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313TH AIR DIVISION



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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1957

DALE O. SMITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

Prepared for the 313th Air Division Historical Division by the following personnel:

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(23 December 1958)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239

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ONE OF THE RIGID RADOMES INSTALLED

IN THE RYUKYUS AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM UNDER

PROJECT TIGHT TOP AS THE 313TH AIR

DIVISION'S ANSWER TO THE ANNUAL PROBLEM

OF TYPHOONS



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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1957

1957

1 July The Far East Air Forces (FEAF) are redesignated as the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and Headquarters, Pacific Air Force/FEAF (REAR) is inactivated. General Laurence S. Kuter, erstwhile FEAF Commander, assumes the title of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, with headquarters at Hickam AFB, T.H, APO 953.

The Far East Command, with headquarters at Pershing Heights, Tokyo, Japan, is dissolved, and the Commander-in-Chief, FEC, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, prepares to return to the ZI for duty as the Army Vice Chief of Staff. The area formerly comprised within the Far East Command is absorbed into an enlarged Pacific Command headed by Admiral Felix B. Stump, the current Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

A new sub-unified command under CINCPAC--Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan (USF/J) is established at Pershing Heights, Tokyo, Japan, under the command of Lieutenant General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., who continues as Commander, Fifth Air Force. The staff of USF/J is composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. The new organization assumes some of the responsibilities of the former Far East Command, but only those pertaining to the Japan area.

The United Nations Command, hitherto headed by General Lemnitzer, is assumed by General George H. Decker, USA, as the command is transferred from Tokyo to Seoul, Korea. In addition to becoming Commander-in-Chief, UNC, General Decker assumes the duties of Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea, and Commanding General, Eighth Army.

A new command--Headquarters, U.S. Army, Pacific--is established in Hawaii under the command of General Isaac D. White, previously the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces Far East and U.S. Eighth Army, to function under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Included in General White's new command are all Army forces in the Pacific, including Hawaii, Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyus.

A separate and subordinate headquarters--U.S. Army, Japan, and United Nations Command and Eighth Army (Rear)--is established at Camp Zama, Japan, under the command of Lieutenant General Charles D. Palmer.

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1 July Headquarters, Fifth Air Force closes at Moriyama Air Station, Japan, APO 710, at 2400, 30 June, and opens at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, APO 925, at 0001, this date, per 5th AF GO 38, dtd. 11 June 1957.

Headquarters, Seventh Air Force is inactivated at Wheeler AFB, T.H. In its place is activated 326th Air Division, APO 915.

General Thomas D. White succeeds General Nathan F. Twining as U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff. General Twining prepares to move up to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the near future.

The 17th Communications Construction Squadron is reassigned from FEAF to Air Materiel Command, per Hq. USAF Ltr., to Comdr. AMC, sub.: Reassignment of 17th Communications Construction Squadron, dtd. 9 Apr. 1957, and FEAF GO 32, dtd. 15 May 1957. AMC GO 25, dtd. 19 Apr. 1957, further reassigns the 17th CCS from 313th Air Division to the 2720th Maintenance Group at Clark AB, without change in station, personnel, or equipment, and redesignates the latter as Headquarters, 2720th Maintenance Group.

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing for operational control and administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and is attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 43, dtd. 25 June 1957.

Detachment #1, 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to the 6361st Air Base Squadron, Iwo Jima AB, for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 52, dtd. 24 July 1957.

The 5th Communications Group, previously assigned to 313th Air Division, is attached to Fifth Air Force for operational control, per 5th AF GO 42, dtd. 1 July 1957.

The functions and personnel of Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group are attached to Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, per 51st FIW GO 14, dtd. 28 June 1957.

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, presently assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, are further attached to Headquarters, 51st

1957

1 July Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, per 51st FIW GO 15, dtd. 28 June 1957.

2 July Major General Francis M. McAlister succeeds Major General Alan Shapley as Commanding General of the Third Marine Division, with headquarters at Camp Courtney, Okinawa.

4 July With the abolition of the title of Governor of the Ryukyu Islands heretofore held by the incumbent Commander, Far East Command, Lieutenant General James E. Moore ceases to be the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands and assumes the new title of High Commissioner of the Ryukyus. General Moore continues to be the Commanding General, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands and IX Corps, but becomes subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific, General Isaac D. White, in Hawaii.

1 Aug. The Advance Party of the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron, consisting of 52 people including dependents, proceeds by aircraft to Clark AB, Philippine Islands, as the first step in the PCS move of that organization.

4 Aug. In the election for the 30 seats in the Naha City Assembly, the anti-Senaga group obtains 23,602 (45.4%) votes, the pro-Senaga group 16,818 (38.6%) votes, and the neutrals 3,055 (7%) votes out of a total number of 45,476 votes cast. In so doing, the anti-Senaga group wins 17 seats; the pro-Senaga faction acquires sufficient strength to prevent a non-confidence vote against Mayor Senaga by absenting themselves in sufficient numbers to make a quorum of 20 impossible.

15 Aug. Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

15 Aug. Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957, and 313th AD GO 24, dtd. 13 Sept. 1957.

The 51st Field Maintenance Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

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15 Aug. The 51st Supply Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The 51st Transportation Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The 51st Tactical Hospital is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The 6351st USAF Dispensary is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The Commander, 51st Air Base Group is designated Air Base Commander of Naha Air Base, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The following units are relieved from all previous logistic attachments and are attached to the 51st Air Base Group for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 24, dtd. 13 Sept. 1957:

33d Air Rescue Squadron
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
Detachment #1, District Office, #3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (except for POL and ration support, which are provided by the 18th Air Base Group)
Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

1957

15 Aug. The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

The 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron is relieved from all previous attachments and is attached to Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), operational control, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.

20 Aug. The flight echelon and Headquarters, 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron moved from Kadena AB to Clark AB, Philippine Islands inPCS transfer.

1 Sep. The 6333d Technical Training Squadron is discontinued at Kadena Air Base, per 5th AF GO 63, dtd. 28 Aug. 1957. Personnel, equipment, and supplies revert to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division. Manpower spaces revert to control of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces.

Headquarters, 5th Communications Group (PACAF) closes at APO 47 at 2400 hours, 31 August, and opens at Kadena Air Base effective 0001 hours, 1 September, per Hq. 5th Comm. Gp. GO 3, dtd. 16 Aug. 1957.

The attachment of the 5th Communications Group to Headquarters, 6101st Air Base Group for administration is rescinded, per 5th AF GO 72, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957, and the 5th Communications Group is attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistics only, per 313th AD GO 26, dtd. 17 Oct. 1957. (It was previously attached to Fifth Air Force for operational control on 1 July 1957, per 5th AF GO 42, dtd. 1 July 1957).

1 Oct. The following units are inactivated at Kadena Air Base and revert to control of the Department of the Air Force, per 5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 1957:

Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Group
Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group
18th Air Police Squadron
18th Communications Squadron
18th Installations Squadron
18th Food Service Squadron

1957

1 Oct. Headquarters, 18th Maintenance and Supply Group
18th Transportation Squadron
18th Supply Squadron
13th Communications Squadron, Division

The Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena AB, is designated and assigned to Fifth Air Force, and further assigned to the 313th Air Division, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.

The following units at Kadena AB are designated and assigned to Fifth Air Force and further assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957, and 5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 1957:

6313th Air Police Squadron
6313th Communications Squadron
6313th Operations Squadron
6313th Installations Squadron
6313th Supply Squadron
6313th Transportation Squadron
6313th Food Service Squadron

1 Oct. The following units are relieved from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
18th Fighter Bomber Wing
12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC)
17th Communications Construction Squadron
336th Fighter Day Squadron
5th Communications Group
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile
1505th Support Squadron (Transport)
Headquarters, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment #1, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
F-100-8 Mobile Training Detachment
District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, is relieved from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and is

1957

1 Oct. attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957.

The following units are relieved from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957:

558th Air Force Band
322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium
7th Tactical Depot Squadron

The 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for POL and rations support only, per 313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957.

The 6332d USAF Dispensary, Kadena AB, is assigned to Fifth Air Force and further assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.

The 18th Tactical Hospital is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 17, dtd. 9 June 1958.

The Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is designated as the Kadena Air Base Commander, per 5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957.

Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, Kadena Air Base, is reassigned from the 13th Air Force to 5th Air Force, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.

4 Oct. The Soviet Union launches the first artificial earth satellite into space 560 miles above the earth's surface, where it begins to circle the globe at a speed of 18,000 miles per hour. Its highest altitude is 570 miles, its lowest 170. The satellite, dubbed Sputnik (short for Iskustvennyi Sputnik Zemli or "Artificial Fellow Traveler Around the Earth"), is approximately 22 inches in diameter and weighs about 184 pounds. It requires one hour and 35 minutes to circle the earth. Sputnik I follows a course at 65 degrees angle to the equatorial plane.

9 Oct. Mr. Neil H. McElroy is sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, succeeding Mr. Charles E. Wilson.

15 Oct. The Flying Training Squadron (Provisional) is designated and organized at Kadena AB, per 5th AF GO 78, dtd. 2 Oct. 1957, and is attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for operational

1957

15 Oct. control, administrative support, and logistic support, per 5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957. The mission of the Flying Training Squadron, Provisional, is to train aircrews and support personnel to become operationally combat ready with an F-100D capability.

25 Oct. The following units are inactivated at Naha AB and revert to control of the Department of the Air Force, per 5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957:

Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group
Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group
51st Air Police Squadron
51st Communications Squadron
51st Installations Squadron
51st Food Service Squadron
Headquarters, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group
51st Supply Squadron
51st Transportation Squadron

The Headquarters, 6431st Air Base Group is designated and assigned to Fifth Air Force, and further assigned to the 313th Air Division, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957, PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957, and 5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.

The following units at Naha Air Base are designated and assigned to Fifth Air Force, and further assigned to the 6431st Air Base Group, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957, PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957, and 5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957:

6431st Air Police Squadron
6431st Operations Squadron
6431st Installations Squadron
6431st Supply Squadron
6431st Transportation Squadron
6431st Food Service Squadron

The following units are relieved from all previous attachment to the 51st Air Base Group and are attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistic support, per 313th AD GO 30, dtd. 29 Oct.1957:

33d Air Rescue Squadron
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (except for the provision of POL and rations support for Site P-52, which is a function of the 6313th Air Base Wing)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron

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25 Oct. Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron
Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron
District Office #3A, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron

The 6351st USAF Dispensary is assigned to Fifth Air Force and further assigned to the 6431st Air Base Group, per PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957, and PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957.

The Commander, 6431st Air Base Group is designated as the Naha Air Base Commander, per 5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957.

30 Oct. The last two F-86F airdraft of the 336th Fighter Day Squadron are delivered to Civil Air Transport (CAT), the contract agency for maintenance work, at Tainan, Formosa, preliminary to being turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force. This event marks the end of the F-86F aircraft's use in the 313th Air Division command.

1 Nov. The 336th Fighter Day Squadron is reduced to a strength of one officer and one airman, and is scheduled for deployment to Seymour-Johnson AFB on 1 December.

Detachment #1, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) is discontinued at Kadena AB, per 5th AF GO 86, dtd. 29 Oct. 1957, with personnel, manpower spaces, equipment, and supplies reverting to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division.

Detachment #2, Headquarters, 313th Air Division is organized at Kadena AB, per 5th AF GO 86, dtd. 29 Oct. 1957, with personnel, manpower spaces, equipment, and supplies being furnished from sources under control of the Commander, 313th Air Division. Detachment #2 is attached to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for operational control.

3 Nov. The Soviet Union launches its second artificial earth satellite, with a dog as passenger, to a height of some 932 miles above the earth, where it begins to circle the globe at a speed of 17,840 miles per hour. The apogee of Sputnik II is 1,056 miles above the surface of the earth, and its perigee is 104 miles. The satellite's weight is approximately 1,120 pounds, and its conical shape is 19 feet long and four feet in diameter. Sputnik II requires one hour and 43.7 minutes to circle the globe while following a track at 65 degrees angle to the equatorial plane.

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3 Nov. Besides carrying apparatus for measuring cosmic rays, temperature, and pressure, the second satellite contains equipment for reporting the condition of its canine passenger.

22 Nov. Detachment #2, Headquarters, 313th Air Division is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistics and administration (not to include personnel assignment and promotion), per 313th AD GO 32, dtd. 18 Nov. 1957.

25 Nov. All personnel assigned or attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division are attached to Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (not to include assignment or promotion of personnel), per 313th AD GO 33, dtd. 19 Nov. 1957.

The Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF, is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 35, dtd. 2 Dec. 1957.

8 Dec. The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) is inactivated at Kadena AB, per 5th AF GO 94, dtd. 27 Nov. 1957. Personnel rendered surplus by this action are absorbed by other units under control of Commander, Fifth Air Force.

9 Dec. Site P-52 is relieved of its function as a primary Air Defense Direction Center.

17 Dec. Mawashi City is merged with Naha City, giving the capital city of the Ryukyus a population of over 190,000, and completing the movement begun in 1954, when Shuri and Oroku were absorbed into Naha City. Under the terms of the merger agreement, the Mawashi area will elect 15 representatives to the Naha City Assembly, thus giving the assembly a total strength of 45 members.

21 Dec. Seisaku Ota is appointed Deputy Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands by High Commissioner Lieutenant General James E. Moore, succeeding Kotaro Kamimura.

23 Dec. The 15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight is redesignated as the 15th Physiological Training Flight, per 5th AF GO 102, dtd. 16 Dec. 1957.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Organized as a Non-Table of Organization unit assigned to Fifth Air Force since its activation on 1 March 1955, the 313th Air Division, as of 1 July 1957, had as its general mission the conduct of defensive operations and the support of offensive operations in its operating areas and the areas adjacent thereto.[1] For purposes of air defense this area was defined as a sector, that for the 313th Air Division being enclosed within imaginary lines drawn between the following points: 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point 30° N., 145° E.[2]

To enable the 313th Air Division to carry out its mission and responsibilities, it was provided a headquarters, located at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and such other units and facilities as were considered necessary by the Commander, Fifth Air Force and were approved by the Commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).

The Commander, 313th Air Division exercised command control over all assigned and attached units; and, prescribed by 5AFR 23-4, 5AFR 23-4A, and 5AFR 23-4B, was directly responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for:

1. Organizing, administering, training, equipping, and preparing for combat all assigned units, as well as attached units, when so directed.

2. Preparing, coordinating, and implementing general emergency plans.

3. Planning and conducting joint training and operations with friendly forces.

4. Developing tactics and techniques of aerial warfare, as well as requirements for new weapons, and improving the utilization of current weapons.

5. Exercising operational control over all Army AAA units for air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine AAA units when shore based, and control of AAA gunfire from ships' batteries, when such fire was in support of the defense of shore installations within the air defense sector.

6. Operational control of all shore-based Naval and Marine fighter aircraft made available for air defense or offensive operations.

7. Supervising maintenance, engineering, operations, internal security, and local ground defense of all assigned facilities.

8. Exercising continuous review of communications and electronics requirements, and initiating programming action necessary to obtain the requisite equipment.

9. Maintaining assigned and/or attached units under his operational control at the highest possible state of readiness.

10. Supporting Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations.

11. Supporting special activities, tenant, and attached units.

12. Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence data.

13. Controlling tactical air traffic within the assigned area.

14. Controlling passive air defense measures in the 313th Air Division areas of responsibility, these measures comprising the following:

a. Area electronic emission control.

b. Illumination control procedures for the area.

15. Supervising organizational and personnel training program.

16. Supervising the organization and field maintenance of assigned equipment and/or the equipment of attached units under his operational control.

17. Issuing mission directives for all assigned units.

18. Monitoring ground control for the utilization of air space, within the limits of the assigned area.

19. Operating an Air Defense Control Center (ADCC).

20. Coordinating with the appropriate local United States governmental authorities all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil affairs.

21. Coordinating with appropriate local Army and Navy commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used utilities and installations.

22. Supporting the Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands (an ex officio title of the Commanding General, Headquarters, Ryukyus Command and IX Corps) in the discharge of United States Civil Administration responsibilities, except as otherwise prohibited by AFR 24-1.*

23. Operating and maintaining all ranges within the 313th Air Division area of responsibility and executing all other directives which might be assigned by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

24. Supporting the 315th Air Division, as outlined in an administrative agreement between Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and Headquarters 315th Air Division, dated 29 July 1957, and the amendments thereto.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of his command, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might otherwise direct. [3]

*The position of Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, hitherto held by the incumbent Commander, Far East Command, was abolished on 4 July 1957, and with it, quite logically, was abolished the position of Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. Simultaneously, Lieutenant General James E. Moore, the Commanding General, Headquarters, Ryukyus Command and IX Corps, assumed the ex officio title of High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, in which capacity he reported henceforth directly to the Office of Civil Affairs/Military Government at the Department of the Army. Although this change in titles was not subsequently reflected in a revision to 5th Air Force Regulation 23-4, one infers that the High Commissioner was to be supported in the discharge of his U.S. Civil Administration responsibilities in the same way as the Deputy Governor.

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Activations, Inactivations, and Reassignments at Kadena 1 July-30 September.

At the beginning of the historical period on 1 July 1957, the 18th Air Base Group was the Kadena "housekeeping" organization, and the Commander of that organization was the Base Commander, as he had been since 1 February, when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was relieved from attachment to the 313th Air Division for all purposes and returned to direct control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.[4] In that role the 18th Air Base Group was attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division for operational control, administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support.[5]

On 1 July 1957, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron was reassigned from FEAF (which was redesignated (PACAF that same date) to the Air Materiel Command.[6] The latter thereupon further reassigned the 17th CCS from 313th Air Division to the 2720th Maintenance Group at Clark Air Base, but with no change in station, personnel, or equipment.[7] The attachment of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron to the 18th Air Base Group for logistic support was likewise left undisturbed.

Also on 1 July 1957, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, previously attached to Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group for administration and logistic support,[8] was relieved from all previous attachments and was placed under the Headquarters, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Yokota AB, Japan, for operational control and administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel),

while the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group remained responsible for logistic support only.[9]

The advance echelon of the 5th Communications Group had moved from Gifu Air Base in Japan to Kadena AB in late June, and on the 25th of that month the group was officially assigned to the 313th Air Division, although the bulk of the organization was still at Gifu.[10] One of the influencing factors in the decision to transfer the 5th Communications Group to Okinawa was its inherent capability to support the 313th Air Division in the area of communications, particularly in the event of typhoon damage.

Next, on 1 July, Fifth Air Force reclaimed operational control of the 5th Communications Group, but permitted this headquarters to retain responsibility for its administrative and logistic support.[11] Additional echelons of the group moved to Okinawa in July and August; and at 2400 hours, 31 August, the Headquarters, 5th Communications Group (PACAF) closed at Gifu AB, opening at Kadena AB effective 0001 hours, 1 September 1957.[12] Also effective on 1 September, the 5th Communications Group's attachment to Headquarters, 6101st Air Base Group for administration was rescinded,[13] and the organization was attached to the 18th Air Base Group for logistics only.[14] Assigned to the 5th Communications Group were three squadrons--the 2d Radio Relay Squadron, the 24th Communications Construction Squadron (Mobile), and the 608th Communications Squadron (Operations, Mobile).

A reorganization of the 5th Comm. Group which took place in June

while it was still in Japan reduced the manpower authorization from 726 to 503. This reduction constituted a manning of only 67 per cent of the Table of Organization authorization, and was the bare minimum which could meet the current or proposed Fifth Air Force contingency tactical communications commitments. Under this reorganization, the 24th Communications Construction Squadron (Mobile) was to be reduced to a single flight. Although this meant a wholesale sacrifice of personnel (the group had a total of 748 men actually assigned at the time its authorization was cut to 503), before leaving Japan, the 24th CCS (M) had transferred its excess personnel and remained at only flight strength for the rest of the year.[15]

On 1 September the 6333d Technical Training Squadron (Survival) was discontinued at Kadena Air Base, the personnel, equipment, and supplies reverting to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division, while the manpower spaces went back to the control of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).[16]

The 6313th Air Base Wing Is Activated at Kadena Air Base.

On 1 October 1957 the Headquarters, 18th Air Base Group and its four component units--the 18th Air Police Squadron, the 18th Communications Squadron, the 18th Installations Squadron, and the 18th Food Service Squadron--were inactivated and turned back to Department of the Air Force control, as were the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Group, Headquarters, 18th Maintenance and Supply Group and its two subordinate units--the 18th

Supply Squadron and the 18th Transportation Squadron, and the 13th Communications Squadron, Division. Actually, the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Group and the Headquarters, M&S Group had already been reduced to a skeletal "one and one" strength on 1 February 1957, at the time the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was divorced from its attachment to the 313th Air Division.[17]

To fill the void left in the Kadena base structure by the inactivation of the 18th Air Base Group, PACAF designated the Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing, assigned it to Fifth Air Force, and further assigned it to the 313th Air Division, also effective 1 October.[18] The Commander of the new 6313th Air Base Wing was designated as the Kadena Air Base Commander.[19] To replace the seven squadrons which were inactivated, PACAF designated seven new squadrons at Kadena AB, assigning them to Fifth Air Force, who further assigned them to the 6313th Air Base Wing. These were the 6313th Air Police Squadron, the 6313th Communications Squadron, the 6313th Operations Squadron, the 6313th Installations Squadron, the 6313th Supply Squadron, the 6313th Transportation Squadron, and the 6313th Food Service Squadron.[20]

This headquarters thereupon relieved the following units from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and attached them to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistic support:[21] Headquarters, 313th Air Division; 18th Fighter Bomber Wing; 12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC); 17th Communications Construction Squadron; 336th Fighter Day Squadron; 5th Communications Group; 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron,

Depot; 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile; 1505th Support Squadron (Transport); Headquarters, 11th Air Postal Squadron; Detachment #1, 11th Air Postal Squadron; Headquarters 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment $4, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron; F-100-8 Mobile Training Detachment; District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron; and the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF.

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, was relieved from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration and logistic support.[22]

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, and 558th Air Force Band were relieved from all previous attachments to the 18th Air Base Group and were now attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistic support.[23]

In a more specialized arrangement, the 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, whose headquarters was at Yae Take Air Station, was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for POL and rations support only.[24]

The 6332d USAF Dispensary was assigned to Fifth Air Force and further assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing. Previously, it had been attached for all purposes to the 18th Air Base Group, but assigned to 313th Air Division.[25]

The 18th Tactical Hospital was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for operational control, administration (including assignment and promotion

of personnel), and logistic support.[26]

Although not actually a part of this chronicle, it may be noted at this point that October 1st also saw the Headquarters, 18th Fighter Bomber Wing reassigned by PACAF from the Thirteenth Air Force to the Fifth Air Force, thus formalizing a relationship which had existed for all effects and purposes since the start of the Korean War.[27]

The Mission of the 6313th Air Base Wing: 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-2 of 5 December 1957 stated that the mission of the 6313th Air Base Wing was to provide administrative and logistical support of the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing, tenant units located on assigned installations, and other units as directed by the 313th Air Division Commander. The 6313th ABW was organized as a non-table of organization unit directly subordinate to the 313th Air Division.

Responsibilities of the 6313th Air Base Wing Commander: As the Installation Commander, Kadena Air Base, the 6313th Air Base Wing Commander was authorized to perform and responsible for performing those duties stated in Air Force Regulations 11-4 and 35-54. He would exercise command jurisdiction over all assigned units; while in the case of attached units he would exercise command jurisdiction only in the areas which he was directed to support. In addition, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Maintaining Kadena Air Base with facilities, equipment, and personnel necessary for immediate and adequate support of the Strategic Air Command, tactical elements of Pacific Air Forces, and the Military Air Transport Service, including:

a. Administrative and logistical support of the units of the Strategic Air Command as a matter of top priority, in accordance with current directives, plans, regulations, and policies.*

b. Administrative and logistical support of Pacific Air Force units, in accordance with the priorities established by 313th Air Division.*

c. Administrative and logistical support of attached units of the Military Air Transport Service.*

2. Furnishing administrative and logistical support, as required, to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and other units, as directed.

3. Commanding Sector "E", in accordance with the joint USARYIS/IX Corps, 313th Air Division, 3d Marine Division Area Damage Control Plan, to include:

a. Preparation of a 6313th Air Base Wing Damage Control Plan.

b. Testing and execution of this plan, as outlined in current 313th Air Division and Fifth Air Force directives, to insure its adequacy.

*The logistical support of SAC, PACAF, and MATS units laid down did not contemplate the furnishing of field maintenance services, but was confined to the responsibility of coordinating field maintenance support requirements for deployed units with the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

4. The administration, operation, and maintenance of Kadena Air Base, assigned off-base installations, and such others as might be directed, in accordance with AFR 35-54.

5. Providing an air terminal for military aircraft at Kadena Air Base.

6. Issuing mission directives to each assigned unit.

7. Formulating, documenting, and maintaining current general emergency plans for Kadena Air Base and its assigned off-base installations, as well as testing these plans to insure a constant state of readiness.

8. Joint planning, coordinating, training, and operations with friendly forces as required.

9. Internal security of assigned installations and ground defense of these installations and their facilities agains pilferage, acts of sabotage or organized attack. This would include the organization, equipping, and training of assigned troops in ground defense.

10. Formulating, documenting, and maintaining passive defense measures for installations, equipment, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 6313th Air Base Wing.

11. Provide aircraft to accomplish the airlift requirements of the 313th Air Division; also provide aircraft and supervision in support of the proficiency flying of Air Force personnel assigned or attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for the accomplishment of such flying.

12. Preparing plans and policies for the conduct of psychological warfare, as directed.

13. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by this headquarters.

14. Administering and supervising the Air Force civilian personnel program for Okinawa.

15. Administration of port accounting activities (Pipeline) for Air Force personnel arriving and departing Okinawa.

16. Establishing and enforcing standards of discipline, conduct, courtesy, and appearance of assigned and attached personnel.

17. Providing spray aircraft for the insect control program.

18. Providing normal base communications services to assigned and attached units and, in addition, operating and maintaining radio transmitting and receiving facilities which supported the PACAF communications network and the Okinawa Air Defense System.

19. Exercising special courts-martial jurisdiction over all personnel assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing and all personnel of any other unit attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for the purpose of special courts-martial jurisdiction.

20. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.[28]

The Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing was not authorized direct communications with other local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Materiel Command Depot Commanders or heads of civilian agencies, "except on routine administrative and logistical matters pertaining to his mission." All

policy matters and direct communications with other major commands were to be handled only by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, "except when specific authorization [was] granted."[29]

Accessions, Losses, and Redesignations at Kadena during the Last Quarter.

On 15 October 1957 the Flying Training Squadron (Provisional) was designated and organized at Kadena Air Base, where it was attached to the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing for operational control, administrative support, and logistic support. The mission of the new organization was to train aircrews and support personnel so that they would be operationally combat ready in the F-100D Super Sabre aircraft.[30]

On 1 November the 336th Fighter Day Squadron was reduced to a strength of one officer and one airman, and was scheduled for deployment to Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base on 1 December 1957.

Also on 1 November, Detachment #2 of Headquarters, 313th Air Division was organized at Kadena AB, its personnel, manpower spaces, equipment, and supplies all being provided from sources under control of the Commander, 313th Air Division. However, the chief function, operational control, was retained by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.[31] On 22 November this headquarters attached Detachment #2 to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistics and administration (not including the assignment or promotion of personnel).[32]

November 1st was additionally notable for the discontinuance of Detachment #1, 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special), its personnel, manpower spaces, equipment, and supplies reverting to control of the Commander, 313th Air Division.[33]

On 25 November all personnel either assigned or attached to Headquarters, 313th Air Division were attached to Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing for administration, not including the assignment or promotion of personnel. With this action the 313th Headquarters orderly room was closed.[34]

One of the most important administrative events of the period was the inactivation of the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) on 8 December. The personnel rendered surplus by this action were absorbed by other units under the control of the Commander, Fifth Air Force, chiefly Detachment #2, Headquarters, 313th Air Division.[35]

Reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing 1 July - 15 August 1957.

The Mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing on 1 July 1957: As the historical period began on 1 July 1957, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base was still operating under the mission assignment set forth in 313th ADR 23-6 of 15 March 1955, which was as follows:

1. To administer, equip, train, and prepare for combat in accordance with 313th Air Division directives, policies, and schedules such Air Force units and personnel as might be designated, assigned, or attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

2. To maintain operating bases and other assigned installations with the necessary personnel and equipment for the purpose of immediate and adequate support of the 313th's air defense mission.

3. To maintain facilities and necessary equipment to support tactical elements of the Far East Air Forces, Military Air Transport Service, Naval Air Facility, Naha, and such other forces as might

be allocated by this or higher headquarters to carry out the missions of the Far East Command.[36]

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and, besides, was attached for operational control, administration, and logistical support. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was automatically the Installation Commander of Naha Air Base, as well. As such, he exercised command jurisdiction over all assigned units, as well as those attached for all purposes. In addition, he administered and/or exercised operational control, as appropriate, of such other units as happened to be attached.[37]

On matters pertaining to his mission, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders and with the heads of civilian agencies, as appropriate. Nevertheless, direct communication with other major commands was not authorized by Headquarters, 313th Air Division except in the case of specific matters.[38]

The Organization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing on 1 July 1957: The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had ended the first half of 1957 with a composition consisting of a headquarters, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, the 51st Air Base Group, the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group (albeit existing in name only since 17 May 1957, when it had been attached to the 51st Air Base Group for all purposes (including the assignment and promotion of personnel) and reduced to a nominal strength of "one and one"), the 51st Tactical Hospital, and "such other facilities, personnel, and assigned units as were necessary to accomplish its mission and meet its responsibilities."

On 1 July 1957, the functions and personnel of Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group were attached to the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, thus in effect reducing the former to a "one and one" organization.[39] Simultaneously, the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons, still technically assigned to the shadowy 51st Fighter Interceptor Group, were attached for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel, to the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[40]

On 14 August, as a final preliminary to the great reorganization to follow the next day, the Manpower and Organization and the Judge Advocate staff functions were transferred from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to the 51st Air Base Group, where they were attached for all purposes, including the assignment and promotion of personnel.[41]

The 51st Air Base Group Becomes the Naha Base Organization: The culmination of the reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, which had begun on 15 May with the transfer of eight staff sections to the 51st Air Base Group, came on 15 August, the effective date of Fifth Air Force General Order 57, of 6 August 1957. This order began by relieving the Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group from its previous attachment to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and placing it, instead, directly under Headquarters, 313th Air Division for operational control, administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistical support. At the same time, the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was relieved from all previous attachments and became

the responsibility of the 51st Air Base Group for logistic support.[42] As an assigned unit of the 313th Air Division, the 51st Wing was tacitly understood to be attached to this headquarters for the functions of operational control and administration, without the necessity of the fact's being noted in general orders.

Under the reorganization, just three units remained under the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing--the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron, the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron--all of which were attached for operational control, administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel), and logistic support.[43] The 26th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was also assigned to the 51st Wing, but continued to be attached for all purposes to Clark AB, where it had been stationed since 11 June 1955.

The 51st Supply Squadron, 51st Transportation Squadron, 51st Tactical Hospital, and 6351st USAF Dispensary were all relieved from their former attachment to the 51st Wing and were attached for all purposes to the Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group. With the four squadrons--51st Air Police Squadron, 51st Communications Squadron, 51st Installations Squadron and 51st Food Service Squadron--comprising an integral part of the 51st Air Base Group, this accession gave the latter organization a total of eight units attached to it for all purposes.[44] It was only natural, then, as well as in conformance with the current policy of streamlining the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing into a purely tactical organization, that the Commander of the 51st Air Base Group was designated as the Air Base Commander for Naha Air Base.[45]

Also effective 15 August, the following units were relieved from all previous logistic attachments and were attached to the 51st Air Base Group for logistic support: the 33d Air Rescue Squadron; Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron; Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron; Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron; the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyako Jima); Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kume Shima); the 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (except for POL and rations support, which were the responsibility of the 18th Air Base Group; Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okino-Erabu Shima); and the Naha Resident Office of the Auditor General, USAF.[46]

The Mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing as of 15 August 1957: Stripped of all the fatty tissue which had hitherto hampered its movements, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was now assigned a mission in keeping with its new structure. 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-6 of 24 September 1957 stated that its mission was that of conducting air defense operations within the 313th Air Division area of operations and the areas adjacent thereto. To meet this responsibility, the 51st FIW was organized as a Table of Organization unit assigned to the 313th Air Division and was provided with a headquarters and such facilities, equipment, personnel, and assigned units as were considered necessary to the performance of its mission.

The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing exercises command, administrative, and operational control of the assigned units. He was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Providing aircraft and/or personnel incidental to the air defense mission, as directed.

2. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

3. Preparing and maintaining plans to conduct combat operations.

4. Being prepared to launch combat operations in accordance with current plans and orders.

5. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and other specialized personnel or such other training programs as might be directed.

6. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.

7. Providing field maintenance support to base support and transient aircraft.

8. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

9. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was not authorized

direct communication with other local Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Materiel Command depot commanders or the heads of civilian agencies, except on routine administrative and logistical matters pertaining to his mission. All policy matters and direct communications with other major commands would be handled only by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, unless specific authorization were granted.[47]

The Mission of the 51st Air Base Group as of 15 August 1957: At the same time, the mission of the 51st Air Base Group was revised in such wise as to encompass the expanded responsibilities now imposed on it. 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-12 of 25 September 1957 stated that its mission was to provide administrative and logistical support to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, tenant units located on assigned installations, and other units, as directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division. The 51st Air Base Group, too, was a Table of Organization unit, directly subordinate to the 313th Air Division, and provided with a headquarters and such facilities, personnel, and assigned units as were considered necessary to carry out its mission and responsibilities.

The Commander, 51st Air Base Group exercised command, administrative, and operational control of the assigned units. Further, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Operating and maintaining Naha Air Base and such off-base installations as should be assigned.

2. Logistical support of units engaged in the air defense mission of 313th Air Division, as directed.

3. Preparation of ground defense and other emergency plans, and providing personnel and equipment, as required. This would include coordination with Army, Navy, and local Air Force commanders, as appropriate, and with civilian agencies, as directed, as well as the maintenance of a state of readiness to execute these plans.

4. Exercising courts-martial jurisdiction up to and including special courts-martial over all personnel assigned to the 51st Air Base Group and all personnel of any other unit attached to the 51st Air Base Group for the purpose of courts-martial jurisdiction.

5. Coordinating and/or conducting training programs for personnel and organizations either assigned or attached.

6. Issuing mission directives for assigned units.

7. Establishing and enforcing standards of discipline, conduct, courtesy, and appearance of assigned and attached personnel.

8. Internal security and local ground and passive defense of assigned Air Force installations and facilities.

9.- Providing air facilities and support for the training of anti-aircraft artillery and such other units as might be necessary.

10. Providing an air terminal at Naha Air Base for military aircraft. Facilities for commercial air operations would be provided as required.

11. The control of entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation in accordance with policies established by 313th Air Division or higher headquarters.

12. Control, as directed, of construction programs, and staff supervision of air installations activities.

13. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

14. Providing base communications services to units assigned or attached to Naha Air Base, including the communications functions of the Okinawa Air Defense Control Center.

15. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

The Commander, 51st Air Base Group was not authorized direct communication with other local Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Materiel Command depot commanders, or the heads of civilian agencies, except on routine administrative and logistical matters pertaining to his mission. All policy matters and direct communications with other major commands were to be handled only by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, except when specific authorization was granted.[48]

The 6431st Air Base Group Replaces the 51st Air Base Group at Naha.

The 51st Air Base Group had held sway as the base organization at Naha for little more than two months, when Fifth Air Force inactivated it and in its place established a new organization, the 6431st Air Base Group, on 25 October 1957. Not only did Fifth Air Force General Order No. 84 of 22 October 1957 do away with the Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group, but it also wrote off the books the 51st Maintenance and

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Supply and 51st Fighter Interceptor Group Headquarters--which had been reduced to "one and one" bases on 17 May and 1 July respectively. Inactivated together with these three group headquarters were the 51st Air Police Squadron, the 51st Communications Squadron, the 51st Installations Squadron, the 51st Food Service Squadron, the 51st Supply Squadron, and the 51st Transportation Squadron.[49]

The Headquarters, 6431st Air Base Group was designated and assigned by PACAF to Fifth Air Force, who further assigned it to the 313th Air Division.[50] The Commander, 6431st Air Base Group was designated as the Naha Air Base Commander.[51]

To replace the inactivated organizations, PACAF designated six new squadrons and assigned them to Fifth Air Force, who further assigned them to the 6431st Air Base Group, effective 25 October. These were the 6431st Air Police Squadron, the 6431st Operations Squadron, the 6431st Installations Squadron, the 6431st Food Service Squadron, the 6431st Supply Squadron, and the 6431st Transportation Squadron.[52] The 6431st Operations Squadron not only succeeded to the mission and responsibilities of the 51st Communications Squadron, but was assigned the additional functions of the 6431st Operations Staff, Base Operations, Base Flight, the Photographic Laboratory, and Training Aids.[53]

Also affected by the 51st Air Base Group's inactivation and the concomitant activation of the 6431st Air Base Group, the following units were relieved from all previous attachment to the former and were attached to the latter for logistic support, effective 25 October:

the 33d Air Rescue Squadron; the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron; the 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (except for the provision of POL and rations support for Site P-52, which continued to be the responsibility of the 6313th Air Base Wing); the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing; Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division; Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron; Detachment #1, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyako Jima); Detachment #2, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kume Jima); Detachment #1, 624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okino-Erabu Shima); Detachment #2. 11th Air Postal Squadron; Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron; and District Office #3A, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron.[54]

The 6351st USAF Dispensary was assigned to Fifth Air Force and further assigned to the 6431st Air Base Group on 25 October.[55]

On 25 November the Naha Resident Office of the Auditor General, USAF was attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support.[56]

The last organizational change of 1957 at Naha came on 13 December with the attachment of the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron for logistic and administrative support, not including the assignment and promotion of personnel, functions which were retained by the wing.[57]

The Mission of the 6431st Air Base Group: The mission of the new 6431st Air Base Group as promulgated in 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-12 of 9 December 1957 was to provide administrative and logistical support to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, to tenant units located on assigned installations, and to other units as directed by the 313th

Air Division Commander.

Whereas the 51st Air Base Group had been a Table of Organization unit, the 6431st Air Base Group was a Non-Table of Organization outfit, directly responsible to the 313th Air Division. As the Installation Commander, Naha Air Base, the 6431st ABG Commander was authorized to perform and even responsible for performing those duties set forth in AFR 11-4 and AFR 35-54. While he would exercise command jurisdiction over all assigned units, he was expected to exercise command jurisdiction of attached units only in those areas for which he was directed to provide support. The Commander, 6431st Air Base Group was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Logistical support, as directed, of units engaged in the air defense mission of the 313th Air Division.

2. Providing air facilities and support for the training of anti-aircraft artillery and such other units as should be directed.

3. Formulating, documenting, and maintaining in a current status all general emergency plans for Naha AB and its assigned off-base installations; testing these plans to insure a state of actual readiness.

4. Joint planning, coordinating, training, and operations with friendly forces, as required.

5. Internal security of assigned installations, and ground defense of these installations and their facilities, against pilferage, acts of sabotage, or organized attack. This would include the organization, equipping, and training of assigned troops in ground defense.

6. Formulating, documenting, and maintaining passive defense measures for installations, equipment, personnel, and dependents under the jurisdiction of the 6431st Air Base Group.

7. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

8. Providing an air terminal at Naha Air Base for military aircraft. Facilities for commercial air operations would be provided as directed.

9. Controlling the entry and exit of passengers and cargo by commercial air transportation, in accordance with policies established by 313th Air Division or higher headquarters.

10. Providing base communications service to units assigned or attached to Naha Air Base, including the communications functions of the Okinawa Air Defense Control Center.

11. Issuing mission directives for assigned units.

12. Exercising courts-martial jurisdiction up to and including special courts-martial over all personnel assigned to the 6431st Air Base Group and all personnel of any other unit attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for that purpose.

13. Establishing and enforcing standards of discipline, conduct, courtesy, and appearance for assigned and attached personnel.

14. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

In the matter of direct communication with other local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Materiel Command depot commanders and the heads of civilian agencies, the Commander, 6431st Air Base Group was denied this privilege, except in routine administrative and logistical matters, just as the 51st Air Base Group Commander had been. Again, all policy matters, and direct communications with other major commands were to be handled by 313th Air Division Headquarters only, except when specific authorization was granted the group.[58]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	5th Air Force Regulation (AFR) No. 23-4A, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 1 Feb. 1957.
2	1	5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations--Division Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 12 Nov. 1957.
3	1	5AFR 23-4, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 16 Aug. 1955; 5AFR 23-4A, dtd. 1 Feb. 1957; 5AFR 23-4B, dtd. 12 Sept. 1957.
4	--	Far East Air Forces (FEAF) General Order (GO) 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
5	--	Fifth Air Force (5AF) GO 7, dtd. 28 Jan. 1957.
6	--	Ltr., Hq. USAF to Comdr. AMC, sub.: Reassignment of 17th Communications Construction Squadron, 9 Apr. 1957;
	--	FEAF GO 32, dtd. 15 May 1957.
7	--	Air Materiel Command (AMC) GO 25, dtd. 19 Apr. 1957.
8	--	5th AF GO 10, dtd. 11 Feb. 1957.
9	--	5th AF GO 43, dtd. 25 June 1957.
10	--	FEAF GO 41, dtd. 28 June 1957, as amended by PACAF GO 12, dtd. 30 July 1957.
11	--	5th AF GO 42, dtd. 1 July 1957.
12	2	Hq. 5th Communications Group GO 3, dtd. 16 Aug. 1957.
13	--	5th AF GO 72, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.
14	3	313th Air Division (AD) GO 26, dtd. 17 Oct. 1957.
15	--	History, 5th Comm. Gp., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957, pp. 2-3, 5.
16	4	5th AF GO 63, dtd. 28 Aug. 1957.
17	4	5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
18	5	Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.
19	4	5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957.
20	5 4	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957; 5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 1957.
21	3	313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957.
22	3	Ibid.
23	3	Ibid.
24	3	Ibid.
25	5	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.
26	---	313th AD GO 17, dtd. 9 June 1958.
27	5	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.
28	6	313th Air Division Regulation (ADR) 23-2, sub.: Organization--Field: 6313th Air Base Wing, dtd. 5 Dec. 1957.
29	6	Ibid.
30	--- 4	5th AF GO 78, dtd. 2 Oct. 1957; 5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957.
31	4	5th AF GO 86, dtd. 29 Oct. 1957.
32	3	313th AD GO 32, dtd. 18 Nov. 1957.
33	4	5th AF GO 86, dtd. 29 Oct. 1957.
34	3	313th AD GO 33, dtd. 19 Nov. 1957.
35	4	5th AF GO 94, dtd. 27 Nov. 1957.
36	6	313th ADR 23-6: Organization--Field: 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 15 March 1955.
37	6	Ibid.
38	6	Ibid.
39	---	51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW) GO 14, dtd. 28 June 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
40	--	51st FIW GO 15, dtd. 28 June 1957.
41	7	51st FIW GO 22, dtd. 14 Aug. 1957.
42	4 3	5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957; 313th AD GO 24, dtd. 13 Sept. 1957.
43	4	5th AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.
44	4	Ibid.
45	4	Ibid.
46	3	313th AD GO 24, dtd. 13 Sept. 1957.
47	6	313th ADR 23-6, sub.: Organization--Field: 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing, dtd. 24 Sept. 1957.
48	6	313th ADR 23-12, sub.: Organization--Field: 51st Air Base Group, dtd. 25 Sept. 1957.
49	4	5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.
50	5 4	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957; PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957; 5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.
51	4	5th AF GO 87, dtd. 30 Oct. 1957.
52	5 4	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957; PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957; 5th AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.
53	--	History, 6431st Air Base Group, 1 July-31 Dec. 1957, p. 4.
54	3	313th AD GO 30, dtd. 29 Oct. 1957.
55	5	PACAF GO 37, dtd. 19 Nov. 1957.
56	3	313th AD GO 35, dtd. 2 Dec. 1957.
57	7	51st FIW GO 29, dtd. 11 Dec. 1957.
58	6	313th ADR 23-12, sub.: Organization--Field: 6431st Air Base Group, 9 Dec. 1957.

CHAPTER II

PROJECT TIGHT TOP

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FLEXIBLE RADOMES--A HISTORY OF COSTLY FAILURES

At the time plans for Operation ICEBERG--the seizure of Okinawa--were being drawn up at Cincpac Headquarters in the latter part of 1944, one of the potential hazards which received considerable attention was that of typhoons. Although the existing literature on the Ryukyu Islands was scarce and scanty, all sources were one in emphasizing the destructiveness and frequency of the tempests which visited the Nansei Shoto almost every year and, sometimes, several times in a single season. When Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet was caught in the act of refueling at sea by an anonymous typhoon on 18 December 1944 and three destroyers were sent to the bottom, planning officers became really aware of the potency of such storms. Previously, they had read about the destructive fury of the typhoon, but this disaster actually brought it home to them and gave the words meaning for the first time. On 5 June 1945 Halsey again ran head-on into a typhoon which wrought havoc throughout his armada, though this time all ships survived. Flight decks were curled like paper brought too near a flame, superstructures were battered, aircraft swept overboard, and the bow of the heavy cruiser Pittsburgh was wrenched loose to float independently as a "suburb" (in the words of Halsey's dispatches) for many hours. Thus early did "typhoon" become synonymous with "destructiveness" in the lexicon of U. S. military men.

The war was barely over and the occupation forces on Okinawa had just begun to relax a bit when a typhoon struck in September 1945, wrecking installations and damaging many of the countless amphibious craft lying offshore or drawn up on the beaches. This was followed by a far more destructive storm in October, which practically leveled the quonset civilization on the island and left the beaches a shambles of shattered ships, boats, and barges. Whether or not the light weight, short range radars in use at the time were destroyed is not known to the present writer, but there can be no doubt that the experience served as an object lesson to the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) people concerning the awful fury of a typhoon.

Even so, to know that a condition exists and to be able to do something about it are two different matters. Just two years later, on 3-4 October 1948, Typhoon Libby completely destroyed an early warning site at Point Tare (Hedo Misaki) on Okinawa's northernmost tip, leaving the air defense system with only one operational site, the Tactical Control Center at Yontan Mountain. Oddly enough, the latter also came through the far more ferocious Typhoon Gloria of 23 July 1949 almost unscathed, being forced off the air for only 32 hours. A new early warning site was established at Miyako Jima on 15 March 1950, and, after having operated for slightly more than three months, was damaged moderately on 23 June by Typhoon Elsie. Later that same year, Typhoon Clara, completely disregarding the Air Weather Service regulation that typhoons were not to visit the Ryukyus between 31 October and 1 June, passed over the islands on 11-12 November 1950, inflicting considerable damage on the newly-

established AC&W sites at Kume Shima and Okino-Erabu Shima, while not entirely neglecting the other sites. Only hasty dismantling of the AN/TPS-1B search sets at the three off-island detachments probably saved them from total loss or severe damage, at least. In the years ahead this was to become standard practice whenever winds in excess of 35 knots were anticipated.

A Home-Made Radome Is Built at Miyako Jima.

While these stark lessons were still fresh in mind, the 624th AC&W Squadron, which operated the three off-island sites at that time, concluded that an experiment aimed at rendering the search radars immune to typhoon winds was definitely called for. Since the AN/TPS-1B had a relatively small antenna, the task of covering one of these sets with a protective radome of home-made design and manufacture should not be insuperable. Such a radome must be both sufficiently sturdy and compactly constructed to resist wind, rain, humidity, and dust, yet be composed of a material which would not affect the electronic beam emitted by the equipment within.

In February 1951 the Kadena Flight Line Maintenance Section began to construct a radome at Site 53, Miyako Jima, using aircraft fabric to form the circumference and flat top, with plywood serving as the ribbing. By early May the project was completed, and just in time to undergo a test at the hands of Typhoon Iris, which passed within 65 miles of Miyako on the 8th with gusts as high as 80 knots. Although the new radome was not typhoonized, it withstood the high winds and permitted the AN/TPS-1B to operate uninterruptedly throughout the storm. In addition, a close

check to ascertain if the presence of the radome resulted in any appreciable loss of range disclosed that it did not.[1]

Even while the plans for constructing this first crude radome at Site 53 were still in the embryonic stage, AC&W officials were looking ahead to the day when similar radomes could be fabricated for the other AN/TPS-1B sets in the Ryukyus Air Defense System. And these later ones should be considerably better than the rough prototype as a result of the techniques acquired and problems overcome in the course of its erection.[2]

Typhoon Marge of 16-20 August 1951 steered well clear of Miyako, postponing the acid test to which the radome would have been subjected had winds as strong as those that blasted Kume and Okino-Erabu struck home. Thus it was that Typhoon Ruth had the honor, on 13-14 October 1951, of accepting the challenge offered by the humble radome at Site 53. It will never be known whether the radome had any part in the set's preservation, but certain it is that the AN/TPS-1B did escape unharmed, while the plywood-and-fabric canopy itself was completely destroyed. The radar's salvation might more definitely be attributed to the existence of the radome were it not for one other circumstance. The SCR-270 search set at Miyako, located only a few feet away from the AN/TPS-1B, likewise sustained no damage.[3] For this reason it was impossible to determine just what part the radome had played in protecting its electronic charge from destruction before itself being blown away. At Site 52 (Yae Take), incidentally, the SCR-270 and AN/TPS-10 search and height finding radars were so badly damaged and water soaked by Typhoon Ruth that the site was shut down temporarily and the personnel transferred to Site 51 and the ADCC.

With the loss of this prototype radome, the inchoate program for erecting similar ones at all sites equipped with AN/TPS-1B radars quietly died. Not only had it failed to stand up against a moderately severe typhoon, but the jerry-built structure was not really needed very much, now that superior SCR-270 search weapons were operating at all of the off-island sites--and the task of designing radomes for these sets with their cumbersome mattress-spring-like antennas was more than local AC&W talent cared to attempt. Besides, it had already been learned from higher headquarters that new AN/FPS-3 surveillance equipment would be arriving soon. ("Soon" actually turned out to be 1953 for the first ones and 1956 for the last set!)

Project Airtight Brings Flexible Radomes to the Air Defense System.

Although the AN/FPS-3 radars for Sites 54 and 52 arrived at Naha Port in August 1953, missing parts for the arctic towers and power generators prevented erection of the sets until March and April 1954 respectively. Early in March a FEALOGFOR (Far East Air Logistic Force) installation team moved into Kume Shima and soon had the AN/FPS-3 in operational condition, enabling it to act as the primary weapon--albeit unofficially--during most of the month. On 14 April, however, the new Bendix inflatable radome, a one-piece article of rubberized material, ripped open for approximately 180° around the 15-foot cap covering the extreme top of the bubble, while the vertical seams split for a length of 2½ feet. As a temporary expedient, the Bendix resident contract technician at Kume cleverly inserted two boards over the damaged areas--one inside and the other outside--then secured them with "C" clamps.

This was admittedly only a jury rig, but it did prevent the escape of an excessive amount of air, thereby averting further tearing of the damaged areas, as well as sparing the blower motors which kept the radome inflated from being overburdened.

Notified of the mishap, FEALOGFOR dispatched two technicians and a new radome to Kume on 17 April, enabling the search weapon to resume operation on the 26th. The defective radome was then removed from the site and shipped to the Bendix Depot at Haneda for repair. As the technicians were preparing to inflate the new radome, they found it necessary to pause and repair the protective tape, which was loose and blistered in spots. Influenced by this unpleasant discovery, which came hard on the heels of the original radome's disintegration, the Bendix engineers recommended that the existing method of packing be investigated and a better system devised to prevent water from entering the inner protective covering.[4]

The FEALOGFOR installation team moved from Kume Shima to Yae Take in April and began erecting the AN/FPS-3 as well as an AN/FPS-4 height finder at that loftiest of all sites in the Ryukyus Air Defense System. By 4 May the two weapons were ready for their 72-hour hot checks, and on 21 May the surveillance radar was officially listed as operational. Only three days went by, however, before a power failure caused the radome to collapse completely in 95 minutes. After a couple of hours the power was restored, and 25 minutes later detachment personnel had the radome inflated once more, with high voltage reapplied to both sets within another 15 minutes. The only apparent damage was a broken window

in the radome, which they repaired with masking tape, and two weak spots in the fabric where it had rubbed against the antenna rail supports. These damaged areas were patched the following day, 25 May 1954.[5]

Moving on from Site 52 to Site 53, the FEALOGFOR installation team began erection of the AN/FPS-3 at the latter place on 19 April. As soon as the antenna was installed, the team began to erect the radome. When the plastic fabric had filled out and begun to come under pressure, however, it suddenly burst. As a result of the autopsy which followed, it was learned that water had seeped into the box in which the radome was packed, causing the fabric to rot. Further investigation revealed that the box had been packed clear back in June 1951. In consequence, the 529th AC&W Group submitted an Unsatisfactory Report (UR) to FEALOGFOR, suggesting that the two defective radomes at Kume and Miyako had been improperly packed and stored. A replacement bubble for Site 53 was airlifted from the ZI and installed by the end of May, enabling the detachment personnel to tune and hot-check the AN/FPS-3.

Site 52 at Yae Take had been more fortunate than Sites 53 and 54 in its experience with the Bendix flexible radomes thus far, but the ease with which its radome had suffered damage when pressure was lost boded ill for its ability to resist strong typhoon winds--the reason for its existence. For this reason, when Typhoon Grace neared Okinawa in mid-August 1954, detachment personnel dismantled the AN/FPS-3 at Yae Take, sparing it and its "protective" radome from the ravages inflicted on much of the site.

At Kume Shima the detachment commander sought to take the same precautions as had been adopted at Yae Take on 15 August, but, as the men were lowering the AN/FPS-3 antenna in preparation for dismantling

it, the one-ton chain hoist broke, causing the antenna to fall approximately three feet and swing clockwise some 60° in azimuth, puncturing the casing of the radome, which had already been distorted by the high winds. A 10-foot hole was torn in the antenna, the HD-83A dehydrator was crushed, the S-403 power distribution panel was destroyed, the SA-230 switch box was damaged, and the portable floodlight assembly was severely damaged. Nevertheless, notwithstanding its gaping wound, the radome remained inflated for approximately seven more hours, during which time high winds estimated at about 170 knots made salvaging of components out of the question. When the winds became so high that the lives of the men struggling with the antenna were placed in jeopardy, the commander ordered all further efforts abandoned and the radome left to its fate. This fate proved to be an unfortunate one; for, shortly afterward, the radome was torn off and the antenna badly damaged. With the loss of the protecting bubble, various other parts of the radar equipment were also damaged by the high winds and driving rain.[6]

Typhoon Grace skirted Miyako Jima at sufficient distance to cause no damage to Site 53 other than knocking the HF telling net out of commission for a short time, and, as soon as the "All Clear" was pronounced, this was restored to operation.[7]

The AC&W site at Miyako Jima was lucky a second time when Typhoon Marie raced past on 25 September 1954, not yet having built up enough strength to inflict more than nuisance damage. There had not been time enough since Typhoon Grace for Kume Shima to obtain a radome as replacement for the one destroyed in August; but it turned out that a bubble

was not especially needed, since Marie struck Site 54 only a glancing blow which necessitated shutting down the AN/FPS-3 for just 7:47 hours.[8]

It was a far different story at Yae Take, where water contamination of the fuel caused the generator to fail at 0715 hours, September 25th. There being no emergency power available to run the blower motors, the radome collapsed within 45 minutes. By this time, the winds had risen to 40 knots and begun to lash the deflated radome fabric continuously against the antenna it was supposed to protect, eventually tearing the crown section of the plastic cover. Unable to resist such rough handling, the radome tore in half at 1000 hours and blew off the tower. At 1330 the main section of the antenna reflector blew off, part of it sailing over the Operations building, taking the wind speed transmitter and communications antennas with it--five FM and two HF, in all.

On 30 September 1954 a Bendix team arrived from Japan with a new radome and the radar parts which required replacing. By 0730 on the 5th of October, they had the AN/FPS-3 in operational condition once more, but this renewed lease on life was of short duration, as the newly installed radome split at the crown the very next day. The antenna was quickly lowered, in order that the radome might be removed before the equipment sustained serious damage. By virtue of this now not-unexpected failure of the flexible radome, the AN/FPS-3 at Site 52 remained on the binnacle list until 9 October, when orders were received to operate the weapon without a radome, there being none then available in the theater. Any replacement bubble would have to come from the ZI.

On 2 November the AN/FPS-3 at Yae Take was shut down for three days

after the antenna was lowered in deference to a typhoon warning, which proved to be a false alarm. The new radome arrived from the ZI on 18 November. One week later it was installed and the surveillance radar returned to operation, though maintenance personnel at the site found it possible to devote any spare time that did or did not lie heavy on their hands repairing the innumerable minor leaks which continued to crop up in the rubber fabric like bubbles in a pot of boiling water.[9]

Taking stock of the first year in which the new Bendix radomes had been installed at Sites 52, 53, and 54, we find that as of 31 December 1954 Yae Take had found it necessary to replace two, Miyako one, and Kume two. And officials of the Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force, as well as the AC&W organizations, were beginning to have their doubts as to the efficacy of the expensive bubbles which they seemed to be forever blowing.

For seven months the AC&W sites remained exempt from assault by typhoon in the wake of Marie, and the radomes began to regain some of the prestige they had lost while under fire. On 12 July 1955, however, Typhoon Clara hit Site P-53 at Miyako with gusts as high as 135 knots, destroying the radome and damaging three sections of the antenna sail on the exposed AN/FPS-3 primary weapon. As soon as the typhoon had passed, the 624th AC&W Squadron requisitioned new radar parts and a radome. On 18 July two Bendix contract technicians arrived at Miyako with most of the desired items; but, owing to windy weather, it was not until 24 July that the new radome could finally be installed. Even then, the non-availability of certain spare parts prevented the AN/FPS-3 from operating with optimum efficiency until their arrival on 4 August.[10]

At the same time that Typhoon Clara was wrecking the radome at Miyako, a FEALOGFOR installation team was erecting the first AN/FPS-6 height-finder indicator in the Ryukyus at Kume Shima. By the end of September this work was completed, and on 12 October 1955 the radome was installed, enabling the long-awaited set to begin operating as soon as it was technically accepted on 5 November.[11]

In October 1955 the AN/FPS-3 at Site 52 went off the air when construction personnel engaged in Phase II Project Airtight construction for Sanko Kensetsu accidentally opened an interlock on one of the power house's panel boards, causing the radome to collapse. In the process, the bubble suffered a 14-inch rip in its side. As soon as pressure could be restored, the balloon was patched from the inside, but it was several more days before time could be found to repair it properly from the outside. A team which flew down from FEAF to inspect the damaged radome condemned it, and, although a new radome was brought to the site in December, the weather was so continuously bad that it was not until early January 1956 that it could finally be erected.[12]

On 27 November 1955 installation of the radome for the AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar at Site 56 (Yuza Dake) was completed, and the set itself was technically accepted by a FEALOGFOR inspection team on 20 December. With this action, every site in the Ryukyus Air Defense System except P-55 was now equipped with a modern surveillance radar.[13]

The radome score for 1955 was less appalling than that for 1954--only two destroyed, as against five in the earlier year--thanks to the failure of Typhoon Clara to hit any detachment other than Site 53 and the absence of additional typhoons.

SECRET

At the same time that Typhoon Clara was wrecking the radome at Miyako, a FEALOGFOR installation team was erecting the first AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator in the Ryukyus at Kume Shima. By the end of September this work was completed, and on 12 October 1955 the radome was installed, enabling the long-awaited set to begin operating as soon as it was technically accepted on 5 November.[11]

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The AB-259 steel tower at Miyako was completed in January 1956, and an installation team from Rome AFD arrived to install the AN/FPS-6 radar there, after which they moved on in rapid succession to Sites 52, 56, and 55. Although the AN/FPS-6 and its radome were quickly erected at P-53, it was not until 7 May that the set was finally given technical acceptance, because of numerous "bugs" which infested it, sadly hampering its performance until they were finally eradicated.[14]

Meantime, communications-electronics officials at Fifth Air Force had become apprehensive over the insatiable appetite for flexible radomes which not only the 313th Air Division but also the 39th, 41st, and 43d Air Divisions in Japan were displaying. The stock of these inflatable bubbles in the Far East Theater was decidedly limited, and to procure replacements from the States involved progress through a long and tortuous pipeline. Besides this, the organizations concerned could anticipate excessive delays in the replacement or repair of damaged radomes, since most of the failures would occur during periods of severe weather, when they would be epidemic in extent, and installations teams would be swamped immediately afterward.

In an attempt to check the ravages of wind and humidity, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bobela, Chief of Fifth Air Force's Communications-Electronics Maintenance-Engineering Division, requested the division commanders at Kadena, Misawa, Johnson, and Itazuke Air Bases to insure that all units in their commands employing arctic type radomes adopt the following measures: (1) strict adherence to applicable radome preventive maintenance card checks; (2) prompt repair of air leaks which would produce a high

blower cycling rate; (3) proper maintenance of blowers; and (4) immediate notification of the FEAF Bendix Depot whenever the maintenance or repair of radome fabric or equipment was found to be beyond the capacity of air division resources.

Bowing in acknowledgement of the numerous occasions on which radomes had been punctured by the sharp edges of antennas when typhoons distorted the normal contours of the bubble, Colonel Bobela suggested that the reflector end sections of the surveillance radars be removed to minimize this possibility whenever high winds were expected. This precaution having been taken, the radar would then be operated minus the end sections only as long as the danger of damage to the radome from high winds continued to exist.[15]

It should not be supposed that Fifth Air Force Headquarters was the only agency concerned about the high consumption rate of radomes in the theater. Northern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (NAMAP), located at Tachikawa AB, Japan, radioed this headquarters around the same time that an investigation of the circumstances resulting in the loss of an AN/FPS-6 radome and the near loss of the AN/FPS-3 radome at Site 33 (Kamo Air Station, in the 39th Air Division area of jurisdiction) had revealed that the original breaks in the fabric were caused by the davit arms. These davits were used to hoist silica gel containers required in the dehydrator operation, and consisted of a four-foot length of three-inch galvanized pipe mounted vertically on the top floor of the tower, adjacent to the personnel hatch, supporting a swinging pipe arm with

pulley, at right angles to the vertical support. When not in use, these davit arms were normally left in a position which placed their outer ends approximately 2½ feet from the radome. Thus, if the bubble suffered a partial loss in pressure (as had happened at Site 33), it could dimple sufficiently to be punctured by the swinging davit arm. To prevent such a mishap at any of the detachments in this command, NAMAP recommended that the swinging davit arm be removed when not in use.[16]

This warning was passed on down to the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons by this headquarters, along with a request that they prepare SOP's directing removal of this davit arm when not in use. The reaction of the two organizations was not only to specify that the offending device be erected only when it was to be used, but also that all other fixtures and objects on the top floor of the search and height-finder towers that could possibly tear the radome be so located that they would not come in contact with the fabric in case the radome lost partial pressure.[17]

Shortly afterward, on 22 January 1956, Fifth Air Force notified this headquarters that the Bendix FEAF Depot was planning to employ Japanese nationals to paint the radomes at the AC&W sites. These personnel had no security clearances, but there would be no occasion for them to enter the Operations building or other restricted areas in the performance of their work. Since neither the real property comprising the sites nor the basic radar equipment itself was classified, Fifth Air Force believed that only the AN/GPX-7 and its associated publications and the Operations room would require special security procedures.

Besides, the Japanese workmen would be repairing and painting only the exterior of the radomes; so this should pose no great problem. Under the circumstances, then, it was recommended that 313th authorize these Japanese workmen access to the sites in order to avoid unnecessary delays in the rehabilitation of the radomes which would ensue if complete dependence were placed on military personnel. It should be understood, however, that access to the interior of the radomes and to the Operations rooms was to be limited to those radome maintenance team members having the requisite security clearance.[18]

According to information from Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area (AMFPA), the AC&W sites would be visited by the radome overhaul and painting crew in the following order: P-54 in January 1956, P-53 in February 1956, P-52 in March 1956, P-56 in April 1956, and P-55 in May 1956.[19]

A Bendix installation team arrived at Kadena AB on 29 February 1956 to install the long-awaited AN/FPS-3A at Okino-Erabu Shima, while another Bendix team began making the rounds of the five air stations to paint the radomes. On 17 April this headquarters requested permission of Fifth Air Force to revise the radome painting schedule as follows: After completing their work at Site P-52, where they were presently engaged, the Bendix team should paint the two radomes at P-53; then should follow the two radomes at P-54; next should be the single radome at P-56; and, finally, the one radome at P-55. This revision had been found necessary because of the transportation schedule and operational commitments.[20]

Technical acceptance of the AN/FPS-3A and its "protective" radome

at P-55 on 10 May 1956 put this command in the best position detection-wise that it had ever occupied--though the development of higher performance aircraft and guided missiles by the Communists during the years since the AN/FPS-3 itself had reached the production stage meant that this was a transitory situation which would not long obtain.[21]

Although the 17th Communications Construction Squadron had begun to construct the AB-259 steel tower for the height finder at Yae Take Air Station in January 1956, it was not until April that it was completed and ready for a team from the 1st Communications Squadron, Rome Air Force Depot, to commence installation of the AN/FPS-6 weapon and its radome. By the latter part of May the visiting team was able to announce that the radar was assembled and the radome erected; whereupon the 17th Communications Construction Squadron sent its people back to P-52 to install the anemometer and pressurization equipment used to keep the radome inflated. On 14 June 1956 the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator received its technical acceptance at Yae Take, enabling that site to become an ADDC merely by augmenting its personnel upon the receipt of official orders to assume such a role.[22]

Next, on 17 May we find 313th's Materiel Directorate radioing Fifth Air Force for permission to amend the schedule for overhaul of the surveillance radars of the air defense system so that P-53 would be visited first, P-54 second, P-52 third, P-56 fourth, and P-55 last.[23]

On 22 May this headquarters informed Fifth Air Force that the cone of the AN/FPS-6 radome at Miyako Jima was loose and being held together temporarily with screws. As a result, the radome's reliability

was so questionable that the Bendix team visiting the site to paint and repair the radomes had recommended that it be replaced. 313th requested, therefore, that a spare radome be furnished, so that the defective one might be withdrawn from service.[24]

Unaware of this action on the part of 313th Air Division, the Commander of Miyako Jima Air Station, Captain Milton E. Johns, addressed a letter to the Director of Materiel for this headquarters the very next day, 23 May, on the subject of this same AN/FPS-6 radome. Although it was scheduled for an immediate overhaul by the Bendix radome team, he said, Captain Johns was convinced that such action would constitute an "unnecessary expenditure of Air Force funds," since the chief of the radome crew had admitted that the repair work required was beyond the capabilities of his men. Furthermore, the same individual was backed by representatives of Bendix and General Electric (manufacturers of the AN/FPS-6 radar set) in his belief that the present radome should be replaced as soon as possible. If a new radome were not available, they recommended either that the hoops be erected and left up, or that the radome be removed and the set operated as a temperate installation until a replacement bubble could be obtained.

This fiberglas radome had been installed in February 1956, but exactly how long it had been in its present condition could not be determined, there having been no means of gaining access to the top of the radome until the repair team installed a ladder pulley assembly. Once this was done, however, it had been quickly learned that there were areas of fabric separation on the crown, while the metal plate located

at the top of the radome to support the knob, pulley assembly, and lightning rod had become unvulcanized over some 80 per cent of its expanse. Consequently, the strain imposed by a man's ascent of the radome ladder was placed entirely on the five screws in this plate.[25]

In forwarding this letter to Fifth Air Force on 1 June, Colonel Clemens K. Wurzbach, Director of Materiel, added a recommendation that no more fiberglas radomes be installed in the Ryukyus because of the prevailing high humidity and hot climate. It was these two factors, he declared, that had been responsible for the separation of materials and the growth of fungus in the materials composing the radome at P-53. Besides, this was the second time a radome at Miyako had been so affected.[26]

Meanwhile, Fifth Air Force, acting with unusual promptness, requested the Bendix FEAF Depot on 24 May to ship P-53 a nylon radome as replacement for the damaged fiberglas bubble. This message went out only three days after the request for such action had been submitted by 313th Air Division.[27]

The Bendix Depot, unfortunately, was not equally quick either to take appropriate action or to advise what action, if any, was being taken, making it necessary for this headquarters to query them on 29 May as to when the new radome might be expected to arrive.[28]

On 7 June Fifth Air Force informed SAMAP that the Bendix FEAF Depot had shipped the new radome for P-53 "on or about 24 May 1956." (This was doubtless a slight exaggeration, since we know that the TWX directing such action was not sent to the depot until the 24th, and

it would have been extraordinary indeed were the Bendix people to ship the radome the very same day). But be that as it may, the radome for the AN/FPS-6 at Miyako was actually installed on 2 June 1956. Fifth Air Force agreed with Colonel Wurzbach that fiberglas radomes should not be installed, owing to their rapid deterioration from the combination of heat and humidity. Besides, information from ZI sources indicated that such radomes were obsolete. Nevertheless, those fiberglas radomes already installed would not be replaced unless it appeared that they were on the verge of failure. Fifth added that a study was being conducted to determine the feasibility of installing any fiberglas radomes not utilized in the Ryukyus in the northern part of Japan.[29]

SAMAP concurred in Fifth Air Force's recommendations concerning the future use of fiberglas radomes in the Ryukyus and, in an indorsement of 25 June, p romised to seek disposition instructions on any such radomes subsequently reported in its area of jurisdiction.[30]

Buttressed with this expression of expert opinion by SAMAP, Fifth Air Force wrote FEAF on 6 July that it was convinced the fiberglas radomes would enjoy an increased life expectancy if they were installed at the AC&W sites in northern Japan. Therefore, in the event SAMAP either already had on hand or should in the future receive fiberglas radomes for installation in the Ryukyus or Philippines, it was requested that these be redistributed to NAMAP for installation in norther Honshu or in Hokkaido. This request would, of course, be applicable to the radomes in storage, not those currently in use.[31]

FEAF was in accord with the recommended action and requested the Commander, Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area (AMFPA) to transfer the

rigid radome be established, as Rome had suggested. AMFPA promised to monitor engineering progress of the rigid radome for the AN/FPS-6 set and keep FEAF informed of all future developments in connection with it.[38]

The 1956 Typhoon Season Deals Flexible Radomes the Coup de Grace.

Not long before this, Mother Nature had taken a hand in the game, and in so doing had vindicated Captain Johns' original contention that the AN/FPS-6 radome at Miyako Jima Air Station was beyond repair and should be replaced. At the same time, she underscored the wisdom contained in Rome Air Force Depot's recommendation that rigid radomes of the type developed by Geodesics, Inc. be installed in place of the flexible types hitherto employed in the Ryukyus.

For nearly three days--31 July through 2 August 1956--Typhoon Wanda aimed glancing blows at the Ryukyu Islands, and when she went her way at last, wrecked radomes were strewn all over the landscape. In all, five of the flimsy bubbles were destroyed, the first to go being the new AN/FPS-6 radome just installed on 2 June at Miyako Jima, and once this feeble covering was blown away the winds proceeded to give the antenna a bad battering. Much the same thing happened at Kume Shima Air Station, where the AN/FPS-6 radome departed unceremoniously, leaving its antenna to absorb a severe beating from the bruising gusts. At Yae Take both the surveillance and newly-installed height-finder radomes were torn to pieces, and the antenna of the former was itself involved in the destruction of its canopy; while Okino-Erabu Shima sacrificed its AN/FPS-3A radome to the fury of the storm.

had a five-inch flange ready-punched for assembly with the other panels by using metal bolts 1½ inches long. Approximately 4,300 bolts were employed in joining the panels.

In the experimental rigid radome erection conducted at an AC&W site in the Zone of Interior late in 1955 the first step was to remove the beacon antenna and lower the AN/FPS-3 reflector. The reflector tips and the feedhorn assembly were then taken off, after which the old flexible radome was deflated and removed. This having been done, the sail was again raised to the normal operating position, but the sail tips and feed horns were left off for the time being to facilitate erection of the rigid radome. The only alteration that had to be made to the radar tower was to drill 40 holes around the base for mounting of the modified base pieces. Rubber gaskets and caulking compound were inserted between adjoining panels as they were assembled to make the structure water-tight.[34]

With the knowledge of this development to back it up, Rome AFD informed the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing--which had earlier presented the problem of frequent radome failures directly to that depot--on 8 August 1956 that it recommended the Naha organization use this rigid radome designed by Geodesics, Inc. for its AN/FPS-3 radars. Not only was it able to withstand the 150-knot winds specified in its design, but laboratory tests had indicated that it could resist ones of 220 knots. Since a rigid radome for the AN/FPS-6 was still only in the developmental stage, Rome recommended that flexible radomes of the type already in use continue to be employed until the new ones were available.[35]

Immediately upon receiving a copy of this message to the 51st FIW, Fifth Air Force, which had been one of the information addressees, radioed Rome AFD to request that the latter furnish data on the capabilities and limitations of rigid radomes and their procurement status. The frequency with which nylon radomes had failed in the Ryukyus indicated that they were little better suited to operation under tropical climatic conditions where frequent typhoons were the order of the day than were the already rejected fiberglas types. Should Rome AFD, therefore, determine that rigid radomes were the probable answer to Fifth Air Force's problems, the latter headquarters hoped the depot would seriously consider assigning the Ryukyus Air Defense System top priority in their allocation.[36]

SAMAP had also been an information addressee of the interesting communication in which Rome Air Force Depot had summarized for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing the characteristics of the newly-developed rigid radomes and recommended their adoption for the Ryukyus. Accordingly, that headquarters advised the Commander, Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area, on 14 August that it favored the continued use of the present radomes and the establishment of a requirement for AN/FPS-6 rigid radomes, just as Rome had suggested. Furthermore, in view of this latest information anent prospective radomes with typhoon-resistant qualities, SAMAP recommended that the AN/FPS-6 fiberglas radomes currently in its stock not be transferred to NAMAP but, instead, be held until disposition instructions were received from AFD 2220.[37]

Headquarters, AMFPA approved the recommendations made by SAMAP and recommended to FEAF on 4 September that requirements for the AN/FPS-6

rigid radome be established, as Rome had suggested. AMFPA promised to monitor engineering progress of the rigid radome for the AN/FPS-6 set and keep FEAF informed of all future developments in connection with it.[38]

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If there had remained any question as to the Bendix flexible radomes' actual worth, this comprehensive disaster should have resolved them once and for all. Five radomes destroyed out of nine installed in the air defense system spoke volumes. Still, it was generally agreed that having a radome was better than not having one--at any time other than during the visit of a typhoon--because of the protection it afforded the weapon from rain, dust, salt spray, and humidity. So the Sisyphean task of installing new radomes before the next typhoon could destroy them was undertaken once more.[39]

Barely a fortnight had elapsed when Typhoon Babs, much milder than her predecessor, but still packing gusts as high as 94 knots, dropped in on the Ryukyus on 15 August 1956. Despite her unwonted moderation, Babs wrecked the radome which had just been installed on the AN/FPS-6 at Yae Take in place of the one destroyed by Wanda; while Sites P-53 and P-54 were shorn of their AN/FPS-3 radomes, with major damage to the respective antennas resulting.[40]

A new AN/FPS-6 radome for Miyako Jima Air Station was shipped to the site, and by 31 August it had been installed.[41]

On 7 September FEAF wrote Fifth Air Force that it was asking Rome AFD, in the light of recent typhoon damage to the radar equipment in the Ryukyus, to investigate the suitability of rigid radomes for employment in the Far East Theater.[42]

That same day, Fifth Air Force asked SAMAP whether any radomes were available as emergency replacements for those which might be lost as the result of typhoon winds. Also, Fifth wanted to know what action was being taken to obtain enough radomes for a reserve back-up, and how

such action was progressing.[43] This TWX had reference, of course, to flexible radomes rather than rigid radomes, the latter still being somewhere in the realm of science-fiction at this point.

The originator of this Fifth Air Force message must have been endowed with a certain degree of clairvoyance (or he kept a close eye on the weather bulletins); for, even as it was being written and the AC&W sites in the Ryukyus were staggering back to their feet and shaking off the effects of the blows just dealt by Wanda and Babs, a third typhoon was approaching Okinawa. More vicious than either Wanda and Babs--most observers, in fact, were to assess her as the most destructive since the almost legendary Gloria of July 1949--Typhoon Emma smashed into the devoted islands on 8 September 1956.

For the third successive time, Yae Take Air Station found itself a favorite target for the storm's wrath, its AN/FPS-3 radome being ripped asunder, leaving the radar weapon exposed to less sudden but no less certain disintegration from the irresistible blasts. At Yuza Dake Air Station the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator had been installed only a short time before and had not yet received its technical acceptance, when Emma swept in, blowing away the radome but sparing the antennas, except for some slight damage. The radome guarding the AN/FPS-3A was likewise destroyed, but in this case the antenna did not get off lightly, being damaged so badly that it had to be replaced. Thus, Typhoon Emma, despite her puissance, could boast only three radome scalps--two fewer than Wanda had taken. However, in justice to her destructive talents and her place in history, it is only fair to recognize that the sole reason for Emma's not running up a greater score was the paucity of prospective

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victims. Several antennas and radomes destroyed by the earlier storms had simply not yet been replaced.[44]

Alarmed by this latest evidence of the worthlessness of flexible radomes when assailed by a determined typhoon, FEAF took time on 11 September to relate for Rome AFD's benefit the tragic tale of "10 AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 Bendix radomes" destroyed by three typhoons "in the past three months."* Such slaughter cried out for drastic action to prevent its repetition, declared FEAF, and the new CW-393/GPS rigid radome of which reports had been received appeared to be the answer to the problem. Before rushing into a project of such magnitude and establishing an emergency requirement with USAF for such a rigid radome, however, FEAF wished to obtain answers to several questions. First, was the rigid radome suitable for installation in a semi-tropical climate where heat, moisture, and salt spray were prevalent? Second, would the rigid radome be more vulnerable to puncture or shattering than the present rubberized fabric radome? (There was evidence that several of the flexible radome failures during the three recent typhoons might have resulted from puncturing by flying lumber and other debris). Third, would installation of the rigid radome require extensive modification of the existing tower structures?[45]

The day after FEAF queried Rome in this fashion, 313th radioed Fifth Air Force Headquarters to request that a radome team be sent to inspect and repair the domes at Miyako and Okino-Erabu as soon as possible, to prevent their possible loss or further damage from high winds.[46]

*Actually, the toll had been even greater, 11 radomes being lost--five in Wanda, three in Babs, and three in Emma. Also, this decimation had occured in a period of only <u>two</u> months--August and September 1956--which made the situation even worse.

Upon receiving this request Fifth Air Force at once perceived the wisdom of locking the barn door before the horse was stolen and submitted an identical request to NAMAP. However, the Moriyama headquarters did not neglect the opportunity to deliver a little lecture to the 313th Air Division. Henceforth, said Fifth, this headquarters should understand that any requests for radome technical assistance were to be submitted to a support air materiel area only when they were definitely beyond the field maintenance resources of the air division.[47]

By this time it is doubtful that anyone connected with the Ryukyus Air Defense System still retained any faith in flexible radomes. Therefore, it can have been only with a sense of relief that they learned on 13 September that Fifth Air Force had "taken emergency programming action for rigid radomes for the AN/FPS-3 radars at the 313th Air Division." The indorsement advising of this action also informed this headquarters than an effort was being made to determine the status of manufacture and availability of rigid radomes for both the AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 radars. Meantime, it was recommended that the fiberglas radomes on hand be held until disposition instructions were received. 313th Air Division, for its part, should establish specific requirementsfor the as-yet-undeveloped AN/FPS-6 rigid radome, as Rome had suggested.

The recent series of typhoons having left the AC&W sites of this command and the depots in this theater short of radomes, Fifth Air Force recommended that the AN/FPS-6 be operated without radomes at those sites where the bubbles had been destroyed. Then, whenever high winds were

A TYPHOON PROVES MORE POWERFUL THAN A FLEXIBLE RADOME



forecast as in the offing, the site crews should remove the upper and lower tips of the antennas and lash the center sections in an immobile horizontal position. Those sites operating without benefit of radomes should be warned far enough in advance of impending high winds to permit their personnel to secure the height finders safely. Finally, such air stations should place great emphasis on corrosion control and fungus proofing, in order to keep deterioration of the exposed equipment to a minimum.[48]

Okinawa and the Ryukyus Air Defense System in general were still reeling from the blows dealt by Typhoon Emma when a new storm named Harriet paid a call on September 25th and 26th. Since few of the radomes previously destroyed had yet been replaced, this latest typhoon found little grist for its mill, though it did not neglect the opportunity to destroy the AN/FPS-3A radome at Okino-Erabu Shima, which had not been disturbed since Wanda. Even so, the antenna itself sustained only minor damage. At Yae Take the antenna for the AN/FPS-3 was completely destroyed, except for the end sails and waveguides, which foresight had removed beforehand. There being no radomes at P-52, none were lost, but the antenna of the AN/FPS-6 also suffered minor damage. It was much the same story at Yuza Dake, where the AN/FPS-3A suffered some damage, but this so minor in nature that it was back in commission by 27 September.[49]

With Harriet's passage the typhoon season came to an end, for all practical purposes. Other storms approached the general area of the Ryukyus, but none came close enough to do any further harm. The score of radomes destroyed--11 of them by typhoons--and four radars still

forced to operate without benefit of radomes as 1957 got underway, a shortage of inflatable domes having made it impossible to replace four canopies for the nine radar sets then operational.

The Last Flexible Radomes Are Installed in the Ryukyus.

Fifth Air Force, it will be recalled, had recommended in its indorsement of 13 September that this headquarters establish specific requirements for a rigid radome for the AN/FPS-6 set. A reply went back to Moriyama Air Station on 26 September that this headquarters would be unable to program for such a radome unless more information concerning its nomenclature and cost were first provided.[50]

Fifth Air Force responded that rigid radomes for the AN/FPS-6 radars in the Ryukyus were still only in the development stage, and no anticipated date of delivery was yet available or even expected in the near future. However, the requirements for rigid radomes for all AN/FPS-6 radars in the 313th Air Division had been forwarded to Rome Air Force Depot; so no further action on the part of the 313th Air Division would be necessary for the time being.[51]

On 8 October a new flexible radome arrived on Okinawa and was promptly installed on the AN/FPS-3 at P-52 to replace the one blown away by Typhoon Emma.[52] About this same time, SAMAP queried Rome AFD as to what plans were being made for theprocurement and production of rigid radomes. The latter replied on 3 December that rigid type radomes were currently being procured by service test only. If and when the development laboratory concerned with this project approved the item

for production quantities, it would be reflected in T.O. 31-1-11.[53]

On 3 December 1956 a new flexible radome for the AN/FPS-6 height finder arrived and was installed at Yae Take to take the place of the one lost in Typhoon Babs. Five days later a new radome for the AN/FPS-3A at Yuza Dake was installed in place of the one destroyed by Typhoon Emma.[54] Shortly afterward, on 17 December, Fifth Air Force asked this headquarters to furnish the location and dates of installation of all radomes requiring reconditioning, in order that a schedule for rehabilitating them might be set up.[55]

A General Electric technical representative from SAMAP reported to this headquarters on 7 January 1957 for the purpose of preparing the AN/FPS-6 height finder at Kume Shima for the overhaul scheduled to commence one week later. Next, on 18 January, a Bendix radome overhaul team arrived at Kadena and proceeded at once to Miyako, where they painted the two radomes. By the 28th of that month the GE overhaul team, having completed its work on the height-finder at Kume, moved on to Miyako to overhaul the AN/FPS-6 at that site. This accomplished on 8 February, they returned to their depot for the time being. A month later they returned to Okinawa and began to overhaul the AN/FPS-6 at Yae Take on 11 March--a task which kept them busy until the 22d.

