO-O&M 9212, Comdr. FEAF to 930th EAG, 29 Aug. 1955.
18	4	DJ, DO, 29 Aug. 1955

Footnote No.	Document No.	
19	5	313th AD GO 29, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.
20	5 6	313th AD GO 27, dtd. 22 Aug. 1955; 5th AF GO 78, dtd. 8 Aug. 1955.
21	5	313th AD GO 42, dtd. 8 Dec. 1955.
22	--	History, DO, July 1955, p. 7.
23	--	Semi-Annual History of the 581st ARG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, Vol. I, p. ii.
24	--	313th AD GO 15, dtd. 16 May 1955.
25	--	FEAF GO 1, dtd. 3 Jan. 1955, and FEAF GO 5, dtd. 15 Jan. 1955.
26	--	Semi-Annual History of the 581st Air Resupply Squadron, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 3-4.
27	--	Semi-Annual History of the 581st Airborne Materials Assembly Squadron, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 1-2.
28	6 5	5th AF GO 78, dtd. 8 Aug. 1955; 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 22 Aug. 1955.
29	7	313th ADR 23-1, sub.: Organization--Field: 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival), dtd. 29 Aug. 1955.
30	7	313th ADR 23-1, sub.: Organization--Field: 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival), dtd. 15 Dec. 1955.
31	--	Semi-Annual History of the 6333d Technical Training Sq., 1 Oct-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 1-6.
32	--	History, Det. #1, Hq. 313th Air Div., July 1955, p. 2.
33	7	313th ADR 23-10, sub.: Organization--Field: 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 15 March 1955.
34	--	Hist., 623d AC&W SQ., 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 1-2.
35	7	313th ADR 23-9, sub.: Organization--Field: 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 15 March 1955.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
36	--	History, 624th AC&W Sq., July-Sept. 1955, pp. 2, 4, 6-9; History, 624th AC&W Sq., Oct-Dec. 1966, pp. 4, 7-8, 29, 38, 41.
37	--	History, 17th Comm. Const. Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 1, 9-16.
38	5	313th AD GO 42, dtd. 8 Dec. 1955.
39	--	History, 13th Comm. Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, p. 2.
40	--	Ibid., pp. 1, 19.
41	--	15th WS GO 8, dtd. 8 Aug. 1955.
42	--	History, 15th WS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955, pp. 3, 10, 13-17.
43	7	313th ADR 23-6, sub.: Organization--Field: 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, dtd. 15 March 1955.
44	7	Ibid.
45	8	Ltr., Hq. 51st FIW, DO, sub.: Movement Orders, 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 8 July 1955.
46	9	51st FIW GO 16, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.
47	5	313th AD GO 2, dtd. 1 March 1955; 313th AD GO 10, dtd. 19 Apr. 1955; and 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 22 Aug. 1955.
48	6	5th AF GO 90, dtd. 15 Sept. 1955.
49	5	313th AD GO 36, dtd. 3 Oct. 1955.
50	10	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div., sub.: Unit Move, 19 Sept. 1955.
51	--	History, 51st FIW, July-Dec. 1955, p. 6.
52	--	5th AFR 23-17, sub.: Organization--Field, 6157th Operations Squadron, dtd. 20 Feb. 1956.
53	--	MATS GO 164, dtd. 6 Sept. 1955
54	--	History, 51st FIW, July-Dec. 1955, pp. 4-5; History, DO, 313th ADiv., Nov. 1955, p. 2.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
55	11	Report of Manpower Management Review, 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron, July 1955.
56	12	313th Air Div. Manpower Survey, sub.: A Study of the AC&W Organizations and Support, 18 July-18 Aug. 1955.
57	12	Ibid.
58	--	Unpublished article by M/Sgt. Edward B. Dawson, 18th FBW OIS, prepared for use in the 313th Air Division weekly Vanguard upon his return from a week's temporary duty at Kume Shima. An excellent piece of reporting, this account of what he saw at an off-island radar EW site missed very little and presented a picture of life as it was lived there very seldom protrayed. Unfortunately, its length (14 legal size pages), the necessity for getting it cleared through security channels, and official lethargy caused the article to be put aside and never used. The present writer obtained a copy and received the permission of Sergeant Dawson to use it as extensively as he might please.
59	12	313th Air Div. Manpower Survey, sub.: A Study of the AC&W Organizations and Support, 18 July-18 Aug. 1955.
60	--	Ltr., Hq, 529th AC&W Gp. to CO 6351st ABW, sub.: Auxiliary Air Strips for Support of AC&W Activities, 29 June 1953.
61	--	Ltr., Hq. 624th AC&W Sq. to CO 529th AC&W Gp., sub.: Information on Airfield at Detachment #4, 5 July 1951.
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Footnote No.	Document No.	
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CHAPTER II

THE LAND PROBLEM IN THE RYUKYUS

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INTRODUCTION

When the Battle of Okinawa came to a close in July 1945 and the last cave of resistance had been seared or sealed, there prevailed on the blasted island a chaos such as must have existed at creation's dawn. Not only had most of the buildings been leveled from Kin south to Ara Saki, but all land ownership records--public and private--had been destroyed along with many former landmarks. The people themselves had been completely dislocated by the grappling armies, thousands having fled to northern Okinawa ahead of the advancing Marines or been transferred to wire-enclosed camps in that same region by the victorious Americans, who sought to spare the non-combatants in this way from the horrors of actual fighting. Others were transferred to outlying islands away from the battle.

As though the ensuing confusion were not enough to make Military Government officials blanch at the mere thought of trying to restore order to the stricken island, the United States Government proceeded to compound it by decreeing that all Japanese nationals--and this included Ryukyuans, of course--residing outside the home islands should be repatriated as quickly as possible. Beginning late in 1945 and continuing throughout 1946, an estimated 140,572 Ryukyuans were brought "home" from Japan, China, Korea, Siberia, the Philippines, the Marianas, Formosa, the Carolines, Marshalls, Gilberts, the United States, and various other places. At the same time,

an estimated 4,766 people were repatriated from the Ryukyus during that period. In 1947, 7,738 more natives of the Nansei Shoto arrived to boost the population, while 3,265 emigrated elsewhere. The year 1948 saw the immigrants decline to 2,607, as the departing citizens numbered 1,026. In 1949 the swollen population was augmented by 1,585 more arrivals, at a time when only 782 moved to other shores. The decline in shifts of population continued into 1950, when only 856 immigrants appeared, and 612 inhabitants sailed to new homes outside the Ryukyus.

All land in the Ryukyu Islands occupied by the United States Forces after the Battle of Okinawa fell into one of two categories: (1) it was privately owned, or (2) it belonged to the Japanese Government. Under International Law, the United States Government was obliged to pay compensation for the use of any privately-owned land, but no similar obligation existed with respect to land belonging to a defeated government, such as that of Japan.

In the immediate wake of the fighting, all land required for military use was seized by the United States Forces in their role of "Occupying Power" under the Rules of Land Warfare, with little consideration given to the rights of private landowners. Another reason for the Military Government's neglecting to take any action toward the re-establishment of land records was the general assumption that political control of the area would be returned to the Japanese Government upon effectuation of a treaty of peace.

When it became apparent, however, that the American Forces would remain in the Ryukyu Islands for a considerable period and would retain political control for at least some time beyond the execution of a peace

treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., issued a directive on 4 October 1950, which provided that a program should be initiated whereby private owners would be compensated for the use of their land. On 5 December of the same year, therefore, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE), followed with an implementing directive which placed primary responsibility for carrying out the program on the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, and, at the same time, provided that the latter could make use of the services of the Okinawa Engineer District* in appraisal, acquisition, and condemnation proceedings. The Deputy Governor thereupon promulgated Military Government Proclamation No. 36, which authorized local boards to ascertain the owners of land upon the basis of available evidence and to issue certificates of ownership.

Once the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made their decision that rentals would be paid, funds were made available for the purpose as of 1 July 1950. The Deputy Governor was authorized to requisition or rent property temporarily required by the United States Forces pending the purchase of property for permanent occupancy or utilization. Since the Executive Branch of the government had not publicly announced the probable duration of United States interest in the Ryukyus, the Deputy Governor, as a matter of policy, elected to pursue a long-term (20 year) rental program, instead of actually purchasing the required land. The District Engineer was requested to proceed on this basis.

The resulting rental program was highly complicated in every respect, as there were more than 44,000 acres** of land to be acquired, consisting

*The Okinawa Engineer District (OKED) had been organized and activated in July 1946.

**In the event, 43,450 acres were actually leased.

of an estimated 144,000 tracts belonging to approximately 50,000 different landowners. Compounding the problem were the multiplicity of landowners, the difference in language between the natives and the American real estate agents, the necessity for registering all lands taken by the United States, and the difference in legal and procedural concepts which distinguished the United States and the Ryukyus.

Since practically all land records had been destroyed during the battle, as we have seen, it became necessary to re-create or re-establish Okinawan land maps and other pertinent data connected therewith, in addition to redetermining ownership of each plot of ground. The method of determining ownership of a given piece of land was, roughly, as follows: The purported owner would file a statement with the appropriate Son* office swearing that he was the owner of a given lot or lots, containing a given area, classified and graded to reflect the highest and best use of the respective lots. This statement then had to be substantiated by two disinterested neighbors. If a review by the land committee of the Son verified the facts and there were no conflicting claims, the land could then be recorded. Unfortunately, most owners did not bother to register their titles, because of the fees involved, and, as a result, the program of re-establishing the evidence of titles was not completed until January 1952.

Having established ownership of the land, the District Engineer was still confronted with the very important problem of determining equitable land values on which to predicate a fair and just rental figure. Unfortunately, there were practically no records of land transactions to use as a

*A Ryukyuan Son (pronounced to rhyme with "bone") is roughly equivalent to an American county, although newspapers frequently translate the word as "village".

guide in making this evaluation. Appraisers from the United States would have required months of research to make the assessment, and there were no Okinawan appraisers, as such, available for this purpose, capable of defending their values sufficiently for budgeting purposes. Time was of the essence, and it was realized that the appraisal must be accomplished with all possible dispatch.

The Hypothec Bank, one of the largest in Japan, had had extensive banking interests in Okinawa prior to World War II, and possessed voluminous records of production and related costs and general information concerning pre-war values of land. Obviously, this organization was uniquely qualified to determine post-war land values on Okinawa, by reason of its background and the data on which it could draw. Under the circumstances, then, the logical thing to do was to contract with the Hypothec Bank for a study and report on land values as of 1 July 1950--the date from which the CINCFE directive of 5 December 1950 authorized rental payments to be made, as we have seen. The bank's Chief Appraiser and two assistants arrived on Okinawa in January 1951 and remained through March of that year. In accordance with their instructions, they visited each of the 26 Sons in which the United States Forces then had installations, conferring with representative landowners, Son officials, bankers, and others to determine the fee value of the different classifications and grades of land within each Son as of 1 July 1950. The thorough and detailed report which they prepared established schedules of values which subsequently formed the basis on which rental payments were determined. From the report of the Hypothec Bank appraisers it was learned that the 44,000 acres held by the United States Forces at the time had a total value of $10,000,000.[1]

The rental for each individual tract was computed at six per cent of the established fee value--a figure regarded by the Okinawa Engineer District as a fair and just return on the investment when the property was considered as bare and vacant, without improvements.* The six per cent rate, which slightly exceeded that recommended by the Hypothec Bank, was approved by the Deputy Governor, and later concurred in by the Far East Command (FEC) and the Office of the Chief of Engineers. It should be understood at this point that the District Engineer was responsible for paying a fair compensation for any real estate requisitioned, but he was not expected to consider any continuing subsistence requirements of the individual landowners.

Because of the difficulties surrounding the rental program, both OKED and USCAR (the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus) agreed that the best means of carrying it out was through the agency of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI). Civil Administration Ordinance No. 91 authorized the Chief Executive, GRI, to enter into individual leases with the landowners and subsequently to convey this interest to the United States under service agreements between GRI and the District Engineer. Besides reimbursing GRI for the rentals paid, the United States would pay GRI a negotiated amount, established by the service agreements, for the administrative work performed. The mechanical details of this arrangement were as follows:

(1) The Okinawa Engineer District would compile and submit to GRI, through USCAR, a listing by government installations of all tracts contained therein, indicating the lot number (legal description), number

*It should be noted that common practice in the United States does not establish any fixed percentage relationship between rental and fee value. The percentage established is dependent upon the individual circumstances of each case.

of tsubo* comprising it, and the amount of rentals due or scheduled to become due each year thereafter for each lot, together with the appraised value of any improvements thereon which were to be purchased.

(2) GRI would determine the ownership of land and of any improvements, then would attempt to negotiate a lease in its own favor with the respective owners. If there were any improvements, GRI would also negotiate a purchase agreement for them, if possible.

(3) Subsequently, GRI would convey to the United States, under a Master Lease, the same individual leasehold and title to any improvements previously acquired, incorporating in one lease all of the individual estates going to make up a single American installation.

(4) The sum due GRI under the Master Lease would comprise the total rental paid for the individual leases, plus the purchase price of any improvements. Annual rentals would be paid as they became due thereafter under the terms of the individual leases.

Because of the time required to resolve policy and to develop and implement operational procedures, the District Engineer was unable to begin actual negotiation of leasehold contracts until 1 August 1952. Despite all the preparations, the program proved unsuccessful, as not more than one per cent of the landowners approached accepted the proffered terms, the other 99 per cent complaining that the amount of rental they would get was too small to be worth the trouble of going through the procedures involved. Besides, they objected to being deprived of their land rights for a period as long as 20 years, and they were decidedly uneasy about the future intentions of the United States respecting the Ryukyus. Furthermore, land values had

*A tsubo is a Japanese measure of land equal to 35.58446 square feet.

risen steadily since 1 July 1950, the date which the Hypothec Bank had used as a point of departure in its appraisal work, and these negotiations were being attempted several years after the date on which the evaluation was based.[2]

Once the Japanese Peace Treaty went into effect, the United States forces ceased to have the status of an occupying power--a situation making it necessary to obtain formal leases for any land held subsequent to that date. In order to reflect the increase in land values which had occurred in the two-year period between the original appraisal of 1 July 1950 and 1 July 1952, the District Engineer added 1.7 per cent to the former valuation.

Headquarters, Far East Command, advised the Deputy Governor in January 1953 that Article 19 of the Japanese Peace Treaty did not preclude payment of rentals for occupancy prior to the effective date of the treaty, 28 April 1952, which was also the date from which payment of rental was legally required. Both Army and Air Force funds were available to pay rental for the Fiscal Years 1951 and 1952, but the Air Force's rental funds for the former years were due to lapse on 30 June 1953, unless expended. All military agencies concerned having been apprised of this approaching deadline, the various Real Estate offices cast about for some means of circumventing a situation which could cause great difficulty if not anticipated in time. The result was USCAR Ordinance No. 105, dated 23 March 1953, which authorized the Chief Executive, GRI, to act as agent for the landowners and to receive rental payments in their behalf for the period 1 July 1950 through 27 April 1952. The individual landowners, in turn, could receive their money from GRI upon executing documents acknowledging the payment as full satisfaction for the use of the land. Approximately $1,060,000 was paid to the

Chief Executive under this program for both Air Force and Army rentals, and, since there was no future commitment involved, about 98 per cent of the landowners had claimed their rental by 1 August 1955.

It having become apparent that the appraisal of 1950 was no longer equitable in the face of spiraling land values, the Deputy Governor requested the District Engineer on 19 March 1953 to re-appraise the value of all United States Government-controlled land as of 28 April 1952, to compute the annual rental from that date forward at six per cent of said values, and to attempt to negotiate leases based on the rentals so computed.

For this appraisal the Chief of Engineers sent two representatives to Okinawa to provide technical assistance. The Okinawa Engineer District, in conjunction with these two representatives, made an exhaustive study of land values throughout the Ryukyu Islands as of 28 April 1952. The lands to be appraised had to be identified as to area, location, and boundary, and the "highest and best use" had to be determined. Since the classifications established by the owners and registry officials, as reflected by registry records, generally agreed with the opinions of these American appraisers and afforded a common basis for evaluation, it was decided to adopt these ready-made classifications of the parcels, since determination of their "highest and best use" was thereby greatly facilitated.

The next problem confronting the United States appraisers was to gather sales data on properties comparable to those being appraised, which could be used as the basis for an estimate of value. The first obstacle encountered in this logical course of action was a "conspiracy of silence" on the part of the local populace, who proved extremely reluctant to divulge any information pertaining to the values of their land. Even when a soupcon of

information was obtained orally after considerable persuasion, it was almost invariably inconsistent and inadequate. The appraisers had their first bit of luck when they discovered that at any time an owner registered or sold a piece of property, he habitually recorded his estimate of its value or the sales consideration as concurred in by officials in the registry office having jurisdiction over his land. In these registry offices the appraisers found a wealth of information which they were able to use in estimating values. By gathering more than 10,000 forms showing these registry data from the various registry offices throughout Okinawa, the appraisers were able to obtain an indication of values for the various grades and classifications in each municipality (Son, Cho, or Shi) where the properties to be appraised were located. These data were classified, tabulated, and analyzed. Then, to serve as a double check, many landowners, land agents, and village officials were interrogated for their opinions on the accuracy of the registry figures. The appraisal as of 28 April 1952 was comprehensive and independent of the earlier Hypothec Bank appraisal, which was turned to only as a general reference. The resulting increase in fee values and rental compensation averaged 40 per cent.

It was normal practice for Okinawan landowners to register their property at only 60 to 80 per cent of its actual value or of the actual sales consideration. Aware of this, the appraisers first "weighed" the registered values by preponderance of recurrence, deleting those which were obviously too high or too low to be representative, thus establishing a "weighed value" for each grade and class within the Son where the properties to be appraised were located. Then, following local practice, the appraisers increased the "weighed value" by an amount which usually ranged from 10 to 50 per cent, in

this way bringing it up to the figure which, in their opinion, had comprised its true value as of 28 April 1952.

The schedule so established for each grade and class of land was used in making an estimate of fee market value for any given area or tract within any particular Son, Cho, or Shi. For several of the more thickly populated Shis (Naha, Mawashi, and Oroku), a separate schedule was prepared for each locality which indicated a sharp contrast of value. The amount of annual rental was then computed at six per cent of the estimated fee market value.

Although a certain grade and class of land generally had the same value as another similar tract within the same Son, there was a wide variance for such land from Son to Son, and there was an even greater difference within a given Son between the better lands and the poorer. Naha City and its environs were treated separately from the balance of the Ryukyus, since the economic situation and vocational interests of the people there were materially different from those of the rest of the islands, which were primarily agrarian. The size of the individual tracts leased by the United States Government ranged from as small as five tsubo (180 square feet) to 285,000 tsubo (233 acres).

It often happened in Okinawa that the owner of an improvement was not necessarily the owner of the land on which the improvement was located. As a result, it was necessary to appraise improvements separately and apart from the land. For the appraisal of improvements, such as buildings and tombs, the standard "reproduction cost less depreciation" approach was employed. First, data were gathered to indicate the prevailing cost of construction and materials. Then an estimate was made of the initial

construction cost of the improvement. From this figure, an amount representative of its estimated degree of depreciation was deducted. The resulting sum was the "physical value" or estimated "reproduction cost less depreciation". Only rarely did the local owners refuse to accept compensation for their improvements at the appraised value thus worked out.

Inasmuch as International Law did not cover all of the real estate situations and problems which were created in the Ryukyu Islands by the American occupation, the Deputy Governor was obliged to establish certain premises as the basis for legal decisions which would be fair to both the United States and the Ryukyuan Governments. Most fundamental of these was the right of the United States "to exercise any and all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° North Latitude." Secondly, where Master Plan boundaries had been established and announced prior to 1 July 1950, the owners of the land contained therein were given due notice of the intent of the United States to take it for military use, as of that date.

Thirdly, the establishment of Master Plan areas subsequent to 1 July 1950 would correspond to the date of USCAR's notification to GRI that specific area was needed. Fourthly, the date of establishment of Master Plan areas would be the date of the lease to be drawn, and would be considered as absolutely binding as though the lease had actually been negotiated at that time, but under no circumstances was the date to be set earlier than 1 July 1950. Fifthly, any areas to be used only temporarily would be rented on the basis of the land appraisals of the Hypothec Bank of Japan plus the 1.7 per cent afterwards added by the District Engineer, up to and including the date of release; however, no rentals were to be paid on areas

for any period of occupation before 1 July 1950. Sixthly, any crops planted or improvements constructed after GRI had been notified in writing by USCAR that a particular area had been selected for use by the United States would be so done at the owner's risk and would not be paid for by the United States in the event of their destruction or denial to the owners.[3]

The Deputy Governor further ruled that landowners of areas designated as Master Plan land or of areas requisitioned for temporary use prior to 1 July 1950 would be paid from the latter date until such time as the area might be released by the United States. Those persons owning areas designated as Master Plan land or occupied on a temporary basis subsequent to 1 July 1950 would be paid from the date of notification to GRI until the actual release of the land by the United States. In a more generous, less businesslike vein, the Deputy Governor added that the natives might use their land during any interval which might exist between its establishment as a Master Plan area and its actual utilization by the United States, without being penalized any reduction in rental payments.

Tombs, houses, and other structures, when destroyed or scheduled for destruction, would be paid for by the District Engineer at the appraised value less the salvage value subsequent to 27 April 1952 (the day before the Japanese Peace Treaty became effective). These payments would be made at the same time as the initial rental payments. Any improvements constructed in Master Plan or leased areas subsequent to the effective date of leasing or to notification that they were Master Plan land would not be paid for. Neither would payment be made for tombs in any area leased or specified as a Master Plan area by the United States if they were not destroyed or reasonable access was not denied the owners. Where reasonable

access was denied the owners, or the displacement of the owners was so far-reaching that visits to the tomb became impractical, thereby causing undue hardship, the tombs would be paid for. Should the owners desire that the undue hardship clause be waived, however, this wish would be recognized and acquiesced in. In the event of controversy, the Land Control Officer would have the power of final decision.

If insufficient time could be allowed for harvesting a crop already planted at the time of leasing, it would be paid for. In a case of this kind, the salvage of a portion, or even all, of the crop by transplanting would not be regarded as an excuse for reducing the payment. On the other hand, any crops planted after those growing at the time the land was leased had been harvested--whether planted with or without the consent of the United States Government--would not be subject to reimbursement.[4]

A third program was commenced on 3 April 1953 with publication of Civil Administration Ordinance No. 109, a standard condemnation law aimed at acquiring additional land not covered by the Certificates of Confirmation. The immediate origin of this law was the need of the United States to acquire physical possession of land tracts not as yet taken into custody for the continuation of the construction program. Under the procedure prescribed therein, whenever the Air Force had a requirement, the acquisition had first to be coordinated with Rycom and USCAR. Next, it was submitted to FEAF for approval; then, if granted, that headquarters coordinated the request with AFFE. Once assured of the latter headquarters' concurrence, the District Engineer proceeded to acquire the land in accordance with the provisions of CA Ordinance No. 109. The exact procedure in these cases was as follows: (1) a notice of intention to acquire the land was filed, after

which the owner had 30 days in which to negotiate a lease; (2) if the owner failed to negotiate, a notice of expropriation was filed, the rent deposited, and possession taken by the United States Government; (3) the owners might then appeal to the United States Land Acquisition Commission on the question of value only.[5]

In the early part of 1953 there arose an immediate requirement for two comparatively small segments of land in the Army's Machinato-Naha Housing Area. In conformity with his policy that no landowners would be dispossessed until they had been tendered a fair rental and payment for any improvements, the Deputy Governor directed that OKED file two Declarations of Taking under the terms of CA Ordinance No. 109--one in April and the other in June 1953. Simultaneously, compensation for the requisition, based on 1952 values, was deposited with GRI. This procedure, providing as it did for the automatic loss of a leasehold interest by the owners concerned, had loud political repercussions--particularly, as it was the first instance in which the United States Forces had acquired a leasehold interest on Okinawa by condemnation proceedings. Made wary by the furor which these cases created, the Deputy Governor determined that this procedure would thereafter be used as little as possible, although it had to be dusted off and brought into play occasionally whenever an urgent need arose for land not in possession as of 5 December 1953.[6]

Seeing the direct negotiation program reach an impasse in spite of everything, the Deputy Governor issued Civil Administration Proclamation No. 26, dated 5 December 1953, which declared that the United States possessed an implied leasehold in all military-used land, and that these leaseholds would be confirmed by the filing of Certificates of Confirmation in the

registry office and the depositing of rental money in the Bank of the Ryukyus for disbursement to the owners. Negotiated leasing under the original program of 1 August 1952 had ground to a halt (if it can be said that anything making imperceptible progress halts) a year later when GRI announced it would not attempt to negotiate any more leases because of the futility of such efforts. As had been the case when the second land acquisition program was formulated in March 1953, CA Proclamation No. 26 had its origin in the imminent lapsing of rental appropriations--this time for the Fiscal Year 1953.

Under the terms of this proclamation, the owners could accept 100 per cent of the rental by agreeing that the amount was satisfactory, or they could withdraw 75 per cent of the sum deposited to their account, then file an appeal for higher evaluation with the United States Land Acquisition Commission. This commission was composed of three members appointed by the Deputy Governor--one each from the Air Force, the Ryukyus Command (Rycom), and USCAR. Free legal counsel for the Okinawan Landowners was provided by GRI from grants-in-aid by USCAR. This counsel was in each case a Ryukyuan attorney.

Needless to say, almost all of the landowners withdrew 75 per cent of the rental deposit and appealed to the Land Acquisition Commission. At the close of this historical period, some cases had been heard, but no decisions had been rendered in any of them, while thousands of additional appeals remained pending. Under the rental program the Air Force acquired leasehold interests in all privately-owned land in the Ryukyu Islands on which installations already existed; while the Japanese Government-owned land within these installations was allocated to the Air Force by the Deputy Governor.[7]

CA Proclamation No. 26 of 5 December 1953 further provided that upon the termination of the government's leasehold interest in a tract of land, it would negotiate a cash settlement with the landowner, based on the condition in which the land was left and its estimated utility to the indigenous owner, rather than assume responsibility for the property's restoration to its former condition.[8]

Because of the economic hardship imposed on the landowners by the large amounts of land requisitioned for military use, the Air Force and Rycom established a joint policy of permitting the indigenous owners or tenants to farm the land until such time as it was actually required for construction or other operations. At any time the United States Forces' use of a particular area necessitated the removal of either the people or their buildings, USCAR was asked to clear the land. This it accomplished by sending a notice to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and to the mayor of the son in which the affected land was located. This policy created one of the most serious problems connected with the land program, since the people began to refuse to vacate their land, notwithstanding their knowledge that the United States Government, in many cases, had paid rent on it for considerable periods of time.

Early in 1953, the Deputy Governor, Major General David A. D. Ogden, asked a group of prominent and trustworthy Okinawans known to be experienced in real estate matters in the Ryukyus to form a Land Advisory Council. The function of this body was to advise the Deputy Governor in all matters concerning a solution to the vexing land problem. One of the first--and certainly one of the most controversial--recommendations made by the council was that a lump sum payment program be instituted in place of

the annual rentals. This recommendation was based on their belief that this was the only way in which landowners could have in hand sufficient capital to purchase comparable replacement lands, emigrate from Okinawa to a foreign country, or pioneer in the Yaeyama Retto. Another argument advanced in favor of lump sum payments was that the United States would apparently remain in the Ryukyu Islands a great deal longer than the 16 or so years within which an annual rental program would be cheaper than fee acquisition. As a result, a letter was dispatched to higher headquarters on 19 October 1953, which eventually caused inclusion of the lump sum payment item in the Military Public Works Bill for the Fiscal Year 1956.

In the latter part of 1953 it became apparent to the various political parties on Okinawa and to the Federation of Municipal Land Advisory Councils* that a lump sum payment program would be attempted. Furthermore, any increase in rentals would depend upon the decision of Congress rather than upon the desires of any local agencies of the United States Government. The Socialist Masses Party and the Federation decided to oppose lump sum payment on the ground that such a procedure was incompatible with the idea of a guarantee of livelihood into perpetuity, such as could be expected from "the good earth".

As a result of mass meetings and political discussions, the Federation

*The Federation of Municipal Land Advisory Councils was a semi-official organization which originally consisted of members of municipal assembly committees concerned with the land problem. As time went on, however, the Federation evolved into a body controlled by a small group of aggressive individuals who employed political methods to form, if not express, the opinions of the landowners. The Federation also engaged in the compilation of statistics and evidence to be presented on behalf of appellants before the U.S. Land Acquisition Commission.

and two of the three political parties agreed that a Ryukyuan land delegation should be sent to Washington, D.C., to present the landowners' situation to the Congress of the United States. Only the Okinawa People's Party, in the person of its lone surviving legislator, Kisaburo Owan, opposed the proposed trip--probably fearful that the six delegates might possibly succeed in their mission, in which case one of the two loudest pieces of ammunition regularly employed by the OPP would be silenced. (The other favorite missile was the reversion issue). On 23 May 1955, the delegation--headed by Chief Executive Shuhei Higa, and including Choko Kuwae, Chairman of the Federation; Hiroshi Senaga, Chief of GRI's Bureau of Statistics; Chojo Oyama, Socialist Masses Party legislator; Ginzo Shinzato, Ryukyu Democratic Party legislator; and Akio Nagamine, an independent legislator--took off from Naha Airfield on their great errand. After a stay of nearly a month in the capital, the party returned to Okinawa on 28 June, to be greeted by an enthusiastic crowd whose spirits were higher than those of the delegates themselves. The latter realized that only time would tell whether their appeals to the Congressmen had influenced them sufficiently to bring about legislation favorable to the Ryukyus.

Next, the Executive Branch, GRI, composed a brochure entitled "Principles of Compensation for the Use of Land by the United States Government". The Legislature, by resolution, then adopted the principles of compensation and added what were to become as familiar to Ryukyuan newspaper readers during the months that followed as "The Four Freedoms" were in the United States at one time: "The Four Principles". Notable, indeed, was the editorial on the burning subject of land acquisition which did

not chant the phrase at some point in its turgid paragraphs, and yet one can hardly resist the suspicion that not more than one out of a thousand readers could have recited the four principles involved, if called upon to be so explicit. (For the matter of that, however, how many Americans could define "The Four Freedoms" of which they heard so much during the Second World War?). Lest the present reader feel a sense of deprivation or ignorance, then, at not having had opportunity to acquaint himself with the four principles demanded by the Ryukyuan landowners, they were as follows:

1. That adequate compensation for requisitioned land be paid, in accordance with the established principles of compensation, using the appraisal of 1954 as a basis for computation initially, but revising the evaluation every two or three years thereafter as values rose.

2. That the method of payment be annual and in advance.

3. That in its utilization of land the United States carry out no further requisitioning, and that any land presently held but not being used be returned to the landowners.

4. That compensation be made for losses to owners incident to unacquired lands. This would include loss of the land itself as the result of dredging operations, compensation for land under highways which had not yet been made because of the dispute over GRI's responsibility in the matter, and inconvenience suffered during training maneuvers or exercises, such as the suspension of fishing, closing of highways, interruption of farming and woodcutting, and the like.

The principles of compensation advanced by landowner groups and presented by the six-man land delegation were divided into two parts--rentals and "other compensation". With respect to rentals for farm land, the natives held that they should consist of the estimated gross productivity of the land, less expenses other than family labor. Thus, rentals would come to about 90 per cent of the cash value of the estimated crop. Rentals for land other than farm land, it was agreed, should be six per cent of the fee value of the land, provided that frequent reappraisals were made and the "highest and best use" at the time of the appraisal was taken into consideration. The term "other compensation" included payment for crops, trees, and bamboos equivalent to the value of the mature plant, regardless of its stage of growth at the time of its destruction. It also meant that the loss of fruit trees and perennials should be compensated for at the rate of the estimated future productivity of the plant; that moving expenses, including every conceivable item connected therewith, should be reimbursed; that traditional rights such as those pertaining to water, to quarry, and to gather firewood would be recognized as the basis for compensation; that suspension of business be compensated for at the rate of the estimated net profit of the business concerned; and, finally, that in the event a farmer were forced to change his means of livelihood, he should be entitled to a lump sum compensation equivalent to five years' rent.

The land delegation estimated that the rental for the Fiscal Year 1955 should be $8,263,178.03--a figure 10 times that worked out by OKED--and that "other compensation" should amount to $14,368,104.18. Thus, the total for the Fiscal Year 1955 alone arrived at by the Okinawan method of

computation exceeded the fee value submitted to Congress on the basis of the Okinawa Engineer District's appraisal.[9]

Finally, in an endeavor to solve the land problem, the Deputy Governor and the Air Force proposed to the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress in 1955 that the United States obtain a long term interest in the land and pay the owners a lump sum equivalent to the 1954 fee value, which was approximately 40 per cent higher than the 1952 evaluation. Under this arrangement, the United States would take a long-term lease or interest in the land occupied by installations classified as "permanent", but would continue the year-to-year leasing on installations classified as "temporary". In both cases, title to the land would remain with the Ryukyuan landowners.

As the historical period ended, it seemed that this plan might solve the monetary aspect of the problem, since even 40 per cent of a pittance is welcome to someone depending on a pittance for his existence; but it remained to be seen whether even the allure of that much additional money could overcome the farmers' traditional reluctance to relinquish their land.

Although the Master Plan for the Ryukyus was relatively firm by 1950, certain additional areas had to be expropriated from time to time during the years that followed, as operational and technical requirements made their inexorable demands. By October 1955, the total area so requisitioned amounted to some 4,400 acres. On the other side of the ledger, some 5,200 acres had been released by the United States Forces between 1 July 1950 and October 1955. By the latter date, the formalization of continuing leaseholds for the 44,000 acres held at that time was approximately 98.5

per cent complete, the deposits for rental covering the period from 28 April 1952 through 30 June 1955 and the purchase of improvements aggregating $3,935,000. In addition, more than 1,600 acres of Japanese Government-owned land had been allocated to the United States Government by the Ryukyuan Property Custodian. No rent was paid for this land.[10]

By the end of 1955, the 313th Air Division possessed a total of 34 installations in the Ryukyu Islands, covering a total of 20,446.64 acres--18,930.13 acres of privately-owned land and 1,516.51 acres of Japanese Government land. For its use of this private land, the United States paid $431,016.07 annual rental, but the Japanese Government received no compensation for its acreage occupied by the victorious foe of the preceding decade.

The largest of the installations, as might be expected, was Kadena Air Base, which covered 5,424.52 acres, all but 163.85 of which were private land. Next in size was Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Base, where the Air Force rented 3,401.5 acres, comprising 3,155.74 acres requisitioned from indicidual landowners and 245.76 expropriated from the Japanese Government. The third larges parcel of land was to be found in the Kadena Village Ammunition Depot, where 3,390.54 acres of private land and 6.2 acres of Japanese Government land were utilized by the Air Force. Surprisingly enough, Naha Air Base was a poor fourth in size, covering a total of 1,822.29 acres, of which 1,402.49 were privately owned and 419.8 the technical property of the Japanese Government. Considerably smaller than the foregoing was Futema Auxiliary Air Base, where 1,130.43 acres of private land were under requisitions.

The customary partiality for the tsubo of the private landowners was

reversed in the case of Yontan AAB, where 533.78 of the 935 acres used by the Air Force belonged to the Japanese Government and only 401.22 to private individuals. Continuing this contradiction to its logical conclusion, both Hirara AAB on Miyako Jima and AC&W Site 55 at Okino-Erabu Shima were constructed entirely on Japanese Government land, as was the Oroku Crash Boat Annex in the vicinity of Naha Air Base. Of all the 34 installations belonging to the 313th Air Division, incidentally, the smallest was the Bishagawa POL Storage Annex, which occupied only .55 of an acre.[11]

The following statistics in connection with the land situation on Okinawa and Ie Shima as of October 1955 indicate the nature and proportions of the problem facing the real estate officials of the United States Forces:

Total Land Area	296,483 acres
Presently Held Under Lease by U.S. Forces	45,600 "
Number of Parcels	127,600 "
Number of Landowners	45,000
Number of Households	126,304
Percentage of Appeals	90%
Pre-War Arable Land	103,800 acres
Arable Land Acquired by U.S. Forces	16,400 "
U.S. Arable Land Farming Still Permitted	6,000 "
Population	632,330
Population Density	1,587 per sq. mi.

Rental deposits made by OKED for the Fiscal Year 1955 under this program totalled $826,000.[12]

THE STORY OF IE SHIMA

World War II Build-Up and Post-War Neglect.

The original plans for Operation ICEBERG contemplated the capture of five islands in the Ryukyus which would be developed as bases for B-29's, fighters, and early warning radar stations in support of the main operations from the island of Okinawa. These satellites were Okino-Daito, an uninhabited island also known as Rasa Jima, 250 miles southeast of the southern tip of Okinawa; Kume Jima, 62 miles directly to the west; Miyako Jima, 190 miles southwest of the big island; Kikai Jima, northeast of Okinawa and directly east of the better-known and more heavily-defended Amami-O-Shima; and Tokuno Shima, the third island north of Okinawa in the chain leading up toward Japan.

In the weeks preceding and following the amphibious assault on that bitterly-defended island whose name, Okinawa, was soon to become a household word in countries throughout the world, reconnaissance revealed that there was actually little point in expending blood and materiel in taking Okino-Daito, Kikai, and Tokuno Islands; for they proved on closer inspection to be unsuited for the purposes which had led to their original inclusion in the operation plans. Soon after the Easter Sunday landings on Okinawa by the troops of the U. S. Tenth Army on 1 April 1945, the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific (GHQ, AFPAC), carried out a personal reconnaissance of both Okinawa and Ie Shima, the tiny island lying some 3½ miles off the tip of the Motobu Peninsula. On the former he discovered potential sites for 18 runways, while on Ie Shima, where the Japanese had already built three air-strips of their own,

he found that four runways might be constructed. Notwithstanding the splendid opportunities for airfield development which the two islands offered, the AFPAC Chief Engineer was careful to warn his superiors that topographical and geological conditions on Okinawa and Ie Shima would necessitate the expenditure of half again as much construction effort as had previously gone into the building of standard airfields throughout the Southwest Pacific Area.[13]

The airfields on Okinawa were to be laid out with a view to providing facilities for Very Long Range (VLR, as they were called--i.e., B-29 and B-32) bomber operations; while Ie Shima was to be engineered primarily to support the operation of fighter escorts for these same bombers. Once the fields were ready to receive the stream of Superforts pouring off the Stateside assembly lines, the Army Air Forces could deliver a devastating one-two punch against Nippon, the B-29's of the Twentieth Air Force in the Marianas providing the right hook, and those of the Ryukyus-based Eight Air Force furnishing the left jab. Considering the beating which the Twentieth Air Force was already giving the Japanese home islands, it seemed unlikely that they could stand up very long before the added fury of these B-29's flying out of Okinawa, Miyako, and Ie Shima. The cancellation of the Phase III projects mentioned above greatly affected the plans for base development on Okinawa and Ie Shima by making most of the resources and troops intended for the abandoned operations available for the work on these two adjacent islands.

On 9 April 1945, the Tenth Army reported to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, over-all commander of the ICEBERG operation in his capacity

as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, that a detailed reconnaissance of the terrain of Okinawa revealed excellent airfield sites for VLR bombers on that island. As a result of this information, Nimitz recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the seizure of Miyako for development as a VLR bomber base be abandoned in favor of a more intensive construction program for Okinawa and Ie Shima. The Joint Chiefs concurred in this suggestion, and the Miyako operation was canceled on 26 April, leaving that scheduled for Kume Shima--where an early warning radar site was programmed--the only element of the Phase III plans to be carried out as originally conceived, on 26 June. Accordingly, base development plans were revised to provide for 18 airstrips on Okinawa and four on Ie Shima, as recommended by the Chief Engineer, GHQ, AFPAC, instead of the eight and two respectively originally planned for the two islands.[14]

The 18 runways which were to be developed on Okinawa included three at Yontan (two for heavy bombers and one for fighters); two VLR bomber runways at Motobu; two medium bomber runways at Machinato; one VLR bomber runway at Naha; one heavy bomber runway at Yonabaru; and one fighter runway each at Awase, Chimu, and Tera (located on the west coast, about seven miles south of Naha Airfield). Two heavy bomber and two medium bomber runways were to be constructed on Ie Shima.[15]

When the advance on Okinawa lagged less than a fortnight after the initial landings, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Commanding General of the Tenth Army, accelerated the plans for seizure of Ie Shima. As it happened, early in March 1945, the Japanese command on Okinawa, concluding that Ie Shima could not be held for more than a few days, had ordered the destruction of all airfields on that island by the end of the

month, "because of tactical requirements." In pursuance of these instructions, the runways were ditched and blasted, while the entire central area of the island was sown with mines, as a defense against possible airborne attack. In doing this, the Japanese displayed their customary resourcefulness: the mines included bombs rigged variously as pressure-detonating or controlled charges, wood and terra cotta anti-tank and anti-personnel charges, and fougasse mines made from drums of gasoline.[16]

The 77th Infantry Division landed on the southwestern beaches of Ie Shima on 16 April, and six days later had taken "at relatively low cost in men, materials, and time what will soon be the most valuable 11 square miles of land in the far western Pacific," according to the report of its G-3.[17] Although the island was declared secure at 1730 on 21 April, after a struggle the last three days of which Major General Andrew D. Bruce, the division commander, described as "the bitterest I ever witnessed," elements of the 77th mopped up remaining groups of the enemy for five more days. The last noteworthy encounter on Ie Shima came during the night of 22-23 April, when a group of Japanese soldiers and civilians, including women, all armed with rifles, grenades, and demolitions, rushed from caves toward the lines of the 306th Infantry Regiment, to be cut down without loss to the American troops.[18] Of the 4,706 Japanese killed on Ie Shima, many were civilians. As a matter of fact, it was extremely difficult to distinguish between soldiers and civilians during the fighting or when inspecting the bodies afterwards. It was estimated that 1,500 civilians had been armed and supplied with Japanese Army uniforms. Some others wore American uniforms, evidently taken from the dead. In the battle's wake, the civilians were all evacuated to Tokashiki Jima, the largest island in

the Kerama Retto, a small group of islets easily visible from Naha.

Since one of the chief reasons for the early seizure of Ie Shima was the need for more fighter runways to support combat operations on Okinawa, runway construction was begun there as soon as possible after the island was considered secure. The outcome of this intense effort was that the surface of the Japanese strips was restored and extensive mine fields removed by 30 April. Twelve days later, an all-weather strip was ready; and the middle of June found three fighter groups (the 318th, 413th, and 507th Fighter Groups of the 301st Fighter Wing) and a night fighter squadron (the 548th) based there on two all-weather strips with crowded parking for over 450 aircraft. By the end of July, two coral-surfaced runways, each 7,000 feet long, were operational for heavy bombers, while a third coral-surfaced runway, 6,000 feet in length, was under construction for medium bomber use. With the termination of hostilities on 15 August 1945, the planned fourth runway, designed for medium bombers, was canceled; but the end of that month saw the other medium bomber strip operational and in use. A total of 324 dispersed hardstands were built on Ie Shima.

By the close of 1945, with operational requirements no longer pressing, officials decided to abandon all three operational runways on Ie Shima in the near future, thus eliminating the difficult resupply problems inseparable from a base not having a port where cargo could be unloaded. As it was, the air units there were dependent on shipments brought in by landing craft or by airlift. During the period from the end of hostilities to the middle of October 1945, military construction requirements were carefully reviewed, and the scheduled work was greatly reduced. On 23 October the

Okinawa Base Command* issued a curtailed base development plan which called for the continued improvement of seven airfields on Okinawa and one on Ie Shima to support operations by light, medium, and heavy aircraft. These airfields were to comprise ones at Bolo (a single 7,500' x 200' runway); Futema (likewise, a single 6,500' x 200' runway); Kadena (one 6,500' x 200' and a second 7,500' x 200' runway); Motobu (a 7,000' x 100' runway); Naha (a 7,500' x 200' runway); Yontan (one 7,000' x 150' and a second 7,000' x 100' runway); Machinato (a 6,500' x 100' runway); and Ie Shima (one 7,000' x 100', another 7,000' x 150', and a third 6,000' x 150' runway). It will be noted that the airfield formerly proposed for Tera was thus completely eliminated from the construction program.[19]

In addition to the construction of airfields, the engineers devoted considerable effort to facilities required to support operations from those same airfields. In the latter part of May, two floating docks were erected on Ie Shima. The same month, a temporary tank farm and an underwater fuel unloading line commenced in April were also completed, making available 8,000 barrels of bulk petroleum storage. Ie Shima was further developed in conjunction with Okinawa as a naval advance base, the construction carried out including warehousing, open storage, wharfage, repair shops,

*When over-all planning for engineer participation in operations on Okinawa was initiated by the Engineer Section, Tenth Army, in October 1944, the Island Command (ISCOM) was established under Tenth Army to provide logistic support for that force during the assault and subsequently to develop a base on the island. Detailed base development planning was assigned to Commodore Andrew G. Bisset, Commander, Construction Troops, ISCOM, who had under his control all troops, both military and naval, which were assigned for base construction. On 31 July 1945, ISCOM was redesignated Army Service Command I, AFWESPAC (U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific). Later still, on 15 October 1945, the organization was further redesignated as the Okinawa Base Command.

hospitals, and quarters.[20]

With the termination of the war, Okinawa quietly drifted back toward the oblivion from which its strategic position had briefly summoned it in 1944-1945--the periods of planning, reconnaissance, and conquest. More effort was expended in simply holding the ground so bloodily gained against the assaults of successive typhoons than in building up a stronger, more permanent base. Yet, if this was true of Okinawa itself, the same story of neglect and abandonment was a hundred times more evident with respect to Ie Shima, the satellite which had been seized for a specific purpose no longer valid.

In the summer of 1945, the Seaview Ammunition Dump on Ie Shima had been constructed and stocked with approximately 22,000 tons of Air Force and Ground Force ammunition. Between September of that year and June 1948 little work was done in connection with this dump, although the 1st Air Division--at that time the highest Air Force headquarters in the Ryukyus--and inaugurated a program earlier in 1948 aimed at consolidating and cleaning up the various ammunition areas on Okinawa and Ie Shima. As a part of this program, 1,500,000 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition and 3,949 long tons of bombs, grenades, mines, pyrotechnics, and components were turned over to the Chinese Government in April. Later on, during the first two weeks of June, a party of Chinese operating under a program initiated by the Federal Liquidation Commission removed some 17,000 tons of aviation ammunition from the dump. Then disaster struck in the form of a fire in the Air Force portion of the Sea View dump on 13 June 1948. By the time the conflagration was finally extinguished two days later, the Ground Force ammunition stores had been completely destroyed, and practically all of the

Air Force stores of small arms ammunition, 20-mm. ammunition, rockets, bombs, rocket fuzes, and 100-lb. fragmentation bombs no longer existed. Thirteen large craters were created by the explosion of revetments, and fragmentation bombs and ammunition of all types lay scattered over a wide area.

The clean-up of Ie Shima was resumed in July 1948, with access roads being cleared and reconstructed where necessary, and ammunition stacked in preparation for detonation or dumping at sea. Approximately 2,000 tons of debris were handled during July. Just when the program was proceeding smoothly again, 5,000 5.00" contact rocket heads loaded on LCT-1141 for disposal at sea exploded on 6 August, completely demolishing the landing craft, killing some 100 natives, and injuring 75 more who were engaged in unloading a Military Government ration ship moored next to the LCT. Clean-up operations were resumed on 20 August 1948, but they were hampered by the rough terrain created by the explosion, the increased maintenance of vehicles, the scarcity of maintenance parts for cranes used in the movement of heavy pieces of ammunition, and the heavy seas which retarded the actual dumping. In spite of all these difficulties, the work did progress, making it possible to commence the project of reconditioning serviceable bombs.[21]

During January 1949, approximately 1,500 tons of grade three ammunition were detonated on Ie Shima, the biggest explosion in the demolition schedule occurring on the 17th when 17 revetments containing 287 tons of high explosives were fired. The following month, ammunition storage operations on Ie Shima were completed, the bombs salvaged from the Seaview Dump, totalling 1,835 tons, being stored on hardstands adjacent to the airstrips on that island. All pits, revetments, and bomb dump areas were

plowed, and the Air Ammunition camp at Ie Shima was abandoned as of 4 March 1949, the detachment moving to the Naval Magazine Area.[22]

On 30 April 1952, two B-29's of the 19th Bombardment Group returning from a mission over North Korea chose to land on the center runway at Ie Shima, rather than chance the hazards awaiting them if they went on into Kadena Air Base. One of the Superforts had lost VHF communications. Being unwilling to attempt a GCA (Ground-Controlled Approach) landing, in view of the extremely poor visibility at Kadena, the aircraft commander decided to set his craft down on the crushed coral 7,000' x 150' strip, where weather conditions, at least, were good. The other bomber, after first vainly attempting a GCA, likewise proceeded to Ie Shima and landed on the same runway without incident. Later the same day, weather conditions having improved, both aircraft took off and returned to their regular base at Kadena.[23]

The following year, when staff planners of the Twentieth Air Force began casting about for sites in both the Ryukyus and the Marianas from which B-62 SNARK guided missiles could be launched without danger to any populated areas from the drop-out of the RATO (Rocket-Assisted Take-Off) units, considerable thought was given to the establishment of such SNARK launching pads at Ie Shima. The GLOBECOM Receiver Building scheduled to get under construction in January 1954, together with its extensive antenna field, would eliminate the eastern runway from consideration. Of the two remaining runways, the western one appeared best suited for use as the site of the SNARK firing pads, because of the lesser danger to the native population from the RATO units' drop-out. Always assuming that Ie Shima were actually chosen for the B-62 launching site, this left only the

center runway available for the landing and take-off of aircraft supporting the SNARK base or the GLOBECOM Receiver Station and making emergency landings.[24]

Proposals for Transfer of the Twentieth Air Force Bombing and Air-to-Ground Gunnery Range to Ie Shima.

On 13 May 1953, representatives of Twentieth Air Force, USCAR, Rycom G-3, the 19th Bombardment Group, the 307th Bombardment Wing, the 6351st Air Base Wing, and the 1811th AACS Group met to discuss the feasibility of transferring the command bombing and air-to-ground gunnery range from Bolo Point to the western end of Ie Shima. Until recently, staff planners of this headquarters had supposed that the existing Bolo range would remain available until some time in 1954, since the contract for building the new B-47 airfield at Bolo called for a year's construction time--and actual work had not yet even commenced. Unfortunately, it had now developed that the best aggregate available for use in constructing the airfield was so located that mining it would necessitate closing the Bolo Point range. This meant, then, that as soon as work was begun on Bolo Airfield, the air-to-ground gunnery range would have to be shut down--one year sooner than had been planned.

True, there were other sites on Okinawa itself which possessed the advantages of accessibility and location over the one proposed for Ie Shima; but they were unanimously disqualified by one consideration: a range situated on Okinawa proper would either be inside an established airway, or it would, at least, interfere with the safe operation of air traffic or water transportation. Okinawa's being so narrow, airways or airfield traffic patterns covered practically the entire island, leaving

only Ie Shima in a clear zone.[25]

It was brought out at the meeting that the Air Force had either already paid rent since 1950 or was prepared to pay rent as of that date for its land on Ie Shima, including that which the gunnery range would occupy. Also, the gunnery to be carried out there would be restricted to .50-caliber ammunition and 5" rockets, while the bombing would be simulated with inert sand-filled bombs containing only a spotting charge, for the most part. The USCAR representative reminded the other conferees that several matters would have to be considered before this command could go ahead with its plans for constructing the new range. There was, for one thing, the amount of land which the natives had under cultivation and the types of crops they were growing in the location proposed for the gunnery range. Also, there was the number of Ie Shimans living within the area under study, not to mention the problem of how and where to relocate them. Not quite so vital to the existence of the natives, but still of considerable moment to them was the question of interference with their fishing grounds and the possibility of having to relocate them.

Before any definite measures were taken toward moving the range from Bolo Point to Ie Shima, the conferees recommended that representatives of USCAR, Rycom, and the Air Force conduct a more thorough investigation to determine the extent of native occupation of the affected region and in which direction the range should be oriented, in order to cause the least dislocation of the natives and destruction of their crops. It was estimated that to move the range and install a new one on Ie Shima would take from six weeks to two months from the starting date, but, before any steps in this direction could actually be taken, Twentieth Headquarters would

have to obtain a statement from the Army, the Navy, and the civilians concerned that the proposed air-to-ground gunnery range was acceptable to them.[26]

It so happened that the particular area on Ie Shima desired for the transplanted range was the same one which the B-62 project would occupy, if that island were selected in place of Bolo Point for the SNARK site. Since Bolo Point definitely had the inside track in the SNARK sweepstakes, as things then stood, it appeared that no conflict of interests would occur, however. Another factor pointing to Ie Shima as the future home of the range was the demand for the aggregate material to be obtained on the site of the existing Bolo gunnery range which would be created if Bolo Airfield were constructed, as the Master Plan provided. Finally, even if construction of Bolo Airfield eliminated Bolo Point from consideration as the site for the SNARK launching base, the B-62 project was so far from realization that it appeared the Twentieth Air Force would be safe in locating the bombing and air-to-ground gunnery range on Ie Shima without fear of its being disturbed for several years, at least.[27]

When the 1811th AACS Group got wind of the possible transfer of the range to Ie Shima, it hastened to request that no demolition bombs larger than 250 pounds in size be used, because of the effect the concussion might have on antenna orientation of the future GLOBECOM Receiver Site. Thus reminded of the sensitive nature of the antennas, Twentieth planners qualified their selection of Ie Shima as the alternate B-62 site with the stipulation that a location on the Motobu Peninsula be substituted if it were found that the concussion or backward air blast resulting from the B-62's launching would be greater than the free explosion of a 250-lb.

TNT bomb.[28]

The Requirement for a High Altitude Dive-Bombing Range on Ie Shima.

On 18 June this headquarters received a radio message from FEAF requesting that the feasibility of locating a high altitude dive-bombing range in the Ryukyus be investigated immediately. The area required need be no larger than that normally used for 100-lb. bombs, since only spotting charges would be employed for any high altitude bombing conducted there. Scoring facilities would be required and the range might be utilized jointly by Twentieth Air Force and Japan Air Defense Force. The message then broached the possibility of utilizing an isolated portion of Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Base for a dive-bombing target during periodic maneuvers in which approximately six practice bombs would be dropped each time. In the opinion of FEAF, a restricted area within a radius of 3,000 feet would be sufficient for safety.[29]

Making it imperative that a dive-bombing range for F-84G Thunderjets be located in the Ryukyus was the political situation in Japan, where the populace had become so sensitive to any incidents involving Americans that FEAF found it necessary to restrict bombing practice to qualified pilots only. Whereas the Japanese people had accepted accidental off-range drops passively, if not philosophically, during the years before the peace treaty became effective, they now seized upon every incident of this kind as another example of the Americans' aggressive nature--and as an excuse for bidding them go home. Since pilots, perforce, needed practice to become qualified, the situation thus created was slightly ridiculous and completely unacceptable, unless every flyer arriving from the ZI were already to possess the necessary experience before coming to the Far East.

Unfortunately--but not surprisingly--this was not the case, and, to make matters worse, the problem had recently been magnified by a large turnover of pilots during the past six months.[30] The entire Ryukyus area had been studied by Twentieth Air Force planners, in hopes that an uninhabited or sparsely settled island might be found to do duty as a target range. Every place tentatively examined, however, proved to be too small, too remote, or too rough for the purpose; therefore, little as anyone liked it, the choice inevitably devolved on Ie Shima as the location of the high altitude dive-bombing range.[31]

Meantime, officers from the Plans and Requirements Divisions of the Operations Section, accompanied by officials from USCAR, had visited Ie Shima for an on-the-spot study of the area under consideration for the air-to-ground gunnery range. Now that the requirement for a high altitude dive-bombing range had been added to that for the gunnery range, it seemed reasonable to combine the two into one project. In addition, instead of waiting for the construction of Bolo Airfield to banish the gunnery range to Ie Shima, the Plans and Requirements people now decided to go ahead with the move just as quickly as a full study of the subject demonstarted the feasibility of locating the range there. Writing the Director of Installations on 26 June 1953, the Deputy for Operations requested that a proposed range layout and cost estimate of the facility be prepared as soon as possible. The area tentatively selected for the range was on the western tip of Ie Shima. Since the dive bombing sorties would all be made downwind, no set traffic approach would be established, particularly in view of the variations in wind direction at different altitudes and seasons of the year. The control tower and two spotting towers

could be sited either along the westernmost runway or on the taxiway just east of it; but, wherever they might be erected, an effort should be made to meet airfield criteria for the center runway, which was to be an active strip utilized for transporting observers and range personnel into and out of Ie Shima. Traffic using the air-to-ground gunnery range would fly a rectangular pattern from south to north, and would adhere to this, regardless of changes in wind direction or other factors.[32]

The same day that the Deputy for Operations imparted these intimate details of the Ie Shima consolidated range to his colleague in the Installations Directorate, Twentieth Air Force received a TWX from Japan Air Defense Force describing the form which the latter desired the dive bombing range to take. If these ideas were followed, the bull's-eye would consist of an eight-foot pyramid centered within two concentric circles, one 50 feet in diameter, the other 300 feet. On each of the four cardinal headings from the center of the target, five rectangular horizontal markers, each five feet by 10 feet in dimension, would be arranged at 200-foot intervals, beginning 200 feet beyond the outer ring. All target materials could be constructed of any available material, just as long as the color contrasted with the surrounding landscape. Two spotting towers should be erected, one with radio controls, on any heading from the center of the target, providing approximately 90° included angle, the towers to be a minimum distance of 3,000 feet from the target. Since all bombing passes made by the JADF units using the range would be carried out downwind from the prevailing breeze, it was quite probable that additional safety precautions, concerning lanes of approach, might be necessary.[33] The 3,000-foot clearance between the spotting towers and the target, which JADF

demanded, was greater than the standard criteria established by the Air Force for its training ranges, but this headquarters was prepared to abide by the wishes of JADF, inasmuch as it was the latter agency which would be using the dive bombing range.[34]

On 29 June 1953, this headquarters got off a radiogram to FEAF, presenting a summary of the situation on Ie Shima. The Tokyo officials were told that although plans were being drawn up for a combination dive bombing and air-to-ground gunnery range on the western tip of Ie Shima, the exact location and final plans had not yet been established. Neither was it known just what the cost would be or how many natives would have to be moved. However, it seemed only humane to allow the farmers to harvest any crops within the restricted area before expelling them for good. In view of the many delaying factors, this headquarters was in no hurry to transfer the air-to-ground gunnery and rocket range from Bolo Point to Ie Shima; moreover, if JADF evinced an immediate need for the dive bombing range, Twentieth would postpone movement of the existing Bolo Point range until the commencement of work on the new Bolo Airfield made such a transfer necessary.[35]

FEAF offered no objection to this command's plan for constructing an air-to-ground dive bombing and gunnery range on Ie Shima, as had been proposed, but did want Twentieth to understand that the high altitude dive bombing range would be needed in the near future--preferably within 60 days. The Tokyo headquarters also suggested that, all else failing, this command complete the ground gunnery features on Ie Shima, but continue to use the Bolo Point range for its other gunnery requirements.[36] Taking his cue from the 60-day target date tossed at him by FEAF, the Twentieth Air

Force's Deputy for Operations requested the Installations Directorate to begin work on construction of the proposed dive bombing range, spotting towers, and other items--at the same time formulating definite plans for relocation of the natives whose homes lay within the area to be requisitioned.[37]

As the story of the high altitude dive bombing range on Ie Shima gradually unfolded during the months that followed, it was, as we shall see hereafter, for the most part a grim tale of farmers fighting a losing battle to hold onto their land against the encroachment of a foreign power which needed these same tsubos to buttress the defenses of democracy against World Communism. Any American military expert could see that if all-out war came against Red China within the near future, the weapon which would most likely be employed to defeat the enemy would be fighter-bombers delivering atomic bombs by means of high altitude dive bombing with quick pull-out to escape the lethal effects of the terrible explosion they had released. For these aircraft and their pilots to be very effective, though, it was first necessary for them to benefit from intensive practice under conditions as nearly like those of actual warfare as could possibly be simulated. Since Ie Shima appeared to offer the only target area suitable for the purpose, it had been selected as the site for the high altitude dive bombing range. All of this made sense, unless one happened to be an Ie Shiman. To him the vague menace of a vague political tenet called "Communism" posed far less of a threat to his livelihood and his happiness than did the immediate, tangible threat constituted by the bombing range. As the Ie Shiman farmer saw it from his worm's eye point of vantage, the connection between giving up his ancestral land for a

pittance and holding Communism at bay was so tenuous as to be non-existent. Having no gun, he could fire no "shot heard 'round the world", and having no Ralph Waldo Emerson to sing his story in ringing rhyme, he could rouse little sympathy for his cause.

A wry note was injected into the tragedy, however, when the Installations Directorate found it necessary, on 17 July 1953, to notify the District Engineer that the prints of a map delineating the boundaries of Air Force property on Ie Shima had inadvertently shown the road which provided access to that land as the boundary line. Through this mistake, several villages and considerable farm land had been included within the perimeter of the interim base, although they were neither authorized, needed, or even wanted. Although the information was volunteered to the Army without prompting, one must not imagine that it was an excess of honesty which impelled this headquarters to call the attention of its sister service to the aberration of which it had been guilty. No, the explanation is more fundamental. It was simply that the Twentieth Air Force did not want to pay rent for any land other than that contained within the actual boundary line.[38]

It will be recalled that FEAF had expressed its hope that the range could be made ready in 60 days. Before giving its reply, Twentieth requested USCAR and OKED to estimate the number of natives and tombs, if any, which would have to be removed from the proposed target area, and, if tombs were found there, OKED was also asked to evaluate them. On 18 July 1953, FEAF had its answer. Much as this headquarters desired to comply with FEAF's wishes in the matter of the range, if it developed that knotty legal difficulties would have to be unraveled before the

natives could be removed from their land, not only would the 60-day goal prescribed prove utterly unrealistic, but the 90-day requirement for which Twentieth was holding out might even be insufficient. In any case, this headquarters hoped to have the plans for the dive bombing range completed and the costs worked up by 27 July.

Apropos of the air-to-ground gunnery range, nothing beyond the planning stages had been done toward transferring it to Ie Shima, FEAF was informed, inasmuch as Bolo Point was regarded as the basically better location. Only when the need for the aggregate material obtainable at Bolo Point for use on Bolo Airfield rendered use of the latter site no longer possible would any great effort be concentrated on transferring the air-to-ground gunnery range. Another factor making local planners reluctant to move the gunnery range within the next few months was their realization that there would be no support facilities for the range personnel on Ie Shima until the GLOBECOM Receiver Site began operating, at which time it should become possible to obtain everything necessary without difficulty. They still believed, however, that the gunnery range could be constructed at the same time as the dive bombing range.[39]

When representatives of the OKED Real Estate Division inspected the target area on Ie Shima shortly afterward, they found six dwellings and 14 tombs which would have to be removed, and the appraiser was advised by son officials that there were actually two additional tombs which the OKED people had evidently missed. The representative of the District Engineer appraised the 20 structures at $1,388.71, and to this figure added $1,500 to pay the cost of relocating all of the dwellings and tombs in the target area. Indicative of how lightly military officials were brushing off any

possibilities of a dissenting note from Ie Shiman land owners in those early days of the range negotiation, the Chief of the Twentieth Air Force Repairs and Utilities Division wrote the following: "In accordance with present procedures, inasmuch as this site is within the Master Plan boundaries of installations under this command, no charge will be made for loss of crops."[40]

Subsequent to the OKED Real Estate people's investigation of the proposed target site, Twentieth asked the 6351st Air Base Wing at Naha AB to make a study of the area tentatively selected for the high altitude dive bombing range, with a view to determining its suitability and making recommendations in the matter. Upon investigating the site previously chosen by this headquarters, the representatives of the 6351st ABW found the terrain highly unsatisfactory, since extensive blasting of coral, filling, and general grading would have to be carried out before the area would be suitable for any type of construction. In the light of this unfavorable topography, they felt that the cost involved in the initial phase of construction would run so high as to be prohibitive. As a substitute for the area they thus condemned, the officers suggested adoption of a location they had found consisting of flat or slightly rolling terrain, which would require a minimum of grading before actual construction of the range could be commenced. An additional advantage of this location was that it would place the range entirely on land within a 1,500-foot radius from the center, and the area within 3,000 feet of the center, well within the allocated space.

Bearing in mind the isolated location of the gunnery range, the lack of security measures, the frequency with which targets would have to be

reconstructed--with the accompanying expenditure of time and money, and the strong probability that the native population would "liberate" any wood material used in construction,* the 6351st ABW emphatically recommended that the target, the 50-foot circle, and the 300-foot circle all be constructed of crushed white coral, which would have little appeal for the islanders. Each of these components of the target should be three feet wide and approximately a foot in depth. Even if no fear of depredations by the Ie Shimans had been entertained where wood was employed, this material was intrinsically quite impractical, since any parts of the target constructed from wood would be ruined after a single bombing and strafing mission by fighter aircraft.

The 6351st ABW further recommended that a building be constructed immediately adjacent to the southernmost control tower, with approximately 500 square feet of floor space for the storage of materials, targets, and equipment, and that it be equipped with a secure lock. This building, to be fitted with a set of double doors, might be used during inclement weather as a shelter for personnel operating the range. In view of the terrain features, the officers surveying the range site urged that all fighter passes be made from the southwest to northeast and break off to the northwest, using a left hand pattern. This was, in fact, the only suitable approach for fighter aircraft. It will be recalled that as a part of its requirements, Japan Air Defense Force had listed two spotting towers, located a minimum distance of 3,000 feet from the target.

*Ryukyuans universally wanted to obtain as much wood as possible, since it or charcoal was used for all cooking and heating. A small amount of coal was mined in Yaeyama, but very little of it found its way to the markets of Okinawa.

The 6351st officers felt that a third tower was essential, because of the direction which the fighter passes would have to take and the location of the range. If their recommendations were accepted, this tower would be erected on the abandoned foundation of an old lighthouse--which meant that it would be only some 2,000 feet distant from the target, instead of the prescribed 3,000 feet. Still, in defense of this departure, the 6351st ABW could cite AFM 335-25 as authority for its proposed arrangement, if JADF took too strenuous exception to the recommendation. Unless this headquarters found the idea objectionable, the Naha wing was prepared to construct the actual targets, which would be secure in the storage building when not in use. The estimated $7,343 total construction cost of the range submitted by the 6351st ABW was $6,551 less than the figure evolved by the Twentieth Air Force Installations Directorate.[41]

Rycom Injects a Lighthouse into the Range Controversy: The business of the gunnery and dive bombing range was complicated in December 1953 by a query from the OKED Liaison Officer as to the feasibility of reconstructing a lighthouse on Ie Shima. From the resulting survey it was discovered that the location requested by the Army agency was within the boundaries of the proposed Twentieth Air Force range. In view of JADF's deep interest in the dive bombing range, this headquarters did not feel competent to determine whether a waiver for construction of the lighthouse should be granted. When a letter to FEAF asking for a ruling in this matter remained unanswered, Operations put through a radio-telephone call to Tokyo. It being more difficult to avoid a direct reply when the question is posed verbally, the FEAF official on the other end of the line answered that no construction which would in any way interfere with the

purpose for which the range was being built would be allowed within its boundaries. The OKED Liaison Officer and Rycom were thereupon informed of this decision.[42]

Early in February 1954, the Plans and Requirements Division of the Twentieth Air Force Operations Section sent Installations a map showing the proposed site of the gunnery and dive bombing range, together with the approach zone. When this map reached the Management Division of the Installations Directorate, however, personnel there found that the greater part of the designated approach zone lay outside the Air Force land boundaries. Although the map bore the notation, "No facilities within this area," various indigenous structures actually appeared to be located within the restricted zone. Before these buildings could legally be removed, the Air Force would first have to obtain authority to acquire the additional land on which they were located. In calling the attention of Operations to the difficulties implicit in constructing the range, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel reminded the other staff section that a prompt decision concerning acquisition of the land in the approach zone was necessary, in order that the area might be cleared. This was all the more true, since USCAR had an iron-clad rule that a minimum of 60 days' notice must be given to the owners of land scheduled for expropriation, so that they might remove and relocate their structures and crops.[43]

The Operations Section was quick to explain that the area indicated on the map received by Installations, with the notation "No facilities within this area," had been sketched in for the express purpose of assisting Rycom in locating its lighthouse site. On the other hand, the

native dwellings within the same area posed no danger to aircraft because of their low altitude, and, besides, they were located beyond the required safety limits of the gunnery range. Under the circumstances, therefore, it did not appear necessary to move any of them or acquire any additional land.[44]

On 8 April, FEAF informed JADF that this command had been directed to modify the Ie Shima range in accordance with the recommendations of the Nagoya headquarters. At the same time, JADF was authorized to communicate directly with the Commander, Twentieth Air Force, on the subject of scheduling and utilization procedures, pending installation of the requested scoring facilities. The following day, JADF used this TWX as the basis for one of its own which it addressed to the Commander, 49th Fighter Bomber Group, authorizing him, in turn, to work out the necessary procedures and schedules directly with Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force.[46]

Now that the actual construction of the high altitude dive bombing range was imminent, the Operations Section of this headquarters began to concern itself with the specific details of design which must be settled upon before work could go forward. As the result of a conversation which Colonel William L. Reynolds, Twentieth's Director of Operations and Training, had with Lieutenant Colonel Blacker, Commander of the 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 49th Fighter Bomber Group, the latter promised to send him a copy of the list of requirements that had recently been used in designing the Ashiya air-to-ground range. Such a list could be used as a model in laying out any range designed to meet the training requirements of the 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron or other units with similar missions. The letter which followed pointed out that if towers were used instead of

pillboxes, they could be of conventional construction, but should be at least 3,000 feet from the target. The terrain would determine their location, while the type of construction would be governed by the necessity for providing safety for the occupants.

In the case of the range at Misawa Air Base, the 7th FBW informed this headquarters, towers were installed at 4,400 and 3,000 feet--an arrangement still meeting the accuracy criteria set forth in the range requirements sent along as an attachment to the letter. Because of terrain limitations at Ashiya Range, however, the 7th FBS was constructing one pillbox at 2,000 feet and a tower at 3,030 feet. Nonetheless, the 7th FBS recognized that the ideal situation would consist of two pillboxes at 2,000 feet, as was the arrangement at the Mito Gunnery Range. Providing the maximum combination of safety to the observers and accuracy of evaluation, this set-up would, of course, be dependent on the existence of suitable terrain. At the same time, though, even if two pillboxes were used, it would still be necessary to provide a Range Control Officer's tower for the observation of low-level aerial patterns.