While the GE overhaul team was ministering to the needs of the height finders at Sites P-54, P-53, and P-52, the Bendix radome overhaul team had transferred its attention to Yae Take Air Station, where, on 15 March, it completed painting the two radomes erected there after the last typhoon had gone its way. Three days later the team members drove south to Yuza Dake to overhaul and paint the AN/FPS-3A radome at

that ADDC. While they were still busy at P-56, the GE overhaul team, having finished with Yae Take, arrived on 25 March to overhaul the AN/FPS-6, a project which was concluded on 3 April 1957.[56]

Early in 1957 a team from Rome Air Force Depot erected a new AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station. On 11 April the set was given technical acceptance and integrated into the air defense net, thus completing the array of radar weapons in the Ryukyus.[57]

PROJECT TIGHT TOP GIVES THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM RIGID RADOMES

Preliminary Plans for the Use of Rigid Radomes.

Although Bendix overhaul teams were still painting and reconditioning the flexible radomes of this command during the early months of 1957, this headquarters had received the comforting information that 10 CW-396A rigid radomes were being procured for use in the Ryukyus Air Defense System. Military specifications for this radome had been made available by the Air Research and Development Command on 7 December 1956. According to the TWX from Fifth Air Force relaying the glad tidings, the CW-396A would be suitable for both "S" and "L" band radars, but no delivery dates, even of a tentative nature, were as yet obtainable.[58] The first rigid reinforced plastic radomes had been manufactured for the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line radar system in Northern Canada, and prototype designs such as that prepared for the Saglek, Labrador, site had withstood simulated winds of 220 miles per hour under static load tests. Furthermore, the later, improved DEW Line design intended for delivery to FEAF would be able to withstand 150 m.p.h. winds

without failure at 67° F. below zero temperatures. However, because of the small number of these radomes being acquired, each one would cost approximately $30,000.

The cost of erecting a rigid radome would be around $2,800, including erection equipment for each radome. Obviously, though, one or two sets of such erection gear would serve to install the radomes seriatim at all the sites within this command.[59]

The next sign of progress toward realization of the rigid radome program in the Ryukyus came in February with FEAF's receipt of a TWX from the Air Materiel Command. According to this message, the Zenith Plastics Company of Gardena, California, had been awarded a contract for the manufacture of these radomes, with the first one scheduled for delivery to AMC during the last week of February. The Air Materiel Command was also arranging for at least the first few radomes to be airlifted to Okinawa.[60]

Apparently the Zenith Plastics Co. ran into difficulties which it had not anticipated when it announced its expected initial delivery date as late February. Or that would seem from the sequel to have been the case; for AMC informed FEAF on 28 March that the latest estimate of the delivery dates was as follows: two radomes to be received from the manufacturer on 1 May 1957; one on 15 May; one on 30 May; four on 1 June; and two on 30 June. AMC added the interesting information that the Zenith firm would not now be providing all 10 of the radomes, it having been found advantageous to contract half of the total production to another manufacturer, the Universal Moulded Products Corporation of

Bristol, Virginia. Airlift of all the radomes was now contemplated, but the dates on which they would arrive at Kadena was still uncertain, though more definite information on this score would be furnished as soon as it was available to AMC.[61]

Now that the production of rigid radomes was only a matter of time, there arose the question of actual installation of the intricate and cumbersome "jigsaw puzzles" in the field. Ordinarily the manufacturer would have furnished skilled employees to perform the work, or at least to supervise it. Such was the accepted practice of such electronic giants as General Electric, Bendix, Philco, Western Electric, RCS, Hughest Aircraft, and the like. However, when Rome Air Force Depot turned confidently to the Zenith and Universal people for such assistance, they learned that these small firms, to whom the manufacture of the rigid radomes was a completely new business, had no trained technicians to send abroad. As a result, it looked for a time as though there would soon be thousands of plastic panels for rigid radomes coming off the assembly line, but no one able to assemble them. In such an event, the 313th Air Division would find itself with a pre-broken Humpty Dumpty on its hands.

In this situation, Rome AFD turned to the parent Lincoln Laboratory at Cambridge, Massachusetts, for assistance. The latter agreed to conduct a one-week installation training class early in May with a maximum of six personnel being instructed in the Eleusinian mysteries of rigid radome construction. The trainees could be drawn from one of

three possible groups: (1) responsible installation personnel at SAMAP, who could then train additional men in the art as the projects progressed; (2) existing Bendix contractor technicians already available within FEAF; or (3) radome contractor personnel, who could be trained to provide further assistance to SAMAP in the role of supervisors. Rome AFD recommended adoption of the first alternative as being the most practical and beneficial.[62]

SAMAP made haste to take advantage of this offer, selecting two airmen to attend the training classes at the Lincoln Laboratory, and suggested that this headquarters utilize two of the spaces remaining. By so doing, 313th would be able to expedite the installation work materially through the use of these additional trained airman supervisors, and they would prove invaluable afterward in performing maintenance on the completed radomes.[63]

This would seem to have been a golden opportunity which Rome offered, but, for reasons too nebulous to be very convincing at this late date, 313th answered SAMAP that it would be unable to provide the trainees. Anyway, said Major Robert E. Kraus, Chief of the Electronics and Communications Branch of 313th's Materiel Directorate, the greater part of the site maintenance personnel would be available for any assistance needed in the installation work, and sufficient OJT for subsequent maintenance problems which might arise could be obtained locally during the actual period of installation.[64]

A jolt to this command's high hopes of getting the rigid radomes erected before the onset of the 1957 typhoon season (whose theoretical period would encompass the months from June through October) came on

22 April in the form of a TWX from Rome AFD announcing that a four-week slippage in the delivery of the radomes by the manufacturers had occurred. This delay meant that the odds in favor of a typhoon's striking the Ryukyus before the new resistant canopies could be erected became almost overwhelming--though, of course, there was still the possibility that luck might be with the 313th Air Division, since it had been so hostile in 1956.[65]

The Rigid Radome Program Gets a Name: "Tight Top"

Up to this time the project for installing rigid plastic radomes at the five AC&W sites in the Ryukyus Air Defense System had struggled along without the benefit of a code designation. On 3 May, 1957, however, this omission was rectified by means of a message from the Commander, Air Materiel Command, to SAMAP, assigning the nickname of "Tight Top" to identify radome shipments to Okinawa. In the natural course of affairs, "Tight Top" was quickly expanded in meaning to comprise the whole project--planning, manufacture, shipment, and erection of the Zenith and Universal rigid radomes.[66]

On 17 May SAMAP asked Rome AFD to advise whether the four-week slippage in the air shipment of the radomes was firm figure, or if the likelihood of further slippage in the delivery schedule existed. This information was "urgently needed", declared SAMAP, for the preparation of its installations schedule.[67] Rome replied that not only was no additional slippage in the delivery of the radomes foreseeable, but present indications were that it might be possible to ship them earlier than previously planned.[68]

This headquarters requested Rome AFD on 31 May to furnish a detailed bill of materials for "Tight Top" on the supposition that adequate monitoring of the project from the viewpoint of supply and installation required the possession of such a document.[69] The Griffiss AFB depot replied on 4 June that it had no bill of materials of the type desired; however, a packing list would be included with each rigid radome when it was shipped. Incidentally, the first plane load of rigid radome materiel had already left the Zenith Plastics Co. factory at Gardena, California.[70]

Erection of the Rigid Radomes Gets Underway.

On 7 June 13 boxes arrived at Naha Air Base aboard a MATS aircraft--evidently the initial shipment of Zenith components of which Rome had spoken. Three of the boxes were labeled "Repair Kit"; four contained 5,000 washers, nuts, and bolts; while of the six remaining boxes, one was marked "Construction Kit". The other five bore no indication of their contents, but, upon being opened, were found to contain scaffolding parts. Despite the previous designation of the code name "Tight Top" for the rigid radome project, none of the boxes bore these two illuminating words, nor was there any marking to indicate how many boxes the base was supposed to receive in this shipment. Neither was there any packing list in any of the boxes such as Rome AFD had promised would be included without fail. Besides this, eight of the 13 boxes were constructed of thin wood, one of which had broken open; while the other five were made of ordinary cardboard and, having been exposed to water somewhere along the line, were falling

apart. In consequence of this chaotic method of shipping, Naha Base Supply had no way of knowing whether any items were missing from the boxes or, indeed, if all the boxes originally in the shipment when it left the factory had been received. Thanks to the failure of Zenith Plastics to follow proper procedures in the preparation and addressing of the air shipment, it was "only by accident and the alertness of Naha Base Supply personnel" that the latter had connected it in any way with Project Tight Top.[71]

The indignation of the Headquarters, Air Materiel Command upon learning of this fiasco was almost as great as had been that of the people here on Okinawa whose task it became to untangle the snarl created by the consignor's negligence. Putting its annoyance into action, the AMC instructed Rome Air Force Depot on 11 June--the very next day after receiving the message from the SAMAP Liaison Officer at Kadena describing the sorry mess--to "take immediate action via the most expeditious method" to insure that correct packaging and identification of the project for which the items were intended were employed on all future Tight Top shipments. In addition, the master packing list should accompany such shipments.[72]

On 17 June FEAF inquired of SAMAP whether a tentative or firm schedule for the airlift and installation of rigid radomes had been established.[73] SAMAP replied that no schedule had been established. Instead, the two contractors were shipping the completed radomes direct from the factory to Travis AFB for further air shipment to Okinawa. Also, as of that date (19 June), Naha Base Supply had received partial

shipments of Tight Top No. 6 (from Zenith Plastics Co.) and Tight Top No. 1 (from Universal Moulded Products Corp.), both of them earlier than originally scheduled.[74]

The following week SAMAP notified its liaison office at Kadena that a rigid radome installation team consisting of three NCO's and 18 airmen would arrive on or about the 27th--which happened to be the next day.[75]

The installation schedule tentatively set up for the rigid radomes called for their erection in the order of Site P-56, P-52, P-54, P-55, and P-53.[76]

When 15 more boxes for Tight Top No. 6 arrived on 26 June, an inventory was begun to determine the quantity received as compared with that required for installation. Since no shipping documents or bills of lading had accompanied the items, the inventory was conducted by comparing corresponding parts with those identified in Tight Top No. 1.[77]

The work of erecting the radomes at Yuza Dake Air Station began on 1 July 1957, and exactly one week later the rigid radome for the AN/FPS-6, Tight Top No. 1--manufactured by Universal Moulded Products Corporation--was completely assembled. Rather unexpectedly, the job was accomplished without undue difficulty, considering that this was the first time the team had actually attempted a project of this nature. Technical acceptance was given on 15 July. Tight Top No. 6-1, a product of Zenith Plastics Company, quickly proved to be much less amenable to assembly, panels D-1 and D-2 having been incorrectly fabricated, with the flange side adjacent to panel D-3 being too long. The base layer of the radome could not be installed, since the bolt holes in the panels did not correspond with the support ring holes.

A check of the Zenith Panel D-3 panel alongside the Universal D-1 and D-2 panels revealed that they joined quite snugly despite their different origins. The Commander of the 623d AC&W Squadron believed it would be possible to drill new holes in the base layer panels to obtain proper seating of these units; however, a sub-standard installation would result if the Zenith D-3 panels were used. Under the circumstances, 313th radioed Rome AFD for permission to transfer some Universal D-1 and D-2 panels to Tight Top No. 6-1, so that the AN/FPS-3A weapon at Yuza Dake could also receive its rigid radome without further delay. Speedy action on the part of the depot in answering this request was encouraged by the comment that installation progress was at a standstill while instructions were being awaited.[78]

Rome AFD was not long in granting 313th's request to substitute D-1 and D-2 panels of Universal manufacture for the improperly fabricated panels produced by Zenith Plastics Co. Only a few days had gone by, however, when it occurred to someone at this headquarters that such an exchange might prove hazardous, since the panels of the two firms were not identical in strength characteristics. Therefore, the Lincoln Laboratory was asked what degradation from a stress analysis viewpoint would occur if such a substitution were made.[79]

Back came a reassuring reply that the D-1 and D-2 base panels of one manufacturer might safely be exchanged for those of another manufacturer with no degradation from a stress analysis viewpoint, since base panels were not located in the region of maximum stress.[80] Armed with this information, the SAMAP erection crew turned-to on Tight Top

No. 6-1 on 26 July and by 1 August had completed erection of this dome for the AN/FPS-3" at P-56. Technical acceptance of the radome was not received until 11 September, however.

Weary of contending with the problems created unnecessarily by the carelessness of the Zenith firm, and hopeful of seeing an improvement brought about in the future, SAMAP addressed a lengthy communication to Rome AFD and Sacramento Air Materiel Area on 19 July, describing in detail the many shortcomings that were being encountered. The jeremiad started off with the complaint that items received for Tight Top No. 7 had not been packaged in overseas water-proof containers, as previously requested. Neither were the boxes marked or stenciled with complete scheme designations, as specified in an earlier message. As a matter of fact, of a total of 90 boxes in a 117-box shipment received at Naha Air Base, not a single one had been marked with the complete scheme designation, the only legend appearing thereon consisting of the magic words "Project Tight Top". In addition, master packing lists were not being received by airmail, as stipulated by both SAMAP and AMC. Worse yet, approximately 25 per cent of the 5/8" steel strapping around the 90 boxes received had been broken upon its arrival at Naha. Also, such items as casters, swivel couplers, and an erection kit containing Black and Decker drills had been received in light weight fiberboard cartons utterly unsuited for their protection in transit, and some 25 per cent of these containers had been found torn or burst at the seams and corners when they were unloaded at Naha. Several boxes

were mis-labeled; others bore no markings at all to identify their contents. The D-1 and D-2 panels shipped for Tight Top No. 7 were identical with the improperly fabricated Zenith panels of the same type previously received for Tight Top No. 6-1--which meant that they were useless.

In view of this incredibly bad situation, SAMAP felt that "the Materiel Facilities Branch of Base Supply, Naha Air Base, has done and are [sic] continuing to do an outstanding job through almost impossible conditions to keep this project in order." The fact that the discrepancies were so numerous and that Zenith continued to turn out panels which could not be utilized for the purpose for which they were intended pointed to poor quality control at the Gardena plant. As might be expected, SAMAP requested Rome AFD and Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMAMA) to take immediate action to correct these discrepancies, in order that similar difficulties would not be encountered in subsequent shipments. Then a suggestion was made that future radome shipments be consolidated at Travis AFB and transported as units on specifically designated C-124 aircraft, or in such other manner as to insure that all of the boxes for aparticular radome would arrive as a "package".[81]

A week later SMAMA replied that it had made no direct shipments of rigid radomes for Project Tight Top, though it had made its packing facilities available to Travis AFB for any boxes the latter received in a damaged condition or improperly packed for air export shipment. However, SAMAP should understand that, since the shipments were originating at more than one contractor's plant, it was impossible to

correct any mis-identification of package contents within the in-transit channels.[82]

The original plan had called for Zenith and Universal each to produce five rigid radomes for the Ryukyus Air Defense System. Probably because of the severe strictures respecting the former's products and methods of shipment which SAMAP had expressed in its TWX of 19 July, the Air Materiel Command canceled the contract with Zenith after the latter had delivered three of the radomes, then added the two additional ones still needed to the contract with Universal Moulded Products Corp. In addition, the AMC ordered 15 D-1 and D-2 panels from Universal on a job lot basis as replacements for the unusable Zenith panels, so that the latter's radomes could be erected.[83]

Incidentally, the cost of each rigid radome received from the manufacturer was $48,691.30 as compared with$18,000 for a Bendix flexible radome; but the latter figure does not include the cost of painting, frequent visits by rehabilitation teams, and the salaries of contract technicians. The life expectancy of a rigid radome was put at 10 years, and approximately 1,200 manhours were required to erect one of the Tight Top domes.[84]

On 23 July PACAF asked this headquarters to furnish the latest information concerning the delivery status and installation schedule for the rigid radomes.[85] 313th replied six days later with a succinct account of installation progress on Tight Top, past and contemplated. To begin with, the AN/FPS-6 at Yuza Dake had been fitted with a Universal radome, as we have seen. In addition, all of the components of three Zenith radomes were on hand except for three hex hubs missing from

Tight Top No. 6-1, and it was planned to install these domes by one of two means. Either the D-1 and D-2 panels extracted from the components for Universal domes currently arriving would be utilized, or the erection team would wait for the replacement panels that were known to have been shipped by Universal, but which had not yet been received. The Universal radomes referred to were included in a large shipment comprising portions of Tight Tops No. 2, No. 3, and No. 4 which had begun arriving on Okinawa on 24 July.

PACAF was further informed that installation of the Zenith radome for the AN/FPS-3A at Yuza Dake was scheduled to commence on 26 July, after which the Zenith canopies for the AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 radars at Yae Take would be assembled, in that order, beginning on August 3d. Next would come installation of the Universal domes for the AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 sets at Kume Shima, to be followed by erection of Universal bubbles for the AN/FPS-3A and AN/FPS-6 radars at Okino-Erabu Shima. Finally, the AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 weapons at Miyako Jima would receive their plastic "derbies". The former would be a Universal radome, but it now appeared that the latter might be a Zenith product, notwithstanding the earlier information that Zenith Plastics was manufacturing only three radomes. 313th promised that all of these installations would be completed "as rapidly as supply, transportation, and weather permit."[86]

Despite all the complaints and criticisms which had been made in connection with the Zenith Plastics Company's products and shipping methods, that firm did not seem to pay them any heed. On 5 August this headquarters was forced to notify SAMAP that it had just received two

Zenith panels identified as AL and BR panel, and long two BL panels. To preclude the necessity of a long delay while these two items were being shipped from the ZI, 313th proposed that panels from the Universal radome shipments already on hand be cannibalized. This would not be a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, since the Universal dome components on hand were not complete enough for erection of the structures at that time. Therefore, SAMAP's immediate concurrence in this proposal was requested. If, however, either such approval or a negative reply was not received within 48 hours, this headquarters would take the silence as authority to proceed with the plan it had presented.[87]

Before giving an answer to this query, SAMAP radioed Rome AFD to ascertain whether Universal panels could safely be substituted for their Zenith counterparts. Back came the reply directly to 313th Air Division that although the bolt holes on the Zenith panels were 1-1/8" apart, as compared with a space separation of only 1" in the case of the Universal panels, it was not believed that this would pose any major installation problem or affect the linear construction of the radome. Admittedly, a slight overlap of the panels might result, but, since it was not expected to affect the structural stability of the dome, Rome thoroughly concurred in the desired substitution. The Griffiss AFB depot would also take whatever action was necessary to replace the AL and BR panels which were to be borrowed from the Universal radome.[88]

The Question of Painting the Radomes Arises.

Meantime, the first radome having been erected at Yuza Dake, it had been discovered that the material of which the new bubbles were

fabricated seemed to increase the inside heat several more degrees than had the old flexible ones. On days when the outside temperature reached 90° or so, the temperature within the radome soarded as high as 126°, not only making it vastly uncomfortable for the men forced to carry out routine maintenance inside the fiery bubble, but even rendering many functions impossible. As an example of this, the antenna became so hot that touching the metal was out of the question. Thus it became impossible to level the antenna or carry out other routine adjustments. Since it was still necessary that these adjustments be made, the maintenance personnel had to wait until night to enter the radome, taking advantage of the fact that the sun was not beating down upon it. Experiments in lowering the temperature by opening the radome doors and increasing ventilation had proved unsuccessful, and operation of the blowers did not reduce the heat appreciably. There was, however, a possible solution which had not yet been tried, according to the 623d AC&W Squadron. This was to paint the radomes with a special heat reflecting type of paint. The same individual who submitted this idea as a management improvement suggestion added the recommendation that a door be provided in one of the panels near the top of the dome for convection circulation.[89]

Thoroughly in accord with the 623d's solution to the problem of overheated radomes, this headquarters wrote Rome AFD on 23 July to learn what paint would be most suitable for this condition. Perhaps in anticipation of a useless and superfluous recommendation on the part of the depot, the TWX added that leaving the doors in the radome open for ventilation had already been given a trial. Unfortunately, the

prevailing high humidity and free entree thus provided the ambient moisture had shown this to be a questionable course which nullified one of the basic reasons for having a radome in the first place, since the plastic canopies were intended to protect the antennas from corrosion, rust, and dust.[90]

With its usual celerity, Rome replied on 26 July that a paint called Radolon was the type approved for covering rigid radomes, and the only reason that it was not stock listed was because of its relatively short shelf life. A regular coating procedure for rigid radomes was being formulated and should be available by 1 September 1957.[91]

Just one day before 313th made the foregoing inquiry of Rome Air Force Depot, SAMAP had submitted to the same agency the question of finding a solution to the problem of ventilation in the rigid radomes. The Clark AB Air Materiel Area hoped that the Lincoln Laboratory would conduct a study on this point, at the same time determining the temperature and humidity tolerances of the plastic radomes and the possibility of bolts pulling loose from the main structure.[92]

Before SAMAP received a reply to this request, it became necessary to send Rome a second message on the subject of contract support of radomes. Aware that the Bendix Radio Corporation had a contract (AF 30 (635)7072) with the Air Force for maintenance of the flexible radomes which it furnished, the question naturally arose whether the same contract would cover maintenance of the new rigid radomes, which were not Bendix products. If it would not, SAMAP desired that the contract be amended to include them. Also, would protective painting of the rigid radomes fall within the category of support items covered in the Bendix contract?[93]

Rome answered on 22 August that Contract AF 30(635)7072 was limited to the scheduled reconditioning and maintenance of inflatable radomes only, and the protective painting of radomes upon installation did not come within the scope of the contract. However, the question of contractual maintenance of rigid radomes had been turned over to the Directorate of Maintenance Engineering at Rome AFD for consideration as a result of SAMAP's raising the point.[94]

Answering the questions posed by SAMAP in its TWX of 22 July proved to be a more time consuming business, with the result that more than a month went by before Rome AFD was able to furnish the answers. However, when the radiogram containing them did arrive, it was found to be quite thorough and well worth waiting for.

According to the project engineer, the CW-396A radome was constructed to withstand an ambient temperature range of 80° below zero to 160° above (fahrenheit) without any degradation in performance. As for the plastic material of which the panels themselves were manufactured, temperatures as high as 250° F. under local infra-red heat would not affect it to any degree.

With respect to the exact reduction in interior temperature which would be produced by the application of an exterior white Radolon coating, it was the depot's belief that there would indeed be some lowering of the temperature, but there were as yet no data to substantiate this theory. It was known, however that painting the old inflatable black, opaque radomes white had reduced their interior temperatures as much as 25° or 30° F. Before authorizing the 313th Air Division to carry out such an extensive and expensive program, Rome would first conduct a study to determine how much the Radolon would affect interior temperatures. If the

results appeared to warrant such a painting project, this headquarters would then receive the "go ahead" signal.

Turning to the question of ventilation previously raised by SAMAP, the depot declared that the radomes themselves would not be affected one way or the other. As for the personnel working in the dome, if they needed ventilation periodically, the existing blower equipment previously employed with the Bendix flexible radomes could be utilized. With the access doors open and the blower equipment in operation, conditions within the radome should be such as to allow personnel to enter without undue discomfort. Use of the blower would also enable the sites to control the humidity partially, but the reduction would be only slight unless a dehumidification unit were acquired.

The depot added that the possibility of bolts pulling loose from the panels as the result of thermal expansion was "very remote". The ambient temperature limits set forth in the first part of the message (minus 80° to plus 160° F.) should rarely, if ever, be exceeded for any extended period of time.[95]

The matter of painting and ventilating the radomes became dormant for several weeks, and this headquarters did not again advert to the subject until an Unsatisfactory Report (UR) was received from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing on 5 November. This document pointed out that the plastic radomes had been of a light green reflective color at the time they were installed. As time went by, however, the surface was gradually undergoing a change from a reflective to an absorbing one, thus raising the internal temperature of the radome. Although outside

temperature in November were considerably lower than during the summer months, the internal temperature of the domes was within 15 degrees of the safe operational temperature of 140° F. Under the circumstances, the wing recommended that the surface of the rigid radomes be painted with a white non-metallic base paint.[96]

On the strength of this UR, 313th radioed Rome AFD on November 8th to request that the latter furnish it the coating procedure for radomes. The TWX also asked whether the depot had given any consideration to awarding a contract for the maintenance and painting of the rigid radomes.[97]

The Director of Maintenance Engineering for Rome AFD answered the first part of the TWX on 15 November by enclosing a "Recommended Procedure for Painting Fibrous-glass Reinforced Plastic Shelters". According to the instructions contained in this document, the surface of the radome must be properly and carefully prepared before the Radolon paint was applied, in order to insure good adhesion. More specifically, the existing glossy resin surface should first be roughened by sand papering or sand blasting, then all residue from this operation must be carefully removed. Next, a primer should be applied and allowed to cure for 24 hours before the Radolon was added. If the paint were brushed on, one or two coats would be sufficient; while, if the primer were sprayed on, two to four coats might be needed to assure the deposit of a thick enough layer.

The Radolon paint itself could be applied by spraying, brushing, rolling, or using a pressure feed system. Several passes of the spray gun would be needed to build up one coat, and each coat should be as

heavy as possible without causing the paint to sag. Two or three coats of Radolon would probably be sufficient for complete coverage, at least four hours being allowed for drying between the application of different coats. Radolon, as the Air Force designated it, was sold as a commercial product under the designation A-625-B by the B. F. Goodrich Co. of Akron, Ohio. Adding white Radolon paint to the radomes would serve two purposes. Not only would it reduce the inside temperatures, but it would at the same time afford a surface coating which would be highly resistant to the effects of sunlight and abrasion.[98]

The second part of 313th's inquiry of 8 November elicited a reply from Rome AFD considerably less palatable to the recipient. According to this radiogram of November 14th, an investigation conducted by Lincoln Laboratory had indicated that it was not necessary to paint the rigid radomes in order to preserve these fibrous glass-reinforced plastic shelters. Nor was any maintenance required other than field and organizational. Under the circumstances, the depot was taking no action to contract maintenance or painting for this command. The same experiments had shown, on the other hand, that painting did greatly reduce the ambient temperature within the radome. This being the case, any Air Force organization desiring to paint its rigid radomes to enhance the comfort of its personnel should feel free to do so, but realizing beforehand that it must assume all responsibilities connected with the project, such as preparation of specifications, letting the contract, and providing the funds.[99] This was small comfort!

The reaction of this headquarters' Chief of Maintenance to this unexpected news was to suggest that Brigadier William G. Hipps, the 313th

Air Division Commander, "be made aware of the responsibilities placed upon the using agency to paint the radomes." The TWX from Rome had made it plain that the Air Materiel Command had no intention of letting a contract to paint the radomes. Therefore, if General Hipps still wanted the domes to be painted, the Maintenance Chief suggested that the Installations Directorate be requested to initiate the necessary action.[100]

General Hipps' response to this intelligence was to reiterate that the radomes must be painted somehow or other, even if the funding had to be provided by this headquarters. Finding itself thus forced into a corner, the Materiel Directorate got a message off to the Bendix Radio Depot in Tokyo requesting that a breakdown of the monetary expense involved in painting the old flexible radomes at the AC&W sites be furnished. This information was required in order for 313th to establish a fund for painting the rigid radomes being installed in the Ryukyus.[101]

The reply received from the Bendix Depot on 4 December proved to be of little help to 313th, as it turned out, that agency explaining that it did not have any breakdown of radome painting expenses available. Under the existing arrangement, the Bendix Corporation provided world-wide radome reconditioning services through a fixed price contract--AF 30(635)7072--negotiated with Rome Air Force Depot. This being the case, the Tokyo Bendix Depot suggested that this headquarters obtain the data it sought from Rome itself.[102]

Taking the hint, the Materiel Directorate radioed Rome AFD the same day this TWX was received from Bendix, to request that 313th be

advised of the monetary expense involved in painting the flexible radomes at AC&W sites under the terms of Contract AF 30(625)7072.[103] When no reply to this message was received in a reasonable length of time, a local paint firm, Turco Products, Inc., was asked to work up an estimate on the cost of painting the radomes with Radolon. It might be thought that the last persons on the island to be afflicted with "Okinawa-itis" (the mysterious malady peculiar to the Ryukyus marked by extreme lethargy and proneness to procrastination on the part of its victims) would be the sales personnel of a commercial firm, for whom the profit motive should act as an antidote and stimulant. Nevertheless, the intensive cerebration required to calculate the square footage of a hemispherical-shaped radome --with the result multiplied by 10--was evidently more than the good people of Turco Products could bring themselves to attempt. Whatever the reason, they never came up with the figures requested, and, with General Hipps' departure as division commander on 8 January 1958, the project was quietly permitted to fade into limbo.

This passivity was not discouraged by the realization of electronics personnel that at least two of the surveillance sets would be modified in the not-too-distant future by the introduction of AN/GPS-27 or AN/GPA-57 kits. Once this was done, practically every part of the radar weapon so modified, including the transmitting and receiving units, would be housed in the tower proper. Almost the only item remaining in the radome would be the antenna, and daily servicing of that part should not consume more than 15 minutes per day. Thus, maintenance personnel would eventually find it unnecessary to spend nearly as much time in the terrible heat of the plastic radomes--at least insofar as the search radars were concerned,

and if PACAF could be persuaded to allocate the modification kits for all of the sites. Besides, there was no dodging the fact that painting the radomes would run into the thousands of dollars. As for the AN/FPS-6, only the antenna itself was housed in the radome, all other parts being contained within the tower proper. Thus, it was not necessary for personnel to enter the height-finder radomes except for lubrication of the antenna moving parts. For this work the set had to be shut down, because the high radio-activity of the AN/FPS-6 made it unsafe for anyone to enter the radome while it was in operation.[104]

Shortcomings in Project Tight Top.

Meantime, on 5 August, the Director of Maintenance Engineering at Rome Air Force Depot had requested that 313th Air Division have the former's contract technical representative here on Okinawa submit a complete technical report on Project Tight Top. Among the subjects which the depot commander wished discussed were the condition of the materiel upon arrival on Okinawa, any shortages discovered, and the adequacy of such tools and materials as caulking guns used in the assembly process.[105]

Since Rome's contract technician had already departed this command on 3 August to return to his home base, the Materiel Directorate here at 313th was saddled with the task of providing at least a summarized version of the detailed information requested by the depot. Obviously, the individual in question could give a much more complete report upon his return to Rome Air Force Depot. In any event, the depot was informed on 7 August that four panels had received minor damage in shipment, but it had been no problem to repair them locally, using the repair kits furnished with each radome scheme. Also, two Zenith BL panels had been

received improperly color coded and otherwise incorrectly identified--one as an AL and the other as a BR panel--as the reader already knows. This was a serious matter, as the third Zenith radome could not be erected until replacement panels were received. It was suggested, therefore, that "immediate action be taken to procure /these panels/ and ship /them/ with highest priority by fastest means." Equally bad, the business of installing the Zenith radomes had almost literally been of a "shoe horn and rubber mallet" variety because of the ill-fitting panels with which the erectors had had to contend.

Other lesser discrepancies which had not greatly affected the process of installation but, certes, had not assisted it either, included the arrival of bottles of chemical DDM for the repair kits in a broken or evaporated condition, the shipment of only one spud wrench and one open end box end combination wrench with each Universal radome, making it necessary to use Zenith tools in order to avoid undue delay, the omission of one tool kit from the Zenith shipments, and the failure to ship caulking equipment. Admittedly, the radomes could be caulked by hand if caulking guns were not received, but, in such a case, each radar set would be off the air for an estimated seven to 10 days--an unacceptable length of time.

Another defect in the system being followed was the continued arrival of the Tight Top materials in small, piecemeal shipments containing one or two boxes of two or more radomes. Such a procedure had an extremely deleterious effect on the maintenance of inventory, on storage, shipment to the erection sites, and the erection schedule. In

view of this experience, 313th recommended that where any future shipments to other areas were concerned, each radome scheme be shipped complete as a unit.

As of the date of this message, three radomes had been erected--one Universal and two Zeniths. Tight Top #1 (Universal) had been installed on the AN/FPS-6 at Yuza Dake on 8 July and technically accepted on the 15th. Tight Top #6-1 (Zenith) had been installed on the AN/FPS-3A at the same site on 1 August, but technical acceptance was being withheld for the time being. Tight Top #6-2 (Zenith) had been completed on the AN/FPS-3 at Yae Take only the day before (6 August) and was expected to receive its technical acceptance a week later. The companion radome at P-52, Tight Top #7 (Zenith), intended for the AN/FPS-6 radar, needed only replacement of the AL and BR panels mentioned earlier plus D-1 and D-2 panels to permit erection to get underway. In addition, only a few boxes were lacking from the two Universal radomes scheduled for Okino-Erabu Shima--Tight Tops No. 2 and No. 3--but they had previously been utilized as a supply source for the D-1 and D-2 panels needed to assemble the Tight Top No. 6-1 and No. 6-2 Zenith radomes. As a consequence of this policy of expediency, the radomes at P-55 could not be erected until the borrowed panels had been replaced; but, rather than seeing the situation improving at once, officials at this headquarters foresaw darker days in store for Okino-Erabu, since it was contemplated that more D-1 and D-2 panels would be borrowed to permit installation of Zenith Tight Top No. 7 at Yae Take.

Yet another radome being held up by the shortage of D-1 and D-2 panels was Tight Top No. 4 (Universal), intended for employment with the

AN/FPS-3 at Kume Shima. Even as this TWX was in the process of preparation, word was received that a MATS C-124 had just arrived with what appeared to be components of Tight Top No. 5, the radome for the AN/FPS-6 at Kume.[106] Despite all obstacles imposed by distance and human error, therefore, it was obvious that Project Tight Top was progressing rapidly and just might be complete before the first typhoon of the 1957 season hit the islands.

Typhoon Agnes Underscores the Need for Rigid Radomes.

This optimistic possibility was not to be realized, however, as Typhoon Agnes entered the scene on 16 August with only four of the 10 radomes installed--two at P-56 and two at P-52--while a fifth, Tight Top No. 4, was only half completed when the storm warning was received. In a furious race against time and the elements, the men of the 10th and 11th Communications Construction Flights sought to get this dome for the AN/FPS-3 at Kume Shima erected before the typhoon could strike. The rising winds tore at workers clinging to beams 100 feet in the air, at the same time drenching them with horizontal rain and salt spray whipped up from the surrounding seas. Nevertheless, work continued in the glare of searchlights as the struggling men continued to fasten panels together. On 17 August the job was completed, the job having taken just minutes less than 24 hours.

As it happened, Agnes described a northerly arc which took her east of the Ryukyus, so that Kume Shima Air Station experienced nothing worse than 50-knot fringe winds. Then, as she came abreast of Yae Take, though 65 miles away, that site received gusts as high as 100 knots on August 18th.

The following day, Agnes passed some 20 miles to the east of Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station, hurling maximum gusts of 110 knots at the site as a souvenir of her visit.

P-52 escaped with very little damage, since both radomes were installed and had been technically accepted as of 13 August. But P-55 was less fortunate. Here neither radome had been installed, and, the storm approaching much nearer than at Yae Take, both search and height finder radars sustained damage which kept them off the air for 146 and 78:45 hours respectively. Agnes also dealt the communications system a blow, shorting out all antennas and transformers; while the LCM used to convey supplies and personnel from ship to shore was so badly battered that it was declared unseaworthy and a replacement requisitioned. The target for the LCM's buffeting, the dock at Kogome Village, did not come off scot free from the exchange either, as 15 square yards of broken concrete which had to be repaired in the wake of the typhoon amply testified.[107]

The Universal AN/FPS-3 radome was completed on 17 August, as we have seen, and the radome (also a Universal product) for the AN/FPS-6 at the same site was assembled on 22 August. The following day both radomes--Tight Tops No. 4 and No. 5 respectively--were given their technical acceptance. By that time both of the Universal radomes for P-55 were at the site, but one was short the D-1 and D-2 panels which had been borrowed in order to erect the Zenith Tight Top No. 7 at P-52. In addition, the radomes for P-53 were beginning to arrive at Kadena, and, according to shipping notices, the last box of replacement D-1

and D-2 panels should arrive very shortly. One typhoon had already been survived without too much damage, and, if any succeeding ones would just wait a few more days, the Ryukyus Air Defense System should be in a position to stand right up to them--always provided the rigid radomes proved to be as typhoon resistant as the Lincoln Laboratory had declared them. However, none of the radomes already installed and accepted had yet been caulked. SAMAP had indicated that caulking guns were being procured on 12 August and should arrive that same week, but the weeks went by and these indispensable items continued to be conspicuous by their absence.[108]

On 27 August Tight Top No. 2 (manufactured by Universal) was erected on the AN/FPS-3A weapon at P-55 and was followed the next day by completion of Tight Top No. 3 (also Universal) for the AN/FPS-6 height finder. Acceptance certificates for both radomes were signed on the 29th.

Temporary relief for the caulking situation came at long last on 29-30 August with the arrival of five boxes containing the caulking guns, 300 cartridges, 300 plungers, and 180 nozzles. These were impressive quantities on the surface, but they were still insufficient to caulk more than six radomes. Besides, only 90 gallons of caulking compound had been shipped, and this amount would serve just four radomes, approximately. Remembering the four savage typhoons which had lashed the AC&W sites in 1956, the 51st Air Base Group at Naha Air Base was most impatient to see the new rigid radomes not only erected but also made water tight by caulking as quickly as possible. As it was, officials

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of that organization had the feeling that they were "living on borrowed time", for here it was September and the air stations had thus far been spared any meteorological violence other than the glancing blow dealt by Agnes. Thus filled with disquietude, the 51st asked SAMAP on 31 August to query Rome AFD for the estimated delivery date of the remaining items required to complete the other four radomes, as well as the additional 110 gallons of compound necessary for caulking the six domes which could not be treated with the supply on hand. Should SAMAP learn that no more caulking compound was being shipped, the 51st requested that it be informed how it could go about procuring the needed material.[109]

With some, at least, of the caulking equipment and materials on hand, this headquarters radioed SAMAP on 4 September for permission to retain a part of the Tight Top installation team on Okinawa to caulk the radomes and correct the various minor discrepancies noted during the inspections. If SAMAP was agreeable to this request, enough men should be left behind to enable the work to be completed in minimum time, thus preventing excessive time off the air for the radars housed within the domes.[110]

Waiting less than a fortnight for a reply to its TWX of 31 August, the 51st Air Base Group sent a follow-up message to SAMAP on 11 September in which it repeated the previous inquiry concerning shipment of the 110 gallons of caulking compound needed so urgently. The radome erection-turned-caulking crew was already filling the cracks and seams on one dome at P-56 and expected to complete the job that same day. However,

the next site scheduled for the caulking treatment was P-52, where both radomes were Zenith products. Inasmuch as that firm had shipped no caulking compound for any of its domes, further progress would shortly come to an abrupt halt unless the 110 gallons previously requested were actually received. The 51st Air Base Group added that it was also quite desirous of obtaining any information SAMAP might have concerning additional cartridges, plungers, and nozzles.[111]

Personnel of the C-E Branch of 313th's Materiel Directorate conducted an inspection of the nine radomes erected (the Universal radome for the AN/FPS-3 at Miyako Jima, Tight Top No. 10, had been completed on 4 September), then noted four discrepancies which the site commanders should insure were corrected before the caulking team departed from their respective air stations. First, the seams and joints were not caulked. Second, there remained a few loose nuts and bolts which should be tightened when the domes were caulked. Third, an itemized list of scaffolding, erection equipment (including tools), and material to be used in making repairs had not been provided the site commanders. Finally, ladders for use in servicing the exteriors of the radomes had not been provided.[112]

Typhoon Bess Threatens the Ryukyus.

Less than a fortnight after Agnes wended her way north toward Japan, a second typhoon, named Bess, appeared in the Western Pacific. Passing very close aboard Iwo Jima on the night of 30-31 August, she lashed that air base with loo mile-per-hour winds and gusts as high as

130 m.p.h. before moving on toward Tokyo, leaving Iwo out of communication with the rest of the world for 23 hours. By September 2d Bess was 540 miles east of Okinawa and moving north-northeast at seven miles per hour. Ordinarily, such a track would have given officials on Okinawa no concern whatsoever, as it would take the typhoon farther and farther away from the great bastion. In the case of Bess, however, it was impossible to feel such equanimity; for she had already changed course five times and seemed completely disinclined to commit herself to any specific path.