The 7th FBS added that the target itself must be clearly visible from 20,000 feet. At Misawa the target was composed of obsolete anti-aircraft tow target banners laid horizontally on frames constructed in the form of a circle--an arrangement providing the best visibility of any of the three ranges, and showing no signs of deterioration after six months' operations, since snow or blown sand could sift through the mesh of the targets. For low-level practice, the range would require an approach at an altitude of 500 feet above the target for a distance of 12 miles. It had been found that the three-pound practice bomb used in most

of the 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron's work provided ample registration of strikes on water or surf; and the strike areas of the Ashiya, Misawa, and Mito ranges were all partially located in the water.[47]

This headquarters radioed JADF on 4 May 1954 that the design specifications originally drawn up for the proposed Ie Shima bombing and gunnery range had conformed to those outlined in the 7th FBS's letter, with the exception of the bull's-eye, and this had subsequently been expanded from 30 feet to 50 feet in diameter, in order to make it comply with the specifications of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group. Since the plans were thus ready, Twentieth intended to commence construction of the range immediately, unless JADF or FEAF expressed disapproval of them.[48] An additional minor modification, by which the range markers were extended from 500 to 800 feet, was incorporated in the plans as the result of a meeting of Twentieth Air Force and 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron representatives on 6 May.[49]

A radphone query was received from the 7th FBS one week later, May 13th, as to the availability of a bombing range in the Ryukyus which might be utilized temporarily, pending completion of the Ie Shima range. The officer making the call was told that the Tori Shima bombing range (a small, volcanic island directly north of Kume Shima which had been selected for its unique virtue of being uninhabited) would be available any afternoon, but there would be no way of scoring results. For their part, officials of this headquarters learned from the radphone conversation that six officers and 15 airmen of the 7th Fighter Bomber Squadron would arrive on Okinawa with their five F-84G Thunderjets in the near future for a six-days' stay.[50]

On 24 May 1954, this headquarters learned that FEAF had requested authority from USAF to release the entire Bolo Auxiliary Airfield area to its original owners.[51] This news prompted Twentieth Air Force to call FEAF's attention to certain facts concerning the Bolo area. Of greatest immediate importance, the only active air-to-ground and ground-to-air gunnery range on Okinawa was the one at Bolo Point. Secondly, the SNARK site survey of November 1953 had determined Bolo to be the best location in the Ryukyus, and there was no later information in hand to indicate that the B-62 project was no longer under consideration. Thirdly, if the site proposed by Twentieth Air Force as the location for the 3d Tactical Depot Squadron were not regarded favorably by higher headquarters, Bolo would have to be given alternative consideration as a possible home for this atomic weapons unit. Finally, in the event of an emergency, Bolo Airfield would only have to be rolled and paved to provide an excellent landing strip; but this would not hold true if it were released to the native owners and they were permitted to resume farming, destroying the runway, taxiways, and hardstand base sub-grades in the process. On the contrary, extensive runway construction would have to be carried out before the field could again be utilized for aircraft.[52]

In a more general vein, this headquarters reminded FEAF that, although no new construction was actually programmed for Bolo, it was the only area on Okinawa which possessed any large expansion potential. Furthermore, it should not be supposed that Twentieth was unaware of the political capital which the United States occupation of the Ryukyus could derive from the restoration of Bolo Airfield to its indigenous owners. If, however, it should become necessary to re-acquire that property at a

later date, as the result of unforeseeable developments, the adverse criticism thus fomented would far outweigh the praise that had greeted its release. Besides, it seemed only logical that the over-all expense to the Air Force would be less if the property were retained continuously.

In conclusion, the letter requested that, if it happened that the SNARK and 3d Tactical Depot Squadron sites had already been decided upon and FEAF was determined to release Bolo Auxiliary Air Base, this command be permitted to retain at least the area currently being used as a gunnery range.[53]

The many excellent arguments presented in this letter evidently decided the day; for, on 17 June, FEAF notified this headquarters that it would hold onto Bolo until the Fiscal Year 1957.[54]

In the meantime, on 24 May, this headquarters had requested the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade to construct a bombing and gunnery range on Ie Shima as a training project. The brigade gave its consent and directed the 930th Engineer Aviation Group to execute the assignment. The latter, in turn, delegated the job to the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion for accomplishment, instructing them to dismantle and reconstruct one 20' x 24' half-quonset, erect three triangular observation towers, and mark two target circles on Ie Shima. Actual work got underway on 2 June as a D-8 bulldozer and a grader began constructing four circles by cutting out the ground to a depth of one foot and a width of 24 feet, then filling the resulting trench with sand. Next to be constructed were the three observation houses, perched atop 30-foot towers fabricated of four-inch pipe. Following this, the battalion erected the 20' x 24' half-

quonset as a radio shack from which target personnel would be able to communicate with the practicing aircraft.[55]

Meantime, on 8 June, the Plans and Programs Division of this headquarters had asked the Management Division of the Installations Directorate to expedite the unpleasant business of clearing the native homes and farms from the area on Ie Shima to be occupied by the bombing and gunnery range. Since the 808th EAB was already busy constructing the range, it was imperative that the land be evacuated immediately.[56] Couching its reply in the ambiguous language proper to governmental communications, the Management office declared that it had requested OKED to clear the gunnery range site at Ie Shima as far back as 16 February 1954. The District Engineer, evidently fearful of appearing impetuous, had waited until 20 May to forward this request to USCAR for action. Becoming suspicious some days later that the matter was not being treated with the promptness it warranted, the Management Division had then telephoned the OKED Real Estate Division on June 8th to ascertain what action was being taken. From this conversation it was learned that an amendment to the Certificate of Confirmation covering payment for improvements would be filed on 15 June and a deposit of money made concurrently. Furthermore, USCAR was clearing the area at a rate which should see the task completed by 19 June 1954.[57]

Lieutenant Colonel John L. Gregory, Jr., Commander of the 8th Fighter Bomber Squadron, arrived at Twentieth Air Force Headquarters on 21 June to discuss final plans connected with the proposed move of detachments of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group to Kadena AB. The problem of operational support for the detachments as they successively arrived on

Okinawa was thus settled in the course of conversations with personnel of this command and the 6332d Air Base Wing. While Colonel Gregory was available, he was taken along on a survey of the Ie Shima range, where progress had been considerably retarded by the continued residence and farming activity of the natives.[58] As a result of this visit from the Commander of the unit most deeply concerned with the range, Operations asked Installations on 23 June to construct the shelters on top of the observation towers mentioned above, and to clear the area between the towers and the center of the range of all trees and shrubs, in order that bombing accuracy might be scored.[59]

FEAF Headquarters advised this command on 26 June that, as a result of Twentieth's request that Bolo Auxiliary Air Base not be released at that time, it was taking action to retain the area until Fiscal Year 1957.[60]

As a ramification or by-product of the Ie Shima range construction, this headquarters pondered the need for retaining the gunnery range which had been in use on Irisuna Jima, a tiny islet lying due east of Kume Jima and northwest of the Kerama Retto. According to the policy of this command, only .50-calibre and .20 millimeter ammunition could be fired on Irisuna Jima; therefore, its actual value was decidedly questionable, since the F-86D aircraft which would soon be arriving to replace the older F-94B's and F-86F's of the Naha fighter interceptor squadrons carried rockets as their armament. On the other hand, plaster-head rockets, as well as .50-calibre and .20 millimeter ammunition, might be fired on both the Bolo Point and Ie Shima ranges. Another argument for abandoning the gunnery range at Irisuna Jima was that it created a

danger area within a controlled air space--a condition not in consonance with FEAF policy. In view of these factors, Twentieth requested the 6351st Air Base Wing at Naha to evaluate its need for the Irisuna Jima range and submit its recommendations as soon as possible.[61]

On 7 July, five F-84G's of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group arrived on Kadena prepared to commence simulated bombing runs on the Ie Shima high altitude dive bombing range within the next three days. The 3,000-foot circle had not been sanded, as yet, the 300-foot circle had not been cleared, and the line of sight from the tower to the center of the target had not been cleared; but it was hoped that by having the 808th EAB put in extra hours and work at high speed, the range might be made ready in time to prevent the 49th FBG detachment from undergoing a period of enforced idleness.[62]

In the meanwhile, the 6351st ABW had agreed that the need for retaining the Irisuna Jima gunnery range no longer existed. The proposed release action had to be suspended, however, when it became apparent that the range would be required for an indefinite period by units of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group, since the Ie Shima range was not yet ready.[63] Of the many construction problems encountered on the latter island, probably the greatest had been that of supplying the detachment. Since supplies and food had to be air-lifted from Okinawa, the work was frequently held up through the inability of cargo planes to fly into Ie Shima because of inclement weather. In the case of heavy supplies too bulky to be air-lifted, LCU's were utilized--a procedure which meant that when the landing craft had steamed as far inshore as the shallow, narrow beach permitted, it was necessary for the bulldozers to drag them the rest of the way to

land. Despite the delays created by these uncontrollable factors, the project was completed on schedule on 31 July 1954, with targets constructed for both rocketry and strafing attacks. The entire project had consumed 11,040 military man-hours, no indigenous labor being employed. This was a rather remarkable circumstance in the Ryukyus, where it had long since become customary to utilize native workers on practially every construction job, with Americans, Chinese, Japanese, or Filipinos serving only as supervisory personnel.

By the time the 808th picked up its tools and prepared to sail back to Okinawa, officials of this command had come to the conclusion that the Irisuna Jima gunnery range would be of no further operational value. As a result, FEAF was requested to delete its classification as a danger area from all publications. At the same time, the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate Branch was directed to take the necessary steps to restore the little island to its Ryukyuan owners, and the 6351st ABW was told to publish a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) covering the interim period until FEAF could amend the Radio Facilities Chart.[64]

The Ie Shima range had not even been completed when the 49th Fighter Bomber Group detachment began using it on 14 July 1954. After a brief career of only three weeks, the range was restricted on 4 August to dive bombing practice only, when this headquarters found that the Thunderjets were dropping too many missiles outside the enclosed danger area whenever they engaged in LABS (Low Altitude Bombing System) practice. After two days' recess, the range was re-opened on 6 August, with the understanding that the 49th FBG pilots would drop a maximum of 50 bombs at Irisuna Jima, or whatever number less than that figure was required to

achieve sufficient proficiency to score on the target.

Because of the demonstrated inadequacy of the 3,000-foot bombing range, this headquarters shut it down completely on 23 August, pending the acquisition of an additional parcel of land on the southwest tip of the island needed to enlarge the target area. As August ended, the range was closed to permit relocation of the bull's-eye in such a way as to provide an adequate safety zone. This relocation was, however, only a temporary measure adopted until the area west of the center runway could be cleared of approximately 350 native families.

Because of the frequent necessity for shutting down the Ie Shima range, this headquarters radioed FEAF requesting that the correspondence releasing Irisuna Jima to its Ryukyuan owners be held in abeyance. The upshot was that FEAF graciously granted temporary use of Irisuna Jima until such time as the Ie Shima bombing range boundaries were modified.[65]

It will be remembered that back in February 1954 the Operations Section of this headquarters had taken exception to Rycom's proposed establishment of a 90-foot lighthouse at a point within the approach zone for fighter-bombers making runs on the Ie Shima range. On the 26th of that month, however, the Okinawa Engineer District advised Rycom that representatives of the Twentieth Air Force had verbally agreed to construction of the lighthouse.[66] As soon as Plans officers heard of this misstatement of the facts--whether deliberate or unintentional was not clear--they hastened to inform Rycom that OKED was in error, adding a request that any construction on the lighthouse which might have been started be halted pending a final determination of location. Waiting 10 days to reply--perhaps to allow time for work on the lighthouse to progress--Rycom

notified Twentieth that construction had advanced to a point where it became impractical to stop further work, the foundation and 10 feet of the 30-foot tower structure having been completed. In addition, the forms were already in place for pouring another 10 feet of the tower support structure. Such being the case, the Army headquarters suggested that the center of the bombing range be moved, so as to exclude the lighthouse from its limits.[67]

As it happened, unfortunately, the range construction had likewise progressed so far that it was considered economically infeasible to relocate the center of the target. Faced with the probability of an impasse--since Rycom was seldom known to yield ground to the Air Force in any matter--the Planning officers of this headquarters made a new, more thorough survey of the terrain in the area of the bombing range. To their delight they discovered that the lighthouse would not constitute a flight hazard after all, since the top of the structure would be approximately 105 feet below the level of the target center. It was also determined that the lighthouse would be exposed to very little danger, being situated only a few feet within the target area and protected by an abrupt terrain drop. Thus, it would be subjected to no greater danger than if it had been located immediately outside the target circle. The few feet involved could make little difference one way or the other. Besides, there would be no hazard to personnel, since the lighthouse would be a concrete, unmanned structure, self-supporting in nature. In advising FEAF of the events which had led up to the present strained situation, Twentieth stressed that since Rycom had previously approved location of the range as proposed by this command, it could not

reasonably oppose it now on grounds of not having been consulted.[68]

It might seem that the business would have been settled with this explanation, but far from it. On 27 August an aggrieved Rycom reminded this headquarters that it had previously requested relocation of the bombing range so that the lighthouse would be outside the 3,000-foot radius of the danger area. Having received no reply thus far, the Army organization now desired Twentieth to give it formal notification of any action taken.[69]

Not inclined to a soft answer by this letter, verging on the arrogant, Colonel William L. Reynolds, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, pointed out that at the time Rycom's original correspondence was received, site planning for the bombing range had reached a stage where any relocation would seriously delay the construction of "this urgently needed facility." Besides, construction of the lighthouse had progressed to a point where it was not economically practicable to abandon it. Having in mind these facts, as well as the results of the recent terrain survey alluded to above, Colonel Reynolds commented that he had not seen fit to answer Rycom's letter, nor did he now regard a reply as necessary. Anyway, the situation arising from the presence of the lighthouse within the target area had been resolved in separate correspondence by a joint agreement between the Twentieth Air Force and the Ryukyus Command.[70]

In the meantime, while Colonel Reynolds was preparing this retort, Rycom had radioed AFFE on 1 September that it agreed with Twentieth the lighthouse would constitute no flight hazard and would be exposed to a minimum of danger from the type of practice missiles which would be used.

Nevertheless, Rycom wanted it understood that should any aircraft engage in dive-bombing practice damage the lighthouse, the Air Force must be prepared to repair it immediately, since the structure formed an integral part of the navigation aids required in the Ryukyus.[71] Shortly afterward, this headquarters and Rycom worked out an agreement whereby the latter would make any necessary repairs to the lighthouse resulting from the dive-bombing activities of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group, then would submit a claim through normal channels for the amount due from the Air Force.[72]

On 17 September, Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief of the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate Branch, informed Operations that it would take approximately 30 to 60 days--more likely the latter--to clear the northwest end of Ie Shima of the native populace, as would be necessary if the bull's-eye were moved north some 3,000 feet. Even if this problem of evacuation had not been involved, the construction connected with the relocation of the target could be expected to consume 20 days. By moving the center of the range and clearing the entire northern area of Ie Shima of the natives, this command expected to obtain a clearance of 5,000 to 6,000 feet on all sides of the bull's-eye.[73] It quickly developed that enlargement of the range area would involve several complicating factors. Most awkward would be the removal of between 200 and 300 indigenous houses from the north end of Ie Shima and resettlement of their occupants on other land elsewhere on the island, in compliance with the Deputy Governor's policy that a new home must be found for any dispossessed native before he could be uprooted from his existing one. This stand by Major General Davis A. D. Ogden, Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands,

was no impulse of the moment, but was, on the contrary, a reflection of State Department policy, whereunder the occupation forces provided the Communists with as little grist for their propaganda mills as possible, avoiding any act of inhumanity, selfishness, or parsimony, where at all possible.

In order that the project for relocating the dive-bombing range might be handled with base funds, this headquarters broke it down into several smaller projects. This done, it would obtain permission from the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade to employ the 808th EAB in this work as soon as the project cards were received by the Installations Directorate. The 808th was prepared to move and be mobilized on Ie Shima within two days after receipt of orders, and 20 more days were expected to see the work completed.[74]

FEAF was not the only headquarters regarding regular practice on the Ie Shima bombing range as indispensable to the combat readiness of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group's F-84G pilots. Major General Fay R. Upthegrove, Commander of the Twentieth Air Force, felt such keen concern in the 49th's becoming skillful in atomic bomb release methods that he wrote a personal letter on the subject to the Commander of the 6332d Air Base Wing. In this note of 21 September 1954, General Upthegrove observed that despite the desultory nature of the 49th FBG's recent training exercises--rendered sporadic by the frequent closing of the range--that unit had progressed from a status of 50 per cent combat readiness to one of 70 per cent. Considering the emphasis which was being placed on bringing the 49th to a condition of maximum combat readiness at the earliest possible date, he intended that Twentieth should continue

supporting it to the limit of its ability. Fifth Air Force, parent headquarters of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group, expected the latter to achieve an 85 per cent combat readiness figure in the near future. Having done so, it was then expected to maintain that rate, notwithstanding a steady influx of pilots qualified by preliminary high altitude dive-bombing training to drop live bombs on an inhabited island. Heretofore, the chief problem besetting the 49th FBG had been the lack of safe bombing ranges in Japan for the new pilots. Now that the Ie Shima range was being denied to them temporarily, the 49th's program was receiving a further setback. Obviously, then, it was of the utmost importance that the target and danger area on Ie Shima be relocated as rapidly as possible, so that the range would again be available to them for training. General Upthegrove wound up his personal appeal to Colonel Cochran's sense of duty by saying, "If you have any major difficulty in effecting the relocation or in obtaining the logistic support for this move, please call on my staff for assistance."[75]

Having taken this action to get the Ie Shima bombing range relocated and reopened for practice releases, General Upthegrove indited another personal letter--this one to Major General Roy H. Lynn, Vice Commander of the Fifth Air Force, who had previously expressed his concern regarding this command's ability to provide logistic support for the 49th Fighter Bomber Group's detachments and make the Ie Shima dive-bombing range operational at an early date. To give General Lynn an approximate picture of the local situation, General Upthegrove explained that some 300 families were involved in the range relocation-- a situation creating "a major problem of resettlement rather than a simple movement project."

Because of the political capital which the Okinawa Peoples' Party (the Ryukyuan party affiliated with the Communists) would be quick to make out of any injustice or apparent injustice done to the natives, the Deputy Governor, as we have seen, had established a policy of locating and providing new homes for indigenous personnel in advance of any large scale resettlement. Contrary to what theoretical reasoning might have led one to believe, however, it had been found that moving a few families at a time, as might be done by starting with those closest to the target area and working progressively farther away, was not advisable. It only aggravated the tender political situation. Other factors which had also played their part in hampering the relocation were the extremely crowded conditions on Ie Shima and the lack of adequate transportation from the main island of Okinawa.

General Upthegrove declared that the relocation of the natives had been given top priority, and every available shortcut was being taken to expedite their resettlement. His Installations personnel, to whom he had turned for an estimate, believed that, unless unforeseen complications developed, the area should be cleared and the range made operational by 20 November. In view of the bad weather which had recently visited Okinawa and the neighboring region, however, the Twentieth Commander was of the personal opinion that the project might take five to 10 more days than his subordinates had estimated.[76]

On 4 October 1954, a five-man party from Twentieth Air Force, OKED, USCAR, and the 6332d Operations Squadron flew to Ie Shima to make a survey and discuss the problems involved in clearing the land with the mayor of Ie Son, one Takeyoshi (or Takekichi) Oshiro. As a result of

their investigation, they learned that there were approximately 250 houses and 750 people to be moved, of which some 30 houses and 100 people were located within the 5,000-foot radius of the new bombing target. An additional group of approximately 75 houses and 250 people was located south of the existing bombing range within the area planned for new acquisition. The field appraisal work being carried out by the Okinawa Engineer District was scheduled for completion on 9 October, and it was hoped that the DE's report and deposit of funds for payment to the indigenous owners would be completed within six more days, unless bad weather prevented air travel for the field work.

Having studied the area slated for clearance, the five real estate specialists met with Mayor Oshiro, the vice-mayor, and other Son officials at the Son office to give them a full and complete explanation of the necessity for taking over the land. It was emphasized throughout the discussion that clearance must be carried out with the least possible delay, as the Air Force needed to take it over immediately. The military people explained further that bombing operations would commence in the very near future, and no indigenes would be permitted to enter the area once it was cleared. This brought Mayor Oshiro to his feet with a remonstrance that the 750 inhabitants of the area could not be uprooted from their farms and left to starve. Not only would new homes need to be found for them, but adequate farm land upon which they could raise the food necessary for their livelihood and very existence would have to be provided. Further complicating the situation, as the mayor pointed out, all of the land outside the Air Force property was privately owned, which meant that it would have to be rented by the people being relocated. This, in his

opinion, would pose a real problem, since the dispossessed Ie Shimans had no money with which to pay rental. Besides, there was no available land, either private or public, upon which the people could be resettled. Before the conference broke up, the survey broke up, the survey group requested Mayor Oshiro to prepare a resettlement plan for submission at a second meeting to be held on 15 October at the USCAR building in Naha.

One beneficial result of the field inspection was the Real Estate people's discovery that an area located at the northeast sector of the Air Force holdings on Ie Shima could, in all probability, be released to its native landowners. Situated north of a ridge separating the GLOBECOM area from the northern shoreline of the island, this land was unoccupied, which meant that the houses to be removed from the bombing range could be relocated there, although other land would have to be found for the farming itself, the ground being unsuitable for cultivation. By transplanting the dwellings to this area, the Twentieth Air Force would solve one of the major problems facing the harassed Son officials and, at the same time, minimize the likelihood of resistance by the people to compulsory evacuation. A cursory inspection of the Air Force property lying outside the bombing range disclosed that approximately 65 per cent of all arable land within these areas was already under cultivation. Since the predominant crops were sweet potatoes and peanuts, they would not interfere with the Air Force's mission in that area, as rice paddies or wet farming would have done, in the event this command found it necessary to make use of these additional acres. It seemed, therefore, that the problem of finding farm land to provide

food for the people who were to be evacuated might be solved by turning over these uncultivated tsubo to them for tilling.[77]

Governmental and Newspaper Reaction to the Ie Shima Land Acquisition.

By this time, the Legislature for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) had begun to take a more than perfunctory interest in the Ie Shima land question. The upshot was--as anyone acquainted with the internal workings and peripatetic propensities of legislative bodies the world over might have predicted--that the Military Requisitioned Land Committee of that unicameral organization set out on a trip to Ie Shima on 7 October for a two-day on-the-spot study of the situation. From conversations with Son officials, they learned that a total of 152 families--74 from Nishizaki-Ku and 78 from Maja-Ku (Ku is the Ryukyuan word for "sub-village")--had been notified that they were to be completely out of the range area by October 15th. Such was the American ultimatum, but the mayor and nearly all of the villagers rejected it and announced their determination not to give up the land. Since the fighter bombers of the 49th FBG had begun using the range, the farmers found that working their fields was a precarious occupation, in pursuance of which it was frequently discreet to dive into a convenient depression to escape the exploding bombs. Adding no more to their enjoyment of the situation was their realization that if they evacuated the land as directed, they would almost certainly be unable to repay the money previously borrowed from the Ryukyus Reconstruction Finance Fund (RRFF) for the purchase of livestock.[78]

While the legislative committee was on Ie Shima, the members talked

with several of the people who would be affected by the forced evacuation. One inhabitant of Maja Sub-Village, explaining that tidal winds made farming on the north side of the island impractical, as the Real Estate people had recognized a few days earlier, and that the land in the eastern part was too rocky for cultivation, declared that "we will never evacuate, even if we should be fired upon." A Nishizaki villager who was interviewed told a sad story of having to stand helplessly by as the sugar cane and peanuts he had painstakingly cultivated on his 3,000 tsubo of land were all destroyed, while the trees which he had "fostered with tender care as if they were my children" to serve as wind-breaks were ruthlessly cut down. Once his small supply of sweet potatoes was exhausted, he would have nothing further with which to feed his family. As the legislators turned away, this farmer emphasized his determination by asserting that "I will not evacuate, even if my neck should be cut off." Still another inhabitant of the area being requisitioned by the Twentieth Air Force--he a citizen of Maja Village--had been deeply impressed by the swiftness and efficiency with which the Americans had acted. Before he and his countrymen knew what was afoot, trucks had driven up and scattered sand over the land, to be followed soon after by aircraft which dropped their bombs on the ground so recently devoted to the peaceful pursuit of agriculture, terrifying the farmers and driving them to seek cover wherever they could find it. Nevertheless, now that the confusion of those first terrible hours was past, the farmer calmly stated that "This is land which we have received from our ancestors, and we would rather die than to lose it."[79]

The Okinawa Times, one of the four Naha Japanese language daily

newspapers at that time, had long since established itself as an organ of Japanese nationalism, intent on reversion to the point of obsession, and not averse to slinging a bit of Okinawan mud in the direction of the American military occupation forces. Nevertheless, putting aside its obvious bias against anyone who stood between the Ryukyus and their return to Japanese sovereignty, there was no denying that it was the most literate and articulate of the Ryukyuan newspapers, as well as the most popular, with a circulation of 25,000 copies morning and evening. Though its reporters were seldom bothered by such considerations as objectivity or the possible prejudices of their news sources, the editors of the Okinawa Times frequently wrote their editorials with a pungency and gift for the clever phrase that a metropolitan journal might envy. If the Times reader ever hoped to encounter some gram of humor in its editorial columns, however, he would be doomed to disappointment. That was one quality which the Okinawa Times, in common with its news competitors--the Okinawa Nippo, Ryukyu Shimpo, and Okinawa Shimbun--apparently lacked.

Firing the first salvo in what was to become an almost constant barrage of editorials concerning Ie Shima and the land problem during the months to come, the Okinawa Times carried an editorial entitled "Land Requisition and Guarantee of Livelihood" in its edition of 12 October 1954. The article began by remarking that "Everyone without exception says 'if the military land requisition problem should be settled satisfactorily, American administration of Okinawa would go smoothly.'" Although this was a mild exaggeration, it was not too far from the mark. Almost certainly, the greatest problem facing the military authorities

in the Ryukyus was that of finding space on the very limited acreage of Okinawa for supply buildings, shops, offices, living quarters, dependent homes, bombing and gunnery ranges, maneuvering areas, recreational grounds, airfields, radar sites, antenna fields, ammunition storage, and the hundred other installations that go to make up a major American military base. Yet, difficult as this would have been, even on an uninhabited island the size of Okinawa, the problem was vastly magnified by the presence of 599,771 Ryukyuans on the approximately 290,555 acres making up Okinawa Island proper--or 666,342 persons on 348,242 acres, if we include the 54 tiny satellite islands which went together with the big island to form Okinawa Gunto.* Of these 54 islands, 24 were uninhabited for geographical reasons of one sort or another, further compressing the ever-growing population at the same time that military acquisitions diminished the land available to support it. As though this were not enough, the natural features of the Ryukyus included uninhabited mountain regions in the northern part of Okinawa and virgin forests in Iriomote Island, Yaeyama Gunto.

Actually, there simply was not enough replacement land for the thousands of Okinawans displaced by the continuous expansion of Army, Air Force, and Navy bases. The Okinawa Times conceded that such persons as government employees, teachers, merchants, and other people whose

*These figures are as of 1 January 1955, per the USCAR official semi-annual publication for the period ending 30 June 1955, Civil Affairs Activities in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 146-147, where are presented remarkably detailed demographic statistics on the subject of the Ryukyus. By 30 June 1955, according to this same source, pp. 144-145, Okinawa Gunto contained a population of 674,904, of whom 622,887 lived on Okinawa Island proper.

income derived from the exercise of their profession or trade would not be threatened in their very existence if their land were requisitioned by the military--although even these classes would undoubtedly sustain some expenses in connection with the move. In any case, they would be greatly discommoded. Where farmers, who eked out a bare living from the land through bitter, unceasing toil even under the best of conditions, were concerned, however, the matter was far more serious. In the words of the Times editor:[80]

> The day they lose their land, they also lose the means of support. The first requisite of Okinawan farmers is self-sufficiency of food supply. Sweet potatoes in their land to them means security in food supply for the family, which will give them ease of mind. In this way they make plans for farm management. Consequently, when they lose their land, they lose the ease of mind which hitherto was theirs, born out of the knowledge that they had the source of food supply. Under such circumstances, it is easy to imagine in what dire situation the farmers find themselves when they lose their land, without prospect of support.

The writer then asked a rhetorical question. Why, he said, had the people of Nishizaki and Maja villages of Ie Shima and of Isahama, in Ginowan Son, Central Okinawa, refused to accept the military evacuation order docilely, when they knew that the land being taken from them was necessary to the expansion of the military bases and that they would have to obey the order in the end, regardless of their personal attitudes? His answer was that the natives involved had come to understand that the amount of money paid by the military for expenses connected with the removal of their houses and as compensation for their planted crops was insufficient to cover those losses. Again, the rental they would receive from the Air Force or the Army for their land was far less than the amount they would have to pay for the lease of equivalent

land from other Okinawans. Compounding the difficulty was the inability of farmers to change their occupation very easily when their land was requisitioned. Since the majority of them lived solely by cultivating land, they were "usually simple-minded and naive," and were "unfit both as traders or enterprisers," in consequence. Neither had most of them accumulated any savings. Therefore, the best these people could hope for was "to get a job as laborers in the military installations or in one of the construction companies." The Times writer went on to remark that military work was all right for Okinawans whose homes were close to their place of employment, but those who lived at remote distance from the military installations might not find it very profitable, because of the necessity of renting a room in one of the villages nearer to the base. Besides, there was no assurance that a farmer uprooted from his land would be able to find employment in military construction, since the program was actually tapering off, rather than increasing in size, and the labor pool was swollen each year as more and more young people finished junior or senior high school and sought a job of one kind or another.[81]

The population of the Ryukyus, at the end of June 1955, was 798,253, of which 380,362 were males and 417,891 females. This meant that the little group of islands with their area of approximately 542,632 acres (847.9 square miles) had increased their population by some 31,505 persons since 25 December 1953, the date on which Amami Gunto reverted to Japan, and by 99,426 persons since 1 December 1950.* Although Okinawa covered

*This means that the three remaining guntos--Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama--had increased by 99,426 persons since 1950. Approximately 199,410 people were lost in the reversion of Amami Gunto on 25 December 1953.

55 per cent of the total land area of the Ryukyus, 84.5 per cent of the population was to be found there. In 1940 the population density for the island chain was 588 per square mile--as compared with 529 for Japan and 44 for the United States. A heavy birth rate, coupled with the entry of approximately 156,853 immigrants, composing repatriates from former Japanese-held islands and areas of the Asiatic mainland for the most part, raised this figure to approximately 640 per square mile in December 1953; and by the end of June 1955 the average had soared to 941.4, the highest number of inhabitants per square mile of any country in the world. The island of Okinawa itself boasted a population of 1,321 persons per square mile at the end of December 1954. The problem of over-population in the Ryukyus was not likely to be alleviated by "the old man with the scythe", either, in view of the islands' having the lowest mortality rate in the world--only six deaths annually for every 1,000 inhabitants. This compared with the annual average of 9.6 deaths per 1,000 persons in the United States--and the Ryukyuan figure could be expected to decline each year, as the effects of American medical practices were felt in every segment of society, particularly in connection with tuberculosis.[82]

The Okinawa Times went on to say that it would be well if the military authorities could avoid the requisitioning of any more land, though whether or not it was done would depend "entirely upon the will of the military authorities." If, of course, the requisition was absolutely necessary, there was no help for it; however, "payment of adequate removal expenses and compensation for agricultural crops should be made, together with a promise for the payment of fair rent (taking the market

price into consideration)." If these conditions were met, the farmers whose land had been requisitioned could be expected to move out with their minds at ease. Unfortunately, declared the writer, the inadequate compensation hitherto paid to landowners for their land had turned the land problem into a political issue that cast a dark shadow on relations between Ryukyuans and Americans, making the former "an easy prey for the demagogues."[83]

On 12 October 1954, Major Dallas A. Sharp, the Rycom Land Control Officer, and Mr. John T. Sheehan, Chief of USCAR's Land Division, met with officials of this headquarters to discuss the urgency of and necessity for the bombing range. Major Sharp contributed the unwelcome intelligence that the Deputy Governor had no fund upon which he could draw to provide resettlement money for the natives of Ie Shima--a nugget of information ominous in its implications of Air Force responsibility.

About this time, the Ryukyu Shimpo carried an article, "Okinawa, Gibraltar of the Orient," written by Mr. Stewart Griffin, the special Tokyo correspondent of the Journal of Commerce, and recently quoted by the Nishi Nippon. As translated from its original English into Japanese, then back into English--with some multilations undoubtedly occurring in the process--the article made the following observations:[84]

> In the Ryukyu Islands, which were captured from Japan after a desperate fight during the period from April to May 1945 /the campaign actually began on 26 March and ended on 2 July 1945/, a great fortress which the United States prides as the Gibraltar of the Pacific has already been established. Moreover, the U.S. Armed Forces are further continuing their efforts strenuously in strengthening the fortress. The following is the recent situation of Okinawa.
>
> Rehabilitation from utter destitution: The progress until a great fort of the United States in the Far East was established

can be said /to be/ the course from utter destitution to prosperity. Prosperity from utter destitution--everyone who has visited this former Japanese territory for the second time may think so. During the first days when the U.S. forces landed on Okinawa in 1945, Okinawa was utterly destroyed, and the economy was on the brink of ruin. However, later on, the efforts of the American military authorities were rewarded, and the standard of living on Okinawa was promoted and rehabilitated toward prosperity.

Of the total population of some 650,000 /this figure is too low, in view of the population's numbering 662,107 as of 1 October 1954, according to the official figures published by USCAR/, about 125,000--that is, more than 33 per cent--are employed by American forces, American civilian construction companies, and independent quarters of American military personnel. Therefore, the military installations are in fact the main industries of Okinawa today, and the situation has come to such that the Okinawan economy can never be maintained without the American forces in the island.

Efforts are especially concentrated upon the increase of farm products, and sugar cane, rice, and sweet potatoes are cultivated by developing the uncultivated land. The commodity export during last year from the four guntos of Okinawa, Miyako, Yaeyama, and Oshima /this last-named gunto, more accurately known as Amami, since O-Shima referred to the single island of Amami-O-Shima, had reverted to Japan on 25 December 1953/ increased by 50 times in comparison with that of 1948--that is, the export has suddenly increased from less than $100,000 to more than $5,000,000. An extraordinary effort is being made in rehabilitation of economy, and on the other hand, a great effort is also being made in reinforcing the military installations. Especially, ever since the truce ending the Indo-China War and Red China obtained a firm status as a powerful nation, further efforts have been made in reinforcing the military installations.

And, the installations are ready to receive American forces stationed in Japan at any time. Okinawa occupies a very important geographic position in terms of strategy. Okinawa is located 400 miles from the mainland of China, 467 miles from Shanghai, 340 miles from Formosa, and 980 miles from Peking. Therefore, a jet plane can enter the China mainland in less than one hour, and a jet bomber loaded with bombs can make a round trip to Red China. An American officer here states that airplanes can be made ready for action within less than 30 seconds after a siren is blown for starting action.

The U.S. has no intention of releasing the island: Three Ryukyuan guntos, excluding Amami Oshima, which was returned to Japan, are placed in an unprecedented anomalous situation. For, at the time when the Japanese Peace Treaty came into effect, the occupation

of the Ryukyus was legally over, but for a strategical reason, Okinawa is still placed under the military administration and is under the jurisdiction of General Hull, Commanding General of the Far East Command /correct title: Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE)/.

The administrative building located in Naha houses USCAR and GRI. The Chief Executive of the GRI's Executive Branch and Speaker of the Legislature are Ryukyuans, but Major General Ogden, Commanding General of the Ryukyus Command and Deputy Governor, holds absolute veto power. Here exists the American Consulate and the Japanese Government Liaison Bureau, which are the liaison agencies between the United States and the Japanese Government.

Ryukyuan people say that Okinawa and the Ryukyus will be returned to Japan some day. However, Major General Ogden declared that the U.S. would hold the Ryukyus for an indefinite period. The U.S. believes that she is entrusted with the trusteeship from the United Nations (over the islands) similarly as if leasing them for 99 years.

On the other hand, Japanese themselves are under the impression that the Ryukyus will not be returned to Japan for at least 10 years, or for 25 years if things turn unfavorable. At any rate, an authority says that Okinawa will belong to the U.S. as long as the cold war continues. The Okinawa islanders, who were made accustomed to be under the Japanese rule for a long time, are obedient and do not complain very much. However, the U.S. is also exerting herself to shut out the complaints by taking measures so that the islanders will not be in needy circumstances. Frankly speaking, the U.S. is only interested in maintaining the Ryukyuan economy to this extent. In short, the U.S. has no intention to raise the economic standard of Okinawa to that of the U.S.

Difficult problems in American administration: After the termination of the war, the Okinawan economy has been remarkably revived, but this is still to a small extent from a broader point of view. The black sugar is the top export, and other than this, there are not many products, and all commodities which the islanders need are dependent upon importation. At present, the island imports commodities not only from Japan, but also from Thailand and Burma. During the early part of the war, Japan chiefly handled the Ryukyuan economy for her own convenience, but this relationship is now totally discontinued.

In pre-war days, people from Japan proper, chiefly from Kagoshima Prefecture, came into the Ryukyus, but recently, only a limited number of Japanese laborers for military construction works, traders as well as a few people for liaison purpose, are

allowed to enter the islands.

The most difficult problem in the Ryukyus today is the compensation problem for land requisitioned from the farmers, in order that the American forces can expand the military installations and air fields. In this respect, they are constantly attacked by a few members of the Ryukyus Communist Party. In other words, after the Japanese Peace Treaty became effective, the American military authorities paid only six per cent of total pre-war time rentals for land they requisitioned for military use from the farmers.

Of course, the farmers greatly complained, saying the amount is too small, and the farmers' request for increased payment was flatly disapproved whenever they made the requests. In order to accept the complaints of the Ryukyuans and investigate them, the Civil Administration was established. The relief measures for evacuating farmers were to assist the farmers in two respects: (1) to relocate them to Yaeyama Island /this should have read "Yaeyama Gunto", as Iriomote and Ishigaki were the two islands in that group to which immigrants were being sent under governmental sponsorship/; and (2) to have them emigrate to South America. However, when these two programs actually came to the stage of realization, various obstructions lay before them.

One more difficult problem is the reversion movement of the islanders. The Ryukyuan people believe that they are Japanese, for they speak Japanese, live like the Japanese, and work like the Japanese. In fact, Ryukyuans are people with mixed blood of Japanese, Chinese, Malayans, and Formosans, in addition to Spanish and Portuguese blood.

Wish of the people: As a result of the legislative election held in March of this year, of 29 fixed number of legislators, 12 belong to the Democratic Party (Conservative Party), 12 to the Socialist Masses Party, three were independents, and two were members of the Peoples' Party (Communist Party). The Peoples' Party and the Socialist Masses Party are wholeheartedly supporting the reversion movement. While both political parties fully understand that the reversion to Japan is impossible for the time being in light of the present situation, they are constantly giving the people a feeling of uneasiness and aim to keep them in an unstable situation.

However, the majority of the Okinawan people understand that they can live more comfortably under the administration of the U.S. than pre-war days, and that even if the islands were to be returned to Japan, they would be treated as people of a second-class nation. Even then, the fact that they still wish for the reversion may be attributed to a sentimental reason for the time being, rather than that of substantial value.

But, as Okinawans are possessors of the conservative feeling of farmers from the beginning, they have a feeling characteristic of their race in connection with reversion to Japan. Therefore, their slogan is "Rehabilitation before reversion." On the other hand, the U.S. has already spent nearly $1,000,000,000 for the construction of huge military installations. There is no land other than her own where the U.S. spent such a huge amount of money as she has in Okinawa.

It is believed that A-bombs and possible H-bombs are stored in Okinawa at present. At any rate, judging from the measures taken so far, there is no possibility of the U.S. releasing the islands.

By this time, the Ie Shima land requisition problem had snowballed to such proportions in the minds of the Ryukyuan people that hardly an issue of at least one of the four Naha Japanese language dailies did not contain either a news article or an editorial on the subject. In its edition of 14 October 1954, the Okinawa Shimbun--with the Okinawa Nippo one of the two newspapers most friendly to the United States at that time--took up the familiar theme, but sought to introduce a new prelude to the hackneyed lament. In this fresh treatment, the Shimbun explained why the people of Ie Shima were more recalcitrant than were the other Ryukyuans driven from their ancestral lands by the unavoidable, but nonetheless resented, encroachment of the military installations. The writer began his editorial with the premise that "It is commonly acknowledged that the success of the American military's administration of Okinawa is solely dependent on how the military requisitioned land problem will be settled," since every Ryukyuan in every walk of life knew, almost instinctively, that "the more poor and isolated the island is, the more bitter it is for those who lose their land." He then proceeded to lecture the people on the danger of their becoming dupes for Communist ends by allowing themselves to become inflamed over the land problem

through the agitation of these common enemies of Americans and Ryukyuans alike. After all, the citizenry should remember, it was, fundamentally, to resist Communist aggression that American troops were still occupying Okinawa in the year 1954, nine years after the war with Japan had ended. The people of the Ryukyus would simply be shutting their eyes if they failed to grasp this basic kernel of the situation.

True, the inhabitants of Ie Son labored under various inconveniences peculiar to the isolation of insular existence, in addition to having sustained great losses as a result of World War II. At the beginning of that global conflict, Ie Shima had a population of approximately 7,000 inhabitants; but, by the time the 77th Infantry Division hit the beaches in April 1945, some 3,200 of the citizens had betaken themselves to Okinawa proper, where they built small shacks to shelter them from the weather until the day should come when they could return to Ie Shima. Approximately 1,800 of those farm folk who remained on their tiny island died in the battle, while the surviving 2,000 residents were evacuated to Tokashiki Jima in the Kerama Retto, as we have seen, to make room for the airfield development underway on Ie Shima. Finally, in April 1946, the first 300 Ie Shimans were returned to their island from exile in Tokashiki Jima, to be followed in May by 400 more, and the balance of nearly 1,400 in July. Gradually, many of those who had sought refuge on Okinawa of their own volition also came back to Ie Shima, swelling the population of the island.

The natives who returned to their ancestral lands found a ravaged soil, scorched and blasted almost beyond recognition by the passage of battle. Theirs were a hundred Taras--homes "gone with the wind" and

each Ryukyuan farmer a Scarlet O'Hara in miniature in his love of soil and indefatigable determination to restore his property. First, the farmers patiently plowed the ground; then they sowed the seeds. For the first several years survival was touch and go, but by 1954 they were pretty well back on their feet, and the population of the island had risen to 6,954 as of 1 October. Given these circumstances, the reader can better understand the bitterness the Ie Shimans felt at being ordered to move off their land to make way for the bombing range, just when their years of hard toil had begun to bear fruit and their homes and farms were restored from the ashes, giving them every prospect of a tranquil existence and a modest livelihood.

In the light of this background, the Okinawa Shimbun editor suggested that "measures should be taken to make their livelihood after leaving the island peaceful and secure, and also provide them with employment. It is said that the Deputy Governor is studying this problem earnestly. However, thepoint to consider in settling the problem is how much money will be paid to them as funds with which to begin a new business." The people of Ie Shima could understand the necessity for their being evacuated during the Battle of Okinawa, but they found little logic in being moved off their land in time of peace and with no guarantee of livelihood. This attitude of intransigence was all the more understandable if one bore in mind that the danger of Communistic aggression was a vague phrase completely removed from their daily existence, and the word "Communism" itself was a term of which only the better educated had ever heard. To appreciate their truculent stand, one had to remember that "The Ryukyuans' attachment and nostalgia toward their land are strong and beyond comprehension of

foreigners."[85]

On the morning of 13 October 1954, Shuhei Higa, the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), conferred at length with Major General David A. D. Ogden, Deputy Governor on a number of subjects, the most important of which was the military requisitioned land problem. Following the conference, Chief Executive Higa told reporters that there appeared to be only one practical way of breaking the log jam created by the military's inability to pay any greater rental for the requisitioned land than was provided in the appropriations made by the United States Congress. He and a small party of GRI officials should make a pilgrimage to Washington, D.C., the Mecca where all the world sought financial assistance, and present their case directly to that body. The exact date of their journey was undecided, as yet, but it would be selected on the basis of what appeared to be the most opportune moment. Commenting on the subjects brought up by the Chief Executive in his press conference, the Ryukyu Shimpo, a generally fair-minded newspaper, thought not staffed with editorial writers as literate as those of the anti-American Okinawa Times, wrote as follows:[86]

> Judging from the present international situation, most people understand the conclusive reason why the United States requires the Ryukyuan base in terms of strategy. However, the problem is that land is naturally necessary for the construction of the military base, and that it will directly be connected with the life- and death problem of the people. Accordingly, the matter of what should be done to make material and spiritual compensation to those who have lost their land has come to the surface as a political as well as an administrative problem, and this is now the greatest source of concern for Okinawa.
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> . . . . . .
>
> It is needless to say that the people's good will and cooperation are necessary for the purpose of constructing and securing the

> greatest military base on Okinawa, the most powerful key-point of the free world. In order to obtain the wholehearted support and cooperation of the people, a wise administration based on good will should be carried out by the administrator. We are inclined to think that under such an actual phase, Americans and Ryukyuans will be able to establish sound policies only when both sides acquire a common interest.

The Shimpo writer then expressed his opinion that the American military authorities could win greater loyalty and cooperation from the Okinawans if they studiously requisitioned cultivated land as seldom as possible, and selected, instead, those areas whose loss would least affect the livelihood of the people. Relations would also be improved if the Americans adopted a policy of furnishing employment for the people banished from their ancestral tsubos by the forced requisitions, and if they paid rentals commensurate with the value of the land to the native owners.

Apropos of the Chief Executive's proposed visit to Washington, D.C., to plead the cause of his people with the Congress of the United States, the shrewd editor regarded it as of utmost importance that GRI compile complete data with which to argue its case and answer questions which might be put to the Ryukyuan delegation. After all, any increases in the rental payments would have to be appropriated by Congress, which would mean heavier taxes for the American people--and it happened that these tax payers were the very same people who would be choosing their representatives at the next election. Even in a country where every man seemed like a Croesus to the impoverished Ryukyuans, a Congressman did not lightly appropriate money without inquiring how badly it was needed. The visiting lobbyists from Okinawa, therefore, should not expect Congress to appropriate funds for greatly increased rentals, unless the

members of that august body were convinced of the justice of such measures as the result of a detailed exposition of the true situation in the Ryukyus. As an alternative, the Ryukyu Shimpo suggested, GRI officials could explain the situation to any high-ranking Americans who might visit Okinawa, but more would probably be accomplished if the Chief Executive or some other representative of the people were to make a personal visit to the United States at an early date.[87]

On October 15th, the same day that this editorial appeared on the streets of Naha, a conference was getting underway in the USCAR building of that city to consider a plan for resettling the people of Ie Shima which Mayor Oshiro was scheduled to present. In sending two representatives to the meeting, this headquarters had understood that the only other persons present would be Oshiro, USCAR and Rycom land experts, and the necessary interpreters. As soon as Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief of the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate Division, and Captain Tompkins N. Bogel, of the Requirements Branch, arrived at the conference room, however, they were conscious of the meeting's being "loaded" with Okinawan reporters, landowners, GRI officials, and sundry other types. The two Air Force men immediately called this unexpected situation to the attention of their Army hosts, declaring that they did not deem it appropriate for newspaper reporters and land association people to be present. The Army officials disagreed with their stand, however, and steadfastly declined to exclude any of the Okinawans present from the conference. Having won this preliminary skirmish, the Chief of USCAR's Land Division, Mr. John T. Sheehan, called the meeting to order.

Others present besides Mr. Sheehan, the Twentieth Air Force representatives, and Mayor Takekichi Oshiro were Mayor Dallas A. Sharp, the

Rycom Land Officer, various GRI officials, reporters from the Okinawa Times and Okinawa Shimbun, assorted native counselors and landowners, and last--though certainly not so in his own estimation--the representative of the landowners, one Shoko Ahagon, who would be heard from again on more than one occasion. Since the wishes of the Air Force representatives in the matter of the meeting's composition had not been respected, they pointedly took no part in the discussions which followed, merely observing what was said and done. Disinclining them all the more to participate was their realization that the subject of land requisitioning had become an extremely sensitive topic for USCAR, GRI, and the landowners, besides serving as the theme of numerous native newspaper articles. With this in mind, Captain Bogel and Mr. Cox felt that it behooved them not to engage in any discussion of the controversial statements which the conference was almost certain to produce.[88]

Chairman Sheehan rammed home the first charge by asking Mayor Oshiro what plans he had made for the resettlement of those villagers who would be uprooted from their land in the near future by the expansion of the high altitude dive-bombing range. (This, incidentally, was for the most part land on which the Air Force had paid rental since 1 July 1950, in anticipation of the day when a need for its use, such as the present one, might arise). The Ie Son magistrate answered that he would prefer to defer any statement of the farmers' plans until he had an opportunity to explain the situation to his people. Mr. Sheehan then addressed himself to the Okinawans present, explaining the reason for the Air Force's wanting the land on Ie Shima at this time, and promising to try to iron out all obstacles to the plan, provided they cooperated wholeheartedly.

As an encouraging note, he added that it had not actually been decided that the people would definitely have to move within the immediate future. He had queried the mayor concerning his evacuation plan merely as a precautionary measure which would be resorted to only in the event circumstances made it necessary for the villagers to move, so that their resettlement would be accompanied by a few difficulties as possible. Having given this soothing explanation, Mr. Sheehan repeated his request that Mayor Oshiro reveal the mystic details of his grand plan for resettling his constituents, in the event it became necessary for them to evacuate.

The mayor spoke briefly, and, as soon as his words were translated into English, the Americans learned what they had suspected all along: he had no plan! On the contrary, Oshiro declared that it was impossible for his people to move to another part of Ie Shima itself because of the land shortage. Chairman Sheehan then asked, quite naturally, why the people could not migrate to some place outside Ie Shima. The mayor's disingenuous, but not too ingenious, reply to this was that the presence of many elderly people and small children prevented it; and he, in his capacity of mayor, must be responsible for protecting the lives of his flock of more than 1,000 persons. Anyway, because of the magnitude of the problem, he had already appealed to Chief Executive Shuhei Higa for assistance. Again, Mr. Sheehan strove to allay the obvious fears of the Ie Shimans by postponing the issue, telling them that "As far as we know right now, they will continue on as they are . . ." until such time as definite instructions for their removal were received. The natives were "to continue on living there until we do get word to the contrary," and

were to continue their farming, as in the past, leaving their possessions where they were until final information was received. Nevertheless, he urged that the people draw up plans to be used, in case resettlement became necessary, studying the possibilities of Okinawa itself, some other near-by island of the gunto, or--better yet--the Yaeyama Retto, where many other families had emigrated from over-crowded Okinawa.

Mayor Oshiro found courage at this point to suggest that the Air Force locate its gunnery range on some uninhabited island, instead of on populous Ie Shima. Sheehan answered that this same idea had occurred to the military authorities, and was under consideration at that very time. However, it appeared that the special requirements connected with the bombing range would make it necessary to use Ie Shima. Major Sharp interjected that if evacuation proved unavoidable, Rycom would see to it that his people were resettled in such a way as still to be able to earn a livelihood. He added that if the Air Force had to engage in any firing which might endanger the natives, he did not believe the Deputy Governor would countenance it, even if the people themselves were willing to remain there and accept the risk. Oshiro's answer to this was that the people of Ie Shima were determined not to move, even if their land became a danger area, and it was because of this stand that he had taken the problem to the Chief Executive.

Convinced in his own mind that the Ie Shimans were only bluffing, Sheehan advised the mayor that he was confident the people would accept the situation and agree to resettle elsewhere if the latter would only explain to them the danger of remaining where they were and relay the military's promise of assistance should they have to move. To this appeal the mayor remained obdurately non-committal.

Not a little disgusted by the Army representatives' temporizing, Mr. Clyde R. Cox rose to observe that the present meeting was, to all intents and purposes, so much wasted time. Eleven days earlier, Mayor Oshiro had promised to prepare a plan for the removal of the inhabitants from the Air Force area and their resettlement elsewhere. However, now that he had failed to present any plan at all for the consideration of Twentieth Air Force officials, there was really nothing left for them to discuss. This, Cox explained, was the reason he and Captain Bogel had taken no part in the discussions. Evidently nettled by the conciliatory tone of Sheehan's remarks, which tended to give the Ie Shimans the false impression that the land requisition was problematical--when this headquarters had already made it quite plain that the land was definitely needed--Cox added that he had "no comment to make on the statements which have been made in this conference."[89]

As soon as the conference had ended and the others had departed, the Twentieth representatives approached Major Sharp for a brief, informal discussion of the problem. If, however, they had thought that he would align himself on the side of the Air Force in the land controversy, Bogel and Cox were quickly disillusioned; for the major confined himself to reiterating the position of the Deputy Governor and the Civil Administrator as it had been expounded during the formal meeting. Aware, themselves, of the strategic and operational importance of the land on Ie Shima to the mission of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group, the two Air Force men attempted to convey the same appreciation of the situation to Major Sharp. The best they could win from him, though, was the information that General Ogden had indicated his willingness to discuss the subject personally

with Major General Upthegrove, the Twentieth Air Force Commander.[90]

In giving its readers a detailed account of this fruitless conference, the Okinawa Times "definitely confirmed" that a firm decision concerning the 488,000 tsubo of land wanted by the Twentieth Air Force for a bombing range had not been made as yet, and the landowners would not be required to vacate until specific instructions were given by the military. Thus, according to the newspaper, "the landowners were somewhat relieved of their anxiety."[91] And thus, also, thanks to the conciliatory tone taken by the Army representative, the farmers of Ie Shima were encouraged to live in a fool's paradise.

By the latter part of October, it began to look as though a partial solution of the Ie Shima relocation problem might be arranged by reorienting the target circle. On the 28th of that month, Captain Bogel sent a map of Ie Shima to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel with an explanation that if the bull's-eye were moved to the north end of the existing range and an area on the north side of the island were then added to the range, a safety zone of at least 5,000 feet radius could be established completely around the target center. Some such arrangement had become almost a matter of necessity, since General Ogden had given orders that the Ie Shimans were not to be moved from their homes until a suitable site, capable of accommodating the entire group, had been located. Captain Bogel added that inasmuch as the bombing technique to be employed by the fighter-bombers was relatively new, no definite lateral safety distance criteria had yet been established. However, past experience inclined this headquarters to believe that the new area indicated on the map would provide a sufficient margin of safety, while not

requiring any additional land. Even better, the new target orientation would reduce the number of houses which would have to be relocated from 350 to 35 or less. At the same time, if operational requirements for additional land arose, Operations would submit the appropriate requests for clearance action. Meantime, Captain Bogel desired the Real Estate Division to clear the indigenous population from the area marked on the map at the earliest possible date.[92]

Subsequently, the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate Division sent a letter to Rycom describing the proposed land danger area. The writer was careful to emphasize that the arrangement shown on the attached maps was only tentative, being subject to revision after trial, and it should not be inferred that this headquarters was conclusively relinquishing all future claims to the land on the southern side of Ie Shima.[93] The same day, 4 November, the OKED Real Estate Division completed its appraisal of all indigenous houses, tombs, and structures in the area, and requested USCAR to clear the area as far as the new safety line, in order that payment for the structures could be made to their owners.

On 5 November, Mr. Nobuo Azuma, Tokyo correspondent for the Associated Press, interviewed Deputy Governor David A. D. Ogden for nearly an hour on a variety of subjects pertaining to the Ryukyus and their problems. The general made no bones of his belief that the question of military requisitioned land was the most vital issue facing the American occupation forces. By comparison, all other problems were mere trifles. Luckily, it appeared that the budgetary issue would be taken up at the next session of the United States Congress, which was scheduled to convene in January 1955. At that time, the U.S. military forces were

occupying some 44,000 acres (17,765 chobu, to use the Japanese term) in Okinawa Gunto--a figure equivalent to 14.2 per cent of the entire area. Reporter Azuma learned that 300-odd landowners affected by military requisitions were even then submitting petitions asking for an increase in rental for the tsubos taken over by the United States. This, however, was so much wasted effort, if they had only known it; for the Deputy Governor was already doing everything in his power to help the Ryukyuans dispossessed of their land by cruel military necessity--and the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, General John E. Hull, was doing the same from his office in Tokyo.

The final solution to the dilemma lay with the authorities in Washington, D.C., and a request for an increased appropriation had already been submitted to Congress. If that body voted this appropriation, the United States would probably lease the land, paying "appropriate prices" for it. The Deputy Governor wanted it understood that the military did not seek actual ownership of the land, contrary to what many Ryukyuans thought. All they wanted was the right to use the land indefinitely. Thus, he said, whenever the American forces withdrew from Okinawa--as they had every intention of doing, once the menace of Communist aggression finally dissappeared--the land would be returned to its indigenous owners. Moreover, since the rental presently being paid was calculated at six per cent of the land value, it was "like interest on money paid for the superficies." Nevertheless, it seemed to General Ogden that, in all the value of the land to its owners before taking it over and using it, as had been done.[94]

THE IE SHIMANS RESIST EVACUATION FROM THE BOMBING RANGE

Opposition To The Survey.

On 26 October 1954, the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade, acting at the behest of the Twentieth Air Force, directed the 930th Engineer Aviation Group to relocate the existing triangulation range tower and bull's-eye at the Ie Shima bombing range, obliterating the recently completed bull's-eye and concentric circles. Included in the project would be an access road, guard towers, a mess hall, communications and radar storage and supply, a generator shed, vehicle storage, and a wood frame pit latrine. The 6332d Air Base Wing would provide specifications for all of the foregoing jobs, while actual execution was made the responsibility of the 808th EAB, which could be expected to profit from its previous experience in building the original bombing range.[95]

The 808th EAB survey team moved in on 8 November, driving stakes and cutting down trees, so that they would have an unobstructed view for their work. This abrupt action would have been painful to the natives under any circumstances, but, coming only three weeks after the Naha meeting at which the USCAR and OKED Real Estate people had held out such high hopes, it appeared like perfidy of the worst kind. The simple farmers were unable to realize that the Air Force was one military organization of the United States and that the Army was another. Neither could they appreciate the pressure being put on the Twentieth Air Force by higher headquarters to have a high altitude dive-bombing range ready at an early date. All the elements of a Greek tragedy were there, with irresistible forces pushing the two sides toward collision.

Two days later, on 10 November, General Ogden conferred with a number of prominent Ryukyuan officials, including Chief Executive Shuhei Higa, Speaker Kunihiro Ohama of the GRI Legislature, Mayor Jugo Toma of Naha City, Chairman Hajime Irei of the Land Committee, Chairman Yoshimoto of the Shi-Cho-Son Mayors' Association, and Chairman Choko Kuwae of the Land Federation. At a convenient point in the discussions, the Deputy Governor seized the opportunity to clarify the situation as it existed in the following words:[96]

> The rental of land for military use on Okinawa is based on the land value [as it existed] on April 28, 1952, and has been decided by the United States Congress. So long as the United States uses land on Okinawa, this rental will not be changed, and it can not be expected that matters decided by the United States Congress will be changed. The United States Land Acquisition Commission will make a decision as to whether or not the present rental is proper, but the Commission will not be able to make a decision beyond the appropriation decided by the United States Congress. However, what is recognized as proper by the Commission will be of great significance, even if it were contrary to that of the United States Congress.

At a time when this command was increasing its pressure on the people of Ie Shima to relinquish their land, the 49th Fighter Bomber Group wired a reminder on 13 November that it was waiting impatiently to begin using the high altitude dive-bombing range which was the source of all the trouble. In a previous message, this headquarters had estimated that the Ie Shima range would be operational around 20 November. Now the 49th FBG wanted to know whether this target date was going to be met. If not, they asked to be given a new, realistic date on which the range could be expected to open, since "the subject range [was] urgently needed for qualification and continuation training of bomb commanders."[97]

Twentieth was forced to reply that the Ie Shima bombing range would definitely not be operational on 20 November 1954, thanks to the difficulties encountered in relocating the indigenous personnel residing within the boundaries of the range. Although this headquarters had requested clearance of the entire area of the island west of the center runway, in order to provide the maximum safety distance from the target center, the Deputy Governor had been unable to comply because the number of natives involved created a resettlement problem of such magnitude that he had neither sufficient funds nor a suitable area for the desired relocation. The larger area of safety having proved impractical because of the population problem, Twentieth had reduced the area which would be cleared to a circle with a radius of 5,000 feet. By so doing, this headquarters had also reduced the number of indigenous personnel to be moved from approximately 350 families to some 30 families. The Deputy Governor's office was acting to clear the area even then, but because of the imponderables involved, no attempt would be made for the time being to forecast a target date for operational use of the range. All that the Twentieth Air Force could do was promise to advise the 49th FBG just as soon as a predictable completion date could be worked out.[98]

On 16 November, a six-man survey party of the 808th EAB, led by Chief Warrant Officer Vernon W. Rabbitt, started surveying at the center of the new impact area on Ie Shima and continued working down the public road in an easterly direction toward Maja Ku (Sub-Village). As the surveying progressed, the 10 or so natives who had first gathered around the party collected other interested onlookers, so that by the time the engineers neared the village they found themselves surrounded by several

hundred people. CWO Rabbitt ordered his men to ignore the crowd and continue working, but this was more easily said than done. After the surveyors had progressed about 1,600 feet, a native approached a rodman and began interfering with his work by making gestures which obstructed the engineer's line of vision. The rodman ignored him, but when Rabbitt moved up with the transit, this same individual kicked out the survey stake. Sensing a definite air of hostility in the crowd, the officer in charge directed his crew to carry their clearing tools and to stay together, never leaving one man alone.

About this time, one of the survey party discovered that a tire on the truck being used in their work had been slashed with a knife so severely that it would be beyond repair. Rather than create an incident in which they would assuredly be the immediate losers, even though the farmers might be the ultimate victims of the resort to violence which they had set in motion, the survey team retired to the village. Here they found a crowd of several hundred Ie Shimans milling around the Ie Shima zone man and Mr. Roy S. Nishida, a nisei employed by the OKED Real Estate Office who had come along as a sort of liaison man between the survey party and the natives. The latter, familiar with the Japanese language, reported that such conversations among the farmers as he had overheard were not so much indicative of belligerence as of a desire to be assured by GRI that the land contained within a 5,000-foot radius of the bull's-eye would comprise the total area to be requisitioned.

The survey party retired to the range storage building for lunch, but another group of natives soon gathered across the road. Realizing the futility of further attempts to go on with the work, CWO Rabbitt

informed the Ie Shimans that he was going to quit surveying for the day and that they should go home. With this assurance, the crowd dispersed. At no time during the episode had the people attempted to inflict bodily harm on the Americans, but Rabbitt was convinced that if he had tried to extend his survey through the village, some incident would have occurred.[99]

In view of this incident and a similar one which had occurred at Naha Air Base almost a year previously,* the Real Estate Division at

*In this earlier incident of 5 December 1953, a band of Communist-inspired demonstrators attempted to halt construction of an access road to the UHF/DF site being built at Hazamahara in Oroku-Son. In order that native crops planted in the 1½-acre field might be harvested before work got underway, USCAR had notified the people of the region as early as the previous October 28th that construction would begin the first week of December. In spite of this warning, some 250 natives gathered in a field near Gushi Village as soon as the construction equipment was observed moving to the job site, and prevented operation of a bulldozer by swarming all around it. The Director of Communications was told that the bulldozer operator was stoned, in addition; however, there is no confirming testimony of this, and the second-hand method by which this allegation was received inclines the writer to doubt its accuracy. The region where the incident occurred had been designated as a military construction site as early as 1950, but the farmers had been allowed to grow crops until the last minute before the actual commencement of construction. When the crowd refused to disperse, troops from the Army 29th RCT moved in and peacefully ejected the demonstrators.

Considerable notoriety was given the incident in the four Okinawan daily newspapers, most of it unfavorable to the United States, quite naturally. Kamejiro Senaga, GRI Legislator and Secretary General of the Ryukyu People's Party (the visible and vociferous element of the Japan Communist Party which endeavored to injure the American occupation of Okinawa by overt acts rather than by covert fifth column activities--which were left to others), denounced the "rout" of the landowners when he was interviewed by the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun; while the Okinawa Times interpreted the action as "intimidation" of the "lamblike" farmers! The less hostile Ryukyu Shimpo found it unfortunate that troops had been called in, when, in that journal's opinion, the "incident might have been dealt with by GRI or by Okinawan policemen." The only sympathetic comment came from the pro-American Ryukyu Shimbun, which remarked that "Communist activities which deliberately create troubles in society will add nothing to the progress of Okinawa." Once this incident had run its course, work on the access road and UHF/DF site proceeded uneventfully, and 24 May 1954 found the entire project complete.

this headquarters decided to check the status of the rental payments which were being made by drawing on Air Force funds cited to OKED. If it developed that the facts justified such strong action, General Upthegrove would inform General Ogden that the Air Force expected a firm hand to be taken with the Ryukyuan people in making its master plan land available whenever the need for it arose.[100]

At the very hour that the "embattled farmers" were standing their ground on Ie Shima, Mayor Oshiro and five representatives of the landowners were huddling with Chief Executive Shuhei Higa and Director Masaru Miyazato of GRI's Department of Internal Affairs, seeking some action which would spare their land from requisition. Then, faithful to the mission with which they had been entrusted prior to their departure from Ie Shima, the visitors presented the following petition on behalf of the 798 Ie Shiman landowners having a stake in the land problem:

> As the result of a meeting which was held by Mr. Sheehan, USCAR official, Major Sharp of Rycom, Mr. Cox of the 20th Air Force, and [representatives of] landowners on October 15th, Mr. Sheehan assured us evacuation would be carried out and till further notice was made, we could engage in agricultural work as before. We were grateful and relieved as if we had escaped from the jaws of death. However, on the 8th, Mr. Sheehan and eight others came here [to Ie Shima] and started a survey.
>
> It gave us the impression that land might be requisitioned according to the purpose stated previously, and the people feel as if they had fallen into a bottomless pit. As to the condition of the island, as well as the firm resolution of the people, we have mentioned [them] in the previous petition. It is thought that the Air Force can obtain a land big enough for its use, if it should conduct a spot survey of an uninhabited island which is large enough to meet the purpose of the Air Force (for example, Aniri Island in Izena [due north of Ie Shima], or national forest in the middle part of Kunigami).
>
> We earnestly hope that the Chief Executive, GRI's departments concerned, and the Legislature will make efforts so that designation of the land as firing range, which is attended with much

danger, will be changed to another area which will not influence the livelihood of the people, at an early date.

The role of pourer of oil on troubled waters must have become a wearisome one at times, but Chief Executive Higa gave no sign of it when Mayor Oshiro and his five Ie Shima compatriots presented this petition to him and Mr. Miyazato. Neither did the wrath contained in their tones move his composure or disturb his habitual politeness. Fortunately, he was able to deny truthfully that the military had informed him of its intention to resume the land survey on Ie Shima. Yet, he added, he had previously requested the Civil Administrator, Brigadier General Walter Johnson, to inform GRI beforehand, whenever a survey was planned, so that the appropriate mayor might be contacted, thus avoiding a misunderstanding. To mollify his wrought-up flock further, the Chief Executive told them that "Just because USCAR or the military is proceeding with a survey, do not interpret it adversely. In the meantime, be aware of the fact that a negotiation is being conducted with the authorities concerned, and do not interfere with the survey."[101]

Both Higa and Miyazato promised to enlist USCAR's aid in halting any further survey work by informing the proper officials of the hardships that would be created by the proposed land requisitioning. With this assurance in hand, the Ie Shimans ascended another flight of stairs in the government building to the USCAR Real Estate Office, leaving their petition behind to provide the GRI officials food for thought and future writers material for their histories. This was simply not their day, however; for, although they were lucky enough to find Mr. Sheehan at his desk, their erstwhile defender and friend could only remark, "In connection

with the military's present plan, I can not say anything." From this cryptic comment the little delegation could infer only that the die had been cast and that, opposed to it though Sheehan might personally be, the Air Force intended to postpone its action no longer.[102]

The most unenviable position of all, perhaps, was occupied by Chief Executive Shuhei Higa. Serving at the pleasure of the Deputy Governor rather than by popular election, the little one-armed ex-English teacher had been the target of the opposition Socialist Masses and Okinawa People's parties from the day of his inauguration on 1 April 1951, and he had not been exempt from the poisoned darts of some members of his own Ryukyu Democratic Party. No individual, appointed to his position by the military authorities and often forced by circumstances to be the mouthpiece for policies which worked a hardship on his own people, could expect to enjoy any degree of popularity. The only popular puppet is in a side show. A favorite shibboleth of both opposition parties--and one which could never fail to ring pleasingly in the ears of the general populace was the cry for public election of the Chief Executive, in the same way as the GRI Legislature had been elected since 1 April 1952. In the present unpleasantness on Ie Shima, therefore, Mr. Higa found himself between Scylla and Charybdis. If, on the one hand, he failed to show some sympathy with the land acquisition policies of the United States Government, his usefulness would have ended and he would have stood in danger of being deposed. On the other hand, no matter how much he might try to soften the blow by delay or appeal for better terms, the people of Ie Shima--or any other region of the Ryukyus undergoing the ordeal of land survey and acquisition, for that matter--would blame the Chief

Executive almost equally with his American masters for their troubles.

In the immediate wake of the disturbance on Ie Shima, Mr. Sheehan phoned Colonel Paul W. Stephens, the Director of Installations, Twentieth Air Force, to inform him that a conference had been held at his office on the 17th, with Chief Executive Higa, Major Sharp, Mayor Oshiro, and himself in attendance. The mayor, having been in Naha at the time of the incident, as everyone knew, could plead complete lack of responsibility for it; but, in any case, he had promised to return to Ie Shima and straighten out the difficulty. Before departing, he had assured USCAR that not only would there be no more demonstrations, but the survey party would be able to return on 22 November to complete their work.[103]

Having been assured by Major Sharp, the Rycom Land Control Officer, that there would be no further demonstration by the Ie Shimans, the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion ordered its survey team to return to the island on 22 November to complete their interrupted work. The landing of the team on Ie Shima proved to be the signal for the almost simultaneous appearance of around 200 natives with Mayor Oshiro at their head. Addressing himself to the head of the survey party, Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Vernon W. Rabbitt, the mayor inquired what the purpose of the survey was supposed to be, adding that the nature of the project had never been explained to him by either GRI or USCAR. Mr. Rabbitt, far removed by the chain of command from the political conversations held at higher echelons, could only answer that it was his understanding that the entire matter had been explained previously, and that Mayor Oshiro had given his personal assurance that no further demonstrations would take place. The

mayor denied this. Having made a quick mental comparison of the number of hostile natives present and that of his own small party, CWO Rabbitt found no difficulty in determining his course of action. Discretion being the better part of valor, according to the best authorities, he made no attempt to go ahead with the work for which he had come. The risk was too great to be worth the effort.

As soon as the 808th EAB had reported the failure of Rabbitt's mission, this headquarters notified Major Sharp of the unexpected turn events had taken and won a promise from him that he and his real estate colleagues in USCAR would visit Ie Shima on the 24th to clarify the thinking of Mayor Oshiro, who was beginning to look like a veritable Proteus when caught between the present wrath of his constituents and the latent power of the United States. Mr. Clyde R. Cox, the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate chief, never a Job of patience, could find no more forbearance for the Ie Shimans after seeing them thwart the astronomically more powerful Air Force repeatedly, like so many Sitting Bulls. It was, therefore, with no compunctions that he gave it as his opinion to Major Sharp and USCAR that it was "time to take off the 'kid gloves' and deal with the mayor and people with a firm hand." The latter officials, hitherto on the side of the Ie Shimans in their controversy with the Air Force, had lost so much face by the recent events that their sympathy had curdled and turned to anger. Under the circumstances, they readily agreed to deal more sternly with the offenders.[104]

On 24 November, Major Sharp and representatives of USCAR flew to Ie Shima to work matters out with the mayor. When they arrived, however, they were confronted by a group of landowners with one Shoko Ahagon at

their head, who refused to let Mayor Oshiro speak for them. Ahagon bluntly told Major Sharp, "We are not going to move--and what are you going to do about it?" Major Sharp declined to discuss the matter further, but returned to Okinawa to report what had happened directly to General Ogden.

Shoko Ahagon was the largest landowner on Ie Shima and operated a general store which represented a considerable financial investment. In addition, he owned large tracts of land in Kunigami and Onna Sons on the Okinawan mainland. Personally, he had nothing to lose (except his reputation, insofar as the military authorities were concerned) and everything to gain by resisting the bombing range clearance, since his own home was not located within the area under requisition and he himself engaged in no farming there. It was subsequently learned from Son officials that Ahagon owned approximately 66,000 tsubo of land within the proposed bombing range area, having acquired 387 tsubo on 8 January 1954 and another 288 tsubo as recently as 10 September 1954. If the tenant farmers renting the land within the range from him should be expelled, however, the resulting loss of revenue would certainly not be compensated for by the rental money which the Air Force proposed to pay. Officials of this command, studying the situation with an eye for the best points of attack, believed that Ahagon aspired to become the mayor of Ie Son, and was endeavoring to use the bombing range dispute as a means of embarrassing the mayor and promoting his own political position.[105]

In the days to come, Shoko Ahagon was to be accused more than once by irate Air Force and Army officials in the Ryukyus of harboring

Communist sympathies and of working to advance the interests of that ideology. The head of Rycom G-2's Civil Intelligence Section was probably more fair-minded and accurate, however, when he evaluated Ahagon as simply a man of wealth who stood to lose a large part of his investment if the Air Force requisitioned his land and paid him only a fraction of its current earning rate. If he could successfully resist that requisition or, as an alternative, make so much trouble that the Americans would increase the proposed rental in order to still his clamor, then he could feel that his efforts had not been wasted. Ahagon might entertain no compunctions at enlisting the aid of Communists--or anyone else who might help--in the Ie Shima land battle (he carried on a steady correspondence with them, supplying the Japan Communist Party with ammunition to fire on behalf of the "downtrodden Ie Shimans"), but he himself was no Communist, nor did his sympathies lie with them. Belligerent and stubborn he might be, but a gadfly is not a viper. He and most of his fellow Ie Shimans, like the American Indian in his day, felt that the United States Government was not to be trusted--that its work meant nothing when self interest was involved. An official might asseverate most solemnly one day that no more land would be needed in a certain area; then, the very next day, some other official would announce with equal finality that so many tsubo had to be evacuated in that same area to make room for a new military project. The resulting confusion and dismay were not calculated to create confidence or respect.[106]

By this time, the business of acquiring even the reduced tract of land needed for the 5,000-foot radius target had begun to loom so large that Plans officers of this headquarters gave thought to a possible

reduction in their requirements. Before taking any definite steps, however, they thought it best to obtain two pieces of information from the more experienced Fifth Air Force to be used in determining adequate safety distance criteria for the projected bombing range. One thing needed was the maximum gross error for both dive-bombing and LABS (Low Altitude Bombing System) techniques, including wild bombs caused by equipment malfunction, but not accidental releases enroute to or from the range. The other information required was the average number of bombs falling outside 1,500-foot, 3,000-foot, 4,000-foot, and 5,000-foot radius circles per 1,000 releases by both dive-bombing and LABS methods. As a possible bonus, Twentieth asked that Fifth Air Force furnish any other pertinent information it might have available.[107]

Although this request was sent to Fifth Air Force on 26 November, the days continued to go by without any reply. Finally, on 9 December, this headquarters radioed Nagoya a second time, advising that an "urgent requirement" for this information existed, since minimum safety distance criteria for the Ie Shima Bombing Range could not be determined without it.[108]

While Twentieth was waiting not too patiently for the information it needed, FEAF got off a dispatch to the office of the Air Force Chief of Staff on 29 November on the obsessing subject of bombing ranges. Air Force Regulation 87-16, which had been promulgated on 12 October 1954, set forth criteria which the majority of the established ranges in the Far East could not meet. The urgent need for land to support the civilian populations of Japan and Korea, as well as the political ramifications and limited island areas available precluded the acquisition

of areas large enough to meet the criteria prescribed by the regulation. This being the case, FEAF sought permission to deviate from the minimum safety requirements thus laid down in any case where existing ranges were concerned. At the same time, "every possible effort" would be made to comply with AFR 87-16 in the establishment of new bombing ranges.[109]

By December 2d, conditions on Ie Shima had reached such an impasse that General Upthegrove personally wrote a letter to General Earle E. Partridge, the Commander, Far East Air Forces, describing the situation and seeking the latter's help in arranging a solution. Although it went without saying that the Twentieth Air Force possessed the strength necessary to force the evacuation of the Ie Shiman natives from the range site, such a course was highly undesirable, as it would provide ready-made propaganda for the Communists, who would not hesitate to make capital out of it despite their professed detestation of capitalism. Another thing which had to be considered was the monetary factor. It was believed that 30 to 40 families would be involved in the evacuation, and at approximately $150.00 per family as the cost of relocation, the total cost would run between $4,500 and $6,000. This was not a vast sum of money when viewed in the light of other Air Force expenditures, but it constituted a roadblock, nevertheless, since no fund existed to cover it. As General Upthegrove explained it, the cost of relocating Ryukyuan natives from government-appropriated land had formerly been paid for with GARIOA* funds, and the money provided the Okinawa Engineer District for this specific purpose had latterly "somehow become involved in red tape" which made it impossible for the Deputy Governor to spend it. On the

* GARIOA: Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas.

bright side of the picture, however, if relocation money could be obtained, in one way or another, he believed that substitute land could be acquired either by purchase or by utilizing acreage presently within the boundaries of the GLOBECOM receiver site which MATS had recently agreed to release.[110]

Unaware, apparently, that FEAF had taken action earlier the same week to obtain from USAF a waiver on bombing range specifications in the Far East Theater, General Upthegrove stated that unless AFR 87-16 were waived, it would be impossible to use Ie Shima as a LABS bombing range. If such a waiver of safety criteria were obtained from USAF, he asked that FEAF exert whatever pressure it could upon Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (AFFE) to "break the present log jam and obtain for the Deputy Governor, here, the necessary guidance and funds to effect relocation of native families involved, in an orderly and peaceful manner." Until both a definite policy and ready money were provided by AFFE, General Ogden declared that his hands were tied.[111]

In the meantime, Mr. Hamlin Bucknam, Chief of Twentieth's Management Division, had phoned Mr. Paul H. Skuse, Director of Public Safety, USCAR, on November 30th to request that police protection be provided for the survey party on its next trip to Ie Shima. As a result, Mr. Kenshin Nakamura, the GRI Police Commissioner, ordered the Chief of Police at Motobu to provide enough men to prevent any further incidents when the 808th EAB survey team returned to the island.[112]

That same day, Deputy Governor Ogden summoned Chief Executive Higa to the office of the Civil Administrator for a two hours' talk on the Ie Shima land crisis. In course of the meeting General Ogden explained the

"final" plan for solution of the problem, which the Air Force had devised, and asked the Chief Executive to see that it was presented to the adamant Ie Shimans. As a result, Deputy Chief Executive Tatsubin Yogi made a hasty trip to Ie Shima shortly afterward to negotiate the new terms of settlement with the islanders. Under the Air Force plan, the land designated for military use would be changed to the coastal line from the previously designated areas of Maja and Nishizaki Villages. Even so, 14 families in Maja, as well as 80 per cent of the arable land in the village, would be affected; therefore, it seemed probable that the natives would still refuse to evacuate their land.

The day following the conference between General Ogden and Chief Executive Higa--1 December--a three-man delegation from Maja Village, led by our old friend Shoko Ahagon--and rounded out by two other villagers named Nohara and Urasaki (who had about as much voice in the matter as First Consul Sieyes and Third Consul Roger-Ducos had possessed during the brief month they held power in the year 1799 before being swallowed up by the Second Consul, one Citizen General Bonaparte)--arrived at GRI to lodge their latest protest. The substance of their declarations was that (1) the villagers had formed a solid front opposed to evacuation, (2) they felt that they had already cooperated with the military authorities as much as could fairly be expected, in view of half the total area of Ie Shima's having previously been requisitioned, and (3) the entire village was opposed to further requisitioning of the land. Again, they suggested that some uninhabited island or some parcel of land owned by GRI be used as the bombing range.[112]

On 9 December 1954, Mayor Oshiro, who had recently been shunted into the background by the more aggressive Ahagon, presented a resettlement plan, prepared with the knowledge and assistance of his land committee, which he felt would be acceptable to his constituents, although he was delaying its presentation to the landowners until he had discussed it with the military officials. His plan featured the following points:[113]

1. Allocation of substitute land for the relocation of houses and farming.

2. Assistance by the Air Force in providing transportation to move houses, surplus materials for buildings, and clearance of new areas by heavy equipment.

3. Provision of adequate water for the new housing area.

4. Permission to farm within the 5,000-foot safety area for some 10 more months, by which time it should be possible for crops to grow in the resettlement area.

5. Assigning Ie Shima farmers a high priority in the purchase of the Australian short horn cattle which GRI planned to buy in the near future.

Almost a month went by before anything more was done to bring about a solution of the Ie Shima stalemate. Finally, on 4 January 1955, a party composed of Deputy Chief Executive Tatsubin Yogi, Mr. Clyde R. Cox, the Twentieth Air Force Real Estate Chief, Major Dallas A. Sharp, Rycom Land Control Officer, and Chief Noha of GRI's Government Section flew out to Ie Shima to negotiate with Mayor Oshiro on the subject of the five-part plan which he had submitted. Tentative agreement was reached on a number of points, but a final decision was postponed until the 14th, to

allow time for the mayor to discuss the proposals with his landowners and the Air Force and Army to iron out any differences existing in their lines of thinking.[114]

The main points of the agreement were as follows:

1. Substitute land of 83,000 tsubo within the runway would be allocated to the landowners. (Previously, land covering 100,000 tsubo in Maja and Nishizaki sub-villages had been designated as military requisitioned land).

2. The costs for removal of 15 houses would be paid immediately after the computation was completed.

3. The military would assist in removing the houses and would make every effort to supply zinc and other construction materials for the 15 houses to be removed.

4. The military would furnish a bulldozer to make the substitute land of 83,000 tsubo arable.

5. The military would either supply food to the landowners for a period of six months, since it would take at least that length of time to harvest crops in the substitute lands, or they would allow the farmers to engage in cultivation for a period of 10 months, as well as plant crops for one season in their own lands which had been designated as military requisitioned land. The Air Force had already approved cultivation for six months, but the farmers hoped that an extension of four additional months would be granted.

6. Water would be supplied from an artesian well with abundant water, which had been constructed by the Air Force. In

this connection, an OKED official stated that GRI would furnish a simplified water service upon completion of the survey and design.

7. GRI would give priority to the inhabitants of Maja sub-village in acquiring loans for Australian short horn cattle.[115]

About this time, the Okinawa Shimbun carried a long editorial entitled "The Troublesome Military Requisitioned Land Problem" which summarized the events of the past year and peered hopefully into the future. The editor wrote as follows:[116]

> Considerable time has elapsed since the land problem in Ie-Son had created trouble. Though the extreme anxiety of the Ie-Son residents seen at first has been somewhat alleviated due to the concession of the military, the villagers' attitude toward the issue still remains pessimistic. At first, one-third of the whole area of Ie-Son was expected to be requisitioned, and the development of the problem had been the target of attention, together with the issues created by requisitioning of farm land in Isahama Sub-Village in Ginowan-Son, and Kiyan Sub-Village in Miwa-Son.
>
> When the islanders were first notified of the land requisitioning in Ie-Son, over 70 of them visited USCAR to petition the official in charge for appropriate measures. However, as the result of their interview, they learned that the military did not intend to requisition the land immediately or forcefully, and the petitioners felt relieved, though temporarily. Since then, the military requisition land issue in Ie-Son had continued to exist, and the old year passed amidst confusion. It appears, however, that the alleviation of military policies served to somewhat stabilize the livelihood of the villagers.
>
> However, this time the landowners in the villages have made an agreement and are trying to refuse accepting the rental for the land, contending that the land rental was too cheap. From the time the rental was fixed on the military requisitioned land, the landowners had opposed it, saying that it was inappropriate and that the basis for appraisal was unfair. This served as a great obstacle in attaining the understanding between the military and the people.
>
> The authorities were asked to give consideration to the too cheap land rental as the big problem from the time the

public hearing to appeal for a raise in the land rental started last year. However, as the military has tenaciously clung to its own views, no bright prospect has been seen as yet in this respect. . . .

. . . . . .

Fortunately, the U.S. Congress that started its session on January 5th is expected to study this problem, and expectation is made in the well-intentioned policies of America. Because the land problem is a matter of life or death for the Okinawan people, its early solution is urgent, but the prolongation of this issue will never be beneficial to the United States in terms of policies and ideologies. This is because, as has often been declared by the United States, she is placing a high strategic value on Okinawa and will never make the folly of giving it up.

Therefore, until the danger of war is completely wiped out from the world, it is unlikely that America will give up Okinawa and return it to Japan. Hence, it is difficult to judge how long, say 10 or 20 years, the American forces will continue to be stationed on Okinawa. From this point of view, it is more important than anything else to have the people of Okinawa understand the American policies.

If the Americans were to be stationed /on Okinawa/ for years to come, it would naturally follow that the people would associate with the Americans for a long time. Thus, it is important to deepen the understanding between the Americans and the people from the viewpoint of bringing harmony among them. Though the Ryukyuan-American friendship and cooperation are advocated, it can naturally be considered that the people's feeling would become alientated if the policies incomprehensible to the people were to continue. There is no guarantee that agitators are not watching for a chance to take advantage of this for alienating the Okinawans from the Americans. The sooner politics comprehensible to the people are established, the better will be the results for the welfare of the people and the military.

How this problem will be settled in the U.S. Congress is the target of concern of not only the landowners, but the whole people of Okinawa. Is it too hasty for us to expect a good measure of the Congress, trusting in the good will of the United States? This is because the American politicians are always showing concern in the promotion of the livelihood of the Okinawan people. Their sympathy towards the special situation of Okinawa is endorsed by that fact that Congressman Miller has proposed to "allow 50,000 Okinawans to emigrate to the South Sea Islands." When good measures are taken for this problem, we may feel a true stability in our livelihood, and at the same time, deepen our trust toward America. We earnestly pray that an early solution will be brought to this problem.

On 6 January, Major Sharp, Mr. Cox, and Major William H. McCumber, the 1962d AACS Squadron GLOBECOM Liaison Officer, met to discuss Mayor Oshiro's proposals. Major McCumber volunteered that the AACS Squadron had no objection to use of the GLOBECOM Receiver Site for farming, but that construction of the antenna field precluded the erection of houses in that area. Under the circumstances, the conferees agreed that the houses should be located outside the antenna field, preferably along the south line of the Air Force boundary adjacent to the son road. It was also decided that this command would find no difficulty in furnishing the transportation, clearing the new areas, and providing surplus materials as the mayor has requested. When it came to providing a water system for the displaced natives, however, the Air Force representatives balked. As an alternative measure, they agreed that Twentieth would turn over some 300 bags of "surplus" cement to the Ie Shimans, enabling them to construct their own new cisterns to replace those they were presently using within the cleared area.

With respect to the natives' farming within the 5,000-foot circle, Operations officers of this headquarters had already expressed their confidence that a schedule could be set up whereby the farmers would be given access on certain specified days when the range was not in operation. This schedule would then be presented to Mayor Oshiro, who had previously agreed to be responsible for his people's adherence to the schedule and to relieve the Air Force of any responsibility for seeing that the inhabitants were present on the range at any time when it was in use during the 10-month period. This arrangement was expected to obviate any necessity for the military's providing food for the natives

during the interim period while the crops in the new area were being cultivated.[117]

Mayor Oshiro was scheduled to meet with the military representatives on 14 January to finalize the terms of the agreement, but, as the Scottish poet noted for all posterity, "The best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley." The day before the scheduled meeting, the landowners of Ie Shima, with the ubiquitous Ahagon as their spokesman, confronted their elected mayor and informed him that (1) the people had no intention of resettling; (2) they wanted no more meetings with the mayor in connection with the land problem; (3) this was the final meeting--and the people would not move.[118]

As it turned out, the meeting between the military and Mayor Oshiro did not actually take place until 21 January, at which time the latter reported the unpleasant results of his "tete-a-tete" with the landowners. The visitors then advised the long-suffering mayor that the Air Force and GRI had agreed to all provisions of his plan and that military necessity required clearance of the area for the bombing range. Shoho Ahagon, as representative of the landowners, was called into the meeting and informed that the mayor's plan was acceptable. By this time the military land negotiators had learned that even though Ahagon might possess no formal title or position on Ie Shima, it was a good idea to obtain his acquiescence in any matter pertaining to the land situation before formulating further plans. As an obstructionist, he was in a class with the redoubtable Kamejiro Senaga, of Okinawa People's Party fame. Quick to prove his claim to this title, Ahagon refused to comment on the plan and denied that he was influencing the people in

their resistance to the land requisitioning. That afternoon, the mayor met with his flock to brief them on the morning's discussions and to sound out their reactions. Once more, Ahagon reiterated his dogged refrain that the people were not going to move. Later the same day, in the mayor's office, he was told in firm language that the clearance was going forward and that the people would be moved. As though to demonstrate his readiness to stand up against the mightest power in the Western World, in response to a question, Ahagon stated that the people did not care to negotiate further, nor were they interested in the assistance offered by Mayor Oshiro, GRI, and the Twentieth Air Force.[119] If causing embarrassment to the mayor by enrolling him on the side of the United States military was Ahagon's intent in this final peroration, he was certainly selecting a tactic eminently suited to the purpose. Nothing could so easily concentrate the anger of the Ie Shimans against one of their own people as his adopting the side of the Americans in the land dispute. Even a moderate desirous only of preventing violence became a renegade in their eyes once his lack of venom became known.

Notwithstanding the loss of face which the military was suffering, in consequence of the Ie Shiman's prolonged resistance to the land requisition, the American emissaries were so reluctant to employ force that they retreated once more from the firm stand they had taken in the mayor's office. Just before boarding the aircraft to return to Kadena, they asked Oshiro to report on the attitude of the islanders toward the seven conditions of the agreement on 26 January. Faithful to his promise, the mayor conducted repeated conferences with the landowners during the next five days, but they steadfastly refused to evacuate the

area, invariably declaring that evacuation would make it difficult for them to make a living. Forced to the wall by their determination, Mayor Oshiro wired GRI on January 26th that "We can not evacuate, because it will make our livelihood difficult. We hope for proper measures."[120] With this, the early solution which had appeared to be just over the horizon grounded on the same old reef which had caused so much grief in the past and now appeared to constitute an obstacle on which any amicable arrangement would founder in the future.

The 49th Fighter Bomber Group Presents Its Bombing Data.

At the time this headquarters radioed Fifth Air Force on 9 December that it had not yet received a reply to its earlier message requesting safe distance criteria for an air-to-ground bombing range, it had no way of knowing that the latter had submitted the same question to the 49th Fighter Bomber Group eight days earlier. By 14 December, however, the 49th FBG had assembled its data and was prepared to furnish detailed information covering practically every conceivable situation or condition. Four days later, Fifth relayed this information to Twentieth, as requested.[121]

According to the figures worked out by the 49th FBG, the maximum gross error for both dive bombing and LABS techniques, including wild bombs resulting from equipment malfunctions and accidental releases, was three miles from the center of the bull's-eye. However, it was to be noted that this maximum gross error applied only to the MK-23, three-lb. practice bomb. There had never been a bomb drop more than 3,500 feet from the center of the target where other types of ordnance were employed in this method of bomb delivery. Since the ranges in use by

by the 49th FBG did not have scoring facilities beyond 3,000 feet, these data had been obtained from accidental bomb drops and malfunction reports, which did indicate distances in terms of three-quarters of a mile, two miles, and the like. Excepting in two instances, these gross errors were due entirely to bomb-rack malfunctions which occurred during pull-up, at which time the three-lb. bomb was released after imposition of three to six G's. Of the total number of three-lb. bombs dropped by dive-bombing and LABS techniques as of that date (approximately 41,000), eight bombs were delayed drops and hit from three-quarters to three miles out from the target. Two three-lb. bombs were released accidentally and hit three miles out from the target.

From 1 January to 1 December 1954, the 49th Fighter Bomber Group had expended 53,437 MK-23 three-lb. practice bombs, with only 29 equipment malfunction reports on the bombing range for MSQ, dive-bombing, and LABS type deliveries.

Having discussed equipment malfunctions and accidental releases, the 49th FBG presented a tabulation of the average number of bombs per 1,000 releases, by both qualified and unqualified pilots, that had fallen beyond designated distances from the target. The most erratic weapon had proved to be the MK-23 three-lb. bomb; for 36 out of 1,000 had fallen outside of 1,500 feet, and 0.045 had fallen outside of 3,000 feet when delivered by dive-bombing methods by qualified pilots. Where unqualified pilots were concerned, 145 had fallen beyond 1,500 feet, 0.021 beyond 3,000 feet, 0.11 beyond 4,000 feet, and 0.049 beyond 5,000 feet. Again, with LABS delivery being employed, qualified pilots using the "A" System released 170 MK-23 three-lb. bombs between the 1,500-foot

and 3,000-foot circles, but none beyond the latter point. Unqualified pilots employing the same weapon and the same system dropped 280 beyond 1,500 feet, three beyond 3,000 feet, and 0.034 between the 4,000 and 5,000-foot circles.

Because of the greater hazard involved, the LABS delivery of 500-lb. GP bombs and T-63 weapons was confined to qualified pilots only, but unqualified pilots were permitted to practice dive-bombing delivery of the 500-pounders. Employing the "A" system of LABS delivery, the qualified pilots laid 566 out of a total of 1,000 releases of the 500-lb. GP bombs between the 1,500 and 3,000-foot circles, but allowed none to fall beyond this point. Again, utilizing LABS delivery of the 500-lb. GP bombs, but employing the "B" system, they lowered the number of releases landing between the 1,500 and 3,000-foot circles to 341, and none went farther afield. The delivery of 500-lb. GP bombs by the dive-bombing method had proved so accurate that not a single one hit beyond the 1,500-foot circle, whether the pilots were qualified or unqualified. The same accuracy obtained in the qualified pilots' delivery of T-63 weapons by dive-bombing. Only 111 fell outside 1,500 feet and none beyond 3,000 feet. LABS delivery of the same T-63 weapons, limited to qualified pilots only, was again more subject to error, as 294 fell between 1,500 and 3,000 feet, while 2.9 landed between 3,000 and 4,000 feet.[121]

On 28 December 1954, the Bolo Point range was made available to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for target practice, the 97th AAA having finished with it eight days earlier. By 1 February 1955, the F-86F's of the 18th FBW had dropped 770 three-lb. bombs in the course of high

and low angle dive-bombing and ship-bombing sorties, and had made daily high and low angle strafing sorties on the Bolo range. In addition, Irisuna Jima was subjected to the ministrations of 57 x 5" rockets and 60 x 500-lb. bombs. The January training schedule called for the 18th FBW to fire 400 x 2.25" and 350 x 5" rockets.[122]

Writing his superior, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, on 1 February 1955, the Chief of the Training Division, Major James C. Finlayson, described the obdurate attitude which the Ie Shiman natives, under the influence of Shoko Ahagon's strong-willed leadership, had adopted toward any attempt to resettle them. He added, however, that several USCAR officials with whom he had discussed the situation were of the opinion that if the engineer aviation troops moved into the area and commenced work in complete disregard of the natives' attitude, the Ie Shimans would then accept the plan proposed by Mayor Oshiro. Besides, the two previous abortive attempts to survey the bombing range had been made prior to receipt of the mayor's resettlement plan.

With these considerations in mind, the Air Force, OKED, and USCAR officials responsible for making the Ie Shima range available to the 49th FBG as speedily as possible prepared a plan for prying the farmers loose from the land to which they clung with molluscoid tenacity. First, the authorities would serve public notice through the Japanese language newspapers that construction of the bombing range was to commence in the near future. Following this warning, the engineers would move in and again try to carry out the survey. If they encountered resistance or interference this time, however, the officials intended to ask Rycom to furnish combat troops to act as armed guards, so that the

work could proceed. USCAR officials--who should have known the Ryukyuan mind as well as any Westerner could understand it, many of them having lived on Okinawa for half a decade or more, and not a few having taken Okinawan wives--these officials expressed their belief that in the face of such a show of force, the Ie Shimans would undoubtedly re-acknowledge the leadership of Mayor Oshiro, in order to obtain as much help as possible in moving their homes.[123]

Hardly had this resolve taken shape, when an information copy of a message from Fifth Air Force to FEAF arrived, urging that the Ie Shima Bombing Range be opened for full time use as quickly as possible. Poor flying weather at Misawa AB had curtailed the primary mission training of the 49th FBG to such an extent that Fifth was prepared to accept the risk of possible clashes between the Ie Shimans and the American military forces, rather than see the tactical atomic bombing unit deprived of the practice it had to have. If FEAF permitted the range to be reopened, the Nagoya headquarters promised that every practicable precaution would be taken to insure that no untoward incidents occurred.[124]

General Upthegrove digested the contents of this TWX, then began to prepare a reply which would present his point of view to General Earle E. Partridge, the FEAF Commander. Making a mistake of which not a few of his fellow military leaders had been guilty in similar situations, he branded Shoko Ahagon as a Communist (although not actually calling him by name), because of the latter's truculent opposition to the land acquisition. "Although agreement had been reached with the mayor and civil authorities," he said, "two or three Communists in the area have stirred up people to the point where they will not agree to

anything at this time." Their object, according to Upthegrove, was "to compel the Deputy Governor to use force in ejection of these families from their land and use same for propaganda purposes." The Deputy Governor, for his part, felt that the Ie Shima land problem might be solved without resort to force, but that it would take time.

Under the circumstances, Upthegrove recommended--with Ogden's concurrence--that the existing 3,000-foot radius bomb range be re-opened on a calculated risk basis, with the Air Force accepting responsibility for any damage caused by off-range releases striking property other than that under lease by this command. The necessary warning would be given to the natives, together with an announcement of the Air Force's regret that the negotiations, which might have brought about a settlement, had broken down. In any case, he felt that re-opening the range might accelerate a final agreement, although it should be understood that even then the 30 days would still be required to construct a new range. Having presented his own ideas on how the Ie Shima impasse should be broken, the Twentieth Air Force Commander requested his superior at FEAF to express concurrence in or disapproval of this proposal as soon as possible.[125]

At about the same time that General Partridge was receiving this message from General Upthegrove, Fifth Air Force was reading FEAF's reply to its own TWX of 7 February. The brief radiogram began by explaining that the agreed-upon evacuation of the range area had been disrupted by political conditions on Ie Shima beyond the control of the Air Force. FEAF then went on to say that until the natives moved off the target land, it was not deemed practicable to utilize the range. Nevertheless,

every effort was being exerted to make it operational "as soon as possible."[126]

If the next communication on the subject of the bombing range is any criterion, it would seem that FEAF, having had time to mull the matter over, underwent a change of heart. On 17 February, that headquarters radioed Fifth and Twentieth that it was now approving use of the existing 3,000-foot radius circle Range 07 at Ie Shima, contingent upon the following conditions: (a) that General Ogden place himself on record as actually concurring in Twentieth's recommendation that the range be re-opened on a "calculated risk" basis; (b) that the qualification runs be limited to high angle, high altitude, dive-bombing, and LABS methods only; (c) that 50 preliminary practice runs be made on other ranges, after which qualification runs would be permitted on the Ie Shima range, but only upon certification of the 49th FBG Detachment Commander. Finally, every possible effort should be made to avoid off-range drops.[127]

Blithely disregarding that portion of the FEAF message requiring assurance of Rycom's acquiescence, Fifth Air Force radioed this command on 19 February that it assumed that message to constitute authority for resuming bombing operations on the Ie Shima range. Therefore, in view of the urgency of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group's resuming its interrupted training, Fifth hoped that the range would be re-opened as soon as possible. To speed up the necessary arrangements, the 49th FBG Detachment Commander would contact the 6332d Air Base Wing directly to work out a schedule for range operations.[128]

For its part, the Twentieth Air Force--being the organization on

the spot--could not so casually shrug off FEAF's injunction to obtain the concurrence of the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command. On 21 February 1955, accordingly, this headquarters wrote the latter seeking the necessary permission to go ahead. Having explained the limited basis on which the target would be operated, under the terms laid down by FEAF's authorization, the letter added that even then nothing would be done without Rycom's approval. To prevent any misunderstanding and subsequent feeling on the part of General Ogden that he had been tricked into sanctioning something which was not what it seemed to be, Twentieth pointed out that it could not assume "any responsibility for damages inflicted to personnel or property within the Air Force-leased land area, and the native populace should be so informed." At the same time, though, every effort would be made to hold off-range releases to an absolute minimum. As partial insurance of this implied accuracy, practice runs would first be carried out on other ranges, then, only after the 49th FBG Detachment Commander had certified his pilots' skill on the basis of the results shown there, the F-84G's would be allowed to make their qualification runs at Ie Shima. Presupposing Rycom's approval, this command desired to re-open the Ie Shima range on 28 February.[129]

Seventy-two hours before that target date, on February 25th, General Ogden notified Twentieth that he approved "Reactivation of the Ie-Shima Bombing Range within the area under lease by the Air Force." Not only did he give his approval, but he promised that the Rycom Land Control Officer would visit Ie Shima that same day to advise the village officials of the proposed re-opening of the bombing range. Thenceforth,

in addition to the usual visual warning indicating that the range was in use, he desired that a representative of the Air Force would personally notify the mayor or his representative sufficiently in advance each time the range area was to be used.[130]

Without waiting for receipt of General Ogden's answer, the Operations section of this headquarters, acting on the assumption that it would be favorable, directed the Commander, 6332d Air Base Wing, on 25 February, to be ready to re-open the Ie Shima bombing range on the 28th. If any change in this schedule became necessary, the wing would be notified. Moreover, the 49th FBG Detachment Commander at Kadena was to contact the 6332d ABW whenever he wished to schedule the range for bombing practice.[131] That same day, 25 February, a TWX was gotten off to Fifth Air Force, authorizing the resumption of 49th Fighter Bomber Group operations on the Ie Shima range as of the last day of the month.[132]

Collision Becomes Inevitable.

While the military officials were bracing themselves for the unpleasant business which lay ahead, GRI had not been idle. If an amiable solution to the Ie Shima land problem could be reached, instead of resort being had to force, it would be better for everyone concerned. On 1 February, therefore, Deputy Chief Executive Tatsubin Yogi summoned Mayor Oshiro (as well as the mayor of Ginowan-Son, who was similarly concerned with land acquisition, in connection with Isahama Sub-Village, where the Army was planning to construct a large dependent housing development) to Naha for a conference. To the question of why the Ie Shimans refused so stubbornly to give up their land and farm the substitute land in the runway area, Mayor Oshior summed up their attitude by

explaining that "Regardless of what scientific method is used, crops can not be grown in that area." Besides, the Air Force's promise to let them cultivate their present farms within the bombing range for 10 more months was not as generous as it might seem at first blush, since the inhabitants were to be allowed to work their plots only one day per week--and this would not be enough to permit successful farming.

GRI officials, won over to the Ie Shimans' point of view after hearing Mayor Oshiro's presentation of the case, decided to negotiate the following day with Major Sharp in an effort to have the land lying between the GLOBECOM Receiver Site and Maja Sub-Village designated as the substitute land. Also, they determined to seek permission for the farmers to cultivate the present farms for 10 more months on a full time-basis. If this latter request were impossible of realization--as they should have suspected very strongly--the GRI officials hoped that the dispossessed people could be given a 200-day food supply in the same way as was being done for the villagers of Isahama.[133]

The next time local officials heard from Ie Shima was on 15 February, when four representatives of Maja Sub-Village, accompanied by Mayor Oshiro, called on Deputy Chief Executive Yogi to confirm their unswerving opposition to the scheduled evacuation--as though anyone doubted it by now! Having established this point beyond cavil, the visiting farmers turned their attention to the proffered substitute land situated between the GLOBECOM Receiver Site and Maja Sub-Village. Declaring that it was totally unsuitable for cultivation, they challenged the military, who had described it as arable land, to prove the truth of this assertion by actual demonstration--even by employing the

vaunted American scientific farming to produce crops where crops could never grow. On top of this, the Maja delegation asked bitterly if the promise to furnish the villagers with food for 200 days meant that they would be allowed to die of starvation at the end of that time.

As a reporter covering the delegation's visit for the Okinawa Shimbun saw it, "The true feeling of the landowners is that they would not want to evacuate, even if all compensations were guaranteed." This sentiment, which would have been strong enough under any circumstances, was certainly not diminished by the fact that the landowners were engaged in farming and in building houses at the very time that the Air Force was attempting to dislodge their desperate grasp on the land. Displaying the same amazing disregard for the realities of life which had proved so successful thus far in fending off the Air Force expropriation, the Maja delegation declared that they would refund all money which had been paid to them as rental; for no price would mean as much to them as their land. All they asked was to be let alone. Under the circumstances, they told Deputy Chief Executive Yogi, they had no choice but to advise that some other land be used for the bombing range, or that the Air Force postpone indefinitely its use of this land.[134]

Given this dramatis personae in conjunction with the belligerent attitude of the individuals comprising the cast of characters, one would need no gift of clairvoyance to predict that the land sought by the Air Force was not going to be placed at its disposal by February 28th. Nor was it. On 26 February, an Air Force detachment flew to Ie Shima, landed on the air strip, and began to erect field antennas and signal wires to the small radio shack which formed an essential part of the

range communications. A crowd of some 150 natives immediately gathered around the party and, while offering no physical harm, systematically cut the wires as fast as they were erected. Without the assignment of most vigilant guards to the wires, it was apparent that the maintenance of signal communications would be impossible.

To this headquarters' way of thinking, then, there remained nothing for it but to resort to force. Before any specific action along these lines could be taken, however, General Ogden would have to give his consent and cooperation. Approached on the subject the morning of the 28th, the Deputy Governor readily agreed that the time for conciliation and appeasement was past. Nevertheless, he could not entirely disregard the eagerness with which the Communist radio and press throughout the world would seize on any incident involving American soldiers on the one hand and Asiatic natives--and civilians at that--on the other. To order measures which might lead to bloodshed should not be undertaken lightly. Before proceeding further, therefore, General Ogden had his Deputy, Brigadier General Robert H. Wienecke, telephone CINCFE's J-5 (Civil Affairs Chief), Brigadier General D. W. Traub, to evolve a plan of operations which would succeed in gaining possession of the disputed land without igniting the Ie Shima powder keg.[135]

The two officers having reached agreement along the lines already proposed by Twentieth Air Force earlier in the day, General Ogden sent a TWX to his superior, General John E. Hull, the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (CINCFE) and ex-officio Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, describing the plan of operations and seeking the latter's approval before ordering troops into Ie Shima. This concept was as follows:

First, a reinforced rifle company of the 75th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), with one platoon of military police attached, would bivouac at the site of the bombing range to "establish the authority of United States Forces to use land acquired under the Master Plan."

Next, the reinforced company would establish a camp site surrounded by tactical wire to provide local security while a two-strand barbed wire fence with a single row of concertina fencing secured thereto on the ground inside the barbed wire fence was being erected. Simultaneously, suitable signs reading "THIS IS GOVERNMENT PROPERTY" and "NO TRESPASSING IS ALLOWED" would be posted on the fence line. Since it could be expected that the natives would tear down the fence and posters unless they were guarded, the infantry soldiers would patrol the wire accompanied by military police who would arrest any persons trespassing or destroying government property. Although force was not to be employed for its own sake, it would be employed to whatever degree was necessary to enable work on the bombing range to go forward. Should large, threatening crowds make mass attempts at trespassing or destruction, tear gas and normal riot control procedures would be used.

Thirdly, even while preparations for the proposed coup de main were being made, Rycom would continue to negotiate with the Ie Shiman authorities, advising them of the decision to send in troops, if necessary, but seeking "an amicable solution" to the problem before this ultimate step was taken, if at all possible.

Fourthly, as the fence progressed, Twentieth Air Force would expedite the work necessary to put the range in operating condition and

be prepared to assume responsibility for the security of the area upon completion of the fence. Generals Wienecke and Traub agreed that sporadic interference with the fence could be anticipated, but the extent of damage should not be so great as to preclude its being repaired by Air Force personnel.

Finally, the plan called for the Air Force to airlift maintenance supplies to Ie Shima for the Army troops engaged in the operation.[136]

Replying on 1 March to this request for approval of troop employment, in a message remarkable both for its promptness and for the ignorance of events on Ie Shima which it indicated, General Hull directed the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyus to furnish him a full description of the background of the present controversy. Among the esoteric nuggets of intelligence he specifically wanted were the location of the area, the circumstances of its acquisition under the Master Plan, and an explanation of the factors which necessitated the use of this particular farm land. Also, he wished to know why other land not devoted to farming could not be used in place of the controversial Maja farm land. Finally, he desired General Ogden's views on the wisdom of controlling the situation by employing native Okinawan police instead of Army troops.[137] Judging from these questions, one must infer that the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands had previously paid little attention to this area of his responsibility, with the result that now that events had marched to the very verge of conflict he became suddenly and unpleasantly aware that the ingredients of political explosion had been mixed under his very nose.

Without wasting any time, the Deputy Governor replied to this TWX

the next day, informing his superior that Ie Shima was an island located some 3½ miles off the tip of the Motobu Peninsula on Okinawa, that the Air Force had leased 3,156 of the total 4,657 acres composing Ie Shima, and that this land was occupied by an air field, a GLOBECOM station, and a bombing range. The area under lease was included in the Air Force's Master Plan, which meant that land rental had been paid regularly on it since 1 July 1950. The portion to be fenced off for the bombing range would approximate 900 acres, and the decision to establish it on Ie Shima had been made only after exhaustive studies of Okinawa and other Ryukyuan islands had demonstrated incontrovertibly that no other suitable area for a scoreable bombing range was available. Besides, the Ie Shima area was the only one meeting the following prerequisites for a suitable bombing range: (1) Adequate safety circumference; (2) Accessibility for scoring and for logistic support of range personnel; (3) Presence of a nearby airfield for emergency landings during practice bombing exercises; and (4) Close proximity to operational bases.

Respecting CINCFE's suggestion that Ryukyuan police might be used to quell any disturbance on Ie Shima, General Ogden replied that he considered it inadvisable "as a matter of policy" to force GRI to use civilian police in assisting the military to evacuate Ryukyuan personnel from military land. It was already a long-established policy that they would never be used on Master Plan land, and "the use of civilian police in this instance would result in severe and adverse political repercussions." In support of this stand, Chief Executive Higa had expressed himself as being unequivocally opposed to their landowners. Likewise, two local residents were largely responsible for the adamant refusal of

the approximately 150 natives in the Maja area to accept the agreement already reached with the mayor and councilmen or to negotiate further.[138] (The two leaders were not identified by name, but it is assumed that they were Shoko Ahagon and either Seiroku Ishikawa or Chiyomatsu Tamaki, since this trio had consistently been in the forefront of both the negotiations and the resistance).

Three days later, General Hull's decision was received, approving the plan for employing Army troops to "establish the authority of the United States forces to use the land required under the Master Plan."[139]

Meantime, on March 2d, nine representatives of the landowners and the head man of Maja Sub-Village had appeared at the office of Chief Executive Higa to petition for suspension of the land requisition. As might be expected, the reporters for the three Okinawan Japanese-language newspapers* were eager to hear what the two parties might have to say to each other, but Mr. Higa kept the door to his office tightly closed until the conference was concluded. This precaution did not prevent the Ie

*The four Naha dailies had been reduced to three early in 1955 when the Okinawa Nippo (known as the Ryukyu Shimbun until 1 August 1954) discontinued publication permanently on 22 February. The general public had first learned of the paper's having financial difficulties when it suspended publication on 25 December 1954--an action which was followed four days later by the filing of a complaint with the Labor Standard Supervision Office against President Senzaburo Nakasone for non-payment of ¥940,000 in wages owed the 92 employees of the Nippo. On 15 January 1955, promise of new capital having been obtained from sources in Japan, Nakasone resumed publication of the Okinawa Nippo. This new lease on life proved short-lived, however, as the paper again suspended publication on 24 January, resumed on 8 February, failed to appear on 14, 16, 17, and 18 February, and finally vanished altogether on 22 February 1955. Whether the Bank of the Ryukyus salvaged any of the 4,000,000 yen reputedly owed it by the Okinawa Nippo is not known.

Shimans from telling what had been said when they emerged from the meeting; for they were all too eager to pour their said tale into sympathetic ears. The substance of their account was as follows:[140]

> We want the authorities to suspend the use of our land for drilling [bombing practice]. At first we were promised that we would be permitted to conduct farming and provided with compensation. But actually, we are neither able to engage in farming nor have we received any compensation. The Chief Executive sought our cooperation by saying that the maintenance of the base on our island was for the protection of the Ryukyus and free countries; so we decided to give our cooperation. However, we were notified to evacuate on February 25th, and we are not given any compensation. This is indicative of disregarding not only the landowners but the whole people of Okinawa. We can appreciate the efforts made by the Chief Executive so far, but they have not amounted to anything. Therefore, we requested him to strongly appeal to the military.
>
> To this request the Chief Executive said, "How about negotiating more conciliatorily?" We told him that we are not attempting to resort to force, but are just seeking the reconsideration of the United States military. The wrong action of the United States will only bring about bad results to both sides; so we would like to consider a plan which will be of benefit to both of us. . . .
>
> The Chief Executive . . . said, "We will do all we can for its solution, as you request, but in the event the military does not accept the request, how about settling the problem with the minimum sacrifice?"
>
> However, if we can not do anything about it, and the Government and military do not help us, and our land is continuously used for shooting practice, we will let the military do as they please, but we will not evacuate and continue to cultivate our farms at night. We have already spent ¥50,000 for negotiations, and we are also suffering from shortage of food. If there is no one who wants to cooperate with us, we will resign ourselves to fate, and let them do as they please.

On 5 March 1955, Major General David A. D. Ogden was relieved from duty as Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, and Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands to return to the ZI for assignment in the Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army. His successor to the Ryukyuan hot seat was Major General James E. Moore, an officer whose

background was in the infantry. General Ogden was first and last an engineer. General Moore had scarcely begun to get settled in his new post when it became necessary for him to approve Operations Order No. 1, dated 8 March 1955, providing for the construction of a barbed wire fence to enclose the western portion of Ie Shima for the Air Force bombing range, the erection of appropriate signs pertaining to trespassing, a patrol of the fence and the area which it would enclose, the arrest of trespassers or saboteurs, the employment of only such force as was required to safeguard United States forces personnel, equipment, and controlled property, and the clearing of all indigenous persons from the bombing range site. Indicative of the meticulous attention to every conceivable situation and detail which marked the operations order, its administrative annex even provided for burial and graves registration. American dead would be evacuated as soon as possible to the Ryukyus Army Hospital; while the native dead would be released to the local mayor or police chief after identification had been established. The identification data pertaining to Ie Shiman corpses would then be forwarded to ACofS, G-1, for further routing.[141]

General Moore was not the only one to inherit the headaches which the Ie Shima bombing range seemed to produce for everyone connected with it. On 1 March 1955 the 313th Air Division was organized and activated at Kadena Air Base as the successor to the harrassed Twentieth Air Force, which had fought the preliminary rounds with tongue and pen. It remained for the new organization to end the struggle in the arena of physical strife.

On 10 March a meeting was held at this headquarters with the

following persons present: Colonel Curtis D. Sluman, the Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division; Colonel William L. Reynolds, 313th Director of Operations; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Guidera, Commanding Officer of the 98th Military Police Battalion, who had been named in the operations order as Task Force Commander; Captain Tompkins N. Bogel, Chief of the Requirements Branch, 313th Air Division; and Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief of the 313th Real Estate Branch, who had probably followed the whole business from start to finish more closely than any other American.

After reaching ready agreement on the selection of Lieutenant Colonel Guidera as the Commander of the task force which would bear his name, the conferees decided that Mr. Cox should act as the Air Force advisor to General Upthegrove on all matters pertaining to real estate and the transfer of native personnel. Included in his responsibility was the selection of substitute farming areas for the individual native farmers. At the same time, he was empowered to authorize minor deviations in the boundary survey in order to avoid buildings which might be situated squarely on the dividing line.

The Task Force Commander was to establish a communications net between Ie Shima and Rycom G-3, with any requests for Air Force assistance in connection with supplies or transportation being passed over this net to G-3, thence to the Plans and Programs Division, 313th Air Division.

Should any natives be arrested, the 6332d ABW would, upon the request of the 313th Air Division Commander, dispatch aircraft to Ie Shima with an Air Police escort to return the prisoners to Kadena AB. There they would be turned over to the custody of the Military Police,

direct coordination being authorized between the Kadena and Rycom Provost Marshals to effect the transfer of such prisoners. The 6332d Air Base Wing was to be prepared to furnish necessary guard personnel to assume the security of the range within five days after D-Day and was to establish the gunnery range communications within 24 hours after notification.

The F-84G's of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group detachment on Kadena were to be prepared to conduct precision dive bombing upon notification. In addition, the Commanders of the 6332d ABW and/or the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing would make certain that their pilots were briefed to conduct flights to Ie Shima as follows:

(1) If possible, they would establish radio contact with ground control before landing, but, if this proved impossible, they should drag the runway prior to landing. After landing, they were to taxi to the south end of the center runway and keep their engines running until assured that no large groups of indigenous personnel had collected.

(2) If large groups should collect around the aircraft, the pilot would contact ground control for Army guards; however, it was believed that no incidents would develop, and the pilots should be briefed to give no indication of apprehension.

The Director of Materiel, 313th Air Division, would be responsible for providing logistic support as requested, and would insure that the units to be committed to the support of Ie Shima were fully advised of their responsibilities, including the provision of personnel to unload aircraft at Ie Shima.[142]

While Air Force and Army officials were arranging the details of the Ie Shima operation, the Commander of the 930th Engineer Aviation Group was instructing the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion on the part that organization was to play. According to the message, after a survey party from the 808th EAB had been airlifted to Ie Shima, they were to stake out the required 5,000-foot perimeter fence line, assured by the protecting guns of the 98th Military Police that they would not again have to undergo the humiliation suffered during previous attempts to survey the bombing range.[143]

The Bombing Range is Cleared by Force.

Preparations for the amphibious assault on Ie Shima--coming 10 years after the more famous one of 1945--got underway on 10 March with the loading of vehicles and equipment for Task Force Guidera on three LCU's at Naha Port. At 0430, the following day, the 166 military personnel of Company "K", 75th RCT, and the 98th Military Police Battalion comprising the task force, departed Sukiran and motored north to Hamasaki, a tiny fishing village on the coast of the Motobu Peninsula. Here they boarded the three LCU's which had been beached in anticipation of their arrival and set sail for Ie Shima at 0700. Upon touching bottom with the landing craft at 0817, the MP's established outposts around the beach, just as though they were invading a fortified island in wartime, while the troops and vehicles were unloaded over the ramps. An advance party having located a suitable bivouac site, the task force command post was established on the middle runway (there were three parallel strips on the western end of Ie Shima, it will be recalled) at 1000 hours. To all appearances, the natives were

caught by surprise by the apparition of so many armed troops on their little island, but they exhibited no discernible hostility, only curiosity. As soon as the troops of Company "K" had secured the airstrip and pitched two-man tents for their own accommodation, a C-47 landed with the Air Force survey party, together with representatives of this headquarters, USCAR, and OKED.[144]

The 808th EAB survey people, each man covered by two soldiers armed with carbines, went to work at once, encountering no interference from the Ie Shimans such as had marked all previous attempts to lay out the new bombing range.[145] Afterward, in relating the events of 11 March to a group of Naha reporters, Mayor Oshiro expressed an attitude which can best be described as "apologetic" for the passive role his people had played, explaining that "Almost all [American] workers carry weapons, so there is not a single islander who would dare to obstruct the work." Another time, after asserting that "More than half of about 20 men engaged in the work are wearing an MP arm band, indicating that they are fully armed," he asked plaintively, "What can the people do against a troop of armed men? We did nothing more than to request them to suspend the requisition so that we may survive."[146]

As the surveyors and troops went methodically about their tasks, the only incident to mark the operation as other than a routine maneuver occurred when a 60-year-old native of Maja Sub-Village, Seiji Namizato, who evidently possessed latent thespian talents, made his initial appearance on the political stage. Approaching some of the soldiers, he tried by signs to dissuade them from requisitioning his land; then, becoming impatient when this method of communication proved

ineffective, he threw himself on the ground and simulated death, to show what would happen to his family of seven if his land were taken away. It is not recorded whether his dramatic performance was accorded the sympathetic reception it undoubtedly deserved, but we do know that his involuntary audience did point out with a good show of indifference that there was really very little they could do about his tragic situation, since they were simply the working crew. Policy making was a bit out of their line.[147]

During the first day on Ie Shima, United States officials held two meetings with Mayor Oshiro and other local leaders aimed at peaceful evacuation and transplanting of the 13 families residing within the bombing range. Neither conference bore any fruit, however, as the local authorities confined their remarks to reiterated requests that the land expropriation be suspended. Although no violence occurred, the attitude of the Ie Shiman populace was, in general, one of defiance, and on at least two different occasions a farmer protested vehemently that the survey team was trespassing on his property. In each case, he was informed that it was United States Government property--not <u>his</u> property, inasmuch as the Air Force had paid rental on the land in question since 1 July 1950.

At 0715, March 12th, four construction (fence) details from the 75th RCT, with Military Police escorts and interpreters, left the command post area where they were bivouacked to begin construction of the four-strand barbed-wire fence. Forty-five minutes later, Mr. John T. Sheehan, of USCAR's Land Division, met with some 15 landowners, with a platoon of MP's in attendance to prevent any disorder. Quite naturally,

in view of this precaution, no incident occurred, but the meeting was a failure insofar as reaching any agreement was concerned. At first, the infantry workers erecting the fence met with no opposition as they followed the survey line laid out the previous day. Although groups of farmers gathered here and there, they seemed generally to accept the prepared explanation of the interpreters.

The smooth progress of construction was abruptly interrupted around 0910, however, when a group of approximately 50 farmers swarmed around 808th EAB survey party, blocking their transit, pulling up stakes, and making threatening gestures. Although the MP's on the scene restrained the natives from actual violence, the farmers effectively prevented the survey team from proceeding with their work. Leading the opposition was our friend Seiji Namizato, the Maja Mossadegh, who rolled and writhed on the ground, screaming and throwing dirt into the air all the while in what the MP's interpreted as an attempt to incite the other natives to violence. He was to deny this charge afterward, but he did admit that he had urged his fellow farmers not to cooperate with the Americans.

Informed of the disturbance, the command post immediately dispatched five additional MP's to the scene, and Lieutenant Colonel Guidera, a veritable Hercules in physique with a temper to match--of the "hot Irish" variety--followed shortly. Having been instructed to have recourse to force only as a last resort, the task force commander leaned over backwards in his endeavor to arrange a peaceful solution, handicapped by the necessity for using an interpreter to convey his own ideas and to understand what the Ie Shimans were saying. As Guidera was speaking, Namizato became even more excited, gesticulating wildly like one of the

ancient Hebrew prophets, while the crowd pressed ever more closely. Suddenly, in a theatrical gesture, the little farmer scooped up a handful of dirt and flung it into the breeze. At almost the same instant, the crowd surged forward, shoving Namizato inadvertently into the giant Guidera with such force that the latter, caught off balance, was staggered and almost knocked down. Whether such had been Namizato's intention or not, some of the dirt struck the colonel in the face. This was too much for flesh to bear. Disregarding political repercussions, Communist propanganda material, or any other subtle considerations which might be weighed in the balance under calmer circumstances, Guidera ordered his assailant arrested on three charges: (1) trespassing on United States military property; (2) inciting the islanders against the United States Forces on Ie Shima; and (3) assaulting the task force commander.

While granting that Colonel Guidera was apodictically justified in arresting the frenetic Namizato, there is something amusing in the picture of the giant colonel's being "assaulted" by the 60-year-old native, who was himself around five feet in height and lucky if he tipped the scales at 115 pounds. According to an Air Force officer, who may have been inclined toward some exaggeration by his relish for a good story, Guidera was six feet six inches tall and displaced some 240 pounds.[148] On the other hand, an Army officer who had worked in the same section with Guidera at the time reduced his stature to six feet two inches and his weight to 210 pounds. Even so, he described the colonel as having tremendously wide shoulders which descended wedge-like to a wasp-waist, giving him the build of a physical culture

A C-47 ON THE RUNWAY AT IE SHIMA



specialist.[149] Both officers agreed, however, that in the days which followed, Guidera was made the butt of so many jests connected with a tiny Ie Shiman's assault upon him that he developed a positive phobia toward the mere mention of the incident, becoming instantaneously angry whenever the subject was brought up.

If the events leading up to the Maja Villager's arrest were far from funny to the task force commander, the sequel was even more distressing to the sexuagenarian farmer. Confined in a 15-foot barbed-wire enclosure, he was trussed up tightly in a blanket and shelter half, with only his neck and head sticking out. Around 1000 that morning, a group of farmers estimated at 200, with Shoko Ahagon at their head, gathered at the command post with the apparent intention of freeing Seiji Namizato. Resorting to stratagem, Colonel Guidera addressed the crowd in a friendly tone, explaining the situation and just what the Americans planned to do. While the attention of the mob was distracted from the prisoner by this speech, the latter was transferred surreptitiously to a C-47, which took off for Kadena AB at 1130. As he spoke, the colonel believed that he observed signs of cooperation on the part of some of the people, and when they were informed of Namizato's evacuation, their attitude appeared to change at once from antagonism to docility. Guidera left no doubt in the minds of his listeners that the fence was to be built and that the enclosed area would be evacuated by the persons presently dwelling there. As the reverse side of the coin, the people were told that they would receive monetary remuneration for any improvements within the fence. It was noted from the questions asked by the audience that the individual farmers seemed to know very

little about the proposed operation and were, in fact, surprised at the plan agreed upon by the local officials and the Air Force. By 1430 hours the crowd had dispersed, but at 1700, Mayor Oshiro and about 300 farmers returned to the command post to learn if the colonel would delay further execution of the operation. Answered in the negative, the mayor then informed the task force commander that he and six of his landowners were going to USCAR the next day to request formal termination of the operation. Guidera, having no authority to forbid his going, nevertheless advised against it. On this note of deadlock the meeting came to an end and the group returned to their homes.

When work stopped for 12 March, 1.7 miles of fence had been completed around the bombing range. Meantime, logistical support for the operation continued with two airlifts per day, bringing water and 300 pounds of ice. As evening fell, guards were posted on the fence, and the night proved to be without incident.[150]

The following morning, the task force commander made another attempt to dissuade Mayor Oshiro from going to Naha, saying that he had an obligation to remain on Ie Shima to do his part in working out the resettlement program. The mayor replied that the vice mayor would act in his place while he was away, and at 0900 he took off in the Air Force C-47 for Okinawa.

Meantime, after his arrival at Kadena, Seiji Namizato had been turned over to the Naha Police Headquarters to await his trial on the 14th. Here he was quickly surrounded by sympathetic Okinawan newspaper reporters who found him indignantly eager to pour out his story. As is usual in cases involving law and order, a considerable disparity

was at once apparent in the charges brought by the military and the account given by the accused. Namizato's statement was as follows:

> I was drinking tea around seven a.m., when an American soldier with a carbine and two others with stakes and surveyors' equipment started to drive stakes in the sweet potato patch behind my home. Surprised, I went out and by sign language begged them to stop the work to save the seven members of my family from misery.
>
> Previously, when 300 tsubo of my land was requisitioned to establish the firing range, I did not raise any objection whatever, but if the remaining 600 tsubo were to be requisitioned, we will not be able to survive. I did not defy the U.S. Forces at all, but only beseeched them in earnest in order that we may live. It appears that they arrested me by misinterpreting my signs of request for signs of threat.
>
> I understand that the indictment states that I attacked an American soldier, but I am the one that got beaten. I was hit on my left shoulder with a fist [whether by the irate Guidera is not made clear], and after I was arrested, I was wrapped in a blanket and tightly bound with a rope. I was transported to Kadena in that state. I am really vexed at the thought that they are trying me at court when I haven't done anything wrong.

The Naha police decided to release Namizato without bond while he was awaiting trial, having no fear that he would fail to appear at the appointed time. However, the unhappy man asked them to keep him in custody for that period, as he had been brought to Okinawa directly from his farm in his work clothes and barefooted. Besides, he had no friends or acquaintances in Naha, this being the first time he had visited the city since the war, and he had no money with him.[151] It is unchronicled whether or not he got to keep the blanket in which he had been wrapped as a souvenir of his unusual experience.

The object of all this furor was not as bereft of friends in the big city as he had at first thought, however; for, on the afternoon of the 13th, eight landowners and Mayor Takekichi Oshiro visited the distressed Namizato at the Naha Police Station to present him with food,

money, and the assurance that his family was being taken care of. Furthermore, he could rest assured that he would have the support of the entire village when he went on trial the following day.

More to the point, it appeared that Tsumichiyo Asato, one of the most capable lawyers in the Ryukyus, would act as his defense attorney. Mr. Asato already had a distinguished career behind him at the time, having served as the first--and only--elected governor of Yaeyama Gunto from 4 November 1950 to 1 April 1951, when the gunto system was done away with and Shuhei Higa was appointed by the Deputy Governor as Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, a consolidation of the four former gunto governments. Tsumichiyo Asato had also been one of the founders of the Socialist Masses Party, to which, incidentally, most of the people of Ie Shima adhered, and with the retirement of Tatsuo Taira from political life on 26 September 1955--to go ahead of our story a bit--he was elected as chairman of the party. By an irony of human nature, notwithstanding Asato's advocacy of socialistic tenets, he was president and chief stockholder in the Kumejima Gold Mining Co., Ltd., while the same sort of inconsistency which put personal capitalistic ambitions ahead of abstract socialistic principles was the motivating basis for Taira's resignation--his desire to devote his entire time to the Ryukyu Sulphur Co., Ltd., of which he was president and chairman of the board.*

Elected to the first Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu

*Tatsuo Taira, incidentally, had been elected as the Governor of Okinawa Gunto at the same time that Asato rolled to victory in Yaeyama Gunto.

Islands in March 1952, Tsumichiyo Asato transferred his law office from Yaeyama to Naha. When he stood for re-election in 1954, however, he was so unfortunate as to find himself opposed to perhaps the greatest vote-getter in the Ryukyus, the redoubtable Kamejiro Senaga, and, as a result, he went down in crushing defeat, getting 1,900 votes to his People's Party rival's 3,637. In the light of subsequent events, it would appear that Asato was not one to harbor a grudge or allow a personal humiliation to act as a bar to the advancement of his party's political objectives. Illustrating this--to dip into the future again--in March 1956 he was elected to the GRI Legislature, where he became leader of the opposition Socialist Masses minority. Perhaps it was the suspicion that he would not have been thus successful if Senaga had been available to do combat in the political lists instead of languishing in durance vile for the crimes of perjury, subornation of perjury, intimidation, and harboring a fugitive from justice which inclined him to be especially magnanimous. Or it may be that political considerations led him to act as he did. Be that as it may, when a great welcoming rally was held in Naha on the evening of Senaga's release from prison on 9 April 1956, Asato strode to the stage amidst loud hand-clapping and shook hands with the liberated hero. Then, addressing the audience of some 10,000 sympathizers and simply curious onlookers, the chairman of the Socialist Masses Party unburdened himself in the following words:[152]

> Mr. Senaga is my political rival under the direct representative system [the electoral system which the opposition parties blamed in large part for their severe defeat at the hands of the Ryukyu Democratic Party during the previous month], but he is the head of an allied party as far as common racial problems are concerned. He was sentenced on charges of perjury and sheltering a criminal, but it is considered that there was a

political motive behind it. I would like to cooperate with him as an allied party leader.

As Asato no doubt anticipated, this speech brought down the house in a storm of applause. It would be interesting, however, to know just what reaction this little speech made on Deputy Governor (Lieutenant General) James E. Moore, when it was passed on to him. If he experienced no feeling of betrayal, it would be surprising, indeed, in view of what had gone before. Only six days previously, Chairman Asato of the Socialist Masses Party and newly-elected Speaker of the Legislature Tatsubin Yogi had visited the Deputy Governor in the Speaker's office immediately after the general had read a lengthy message to the legislature. Both legislators expressed their appreciation of the Deputy Governor's interest in their activities and asked if they might have similar informal talks from time to time. When Moore readily assented to this request, Asato told reporters that "It is certainly a forward step for the concrete operation of administration, that by our talks we have deepened our mutual understanding and USCAR has announced its goal."[153] Under the circumstances, his speech and actions of April 9th were like a stab in the back for the Deputy Governor.

It transpired, however, that Tsumichiyo Asato's considerable legal and forensic talents were not needed to defend Seiji Namizato, whom we have left behind bars while exploring his lawyer's past and future. On the morning of 14 March, Defendant Namizato, Attorney Asato, and various defense witnesses duly appeared before Judge (Major) Raymond M. Peak in the Civil Summary Court, located at the Naha Police Station. There had gathered a large audience, including Mayor Oshiro, the headman (ku-cho) of Maja Sub-Village (who also happened to be named Oshiro--

Kozo being his given name), Ie Shiman landowners--at this time more numerous than native Okinawans, it sometimes seemed, old women, and other interested persons. Whether by design, through negligence, or because of press of other business, the witness for the military failed to appear at the appointed time. Taking into consideration the fact that 48 hours had already elapsed since the defendant's arrest, Judge Peak waited only a few perfunctory minutes, then released Namizato and dismissed the case.[154] Although the present writer is unable to learn exactly what machinations went on behind the scenes on that occasion, he is inclined to believe that Rycom and USCAR officials, having had time to look at the affair in a calmer perspective, finally realized the ridiculousness of the charges against Namizato and hit upon this method of backing out gracefully, sustaining a minimum loss of face in the process. To have continued the action would have been akin to employing a hydrogen bomb to exterminate a troublesome gnat.

On Ie Shima, meanwhile, the troops of Company "K" had erected fence with such a will that 13 March found the barbed-wire enclosure completed, except for the four gates and a 100-yard stretch which would require special Engineer stakes to close. Concurrently, Mr. Cox, the 313th Air Division Real Estate Chief, and Colonel Guidera were negotiating with Vice-Mayor Nakama and the 13 displaced families who were to be transplanted. The outcome was an agreement to move to a temporary relocation area adjacent to Maja Sub-Village, where tents for shelter would be provided and animal pens for the domestic farm animals constructed. In addition, trucks and men of the task force would be made available to dismantle and relocate the dwellings and outbuildings. In

compliance with this agreement, a message was sent to Rycom G-3 requesting the early dispatch of 13 squad tents to be used by the 84 dislocated villagers for a period of 10 days. Late on the afternoon of the 13th, an aircraft flew in with a load of building materials for use in rebuilding the homes of the 13 families.

Promptly at 0800 hours on 14 March, the relocation of the 13 families got underway, the troops helping them to move their personal belongings and dismantling their homes, which they then transported as intactly as possible to the newly-erected "tent city". At 1014, a C-47 landed on the airstrip with Mr. Sheehan of USCAR and a GRI finance team assigned to pay the displaced families 100 per cent value for the improvements on their land, including homes, cisterns, sheds, and the like. All of the affected families accepted this payment, which totalled $5,790.45; but, when the team attempted to reimburse the other Ie Shiman landowners whose dwellings were outisde the fence for the destruction of tombs located within the bombing range and for the rental on farm land of whose use they were now deprived, they adamantly refused to accept a single yen.

At 1130 on March 15th, the eight members of the GRI Legislature's Special Land Committee, headed by Chairman Tomotsune Oyama, arrived at Ie Shima on board the police boat Asakaze, with three newspapers and the same number of investigators in their train. The task force commander, informed by radio in advance of their coming, met the party at the beach and drove them to Maja Ku in several jeeps and trucks. Upon reaching the relocation site, the legislators presented Colonel Guidera with a letter of introduction from Colonel Walter H. Murray, the Deputy Civil Administrator, then asked permission to enter the enclosed bombing range

area. Chiefly because of the presence in the party of Kisaburo Owan, the lone member of the People's Party serving in the Legislature since the imprisonment of Kamejiro Senaga, the task force commander refused their request. Moreover, even had no member of the detested OPP been included in the group, the fact that several of the committee members were of Socialist Masses persuasion--opposed to the United States, on general principles, in most matters, and particularly so where the land situation or reversion was concerned--would probably have disinclined him to grant their request.[155]

A reporter for the Okinawa Times, who had come in with the legislators, set down on paper a description of what he saw and heard which is worthy of preservation. However, the reader is admonished to bear in mind that the Times was the least friendly to the United States of any of the Japanese language dailies on Okinawa and that it shared with the others a predilection for appealing to the sympathies of its readers by describing abused or distressed women, elderly people, and children. The farmers they saw were invariably innocent folk, devoid of all guile, as though lifted straight out of Sidney's Arcadia; while the Americans doing business with them were Archimagos of deceit and treachery. With this warning, the following is presented:[156]

> In the neighborhood of the place of work, sooty posts and lumber were seen piled along the road. Landowners who had been ordered to evacuate were engaged in packing the household effects, while the working crew were engaged in distributing drinking water from a large truck, helping the evacuees. Housewives with infants and old people were busy preparing meals inside the tents on a hastily improvised fireplace of stones and would not so much as look back when the party of investigators arrived. There was an old man who reportedly had not touched food since the 14th. [This being the early afternoon of the 15th, he could as yet scarcely be regarded as a serious challenger for the fasting records set by

Mahatma Gandhi in the latter's heyday/.

The committee members sat on the grass in a circle and listened to the story of the people concerning the evacuation. According to it, from 7 a.m. on the 14th, grass roofings, floor boards, walls, and posts were removed one by one by the wrecking crew, and part of them were leveled by bulldozers. This area is scarce in drinking water, and the inhabitants customarily used rain water tanks. These too were removed by bulldozers, and old farmer said, with tears in his eyes. Another landowner who had a little girl sick with measles had to ask for military aid, and had the child taken to a hospital in a military truck. Such being the situation, the landowners did not know what to do and vacantly looked on while the military crew went on with their work, they said.

Although the Land Committee members were told by Mr. Freimuth, USCAR's liaison officer, that he had been informed that landowners themselves were tearing down their houses, this was contrary to what was said in the telegraphic message the committee had received from the Maja villagers. As a result of the investigation, it was clearly established that no landowners took part in pulling down the houses and that the landowners had no prior knowledge of the removal.

All landowners had received compensation for removal of houses from the land office, but Kokichi Chinen, who received ¥20,000, explained that he accepted the money because he was told that the money will not be paid if not claimed within four days and the house torn down regardless. According to Mr. Arakaki, an official in charge of land of (GRI's) Administration Section, it seems that some of them are receiving land rent and compensation for removal of graves. The relocation area has tentatively decided as an area in the neighborhood of Maja, as a result of negotiation between village authorities and USCAR. The party of legislators later visited the village office and listened to the statements of Assistant Mayor Nakama and Chief Tamaki of Industry Section concerning the real situation. The party left for Naha a little after 4 p.m. and is scheduled to hold a meeting on the 16th.

With the situation on Ie Shima apparently well in hand, the task force began to break up. At noon on March 15th, 36 men of the temporary organization boarded an LCU and returned to their cantonment area, and later that same afternoon, another 45 men redeployed to the Sukiran area on Okinawa. Shortly after the first contingent of troops boarded the landing craft, the GRI team which had arrived the previous day announced

that 80 kin (1 kin eq. 1-1/3 lb) of dried sardines, 17 go (1 go eq. 0.33 lb.) of rice, and five cases of noodles were now available at the Son office warehouse for requisition by the 13 displaced families. This worked out as a week's supply of one kin of sardines per day, three go of rice per day, and two packages of noodles per day for each member of the families involved. Since the borrowed tents were supposed to be returned to the military after 10 days, GRI expected all of the villagers to cooperate in completing the houses by that time.

At 0500 hours, 16 March, the bombing range was closed and military police guards were posted to insure that no one gained entry. Then for approximately one hour, from 0900 to 1000 hours, F-84G's of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group Detachment at Kadena made practice strikes on the target with three-lb. bombs. As soon as the bombing runs stopped, a C-47 took off from Ie Shima with 20 more men of the task force. Meantime, at 0900, the first air police detachment, consisting of an NCO and nine airmen, had flown into the island as a preliminary step in the Air Force's assumption of responsibility for the integrity of the bombing range. At 1410, Major Raymond W. Coy, of the 6332d Air Base Wing, arrived on the scene to take command for the Air Force and receipt for the installation and all the materials remaining. Twenty minutes later, the LCU departed Ie Shima with another decrement of troops, and at almost the same time, a C-119 took off with the last of the task force.[157]

In writing his report of the operation on Ie Shima, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Guidera, the task force commander, arrived at several conclusions. One was that "the individual farmer affected by this operation was not fully informed by his local officials, and that self-

appointed 'leaders" had, by their somewhat selfish manipulations, deluded the individual farmer as to the purpose and financial arrangements made by U.S. Forces." He also felt that the entire population, as well as the local official and unofficial leaders, were caught by surprise by the military's resolution on this occasion. They had witnessed so many instances of compromise and vacillation in the past that they had unconsciously come to believe that the Americans were incapable of determined action. He concluded further that the problem might arise again, unless speedy action were taken to allocate and prepare for farming enough substitute land for the 150 or so families who had been farming within the range area, though living outside its boundaries. This possibility was increased in likelihood, he felt, since the present arrangement calling for one day's farming per week appeared to be insufficient to provide an adequate food supply for the displaced farmers, at least until substitute land had begun to produce crops.

Apparently, when Colonel Guidera's trigger temper was not involved, as it had been in the case of the Namizato incident, he was a reasonable, good-hearted man, if we judge from the above conclusions and the following recommendations which he included in his report. The first of these was that (1) USCAR, GRI, and the 313th Air Division be urged to expedite the preparation of substitute farm land; (2) that a re-study of Air Force tactical requirements be made to see if additional farming time might not be allowed within the range area until substitute land was productive; and (3) that the tents being used by the 13 families be left in their possession for at least 20 days, instead of

the 10 previously prescribed.[158]

While events on Ie Shima had been thus marching to a climax, the members of the Special Land Committee of the GRI Legislature were devoting the greater part of 14 March to an attempt (vain, as it proved) to discuss the situation with the Civil Administrator, Brigadier General Walter Johnson, and listening to the testimony of three visiting delegates from the embattled island. Kosuke Maeda, the first to speak, though certainly not the first in importance, had this to say:[159]

> According to an announcement by the military, the mayor and the members of the Land Committee assented to the requisition. The Land Committee has never received any notification or instruction regarding military requisition of land. The military's declaration that the Committee has assented to the requisition is very annoying. The truth is that the whole village of Maja is united, and even the children quit attending school from the 11th in order to protest the requisition. /Unless the school children of Ie Shima were vastly different from those of most other places in the world, their eagerness to display their sympathy with the displaced families by remaining away from school should not be interpreted as any display of sacrifice or self-denial. They were probably all too happy at the unscheduled vacation which broke up the routine of school life!/ If the land were requisitioned, the only thing that remains for us will be death. In November, last year, we adopted a resolution against the requisition at a general meeting. The Land Committee never consented to the requisition.

As might be expected from our past acquaintance with Shoko Ahagon, the second of the three Ie Shima delegates to speak, his testimony was both lengthier and more virulent than that of Maeda, but in view of the atmosphere then prevailing it was precisely the sort of utterance which the Okinawa Times and the general public wanted to hear. The Maja demagogue spoke as follows:

> The general trend of thought among the people is that the military is unreliable. We had weighed the situation carefully when we received the last notification, but our conclusion was that if we lost our land we could no longer subsist. Our farm income at

present is some ¥10,000,000, but the land rent barely amounts to ¥180,000, and there is no other kind of compensation and no place to move to. On the 11th, several hundred soldiers came to the island in three vessels, but the Iejima [the name Ie Shima is never used by the Ryukyuans themselves, who habitually refer to the belligerent little island as Iejima] people have never before taken any adverse action against American Forces.

Mr. Namizato [the old man who was arrested for "assaulting" Lieutenant Colonel Guidera] only begged to have his land spared, in sign language, and lay on his back on the ground, hoping to convey the thought that if he lost his land, he and his family will have to starve and die. Yet, he was tied hand and foot like a pig, and taken away. When I went to ask for an interview, soldiers appeared with facial expressions I shall never forget. We were humiliated. In order to be able to say anything, a man is required to be a landowner. Anyone who spoke was requested to give his name and address, and petitions were rejected. We were surrounded by soldiers armed with loaded rifles, although we did not oppose them with force. When we asked for a consultation, the soldiers refused to stand aside and let us pass.