For a time contact with Bess was lost, but when she eventually turned up on the weather charts again on 3 September, it was discovered that only 425 miles now separated her from Okinawa, and mixiмum sustained winds were now 115 m.p.h. Twenty-four hours later she turned towards Okinawa, causing authorities to place the island in Condition III. With this official recognition that Bess constituted a menace to life and property, the Army Hospital (the only military hospital on Okinawa and used by personnel of all services and their dependents) evacuated its patients from the old quonsets in the Mercy Area to the concrete-and-steel Stilwell Field House at Sukiran. At the same time, personnel of the 3d Marine Division occupying tents at Camp Hansen (near Kin Village) stood by with their sea bags packed, ready to strike their tents upon declaration of Condition I and take cover in more permanent structures elsewhere on the island.

As Bess appeared to be nearing Okinawa on 5 September, the Army went into Condition I, while the Air Force--going by the book--assumed a more relaxed Condition II. Maximum sustained winds in the storm's

center were now 130 m.p.h., with gusts reaching 150 m.p.h. When the typhoon had closed to within 230 miles north-northeast of Okinawa, she leisurely turned away once more and moved on her original course toward Japan, where she proceeded to lash the coast of Kyushu. Thanks to the distance which Bess had kept between herself and the American bases on Okinawa, Kadena and Naha experienced nothing worse than stead winds of 25 m.p.h., with gusts up to 35 m.p.h.[113]

Although Typhoon Bess had not posed too great a threat to the Ryukyus, it may be seen from the foregoing, the Commander of the 313th Air Division, Brigadier General William G. Hipps, seems to have labored under the misapprehension that the winds affecting the Air Force's bases had been much stronger than they actually were. And he believed that it was only the existence of the rigid radomes at the two northerly sites in the AC&W system which preserved their radar sets from destruction or, at least, precautionary dismantling. Filled with the spirit of gratitude and thanksgiving, General Hipps sent a message to the commanders of every organization which had had anything to do with Project Tight Top. "Both personally and on behalf of the Air Force and U.S. community on Okinawa" he found it "a privilege to thank everyone in the chain of commands" for their assistance in bringing Project Tight Top to a point of 90 per cent completion in less than 12 months. (Only the Zenith radome for the AN/FPS-6 set at Miyako Jima remained to be installed when General Hipps wrote this paean, the Universal radome for the AN/FPS-3 at P-53 having been completed on 4 September, as related above, and technically accepted six days later).

According to the division commander, Typhoon Bess had bestowed winds of "approximately 100 knots" on Sites P-52 and P-55, and higher winds had been forecast, though not actually received. Formerly, he said, under such conditions it would have been necessary for the threatened sites to suspend operations and tie down the radar antennas, thereby leaving the base complex without any means of warning against possible attack. But with the new rigid radomes in place at nine of the 10 sites, 313th Air Division had been able to maintain uninterrupted air defense operations and, at the same time, give the Air Weather Service constant information on the location, direction of movement, and speed of the typhoon.

In addition to adding immeasurably to the air defense strength of Okinawa, General Hipps went on, Project Tight Top would produce a definite financial saving in the long run, even though the initial cost was far in excess of that for flexible type radomes. All in all, then, it was "a real tribute to the ability of the U.S. Air Force to plan and program the necessary production, supply, and transportation actions required for this rather difficult and remote area."[114]

A Partial Solution to the Caulking Problem Is Found.

As the reader may recall, the Zenith Plastics Company had shipped no caulking compound for use with its radomes. For this reason, the first dome to receive caulking treatment was Tight Top No. 1 (the AN/FPS-6 bubble at P-56), which was a Universal Moulded Products Corporation item. The natural course would then have been to proceed to the other on-island sites before moving on to the radomes situated off-island. Unfortunately

for the smooth functioning of this procedure, the AN/FPS-3A at P-56 and both radars at P-52 were protected by Zenith domes, for which no caulking compound was on hand. In this dilemma, the 51st Air Base Group took the bull by the horns and diverted the Universal caulking compound intended for the two radomes at P-54 and the AN/FPS-3 to the three on-island Zenith domes.

Having first taken this action, the 51st Air Base Group then notified SAMAP what it had done, adding that the Zenith radomes were consuming the compound at a far greater rate than they were supposed to, because of expanded seams. As a result, there was reason to doubt that the 110 gallons of compound previously requested would now prove sufficient, even if received, to complete treatment of the radomes at all five sites. If the supply of compound on hand permitted, however, the 51st ABG planned to caulk the radomes at Okino-Erabu Shima--Tight Tops No. 2 and No. 3--upon completion of the work at Yae Take.[115]

TYPHOON FAYE TESTS THE RIGID RADOMES AND FINDS THEM NOT WANTING.

Typhoon Faye, the eleventh Pacific typhoon of 1957, was born on 18 September, 200 miles southeast of Guam. From there she moved northwestward as is the wont of most typhoons originating in that region, at an unexceptional speed of 10 to 15 knots, arriving just off the northern Philippines six days after her birth, meantime having registered gusts as high as 190 knots during her passage. At this point she came to a virtual standstill and lost her force, subsiding to a sustained velocity of 50 knots with gusts reaching no higher than 70 knots. Instead of proceeding westerly toward the coast of China, as practically all storms

in her position usually do in late September, Faye turned to the north-northwest on 24 September and bent her course for the east coast of Taiwan.

At 0800I on the 25th, an Air Force weather reconnaissance plane which had penetrated the eye of the storm found that Faye had again veered sharply during the night and was now heading to the north-northeast. This change in direction alerted weathermen in the Ryukyus and Kyushu that Faye might swerve toward them. True, she was only a tropical storm, but she would bear watching, since such tropical storms often built up into typhoons on short notice. Therefore, the decision was made to continue aircraft reconnaissance of the recent tempest.

Late in the afternoon of the 25th a Navy weather reconnaissance aircraft spent more than three hours in and around the storm, definitely locating Faye at a position 25 miles south of Ishigaki Jima in the Yaeyama Retto at 1700I, at which time the storm winds covered an estimated radius of 25-35 miles. Two hours later weather reports from Ishigaki showed that Faye was moving past, just off the east coast of the island. Detachments #4 and #7 of the 15th Weather Squadron--at Kadena and Naha respectively--received excellent and continuous progress reports on Faye from the Ryukyus Weather Station. As the storm center passed offshore, the barometer fell and winds picked up to a maximum of 68 knots. Since a storm of 65 knots or higher is classified as a typhoon, weathermen upgraded Faye from the category of a tropical storm. While so doing, however, they did not entertain any great apprehension concerning her, as the 2000I observation revealed that she was snuggled cozily halfway between Ishigaki and Miyako, with wind velocities of only 31 knots and

25 knots respectively being recorded. Since these two islands were only some 60 miles apart and the barometers at their weather stations registered atmospheric pressures only slightly below normal--Ishigaki 991 millibars and Miyako 998--it appeared that Faye, even though bearing the formal designation of "typhoon", could not conceal much danger. Besides, Faye had followed a straight line trajectory toward the north-northeast which, if continued,would take her well to the westward of Okinawa, in which case the latter should experience no effects.

Although Faye had barely qualified as a full-fledged typhoon during the time she was moving past Ishigaki Jima, she did not fail to leave behind some few souvenirs of her visit. Seven dwellings were totally destroyed, nine others partially damaged, two public buildings totally destroyed, and 20 non-dwellings partially damaged.[116]

Since Faye was headed directly for Miyako on her present course, no one was surprised when the winds there began picking up and the barometer to fall. The AN/CPS-9 weather radar at Kadena had now commenced to pick up the doughnut shaped cloud formation surrounding the eye of the typhoon, enabling the weather observers to know continuously where the center of the storm was located. Reports received from Miyako at 2200I on the 25th revealed that the wind had increased considerably and was becoming boisterous. Peak gusts now ran as high as 100 knots. The fact that Faye was continuing to grow stronger made the weather people anxious for the next report from Miyako, although they believed that it would announce abating winds.

As a result, eyes were glued to the teletype at 2300I when the weather report was due to come in over the radio. It was received all right, but the atmospheric conditions garbled it so badly that 15th Weather Squadron personnel could not be sure of its content, even though they did piece together what they believed to be the typhoon report as transmitted from Miyako. But, just to play safe, the 313th Air Division declared Condition III to be in effect at Air Force installations on Okinawa at 2300I, 25 September. Finally, at 0130I on the 26th, confirmation of the earlier garbled message was obtained through the Ryukyuan Weather Bureau that Miyako had sustained winds of 83 knots with gusts to 117 knots at 2300I. (This delay was occasioned by the system under which the Ryukyu Weather Bureau operated at that time. In addition to the main weather station on Okinawa, near Naha City, the bureau had six weather stations--at Minami Daito, Miyako, Ishigaki, Iriomote, Yonaguni, and Kumejima--on outlying islands, as well as a newly-established branch near Yona Village in Kunigami Son, northern Okinawa. The weather stations in Daito, Miyako, and Ishigaki transmitted all meteorological information directly to the Central Meteorological Observatory in Tokyo, as they had done since before the war. This meant that the Ryukyu Weather Bureau had no knowledge of weather conditions in the Sakishima Gunto area until a cablegram was received from the Tokyo observatory anywhere from two to five hours later.)* Because of its greater altitude (360 feet), the AC&W site at Miyako recorded maximum winds of 90 - 95 knots, with gusts

*This rather ridiculous and cumbersome system was brought to an end in November 1958 when the Central Meteorological Observatory finally yielded to the representations of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and agreed to let the Ryukyu Weather Bureau operate independently of it, although, of course, with close coordination between the two continuing.

LAST OF HER KIND!

THE OLD FLEXIBLE RADOME ON THE AN/FPS-6

HEIGHT FINDER AT MIYAKO JIMA

COMES THROUGH TYPHOON FAYE WITH FLYING COLORS



to 150 knots--at which point the anemometer blew away.

As it happened, P-53 at Miyako Jima was the only site in the Ryukyus Air Defense System which had not yet been equipped with rigid radomes for both of its radar weapons. The AN/FPS-3 dome had been installed on 4 September, but that for the AN/FPS-6, Tight Top No. 9, had not yet even been shipped from the ZI. Fortunately, though, the flexible radome for the latter set, which had been installed on 31 August 1956, was standing when Faye struck--and, by that perversity peculiar to inanimate objects in the service of homo sapiens--was still standing when Faye departed. It was, ironically enough, because of the demonstrated fraility of the flexible radomes that a hardier breed had been developed; but, now that its days were numbered, this old rubber bubble, which had already survived Typhoons Emma and Harriet, displayed qualities of resistance and durability worthy of Leonidas at Thermopylae. Under any other circumstances, this inflatable dome would probably have dimpled, snagged on the antenna sail, ripped, lost pressure, and suddenly blown away, leaving the unprotected superstructure of the radar to be reduced to twisted junk. This had been standing operating procedure for the flexible radomes all too often in the past. But on this occasion, as the last representative of her species in the Ryukyus, the doughty dome stood fast, shrugged off the strongest winds hurled against her, and lived to be honorably deflated and methodically removed in November to make way for Tight Top No. 9.

As for Tight Top No. 10, assigned to protect Miyako's AN/FPS-3, an inspection conducted after the storm had passed revealed some bolts missing and others badly loosened. Otherwise, everything was in good shape.

All facilities at Miyako Jima Air Station did not escape so lightly, however. A beacon tower being erected by the AACS was blown down, cutting guy wires and antenna transmission lines in its descent. At the receiver site, three pole guys and 12 ball strain insulators were broken, three poles were pulled out of line, and three AS-505 antennas were left leaning as the result of the pole mounting bolts having been bent. All of this damage was quite minor in nature, though, and could be repaired in a short time.

As was usually the case, it was the Ryukyuan natives who suffered most from the typhoon. In the Miyako Gunto (exclusive of Tarama Jima, which submitted no report) six people were killed, three were seriously injured, 26 slightly injured, and one person was missing. A total of 1,557 dwellings were totally destroyed, leaving 9,028 people homeless; 2,356 dwellings were partially damaged; 21 public buildings were totally destroyed; 13 public buildings were partially damaged; 2,595 non-dwellings were totally destroyed; and 1,390 non-dwellings were partially damaged. In addition, four vessels of over five tons were sunk, four more grounded, seven damaged, and 16 displacing less than five tons were damaged. Although not so immediately apparent, 75 per cent of the sugar cane and truck crops were either destroyed or inundated, causing them to rot in a short time.[117]

By now it was clear that Faye packed dangerous winds at her center, even though she was still only a tiny spot on the weather map, and the extensive damage she had wrought at Miyako had not yet been reported. On the other hand, her diameter had not increased during the past 10 hours

despite the fact that she had gained in velocity remarkably, which meant that to do serious damage she would have to score a direct hit on Okinawa. Fringe winds would constitute no great hazard. The burning question, then, became that of where would Faye go? Since there is no way of determining exactly what course a typhoon will follow, weathermen do the next best thing--plot probably immediate future positions by extrapolating past positions. That is, they note the track followed by a storm center for several hours, then forecast it to continue in that same general direction. With the continuous record of storm progress provided by the AN/CPS-9, this technique could be exploited to the fullest.

At 0200 on the 26th, radar data showed that Faye was still maintaining a steady northeast track which, if continued, would take her safely past Okinawa. By now her forward speed had increased slightly to approximately 15 knots. All the while, the AN/CPS-9 performed flawlessly, recording with ever increasing clarity the specific shape of the cloud system and the storm eye. As the minutes passed, the eye continued to move, its forward speed slowly accelerating. Condition I for Okinawa was declared at 0300I. At 0600I, Faye was still maintaining a northeasterly heading which would, if continued for three more hours, take her past southern Okinawa, and, if continued for another two hours, steer her safely beyond the northern tip of the island.

By 0700I, however, it was evident that Faye had veered slightly toward Okinawa and was moving forward at an ever-increasing speed. She was then centered about 20 miles south of Kume Jima, which lies some 62

miles west of Kadena. Just before 0700, winds at Kume had been measured by the Ryukyu Weather Station there at 54 knots, with gusts to 90 knots, the strongest winds still appearing to be restricted to a small area close to the center of the eye. On 1,017-foot O-Take Yama, where the AC&W site was located, the detachment recorded maximum winds of 90 knots,with gusts to 150 knots, perforce estimated, since the unofficial anemometer in use measured velocities only up to 100 knots. The official 15th Weather Squadron anemometer had been blown away the year before by Typhoon Emma and had never been replaced. An hour later the radar showed that Typhoon Faye had again swerved to the right and was on a track which would take the center of the eye right along the west coast of Okinawa.

Despite the estimated 150-knot winds experienced at Kume Jima, the air station escaped quite lightly. Many nuts on both radomes were loosened, while others were found on the deck, where they had fallen after working their way completely off the bolts. But the period of great vibration had been of such brief duration that neither dome had suffered any harm, though the AN/FPS-6 tower stood in need of immediate attention, and some expansion on the bottom panels was observable. Two doublet antennas were blown down at the transmitter site; four AS-505 antennas were slightly damaged but remained operational. The task of restoring everything to normal condition was well within the capacity of site personnel, and the only material needed was 600 feet of #12 AWG three-strand copper weld wire.[118]

By 0730 of the 26th, the typhoon eye measured 11 miles in diameter, having fluctuated between 11 and 20 miles for the past several hours. The storm center was making good a true heading of 65° at 24 knots. Radar information showed that the doughnut-shaped "collar" cloud immediately encircling the eye was approximately 10 miles in width and extended upward to great altitudes. This "collar" was the specific part of the storm responsible for the very heavy rain and driving winds which represented the fury of the typhoon storm cell.

Radar scopes showed clearly and in detail how Faye moved. As she swung up the west side of Okinawa, she produced sustained winds of 90 knots, with gusts as high as 127 knots. Then, while the storm was abreast of Kadena, the wind direction changed from southerly to westerly, and finally to northwesterly. At each point during her passage, destructive winds occurred for a period of less than two hours.

At Yuza Dake Air Station the anemometer recorded maximum winds of 85 knots, with gusts to 105 knots--the lowest experienced by any of the five sites. When the radomes were examined later, a red smear was discovered on the northeast side of the AN/FPS-3A dome, indicating that some type of flying debris had struck the seam of a panel. This was further indicated by the presence of a slight crack on the inside seam of the same panel, but the crack did not run completely through the panel. In addition, several panels on both radomes appeared to have expanded, producing the effect of an inward bulge to the panels concerned. The panel could be pushed out into its correct position, but it immediately sprang inward again as soon as the pressure was released. Whether this was due to the installation of the radomes or to heat expansion was not known.[119]

The "All Clear" for Okinawa was declared at 1300I, 26 September, and by mid-afternoon Faye had left Okinawa behind and was heading for the open sea. Weather people in Japan watched her for another 24 hours as she moved rapidly along, diminishing eventually to a tropical storm, and finally ending her career at noon on 27 September, 150 nautical miles south of Tokyo.

Faye had indeed been a very unusual storm. Unlike a normal typhoon (if there is such a thing), which intensifies as it recurves, losing strength as it moves off to the northward, Faye dissipated as she recurved, then itensified rapidly as she moved in a northerly direction. Unlike many such storms, which provide clear local warnings in the form of falling pressure and increased winds many hours before their arrival, Faye gave only an abrupt two to three hours' warning. In addition, her size was completely disproportionate to the ferocity she possessed; for, despite her very strong winds, Faye was less than one-tenth the size of a truly large typhoon, making her a veritable pocket battleship of her species, diminutive but powerful. Also, as she closed in on Okinawa, she moved at the highest forward speed of any recorded tropical storm or typhoon which had passed over or near Okinawa during the month of September since the year 1899. From noon on 20 September until mid-day of the 26th, Faye's average speed of advance was 19.5 knots, as compared with an average of about 9.5 knots for all other storms.

Considering the ferocity of Typhoon Faye, the extent of the damage inflicted upon communications and electronics facilities of the Ryukyus was remarkable for its lightness. And when it is compared with the

terrific destruction visited upon aircraft, temporary type buildings, and the native populace, the relative immunity with which the C-E facilities were favored becomes even more incomprehensible. Or, that is, it is incomprehensible until we learn that it was not chance or benign fortune which enabled this particular facet of the Air Force installations in the Ryukyu Islands to come through with such a whole skin, but careful, long-range planning resulting from past sad experience.

While the memory of Typhoon Emma, of September 1956 was still fresh in mind, Brigadier General William G. Hipps, the 313th Air Division Commander, had expressed a desire that all communications facilities be engineered and constructed to withstand 200-knot winds. Partly as a result of this recommendation, SAMAP, under the command of Colonel Millard L. Haskins, had made commendable progress in designing and installing facilities of the kind General Hipps envisioned, capable of surviving severe typhoons and adverse climatic conditions. The most obvious of all, however, were the Tight Top radomes, which had enabled radar operations to continue uninterruptedly through the worse part of Typhoon Faye while themselves coming through relatively unscathed.

But it must not be supposed that rigid radomes were the only facilities which had been fortified for the express purpose of meeting the challenge of the yearly typhoons. Under Project New Moon* the outside telephone plant at Naha Air Base had been placed underground prior to Faye (it was completed on 21 August 1957), and a new telephone exchange

*Project New Moon is described in detail in the 313th Air Division History for the period 1 January-30 June 1957, Vol. I, pp. 63-91.

in a permanent building was 90 per cent complete when she struck. Because of damage to the old temporary type structure, exchange operations were moved into the new building immediately after the typhoon. Thanks to Naha Project New Moon, only two cables at Naha AB were out of service after the storm, as compared with 10 or 12 usually knocked out by a severe typhoon.

Kadena Project New Moon had been underway only since 1 September 1957, so not too great a percentage of the telephone system had been placed underground when Faye arrived. In this case luck did play a part, it may be, for only five cables were out of order when she left, whereas the normal quota of outages would have been 15 to 20 on the basis of past typhoons of comparable severity. Within five days, all operational cables at both bases had been restored to service by the 17th Communications Construction Squadron. After Typhoon Emma the preceding year, one entire month of the same organization's productive time had been devoted to restoring the operational circuits knocked out at that time. However, this difference may be attributed in part to the much smaller amount of water dumped on Okinawa by Faye, it being borne in mind that Emma had produced a veritable deluge together with her shattering winds.

Perhaps the only facility which had been more vulnerable to past typhoons than flexible radomes and aerial cable had been the antenna farms. In the case of Faye, however, only four of the antenna farms within this command sustained more than negligible damage. The Radar Approach Control Center (RAPCON) at Kadena Air Base lost four 90-foot

poles and their antennas when one of the poles which was either rotten or not properly guyed crashed across the guy wires supporting the other three. With their supports torn away, these three poles naturally toppled to the ground.

At Naha AB the ADCC lost one 90-foot AB-105 tower which was trying to support too many cross arms and antennas for its size and degree of stability. Prior to the typhoon there had been persons who insisted that the load being imposed on this AB-105 tower was excessive and dangerous. The result proved them right.

A total of 18 AB-105 towers were also lost at the 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile's Onna Point receiving antenna farm. Interestingly enough, the 17th Communications Construction Squadron had been engaged in tightening guy wires, resetting anchors, and performing other associated tasks at the Onna Point antenna farm just before Typhoon Faye's arrival, but the project was not yet completed. Not a single one of the AB-105 towers given this extra attention succumbed, the 18 which were lost all being among those which the 17th CCS had not yet had time to rehabilitate.

Faye achieved her greatest fury at Yae Take Air Station, the evidence indicates, although the exact velocity of the winds could not be determined, as the anemometer blew away while recording 200 knots. Nine 60 to 70-foot poles were smashed to the ground, either destroying or damaging the antennas. Countless nuts in the radomes were loosened, and more than 100 worked entirely off their bolts, while scattered pock marks were found on the west side of the bubbles.

Subsequently, a noticeable rusting of the base bolts was observed. Besides this damage to C-E facilities, all of the BOQ windows and frames were blown out, as were most of those in the enlisted men's barracks. A 20 x 60' quonset type building used as a gymnasium at P-52 was completely demolished, while the roof of the NCO lounge was ripped away. No casualties were suffered, since all personnel not on duty were confined to quarters, and the crews on duty in Operations remained there overnight, such desirable items as bunks, "C" rations, and water having been provided beforehand.[120]

It was bad enough in itself to sustain this damage, but making it worse was the realization that much of it could have been prevented by proper action beforehand. In the case of the antenna farm, the contractor who installed the poles and anchors had evidently not been supervised very carefully, as they were not properly seated. On the other hand, the poles were considered too tall for 1,499-foot Yae Take; therefore it was possible that they would have blown down anyway, though it was much less likely. When the crews got around to restoring the antenna field, they brought in 35-foot poles in place of the 60 to 70-foot poles lying on the ground, as the shortest possible sticks which could still provide the desired communications.[121]

The failure of the antenna field at Yae Take was, then, the result of shoddy work by a contractor, complemented by derelict supervision on the part of the monitoring agency. The loss of windows and consequent soaking of the building interior by sheets of water had their source in an error of judgement committed four years before.

On 11 September 1953, the District Engineer at Camp Kue had informed Twentieth Air Force that his organization was reanalyzing the need for typhoon shutters on permanent type structures. Previous studies based upon typhoon experience on Okinawa since 1948, said the letter, had indicated that typhoon shutters on such buildings were "generally unnecessary" and that the "excessive cost" of their installation and maintenance was "not warranted." As tangible evidence to support this assertion, OKED cited the fact that nine barracks and 122 family quarters of the permanent type (concrete block and steel construction) had withstood all typhoons during the past four seasons without benefit of shutters. The glass breakage in these structures had been negligible and no injury to personnel or property had been reported.

Inversely, the cost of providing metal typhoon shutters for a barracks of the type adopted as standard by the Air Force on Okinawa was about $16,000 and had a life expectancy of 10 years, added the District Engineer. Since they were so expensive, it would be well for this headquarters to make a cardful evaluation of the need for shutters.[122]

It was then that Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Bailey, Acting Chief of Twentieth Air Force's Engineering Division, then made the fatal recommendation that was to influence construction in this command for years to come. His indorsement to the District Engineer's letter advised that shutters should be omitted from permanent type buildings, "as experience has shown that they are not necessary." The one exception he made to this rule was that in any case where a building would be adjacent to a construction project or any area where there was a possibility

of loose debris, woven wire should be welded to 3/8" iron rods for smaller openings and mounted on 1" angle frames for larger openings.[123] Typhoon Faye demonstrated just how wrong were Colonel Bailey and the District Engineer.

In May 1957 Contract AF 62(321)-944 for $215,393.39 had been awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for repair work on 1956 typhoon-damaged construction at Miyako Jima, Yae Take, Okino-Erabu Shima, and Yuza Dake Air Stations, and for repair of the access road to the Senaga Shima ammunition storage area at Naha Air Base. Included in the contract were typhoon shutters for the various buildings at the AC&W sites. Subsequently, Kume Jima Air Station was added to the contract. Toa Kensetsu began work on the contract on 19 June 1957, but had installed none of the shutters when Faye struck. Impressed with the importance of getting them ready as quickly as possible by the events of that typhoon, the contractor completed those at Kume in November 1957, only to have the detachment commander declare them unsatisfactory. Two representatives of the Engineering Branch of this headquarters who visited P-54 the same month to ascertain whether or not this reaction was justified found that it would indeed be desirable to redesign the typhoon shutters partially, in order to eliminate a hazard to site personnel and simultaneously eliminate a requirement for a shutter storage building.[124]

In April 1958 higher headquarters approved and funded $6,800 in P-458 funds for the installation of sliding typhoon shutters fabricated of steel frames with aluminum panels for the upper floors of the buildings at four AC&W sites, in accordance with Naha projects NAH-85-8

(Kume Shima). The shutters for the ground floors would be removable.[125]

After passing squarely over Yae Take, Typhoon Faye continued the straight northeasterly course which she had been following for several hours, as a result of which she missed Okino-Erabu Shima by a considerable margin. Even so, winds of 120 knots were experienced at the 780-foot air station, with the usual reaction in the form of loosened nuts. Otherwise, P-55 was none the worse for Faye's foray.[126]

Following Typhoon Emma in September 1956, every communications-electronics organization, every C-E construction agency, and sundry higher headquarters had all requisitioned the materials they thought would be necessary for the restoration of service at the stricken installations. The result of this approach was that many surplus or even unwanted items were shipped to the Ryukyus. Another reverse effect was that some of the numerous items ordered had not reached the requisitioning organization more than a year later.

Profiting from this experience, PACAF adopted a procedure immediately after Faye which promised to be much more economical and to get items to the unit requiring them in a minimum of time. Colonel Robert E. Bohan, Jr., the SAMAP Inspector General, who was at Kadena AB, was appointed SAMAP Task Force Commander for Typhoon Faye restoration. Upon formally assuming this position in the office of the 313th Air Division Director of Materiel, Colonel Bohan appointed Major William E. Hignite, Commander of the 17th Communications Construction Squadron and SAMAP Liaison Officer, as the C-E Project Officer for the Air Force in the Ryukyus area.

An assessment of damage became the order of the day, and within a matter of hours an approximate estimate of the harm sustained by Air Force

C-E facilities was ready for dispatch to SAMAP. On 28 September, a Major Arcuri and a Mr. Bush, both assigned to SAMAP, arrived at Kadena to assist in the assessment of C-E damage. Their first visit was to Miyako Jima in company with two enlisted personnel of the 17th CCS. Upon their return, Major Arcuri, accompanied by two men of the 17th CCS, flew north to Okino-Erabu Shima on 29 September, while Mr. Bush and two other airmen of the 17th made their way to Kume Jima.

After all damages were assessed by 17th Communications Construction Squadron personnel, Major Hignite met with his people at 1400 hours on 29 September and compiled a book format listing of C-E facilities at Kadena, Naha, Deragawa, the China Sea Receiver Site, Onna Point, and the AC&W sites which had suffered damage. This report, entitled Project Big Wind, was presented to General Hipps, Colonel Haskins, and their respective staffs at 0900 on the 30th. It was stressed at this briefing that the list of items needed for typhoon restoration of each unit would have to be requisitioned by each unit through normal supply channels under Project Big Wind.

A message from CINCPACAF authorized the use of material from certain C-E schemes at Kadena for typhoon restoration only. In addition, some 8,000 pounds of C-E equipment was airlifted from SAMAP to aid in typhoon restoration, being assigned to the 17th CCS. The latter organization released the material as each agency demonstrated its genuine requirement to aid in the work of restoration. This crew was first sent to Onna Point.

This headquarters gave the 17th Communications Construction Squadron

a priority for the restoration of the various C-E facilities, which the 17th CCS followed in dispatching eight construction crews and eight cable splicing crews on the projects listed.[127]

At Naha Air Base the prompt action of personnel from the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons in security unit aircraft and support equipment limited damage in these categories to a negligible point. This was especially fortunate, as the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had just received nine additional F-86D's on 23 September from units recently inactivated in Japan, giving the wing a total inventory of 56 Sabrejets on which Faye might test her muscles.[128]

Less lucky, perhaps because more immobile, the temporary type structures at Naha AB took quite a mauling from the typhoon winds, which ranged as high as 148 knots at that base. Building T-49, a supply storage warehouse which had been used as the Base Supply building until permanent Building #72 was completed, was entirely destroyed. In addition, all but 6,000 square feet of Building T-47, a temporary "joined-quonset" type of structure, was so severely damaged that it was deemed a hazard to personnel and aircraft and removed in its entirety. In the loss of these two buildings, the wing was deprived of 108,000 square feet of vital storage and even more vital maintenance shop space. Elsewhere at Naha an estimated $39,000 worth of damage was done to overhead electrical distribution lines; three temporary dependent houses were blown from their foundations; approximately one mile of security fencing was blown down and the earth around the concrete foundations of the fence posts severely eroded; the access road to Senaga Shima was again rendered inaccessible by high water and winds, requiring its subsequent

reconstruction; and the progressive erosion of filled earth on the slopes of the underground tanks at POL Farm #3 was aggravated by the heavy rainfall accompanying Faye.

Attesting to the wisdom of replacing temporary buildings with ones of reinforced concrete construction as rapidly as possible, even though the initial cost might seem forbidding, was the relative impunity with which such structures as already existed came through the typhoon. Only superficial damage in the form of broken window panes for the most part, some damage to doors, and minor water damage to interiors marked the visit of Faye to these "fortified" buildings.

Although the aircraft of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing came through the storm with few souvenirs, those of the sister services using Naha Air Base were not so fortunate. One witness reported seeing "three Marine aircraft taxiing down the field in reverse. They were lashed together and were empty. They crashed into a big Navy patrol craft and smashed all four." Whether this was all of the Navy and Marine aircraft damaged by Typhoon Faye is not known by this writer.[129]

Within 12 hours following the "All Clear", the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing submitted a preliminary report of damage, including dollar value, to 313th. The development of essential replacement projects was immediately undertaken, and, in addition to ones for the repair of damage to temporary and permanent facilities at Naha and the AC&W sites, replacement projects were submitted for 38,000 square feet of maintenance shop space on the site of Building T-47 and 22,000 square feet of permanent supply warehousing on the location of the late Building T-49. Emergency contractual action was taken to repair the access road to Senaga Shima,

the reserve ammunition storage area, while immediate steps were taken by the 51st Installations Engineer to restore utilities to the maximum extent and repair the security fence.[130]

A flash report sent to PACAF and Fifth Air Force by the Engineering Branch of 313th's Office of Installations soon after the storm estimated the damage at Naha Air Base as $1,000,000; that at Kadena Air Base as $1,500,000; and that at the various outlying sites as $175,000. Although C-E personnel had found little damage at the AC&W sites other than P-52, subsequent visits by representatives of the Facilities Support Branch found that restoration work at Miyako Jima Air Station, for example, would cost approximately $14,000. A good part of this sum would go into the re-erection of security fences.[131]

Where the aircraft at Naha--Air Force, at least--had come through the typhoon with little harm, those at Kadena were lashed, battered, and overturned with utmost abandon. The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, suffered major damage to four of its RF-84F's and minor damage to two others when a one-quarter quonset building and a nose dock were demolished in the immediate area of the aircraft, hurling debris in every direction. The total cost in aircraft parts requiring replacement or repair came to $97,784. Two maintenance stands and an engine stand with a replacement cost of about $2,500 were destroyed or incurred major damage. Altogether, it was estimated that $128,953.66 would be required to repair or replace the damage caused by Typhoon Faye, and this figure did not include the cost of replacing the buildings and nose dock that had been destroyed.[132]

Nor was the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron the only organization to have its effective strength severely curtailed. Five F-86-F's received major damage and 17 others minor damage; five F-100D's sustained minor damage; two T-33's sustained major damage and three minor; a C-124 received major damage; seven C-47's received major damage; one C-54 and a C-118 were damaged, but it could not be determined immediately whether to a major or a minor degree; and two SA-16's were victims, one major, the other only minor.[133]

Although their loss was not as costly from the aspect of either money or mission support, temporary type structures contributed in even greater numbers to the toll run up by Faye. It is impossible to distinguish absolutely between buildings destroyed and those so severely damaged as to be recommended for disposal, but an attempt will be made to segregate these two categories in the following lists and to include a third category of buildings which were to be repaired by Installations shop effort.

Among the buildings totally demolished, ironically enough, was T-2, the quonset housing the 15th Weather Squadron Commander and the Adjutant and Personnel sections. In addition, the observing tower used by Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron, at Kadena, was damaged. Other structures demolished or blown away were T-15, a bus stop; T-100A, a shed at the Coleman Gymnasium; T-392, a nursery building reefer box; T-814, T-816, T-832, T-833, T-834, T-851, T-853, and T-860--all nose docks; T-2019, a quonset in the rear of the Oxygen Plant; T-2020, an 8' x 8' wood frame shed; T-2223, base disposal; T-2318, in the POL parking area; T-755,

an 8'x 10' wood frame transmitter building; T-852, a 20'x20' and 10'x16' quonset and frame building on Kadena Airfield; T-9030, a 16'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-9013, a 16'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-9028, an 8'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-9056, a 16'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-9095, an 8'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-9098, an 8'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack; T-4029, a 20'x56' quonset in the ammunition area; T-2149, a 16'x20' frame building; T-2458, a 12'x22' and 4'x9' frame building used as a latrine; T-2460, a 17'x34' frame building; T-3513, an 8'x12' frame building; jet blast deflectors; T-206, a wood frame shed at Bishagawa; T-241, a wood frame shed at Bishagawa; T-243, a wood frame shed at Bishagawa; T-244, a wood frame shed at Bishagawa; T-245, a wood frame shed at Bishagawa; T-249, a quonset shop at Bishagawa; T-5101, the unused control tower at Yontan Auxiliary Air Field; T-5102, a quonset at Yontan AAF; T-5103, a quonset at Yontan AAF; T-5311, a wood frame building at Yontan AAF; T-6005, a special projects shed at Yontan AAF; and T-5007, the Yontan water point building.[134]

The structures which were so severely damaged as to be recommended for disposal (i.e., razing), either because the cost of repairing them would be inordinately high or because there was little or no future need for them, were as follows: T-41, a quonset airmen's barracks, damaged and badly deteriorated; T-49, an old concrete block latrine, lost its roof, windows and doors; T-52, the former Doolittle Restaurant in the 313th Air Division barracks area, was partially demolished, and had deteriorated badly even before the typhoon; T-96 suffered complete

demolition of one portion, this part only being recommended for disposal; T-28, the old Bell's dry cleaning shop, was generally battered; T-169, a two-man prefabricated BOQ lost all of one side; both bulkheads were blown out of administrative quonset T-205; the two old quonsets-T-224 and T-225--housing the American Express Bank before its transfer to a permanent building, were both damaged beyond hope of repair and were extremely hazardous; T-226, the old accounting office quonset, was left in similar condition; T-318, a jumbo quonset at Bishagawa used as commissary storage, suffered damage to a bulkhead; T-363, a dependent house in the women's quarters area, lost its entire rear end and part of the roof; T-427, an old prefabricated BOQ was badly mauled; T-1190, the quonset used by the MARS station, was severely damaged; T-1420, a metal frame two-man BOQ, was not hurt too much by Faye, but, as it was not used and was already in poor condition, it was recommended for disposal; T-1492, a quonset which had formerly held the hobby shop, lost both ends and bulkheads; T-1501, located in the Installations Engineer Supply area, was left in a state of near collapse; T-1526, an old BOQ in the rear of the Rawinsonde building, was recommended for disposal as much because there was no requirement for the vacant structure as by reason of typhoon damage sustained; T-1792, a shed in the rear of the old Rocker Club, was in a state of collapse and, besides, contained only junk; T-2021, a quonset in the rear of the oxygen plant, was damaged and in the way of new construction; T-2045, located between Hard Stands 221 and 315, was severely hurt; T-1794, a wooden shed full of junk, was near collapse; T-2085 and T-2087, in the storage area, were both in a state of collapse; T-2098, at Bolo Point, justified demolition; T-2129, a part of the old

boat pool inside the flight line, in the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron area, was recommended for disposal, as were T-2501, a quonset in the SAC area, T-3120, in Supply Area #2; Buildings 4003, 4006, 4009, 4019, and 4025 in the old 12th Aviation Depot Squadron area; the bulkhead of T-5119 was caved in; both bulkheads of T-6015 were gone; T-850 and T-852, 11'x16' wood buildings, were both in poor condition and consititued hazards; T-2140, a 16'x24' prefabricated building situated between Hardstands 209 and 221; T-2096, a 6'x20' wood frame building covered with sheet metal; T-2350, a 12'x20' quonset metal frame at Hardstand 330; T-9074, a 16'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack in the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron area; T-9075, a 16'x20' quonset northeast of Taxiway #3, used as a crew chief shack; T-9007, a 16'x20' quonset crew chief shack; T-9094, a 16'x20' quonset crew chief shack; T-9096, an 80'x20' quonset used as a crew chief shack in the 12th FBS area; T-9099, a 16'x20' quonset northeast of Taxiway #3, formerly used for ammunition storage; T-2081, a 20'x72' quonset located between Hardstands #112 and 205 and used by the 322d Troop Carrier Squadron as a shop, would have to be completely rebuilt; T-9011, an 8'x20' quonset crew chief shack located in the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron area; and a shed between T-2166 and T-2167, approximately 10'x16' wood frame, metal covered, formerly used for storage by CAT Airline.[135]

The list of buildings which were damaged but scheduled for repair by Installations Engineer shop effort was as follows: T-803, repair the roof, windows, and doors; T-821, replace double doors; T-822, repair the doors and jambs; T-823, repair the roof; T-839, repair the roof and bulkheads;

T-861, repair the bulkhead, interior partitions, and roof; T-874, replace metal on the cooling unit; T-1487; T-1880, T-2009, repair the bulkhead; T-2009A, repair the bulkhead; T-2018, repair the roof; T-2036, repair double doors; T-2049, repair double doors, roof, and roof jack; T-2046, repair the bulkhead; T-2047, repair the roof; T-2050, repair the roof; T-2060, repair flashing; T-2066, repair the roof jack; T-2090, repair sheet metal on bulkhead, roof and cables; T-2099, repair bulkhead; T-2092, repair roof jack; T-2128, repair metal doors; T-2149, repair bulkhead; T-2161, repair double doors; T-2166, repair metal door; T-2165, repair double doors; T-2168, repair roof and roof jack; T-2170, repair roof jack; T-2171, repair roof; T-2173, repair eyebrow metal; T-2129, repair bulkhead and doors; T-2195, repair roof jack and louvered doors; T-2217, repair roof; T-2219, repair bulkhead; T-2262, repair flashing; T-2450, replace sheet metal on bulkhead; T-9010, replace sheet metal on bulkhead; 3511A, replace metal door; T-717, general restoration; and T-2457, repair roof.[136]

A wry note was injected into the story of Typhoon Faye by the mushroom growth of rumors accounting for the extreme destructiveness of this particular typhoon. In Tokyo it was bruited about immediately afterward that "penny pinching" was to blame for the heavy toll of aircraft. Press reports from that city said that the current Air Force economy drive had denied the aircraft sufficient gasoline to evacuate to a safer area. These reports were branded as "fantastic" by an Air Force spokesman, who stated that a number of support aircraft had

evacuated Okinawa in advance of the storm, and that those which were caught were the victims of a "whim of nature."

This theory of a "whim of nature" as the real culprit, rather than an error in judgment on the part of top officials was given further substance and identity by this nebulous "spokesman" through his explanation that Faye "combined the destructive features of both the typhoon and the twister tornado." This glib statement, of course, ignored the meteorological law that a tornado and a typhoon rarely occur in conjunction, since the former achieves its greater violence by its sudden introduction into a very small area, where it abruptly plunges the barometric pressure far below normal, thus sucking the air out of buildings at the same moment that its winds smash them from the outside. As a result, even concrete and brick structures frequently collapse when hit by tornadoes. A typhoon, on the other hand, approaches slowly enough that the barometric pressure gradually decreases in advance of its coming, with the result that no vacuum is created. Thus, a tornado is actually different from a typhoon only in velocity, area affected, and the duration of its attack; but, by the same token, the two are, by the book definition, mutually incompatible. A tornado is extremely unlikely to form in an area whose pressure has already been lowered by the approach of a typhoon.[137]

Perhaps the most fatuous utterance to come out of Faye, however, was that attributed by the Okinawa Morning Star to "an Air Force spokesman" who was at least wise enough to remain anonymous. "Actually," he is quoted as having asserted, "this typhoon saved us money. It cleared the area of a number of buildings which were scheduled for removal anyway."[138]

In October, time having been allowed for a more detailed assessment of damage, the Office of Installations submitted a Typhoon Faye Repair and Restoration Program simultaneously to Headquarters, PACAF and Fifth Air Force. This program consisted of 10 projects for Kadena totalling $1,647,300 and 15 projects for Naha totalling $928,354. An ad hoc committee at PACAF then reviewed the program on 22-23 October and recommended that Kadena projects totalling $233,000 be disapproved, $259,000 be approved, $850,000 be resubmitted with additional justification or clarification, and $304,800 be accomplished as P-458 projects. With respect to the Naha projects, the committee recommended that $202,000 be disapproved, $596,429 be rejustified or clarified, and $129,925 be accomplished as P-458 projects. Thus, none of the Naha projects were actually approved.[139]

In consonance with these decisions of the PACAF ad hoc committee, 313th revised the program and resubmitted it on 12 November, with 10 projects to be accomplished from the first increment of P-459.2 funds in the amount of $500,000. These 10 projects were included in the revised FY-58 O&M Program. In addition, those projects which were above the major command's approval authorization were transmitted to higher headquarters for necessary essentiality approval. This applied to Projects KAD-305-8 for Repair of Electrical Distribution System, at an estimated cost of $225,000, and Naha Project NAH-35-8, Partial Restoration of Building T-47 at an estimated cost of $285,000.