The military says it will soon begin firing practice, but we have decided that the land we now occupy is the safest, even if bombs fall and our houses are burned. We must cultivate our land even at night; for once we move from our land, we will not be able to live. [This bold speech is the more interesting if we bear in mind that the speaker himself had no home within the bombing range. Thus, it was rather easy for him to be "daring", encouraging the others to remain firmly emplanted on their land when the bombs began to fall!] Although the military told us that we will receive a lot of food if we will evacuate, nothing has been done so far. [In this statement, Ahagon was, for once, correct, but he was also hasty; for the shipment of food for distribution to the evacuated families had arrived at Ie Shima the same day, and the following morning, as we have seen, it was made available to those entitled to it]. All our trust and cooperation with the military is about to be lost. It is regrettable that no one did anything, even though armed soldiers were mobilized. I beg you to find out who is right, and settle this matter.

The third visitor from Ie Shima, Ryoichi Taira, was either more laconic than his compatriot, or else the Okinawa Times writer who was reporting their words had become more than a little bored with the whole business by the time he got around to having his say. Be that as it may, his comment, as carried by the Times, consisted of exactly one sentence: "When I think of the eviction problem, I can not help but

think that we are now slaves."[160]

The following day, 15 March, the three Ie Shima representatives of the landowners started a "hunger strike" in front of the Chief Executive's office, interrupting it when Shuhei Higa took time from his busy schedule to confer with them. The resulting interview was punctuated by volleys of ill humor and rudeness from Ahagon, who seemingly never believed in winning a point by winning the man. In any instances where he appears on the pages of this history, he invariably appears determined to butt all opposition aside, no matter how much more powerful the opponent. Inasmuch as Ahagon had come to the meeting more to abuse the Chief Executive and vent his spleen than to arrange a solution to the resettlement problem, the result was exactly what might have been anticipated--both parties were angered, and nothing was accomplished. The visiting delegation thereupon resumed their well-publicized vigil in front of Mr. Higa's office door.[161]

Although a show of force had been necessary to gain the Ie Shimans' acquiescence in clearing of the bombing range and erection of the perimeter fence, the Air Force had nonetheless agreed to a number of concessions, in order to palliate the sad lot of the families affected. Under the resulting resettlement plan, this command promised (a) to assist the 13 landowners whose homes were located within the bombing range in removing their dwellings; (b) to provide cement and lumber for the reconstruction of dwellings and water cisterns; (c) to provide land areas for relocating the 13 dwellings and for farming by all of those people who had formerly cultivated their crops within the requisitioned land; (d) to clear the new farm areas with heavy equipment;

and (e) to permit farming within the bombing range for a period of 10 months on a minimum basis of one day per week.

In fulfillment of this agreement, the 313th Air Division airlifted and turned over to Son officials on Ie Shima 33,000 pounds of cement, 26,666 pounds of lumber, 500 pounds of nails, and 671 pounds of wire. On 15 March, the substitute land allocated to the affected farmers within the Air Force leased area was inspected by GRI and Ie Son officials, who were accompanied by Mr. Cox, the 313th Real Estate Chief. Although the officials indicated that the new land was acceptable, they added that they would not be ready for clearance of the farm areas for at least 20 days, as they planned to relocate and reconstruct the dwellings before starting the farm clearance. Once they were ready for the Air Force to move in the necessary heavy equipment for this work, the Son officials promised to give five days' notice through USCAR.

Mr. Cox, for his part, reaffirmed that the farmers would be allowed to cultivate their plots inside the bombing range for 10 more months, the range officer notifying the mayor each time of the specific days on which they might enter the fenced-in area. He added that it was tentatively planned to permit access every Sunday and, possibly, after noon on Saturdays. In addition, the range officer would be instructed to maintain close liaison with the mayor, in order that the latter might be notified of the range's availability at any time it was not being used, such as during daylight hours after bombing had ceased for the day and on days when inclement weather grounded the F-84G's.[162]

Two areas were designated for relocation of the 13 dwellings which had been removed from the bombing range. One was in Maja Sub-Village

itself, west of the middle airstrip and north of the perimeter road on the north side of the island. The other was located along the south perimeter road of the island at the southeast corner of the Air Force land. A third area commencing east of the east airstrip and extending eastward through the GLOBECOM area to the Air Force east boundary was designated for farming, but the natives were not permitted to rebuild their houses in this area, since radio antennas for the GLOBECOM Receiver Station were scheduled to be erected there shortly. Although these antennas would affect farming to some degree while they were being constructed, once in place they would disrupt agriculture hardly at all.

Every effort had been made to allocate land for which no foreseeable Air Force need existed, but this headquarters wanted it understood beyond the shadow of a doubt that it reserved the right to utilize all or any part of the designated areas, should the need arise at any time in the future. Furthermore, only those natives whose houses or farms were located within the bombing range were authorized to resettle in these areas. No other persons would be allowed to build or commence farming therein.

All of this Mr. Cox explained in detail to the vice-mayor and the Chief of the Agricultural Section for Ie Son, as well as to Mr. Arakaki of GRI's Administration Section, in course of their inspection trip on March 15th. Subsequently, the same information was passed on to the Rycom Land Control Officer, in order that he could advise the displaced farmers that they now had formal permission to use the above-specified Air Force land, subject to the conditions outlined.[163]

That everything was not going as smoothly on Ie Shima as hoped,

despite the elaborate measures taken by the Air Force, was revealed when Kiyotaka Ishikawa and two other representatives of Maja-Ku visited GRI on 17 March to request that food be sent there immediately. They pointed out that when the farmers were forced to evacuate the bombing range earlier in the week, the military had notified them to take with them one week's food supply. Since the farmers had been living on the products harvested that day, it was "absurd to tell us to be in possession of a week's supply." The delegation admitted that a week's food supply had been provided for the 13 displaced families by GRI, but there were, besides, 50 families (250 persons) whose entire farm land lay within the area, and another 28 families (about 115 persons) who had half of their land there. This added up to a rice requirement of 18 to (one to is equal to 0.05 of a bushel) or a monetary equivalent of ¥9,040 ($75.33) every day. This amount, the delegation declared, was "absolutely necessary to tide over the crisis, and the people of the sub-village are awaiting our return eagerly."[164]

Up to this point, the visiting Ie Shimans had been surprisingly dispassionate in their remarks, offering facts instead of emotion, although such an approach was not at all in keeping with the customary reaction of Okinawans given an opportunity to unburden themselves on the shoulders of a sympathetic reporter. It was, then, too much to expect such restraint from the volatile visitors for long, and when they did, inevitably, get around to castigating the military, they laid about them with a savagery and disregard for the truth that Kamejiro Senaga might have envied. After stating that Mayor Oshiro had found it necessary to visit GRI on 13 March in order to deny the news report that

he and the Chairman of the Land Committee had consented to the evacuation order, the delegation asserted that it was this very denial which had been responsible for his enforced return to Ie Shima by military aircraft. Their comment on this was as follows:[165]

> We inhabitants regret very much that such an inhuman conduct is being carried out by the U.S. military. The military forced us to sign /the evacuation agreement/ by holding down our fingers. They burnt our houses or destroyed them with a bulldozer, and took sick children to the police station or public office, refusing to deliver them to their parents. What hateful and devilish conduct!! We heartily desire the promotion of real friendship between the U.S., and in order to make the military reconsider, we, inhabitants of Maja Sub-Village, will fight to the end by sacrificing ourselves. We are convinced that is the very way to attain the happiness of both the Okinawan and American people.

The Special Land Committee of the GRI Legislature met on 19 March to discuss the problem of providing food for the displaced people of Ie Shima. After deciding to ask GRI to supply all the affected inhabitants with three months' food as a temporary measure, they granted Mr. Ahagon's request to say a few words on behalf of his people. Addressing himself to the members of the Land Committee, while the more than 20 residents of Maja-Ku who had come to Naha to petition for compensation for their alleged loss of livelihood listened approvingly, Ahagon painted the following gloomy picture of conditions in his village:[166]

> Presently the people of Ie Son are living in one-third the area of the island. The substitute land is now under cultivation; so for the evacuees to take up this land is like killing the other landowners. /According to the Rycom Land Control Officer, this substitute land had not been used by its owners for eight years/. The population has increased by 500 compared to pre-war time, and this fact must be understood. /This statement was not too far afield, as the 1940 population had been 6,816, and that of 30 June 1955 was 7,119--an actual increase of 303 persons/. The livelihood of farmers is destined to be miserable,

so we do not understand the military's intent in letting us cultivate land only once a week.

The same day that the Maja delegation was presenting the sad plight of the people to GRI, Deputy Chief Executive Tatsubin Yogi was visiting Ie Shima to observe conditions there at first hand. Upon his return to Naha, he told reporters that the 13 evacuated families were still living in tents at the entrance to Maja-Ku and that the building materials of the houses torn down were piled in front of the respective tents, but they were not serviceable. As for the materials brought in by the Air Force, they were "not enough for even a single house." He had heard that more materials were expected to arrive, but, even then, "they would not even be enough for floors of the 12 houses to be built."

Commenting on Mr. Yogi's report, the Okinawa Times declared that:

> It is natural for them to be in such a mental state, since they have lost their land which they have cherished next to their life. Furthermore, bombing practice was started before they could recover from the shock, so they are unable to harvest their sweet potatoes and are facing starvation. . . . It is indeed regrettable that the Government has not made any concrete decisions, although appearing to be planning to aid the people with food, reconstruction of houses and substitute land. . . . And yet, regardless of what the counter-measures may be, it is after all only a temporary measure, for more than 70 families are actually facing food shortage, without a place to live in. Something must be done about it as soon as possible.

Warming to his subject, the Times editor went on to describe the intimate connection between the sweet potato and survival for the average Ryukyuan:

> Strange as it may seem, a sweet potato patch in Okinawa is the people's food store-house. Each day's supply of potatoes is dug up every day, but, with the potato field fenced off and bombs liable to fall, the store-house will not serve its purpose and the people will have to face starvation with the store-house in sight.

> Thus, it is necessary that food be supplied and a lump sum paid for building houses. It will never do to tell these people to be content with a house a little better than a pig's sty or a goat's shed. If these people are prepared to cope with the situation, it is well and good, but, if they are unable to take care of themselves, the Government should do something for them.[167]

The war of words continued without intermission, with GRI on the receiving end of most of the volleys; but the Ie Shimans, finding that their verbal shots were having little effect, finally turned their guns in a new direction. The person selected as the receipient of the latest petition, prepared on 20 March, was Mrs. Shuhei Higa, the wife of the Chief Executive. Declaring that "We, farmers, have no choice but to take this measure," the eight representatives of the Ie Shima landowners--including the ubiquitous Ahagon, of course--who had been staging a sit-down strike in front of Mr. Higa's office for several days, added that they could not comply with the evacuation order simply by accepting the removal fees. Even if they did so, such a course still provided no guarantee of their livelihood. Again, the military might suggest that they resettle in Ishigaki or Iriomote, where there was a considerable acreage of primitive land, but in actuality it was easier to recommend such an undertaking than to carry it out. Besides, it is always difficult for one to go to a strange land, leaving behind the native place where he was reared, and "this is especially so for the people of Maja who have never left the island." (Knowing as we do that all the natives of Ie Shima were forcibly evacuated for approximately a year in 1945-46, we can see that this statement was not completely accurate).

The petition averred that the damages recently inflicted on Maja-Ku far exceeded those suffered during World War II, and that the people

were compelled to accept the evacuation compensation by "armed soldiers" who made them affix their thumb prints as evidence of acquiescence and as receipt for payment. "If the military should continue this unjust act," the letter said, "we can not but apprehend the future of the United States." The Japanese in their day had been better than the Americans, declared Ahagon and Company, since they at least understood if the situation was explained to them. Getting more bitter as they proceeded, the petitioners asserted that they were[168]

> . . . at the acme of hatred, deeply disappointed without even knowing where to move. We think that a country's prosperity depends on the promotion of industry, and we have never heard of a country that prospered through her military might. Moreover, we think that good politics will stabilize the people's livelihood and result in promoting education and decreasing crime.
>
> We pray that the Chief Executive will do his utmost to eliminate such wrong-doings of the military and not make the Ryukyuan-American friendship in name only. The evil presently being conducted in Iejima is considered to be the act of a certain American (Mr. Cox). This is a disgrace upon the Americans. Good and bad acts are clearly distinguished, and can not be hidden. We know that the Chief Executive is a busy man; so we are sending this letter to you, his wife.

It would seem that the Ie Shimans had little faith that Mrs. Higa's intercession with her husband would bear any tangible fruits, or else this petition was written merely for the practice its authors would acquire in drawing up an effective appeal for assistance. In either case, only two days later, on 22 March, Shoko Ahagon and Socialist Masses Legislator Saichi Kaneshi submitted a 10-point petition to Chief Executive Higa himself, in which the following requests were made:[169]

1. That foodstuffs be supplied in accordance with Articles 8 and 40 of the Livelihood Protection Law for the 13 evacuated

families and all families whose land had been requisitioned.

2. That all families who had 50 per cent of their land requisitioned be supplied half the foodstuffs furnished the above 13 families.

3. That proper measures be taken immediately, so that the evacuated families would not be inconvenienced by lack of water for drinking or other purposes.

4. That houses which could withstand storm and hot weather be furnished until a permanent measure for the evacuated families could be decided upon.

5. That protective facilities for livestock and expenses for purchasing fodder be considered, not only for those who had been evacuated or who had lost all of their arable land, but even for those who had lost less than half their land.

6. That the Government of the Ryukyu Islands assume continuing responsibility for the above temporary measures until such time as a permanent counter-measure was mounted.

7. That the American soldiers on Ie Shima immediately put to a stop to such acts as the open removal of sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, and firewood from the fenced-in area.

8. That the Air Force discontinue bombing practice on Saturdays and Sundays, since the resulting random firing in the vicinity of the graveyards located inside the fence prevented the inhabitants from harvesting their crops.

9. That such wanton acts as killing of the goats in the pastures--a regular occurrence--be stopped.

A "HORSESHOE" OR "TURTLEBACK" TOMB

OF THE TYPE COMMON ON IE SHIMA

THE DENIAL OF ACCESS TO WHICH

CAUSED THE AIR FORCE SO

MUCH TROUBLE





10. That the tombs within the fence be left unmolested until a final decision could be made.

Besides these 10 items, the Maja-Ku representatives requested 15 kin (a kin equals 1.3228 pounds) of sweet potatoes, three kin of soy bean refuse, and 0.5 kin of salt--an average of ¥89.5 for each cow and horse; and 20 kin of sweet potatoes, three kin of soy bean refuse, and one kin of salt--an average of ¥102.0 for each hog. In addition, they requested a supply of 30 koku (a koku equals 47.65 gallons) of drinking water for the 13 families and 30 empty oil drums to be used as containers for the water.[170]

Lest Major General James E. Moore, who had succeeded Major General David A. D. Ogden as Deputy Governor on March 5th, might feel that he was being neglected, the professional pleaders from Maja-Ku presented him with a shiny new petition all his own, on 23 March. After congratulating General Moore upon his assumption of the high post, the Ie Shima delegates asked him to suspend further drilling and permit full-time farming within the bombing range. Apologizing for submitting a complaint so soon after his succession to power, the petition explained that they felt the Deputy Governor, by knowing the facts, would be enabled to use them as a guide for future policy, making it possible for the present "nominal" friendship between Ryukyuans and Americans to be transformed into a genuine friendship based on mutual trust and respect. Having unburdened themselves of these generalities, the petitioners proceeded to unfold the following story of the complicated land battle on Ie Shima, to show how relations between the Americans and the Ie Shimans had been caused to deteriorate:[171]

The military requisitioned land problem in Maja-Ku, Ie Son, started on July 19, 1953. On the 24th, an official, Mr. Goto, visited our area and conducted a survey of all property on the land with the cooperation of the residents. Later, the landowners were forcibly made to affix their seals. Several months later, target ranges were built with bulldozers. This is causing considerable damages to agricultural crops and the village is in a state of famine now.

When we appealed to the military, we were told not to worry, as they would pay compensation, but up till today, nothing has been done. At first, we were told that the military would permit farming and that the requisitioning will not affect our crops. However, after practice was started, it became evident that it was impossible to do so, and the landowners were led to an extremely straitened condition, resulting in 74 persons petitioning for suspension of practices on October 8, 1954.

Towards this, the military said that it would suspend the firing practices; so the residents returned to the area feeling relieved, but the military authorities came to notify us again that it wanted to use the area for military purpose. We requested them to change its plan and use some other uninhabited island for this purpose, since we were making our living here and giving our children education, solely from the income derived from our agricultural crops in the annual amount of over ten million yen. However, on the 11th, a large number of armed soldiers swarmed into our island, and one old farmer /Seiji Namizato/ was arrested when he requested the soldiers not to step into his farmland, as it would result in decreasing the amount of crop and make livelihood difficult for his seven-member family.

Some sub-villagers were seized with panic, some enraged, some fell into half-stupor, some cried, while others silently watched the barbaric attitude and acts. At about 7:30 a.m. on the 14th, about 80 armed soldiers suddenly visited our place in trucks and bulldozers without any prior notification, and began destroying and burning the houses. The residents are now weeping day in and day out, feeling resentment and indignation toward the American soldiers. School children were even unable to attend their graduation ceremony, while some parents sent their children off to school with one piece of cold sweet potato.

We have heretofore paid respect to the United States as a country of justice, humanity, and love, and were convinced that she was the country that would lead the other countries in the world. The fact that she conducted such wrong and unjust acts constitutes a big error of the United States military and is a great dishonor of the American people. We have striven to cooperate to the last, but it is too evident that we can not cooperate without payment of compensation for our livelihood, as it will become pretty hard to make a living.

> We are convinced that the U.S. Military Force is dedicated to a holy mission and believe that it will protect the people and strive to realize the happiness of the people and world peace. Under the present tense world situation, it is disadvantageous to create a misunderstanding between the Ryukyuans and Americans, or to make an alienation in terms of ideology. We hope that the misunderstanding caused by the Iejima incident will be cleared and the situation corrected, and pray from the bottom of our hearts that the Ryukyuan-American friendship will be deepened and that our mutual prosperity will continue forever. We make this request, convinced that your Honor will take proper measures.

Although there was no connection between the two, the same day that this letter was presented to the Deputy Governor, there occurred the first break in the deadlock between the Maja delegation and GRI which had heretofore blocked all efforts at conciliation. Meeting with the three members of the Legislative Land Committee, Chief Executive Higa promised that his government would take the following measures to alleviate the plight of the Ie Shimans:

1. Provide water: Thirty koku of water would be supplied each day, as well as 30 empty oil drums of one-koku capacity in which the families could store the precious liquid. In addition, 10 more drums would be supplied for use in transporting the water. Since the water had to be hauled regularly, GRI would allow ¥900 per day, calculating three horse-carts at ¥300 apiece and each one making four round trips per day.

2. Supply fodder for domestic animals: Since an adult's food subsidy would be paid to each family member, regardless of size or age, it could be predicted that money would actually be left over. This excess money could be used to purchase fodder for their domestic animals. Moreover, since it would be permissible to harvest crops within the fenced-in area, the displaced families could use this source to

make up the shortage, if any existed.

3. Extend the loan term for the tents: GRI had arranged with the Air Force to extend the loan period for the tents being used by the 13 families until 8 April. If at that time it was found that further extension was necessary, another negotiation would be made.

4. Construct temporary shacks: It was believed that extending the term for which the tents could be used would solve the housing problem; however, if the 313th Air Division refused to let GRI keep them past April 8th, the latter would see that temporary shacks were built.

5. Construct temporary pens for livestock: With the cooperation of the villagers, GRI would see that temporary pens for the livestock were constructed with old lumber, each family being given ¥500--or ¥6,500 in all.[172]

The terms of this five-pronged promise sounded so good to the delegation from Maja-Ku, who had been staging a sit-down strike in front of the Chief Executive's office for nearly a fortnight, that they abandoned their passive protesting and returned home.

Unfortunately for any hopes of an easy solution, the Ie Shima land problem was complicated by one unavoidable factor: too many different people needed the same areas. Cut it as you might, there simply was not enough land to go around. If the Air Force gave a parcel of land to one group of natives, it was at the expense of another. The truth of this condition was quickly demonstrated, when the inhabitants of Maja Sub-Village assembled to work out a course of action the morning following the return of the three-man delegation from Naha. After an

extensive exchange of views by those present, it was decided that if the indigenous owners of the substitute land designated by the Air Force were agreeable, the 13 families who had lost their homes and the others who had lost all of their farming land would move to the areas offered. The next step, then, was to obtain the permission of the landowners in question.

That same afternoon, therefore, a conference was held, with seven sub-village headmen, 10 members of the Son assembly, the three land committee members, and Vice Mayor Nakama representing Mayor Takekichi Oshiro in attendance. The chief purpose of the meeting was to obtain the consent of the landowners to the use of their land by the families from Maja Sub-Village--a formality which all parties concerned deemed essential, despite the fact that these landowners had been receiving compensation from the Air Force for their real estate since 1950. It might have been supposed that the Ie Shimans owning the land in question would be eager to help their fellows in their hour of distress. If such was the expectation of the evacuees themselves, however, they were doomed to disappointment. Such compassion as the leaders of Agarijo-Ku and Irijo-Ku were able to muster was for themselves, and, although they might commiserate with their brethren, they could spare them no land. This--notwithstanding their apparently having made no use of the land these many years. Now the unused land suddenly became quite desirable.

Katsuo Sakihama, the headman of Irijo-Ku, and Seiei Oshiro, his opposite number for Agarijo-Ku, answered the request for permission to use the land with these words: "The present conditions of the two sub-villages are that arable land is considerably reduced in comparison with

that of pre-war days, and uncultivated land is being developed. We are very sorry, but we can not lease our land, even though it is designated as military-requisitioned land. If we should do so, our sub-villages will be placed in the same plight as Maja-Ku." Not only were the inhabitants of Irijo and Agarijo disinclined to lease their land to their homeless and farmless brethren, but, they said, they were considering sending a petition to the Air Force for early release of their land.

Until events took this turn, the villagers of Maja-Ku had intended to accept the cement furnished by the Air Force and use it to build livestock sheds and temporary houses on the substitute land, provided the persons owning the substitute land approved. Now that the latter's refusal made this plan impossible--according to the lights of the Maja Sub-Villagers--there was nothing for it but to store the cement at the village office and the evacuees to build their temporary huts in the area near the tents.[173]

Three days after this meeting, on March 29th, Major Dallas A. Sharp, the Ryecom Land Control Officer, made a field trip to Ie Shima with Mr. Arakaki of GRI's Administrative Section. Proceeding first to the Son office, Major Sharp asked Mayor Oshiro to go with him to the tent village where the 13 displaced families were still living, despite the fact that their canvas homes had originally been loaned on the basis of only 10 days' utilization. By now, Major Sharp had dealt with Mayor Takekichi Oshiro enough times and under circumstances sufficiently varied that he should have known his man pretty well. Even so, it is doubtful that he was prepared for the reaction which his seemingly

reasonable request evoked. The major probably did not realize it, of course, but ever since the arrival of Task Force Guidera and his fruitless trip to Naha, Mayor Oshiro had been under an increasingly severe nervous strain. Reviled by the villagers as a weak-kneed renegade who betrayed their interests, ordered by the military to act as intermediary and agent for policies obnoxious to his people and himself, the poor mayor found himself between two fires. If he tried to carry out the orders of the Americans, he was a traitor in the eyes of the Ie Shimans. If he sought to postpone an action whose consequences he feared or opposed, the military regarded him as a two-faced person, in whom no reliance could be placed. Placed in this unenviable situation, Takekichi Oshiro could not sleep at night and found difficulty in eating, much as would have an American placed in a similar position.* Finally, accepting full responsibility for the grief which evacuation of the bombing range area had brought to the people of Maja-Ku, he had tendered his resignation to the Chairman of the Ie Son Assembly, Otomatsu Tamashiro, on 16 March.[174]

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the mayor not only declined to accompany Major Sharp, but readily found a hundred reasons for not doing so. To begin with, he had been sick. (This, as we know, was true). Besides, he said that he had not been working with the resettlement problem; therefore, he did not feel qualified to deal with so complex a matter without first having an opportunity to study it in detail. (Actually, it would probably have been difficult to find

*This is the only instance known to the present writer of a Ryukyuan's exhibiting the classic symptoms of an aggravated ulcer. The natives are ordinarily so light-hearted and irresponsible for the morrow that this curse of civilization is little known among them.

any subject under the sun of which Mayor Oshiro possessed a more intimate knowledge than he had of the Ie Shima land problem). Finally, he summed up the reasons disqualifying him from going along with the visitors under one succinct heading: he did not want to accompany Major Sharp when the latter attempted to persuade the landowners to move out of their tents and erect permanent houses on the proffered substitute land!

Finding the mayor adamant in his determination to serve no further as a wedge for splitting the resistance of his constituents, Major Sharp turned to the vice-mayor and, after considerable effort, finally persuaded him and the Chief of the Agricultural Section to accompany him to the tent site. Upon their arrival, the trio found that Kozo Oshiro, the Ku-Cho (mayor) of Maja Sub-Village, and several representatives of the displaced families had betaken themselves to the home of Shoko Ahagon for advice as to what they should do as soon as they saw the Land Control Officer disembark from the aircraft. From previous conversations with the landowners, Major Sharp had come to the conclusion that most of the people desired to resettle in the area set aside for them, but that they would not do so unless the whole group, including Ahagon and the other leaders, agreed to it.

After a time, the ku-cho, Shoko Ahagon, and the representatives of the displaced landowners returned to the tent encampment where, with some difficulty, they were persuaded to accompany Major Sharp to the proposed village and farm sites for a field inspection. On being shown two large areas of apparently arable land not presently being cultivated, the landowners demurred that the first was too rocky for

farming, while the second, although admittedly suitable for cultivation, could not be used by the dispossessed families, because of the objections of the landowners. This latter point, of course, was based on the recent refusal of the Ku-Cho's of Irijo and Agarijo Sub-Villages to permit the evacuated Majans to make use of their land. The major thereupon explained in detail the provisions of the letter written by the 313th Air Division, adding that the land in question was under lease by the Air Force, and that the people, in consequence, had the right to resettle on and farm it, even if it meant that the Air Force would have to protect them in the exercise of that right. This argument might have proved the precise lever required to change the people's mind, if they had been allowed to act without outside interference. Even as they were wavering in indecision, Ahagon and Vice-Mayor Nakama countered that although the Air Force might possess the legal right to grant the farmers use of the land, the latter were forbidden by ancient Ryukyuan custom from using another landowner's land--even though under leasehold--unless he gave his consent.

This was the turning point. After this it was evident that the tide was definitely running against Major Sharp. Nevertheless, he fought back valiantly, explaining that the owners' acceptance of rental money nullified any voice they might otherwise have had in the disposition of their land. Besides, the fact that they had made no use of it whatsoever during the past eight years made it seem reasonable to conclude that they would suffer no hardship from its cultivation by the families whom the Air Force was now encouraging to take it over. Then, striking sharply at Ahagon's vulnerable point, the major pointed out that the advice

not to accept the substitute land, which they were receiving so gratuitously, came from persons who were still living undisturbed in their own homes! These arguments should have been sufficiently convincing to win over his audience, but to make doubly sure, he reminded the displaced families that the Air Force had already delivered materials to be used in rebuilding their homes and that it was prepared to furnish heavy equipment for the establishment of farms and village sites, and to make other improvements, once it received assurance that the people would accept the assistance. The Ie Shimans should understand, however, that there was a limit to how long the Air Force might allow them to continue using the tents and leave the materials stock-piled awaiting their decision to resettle. All in all, it would be in the best interests of both themselves and their families if the evacuated Maja Sub-Villagers re-established their homes and farms as quickly as possible. Finally, Major Sharp wished the intransigent landowners to entertain no illusions that the military might eventually weaken in its resolution and accede to their request for indefinite livelihood compensation. Such a suggestion was completely unacceptable to the 313th Air Division.

When Major Sharp prepared his report shortly afterward on this trip to Ie Shima, he expressed his belief that "if the individual landowner could be consulted without interference or agitation by anti-American persons, the people could be resettled. An immediate resettlement of the families has also been worsened by the concessions made by GRI, who have promised them six month's livelihood compensation and monies for hauling water and taking care of the livestock in their present location."[175]

TAKEKICHI OSHIRO

THE MAYOR OF IE SON



By this time, the reader must have acquired a sympathetic interest in the harassed would-be ex-mayor, Takekichi Oshiro, and may wonder what happened to him. It will not be amiss, then, to relate that after he submitted his resignation, his constituents suddenly realized how good a man he really was. The Son Assemblymen, belatedly recognizing that the mayor should not have borne the sole responsibility for the bombing range evacuation, and that they were themselves involved in it, as well as the various sub-village officials, urged him repeatedly to remain in office. For some days Oshiro remained steadfast in his refusal to resume the reins, pleading poor health, but when the assembly in desperation called a general conference of all the sub-villagers on April 1st, and the populace unanimously begged him to continue as mayor, he finally relented.[176] Whether or not Takekichi Oshiro had reason afterward to regret yielding to the pressure of his people the reader can best judge for himself from the events of the next few months.

On 4 April, USCAR wrote Chief Executive Higa, in reply to a letter of his dated March 23d, that while every effort had been made to allocate areas which were not affected by immediate Air Force requirements, GRI must realize that if a requirement did arise, the 313th Air Division reserved the right to utilize any part or all of the areas designated. Furthermore, it must be understood that only those people whose houses or farms had been located within the bombing range would be authorized to resettle in the areas designated. (This declaration was evidently aimed at the Ku-Cho's of Agarijo and Irijo Sub-Villages, who had not only forbidden the evacuated families of Maja-Ku to move onto their land but had even hinted at petitioning the Air Force for its early release).

No one else would be permitted to build or commence farming within these areas. With this restatement of the 313th Air Division's position, USCAR felt that there should be no excuse for future misunderstanding on the part of the natives or of GRI itself.[177]

The reader may have noticed, with some wonder, that Shoko Ahagon has not appeared in the pages of this chronicle for some time. Since his absence must be regretted by no one more than himself, it seems best to re-introduce the irreconcilable rebel and let him resume his role in the drama for better or worse.

The Executive Branch of GRI was thrown into confusion on 12 April when 16 landowner representatives from Maja and Nishizaki Sub-Villages arrived in Naha to make new demands of the government. First to fall into their clutches was Director Miyazato of GRI's Department of Internal Affairs, who saw a morning drift away beyond recall while he listened to their complaints and sought to mollify their anger. If Chief Executive had hoped that by throwing Miyazato to the Ie Shiman lions he would be spared the ordeal of a visit from them, he was doomed to disappointment. That afternoon, the petitioners closeted themselves with Mr. Higa and Deputy Chief Executive Yogi for approximately two hours--every minute of them undoubtedly unpleasant for the GRI officials.

Ahagon began by complaining that the tents in which "we are presently living" were very unsanitary, so that sickness was resulting therefrom. In view of this, the petitioners wanted the Chief Executive to take immediate action to have temporary shacks constructed. "In the present place?" was Higa's natural question. Ahagon had evidently been waiting eagerly for this gambit; for he replied at once that since there

did not seem to be any suitable substitute land, there was no alternative but to have the fence removed from the bombing range, so that the families could rebuild there. No matter what opinion of Shoko Ahagon one might have, there was no denying his bulldog determination to thwart the United States Air Force--or anyone else who tried to take a piece of land in which he had an interest. The bombing range had become a virtual obsession with him. Chief Executive Higa--not motivated by the same inner compulsions--replied that it was not within his power to remove the fence. In fact, he had already tried many times to no avail. To emphasize this, he added that "I want to clearly say that it is useless to hope for the removal of the fence."

He might as well have reasoned with a boulder. Ahagon declared that if the fence were not removed, the people could not make a living. Retaining his composure by an exertion of willpower, despite the trial being made of it by the petitioners' insistence, Mr. Higa reiterated that not only was removal of the fence impossible, but it was likewise impossible to build temporary shacks in that fenced-in area. The thing to do was to find suitable substitute land on which to build the houses. Later in the conversation, the Chief Executive mentioned that the landowners had been paid some ¥9,000,000 ($75,000) since it was first designated as Master Plan land, according to information he had; but Ahagon retorted that the people of Maja-Ku had declined to accept the money when they learned that it was rental for their land. (Just what they had previously thought the money was for is not clear). Anyway, even if they wished to use the materials furnished by the Air Force for the reconstruction of their houses, they could not do so, since the lumber

was full of white ants.

At this point the Deputy Chief Executive broke in to suggest that if the fence could not be removed, it would be better to build permanent homes somewhere in the substitute land, and, if there was no suitable land in Ie Son, they would have to find a permanent place elsewhere. As usual, Ahagon had the last word (he also generally had the first word and most of those in between), muttering darkly that "They want the land, but will not pay the compensation. If they are not going to pay the compensation, return our land! Our request is clear."[178]

The next occasion on which GRI heard from Ie Shima was on 18 April, when a petition arrived from Mayor Oshiro, asking for immediate repair of the Horigi Water Point, northeast of Iegusuku Yama (the famed Pinnacle, which had claimed so many casualties when the 77th Infantry Division stormed it in April 1945). According to his account, on April 7th, American soldiers engaged in constructing the bombing range had deliberately broken the pump which was used to force water through a system of pipes to 11 different areas where water tanks were set up. As a result, the people of the island were suffering great inconvenience from the shortage of water.[179]

The petitioning party of Shoko Ahagon which had been annoying government officials since April 12th was reinforced on the 18th by the arrival of two women from Maja-Ku. Interviewed by a reporter for the Okinawa Shimbun, they told how they had already sold their peanut seeds, since there was no longer a farm on which to plant them. Declaring that they could not exist on the food allowance granted them by GRI, the women went on to describe their plight in the following words:[180]

> The children are dissatisfied with only rice-gruel, complaining of hunger. We parents are also tearfully watching the school children attending school without lunch. The parents are saying that they would rather sell their children in Itoman /in accordance with an ancient apprentice system which had overtones of slavery/ than continue to let them attend school hungary as they are. We have already sold oxen and horses because of the feeding cost. We request proper compensation so that we may survive. We are here because we are on the verge of death. We can only gaze at the farm land and cry.

The following day, 19 April, the four delegates from Maja-Ku met with Civil Administrator Brigadier General Walter Johnson for more than one hour, with reporters barred from attendance. The Civil Administrator expressed his sympathy for the distressed situation of the inhabitants, but added that it was nonetheless impossible to remove the wire fence, as Ahagon requested. If, however, the sit-down demonstrators would return home and devote themselves diligently to cultivating their land, the military might consider seeking other sources from which compensation could be made. When another delegate advanced the familiar objection that the substitute land was not only private land but was also unfit for cultivation, General Johnson effectively disposed of the latter argument by informing them that military and civilian agricultural experts had already been dispatched to Ie Shima that very day to examine the soil. Since the results of their findings were to be made known the following day, any further doubt as to the potential use which could be made of the land should soon be dissipated. It would either be found suitable for cultivation, or it would be declared unfit for that purpose.

This same doubting delegate, Henza by name, declared that "We are not opposed to the military, but we object to false reports that the landowners evacuated peacefully, when, in reality, bulldozers pulled

down our houses. Our strong attachment to the land is natural when considering that it was handed down to us through many generations. It is strange to hear it said that we are being instigated by the Communists, when we are cooperators."

To this indignant outburst the Civil Administrator merely replied somewhat cryptically, "I am well aware of what you and the military have done." Ahagon, more than ordinarily subdued, commented that the representatives would have no further need to sit down before the doors of GRI if proper compensation for their livelihood were made by raising the land rental to a reasonable level. In fact, he added, they would be glad to go home. Again General Johnson's reply was rather enigmatic, consisting simply of the promise that "We shall see that you do not starve." On this note the conference came to an end, having actually achieved very little, despite the time it had consumed.[181]

Two days after the meeting, the petitioners were handed a formal reply to their demands in the form of a letter signed by the Chief of USCAR's Administration Division, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph R. Pate. Emphasizing that it was impossible to give further consideration to the points covered by the petition, the letter reminded the landowner representatives that General Johnson had stated quite definitely the fence would not be removed from around the bombing range, and the Air Force would not give up land on which it had been paying rent for so long. In addition, the land would continue to be used for firing range purposes. Colonel Pate added that both the 313th Air Division and USCAR would be happy to give the 13 dispossessed families assistance in re-establishing their homes and farms on the new land, if and when they

displayed some inclination to help themselves. As everyone on Ie Shima already knew, lumber and funds had already been provided, and other assistance could be given once the families designated new sites which they were willing to accept. In closing, the letter tartly advised the delegation that "Petitions of this type, requesting impossibilities, as the petitioners well realize, make no contributions to a mutually acceptable solution of the problem."[182]

Meantime, the four-man party of real estate and agricultural experts mentioned by Brigadier General Johnson were conducting their investigation to ascertain if enough land had been allocated by this command, and if it was suitable for farming, as the inhabitants had denied. After making a thorough inspection, including a series of soil tests, of all the allocated areas, then comparing them with the former farming areas now enclosed within the fence, the party concluded that the allocated substitute areas were adequate in respect both of quantity and quality of the land. This determination having been made, Mr. Ellis J. Kohler, Chief of USCAR's Natural Resources Division, who formed one of the party, set about designating specific plots within the allocated areas which should be cleared by the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion for the displaced families' use. At such time as the 808th was ready to perform this clearance, USCAR promised to send personnel to Ie Shima to lay out the plots and work in close cooperation with the engineers. During the trip, Mr. Cox noted that the lumber, cement, nails, and wire provided by the 313th Air Division at his suggestion had been stockpiled in the area, protected from the elements by canvas covering, but doubtless suffering rapid deterioration from the effects of the high

humidity and heavy rainfall. As we know, there had been no effort to utilize these materials in rebuilding the dismantled houses.[183]

Ever in search of a forum from which he might influence public opinion and hear the dulcet sound of his own voice, Shoko Ahagon turned to a new medium on 24 April, writing a letter to the "Readers' Voice" column of the Okinawa Shimbun. Although the farmers were allowed to cultivate their crops within the fence once a week, he said, the permission was actually meaningless, since the crops were frequently leveled by bulldozers and destroyed by bombing. As for the nine million yen reportedly paid as land rental to the villagers, they had no recollection of ever having received so large a sum of money. It was true that at the end of 1953 they had received a small amount as "consolation" money. Again, in July 1954, he recalled, some officials had come to Ie Shima to pay the villagers ¥180,288 for land which had been giving the farmers an annual revenue of ¥10,000,000 [sic], but the inhabitants would not accept the money when they learned that it was rental instead of consolation money. Then, completing his catalogue of the military's transgressions, Ahagon declared that the newspapers might report that cement, nail, electric wire, and lumber had been airshipped into Ie Shima for the use of the displaced people; but, in reality, they had received nothing. Contradicting one portion of this statement in the very next breath, he added that termite-bored lumber fit only for firewood had been sent to Maja Sub-Village for use in rebuilding the houses. Knowing as we do that the materials which he so specificially denied having received had actually been delivered, it is plain that Mr. Ahagon was troubled by no twinges of conscience in lying quite badly, so long as it advanced

his cause by gaining sympathy for the Ie Shimans.[184]

Becoming weary, at last, of the evacuated families' continued refusal to resettle in the designated substitute areas, this headquarters requested the Deputy Governor on 25 April to notify them that unless they began building their homes within 30 days--or whatever period of time he considered reasonable--the tents and building materials would be reclaimed. After all, if the materials remained unused for an appreciable period, they would deteriorate and eventually become a complete loss. The 313th Air Division could "not condone such a loss occasioned solely by the dilatory actions of people who are the receipients of assistance by the United States Government."[185]

About the same time that the Air Force was reaching the end of its patience, the landowner representatives found themselves at the end of their financial rope, making it necessary for them to return home. In their final interview with Deputy Chief Executive Yogi on April 25th, they announced that they would start cultivation in the fenced-in area immediately upon their return to Ie Shima, whether the military liked it or not. Declaring that it was impossible for them to maintain their livelihood with the ¥21 (17½ cents) per day allowed each person for food expense under the Livelihood Protection Law, they proclaimed their determination to farm inside the bombing range until such time as a permanent Livelihood Compensation Law should be enacted.[186]

If American military authorities who heard of this threat imagined that it was only inflated bluster, they were in for a rude awakening; for the Ie Shimans were as good as their word. Observing that the guards inside the fence were not too vigilant, the villagers, encouraged

by Ahagon to do so, slipped inside the bombing range on the very day of his return to Maja-Ku and resumed cultivation of a small plot of farmland which the bulldozers had not leveled as a part of the target proper. Three days later, on the evening of 28 April, a mass meeting of all Ie Shimans was held on the grounds of the Ie Junior High School, with more than 2,000 people in attendance. The chief result was the unanimous adoption of a resolution presenting the case of the evacuees and voicing the refusal of all Son inhabitants to abide by the existing system of land requisitioning. The resolution read as follows:[187]

> Since the land requisitioning, as well as the removal of houses in Maja and Nishizaki Sub-Villages, in Ie Son meant a matter of life or death for 741 persons concerned, the whole villagers concentrated their efforts in requesting USCAR and GRI to suspend the use of the land. However, this was to no avail, since the military on March 11th mobilized several hundred completely armed soldiers, and as being the supreme order, set up a fence in the area (approximately 1,500,000 tsubo) within the radius of 5,000 feet from the center of the target. Thus, over 221,000 tsubo of land within the fenced-in area were requisitioned and 13 families were evicted.
>
> Those concerned are at loss what to do, thus creating a grave problem from a humanitarian standpoint. In accordance with the provision of the Livelihood Protection Law, we are presently provided with ¥21.00 per adult-per day by GRI, but this is just a temporary measure, and the future of 741 persons remains dark. Until such time as permanent measures are taken by GRI and USCAR based on the Livelihood Compensation Principle, and an over-all solution is made, we resolve, in the name of whole Ie Son residents, that we can not comply with the land requisitioning, in order to live, thinking the above to be a righteous request.

On the afternoon of 4 May, Deputy Chief Executive Yogi, Director Miyazato of the Internal Affairs Department, and Chief Noha of the Government Section, GRI, conferred for more than two hours with Major Sharp and the Messrs. Kohler and Sheehan at USCAR. As a result, it was agreed that the construction of houses for the 13 families would be

carried out in the immediate future. The three GRI officials then met with Ahagon and three other representatives of Maja Sub-Village, instructing them to have the landowners agree upon a site for their homes prior to Major Sharp's scheduled arrival on the 10th. By now the evacuees were in a mood to commence construction of their houses, as the thought of living in tents with the advent of hot weather and the imminent approach of the typhoon season was most disquieting. Mayor Oshiro had already hinted that the 13 families would be willing to build their homes on certain uncultivated communal land in Maja-Ku, as suggested by the military, provided they were allowed to farm in an area located between the bombing range fence and the west taxiway of the center airstrip, and midway between the north and south perimeter roads. The fact that this area was predominantly Son-owned land, rather than the property of individuals, made it more acceptable in the eyes of the sensitive Ie Shimans with their profound respect for personal property rights, while its desirability was enhanced by the land's location within walking distance of the village.[188]

General Upthegrove, the 313th Air Division Commander, readily agreed to the natives' cultivating this parcel of Air Force-leased land, but he did impose one condition: the 13 uprooted families would have to commence building their houses in Maja Sub-Village before they could be permitted to farm the other area--and they would have to commence construction immediately.[189]

The 808th EAB was scheduled to start clearing the new farming areas on Ie Shima on 16 May under the guidance of Major Sharp, who would show the work crews exactly which land they were to grade and work.[190] Upon

the latter's arrival, he inquired of the landowners--including the headmen of both Maja and Nishizaki Sub-Villages--exactly what plan they had agreed upon since his last conversation with them. The Ie Shimans replied that they <u>really</u> wanted to rebuild their houses on the site of their former homes (an Ie Shiman, genus Maja-Ku, does not give up easily!); however, since the Air Force had already expressed its opposition to that course, they would settle for having them built on village-owned land in Ishidobaru as a temporary measure. Major Sharp's response to this was that although it would be all right for them to farm in Ishidobaru, they could not build houses there. The landowners objected that the inhabitants of Iriemae were already farming most of the arable land in Ishidobaru, but there were house lots aplenty, comprising land too rocky or sterile for cultivation. The major could only repeat that the 13 displaced families could not be given any house lots in Ishidobaru.

The Land Control Officer was embarrassed a bit when the villagers informed him that an estimated 300,000 tsubo of land had been set on fire by the bombs dropped during the practice of May 14th. To their demand to be told what compensation he intended to provide for the damage done, the major could muster only a non-committal "I don't know." Continuing their inquisition, the farmers reminded him that their land had been requisitioned, the houses "burnt", and 13 families "compelled to live in unsanitary tents" such as those pitched nearby. What did he, "as a human being", feel, they asked him, when he saw their wretched situation? Avoiding a direct answer, Major Sharp stated simply that he wanted to build houses for them as early as possible.

One of the native landowners--the record does not identify him

further, but the tone of his language is that of our nimble friend, Ahagon--thereupon mounted his figurative soapbox to proclaim that "Though the military insists that land is necessary, it is far more necessary for us than for the military. The United States is a great country, and yet she is letting us die without giving any help. What in the world is her intention?" Again, the harassed Land Control Officer had no ready answer to this rhetorical question. However, he warned that it would behoove the displaced families to accept substitute land and build their homes as quickly as possible, as the Air Force intended to withdraw the tents and materials it had flown in, unless the houses were rebuilt by the time the farm areas were cleared by the 808th EAB--a task expected to take about 30 days. The landowners retorted that it was obvious on the basis of previous surveys that there actually was no substitute land. To this the major replied that there were several places to which they could move if only they would do so; but the obstinate farmers countered that even if such land did exist, they would first have to receive the written consent of the owners to their cultivating it. This Major Sharp had no intention of doing, even if it had been possible to bring the landlords around to give their consent, since the right of the military to dispose of leased land as it saw fit was at the very foundation of United States Forces' policy in the Ryukyus. It was, then, on this note of disagreement that the meeting came to an end.[191]

The next we hear from Ie Shima is on 23 May, when 28 men and women from Maja-Ku, led by Shoko Ahagon, appeared in the offices of GRI to appeal to Deputy Chief Executive Tatsubin Yogi, who was acting as head

of the government in the absence of Shuhei Higa, then enroute to Washington, D.C., as a member of the Land Delegation. As might have been predicted, the visitors urged that the fence be removed, so that they could cultivate the land within freely, then one of the party suddenly whipped out a .22-calibre petition and emptied its contents in the general direction of the unsuspecting Yogi. One of the most remarkable things about the Ie Shimans was their ability to produce a petition from their pockets at any given moment with a lightning ease that would have made Wild Bill Hickok jealous. The profligacy with which the good citizens of Maja-Ku scattered petitions around the landscape indicates that though they may have been lacking in land, food, medicine, and good sense, they were certainly suffering from no paucity of paper or time.

As though the Deputy Chief Executive did not already have reason enough to feel bad when he saw the petition pressed into his hand, one woman in the party cried tearfully that if their houses were not rebuilt immediately, the evacuees would undergo the greatest misery, since the rainy season was just starting. One of the loudest laments of the Maja-Ku crew was that they had been prevented for more than two months from visiting their ancestral tombs, as they were wont to do, in consequence of their being enclosed by the bombing range fence. The delegation admitted that the people had been slipping into the bombing range and cultivating their plots "amidst the bullets", in order to eke out a living. This surreptitious procedure was necessary, they maintained, since they were permitted to farm only on rainy days when firing practice was impossible, instead of every Saturday afternoon and all day

Sunday, as promised by the Air Force. As a result, they had come to the sad pass of existing only on sweet potato refuse left over from the previous year, a situation making it impossible for them to provide the children going to school adequate food.

Waxing "Ahagon-ish", the representatives demanded that "high government officials" make an on-the-spot inspection of the situation, "instead of clinging to a desk." Up to now they had relied on the Chief Executive to solve their difficulties, but henceforth, they vowed, they would "rely on anyone who extends us a helping hand as if he were God." Since the problem had finally reached a point where it was beyond solution by the residents of Maja-Ku alone, they averred that they would "follow anyone who extends us assistance." This implied threat that the assistance of the Japanese Government or that even Communist succor would be welcomed was to be passed on to the military. The aforementioned petition of which Deputy Chief Executive Yogi found himself the unwilling recipient read as follows:[192]

> With the suspension of livelihood expenses since May, there is no alternative but to die if the situation remains as is, and we are obliged to continue farming our land within the fenced-in area as the last resort. Concerning this, we appealed in the petition submitted on April 22, asking that it be acknowledged that we are not guilty of farming in the area. Despite this, the firing practice by the Air Force is being continued. Farms and forests are undergoing great damages due to the continuation of practices. Moreover, bombs have also dropped outside the fenced-in area, and our lives have been exposed to danger.
>
> In order to protect our right to live under such a circumstance, we request that consideration be made on the following points: (1) We request that our land which was taken away without our consent be returned immediately to us, and that the fence built around our land be removed immediately; (2) we request that our houses, pens for domestic animals as well as water tanks which were burnt without our consent, be rebuilt at the original place; (3) we request that monetary compensation be made for damages made by bombs; and (4) we request that practice using real bombs be

suspended to protect human life.

Having conferred with Mr. Yogi and fired their petition, the 28 Majans stalked out of his office and proceeded to sit down in front of the Executive Building, vowing to remain there in sedentary protest until the bombing range was removed from their land. As indicated in their petition, the compensation payment of ¥21 per day had been cut off at the end of April--likewise the allowance for medical expenses--thereby working quite a hardship. Even so, the landowners were so determined to win their point by wearing down the resistance of the military that it was rumored they were selling their cattle and even borrowing money to pay the expenses involved in sitting down in passive defiance for week after week, if that became necessary. They also gave some thought to starting a fund-raising campaign in the streets of Naha as a last resort. Certain ones were wise enough, however, to realize that this maneuver would only end in disaster if the permission of the police authorities were not first obtained--and that it was unlikely that it would be given, since the sit-down strike was basically anti-GRI.[193]

In view of the allegations made by the Maja delegation, it is interesting to compare the box score compiled by the Air Force apropos of farming with the information presented by the natives. According to Mr. Cox, the farmers had had access to their farms within the range a total of 46 out of the 61 days elapsing from the opening of the bombing range on 18 March to 17 May 1955. Admittedly, construction work had also been performed within the range by the 808th EAB during this period, but he denied that it had interfered with the farmers' access to

the area.[194]

The greater part of the Maja-Ku petitioners returned to Ie Shima on 28 May, having been evicted from the Executive Building by the police four days earlier, but a few of the more obstinate set up camp in the vacant lot in front of the Executive Building with the announced intention of remaining there until they won their case. On May 30th they were reinforced by two women and two young men, who brought the following letter from the Maja Villagers to encourage the would-be martyrs:[195]

> All the villagers learned through information received on May 29th that you are still awaiting an answer in the rain, in order to survive, even though you were driven away by the cold-hearted police, and we are very grateful to you. The villagers were also enraged at the irresponsibility and cold-heartedness of the Government and the police, and we decided at the regular meeting held on May 28th to forcibly continue cultivation, in view of this inhuman conduct. The foolish fellows /Air Force pilots/ even conduct training on Sundays, but we are continuing with our cultivation.
>
> Due to the long spell of wet weather, the interior of our tents is like a pond, and the children keep on crying. We are experiencing more hardship than we had experienced during World War II, but we believe that the time will come when Heaven will recognize our sincerity without fail, and the military, being human beings, will understand our stand some day. Therefore, we hope you will persevere and not return to the village until you achieve your aim, no matter how long it takes. Please take good care of yourselves.

Deputy Chief Executive Yogi and Speaker Kunihiro Ohama of the Legislature, spurred to action by the pressure of public opinion, met with Civil Administrator Johnson on 31 May to convey the chief grievances of the Ie Shiman evacuees, which were as follows: (1) Because of GRI's suspension of payments for livelihood expenses as of 30 April, they were hard up for food; (2) The 13 families were leading a hard life in the tents loaned to them, inasmuch as their houses had not yet

been constructed; and (3) If the military discontinued the payment of livelihood expenses and gave no assistance for constructing the houses, it should release the requisitioned land immediately and permit them to engage in farming.

Brigadier General Johnson answered that if USCAR could be assured that the inhabitants had selected a housing lot and completed their preparation for construction, it might consider furnishing additional construction materials and other assistance. In that event, however, the specific help to be given the various families would be decided by USCAR and GRI only after an investigation of each case. Also, if the people began cultivation in the 6,000 tsubo of village-owned land which had been proposed as substitute land or in other arable land allocated by the Air Force from that which it had under lease, the military might consider giving additional assistance. An investigation of the families' need for help should be conducted jointly by officials of USCAR and GRI once a month with the cooperation of the Mayor of Ie Son, but, unless their opinions proved to be in accord, no assistance should be given. Finally, any aid furnished under the Livelihood Protection Law should be given to those who, upon thorough investigation, were found to be eligible for its provisions.[196]

The same day that General Johnson held this conference with the two GRI officials, USCAR dispatched the following reply to the Maja delegation's petition of 23 May:[197]

> It is impossible to return the requisitioned land, remove the fence, restore the buildings, and suspend the firing practice, and we reject such requests. The request for compensation for damages caused by firing practice can be settled in the same way as other requests for compensation. The Deputy Governor is of the

opinion that instead of making persistent petitions, if they had helped construct the houses for the 13 families with construction materials given by the United States, it might have produced satisfactory results, not only for themselves, but for other persons concerned, and that they should have cooperated with the village mayor in selecting a substitute land proposed by the military.

Although most of the editorials appearing in the three Japanese-language Naha newspapers commiserated with the Ie Shimans in their sad fate and deplored the manner in which they were being treated by both the military and GRI, the Ryukyu Shimpo suggested that the landowners would be well advised "to try to act in concert with the military's fundamental line." In so doing, it would "not mean subjecting themselves to unreasonable oppression forever," since the land delegation had been sent to Washington expressly to obtain justice for the people of the Ryukyus. The editor feared that if the Ie Shimans--and the Okinawans themselves, for that matter--did not cease their interminable opposition to the acquisition of land, the military might eventually lose patience and tragedy result. No matter how much the farmers might clamor for the return of their land, it was not likely that the United States Forces would ever seriously consider it in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the landowners should abandon all further attempts to have their situation ameliorated. The main thing was to make no unreasonable requests, but, instead, to concentrate on points which the military should find no inconsistency in granting.[198]

Commenting on the continued sit-down demonstration of the Maja landowner representatives in their jerry-built hut adjacent to the Executive Building, the "Daigen Shogen" column of the Okinawa Times suggested

that they would be wise to go home and do what they could to improve their "wretched living conditions" instead of wasting their time in Naha. One man should be sufficient to handle the task of prodding GRI to take measures for the settlement of their problems. The writer noted that students of the University of the Ryukyus at Shuri were reported to have held a meeting on June 6th to raise funds for the relief of the Ie Shimans. While granting that it was always a good thing to extend a helping hand to those in need, the columnist felt that the government, by its procrastination in making an on-the-spot investigation of conditions in Maja-Ku, had been forestalled in its duty by the students and had ignored a moral obligation. Judging from the existing state of affairs, the popular clamor for relief of the evacuees would gain force, just as the demands of the landowner representatives would increase with each succeeding petition. Thus, the situation could snowball until it became almost impossible of settlement. The government's delay in this business, asserted "Daigen Shogen", should be investigated.[199]

As though the 313th Air Division was not having enough trouble with the recalcitrant Ie Shimans themselves at this time, it unexpectedly found itself under attack from another direction. An unidentified person who had recently returned to the United States from the Far East--evidently a New Yorker--wrote Senator Herbert H. Lehman of that state a letter complaining of the ruthlessness with which the Air Force had removed the natives from an inhabited island "without notice that they were to leave, without compensation for their property, without arrangement for temporary relief, and without arrangements for resettlement."

According to the senator's informant, the people had simply been "deposited on nearby islands with confusion and suffering resulting." In addition, he alleged that although many uninhabited islands were available for the bombing range which the Air Force needed in the Ryukyus, a heavily populated island had been chosen, presumably because its proximity to headquarters made observation of bombing results easier. Lehman forwarded the substance of these charges to Headquarters, USAF, with a request for explanation. USAF relayed the matter to FEAF, with this headquarters made an information addressee. The TWX asked that FEAF forward any information it might have which USAF could use as the basis for a reply to Senator Lehman, including the length of notice given the natives and the "final resettlement accomplishments."[200]

Without waiting for FEAF to notify Fifth Air Force and Fifth to relay the request for information down channels to the 313th Air Division, this headquarters (which is to say Mr. Clyde R. Cox, to give credit where credit is due) began preparing a reply immediately upon receiving the USAF message, and sent it forward the following day. Answering the allegation that an inhabited island had been selected for the bombing range merely because it was convenient for desk-bound personnel, the TWX stated that Ie Shima had been chosen only after "extensive investigations" disclosed that no other island or area met the requirements. It then pointed out that the Twentieth Air Force had first tried to get by with a target circle of only 3,000-foot radius, in order to use as little land as possible; but, when this proved too small to ensure safety for the natives just outside its circumference, negotiations were begun with the mayor on 5 October 1954 to remove and resettle the inhabitants from an area with a 5,000-foot radius. Eventually, the Air

Force had committed itself to carry out the following conditions requested by the mayor: (1) To assist in the removal of dwellings; (2) To provide building materials to reconstruct dwellings; (3) To provide substitute Air Force-leased land for dwellings and farming; (4) To clear new farm areas for cultivation; and (5) To permit farming within the range one day a week for 10 months.

The message went on to tell how negotiations had continued until 25 February 1955 without any weakening on the part of the natives, who still refused to move. Having obtained the approval of the Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, the military had then removed the inhabitants, fenced the range at 5,000-foot radius, and re-opened it on 18 March. Even though the natives had not fulfilled their part of the agreement by voluntarily evacuating the land, the Air Force met all the commitments it had agreed to under the mayor's plan, and also furnished 13 squad tents for temporary quarters for the 13 displaced families. The native owners were paid $6,090 for their dwellings and the improvements which had been removed, besides being permitted to retain all the salvage material therefrom. In spite of all this, the Ie Shimans still refused to reconstruct their dwellings or cultivate new farm areas provided. On this last score, the best that could be said was that the 313th Air Division, USCAR, and GRI were continuing their efforts to bring about the resettlement at the very moment the radiogram was being dispatched.[201]

As a time when little glory was attaching itself to anyone having any connection with the Ie Shima Bombing Range unpleasantness, this headquarters received a message of appreciation from the Commander, Far

East Air Forces, for the initiative it had displayed in supplying prompt answers to the queries posed by USAF, even though the 313th Air Division was only an information addressee. This action had "enabled FEAF to meet the USAF suspense with no difficulty and provided the majority of the answers posed in the USAF message. . ."[202]

It would seem that practically every member of GRI Executive Branch wanted to see for himself exactly what the situation was on Ie Shima; for, on 5 June, 18 officials, representing the Agriculture, Public Welfare, and Construction Works Sections, embarked on a boat for that embattled island, bent on investigating and reporting on the various claims and petitions submitted by the Maja Sub-Villagers to USCAR and GRI. The chief purpose of the survey was the collection of accurate data which could later be used as a basis on which to make a budgetary appropriation for compensation of the damages sustained by the landowners.

The following morning, 6 June, the investigating party paid a visit to the Son office and made preliminary arrangements with the local officials for their proposed survey. Lacking transportation of any sort, they were probably pleasantly surprised when they were joined by Major Dallas W. Sharp, the USCAR Land Control Officer, whose ostensible purpose in coming was to make still another attempt at persuading the 13 families to rebuild their homes in Maja-Ku. Nevertheless, although there is no direct evidence to the contrary, it is hard to down the suspicion that coincidence was not the only element at work in bringing the major to Ie Shima on the same day that the GRI officials made their appearance. Having a greater bearing on his

arrival, more than likely, was his desire to keep a watchful eye on the visiting bureaucrats, observing what manner of tales were poured into their sympathetic ears by the local populace.

Be that as it may, at 1300 hours that afternoon, the combined parties boarded one of the two 3/4-ton trucks assigned jointly to the Range Officer and the Air Police detail who guarded the fence against incursions and drove to the bombing range, only to find upon their arrival that fighter-bombers were making runs on the target at that very time. Returning to the range at 1700 hours, bombing practice having ended in the interim, they found that the 808th EAB had cleared a portion of the substitute area allocated by this command, including the Son land located between the fence and the active airstrip. The rainy weather of recent weeks, however, had prevented the lone bulldozer and rooter not withdrawn from Ie Shima from accomplishing as much as Major Sharp hoped for.

The GRI representatives, whose formal survey was scheduled to consume five days, immediately began collecting data pertaining to their respective specialties. Those connected with the Agriculture Section of the Economics Department were interested in learning the extent of damages suffered by crops on both sides of the fence, the land holdings of each family, the crops (mostly sweet potatoes) harvested during May, and other information of similar nature. The personnel from the Construction Works Section of the Public Services Department turned their attention to the building materials which the Air Force had flown in and to the materials salvaged from the dismantled houses. This done, they sought to ascertain if the 13 evacuated families had any intention of rebuilding

their homes at an early date. If questioning revealed that some possessed such a desire, the Construction Works officials were prepared to get work on them underway immediately. For their part, the representatives of the Public Welfare Section directed their energies toward surveying the food supply situation of each of the 13 families then living in tents.[203]

As the investigators went about their work, the Maja villagers watched them with "mingled expressions of hopeful expectation and apprehension", uncertain exactly what the purpose of the study might be. When the truck drove pas them, they hoisted banners and called out, "Go on foot and make a thorough inspection." It would seem from this that the people had heard rumors of investigators who whizzed by in sleek limousines, then proceeded to write "authoritative" reports of conditions and recommend steps to be taken on the strength of this whirlwind observation.

An inspection of the sacks of cement donated by this command disclosed that they had turned hard and were probably ruined beyond usefulness. One the positive side, Major Sharp learned that one of the 13 families--that of a Mr. Nakada, consisting of six members--was in the process of moving to a location outisde the Air Force land, where he had purchased a small plot of ground. The 3/4-ton trucks had been used to transport some of his building material, but, unfortunately, they were not large enough to carry the bulkier items. Nakada applied for compensation in the amount of ¥70,000 ($583.33), but the Resettlement Compensation Board headed by Army Lieutenant Colonel Page H. Brownfield reduced this figure to ¥18,919 ($157.65), quite a smaller sum. Even after this break in the solid wall of resistance had occurred, the other 12 families adamantly refused to rebuild their houses, claiming that they needed

financial assistance before they could consider it seriously. Without consulting the Civil Administrator, GRI agreed to give such financial aid; however, when he subsequently learned of the promise, as he was bound to do, General Johnson refused to sanction any such arrangement until he had evidence that the people concerned were themselves taking action to reconstruct their homes.

Returning to the Son office upon completion of the inspection, Major Sharp called the GRI officials together and enumerated several conclusions he had come to as a result of the afternoon's inspection. One was that there were some 6,000 tsubo of village-owned land suitable for cultivation. Secondly, the materials supplied by the Air Force could still be used, although the weather was taking its toll. Thirdly, the Majans were actually cultivating land within the fence, notwithstanding their constant clamoring that frequent bombing and bulldozing activity made farming next to impossible within the bombing range. Finally, the burnt-out area resulting from the practice bombing more nearly approximated 8,000 tsubo in size than the 300,000 tsubo which the natives had reported, and the extensive damage to the crops alleged to have resulted from the bulldozer's operation was actually very slight, consisting only of that caused by the blade in drawing the target circles.

To the major's query of what the 18 investigators thought of the points he had just made, they made answer that while there might admittedly be some land fit for cultivation, it was too small in area to be acceptable as substitute land. With respect to the lumber furnished by the Air Force, any evidence of termite damage was undetectable, they had to admit, but they "hoped to determine the degree of utilization at the

next inspection." (This more than likely meant that once the major had taken his departure and was thus effectively debarred from contradicting their findings, they could safely report that the wood was honeycombed with termited!) There was also no denying, as he said, that the farmers had been cultivating the land within the fence, albeit after 1700 hours each day, but that was all right. As for the extent of the burnt area, they conceded that it was "in all probability . . . less than 300,000 tsubo", but they were careful not to agree that it might more closely approximate 8,000 tsubo! In any event, they said, a definite statement could not be made until after their inspection was completed.[204]

When the air police detachment on Ie Shima made their routine check of the bombing range at 0830 hours on 13 June before opening it for bombing operations, they found 55 natives camped on the bull's-eye of the target. Although the participants were afterwards to claim that they were merely "taking a rest while farming," the air police saw it as a sit-down stroke both well-planned and organized. Confirming them in this belief was the prominence of several banners covered with written protests and demands. In addition, though less conclusive, the Ie Shimans had brought their lunches and teapots and were obviously prepared to spend the day there for one reason or another. Of course, they might have done the same thing if they were planning to farm their plots of ground all day.

Notified of the situation by the NCOIC of the air police detachment, Major Lloyd H. Hansen, the Kadena Provost Marshal, caught a plane for Ie Shima, arriving at 1030. Accompanied by Haruo Tamashiro of the Military Land Section, Ie Son Office, the Provost Marshal proceeded to the range

and warned the natives that they must vacate it by noon or be arrested and removed by force. When the deadline established by the major's ultimatum came and went without any sign of compliance on the part of the Ie Shimans, the Provost Marshal waited a while longer, then, at 1330, ordered 15 American air police and five Okinawan security guards employed by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing to surround the group and escort them from the bombing range. At first, Major Hansen asked the natives to leave the area voluntarily, but they merely pointed their fingers to the white banners they were carrying without saying a word and made no movement to leave. The Provost Marshal then asked them to get into the truck and to hold up their sickles and hoes in front of them as an indication of compliance. When this, too, failed to produce results, the air police lowered their gun barrels to firing level and forced the sullen strikers to climb into the two trucks nearby. A total of 40 men and boys and 15 women were transported temporarily to a quonset, where they were held under guard. The men were then searched and held in the building until aircraft arrived to take them to Okinawa. All of the women and some of the older men and young boys were later released, after being cautioned not to return to the bombing range at any time they saw a red flag flying.

The remaining 32 farmers, including leaders of the protest group, were flown in two C-47's to Kadena AB, where they were met by other air policemen, who conducted them to the Koza Police Station. Upon their arrival, it was discovered that the detention rooms of the station were already jammed; so it was necessary to lock them up in the fencing gymnasium of the police station as a temporary measure, after which they were

provided with supper and bedding.[205]

The following day, June 14th, the 32 prisoners were hailed before Judge (Major) Eliot O. Chaudoin, presiding over the military summary court at Koza, for trial on the charge of trespassing. After questioning three American witnesses summoned from Ie Shima, Judge Chaudoin examined the facts concerning each defendant in turn. Thanks to the difficulties created by the difference in languages, the inquiry did not progress very smoothly, but, even so, before the day was out, the judge had found all 32 men guilty of trespassing, in direct violation of Civil Administration Ordinance #144. After sentencing each individual to three months' imprisonment at hard labor, Chaudoin suspended the sentences for one year, pending their future good behavior. However, he added in unequivocal language, if any of the defendants violated his parole, he would be brought back before the court and his suspended sentence would be vacated, besides which, the three months' sentence already imposed would be increased by an additional six months for the second offense.[206]

This mixing of justice with mercy did not receive the wholehearted approbation of legal authorities of the 313th Air Division, even if it did fulfill the desires expressed by the Civil Administrator. The former felt that the sentence was too light to have the restraining influenced hoped for from it. Although the sentence did conform with one paragraph of CA Ordinance No. 144, providing various punishments for the offense of trespass, other sections of the same ordinance prescribed much severer sentences which could be dealt out to those who might be proved to be the leaders or instigators of the disturbance.

Conviction for committing "any act calculated to cause a public disturbance or to lead to acts of violence" could result in a fine of not more than ¥10,000 ($83.33) of imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. The legal officers of this headquarters hoped that an investigation would be made, aimed at exposing the instigators of the sit-down strike and bringing them to trial on charges "more stringent than that of simple trespass."

Still another paragraph of CA Ordinance No. 144 could be used as an excellent snare for capturing such vicarious offenders as Shoko Ahagon. This particular one provided that "Any person who conspires to do any act constituting an offense under any law of the Civil Administration, or who advises, assists in, or procures the commission of any such act, shall be punished as if he had committed the offense." Although it was not actually known that Ahagon was behind the recent disturbance, it was impossible to believe that the apostle of discord had no hand in it, and that if he were put behind bars, things would not go more smoothly on the little island west of Motobu.[207]

On the evening of the 32 passive resisters' release from durance vile, the GRI Legislature summoned them to Naha to hear their different stories. Among the indignities which the recent prisoners described for the benefit of the keenly sympathetic audience were a strict search of each individual, confiscation of all belongings found on their persons, and intensive interrogation of any who happened to have in their possession small pieces of paper containing writing. Most sadistic of all, the prisoners had not been allowed to smoke. Then, when they had been herded into the vehicles for transportation to the airfield, those "who

showed an attitude of disobedience were kicked or beaten with the butt of a rifle."* Sensing, evidently, that the legislators would not look askance at any barbs shot in the general direction of the Executive Branch, the probationers cried that they had been deprived of their land by coercion and without any compensation for their lost livelihood. Finding themselves with "no food to eat, nor any house to live in," they had tilled their land within the fence as the only alternative to starvation. "This," they declared, was "all because the Executive Branch has not taken any measure for our livelihood." Even after this heart-rending appeal, the legislators were unable to agree on a proper course of action, and the messy business ended by being turned over to the Special Committee for Military Requisitioned Land.[208]

Seeing the problem thus tossed into its lap to do with as seemed best, the Special Committee for Military Requisitioned Land took the only course that Ryukyuans so situated appeared to know: they drew up a petition. (Luckily for the peace of mind of the United States Force, Okinawans did not possess the penchant for reprisals and violence which Cypriots, Algerians, Indonesians, or Moroccans similarly circumstanced would have exhibited. As a matter of fact, an American walking alone at night down a dark street in Okinawa was in less danger of harm from a

*When the 32 farmers described such cases of wanton brutality during their trials before Judge Chaudoin, the air police witnesses testified in rebuttal that the stories were wholly without foundation--utterly untrue. Nevertheless, until Major Lloyd H. Hansen, the Kadena Provost Marshal, called the attention of the Japanese language newspapers in Naha to their failure to report the AP witnesses' repudiation of the stories, not a single one of them saw fit to print the military's side of the matter. Only then (probably under considerable pressure from the irate provost marshal) did the Okinawa Shimbun run an editorial entitled "What Is the Truth?"

native than would have been true in most cities in his own country. As sneak thieves, your Ryukyuans did not have to yield first place to any people, but rare indeed was the case of an American's being set upon by one of the indigenes). Adopted by the Legislature with only one dissenting vote--that of OPP Legislator Kisaburo Owan--the petition requested Deputy Governor James E. Moore to review the sentences of the 32 convicted Ie Shimans read as follows:[209]

> It is indeed a regrettable fact that 32 Maja villagers of Ie Son were indicted in the Koza District Civil Administration Summary Court on June 14 on the charge of entry into an off-limits area, found guilty, and sentenced to three-months imprisonment with hard labor and one-year stay of execution.
>
> Thinking back the cause of this case, as a result of the fact that the Maja villagers were forced to evacuate from their land, they lost their arable land which was the only means of making a living; moreover, the livelihood compensation which was being given them was discontinued. It is considered, therefore, that they took such action as to enter the off-limits area and engage in cultivation, driven by the pressing need of maintaining their lives.
>
> Their sorrow and desperation are beyond the imagination of the people under normal condition, and their mentality is beyond normal judgment. In consideration of their depressed feeling brought about by distress, and the action taken in accordance with their instinct to subsist at the time they entered the off-limits area, we petition that they be acquitted of the penalty according to the right of review held by the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands.

In the wake of the sit-down strike of 13 June, this headquarters laid down two new rules designed to prevent a recurrence of the trouble. The first provided that only natives still having crops in the area needing to be harvested would be given a pass upon the recommendation of the mayor of Ie Son and admitted inside the bombing range. The second established limited hours of access to the range farms and directed that they be closely adhered to in the future.[210]

Despite the object lesson which the Air Force had sought to give

the Maja farmers by arresting them and transporting them to Kadena for trial at considerable expenditure of energy, it would seem that some, at least, of the group were not only impenitent, but were even encouraged by the lightness of their sentences to become more bold. On the evening of 15 June, shortly after returning to Ie Shima, two of the late prisoners approached the air police at the air strip and told them "to inform the United States of America" that the Air Force would no longer be allowed to use the bombing range, and, if it did, "there would be trouble."[211]

Although this threat could probably be shrugged off as sheer bombast by young men whose sullen feelings could find no better channel for release, officials of this command acted on the theory that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." The very next day, 16 June, Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Wade, the 313th Provost Marshal, and Major Ralph R. Bayer, Commander of OSI District Office #3, called on Lieutenant Colonel Woodrow W. Morse, Rycom G-2, and told him of the vague threats which the air police on Ie Shima had received. Having briefed him in this wise, the two Air Force officers expressed their hope that Rycom would be prepared to offer assistance in case the situation "snowballed". Inasmuch as bad weather often made flying extremely hazardous, they wanted assurance that the Army would make sufficient shipping available on short notice to transport to Ie Shima the number of troops necessary for quelling any outbreak. After Colonel Morse had consulted with his headquarters' G-3, he reported that the Rycom alert company could be placed at the disposal of the Air Force any time the situation demanded it, and Army tugs would be made available for their

dispatch to the scene of the trouble. He then told the two 313th Air Division officers something of which they were evidently unaware, but which did not particularly surprise them, in view of past experience. This intelligence was that at the time the 32 farmers were released from confinement on 14 June, prominent members of the Okinawa People's Party had contacted them, urging them to continue the fight upon their return to Ie Shima by cutting the fence, refusing to farm the substitute land, declining to rebuild the dismantled houses, and any other action which would embarrass the military authorities.

Even before the provost marshal and the CSI chief visited Rycom G-2, they already knew that Mayor Oshiro had received a letter from Saichi Kaneshi, one of the leaders of the Socialist Masses' Party, and Kisaburo Owan, the lone surviving representative of the Okinawa People's Party in the Legislature, advising that the two politicians planned to sponsor a rally on Ie Shima around June 17th. One result of Lieutenant Colonel Wade's and Major Bayer's discussion with Colonel Morse was an order by Brigadier General Johnson that the proposed rally be abandoned. Refractory as were the Messrs. Owan and Kaneshi in matters pertaining to USCAR and the military occupation of Okinawa, they were sufficiently realistic not to risk joining their beau ideal, Kamejiro Senaga, behind bars by outright defiance of the Civil Administrator. After this, we hear no more of a rally on Ie Shima sponsored by either of these gentlemen.[212]

On 21 June the Civil Administrator gave Speaker Ohama his reply to the Legislature's resolution of the 15th which had asked that the 32 Ie Shiman landowners convicted of trespassing be acquitted. After

explaining that all cases tried before United States Civil Administration courts properly came before him for review, in the normal order of business, General Johnson rejected their plea and announced that he approved the sentences as originally assigned. (If he had done anything else, it would have been passing strange, since we know that Judge Chaudoin's verdicts and sentences were generally sketched out for him beforehand by the Civil Administrator). Even if this had not been the case, there was no denying that the farmers had really had no valid excuse for being inside the fence on the day in question. It had been made clear to one and all that the evacuees could farm the bombing range land every day from 1700 to 0800 the following morning, as well as all day Sunday and after 1200 on Saturdays, unless specifically advised to the contrary. As a matter of fact, the natives had legally conducted farming on 47 of the 60 days which had elapsed since the original notice was given that firing exercises would be conducted periodically. But, be that as it might, the individuals in question had been warned by the provost marshal to leave the area on this particular day, and, when they paid no heed to his order, he had no alternative but to arrest and prosecute them.[213]

As a result of their protracted refusal to cooperate with the Air Force, Major General Fay R. Upthegrove, the 313th Air Division's Commander, had lost almost all patience with the people of Maja-Ku. Under the circumstances, the measure which he directed the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing Commander to take at this juncture must be regarded as remarkably restrained. After reviewing all the attempts the military had made to treat the displaced farmers as kindly as possible, Upthegrove

cited the need for positive steps to prevent a recurrence of the recent unlawful trespassing on the bombing range. He desired, therefore, that all but two gates in the fence surrounding the range be closed, and that guards be stationed at these two gates to control access to the area. Also, signs were to be posted at all gates, indicating which ones were to be used, and stating that access would be permitted only to those persons having passes for entry.

The general further directed that passes were to be issued only to those persons entitled by reason of previous cultivation or tenancy of land therein to enter the range to engage in farming. These individuals were to be designated in writing on a list certified by the mayor of Ie Son. Finally, all persons entering or found within the range without a pass were to be arrested and turned over to the civil police for prosecution.[214]

EMIGRATION: A SOLUTION TO THE LAND PROBLEM

Emigration Prior to World War II and Afterwards.

At a time when the requisitioning of land on Okinawa and the high birth rate abetted by a low mortality rate were increasing congestion on the 67-mile-long island every day, the Okinawa Times in its issue of 12 November 1954 carried a brief review of emigration from the Ryukyus beginning more than 50 years before. Just as emigration had proved to be the salvation of the over-populated islands in years gone by, it appeared to be the most effective safety valve in the year 1954 for the increasing numbers of people who found that there simply remained too little land from which they could scratch out a living. The

overpopulation of Okinawa was, so to speak, "a predestination which has given much trouble to the Okinawan statesmen ever since ancient times," because of the island's small size, its scanty natural resources, and its abnormally high birth rate.

"While desertion of one's own country might be considered unpraiseworthy," admitted the Times, "the grim reality of Okinawa does not permit any sentimental nostalgia about one's homeland." If historical precedent were needed to encourage the wavering, they should remember that "our forebears, fully convinced that life confined to this small island did not offer much, set out on an ocean cruise and traded in far-off countries in many parts of Asia, and established their name of "Ocean People". Moreover, as they had come in contact with the foreign cultures of other countries to which their ships had taken them, they had assimilated them and gradually established "a variegated culture peculiar to the Ryukyus." In time, years and years of experience in foreign trade had expanded their outlook on life until they "came to regard the whole world as their own country."

The editorial writer urged the Ryukyuans of the present day to take a lesson from the history of their ancestors' overseas activity and work out a constructive emigration policy which would give that "great work" a rebirth. Emigration in those long ago days was carried out by the Government of the Kingdom of the Ryukyus. After the establishment of the Japanese Prefectural Government, however, the officials and politicians had all forgotten the vital importance of a sound emigration policy, and had left the matter in the hands of emigration companies, who, naturally, had just one aim: profit. Because of this selfishness

of purpose, they had sent out anyone who was able to pay the expense, regardless of his fitness-and by so doing, they "had sown the seed of trouble which eventually developed into an anti-Okinawan emigrant movement abroad."

The occasion bringing the subject of emigration to mind was the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the Ryukyu Overseas Association by Mr. Shinsuke Taira of Nakijin Son (in the northern part of the Motobu Peninsula of Okinawa), on 13 November 1924, with the idea of developing and promoting the welfare of Okinawa. After being interrupted by World War II, the work of the organization had been resumed in 1948 with the old slogan, "Emigration first for rehabilitation and reconstruction of our native land," being dusted off and re-adopted.

Immigration to Hawaii from the Ryukyus began on 5 December 1899 (the 32d year of the Mekji Era), when 27 people from Kin Son, led by Matasuke Toyama, set sail from Naha under a government contract to work in the sugar plantations, and arrived in Hawaii on 8 January 1900. In 1903 a total of 941 Ryukyuans went abroad, 307 going to Hawaii (among them a group of 45, also from Kin Son, led by Kyuzo Toyama, brother of the pioneer leader, who left Okinawa to escape the opposition of the Japanese), 51 to the Unites States, 223 to Mexico, and 360 to the Philippines. During the years that followed, many more Okinawans went to Hawaii, and when the New Immigration Act of the United States was placed in effect, their numbers had grown to some 20,000. As the Okinawa Times writer reviewed the situation in 1954, there were an estimated 30,000 Ryukyuans settled in the Hawaiian Islands.

Meantime, by 1907, more than 10,200 Ryukyuans had gone aboard to

settle in places as distant and varied as New Caledonia and Peru, causing Tokyo to pass laws effective in Okinawa which were designed to protect their interests as Japanese subjects. In 1938, there were some 69,000 Okinawans abroad in sundry countries of the world--a figure equivalent to 12 per cent of Okinawa Prefecture's population of 580,000 people.

Although immigration of Orientals to the United States was prohibited for a number of years, by 1954 some 2,500 had emigrated from the Ryukyus to America in the wake of the original 51 colonists. Some of these immigrants went on to achieve prominence among the Japanese communities in the United States. The first immigration to Canada took place in 1907, but very few Ryukyuans followed in their wake; so that 1954 found only some 300 of them making that huge country their home while engaging in agriculture, in most cases. In 1904 the first Okinawans embarked for Mexico as colonists, and the tide of migration continued into the early years of the Showa Era--which began in 1926. In more recent years, however, very few people had gone to the land of the Montezumas. Some Ryukyuans were known to have immigrated to Cuba as agricultural workers during the Taisho Era, from 1912 to 1926, but the Okinawa Times had no further information concerning them.[215]

The first emigration from Okinawa to Peru took place in 1906, to be followed by a wave of would-be settlers in the years that followed. As was the case with all countries of the Western Hemisphere, the tide of Japanese immigration to Peru and Bolivia was cut off completely during World War II, and it was not until 1952 that the latter re-opened its doors to colonists from Nippon. Unfortunately for everyone concerned,

certain Japanese individuals smuggled themselves into Peru on the pretext of immigrating to Bolivia. When the deception was discovered shortly afterward, feeling ran so high in Peru that further entry of Orientals was expressly forbidden, as of April 1952. From that time until November 1954, no more Japanese or Ryukyuans were permitted to immigrate to Peru. In the latter month, however, an Okinawan who had resided in Lima for many years, operating a travel agency, made a personal appeal to the President of Peru to have his mother admitted to that country as an immigrant. As a result, not only was his own request granted, but permission was given for five other Okinawans to enter in June 1955. The Ryukyuan businessman who had thus broken the ice hoped that this would serve as an opening wedge by which immigration on a large scale might be resumed. In his opinion, honesty was the touchstone most likely to open the doors and keep them ajar. The illegal Japanese entrants had created a bad impression in Peru which could be erased only by demonstrated honesty of purpose on the part of the Ryukyuans. At the same time, he advised--in contradiction of his own recommended policy of probity--that a little subtle flattery would not be amiss, in the form of a congratulatory message from GRI to the Peruvian Government on the occasion of Peruvian Independence Day, which would be July 28th.[216]

Despite the abrupt halt in immigration to Peru caused by World War II, the former Ryukyuans and their descendants living in that country numbered some 10,000 by the year 1954, and could be found operating grocery stores, cafes, barber shops, and other business in Lima, as well as in other areas.

The first immigrants to Brazil, 355 in number, were sent out in 1908, and most of the succeeding years saw additional Ryukyuans taking passage for the same vast, undeveloped country, although there was one period during which immigration to Brazil was prohibited or severely restricted, because of the poor results obtained from the previous colonization attempts. By 1954 there were approximately 40,000 Ryukyuans-Brazilians, many of them prominent in business and politics, some 1,400 having immigrated to the land of the Amazon at the call of their families after World War II.

Formal emigration from Okinawa to Argentina did not begin until 1913, but many of the settlers originally sent to Brazil had already moved south across the border into Argentina, as a land of greater opportunity, more temperate climate, and fewer hardships. According to the best information, Okinawan immigrants constituted 70 per cent of all the Japanese settlers in Argentina, many of them being engaged in gardening or in operating laundry enterprises. During the years following the Second World War, as many as 1,400 to 1,500 Ryukyuans made the long voyage to Argentina at the call of their relatives. The first group to leave Naha Port for South America in 1955 consisted of 148 Ryukyuans bound for Argentina and Brazil. Forty-one of this number boarded the 14,000-ton Dutch Royal Inter-Ocean Line vessel Louis on 17 January, with Argentina as their destination, while the other 107 people were immigrants to Brazil. Included in the group were three brides-to-be and five women more than 70 years old--the eldest being 86 years of age.[217]

Colonization in Bolivia.

Although 70 per cent of the land in Bolivia was suitable for cultivation, only a third of the entire population lived in this region, because of the enervating humidity prevalent in the fertile lowlands and the greater employment opportunities on the plateau. Eighty per cent of the people, in fact, made their homes at an altitude of more than 10,000 feet. As a result of this trend, agriculture was pretty much neglected and mining emphasized, mineral products constituting over 90 per cent of Bolivia's exports, and tin alone accounting for some 70 per cent of the total. Of the world's supply of this indispensable metal, Bolivia produced 15 per cent. Thus, the greater part of the population found employment in the mining industry, and the magnates accumulated vast fortunes from the toil of the peons. However, this unbalanced emphasis on mining the soil rather than cultivating it meant that the country had to import a great part of its food supply from foreign countries, despite the fact that much of the land at the lower altitudes was quite fertile. Unfortunately, the natives--mostly Indians and mestizos--had long since demonstrated their aversion to tilling the soil in the hot, sultry atmosphere of the lowland regions of Bolivia. Clearly, then, if the nation with its area of 419,470 square miles was to utilize the unused portion of its land to help support its population of 3,019,000 persons, immigrants accustomed to toiling in the fields for long hours in rain or searing sunshine must be brought in. The farmers of Okinawa fitted this description exactly, and the similarity in climates of the two countries was remarkable if the comparison were confined to the

lowlands of Bolivia.*

In September 1951, Dr. James L. Tigner, a Stanford University professor on temporary assignment with the United States Government, arrived on Okinawa to investigate the associated problems of land, population, and emigration. After two weeks' intensive study, he flew to South America, where he toured various countries with an eye to discovering areas both suitable and willing to receive immigrants from the Ryukyu Islands. In October 1952, Dr. Tigner revisited Okinawa and worked out a general plan for emigration from the Ryukyus to Bolivia which both USCAR and GRI adopted in substance. In accordance with this plan, an Emigration Bank was established, and a subsidy of $160,000 to promote this movement was made available. Despite these careful preparations, it was not until the summer of 1954 that the untapped primeval reaches of Bolivia were utilized to funnel off a part of the excess population of Okinawa, though a few Ryukyuans had gone to Bolivia in the years preceding World War II, there forming the Uruma Immigrants' Association. These people, eager to see more of their countrymen enjoying the far greater opportunities that lay at hand in South America, wrote Chief Executive Shuhei Higa in November 1952 that no less a personage than the President of Bolivia had given his personal blessing to the immigration of Okinawans. More tangibly, the Ryukyuans would be granted land ownership and a loan to be repaid within 13 years.[218] On 19 June

*An Okinawan working for the United States Forces or for GRI could be the very epitome of laziness and inefficiency all too often--although this was not universally so, of course--and as clock-watchers (at the close of the day, not the beginning) they were worse than Americans. But find one working for himself as a farmer or wood-cutter, and you would see exemplified the meaning of the word "indefatigability".

1954, 269 Ryukyuans sailed from Naha Port to settle in the Uruma District of Bolivia, as the first group in a large-scale immigration movement sponsored by GRI and financed by the United States Government.

To make the settlers' path easier, a three-man advance party had flown ahead, surveying the proposed site, discussing anticipated problems with Bolivian officials, and learning as much as possible about the rates of monetary exchange, the price of land, and local wages after their arrival on 5 June. As an indication of the remoteness of the region where the Okinawans were to be settled, the advance party required eight days to travel from Santa Cruz City to Uruma, traversing a land often devoid of roads and bridges, and passing through a virgin forest which surrounded the area east of the Rio Grande, where the colonists were to make their homes.[219]

Reflecting on the significance of the embarkation of this first group of immigrants to Bolivia, the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun observed that "Their departure must be said to be a bright and historical one for the Ryukyus . . . . and the mission they shoulder must be said to be very great." This was true because of the direct relationship their success or failure would have to the dispatch of future emigrants from Okinawa. Not only the American and Bolivian Governments but also those of Argentina and Brazil would be watching these Okinawan pioneers very closely to see whether or not they proved to be good investments for the country which adopted them. The Asahi Shimbun took comfort from its knowledge that the present emigrants had been selected from among many applicants after rigid examinations and had received a certain amount

of preliminary training designed to equip them for the trials and toils which would undoubtedly face them in their new land. The editor hoped that no thoughtless persons with "get-rich-quick" notions had been included among the 269 Ryukyuans who boarded the SS Tjisadane, and that every individual would stick by his decision to leave Okinawa and make Bolivia his permanent home, cutting the old ties irrevocably. "Each emigrant must bear in mind that he should not be a failure for any reason," admonished the Asahi Shimbun, "as it would have a great effect on possible emigration to South America and various other countries." Because of the intentness with which the governments of Latin America were scrutinizing this present immigration, every colonist was "burdened with an important mission as a diplomat," on whom depended the success of failure of future emigration by Okinawans.[220]

Shortly before this first group of emigrants left for Bolivia, GRI requested USCAR to provide $12,317 in supplementary funds for the party, regarding the Bolivian Government's subsidy as inadequate, in view of the inflationary trend in that country. USCAR replied on 22 June that it could not entertain the idea of making such a remittance unless and until it possessed definite information concerning the inadequacy of the settlement funds and the data necessary for an accurate determination of the requirements for additional money, if any. Even then, should USCAR admit that the request were justified, the proper procedure would be for GRI to make its application directly to the foreign exchange bank.[221]

One month, lacking a day, after the Dutch vessel SS Tjisadane departed with the first group of immigrants for Bolivia, a second group of

129 Okinawans boarded another vessel of Netherlands registration, the SS Togelberg, to make their homes in that same country. In addition, the ship took aboard 46 people who had been called by their families or relatives in Brazil and Argentina. In bidding these pioneers farewell, Chief Executive Shuhei Higa reminded them of their obligations to the country they were leaving behind, as well as to the one in which they would soon be settling, in the following words:[222]

> Development is a word easy to say, but, actually, development requires great pains and is accompanied by various difficulties. I wish you to do your gest after resettlement, overcoming these difficulties in cooperation with the seniors there. The realization of overseas emigration has been one of the biggest policies of the Government, and the Government expects to send 1,000 persons within the next 10 years. However, whether this plan will go smoothly or not is solely dependent upon you. I hope you will take good care of yourselves and fulfil your initial purpose. The Government wants to further exert itself for training future prospective emigrants.

The three-man advance party which went by commercial airline to Bolivia found that the price of land was very cheap, with a tract 100 meters square in the suburbs of Sao Paulo costing from 30,000 to 50,000 Bolivianos to one American dollar, although it had been 1,300 to one at the time the subsidization plan was originally made. The advance guard feared that many of the immigrants might desert the resettlement area, where both means of transportation and water supply were inconvenient, in favor of the suburbs of the cities of Bolivia. Although there was no legal way they could be forbidden to move in this fashion, such a tendency would almost certainly result in the Bolivian Government's barring further immigration by Ryukyuans, since its goal was the development of the agricultural areas of the country.

As a means of making colonization of South America easier for

future emigrants, the leader of the advance party suggested that basic Spanish be taught in the primary schools of Okinawa. In view of the lack of enthusiasm which the Department of Education and the Okinawa Teachers' Association evinced toward the teaching of English in the schools of the Ryukyus, however, this was almost certainly a vain hope on his part. Undoubtedly, a speaking and writing knowledge of English would have proved of inestimable value to Okinawa school graduates seeking employment with the military or working in jobs having contact with Americans, but the xenophobia of the educators and so-called intelligentsia was so great that they limited the teaching of English to a bare, almost useless, minimum. Under these circumstances, then, it was not likely that the Department of Education would display sufficient breadth of vision to revise the curricula so as to include Spanish.[223]

The members of the advance party were not the only ones to admonish the present emigrants as well as those Okinawans in future colonizing groups who might consider abandoning their farms in the Uruma area of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in favor of urban life. The Foreign Ministry of the Japanese Government was so deeply concerned about the adverse impression such failure to continue farming might make on the Bolivian Government, it warned GRI that the labor of these Okinawan settlers would affect the reputation of the entire Japanese community in that country, one way or the other. Such being the case, the Foreign Ministry hoped that prudence would be exercised in formulating the reclamation plan for the resettlement area and in executing the future emigration program. The Japanese Government was impelled to

interfere where it had no business by a report from its consulate in Peru which had described breeding grounds for future discontent on the part of the immigrants in the bad roads, the difficulty in obtaining a good water supply, and the remoteness of the resettlement area from towns of any consequence. Yet, if any considerable number of these people transplanted themselves to urban communities or to adjoining countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and the like, all Japanese immigrants to South America would be tarred with the same brush as unreliable, vacillating, and weak. For this reason, GRI was in duty bound to select its colonists with extreme care before sending them aboard to make new homes and relieve the pressure of over-population on Okinawa.[224]

The first Bolivian immigrants disembarked from the SS Tjisadane at Santos, Brazil, on 6 August, and shortly afterward boarded a train bound for the country they were adopting. At every railway station enroute, the Okinawans were greeted by throngs of their fellow-countrymen, who came down to wish them good luck. After enjoying the dubious pleasure of riding for eight days on a woodburning train whose speed varied in direct ratio to the combustibility of the fuel picked up enroute, the travel-worn party finally arrived at the town of Bairon, Bolivia, where it became necessary to continue their journey in five large trucks for three more days and nights. Actually, the Uruma settlement area was only some six miles in a straight line from the Bairon Railway Station, but, because of the lack of a negotiable road, the immigrants had to traverse a tortuous route along the Rio Grande for approximately 22 miles.

Eventually the weary Okinawans did reach the settlement area, only to find that the three houses in which they were to live had not been completed for occupancy, there being nothing but three skeletons 100 meters long and six meters wide, without roof, wall, or floor. To make matters worse, no water was available, even though a hole had been dug to a depth of eight meters. There was no kitchen or dining room; but, sleep being the foremost consideration after the party's long journey, the immigrants collected dry leaves and grass to make their beds and thus passed the first night. As was to be expected, the pioneers rose the following morning and found no water in which to wash their faces and hands, finally having to satisfy themselves with the muddy water of a nearby swamp. Some people began to grumble, but after they had heard the explanations of the party leader and the advance party members, they quieted down.

Several months before their arrival, the Bolivian Government had started work on the frame houses and had cleared some 123 acres of forest. However, in the short time which had elapsed since then, new growth from the stumps of the trees cut down had reached a height of five feet or more. As one of the settlers described it, "The woods yonder is leterally a sea of trees, a deep unfathomable jungle inside of which not even the song of a bird can be heard, so that one sometimes feels very sad and eerie at other times." Within a few days after the immigrants' arrival at Uruma, their well had been sunk to a depth of 10 meters, at which point damp dirt could be scopped up, and, with the installation of a suction pump scheduled to arrive from La Paz by the end of August, it was expected that there would be no further difficulty with the water supply. Once this problem was solved, the region

should become a very pleasant place in which to live, since the soil was fertile, roads were to be constructed shortly, and the climate was mild but not enervating. The plan of settlement called for cultivation to be carried out jointly for one year, at the end of which the land would be divided equally among the colonists, enabling each to operate his own farm independently.

The new settlers found ant trees which fairly spewed thousands of ants at the slightest touch and trees with thorns, the least prick of which produced an excruciatingly painful burning sensation. Although there were numerous animals and a variety of wild honey bees, the object of greatest anxiety was a tribe of "Barubaru" natives, who roamed the jungle naked in bands of five or six men, armed with crudely made ironwood weapons. Because of the ferocity of these savages and their penchant for attacking without provocation at most embarrassing moments, the Bolivian natives of the Santa Cruz region never went abroad without a gun. The Okinawans had arrived at their new home in the midst of the dry season, with the result that the steadily-blowing wind which arose every morning around 1000 hours created a whirlpool of dust until around 1700, when it stopped abruptly. After that hour it was very pleasant, the air becoming rather cool and invigorating.[225]

The first impression which the new arrivals formed of their native Bolivian neighbors was that their standard of living was low and their culture very primitive. Living in shacks devoid of both walls and floors, they possessed nothing which could be accurately described as furniture. In theory, all commodities other than cows, hogs, and eggs,

had to be imported. Actually, their high price made that idea impracticable. In view of the extremely high price of cloth, it was no wonder that the natives wore clothes so ragged that decency would have been better served by their total omission. Many of the Okinawan settlers planned to employ the Uruma natives to assist them in developing their respective tracts when the land was apportioned to the various individuals at the end of the first year. With this cheap labor pool available, they expected to find their work far easier than if they had immigrated to Brazil or Argentina.[226]

After the settlers had dwelt in their new homes for a short time, the leader of the emigration party, Seiryo Nagamine, wrote a report of the state of affairs to the Director of GRI's Department of Social Affairs, expressing dissatisfaction with several aspects of the colonization effort. Perhaps most exasperating was an agreement concluded between the Bolivian and Ryukyuan Governments, of which he had been given no official notification, granting the pre-war Okinawan settlers 61,250 acres of land unconditionally, and giving the new immigrants no share in them. His first intimation of such an agreement had been received from the old settlers themselves. Another matter with which he took issue was the method--or lack of method--by which the emigrants in his party had been selected. Some of these so-called pioneers had not even brought along a hoe, trying, instead, to "reclaim land with theories and argument." Why, asked Nagamine, had such men been chosen, when the situation demanded that everyone, including the leaders, must contribute his bit for the common cause?

In the future selection of emigrants, he hoped that GRI would

consider the following factors: (1) the candidate should have no addiction to strong drink; (2) the women should understand that their principal job was reclamation of the land and that housekeeping was only incidental; (3) priority of selection should be given to those whose land in the Ryukyus had been requisitioned beyond hope of future release--persons so situated would be much more likely to regard their new homes as points of no return; (4) preference should be given to experienced farmers; (5) the "evil practice" of granting undue weight to the recommendations of influential persons in the selection of the emigrants should be abolished; and (6) undue importance ought not to be attached to men with highly specialized or unusual skills, but, rather, preference should be given to tile, brick, and barrel makers, as persons of greater usefulness to the new community.

The leader's lot was not made easier by the desire of many of his flock to abandon the Uruma District for some more civilized region, either in Bolivia itself or in Brazil; nor did the repeated warnings against such an occurrence which he received from the Japanese Embassy in Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contribute to his peace of mind. These dignitaries were especially sensitive on this point, as indicated previously, since Japanese immigration to Brazil following World War II had proved a failure, only 30 per cent of the settlers remaining where they had agreed to live, and more deserting the resettlement areas all the time.

The Director of GRI's Department of Social Affairs, to whom this letter was addressed, accepted the suggestions in good spirit and promised to do whatever he could to improve the caliber of emigrants

forming future parties. Regarding the agreement which the leader of the immigrants had found so obnoxious, the Director explained that this involved nothing more than a misunderstanding on the part of Nagamine. The land in question had been purchased with money borrowed in the name of the emigration party, and it would ultimately become the property of the immigrants. At the same time, however, since everything had been made possible by the unselfish cooperation of the earlier settlers, it would only be proper for the new immigrants to respect their established rights to cultivate the land, the two groups maintaining friendly relations with each other.[227]

Commenting editorially on the conditions in the new Uruma colony revealed by Nagamine's letter, the Okinawa Times concluded that "the safest of emigrants are those who have relatives or friends in the country to which they emigrate, and most of them are doing pretty well." The writer noted, however, that "the majority of those who emigrated impulsively under the influence of exaggerated propaganda, or due to their spirit of adventure, or under the influence of a get-rich-quick dream failed ignominiously." For emigration to be successful, the dispatching agency should make a careful study of the climate, environment, and conditions under which the land was to be developed, then decide whether the family under consideration was qualified to undertake such an enterprise. Monetary assistance to the emigrants in the form of loans for the payment of passage and other expenses was well and good, but it was not enough. A thorough exploration of the region to which the party would be going and a careful training of the prospective emigrants were both indispensable to success.[228]

By mid-October 1954 the reports coming out of Uruma in the form of personal letters and formal correspondence were so generally favorable that when a rumor sprang up that the United States Congress had appropriated $800,000 to assist "the eastward course of empire" by sending additional colonists to Bolivia, it received ready acceptance. Although this information was strictly unofficial, the United States Foreign Operations Administration had implied much the same thing. It was further said that the immigrants would be assisted to the extent of 45,000,000 Bolivianos ($236,842.10) by the Bolivian Government, which would be provided, in turn, with agricultural products by the United States. As though this were not enough, the Bolivian Government had assigned 10,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.471 acres) for the Ryukyuan immigrants, and 12,000 Okinawans (3,000 families) would be invited to settle in the province of Santa Cruz during the next 10 years--1,000 each in 1955 and 1956, and 1,400 every year from 1957 through 1963. The American Government was likewise said to be negotiating with Brazil, Peru, and Argentina in an endeavor to persuade them to invite Ryukyuan immigrants on a sizeable scale.[229]

The Government of the Ryukyu Islands had previously established the Emigration Bank with a planned capitalization of ¥100,000,000 as a means of financing the resettlement program. In 1954, the first year, GRI invested ¥10,000,000, proposing to produce the balance within the next three years. Unfortunately for the excellent intentions of the authorities, dispatching the initial 400 emigrants to Bolivia in June and July 1954 had consumed ¥29,200,000--a sum accumulated by combining the ¥10,000,000 deposited in the Emigration Bank with ¥19,200,000 contributed

by USCAR. Thus, when GRI began to cast about for the necessary funds to send the next scheduled group of 1,000 immigrants to Bolivia, only ¥16,200,000 was to be found in the Emigration Bank--an amount sufficient to dispatch only 400 people. Nevertheless, the Council for Selecting and Dispatching Emigrants met on 12 November at the office of the Director of Social Affairs to discuss the method which would be followed in selecting the emigrants who would be sent to Bolivia during the next fiscal year. Because of the criticisms voiced in connection with the two earlier groups and the warnings given by the American and Japanese Governments, GRI was most anxious to avoid sending persons ill suited to the rugged life of pioneers in the Twentieth Century "New World".[230] At the same time, GRI remained confident that the United States Foreign Operations Administration would grant the $800,000 needed to send 1,000 Okinawans to Bolivia. If this financial reinforcement did, somehow, fail to materialize, however, the Department of Social Affairs planned to dispatch as many emigrants as their own funds would permit--then make further efforts to obtain assistance from USCAR.

Ever critical of anything or anybody connected with GRI, the Okinawa Times commented that "Their trouble does not differ from that of a merchant who has extended his business, without funds to operate it." Under these circumstances, the writer asked rhetorically, how could GRI proclaim that prosperity for Okinawa was dependent upon emigration? If the government were unable to pursue its emigration program to a conclusion as planned, it would be admitting, by the same token, that prosperity was impossible.[231]

Writing to a friend in Naha on 16 October, one of the Uruma

settlers described life in the new colony. The problem of water supply, which was one of the first things to catch the notice of the immigrants, as we have seen, had been solved with the striking of water at a depth of 45 meters. Henceforth, the pioneers had an ample supply of good, potable water. If the plans of the group were realized, the planting of crops would be completed by the end of December, the land would be divided and allocated to each family or individual in January 1955, and the colonists would resettle in their own private homes in February. Thus would come to an end the communal phase of the settlement, and private enterprise would be given the opportunity to prove its mettle. A source of distress to the parents of school-age children was the total lack of any facilities for educating them. All able-bodied people were too busy tilling the soil and repelling the relentless incursions of the jungle to have time for schools and schooling. This was the more regretted, since the adults recognized that every year of childhood bereft of education was a year lost beyond recall. However, they solaced themselves with the thought that this difficulty was just one of the concomitants of pioneering which would be overcome by time.

Although the settlers heard no more rumors of the barubaru natives, they continued to take the same precautions as before. On the credit side of the ledger, they found an abundance of a certain species of strange fish in a lake not far away. There was no denying that this finy creature was distinctly unpalatable in appearance, but those hardy enough to make the attempt found the fish very delicious to eat, possessing a flavor much like that of a lobster. To Okinawans, accustomed to getting their fish from the sea, it seemed "like a dream to be able to eat fish

in such a remote area." The settlers also heard that alligators, mountain turtles, wolves, tigers (probably jaguars were meant), and "anta" (animals similar to the buffaloes of the Orient) were to be found in the vicinity of the same lake; but, according to the natives of the region, no one had been harmed by these beasts during the past 30 years.

Although their daily life called for a great deal of hard toil--more than the average American would wish to undergo, even vicariously--most of the colonists experienced a feeling of "liberation" in their new home, a sense of relaxation. No longer did they have to worry about the annual visitations of destructive typhoons which could undo a year's work in a matter of minutes. Financial problems arising from the smallness of the farms they cultivated on Okinawa or the military's requisitioning a part of it need not be faced in this frontier region of land abundance, and social obligations had gone by the board as soon as they set foot in the Western Hemisphere. Even so, this distaste for the complexities of social intercourse did not prevent the new colonists from finding one of their chief pleasures in the form of Sunday visits to a little settlement of pre-war Okinawans who had their homes on the Rio Grande. After eating dinner as the guests of these former residents of the Motobu Peninsula, the new settlers spent the afternoon washing, bathing, and fishing in the river, which was far bigger than any stream to be found in the Ryukyus.[232]

Not long afterward, another emigrant, a former teacher at the Miyako Agricultural and Forestry School, wrote a letter to the Director of GRI's Central Agricultural Experimental Station, in which he presented a picture of the Uruma Settlement, as he saw it. To begin with, conditions were better than he had expected, the resettlement area having electric

lights and rice cleaning machines to make life both more enjoyable and efficient. He was also delighted to learn that the soil could be cultivated for five to 10 years without the use of fertilizer. Not only was the land fertile, but it was easily plowed and harrowed. In addition, at that very time, engineers were making a spot survey with the idea of constructing an irrigation canal under the auspicies of the Bolivian Government, and actual work was scheduled to commence as soon as the funds for it were appropriated in the budget the following February.

As an incentive for experimentation and research, the President of Bolivia and the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry had offered a prize of ¥200,000,000 ($1,666,667.00) to the immigrants if they were successful in the cultivation of wheat. The size of the potential reqard indicates that all previous efforts to grow "the staff of life" with any degree of success in Bolivia had met with failure. With such a prize held before them, the settlers--farmers all of their lives, for the most part--determined to grow wheat, no matter what the toil involved. In making this resolve, they entertained no illusions of easy victory. Considerable study would probably be necessary before a seed was laid in the earth, and more experimentation would have to follow ere they could cultivate this grain successfully, since the climate of Bolivia varied little during the year, while the daily temperature fluctuated many degrees. In view of this, the writer hoped that the Director of Central Agricultural Experimental Station, to whom he was sending his letter, would see to it that the next emigration group brought along wheat seed literature on the subject of wheat.

In conclusion, the ex-teacher expressed his belief that future

emigrant parties should be composed of families, rather than single individuals, as the latter invariably suffered from loneliness and nostalgia. The writer, incidentally, should have known whereof he spoke; for he was one of those who had left his family behind. Now his greatest hope was that GRI would include his wife and children in the next emigrant group sent out to Bolivia.

Commenting to an Okinawan reporter on the subjects discussed in this letter, the Director of the Central Agricultural Experimental Station declared that his organization would do everything within its power to make the Bolivian emigration program a success. Since the extensive growth of wheat appeared to be a matter of prime importance, his people would make a thorough study of the varieties of wheat and different methods of cultivation. If possible, he wanted to introduce new kinds of wheat to Okinawa, as well as send out various kinds already growing there. It would also be wise to include agricultural technicians in the next emigrant group and send a few leaders to provide guidance on the spot.[233]

Although sufficient funds to finance the dispatch of 1,000 emigrants to Bolivia during 1955 were not actually on hand, GRI went ahead with its plans for sending at least the first 400 of these people in February and March with the money available. This plan was dealt a rude jolt, however, when GRI received a letter from the Bolivian Minister of Agriculture in January 1955 advising that the emigrants delay their departure from Okinawa until April. Because of the rainy season lasting from December to March each year, he explained, it was impossible to construct the houses required to accommodate the settlers upon their arrival in Bolivia, and, equally bad, no cultivation could take place until the heavy rains

stopped. Thus, if the immigrants arrived at their resettlement area during the rainy season, they would be condemned to idleness for many weeks. Besides, the Bolivian Government was itself suffering from financial difficulties which would prevents its being able to assist the immigrants through this period of greatest stress. As a result of this advice, GRI decided to postpone the departure of the first group of 1955 colonists to Bolivia, recommending that the suspended emigrants not dispose of their property on Okinawa until given a definite embarkation date.[234]

As it turned out, the sailing of the first group of 1955 emigrants would have been delayed anyway, although no one on Okinawa had any way of knowing about the tragic events which were taking place in the Uruma Colony until some time later. Just as the June and July 1954 immigrants were beginning to get their heads above water by dint of sheer hard work and determination, the settlement was stricken by an epidemic tentatively identified as malaria. Within a few days some 80 persons had become sick, and, before long, eight of them died.[235] During the first months after the colonists' arrival at Uruma it had often been necessary for the settlers to drink stagnant water while working in the mountains; yet, no one had suffered any ill effects. As they became more undernourished and run-down from heavy work without compensatory rest, however, the immigrants naturally became more susceptible to disease. All the same, there were those who believed that there would have been no fatalities if it had been possible to get the victims to the nearest hospital in Santa Cruz within a reasonable time after they were first stricken. Unfortunately, this had been out of the question, involving,

as it would have, a trip by ox-cart over approximately 47 miles of very rudimentary roads.[236]

The impact of the bad news from Bolivia on the Okinawan public and press was both instantaneous and violent. For the Okinawa Times the bad tidings served wonderfully well as a cudgel with which to belabor the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and all officials within arm's reach. Thus motivated, the paper was quick to note that considerable doubt existed concerning the cause of the epidemic, notwithstanding the fact that the Uruma area had previously been described as free from malaria and other diseases. The belligerent Times then suggested that if it could be proved that the emigrants had carried the malaria germs within their systems at the time they left Okinawa, the authorities should be held responsible for not giving them physical examinations which would have revealed them to be carriers of the disease prior to their departure. The possibility of the settlers' having brought the germs with them was given credibility by the coincidence of most of the victims' coming from the central district of Okinawa. "Moreover," asserted the daily, "there is the danger of turning a non-malarial locality into a marial area; so it is plain that the incident will affect the future emigration adversely." The writer of the editorial went on to recommend that the present Emigration Bank be developed into a public Emigration Corporation, under the supervision of GRI. If this course were adopted, however, "the authorities must be very careful not to give any room for the emergence of profiteering emigration companies which abounded in pre-war years."[237]

For its part, the Okinawa Shimbun recalled that the emigrants had been dispatched only after a "careful on-the-spot investigation" by the

emigration delegates--a circumstance probably making the news all the more shocking to the government. Contradicting itself after a fashion, the Shimbun conscientiously asseverated that "Although the Government can be blamed for their oversight in not making a thorough spot investigation, it is no time to blame anyone." Rather, a careful study of the problem should be made and proper steps taken to prevent a repetition of the mistake. What made this task the more puzzling was the relative thoroughness with which the earlier emigrations had in fact been equipped. Nurses, apprentice pharmacists, quinine, and other preventive medicines had accompanied the settlers from Okinawa to Uruma; yet, in spite of all these precautions, the mysterious epidemic had laid low one-fifth of the colonists. One solution would be to send medical officials to the resettlement area to investigate the region from every conceivable health angle before dispatching any more emigrants. In any event, the Okinawa Shimbun hoped that "appropriate measures will be immediately taken towards this spread of malaria among Bolivian emigrants with the cooperation of USCAR."[238]

While the newspapers on Okinawa were making the Uruma settlers' problems their own, the colonists themselves were seeking a solution to the difficulties which threatened to overwhelm them. One thing on which practically every member of the community agreed was the necessity for moving to a more salubrious region. As the first step toward this, a tentative arrangement was made to migrate to the area of Monteagudo, which possessed soil more fertile than that at Uruma and was more accessible, besides. Before making the actual move, however, the settlers planned to send a 12-man investigation party to study the

lay of the land; then, if everything was found to be favorable, they would petition the Bolivian Government for permission to make their new homes there.[239]

As news of the fatal outbreak among the Bolivian colonists continued to arrive on Okinawa--each letter a monody telling of another victim of the mysterious malady--GRI decided that something must be done to still the clamor of the press, the kin of those who had recently immigrated to South America, and the future emigrants scheduled to sail for Bolivia later in the year. Upon reflection, the best method of accomplishing this seemed to be through the dispatch of an inspection party to the colony to observe first-hand the sanitary conditions and other facets of the local situation which could not really be learned in any other way.

GRI settled informally on Mr. Yasukuni Yamagawa, Director of the Social Affairs Department, and Dr. Zensuke Teruya, a Brooklyn-born Okinawan who spoke impeccable English which he had little occasion to employ in his capacity as Chief of the Koza Health Center. Approached with this plan, USCAR took a distinctly negative attitude, declaring that there was no necessity for sending any delegates now that the malaria condition had been controlled by the measures taken by America's Foreign Operations Administration and the Bolivian Government. Despite this opposition to the plan, GRI had its heart set on sending the two men to inspect conditions at Uruma and at any other sites under study for resettlement. Not only might they prevent a similar outbreak in the future by discovering the exact cause of the epidemic, but their presence would aid vastly in calming the near-hysteria of the

colonists.[240]

Any disinterested but observant outsider reading the editorials and news columns of the Okinawa Times over a period of time would undoubtedly have discovered that that daily newspaper never really needed an excuse for attacking the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. GRI could, in fact, do very little which obtained the approval of that journal. When an occasion for indicting GRI on a specific count did offer itself, moreover, the Times exhibited a sanctimonious zeal for exposing the official transgression that would never have been suspected from the cautious reticence with which it reported those matters in which the government might take pride. A splendid club for belaboring GRI was provided by a report from Bolivia that the colonists were blaming the official emigration delegates for their plight because of the "inadequate and irresponsible advance survey" they had made at Uruma prior to the immigrants' arrival. The Okinawa Times granted that they might have been a little remiss in their duty, but was disinclined to place the whole blame on the emigration delegates alone. On the contrary, it would be more appropriate to "make an issue of the lukewarm attitude of the Government toward the emigration policy and review the past actions."[241] The writer went on in the following vein:

> The Government, the Legislature, and the public are all under the evil influence of the pre-war conception of emigrants, which regarded them as people disowned by their mother country. While they are fully aware as an ideal, the importance of emigration policy for the Ryukyus, they would not take any positive step to tackle this problem in real earnest as an important political problem.

The Government was doing everything possible to perfect a plan for the economic recovery of Okinawa, admitted the Times, but it could not

be said that the same care had gone into the emigration program. Of course, there was no denying that the practice of dispatching emigration delegates as a scouting party to countries considered for colonization was an improvement over the pre-war practice. Even so, the delegates' survey in Bolivia had shown itself to be incomplete and more loosely executed. Before any emigrants were sent out to Bolivia, pontificated the Times editor, an "inquiry organ" composed of government and civic leaders should have been organized to scrutinize the report of the delegates, discover its shortcomings, and request a resurvey. Failing this penetrating insight, the "inquiry organ", accepting the report as reliable, could have discussed measures calculated to lighten the hardships of the emigrants and have recommended their adoption by the government--such matters, for example, as the need for a medical facility, or the exclusion of the very old and the very young from the ranks of the pioneers, until such time as the new settlement area had taken on the semblance of "a going proposition."[242]

The Chairman of the Uruma Emigrants' Association, Mr. Jose Akamine, got off a letter to Chief Executive Shuhei Higa on 15 February, giving him the latest information about the 1954 settlers. The Bolivian Government had dispatched three leading doctors to the colony as soon as the proportions of the epidemic became apparent, to treat the patients and study the disease. With them went ¥400,000 worth of medicines donated by the government for distribution without charge. In addition, the Japanese Association in La Paz contributed more than ¥1,000,000 in Bolivian currency, and the Okinawans' Association donated medicines worth ¥100,000. Yet another example of cooperativeness came

from the Santa Cruz city charity hospital, which exempted half the Okinawan settlers confined there from any charge.

As a result of the study made by the three medical experts who visited the scene, it was determined that the epidemic was not malaria, as had been supposed, but was, instead, a mysterious tropical disease which had never previously broken out in Bolivia. Despite the doctors' lack of acquaintance with the disease, they checked its course so successfully that all patients had recovered by the time Akamine wrote his letter in mid-February. To prevent similar disasters in the future, however, the Bolivian Government stationed one doctor in the resettlement area on a permanent basis. By now it had been found that the contemplated resettlement district of Monteagudo was unsuitable for the purpose; so the Okinawans negotiated for a proper site with the representatives of the United States Foreign Operations Administration. To the emigrants' request that they be permitted to move to one of the sites suggested by the F.O.A., the Minister of Agricultural Affairs gave his approval, on 8 February, for a part of them, as well as all of the expected 1955 immigrants, to settle there during the year.[243]

It will be recalled that the ex-school teacher from Miyako Jima who had written of his experiences as an emigrant recommended that future colonizing groups be composed of families, rather than of single individuals, because of the latter's susceptibility to loneliness. The Okinawa Times, however, took a completely different view of the matter. In addition to sending enough young, single men to Bolivia to marry the widows in the Uruma Colony recently bereft of their husbands by the epidemic, the paper recommended that the great bulk of future emigrants

be selected from the ranks of the bachelor class. The reasoning behind this plan was that young men were better able to take care of themselves in an uncultivated area which would be dangerous for women and children. It seems probable that the Times editor was influenced in his thinking by an article he had read in a Japanese newspaper reporting that the chairman of the board of directors for one of the largest industrial associations in Brazil was visiting Japan to recruit 1,500 single emigrants. These men would be sent to the South American country at the rate of 500 annually for a period of three years. If this test case proved successful, it was expected that similar emigration of young single men to other countries of Central and South America would be stimulated as a result.

It was particularly urgent, the Times felt, that this element of the population be included in any future emigration, because of the increasing difficulty which would be encountered by the graduates of junior and senior high schools in finding employment. The writer hoped, therefore, that the two emigration delegates about to depart for Bolivia would add Brazil and various other countries of Latin America to their itinerary, negotiating with the authorities in each, inspecting any proposed resettlement areas, and mapping out a plan of action.[244]

In the latter part of March, Chairman Ichiro Inamine of the Ryukyu Overseas Association received a letter from Representative Walter H. Judd of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reporting on the situation of the Bolivian colonists. At his insistence, said the Congressman, the United States Government had sent experts to examine the settlement in an attempt to determine the precise cause of the disease which affected

some 200 of the immigrants and caused the deaths of 15 of them. Although the exact nature of the epidemic was not yet known, the experts had ascertained that it was not malaria, as at first suspected, nor again was it the sylvanic plague--which had been the next disease to be tentatively blamed as the offender. On the more positive side, the medical team reported that the situation was improving with the institution of sanitary measures such as the elimination of flies, mosquitoes, and rats.

Representative Judd went on to say that two other sites had been tentatively selected with the cooperation of the Bolivian Government. One, northeast of Santa Cruz in the Buena Vista section, comprised 10,000 hectares of land facing an all-weather highway. Upon completion of a bridge being built across the only intervening river, the settlers would be able to transport their products to Santa Cruz City within just two hours, and if a highway then under construction were completed, communication between the new resettlement area and the capital city of La Paz would become very convenient. The difficulties connected with the colony's transplanting were bound to be great, chiefly because of the problem of transportation, but they were not insuperable. The Foreign Operations Administration and the Bolivian Government were planning to furnish equipment to clear the land and trucks to transport the colonists to their new home. Temporary barracks would be built to house the immigrants engaged in the construction work, and the settlers would be moved into them as the shelters became ready for occupany. These structures would be more substantial than the ones in which the colonists had been living, would have thatch roofs, and would be built

about two feet above the ground. In addition, potable water would be available in wells not too deep. There was no denying that the colonists would be confronted with a rough future full of toil and privations, as they would have to make a fresh start in building their houses and developing the forests. However, if they maintained the strong pioneer spirit and firm unity which had marked their reaction to adversity thus far, it could be expected that they would overcome the hardships which lay ahead and establish permanent homes.

Examination of the soil in this new area had shown it to be suitable for the production of corn, yucca, rice, and peanuts; however, Mr. Judd had no information about the other resettlement area located to the east of the one where the immigrants were currently living. As evidence of the good morale which the pioneers retained in spite of everything, some 30 families planned to remain behind on the present Uruma site to raise cattle. The FOA had worked out an agreement with the Bolivian Government whereby the settlers would make small payments for the right to cultivate their particular farms in the new area, then, after four years, each family would be given complete ownership of the land it had been tilling. On the basis of 120 families, this worked out to an average of about 90 hectares (approximately 225 acres) for each one.

The kind-hearted Minnesota Congressman, whose interest in the people of the Orient went back many years, added that the American Agricultural Officer in Bolivia, a Mr. Henney, had been placed in charge of the development of the land and the new settlements. In order that this new responsibility might not be in name only, he had been relieved

of all his other duties and was to remain in charge until the FOA could find a new man and send him to Bolivia. Mr. Judd concluded by observing that in view of "all these complications" it did not seem advisable to send more immigrants to Bolivia in 1955. However, he hoped "very much" that the situation could be straightened out sufficiently to permit resumption of emigration in 1956 and that the United States Government would provide funds to assist in the program. In closing, the Minnesotan promised to notify Mr. Inamine as soon as it was possible to obtain consideration in the House of a bill he was preparing which would establish a quota for Okinawan immigrants to the United States.[245]

While emigration to Bolivia was at a standstill as a result of the as-yet-unidentified epidemic, the 10,000-ton Dutch vessel Tjisadane of the Royal Inter-Ocean Line steamed out of Naha Port on 18 April with 140 Ryukyuans aboard, most of them summoned by relatives in South America. Eleven families comprising 37 persons were bound for Argentina, while 16 families (80 persons) had Brazil as their destination. Included in the latter group was the four-generation family of one Saburo Takara totalling 16 members. A number of those not belonging to family groups were girls going to the New World as picture brides for the single men who had settled there in 1954. Aboard the same liner, incidentally, were 17 Japanese families (105 persons) who had been selected by the Japanese Government to be the first planned emigrants to Paraguay for the year 1955.[246]

Shortly afterward, Dr. Teruya and Mr. Yamagawa, the two emigration delegates, conferred with a doctor of the Inter-American Health Center who had studied the contagious disease in the Uruma Colony and found it

to be leptospirosis (Weil's disease), a disease favoring yound men and adults as its victims. Since it was generally believed that this disease was contacted from animals, the medical authorities had ordered all pet dogs in the settlement killed. On the other hand, there was a possibility that Weil's disease was contacted through meals left over by patients and through waste matter ejected by the victims. For this reason it was quite important, the doctor informed the two Ryukyuans, to bury the bodies of those who died of the disease deep in the soil. The latent period for leptospirosis was 10 to 15 days in length, and the kidneys were the organs most easily attacked, a pain in the lower body signaling the early stage of the disease. One happy characteristic of the disease, however, was the immunity from further attack which those contacting it enjoyed, if they recovered. Those not recovering enjoyed even greater immunity, it is needless to say.

After Deputy Director Yamashiro of GRI's Social Affairs Department had read this letter, he commented that in the period following the close of World War II the area around Amami-O-Shima had produced around 100 patients suffering from leptospirosis every year. It had been found, however, that the disease could be checked by cleaning up the area and exterminating the murine population. Subsequently, Teruya and Yamagawa learned from talking with Bolivian doctors of Santa Cruz City that there actually was no area in Santa Cruz State which could be accurately described as free from epidemics.[247]

Almost exactly one month after the departure of the Tjisadane, 10 families comprising 55 persons bound for Brazil and two families (nine individuals) with Argentina as their objective, boarded another Dutch

vessel of the Royal Inter-Ocean Line, the 14,150-ton Tegelberg,* at Naha Port on 17 May, swelling the tide of emigration from Okinawa.[248]

Meantime, on 5 May, 25 families, composed of 83 emigrants, had begun the move from Uruma to the new area which had been assigned them. Since the temporary houses were not yet ready at the latter place, the settlers were first transported to Algodon, where a cotton company had a dormitory in which they could live for the time being. To pay for their room and board while occupying these temporary quarters, the settlers picked cotton for the company. The second party was to follow from Uruma as soon as transportation facilities could be assembled. This was not simple, however, as most of the colonists had acquired considerably more household goods than they had brought with them from Okinawa the previous year, and those crops which had already been harvested at Uruma also had to be brought along to the new home. The enthusiasm of the settlers made them confident, however, that they could overcome all difficulties.[249]

While the colonists in Bolivia were attempting to find a permanent home, some 400 people who had been selected as members of the second emigration group from Okinawa were standing by, not knowing when they would depart, or even if they would depart. Apropos of the composition of this second emigration group, two distinct schools of thought sprang up almost simultaneously. The United States Foreign Operations Administration wished to have the previously selected planned

*On 17 April the Tegelberg had given aircraft of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron a bit of work, when she sent out a distress message from a position close aboard Okinawa as she was making her way from Manila to Kobe. Shortly after two aircraft and the destroyer Collett had begun to search for her, the Tegelberg advised that she was all right.

settlers sent to Bolivia as soon as all of the 1954 group of colonists had completed their move from Uruma; while the two emigration delegates from Okinawa recommended, on the basis of their on-the-spot investigation, that every effort should be made to send out the families of the original colonists in the next emigration party.

At first glance, the latter view might sound like a suggestion influenced unduly by sentiment, since married people--even experts--tend to regard bachelors as second class citizens who exist only to pay taxes for the support of married people and to serve the country in time of war. By extension of this way of thinking, the single men who were waiting for word to embark for South America should be only too happy to give up their places in favor of the dependents of the family heads who had gone out in the first emigration party. Actually, as it happened, the recommendation of the emigration delegates was based on hard sense and cold logic, though sentimental considerations can not be absolved of all responsibility. Mr. Yamaga pointed out that family members arriving in Bolivia to join their sponsors would not have to be allocated land or given funds for farming, as would new, unattached immigrants. All that dependents would require was food. In any event, the emigration delegates reported that the FOA had announced its policy not to assist any other emigrants until those already in Bolivia had been settled, and that it would "give its wholehearted assistance and guidance" to the emigrants from Okinawa, through the Bolivian Government.[250]

Dr. Teruya and Director Yamagawa, the two emigration delegates, arrived back on Okinawa the last week in June and reported on some of

the things they had learned from their trip to Bolivia. For one thing, of the total sum of $23,000,000 in economic aid which they understood the United States was furnishing Central and South America, $16,000,000 was being given to Bolivia. This, the two men declared, should provide some idea of the interest the United States had in Bolivia, not to mention the voice it most likely had in the latter's affairs. An example of this influence could be found in Bolivia's policy of giving Okinawan immigrants the same privileges and rights as were granted to her own native resettlers.

They also had learned that $800,000 would probably be appropriated by the United States to subsidize the cost of Ryukyuan emigration to Bolivia--$350,000 of this sum having been allocated for traveling expenses and the balance of $450,000 to be used to assist the immigrants in the resettlement areas.[251]

While in Washington, D.C., on their way back to Okinawa, the two delegates had sought to persuade officials there to let GRI sent a resident-officer to Bolivia, who would be charged with the task of guiding the present and all future immigrants by maintaining close liaison with the Bolivian Government and the FOA officials. Since the Washington authorities seemed to have no objection to this plan, it only remained to obtain the assent and support of USCAR. The programmed 1955 emigrants would not be dispatched until the first group were definitely well established in their new homes. To prevent a repetition of the recent trouble, a mobile health center belonging to the American Agricultural Guidance Station had been located at the new resettlement area, as well as a doctor attached to the Development Bureau of the Bolivina

Government, a nurse, and a pharmacist, who would be stationed there permanently. Thus, the medical facilities could be considered almost complete, and, when the delegates had left the area, there were no patients among the settlers.[252] All things considered, then, the mid-year point of 1955 found the prospects for successful and large-scale future immigration to Bolivia encouragingly bright.

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	36	Statement of Mr. Richard A. Davies, USCAR Real Estate Div., to Sub-Committe of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
2	37	Statement of Mr. John C. Brick, Oked Real Estate Div., to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
3	38	Ltr., Hq. Rycom to CG 20th AF, Civil Administrator, USCAR, and DE, OKED, sub.: Legal Policy of the Land Acquisition Program, 29 July 1953.
4	38	Ibid.
5	38	Ibid.
6	36	Statement of Mr. Richard A. Davies, USCAR Real Estate Div., to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955;
	37	Statement of Mr. John C. Brick, OKED Real Estate Div., to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
7	39	Staff Study, sub.: Air Force Land in the Ryukyus Islands, n.d.
8	37	Statement of Mr. John C. Brick, OKED Real Estate Div., to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
9	36	Statement of Mr. Richard A. Davies, USCAR, to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
10	37	Statement of Mr. John C. Brick, OKED, to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
11	39	Staff Study, sub.: Air Force Land in the Ryukyu Islands, n.d.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
12	36	Statement of Mr. Richard A. Davies, USCAR, to Sub-Committee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Okinawa Land Problem, 21 Oct. 1955.
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14	—	Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp. 419-420.
15	—	Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-1945: Airfield and Base Development, Vol. VI, the Office of the Chief Engineer, GHQ, AFPAC, edited by Lt. Col. George A. Meidling, U.S. Corps of Engineers, 1951, pp. 386-389.
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17	—	77th Div. G-3 Msg. File, p. 55, quoted in Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 182.
18	—	Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp. 181-182.
19	—	Engineers of the Southwest Pacific 1941-1945: Airfield and Base Development, Vol VI, pp. 388-389.
20	—	Ibid., pp. 395-396.
21	—	History, Air Force Units on Okinawa, 1948, pp. 57-59; History of the Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Forces on Okinawa, Jan.-June 1949, p. 90.
22	—	History of the Thirteenth and Twentieth Air Forces on Okinawa, January-June 1949, pp. 90-91.
23	—	Daily Journal, Deputy for Operations, Hq. 20th AF, 30 Apr. 1952.
24	—	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, sub.: Site Survey for B-62 (SNARK) Pilotless Aircraft Unit, 5 Oct. 1953; DF, Chief of Eng., Hq. 20th AF to DCS/O, sub.: Engineering Report on Site Survey for B-62 (SNARK) Pilotless Aircraft Unit, 1 Oct. 1953.
25	40	Minutes of Meeting to Discuss the New Locztion of Air-to-Ground Firing Range, [circa] 20 May 1953.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
26	40	Ibid.
27	40	Ibid.
28	40	Ibid.
29	41	AX 6708-D-XO-RQMT, CG FEAF to CG 20th AF, 18 June 1953.
30	--	Ltr., Major General Roy H. Lynn, VC 5th AF, to Major General Fay R. Upthegrove, Comdr, 20th AF, 1 Sept. 1954.
31	--	Conversation by Command Historian, Hq, 20th AF, with Capt. Wilbur C. Bohnhoff, Plans and Programs Div., Hq. 20th AF, 23 Oct. 1954.
32	42	DF, DO, Hq. 20th AF to Dir. Installations, Hq, 20th AF, sub.: Proposal for a Dive Bombing Range on the Island of Ie Shima, 26 June 1953.
33	43	OPR-O-633, CG JADF to CG 20th AF, 25 June 1953.
34	44	DF, Asst. DO to Dir. Inst., sub.: JADF Specifications for Dive Bombing Range on Ie Shima, 26 June 1953.
35	45	DX 12090 OPN-RQMT, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 29/1630I June 1953.
36	46	AX 7236 D/O-RQMT, Comdr, FEAF to Comdr. 20th AF, 3 July 1953.
37	47	DF, DO to D/Inst., sub.: Air-to-Ground Dive Bombing and Gunnery Range on Ie Shima [circa] July 1953.
38	48	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to DE, OKED, sub.: Boundary, Air Force Facilities, Ie Shima, 17 July 1953.
39	49	D-OPN-RQMT, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 18/0830I July 1953.
40	50	DF, Chief, R&U Div., Inst. Dir., to Chief of Eng., Inst. Dir., sub.: Cost of Tombs and Dwellings on Ie Shima, 28 July 1953.
41	51	Ltr., Hq. 6351st ABW to Comdr. 20th AF, sub.: Proposed Gunnery Range, 28 Sept. 1953.
42	--	History, DCS/O, Hq. 20th AF, Dec. 1953, pp. 19-20.

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43	52	DF, DM/I-MGMT to DCS/O, sub.: Air-Ground Gunnery Range, Ie Shima, 13 Feb. 1954.
44	52	DF, DCS/O to DM/I-MGMT, sub.: Air-Ground Gunnery Range, Ie Shima, 15 Feb. 1954.
45	53	M-DO-RQMTS 79469, Comdr, FEAF to Comdr, JADF, 08/0315Z Apr. 1954.
46	54	OPR-O-419, Comdr, JADF to Comdr, 49th FBG, 09/0310Z Apr. 1954.
47	55	Ltr., Hq. 7th FBS to Hq. 20th AF, sub.: Ashiya Air-to-Ground Range, 27 Apr. 1954.
48	56	GX-3504 DO/P-P, Comdr, 20th AF to Comdr. JADF, 04/1500I May 1954.
49	--	DJ, DCS/O, Hq, 20th AF, 6 May 1954.
50	--	Ibid., 13 May 1954.
--	57	Ltr., Hq, 20th AF to CG Rycom, sub.: Establishment of Restricted Airspace Area over Bombing and Gunnery Range, 21 May 1954.
51	58	A-MAT-INSTL, P4966, FEAF to JEP, Hq/CofS, USAF, 24 May 1954.
52	59	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, sub.: Bolo Auxiliary Air Base, 7 June 1954; DJ, DCS/O, Hq. 20th AF, 5, 6 June 1954; History, 930th Engineer Aviation Group (EAG), July-Dec. 1954, pp. 51-53.
53	59	Ibid.
54	59	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, sub.: Bolo Auxiliary Air Base, 7 June 1954), Hq. FEAF to Comdr. 20th AF, 17 June 1954.
55	--	History, 930th EAG, 1 May-30 June 1954, pp. 16-17.
56	60	DF, DO/P-P to DM/I-MGMT, sub.: Ie Shima Bombing and Gunnery Range, 8 June 1954.
57	60	1st ind., (DF, DO/P-P to DM/I-MGMT, sub.: Ie Shima

Footnote No.	Document No.	
		Bombing and Gunnery Range, 8 June 1954), DM/I-MGMT to DO/P-P, 14 June 1954.
58	--	DJ, DCS/O, 22 June 1954.
59	--	Ibid, 23 June 1954.
60	--	Ibid, 26 June 1954.
61	61	MF(C) 5406955 DO/P-P, Comdr, 20th AF to Comdr. 6351st AEW, 3 July 1954.
62	--	DJ, DCS/O, 1, 6, and 7 July 1954.
63	--	History, DCS/O, July 1954, p. 12.
64	--	Ibid, p. 20.
65	62	Memo. [evidently written by Operations and Training Directorate, Hq. 20th AD], sub.: Ie-Shima Range, 20 Sept. 1954; History, DCS/O, Aug. 1954, pp. 6, 12.
66	63	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to CG Rycom, sub.: Construction of Lighthouse, Ie-Shima, 12 Feb. 1954), Hq. Rycom to Comdr. 20th AF, 4 March 1954.
67	63	3d ind., (Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to CG Rycom, sub.: Construction of Lighthouse, Ie-Shima, 12 Feb. 1954), Hq. Rycom to Comdr. 20th AF, 19 March 1954.
68	64	G-6398 DO/P-P, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 20/1101I Aug. 1954.
69	65	Ltr., Hq. Rycom to Comdr. 20th AF, sub.: Construction of Lighthouse, Ie-Shima, 27 Aug. 1954.
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71	66	RCD Y0619, CG Rycom to CG AFFEE, 1 Sept. 1954.
72	67	D-15917 DO/P-P, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 20/1430I Sept. 1954.
73	62	Memo. [evidently originated by 20th AF O&T Dir.], sub.: Ie-Shima Range, 20 Sept. 1954; History, DCS/O. Sept. 1954, p. 16.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
74	68	DF, DO/CO&T to DCS/O, sub.: Present Ie-Shima Range Status, 18 Sept. 1954.
75	69	Ltr., Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, Comdr. 20th AF, to Col. James C. Cochran, Comdr. 6332d ABW, 21 Sept. 1954.
76	--	Ltr., Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, Comdr. 20th AF, to Maj. Gen. Roy H. Lynn, VC 5th AF, 1 Oct. 1954.
77	70	DF, DM/I-MGMT to DCS/O, sub.: Clearance of Bombing Range on Ie-Shima, 5 Oct. 1954.
78	--	Ryukyu Shimpo, 9 Oct. 1954.
79	--	Ibid.
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86	--	Ryukyu Shimpo, 15 Oct. 1954.
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88	71	DF, DM/I-MGMT to DCS/O, sub.: Clearance of Bombing Range on Ie-Shima, 16 Oct. 1954.
89	72	Minutes of Conference, sub.: Reference Resettlement Plan for Ie-Shima, 15 Oct. 1954.
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92	73	DF, DCS/O to DCS/M, sub.: Ie-Shima Bombing and Gunnery Range, 28 Oct. 1954.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
93	74	Memo. to Record, DCS/O, 4 Nov. 1954.
94	--	Ryukyu Shimpo, 10 Nov. 1954.
95	--	History, 930th EAG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1954, pp. 52-53.
96	--	Ryukyu Shimpo, 11 Nov. 1954.
97	75	49FB-A-C-694, Comdr. 49th FBG to Comdr. 20th AF, 13/0250Z Nov. 1954.
98	76	16800 DO/P-P, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. 49th FBG, 15/1530I Nov. 1954.
99	77	Ltr., CWO Vernon W. Rabbitt, Const. Eng., Hq. 808th EAB, to Whom It Might Concern, 17 Nov. 1954.
100	--	DJ, DCS/M, 19 Nov. 1954.
101	--	Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 Nov. 1954.
102	--	Okinawa Times, 18 Nov. 1954.
103	--	DJ, DCS/M, 19 Nov. 1954.
104	--	Ibid., 24 Nov. 1954.
105	78	Chronology of Ie Shima Clearance, 20 Aug. 1954-21 Jan. 1955, prepared by Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief, 20th AF Real Estate Branch.
106	--	Telephone conversation by Command Historian with Capt. John T. Harmeling, Rycom G-2, Civil Intelligence Section, 19 March 1956.
107	79	9215 DO/P-P, Comdr, 20th AF to Comdr. 5th AF, 26/1330I Nov. 1954.
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108	81	9579 DO/P-P, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. 5th AF, 09/1100I Dec. 1954.
109	82	U-DO-DO&T-2 13662, Comdr. FEAF to Chief of Staff, USAF, 29/0625Z Nov. 1954.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
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113	78	Chronology of Ie Shima Clearance, 20 Aug, 1954-21 Jan. 1955, prepared by Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief, 20th AF Real Estate Branch.
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---	84	Memo. for Record, Mr. John T. Sheehan, USCAR Real Estate Div., sub.: Ie Shima Clearance Negotiations, 5 Jan. 1955.
116	--	Okinawa Shimbun, 9 Jan. 1955.
117	85	DF, DM/I-MGMT to DCS/O, sub.: Clearance of Bombing Range on Ie Shima, 7 Jan. 1955.
118	78	Chronology of Ie Shima Clearance, 20 Aug. 1954-21 Jan. 1955, prepared by Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief, 20th AF Real Estate Branch.
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120	--	Okinawa Shimbun, 27 Jan. 1955.
121	86	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. 49th FBG to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Safe Distance Criteria for Air-to-Ground, 14 Dec. 1954), Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 20th AF, 18 Dec. 1954.
121	86	Ltr., Hq. 49th FBG to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Safe Distance Criteria for Air-to-Ground, 14 Dec. 1954.
122	87	DF, DO/O-T to DCS/O, Hq. 20th AF, sub.: Ranges and Fighter Bomber Wing Status, 1 Feb. 1955.
123	87	Ibid.
124	88	OPR-52/263, Comdr, 5th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 07/0120Z Feb. 1955.