P-341 projects to replace flimsy sheet metal buildings located on the flight lines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases were transmitted to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for essentiality approval and funding. These

projects were to provide each operational squadron with a Headquarters and Operations Building and a Shop Aircraft Organizational Maintenance Building. Each of these buildings was to be of concrete block with a reinforced concrete roof, and each was estimated to cost $25,000.[140]

As was usual in the case of the typhoons visiting the Ryukyus, most of the loss of life was suffered by the natives, whose homes were far flimsier than the dependent houses, BOQ's, and barracks of the military. A total of 46 Okinawans were killed, 59 seriously injured, 160 slightly injured, and 78 (all males) missing--the latter being chiefly fishermen, whose fate might not be known for weeks in some cases, or ever in others. One Marine was the victim of a fractured skull and died in the Ryukyus Army Hospital.

On the material side of things, 12,414 Okinawans were made homeless through the total destruction of 3,094 dwellings. Another 3,967 homes were partially destroyed; 112 public buildings were totally destroyed and another 229 damaged; 3,829 non-dwellings were totally destroyed and 2,430 damaged. Thirteen vessels of more than five tons were sunk, 28 were grounded, 20 damaged, six were missing; 49 under five tons were missing, and 83 under five tons were damaged. In addition, three bridges were washed out and roads on the island were washed out at 27 different places. (These figures for Okinawa are in addition to those given above for Yaeyama and Miyako Guntos.[141]

Among the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) public buildings destroyed were practically all of those comprising the tuberculosis sanitarium at Hamada Village in Kin Son. There the patients saved

themselves from injury by cowering under their hospital beds while the sinds raged outside, then tore away the roofs of their quonset wards from right over their heads. Some of the patients were evacuated to the Koza Central Hospital, but most had to be sent to their homes. As late as December 1958 the work of constructing new buildings for the Kin Sanitarium, either of wood with tile roofs, or of concrete block, was still in progress. Meantime, however, many of the ones completed earlier in the year had long since been occupied and placed in use. Incidentally, one of the government buildings at Miyako Jima damaged by Typhoon Faye was a new tuberculosis hospital which had been formally dedicated only one month before Faye. Most of the roof of one ward was ripped off.

Vessels of the Taiwan Patrol Force anchored in Buckner Bay when reports of Faye's approach were received hurriedly put to sea shortly before midnight of September 25th, thus escaping any damage. The Navy installations at White Beach, on the tip of the Katsuren Peninsula, sustained very little damage, because of the narrow path followed by the storm.

The Marines at Camp Hansen, near Kin Village, Okinawa, were left homeless when the typhoon leveled most of the quonset structures on that base, although the wise precaution of evacuating most of the men ahead of the storm to permanent type barracks at Sukiran prevented loss of life. Camp Kinser, a tent area for the most part, was also stricken, but the monetary loss was probably not too great, and the personnel had been evacuated beforehand. Camps Hauge and Courtney, also 3d Marine

Division installations, were likewise hit hard, though not nearly so destructively as Hansen and Kinser.[142]

THE AFTERMATH OF TYPHOON FAYE

Since Typhoon Faye constituted the first real test of the new rigid radomes under actual field conditions, it was only natural that the people at Lincoln Laboratory and Rome Air Force Depot who had played such an important part in their development should be deeply interested in learning how well the domes had fared and in what respects improvements or modifications were indicated. Faye had hardly left the area when this headquarters received a message from the Cambridge Research Center on 27 September requesting that it be advised of the effects of the strong winds on the rigid radomes recently installed. The TWX also wished to know the maximum and average wind velocity and the duration of the typhoon.[143]

The maintenance people at this headquarters were swamped with work in the days immediately following Faye, but by 2 October they were able to draw up a reply. The highest winds experienced at the radar sites had been recorded at Yae Take Air Station where peak winds of 150 to 160 miles-per-hour were encountered for approximately two hours, while occasional gusts in excess of 200 m.p.h. were recorded during a 30-minute period at the very height of the storm. Despite the violence of the elements, the rigid radomes had suffered no material damage as a result of either the high winds themselves or flying debris, except for a loosening of the nuts and bolts brought about by the

severe vibration to which the radomes were subjected. This was true of all the radomes, to a greater or lesser degree, but at P-52 over 100 nuts had fallen completely off their bolts. In view of this, it was believed that had the storm been of longer duration, major damage to, or even complete loss of, the rigid radomes would have resulted. Therefore, this headquarters planned to submit an Unsatisfactory Report on the nut-bolt combination currently in use on the radomes.[144]

Even before sending this reply to the Cambridge Research Center, this headquarters had taken steps to place the radomes in readiness for any succeeding typhoons that might come their way before a solution to the nut-bolt problem had been provided. In a radiogram of 1 October, 313th requested the Commanders of the 623d and 624th AC&W Squadrons to make a physical inspection of every panel in each of the nine radomes to uncover any latent damage, to replace missing nuts and bolts, and to re-tighten all of the others, employing a minimum of 40 pounds' torque, as soon as possible.[145]

Equally concerned with the obvious, unpleasant possibilities inherent in the existing system of securing the nuts to the bolts, SAMAP radioed Rome Air Force Depot on 1 October to ask that "immediate attention be given to the resolution of this problem" with the Clark AB depot being advised of any recommended solution. SAMAP had already tried without success to locate lock washers or nuts within its area which could be used with the Tight Top bolts. In the absence of these items, the depot had considered burring the threads of the bolts after the nuts had been installed and tightened, as well as applying varnish or glyptol on the

bolts during installation. Inasmuch as a total of 80,000 bolt assemblies were involved, SAMAP suggested that Rome give no consideration to the use of keyways, cotter pins, or any similar devices.[146]

Rome responded to this urgent plea with a recommendation that SAMAP coat the threads of the radome bolts with Permetex #1, glyptol, or varnish, as an interim measure. While this program was being carried out, all activities connected with Tight Top should prepare detailed reports on the problem of insecure nuts and any other matters relative to the project. As soon as these reports were received, the Director of Maintenance Engineering at the depot would initiate a complete investigation of the problem, and try to come up with a more permanent solution.[147]

On 16 October this headquarters was able to inform SAMAP that the 10th Communications Construction Flight crew assigned to caulk the radomes was correcting the various deficiencies noted in the respective acceptance certificates. As they tightened the nuts on the radomes, so that they slightly depressed the plastic material of the panels, they were securing the nuts with glyptol and varnish on their outer faces and on the bolt ends. By so doing, they obviated the need for a technical assistance team.[148] In a U.R. submitted on 25 October, however, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing recommended that all <u>future</u> radome kits include lock washers which would be inserted between the flat washers and the nuts. Also, a specific torque value should be established and all affected organizations notified accordingly.[149]

The caulking program did not go equally well, however. The crew from SAMAP assigned to this job soon found that the plastic nozzles furnished with the caulking guns frequently broke while being used.

Besides, the smallness of the nozzle tip and the largeness of the irregular seams encountered in the Zenith radomes combined to make the task more time-consuming and absorbed great quantities of the compound. Although 30 gallons were supposed to be shipped with each radome, Universal had supplied only 10 gallons of caulking compound with all of its radomes except Tight Top No. 4 at Kume Jima and Tight Top No. 10 at Miyako Jima. Twenty gallons had been supplied for each of these two. For its part, Zenith furnished no compound at all for Tight Top No. 6 or Tight Top No. 7 (P-56 and P-52 radomes respectively), but had seen fit to provide 10 gallons for Tight Top No. 8 (formerly known as Tight Top No. 6-2) at Yae Take. Thus, 90 gallons of caulking compound, in all, had been received. The SAMAP Liaison Officer at Kadena estimated on 16 October that 25 additional gallons of compound would be needed to complete caulking of the radomes at P-53 and P-54. In addition, he requested Rome AFD to ship 75 more gallons for future use in rehabilitation of the radomes--10 gallons for each Zenith radome, because the larger seams resulting from a poor fit, and five gallons for each Universal bubble.[150]

By 8 November the situation had become so critical that SAMAP prepared a radiogram for Rome declaring that 110 gallons of caulking compound were "urgently required." The Griffiss AFB depot was requested to take "expeditious action" to prevent a work stoppage on or before 15 November, and SAMAP asked that Rome give its reply "Priority" handling. Through some administrative error, however, SAMAP's own message citing its urgent need was assigned "Deferred" handling, so that it did not even leave that headquarters until 12 November, four days after it was

submitted for transmittal.[151]

Meanwhile, on 12 October, this headquarters had informed Fifth Air Force that although varnish or glyptol was being used on the nut-bolt assemblies as a temporary expedient to prevent loosening, several permanent remedies had been considered. These included (1) replacement of the slick washers which had accompanied the radomes with shake-proof washers, (2) replacement of the nuts presently in use with a self-locking type nut, (3) use of a jam nut in connection with the presently installed nut, (4) use of a cotter key and keyway in the bolt, or (5) burring the threads of the bolt after the nut was in place. However, two of these possible remedies were relegated to the realm of the theoretical, at least for the time being, as no lock washers or lock nuts were available within SAMAP resources, nor through regular supply channels available to this command, nor yet by local purchase on Okinawa. A third of the possibilities was also pretty well eliminated by SAMAP's suggestion that keyways and cotter pins be omitted from consideration because of the installation problem involved in 80,000 bolt assemblies. As for the suggestion that the threads of the bolts be burred, this would possess the disadvantage of making removal of the nuts practically impossible, short of sawing off the bolts, in the event removal of a damaged panel became necessary.

This headquarters still looked upon shake-proof lock washers as the most expedient and economical solution of the problem; therefore, Fifth Air Force was requested to assist 313th in obtaining 45,000 phosphor bronze or stainless steel shake-proof lock washers through local purchase

or manufacture in Japan.[152]

When several weeks had gone by and no shake-proof lock washers of the type desired were forthcoming, this headquarters came to the gradual realization that perhaps all of this added expense would not be necessary after all, as the glyptol and varnish used as a temporary measure appeared to secure the nuts with a vise-like grip that could hardly be improved upon. Besides, as an Unsatisfactory Report on the Universal radome submitted by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing observed, the installation of lock washers would entail the removal and replacement of 4,200 nuts and 4,200 washers on each radome, which would, in turn, necessitate the radar set's being off the air for a week in each case. The use of lock nuts, on the other hand, would cut the time involved in the operation by more than 50 per cent, and site personnel could perform the installation job without outside assistance from SAMAP.[153]

Still, the lock nuts were not readily available, and the glyptol seemed to be doing the job. Hence, this headquarters contemplated no further action in the matter, unless new developments brought about a change in views.[154] Of course, there was no way of determining for certain just how efficacious the glyptol-varnish treatment really was until it could be subjected to trial by combat with a full-fledged typhoon. And Faye happened to be the last one to inflict herself on the Ryukyu Islands in 1957.

INSTALLATION OF THE AN/FPS-6 RADOME AT MIYAKO COMPLETES PROJECT TIGHT TOP

On 23 October, 63 boxes of Tight Top No. 9 components for the AN/FPS-6 height finder at P-53 arrived at Kadena by air shipment, and



were followed by the two remaining boxes the same week. All 65 boxes were shipped from Naha Port to Miyako Jima on the 28th, arriving the next day. In preparation for the erection of this tenth and last radome in the Ryukyus Air Defense System, SAMAP dispatched a factory-trained non-commissioned officer and eight experienced airmen on 30 October to assist the crews already on hand. On 11 November 1957, the rigid radome, a Zenith Plastics Co. product, instead of the Universal Moulded Products Corp. item which this headquarters had previously been led to believe it would be, was completed. With this action Project Tight Top was brought to a close for all practical purposes. All that remained was the caulking of the two radomes at Kume Jima, and, since no more compound was on hand, this action would have to wait until the 110 gallons requisitioned from Rome Air Force Depot were received. At the end of the year this additional caulking compound had not yet arrived on Okinawa.[155]

As a postcript to Project Tight Top, it is interesting to note that the four flexible radomes which had been dismantled to make way for the rigid radomes--including the sturdy one at P-53 which had ridden out Typhoon Faye so successfully--were shipped to Guam in November for employment on Site P-57 at Mount Santa Rosa. What fate befell them there is not known, nor is it a part of this story.[156]

Also by way of epilogue, it may not be amiss to mention the action which was taken in connection with the antennas as the AC&W sites. The reader of the foregoing account of Typhoon Faye or of the 1956 typhoon season can not but have become aware of the extreme vulnerability of the



antennas to high winds. However, he may not appreciate just how susceptible the AS-505 was to moisture, as well. But this innocence was not shared by the Materiel people in this command. Long, hard thought on the problem finally produced a possible solution in the form of coating the antennas externally with neoprene compound. Two AS-505 UHF antennas were given this treatment and installed at P-52 on 25 October 1957. After the results had been observed for a month, during which neither antenna had shorted out even once, action was taken in November to coat all of the AS-505 UHF antennas within the 313th Air Division in the same way.

Another antenna which had proved to be a veritable reed in the storm was the AS-20 HF. In December 1957, 20 "ruggedized" AS-20 HF antennas were received and also installed at Yae Take Air Station, the highest and generally most severely battered of the AC&W sites. These "ruggedized" antennas were built to withstand winds in excess of 150 m.p.h., and were scheduled for eventual installation at all sites within 313th Air Division.[157]

MEASUREMENTS OF RAINFALL AT THE DETACHMENTS OF THE 15TH WEATHER SQUADRON

Although not closely related to the story of Project Tight Top, the statistics on rainfall at the various detachments of the 15th Weather Squadron for the six-month period are of interest as being illustrative of a secondary hazard against which the rigid radomes were to furnish protection in the months to come--the primary one, of course, being typhoons.

Detachment #1 at Clark AB recorded 40.55 inches of rainfall from 1 July through 31 December 1957. Detachment #2 at Andersen AFB, Guam, led the way with 53.83 inches. Detachment #4 at Kadena AB suffered from an unusually dry year--in part because of the visit of only one typhoon--but still managed to record 24.04 inches. Detachment #6 at Iwo Jima received 29.82 inches. Detachment #7 at Naha AB differed only slightly from Detachment #4, measuring 25.41 inches. Detachment #9 at Itazuke AB, Japan, had a drenching 46.12 inches, for runner-up honors. Detachment #10 at Ashiya AB, Japan, came in third with 42.28 inches. Detachment #25 at Eniwetok recorded 36.31 inches. And Detachment #26 on Johnston Island had to be content with a frugal 8.09 inches of rainfall.[158]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	---	Historical Data Report (HDR), 529th Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Group, May 1951, pp. 14-15; HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., May 1951, pp. 1-2.
2	---	HDR, 529th AC&W Gp., Apr. 1951, p. 15.
3	---	HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., Oct. 1951, p. 3.
4	---	Ibid., April-June 1954, pp. 32-33.
5	---	HDR, 623d AC&W Sq., April-June 1954, pp. 17-19.
6	---	HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., July-Sept. 1954, pp. 27-30; HDR, 529th AC&W Gp., 1 July-31 Dec. 1954, pp. 20-21.
7	---	HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., July-Sept. 1954, p. 17.
8	---	Ibid., pp. 15-18.
9	---	HDR, 623d AC&W Sq., Oct.-Dec. 1954, pp. 13-16.
10	---	HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., July-Sept. 1955, pp. 10-12, 14.
11	---	Ibid., Oct.-Dec. 1955, pp. 25, 29.
12	---	HDR, 623d AC&W Sq., July-Dec. 1955, pp. 12-13.
13	---	HDR, 623d AC&W Sq., July-Dec. 1955, pp. 23-24; HDR, Director of Materiel (D/M), Hq. 313th Air Div., Sept. 1955, p. 12, Oct. 1955, p. 10, Nov. 1955, p. 10, Dec 1955, p. 13.
14	---	HDR, 624th AC&W Sq., Jan.-June 1956, p. 6.
15	8	Ltr., Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 39th, 41st, 43d, and 313th Air Divisions, sub.: Radome, Maintenance and Repair, 7 Jan. 1956.
16	9	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Davit Arms, 12 Jan. 1956
17	10	624th AC&W Sq. SOP No. 6, sub.: Radar Maintenance: Elimination of Radome Hazards, 24 Jan. 1956.
18	11	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Japanese Nationals to Paint Radomes at AC&W Sites, 26 Jan. 1956.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
19	12	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Radome Overhaul Program, 31 Jan. 1956.
20	-- 13	HDR, D/M, Hq. 313th Air Div., Feb. 1956, pp. 19-20; 313MC-M 1004-D, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 17/0700Z Apr. 1956.
21	--	HDR, D/M, Hq. 313th Air Div., May 1956, p. 12.
22	--	HDR, 623d AC&W Sq., Jan.-June 1956, p. 14.
23	14	313MC-M 2687-E, Comdr, 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 17/0500Z May 1956.
24	15	313MC-M 2811-E, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 22/0616Z May 1956.
25	16	Ltr., Comdr., Miyako Jima Air Station to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956.
26	16	2d ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 1 June 1956.
27	17	5FMME-E 12428, Comdr. 5th AF to Bendix FEAF Depot, 24/0925Z May 1956.
28	18	313MC-M 2932-E, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Bendix FEAF Depot, 29/0246Z May 1956.
29	16	3d ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. SAMAP, 7 June 1956.
30	16	4th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. SAMAP to Comdr. 5th AF, 25 June 1956.
31	16	5th ind., (Ltr., Comdr, Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. FEAF (ADv), 6 July 1956.
32	16	6th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. FEAF to Comdr. AMFPA, 13 July 1956.
33	16	9th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. NAMAP to Comdr. SAMAP, 31 July 1956.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
34	---	Bendix Radio Contractor Maintenance Digest, Jan. 1956, pp. 2-4.
35	19	MRMTNA-8-4-E, Comdr. RAFD Griffiss AFB to Comdr. 51st FIW, 08/1853Z Aug. 1956.
36	20	5FMME-E 19057, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. Rome AFD, 10/0210Z Aug. 1956.
37	16	10th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radomes, 23 May 1956), Hq. SAMAP to Comdr. AMFPA, 14 Aug. 1956.
38	16	11th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. AMFPA to Comdr. FEAF, 4 Sept. 1956.
39	--- 21	HDR, D/M, Hq. 313th Air Div., Aug. 1956, p. 12; Tabulation of antennas and radomes destroyed or damaged during the 1956 typhoon season, prepared for internal use by the C-E Branch, 313th Air Div. D/M.
40	21	Ibid.
41	22	MC-M 7117M, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 18/0517Z Dec. 1956.
42	16	12th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 7 Sept. 1956.
43	23	5FMSS-AC21697, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. SAMAP, 07/0943Z Sept. 1956.
44	--- 21	HDR, D/M, Hq 313th Air Div., Sept. 1956, p. 13; Tabulation of antennas and radomes destroyed or damaged during the 1956 typhoon season, prepared for internal use by the C-E Branch, 313th Air Div. D/M.
45	24	FFOAC-E-A 36966, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. Rome AFD, 11/0730Z Sept. 1956.
46	25	313MC-M 53071, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 12 Sept. 1956.
47	26	5FMME-E 22328, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. NAMAP, 13/0930Z Sept. 1956.
48	16	13th ind., (Ltr., Comdr. Miyako Jima AS to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Condition of FPS-6 Radome, 23 May 1956), Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 13 Sept. 1956.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
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50	27	MC-M 5479-T, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 26/0547Z Sept. 1956.
51	28	5FMME-E 24361, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 05/0710Z Oct. 1956.
52	22	MC-M 711M, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 18/0517Z Dec. 1956.
53	29	PSMD-12 4587-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 03/1046Z Dec. 1956.
54	29	Ibid.
55	30	6FMME-E 30622, Hq. 5th AF to Hq. 313th Air Div., 17/0152Z Dec. 1956.
56	---	Daily Staff Journals (DJ), D/M, Hq. 313th Air Div., 7, 24 Jan. 1957; 8 Feb. 1957; 12, 19, 25 March 1957; 5 Apr. 1957; HR, D/M, Jan. 1957, p. 9; Mar. 1957, p. 10; Apr. 1957, p. 9.
57	---	DJ, D/M, 12 Apr. 1957; HR, D/M, Apr. 1957, p. 9.
58	---	DJ, D/M, 2 Jan. 1957.
59	31	Ltr., M.I.T. Lincoln Laboratory (Joseph A. Vitale, Head, Div. 7, to Col. Frank R. Webster, Jr., Deputy IG, Hq. Pacific Air Force/FEAF (Rear), 10 Jan. 1957.
60	---	HR, D/M, Feb. 1957, p. 9.
61	32	MCFCC-3-259-E, Comdr. AMC to Comdr. FEAF, 28/1743Z March 1957.
62	33	FFMME 15316-55, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 05/0818W Apr. 1957.
63	34	PSMDP-4 3825-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 09/0805Z Apr. 1957.
64	35	313MC-M U-4-299, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 15/0728Z Apr. 1957.
65	36	MRF-4-75-E GHAJQT, Comdr. RAFD to SAMAP, 22/2205Z Apr. 1957.
66	37	MCSDCP-5-1947-E, Comdr. AMC to Comdr. SAMAP, 03/2152Z May 1957.

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67	38	PSMDP-5 4288-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 17/0331Z May 1957.
68	39	MRF-5-45-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. SAMAP, 20/1843Z May 1957.
69	40	313MC-M U-5-578, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. RAFD, 31/0648Z May 1957.
70	41	MRF-6-16-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 04/1808Z June 1957.
71	42	SAMAP-L U-6-18, SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, to Comdr. SAMAP, 10/0100Z June 1957.
72	43	MCSDCP-6-1710-E, Comdr. AMC to Comdr. RAFD, 11/2122Z June 1957.
73	44	FFMME 18965, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. SAMAP, 17/0555Z June 1957.
74	45	LSMDP-6 4720-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. FEAF, 19/0907Z June 1957.
75	46	PSMDP 4792-E, Comdr. SAMAP to SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, 26/0706Z June 1957.
76	--	DJ, D/M, 17 June 1957.
77	--	Ibid., 28 June 1957.
78	47	313MC-M-U-7-112, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD, 05/0752Z July 1957; HR, D/M, July 1957, p. 8; 623CC G030, Comdr. 623d AC&W Sq. to Comdr. SAMAP, 03/1420Z July 1957.
79	49	313MC-M U-7-365, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. AFCRC, 20/0145Z July 1957.
80	50	CRLE 7-24-2-E, Comdr. AFCRC to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 25/2007Z July 1957.
81	51	PSS 7-46-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdrs. Rome AFD and SMAMA, 19/0919Z July 1957.
82	52	SMSW-7-19-E, Comdr. SMAMA to Comdr. SAMAP, 26/0008Z July 1957.
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86	54	313MC-M U-7-516, Hq. 313th Air Div. to CONCPACAF, 29/0655Z July 1957.
87	55	313MC-M U-8-133, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 05/0532Z Aug. 1957.
88	56	MRF-8-IAE, Comdr. RAFD to Hq. 313th Air Div., 07/2022Z Aug. 1957.
89	57	Ltr., 623d AC&W Sq. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Painting of Rigid Radome, 17 July 1957.
90	58	313MC-M U-7-382, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. RAFD, 23 July 1957.
91	59	MRMTNC-7-276-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 26/1320Z July 1957.
92	60	PSMDC-7 5097-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 22/0853Z July 1957.
93	61	PSMDC-8 5453E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 16/0856Z Aug. 1957.
94	62	PSMD P-8 5515 E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 22/0904Z Aut. 1957.
95	63	PSMDR-9 5652 M, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 04/0258Z Sept. 1957.
96	64	U.R., Serial No. 51FIW57-183, 51st FIW, Item: Radome, Self Supporting (Universal Moulded Products Corp.), 5 Nov. 1957.
97	65	313MC-M U-11-146, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD, 08/0200Z Nov. 1957.
98	66	Ltr., Hq. RAFD to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Rigid Radome Painting Procedure, 15 Nov. 1957.
99	67	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Painting Rigid Radomes, 19 Nov. 1957.
100	68	DF, 313MC-M to 313MC, sub.: Painting of Rigid Radomes, 22 Nov. 1957.
101	69	313MC-M U-11-444, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Bendix Radio FEAF Depot, 26/0300Z Nov. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
102	70	BXTD 00657, Bendix Radio Tokyo Depot to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 04/0005Z Dec. 1957.
103	71	313MC-M U-12-81, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD, 05/0116Z Dec. 1957.
104	--	Conversation by Command Historian with M/Sgt. Jack Farley, Radar Maint. Section, 623d AC&W Sq., 19, 25 Nov. 1958.
105	72	MRM 8-38-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 05/1038Z Aug. 1957.
106	73	313MC-M U-8-146, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD, 07/0746Z Aug. 1957.
107	-- --	History, 624th AC&W Sq., 1 July 1957-8 March 1958, pp. 5, 10-11; 313th Air Div. Vanguard, 25 Oct. 1957.
108	74	313MC-M U-8-406, Hq. 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, 22/0646Z Aug. 1957.
109	75	51HCR-S-BS 3179, Comdr. 51st ABG to Comdr. SAMAP, 31/0200Z Aug. 1957.
110	76	313MC-M U-9-34, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 04/0454Z Sept. 1957.
111	77	51 HCR-S-BS 3230, Comdr. 51st ABG to Comdr. SAMAP, 11 Sept. 1957.
112	78	313MC-M U-9-192, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., 12/0646Z Sept. 1957.
113	--	Okinawa Morning Star, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Sept. 1957.
114	79	3130C-E U-9-163, Hq. 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, Comdr. AMC, Comdr. 5th AF, Comdr. Rome AFD, Comdr. SAMAP, et al., 11/0645Z Sept. 1957.
115	80	51 HCR-S-BS 3299, Comdr. 51st ABG to Comdr. SAMAP, 20/0100Z Sept. 1957.
116	81 --	Memo. for Record, 15th Weather Squadron (WS), sub.: Narrative History of Typhoon Faye, 4 Oct. 1957; USCAR OPI Press Release, 30 Sept. 1957.

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118	82	Ltr., 623d AC&W Sq. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Evaluation of Rigid Radome Design, 11 Oct. 1957;
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	83	munications and Electronics Annex: Project Big Wind, 7 Oct. 1957.
119	82	Ltr., 623d AC&W Sq. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Evaluation of Rigid Radome Design, 11 Oct. 1957.
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	--	1957-8 March 1958, p. 11.
121	83	Typhoon Faye: the Communications and Electronics Annex: Project Big Wind, 7 Oct. 1957.
122	85	Ltr., DE, OKED, to CG 20th AF, sub.: Typhoon Shutters, 11 Sept. 1953.
123	85	1st ind., (Ltr., DE, OKED, to CG 20th AF, sub.: Typhoon Shutters, 11 Sept. 1953), Hq. 20th AF to DE, OKED, 30 Sept. 1953.
124	—	Monthly HR, 313th Air Div. Office of Installations, Nov. 1957, p. 5; Conversation by Command Historian with Mr. Otto Davis, 313th Air Div. Survey Section, Office of Installations, 12 Dec. 1958.
125	—	MHR, 313th Air Div. Inst. Office, Apr. 1958, p. 4; Conversation by Command Historian with Mr. Otto Davis, 313th Air Div. Survey Section, Office of Installations, 12 Dec. 1958.
126	84	Ltr., 624th AC&W Sq., to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Evaluation of Rigid Radome Design, 10 Oct. 1957.
127	83	Typhoon Faye: the Communications and Electronics Annex: Project Big Wind, 7 Oct. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
128	--	History, 51st FIW, 1 July-31 Dec. 1957, p. 22.
129	--	Quoted in Okinawa Morning Star of 27 Sept. 1957.
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131	--	MHR, Office of Installations, Hq., 313th Air Div., Sept. 1957, pp. 5, 7.
132	86	Ltr., 15th Tac. Recon. Sq. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Typhoon Faye, 29 Jan. 1958;
	87	KAS-FS K-4318, Comdr. 18th ABG to IG, USAF, 30/0925Z Sept. 1957.
133	87	KAS-FS K-4318, Comdr. 18th ABG to IG, USAF, 30/0925Z 1957.
134	--	DF, IE, Real Estate Office, to D/M, Hq. 6313th ABW, sub.: Review of Typhoon Damaged Buildings, 16 Oct.
	--	1957; Memo., Mrs. Ruth A. Soukup, DAFC, 6313th ABW Real Estate Office, sub.: Survey of Typhoon Damage, Kadena Air Base, 8 Oct. 1957.
135	--	Memo., Mrs. Ruth A. Soukup, DAFC, 6313th ABW Real Estate Office, sub.: Survey of Typhoon Damage, Kadena AB, 8 Oct. 1957.
136	--	Memo., 6313th IE Real Estate Office, sub.: Following Listed Buildings on Kadena Air Field to be Repaired by Installations Shop Effort, n.d.
137	--	Conversation by Command Historian with Lieut. Col. Richard C. Suehr, 15th WS Hq. Operations Section, 12, 15 Dec. 1958.
138	--	Okinawa Morning Star, 1 Oct. 1957.
139	--	MHR, Hq. 313th Air Div. Office of Installations, Oct. 1957, p. 7.
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141	--	Press Release, CPI, USCAR, 30 Sept. 1957.
142	--	Okinawa Morning Star, 27, 28, 29, 30 Sept., 1 Oct. 1957; Personal observation of Command Historian.
143	88	CRKL 9-19-M, Hq. AFCRC to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 27/2035Z Sept. 1957.

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145	90	313MC-M U-10-1, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., 01/0001Z Oct. 1957.
146	91	PSMDP-9 5988-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 01/0328Z Oct. 1957.
147	92	PSMDP-10-6154-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 10/0917Z Oct. 1957.
148	93	313MC-M U-10-278, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 16/0002Z Oct. 1957.
149	94	U.R., Serial No. 51FIW57-177, 51st FIW, Item: Radome, Self Supporting (Zenith Plastics Co.), 25 Oct. 1957.
150	95	SAMAP-L-U-9-100, SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, to Comdr. Rome AFD, 16/0000Z Oct. 1957.
151	96	PSMDC-11 6540E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 08/0653Z Nov. 1957.
152	--	313MC-M U-10-231, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 12/0135Z Oct. 1957.
153	97	U.R., Serial No. 51FIW57-192, Hq. 51st FIW, Item: Rigid Radome (Universal Moulded Products Corp.), 29 Nov. 1957.
154	98	313MC-M U-11-311, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 20/0017Z Nov. 1957.
155	---	HR, D/M, Oct. 1957, p. 8; Nov. 1957, p. 6; SAMAP-L
	99	U-9-105, SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, to Comdr.
		SAMAP, 23/0200Z Oct. 1957; PSMDP-10 6350-E, Comdr.
	100	SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 25/0747Z Oct. 1957.
156	101	313MC-U-11-273, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 3d Air Div., 16/1445Z Nov. 1957.
157	----	History, D/M, Hq., 313th Air Div., Oct. 1957, p. 8; Nov. 1957, p. 7; Dec. 1957, p. 7.
158	----	Figures obtained for Command Historian by Hq., 15th WS, 21 Jan. 1958.
----	102	Typhoon "Emma" Damage Log.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	103	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 623d AC&W Sq., sub.: Dismantling of AN/CPS-4, 7 Feb. 1956.
---	104	OFMME-E 11682, Hq. 5th AF to Comdrs. 39th, 41st, 43d, and 313th Air Divs., 16/0400Z May 1956.
---	105	313MC-M 2932-E, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Bendix FEAF Depot, 29/0246Z May 1956.
---	106	PSMDC 6642, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. AMFPA, 01/0230Z June 1956.
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---	108	PSMD 6817, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 13/0705Z June 1956.
---	109	313MC-M 3228F, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, 14/0731Z June 1956.
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---	112	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Pulse Transformers for Height Finding Radars, 10 July 1956.
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---	114	51WMC-M 8-13, Comdr. 51st FIW to Comdr. Rome AFD, 06/0100Z Aug. 1956.
---	115	51WMC-M 8-62, Comdr. 51st FIW to Comdr. Rome AFD, 16/0530Z Aug. 1956.
---	116	5FMME-E 23745, Hq. 5th AF to Comdrs. NAMAP and SAMAP, 28/1000Z Sept. 1956.
---	117	Ltr., Kume Shima Air Station to Comdr. 623d AC&W Sq., sub.: Damage to FPS-6 Tower, 30 Sept. 1956.
---	118	Ltr., 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Unsatisfactory Condition of Height Finder at Site P-54, 26 Nov. 1956.

SECRET

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	119	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 51st FIW, sub.: Identification of Radome Shipment to Okinawa, 9 May 1957.
---	120	Ltr., SAMAP Liaison Office, 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Site Survey for Project Tight Top, [circa 11 July 1957].
---	121	PSMDC-8 5379-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 13/0537Z Aug. 1957.
---	122	51 HCR-S-BS 3078, Comdr. 51st FIW to Comdr. SAMAP, 20 Aug. 1957.
---	123	PFMME-E 22409, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 21/2342Z Aug. 1957.
---	124	313MC-M U-8-416, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 22/0717Z Aug. 1957.
---	125	PSMDR-8 5622E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 30/0909Z Aug. 1957.
---	126	PSMDR-85632E, Comdr. SAMAP to SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, 30/0916Z Aug. 1957.
---	127	313MC-M U-8-539, Hq. 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, 30 Aug. 1957.
---	128	51 HCR-S-BS 3186, Comdr. 51st ABG to Comdr. SAMAP, 04/0201Z Sept. 1957.
---	129	MRSWIR-9-16-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. SAMAP, 09/1946Z Sept. 1957.
---	130	MEMORS 9-119-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. SAMAP, 11/2009Z Sept. 1957.
---	131	313MC-M U-9-180, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdrs. McClellan AFD and ATCO, Travis AFB, 12 Sept. 1957.
---	132	Ltr., Hq. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Unsatisfactory Report of Zenith Radomes, 20 Sept. 1957.
---	133	313MC-M U-9-339, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 21 Sept. 1957.
---	134	5FMME-CE 93831, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 26/0815Z Sept. 1957.

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Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	135	CRKL 9-19, Hq. AFCRC, L. G. Hanscom Field, to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 27/2035Z Sept. 1957.
---	136	CRLE 9-26-1E, Comdr. AFCRC, L. G. Hanscom Field, to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 31/1843Z Sept. 1957.
---	137	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Evaluation of Rigid Radome Design, 1 Oct. 1957.
---	138	PSMDP-10 6003 E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 02/0356Z Oct. 1957.
---	139	MRF-10-10-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdrs. AFCRC, L. G. Hanscom Field, and Hq. 313th Air Div., 02/1830Z Oct. 1957.
---	140	SAMAP-L U-9-87, SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, to Comdr. SAMAP, 3 Oct. 1957.
---	141	313MC-M U-10-72, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. SAMAP, 04/0522Z Oct. 1957.
---	142	PSSCSS-10-101-E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 07/0858Z Oct. 1957.
---	143	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to 623d and 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Rigid Radomes, 9 Oct. 1957.
---	144	PSMDP-10-6158-E, Comdr. SAMAP to SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, 10/0918Z Oct. 1957.
---	145	Ltr., SAMAP Liaison Office, Kadena AB, to Comdr. 623d AC&W Sq., sub.: Rigid Radomes, 11 Oct. 1957.
---	146	313MC-M U-10-212, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 11/0600Z Oct. 1957.
---	147	313MC-M U-10-245, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD and Lincoln Lab., 14/0636Z Oct. 1957.
---	148	PSMDP-10 6198 E, Comdr. SAMAP to Comdr. Rome AFD, 16/0158Z Oct. 1957.
---	149	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, sub.: Evaluation of Rigid Radome Design, 22 Oct. 1957.
---	150	313MC-M U-10-409, Hq. 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, 23/1050Z Oct. 1957.
---	151	313MC-M U-11-155, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Rome AFD, 8 Nov. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	152	MRSCEB61-11-154-E, Comdr. RAFD to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 14/2028Z Nov. 1957.
---	153	313MC-M U-11-351, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. Shelby AFD, 21 Nov. 1957.
---	154	313MC-M U-12-356, Hq. 313th Air Div. to COMSAMAP, 19/0020Z Dec. 1957.
---	155	Daily Staff Journals, Operations Directorate, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	156	Daily Staff Journals, Materiel Directorate, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	157	Daily Staff Journals, Personnel Directorate, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	158	Daily Staff Journals, Office of Installations, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	159	Daily Staff Journals, Office of Procurement, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	160	Daily Staff Journals, Office of the Comptroller, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1957.
---	161	313th Air Division Personnel Strength Reports, as of 31 July, 31 August, 30 September, 31 October, 30 November, and 31 December 1957.

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

















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


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








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





APPENDIX 1

KEY STAFF POSITIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1957

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

POSITION	NAME
COMMAND SECTION	
Commander	Brig. General William G. Hipps (1 July - 31 December)
Deputy Commander	Colonel Wallace C. Barrett (1 July - 31 December)
Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Fred W. Bock (1 July - 22 October)
	Captain Randolph L. Hall (Ad'l. Dty.) (23 October - 25 November)
	Colonel Elmer H. Nelson (25 November - 31 December)
Aide de Camp	1st Lieutenant James D. Pewitt (1 July - 31 December)
Special Assistant to Commander	1st Lieutenant Kenneth H. Kennedy (22 July - 31 December)
Special Assistant to Commander	Colonel Robert F. Hardy (30 August - 19 September)
INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION	
Inspector General	Colonel Leo C. Moon (1 July - 19 September)
	Colonel Robert F. Hardy (19 September - 31 December)
Provost Marshal	Lieut. Colonel Richard J. Wade (1 July - 8 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Carl C. Conant (8 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Director of Inspections	Major Charles J. Pellerin (1 July - 7 August)
	Lieut. Colonel Forrester M. Smith, Jr. (7 August - 31 December)
Maintenance Inspector	Major Chester C. Napierkoski (1 July - 4 December)
	Vacant (4 December - 31 December)
Supply Inspector	Lieut. Colonel Belvie R. Lowrance (1 July - 6 November)
	Major Walter R. Wick (6 November - 31 December)
Communications and Electronics Inspector	Captain Bert A. Steen (1 July - 9 December)
	Major Charles C. Culley (9 December - 31 December)
Administrative Inspector	1st Lieutenant Kenneth H. Kennedy (1 July - 22 July)
	Vacant (22 July - 1 August)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert C. Smith (1 August - 16 December)
	Major Lawrence L. Mentzer (16 December - 31 December)
JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION	
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel John A. McLaughlin (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES	
Information Services Officer	Lieut. Colonel Frederick J. Betz (1 July - 31 December)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
COMMAND ADJUTANT SECTION	
Command Adjutant	Captain Randolph L. Hall (1 July - 5 December)
	Major Lawrence A. Starr (5 December - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE SURGEON	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel Anthony Czerwinski (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE CHAPLAIN	
Staff Chaplain	Lieut. Colonel Richard M. Graham (1 July - 31 December)
HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON SECTION*	
Commandant	Captain John F. Cooper (1 July - 25 November)
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER	
Comptroller	Lieut. Colonel John E. Laybourn (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant to the Comptroller	Captain John R. O'Brien (25 September - 16 December)
	Vacant (16 December - 31 December)
Budget Officer	Captain Charles E. Clarke (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Management Analysis Division	1st Lieutenant Patrick G. Wells (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Statistical Services Division	1st Lieutenant Patrick G. Wells (1 November - 31 December) (Ad'l Dy.)