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125	89	17567 COMDR, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 10/1030I Feb. 1955.
126	90	DO-CO&T-2 2494, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 11/0130Z Feb. 1955.
127	91	DO-CO&T-2, Comdr. FEAF to Comdrs. 5th AD and 20th AF, 17/0534Z Feb. 1955.
128	92	OPR-02 392, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 20th AF, 19/0320Z Feb 1955.
129	93	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to CG Rycom, sub.: Re-Opening Ie-Shima Bombing Range, 21 Feb. 1955.
130	93	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to CG Rycom, sub.: Re-Opening Ie-Shima Bombing Range, 21 Feb. 1955), Hq. Rycom to Comdr. 20th AF, 25 Feb. 1955.
131	94	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to Comdr. 6332d ABW, sub.: Re-Opening Ie-Shima Bombing Range, 25 Feb. 1955.
132	95	17663 DO/P-P, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. 5th AF, 25/1030I Feb. 1955.
133	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 2 Feb. 1955.
134	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 16 Feb. 1955.
---	96	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to DE, sub.: Air Force Land on Ie-Shima, 28 Feb. 1955.
135	97	002 D/O-P-P, Comdr, 313th ADiv to Comdr. 5th AF, 01/1100Z March 1955.
136	98	YO125, Dep. Gov., USCAR, to CINCFE, 28/0620Z Feb. 1955.
137	99	C 71675, Gov. RYIS to Dep. Gov. RYIS, 01/0315Z Mar 1955.
138	100	YO129, Dep. Gov., USCAR, to Gov. RYIS, 02/0731Z March 1955.
139	101	C71735, Gov. RYIS to Dep. Gov. RYIS, 05/0347Z Mar 1955.
140	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 3 March 1955.
141	102	Hq., Rycom Operations Order No. 1, 8 March 1955.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
142	103	Memo. for the Record, Hq., 313th ADiv., sub.: Ie-Shima, 10 March 1955.
143	104	GO 36, Comdr. 930th EAG to Comdr. 808th EAB, 10/0600 March 1955.
144	105	Ltr., Capt. Fred A. Barringer, Task Force S-3, to CO, Task Force Guidera, sub.: Operational After Action Report--Operation Guidera, 17 March 1955.
145	---	DJ, DO, 11 March 1955.
146	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 14 March 1955; Okinawa Times, 14 March 1955.
147	---	Okinawa Times, 14 March 1955.
148	---	Comment made to Command Historian by Lt. Col. Lynn D. Blackwell, 313th ADiv Ops. Directorate, 17 Apr. 1956.
149	---	Description given Command Historian by Major Robert Lippincott, 8118th AU, Rycom, 18 Apr. 1956.
150	106	After Action Report, 11-16 March 1955, Hq. TF Guidera, n.d.
151	---	Okinawa Times, 13 March 1955.
152	---	Ibid., 10 Apr. 1956.
153	---	Ibid., 4 Apr. 1956.
154	---	Ibid., 14 March 1955.
155	107	Hq., Task Force Guidera, Sequence of Events, n.d.
156	---	Okinawa Times, 16 March 1955.
157	105 106 107	Ltr., Capt. Fred A. Barringer, TF S-3, to CO, TF Guidera, sub.: Operational After Action Report - Operation Guidera, 17 March 1955; After Action Report #1--0400/11 March 1955 to 1500/16 March 1955, n.d.; Hq. TF Guidera, Sequence of Events, n.d.
158	106	Hq. TF Guidera, After Action Report #1, 0400/11 March 1955 to 1500/16 March 1955.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
159	---	Okinawa Times, 15 March 1955.
160	---	Ibid.
161	---	Ibid., 16 March 1955.
162	108	DF, DM/I-MGMT (Mr. Cox) to DM/I-MGMT (Mr. Hamlin Bucknam) and DO, sub.: Air Force Commitments, Ie-Shima, 18 March 1955.
163	109	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to CG Rycom, sub.: Use of Air Force Land on Ie-Shima, 28 March 1955.
164	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 18 March 1955.
165	---	Okinawa Times, 19 March 1955.
166	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 20 March 1955.
167	---	Okinawa Times, 19 March 1955.
168	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 21 March 1955.
169	---	Okinawa Times, 23 March 1955.
170	---	Ibid.
171	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 24 March 1955.
172	---	Ibid, 24 March 1955.
173	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 29 March 1955.
174	---	Okinawa Times, 19 March 1955; Ryukyu Shimpo, 6 Apr. 1955.
175	110	Memo., Major Dallas A. Sharp, Rycom Land Control Officer, to CG Rycom, sub.: Ie-Shima, 1 Apr. 1955.
176	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 6 Apr. 1955.
177	111	Ltr., USCAR to Chief Executive, GRI, sub.: Request of a Special Action for the Preferential Use of Fungibles in Ie Son by Evacuees, 4 Apr. 1955. The pedantic sound of this subject gives it the ring of the title for a doctor's dissertation.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
178	---	Okinawa Times, 13 Apr. 1955
179	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 19 Apr. 1955.
180	---	Ibid., 19 Apr. 1955.
181	---	Okinawa Times, 20 Apr. 1955.
182	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 22 Apr. 1955.
183	112	DF, DM/I-MGMT to Deputy Comdr. Hq. 313th AD, sub.: Ie-Shima--Clearance of Farming Areas, 21 Apr. 1955.
184	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 24 Apr. 1955.
185	113	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div., to Deputy Gov., sub.: Resettlement of 13 Families on Ie Shima, 25 Apr. 1955.
186	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 26 Apr. 1955.
187	---	Ibid., 3 May 1955.
188	---	Okinawa Times, 5 May 1955.
189	114	Memo. for Record, Mr. Clyde R. Cox, Chief, 313th Air Div. Real Estate Branch, 12 May 1955.
190	115	DJ, DM/I-MGMT, 11 May 1955.
191	116	Okinawa Times, 18 Mary 1955; DJ, DM/I-MGMT, 17 May 1955.
192	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 24 May 1955.
193	---	Ibid., 25 May 1955.
194	117	DJ, DM/I-MGMT, 24 May 1955.
195	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 31 May 1955.
196	---	Okinawa Times, 1 June 1955.
197	---	Ibid.
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199	---	Okinawa Times, 8 June 1955.
200	118	AFCIE-RUO 37017, Hq. USAF to Comdr. FEAF, info. 20th AF and USCAR, BT 02/2215Z june 1955. USAF apparently forgot that Twentieth Air Force had been replaced by the 313th Air Division on 1 March 1955.
201	119	DM/I 4405, Comdr. 313th ADiv to Comdr. 5th AF, 03/0715Z June 1955.
202	120	DO-CO&T-2 32751, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 09/0748Z June 1955.
203	121	DF, DM/I-MGMT to DC, Hq. 313th ADiv., sub.: Ie-Shima Bombing Range, 9 June 1955; Okinawa Times, 8 June 1955.
204	---	Okinawa Times, 8 June 1955.
205	---	Okinawa Morning Star (the only English language, privately published newspaper in the Ryukyus), 14 June 1955; Okinawa Shimbun, 18 June 1955, quoting statement made by Major Lloyd H. Hansen to a reporter for that newspaper.
206	122	Okinawa Morning Star, 15 June 1955; Okinawa Shimbun, 15 June, 1955, Statement made by Mr. Seymour S. Bernfeld, USCAR Legal Division, to Major Harry Scheiner, Asst. Staff Judge Advocate, Hq. 313th Air Div., as related in unsigned memo. (probably written by Major Scheiner) found in 313th Air Div. Provost Marchal file, sub.: Occurrence on Ie-Shima, 15 June 1955.
207	122	Ibid.
208	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 16 June 1955.
209	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 16 June 1955.
210	123	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Obstruction of Ie-Shima Bombing Range by natives, 20 June 1955.
211	124	Memo. for Record, 313th Air Div. Provost Marshal, sub.: Ie-Shima Problem, 16 June 1955.
212	125	Memo. for Record, Lt. Col. R. J. Wade, 313th Air Div.

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213	---	Okinawa Times, 22 June 1955
214	126	Ltr., Comdr. 313th Air Fiv. to Comdr. 18th FBW, sub.: Ie-Shima Bombing Range, 28 June 1955.
---	127	Memo. for Record, unsigned, probably written by 20th AF Plans and Programs, 30 Nov. 1954.
215	---	Okinawa Times, 12 Nov. 1954, 7 Feb. 1955.
216	---	Ibid., 5 Dec. 1954
217	---	Ibid., 12 Nov. 1954; Okinawa Nippo, 18 Jan. 1955.
218	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 29 Nov. 1952.
219	---	Okinawa Times, 1 Aug. 1954.
220	---	Okinawa Asahi Shimbun, 20 June 1954.
221	---	Okinawa Times, 23 June 1954.
222	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 19 July 1954.
223	---	Okinawa Times, 1 Aug. 1954.
224	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 23 Aug. 1954.
225	---	Okinawa Times, 5 Sept. 1954.
226	---	Ibid., 9 Oct. 1954.
227	---	Ibid., 3 Oct. 1954.
228	---	Ibid., 4 Oct. 1954.
229	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 10 Oct. 1954.
230	---	Okinawa Nippo, 13 Nov. 1954.
231	---	Okinawa Times, 27 Nov. 1954.
232	---	Ibid., 3 Dec. 1954.

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233	---	Ibid., 5 Dec. 1954.
234	---	Ibid., 11 Jan. 1955.
235	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 27 Feb. 1955.
236	---	Okinawa Times, 13 and 19 Jan. 1955.
237	---	Okinawa Times, 13 Jan. 1955.
238	---	Okinawa S himbun, 13 Jan. 1955
239	---	Okinawa Times, 19 Jan. 1955.
240	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 10 Feb. 1955.
241	---	Okinawa Times, 15 Feb. 1955.
242	---	Ibid.
243	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 27 Feb. 1955.
244	---	Okinawa Times, 20 March 1955.
245	---	Ibid., 27 March 1955; Ryukyu Shimpo, 2 June 1955.
246	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 18 Apr. 1955.
247	---	Ibid., 21 May 1955; Okinawa Times, 1 June 1955.
248	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 18 May 1955.
249	---	Okinawa Times, 31 May 1955.
250	---	Ryukyu Shimpo, 2 June 1955.
251	---	Ibid., 30 June 1955.
252	---	Okinawa Shimbun, 30 June 1955.
---	128	Ltr., Hq. MAAG, Formosa, to CG CAF, Taiwan, sub.: Report on Exercise "WATCHDOG", 6 June 1953.
---	129	Statement by Brig. Gen. William G. Hipps, Comdr. 313th Air Div., before Sub-Committee of House Armed Forces Committee, 21 Oct. 1955.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	130	Ltr., Hq. 624th AC&W Sq. to CO 529th AC&W Gp., sub.: Reroute of Surface Transportation, 21 Jan. 1953.
---	131	Ltr., Hq. 624th AC&W SQ. to CO 529th AC&W Gp., sub.: Unsatisfactory Freight Ship Service, 9 July 1953.
---	132	DF, DM/I-ENG to DM/I-MGMT, sub.: Real Estate Clearances for AC&W Site Requirements as Indicated, 8 Sept. 1954.
---	133	DF, DM/I-ENG to EM/I-PROG, sub.: Programming of Funds for Road and Water Requirements, 17 May 1954.
---	134	DF, DCS/M to OPN-COMM, sub.: Radar Equipment at Guam, M.I., 16 Oct. 1953.
---	135	Staff Study, Hq. 20th AF, sub.: Guam Air Defense, Radar and Communications Program, 1953-1954, n.d., /circa Sept. 1953/
---	136	TWX, Comm Elm Provence, Tokyo to Comdr. AACS, Andrews AFB, Nov. 1953.
---	137	Ltr., AACS, to Comdr. 1811th AACS Gp., sub.: GLOBECOM Transmitter Facilities, Kadena, 26 Jan. 1954.
---	138	DPR 0047, Comdr. 1808th AACS Wing to Comdr. 1811th AACS Gp., 28/0028Z Jan. 1954.
---	139	AACS E 01-C-21, Comdr. AACS to Comdr. 1808th AACS Wing, 01/2108Z March 1954.
---	140	Ltr., Office of the GLOBECOM Liaison Officer, Hq. 1811th AACS Gp., to Comdr. AACS, sub.: Globecom Contractual Installation and Construction Progress and Status Report, 19 Aug. 1954.
---	141	Ltr., Office of the GLOBECOM liaison Officer, Hq. 1811th AACS Gp., to Comdr. AACS, sub.: Globecom Contractual Installation and Construction Progress and Status Report, 18 Sept. 1954.
---	142	Ltr., Office of the GLOBECOM liaison Officer, Hq. 1811th AACS Gp., to Comdr. AACS, sub.: Globecom Contractual Installations and Construction Progress and Status Report, 16 Oct. 1954.
---	143	Daily Journals, Director of Materiel, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	144	Daily Journals, Director of Personnel, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955.
---	145	Daily Journals, Deputy for Air Defense, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955.
---	146	Daily Journals, Comptroller, 1 July-31 Dec. 1955.

APPENDIX 1

KEY STAFF POSITIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION



APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1955

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

POSITION	NAME
COMMAND SECTION	
Commander	Major General Fay R. Upthegrove (1 July - 11 July)
	Colonel Curtis D. Sluman (Acting) (11 July - 3 September)
	Brigadier General William G. Hipps (3 September - 31 December)
Deputy Commander	Colonel Curtis D. Sluman (1 July - 31 December)
Deputy for Air Defense	Colonel Hilmer C. Nelson (1 July - 16 August)
	(Vacant 16 August - 24 October)
	Colonel Paul E. Hoeper (24 October - 31 December)
Assistant to Deputy Commander	Lieutenant Colonel James R. Smith (1 July - 17 September)
Executive Officer	Lieutenant Colonel James R. Smith (17 September - 17 October)
	Lieutenant Colonel Walter P. Williams (17 October - 31 December)
Aide de Camp	Captain John R. Crane (1 July - 31 July)
	Captain Oliver C. Kyle, Jr. (Acting) (31 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Protocol Officer	Captain Oliver C. Kyle, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
INSPECTOR GENERAL	
Inspector General	Colonel Homer C. Rankin (1 July - 29 October)
	Major Charles J. Pellerin (Acting) (29 October - 21 November)
	Colonel Clement K. Wurzbach (21 November - 31 December)
Provost Marshal	Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Wade (1 July - 31 December)
Director of Inspections	Major Charles J. Pellerin (1 July - 31 December)
Communications & Electr. Insptr.	(Vacant 1 July - 8 July)
	Captain Bert A. Steen (8 July - 31 December)
Administrative Inspector	First Lieutenant Kenneth H. Kennedy (1 July - 31 December)
Technical Inspector	WOJG Marvin T. Higginson (1 July - 18 August)
	(Vacant 18 August - 31 December)
Supply Inspector	Major Dale P. Simpson (14 August - 31 December)
Maintenance Inspector	Major Lewis J. Villani (18 August - 31 December)
Commander, OSI Dist. Office #3	Major Ralph R. Bayer (1 July - 5 October)
	Lieutenant Colonel James T. Emott (5 October - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
JUDGE ADVOCATE	
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieutenant Colonel Robert O. Rollman (1 July - 31 December)
SURGEON	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel Jack H. Bristow (1 July - 11 July)
	Colonel Vance H. Marchbanks, Jr. (11 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES	
Information Services Officer	Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Carrigan (1 July - 29 September)
	Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. Betz (29 September - 31 December)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne C. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION	
Commandant	Captain Stanley Haas (1 July - 17 August)
	Major Charles P. Downer (17 August - 31 December)
COMMAND ADJUTANT	
Command Adjutant	Lieutenant Colonel Jack A. Riggs (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER	
Comptroller	Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence A. Boyd (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Management Analysis Div.	Lieutenant Colonel Lewis E. Hollard (1 July - 18 August)
	1st Lieutenant Patrick G. Wells (18 August - 31 December)
Budget Officer	Captain Charles E. Clarke (1 November - 31 December)
Chief, Statistical Services Div.	Major Onie A. Carroll (1 July - 10 October)
	(Vacant 10 October - 31 December)
Chief, Machine Accounting Branch	Captain Llewellyn B. Marshall (1 July - 31 December)
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL	
Director of Personnel	Colonel John A. Meeks (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Lieutenant Colonel John T. McDaniel (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Officers' Division	Major Dubert B. Hartley (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Warrant Officers' and Airmen's Division	Captain John S. Dunham (1 July - 12 July)
	Captain Louis E. Herrick (12 July - 31 December)
Chief, Individual Training OJT Division	Captain Harold W. Lloyd (1 July - 31 December)
Education Officer	(Vacant 1 July - 31 July)
	Captain John R. Barnard (1 August - 10 September)
	Captain Randolph L. Hall (10 September - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Personnel Services Div.	CWO Ralph F. Webster, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	
Assistant for Safety	Major Ulmer L. Buchanan (1 July - 31 December)
STAFF CHAPLAIN	
Staff Chaplain	Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. O'Brien (1 July - 13 September)
	Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Graham (13 September - 31 December)
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS	
Director of Operations	Colonel Leo C. Moon (1 July - 14 November)
	Colonel Edwin C. Ambrosen (14 November - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Blackwell (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans and Programs Division	Major Paul A. Hughes (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Programs Branch	Captain Tompkins N. Bogel (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans Branch	Major Dean F. Schwendeman (25 November - 31 December)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Major James C. Finlayson (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Air Defense Operations Branch	Major John C. Baird (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Tactical Operations Branch	Major Jack L. Raymer (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Electronics Warfare Branch	1st Lieutenant John V. Fay, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Operations Services Branch	Captain Charles A. Wilde (1 July - 1 September)
	Captain Robert M. Ryan, Jr. (1 September - 25 November)
	Captain Charles A. Wilde (25 November - 31 December)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Div.	Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin P. Rambo (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Division	Lieutenant Colonel Irving H. Gravin (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch	Major Frank A. Papcun (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Electronics Systems Branch	Captain Eugene P. Daspit (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Major Richard P. Reinsch (1 July - 24 October)
	Major James F. Giddens (24 October - 31 December)
Chief, Operational Intelligence Branch	Captain Rudolph H. Pestalozzi (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Current Intelligence Branch	1st Lieutenant Donald F. Hubbard (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Targets Intelligence Branch	Captain Lawrence W. Gold (1 July - 12 July)
	2d Lieutenant John E. Pirtle (12 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL	
Director of Materiel	Colonel Robert Whelchel (1 July - 14 August)
	Colonel Kermit R. Kann (14 August - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Materiel	Lieut. Colonel Lloyd W. Neighbors (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Branch	Lieut. Colonel George A. Wischmann* (1 July - 27 November)
	(Vacant 27 November - 3 December)
	Major Edward J. Pawlowski (3 December - 31 December)
Staff Exchange Officer	Lieutenant Colonel Jewell Matthews (1 July - 21 September)
	(Vacant 21 September - 2 December)
	Lieut. Colonel Irvin G. Anderson (2 December - 31 December)
Administrative Officer, Damage Control Office	Captain Michael V. Doran** (24 July - 31 December)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Major Howard W. Peterson (Acting) (1 July - 4 September)
	Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Clark (4 September - 31 December)
Chief, Aircraft Supply Branch	Major Howard W. Peterson (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, General Supply and Services Branch	Captain Ralph H. Stem (1 July - 31 December)

* Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel effective 12 August 1955.
** Promoted to Captain effective 16 November 1955

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Armament and Munitions Branch	1st Lieutenant Robert W. Muth (1 July - 11 July)
	(Vacant 11 July - 31 December)
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Rycom and POL Officer	1st Lieutenant Robert T. Frost (7 October - 31 December)
Supply Officer	Captain Austin G. Petry (24 August - 10 September)
Chief, Services Branch	2d Lieutenant John T. Peters (15 August - 6 September)
	(Vacant 6 September - 31 December)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major Gerald L. Purkey (Acting) (1 July - 9 November)
	Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Chick, Jr. (9 November - 31 December)
Chief, Armament Maintenance Branch	Major Gerald L. Purkey (1 July - 31 December)
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	Captain Barton W. MacNeill (3 October - 31 December)
Communications and Electronics Staff Officer	Major Edward C. McCullough (1 July - 21 July)
	Major Robert T. Kraus (21 July - 31 December)
Electronics Officer	1st Lieutenant Walter M. Myrick (26 October - 31 December)
Chief, Transportation Division	Lieut. Col. Stanley E. Bradley, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Air Priorities Officer	1st Lieutenant David Kulchin (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Surface Transportation Officer	1st Lieutenant George A. Breher* (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Procurement Division	Major Paul F. Pomeroy (1 July - 18 July)
	Major Vincent E. Howard (18 July - 31 December)
Chief, Installations Division	Colonel Paul W. Stephens (1 July - 24 July)
	Major Robert F. Kavanaugh (Acting) (24 July - 24 September)
	Lieutenant Colonel Stanley R. Wilber (24 September - 11 October)
	Major Robert F. Kavanaugh (Acting) (11 October - 31 December)
Chief, Plans and Programs Branch	1st Lieutenant Norman L. Stout (1 July - 10 October)
	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (10 October - 31 December)
Assistant Chief, Installations Div.	Mr. James H. Cusack (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Management Branch	Mr. Hamlin Bucknam (Civilian) (1 July - 4 December)
Chief, Facilities Support Branch	Major Robert F. Kavanaugh (1 July - 31 December)
Real Property Officer	Mr. Clyde R. Cox (Civilian) (1 July - 30 July)
	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (Acting) (30 July - 31 December)

*Promoted to First Lieutenant effective 17 July 1955.

Appendix 1

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

POSITION	NAME
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Commander	Colonel Glendon P. Overing (1 July - 31 December)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Commander, Rear	Colonel John C. Healey (2 September - 29 September)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel John C. Healey (1 July - 31 December)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Executive Officer	Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Smith (1 July - 31 December)
18th Air Base Group Commander	Colonel James B. Cobb (1 July - 31 December)
18th Maintenance & Supply Group Commander	Colonel James L. Perkins (1 July - 31 December)
18th Fighter Bomber Group Commander	Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Andres (1 July - 21 November)
	Colonel Leo C. Moon (21 November - 31 December)
12th Fighter Bomber Sqdn. Commander	Major Joe Setnor (1 July - 10 September)
	Major Mark V. Wilson (10 September - 31 December)
44th Fighter Bomber Sqdn. Commander	Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Andres (1 July - 22 July)
	Major Burton S. Shiner, Jr. (22 July - 18 November)
	Lieutenant Colonel Carleton W. Rogers (18 November - 31 December)
67th Fighter Bomber Sqdn. Commander	Major Howard B. Townsley (1 July - 10 November)
	(Vacant 10 November - 19 November)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
67th Fighter Bomber Sqdn. Comdr. (Cont'd.)	Lieutenant Colonel Peter F. English (19 November - 31 December)
18th Supply Squadron Commander	Major William P. Vanden Dries (1 July - 31 December)
18th Motor Vehicle Sqdn. Comdr.	Major Raymond E. Butler (1 July - 7 October)
	First Lieutenant Donn H. Lipton (7 October - 31 December)
18th Field Maintenance Sqdn. Comdr.	Major Robert C. Kerr (1 July - 31 December)
18th Installations Sqdn. Commander	Captain Edwin B. Koonce (1 July - 18 October)
	Major Andy S. Briscoe (18 October - 31 December)
18th Communications Sqdn. Commander	Major Galen A. Livingood (1 July - 31 December)
18th Tactical Hospital Commander	Lieut. Colonel Dayton R. Griffith (1 July - 31 December)
7th Tactical Depot Sqdn. Commander	Lieutenant Colonel Hugh M. Dale (1 July - 24 August)
	Lieutenant Colonel Edgar L. Kiser (24 August - 31 December)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Clifford L. Martin (1 July - 31 December)
12th Aviation Depot Sqdn. Commander	Lieutenant Colonel John C. Fox (1 July - 31 December)
13th Communications Squadron Comdr.	Major Gordon R. Sorensen (1 July - 31 December)
15th Weather Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lowell A. Schuknecht (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
17th Comm. Construction Sqdn. Comdr.	Captain Robert C. Mills (1 July - 31 December)
80th Fighter Bomber Squadron Comdr.	Lieut. Colonel John L. Gregory, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot Commander	Lieut. Colonel Leo H. Vanderhoven (1 July - 31 December)
581st Air Resupply Group Commander	Colonel William W. Wilcox (1 July - 31 December)
581st Air Resupply Gp. Deputy Comdr. and Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Herbert M. Campbell (1 July - 14 August)
581st Air Resupply Gp. Exec. Officer	Lieut. Colonel Bernard L. Campbell (14 August - 31 December)
581st Air Resupply Squadron Comdr.	Lieut. Colonel Calvin E. McWilliams (1 July - 31 December)
581st Airborne Materials Assembly Squadron Commander	Lieutenant Colonel Edward R. Ford (1 July - 31 December)
6333d Technical Training Sqdn. (Survival) Commander	Major Robert E. Pasho (1 October - 31 December)
744th Troop Carrier Sqdn. (m) Comdr. (Organization arrived TDY from Shiroi AB, Japan, 23 November 1955)	Major Guy E. Ridgeway (23 November - 31 December)
808th Engineer Aviation Bn. Comdr.	Lieut. Colonel Christian C. Lutz (1 July - 31 December)
1962d Airways and Air Communications System Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Dean A. Voight (1 July - 31 December)
6927th Security Flight (USAFSS) Comdr.	First Lieutenant Emory R. Moore (1 July - 16 October)
	Major James P. Goss (16 October - 31 December)

Appendix 1

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

POSITION	NAME
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Base Commander	Colonel Edwin C. Ambrosen (1 July - 14 November)
	Colonel George V. Williams (Acting) (14 November - 20 November)
	Colonel John H. Bell (20 November - 31 December)
51st Ftr. Intcptr. Wing. Ground Executive Officer	Colonel Newton M. Richard, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
51st Air Base Group Commander	Colonel Travis Hoover (1 July - 7 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Abram B. Sheaffer (7 July - 25 November)
	Colonel Walter V. Gresham (25 November - 31 December)
51st Maintenance and Supply Gp. Comdr.	Colonel Robert L. Cardenas (1 July - 31 December)
51st Fighter Interceptor Group Comdr.	Colonel George V. Williams (1 July - 31 December)
16th Fighter Interceptor Sqdn. Comdr.	Major Lee F. Richason (1 July - 5 July)
	Major Emmett C. Wyttenbach (5 July - 24 October)
	Lieut. Colonel Glenn E. W. Mann, Jr. (24 October - 31 December)
25th Fighter Interceptor Sqdn. Comdr.	Lieutenant Colonel Donald V. Miller (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
26th Fighter Interceptor Sqdn. Comdr.	Lieutenant Colonel Homer W. Morris (1 July - 31 December)
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieutenant Colonel Raleigh G. Smith (1 July - 31 December)
51st Tactical Hospital Commander	1st Lieutenant Herbert R. Hornberger (1 July - 31 December)
6157th Operations Squadron Commander (Organization based at Naha AB as of 5 October 1955)	Lieut. Colonel Philip M. Loveless, Jr. (5 October - 31 December)
Detachment #1, Hq. 313th Air Division Commander	Lieut. Colonel Stephen J. Bertling (1 July - 31 August) Major Maurice W. Gouchoe (31 August - 20 September) Lieut. Colonel James R. Geary, Jr. (20 September - 31 December)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Sqdn. Commander	Lieut. Colonel Harry O. Flathmann (1 July - 31 December)
624th Aircraft Control and Warning Sqdn. Commander	Major Joe L. Graham (1 July - 31 December)
1233d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Captain A. J. Vickers (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment #1, 22d Crash Rescue Boat Squadron Commander	First Lieutenant Carl Sojein (1 July - 11 November) CWO Arthur C. Dennison (11 November - 31 December)

APPENDIX 2

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF KEY PERSONNEL

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM GROVER HIPPS



BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM GROVER HIPPS, 1358 A

Commander, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Lumber City, Pennsylvania, 8 June 1912.

Marital Status: Married, 1 child.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Curwenville, High School, Pa.	Academic	X			1930
College:	USMA West Point, New York	Mil Science	X		BS	1937

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
Randolph Fld Texas	Pilot Tng	13 mos	Com	1938
AWC	Reg Course	10 mos	Com	1949

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
DSC	11 Dec 1942
Purple Heart	.---
Bz Star Medal	17 Mar 1947
Air Medal	29 Dec 1945
5 AF Citation	1945
Phil. Def. Ribbon	1945
Phil. Lib. Ribbon	1945
Asiatic Pac Th	1944
Amer Def Medal	1945
WW II Vic Medal	1945
Legion of Merit	1947
Dist Unit Cit.	1947
OLC Legion of Merit	1947
Nat'l Def Sv Medal	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	RA	12 Jun 1937	12 Jun 1937
1st Lt	RA	8 Jun 1940	8 Jun 1940
Captain	AUS	9 Sep 1940	9 Sep 1940
Major	AUS	30 Jan 1942	30 Jan 1942
Lt Colonel	AUSAC	1 Dec 1942	1 Dec 1942
Lt Colonel	AUS	26 Jan 1943	26 Jan 1943
Colonel	AUSAC	30 Oct 1943	17 Aug 1943
Colonel	AUS	1 Aug 1944	1 Aug 1944
Captain	RA	12 Jun 1947	12 Jun 1947
Lt Colonel	USAF	2 Jul 1948	1 Jul 1948
Colonel	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	17 Aug 1943
Colonel	USAF	28 Jul 1951	28 Jul 1951
Brig General	USAF	25 Aug 1953	24 Aug 1953

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization

Mar 1931	Jun 1933	Pfc National Guard	
Jul 1933	Jun 1937	Cadet	USMA West Point, N.Y.
Sep 1937	Oct 1938	Student Flt Tng	Randolph & Kelly Flds.
Nov 1938	Sep 1940	Pilot-CO Recruiting Tng Ctr	3d Attack Gp Barksdale
Sep 1940	Mar 1941	Same	27B Gp Hunter, Fld, Ga.
Apr 1941	Dec 1941	Commanding Officer	16B Sq 27B Gp
11 Dec 1941	1 Feb 1942	A-3	Far East Air Forces
2 Feb 1942	1 Mar 1942	Staff A-5	ABDACOM JAVA
2 Mar 1942	31 Jul 1942	Staff A-3	Allied Air Forces, SWPA
1 Aug 1942	31 Dec 1942	Staff A-3	Adv Station 5 AF
1 Jan 1943	31 Dec 1944	Staff	Ops Div WDGS
1 Jan 1945	24 Jun 1945	Staff Officer Thea. Group	Same
25 Jun 1945	31 Dec 1945	A-5	Hq FEAF APO 925
1 Jan 1946	24 Jan 1946	A/C Air Staff A-3	Hq PACUSA APO 925
25 Jan 1946	19 Apr 1946	Deputy AC/S A-3	Hq PACUSA APO 925
20 Apr 1946	30 Jun 1946	Deputy AC/S A-5	Hq SAC Bolling Fld, DC
1 Jul 1946	30 Jun 1947	Deputy AC/S A-5	Hq SAC Andrews Fld,D.C.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
1 Jul 1947	31 May 1948	Chief Plans Sec A-5	Hq 44th Bomb Group Hq SAC Andrews Fld., D.C.
"Transferred to the Dept of the Air Force per Transfer Order 1 NME 26 Sep 1947"			
1 Jun 1948	9 Aug 1948	Chief Plans Sec A-5	(Hq SAC) Andrews AFB D.C., Hq 44th Bomb Ground
10 Aug 1948	21 Dec 1948	Student AWC	Sq B-1 41st AFBU Maxwell Field, Ala.
22 Dec 1948	19 Jun 1949	Student AWC	Hq AWC, MAFB, Ala.
Flying hrs fr 1 Aug 1948 to 31 May 1949 (113:50) (B-25. c-45)			
20 Jun 1949	19 Jun 1950	Instr P/A Div	Hq, AWC, MAFB, Ala.
20 Jun 1950	14 Nov 1950	Instr Plns & Opns Div, AWC	Same
15 Nov 1950	16 May 1951	Faculty AWC	Same
17 May 1951	16 Jun 1951	Faculty, Acad Div No. 1	Same
17 Jun 1951	18 Jul 1951	TDY to Washington, D.C.	Same
19 Jul 1951	31 Jul 1955	Exec. to the Secy of the Air Force	Hq USAF OSAF, Wash. D.C.
1 Aug 1955	1 Sep 1955	Tvl, Lv & Processing	Hq 313th AD, APO 239
2 Sep 1955		Commander	313th AD, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
East Indies	USAFFE GO 60/44 & 43/45
Papuan	USAFFE GO 38/43
S. Philippine	WDGO 33/45
Luzon	WDGO 33/45
Philippine Is	WDGO 24/47

RATINGS, SPECIALTIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
Sen Pilot	24 Mar 1944
Best qualified aircraft Bomber 4 Engine B-29 Comd Plt	23 Oct 1953

313th AD, 1955-II

COMBAT DATA

20 combat missions, 91 combat hours, B-25, B-17, South West Pacific.

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 122)

23 June 1955

1. MAJGEN FAY R UPTHEGROVE, 76A, is rel from asg Hq 313th Air Div, FEAF, APO 239, San Francisco, Calif, from dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div; asg Hq 3380th Technical Tng Wg, ATC, Keesler AFB, Miss rept NLT 1 Sep 55 for dy as Comdr, 3380th Technical Tng Wg. DALVP. Tvl by mil and or nav water carr auth. Tvl of depn (W, Mrs Marcella D Upthegrove; and daughter, Mary J. Upthegrove, DOB 11 Aug 36), concurrently with OAuth. If tvl to CLUS is perf by MATS, AMD and auth for excess personal bag alw w/b obtained from the local area priority issuing agency. TPA with 9 days tvl time auth. If POV is not used, tvl time w/b the time of the carr used. WP. PCS. TDN. 5763500 048-132 P 531-02, 03 S 99-999; 5763500 048-118 P 511-01 S 99-999. EDCSA: 16 Aug 55.

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5. BRIGEN WILLIAM G HIPPS, 1359A, is rel from asg Hq USAF, SAFS, WASHDC, from dy as Exec Asst to the SAF: asg Hq 313th Air Div, FEAF, APO 239, San Francisco, Calif rept on or about 15 Aug 55 for dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div, eff upon dept of MAJGEN UPTHEGROVE. DALVP. Tvl by mil and or nav water carr auth. Tvl of depn (W, Mrs Juanita R Hipps; and son, William G Hipps, Jr, DOB 2 Mar 49; address - 505 Tyler Place, Alexandria, Va), concurrently with OAuth. Officer and depn WP PAE, Travis AFB, Calif rept NLT 10 Aug 55 for tvl to destn under AMD US-33-1D-0677-RF-8 (officer), and AMD US-33-1DE-0678-RF-8 (depn). Os shipmt of HHG and POV auth. OAuth personal bag alw of 150 lbs, incl excess, while tvl by air. Each depn over 12 yr of age is auth personal bag alw of 100 lbs, incl excess, and each depn under 12 yr of age is auth personal bag alw of 65 lbs, incl excess, while tvl by air OCLUS. Immn IAW AFR 160-102, as appl, w/b accomp by officer and depn. Depn will have passports in possession upon arr PAE. Excess personal bag alw by water w/b sent c/o PTO, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif, marked PRIBAG. All mail w/b addressed to show gr, name, AFSN, Commander, 313th Air Division, APO 239, San Francisco, Calif. TPA with 12 days tvl time auth. If POV is not used, tvl time w/b the time of the carr used. WP. PCS. TDN. 5763500 048-132 P 531-02, 03 S 99-999; 5763500 048-118 P 511-01 S99-999. EDCSA: 1 Aug 55.

. . . . . .

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

N. F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

OFFICIAL:

E. E. TORO
Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

A TRUE INFORMATION COPY:
Robert L. Lattimore
ROBERT L. LATTIMORE
2d Lt USAF
Asst ISO

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 135)

13 July 1955

. . . . . .

5. SMOP 5, SO 122, DAF, CS, relating to rsg of BRIGEN WILLIAM G HIPPS, 1358A, Hq USAF, OSAFS, WASHDC to Hq 313th Air Div, FEAF, APO 239, San Francisco, Calif, as reads "rept on or about 15 Aug 55 for dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div" and "rept NLT 10 Aug 55 for tvl to destn" LATR "rept on or about 22 Aug 55 for dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div" and "rept NLT 17 Aug 55 for tvl to destn."

. . . . . .

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

OFFICIAL:

N. F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

E. E. TORO
Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

A TRUE EXTRACT INFORMATION COPY:

ROBERT L. LATTIMORE
2d Lt USAF
Asst ISO

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 151)

4 August 1955

. . . . . .

3. SMOP 5, SO 122, DAF, CS, as amnd by para 5, SO 135, DAF, CS, relating to rsg of BRIGEN WILLIAM G HIPPS, 1358A, Hq USAF, OSAFS, WASHDC to Hq 313th Air Div, FEAF, APO 239, San Francisco, Calif, with EDCSA: 1 Aug 55, as reads "rept on or about 22 Aug 55 for dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div" and "rept NLT 17 Aug 55 for tvl to destn" is further, amnd to read "rept on or about 28 Aug 55 for dy as Comdr, 313th Air Div" and "rept NLT 23 Aug 55 for tvl to destn."

. . . . . .

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:

OFFICIAL:

N. F. TWINING
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

E. E. TORO
Colonel, USAF
Air Adjutant General

A TRUE EXTRACT INFORMATION COPY:

Robert L. Lattimore
ROBERT L. LATTIMORE
2d Lt USAF
Asst ISO

COLONEL EDWIN CLARENCE AMBROSEN



COLONEL EDWIN CLARENCE AMBROSEN, AO 421 569

Director of Operations, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Winona, Minnesota, 26 October 1914

Marital Status: Married, 3 children

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Winona Sr. High, Winona, Minnesota	Academic	X			1932
University:	Purdue University	Bus Adm.		X	1½ yrs	1938
	Univ of Minnesota	Bus Adm.		X	1 year	1940

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AFF	Pilot Training	5 mos	Com	1941
AFF Kelly Fld, Texas	Adv Plt Tng	2½ mos	Com	1941
AAFSAT, Florida	Stf Off Tng	1 mo	Com	July 1943
AAFSAC, Florida	Airborne Rdr Fam	1 wk	Com	July 1945

AWARDS, DECORATIONS, AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
AM with 5 OLC	11 Nov 1944
Unit Cit with 1 OLC	12 Sep 1944
SS	30 Oct 1944
EAME Rib with 4 BS	1944
NDSM	31 Jul 1953
AFRM	31 Jul 1953
French Croix de Guerre with Palm	31 Jul 1953
WWI Vic Med	31 Jul 1953
ACM	31 Jul 1953
ADSM	31 Jul 1953
DFC	14 Jul 1944

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	ORC	12 Jul 1941	12 Jul 1941
1st Lt	AUS	1 Feb 1942	1 Feb 1952
Captain	AUS-AC	7 Nov 1942	7 Nov 1942
Captain	AUS	26 Nov 1943	26 Nov 1943
Major	AUS-AC	2 Dec 1943	2 Dec 1943
1st Lt	AUS-AC	12 Jul 1944	12 Jul 1944
Lt Colonel	AUS-AC	13 Aug 1944	13 Aug 1944
Colonel	USAFR	12 Dec 1949	
Colonel	AFUS	7 Jun 1950	7 Jun 1950

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Enlisted 20 Nov 1940, Cadet & Plt Tng, Disch 11 Jul 1941. EAD 12 Jul 1941, Inst Plt SE & B-24, 24 mo. Dir of O&T 14 mo. Sq Comdr Plt B-24 16 mo. Flt Leader 20 mo. Sq Exec Off 2 mo. Rel from Active Duty 4 Sep 1946

Dates			
From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
5 Sep 1946	6 Jun 1950	Inactive Res 3/two 15 day AD tours	
7 Jun 1950	28 Feb 1951	Asst to Gp Ch for Res Matters	Hq USAF DCS/O-ODP
1 Mar 1951	14 Oct 1951	Same	Same
15 Oct 1951	29 Feb 1952	Same	Same
1 Mar 1952	24 Jun 1952	Same	Same
25 Jun 1952	28 Feb 1953	Dep for R/F Proj, Prog Div	Same
1 Mar 1953	5 Jul 1953	Same	Same
6 Jul 1953	30 Sep 1953	Same	Same
10 Oct 1953	5 Jul 1954	Same	Same
6 Jul 1954	18 Jul 1954	Same	Same
19 Jul 1954	8 Aug 1954	No duty assignment	P.L to FEAF
9 Aug 1954	15 Aug 1954	Wg Exec Off	Hq 51st FIW, APO 235
16 Aug 1954	31 Oct 1954	Wg Comdr	Same
1 Nov 1954	13 Nov 1955	Same	Same
14 Nov 1955	Present	Dir of Opns	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
Naples-Foggia	1945

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN (cont'd.)

Campaign	Date
Rome-Arno	1945
Southern France	1945
Air Off, Europe	1945

RATINGS, SPECIALITIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
Pilot	11 Jul 1941
Sr Pilot	1 Nov 1951

COMBAT DATA

40 Combat Missions, 246 Combat Hours, B-24, EAME.

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

COLONEL JOHN HOWARD BELL



313th AD, 1955-II

COLONEL JOHN HOWARD BELL, AO 4185 A

Commander

51st Fighter Interceptor Wing

Place and Date of Birth: Lewistown, Pennsylvania, 3 August 1916

Marital Status: Married, No children

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj.	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Lewistown, Penn.	Academic	X			1934
University :	Temple Univ. Penn.	Mgmt.	X		BS	1939

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AFF	Prim & Bsc Rlt Tr	9 mos.	Com	Dec 1940
Craig Fld, Ala.	Mil Mgmt Course	1 mo.	Com	Apr 1947
AC&SL, AU	Reg Course	9 mos.	Com	Jun 1948
Grad Sch of Bus	Adv Mgmt Course	3 mos.	Com	May 1953
Air War College	Reg Course	10 mos.	Com	Jun 1954

AWARDS, DECORATIONS, AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
ACM	31 Jul 1953
APM	31 Jul 1953
Air Medal	25 Sep 1945
ADEFMDL	31 Jul 1953
WW II Vic MDL	31 Jul 1953
NATDEFSVCMDL	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	ORC	20 Dec 1940	
1st Lt	AC	4 Jan 1942	3 Jan 1942
1st Lt	AUS	3 Aug 1943	3 Aug 1943
Capt	AC	22 Aug 1942	22 Aug 1942
Capt	AUS	1 Nov 1943	1 Nov 1943
Major	AC	24 Mar 1943	24 Mar 1943
Major	AUS	24 Jul 1944	24 Jul 1944
Lt Col	AC	1 Aug 1944	1 Aug 1944
Lt Col	AUS	1 Aug 1944	1 Aug 1944
1st Lt	RA	5 Jul 1946	3 Aug 1944
Lt Col	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	1 Aug 1944
Maj	USAF	3 Sep 1948	1 Jul 1948
Lt Col	USAF	12 Jul 1951	19 Oct 1950
Colonel	AFUS	19 Jan 1951	19 Jan 1951

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
13 May 1940	19 Dec 1940	A/C Tng	
20 Dec 1940		Basic Fly Instr - Basic elements of Flying dual & solo, day & night, 12 mos; Wg. Engr. Off. sub depot, 12 mos; Wg Comdr of depot, 4 mos; Wg Base Comdr, 4 mos; Hq CBI Ass't Eng Off, 3 mos; GRU Engr Off, 3 mos; Hq CBI D/S to 84th ADG, 3 mos; Comd Ass't Ch Maint & Rpr Off, 2 mos; Comd of Maint Div, 14 mos; Base Unit Ch, Require Br, Logistic Div A-4, 2 mos; Hq SAC Ass't Ch, Logistic Div A-4, 12 mos; Hq SAC, Ch Maint Sec A-4 Div, 7 mos.	
7 Aug 1947	4 Jun 1948	Student Off AC&SS	Air Univ, MAFB, Ala.
5 Jun 1948	27 Aug 1948	No duty assgmt.	AU Maxwell AFB, Ala.
28 Aug 1948	10 Sep 1948	W/Sta N.Y.Univ. NYC	SqS 41st AFBU, MAFB, Ala.
11 Sep 1948	30 Sep 1948	Waiting assgmt.	HqSq 92ABGRUSPAFB Wn
1 Oct 1948	31 Oct 1948	Actg A-4	HqSq 92 B Wg, SPAFB Wn
1 Nov 1948	30 Nov 1948	A-4 Officer	Same
1 Dec 1948	19 Mar 1949	Wing A-4	HqSq 92 B Wg, SPAFB, Bong Wn
20 Mar 1949	30 Jun 1949	A-4 Officer 52	Hq 311th AD, TAFB, Kans
1 Jul 1949	20 Oct 1949	Asst Dir of Mat'l.	Same
21 Oct 1949	11 Jan 1950	Dep to Ass't. for Fgn. Aid	Hq USAF, Wash., D.C., DCSM
12 Jan 1950	30 Apr 1950	Asst to Ch Pol Div Inter Br	Same
1 May 1950	31 Dec 1950	Same	Same

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (Cont'd.)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
1 Jan 1951	11 Mar 1951	Staff Off, Spec Proj Br	Same
12 Mar 1951	4 Apr 1951	TDY Hq Sq 9th AF (TAC) PAFB, N.C.	Same
5 Apr 1951	21 May 1951	Staff Off, Spec Proj Br	Same
22 May 1951	24 May 1951	Same	Same
25 May 1951	31 Dec 1951	Exec OSAF - Under Sec of AF	Hq USAF OSAF
1 Jan 1952	31 Dec 1952	Same	Same
1 Jan 1953	23 Feb 1953	Same	Same
24 Feb 1953	25 May 1953	Stu Off (TDY Harvard Univ.)	Same
26 May 1953	2 Aug 1953	Exec to Under Sec	Same
3 Aug 1953	25 Jul 1954	Student AWC	AWC, MAFB, Ala.
26 Jul 1954	14 Aug 1954	Tul, Lv, & Proc.	P/L to FEAF
15 Aug 1954	26 Aug 1954	Ch, Maint Div, D/M	Hq 5th AF, APO 970
27 Aug 1954	31 Oct 1954	Dr of Maint-Eng, DCS/MATS	Hq 5th AF, APO 710
1 Nov 1954	10 Dec 1954	Same	Same
11 Dec 1954	12 Jul 1955	Dr of Maint, DCS/MAT, Engr.	Same
13 Jul 1955	30 Sep 1955	Asst DCS/MAT, Eng	Same
1 Oct 1955	19 Nov 1955	Same	Same
20 Nov 1955	Present	Wing Commander	Hq. 51st FIW, APO 235 (Naha AB)

CAMPGAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
Cent. Burma (BSS)	1947
India-Burma (BSS)	1947

RATINGS, SPECIALITIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
Pilot	20 Dec 1940
Sr Pilot	15 Jan 1946
Sr Pilot	5 Jul 1946
Comd Pilot	20 Dec 1955

SOURCE: Officers' WD Form 66

COLONEL PAUL EDWARD HOEPER



COLONEL PAUL EDWARD HOEPER, 8 703 A

Deputy for Air Defense, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Wausau, Wisconsin, 11 April 1919.

Marital Status: Married, 3 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location:	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Wausau, Wisconsin	Academic	X			1937
Univ's.	Univ. of Michigan	Economics	X		BA, EC	1946
	Univ. of Pitts-burgh, Pa.	Advance Mgt	X		ML, EC	1950

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AFF	Prim & Basic Plt	8 mos	Com	Apr 1942
AAFSAT	Day Ftr	2 wks	Com	1943
USAF CAFB, Alabama	Sr Off Mil Mgt Crse	1 mo	Com	Jun 1949
U. of Pittsburgh	Advanced Mgt	10 mos	Com	Jun 1950
Craig AFB, Alabama	Jet Indoc Crse	21 dys	Com	Jun 1954
Tyndall AFB, Florida	Phase II-Adv Jet Ftr Crse #112101C	2½ mos	Com	Oct 1954

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
EAMECM	21 Feb 1943
DUB	9 May 1945
AM (11 OLC)	29 Nov 1943
DFC (1 OLC)	7 Mar 1944
PH	23 May 1944
WW II VM	31 Jul 1953
ACM	31 Jul 1953
Croix De Guerre	7 Oct 1945
NATDEFSM	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	AC	29 Apr 1942	29 Apr 1942
1st Lt	AUS	22 Oct 1942	22 Oct 1942
Captain	AUS-AC	18 Dec 1943	18 Dec 1943
Captain	AUS	24 Feb 1944	24 Feb 1944
Major	AUS	10 Jul 1944	10 Jul 1944
1st Lt	ORC	29 Apr 1945	---
Lt Colonel	AUS	29 Apr 1945	29 Apr 1945
1st Lt	RA	19 Jun 1947	29 Apr 1945
Lt Colonel	AUS	5 Aug 1947	---
Captain	USAF	25 Oct 1948	1 Jul 1948
Lt Colonel	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	30 Sep 1946
Major	Reg AF	12 Oct 1951	14 Dec 1950
Colonel	USAF	18 Jun 1952	1 Jun 1952

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Enl 16 Aug 1941 A/C Disch 28 Apr 1942; EAD 29 Apr 1942, Ftr Plt 22 mos, Asst Opns 4 mos, Opns Off 16 mos, Awtg Separation & Lv 4 mos, Reld fr AD 3 Mar 1946, Inactive Status 17 Mos, Recall to EAD 5 Aug 1947, 5 Aug 1947 to 1 Sep 1947 Awtg Asgmt.

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
2 Sep 1947	20 Oct 1947	Dep Comdr	56 M&S Gp Selfridge AFB, Michigan
21 Oct 1947	28 May 1948	Sq Comdr	Maint Sq 56 M&S Selfridge AFB, Michigan
29 May 1948	5 Jul 1948	Sq Comdr & Ch of Maint	56 M&S Gp Selfridge AFB, Michigan
6 Jul 1948	6 May 1949	Gp Comdr & Ch of Maint	Same
7 May 1949	9 Jun 1949	TDY-Craig AFB, Ala-Sr O Mil Mgt Crse	Same
10 Jun 1949	26 Jul 1949	Jet Ftr Plt	Same
27 Jul 1949	24 Aug 1949	Awtg Asgmt	Same
25 Aug 1949	15 Jun 1950	Stu-Spec Adv Mgt-U of Pittsburgh	Hq USAFIT (AU) W-PAFB, Ohio
16 Jun 1950	15 Jul 1950	Tvl & Delay Enroute	Hq USAFIT (AU) W-PAFB, Ohio

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
16 Jul 1950	27 Jul 1951	Ch, Sch Asgmt Br	Hq USAF, DCS/P PMP
28 Jul 1951	31 May 1952	Ch, Career Sch Br	Same
1 Jun 1952	30 Apr 1953	Ch, Manning Contr Br, Off Asgmt Div	Same
1 May 1953	6 Jun 1954	Ch, Manning Contr Br, Off Asgmt Div	Hq USAF, DCS/P D/Mil Per
7 Jun 1954	30 Jun 1954	TDY-Craig AFB, Ala-Jet Indoc Crse	Same
1 Jul 1954	17 Jul 1954	Ch, Manning Contr Br, Off Asgmt Div	Same
18 Jul 1954	31 Oct 1954	TDY-Tyndall AFB-Phase II Adv Jet	1501 Aer Port Sq, Travis AFB
1 Nov 1954	13 Nov 1954	Tvl, Lv & Processing	Pipeline to FEAF
14 Nov 1954	31 Dec 1954	Dep for Opns	Hq 43d ADiv (Def) APO 929
1 Jan 1955	4 Sep 1955	Gp Air Commander	Hq 18 FBGp, APO 239
5 Sep 1955	23 Oct 1955	Asst to Wg Comdr for Mobility (Wg)	Hq 18th FITBCMWG, APO 239
24 Oct 1955		Deputy for Air Defense, Comd Sec (ADiv)	Hq 313th ADiv, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign		Date
Air Off Europe	(BSS)	14 Feb 1944
Normandy	(BSS)	16 Nov 1944
No France	(BSS)	1 Dec 1944
Rhineland	(BSS)	22 Jun 1945
Ardennes-Alsace	(BSS)	22 Jun 1945
Cen Europe	(BSS)	22 Jun 1945

RATINGS, SPECIALTIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
Pilot	29 Apr 1942
Pilot	5 Aug 1947
Sr Pilot	23 Aug 1952

313th AD, 1955-II

COMBAT DATA

85 combat missions, 350 combat hours, F-38 & F-51, 3 Enemy Acft destroyed, ETO.

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

COLONEL KERMIT ROOSEVELT KANN



COLONEL KERMIT ROOSEVELT KANN, AO 289 586

Director of Materiel, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Lisburn, Pennsylvania, 19 February 1908.

Marital Status: Married, 2 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	New Cumberland, Pa.	Academic	X			1927
College:	Beckley College, Harrisburg, Pa.	Bus. Ad.		X	1½ yrs.	1929

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
Detroit, Michigan	Auto Maint	1 mo	Com	1941
Lowry Fld., Colorado	Airplane Armt	6 mos	Com	Jun 1947

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
EAME Rib	31 Jul 1953
Bz Star Medal	4 Feb 1945
Am Def Sv Medal	31 Jul 1953
Am Campaign Medal	31 Jul 1953
WW II Vic Medal	31 Jul 1953
Nat'l Def Sv Medal	31 Jul 1953
Armed Forces Res Medal	31 Jul 1953
1st Hour Glass Dev	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	ORC	24 Sep 1931	---
1st Lt	ORC	29 Oct 1934	---
1st Lt	ORC	30 Jan 1941	2 Jan 1938
Captain	ORC	24 Oct 1941	24 Oct 1941
Major	AUS	12 May 1943	12 May 1943
Lt Colonel	AUS	15 Mar 1944	15 Mar 1944
Lt Colonel	ORC	12 Oct 1945	---
Lt Colonel	AUS	7 Nov 1946	9 Dec 1944
Colonel	ORC	13 Jun 1946	---
Lt Colonel	AUS	30 Jun 1948	9 Dec 1944
Colonel	AFUS	15 Aug 1951	1 Aug 1951

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
24 Sep 1931	30 Apr 1935	Civ Status-Res (2-two wk AD Tours)/1 May 35 - 30 Apr 1937 Company Comdr, CCC, 3d Corps Area/ 1 May 37-29 Jan 41 Civ Status-Res (2-two wk AD Tours)	
30 Jan 1941	5 May 1942	Commanding Officer	89 QM Bn, Savannah, Georgia
6 May 1942	17 Sep 1942	Base Auto Off Staff	Savannah AFB, Ga.
18 Sep 1942	29 Oct 1942	Processing, Travel	Pipeline to ETO
30 Oct 1942	1 Aug 1943	Auto Off Staff	Hq 8AF Sv Cmd, England
2 Aug 1943	15 Oct 1943	Ordnance Off	ORD Sec 8, TASAC, ETOUSA
16 Oct 1943	20 Jun 1945	Auto Off Staff	ORD Sec 9, ASC,EOUTSA
21 Jun 1945	12 Feb 1946	Processing, Travel & Separation	Pipeline to ZI
13 Feb 1946	6 Nov 1946	Civilian Status - Active Reserve	
7 Nov 1946	26 Jul 1947	EAD, Processing-Stu Off (Airplane Armt Crse) - Enroute OS	

Remains asgd to the Dept of the Army per Trf Order 1, NME, 26 Sep 1947.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
27 Jul 1947	22 Nov 1948	Auto Maint Adv CAF Sch Chengtu	Air Div, AAG, APO 909
Trfd to the Dept of the Air Force per Joint Army & AF Adj Reg 1-1-2, 1947			
23 Nov 1948	1 Apr 1949	Patient	49th GH, APO 1052
2 Apr 1949	23 Apr 1949	Awtg Dy Asgmt	13 Air Repl Dep, APO 703
24 Apr 1949	8 Aug 1949	Dir of Transportation	Hq 6332 M&S Gp, APO 239
9 Aug 1949	22 Sep 1949	Processing, Travel & Leave	Enroute to ZI
23 Sep 1949	31 Oct 1949	Gp Commander	29 Maint Gp, 29th A/D Wg, Kelly AFB, Texas
1 Nov 1949	23 Feb 1950	Same	25 Maint Gp 25 ADW, KAFB, Texas
24 Feb 1950	28 May 1950	Gp Commanding Officer	Same
29 May 1950	1 Jan 1951	Executive Off, 25th Maint Gp, Dep	Hq 25th Maint Gp, Dep 25th ADWg, Hill AFB, Utah
2 Jan 1951	11 Oct 1951	Inspector Gen, Hq OOAM & 25th ADWg	Hq & Hq Sq 25 ADW, Hill, Utah
12 Oct 1951	29 Feb 1952	Same	Hq OOAMA, Hill AFB, Ut
1 Mar 1952	31 Jan 1954	Insp General	Same
1 Feb 1954	6 Jul 1955	Same; Asst for Qual Con 6511 (192 days)	Same
7 Jul 1955	13 Aug 1955	Lv, Tvl and Processing	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239
14 Aug 1955		Dir Mat, DM (Air Div)	Same

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
Normandy	1947
No. France	1947

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

COLONEL VANCE HUNTER MARCHBANKS, JR.


V. L. MARCHBANKS JR.
COL. USAF (MC)

COLONEL VANCE HUNTER MARCHBANKS, JR. 19 162 A

Staff Surgeon, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Ft. Washakis, Wyoming, 12 January 1905.

Marital Status: Married, 2 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Nashville, Tenn.	Compl	X			1923
University:	Univ of Arizona	Zoology			BS	1931
	Howard Univ. Washington, D.C.	Med			MD	1937
Postgraduate:	Univ of Arizona	Zoology		X		1932

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AC Sch Avn Med	Avn Med Exam	7 mos	Com	1942
AR Med Sch	NP Admin	1 mo	Com	1942
Educ Equiv	BA BR Crs	---	Com	1948
AMC Walter Reed	----	---	---	--
Gen Hosp	Atomic Warfare	5 dys	Com	1948
USPHS	Venerial Disease	6 dys	Com	1950
USAF Sch Avn Med WG/B	Surg & Hosp	---	---	--
GAFB	Com Crs	5 wks	Com	1953
USAFECl	Fld Off Corr Crs	---	Com	Sep 1954

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
BSM	6 Jun 1945
EAMECM	14 Apr 1945
DUB	15 Sep 1945
WW II VIC MED	14 Nov 1945
CR	24 Oct 1950

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS (cont'd)

Type	Date of Authority
KSM	31 Mar 1951
UNSVM	31 Jul 1953
NATDEFSM	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
1st Lt	ORC	25 Apr 1939	---
Captain	AUS	16 Jan 1943	16 Jan 1943
Major	AUS	29 Mar 1944	29 Mar 1944
Lt Colonel	ORC	17 Sep 1947	---
Major	RA	10 Jun 1948	10 Jun 1948
Major	USAF	1 Jul 1949	10 Jun 1948
Lt Colonel	SPOT	10 Sep 1950	10 Sep 1950
Lt Colonel	USAF	20 Oct 1950	19 Oct 1950
Lt Colonel	AFUS	15 Mar 1950	10 Sep 1950
Colonel	USAF	28 Mar 1955	28 Mar 1955

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
25 Apr 1939	14 Apr 1941	1st Lt, ORC	

Prior Tours of Active Duty
3 Jul 1939 - 17 Jul 1939, 15 Apr - 26 Sep 1947 Med Off, Gen (3100) - 60 mos, Flt Surg (3001) - 17 Mos, Stu Off (2700) - 1 Mo, AUS, Highest Grade Held - Lt Col.

27 Sep 1947	30 Apr 1949	Surg	332 STAMEDGRU LAFB, Chio
1 May 1949	30 Jun 1949	Wg Surg	Same
1 Jul 1949	6 Oct 1949	CO STA Hosp	2260 ABS, LAFB, Ohio
7 Oct 1949	30 Apr 1950	Ch Med Svc & Ch Surg Svc	22 MEDGRU, MAFB, Calif
1 May 1950	3 Jul 1950	Ch Surg Svc	Same
4 Jul 1950	5 Nov 1950	Flt Surg (TDY with 22 BGRU, MAFB, Calif)	Same

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
6 Nov 1950	25 Jan 1951	Ch Avn Med	Same
26 Jan 1951	5 Jun 1951	Ch Avn Med (TDY with LAFB, Ohio)	Same
6 Jun 1951	2 Jul 1951	Ch Avn Med	Same
3 Jul 1951	31 Dec 1951	Co Med Sq	91 Med Sq, LAFB, Ohio
"1 Jul 1949, Trfd to DAF, MAJ per PAR 5, SO 141, DA, dated 22 Jul 1949"			
1 Jan 1952	13 Jan 1952	CO Med Sq	91 Med Sq, LAFB, Ohio
14 Jan 1952	13 Feb 1952	CO USAF Hosp & Wg Surg	Same
"14 Feb 1952, 91st MED Sq, REDSGD, 91st MEDGRU, IAW, Par 5 GO 6, Hq SAC, 31 Jan 1952"			
14 Feb 1952	30 Sep 1952	GRU Com & Wg Surg	91 MEDGRU, LAFB, Ohio
1 Oct 1952	18 Oct 1953	GRU Com & Div Surg	Same
19 Oct 1953	5 Nov 1953	Stu Off, WGBSURG & Hosp Crs	Same
6 Nov 1953	31 Dec 1953	Gru Com & Div Surg	Same
1 Jan 1954	11 Jan 1954	Outgoing - No Dy	Same
12 Jan 1954	2 Feb 1954	Tvl, Lv & Processing	Pipeline to FEAF
3 Feb 1954	1 Jul 1955	Dir of Professional Svcs	6110 USAF HOSP, APO 1054
2 Jul 1955	10 Jul 1955	Asst Stf Surg, Surg (Air Div)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239
11 Jul 1955		Staff Surgeon, SURG, (AIR DIV)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
SO France	30 Dec 1944
Sicilian	30 Dec 1944
Naples-Foggia	10 Nov 1944
AC Balkans	19 Apr 1945
Appennines	26 May 1945
PO Valley	26 May 1945
Rhineland	14 Apr 1945
NO France	21 Apr 1945

313th AD, 1955-II

RATINGS, SPECIALTIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
AME	18 Feb 1943
Flt Surg	24 Jan 1944
ACM	11 Mar 1949

COMBAT DATA

OFF Flew 3 CMIS as ACM, Total CMBS 28.05 BTWN 7 Aug 1950 and 4 Oct 1950.
Type of ACFT: B-29.

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

313th AD, 1955-II

COLONEL CLEMENS KIEFFER WURZBACH



COLONEL CLEMENS KIEFFER WURZBACH, 1 858 A

Inspector General, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Cliff, Texas, 31 October 1915.

Marital Status: Married, 1 child.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	San Antonio, Texas	Academic	X			1932
University:	St. Mary's Univ, San Antonio, Tex	Chemistry	X		BA	1936

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AFFS	Pilot Tng	1 yr	Com	1937
Naval War College Newport, R.I.	Jr Course	10 mos	Com	May 1948
	---	---	---	---

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
Silver Star (1 OLC)	---
AM (3 OLC)	---
DFC	---
DSM (1 OLC)	---
Croix de Guerre	29 Jan 1945
British DFC	19 Oct 1945
EAME Camp Med	---
Amer Def Sv Med	---
DUC (P)	---
Amer Camp Med	---
WW II Vict Med	---
A Occ Med (Germ)	---
Nat'l Def Sv Med	---

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	ORC	6 Oct 1937	6 Oct 1937
2d Lt	RA	15 Aug 1939	15 Aug 1939
1st Lt	AUS	3 Oct 1940	9 Sep 1940
Captain	AUS	30 May 1942	1 Feb 1942
Captain	AUSAC	1 Mar 1942	1 Mar 1942
Major	AUSAC	26 Jun 1942	1 Mar 1942
1st Lt	RA	15 Aug 1942	15 Aug 1942
Major	AUS	6 May 1943	6 May 1943
Lt Colonel	AUSAC	18 Jun 1943	18 Jun 1943
Colonel	AUSAC	21 Oct 1943	21 Oct 1943
Lt Colonel	AUS	1 Mar 1944	1 Mar 1944
Colonel	AUS	1 Aug 1944	1 Aug 1944
Colonel	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	21 Oct 1943
Lt Colonel	USAF	2 Jul 1948	1 Jul 1948

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
12 Oct 1936	6 Oct 1937	Aviation Cadet	---
7 Oct 1937	14 Aug 1940	Plt, SE & Comm Off	---
15 Aug 1940	31 Dec 1941	Flt Comdr, OPNSO & Sq Comdr	---
1 Jan 1942	15 Mar 1942	Sq Comdr	48BGp, Okla City, Okla.
16 Mar 1942	20 Apr 1942	Gp Opns Off	305BG, Salt Lake City, Utah
21 Apr 1942	21 Apr 1943	Sq Comdr	303 BGp, USA & ETO
22 Apr 1943	24 Jun 1943	Air Ex Off	351 BGp, ETO
25 Jun 1943	11 Dec 1943	Gp, CO & Air Base CO	Hq 91 Gp (H), ETO
12 Dec 1943	14 Oct 1945	Asst A-3, Deputy C of S Opr	Hq 1st Air Div, ETO
15 Oct 1945	2 Apr 1946	AC of S Opr	Hq 51TCWg EATS, ETO
3 Apr 1946	14 Jul 1946	Tvl, Lv & Proc	Pipeline to US
15 Jul 1946	31 Dec 1946	Sch Secretary	41 AAFBU, Tyndall Fld., Fla.
1 Jan 1947	17 May 1947	Asst Sch Secretary & Member RA Interviewing Board	308 AAFBU, Tyndall Fld., Florida
18 May 1947	25 May 1948	Stu, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.	Hq 1st Army

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
Trfd to the Dept of the Air Force per Transfer Order #1, NME, 26 Sep 47			
26 May 1948	17 Aug 1948	Chf, Opr Reqmts Div, Plans & Opns	501 AFBU (Hq MATS) Wash. D. C.
18 Aug 1948	18 Oct 1948	Chf, Opr Reqmts Div, Plans & Opns	Hq & Hq Sq, MATS, Wash. D. C.
19 Oct 1948	31 Jan 1949	Chf, Tns & Reqmts Div, Plans & Opns	Same
1 Feb 1949	31 Mar 1949	Chf, Reqmts & Dev Div, Dir of Opr	Same
1 Apr 1949	14 Apr 1949	Chf, Reqmts & Dev Div, Dir of Opr	Same
15 Apr 1949	30 Jun 1949	Chf, Rqmt & Dev Div, D/Op	Same
1 Jul 1949	28 Feb 1950	Chf, Rqmt & Dev Div, D/Op	Same
1 Mar 1950	31 Dec 1950	Chf, Rqmt & Dev Div, D/Op	Same
1 Jan 1951	9 Aug 1951	Chf, Rqmt & Dev Div, D/Op	Same
10 Aug 1951	31 Dec 1951	Dep for Air Logistics, Asst for Opnl Systems	Hq ARDC, Baltimore, Md.
1 Jan 1952	31 Jan 1952	Dep for Air Logistics, Asst for Opnl Systems	Same
4 Jan 1952	4 Jul 1952	Dep for Mil Air Trans Sv, w/Asst for Opnl Readiness	Same
5 Jul 1952	29 Jul 1952	Tvl, Lv & Unasgd	Hq Wright Air Dev Cen W-P AFB, Ohio
30 Jul 1952	1 Sep 1952	Chf, Cargo Sec, Acft Br, Wpns Sys Div	Same
2 Sep 1952	31 Dec 1952	Chf, Cargo Trainer Br, Wpns Sys Div, Dep for Opns	Same
1 Jan 1953	10 Jan 1953	Chf, Cargo Trainer Br, Wpns Sys Div, Dep for Opns	Same
11 Jan 1953	1 Feb 1954	Chf, Cargo Trainer Br, Wpns Sys Div, Dep for Opns	Same
2 Feb 1954	14 Apr 1954	Chf, Cargo & Trainer Acft Br, Dir of Air Wpns Sys.	Same
15 Apr 1954	15 Aug 1954	Chf, Cargo & Trainer Acft Div, Dir of Wpn Sys Opns	Same

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
16 Aug 1954	31 Oct 1954	Chf, Cargo & Trainer Acft Div, Dir of Wpn Sys Opns	Same
1 Nov 1954	31 Jul 1955	Ch, Cargo & Trainer Acft Div, Dir of Wpn Sys Opns	Same
1 Aug 1955	19 Aug 1955	Ch, Cargo & Tnr Acft Div, Dir of Wpn Sys Opr, Dep Comdr for Wpn Sys w/dy sta HEDWADC, WPAFB, Ohio	HEDARDC, BALTO
20 Aug 1955	30 Sep 1955	Ch, Cargo & Tnr Acft Div, Dir of Sys Mgt, Dep Comdr for Wpn Sys	DET1, HEDARDC, WPAFB, Ohio
1 Oct 1955	14 Nov 1955	Ch, Cargo & Tnr Acft Div, Dir of Sys Mgt, Dep Comdr for Wpn Sys	Same
15 Nov 1955	21 Nov 1955	Travel & Processing	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239
22 Nov 1955	5 Feb 1956	Inspector General, IG (Air Div)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK JOSEPH BETZ


Frederick J Betz

313th AD, 1955-II

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK JOSEPH BETZ AO 905 356

Information Services Officer

Place and Date of Birth: Newark, New Jersey, 23 March 1907.

Marital Status: Single.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Hillside, N.J.	General	X			1924

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
Miami Beach	OTS, AAF Adm	1½ mos.	Com	Jul 1942

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
B.S.M.	25 Jun 1945
EAME Camp Medal	16 Mar 1951
WW II Vic Medal	16 Mar 1951
Amer Camp Medal	16 Mar 1951
Occup Med (GER)	16 Mar 1951
Armed Forces Res Medal	29 May 1952
ACR	---
Nat Def Sv Medal	---

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
1st Lt	AUSAC	12 May 1942	12 May 1942
1st Lt	AUS	26 May 1942	26 May 1942
Captain	AUS	25 Feb 1943	25 Feb 1943
Major	AUS	17 Aug 1944	17 Aug 1944
Lt Colonel	AUS	28 Dec 1945	28 Dec 1945
Lt Colonel	ORC	6 Jul 1946	---
Lt Colonel	AFUS	2 Apr 1951	20 May 1950

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
28 May 1942	11 Jul 1942	Stu O, OTS	Miami Beach, Fla.
12 Jul 1942	31 Mar 1943	Asst A-2 Off	Montgomery, Ala.
1 Apr 1943	28 Aug 1943	Ch Int Div	Same
29 Aug 1943	26 Nov 1943	Asst Gp S-2 Off	Hq 19 BGp, Pyote, Tex.
27 Nov 1943	11 Feb 1944	E/R os	Pipeline to MTO
12 Feb 1944	28 Apr 1944	Adm O	Hq K, Air Sv A, Oran
29 Apr 1944	21 Nov 1944	Air Press & Radio Censor	Hq AAF, Italy, MTO
22 Nov 1944	16 Dec 1944	Sr Air Press Censor	PRCB, AFG, Italy
17 Dec 1944	30 Jun 1945	Pub Relations O	Hq 12AF, Italy
1 Jul 1945	7 Jun 1946	Ch Press Br	Hq USAF, APO 777
8 Jun 1946	27 Jun 1946	E/R ZI	Pipeline to ZI
28 Jun 1946	3 Nov 1946	Sep & Term Lv	Ft Dix, N.J.
4 Nov 1946	26 Mar 1951	VAR	- - -
27 Mar 1951	1 Apr 1951	Proc & Awtg DAD	2218 PPSq, HAFB, Calif.
2 Apr 1951	31 May 1954	PIO	Hq TAC, Langley AFB, Virginia
1 Jun 1954	31 Jul 1955	Inf Svc Off, (Cmd)	Hq Tac, LAFB, Va.
1 Aug 1955	24 Sep 1955	Tvl, Lv, & Processing, E/R to FEAF, Awtg. Asgmt	Pipeline to FEAF
25 Sep 1955		Inf Svc Off	Hq 313th AD, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
Rome-Arno	4 Mar 1947
S France	4 Mar 1947
N Apennines	4 Mar 1947

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD MARSHALL GRAHAM



313th AD, 1955-II

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD MARSHALL GRAHAM, AO 492 306

Chaplain, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Alexandria, Virginia, 14 May 1905.

Marital Status: Married, 2 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Washington, D.C.	Bus Adm	X			1924
Colleges:	Nat Univ of Law, Washington, D.C.	Law		X	2 yrs	1926
	Southern Baptist Theological	Theology	X		THG	1929

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
Harvard University	Chaplain Bsc Crse	1 mo	Com	1942

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
EAME Camp Medal	1953
Am Camp Medal	1953
WW II Vic Medal	1953
Arm for Res Medal	1953
Nat Def Sv Medal	1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
1st Lt	AUS	26 Aug 1942	3 Sep 1942
Captain	AUS	6 Aug 1943	6 Aug 1943
Captain	RES	14 Nov 1945	14 Nov 1945
Captain	AUS-A	31 May 1946	6 Aug 1943
Major	ORC	27 Nov 1946	27 Nov 1946
Captain	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	6 Aug 1943
Major	AUS	6 Apr 1949	6 Apr 1949
Major	USAFR	1 Jul 1949	----
Major	AFUS	1 Jul 1949	6 Apr 1949
Lt Colonel	USAFR	6 Feb 1950	----
Lt Colonel	USAF	1 Jun 1953	15 Apr 1953

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
26 Aug 1942	2 Sep 1942	Inactive Reserve, 3 Sep 1942 to 7 Feb 1946, Base Chaplain 5310, Captain, 15 mos ETO, 8 Feb 1946 - 30 May 1946 Inactive Reserve, Chaplain 5310, Captain.	
31 May 1946	18 Nov 1946	Post Chaplain	Williams Fld., Arizona
19 Nov 1946	3 Dec 1946	Tvl & Processing	2532nd AFBU, PSRF, Tex
4 Dec 1946	31 Dec 1946	Asst Post Chaplain	Same
1 Jan 1947	30 Jun 1947	Same (Acting Staff Chaplain)	Same
1 Jul 1947	3 Feb 1948	Same	Same
Remains asgd to DA per TO #1, NME, 26 Sep 1947			
4 Feb 1948	16 Mar 1948	Casual Awtg Asgmt OS	106 AFBUORD, Camp Kilmer, N.J.
17 Mar 1948	31 Mar 1948	Same	Hq NOPC, New Orleans, La.
1 Apr 1948	4 May 1949	Asst Air Chaplain	Same
5 May 1949	3 Oct 1949	Gp Chaplain	Hq Hq Sq 5700 ABG, Albrook AFB, Canal Zone
4 Oct 1949	17 Nov 1949	Asst Gp Chaplain	Same
Trfd to DAF per JAAFAR #1-11-61, dated 16 May 1949.			
18 Nov 1949	29 Nov 1949	Asst Gp Chaplain	Same
30 Nov 1949	7 Dec 1949	Tvl, lv & processing	Return to ZI
8 Dec 1949	2 Jan 1950	Tvl, lv & processing	Hq 4th FWg, LAFB, Va.
3 Jan 1950	31 Aug 1950	Wing Chaplain	Same

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
1 Sep 1950	12 Mar 1951	Wing Chaplain	Hq 363rd TR Wg, LAFB, Virginia
13 Mar 1951	4 Mar 1952	Same	Hq 47th BWg, LAFB, Va.
5 Mar 1952	9 Jan 1954	USAF, Dist Ln Chaplain	Hq Hq Comd, USAF, BAFB, D.C.
10 Jan 1954	1 Feb 1954	Tvl, lv & processing	Hq 1 AF, MAFB
2 Feb 1954	5 Aug 1955	Stf Chaplain FAF	Same
6 Aug 1955	12 Sep 1955	Tvl, Lv, & Proc	Pipeline to FEAF
13 Sep 1955		Stf Chaplain (Air Div)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT OREN ROLLMAN


Lt. Col. USAF

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT OREN ROLLMAN, 22 823A

Staff Judge Advocate, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, 30 March 1921.