*Headquarters Squadron Section abolished 25 November 1957.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE	
Director of Operations	Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans and Programs Division	Major Joe N. Swanger (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans Branch	Major Earl H. Singleton (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Passive Defense Branch	Major Warren G. Wycoff (21 September - 31 December)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Lieut. Colonel Peter F. English (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Projects Branch	Major Ralph D. Terpening (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Defense Systems Operations Branch	Major James M. Jones, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Special Assistant for Operations Analysis	Mr. Jerry Goodman (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Combat Operations Division	Lieut. Colonel William A. Beard (1 July - 20 December)
	Major Uriel J. Davis (20 December - 31 December)
Chief, Operations Services Branch	Captain Thomas O. Batey (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Division	Lieut. Colonel William Y. Brown (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch	Captain Walter A. Proft (1 July - 15 October)
	Vacant (15 October - 31 December)
Communications Officer	Captain Walter A. Proft (15 October - 31 December)
Ground Electronics Officer	Captain John Holoviak, Jr. (18 December - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Communications Systems Branch	Vacant (1 July - 26 August)
	Major Ernest L. Watts (26 August - 31 December)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Lieut. Colonel James F. Giddens (1 July - 24 December)
	Major James P. Smith (24 December - 31 December)
Chief, Operational Intelligence Branch	Vacant (1 July - 1 August)
	1st Lieutenant James W. Wallace (1 August - 20 December)
	Vacant (20 December - 31 December)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Major Jack D. Alexander (1 July - 31 December)
MATERIEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Materiel	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (1 July - 1 August)
	Colonel Gust Askounis (1 August - 23 December)
	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (23 December - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Materiel	Major James T. Huckabay (Ad'l. Duty) (1 July - 1 August)
	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (1 August - 23 December)
	Major James T. Huckabay (Ad'l. Duty) (23 December - 31 December)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Captain Michael V. Doran (1 July - 11 September)
	Lieut. Colonel Nathan B. Hays (11 September - 8 November)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Supply and Services Division (Cont'd.)	Vacant (8 November - 31 December)
Chief, Communications and Electronics Branch	Major James P. Goss, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Damage Control Officer	Captain Michael V. Doran (Ad'l. Duty) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications and Electronics Supply Branch	CWO John M. Howard (11 July - 31 December)
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Rycom, and POL Officer	1st Lieutenant Cyrus B. Gittings (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major James T. Huckabay (1 July - 31 December)
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	Captain Barton W. MacNeill (1 July - 31 December)
Communications Officer	Captain Roy W. Wheelis (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Transportation Division	Lieut. Colonel Stanley E. Bradley, Jr. (1 July - 3 November)
	Vacant (3 November - 18 November)
	Lieut. Colonel Joseph D. Morgan, Jr. (18 November - 31 December)
Air Transportation Officer	1st Lieutenant Walter L. Apperson (1 July - 31 December)
Surface Transportation Officer	CWO Gene A. Vincent (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT	
Procurement Officer	Major Albert J. Stern (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Local Purchasing Division	Captain Joseph Fischle (17 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Contract Division	1st Lieutenant Arden B. Engebretsen (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INSTALLATIONS	
Installations Officer	Lieut. Colonel William W. Robertson (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Installations Officer, and Chief, Engineering Branch	Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Real Property and Programs Branch	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Facilities Support Branch	Mr. Marion W. York (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Administrative and Damage Control Sections	Major Lawrence A. Starr (20 September - 5 December)
	Vacant (5 December - 31 December)
FIFTH AIR FORCE INSTALLATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO OKED	
FAFIR, OKED	Colonel Clemens K. Wurzbach (1 July - 31 December)
PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Personnel	Colonel James B. Cobb (1 July - 10 August)
	Colonel William R. Farnell, Jr. (10 August - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Kathleen McClure (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Officers' Division	Lieut. Colonel David B. Moody (1 July - 31 December)
Civilian Personnel Officer	*Mr. Wallace E. Walker (Civilian) (29 July - 31 December) (Ad'l. Duty)

*Regular assignment: Central Civilian Personnel Officer, 18th Air Base Group and 6313th Air Base Wing.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
Chief, Warrant Officers' and Airmen's Division	CWO William A. McNease (1 July - 9 September)
	Major Burr S. Watters, Jr. (9 September - 31 December)
Chief, Training and Utilization Division	Captain Harold E. Raleigh (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Personnel Services Division	Lieut. Colonel George H. Johnson, II (1 July - 7 Oct.)
	Major Alvin E. Reilly (7 October - 31 December)
Staff Exchange Officer	Lieut. Colonel Charles P. Downer (1 July - 31 December)
Dependents' School Officer	2d Lieutenant Noel H. McCoy (1 July - 1 November)
	Captain Jarrell R. Frick (Civilian) (1 November - 31 December)
ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY OFFICE	
Assistant for Safety	Major Dean F. Schwendeman (1 July - 31 December)
OSI DISTRICT OFFICE #3	
Commander, OSI District Office #3	Lieut. Colonel Lewis J. Kolb (1 July - 31 December)
DETACHMENT #2, Headquarters, 313th Air Division Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter P. Williams (25 November - 31 December)

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Commander	Colonel Robert C. Orth (1 July - 31 December)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel William S. Chairsell (1 July - 31 December)
18th Fighter Bomber Wing Executive Officer	Colonel Britt S. May (1 July - 10 July)
	Major Warren D. Curton (10 July - 1 December)
	Lieut. Colonel Allen D. Reed (1 December - 31 December)
12th Fighter Bomber Squadron* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Warren S. Patterson, Jr. (1 July - 20 August)
44th Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lucien K. Cox (1 July - 31 December)
67th Fighter Bomber Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Jesse C. Davis (1 July - 31 December)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major George O. McMahan (1 July - 31 December)
6318th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Roland G. Fox (1 July - 31 December)
18th Air Base Group and Base** Commander	Colonel William C. Adams (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Air Base Wing and Base** Commander	Colonel William C. Adams (1 October - 31 December)
18th Supply Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Jack E. Grapentine (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Supply Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Jack E. Grapentine (1 October - 31 December)
6313th Operations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Arland Stanton (1 October - 31 December)

*The 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron made a permanent change of station to Clark AFB, P.I., effective 20 August 1957, and was reassigned to the 13th Air Force.

*The 18th Air Base Group was inactivated on 1 October 1957, and the 6313th Air Base Wing was organized in its place, per 5th AF GO 76, dtd. 26 Sept. 57.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
18th Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Carmon M. Anderson (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Carmon M. Anderson (1 October - 31 December)
18th Food Service Squadron Commander	Captain Carold D. Pierce (1 July - 18 July)
	1st Lieutenant Richard E. Ryan (18 July - 1 August)
	Captain Robert E. Lee (1 August - 1 October)
6313th Food Service Squadron Commander	Captain Robert E. Lee (1 October - 2 December)
	Major Paul Torretti (2 December - 31 December)
18th Installations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John H. Buie (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Installations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John H. Buie (1 October - 31 December)
18th Air Police Squadron Commander	Captain James S. Roberts (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Air Police Squadron Commander	Captain James S. Roberts (1 October - 31 December)
18th Tactical Hospital and 6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel Anthony Czerwinski (1 July - 31 December)
13th Communications Squadron Commander	Major John W. Berge, Jr. (1 July - 1 October)
6313th Communications Squadron Commander	Major John W. Berge, Jr. (1 October - 31 December)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Edgar L. Kiser (1 July - 31 December)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Weldon O. Huston (1 July - 31 December)

Appendix 1

Position	Name
12th Aviation Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Maurice E. Murphy (1 July - 31 December)
15th Weather Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lowell A. Schuknecht (1 July - 7 August)
	Lieut. Colonel David C. Barrow (7 August - 31 December)
17th Communications Construction Squadron Commander	Major William E. Hignite (1 July - 2 December)
	Captain Roscoe C. Venable (2 December - 31 December)
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot Commander	Major George E. Thompson (1 July - 31 December)
6333d Technical Training Squadron* Commander	Major Robert E. Pasho (1 July - 1 September)
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lester L. Gaylord (1 July - 31 December)
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile Commander	Major John M. Pledge (1 July - 31 December)
15th Altitude Chamber Indoctrination Flight Commander	Captain Simpson J. Roper (1 July - 31 December)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Major John W. Woodill (1 July - 31 December)
336th Fighter Day Squadron** Commander	Major Richard J. Condrick (1 July - 23 August)
	Major Robert E. Erickson (23 August - 1 November)
322d Troop Carrier Squadron,*** Medium (Special) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter P. Williams (1 July - 8 December)

*The 6333d Technical Training Squadron was inactivated 1 September 1957.

**The 336th Fighter Day Squadron was inactivated 1 November 1957.

***The 322d Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium (Special) was inactivated 8 December 1957.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel William E. Nuding, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
5th Communications Group Commander*	Lieut. Colonel Harry C. Ross (1 September - 31 December)
2d Radio Relay Squadron Commander*	Major Suey C. Wong (1 September - 14 October)
	Major Milton K. Caston (14 October - 31 December)
24th Communications Construction Flight Commander*	Major Milton K. Caston (1 September - 14 October)
	Captain Marion E. Strange (14 October - 31 December)
608th Communications Squadron Commander*	Major Arthur L. Vietinghoff (1 September - 31 December)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Base Commander**	Colonel Robert L. Cardenas (1 July - 15 July)
	Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr. (15 July - 1 August)
	Colonel Elliott H. Reed (1 August - 15 August)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander	Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr. (15 August - 22 November)
	Colonel Lester J. Johnsen (22 November - 31 December)

*Moved PCS from Japan effective 1 September 1957. The commanders are shown as of that date.

**The position of 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Base Commander was abolished 15 August 1957.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Ground* Executive Officer	Colonel William P. Farnell, Jr. (1 July - 10 August)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (10 August - 15 August)
51st Fighter Interceptor Group** Commander	Lieut. Colonel George C. Farr (1 July - 25 October)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Major Norman H. Frisbie (1 July - 31 December)
25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Hugh C. Slater (1 July - 31 December)
51st Air Base Group Commander***	Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr. (1 July - 15 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (15 July - 1 August)
	Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr. (1 August - 15 August)
	Colonel Elliott H. Reed (15 August - 25 October)
51st Air Base Group Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (15 August - 25 October)
6431st Air Base Group Commander***	Colonel Elliott H. Reed (25 October - 31 December)
6431st Air Base Group Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (25 October - 31 December)
51st Communications Squadron Commander	Major John W. R. Johnson (1 July - 25 October)

*The position of 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing-Ground Executive Officer was abolished 15 August 1957.

**The Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Group was inactivated 25 October 1957.

***The 51st Air Base Group was inactivated and succeeded by the 6431st Air Base Group on 25 October 1957.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
6431st Operations Squadron Commander	Major John W. R. Johnson (25 October - 25 November)
	Major Harry R. Cassleman (25 November - 31 December)
51st Installations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Stanley R. Wilber (1 July - 8 August)
	Captain Alexander F. Wozniak (8 August - 2 September)
	Captain Merrill E. Jensen (2 September - 25 October)
6431st Installations Squadron Commander	Captain Merrill E. Jensen (25 October - 12 November)
	Major Jesse M. Doyle (12 November - 31 December)
51st Air Police Squadron Commander	Major James L. Dixon, Jr. (1 July - 25 October)
6431st Air Police Squadron Commander	Major James L. Dixon, Jr. (25 October - 18 December)
	Major William E. Frantz (18 December - 31 December)
51st Maintenance and Supply Group* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Carter (1 July - 15 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Donald F. Lynch (15 July - 25 October)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Garland E. Cain (1 July - 31 December)
51st Supply Squadron Commander	Major Roland E. Deaton (1 July - 25 October)
6431st Supply Squadron Commander	Major Roland E. Deaton (25 October - 31 December)

*The Headquarters, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group was inactivated 25 October 1957.

Appendix 1

Position	Name
51st Transportation Squadron Commander	Captain Thomas L. Newsom (1 July - 15 August)
	Major Harold G. Barber (15 August - 25 October)
6431st Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Harold G. Barber (25 October - 31 December)
51st Food Service Squadron Commander	Major John Marusiak (1 July - 25 October)
6431st Food Service Squadron Commander	Major John Marusiak (25 October - 31 December)
51st Tactical Hospital and 6351st USAF Dispensary Commander	Major Norman I. Condit (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division Commander	Lieut. Colonel William A. Beard (1 July - 31 December)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel James R. Geary, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
624th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Johnnie V. Haselby (1 July - 31 December)
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Calof (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	1st Lieutenant Andrew S. Jones (1 July - 31 December)

APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE

313TH AIR DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1957

Appendix 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1957

July: Forty-six numbered contracts totalling $279,175.70 and 17 unnumbered contracts totalling $14,240.30 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-998 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Machinato Machine Shop for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-999 for $6,000.00 was awarded to Barclay Motors for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1000 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1001 for $19,200.00 was awarded to the Universal Co., Ltd., for the installation and maintenance of a two-way radio system for general purpose vehicles at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1002 for $900.00 was awarded to the Harika Company for a blanket purchase agreement (live chickens) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1003 for $12,000.00 was awarded to Taiyo Denki Shokai for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1004 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for a blanket purchase agreement (office and household supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1005 for $500.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings for a blanket purchase agreement (neoprene kits) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

July: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1006 for $11,750.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (general machine shop repair services) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1007 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for a blanket purchase agreement (general spare parts and accessories) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1008 for $1,260.00 was awarded to Robert L. Hirsch for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1009 for $600.00 was awarded to Norma J. Beatley for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1010 for $787.50 was awarded to Jane A. Williams for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1011 for $1,560.00 was awarded to Betty A. Lapointe for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1012 for $4,095.00 was awarded to Louis S. Edds for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1013 for $900.00 was awarded to Toru Kakimoto for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1014 for $1,080.00 was awarded to Lyle M. Michelsen for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-1015 for $3,250.00 was awarded to Joan M. McAllister for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-1016 for $2,618.00 was awarded to Elizabeth Blodgett for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-1017 for $270.00 was awarded to Jean S. Tubbs for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-1018 for $1,200.00 was awarded to Goya Stamp Maker for a blanket purchase agreement (rubber stamps) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-1019 for $15,000.00 was awarded to General Paint Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (paint and dopes) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-1020 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive parts) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

0 6 8 0

July: (x) Contract AF 62(321)-1020 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive parts and accessories) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-1022 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings for a blanket purchase agreement (paint and dopes) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-1023 for $15,000.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor, Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive parts and accessories) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-1024 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive parts and accessories) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-1025 for $15,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for a blanket purchase agreement (general office supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(cc) Contract AF 62(321)-1026 for $15,000.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (paint, hardware, and electrical supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-1027 for $661.50 was awarded to Elizabeth J. Birch for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(ee) Contract AF 62(321)-1028 for $156.00 was awarded to Marita F. Carrithers for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(ff) Contract AF 62(321)-1029 for $140.00 was awarded to Fred K. Iwama for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(gg) Contract AF 62(321)-1030 for $181.50 was awarded to Jon K. Moon for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(hh) Contract AF 62(321)-1031 for $154.00 was awarded to Betty H. Pewitt for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(ii) Contract AF 62(321)-1032 for $130.00 was awarded to Tom S. Tsao for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(jj) Contract AF 62(321)-1033 for $577.50 was awarded to Alice S. Perry for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

0681

July: (kk) Contract AF 62(321)-1034 for $960.00 was awarded to Dorothy M. Thompson for teaching services for Kadena Air Base.

(ll) Contract AF 62(321)-1035 for $445.00 was awarded to the Ryukyus Sanitation Corp. for trash collection at Kadena Air Base.

(mm) Contract AF 62(321)-1036 for $299.70 was awarded to Mori Eitomi for lightering services at off-island AC&W sites.

(nn) Contract AF 62(321)-1037 for $8,000.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor & Co., Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for August and September 1957, for Kadena Air Base.

(oo) Contract AF 62(321)-1038 for $8,000.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor & Co., Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for August and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(pp) Contract AF 62(321)-1039 for $8,000.00 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive services) for August and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(qq) Contract AF 62(321)-1040 for $500.00 was awarded to W. W. Taylor & Co., Inc. for a blanket purchase agreement (automotive parts and services) for August and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(rr) Contract AF 62(321)-1041 for $12,000.00 was awarded to Showa Electric Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(ss) Contract AF 62(321)-1042 for $12,000.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for a blanket purchase agreement (electrical supplies) for July, August, and September 1957, for Naha Air Base.

(tt) Contract AF 62(321)-1043 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Vinnell Corp. for maintenance of Air Force buses at Kadena Air Base.

Twenty numbered contracts totalling $319,398.51 and 64 unnumbered contracts totalling $53,271.33 were closed during July 1957.

Three salvage contracts totalling $77,956.00 were written during July 1957.

Aug.: Three numbered contracts totalling $17,345.00 and 28 unnumbered contracts totalling $30,786.00 were awarded to local contractors

0682

Aug: for the procurement of supplies and services for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1044 for $10,000.00 was awarded to Far East Service Co. for a blanket purchase agreement (general office supplies) for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1045 for $6,900.00 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Co. for cement for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1046 for $445.00 was awarded to the Ryukyu Sanitation Corp. for the collection of trash and garbage at Kadena Air Base.

Ten numbered contracts totalling $206,896.70 and 27 unnumbered contracts totalling $39,112.48 were closed during August 1957.

Four salvage contracts totalling $22,075.00 were written during August 1957.

Sept: One numbered contract for $445.00 and 15 unnumbered contracts totalling $12,614.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1047 for $445.00 was awarded to the Ryukyus Sanitation Corp. for the collection of off-base garbage and trash pick-up.

Twenty numbered contracts totalling $253,295.22 and 39 unnumbered contracts totalling $47,471.24 were closed during September 1957.

Oct: Three numbered contracts totalling $2,077.00 and 14 unnumbered contracts totalling $12,613.73 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1048 for $672.00 was awarded to Alice S. Perry for services as a Testing Specialist at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1049 for $960.00 was awarded to Allis E. Bennett for instructor services at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1050 for $445.00 was awarded to the Ryukyus Sanitation Corp. for the collection of trash and garbage at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1051 for $3,420.00 was awarded to Turco Products for sodium hydroxide for use at Kadena Air Base.

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Oct.: Twenty-three numbered contracts totalling $430,394.60 and 50 unnumbered contracts totalling $52,874.54 were closed during October 1957.

Nov.: Three numbered contracts totalling $26,491.75 and 56 unnumbered contracts totalling $36,148.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1052 for $1,100.00 was awarded to Paccon Corp. for repair of the roof of Building 1715A, Stearley Heights, Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1053 for $11,385.75 was awarded to Furugen Bros. Co. for glass for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1054 for $14,006.00 was awarded to Barclay Motors for motor vehicle repair for Kadena Air Base.

Eight numbered contracts totalling $156,751.06 and 48 unnumbered contracts totalling $64,981.82 were closed in November 1957.

Dec.: Fifteen numbered contracts totalling $90,112.16 and 113 unnumbered contracts totalling $76,426.37 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1055 for $5,400.00 was awarded to the Wakugawa Trading Co. for plate glass for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1056 for $8,866.26 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for paint for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1057 for $3,076.20 was awarded to Turco Products for cleaning compound for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1058 for $15,405.50 was awarded to Barclay Motors for the maintenance of motor vehicles for Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1059 for $3,414.50 was awarded to Furugen Bros. Co. for plate glass for Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1060 for $12,724.14 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for bolts for Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1061 for $5,637.50 was awarded to Connell Brothers Co. for uniflex for Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1062 for $3,042.60 was awarded to Kinsad Corp. for paint for Kadena Air Base.

0684

Dec.: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1063 for $6,042.63 was awarded to E. J. Griffith & Co. for paint for Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1064 - Canceled.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1065 for $1,384.57 was awarded to Hopkins and Munfrey, Inc. for A&E services for Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1066 for $5,041.57 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1067 for $2,588.30 was awarded to Western Pacific Corp. for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1068 for $9,513.00 was awarded to Barclay Motors for the maintenance of motor vehicles at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1069 for $5,229.16 was awarded to Furugen Bros. Co. for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1070 for $2,096.23 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

Six numbered contracts totalling $133,260.50 and 94 unnumbered contracts totalling $81,372.19 were closed during December 1957.

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APPENDIX 3

COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEWS

313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1957

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SECRET

313TH

COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
JULY 1957

620711

SECRET

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COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY
COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION
APO 239

FOREWORD

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW IS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. PRESENTATION MATERIEL HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY STAFF AGENCIES.

John E Laybourn
JOHN E. LAYBOURN
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER

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

MISSION 313 TH A.D.

CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA

AIRFIELD STATUS



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STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



Command: The Command rate of 3.0% reported this month is the lowest rate since August 1956. Our average rate has been 5.4% for the past three months reported as compared to 5.7% for all Fifth Air Force units.

Hq. 313th AD: The 313th Air Division ranked first for the month of July in comparison with all other Air Division Headquarters within Fifth Air Force. Our average rate has been 2.9% for the past three months reported.

REPORTING



5TH AF RATE

51ST FIW: Their rate of 0.9% reported during this month is the lowest since September 1956 when the Wing had no late reports. The monthly average has been 2.3% for the past three months reported.

18TH ABG; Their rate of 4.1% is the lowest since December 1956 and 3.4% less than the previous month reported. The average rate over the past three months reported has been 7.1%.

0695

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW–F-86 1 JUL-31 JUL



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	165	397	20	112	174	580	38	199	116	174
FLOWN	279	504	37	220	86	680	29	67	155	311

During the first month of the new training cycle, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has completed 88.4% of its overall F-86D training requirements. Training in the profile and weapons phases, which was below the desired standard for the first six months of calendar year 1957, continues to remain below the standard this month.

0697

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS - F-86F — 1 JUL - 31 JUL



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	28	104	26	20	18	72	6	84	72
FLOWN	43	118	47	68	15	86	13	152	132

The 336th FDS has accomplished 95.6% of its overall training requirements during the first month of the new training cycle. Training in the Simulated Emergency Flight Approach phase, which was below the desired standard during the previous training year, continues to remain below the standard this month.

0698

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	104	103	75			
ASSIGNED	78	77	79			
OPNL READY	64	62	69			

ASGD/AUTH ——— O/R/ASGD - - - -

The Command reflected a net loss of 28 authorized crews as of 1 July 1957. This loss resulted from the new manning critera of one crew per authorized aircraft. There was a net gain of 2 assigned and 7 operational ready crews. The assigned crew manning rate went from 74.7% to 105% while the turnover in crews increased the operational ready rate from 80.5% to 87%. During the period May-July, the manning rate has been 83% and the operational ready rate has been 83.3%.

0699

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	74	74	50			
ASSIGNED	59	61	62			
OPNL READY	56	55	60			

The 51st FIW reflected a loss of 24 authorized crews as of 1 July 1957. (One crew per authorized aircraft). There was a net gain of 1 assigned and 5 operational ready crews during the month of July. The assigned crew manning rate went from 82.4% to 124% while the turnover in crews increased the operational ready rate from 90.2% to 96.8%. During the May-July period, the manning rate has been 91.9% and the operational ready rate has been 94.0%

0700

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
37	37	25				AUTHORIZED	37	37	25			
30	30	31				ASSIGNED	29	31	31			
28	28	30				OPNL READY	28	27	30			

ASGD / AUTH ——

—— O/R / ASGD

16TH FIS: There was a net gain of 1 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month, with a manning rate of 124% and a 96.8% operational ready rate.

25TH FIS: There was a net gain of 3 operational ready crews during the month, with a manning rate of 124% and a 96.8% operational ready rate.

NOTE: One crew is authorized per authorized aircraft.

0701

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	29	29	25			
ASSIGNED	19	16	17			
OPNL READY	8	7	9			

ASGD/AUTH ——— O/R/ASGD - - - -

The 336th FDS reflected a loss of 4 authorized crews as of 1 July 1957. (One crew per authorized aircraft). There was a net gain of 1 assigned and 2 operational ready crews. The assigned crew manning rate went from 55.2% to 68% while the turnover in crews increased the operational ready rate from 43.7% to 53%. During the period May-July, the manning rate has been 62.6% and the operational ready rate has been 46.2%.

0702

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
HOURS FLOWN	916	606	1084			
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	40	41	39			
ASSIGNED CREWS	59	61	62			

	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
HOURS FLOWN	394	291	486			
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	25	23	23			
ASSIGNED CREWS	19	16	17			

= AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT
= 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT
= AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW
= 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

51ST FIW: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 27.7 and 17.5 hours, respectively, during the month of July. In June they averaged 14.8 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 15.1 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units, while the assigned crews averaged 9.9 hours as comparted to 10.2 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D crews.

336th FDS: The possed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 21.1 and 28.6 hours, respectively, during the month of July. In June they averaged 12.6 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 16.8 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F units, while the assigned crews averaged 18.2 hours as compared to 15.9 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F crews.

0703

AIR DEFENSE

SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS



		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	29	12	27			
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	16	6	17			
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	13	6	10			
4	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	1	1	0			
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	1	2	0			
6	INTERCEPTED	11	3	10			

LINE 2+3=LINE 1
LINE 4+5+6=LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts was at 100% during the month of July. Our successful intercept rate has been 74.3% during the period 1 April through 30 June as compared to 59.0% for all Fifth Air Force units. The Command unknown track rate during July was 11.4, with 2,363 tracks processed and 27 unknown. Our unknown rate has been 12.0 during the period 1 April through 30 June as compared to 4.4 for all Fifth Air Force units.

0704

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 JULY 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	23							5	5	2		2	4							41
18 FBW			77	1									7							85
322 TCS					8	3														11
15 TRS				17									2							19
KADENA TOT.	23		77	18	8	3		5	5	2		2	13							156
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		39						4	2		2	2	6							55
NAHA TOT.		39						4	2		2	2	6							55
313TH TOT.	23	39	77	18	8	3		9	7	2	2	4	19							211

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 2 C-47's, 1 T-33, 1 L-20 and a loss of 3 B-26's and 1 100-D.

Naha Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 B-26, 1 H-19 and a loss of 2 F-86D's and 1 T-33.

0106

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OPERATIONAL READY	76.7	80.9	75.0			
% ANORM SKED	8.7	6.1	9.0			
% ANORM UNSKED	11.3	10.6	13.1			
% ANORS	3.3	2.4	2.9			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The Command Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 5.9% during the month of July, but remains above the desired 70% standard for the sixth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance increased 2.9% and 2.5%, respectively. The ANORS rate increased this month but is below the 5% standard for the sixth consecutive month.

0707

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	74.4	83.0	76.0			
% ANORM SKED	9.5	4.4	10.1			
% ANORM UNSKED	13.8	9.8	11.8			
% ANORS	2.3	2.8	2.1			

% OPERATIONAL READY — — — — 70 % OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED ———— 5 % ANORS STD % ANORS

The 51st FIW Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 7.0% during the month of July, but remains above the desired 70% standard for the sixth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance increased 5.7% and 2.0% respectively. The ANORS rate remains below the 5% standard for the fifth consecutive month. Their monthly operational ready rate has been 77.9% for the period 1 April through 30 June as compared to 70.0% for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units.

0708

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
73.1	85.8	77.5				% OP READY	75.8	80.3	74.6			
9.1	1.7	8.6				% ANORM SKED	9.9	7.0	11.6			
13.3	6.3	9.6				% ANORM UNSKED	14.3	12.7	13.8			
4.5	5.7	4.3				% ANORS	0.0	0.0	0.0			

% OPERATIONAL READY —— 70 % OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED ------ 5% ANORS STD % ANORS

16th FIS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 8.3% during the month of July, but remains above the desired goal for the fifth consecutive month. This drop can be attributed to an increase in the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates. The ANORS rate is below the 5% standard for the third time in the past four months.

25th FIS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 5.7% during the month of July, but continues above the desired standard for the ninth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased while the ANORS rate remained at 0.0% for the fourth consecutive month. This rate has been below the standard for the past eleven months.

0709

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	80.0	77.2	73.1			
% ANORM SKED	7.6	9.0	7.0			
% ANORM UNSKED	7.4	12.0	15.4			
% ANORS	5.0	1.8	4.5			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 336th FDS Operational Ready rate decreased 4.1% during the month of July, but remained above the desired standard for the eighth consecutive month. The scheduled maintenance rate decreased 2.0% while the unscheduled rate increased 3.4%. The ANORS rate increase 2.7% but remained below the 5% standard for the second consecutive month. Their operational ready rate has been 77.% for the period 1 April through 30 June as compared to 78.7% for all Fifth Air Force F-86F units.

0710

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	40.6	36.7	31.2			
% ANORM SKED	15.7	13.8	15.3			
% ANORM UNSKED	33.1	25.6	21.3			
% ANORS	10.6	23.9	32.2			

The 18th FBW F-100D Operational Ready rate decreased 5.5% during the month of July. The scheduled maintenance rate increased 1.5% while the unscheduled rate decreased 4.3%. The ANORS rate continues to increase, this month by 8.3%, and is the highest rate since the F-100D's were received by this organization.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
71.1	62.5	58.4				% OP READY	70.3	72.4	70.4			
7.4	13.2	8.6				% ANORM SKED	13.6	15.0	16.3			
17.3	14.2	18.0				% ANORM UNSKED	9.7	10.6	6.1			
4.2	10.1	15.0				% ANORS	6.4	2.0	7.2			

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70% OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

322nd TCS: Their Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 4.1% during the month of July and is below the 70% standard for the second time in the past four months. Scheduled maintenance decreased 4.6% while unscheduled increased 3.8%. Their ANORS rate increased 4.9% and is above the 5% standard for the second time in the past four months.

15TH TRS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 2.0% during the month of July, but is above the standard for the third consecutive month. Scheduled maintenance increased 1.3% while unscheduled reflected a decrease of 4.5%. The ANORS rate increased 5.2% and is above the standard once again.

0712

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	43164	44740	49720			
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	3615	1928	1476			
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	3216	3439	3127			

= $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

Our vehicle out of commission rate decreased to 9.3% during the month. There was a 1.3% decrease in the deadlined for parts area but the overall rate is still 4.3% over the desired standard. Our vehicle out of commission rate has been 14.2% for the period 1 April through 30 June as compared to 8.7% for Fifth Air Force Units.

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		51ST FIW						18TH ABG					
		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	12254	11360	36916				30910	33380	12804			
2	DAYS DP	109	97	1267				3506	1831	209			
3	DAYS DM	68	95	2977				3153	3344	150			

▪ = LINE 2 / LINE 1 X 100

▦ = LINE 3 / LINE 1 X 100

51ST FIW: For the eighth consecutive month, the vehicle out of commission rate has remained below the 5% standard. Slight increases were experienced in both the VDM and VDP rates.

18TH ABG: Their vehicle out of commission rate continues in excess of the desired standard, however, the present rate is the lowest since May 1956. The VDM and VDP rates were reduced 1.9% and 2.1% respectively, as a result of permission granted by Fifth Air Force to demilitarize and cannibalize M-series vehicles being salvaged.

0714

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 JUL 57

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1077	933	86	8331	8807	106	467	459	98	4828	4790	99
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	695#	598%	86	5387	5651	105	444	434	98	4146	4115	99
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	434	362	83	2817	3042	108	166	172	104	1629	1636	100
TOTAL ATCH UNITS	261	236	90	2570	2609	102	278	262	94	2517	2479	98
TOTAL HQ 313th AIR DIV	76	77	101	124	131	106	48	56	117	7	17	243
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCHD)	192	169	88	2377	2403	101	278	262	94	2499	2461	98
322ND TRP CAR SQ (ATCHD)	69	67	97	193	206	105				18	18	100
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	37	24	65	134	167	125						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	14	108						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	234	196	84	1867	1909	102	116	115	99	1379	1389	101
623RD & 624TH ACW (ASGD)	70	50	71	604	673	111	1	1	100	243	230	95
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	16	13	81	75	148	197	1	0	0			
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	382	335	88	2944	3156	107	23	25	109	682	675	99
TOTAL PIPELINE		14			127							

Includes 28 WO's % Includes 22 WO's

OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 1% increase with a net loss of 7 authorized spaces and a net gain of 2 assigned. AIRMEN: Assigned unit manning reflected a 2% increase with a net loss of 144 authorized spaces and 82 assigned. CIVILIAN: The DAFC manning reflected a 2% increase with a net gain of 2 assigned. Indigenous manning reflected an increase to 100% with a net loss of 28 authorized spaces and 10 assigned. The 17th Communication Squadron with authorizations for 7 officers and 144 airmen was reassigned to AMC, effective 1 July 1957.

0716

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
GEN	AUTH	2	2	2			
	ASGD	1	1	1			
	%MANNED	50	50	50			
COL	AUTH	12	12	12			
	ASGD	12	10	11			
	%MANNED	100	83	92			
L/COL	AUTH	50	50	50			
	ASGD	43	40	40			
	%MANNED	86	80	80			
MAJ	AUTH	107	109	108			
	ASGD	96	92	89			
	%MANNED	90	84	82			
CAPT	AUTH	249	245	241			
	ASGD	207	209	209			
	%MANNED	83	85	87			
LTS	AUTH	262	256	255			
	ASGD	244	223	226			
	%MANNED	93	87	89			
WO	AUTH	19	28	27			
	ASGD	22	21	22			
	%MANNED	116	75	81			
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	701	702	695			
	ASGD	625	596	598			
	%MANNED	89	85	86			
	PROJ'D				580		

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
M/SGT	AUTH	341	340	338			
	ASGD	258	256	259			
	% MANNED	76	75	77			
T/SGT	AUTH	538	538	521			
	ASGD	448	486	443			
	% MANNED	83	85	85			
S/SGT	AUTH	1434	1438	1409			
	ASGD	785	814	810			
	% MANNED	55	57	57			
A/1C	AUTH	1845	1832	1785			
	ASGD	842	1019	985			
	% MANNED	46	56	55			
A/2C	AUTH	1260	1259	1226			
	ASGD	1673	1668	1644			
	% MANNED	133	132	134			
* A/3C	AUTH	124	124	108			
	ASGD	1598	1432	1510			
	% MANNED	1289	1155	1398			
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	5542	5531	5387			
	ASGD	5604	5645	5651			
	% MANNED	101	102	105			
	PROJ'D				5196		

* INCLUDES A/B

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	MAY AUTH	MAY ASGD *	MAY % MANNED	JUNE AUTH	JUNE ASGD *	JUNE % MANNED	JULY AUTH	JULY ASGD *	JULY % MANNED	AUGUST AUTH	AUGUST ASGD *	AUGUST % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	270	264	98	263	259	98						
	5	991	934	94	954	954	100						
	3	441	852	193	355	747	210						
	1	20	9	45	20	8	40						
18TH ABG	7	292	331	113	292	339	116						
	5	1122	931	83	1129	905	80						
	3	544	495	91	537	538	100						
	1	55	52	95	55	59	107						
51TH FIW	7	317	287	91	321	298	93						
	5	1013	900	89	1043	916	88						
	3	426	525	123	454	575	127						
	1	49	47	96	49	51	104						
COMMAND TOTALS	7	879	882	100	876	896	102						
	5	3126	2765	88	3126	2775	89						
	3	1411	1872	133	1346	1860	138						
	1	124	108	87	124	118	95						

* PAFSC

The command 7 skill level is at 102%, with a net gain of 3 authorized spaces and 13 assigned. The 5 level skill increased to 89% with a gain of 10 assigned. The 3 skill level increased 5% with a net loss of 65 authorized spaces and 12 assigned. The 1 skill level increased to 95% with a gain of 10 assigned.

PROBLEM AREAS

31 JULY 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
1024A	Helicopter Pilot	4	1	100%	25%
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	9	10%	128%
1677	Intercept Controller	47	38	33%	80%
2054	Intelligence Officer	11	8	0%	73%
3034	Communications Officer	22	14	65%	63%
3044	Ground Electronics Off	7	3	66%	43%
6416	Supply Staff Officer	8	5	0%	63%
[illegible]	Supply Officer	44	28	62%	64%
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0%	50%
7224	Personnel Officer	22	16	50%	73%
293X5	Tech Control Oper	18	1	0%	6%
342X0A	FTI Sim Fighter Bon Tech	7	0	0%	0%
362X1	Auto Gen Off Equip Rpmr	21	11	120%	52%
451X0	Prod Acdg Tech	10	5	100%	55%
566X0A	Refrig Air Cond Specl	20	11	45%	50%
603X0	Veh Operator	170	78	96%	56%
603X1	Veh Dispatcher	12	7	60%	45%
902X2	Operating Room Specl	10	4	33%	40%
921X0	Rescue & Survival	24	7	67%	30%
981X0	Dental Specl	16	8	64%	50%

The Supply and Communications fields have been reflected as problem areas for the past eight months. Manning for those AFSC's 3034 and 3044, required at remote sites, should be at 100%.

AIRMEN TRAINING



JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
2126	1799	1865	2022	2172	2167	ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	698	724	737	772	918	811
1794	1480	1472	1565	1703	1846	OJT—C	624	627	598	616	684	692
158	116	97	80	74	128	OJT—D	30	38	29	31	27	27
239	210	118	61	163	117	COMPLETED OJT	81	88	13	10	70	75

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

COMMAND: The increased in training rate can be attributed to a net loss of 5 eligibles and a net gain of 197 in training during June. The completion rate was 5.9% in June, with 117 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training. Fifth Air Force reported 93.7% in training rate and a 4.8% completion rate in June.

HQ 313TH AD: The increased in training rate can be attributed to a net loss of 107 eligibles and a net gain of 8 in training during June. The completion rate was 10.4%, with 75 being upgraded and completing cross training.

0721

AIRMEN TRAINING



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	551	555	581	620	666	719
OJT—C	481	482	536	543	585	651
OJT—D	40	37	28	21	21	42
COMPLETED OJT	99	97	77	17	24	17

18TH ABG	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	877	520	547	630	588	639
OJT—C	689	371	339	406	434	503
OJT—D	88	41	40	28	26	39
COMPLETED OJT	59	25	28	34	69	25

NUMBER ON OJT—C & OJT—D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT—C = UPGRADING
OJT—D = CROSS TRAINING

51ST FIW: Their increased in training rate was due to a net gain of 53 eligibles and 87 in training during June. The completion rate was 2.4%, with 17 airmean being upgraded and completing cross training.

18TH ABG: Their increased in training rate was due to a net gain of 51 eligibles and 102 in training during June. The completion rate was 4.4%, with 25 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

DISCIPLINE



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
MILITARY STRENGTH	9428	9670	9037			
AWOL	1	3	2			
OVERALL STRENGTH	9912	10204	9454			
OFFENDERS	119	163	140			

= NO AWOL / MIL STRENGTH X 1000

= NO OFFENDERS / AVG STRENGTH X 100

AWOL: The Command reported 2 AWOL's during the month of July, but the reduction in military strength allowed only a slight decrease in the AWOL rate.

OFFENDERS There was a decrease of 23 in the offender category during the month of July.

0723

DISCIPLINE



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
MILITARY STRENGTH	2968	3192	2826			
AWOL	0	0	0			
OVERALL STRENGTH	3155	3379	3013			
OFFENDERS	30	58	58			

	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
MILITARY STRENGTH	6460	6478	6211			
AWOL	1	3	2			
OVERALL STRENGTH	6757	6825	6441			
OFFENDERS	89	105	82			

= NO AWOL / MIL STRENGTH X 1000

= NO OFFENDERS / AVG STRENGTH X100

51ST FIW: There was an increase of 0.2% in the offenders rate during the month of July which was brought about by a decrease in strength. No military personnel were reported AWOL for the forth consecutive month.

18TH ABG: There was a slight decrease of 0.2% in the offenders rate during July. Two AWOL's were reported this month, bringing the total for the first seven months of this year to 15 AWOL's.

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



TRIALS	JAN – MAR	ARP – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
GEN	7	2		
SPEC	31	25		
SUM	40	65		

During the April thru June period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.07 per thousand persons assigned. The Special and Summary rates were 0.83 and 2.14, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The Summary Court rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special and General rates reflected a decrease.

0725

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA JAN-MAR	KADENA APR-JUN	KADENA JUL-SEP	KADENA OCT-DEC	TRIALS	NAHA JAN-MAR	NAHA APR-JUN	NAHA JUL-SEP	NAHA OCT-DEC
3	0			GEN	4	2		
13	18			SPEC	18	7		
21	38			SUM	19	27		

KADENA AIR BASE: There were no General Court Martials during the April - June period. The Special and Summary rates were 0.89 and 1.93, respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The last time this base went free from General Court Martials was during the October - December period. The Special and Summary rates increased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.20 during the April - June period, while the Special and Summary rates were 0.79 and 2.74, respectively. The Summary rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special and General rates decreased.

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		2215.0	2214.0	2231.0			
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	56.0	16.0	9.1			
		REPAIR	30.0	53.0	75.0			
		COMMITTED	50.0	11.0	35.9			
TOTAL NO.	NO. WAITING	MOS. WAIT	293 5.5	290 6	401 6			
	NO. DRAWING	DEPARTS	140 97	123 79	60 78			
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	2215	2218	2231	2229		
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	651	654	640			
		AIRMEN	1404	1462	1459			
		CIVILIAN	21	22	21			

The percentage of unoccupied quarters increase 1.8% during the month of July, bringing the Command back into an unfavorable housing condition after only one month below the desired 4% standard. The increase can be attributed for the most part to more homes being carried in the unoccupied committed and repair categories.

0127

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1,791	2,384	5,037			
39,498	41,958	46,995			

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
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1
0
-1
-2
-3
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-5
-6

KADENA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
92	-4,590	-5725			
69,567	41,152	35,968			

NET PROFIT/LOSS

NET WORTH

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $5,037.27 during the month of July. This increased their total profit for the first seven months of calendar year 1957 to $15,598.76 and is in comparison to a $865.00 net profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net loss of $5,724.69 during the month of July. Club operations during the first seven months of calendar year 1957 resulted in a net loss amounting to $8,048.69. This loss compares unfavorably with a net profit of $15,106.00 for the same period during 1956.

0728

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
4,737	4,017	6,002			
100,640	104,653	110,655			

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
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-6

NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
3,911	5,164	7,054			
47,289	52,454	59,356			

NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $6,701.59 during the month of July. This increases their total profit for the first seven months of calendar year 1957 to $28,685.73 and is $9,838.73 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,054.16 during the month of July. This increases their total profit for the first seven months of calendar year 1957 to $12,854.84 and is in comparison to a $4,247.00 net loss shown for the same period during 1956.

0729

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMAN

NAHA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
-705	1321	2480			
45,092	46,414	48,894			

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
NET PROFIT/LOSS	1,419	286	-1503			
NET WORTH	52,777	53,063	51560			

KADENA



NAHA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $2,479.91 during the month of July. This increased their total profit for the first seven months of calendar year 1957 to $7,504.91 and is $4,025.91 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net loss of $1,503.00 during the month of July. This decreased their total profit for the first seven months of the calendar year 1957 to $7,399.00, but is $5,038.00 above the profits shown for the same period during 1956.

0730

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	JUL 57		1957 CUMULATIVE			
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	676	0	4047	0	
18TH ABG	0	462	0	3267	0	
51ST ABG	0	242	0	2195	0	
16TH FDS	0	608	2	3837	52.1	
336TH FDS	0	629	2	3746	53.4	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-JUL 1956) - - - - - (23.5)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-JUL 1957) ..... (23.4)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of July with a total of 2,617 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first seven months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 17,092 hours flown. Our present rate of 23.4 is slightly lower than the 23.5 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 20 in June as compared to 27.6 for the Division.

0732

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	JUL 1957 ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	2	53.4
	51ST FIW	0	2	19.8
	COMMAND	0	4	23.4
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	2	19.8
	COMMAND	0	2	11.7
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	2	53.4
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	2	11.7

RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100

313TH AD RATE (JAN-JUL 1956).....

The Command went accident free during the month of July, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	JUL 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	JUL 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	JUL 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	2	1,050
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	3	1,170
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	1,440
322ND TCS	1	5	150	5	2,010
313TH AD	1	14	420	6	2,370
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	2	3,000
51ST M&SG	2	60	1800	8	3,810
18TH ABG	0	0	0	10	5,490
51ST FIG	0	0	0	6	15,330



313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN – JUL 1956) – – – – – – – ($ 796)

313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN – JUL 1957) ..... ($ 2882)

The Command reported four (4) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $2,370.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are forty-seven (47) injuries at a cost of $37,470.00. This is $27,090.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occurred during July:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
July	1	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cumulative	11	47	9	8	5	4	10	2	9

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to two in 1956 for this same period.

0734

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	JUL 1957 ACDTS	JUL 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	JUL 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIC	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	4	118
51ST ABG	1	5	78	2	159
18TH SUP & TRANS	1	0	0	4	192
624TH AC&W	1	5	351	1	351
18TH ABG	2	13	371	6	974



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—JUL 1956)----------($443.00)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—JUL 1957)----------($139.00)

The Command reported three (3) motor vehicle accidents during the month of July at a total cost of $371.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are nineteen (19) accidents at a cost of $1,804.00. This is $3,952.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The accidents this month resulted from backing without a guide, operating a vehicle too fast for road conditions and failure to maintain safe distance.

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DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION	2
DIRECTOR OF MATERIEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICE, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
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0736

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313TH

COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
AUG–SEP 57

623083

SECRET

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COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW IS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. PRESENTATION MATERIEL HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY STAFF AGENCIES.

John E Laybourn

JOHN E. LAYBOURN
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER

0732


GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
JAPAN
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
30 N
145 E
EAST CHINA SEA
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
IWO JIMA
313TH A.D.
TIAWAN
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

0740

AIRFIELD STATUS



0741

STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



5 TH AF RATE ——

Command: The Command rate of 1.1% reported this month is the lowest rate ever recorded. During the past three months, there has been a marked improvement in reporting timeliness.

Hq, 313th AD: The 313th Air Division ranked second in reporting efficiency for the month of September in comparison with all other Air Division Headquarters; however, overall reporting timeliness increased during September with 98.5 percent of the reports arriving on time as compared with 96.8 percent during August.

0744

REPORTING



5TH AF RATE

51ST FIW: Their rate of 2.2% reported during this month is the highest since March 1956. The monthly average has been 1.0% for the past three months.

18TH ABG: For the first time on record, this unit had a perfect record with no late reports. Their monthly average has been 2.7% for the past three months.

0745

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW – F-86D 1 JUL – 31 AUG



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	329	793	40	224	348	1160	77	397	232	348
FLOWN	441	726	59	340	139	1082	48	123	265	437

During the first two months of the new training cycle, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has completed 83.4% of its overall F-86D training requirements. Training in the profile and weapons phases, which was below the desired standard for the first six months of calendar year 1957, continues to remain below the standard this month.

0747

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW – F-86D 1 JUL – 30 SEP



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	480	1156	58	326	507	1690	112	569	338	507
FLOWN	785	1247	87	555	195	1798	99	149	492	719

During the first three months of the new training cycle, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has completed 87.0% of its overall F-86D training requirements. Training in the profile and weapons phases continues to remain below the standard.

0748

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS-F-86F 1 JUL - 31 AUG



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	56	208	52	40	36	144	12	168	144
FLOWN	55	202	78	60	17	154	40	256	187

The 336th FDS has accomplished 96.9% of its overall training requirements during the first two months of the new training cycle. Training in the Simulated Emergency Flight Approach phase, which was below the desired standard during the previous training year,

0749

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

336TH FDS - F-86F — 1 JUL - 30 SEP



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	PROFILE	ACROBATICS	SIMULATED EMER. FLT.		WEAPONS	TACTICS
REQUIRED	84	312	78	60	54	216	18	252	216
FLOWN	128	216	90	60	17	179	42	278	194

The 336th FDS has accomplished 85.1% of its overall training requirements during the first three months of the new training cycle. This unit is currently standing down pending deactivation.

0750

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	104	103	75	75	75	
ASSIGNED	78	77	79	74	75	
OPNL READY	64	62	69	65	62	

ASGD/AUTH ——— O/R/ASGD - - - -

The Command reflected a net gain of one assigned crew and a net loss of three operational ready crews during the month of September. The assigned crew manning rate is at 100% while the turnover in crews decreased the operational ready rate from 87.8% to 82.7%. During the period July-September, the manning rate has been 101% and the operational ready rate has been 86%.

0751

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	74	74	50	50	50	
ASSIGNED	59	61	62	59	54	
OPNL READY	56	55	60	57	52	

ASGD/AUTH —— O/R/ASGD - - -

The 51ST FIW reflected a net loss of 5 assigned and 5 operational ready crews during the month of September. The assigned crew manning rate went from 118% to 108% while the turnover in crews decreased only slightly the operational ready rate from 96.6% to 96.3%. During the July-September period, the manning rate has been 117% and the operational ready rate has been 96.6%.

0752

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
37	37	25	25	25		AUTHORIZED	37	37	25	25	25	
30	30	31	31	28		ASSIGNED	29	31	31	28	26	
28	28	30	29	26		OP'IL READY	28	27	30	28	26	

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD

16TH FIS: There was a net loss of 3 assigned and 3 operational ready crews during the month, with a manning rate of 112% and a 92.9% operational ready rate.

25TH FIS: There was a net loss of 2 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month, with a manning rate of 104% while the operational ready rate remained at 100% for the second consecutive month.

0753

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
AUTHORIZED	29	29	25	25	25	
ASSIGNED	19	16	17	15	21	
OPNL READY	8	7	9	8	10	

ASGD/AUTH ——— - - - - O/R/ASGD

The 336TH FDS reflected a net gain of 6 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month of September. The assigned crew manning rate went from 60% to 84% while the turnover in crews decreased the operational ready rate from 53.3% to 47.6%. During the period July-September the manning rate has been 70.7% and the operational ready rate has been 50.9%

0754

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW



51ST FIW-F-86D							336TH FDS-F-86F					
MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
916	606	1084	479	939		HOURS FLOWN	394	291	486	202	136	
40	41	39	38	45		POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	25	23	23	23	23	
59	61	62	59	54		ASSIGNED CREWS	19	16	17	15	21	

= AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

= AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

= 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

= 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

51ST FIW: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 20.9 and 17.4 hours, respectively, during the month of September. In August they averaged 12.6 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 17.1 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units, while the assigned crews averaged 8.1 hours as compared to 11.2 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D crews.

336TH FDS: The possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 5.9 and 6.5 hours, respectively, during the month of September. In August they averaged 8.8 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 15.9 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F units, while the assigned crews averaged 13.5 hours as compared to 15.1 for all Fifth Air Force F-86F crews.

0755

AIR DEFENSE

SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS



		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	29	12	27	10	8	
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	16	6	17	7	6	
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	13	6	10	3	2	
4	FADE3/PERSONNEL ERROR	1	1	0	1	0	
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	1	2	0	0	0	
6	INTERCEPTED	11	3	10	2	2	

LINE 2+3=LINE 1
LINE 4+5+6=LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts was at 100% during the month of September. Our successful intercept rate has been 78.9% during the period 1 June through 31 August as compared to 44.2% for all Fifth Air Force units. The Command unknown track rate during September was 3.8, with 2,116 tracks processed and 8 unknown. Our unknown rate has been 7.9 during the June-August period as compared to 3.9 for all Fifth Air Force units.

0756

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 AUG 1957

KADENA AB	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	H-19	L-20	T-33							TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	23							5	5	3		2	4							42
18 FBW			52	1									7							60
322 TCS					8	4														12
15 TRS				17									2							19
KADENA TOT.	23		52	18	8	4		5	5	3		2	13							133
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		38						4	2		2	2	6							54
NAHA TOT.		38						4	2		2	2	6							54
313TH TOT.	23	38	52	18	8	4		9	7	3	2	4	19							187

Kadena Air Base: Reported a gain of 1 C-54 and 1 C-119. Twenty-five (25) F-100D's were lost. (12th F.B.Sq. to 13th AF)

Naha Air Base: Reported a loss of 1 F-86D.

0758

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

30 SEPT 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	C-124	H-19	L-20	T-33						TOTAL
336FDS-18ABG	23							1	5	3	1		2	4						39
18 FBW			53	1										5						59
322 TCS					8	3														11
15 TRS				20										2						22
KADENA TOT.	23		53	21	8	3		1	5	3	1		2	11						131
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		45						4	2				2	2	6					61
NAHA TOT.		45						4	2				2	2	6					61
313TH TOT.	23	45	53	21	8	3		5	7	3	1		2	4	17					192

KADENA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 1 F-100D, 3 RF-84F's and 1 C-124 (Damaged during Typhoon Faye). Four (4) B-26's, 2 T-33's and 1 S-A16 were lost.

NAHA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 7 F-86D's.

0759

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OPERATIONAL READY	76.7	80.9	75.0	79.4	75.3	
% ANORM SKED	8.7	6.1	9.0	7.8	6.8	
% ANORM UNSKED	11.3	10.6	13.1	11.5	16.2	
% ANORS	3.3	2.4	2.9	1.3	1.7	

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The Command Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 4.1% during the month of September, but remains above the desired 70% standard for the eighth consecutive month. Scheduled maintenance decreased one percent while unscheduled increased 4.7%. The ANORS rate increased slightly this month but is below the 5% standard for the eighth consecutive month.

0760

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	74.4	83.0	76.0	76.1	79.9	
% ANORM SKED	9.5	4.4	10.1	9.9	7.3	
% ANORM UNSKED	13.8	9.8	11.8	12.8	10.9	
% ANORS	2.3	2.8	2.1	1.2	1.9	

The 51st FIW Operational Ready rate reflected an increase of 3.8% during the month of September and remains above the desired 70% standard for the eighth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 2.6% and 1.9% respectively. The ANORS rate remains below the 5% standard for the seventh consecutive month. Their monthly operational ready rate has been 78.3% for the period 1 June through 31 August as compared to 69.7% for all Fifth Air Force F-86D units.

0761

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



16TH FIS							25TH FIS					
MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
73.1	85.8	77.5	75.0	82.2		% OP READY	75.8	80.3	74.6	77.1	77.7	
9.1	1.7	8.6	11.0	7.5		% ANORM SKED	9.9	7.0	11.6	8.8	7.0	
13.3	6.3	9.6	11.6	8.9		% ANORM UNSKED	14.3	12.7	13.8	14.1	12.9	
4.5	5.7	4.3	2.4	1.4		% ANORS	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	

% OPERATIONAL READY ——— 70 % OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED - - - - - 5 % ANORS STD % ANORS

16TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 7.2% during the month of September, and remains above the desired goal for the seventh consecutive month. This increase can be attributed to a drop in the scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates. The ANORS rate is below the 5% standard for the third consecutive month.

25TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased .6% during the month of September, and continues above the desired standard for the eleventh consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates decreased while the ANORS rate, which has been at 0.0% for the previous five consecutive months, went up to 2.4%. This rate has been below the standard for the past (13) months.

0762

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	80.0	77.2	73.1	85.0	67.6	
% ANORM SKED	7.6	9.0	7.0	4.2	5.9	
% ANORM UNSKED	7.4	12.0	15.4	9.4	25.2	
% ANORS	5.0	1.8	4.5	1.4	1.3	

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 336th FDS Operational Ready rate decreased 17.4% during the month of September. (This unit is standing down pending deactivation.) The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased 1.7% and 15.8% respectively. The ANORS rate remained below the 5% standard for the fourth consecutive month.

0763

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
% OP READY	40.6	36.7	31.2	55.7	68.7	
% ANORM SKED	15.7	13.8	15.3	9.6	12.7	
% ANORM UNSKED	33.1	25.6	21.3	13.2	13.9	
% ANORS	10.6	23.9	32.2	21.5	4.7	

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 18th FBW F-100D Operational Ready rate increased 13.0% during the month of September but remains below the desired standard. The scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased 3.1% and .7% respectively. The ANORS rate decreased substantially during the month of September (16.8%) and is below the standard for the first time since the aircraft were received.

0764

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS

322ND TCS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
71.1	62.5	58.4	57.2	54.1	
7.4	13.2	8.6	7.6	17.3	
17.3	14.2	18.0	14.4	21.8	
4.2	10.1	15.0	20.8	6.8	

15TH TRS



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
70.3	72.4	70.4	75.5	68.5	
13.6	15.0	16.3	9.7	16.9	
9.7	10.6	6.1	7.2	9.8	
6.4	2.0	7.2	7.6	4.8	

% OP READY		
% ANORM SKED		
% ANORM UNSKED		
% ANORS		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

322ND TCS: Their Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease and is below the 70% standard for the fourth consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased 9.7% and 7.4% respectively. The ANORS rate decreased 14.0% but remains above the standard.

15TH TRS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 7.0% during the month of September and is below the standard for the first time in the past five months. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates increased 7.2% and 2.6% respectively. The ANORS rate decreased 2.8% and is below the standard.

0765

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	43164	44740	49720	50644	45840	
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	3615	1928	1476	1631	1907	
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	3216	3439	3127	2478	326	

= $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

The regulation covering the reporting on Ground Powered Equipment has been changed and figures reported for the month of September are not comparative with previous data. Standard times have been introduced and only VDP and VDM in excess of the standard is reported.

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT			MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1	12254	11360	12804	12188	10740		1	VEH DAYS ASGD	30910	33380	36916	38456	35100	
2	109	97	209	213	253		2	DAYS DP	3506	1831	1267	1418	1654	
3	63	95	150	250	22		3	DAYS DM	3153	3344	2977	2228	304	

▩ = $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

▦ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

The regulation covering the reporting on Ground Powered Equipment has been changed and figures reported for the month of September are not comparative with previous data. Standard times have been introduced and only VDP and VDM in excess of the standard is reported.

0767

313 TH AIR DIVIS

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 AUG 57

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON – US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1006	904	90	8032	8644	108	467	457	99	4812	4732	98
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	670#	592*	88	5321	5721	108	439	431	98	4129	4044	98
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	415	355	86	2800	3075	110	164	172	105	1627	1577	97
TOTAL ATCH UNITS	255	237	93	2521	2646	105	275	259	94	2502	2467	99
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	75	81	114	125	137	110	48	56	117	5	17	340
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCHD)	192	171	89	2334	2438	104	275	259	94	2484	2449	99
322ND TRP CAR SQ (ATCHD)	63	66	105	187	208	111				18	18	100
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	32	23	72	138	164	119						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	14	108						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	221	187	85	1844	1937	105	115	116	101	1379	1363	99
623RD & 624TH ACW (ASGD)	70	49	70	605	681	113				243	197	81
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	16	13	81	75	142	189	1	0	0			
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	336	312	93	2711	2923	108	23	26	113	683	688	101
TOTAL PIPELINE		21			141							

#Includes 27 WO's * Includes 19 WO's

OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 3% increase with a net loss of 19 authorized spaces and 7 assigned. AIRMEN: Assigned unit manning reflected a 2% increase with a net loss of 17 authorized spaces and a net gain of 33 assigned. CIVILIAN: The DAFC manning reflected a 1% increase with a net loss of 2 authorized spaces. Indigenous manning reflected a decrease of 5% with a net loss of 1 authorization and 59 assigned. The 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron with authorizations for 45 officers and 220 airmen was reassigned to 13th Air Force, effective 15 Aug 1957.

0769

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 September 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1020	938	91	8463	9379	111	457	473	104	4811	4762	99
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	684#	627*	92	5749	6342	110	439	452	103	4129	4076	99
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	441	383	87	3277	3537	108	164	168	102	1627	1623	100
TOTAL ATCH UNITS	243	244	100	2472	2805	113	275	284	103	2502	2453	98
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	75	81	108	125	138	110	48	56	117	5	18	360
KADENA												
18TH AIR BASE GP (ATCH)	180	175	97	2285	2583	113	275	284	104	2484	2435	98
322ND TRP CAR SQ (ATCHD)	63	69	110	187	222	119	0	0		18	18	100
5TH COMM GP (ASGD)	26	23	88	477	399	84						
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	32	27	84	138	164	119						
15TH AIC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	14	108						
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	221	181	82	1844	2018	109	115	112	97	1379	1367	99
623RD & 624TH ACW (ASGD)	70	55	79	605	676	112				243	238	98
DET #1-313TH AD (ASGD)	16	14	88	75	128	171	1	0				
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	336	311	93	2714	3037	112	18	21	117	682	686	101
TOTAL PIPELINE		28			176							

Includes 29 WO's * Includes 22 WO's

OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 1% increase with a net gain of 26 authorized spaces and 28 assigned. AIRMEN: Assigned unit manning reflected a 2% decrease with a net gain of 477 authorized spaces and 462 assigned. CIVILIAN: The DAFC manning reflected a 3% decrease with a net loss of 4 assigned. Indigenous manning was at 100% with a net gain of 46 assigned. The 5th Communications Group with authorizations for 26 officers and 477 airmen was reassigned to this headquarters, effective 1 September 1957.

0770

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
GEN	AUTH	2	2	2	2	2	
	ASGD	1	1	1	1	1	
	% MANNED	50	50	50	50	50	
COL	AUTH	12	12	12	10	11	
	ASGD	12	10	11	13	12	
	% MANNED	100	83	92	130	109	
L/COL	AUTH	50	50	50	48	48	
	ASGD	43	40	40	41	40	
	% MANNED	86	80	80	85	83	
MAJ	AUTH	107	109	108	105	107	
	ASGD	96	92	89	87	94	
	% MANNED	90	84	82	83	88	
CAPT	AUTH	249	245	241	227	239	
	ASGD	207	209	209	209	217	
	% MANNED	83	85	87	92	91	
LTS	AUTH	262	256	255	251	248	
	ASGD	244	223	226	222	242	
	% MANNED	93	87	89	88	98	
WO	AUTH	19	28	27	27	29	
	ASGD	22	21	22	19	22	
	% MANNED	116	75	81	70	76	
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	701	702	695	670	684	
	ASGD	625	596	598	592	628	
	% MANNED	89	85	86	88	92	
	PROJ'D						662

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
M/SGT	AUTH	341	340	338	327	341	
	ASGD	258	256	259	252	278	
	% MANNED	76	75	77	77	82	
T/SGT	AUTH	538	538	521	524	543	
	ASGD	448	456	443	427	442	
	% MANNED	83	85	85	81	81	
S/SGT	AUTH	1434	1438	1409	1402	1487	
	ASGD	785	814	810	823	929	
	% MANNED	55	57	57	59	62	
A/1C	AUTH	1845	1832	1785	1766	1939	
	ASGD	842	1019	985	955	1125	
	% MANNED	46	56	55	54	58	
A/2C	AUTH	1260	1259	1226	1197	1334	
	ASGD	1673	1668	1644	1643	2159	
	% MANNED	133	132	134	137	162	
* A/3C	AUTH	124	124	108	105	105	
	ASGD	1598	1432	1510	1621	1406	
	% MANNED	1289	1155	1398	1544	1339	
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	5542	5531	5387	5321	5749	
	ASGD	5604	5645	5651	5721	6339	
	% MANNED	101	102	105	108	110	
	PROJ'D						5625

* INCLUDES A/S

0 7 1 2

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	MAY AUTH	MAY ASGD *	MAY % MANNED	JUNE AUTH	JUNE ASGD *	JUNE % MANNED	JULY AUTH	JULY ASGD *	JULY % MANNED	AUGUST AUTH	AUGUST ASGD *	AUGUST % MANNED
313TH A.D. ASGD UNITS	7	270	264	98	263	259	98	246	246	100	264	253	96
	5	991	934	94	954	954	100	904	913	101	932	957	103
	3	441	852	193	355	747	210	353	656	186	386	640	166
	1	20	9	45	20	8	40	4	6	150	1	6	600
18TH ABG	7	292	331	113	292	338	116	292	347	119	264	344	130
	5	1122	931	83	1129	905	80	1129	968	86	1059	976	92
	3	544	49[illegible]	91	537	538	100	537	526	98	467	559	120
	1	55	[illegible]	95	55	59	107	55	70	127	55	70	127
51TH FIW	7	317	287	91	321	298	93	316	307	97	304	305	100
	5	1013	900	89	1043	916	88	999	979	98	991	1027	104
	3	426	525	123	454	575	127	436	558	128	437	540	125
	1	49	47	96	49	51	104	48	56	117	46	57	119
COMMAND TOTALS	7	879	882	100	876	895	102	854	900	105	832	902	108
	5	3126	2765	88	3126	2775	89	3032	2860	94	2982	2960	99
	3	1411	1872	133	1346	1860	138	1326	1740	131	1286	1739	135
	1	124	108	87	124	118	95	107	132	123	104	133	128

* PAFSC

The command 7 skill level is at 108%, with a net loss of 22 authorized spaces and a gain of 2 assigned. The 5 level skill increased to 99% with a net loss of 50 authorized spaces and a gain of 100 assigned. The 3 skill level increased 5% with a net loss of 40 authorized spaces and 1 assigned. The 1 skill level increased to 128% with a net loss of 3 authorized spaces and a gain of 1 assigned.

0 7 7 3

PROBLEM AREAS

31 AUG 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	OFFICERS				
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	6	17%	85%
1644	Intercept Controller	47	45	27%	93%
2056	Intelligence Officer	11	7	0%	63%
3034	Communications Officer	22	13	54%	59%
3044	Ground Electronics Off	7	2	50%	28%
6416	Supply Staff Officer	8	6	33%	75%
6424	Supply Officer	44	25	96%	96%
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0%	50%
7324	Personnel Officer	20	15	47%	63%
	AIRMEN				
293X5	Tech Control Oper	12	1	13%	8%
342X0	Flt Simulator (Fl)	10	4	25%	40%
551X1	Const Equip Oper	11	7	140%	61%
603X1	Van Dispatcher	11	5	40%	45%
741X1	Recreational Specl	11	6	75%	55%
902X2	Operating Room Specl	10	3	33%	40%

The number of personnel problem areas decreased by five (5) during the month of August. The Supply and Communication fields have been reflected as problem areas for the past nine months.

PROBLEM AREAS

30 SEP 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	OFFICERS				
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	7	29%	100%
1644	Intercept Controller	47	44	19%	93%
2054	Intelligence Officer	11	7	29%	63%
3034	Communications Officer	35	23	61%	65%
3044	Ground Electronics Off	7	2	50%	28%
6416	Supply Staff Officer	9	8	25%	88%
6424	Supply Officer	47	29	59%	62%
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0%	50%
7324	Personnel Officer	23	18	39%	78%
	AIRMEN				
293X5	Tech Control Oper	14	2	14%	14%
342X0D	FLT Simulator (FI)	10	3	25%	30%
741X1	Recreational Specl	11	6	33%	54%

The number of personnel problem areas has decreased by eight (8) during the past two months. The Supply and Communication fields continue to be reflected as problem areas.

AIRMEN TRAINING



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	2062	2031				
OJT - C	1866	1788				
OJT - D	100	141				
COMPLETED OJT	226	105				

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	713	700				
OJT - C	677	650				
OJT - D	27	28				
COMPLETED OJT	88	34				

NUMBER ON OJT — C & OJT — D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 = 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING
OJT — D = CROSS TRAINING

COMMAND: The in training rate decreased only .7% during this month with a net loss of 31 eligibles and 37 in training. The completion rate was 5.4%, with 105 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

HQ 313TH AD: The decreased in training rate can be attributed to a net loss of 13 eligibles and 26 in training. The completion rate was 5.0%, with 34 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

AIRMEN TRAINING



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
700	677					ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	649	684				
660	604					OJT — C	529	534				
38	63					OJT — D	38	50				
63	52					COMPLETED OJT	75	19				

NUMBER ON OJT ——C & OJT ——D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 = 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT ——C = UPGRADING
OJT —— D = CROSS TRAINING

51ST FIW: Their decreased in training rate was due to a net loss of 22 eligibles and 29 in training. The completion rate was 7.5%, with 52 airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

18TH ABG: Their increased in treining rate was due to a net gain of 5 eligibles and 17 in training. The completion rate was 3.7% with 19, airmen being upgraded and completing cross training.

DISCIPLINE



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
MILITARY STRENGTH	9428	9670	9037	9146	10,619	
AWOL	1	3	2	3	0	
OVERALL STRENGTH	9912	10204	9454	9721	11,183	
OFFENDERS	119	163	140	166	170	

= NO AWOL / MIL STRENGTH X 1000

= NO OFFENDERS / AVG STRENGTH X 100

AWOL: The Command reflected an increase of 1 AWOL during the month of August, to increase our rate accordingly. However, a decrease of 3 during September gives a rate of zero at the present time.

OFFENDERS: The total offenders have increased 30 during the past two months, however the increase in overall strength allows the rate to remain stable.

0778

DISCIPLINE



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT		MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
2968	3192	2826	2941	3067		MILITARY STRENGTH	6460	6478	6211	6205	7552	
0	0	0	2	0		AWOL	1	3	2	1	0	
3155	3379	3013	3117	3228		OVERALL STRENGTH	6757	6825	6441	6604	7955	
30	58	58	56	45		OFFENDERS	89	105	82	110	125	

▨ = $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$

▦ = $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVG STRENGTH}} \times 100$

51ST FIW: Their offenders rate has reflected a 0.5% decrease during the past two months with 13 less offenders. Two AWOL's were reported during the month of August, the only AWOL's reported by this Wing in the past six months.

18TH ABG: The number of offenders has reflected 43 more offenders over the past two months, increasing their offenders rate accordingly. The AWOL rate has been on a steady decline for the past four months.

0779

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



TRIALS	JAN – MAR	ARP – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
GEN	7	2	3	
SPEC	31	25	25	
SUM	40	65	97	

During the July through September period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.01 per thousand persons assigned. The Special and Summary rates were 0.82 and 3.21 respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The General and Special rates reflected a slight decrease over the previous month, while the Summary rate reflected an increase.

0780

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA JAN-MAR	KADENA APR-JUN	KADENA JUL-SEP	KADENA OCT-DEC		NAHA JAN-MAR	NAHA APR-JUN	NAHA JUL-SEP	NAHA OCT-DEC
3	0	1		GEN	4	2	2	
13	18	17		SPEC	18	7	8	
21	38	49		SUM	19	27	48	

KADENA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.05 during the July-September period, while the Special and Summary were 0.84 and 2.4, respectively. The General and Summary rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special rate decreased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.20 during the July through September period, while the Special and Summary rates were 0.82 and 4.94, respectively. The Special and Summary rates reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the General rate remained constant.

0781

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			MAY		JUN		JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT	
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		2215.0		2214.0		2231.0		2244.0		2233.0			
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	56.0		16.0		9.1		1.0		3.3			
		REPAIR	30.0		53.0		75.0		77.9		49.7			
		COMMITTED	50.0		11.0		35.9		60.1		37.0			
TOTAL NO.	NO. WAITING	MOS. WAIT	293	5.5	290	6	401	6	433	6	455	6		
	NO. DRAWING	DEPARTS	140	97	123	79	60	78	101	99	74	37		
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	2215		2218		2231		2244		2233			2233
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	651		654		640		618		658			
		AIRMEN	1404		1462		1459		1526		1488			
		CIVILIAN	21		22		21		28		28			

The percentage of unoccupied quarters reflected a net decrease of 1.2% during the months of August and September, bringing the Command back to a favorable housing condition. This decrease can be attributed to less homes being carried in the unoccupied committed and repair categories.

0782

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
1,791	2,384	5,037	1,043	2,889	
39,498	41,958	46,995	48,038	50,927	

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
92	-4,590	-5725	-280	-1,566	
69,567	41,152	35,968	35,688	34,122	

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $3,932.06 during the month of August and September. This increased there total profit for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 to $19,530.82 and is in comparison to a $3,963.00 net profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net loss of $1,846.02 during the month of August and September. Club operations during the first nine months of calendar year 1957 resulted in a net loss amounting to $9,894.71. This loss compares unfavorably with a net profit of $11,166.00 for the same period during 1956.

0783

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NAHA



MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
4,737	4,017	6,002	6,267	5,371	
100,640	104,653	110,655	116,922	122,293	

NCO

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
NET PROFIT/LOSS	3,911	5,164	7,054	10,393	7,425	
NET WORTH	47,269	52,454	59,356	69,749	76,215	

KADENA



NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $11,637.87 during the month of August and September. This increases their total profit for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 to $40,323.60 and is $17,808.60 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $17,817.98 during the month of August and September. This increases their total profit for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 to $30,672.82 and is in comparison to a $3,849.00 net loss shown for the same period during 1956.

0784

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMAN



	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT
NAHA	-705	1,321	2,480	3,227	4,333	
	45,092	46,414	48,894	52,121	56,454	
KADENA	1,419	286	-1503	3,031	2,603	
	52,777	53,063	51560	54,591	57,194	

NET PROFIT/LOSS

NET WORTH

NAHA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,560.63 during the month of August and September. This increased their total profit for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 to $15,065.54 and is $9,006.54 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $5,634.28 during the month of August and September. This increased their total profit for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 to $13,033.28 and is $7,125.28 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

0785

313TH AIR DIVISION

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	AUG 57		1957 CUMULATIVE			
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	306	0	4353	0	
18TH ABG	0	396	0	3663	0	
51ST ABG	0	277	0	2472	0	
16TH FIS	0	302	2	4139	48.3	
336TH FDS	0	243	2	3989	50.1	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}} \times 100{,}000$

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-AUG 1956) - - - - (22.8)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-AUG 1957) ..... (21.5)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of August with a total of 1,524 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first eight months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 18,616 hours flown. Our present rate of 21.5 is slightly lower than the 22.8 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 22 in July as compared to 23.4 for the Division.

0787

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	SEP 57		1957 CUMULATIVE		
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE
25TH FIS	0	576	0	4929	0
18TH ABG	0	421	0	4084	0
51ST ABG	0	347	0	2819	0
16TH FIS	0	592	2	4731	42.3
336TH FDS	0	155	2	4144	48.3



$$\text{RATE} = \frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}} \times 100{,}000$$

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-SEP 1956)- - - - - - - - (22.8)

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-SEP 1957)..... (19.3)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of September with a total of 2,091 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first nine months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 20,707 hours flown. Our present rate of 19.3 is slightly lower than the 22.8 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 23 in August as compared to 21.5 for the Division.

0788

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	AUG 1957 ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	2	50.1
	51ST FIW	0	2	18.2
	COMMAND	0	4	21.5
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	2	18.2
	COMMAND	0	2	10.7
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	2	50.1
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	2	10.7

RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100

313TH AD RATE (JAN—AUG 1956).....

The Command went accident free during the month of August, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

0789

313TH AIR DIVISION

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

SEP 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	NO OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	2	48.3	
	51ST FIW	0	2	16.0	
	COMMAND	0	4	19.3	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	2	16.0	
	COMMAND	0	2	9.7	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	2	48.3	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	9.7	

313TH AD RATE (JAN—SEP 1957).....

The command went accident free for the third consecutive month, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

0190

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	AUG 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	AUG 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	AUG 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	2	1,050
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	1,440
18TH INSTL & AP	1	14	42	4	1,590
322ND TCS	0	0	0	5	2,010
313TH AD	0	0	0	6	2,370
18TH SUP & TRANS	1	30	900	3	3,900
51ST M&SG	1	14	420	9	4,230
18TH ABG	3	33	990	13	6,480
51ST FIG	1	25	750	7	16,080



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—AUG 1956) - - - - - - - - ($ 1,327)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—AUG 1957) ..... ($ 3,150)

The Command reported seven (7) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $3,480.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are fifty-four (54) injuries at a cost of $40,950.00. This is $23,700.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occurred during August:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
August	2	7	2	0	0	2	2	0	1
Cumulative	13	54	11	8	5	6	12	2	10

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to three in 1956 for this same period.

0791

313TH AIR DIVISION

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	SEP 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	SEP 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	SEP 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDK	0	0	0	1	420
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1380
51ST ABG	0	0	0	1	1440
624th AC&W	1	15	450	3	1500
18TH INSTL & AP	1	10	300	5	1890
322ND TCS	0	0	0	5	2010
313TH AD	0	0	0	6	2370
18TH SUP & TRANS	2	12	360	4	4260
51ST M&SG	3	44	1320	12	5550
18TH ABG	1	7	210	14	6690
51ST FIG	2	45	1350	8	17430



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—SEP 1956)- - - - - - - - ($ 1,581)

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—SEP 1957)..... ($ 3,457)

The Command reported ten (10) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $3,990.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are sixty-four (64) injuries at a cost of $44,940.00. This is $24,390.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occurred during Sept:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Accts 2 Wheel Veh	Accts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
September	0	10	1	2	0	1	4	0	2
Cumulative	13	64	12	10	5	7	16	2	12

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to three in 1956 for this same period.

0192

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	AUG 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE	
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10
18TH INSTL & AP	0	0	0	4	118
51ST ABG	0	0	0	2	159
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	4	192
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	1	351
18TH ABG	1	4	29	7	1003



313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN–AUG 1956) – – – – – ($458.38)
313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN–AUG 1957) ..... ($141.00)

The Command reported one (1) motor vehicle accident during the month of August at a total cost of $29.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are twenty (20) accidents at a cost of $1,833.00. This is $4,126.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The accident this month resulted from backing without a guide.

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	SEP 1957 ACDTS	SEP 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	SEP 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIG	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
51ST M&SG	0	0	0	2	10
18TH INSTL & AP	3	0	0	7	118
51ST ABG	0	0	0	2	159
18TH SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	4	192
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	1	351
18TH ABG	2	60	1244	9	2247



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—SEP 1956)– – – – – ($ 487.62)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—SEP 1957)····· ($ 236.69)

The Command reported five (5) motor vehicle accidents during the month of September at a total cost of $1,244.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are twenty-five (25) accidents at a cost of $3,077.00. This is $3,262.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The five (5) accidents this month resulted from falling asleep while driving, two accidents resulted from failing to yield right away, and the remaining two accidents resulted from running into the rear end of parked vehicles.

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0795

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313TH COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
OCTOBER 1957

623665

SECRET

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COMMAND-MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW IS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. PRESENTATION MATERIEL HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY STAFF AGENCIES.

John E. Laybourn

JOHN E. LAYBOURN
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER


GULF OF CHINA
SEA OF JAPAN
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
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SHANGHAI
30 N
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30 N
145 E
EAST CHINA SEA
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
IWO JIMA
313TH A.D.
TIAWAN
23 N
123 E
23 N
132 E

AIRFIELD STATUS



STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



313 TH AIR DIVISION

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REPTS CONSIDERED	363	280	266	299		
NO OF LATE REPTS	10	7	3	6		

5TH AF RATE

The Command rate of late reports reflected a slight increase during the month of October, however, is lower than the Fifth Air Force rate of 3.2%. Our rate of late reports for the period 1 August through 31 October has been 1.9% as compared to 3.8% for all Fifth Air Force Units.

0803

REPORTING



HQ 313th A. D.: The 313th Air Division rate of late reports remained constant at 1.5% during the month of October. The rate of late reports for the period 1 August through 31 October has been 2%.

6313th ABW: Their late report rate increased 3.4% during the month of October. Their rate for the period 1 August through 31 October has been 2.5%.

0804

REPORTING



5TH AF RATE

51st FIW: With the 6431st ABG assuming the responsibility of the majority of the reports submitted from Naha Air Base, the 51st FIW submitted only 2 reports during the month, which arrived at higher headquarters on time.

6431st ABG: During the first month as a separate reporting organization their rate of late reports at 0.9% is well below the overall Fifth Air Force rate.

OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

COMBAT CREW TRAINING

51ST FIW—F-86D 1 JUL—31 OCT



TRAINING	INSTRUMENT		NAVIGATION	FORMATION	PROFILE	RADAR	VISUAL ATTACK	WEAPONS	SHORT FLD LANDING	SIMULATED FLAME-OUT
REQUIRED	625	1505	75	424	660	2200	146	743	448	660
FLOWN	1035	1461	115	697	255	2371	142	201	681	911

During the first four months of the new training cycle, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing has completed 86.7% of its overall F-86D training requirements. Training in the profile and weapons phases continue to remain below the desired standard of 100%.

0807

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS

COMMAND



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	75	75	75	75		
ASSIGNED	79	74	75	71		
OPNL READY	69	65	62	57		

ASGD/AUTH ——— O/R/ASGD - - - -

The Command reflected a net loss of four assigned and five operational ready crews during the month of October. This decrease in crews can be attributed to the pending deactivation of the 336th FDS. The assigned and operational ready crew manning decreased from 100% to 94.6% and from 82.7% to 80.3% respectively. During the August-October period, the manning rate has been 97.8% and the operational ready rate has been 83.6%.

0808

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	50	50	50	50		
ASSIGNED	62	59	54	61		
OPNL READY	60	57	52	52		

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - -

The 51st FIW reflected a net gain of seven assigned, while the operational ready crews remained constant during the month of October. The assigned crew manning increased from 108% to 122%, while the operational ready rate decreased from 96.3% to 85.2%. During the August-October period, the manning rate has been 116% and the operational ready rate has been 92.5%.

0805

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
25	25	25	25			AUTHORIZED	25	25	25	25		
31	31	28	30			ASSIGNED	31	28	26	31		
30	29	26	28			OPNL READY	30	28	26	24		

ASGD / AUTH ——

O/R / ASGD - - -

16th FIS: There was a net gain of 2 assigned and 2 operational ready crews during the month, with a manning rate of 120% and a 93.3% operational ready rate.

25th FIS: There was a net gain of 5 assigned and a net loss of 2 operational ready crews during the month. Their manning rate is 124% and the operational ready rate is 77.4%.

0810

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	25	25	25	25		
ASSIGNED	17	15	21	10		
OPNL READY	9	8	10	5		

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - -

The 336th FDS reflected a net loss of 11 assigned and 5 operational ready crews during the month of October. Their assigned crew manning rate has decreased to 40%, while the loss of assigned crews increased the operational ready rate from 47.6% to 50%.

0811

SECRET

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW

51ST FIW F-86D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HOURS FLOWN	1084	479	939	1190		
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	39	38	45	45		
ASSIGNED CREWS	62	59	54	61		

= AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

= AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

——— = 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

– – – – = 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

The 51st FIW F-86D possessed aircraft and assigned crews averaged 26.4 and 19.5 hours, respectively, during the month of October. In September they averaged 20.9 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 23.4 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D Units, while the assigned crews averaged 17.4 hours as compared to 20.2 for all Fifth Air Force Crews.

0812

AIR DEFENSE



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	27	10	8	14		
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	17	7	6	9		
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	10	3	2	5		
4	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	0	1	0	1		
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	0	0	0	0		
6	INTERCEPTED	10	2	2	4		

LINE 2 + 3 = LINE 1
LINE 4 + 5 + 6 = LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts was 80% during the month of October. Our successful intercept rate has been 93.3% during the period 1 July through 30 September as compared to 49% for all Fifth Air Force units. The Command Unknown track rate during October was 5.6, with 2,512 tracks processed and 14 unknown. Our unknown rate has been 6.7 during the July-September period as compared to 4.6 for all Fifth Air Force units.

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 OCTOBER 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT												
KADENA AB	F-86F	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16		B-26	C-47	C-119	C-124	H-19	L-20	T-33						TOTAL
336 — 6313	3								9	3	1		2	4						22
18TH FBW			55	1										7						63
322ND TCS					7	3														10
15TH TRS				20										2						22
KADENA TOT.	3		55	21	7	3			9	3	1		2	13						117
NAHA AB																				
51ST FIW		45						4	1			2	2	6						60
NAHA TOT.		45						4	1			2	2	6						60
313TH TOT.	3	45	55	21	7	3		4	10	3	1	2	4	19						177

KADENA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 4 C-47's, 2 F-100D's and 2 T-33's. Twenty (20) F-86F's, 1 B-26, and 1 C-54 were lost.

NAHA AIR BASE: Reported a loss of 1 C-47.

0815

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OPERATIONAL READY	75.0	79.4	75.3	76.2		
% ANORM SKED	9.0	7.8	6.8	9.4		
% ANORM UNSKED	13.1	11.5	16.2	13.9		
% ANORS	2.9	1.3	1.7	0.5		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70% OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

The Command Operational Ready rate reflected a slight increase during the month of October and remains above the desired 70% standard for the ninth consecutive month. Scheduled maintenance increased 2.6%, while the unscheduled maintenance and ANORS rates decreased 3.5%. The ANORS rate has remained below the 5% standard for the ninth consecutive month.