Marital Status: Married, 3 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Schuylkill Haven High School, Pa.	Commercial	X			1938
College:	Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.	Pol. Sc. Econ.	X		AB	1948
Postgraduate:	Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle	Law	X		LLB	1949

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Type	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AAF	OCS	3 mos	Com	Aug 1942
Chaunte Fld., Illinoia	ACTS	6½ mos	Com	Mar 1941

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
Amer Def Medal	22 Sep 1948
Amer The Rib	22 Sep 1948
WW II Vic Medal	22 Sep 1948
EAME The Rib	22 Sep 1948
DUB	17 Jun 1944
Bronze Star Medal	31 Aug 1944
Nat'l Def Sv Medal	31 Jul 1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	AUS	5 Aug 1952	5 Aug 1942
1st Lt	AUS	27 Jan 1943	27 Jan 1943
Captain	AUS	26 Aug 1943	26 Aug 1943
Major	AUS	1 Jun 1945	1 Jun 1945
Major	AFUS	10 Oct 1949	10 Oct 1949
Major	USAFR	25 Apr 1950	25 Apr 1950
2d Lt	USAF	29 May 1951	10 Oct 1949
Lt Colonel	USAF	18 Jun 1952	1 Jun 1952
1st Lt	Reg AF	10 Oct 1952	10 Oct 1952

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
30 Sep 1940	4 Aug 1942	Enl AP & E Mech OCS	509BS 351 BGp
5 Aug 1942	12 Oct 1944	Engineering Off	Same
13 Oct 1944	14 Jun 1945	Dpty CO Mat & Maint A-4	94 Combat Wg
15 Jun 1945	30 Jun 1945	Dir Maint Tech Sec	2nd Bomb Wg
1 Jul 1945	31 Aug 1945	Lv Tvl Processing Ret fr o/s	---
1 Sep 1945	22 Jan 1946	Term Lv RFAD	Indian Gap, Pa.
23 Jan 1946	9 Oct 1949	INACTIVE STATUS - 2 wks AD 1 Aug 1947 to 15 Aug 1947	w/PA ANG
10 Oct 1949	26 Oct 1949	Awaiting Asgmt	3800 AUWg Maxwell AFB, Alabama
27 Oct 1949	13 Nov 1949	Asst Dpty Gp CO	Hq 3821 M&S Gp TAFB, Fla.
14 Nov 1949	31 Aug 1950	Gp Maint Off	Same
1 Sep 1950	17 Sep 1950	Gp Maint Off	Hq Hq Sq 3625 M&S Gp TAFB, Fla.
18 Sep 1950	10 Jan 1951	Maint Staff Off	Hq Hq Sq 3625 M&S Gp TAFB, Fla.
11 Jan 1951	19 Aug 1951	Wg Legal Off	3625 Tng Wg, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
20 Aug 1951	31 Aug 1952	Wg Sr Legal Off	Same
"11 Jun 1952, 3625th Tng Wg Rdsgnd 3625th Fly Tng Wg (Adv Intcp) IAW GO 13, Hq Crew Tng AF"			
1 Sep 1952	8 Apr 1953	Staff Judge Advocate Tyndall AFB	3625 Fly Tng Wg (AI) TAFB, Fla.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
9 Apr 1953	30 Jun 1954	Asst Staff Judge Advocate	3650th MTW, SAFB, New York
1 Jul 1954	4 Aug 1954	Tvl, Lv & Proc	P/L to FEAF
5 Aug 1954	4 Apr 1955	Staff JA	Hq 6332d ABWg, APO 239
5 Apr 1955	5 Jun 1955	Staff Judge Advocate	Hq, 18th FTR BMR WG, APO 239
6 Jun 1955	30 Jun 1955	Asst SJA, JA	Hq, 313th Air Div, APO 239
1 Jul 1955		Staff Judge Advocate (Air Div)	Same

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER PIPPEN WILLIAMS



LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER PIPPEN WILLIAMS, 7 815 A

Executive Officer, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Greensboro, Alabama, 16 May 1920.

Marital Status: Married, 3 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Greensboro, Alabama	Academic	X			1938
University:	Wayne University, Michigan	Bus Adm	X		BA	1947

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
AFF	Prim & Basic Pilot	8 mos	Com	May 1941
RTU, Key Fld	Tac Rcn Tng (1061)	3 mos	Com	Dec 1943
AC&SS, MAFB, Alabama	F O C	22 wks	Com	Dec 1948
AC&SS, MAFB, Alabama	A I C	6 wks	Com	Jun 1951

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
EAME	1953
Amer Defense	1953
Amer Camp Medal	1953
WW II Vic Medal	1953
Army Occ (Germ)	1953
Nat Def Sv Medal	1953
Air Medal	1945
Med, Humane Act	1953

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	ORC	29 May 1941	---
1st Lt	AUS	17 Jun 1942	17 Jun 1942
Captain	AUSAC	13 Jan 1943	13 Jan 1943
Captain	AUS	19 Nov 1943	19 Nov 1943
Major	AUSAC	1 Mar 1944	1 Mar 1944
Major	AUS	1 Aug 1944	1 Aug 1944
Lt Colonel	AUS	1 Jul 1945	1 Jul 1945
1st Lt	RA	5 Jul 1946	7 Dec 1944
Lt Colonel	AUS	1 Jul 1945	28 Oct 1945
Lt Colonel	AFUS	30 Jun 1948	28 Oct 1945
Captain	USAF	25 Oct 1948	1 Jul 1948
Major	USAF	12 Jul 1951	14 Dec 1950

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
10 Jun 1935	1 Jun 1938	EM, Alabama NG: 14 Oct 1940 to 29 May 1941, AC, Pilot Tngs: Comm, 2d Lt, ORC 29 May 1941, Active Duty from 30 May 1941, Pilot 7 mos; Opns Off, 24 mos; CO Sq. 22 mos; Opns Off 3½ mos; to 13 Mar 1946, Lt. Col.,: From 14 Mar 1946 to 10 Jul 1946 Res Status; EAD, 11 Jul 1946, Stu at Wayne University, Mich, to 10 Sep 1947:	
11 Sep 1947	10 Oct 1947	Pilot & Exec Off	27 Tow Sq, Biggs Fld., Texas
11 Oct 1947	2 May 1948	Executive Officer	1st Tow Tgt Sq., Biggs Fld.
3 May 1948	7 Jul 1948	C.O. W.O. Screenting Pt	1TTSq, Biggs AFB, Texas
8 Jul 1948	17 Dec 1948	TDY, AC&SS, FOC, MAFB, Alabama	Same
18 Dec 1948	20 Jan 1949	Lv, Awaiting Trf	Same
21 Jan 1949	3 Feb 1949	Exec Off, 47BW, BAFB, La.	Same
4 Feb 1949	21 Apr 1949	Exec Off, Gp.	Hq 47ABGp, BAFB, La.
22 Apr 1949	30 Apr 1949	Awaiting Asgmt	Hq 317TCW, APO 147
1 May 1949	31 May 1949	Sq CO, (Berlin Airlift, 1st Alft Task)	40th, 317TCG, APO 147

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE (cont'd)

Dates From	Dates To	Duties	Unit or Organization
1 Jun 1949	10 Sep 1949	Wg Exec Off (Berlin Alft)	Hq Hq Sq, 317TCW, APO 147
11 Sep 1949	16 Oct 1949	Proc & lv	3800 Air Wg, MAFB, Ala
17 Oct 1949	31 Oct 1949	Base Executive	3080 ABGp, Bkly AFB, Ala
1 Nov 1949	31 May 1951	Same	Hq MOAMA, Bklyn AFB, Ala
1 Jun 1951	29 Jun 1951	TDY, AIC, MAFB, Ala	Same
30 Jun 1951	12 Jul 1951	Enroute & Lv	Same
13 Jul 1951	31 Jul 1952	PAST, Miss State Col.	Hq Sq, 12AF, RAFB, Ga.
1 Aug 1952	14 Sep 1955	PAST, Det #425, Miss St College	Hq AFROTC, AU, Mtgy, Alabama
15 Sep 1955	12 Oct 1955	Tvl, Lv & Processing	Pipeline to FEAF
13 Oct 1955		Executive Off, Comd Sec (ADiv)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

CAMPAIGNS PARTICIPATED IN

Campaign	Date
Anti-Sub (BSS)	1947
Rhineland (BSS)	1947
Cen Europe (BSS)	1947
Berlin Airlift	1953

RATINGS, SPECIALTIES, AND DESIGNATIONS

	Effective Date
Pilot	29 May 1941
Sr Pilot	12 May 1950

COMBAT DATA

7 combat missions, 15 combat hours, ETO P51; 24 combat missions, 50 combat hours, Sub Patrol.

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

MAJOR CHARLES PAUL DOWNER



MAJOR CHARLES PAUL DOWNER, AO 390 687

Commandant, 313th Air Division

Place and Date of Birth: Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 15 February 1918.

Marital Status: Married, 3 children.

EDUCATION:

	Name and Location	Major Subj:	Graduate Yes	Graduate No	Degree	Date
High School:	Jackson, Mississippi	Academic	X			1936
College:	Mississippi State College	Aviation	X		BS	1940
University:	Univ of New Mexico	Bus. Ad. & Mgmt.		X	1yr	1954

ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY & CIVILIAN SCHOOLING

Name of School	Title of Course	Length	Rating	Year
Scott AFB, Illinois	Comm Course	4 mos	Com	Aug 1942
Orlando, Florida	Flash Recognition	1 mo	Com	Apr 1943
AC&SS, AU	AIC	1 mo	Com	Jul 1951

AWARDS, DECORATIONS AND CITATIONS

Type	Date of Authority
Amer Thea Rib	AFR 35-50
WW II Vic Medal	AFR 35-50
AF Res Medal	AFR 35-50
Amer Def Sv Medal	AFR 35-50
Nat'l Def Sv Medal	AFR 35-50

GRADE STATUS

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
2d Lt	RES	20 May 1940	---
2d Lt	AUS	2 Jan 1941	2 Jan 1941
1st Lt	AUS	2 Dec 1942	2 Dec 1942

GRADE STATUS (cont'd)

Grade	Type	Effective Date	Date of Rank
Captain	AUS	8 Aug 1943	8 Aug 1943
Major	AUS	25 Jul 1944	25 Jul 1944
Major	RES	1 Dec 1945	---
Major	AFUS	5 Jun 1951	24 Sep 1949

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICE

Dates From	To	Duties	Unit or Organization
20 May 1940	1 Jan 1941	Reserve Officer	---
2 Jan 1941	19 Mar 1946	Called to AD; 10 mos. 8219. Weather Off; 6 mos 2700, Stu Off; 4 mos. 2136, Unit Off. Non-Tact; 32 mos. 2520, Tng Off; 8 mos. 2680 Asst Air Insp Comm; Highest Grade Held - Major.	
20 Mar 1946	4 Jun 1951	Reserve Status (One 16 day STOAD)	---
5 Jun 1951	10 Jun 1951	Recalled to AD, Proc & Tvl	3811 ABSq, MAFB, Ala.
11 Jun 1951	29 Jun 1951	A/PAS Det #510, Univ of New Mexico	Hq 14AF, Robins AFB, Ga.
30 Jun 1951	27 Jul 1951	TDY MAFB, Ala AIC	Same
28 Jul 1951	30 Apr 1952	A/PAS Det #510, Univ of New Mexico	Same
1 May 1952	29 Mar 1953	Same (TDY Sum Cp 47 days)	Same
30 Mar 1953	17 Apr 1953	TDY MAFB, Ala (Ed Workshop)	Hq AFROTC, AU, Mtgy, Ala.
18 Apr 1953	31 Jul 1955	A/PAS Det #510, Univ of New Mexico	Same
1 Aug 1955	16 Aug 1955	Lv, Tvl and Processing	Pipeline to FEAF
17 Aug 1955		Comdr, Hq Sq Sec (Air Def)	Hq 313th Air Div, APO 239

Source: Officer's WD Form 66.

APPENDIX 3

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS

313TH AIR DIVISION

JULY-DECEMBER 1955

SECRET

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW



FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF
JULY 1955

302959

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COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. [illegible]
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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0470


SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT CO-OUT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE.
JAPAN
NANKING
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORMOSA
313
IWO JIMA
23 N
123 E

0471

OKINAWA


EAST CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
KADENA AIRFIELD
9500' X 200'
9500' X 200'
YONABARU AIRFIELD
7000' X 150' (NAVY)

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

STRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



0473

RATING SYSTEM

15TH F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	151					
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	82					
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	150					
AOCP RATE	(150)	105					
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	98					
GND ACDTS	(50)	35					
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	569					
% TOTAL POINTS		56.9					
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F							

51ST F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	170					
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	82					
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	129					
AOCP RATE	(150)	135					
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	67					
GND ACDTS	(50)	13					
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	596					
% TOTAL POINTS		59.6					
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F						—	

SOURCE: DIR OF MA

0474

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0475

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

This is the first issue of the Command Management Review in its new format.

The Fifth Air Force rating system was used in this issue and the scores for various programs, for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, can be found on page 1.

The objective of scoring our programs is to provide the commanders and staff with a system for determining the relative efficiency of our tactical units.

Suggestions for improving the rating system should be sent to the Comptroller where they will be given prompt attention and be forwarded to Fifth Air Force for consideration.

New items to be included in the Command Management Review must be sent to the Commander for approval before they can be published in the review.

0476

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0477

OPERATIONS COMMENTS

(Flying Hour Program) Of the 10,350 hours allocated to the command for the 1st Quarter, 26% has been accomplished as of 31 July 1955, leaving 74% to be accomplished during the months of August and September.

Command 1st Quarter Allocation	10,350	
Hours flown as of 31 July	2,692	- 26%
Balance to be accomplished in August and September	7,658	- 74%
Madera 1st Quarter Allocation	6,750	
Hours flown as of 31 July	1,682	- 24.9%
Balance to be accomplished in August and September	5,068	- 75.1%
Mesa 1st Quarter Allocation	3,600	
Hours flown as of 31 July	1,011	- 28%
Balance to be accomplished in August and September	2,589	- 72%

0478

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT — OVERALL

% QTRLY HRS FLOWN

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	26.0					
QTRLY HRS ALLOC	10,350					
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,693					
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,693					

18 TH F B WG



24.9						
6,750						
1,682						
1,682						

51 ST F I WG



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	28.0					
QTRLY HRS ALLOC	3,600					
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011					
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,682					

SECRET

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18TH F B WG



%QTRLY ALLOC FLN	27.2					
QTRLY HRS ALLOC	2250					
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614					
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	614					

67TH F B SQ



25.1					
2250					
566					
566					

44TH F B SQ



%QTRLY ALLOC FLN	22.3					
QTRLY HRS ALLOC	2250					
CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN	502					
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	502					

SECRET

10

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

0480

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 51ST F I WG.

% QTRLY HRS FLOWN

18TH F I SQ



%QTRLY ALLOC FLN	27.9					
QTRLY HRS ALLOC	1800					
CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN	503					
HRS FLOWN THIS MO.	503					

25TH F I SQ



28.2						%QTRLY ALLOC FL
1800						QTRLY HRS ALLOC
506						CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN
508						HRS FLOWN THIS MONTH

28TH F I SQ



SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

0481

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OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

OVERALL

313TH A D



AUTHORIZED	164
ASSIGNED	143
OPNL READY	67
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53

18TH F B WG



51ST F I WG



90	AUTHORIZED	74
74	ASSIGNED	69
12	OPNL READY	55
53	O/R LESS GUNNERY	0

SECRET

12

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS OT

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

18TH F B WG

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30					
ASSIGNED	28					
OPNL READY	0					
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20					

67TH F B SQ



44TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
30						AUTHORIZED	30					
22						ASSIGNED	24					
0						OPNL READY	12					
22						O/R LESS GUNNERY	11					

SECRET

0483

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

51ST F I WG



AUTHORIZED	37
ASSIGNED	33
OPNL READY	26
O/R LESS GUNNERY	0



37						AUTHORIZED						
36						ASSIGNED						
29						OPNL READY						
0						O/R LESS GUNNERY						

SECRET

14

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS OT

0484

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

002059

0485

MATERIEL COMMENTS

(Tactical Aircraft Maintenance Status) A daily average of 10% of F-86F aircraft in the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing were out of commission during the first 14 days of July for compliance with T.O. 1F-86-511. This project was suspended 15 July due to non-availability of wing bolts with 22 aircraft in the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron remaining to receive this technical order compliance. A daily average of 21% of the F-86D aircraft in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing were out of commission throughout the month of July for compliance with T.O. 1F-86D-511 and T.O. 1F-86D-236.

(POL) The reason for increase in consumption of JP-4 fuel for the month of July is type missions flown during the month. Frequent low altitude missions consume more fuel per hour than long high altitude missions.

30295

0486

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT										NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47		VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	H-19	B-26	TOTAL
18 FBW	69										2		4			3				6			2	86
581 ASLG		11															4				3			18
KADENA TOTALS	69	11									2		4			3	4			6	3		2	104
NAHA AB																								
51 FIW	44											3	3	2						7				59
33 RSQ													1								5	2		8
NAHA TOTALS	44											3	4	2						7	5	2		67
313TH TOTALS	113	11									2	3	8	2		3	4			13	8	2	2	171

SOURCE: 1-AF-A1

0487

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5 TH AF IN COMM RATE = 80 %

OVERALL



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1					
% AOCP	5.9					

313 TH A D

18 TH F B WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
601					
6.1					

51ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9					
% AOCP	5.8					

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0488

CONFIDENTIAL

TECHNICAL ORDER COMPLIANCE

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT



ON HAND 1ST OF MO	4412					
RECEIVED DURING MONTH	1380					
ACCOMPLISHED	1459					
% ACCOMPLISHED	33					



2835						ON HAND 1ST OF MO	1377					
1091						RECEIVED DURING MONTH	289					
762						ACCOMPLISHED	697					
27						% ACCOMPLISHED	44					

CONFIDENTIAL

19

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

FUEL ISSUES BY TYPE FUEL

TYPE FUEL (GALLONS)	TOTAL	313TH A. D.				
100/130	428,738					
115/145	932,895					
JP-4	1,848,880					
80	530					
	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0491

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

During the period 1 January 1955 to 30 June 1955, the percentage of assigned apprentice level airmen in training to the skill level increased from 30% to 85%. The total number of airmen completing training was 1,260, which amounted to an average monthly completion ration of 12% for the entire 6 months. The goal announced by Headquarters Fifth Air Force recently is a 90% in-training ratio, and a 15% completion ratio.

Personnel turnover for the month of July for assigned units shows a decrease of 23 Officers and 31 Airmen. Gaining of the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron during the month reflected an increase of 34 Officers and 108 Airmen. Loss of the 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron during the month reflected a decrease of 29 Officers and 176 Airmen. All other losses due to normal rotation.

0492

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF _____

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
*Total Air Force on Okinawa	[illegible]	[illegible]		9859	8915		[illegible]	[illegible]		4864	4811	
*Total 313th Air Division	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	455		4243	4241	
Total Assigned Units	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		205	[illegible]		1580	1566	
Total Attached Units	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	264		2663	2675	
Hq 313th Air Division Total	95	92		210	[illegible]		67	73		28	44	
KADENA												
18th FBWg (Atched)	[illegible]	[illegible]		3091	[illegible]		294	[illegible]		2663	2675	
80th FBSq (Atched)	43	45		145	194							
581st A R Gp (Asgd)	148	144		510	517					22	21	
13th & 17th Comm Sqs (Asgd)	16	16		379	333					39	40	
NAHA												
51st FIWg (Asgd)	[illegible]	206		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		1364	1361	
623rd & 624th AC&W Sqs (Asgd)	[illegible]	[illegible]		655	590					127	100	
Det #1, Hq 313th Air Div (Asgd)	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]				
Total Supported Units	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]		621	570	
Total Pipeline (Not included in above figures)		55			255							
* Includes SCARWAF												

SOURCE: RCS 313TH ADPS

OFFICERS STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3					
	ASGND	1					
	PROJD ASGND		1	1	1		
COL	AUTH	20					
	ASGND	22					
	PROJD ASGND		15	15	15		
L/COL	AUTH	54					
	ASGND	45					
	PROJD ASGND		43	59	58		
MAJ	AUTH	132					
	ASGND	105					
	PROJD ASGND		110	119	120		
CAPT	AUTH	292					
	ASGND	173					
	PROJD ASGND		178	207	214		
LTS	AUTH	336					
	ASGND	440					
	PROJD ASGND		415	391	381		
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	837					
	ASGND	787					
	PROJD ASGND		763	792	789		

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0494

WO & AMN PERSONNEL STRENGTH

CURRENT & PROJECTED



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
WO	AUTH	19					
	ASGND	30					
	PROJ'D		21	21	19		

THOUSAND



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AMN	AUTH	7012					
	ASGND	6192					
	PROJ'D		6052	6486	6046		

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469					
	ASGND	323					
T/SGT	AUTH	601					
	ASGND	455					
S/SGT	AUTH	1726					
	ASGND	966					
A/1C	AUTH	2095					
	ASGND	1211					
A/2C	AUTH	1679					
	ASGND	1907					
A/3C	AUTH	442					
	*ASGND	1330					
TOTAL	AUTH	7012					
	ASGND	6192					

* INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0496

PROBLEM AREAS

OFFICER & AIRMEN

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGND	% SKILLED	% MANNED
11240	Fighter Pilot	111	80	76	72
1435	Air Operations Officer	33	23	64	70
1525	Aircraft Observer, Nav, Bomb.	19	9	80	47
1644	Intercept Controller	45	40	27	88
3016	Comm Elect Staff Off	11	9	52	82
3054	Air Electronics Off	11	3	33	27
6424	Supply Off	49	35	59	71
274X	AC&W	214	187	59	87
303XX	Radar Maint	64	58	72	91
304XX	Radio & Radar Systems Maint	137	63	33	45
431X10	Jet Acft Maint	410	300	47	73
461XX	Ammo Handlers	37	42	74	113
462XX	Weapons Maint	149	108	59	72
47XXX	Vehicle Maint	348	144	44	41
567XX	Elect Power Maint	53	9	100	17
64XXX	Supply	872	772	83	89
643X0	POL	167	112	53	67
672XX	Accounting	28	21	64	75
682XX	Machine Accounting	53	9	35	17
7XXX	Air Police	450	338	75	75

SOURCE : DIR OF PER

0497

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS

PERCENT UNOCCUPIED BY CAUSE



AVG NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		1108.5															
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	27.2															
		REPAIR	13.4															
		COMMITTED	4.7															
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	NO. OF WAIT	152	11														
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES	76	95														
	QTRS AVAIL.	FORECAST	1117			1127		1142										
	TROOPS OCCUPIED	OFFICER	459															
		AIRMEN	635															
		CIVILIAN	15															

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0498

OPEN MESS FACILITIES , INANCIAL STATUS

KADENA

NET PROFIT / LOSS —



NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,675					
NET WORTH	100,063					



2,695						NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,653					
327,112						NET WORTH	73,438					

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0499

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA

NET PROFIT / LOSS —

OFFICERS



NET PROFIT/LOSS	84					
NET WORTH	29,977					

NCO





AIRMEN



2,265.51						NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285					
62038.74						NET WORTH	31,399					

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0500

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0501

ANNUAL MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATE

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACCIDENTS} \times 100,000}{\text{HOURS FLOWN}}$ OVERALL



	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN	MAJOR ACDT	HRS FLOWN
313TH AD *	2	4703										
10TH FBW	1	2073										
51ST FIW	1	1566										

* HOURS FLOWN - INCLUDE 51ST A R W

SOURCE ASST FOR SFTY

0502

GROUND ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE







SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0503

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COMPTROLLER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
HEADQUARTERS, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
TOTAL	20

0504

SECRET



305257

305257

305257

FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF
AUGUST 1955

SECRET

COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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
SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE.
JAPAN
NANKING
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORNOSA
IWO JIMA
23 N
123 E
23 N
138 E

OKINAWA



0509

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

STRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



0510

RATING SYSTEM

18 TH F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	129	139				
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	39	26				
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	150	159				
ACCP RATE	(150)	105	150				
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	94	101				
GND ACDTS	(50)	35	34				
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	552	609				
% TOTAL POINTS		55.2	60.9				
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		11TH					

51ST F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	190	168				
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	57	133				
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	130	119				
ACCP RATE	(150)	135	150				
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	77	48				
GND ACDTS	(50)	13	32				
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	602	650				
% TOTAL POINTS		60.2	65.0				
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		10TH					

0511

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0512

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

(Command Management Review) In this, the second issue of the Command Management Review in its new format a number of charts have been added and many of the old charts have been revised. The reason for the revision of the old charts is to show a better comparision between groups and squadrons within the command, in related fields.

(Rating System) Of a possible 1000 points under the Fifth Air Force Rating System, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing scored 609 points during the month of August. An increase of 87 points over July, when they placed 11th out of thirteen units considered by Fifth Air Force. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing scored 650 points an increase of 48 points over July, when they placed 10th out of the thirteen units considered.

Major Aircraft Accidents resulted in a loss of 152 points by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. Operational Readiness of Crews and Major Aircraft Accidents resulted in a loss of 174 and 99 points, respectively for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0514

(Flying Hour Program) The quarterly allocation of flying hours for the command in the 1st quarter has been changed from 10,380 hours to 10,575 hours. 18th Fighter Bomber Wing allocation has been changed from 6,750 hours to 7,125 hours and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing allocation has been changed from 3,600 hours to 3,450 hours.

Of the 10,575 hours allocated to the command for the 1st quarter, 43% has been accomplished as of 31 August 1955, leaving 51% to be accomplished or 5,392 hours to be flown during the month of September.

A monthly average of 31% of the allocated hours for the Fifth Air Force F-86F units has been accomplished during the past 4 months, as compared to 23% by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the past 2 months.

A monthly average of 35% of the allocated hours for Fifth Air Force F-86D units has been accomplished during the past 4 months, as compared to 28% by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the past 2 months.

(Operational Readiness of Crews) Of the 148 assigned crews to the command 62 are operational ready or 42% of the assigned crews. Of the 62 operational ready crews, 52 are assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing or 76% of the assigned crews and 10 are assigned to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing or 13% of the assigned crews.

A monthly average of 18% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86F crews have been operational ready for the past 4 months as compared to an average of 14% at the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the past 2 months.

Due to the change as of 1 July 1955 in the criteria for operational readiness of F-86D pilots, the comparison will be only for the month of July. 86% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86D crews were operational ready for the month of July 1955 as compared to a 76% average for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the past 2 months.

0515

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

OVERALL

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	26.0	49.0				
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			10,575			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,693	5,183				
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,693	2,490				

18 TH F B WG



24.9	46.6				
		7,125			
1,682	3,328				
1,682	1,646				

51 ST F I WG



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	28.0	56.7			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			3,450		
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011	1,958			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,011	947			

SECRET

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18 TH F B WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

12 TH FB SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	27.2	47.6				
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614	1,131				
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	614	517				

67 TH F B SQ



44 TH F B SQ



25.1	4[illegible]3					
		2,375				
566	1,057					
566	491					

% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	22.3	47.8				
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	502	1,137				
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	502	635				

SECRET
10

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS O & T

% QTRLY HRS FLOWN = $\frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	27.9	53.8				
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	503	929				
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	426				

25 TH FISC



28.2	53.8					
		1,725				
503	929					
503	421					

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

SECRET

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{AUTHORIZED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF AUTH

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{ASSIGNED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF ASGND

39TH A D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	164	164				
ASSIGNED	143	146				
O/R NL READY	67	62				
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48				

18TH F B WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
90	90				
74	79				
12	10				
53	48				

51ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	74	74				
ASSIGNED	69	67				
O/R NL READY	55	52				
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*				

*-NOT APPLICABLE

SECRET

12

0519

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

19TH F B WG

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

12TH F B SQ



AUTHORIZED	30	30
ASSIGNED	28	29
OPNL READY	0	0
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20	20

67TH F B SQ



44TH F B SQ



30	30					AUTHORIZED	30	30			
22	25					ASSIGNED	24	25			
0	0					OPNL READY	12	10			
22	21					O/R LESS GUNNERY	11	7			

SECRET

13

0520

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

51ST F I WG

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{AUTHORIZED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF AUTH

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{ASSIGNED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF ASGND



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37				
ASSIGNED	33	30				
OPNL READY	36	24				
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*				

25TH F I SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
37	37				
36	37				
29	28				
*	*				

AUTHORIZED
ASSIGNED
OPNL READY
O/R LESS GUNNERY

*=NOT APPLICABLE

AC & W OPERATIONS

UNKNOWN TRACKS

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TOTAL TRACKS	2831	2754				
INITIALLY UNKNOWN	109	32				
% OF TRACKS UNKNOWN	4.03	1.16				
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO SCRAMBLE	72	4				
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO INTERCEPTION	10	15				
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY BY INTERCEPTION	22	11				
MISPLOTS	2	0				
WEATHER PLOTS	3	1				
REMAINING UNKNOWN	0	0				

AVERAGE TIME (MINUTES) SCRAMBLE TO AIRBORNE

	13 FBW	81 FIW	13 FBW	81 FIW	13 FBW	81 FIW	13 FBW	81 FIW	13 FBW	81 FIW	13 FBW	81 FIW
FROM STANDBY	4.5	7.3	5.3	6.4								
FROM READINESS	5.3	5.7	5.1	5.7								
AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME	31.0	32.7	32.0	32.1								

SECRET

15

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O & T

0522

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0523

(ACCP) The percent ACCP for the command dropped from 5.9 for the month of July to 4.3 for the month of August. All units showed a decrease from the previous month with the exception of the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron, which showed an increase from 14.1% to 14.7% and the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron which showed an increase from 5.4% to 5.6%. The command is at the present time below the Fifth Air Force rate of 5% ACCP.

(In Commission) The percent in commission for the command increased 1% from July to August. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing shows an increase from 61.1 in July to 63.1 in August and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing shows a decrease from 51.0 in July to 47.5 in August. No squadron met the Fifth Air Force 80% in commission rate. The largest drop of in commission time was in the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, which dropped from 81.8% in July to 72.5% in August.

(Technical Order Compliance) The technical order compliance chart has been removed from the Command Management Review this month, pending evaluation of the new FEAF reporting system for TOC wich replaced FEAF Regulation 66-13.

0524

CONFIDENTIAL

BASED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT										NON-COMBAT											
	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47	C-26	VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	H-19	B-29	TOTAL
KADENA AB																								
18 F B W	69										2		4			3			5			2		85
581 ASLG		12														4				3				19
KADENA TOTALS	69	12									2		4			3	4		5	3		2		104
NAHA AB																								
51 FIW	45											3	4	2					6					60
33 RSQ													1							5	2			8
NAHA TOTALS	45											3	5	2					6	5	2			68
313TH TOTALS	114	12									2	3	9	2		3	4		11	5	2	2		172

SOURCE: 1-AF-A1

0525

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5 TH AF IN COMM RATE = 80 %

OVERALL



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1	57.1				
% AOCP	5.9	4.6				

313 TH A D

18 TH F B WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
60.1	63.5				
8.1	4.8				

51ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9	47.5				
% AOCP	5.8	4.3				

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0526

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

18TH F B WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 80%

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	61.4	66.1				
% AOCP	1.6	0.5				

67TH F B SQ



44TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	81.5	72.5				
% AOCP	0	0				

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
	48.0	49.8				
	14.1	14.7				

SECRET
20

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0527

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

51ST F I WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 80%

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	49	48.6				
% AOCP	2.8	2.7				

25TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	45	46.5				
% AOCP	5.4	5.6				

SECRET

21

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0528

CONFIDENTIAL

FUEL CONSUMPTION

TACTICAL JET AIRCRAFT



F 86-F	12TH F B SQ	*	478
	67TH F B SQ	*	494
	44TH F B SQ	*	463



F 86-D	16TH F I SQ	*	508
	25TH F I SQ	*	530

* = INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0529



THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0530

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

(Personnel Turnover) Personnel turnover for the month of August for assigned units showed a decrease of 4 officers and a gain of 20 airmen. All gains and losses due to normal rotation, no assigned units gained or lost during the reporting month.

(Open Mess Facilities) All six Open Mess Facilities showed a decrease in profits during the month of August over the month of July. Three of the decreases resulted in a net loss for the month of August, Kaiena Officers Club, Naha Officers Club and the Naha NCO Club. The remaining facilities still showed a profit.

(Problem Areas) The following officers AFSC's were added to the problem area since the month of July, 1124A, 7224 and 7324. The following officer and airmen AFSC's were deleted from the problem areas since the month of July, 1525 and 64XXX. No airmen AFSC's were added during the month of August.

(Dependent Housing Status) Percent of unoccupied houses during the month of August reflected an improvement of 2.8% as compared to 4.0% for the month of July.

(OJT) The percentage of assigned apprentice level airmen in training to the 5 skill level as of 31 July 1965 was 97%. The average monthly completed training ratio running 12%. The Fifth Air Force goal is a 90% in training ratio and a 16% completion ratio.

0531

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 August 1955

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
* Total Air Force on Okinawa	1105	1059		9619	8755		509	459		[illegible]	[illegible]	
Total 313th Air Division	884	855		7035	6418		498	449		4327	[illegible]	
Total Assigned Units	534	538		3827	3580		204	178		1665	[illegible]	
Total Attached Units	350	317		3208	2838		294	271		2662	[illegible]	
Hq 313th Air Division Total	90	89		177	187		65	68		24	36	
MADEKA												
1[illegible]th FBSq (Atchd)	301	271		2994	2632		294	271		2662	[illegible]	
[illegible]th FBSq (Atchd)	49	46		214	206							
581st ARGp (Asgd)	121	140		445	544					22	21	
13th & 17th Comm Sqs (Asgd)	14	16		341	323					39	40	
NAHA												
51st FIAg (Asgd)	221	207		2109	1817		138	109		1417	[illegible]	
623rd & 624th AC&W Sqs (Asgd)	68	67		624	587					163	[illegible]	
Det # 1, Hq 313th Air Div (Asgd)	20	19		131	122		1	1				
* Total Supported Units	221	204		2584	2337		11	10		602	555	
* Total Pipeline (Not included in above figures)		62			367							
* Includes SCARWAF												

SOURCE: RCS 313TH AD P5

CONFIDENTIAL

0532

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3	3				
	ASGD	1	1				
	% MANNED	33	33				
COL	AUTH	20	19				
	ASGD	22	18				
	% MANNED	110	95				
L/COL	AUTH	54	56				
	ASGD	45	44				
	% MANNED	83	78				
MAJ	AUTH	132	133				
	ASGD	106	105				
	% MANNED	80	79				
CAPT	AUTH	292	257				
	ASGD	173	169				
	% MANNED	59	66				
LTS	AUTH	336	345				
	ASGD	440	446				
	% MANNED	131	129				
WO	AUTH	19	22				
	ASGD	30	26				
	% MANNED	158	118				
COMD	AUTH	856	835				
	ASGD	817	809				
TOTAL	% MANNED	95	97				
	PROJ'D			785	773	763	

SOURCE : O-OM COMP & PER

0533

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469	455				
	ASGD	323	303				
	% MANNED	69	67				
T/SGT	AUTH	601	593				
	ASGD	455	454				
	% MANNED	76	77				
S/SGT	AUTH	1726	1655				
	ASGD	966	968				
	% MANNED	56	58				
A/1C	AUTH	2095	2049				
	ASGD	1211	1295				
	% MANNED	58	63				
A/2C	AUTH	1679	1702				
	ASGD	1907	1953				
	% MANNED	114	115				
A/3C	AUTH	442	387				
	*ASGD	1330	1239				
	% MANNED	301	338				
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	7012	6821				
	ASGD	6192	6212				
	% MANNED	88	91				
	PROJ'D			6611	6744	6994	

*INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE : O-OM, COMPT & PER

0534

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASSIGD	PCS CHILLED	PCS ASSIGD
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

PERCENT UNOCCUPIED BY STATUS



TOTAL
USABLE
REPAIR
COMMITTED

AVS NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS			1106.5			1123.4											
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE		27.2			18.5											
		REPAIR		13.4			7.1											
		COMMITTED		4.7			3.8											
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	NO. OF MOVE		419	11		428	11										
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES		76	95		77	106										
	NO. AVAIL.	FORECAST		1117			1134			1142		1160						
	OFFICERS	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	449			466											
			WOMEN	636			653											
			CIVILIAN	13			10											

0536

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

KADENA

NET PROFIT/LOSS ——

OFFICERS



NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,675	−1,989				
NET WORTH	100,063	99,338				

NCO



2,699	2,365				
327,112	329,549				

(DOLLARS)
THOUSAND
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5

AIRMEN



NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,658	690			
NET WORTH	73,438	74,129			

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0537

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA

NET PROFIT / LOSS ——

OFFICERS



NET PROFIT/LOSS	84	-1,389				
NET WORTH	29,977	28,587				

NCO



2,265	-1,069					
62,038	60,983					

AIRMEN



NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285	2,440				
NET WORTH	31,399	39,734				

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0538

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0539

SAFETY COMMENTS

(Major Aircraft Accidents) The cumulative average major aircraft accident rate for the command is 49 in comparision to the Fifth Air Force cumulative average of 32 as of 31 July 1955. One accidents during the month of August gave the command a total of 17 major aircraft accidents so far this year, with a total of 34,334 hours flown. Fifth Air Force average for 1954 was 43 and USAF average for the same period was 20.

(Military Disabling Injuries) There were 7 disabling injuries during the month of August, with a total cost of injuries of $3,384. This brought the command cost of disabling injuries up to $178,710.00 for the first 8 months of 1955. Their were no fatalities during the month of August.

(Motor Vehicle Accidents) There were 7 motor vehicle accidents during the month of August, with a total cost of $2,693.00. This brought the command cost of accidents up to $34,100.00 for the first eight months of 1955.

0540

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

-----313 TH 1955 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RATE—49

———5TH AF 1954 AVERAGE RATE—40

$$\text{RATE} = \frac{\text{NO. OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HOURS}} \times 100{,}000$$

UNITS	AUG 1955		1955 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18TH AB GP	0	445	0	3682	0	
51ST AB GP	0	294	0	2664	0	
26TH FIS *	0	0	0	2535	0	
581ST AR GP	0	907	1	6325	16	
25TH FIS	0	421	1	4250	24	
16TH FIS	1	661	4	5475	74	
12TH FBS	0	557	4	4338	92	
44TH FBS	1	665	1	1034	97	
67TH FBS	0	595	6	4331	138	

* 26TH FIS TRANSFERRED 1 JULY 55

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0541

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	AUGUST 1955 ACDTS THIS MO.	1955 CUMULATIVE NO. OF ACDTS	RATE
ALL CAUSES	18 FBW	1	11	73
	51 FIW	1	5	33
	581 ARG		1	15
PILOT ERROR	18 FBW	1	5	37
	51 FIW		1	6
	581 ARG			
SUPV. ERROR	18 FBW			
	51 FIW	1	1	6
	581 ARG			
MAINT. ERROR	18 FBW		1	7
	51 FIW			
	581 ARG			
MAT. FAILURE	18 FBW		2	15
	51 FIW		2	13
	581 ARG			
MISCELLANEOUS	18 FBW			
	51 FIW			
	581 ARG			
UNDETERMINED	18 FBW		3	22
	51 FIW		1	6
	581 ARG		1	15



RATE = $\frac{\text{NO. OF ACDTS}}{\text{HRS FLOWN}}$ X 100,000 ---- 5TH AF, 1954 RATE

SOURCE: ASST. FOR SFTY.

0542

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	AUGUST 1955				1955 CUMULATIVE			
	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	COST	COST - $1,000 (0 5 10 15 20 25)
13 COMM SQ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	
6332 USAF DIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	
6351 USAF DIS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	
51 TAC HOSP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00	
HQ. SQ. 51 F I W	0	0	0	0	1	0	360.00	
623 AC & W SQ	0	0	0	0	2	0	450.00	
18 F B GP	0	0	0	0	1	0	540.00	
17 C C SQ	0	0	0	0	2	0	630.00	
624 AC & W SQ	0	0	0	0	2	0	720.00	
HQ. SQ. 18 F B W	0	0	0	0	3	0	750.00	
51 M & S GP	0	0	0	0	6	0	960.00	
581 AR GP	2	0	26	780.00	4	0	1,020.00	
18 TAC HOSP	1	0	10	300.00	2	0	1,140.00	
80 F B SQ	0	0	0	0.00	3	0	2,340.00	
51 A B GP	3	0	64	1924.00	9	0	3,150.00	
* HQ. SQ 313 A D	0	0	0	0	1	1	32,100.00	
18 M & S GP	0	0	0	0	6	1	33,180.00	
51 F I GP	0	0	0	0	8	1	33,780.00	
18 A B GP	1	0	12	360.00	11	2	67,290.00	

313 TH A D AVERAGE COST --- 9,406

36

SOURCE : ASST FOR SFTY

* INCLUDES DET # 1 313 AD

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	AUGUST 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		COST OF ACCIDENTS — $1,000 (0 2 4 6 8 10)
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	
13 COMM SQ	0	0	0	0	0.00	
17 C C SQ	0	0	0	0	0.00	
6581 USAF DIS	0	0	0	0	0.00	
HQ.SQ. 51 FIW	0	0	0	0	0.00	
51 FI GP	0	0	0	0	0.00	
51 AB GP	0	0	0	2	0.00	
51 TAC HOSP	0	0	0	1	0.00	
HQ. SQ. 18 FBW	0	0	0	1	0.00	
18 FB GP	0	0	0	0	0.00	
18 TAC HOSP	1	0	0	1	0.00	
581 AR GP	0	0	0	0	0.00	
80 F B SQ	0	0	0	0	0.00	
6332 USAF DIS	0	0	0	1	73.00	
524 AC & W SQ	0	0	0	2	175.00	
* HQ. SQ. 313 A.D.	0	0	0	2	226.00	
623 AC & W SQ	0	0	0	2	298.00	
51 M & S GP	0	0	0	6	324.00	
10 M & S GP	4	33	2,279.00	14	3,275.00	
10 A B GP	2	17	416.00	15	29,729.00	

313 TH A D AVERAGE COST --- 1,741

* INCLUDES DET #1, 313 A.D

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0544

DISTRIBUTION LIST

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ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	1
COMPTROLLER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
HEADQUARTERS, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
TOTAL	19

0545


COMMAND...
MANAGEMENT
REVIEW
313TH
FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF
September 1965
306812

COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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
SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE FIFTH AIR FORCE
JAPAN
30 N
125 E
30°N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORMOSA
IWO JIMA
313
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

0549

OKINAWA



0550

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

TRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATIO AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



055

RATING SYSTEM

18 TH F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	129	135	161			
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	39	33	32			
[illegible]-COMM RATE	(200)	150	159	194			
[illegible] RATE	(150)	105	150	105			
MAJ [illegible] ACDTS	(200)	94	61	200			
GND ACDTS	(50)	35	32	26			
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	552	570	718			
% TOTAL POINTS		55.2	57.0	71.8			
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		11TH	7TH				

51ST F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	190	168	166			
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	57	134	136			
N-COMM RATE	(200)	130	119	140			
ADCP RATE	(150)	135	150	150			
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	77	48	200			
GND ACDTS	(50)	13	33	44			
TOTAL POINTS-	(1,000)	602	653	836			
% TOTAL POINTS		60.2	65.3	83.6			
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		10TH	6TH				

0552

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0553

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

(Rating System). Of a possible 1,000 points under the Fifth Air Force Rating System, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing scored 718 points during the month of September. This is an increase of 148 points over August, when they placed 7th out of 22 units considered by Fifth Air Force. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing scored 736 points, an increase of 183 points over August, when they placed 6th out of the 12 units considered.

The absence of major aircraft accidents in the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, resulted in a gain of 139 and 151 points respectively. Operational Readiness of Crews resulted in the largest loss of points for both Wings, 188 for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and 64 points for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

0554

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0555

OPERATIONS COMMENTS

(Flying Hour Program) Neither the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing nor the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing flew the allocated hours for the first quarter of fiscal year 1956.

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing flew 2,347 hours of their hours allocated for the month of September. This is an improvement of over six hundred (600) hours flown during the months of July and August. Totals for the first quarter were 5,726 hours flown of the allocated 7,125 hours, or 80.5% of the allocation.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing flew 934 hours of their 1,150 hours allocated for the month of September. This is an improvement of eighty-seven (87) hours over the month of August. Totals for the first quarter were 2,792 hours flown of the allocated 3,450 hours, or 80.9% of the allocation.

A monthly average of 32% of the allocated hours for the Fifth Air Force F-86F units has been accomplished during the past 3 months, as compared to 27% by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period.

A monthly average of 34% of the allocated hours for the Fifth Air Force F-86D units has been accomplished during the past 3 months, as compared to 27% by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the same period.

(Operational Readiness of Crews) Of the 74 crews assigned to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, 12 crews are operational ready, or 16% of the assigned crews. A monthly average of 18% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86F crews have been operational ready for the past 3 months as compared to an average of 24% for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period.

Of the 60 crews assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 45 crews are operational ready, or 68% of the assigned crews. A monthly average of 83% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86D crews have been operational ready for the past 2 months as compared to an average of 75% for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the past 3 months.

The command position was decreased slightly during the past month. Of the 140 crews assigned, there were 57 operational ready, or 41%, which is a decrease of 1% from the previous month.

0556

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT — OVERALL

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	49.5	80.5			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			10,575			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,693	5,237	8,518			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,704	2,633	3,281			

18 TH F B WG



23.8	47.4	80.4				% QTRLY ALLOC FLN
		7,125				QTRLY HRS ALLOC
1,682	3,379	5,726				CUM QTRLY HRS FLN
1,693	1,686	2,347				HRS FLN THIS MONTH



51 ST F I WG



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.3	53.8	80.9			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			3,450			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011	1,858	2,792			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,011	847	934			

SECRET

9

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS OST

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18TH F B WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

12TH FB SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	47.4	80.9			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC						
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614	1,127	1,921			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	609	518	794			

67TH FB SQ



24.5	41.9	78.5			
566	1,113	1,865			
581	532	752			

44TH F B SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	21.2	47.9	81.7			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC						
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	502	1,139	1,940			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	636	801			

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS O & T

0558

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

51 ST F I WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

16TH F I SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.1	53.8	77.9			
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	503	929	1,344			
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	426	415			

25 TH F I SQ





29.1	53.8	83.9				% QTRLY ALLOC FLN
		1,725				QTRLY HRS ALLOC
508	929	1,448				CUM QTRLY HRS FLN
508	421	519				HRS FLN THIS MONTH

SECRET
11

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

OVERALL

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	164	164	164			
ASSIGNED	143	146	140			
OPNL READY	67	62	57			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48	45			





	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	90	90	90			
ASSIGNED	74	79	74			
OPNL READY	12	10	12			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48	45			

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	74	74	74			
ASSIGNED	69	67	66			
OPNL READY	55	52	45			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*			

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0560

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

18TH F B WG

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30			
ASSIGNED	28	29	24			
OPNL READY	0	0	0			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20	20	21			

67TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
30	30	30			
22	25	25			
0	0	0			
22	21	4			



44TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30			
ASSIGNED	24	25	25			
OPNL READY	12	10	12			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	11	7	20			

0561

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

51ST F I WG

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X100 = % O/R OF ASGND

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37			
ASSIGNED	33	30	30			
OPNL READY	26	24	22			
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*			

25TH F I SQ





37	37	37				AUTHORIZED	
36	37	36				ASSIGNED	
29	28	23				OPNL READY	
*	*	*				O/R LESS GUNNERY	

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0562

SECRET

AC & W OPERATIONS

UNKNOWN TRACKS

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TOTAL TRACKS	2231	2238	2609			
INITIALLY UNKNOWN	109	32	36			
% OF TRACKS UNKNOWN	4.88	1.43	1.38			
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO SCRAMBLE	72	4	3			
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO INTERCEPTION	10	16	18			
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY BY INTERCEPTION	22	11	13			
MISPLOTS	2	0	2			
WEATHER PLOTS	3	1	1			
REMAINING UNKNOWN	0	0	0			

AVERAGE TIME (MINUTES) SCRAMBLE TO AIRBORNE

	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW
FROM STANDBY	4.5	7.5	3.5	4.4	*	4.3						
FROM READINESS	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.7	*	6.3						
AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME	61.0	32.7	52.0	32.1	*	40.0						

* ALL SCRAMBLES MADE BY 51ST FIW

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O & T

0563

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0564

MATERIEL COMMENTS

(ACCF) The percent ACCF for the command increased from 4.6 for the month of August to 5.1 for the month of September. All units showed a decrease from the previous month with the exception of the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron, which increased from 0.5 to 1.5. The large increase in ACCF at this Squadron was due to misinterpretation of the reporting requirements as set forth in the directives covering ACCF reporting. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the past 2 months has been below the Fifth Air Force rate of 5%. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing increased from 4.8 during the month of August to 5.4 for the month of September.

(In Commission) The Fifth Air Force standard in-commission rate dropped from 80% to 75%. The command in-commission rate increased from 57.1% in August to 64.4% for the month of September. The 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, with 88.9% in commission, was the only unit over the Fifth Air Force rate of 75%.

All units increased in-commission rates during the month of September. This increase and the drop in the Fifth Air Force standard reflected a gain of 45 and 21 points for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing respectively, in the Rating System.

0565

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT									NON-COMBAT											
KADENA AB	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47	VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	C-118	B-26	TOTAL
18 FBW	63									2	5			3				5			2		80
581 ASLG		10													4		1		3	1			19
KADENA TOTALS	63	10								2	5			3	4		1	5	3	1	2		99
NAHA AB																							
51 FIW	45									3	4	2						6					60
																	7						
NAHA TOTALS	45									3	4	2						6					60
313TH TOTALS	108	10								2	3	9	2		3	4		1	11	3	1	2	159

SOURCE: 1-AF-A1

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5 TH AF IN COMM RATE = 75 %

OVERALL



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1	57.1	64.4			
% AOCP	5.9	4.6	5.1			



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
60.1	63.5	72.6			
6.1	4.8	6.4			



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9	47.5	52.4			
% AOCP	5.8	4.3	3.2			

SECRET
19

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0567

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

18TH F B WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

12TH F B SQ



% IN COMM	61.4	66.1	72.1			
% AOCP	1.6	0.5	8.3			

67TH F B SQ



46.8	49.8	56.7			
14.1	14.7	10.6			

44TH F B SQ



% IN COMM	81.5	72.5	88.9			
% AOCP	0	0	0			

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0568

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

51ST F I WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	49	48.6	51.2			
% AOCP	2.8	2.7	1.1			

25TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	45	46.5	53.4			
% AOCP	5.4	5.6	5.1			

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0569

CONFIDENTIAL

FUEL CONSUMPTION

TACTICAL JET AIRCRAFT



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-F	12TH F B SQ	*	478	449			
	67TH F B SQ	*	494	464			
	44TH F B SQ	*	463	431			



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-D	16TH F I SQ	*	508	558			
	25TH F I SQ	*	530	545			

* = INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0570

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0571

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

(Personnel Turnover) Personnel turnover for assigned units during the month of September shows a increase of 23 officers and increase of 106 airmen. Command increase in airmen [illegible] reflects gains in only the A/2C and A/3C grades, all skilled and supervisory grades reflect a loss of personnel.

(Problem Areas) The following officer AFSC's were deleted from the problem areas during the month of September: 1644, 3016, 3054, 6424 and 7024. AFSC 1234C was added to the officer problem areas. The remaining AFSC's are reported due to the low percent of skilled personnel. Ten (10) airmen AFSC's were added to the problem areas during the month of September. The increase of airmen problem areas is due largely to the lack of skilled and supervisory personnel.

(Dependent Housing Status) Percent of unoccupied houses reflected an increase from 2.8% in August to 3.7% during September. This is still a favorable condition.

(On-the-Job Training) The percentage of assigned apprentice level airmen in training to the 5 skilled level as of 31 August 1955 was 86%. The average monthly completed training ratio remains at 12%. The Fifth Air Force goal is a 90% in training ratio and a 15% completion ratio. A total of 273 airmen were upgraded in skill level during the month of August, raising the command skill level from 64% to 65% at the 5 and 7 level skill. 69% of the command authorizations are skill and supervisory positions.

(Open Mess Facilities) Three of the six Open Mess Facilities showed a net profit during the month of September. The Kadena NCO Club showed the largest net profit of $2,927. The three facilities reflecting a net loss for the month were the Naha Officers' Club, Naha NCO Club, and the Kadena Airmens Club.

0572

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 September 1955

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
*TOTAL AIR FORCE ON OKINAWA	1096	1032	94	9346	8813	94	502	472	94	4876	4864	99
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	879	835	94	6863	6510	95	491	462	94	4273	4267	99
TOTAL ASSIGNED UNITS	532	519	97	3735	3652	98	202	184	91	1639	1531	93
TOTAL ATTACHED UNITS	347	316	91	3128	2858	91	289	278	96	2634	2736	104
HQ 313TH AIR DIVISION TOTAL	88	88	100	175	192	110	64	67	104	24	35	146
KADENA												
18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING (ATCHD)	298	267	89	2914	2660	91	289	278	96	2634	2736	104
80TH FTR BOMB SQ (ATCHD)	49	49	100	214	198	92						
581ST ASL GP (ASGD)	121	133	110	445	518	116				22	21	95
13TH & 17TH COMM SQS (ASGD)	14	15	107	341	316	93				39	40	102
NAHA												
51ST FTR INTCP WING (ASGD)	220	199	90	2015	1938	96	137	115	84	1396	1337	96
623RD & 624TH AC&W SQS (ASGD)	69	65	94	628	566	90		2	-	158	98	62
DET #1-HQ 313TH AIR DIV (ASGD)	20	19	95	131	122	93	1		0			
*TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	217	197	90	2483	2303	93	11	10	91	603	597	99
*TOTAL PIPELINE (NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE FIGURES)		57			670							
* INCLUDES SCARWAF												

SOURCE: RCS 313TH AD P5

0573

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3	3	3			
	ASGD	1	1	1			
	% MANNED	33	33	33			
COL	AUTH	20	19	19			
	ASGD	22	18	16			
	% MANNED	110	95	84			
L/COL	AUTH	54	56	55			
	ASGD	45	44	47			
	% MANNED	83	78	85			
MAJ	AUTH	132	133	130			
	ASGD	106	105	109			
	% MANNED	80	79	84			
CAPT	AUTH	292	257	265			
	ASGD	173	169	165			
	% MANNED	59	66	62			
LTS	AUTH	336	345	337			
	ASGD	440	446	426			
	% MANNED	131	129	126			
WO	AUTH	19	22	21			
	ASGD	30	26	22			
	% MANNED	158	118	105			
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	856	835	830			
	ASGD	817	809	786			
	% MANNED	95	97	95			
	PROJ'D				814	803	772

SOURCE : O-OM COMP & PER

0574

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469	455	454			
	ASGD	323	303	290			
	% MANNED	69	67	64			
T/SGT	AUTH	601	593	596			
	ASGD	455	454	445			
	% MANNED	76	77	74			
S/SGT	AUTH	1726	1655	1,624			
	ASGD	966	968	887			
	% MANNED	56	58	55			
A/1C	AUTH	2095	2049	2004			
	ASGD	1211	1293	1,131			
	% MANNED	58	63	56			
A/2C	AUTH	1679	1702	1,655			
	ASGD	1907	1953	2,007			
	% MANNED	114	115	121			
A/3C	AUTH	442	367	316			
	* ASGD	1330	1239	1,552			
	% MANNED	301	338	491			
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	7012	6821	6,649			
	ASGD	6192	6212	6,312			
	% MANNED	88	91	95			
	PROJ'D				6451	6666	6327

* INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE : O-OM, COMPT & PER

0575

PROBLEM AREAS

OFFICER & AIRMEN

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGND	% SKILLED	% MANNED
[illegible]	Pilot, Ftr	90	78	78	[illegible]
[illegible]	Pilot, Ftr	74	68	69	[illegible]
[illegible]	Pilot, Bombardment	36	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Supply Staff Off	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Personnel Off	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Intelligence Operators	[illegible]			
[illegible]	Aircraft Control & Warning	214	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Ground Radar	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]	Ground Radio	174	127	30	[illegible]
431X1B	Aircraft Maintenance	218	122	61	[illegible]
462X0	Weapons Maintenance	138	[illegible]	55	[illegible]
[illegible]	Ground Power Equipment	75	[illegible]	17	[illegible]
[illegible]	Auto Body Repair	19	[illegible]	0	[illegible]
[illegible]	Gas Generator Plant	20	[illegible]	111	[illegible]
[illegible]	Electric Power Prod	15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Sales Store	11	7	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	POL	163	117	[illegible]	[illegible]
672X0	Accounting	27	25	[illegible]	[illegible]
682X0	Machine Accounting	24	6	20	[illegible]
703X0	Chaplain Service	13	10	60	[illegible]
771X0	Air Police	399	226	55	[illegible]
901X0	Aero Specialist	10	5	40	50
906X0	Medical Administration	17	21	53	124
922X0	Surv Training	52	32	36	62

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0576

COURTS MARTIAL RATE

COMMAND TOTAL



RATE
6
4
2
0

HQ 313 TH



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
33				SPEC		SPEC	—				
51				SUM		SUM	—				

KADENA



RATE
6
4
2
0

NAHA



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
22				SPEC		SPEC	11				
26				SUM		SUM	29				

PAST 6 MO AVG

29

SOURCE: SJA

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



AVG NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS			1106.5			1123.4			1,139.3								
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE		27.2			19.5			28.4								
		REPAIR		13.4			7.1			11.0								
		COMMITTED		4.7			5.8			4.8								
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	MO. OF WAIT		419	11		428	11		459	10.C							
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES		76	95		77	106		80	84							
	QTRS AVAIL.	FORECAST		1117			1134			1,147			1,162		1,177			
	QTRS OCCUPIED	OFFICER		469			466			457								
		AIRMEN		635			658			635								
		CIVILIAN		13			10			10								

SOURCE : DIR OF PER

0578

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

KADENA



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,673	-1,989	763			
NET WORTH	102,063	99,338	95,098			



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2,699	2,365	2,927			
327,112	329,549	335,063			



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,658	690	-2,805			
NET WORTH	73,438	74,129	71,323			

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0579

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	84	-1,389	-862			
NET WORTH	29,977	28,587	27,286			





2,265	-1,069	-1,712				NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285	2,440	1,241			
62,038	60,983	57,200				NET WORTH	31,399	39,734	34,825			

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0580

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0581

SAFETY COMMENTS

(Major Aircraft Accidents) The cumulative average major aircraft accident rate for the command for the first nine (9) months is 48 in comparison to the Fifth Air Force cumulative average of [illegible] as of 31 August 1955. Fifth Air Force average for 1954 was 40 and USAF average for the same period was 20. Two accidents during the month of September gave the command a total of 19 major aircraft accidents for the first nine (9) months, with a total of 39,604 hours flown. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing went accident free for the month of September. The two (2) accidents occured in the 581st Air Resupply Group.

(Military Disabling Injuries) There were 7 disabling injuries during the month of September at a total cost of $3,990.00. This brought the command total for disabling injuries up to $132,700.00 for the first nine (9) months of the year. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had a decrease from three (3) injuries for August to one (1) for September. The 581st Air Resupply Group had no injuries in September. Off-duty injuries for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was the reason for an increase from two (2) injuries during the month of August to six (6) during the month of September.

(Motor Vehicle Accidents) There were four (4) motor vehicle accidents during the month of September, at a total cost of $1,511.00. This brought the command cost of accidents up to $35,611.00 for the first nine (9) months of the year. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing motor vehicle accidents were reduced more than 50% from the month of August, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is enjoying two (2) consecutive months with no motor vehicle accidents.

0582

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

313 TH 1955 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RATE --- 5 TH A F 1954 AVERAGE RATE ••••

UNITS	SEP 1955		1955 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
4 TH BASE FLT	0	500	0	4191	0	
51ST BASE FLT	0	370	0	3034	0	
26TH FIS *	0	0	0	2535	0	
25TH FIS	0	519	1	4769	21	
551ST ARG	2	609	3	6934	43	
44TH FBS	0	879	1	1913	52	
16TH FIS	0	553	4	6028	66	
2TH FBS	0	749	4	5087	78	
67TH FBS	0	782	6	5113	117	

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

RATE $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HOURS}} \times 100{,}000$

* 26 TH FIS REASSIGNED TO 13TH AF, 10 JULY 1955.

0583

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

SEPTEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO.	NO. OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
ALL CAUSES	18 FBW	0	11	67	
	51 FIW	0	5	31	
	581 ARG	2	3	43	
PILOT ERROR	18 FBW	0	5	31	
	51 FIW	0	1	6	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	18 FBW	0	0	0	
	51 FIW	0	1	6	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	18 FBW	0	1	6	
	51 FIW	0	0	0	
	581 ARG	1	1	14	
MAT. FAILURE	18 FBW	0	2	12	
	51 FIW	0	2	12	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MISCELLANEOUS	18 FBW	0	0	0	
	51 FIW	0	0	0	
	381 ARG	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	18 FBW	0	3	18	
	51 FIW	0	1	6	
	581 ARG	1	2	29	

5TH A F RATE ———

SOURCE : ASST FOR SFTY

0584

LITARY DISABLING INJURIES

ITS	SEPTEMBER 1955				1955 CUMULATIVE			COST—$1,000
	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	COST	0 5 10 15 20 25
[illegible]	[illegible]	0	0	0	1	0	360	
[illegible] AC&W	0	0	0	0	2	0	450	
[illegible]TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	2	0	720	
18TH FBG	1	0	15	450	2	0	990	
381ST ARG	0	0	0	0	4	0	1,020	
31ST M&SG	1	0	21	630	7	0	1,590	
19TH FBW	0	0	0	0	5	0	1,890	
30TH FBS	0	0	0	0	3	0	2,340	
31ST ABG	0	0	0	0	9	0	3,450	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	3	1	32,730	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	8	1	33,780	
18TH M&SG	4	0	92	2,760	10	1	35,940	
18TH ABG	1	0	5	150	12	2	67,440	

313TH AD CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST ---

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0585

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	SEPTEMBER 1955 ACCTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACCTS	1955 CUMULATIVE ACCTS	COST OF ACCTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS — $100.00 0 10 20 30 40 50
18TH FBS	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0	
581ST ARG	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	1	0	
51ST ABG	0	0	0	2	0	
80TH FBS	1	1	27.	1	27.	
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	73.	
63RD ACBW	0	0	0	2	175.	
91ST ARB	0	0	0	2	226.	
3RD ACBW	0	0	0	2	298.	
1ST M&S G	0	0	0	6	324.	
18TH M&S G	3	23	1,484.	17	4,759.	
18TH ABG	0	0	0	15	29,729.	

313 TH AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST – 2,739.

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0586

DISTRIBUTION LIST

	NO COPIES
COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE	2
COMMANDER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	1
COMPTROLLER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
HEADQUARTERS, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1
TOTAL	19

0587

SECRET

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW



FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF
OCTOBER

3C8750

SECRET

COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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
SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE.
JAPAN
NANKING
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORMOSA
313TH
IWO JIMA
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

OKINAWA



0592

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

STRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



0593

RATING SYSTEM

18 TH F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	129	135	156	98		
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	39	33	24	28		
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	150	159	189	178		
AOCP RATE	(150)	105	150	105	75		
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	94	61	200	0		
GND ACDTS	(50)	35	32	25	27		
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	552	570	699	406		
% TOTAL POINTS		55.2	57.0	69.9	40.6		
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		11TH	7 TH	9 TH			

51ST F B WG

		JUL	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM	(200)	190	168	167	200		
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	57	134	134	161		
IN-COMM RATE	(200)	130	119	139	164		
AOCP RATE	(150)	135	150	150	150		
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	77	49	200	85		
GND ACDTS	(50)	13	33	44	22		
TOTAL POINTS	(1,000)	602	653	834	782		
% TOTAL POINTS		60.2	65.3	834	78.2		
RANKED WITH FIFTH A F		10TH	6TH	2 ND			

0594

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0595

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

(Rating System) Of a possible 1,000 points under the Fifth Air Force Rating System, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing scored 406 points during the month of October. This is a decrease of 293 points over the previous month when they placed 9th out of 12 units considered by Fifth Air Force. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing scored 782 points, a decrease of 52 points over the previous month when they placed 2nd out of the 12 units considered.

The occurrence of major aircraft accidents in the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing resulted in a loss of 200 and 115 points respectively. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing reflected a loss of points in all fields except Operational Readiness of Crews and Ground Accidents where they gained 4 and 2 points respectively over the previous month. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing reflected a gain of points in all fields except Ground Accidents where they lost 22 points from the previous month.

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

OPERATIONS COMMENTS

(Flying Hour Program) The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing overflew their first month's allocation of the second quarter fiscal year 1956 by forty-one (41) hours. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing only flew 49% of their allocated hours for the first month of the second quarter fiscal year 1956. Compliance with Technical Order 00-35D-54 grounded all F-86F aircraft from 15 through 22 October. This was the major contributing factor for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing underflying its allocation by 51%.

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing flew 1,150 hours of their 2,351 hours allocated, or 49% of the allocation. This is a decrease of 1,197 hours from the previous month.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing flew 1,179 hours of their 1,150 hours allocated, or 102% of the allocation. This is an improvement of 245 hours from the previous month.

A monthly average of 31% of the allocated hours for the Fifth Air Force F-86F units has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 24% by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period.

A monthly average of 31% of the allocated hours for the Fifth Air Force F-86D units has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 29% by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the same period.

(Operational Readiness of Crews) Of the 81 crews assigned to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, 6 crews are operational ready, or 7% of the assigned crews. A monthly average of 20% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86F crews have been operational ready for the past 3 months as compared to an average of 12% for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period.

Of the 65 crews assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 55 crews are operational ready, or 84% of the assigned crews. A monthly average of 84% of the assigned Fifth Air Force F-86D crews have been operational ready for the past 3 months as compared to an average of 77% for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the same period.

0598

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT — OVERALL

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	49.5	80.5	22.0		
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			10,575			10,575
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,704	5,237	8,518	2,329		
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,704	2,533	3,281	2,329		

18 TH F B WG



51 ST F I WG



23.8	47.4	80.4	16.1			% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.3	53.8	80.9	34.2		
		7,125			7,125	QTRLY HRS ALLOC			3,450			3,450
1,693	3,379	5,726	1,150			CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011	1,858	2,792	1,179		
1,693	1,686	2,347	1,150			HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,011	847	934	1,179		

SECRET
9

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS OCT

0599

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18 TH F B WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

12 TH FB SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	47.4	80.9	14.5		
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			2,375
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614	1,127	1,921	345		
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	609	518	794	345		

67 TH F B SQ



24.5	41.9	78.5	11.2		
		2,375			2,375
566	1,113	1,865	266		
581	532	752	266		

44 TH F B SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	21.2	47.9	81.7	22.7		
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			2,375
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	502	1,139	1,940	539		
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	636	801	539		

SECRET
10

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS O & T

0600

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

51 ST F I WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

16 TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.1	53.8	77.9	34.4		
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			1,725
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	503	929	1,344	594		
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	426	415	594		

25 TH F I SQ





	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.1	53.8	83.9	339		
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			1,725
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	508	929	1,448	585		
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	508	421	519	585		

SECRET
11

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

OVERALL

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

313 TH A D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	164	164	164	164		
ASSIGNED	143	146	140	146		
OPNL READY	67	62	57	61		
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48	45	48		

18 TH F B WG



%
100
75
50
25
0

51 ST F I WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
90	90	90	90			AUTHORIZED	74	74	74	74		
74	79	74	81			ASSIGNED	69	67	66	65		
12	10	12	6			OPNL READY	55	52	45	55		
53	48	45	48			O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*		

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0602

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

18TH F B WG

▨ = OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

▩ = OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30		
ASSIGNED	28	29	24	24		
OPNL READY	0	0	0	0		
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20	20	21	20		

67TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
30	30	30	30		
22	25	25	27		
0	0	0	0		
22	21	20	20		



44TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30		
ASSIGNED	24	25	25	30		
OPNL READY	12	10	12	6		
O/R LESS GUNNERY	11	7	4	8		

0603

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

81ST F I WG

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X100 = % O/R OF ASGND

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37		
ASSIGNED	33	30	30	32		
OPNL READY	26	24	22	28		
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*		

25TH F I SQ





JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	
37	37	37	37			AUTHORIZED
36	37	36	33			ASSIGNED
29	28	23	27			OPNL READY
*	*	*	*			O/R LESS GUNNERY

*=NOT APPLICABLE

SECRET

0604

SECRET

AC & W OPERATIONS

UNKNOWN TRACKS

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TOTAL TRACKS	2231	2238	2609	2502		
INITIALLY UNKNOWN	109	32	36	29		
% OF TRACKS UNKNOWN	4.88	1.43	1.38	1.19		
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO SCRAMBLE	72	4	3	4		
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO INTERCEPTION	10	16	18	10		
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY BY INTERCEPTION	22	11	13	14		
MISPLOTS	2	0	2	0		
WEATHER PLOTS	3	1	1	1		
REMAINING UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0		

AVERAGE TIME (MINUTES) SCRAMBLE TO AIRBORNE

	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW
FROM STANDBY	4.5	7.5	3.5	4.4	*	4.3	**	3.33				
FROM READINESS	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.7	*	6.3	4.0	5.0				
AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME	61.0	32.7	52.0	32.1	*	40.0	44.0	37.0				

* ALL SCRAMBLES MADE BY 51ST FIW
** NO SCRAMBLES FROM STANDBY BY 18TH FBW

SECRET
15

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O & T

0605

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0606

MATERIEL COMMENTS

(ACCP) The ACCP rate for the command remained at 5.1% for the month of October. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing showed an increase in ACCP from 6.4% in September to 7.6% in October, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing reflected a decrease from 3.8% to 1.6% for the same period. Fifth Air Force F-86F units have a 5.6% ACCP average for the past 3 months as compared to 6.3% for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period. Fifth Air Force F-86D units have an 8.3% ACCP average for the past 3 months as compared to 3.0% for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the same period.

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, were under the Fifth Air Force standard of 5% ACCP.

(In Commission) The in-commission rate remained the same at 64.4% for the month of October. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing reflected a decrease from 72.6% for the month of September to 66.7% for the month of October, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing shows an increase from 52.4% to 61.3% for the same period. Fifth Air Force F-86F units have a 66.3% in-commission rate for the past 3 months as compared to 67.6% for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for the same period. Fifth Air Force F-86D units have a 59.3% in-commission rate for the past 3 months as compared to 53.7% for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for the same period.

No units under the 313th Air Division were over the Fifth Air Force standard of 75% in-commission rate.

0607

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT											NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47			VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	B-29	B-26	TOTAL
18 F B W	60											2		5	1						5		1	3	80
581 ASLG		10																4				4			20
KADENA TOTALS	60											2		5	1		3	4		2	5	4	1	3	100
NAHA A B																									
51 F I W	44												3	4	2						5				58
6157 OPSQ																					11				11
NAHA TOTALS	44												3	4	2						16				69
313TH TOTALS	104	10										2	3	9	3		3	4		2	21	4	1	3	169

SOURCE: I-AF-AI

0608

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5 TH AF IN COMM RATE = 75 %

OVERALL

313 TH A D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1	57.1	64.4	64.4		
% AOCP	5.9	4.6	5.1	5.1		

18 TH F B WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
60.1	63.5	72.6	66.7		
6.1	4.8	6.4	7.6		

51 ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9	47.5	52.4	61.3		
% AOCP	5.8	4.3	3.2	1.6		

SECRET
19

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0609

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

18TH F B WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

8TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE =75 %



% IN COMM	61.4	56.1	72.1	56.1		
% AOCP	1.6	0.5	8.3	8.5		





46.8	49.8	56.7	68.4			
14.1	14.7	10.6	14.7			

% IN COMM	81.5	72.5	88.9	74.1		
% AOCP	0	0	0	0.4		

SECRET

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

51ST F I WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	49.0	48.6	51.2	56.9		
% AOCP	2.8	2.7	1.1	3.3		

25TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	45.0	46.5	53.4	65.7		
% AOCP	5.4	5.6	5.1	0.0		

SECRET

21

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0611

CONFIDENTIAL

FUEL CONSUMPTION

TACTICAL JET AIRCRAFT



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-F	12TH F B SQ	*	478	449	444		
	67TH F B SQ	*	494	464	432		
	44TH F B SQ	*	463	431	423		



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-D	16TH F I SQ	*	508	558	494		
	25TH F I SQ	*	530	545	525		

* = INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0612

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0613

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

(Personnel Turnover) Personnel turnover for assigned units during the month of October shows an increase of 17 officers and 260 airmen. For the second consecutive month the increase in airmen strength reflects a gain in A/2C and A/3C grades, and a net decrease in skilled and supervisory grades. The 6333rd Technical Training Squadron (Survival) and 6157th Operations Squadron were gained during the month, however, personnel assigned to these units were gained from within the command.

(Problem Areas) The following officer AFSC's were added to the problem areas during the month of October: 3016, 3044, 3054 and 6432. AFSC 6416 was deleted from the officer problem areas. Twelve (12) airmen AFSC's were deleted from the problem areas.

(Dependent Housing Status) Percent of unoccupied houses reflected an increase from 3.9% in September to 4.1% in October. This increase is due to the 30 quarters being repaired during the month of October. The number of unoccupied quarters usable and committed decreased during the month.

(On-the-Job Training) The percentage of assigned apprentice level airmen in training to the 5 skilled level as of 30 September was 85%. The average monthly completed training ratio remains at 12%. The Fifth Air Force goal is 90% in training ratio and a 15% completion ratio. A total of 103 airmen were upgraded in skill level during the month of September. Our airmen skill level is 69% in the 5 and 7 levels. 69% of the command authorizations are skilled and supervisory positions.

(Open Mess Facilities) Three of the six Open Mess Facilities showed a net profit during the month of October. The Kadena NCO Club showed the largest net profit for the second consecutive month. The three facilities reflecting a net loss for the month were the Naha Officers' Club, Naha Airmens Club, and Kadena Airmens Club. The Naha Airmens Club showed the largest net loss of $2,822.

0614

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 October 1955

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
* TOTAL AIR FORCE ON OKINAWA	1140	1036	91	9474	9302	94	502	452	90	4893	4956	101
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	866	803	93	6749	6572	97	491	443	90	4234	4344	101
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	569	536	94	3830	3710	97	202	180	89	1650	1583	96
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	297	267	90	2919	2862	98	289	263	91	2634	2761	105
Hq 313TH AI TOTAL	89	96	97	172	135	107	64	66	103	24	32	133
KADENA												
18TH FB WG (ATCHD)	297	267	90	2919	2862	98	289	263	91	2634	2761	105
581ST AR GP (ASGD)	136	132	97	498	491	98				22	21	95
13TH & 17TH COMM SQS (ASGD)	14	15	107	341	324	95				39	40	102
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	241	224	93	2062	1979	96	137	112	82	1392	1380	99
623RD & 624TH AC&W SQS (ASGD)	69	60	87	626	606	97		2		173	110	63
DET #1 - 313TH AD (ASGD)	20	19	95	131	125	95	1		0			
**TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	274	233	85	2725	2330	85	11	9	82	609	612	100
*TOTAL PIPELINE (NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE FIGURES)		49			505							
*INCLUDES SCAMAF												

SOURCE: RCS 313TH AD-5

0615

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3	3	3	3		
	ASGD	1	1	1	1		
	% MANNED	33	33	33	33		
COL	AUTH	20	19	19	19		
	ASGD	22	18	16	16		
	% MANNED	110	95	84	84		
L/COL	AUTH	54	56	55	57		
	ASGD	45	44	47	50		
	% MANNED	83	78	85	88		
MAJ	AUTH	132	133	130	133		
	ASGD	106	105	109	117		
	% MANNED	80	79	84	88		
CAPT	AUTH	292	257	265	278		
	ASGD	173	169	165	175		
	% MANNED	59	66	62	63		
LTS	AUTH	336	345	337	355		
	ASGD	440	446	426	424		
	% MANNED	131	129	126	119		
WO	AUTH	19	22	21	21		
	ASGD	30	26	22	20		
	% MANNED	158	118	105	95		
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	856	835	830	866		
	ASGD	817	809	786	803		
	% MANNED	95	97	95	93		
	PROJ'D					751	730

SOURCE : O-OM COMP & PER

0616

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469	455	454	464		
	ASGD	323	303	290	288		
	% MANNED	69	67	64	62		
T/SGT	AUTH	601	593	596	600		
	ASGD	455	454	445	427		
	% MANNED	76	77	74	71		
S/SGT	AUTH	1726	1655	1624	1660		
	ASGD	966	968	887	909		
	% MANNED	56	58	55	55		
A/1C	AUTH	2095	2049	2004	2054		
	ASGD	1211	1295	1131	1084		
	% MANNED	58	63	56	53		
A/2C	AUTH	1679	1702	1655	1654		
	ASGD	1907	1953	2007	2088		
	% MANNED	114	115	121	126		
A/3C	AUTH	442	367	316	317		
	*ASGD	1330	1239	1552	1776		
	% MANNED	301	338	491	560		
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	7012	6821	6649	6749		
	ASGD	6192	6212	6312	6572		
	% MANNED	88	91	95	97		
	PROJ'D					6888	6513

* INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE : O-OM, COMPT & PER

0617



PROBLEM AREAS

OFFICER & AIRMEN

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGND	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1124A	Pilot, Ftr	90	77	82	86
1124C	Pilot, Ftr	74	64	86	86
1254C	Pilot, Bmdmt	36	29	35	81
3016	Comm Elect Stf Off	15	11	45	73
3044	Grd Elect Off	7	6	50	86
3054	Air Elect Off	10	5	20	50
6424	Supply Off	45	39	49	87
7324	Personnel Off	32	25	40	78
2736C	Acft Con-Eng Opr	214	196	62	92
431X1C	Acft Jet 1 Eng Mec	409	370	63	90
4328C	Jet Eng Mec	146	113	43	77
4628C	Weapons Mechanic	138	109	56	79
471X1	Auto Mec	173	58	30	34
472X0	Gnd Pow-Spt Eq Rp	74	25	17	34
6437C	Petrl Supply Specl	153	110	51	71
771X0	Air Policeman	399	283	55	71

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0618

COURTS MARTIAL RATE

COMMAND TOTAL



RATE
6
4
2
0

HQ 313 TH



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
33				SPEC		SPEC	—				
51				SUM		SUM	—				

KADENA



RATE
6
4
2
0

NAHA



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
22				SPEC		SPEC	11				
26				SUM		SUM	25				

SOURCE: SJA

0619

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



AVG NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS			1106.5		1123.4		1,139.3		1,149.8								
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE		27.2		19.5		20.4		15.6								
		REPAIR		13.4		7.1		11.0		30.0								
		COMMITTED		4.7		5.8		4.6		2.1								
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	NO. OF WAIT		419	11	428	11	459	10.5	498	8.5							
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES		76	95	77	106	50	84	91	34							
	QTRS AVAIL.	FORECAST		1117		1134		1,147		1,151				1,166		1,181		
	QTRS OCCUPIED	OFFICER		469		466		457		524								
		AIRMEN		635		658		635		589								
		CIVILIAN		13		10		10		8								

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0620

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

KADENA

NET PROFIT/LOSS ——

OFFICERS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,675	-1,989	763	363		
NET WORTH	100,063	99,338	95,098	94,562		

NCO



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2,699	2,365	2,927	1,934		
327,112	329,549	336,063	334,164		

AIRMEN



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,658	690	-2,805	-1,169		
NET WORTH	73,438	74,129	71,323	69,040		

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0621

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA

NET PROFIT / LOSS ——



NET PROFIT/LOSS	84	-1,389	-862	-1,477		
NET WORTH	29,977	28,587	27,286	26,247		





2,265	-1,069	-1,712	908			
62,038	60,983	57,200	58,109			

NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285	2,440	1,241	-2,822		
NET WORTH	31,399	39,734	34,625	32,003		

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0622

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0623

SAFETY COMMENTS

(Major Aircraft Accidents) The cumulative average major aircraft accident rate for the command for the first ten (10) months is 50% in comparison to the Fifth Air Force cumulative average of 33.6% as of 30 September 1955. Fifth Air Force average for 1954 was 40% and USAF average for the same period was 20%. Three (3) accidents during the month of October gave the command a total of 22 major aircraft accidents for the first ten (10) months, with a total of 43,432 hours flown.

Cause factors have not been determined by the Investigation Boards for aircraft accidents occuring in the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron during the month of October. Subject accidents will be carried in the undetermined column of the Cause Factor Analysis chart until Board action is completed.

(Military Disabling Injuries) There were nine (9) disabling injuries during the month of October at a total cost of $5,640.00. This brought the command total for disabling injuries up to $138,340.00 for the first ten (10) months of the year. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had a decrease from six (6) injuries in September to five (5) in October, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing increased from one (1) injury in September to four (4) in October. The 581st Air Resupply Group is enjoying two (2) consecutive months with no disabling injuries.

(Motor Vehicle Accidents) There were eight (8) motor vehicle accidents during the month of October at a total cost of $475.00. This brought the command cost of accidents up to $36,086.00 for the first ten (10) months of the year. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing accidents increased from three (3) in September to six (6) during the month of October. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had two (2) accidents in October and no accidents in September.

0624

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

313 TH 1955 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RATE — — — — 5 TH AF 1954 AVERAGE RATE •••••

UNITS	OCT 1955		1955 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18 TH BASE FLT.	0	298	0	4489	0	
51ST BASE FLT.	0	743	0	3777	0	
26TH FIS *	0	0	0	2535	0	
25 TH FIS	1	585	2	5354	37	
581 ST A R G	0	289	3	7223	41	
16 TH F I S	0	594	4	6622	60	
12 TH F B S	0	396	4	5483	73	
44 TH F B S	1	605	2	2518	79	
67 TH F B S	1	318	7	5431	129	

RATE $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HOURS}}$ X 100,000

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

* 26 TH FIS REASSIGNED TO 13 TH AF, 10 JUL 1955

0625

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

SEPTEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO.	NO. OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	18 F B W	2	13	72	
	51 F I W	1	6	33	
	581 A R G	0	3	41	
PILOT ERROR	18 F B W	0	5	28	
	51 F I W	0	1	5	
	581 A R G	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	18 F B W	0	0	0	
	51 F I W	0	1	5	
	581 A R G	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	18 F B W	0	1	5	
	51 F I W	0	0	0	
	581 A R G	0	1	14	
MAT. FAILURE	18 F B W	0	2	11	
	51 F I W	0	2	11	
	581 A R G	0	0	0	
MISCELLANEOUS	18 F B W	0	0	0	
	51 F I W	0	0	0	
	581 A R G	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	18 F B W	2	5	28	
	51 F I W	1	2	11	
	581 A R G	0	2	27	

5TH A F RATE- - -

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0626

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	OCTOBER 1955				1955 CUMULATIVE			
	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	COST	COST—$1,000 0 5 10 15 20 25
51ST F I W	0	0	0	0	1	0	380	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	2	0	480	
624TH AC&W	1	0	1	30	3	0	710	
581ST A R G	0	0	0	0	4	0	1,220	
18TH F B G	1	0	2	60	3	0	1,060	
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	0	7	0	1,580	
18TH F B W	0	0	0	0	5	0	1,890	
80TH F B S	0	0	0	0	3	0	2,340	
51ST A B G	3	0	156	4,680	12	0	8,130	
313TH A D	1	0	10	300	4	1	33,030	
51ST F I G	0	0	0	0	8	1	33,780	
18TH M&SG	1	0	3	90	11	1	33,030	
18TH A B G	2	0	16	480	14	2	37,920	

313TH A D CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST — — —

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0627

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	OCTOBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS — $ 100.00 (0 2 4 6 8 10)
581 ST A R G	0	0	0	0	0	
51 ST F I G	1	0	0	1	0	
51 ST F I W	0	0	0	1	0	
51 ST A B G	0	0	0	2	0	
80TH F B S	0	0	0	1	27	
18TH F B G	2	2	29	2	29	
18TH F B W	0	0	0	3	73	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	2	175	
313TH A D	0	0	0	2	226	
51ST M&S G	0	0	0	6	324	
623 RD	1	5	90	3	388	
18 TH M&S G	1	2	52	18	4,811	
18TH A B G	3	61	304	18	30,033	

313TH AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST -- 2,775

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0628

DI TRIBUTION L.ST

	NO COPIES
COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE	2
COMMANDER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	1
COMPTROLLER, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
HEADQUARTERS, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1
TOTAL	19

0629

SECRET

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW



FIGURES FOR THE MONTH OF

NOV 55

310461

SECRET

COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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
SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE.
JAPAN
NANKING
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORMOSA
313
IWO JIMA
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

0633

OKINAWA



0634

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

TRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATIO.
AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



0635

RATING SYSTEM

18 TH F B WG

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM (200)	129	135	156	170	198	
OPNL READY CREWS (200)	39	33	24	25	18	
IN-COMM RATE (200)	150	159	189	169	177	
MAJ ACFT ACDTS (200)	94	61	200	0	133	
AMN TRAINING (200)					130	
AOCP RATE (100)	105	150	105	15	73	
DISCIPLINE (75)					23	
REPORTING (50)					0	
DEADLINED VEH (50)					27	
GND ACDTS (25)	35	32	25	27	15	
TOTAL POINTS (1,300)	552	570	699	405	794	
% TOTAL POINTS	55.2	57.0	69.9	40.5	61.1	
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF	11TH	7TH	9TH	12TH		

0636

RATING SYSTEM

51ST F I WG

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HR PROGRAM (200)	190	168	167	200	184	
OPNL READY CREWS (200)	57	134	134	146	174	
IN-COMM RATE (200)	130	119	139	164	153	
MAJ ACFT ACDTS (200)	77	49	200	2	67	
AMN TRAINING (200)					123	
AOCP RATE (100)	135	150	150	150	100	
DISCIPLINE (75)					34	
REPORTING (50)					6	
DEADLINED VEH (50)					15	
GND ACDTS (25)	13	33	44	22	17	
TOTAL POINTS (1,300)	602	653	834	684	873	
% TOTAL POINTS	60.2	65.3	83.4	68.4	67.1	
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF	10TH	6TH	2ND	5TH		

0637

RATING SYSTEM

581 ST A R GP

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HR PROGRAM	(200)		190	173	200	156	
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)		160	154	200	151	
IN-COMM RATE	(200)		146	134	116	124	
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)		0	0	200	133	
AMN TRAINING	(200)					167	
AOCP RATE	(100)		0	0	0	33	
DISCIPLINE	(75)					*	
REPORTING	(50)					*	
DEADLINED VEH	(50)					*	
GND ACDTS	(25)		*	50	49	20	
TOTAL POINTS	(1,300)		496	511	666	784	
% TOTAL POINTS			52.2	51.1	66.6	69.7	
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF			9TH	12TH	6TH		

* NOT RATED IN THIS AREA

0638

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0639

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

(Rating System) This is the first issue of the Fifth Air Force Rating System using a three (3) month average to obtain a current month's score. Under this revised Rating System, the following fields have been added: Airman Training, Discipline, Reporting, and Deadlined Vehicles. The breakdown of maximum points obtainable in each field and points received by the Units considered, can be found on pages 4, 5 and 6.

This is the first month the 581st Air Resupply Group has been rated by this Headquarters.

Charts are being prepared by the Graphic Presentation Section to cover all phases of the present Rating System for all Units considered. These charts will appear in the Command Management Review prepared for the month of January 1956.

The scores for the three Units considered this month are based on a three (3) month average with the exception of the reporting field. This field has been considered for the months of October and November only, due to the non-availability of information for the month of September.

0640

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

OPERATIONS COMMENTS

(Flying Hour Program) The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing overflew the first two months' allocation of the second quarter for Fiscal Year 1956 by fifty-nine (59) hours. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing underflew their allocation for the same period by thirty-one (31) hours. Both Wings received a cut in their flying hour allocation for the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1956.

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing flew 2,577 hours of their 2,608 hours allocation or 98.8% while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing flew 2,009 hours with an allocation of 1,950 hours, or 103%.

A monthly average of 33% of the allocated flying hours for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 38% by all the Fifth Air Force F-86F Units for the same period.

A monthly average of 32% of the allocated flying hours for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 34% by all the Fifth Air Force F-86D Units for the same period.

The increase in percent of allocated hours flown by Fifth Air Force Units, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is due largely to the cut in allocation for the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1956.

(Operational Readiness of Crews) Two (2) of the 85 crews assigned to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing are operational ready, or 2%. A monthly average of 8% of the assigned 18th Fighter Bomber Wing F-86F crews have been operational ready for the past three (3) months as compared to an average of 27% for the Fifth Air Force F-86F Units for the same period.

Fifty-nine (59) of the 67 crews assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing are operational ready, or 88%. A monthly average of 80% of the assigned 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing F-86D crews have been operational ready for the past three (3) months as compared to an average of 87% for the Fifth Air Force F-86D Units for the same period.

0642

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT — OVERALL

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	49.5	80.5	34.1	67.1	
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			10,575			6,833
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,704	5,237	8,518	2,329	4,586	
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,704	2,533	3,281	2,329	2,257	

18 TH F B WG



51 ST F I WG



23.8	47.4	80.4	29.4	65.9		% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.3	53.8	80.9	40.3	68.7	
		7,125			3,912	QTRLY HRS ALLOC			3,450			2,926
1,693	3,379	5,726	1,150	2,577		CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011	1,858	2,792	1,179	2,009	
1,693	1,686	2,347	1,150	1,427		HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,011	847	934	1,179	830	

SECRET
11

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS OBT

0643

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18 TH F B WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

12 TH FB SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	47.4	80.9	26.5	70.3	
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375		70	1,304
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614	1,127	1,921	345	917	
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	609	518	794	345	572	

67 TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
24.5	41.9	78.5	20.4	45.1	
		2,375			1,304
566	1,113	1,865	266	588	
581	532	752	266	322	

44 TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	21.2	47.9	81.7	41.2	82.2	
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			1,304
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	502	1,139	1,940	539	1,072	
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	636	801	539	533	

SECRET

12

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS O & T

0644

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

51 ST FI WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

16TH FI SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.1	53.8	77.9	40.6	66.9	
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			1,463
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	503	929	1,344	594	980	
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	426	415	594	386	

25TH FI SQ





29.1	53.8	83.9	39.9	70.2		% QTRLY ALLOC FLN
		1,725			1,463	QTRLY HRS ALLOC
508	929	1,448	585	1,029		CUM QTRLY HRS FLN
508	421	519	585	444		HRS FLN THIS MONTH

SECRET
13

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

0645

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

OVERALL

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{AUTHORIZED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF AUTH

$\frac{\text{OPERATIONALLY READY}}{\text{ASSIGNED}} \times 100 = \%$ O/R OF ASGND

313 TH A D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	164	164	164	164	164	
ASSIGNED	143	146	140	146	152	
OPNL READY	67	62	57	61	61	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48	45	48	63	

18 TH F B WG



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
90	90	90	90	90	
74	79	74	61	85	
12	10	12	6	2	
53	48	45	48	63	

51 ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	74	74	74	74	74	
ASSIGNED	69	67	66	65	67	
OPNL READY	55	52	45	55	59	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*	*	

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0646

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

18TH F B WG

OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30	30	
ASSIGNED	28	29	24	24	27	
OPNL READY	0	0	0	0	0	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20	20	21	20	15	

67TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
30	30	30	30	30	
22	25	25	27	28	
0	0	0	0	0	
22	21	20	20	23	

44TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30	30	
ASSIGNED	24	25	25	30	30	
OPNL READY	12	10	12	6	2	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	11	7	4	8	25	

0647

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X100 = % O/R OF ASGND

31ST F I SQ

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37	37	
ASSIGNED	33	30	30	32	34	
OPNL READY	26	24	22	23	31	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*	*	

25TH F I SQ





	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37	37	
ASSIGNED	36	37	36	33	33	
OPNL READY	29	28	23	27	28	
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*	*	

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0648

SECRET

AC & W OPERATIONS

UNKNOWN TRACKS

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TOTAL TRACKS	2231	2238	2609	2502	6821	
INITIALLY UNKNOWN	109	32	36	29	27	
% OF TRACKS UNKNOWN	4.88	1.43	1.38	1.19	0.4	
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO SCRAMBLE	72	4	3	4	6	
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO INTERCEPTION	10	16	18	10	11	
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY BY INTERCEPTION	22	11	13	14	7	
MISPLOTS	2	0	2	0	1	
WEATHER PLOTS	3	1	1	1	2	
REMAINING UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0	0	

AVERAGE TIME (MINUTES) SCRAMBLE TO AIRBORNE

	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	18 FBW	51 FIW	18 FBW	51 FIW	18 FBW	51 FIW	18 FBW	51 FIW	18 FBW	51 FIW	18 FBW	51 FIW
FROM STANDBY	4.5	7.5	3.5	4.4	*	4.3	**	3.33	3.7	4.1		
FROM READINESS	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.7	*	6.3	4.0	5.0	4.7	5.4		
AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME	61.0	32.7	52.0	32.1	*	40.0	44.0	37.0	41.7	33.6		

* ALL SCRAMBLES MADE BY 51ST FIW
** NO SCRAMBLES FROM STANDBY BY 18TH F B W

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O & T

0649

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0650

MATERIEL COMMENTS

(AOCP) The AOCP rate for the command decreased from 5.1 in October to 3.6 for the month of November, this is below the Fifth Air Force standard of 5% AOCP. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing showed a decrease in AOCP from 7.6 in October to 4.4 in November, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing reflected an increase from 1.6 to 2.5 for the same period. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had a 2.4% AOCP average for the past three (3) months as compared to 8.0% for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units for the same period. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had a 6.1% AOCP average for the past three (3) months as compared to 6.6% for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units for the same period.

The 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron was the only Unit over the Fifth Air Force standard of 5% AOCP.

(In-Commission) The In-Commission rate dropped from 64.4 for the month of October to 62.6 for the month of November. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing reflected a decrease of 1% from the previous month and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing decreased 3% for the same period. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had a 57.3% in-commission average for the past three (3) months as compared to 59.0% for Fifth Air Force F-86D Units for the same period. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had a 68.3% in-commission average for the past three (3) months as compared to 67.3% for Fifth Air Force F-86F Units for the same period.

The 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron was the only Unit over the Fifth Air Force standard of 75% in-commission rate.

0651

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT									NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47	VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	B-29	B-26	TOTAL
18 FBW	57									2		4			3				5		1	2	74
581 ASLG		10														4		2		4			20
KADENA TOTALS	57	10								2		4			3	4		2	5	4	1	2	94
NAHA AB																							
51 FIW	44										3	4							5				56
6157 OPSQ																			10				10
NAHA TOTALS	44										3	4							15				66
313TH TOTALS	101									2	3	8			3	4		2	20	4	1	2	160

SOURCE: 1-AF-A1

0652

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$

5 TH AF IN COMM RATE = 75 %

OVERALL



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1	57.1	64.4	64.4	62.6	
% AOCP	5.9	4.6	5.1	5.1	3.6	

313TH A D

18TH F B WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	60.1	63.5	72.6	66.7	65.7	
% AOCP	6.1	4.8	6.4	7.6	4.4	

51ST F I WG



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9	47.5	52.4	61.3	58.3	
% AOCP	5.8	4.3	3.2	1.6	2.5	

SECRET

21

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0653

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

18TH F B WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

12TH F B SQ



% IN COMM	61.4	66.1	72.1	56.1	60.9	
% AOCP	1.6	0.5	8.3	8.5	0.6	

67TH F B SQ



46.8	49.8	56.7	68.4	59.5	
14.1	14.7	10.6	14.7	10.8	

44TH F B SQ



% IN COMM	81.5	72.5	88.9	74.1	75.6	
% AOCP	0	0	0	0.4	2.3	

PERCENT
100
80
60
40
20
0

SECRET
22

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

51ST F I WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	49.0	48.6	51.2	56.9	52.4	
% AOCP	2.8	2.7	1.1	3.3	4.5	

25TH F I SQ





	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	45.0	46.5	53.4	65.7	63.8	
% AOCP	5.4	5.8	5.1	0.0	0.6	

SECRET
23

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0655

CONFIDENTIAL

FUEL CONSUMPTION

TACTICAL JET AIRCRAFT

18TH F B WG



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-F	12TH F B SQ	*	478	449	444	433	
	67TH F B SQ	*	494	464	432	390	
	44TH F B SQ	*	463	431	423	508	

51ST F I WG



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-D	16TH F I SQ	*	508	558	494	601	
	25TH F I SQ	*	530	545	525	521	

* = INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0656

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0657

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

(Personnel Turnover) Personnel turnover for assigned Units reflects an increase of 21 officers and 220 airmen. For the third consecutive month the increase in airmen strength reflects a gain in A/2C and A/3C grades, and a net decrease in skilled and supervisory grades.

(Problem Areas) The chart pertaining to problem areas has been removed from the Management Review for the current month due to non-availability of information.

(Dependent Housing Status) Percent of unoccupied houses reflects an increase from 4.1% in October to 5.7% in November. This unfavorable condition is due largely to the increase of usable homes being unoccupied.

(Open Mess Facilities) The two Airmen's Clubs were the only Open Mess Facilities showing a net loss for the month of November. The Naha Officers' Club reflects the largest net profit for the month.

(On-the-Job Training) The on-the-job training and completion ratios for the month of October will not appear in this month's Management Review due to non-receipt of statistical data from Fifth Air Force.

(Projected Strength) Total projected officer strength for January and February is 770 and 754 respectively. Total projected airman strength for the same months is 6,087 and 6,013 respectively.

0658

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 November 1955

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
* TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1142	1039	91	9464	8897	94	503	449	89	4936	4937	100
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	893	824	92	6931	6792	98	491	436	89	4327	4313	99
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	569	525	92	3862	3693	96	202	177	88	1692	1574	93
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	324	299	92	3069	3099	101	289	259	90	2635	2739	104
HQ 313TH AD TOTAL	89	85	95	172	183	106	64	63	98	24	27	112
KADENA												
18TH FB WG (ATCHD)	297	274	92	2863	2920	102	289	259	90	2635	2739	104
581st AR GP (ASGD)	136	118	87	498	471	95				22	20	91
13TH & 17TH COMM SQS (ASGD)	14	15	107	341	295	86				39	39	100
7TH TAC DEPOT SQS (ATCHD)	27	25	92	206	179	87						
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	241	228	95	2094	2024	97	137	114	83	1433	1371	96
623RD & 624TH AC&W SQS (ASGD)	69	59	85	626	603	96				173	117	67
DET #1 - 313TH AD (ASGD)	20	20	100	131	117	89	1		0			
* TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	249	215	86	2533	2105	83	12	13	108	609	624	102
* TOTAL PIPELINE		31			444							
* INCLUDES SCAMWAF												

SOURCE: RCS 313TH AD P

0659

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3	3	3	3	3	
	ASGD	1	1	1	1	1	
	% MANNED	33	33	33	33	33	
COL	AUTH	20	19	19	19	19	
	ASGD	22	18	16	16	20	
	% MANNED	110	95	84	84	105	
L/COL	AUTH	54	56	55	57	58	
	ASGD	45	44	47	50	52	
	% MANNED	83	78	85	88	90	
MAJ	AUTH	132	133	130	133	139	
	ASGD	106	105	109	117	120	
	% MANNED	80	79	84	88	86	
CAPT	AUTH	292	257	265	278	289	
	ASGD	173	169	165	175	185	
	% MANNED	59	66	62	63	64	
LTS	AUTH	336	345	337	355	364	
	ASGD	440	446	426	424	427	
	% MANNED	131	129	126	119	117	
WO	AUTH	19	22	21	21	21	
	ASGD	30	26	22	20	19	
	% MANNED	158	118	105	95	90	
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	856	835	830	866	893	
	ASGD	817	809	786	803	824	
	% MANNED	95	97	95	93	92	
	PROJ'D						749

SOURCE : O-OM COMP & PER

0660

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469	455	454	464	480	
	ASGD	323	303	290	288	314	
	% MANNED	69	67	64	62	65	
T/SGT	AUTH	601	593	596	600	632	
	ASGD	455	454	445	427	432	
	% MANNED	76	77	74	71	68	
S/SGT	AUTH	1726	1655	1624	1660	1705	
	ASGD	966	968	887	909	883	
	% MANNED	56	58	55	55	52	
A/1C	AUTH	2095	2049	2004	2054	2141	
	ASGD	1211	1295	1131	1084	944	
	% MANNED	58	63	56	53	44	
A/2C	AUTH	1679	1702	1655	1654	1678	
	ASGD	1907	1953	2007	2088	2164	
	% MANNED	114	115	121	126	129	
A/3C	AUTH	442	367	316	317	295	
	* ASGD	1330	1239	1552	1776	2055	
	% MANNED	301	338	491	560	697	
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	7012	6821	6649	6749	6931	
	ASGD	6192	6212	6312	6572	6792	
	% MANNED	88	91	95	97	98	
	PROJ'D						6672

* INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE : O-OM, COMPT & PER

0661

COURTS MARTIAL RATE

COMMAND TOTAL



RATE
6
4
2
0

HQ 313 TH



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
33				SPEC		SPEC	—				
51				SUM		SUM	—				

KADENA



RATE
6
4
2
0

NAHA



2				GEN	TRIALS	GEN	—				
22				SPEC		SPEC	11				
26				SUM		SUM	25				

SOURCE: SJA

0662

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



				JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
AVG NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS			1106.5		1123.4		1,139.3		1,149.9		1,159.6			
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE		27.2		19.5		28.4		15.6		34.9			
		REPAIR		13.4		7.1		11.0		30.0		26.9			
		COMMITTED		4.7		5.8		4.8		2.1		5.2			
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	MO. OF WAIT		419	11	428	11	459	10.5	498	8.5	422	9		
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES		76	95	77	106	60	84	91	34	20	21		
	QTRS	AVAIL.	FORECAST	1117		1154		1,147		1,151		1,161			1,176
		OCCUPIED	OFFICER	469		466		457		524		471			
			AIRMEN	635		656		635		589		642			
			CIVILIAN	13		10		10		8		8			

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0663

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

KADENA

NET PROFIT/LOSS ——

OFFICERS



NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,675	-1,989	763	363	1,559	
NET WORTH	100,063	99,338	95,098	94,562	95,121	

NCC



2,699	2,365	2,927	1,934	382	
327,112	329,549	335,063	334,164	328,253	

AIRMEN



NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,658	690	-2,808	-1,169	-1,185	
NET WORTH	75,436	74,129	71,323	69,040	67,855	

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA

NET PROFIT / LOSS ——



NET PROFIT/LOSS	84	-1,389	-862	-1,477	1,892	
NET WORTH	29,977	28,587	27,286	26,247	28,140	





2,285	-1,069	-1,712	908	239		
62,038	60,969	57,200	58,109	58,103		

NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285	2,440	1,241	-2,822	-1,277	
NET WORTH	31,599	29,734	34,825	32,003	30,726	

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0665

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0666

SAFETY COMMENTS

(Major Aircraft Accidents) The cumulative average major aircraft accident rate of the command for the first eleven (11) months is 48.5% in comparison to the Fifth Air Force cumulative average of 35% as of 31 October 1955. Fifth Air Force average for 1954 was 40% and USAF average for the same period was 20%. One (1) major accident during the month of November gave the command a total of 23 major aircraft accidents for the first eleven (11) months, with a total of 47,374 hours flown.

(Military Disabling Injuries) There were eight (8) disabling injuries during the month of November at a total cost of $4,230.00. This increase gave the command a total of 85 disabling injuries at a total cost of $192,570.00 for the same period. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had five (5) injuries in both November and October, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing decreased from four (4) accidents in October to two (2) in November. The 581st Air Resupply Group had their first and only injury in three (3) months.

(Motor Vehicle Accidents) There were eight (8) motor vehicle accidents during the month of November at a total cost of $118.00. The command had 67 motor vehicle accidents at a total cost of $36,204.00 for the first eleven (11) months of the year. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing accidents increased from three (3) in September to six (6) in October and seven (7) in November. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had no accidents during the month of September, and decreased from two (2) accidents in October to one (1) in November. The 581st Air Resupply Group is enjoying three (3) consecutive months with no motor vehicle accidents.

0667

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

313 TH 1955 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RATE — — — 5TH AF 1954 AVERAGE RATE · · · · ·

UNITS	NOV 1955		1955 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18 TH BASE FLT	0	370	0	4859	0	
51 ST BASE FLT.	0	241	0	4018	0	
26TH FIS *	0	0	0	2535	0	
581 ST ARG	0	714	3	7937	38	
25 ST FIS	1	444	3	5798	52	
16TH FIS	0	571	4	7193	56	
44TH FBS	0	608	2	3126	64	
12 TH FBS	0	618	4	6101	65	
67 TH FBS	0	376	7	5807	120	

RATE $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HOURS}}$ X100,000

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

* 26 TH FIS REASSIGNED TO 13TH AF, 10 JUL 1955.

0668

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

NOVEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO.	NO. OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	18 FBW	0	13	65	
	51 FIW	1	7	35	
	581 ARG	0	3	38	
PILOT ERROR	18 FBW	0	6	30	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	18 FBW	0	0	0	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	18 FBW	0	1	5	
	51 FIW	0	0	0	
	581 ARG	0	1	13	
MAT. FAILURE	18 FBW	0	2	10	
	51 FIW	0	2	10	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MISCELLANEOUS	18 FBW	1	2	10	
	51 FIW	0	0	0	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	18 FBW	0	4	20	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	2	25	

5TH AF RATE -----

0669

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	NOVEMBER 1955				1955 CUMULATIVE			COST—$1,000 0 5 10 15 20 25
	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	COST	
51ST F I W	0	0	0	0	1	0	360	
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	2	0	450	
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	3	0	750	
581ST ARG	1	0	10	30	5	0	1,320	
51ST M&S G	0	0	0	0	7	0	1,590	
18TH F B G	1	0	21	630	4	0	1,680	
18TH F B W	0	0	0	0	5	0	1,890	
80TH F B S	0	0	0	0	3	0	2,340	
51ST A B G	0	0	0	0	12	0	8,130	
313TH A D	1	0	7	210	5	1	33,240	
18TH M&S G	2	0	3	90	13	1	36,120	
51ST F I G	2	0	98	2940	10	1	36,720	
18TH A B G	1	0	2	60	15	2	67,980	

313TH AD CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST ——— SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0670

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	NOVEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		COST OF ACCIDENTS — $100.00
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	0 2 4 6 8 10
581 ST ARG	0	0	0	0	0	
51 ST FIG	0	0	0	1	0	
51 ST FIW	0	0	0	1	0	
51 ST ABG	0	0	0	2	0	
80TH FBS	0	0	0	1	27	
18 TH FBG	0	0	0	2	29	
18 TH FBW	0	0	0	3	73	
624 TH AC&WS	0	0	0	2	175	
51 ST M&S G	1	0	0	7	324	
313 TH A D	2	8	100	4	326	
623 RD AC&W	0	0	0	3	388	
18TH M&S G	5	2	18	23	4,829	
18 TH A B G	0	0	0	18	30,033	

313 TH AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST - 2,784

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0671

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DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
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COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
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TOTAL	19

0672

SECRET



SECRET

COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE COMMAND – MANAGEMENT REVIEW HAS AS ITS PURPOSE TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR A HEADQUARTERS IN DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. THE PRESENTATIONS ARE CONTRIBUTORY OF ALL STAFF AGENCIES.

L. A. BOYD
Lt. Col., USAF
Comptroller

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
SEA OF JAPAN
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313TH AD
MAINTAIN A HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS OF UNITS UNDER ITS COMMAND AND BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER, FIFTH AIR FORCE.
NANKING
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
EAST CHINA SEA
30 N
145 E
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
FORMOSA
313
IWO JIMA
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

0676

OKINAWA



0677

MISSION

MANAGEMENT OF ALL RESOURCES TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ASSIGNED MISSION.

STRUCTURAL -- ORGANIZATIONAL AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



0678

RATING SYSTEM

18 TH F B WG

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HRS PROGRAM (200)	129	135	156	170	198	200
OPNL READY CREWS (200)	39	33	24	25	18	12
IN-COMM RATE (200)	150	159	189	168	177	181
MAJ ACFT ACDTS (200)	94	61	200	0	133	92
AMN TRAINING (200)					130	167
AOCP RATE (100)	105	150	105	15	73	83
DISCIPLINE (75)					23	17
REPORTING (50)					0	13
DEADLINED VEH (50)					27	27
GND ACDTS (25)	35	32	25	27	15	15
TOTAL POINTS (1,300)	552	570	699	405	794	807
% TOTAL POINTS	55.2	57.0	69.9	40.5	61.1	62.1
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF	11TH	7TH	9TH	12TH	12TH	

0679

RATING SYSTEM

51 ST F I WG

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HR PROGRAM	(200)	190	168	167	200	184	200
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)	57	134	134	146	174	171
IN—COMM RATE	(200)	130	119	139	164	153	160
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)	77	49	200	2	67	1
AMN TRAINING	(200)					123	143
AOCP RATE	(100)	135	150	150	150	100	100
DISCIPLINE	(75)					34	34
REPORTING	(50)					6	11
DEADLINED VEH	(50)					15	11
GND ACDTS	(25)	13	33	44	22	17	16
TOTAL POINTS	(1,300)	602	653	834	684	873	847
% TOTAL POINTS		60.2	65.3	83.4	68.4	67.1	65.2
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF		10TH	6TH	2ND	5TH	7TH	

0680

RATING SYSTEM

581 ST A R GP

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
FLYING HR PROGRAM	(200)		190	173	200	156	124
OPNL READY CREWS	(200)		160	154	200	151	133
IN-COMM RATE	(200)		146	134	116	124	133
MAJ ACFT ACDTS	(200)		0	0	200	133	200
AMN TRAINING	(200)					167	193
AOCP RATE	(100)		0	0	0	33	54
DISCIPLINE	(75)					*	*
REPORTING	(50)					*	*
DEADLINED VEH	(50)					*	*
GND ACDTS	(25)		*	50	49	20	17
TOTAL POINTS	(1,300)		496	511	666	784	854
% TOTAL POINTS			52.2	51.1	66.6	69.7	75.9
RANKED WITH FIFTH AF			9TH	12 TH	6 TH	9 TH	

* NOT RATED IN THIS AREA

0681

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0682

COMPTROLLER COMMENTS

(Rating System) The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing scored 807 of a possible 1,300 points in the revised Fifth Air Force Rating System, or 62.1%. This is a 1% increase over the previous month. This increase could have been greater but the occurrence of major aircraft accidents in October and December, and the low number of operational ready crews over the past three (3) months, resulted in a total loss of 296 points. Twenty-three (23) AWOL's during the months of November and December was the major contributing factor to a loss of 58 more points in the Discipline area.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing scored 847 of a possible 1,300 points, or 65.2%. This is a 1.9% decrease over the previous month. This decrease can be attributed for the most part to the occurrence of three (3) major aircraft accidents during the past three (3) months, resulting in a total loss of 199 points.

The 581st Air Resupply Group scored 854 of a possible 1,125 points, or 75.9%. This is a 6.2% increase over the previous month. The total points received could have been greater if it was not for the fact that only 62% of the second quarter flying hour allocation was flown which resulted in a loss of 74 points. A further loss of 83 more points can be attributed to the low in-commission rate during the months of October and November, and the high AOCP rate during October.

0683

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

OPERATIONS COMMENTS

(Flying Hour Program) The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing overflew their second quarter allocations for Fiscal Year 1956 by six (6) and twenty-six (26) hours respectively.

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing flew 3,978 hours with an allocation of 3,952 hours, or 100.6% while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing flew 2,932 hours with an allocation of 2,926 hours, or 100.2%.

A monthly average of 33.5% of the allocated flying hours for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 37% by all the Fifth Air Force F-86F units for the same period.

A monthly average of 33.4% of the allocated flying hours for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has been accomplished during the past three (3) months, as compared to 33% by all the Fifth Air Force F-86D units for the same period.

(Operational Readiness of Crews) Eight (8) of the 87 crews assigned to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing are operational ready, or 9%. A monthly average of 6% of the assigned 18th Fighter Bomber Wing F-86F crews have been operational ready for the past three (3) months as compared to an average of 31% for the Fifth Air Force F-86F units for the same period.

Fifty-nine (59) of the 70 crews assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing are Operational ready, or 84%. A monthly average of 85% of the assigned 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing F-86D crews have been operational ready for the past three (3) months as compared to an average of 93% for the Fifth Air Force F-86D units for the same period.

0685

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

18 TH F B WG



25.8	47.4	80.4	29.1	65.2	100.6
		7,125			3,952
1,693	3,379	5,726	1,180	2,577	3,978
1,693	1,686	2,347	1,190	1,827	1,401

313 TH A D



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	49.5	80.5	33.8	66.7	100.4
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			10,575			6,878
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	2,704	5,237	8,518	2,329	4,586	6,910
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	2,704	2,533	3,281	2,329	2,257	2,324

51 ST F I WG



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.3	53.8	80.9	40.3	68.7	100.2
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			3,450			2,926
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	1,011	1,858	2,792	1,179	2,009	2,932
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	1,011	847	934	1,179	830	923

SECRET

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

SECRET

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

18 TH F B WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

12 TH FB SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	25.6	47.4	80.9	26.2	69.6	105.3
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			1,317
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	614	1,127	1,921	345	917	1,387
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	609	518	794	345	572	470

67 TH F B SQ



44 TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	21.2	47.9	81.7	40.9	81.3	116.4
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			2,375			1,318
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	502	1,139	1,940	539	1,072	1,534
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	636	801	539	533	462

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
67 TH F B SQ	24.5	41.9	78.5	20.2	44.6	80.3
			2,375			1,317
	566	1,113	1,865	266	588	1,057
	581	532	752	266	322	469

SECRET

12

SOURCE : DIR OF OPS O & T

0687

FLYING HOUR PROGRAM

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

51 ST F I WG

$$\% \text{ QTRLY HRS FLOWN} = \frac{\text{CUM QTRLY HRS FLOWN}}{\text{QTRLY HRS ALLOC}} \times 100$$

16TH F I SQ



% QTRLY ALLOC FLN	29.1	53.8	77.9	40.6	66.9	98.4
QTRLY HRS ALLOC			1,725			1,463
CUM QTRLY HRS FLN	503	929	1,344	594	980	1,440
HRS FLN THIS MONTH	503	426	415	594	386	460

25TH F I SQ



29.1	53.6	83.9	39.9	70.2	101.9	% QTRLY ALLOC FLN
		1,725			1,463	QTRLY HRS ALLOC
508	929	1,448	585	1,029	1,492	CUM QTRLY HRS FLN
508	421	519	585	444	463	HRS FLN THIS MONTH

SECRET
13

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O&T

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

OVERALL

313TH A D

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X100 = % O/R OF ASGND



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	164	164	164	164	164	164
ASSIGNED	143	146	140	146	152	157
OPNL READY	67	62	57	61	61	67
O/R LESS GUNNERY	53	48	45	48	63	68



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
90	90	90	90	90	90	AUTHORIZED	74	74	74	74	74	74
74	79	74	81	85	87	ASSIGNED	69	67	66	65	67	70
12	10	12	6	2	8	OPNL READY	55	52	45	55	59	59
53	48	45	48	63	68	O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*	*	*

*-NOT APPLICABLE

SECRET

14

0689

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

10TH F B WG

▨ = OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X 100 = % O/R OF AUTH

▩ = OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X 100 = % O/R OF ASGND

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30	30	30
ASSIGNED	28	29	24	24	27	28
OPNL READY	0	0	0	0	0	0
O/R LESS GUNNERY	20	20	21	20	15	27

67TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
30	30	30	30	30	30
22	25	25	27	28	29
0	0	0	0	0	0
22	21	20	20	23	24

44TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	30	30	30	30	30	30
ASSIGNED	24	25	25	30	30	30
OPNL READY	12	10	12	6	2	8
O/R LESS GUNNERY	11	7	4	8	25	17

0690

SECRET

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

31ST F I WG

= OPERATIONALLY READY / AUTHORIZED X100 = % O/R OF AUTH

= OPERATIONALLY READY / ASSIGNED X100 = % O/R OF ASGND

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	37	37	37	37	37	37
ASSIGNED	33	30	30	32	34	35
OPNL READY	26	24	22	28	31	32
O/R LESS GUNNERY	*	*	*	*	*	*

25TH F I SQ





JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
37	37	37	37	37	37	AUTHORIZED						
36	37	36	33	33	35	ASSIGNED						
29	28	23	27	28	27	OPNL READY						
*	*	*	*	*	*	O/R LESS GUNNERY						

*-NOT APPLICABLE

0691

SECRET

A[illegible] & W OPERA[illegible]ONS

UNKNOWN TRACKS

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TOTAL TRACKS	2231	2238	2609	2502	6821	6779
INITIALLY UNKNOWN	109	32	36	29	27	54
% OF TRACKS UNKNOWN	4.88	1.43	1.38	1.19	0.4	0.8
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO SCRAMBLE	72	4	3	4	6	14
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY PRIOR TO INTERCEPTION	10	16	18	10	11	23
IDENTIFIED FRIENDLY BY INTERCEPTION	22	11	13	14	7	15
MISPLOTS	2	0	[illegible]	0	1	1
WEATHER PLOTS	3	1	1	1	2	1
REMAINING UNKNOWN	0	0	0	0	0	0

AVERAGE TIME (MINUTES) SCRAMBLE TO AIRBORNE

	JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW	18FBW	51FIW
FROM STANDBY	4.5	7.5	3.5	4.4	*	4.3	**	3.33	3.7	4.1	3.9	4.3
FROM READINESS	5.5	5.7	5.1	5.7	*	6.3	4.0	5.0	4.7	5.4	4.8	5.2
AVERAGE TURN AROUND TIME	61.0	32.7	52.0	32.1	*	40.0	44.0	37.0	41.7	33.6	40.8	35.7

* ALL SCRAMBLES MADE BY 51ST FIW
** NO SCRAMBLES FROM STANDBY BY 18TH F B W

SECRET
17

SOURCE: DIR OF OPS O & T

0692

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0693

MATERIEL COMMENTS

(ACCP) The ACCP rate for the command decreased from 3.6 in November to 2.8 for the month of December. This is below the Fifth Air Force standard of 5% ACCP. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing reflected a decrease of 1.1% and 0.2% respectively, from the previous month.

The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had a 5.1% ACCP average for the past three (3) months as compared to 6% for Fifth Air Force F-86F units for the same period. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had a 2.1% ACCP average for the past three (3) months as compared to 6% for Fifth Air Force F-86D units for the same period.

The 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron was the only unit over the Fifth Air Force standard of 5% ACCP, however, their rate decreased from 10.8% in the previous month to 5.4% for December.

(In-Commission) The In-Commission rate increased from 62.6% for the month of November to 70.4% in December. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing reflected an increase of 10.7% and 1.9% respectively, from the previous month. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing had a 69.6% in-commission average for the past three (3) months as compared to 69.6% for Fifth Air Force F-86F units for the same period. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had a 59.5% in-commission average for the past three (3) months as compared to 61.0% for Fifth Air Force F-86D units for the same period.

The 12th and 44th Fighter Bomber Squadrons were over the Fifth Air Force standard of 75% in-commission rate.

0694

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

	COMBAT										NON-COMBAT											
KADENA AB	F-86	B-29	L-20	F-94	F-84	SA-16	C-119	H-19	C-47	C-45	VB-17	L-20	C-47	C-45	T-7	T-6	C-119	C-124	C-54	T-33	SA-16	B-29	B-26	TOTAL
18 FBW	50										1		4			3	2			5			2	67
581 ASLG		10				3	4			2											1			20
KADENA TOTALS	50	10				3	4			2	1		4			3	2			5	1		2	87
NAHA AB																								
51 FIW	46											3	4							7				60
6157 OPSQ	6																			6				12
NAHA TOTALS	52											3	4							13				72
313TH TOTALS	102	10				3	4			2	1	3	8			3	2			18	1		2	159

SOURCE: 1-AF-A1

0695

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOT HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOT HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5 TH A F IN COMM RATE = 75 %

OVERALL



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	56.1	57.1	64.4	64.4	62.6	70.4
% AOCP	5.9	4.6	5.1	5.1	3.6	2.8



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	60.1	63.5	72.6	66.7	65.7	76.4
% AOCP	6.1	4.8	6.4	7.6	4.4	3.3

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	51.9	47.5	52.4	61.3	58.3	60.2
% AOCP	5.8	4.3	3.2	1.6	2.5	2.3

SECRET

21

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0696

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

18TH F B W

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS IN COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

12TH F B SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	61.4	66.1	72.1	56.1	60.9	76.9
% AOCP	1.6	0.5	6.3	8.5	0.6	0.0

67TH F B SQ



44TH F B SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
46.8	49.8	56.7	68.4	59.5	74.8	% IN COMM	81.5	72.5	88.9	74.1	75.6	77.4
14.1	14.7	10.6	14.7	10.8	5.4	% AOCP	0	0	0	0.4	2.3	4.6

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0697

SECRET

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

51ST F I WG

$$\% = \frac{\text{TOTAL HRS 'N COMM OR AOCP}}{\text{TOTAL HRS POSSESSED}} \times 100$$

5TH A F IN COMMISSION RATE = 75 %

16TH F I SQ



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% IN COMM	49.0	48.6	51.2	56.9	52.4	54.5
% AOCP	2.8	2.7	1.1	3.3	4.5	4.7

25TH F I SQ



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
45.0	46.5	53.4	65.7	63.8	65.7	% IN COMM						
5.4	5.6	5.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	% AOCP						

SECRET

23

SOURCE : DIR OF MAT

0698

CONFIDENTIAL

FUEL CONSUMPTION

TACTICAL JET AIRCRAFT



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-F	12TH F B SQ	*	478	449	444	433	431
	67TH F B SQ	*	494	464	432	390	432
	44TH F B SQ	*	463	431	423	508	435



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
F 86-D	16TH F I SQ	*	508	558	494	601	576
	25TH F I SQ	*	530	545	525	521	570

* = INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: DIR OF MAT

0699

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

0700

PERSONNEL COMMENTS

(Personnel Turnover) Personnel turnover for assigned units reflected a decrease of 28 officers and 115 airmen. All losses were due to normal rotation.

(Airmen Problem Areas) From information available it is doubtful that this command will receive sufficient skill level airmen necessary to correct the deficiencies indicated on the problem area chart. It is therefore, incumbent upon each Commander, Staff Officer and Supervisor to obtain maximum utilization of the personnel presently assigned. To accomplish this, mal-assignment must be corrected, non-essential duties must be abolished, and every effort must be made through the OJT program to raise skill levels.

(Dependent Housing Status) Percent of unoccupied houses reflects a decrease from 5.7% in November to 2.8% in December. This favorable condition is due to the decrease of homes being repaired and usable homes unoccupied.

(Open Mess Facilities) The Naha NCO Club and Naha Airmen's Club were the only Open Mess facilities showing a net loss for the month of December. The Kadena Airmen's Club reflects the largest net gain of $3,460.31.

(Projected Strength) Total projected officer strength for January, February and March is 772, 756 and 739 respectively. Total projected airmen strength for the same months are 6,057, 5,983 and 6,066 respectively.

(On-The-Job Training) The percentage of assigned apprentice level airmen in training to the 5 skill level as of 30 November 1955 was 84%. The average monthly completed ratio remains unknown due to the non-availability of October data from Fifth Air Force. The Fifth Air Force goal is 90% in training ratio and a 15% completion ratio. A total of 169 airmen were upgraded in skill level during the month of November. Only 48% of the assigned airmen strength of this command possess skilled and supervisory AFSC's, while the authorizations reflect a requirement for 71% of the assigned personnel to fall within this category. The command has met the Fifth Air Force standard of 45% of its assigned potential trainees on OJT as of 31 December 1955.

0701

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 December 1955

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMEN			US			NON-US		
	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
* TOTAL AF IN OPINAWA	1187	1057	89	9687	8948	92	495	454	92	4932	4822	98
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIV	#898	#796	89	6873	6677	97	483	440	91	4323	4233	[illegible]
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	571	499	87	3837	3685	96	200	174	87	1688	1577	[illegible]
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	327	297	91	3036	2992	98	283	266	94	2635	2661	101
HQ 313TH AD TOTAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	174	160	[illegible]	63	60	[illegible]	[illegible]	27	123
KADENA												
18TH [illegible] (ATCHD)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	94	[illegible]	2661	[illegible]
581ST [illegible] (ASGD)	[illegible]	[illegible]	77	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]					20	[illegible]
13TH & [illegible] SQS (ASGD)	14	14	100	341	[illegible]	[illegible]					40	102
7TH TAC [illegible] SQ (ATCHD)	[illegible]	[illegible]	86	217	[illegible]	[illegible]						
NAHA												
51ST FI WG (ASGD)	242	221	91	2076	2083	100	137	114	83	1431	1391	97
623RD & 624TH AC&W SQS (ASGD)	69	55	80	626	566	90				174	126	72
DET #1, 313TH AD (ASGD)	13	21	161	122	120	98						
* TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	289	261	90	2814	2271	81	12	14	117	609	584	96
* TOTAL PIPELINE		34	-		426	-						
* INCLUDES SCARWAF #INCLUDES 21 WO'S % INCLUDES 20 WO'S												

CONFIDENTIAL

SOURCE: RCS 313TH AD P5

0702

OFFICEP STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	3	3	3	3	3	3
	ASGD	1	1	1	1	1	1
	% MANNED	33	33	33	33	33	33
COL	AUTH	20	19	19	19	19	19
	ASGD	22	18	16	16	20	18
	% MANNED	110	95	84	84	105	95
L/COL	AUTH	54	56	55	57	58	59
	ASGD	45	44	47	50	52	50
	% MANNED	83	78	85	88	90	84
MAJ	AUTH	132	133	130	133	139	139
	ASGD	106	105	109	117	120	117
	% MANNED	80	79	84	88	86	84
CAPT	AUTH	292	257	265	278	289	297
	ASGD	173	169	165	175	185	190
	% MANNED	59	66	62	63	64	66
LTS	AUTH	336	345	337	355	364	370
	ASGD	440	446	426	424	427	400
	% MANNED	131	129	126	119	117	108
WO	AUTH	19	22	21	21	21	21
	ASGD	30	26	22	20	19	20
	% MANNED	158	118	105	95	90	95
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	856	835	830	866	893	898
	ASGD	817	809	786	803	824	796
	% MANNED	95	97	95	93	92	89
	PROJ'D						

SOURCE : O-OM COMP & PER

0703

AIRMEN STRENGTH B. GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	469	455	454	464	480	480
	ASGD	323	303	290	288	314	314
	% MANNED	69	67	64	62	65	65
T/SGT	AUTH	601	593	596	600	632	635
	ASGD	455	454	445	427	432	426
	% MANNED	76	77	74	71	68	67
S/SGT	AUTH	1726	1655	1624	1660	1705	1708
	ASGD	966	968	887	909	883	858
	% MANNED	56	58	55	55	52	50
A/1C	AUTH	2095	2049	2004	2054	2141	2143
	ASGD	1211	1295	1131	1084	944	955
	% MANNED	58	63	56	53	44	44
A/2C	AUTH	1679	1702	1655	1654	1678	1750
	ASGD	1907	1953	2007	2088	2164	2288
	% MANNED	114	115	121	126	129	131
A/3C	AUTH	442	367	316	317	295	157
	*ASGD	1330	1239	1552	1776	2055	1836
	% MANNED	301	338	491	560	697	1169
COMD TOTAL	AUTH	7012	6821	6649	6749	6931	6873
	ASGD	6192	6212	6312	6572	6792	6677
	% MANNED	88	91	95	97	98	97
	PROJ'D						

* INCLUDES A/B

SOURCE : O-OM, COMPT & PER

0704

PROBLEM AREAS

OFFICER & AIRMEN

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGND	% SKILLED	% MANNED
11244	Pilot, Ftr	97	88	31	81
12340	Pilot, Bombardment	36	28	56	77
1435	Air Opns Off	36	40	67	101
1554	Acft Obs, Rad Op	21	5	96	24
1644	Intercept Controller	45	38	62	84
3016	Comm Elect Staff Off	16	13	54	81
3034	Comm Off	24	22	28	98
3054	Air Elect Off	11	9	33	82
3234	Arm Systems Off	10	6	00	60
4316	Acft Staff Off	10	11	46	101
6424	Supply Off	45	36	64	79
7324	Pers Off	34	25	44	74
27370	ACRM Oper	214	262	69	122
291X0	Comm Cen Spec	143	115	47	80
422X0	Instrument Rep	51	58	55	114
432X0	Jet Eng Mech	140	144	41	103
432X1	Recip Eng Mech	108	90	67	83
461X0	Munitions Spec	53	37	25	70
462X0	Weapons Mech	146	164	49	112
471X1	Auto Rep	177	100	33	56
472X0	Grd Pow Spt Eqp Rep	78	42	22	54
641X1(73)	Orgn Supply Spec	235	238	66	101
643X0	POL Spec	163	184	41	113
771X0	Air Police	480	337	52	70

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0705

COURTS MARTIAL RATE

COMMAND TOTAL



RATE
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HQ 313 TH



					TRIALS					
2	1			GEN		GEN	—	—		
33	39			SPEC		SPEC	—	—		
51	84			SUM		SUM	—	—		

KADENA



RATE
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NAHA



					TRIALS					
2	—			GEN		GEN	—	1		
22	28			SPEC		SPEC	11	11		
26	43			SUM		SUM	25	41		

SOURCE: SJA

0706

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
AVG NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		1108.5		1123.4		1,139.3		1,149.8		1,159.5		1,170.0	
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	27.2		19.5		28.4		15.6		34.9		22.1	
		REPAIR	13.4		7.1		11.0		30.0		26.9		8.3	
		COMMITTED	4.7		5.8		4.6		2.1		5.2		3.3	
TOTAL NO.	NO WAITING	NO. OF WAIT	419	11	428	11	459	10.5	498	8.5	422	9	551	9
	NO DRAWING	DEPARTURES	76	95	77	106	50	84	91	34	20	21	72	25
	QTRS AVAIL.	FORECAST	1117		1154		1,147		1,151		1,161		1,174	
	QTRS OCCUPIED	OFFICER	459		466		457		524		471		481	
		AIRMEN	636		659		635		589		642		662	
		CIVILIAN	15		10		10		8		8		9	

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0707

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

KADENA



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	4,675	−1,989	763	363	1,559	3,363
NET WORTH	100,063	99,338	95,098	94,562	93,121	110,205



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2,699	2,365	2,927	1,934	352	1,437	NET PROFIT/LOSS	2,658	690	−2,805	−1,169	−1,185	3,460
327,112	329,549	335,083	334,164	328,253	326,658	NET WORTH	73,438	74,129	71,323	69,040	67,855	71,396

SOURCE: DIR OF PER

0708

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA

NET PROFIT / LOSS ——



NET PROFIT/LOSS	84	-1,389	-862	-1,477	1,892	611
NET WORTH	29,977	28,587	27,288	26,247	28,140	28,751







2,265	-1,069	-1,712	908	239	-3,717	NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,285	2,440	1,241	-2,822	-1,277	-160
62,038	60,983	57,200	58,109	58,103	54,369	NET WORTH	31,399	39,734	34,825	32,003	30,726	30,765

SOURCE: DIR OF PEN

0709

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

0710

SAFETY COMMENTS

(Major Aircraft Accidents) The cumulative average major aircraft accident rate of the command for calendar year 1955 was 48.9% in comparison to the Fifth Air Force cumulative average of 35% as of 30 November 1955. Fifth Air Force average for 1954 was 40% and USAF average for the same period was 20%. Two (2) major aircraft accidents during the month of December gave the command a total of 25 major aircraft accidents for calendar year 1955, with a total of 51,103 hours flown.

(Military Disabling Injuries) There were eight (8) disabling injuries during the month of December at a total cost of $3,990.00. This increase gave the command a total of 93 disabling injuries at a total cost of $196,560.00 for calendar year 1955. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing increased from five (5) injuries in November to six (6) in December, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing decreased from two (2) injuries in November to one (1) in December. The 581st Air Resupply Group had one (1) injury in both November and December.

(Motor Vehicle Accidents) There were eight (8) motor vehicle accidents during the month of December at a total cost of $4,425.00. The command had 75 motor vehicle accidents at a total cost of $40,629.00 for calendar year 1955. The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing accidents decreased from seven (7) in November to four (4) in December, while the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing increased from one (1) in November to four (4) in December. The 581st Air Resupply Group is enjoying its fourth consecutive month with no motor vehicle accidents.

0711

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS

313 TH 1955 CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RATE — — — 5 TH AF 1954 AVERAGE RATE • • • •

UNITS	DEC 1955		1955 CUMULATIVE			RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
	ACCTS	HRS FLOWN	ACCTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	
18 TH BASE FLT.	0	311	0	5170	0	
51 ST BASE FLT	0	233	0	4251	0	
26 TH FIS *	0	0	0	2535	0	
581 ST ARG	0	326	3	8263	36	
25 TH FIS	0	463	3	6261	48	
44TH FBS	0	531	2	3657	55	
16 TH FIS	1	782	5	7975	63	
12 TH FBS	1	539	5	6640	75	
67 TH FBS	0	544	7	6351	110	

RATE $= \frac{\text{NO OF ACCTS}}{\text{FLYING HOURS}} \times 100{,}000$

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

* 26 TH FIS REASSIGNED TO 13 TH AF, 10 JUL 1955

0712

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

DECEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO.	NO. OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	18 FBW	1	14	64	
	51 FIW	1	8	38	
	581 ARG	0	3	36	
PILOT ERROR	18 FBW	0	6	27	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	18 FBW	0	0	0	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	18 FBW	0	1	5	
	51 FIW	0	0	0	
	581 ARG	0	1	12	
MAT. FAILURE	18 FBW	0	2	9	
	51 FIW	1	3	14	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
MISCELLANEOUS	18 FBW	0	0	0	
	51 FIW	0	2	9	
	581 ARG	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	18 FBW	1	5	23	
	51 FIW	0	1	5	
	581 ARG	0	2	24	

5 TH AF RATE — — —

0713

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	DECEMBER 1955				1955 CUMULATIVE			COST — $ 1,000
	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	FATAL	COST	0 5 10 15 20 25
51 ST FIW	0	0	0	0	1	0	360	
623 RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	2	0	450	
624 TH AC&W	0	0	0	0	3	0	750	
51 ST M&S GP	1	0	2	60	8	0	1,650	
581 ST ARG	1	0	14	420	6	0	1,740	
80 TH FBS	0	0	0	0	3	0	2,340	
18 TH FBG	2	0	37	1,110	6	0	2,790	
18 TH FBW	2	0	76	2,280	7	0	4,170	
51 ST ABG	0	0	0	0	12	0	8,130	
313 TH A D	0	0	0	0	5	1	33,240	
18 TH M&S GP	2	0	4	120	15	1	36,240	
51 ST FIG	0	0	0	0	10	1	36,720	
18 TH ABG	0	0	0	0	15	2	67,980	

313 TH AD CUMULATIVE AVERAGE COST — — —

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0714

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	DECEMBER 1955			1955 CUMULATIVE		COST OF ACCIDENTS — $100.00 0 2 4 6 8 10
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	
581 ST ARG	0	0	0	0	0	
51 ST FIG	0	0	0	1	0	
51 ST FIW	0	0	0	1	0	
80 TH FBS	0	0	0	1	27	
18 TH FBG	0	0	0	2	29	
18 TH FBW	0	0	0	3	73	
624 TH AC&W S	0	0	0	2	175	
51 ST ABG	3	13	283	5	283	
51 ST M&S GP	1	0	0	8	324	
313 TH A D	1	3	60	5	386	
623 RD AC&W	0	0	0	3	388	
18 TH M&S GP	2	1	3,959	25	8,788	
18 TH ABG	1	5	123	19	30,156	

313 TH AVERAGE CUMULATIVE COST — 3,125

SOURCE: ASST FOR SFTY

0715

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DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
HEADQUARTERS, AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL	1
TOTAL	19

0716

APPENDIX 4

CONTRACTS LET BY THE

313TH AIR DIVISION PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1955

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION PROCUREMENT

DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1955

Appendix 4

July: One contract for $19,950.00, nine delivery orders totalling $34,528.82, and five purchase orders totalling $2,724.84 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-579 for $19,950.00 was written to Tokyo Denki for maintenance of the Kadena AB electrical system.

Four contracts totalling $61,128.03 and nine purchase orders totalling $7,603.28 were closed during July.

Sixteen salvage sales contracts totalling $12,785.10 were written during July.

August: Seven contracts totalling $87,855.75, 10 delivery orders totalling $8,481.29, and 11 purchase orders totalling $7,676.48 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-580 for $57,920.10 was written to Nakachi Construction Co. for the renovation of furniture at Kadena AB.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-581 for $2,479.65 was written to Ryukyuan Watch Center for the repair, overhaul, and maintenance of aircraft watches and clocks for Kadena AB.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-582 for $22,188.00 was written to American Office Machine Co. for the maintenance and repair of appriximately 3,845 machines on Kadena AB.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-583 for $150.00 was written to Eikichi Sunade for lightering services for the off-island site at Kume Jima.

0718

Appendix 4

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-584 for $150.00 was written to Ryukyu Kaiun Kaisha for lightering services for the off-island site at Miyako Jima.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-585 for $300.00 was written to Mori Eitomi for lightering services for the off-island site at Okino-Erabu Shima.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-586 for $4,688.00 was written to Stenbo Protective Coatings, Inc., for the repair and replacement of the roof on the maintenance and operations building, Yae Take.

Sixteen contracts totalling $232,099.44 and 14 purchase orders totalling $20,436.74 were closed during August.

Fifty-two salvage sales contracts in the amount of $61,992.11 were written during August.

September: Eight contracts totalling $293,417.00, 14 delivery orders totalling $22,959.35, and 22 purchase orders totalling $30,395.02 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-587 for $25,000.00 was written to Bandy, Elliott, and Fischer for the construction of interim facilities on Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-588 for $22,710.00 was written to International Dairy for transportation of dairy products on Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-589 for $3,010.00 was written to American Office Machine Co. for repair of office machines.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-590 for $11,300.07 was written to Zentaro Gumi for the repair of Buildings T-47 and T-91 on Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-592 for $10,000.00 was written to Yomitan Industries for grass cutting on Naha AB.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-593 for $13,107.00 was written to Barclay and Co. for custodial supplies for Naha AB.

Appendix 4

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-591 for $2,700.00 was written to Vinnell Corporation for the repair of three truck cranes at Naha AB.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-594 for $199,690.00 was written to Bandy, Elliott, and Fischer for corrosion treatment of napalm cases in the 546th Ammunition Area, Kadena AB.

Four contracts totalling $95,050.62 and five purchase orders totalling $5,618.36 were closed during September.

October: One contract for $17,600.00, 22 delivery orders totalling $39,281.72, and 13 purchase orders totalling $13,226.83 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) AF 62(321)-595 for $17,600.00 was written to Pacific Construction Co. for repair and painting of Ty-Base screens and doors.

Four contracts totalling $57,382.16, 13 purchase orders totalling $8,654.00, and 23 delivery orders totalling $50,248.85 were closed during October.

Forty-one salvage sales contracts in the amount of $126,705.90 were written during October.

November: Three contracts totalling $16,713.50, eight delivery orders totalling $12,333.68, and 14 purchase orders totalling $21,126.37 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-597 was written to Turco Products, Inc., for furnishing supplies to Kadena AB in the amount of $9,916.68.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-598 for $2,780.00 was written to Bandy, Elliott, and Fischer for the installation of additional electronic panel boards for the BLOBECOM transmitter on Kadena AB.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-599 for $3,971.82 was written to

Appendix 4

Yomitan Industries for flight planning facilities at Base Operations, Kadena AB.

Two contracts totalling $15,611.66, 14 purchase orders totalling $13,441.44, and five delivery orders totalling $3,663.29 were closed during November.

A total of 108 salvage sales contracts in the amount of $37,433.00 were written during November.

December: Twenty-one contracts totalling $269,096.31, four delivery orders totalling $1,054.00, and 24 purchase orders totalling $27,456.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-600 for $4,640.00 was written to State Construction Co. for altering Building T-96 (former Twentieth Air Force Officers' Mess Hall) into a television station.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-601 for $25,000.00 was written to Barclay and Co. for body repair of 37 buses.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-602 for $9,847.15 was written to Turco Products, Inc. for furnishing supplies to Kadena AB.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-603 for $3,396.61 was written to Yomitan Industries for the construction of approximately 12,000 feet of sidewalks in the Keystone Swimming Pool area of Kadena AB.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-604 for $3,467.20 was written to Toa Kensetsu for the repair and painting of the power plant building, T-1300, at Naha AB.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-605 for $6,422.72 was written to Turco Products, Inc. for furnishing supplies to Kadena AB.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-606 for $4,870.57 was written to Yomitan Industries for construction of aircraft obstruction lights ($788.78) and two storage sheds ($4,081.79) at Naha AB.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-607 for $1,143.00 was written to Nago Block Factory for concrete blocks.

Appendix 4

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-608 for $6,425.04 was written to Kokuba Gumi for cement used at Kadena AB.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-609 for $123,000.00 was written to Yomitan Industries for soil erosion work on Kadena Airfield.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-610 for $6,425.04 was written to Kokuba Gumi for cement used at Kadena AB.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-611 for $5,062.30 was written to Toa Kensetsu for a 1,050 linear foot, eight-foot high security fence around the Ready Rocket Storage Building at Naha AB.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-612 for $4,322.87 was written to Toa Kensetsu for the construction of one motor pool parking area and the repair of dining hall reefers in Buildings 900 and 907 at Naha AB.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-613 for $8,328.98 was written to Connell Brothers Co., Ltd., for asphalt tile and asphalt tile cement requested by 13th Air Task Force (P), at Taipei, Formosa.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-614 for $7,344.00 was written to Barclay and Co. for teletype paper.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-615 for $8,497.50 was written to Barclay and Co. for teletype tape and ribbon.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-616 for $8,467.00 was written to Barclay and Co. for dog food.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-617 for $8,526.33 was written to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for painting of buildings at Kadena AB. The contract amount was based upon the unit price per building.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-618 for $8,832.00 was written to Connell Brothers, Ltd., for 2,400 gallons of pastel shade interior paint for delivery to AFB 5270, Base Supply Officer.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-619 for $5,208.00 was written to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for 1,400 gallons of Latex rubber-base paint to be delivered to AFB 5270, Base Supply Officer.

Appendix 4

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-620 for $9,870.00 was written to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for paint.

Five contracts totalling $25,522.34, 13 purchase orders totalling $16,580.94, and three delivery orders totalling $1,815.37 were closed during December.

Fifteen salvage sales contracts in the amount of $55,323.00 were written during December.