0816

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OP READY	76.0	76.1	79.9	78.2		
% ANORM SKED	10.1	9.9	7.3	13.0		
% ANORM UNSKED	11.8	12.8	10.9	8.1		
% ANORS	2.1	1.2	1.9	0.7		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70% OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 51st FIW Operational Ready rate reflected a decrease of 1.7% during the month of October, however remains above the desired standard for the ninth consecutive month. Scheduled maintenance increased 5.7%, while the unscheduled maintenance and ANORS rate decreased 4%. The ANORS rate remains below the standard for the eighth consecutive month. Their monthly operational ready rate has been 78.1% for the period 1 July through 30 September as compared to 68.7% for all Fifth Air Force F-86D Units.

0817

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
77.5	75.0	82.2	84.1			%OP READY	74.6	77.1	77.7	72.0		
8.6	11.0	7.5	11.0			%ANORM SKED	11.6	8.8	7.0	15.0		
9.6	11.6	8.9	3.7			%ANORM UNSKED	13.8	14.1	12.9	12.9		
4.3	2.4	1.4	1.2			% ANORS	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.1		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70% OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

16TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 1.9% during the month of October and remains above the desired goal for the eighth consecutive month. This increase can be attributed to the decline in the unscheduled maintenance and ANORS rate. Scheduled maintenance reflected a 3.5% increase. The ANORS rate is below the standard for the fourth consecutive month.

25TH FIS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 5.7% during the month, however remains above the desired goal for the twelfth consecutive month. Scheduled maintenance increased 8%, while the ANORS rate decreased 2.3%. The unscheduled maintenance rate remained constant. The ANORS rate has been below the standard for the past fourteen months.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OP READY	73.1	85.0	67.6	70.9		
% ANORM SKED	7.0	4.2	5.9	0.0		
% ANORM UNSKED	15.4	9.4	25.2	29.1		
% ANORS	4.5	1.4	1.3	0.0		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5% ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 336th FDS Operational Ready Rate increased 3.3% during the month of October. Due to the pending deactivation of this organization, no scheduled maintenance or ANORS were performed during the month. The unscheduled maintenance increased 3.9%.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OP READY	31.2	55.7	68.7	62.8		
% ANORM SKED	15.3	9.6	12.7	17.9		
% ANORM UNSKED	21.3	13.2	13.9	13.0		
% ANORS	32.2	21.5	4.7	6.3		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 18th FBW F-100D Operational Ready rate decreased 4.9% during the month of October and remains 7.2% below the desired standard. The ANORS and scheduled maintenance rates increased 5.2% and 1.6% respectively. The unscheduled maintenance rate decreased slightly during the month. Their present ANORS rate is slightly over the desired goal.

0820

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS

322ND TCS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
58.4	57.2	54.1	55.9		
8.6	7.6	17.3	7.7		
18.0	14.4	21.8	32.2		
15.0	20.8	6.8	4.2		

15TH TRS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
70.4	75.5	68.5	65.8		
16.3	9.7	16.9	7.4		
6.1	7.2	9.8	6.2		
7.2	7.6	4.8	20.6		

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

322ND TCS: Their Operational Ready rate reflected a slight increase, however remains below the desired standard for the fifth consecutive month. The ANORS and scheduled maintenance reflected a 12.2% decrease, while the unscheduled maintenance increased 10.4%. The ANORS rate is presently below the desired standard.

15TH TRS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 2.7% during the month and remains below the deired goal for the second consecutive month. Scheduled and unscheduled maintenance decreased 13.1%, however the ANORS rate increased 15.8% and is well over the desired standard.

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	VEH DAYS ASGD	49720	50644	45840	52233		
2	DAYS DEADLINED FOR PARTS	1476	1631	1907	2202		
3	DAYS DEADLINED FOR MAINT	3127	2478	326	466		

▒ = $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$ ▥ = $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

The Command vehicle out of commission rate was 5.1% during the month of October, which is slightly over the desired goal of 5%. The vehicle out of commission for parts rate remained constant at 4.2%, while the vehicle out of commission for maintenance reflected a slight increase. During the July-September period, our VOC rate has been 7.5% as compared to 7.3% for all Fifth Air Force units.

GROUND POWERED EQUIPMENT

DEADLINE RATES



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	12804	12188	10740	11868		
2	209	213	253	268		
3	150	250	22	44		

1 = VEH DAYS ASGD

2 = DAYS DP

3 = DAYS DM

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	36916	38456	35100	40365		
2	1267	1418	1654	1934		
3	2977	2228	304	422		

= $\frac{\text{LINE 2}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

= $\frac{\text{LINE 3}}{\text{LINE 1}} \times 100$

NAHA: The Naha VOC rate reflected a slight increase during the month of October, however, continues to remain below the desired goal.

KADENA: The Kadena VOC rate has reflected a marked improvement over the past four months. The present rate of 5.8% is slightly over the established standard. The VOCP rate of 4.8% is due to the present lack of funds for Local Purchase and Army procured items.

0823

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 OCTOBER 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	1002	987	99	8698	9419	108	469	461	98	4566	4675	102
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	668#	648*	97	5869	6366	108	451	441	98	3883	4086	105
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	605	580	96	5681	6137	108	451	441	98	3883	4068	105
TOTAL ATCHD UNITS	63	68	108	188	209	111					18	
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV. KADENA	69	82	119	96	138	144	44	49	111	5	25	500
6313TH AIR BASE WG (ASGD)	182	183	101	2382	2629	110	290	283	98	2341	2422	103
5TH COMM GROUP (ASGD)	26	23	88	477	404	85						
15TH AIC FLIGHT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	14	108						
336TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	31	16	52	133	118	89						
322ND TRP CARR SQ (ATCHD) NAHA	63	68	108	188	209	111					18	
51ST FTR INTCP WING (ASGD)	100	109	109	760	907	119	8	21	263	42	78	186
6431ST AIR BASE GP (ASGD)	111	94	85	1132	1155	102	108	87	81	1249	1305	104
623RD & 624TH AC&W (ASGD)	70	55	79	617	665	108		1		246	238	97
DET# 1, 313TH A. D. (ASGD)	15	16	107	71	127	179	1					
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	334	339	101	2829	3053	108	18	20	111	683	589	86
TOTAL PIPELINE		3			165							

Includes 22 WO's * Includes 24 WO's

OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 65 increase with a loss of 16 authorized spaces and a net gain of 21 assigned. AIRMEN: Assigned unit manning reflected a 2% decrease with a net gain of 120 authorized spaces and 24 assigned. CIVILIAN: The DAFC manning reflected a 5% decrease with a gain of 12 authorized spaces and a net loss of 11 assigned. Indigenous manning increased 6% with a net loss of 246 authorized spaces and a net gain of 10 assigned.

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	338	327	341	326		
	ASGD	259	252	278	296		
	% MANNED	77	77	82	91		
T/SGT	AUTH	521	524	543	423		
	ASGD	443	427	442	450		
	% MANNED	85	81	81	106		
S/SGT	AUTH	1409	1402	1487	1343		
	ASGD	810	823	929	926		
	% MANNED	57	59	62	69		
A/IC	AUTH	1785	1766	1939	1207		
	ASGD	985	955	1125	1089		
	% MANNED	55	54	58	90		
A/2C	AUTH	1226	1197	1334	2475		
	ASGD	1644	1643	2159	2153		
	% MANNED	134	137	162	87		
*A/3C	AUTH	108	105	105	95		
	ASGD	1510	1621	1406	1452		
	% MANNED	1398	1544	1339	1528		
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	5387	5321	5749	5869		
	ASGD	5651	5721	6339	6366		
	% MANNED	105	108	110	108		
	PROJ'D					6088	5772

* INCLUDES A/B

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	2	2	2	3		
	ASGD	1	1	1	1		
	%MANNED	50	50	50	33		
COL	AUTH	12	10	11	12		
	ASGD	11	13	12	11		
	%MANNED	92	130	100	92		
L/COL	AUTH	50	48	48	41		
	ASGD	40	41	40	42		
	%MANNED	80	85	83	102		
MAJ	AUTH	108	105	107	99		
	ASGD	89	87	94	95		
	%MANNED	82	83	88	96		
CAPT	AUTH	241	227	239	252		
	ASGD	209	209	217	222		
	%MANNED	87	92	91	88		
LTS	AUTH	255	251	248	239		
	ASGD	226	222	242	253		
	%MANNED	89	88	98	106		
WO	AUTH	27	27	29	22		
	ASGD	22	19	22	24		
	%MANNED	81	70	76	109		
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	695	670	684	668		
	ASGD	598	592	628	648		
	%MANNED	86	88	92	97		
	PROJ'D					647	693

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	SEPTEMBER AUTH	SEPTEMBER ASGD	SEPTEMBER % MANNED	OCTOBER AUTH	OCTOBER ASGD	OCTOBER % MANNED	NOVEMBER AUTH	NOVEMBER ASGD	NOVEMBER % MANNED	DECEMBER AUTH	DECEMBER ASGH	DECEMBER % MANNED
313TH AD ASGD UNITS	7	310	295	95									
	5	1209	1202	99									
	3	537	750	140									
	1	1	11	1100									
6313TH ABW	7	264	359	136									
	5	1059	1065	101									
	3	523	587	112									
	1	55	40	73									
51ST FIW	7	217	145	67									
	5	496	500	101									
	3	160	253	158									
	1	3	5	167									
6341ST ABG	7	81	158	195									
	5	448	574	128									
	3	232	339	146									
	1	46	37	80									
COMMAND TOTALS	7	872	957	110									
	5	3212	3341	104									
	3	1452	1929	133									
	1	105	93	89									

* PAFSC

The Command 7 skill levle increased 2% during September with a gain of 40 authorized spaces and 55 assigned. The 5 skill level increased 5% with a net gain of 230 authorized and 381 assigned. The 3 skill level decreased 2% with a net gain of 166 authorized spaces and 190 assigned. The 1 skill level decreased 39% with a net gain of 1 authorized space and a net loss of 40 assigned.

0828

PROBLEM AREAS

31 OCTOBER 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	OFFICERS				
1616	Acft Control Staff Off	7	8	13	114
1644	Intercept Controller	47	46	20	97
3044	Ground Electronics Off	7	2	50	28
6416	Supply Staff Officer	9	9	33	100
6424	Supply Officer	46	28	54	60
6844	Machine Accounting Off	2	1	0	50
	ENLISTED				
27300	Acft Con & Warning Supt	10	3	0	30
293X5	Channel & Tech Con Opr	18	6	27	33
342X0	Flight Simulator Spec	17	5	17	29
361X1	Cable Splicer	9	4	22	44
402X0	Photographic Repairman	8	4	50	50
471X2	Special Vehicle Repair	18	11	50	61
551X1	Construction Equip Opr	11	6	45	54
551X2	Masonry & Concrete Wrk	1	0	0	0
741X1	Recreation Specialist	11	7	27	63
902X2	Operating Room Spec	10	4	20	40

The number of officer personnel problem areas decreased three (3) during the month, while the airmen problem areas increased by eight (8). The Supply and Communication fields continue to be reflected as problem areas.

0829

AIRMEN TRAINING



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	2062	2031	2188			
OJT-C	1866	1788	1983			
OJT-A&D	100	141	150			
COMPLETED OJT	226	105	117			

NUMBER ON OJT-A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT-C = UPGRADING
OJT-A&D = CROSS TRAINING

The Command in-training rate increased 2.5% during the month of September with a net gain of 157 eligibles and 204 in-training. The completion rate was 5.5% during the month with 107 airmen being upgraded and 10 completing cross training. Our in-training rate of 95% during the month of August compares to 94.9% for all Fifth Air Force Units, while our completion rate of 5.4% compares to 8.5% reported for all Fifth Air Force Units.

0830

AIRMEN TRAINING



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
700	677	348				ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	713	700	807			
660	604	305				OJT-C	677	650	764			
35	63	15				OJT- A&D	27	28	43			
63	52	13				COMPLETED OJT	88	34	47			

NUMBER ON OJT — A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100

5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING

OJT — A & D = CROSS TRAINING

51st FIW: Reorganization of this Wing resulted in a net loss of 329 eligibiles and 347 in-training. This decrease in personnel decreased the in-training rate 6.5%. Their completion rate was 4.1% with 12 airmen being upgraded and 1 completing cross training.

Hq 313th A.D.: The increased in-training rate of 3.1% during the month was due to a net gain of 107 eligibles and 129 in-training. The completion rate was 5.8% with 43 airmen being upgraded and 4 completing cross training.

0831

AIRMEN TRAINING



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
		387				ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	649	654	646			
		315				OJT-C	529	534	599			
		46				OJT-A&D	38	50	46			
		10				COMPLETED OJT	75	19	47			

NUMBER ON OJT — A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100

5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING

OJT-A&D = CROSS TRAINING

6431st ABG: During the first month as a separate organization, their in-training rate was 97.5% with 361 of 387 eligibles in-training. Their completion rate was 2.8% with 9 airmen being upgraded and 1 completing cross training.

6313th ABW: The increased in-training rate can be attributed to a net loss of 8 eligibles and a net gain of 61 in-training. Their completion rate was7.3% with 43 airmen being upgraded and 4 completing cross training.

0 A 3 2

DISCIPLINE



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MILITARY STRENGTH	9037	9146	10,619	9,808		
AWOL	2	3	0	2		
OVERALL STRENGTH	9454	9721	11,183	10,299		
OFFENDERS	140	163	156	122		

= NO. AWOL / MIL. STRENGTH X 1000

= NO OFFENDERS / AVG STRENGTH X 100

AWOL: The Command reported two AWOL's during the month of October, increasing our rate accordingly.

OFFENDERS: Thirty-four less offenders were reported during the month of October, decreasing the offender rate accordingly.

DISCIPLINE



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2826	2941	3067	3399			MILITARY STRENGTH	6211	6205	7552	6409		
0	2	0	2			AWOL	2	1	0	0		
3013	3117	3228	3504			OVERALL STRENGTH	6441	6604	7955	6795		
58	54	45	31			OFFENDERS	82	109	111	91		

= $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$

= $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVE STRENGTH}} \times 100$

NAHA: With fourteen less offenders reported during the month an the increase in the overall strength, the offenders rate has decreased 0.5%. Two AWOL's reported during the month, increased the rate accordingly.

KADENA: Reported twenty less offenders, however, the decrease in the overall strength, resulted in only a slight change in the offenders rate. There were no AWOL's reported for the second consecutive month.

0834

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



		JAN – MAR	ARP – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
TRIALS	GEN	7	2	3	
	SPEC	31	25	25	
	SUM	40	65	97	

During the July through September period the Command General Court Martial rate was 0.01 per thousand persons assigned. The Special and Summary rates were 0.82 and 3.21 respectively, per thousand persons assigned. The General and Special rates reflected a slight decrease over the previous month, while the Summary rate reflected an increase.

COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA	JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC
GEN	3	0	1	
SPEC	13	18	17	
SUM	21	38	49	

NAHA	JAN-MAR	APR-JUN	JUL-SEP	OCT-DEC
GEN	4	2	2	
SPEC	18	7	8	
SUM	19	27	48	

KADENA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.05 during the July-September period, while the Special and Summary were 0.84 and 2.4, respectively. The General and Summary rate reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the Special rate decreased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their General Court Martial rate was 0.20 during the July through September period, while the Special and Summary rates were 0.82 and 4.94, respectively. The Special and Summary rates reflected an increase over the previous quarter, while the General rate remained constant.

0836

DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JUL		AUG		SEP		OCT		NOV		DEC	
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		2231.0		2244.0		2233.0		2221.0					
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	9.1		1.0		3.3		4.0					
		REPAIR	75.0		77.9		49.7		67.0					
		COMMITTED	35.9		60.1		37.0		32.0					
TOTAL NO.	NO. WAITING	MOS. WAIT	401	6	433	6	455	6	512	6				
	NO. DRAWING	DEPARTS	60	78	101	99	74	37	62	52				
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	2231		2244		2233		2221			2221		2221
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	640		618		658		627					
		AIRMEN	1459		1526		1488		1473					
		CIVILIAN	21		28		28		32					

The percentage of unoccupied quarters reflected a net increase of 0.6% during the month of October, bringing the Command rate slightly in the unfavorable housing condition. This unfavorable condition resulted from an increased number of homes in the unoccupied repair category.

0837

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NAHA	5,037	1,043	2,889	3,234		
NAHA	46,995	48,038	50,927	54,162		
NET PROFIT / LOSS						
NET WORTH						
KADENA	-5725	-280	-1,566	847		
KADENA	35,968	35,688	34,122	34,969		

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $3,234.80 during the month of October. This increased there total profit for the first ten month of calendar year 1957 to $22,765.62 and is in comparison to a $7,099.00 net profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $847.43 during the month of October. Club operations during the first ten months of calendar year 1957 resulted in a net loss amounting to $9,047.28. This loss compares unfavorably with a net profit of $12,130.00 for the same period during 1956.

0038

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
6,002	6,267	5,371	7,283		
110,655	116,922	122,293	129,568		

$ THOUSAND $

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	7,054	10,393	7,425	7,969		
NET WORTH	59,356	69,749	76,215	84,184		

KADENA



NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,283.77 during the month of October. This increases their total profit for the first ten months of calendar year 1957 to $47,607.37 and is $22,927.37 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,969.42 during the month of October. This increases their total profit for the first ten months of calendar 1957 to $38,642.24 and is in comparison to a $3,433 net loss shown for the same period during 1956.

0839

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMAN

NAHA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2,480	3,227	4,333	4,695		
48,894	52,121	56,454	60,592		

$ THOUSAND $

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6

	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
NET PROFIT/LOSS	-1,503	3,031	2,603	2,269		
NET WORTH	51,560	54,591	57,194	59,463		

KADENA



NAHA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $4,695.20 during the month of October. This increases their total profit for the first ten months of calendar year 1957 to $19,760.74 and is $13,350.74 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

KADENA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $2,269.35 during the month of October. This increased their total profit for the first ten months of calendar year 1957 to $15,302.63 and is $10,332.63 above the profit shown for the same period during 1956.

0840

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	OCT 57		1957 CUMULATIVE		
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE
25 TH FIS	0	762	0	5691	0
6313 TH ABW	0	376	0	4460	0
6431 TH ABG	0	372	0	3191	0
16 TH FIS	0	750	2	5481	36.5
336 TH FDS	0	133	2	4277	46.8



RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313 TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–OCT 1956) ———— (26.2)

313 TH AD AVERAGE (JAN–OCT 1957) ..... (17.3)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of October with a total of 2,393 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first ten months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 23,100 hours flown. Our present rate of 17.3 is lower than the 26.2 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 23 in September as compared to 19.3 for the Division.

0842

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	UNITS	OCT 1957 ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE	RATE (0 20 40 60 80 100)
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	2	46.8	
	51ST FIW	0	2	13.9	
	COMMAND	0	4	17.3	
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	2	13.9	
	COMMAND	0	2	8.65	
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	2	46.8	
	51ST FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	2	8.65	

313TH AD RATE (JAN—OCT 1956).....

The Command went accident free for the fourth consecutive month, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

0843

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	OCT 1957 NO OF DIS INJ	OCT 1957 MAN DAYS LOST	OCT 1957 COST OF INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF DIS INJ	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF INJ
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
6431ST AP & INSTL	1	7	210	1	210
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	3	1,500
6431ST ABG	1	4	120	2	1,560
322ND TCS	0	0	0	5	2,010
313TH AD	0	0	0	6	2,370
6313TH AP & INSTL	1	21	630	6	2,520
6431ST SUP & TRAN	1	2	60	8	2,550
6313TH SUP & TRAN	1	14	420	6	4,680
6313TH ABW	2	19	570	16	7,260
51ST FIW	2	45	1,350	16	21,840

1957 CUMULATIVE COST ——— 1000

0 2 4 6 8 10

313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-OCT 1956) ---------- ($1,918)

313 TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-OCT 1957) ..... ($3,715)

The Command reported nine (9) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $3,360.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are seventy-three (73) injuries at a cost of $48,300.00. This is $23,370.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during Oct:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Accts 2 Wheel Veh	Accts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
October	2	9	0	1	1	2	2	0	3
Cumulative	15	73	12	11	6	9	18	2	15

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to three in 1956 for this same period.

0844

MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	OCT 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE		
	ACDTS	DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	COST OF ACDTS	ACDTS	COST OF ACDTS	COST OF ACCIDENTS — $100 (0 2 4 6 8 10)
15TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0	
16TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0	
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0	
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0	
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0	
623RD ACSW	0	0	0	0	0	
6431ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0	
6431ST SUP & TRAN	0	0	0	2	10	
6431ST AP & INSTL	0	0	0	2	159	
6913TH SUP & TRAN	0	0	0	4	192	
6913TH AP & INSTL	1	2	75	8	193	
624TH ACSW	0	0	0	1	351	
6913TH ABW	0	0	0	9	2,247	

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-OCT 1956)——————————($728)

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-OCT 1957)·····($242)

The Command reported one (1) motor vehicle accident during the month at a total cost of $75.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are twenty-six (26) accidents at a cost of $3,152.00. This is $6,309.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The accident this month resulated from driving at excess speed.

0845

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DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
INSPECTOR GENERAL, 313TH AIR DIVISION	1
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICE, HISTORICAL DIVISION	4
COMMANDER, 18TH FIGHTER BOMBER WING	2
COMMANDER, 6313TH AIR BASE WING	2
COMMANDER, 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING	2
COMMANDER, 6431ST AIR BASE GROUP	2
COMMANDER, 322ND TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (MED) (SP)	1
HEADQUARTERS. AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY	1
TOTAL	26

SECRET

COMMAND...

MANAGEMENT REVIEW



MONTH OF
NOV-DEC 1957

624568

SECRET

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COMMAND - MANAGEMENT REVIEW

PREPARED BY

COMPTROLLER

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APO 239

FOREWORD

THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMAND MANAGEMENT REVIEW IS TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT TOOL FOR DIRECTING ATTENTION AND EMPHASIS TO PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENT AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS. PRESENTATION MATERIEL HAS BEEN CONTRIBUTED BY STAFF AGENCIES.

John E. Laybourn

JOHN E. LAYBOURN
LT. COL. USAF
COMPTROLLER

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
GULF OF CHINA
SEOUL
KOREA
YELLOW SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
MISSION 313 TH A.D.
CONDUCT DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DIVISIONS OPERATING AREA
JAPAN
SHANGHAI
30 N
123 E
30 N
145 E
EAST CHINA SEA
PRIMARY AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
OKINAWA
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313TH A.D.
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23 N
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132 E

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

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STRUCTURAL--ORGANIZATION AND KEY PERSONNEL CHART



REPORTING



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
REPTS CONSIDERED	363	280	266	299	233	
NO OF LATE REPTS	10	7	3	6	6	

5TH AF RATE ——

The Command rate of late reports reflected a slight increase during the month of November, however, remains below the Fifth Air Force rate of 3.1%. Our late reports rate for the period 1 Sept - 30 November has been 1.9% as compared to 3.2% for all Fifth Air Force Units.

0853

313 TH AIR DIVISION

COMPTROLLER

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF ACCOUNTING, MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, AND STATISTICAL SERVICES.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION COMPTROLLER PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

REPORTING



HQ 313th A. D.: The 313th Air Division rate of late reports increased 1.4% during the month of November. Our rate of late reports for the period 1 September - 30 November has been 1.9%.

6313th ABW: Their late report rate reflected a slight increase during the month of November. Their rate for the period 1 September - 30 November has been 2.3%.

0055

REPORTING



51st FIW: The three reports submitted by this organization during October and November arrived at higher headquarters on time.

643lst ABG: Their late reports rate reflected a slight increase during the month of November. Their late reports rate for the first two months as a separate reporting organization is 1%, well below the Fifth Air Force rate.

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OPERATIONS

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION OPERATIONS, PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AUTHORIZED	50	50	50	60	60	60
ASSIGNED	62	59	54	61	68	66
OPNL READY	60	57	52	52	57	62

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD

The 51st FIW reflected a net gain of five assigned and ten operational ready crews during the months of November and December. The assigned crew manning increased from 102% to 110% during this period, while the operational ready rate increased from 85.2% to 93.9%. During the October-December period the manning rate has been 108.3% and the operational reacy rate has been 87.7%.

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OPERATIONAL READINESS OF CREWS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
25	25	25	30	30	30	AUTHORIZED	25	25	25	30	30	30
31	31	28	30	33	32	ASSIGNED	31	28	26	31	35	34
30	29	26	28	30	31	OPNL READY	30	[illegible]	26	24	27	[illegible]

ASGD / AUTH ——— O/R / ASGD - - -

16th FIS: There was a net gain of two assigned and three operational ready crews during the months of November and December. This gain increased the manning rate from 100% to 100.6% and the operational ready rate from 93.3% to 96.8%.

25th FIS: There was a net gain of three assigned and seven operational ready crews during the months of November and December. This gain increased the manning rate from 103.3% to 113.3% and the operational ready rate from 77.4% to 91.2%.

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SECRET

AVERAGE HOURS FLOWN PER POSSESSED AIRCRAFT AND ASSIGNED CREW

51ST FIW F-86D



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
HOURS FLOWN	1084	479	939	1190	989	705
POSSESSED AIRCRAFT	39	38	45	45	46	47
ASSIGNED CREWS	62	59	54	5	68	65

▒ = AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT — = 5TH AF AVE HRS PER POSS ACFT

▒ = AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW ····· = 5TH AVE HRS PER ASGD CREW

The 51st FIW F-86D possessed aircraft averaged 21.1 and 15 hours, respectively, during November and December. The assigned crews averaged 14.2 and 10.6 hours, respectively, during the same period. In October they averaged 26.4 hours per possessed aircraft as compared to 21.3 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D Units, while the assigned crews averaged 19.5 hours as compared to 18.7 for all Fifth Air Force F-86D crews.

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AIR DEFENSE



		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	UNKNOWN TRACKS	27	10	8	14	9	18
2	IPI/NOT ORDERED	17	7	6	9	5	8
3	INTERCEPTS ATTEMPTED	10	3	2	5	4	10
4	FADES/PERSONNEL ERROR	0	1	0	1	0	1
5	EQUIPMENT FAILURE	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	INTERCEPTED	10	2	2	4	4	9

LINE 2 + 3 = LINE 1
LINE 4 + 5 + 6 = LINE 3

$\frac{\text{LINE 6}}{\text{LINE 3}}$ = % SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTS

The Command rate of successful intercepts was 90% in December as compared to 100% during November. Our successful intercept rate has been 90% during the Sep-Nov period as compared to 93.5% for all Fifth Air Force units. The Command unknown track rate was 5.5 during December with 3,297 tracks processed and 18 unknown and 4.4 in November with 2,122 tracks processed and 9 unknown. Our unknown rate has been 5.2 during the Sep-Nov period as compared to 5.4 for Fifth Air Force Units.

MATERIEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES, MAINTENANCE, PROCUREMENT, INSTALLATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION MATERIEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

30 NOVEMBER 1957

	COMBAT							NON-COMBAT									
KADENA AB	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F	C-54	SA-16			B-26	C-47	C-119	C-124	H-19	L-20	T-33	C-54	SA-16	TOTAL
313 OPRS									4	3			2	4	4		17
18TH FBW			61	1					5		1			7		1	76
322 TCS					3												4
15TH TRS				20										2			22
KADENA TOT			61	21	3	1			9	3	1		2	13	4	1	119
NAHA AB																	
51ST FIW		46												6			52
6431 OPRS								4	1			2	1				8
NAHA TOT.		46						4	1			2	1	6			60
313TH TOT		46	61	21	3	1		4	10	3	1	2	3	19	4	1	179

KADENA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 6 F-100D's and a loss of 3 F-86F's and 1 SA-16.

NAHA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 1 F-86D and a loss of 1 L-20.

POSSESSED AIRCRAFT

31 DECEMBER 1957

	COMBAT				NON-COMBAT									
KADENA AB	F-86D	F-100D	RF-84F		B-26	C-47	C-54	C-119	C-124	H-19	L-20	SA-16	T-33	TOTAL
6313 OPRS					5	1	3			2	2	4		17
DET 2 313AD						3								3
18TH FBW		59			5			1			1	7		73
15TH TRS			19									2		21
KADENA TOT		59	19		10	4	3	1		2	3	13		114
NAHA AB														
61ST FIW	47											6		53
6431 OPRS					4	2			2	2				10
NAHA TOT.	47				4	2			2	2		6		63
313TH TOT	47	59	19		4	12	4	3	1	2	4	3	19	177

KADENA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 1 SA-16 and 1 C-47 and a loss of 2 F-100D's, 2 RF-84F's and 3 C-54's.

NAHA AIR BASE: Reported a gain of 1 F-86D, 1 C-47 and 1 L-20.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OP READY	76.0	78.1	78.9	76.8	77.7	78.9
% ANORM SKED	10.1	9.9	7.5	13.0	10.8	7.6
% ANORM UNSKED	11.8	12.0	10.9	8.1	9.1	8.5
% ANORS	2.1	1.2	1.9	0.7	2.7	1.4

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70% OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 8% ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 51st FIW Operational Ready rate reflected a 2.7% decrease during the months of November and December, however, remains above the desired standard for the eleventh consecutive month. The ANORS and unscheduled maintenance rates increased 8.3% during this period, while the scheduled maintenance rate decreased 5.4%. The ANORS rate remains below the desired standard for the tenth consecutive month. Their monthly operational ready rate has been 77.3% for the period 1 October - 31 December.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
77.5	75.0	82.2	84.1	78.3	77.2	% OP READY	74.6	77.1	77.7	72.0	76.9	73.6
8.6	11.0	7.5	11.0	9.9	7.8	% ANORM SKED	11.6	8.8	7.0	15.0	11.2	7.8
9.6	11.8	8.9	3.7	7.3	12.6	% ANORM UNSKED	13.8	14.1	12.9	12.9	11.1	18.6
4.3	2.4	1.4	1.2	4.6	2.6	% ANORS	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.1	0.8	0.2

% OPERATIONAL READY ——— 70% OP READY STD % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED - - - - - 5% ANORS STD % ANORS

16th FIS: Their Operational Ready rate decreased 6.9% during the months of November and December, however, remains above the desired goal for the tenth consecutive month. The unscheduled maintenance and ANORS rates increased 10.3%, while the scheduled maintenance decreased 3.4%. The ANORS rate is below the standard for the sixth consecutive month.

25th FIS: Their Operational Ready rate increased 1.6% during November and December and remains above the desired goal for the fourteenth consecutive month. The Unscheduled maintenance and ANORS rates increased 5.8%, while the scheduled maintenance decreased 7.4%. The ANORS rates has been below the goal for 14 mos.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS

18TH FBW



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
% OP READY	31.2	55.7	68.7	62.8	56.5	51.0
% ANORM SKED	15.3	9.6	12.7	17.9	22.8	20.5
% ANORM UNSKED	21.3	13.2	13.9	13.0	13.3	11.4
% ANORS	32.2	21.5	4.7	6.3	7.4	7.0

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED
% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

The 18th FBW F-100D operational ready rate decreased 6.3% during the month of November and increased 4.5% during December and remains 9% below the desired standard. The scheduled maintenance and ANORS rates reflected a net increase during this two month period, while the unscheduled maintenance reflected a slight decrease. Their present ANORS rate is 2% over the desired goal.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE STATUS

SUPPORTED UNITS



322ND TCS JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		15TH TRS JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
58.4	57.2	54.1	55.9	54.9		% OP READY	70.4	75.5	66.5	65.8	74.3	75.8
8.6	7.6	17.3	7.7	16.2		% ANORM SKED	16.3	9.7	16.9	7.4	6.2	4.4
18.0	14.4	21.8	32.2	27.1		% ANORM UNSKED	6.1	7.2	9.8	6.2	6.3	6.0
15.0	20.8	6.8	4.2	1.8		%ANORS	7.2	7.8	4.8	20.6	13.2	10.8

% OPERATIONAL READY — 70 % OP READY STD — % ANORM UNSKED

% ANORM SKED — 5 % ANORS STD — % ANORS

322nd TCS: This organization was discontinued effective the 8th of December.

15th TRS: Their operational ready rate increased 13% during the months of November and December. The ANORS, scheduled and unscheduled maintenance rates reflected a decrease during this period. The ANORS rate reflected the greatest improvement, however, remains 5.8% over the desired standard.

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE

NAHA

DECEMBER



1	2	3	4	5
10	12	5	0	20
20	100	42	0	100

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
POINTS RECEIVED	73	47				
PERCENT	73	47				

1. DOWN TIME (50 POINTS MAX.)
2. DIRECT MANHOURS (12 POINTS MAX.)
3. INDIRECT MANHOURS (12 POINTS MAX.)
4. ABSENT MANHOURS (6 POINTS MAX.)
5. EXPENSE (20 POINTS MAX.)

Per Vehicle Equivalent (PVE) 1. Downtime PVE: Decreased from 35 pts (21-24 hrs PVE) in Nov to 10 pts (35-38hrs PVE) during Dec. The desired goal is 50 pts (16 hrs or less PVE). 2. Direct Manhours PVE: Remained at 12 pts (4 manhrs or less PVE) during Nov and Dec. This is the desired goal. 3. Indirect Manhours PVE: Increased from no pts (7 manhrs or more PVE) in Nov to 5 pts (6-7 manhrs PVE) during Dec. The desired goal is 12 pts (4 manhrs or less PVE). 4. Absent Manhours PVE: Decreased from 6 pts (2.5 manhrs or less PVE) in Nov to no pts (4.2 manhrs or more PVE) during Dec. The desired goal is 6 pts (2.5 manhrs or less PVE). 5. Supply & Contractual Services Expense PVE: Remains at 20 pts ($8.00 or less PVE) during Nov & Dec. This is the desired goal.

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VEHICLE MAINTENANCE PERFORMANCE

KADENA

DECEMBER







1	2	3	4	5
0	0	0	3	10
0	0	0	50	50

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR
POINTS RECEIVED	16	13				
PERCENT	16	13				

1. DOWN TIME (50 POINTS MAX.)
2. DIRECT MANHOURS (12 POINTS MAX.)
3. INDIRECT MANHOURS (12 POINTS MAX.)
4. ABSENT MANHOURS (6 POINTS MAX.)
5. EXPENSE (20 POINTS MAX.)

Per Vehicle Equivalent (PVE) 1. Downtime PVE: No pts (41 hrs or more PVE) were received during Nov & Dec. The desired goal is 50 pts (16 hrs or less PVE). 2. Direct Manhours PVE: No pts (6.1 manhours or more PVE) were received during Nov & Dec. The desired goal is 12 pts (4 manhrs or less PVE). 3. Indirect Manhours PVE: No pts (7 manhrs or more PVE) were received during Nov & Dec. The desired goal is 12 pts (4 manhrs or less PVE). 4. Absent Manhours PVE: Decreased from 6 pts (2.5 manhrs or less PVE) in Nov to 3 pts (2.6-4.1 manhrs PVE) during Dec. The desired goal is 6 pts (2.5 manhrs or less PVE). 5. Supply & Contractual Services Expense PVE: Remained at 10 pts ($10.01-$12.90 PVE) during Nov & Dec. The desired goal is 20 pts ($8.00 or less PVE).

0870

313 TH AIR DIVISION

PERSONNEL

THIS COORDINATING STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, PERSONNEL SERVICES, AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313 TH AIR DIVISION PERSONNEL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 30 NOVEMBER 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	[illegible]	1021	103	8717	9449	108	468	451	96	4550	4305	95
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	[illegible]	665*	100	5869	6333	108	451	433	96	3883	3718	96
TOTAL ASGD UNITS	623	628	100	5744	6192	108	451	433	96	3883	3701	95
TOTAL ATCH UNITS	42	37	88	125	143	114					17	
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	90	88	98	159	163	103	44	49	111	5	29	580
[illegible]												
[illegible] AIR BASE WG (ASGD)	182	[illegible]	119	2382	[illegible]	113	290	279	96	2341	2183	93
[illegible] GROUP (ASGD)	28	24	92	477	41[illegible]	88						
15TH ARC FLT (ASGD)	1	2	200	13	14	108						
[illegible]TH FTR DAY SQ (ASGD)	31	2	6	133	1	1						
322ND TRP CARR SQ (ATCHD)	42	37	88	125	143	11[illegible]					17	
NAHA												
51ST FIW (ASGD)	100	119	119	760	906	119	8	18	225	42	71	169
6431ST ABG (ASGD)	111	106	95	1132	1202	106	108	87	81	1249	1176	94
623RD & 624TH ACW (ASGD)	70	55	79	617	701	114				246	237	96
DET #1, 313TH AD (ASGD)	15	16	107	71	105	148	1					
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	328	356	109	2848	3114	109	17	18	106	667	587	88
TOTAL PIPELINE		13			144							

#Includes 22 NO's *Includes 24 NO's

OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 3% increase with a gain of 17 assigned, while the authorized remained constant. **AIRMEN**: Assigned unit manning remained constant at 108%. No change in authorizations, while the assigned reflected a net loss of 31. **CIVILIAN**: The DAFC manning reflected a 2% decrease with authorized spaces remaining constant and a net loss of 8 assigned. Indigenous manning decreased 9% with authorized spaces remaining constant and a net loss of 368 assigned.

0 A 7 2

PERSONNEL STRENGTH

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1957

	MILITARY						CIVILIAN					
	OFFICERS			AIRMAN			US			NON—US		
	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN	AUTH	ASGD	%MAN	AUTH	ASGD	% MAN
TOTAL AF ON OKINAWA	924	1031	112	3480	3928	111	467	449	96	4548	4310	95
TOTAL 313TH AIR DIVISION	595	677	114	5611	6245	111	451	432	96	3883	3723	96
TOTAL HQ 313TH AIR DIV	69	85	123	96	142	148	44	46	105	5	30	600
DET # 2, 313TH AIR DIV	21	23	110	63	66	105						
KADENA												
6313TH AIR BASE WING	123	169	137	1958	2715	113	287	277	94	2315	2183	94
5TH COMM GROUP	26	23	88	477	426	89						
6332ND USAF DISP	22	26	118	64	84	131	3	2	67	26	24	92
7TH TAC DEPOT SQ	37	38	100	354	405	114						
558TH AIR FORCE BAND	1	1	100	19	22	116						
NAHA												
51ST FI WING	100	123	123	760	924	122	8	17	213	42	70	167
6431ST AIR BASE GROUP	111	113	102	1132	1209	109	108	90	83	1249	1175	94
623RD & 624TH AC&W	70	59	84	627	628	102				246	241	98
DET # 1, 313TH AIR DIV	15	17	113	71	104	146	1	0	-			
TOTAL SUPPORTED UNITS	329	354	108	2349	3180	112	16	17	106	665	587	88
TOTAL PIPELINE		19			172							

Includes 22 WO's & Includes 25 WO's

The decrease in officer and airman authorizations resulted from the loss of the 322nd TCS and the 336th FDS. OFFICERS: Assigned unit manning reflected a 14% increase with a loss of 73 auth spaces and a gain of 12 assigned personnel. AIRMEN: Assigned unit manning increased 3% resulting from a loss of 258 auth spaces and 90 assigned. CIVILIANS: The DAFC manning remained constant with a loss of 1 assigned, while authorizations remained constant. Indigenous manning remained constant with a gain of 5 assigned, while authorizations remained constant.

0873

OFFICER STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
GEN	AUTH	2	2	2	3	3	3
	ASGD	1	1	1	1	2	2
	%MANNED	50	50	50	33	66	67
COL	AUTH	12	10	11	12	12	12
	ASGD	11	13	12	11	12	12
	%MANNED	92	130	109	92	100	100
L/COL	AUTH	50	48	48	41	41	39
	ASGD	40	41	40	42	42	44
	%MANNED	80	85	83	102	102	113
MAJ	AUTH	108	105	107	99	99	96
	ASGD	89	87	94	95	102	107
	%MANNED	82	83	88	96	103	111
CAPT	AUTH	241	227	239	252	252	230
	ASGD	209	209	217	222	222	224
	%MANNED	87	92	91	88	88	97
LTS	AUTH	255	251	248	239	239	193
	ASGD	226	222	242	253	260	263
	%MANNED	89	88	98	106	109	136
WO	AUTH	27	27	29	22	22	22
	ASGD	22	19	22	24	25	25
	%MANNED	81	70	76	109	114	114
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	695	670	684	668	668	595
	ASGD	598	592	628	648	665	677
	%MANNED	86	88	92	97	99	114
	PROJ'D						

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY GRADE

		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
M/SGT	AUTH	338	327	341	326	326	314
	ASGD	259	252	278	296	297	300
	% MANNED	77	77	82	91	91	96
T/SGT	AUTH	521	524	543	423	423	403
	ASGD	443	427	442	450	445	449
	% MANNED	85	81	81	106	105	111
S/SGT	AUTH	1409	1402	1487	1343	1343	1273
	ASGD	81[illegible]	823	929	926	916	940
	% MANNED	57	59	62	69	68	74
A/1C	AUTH	1785	1766	1939	1207	1207	1193
	ASGD	985	955	1126	1089	1036	1036
	% MANNED	55	54	58	90	86	87
A/2C	AUTH	1226	1197	1334	2475	2475	2336
	ASGD	1644	1643	2159	2153	2123	2221
	% MANNED	134	137	162	87	86	95
*A/3C	AUTH	108	105	105	95	95	92
	ASGD	1510	1621	1406	1452	1518	1299
	% MANNED	1398	1544	1339	1528	1597	1412
COMM TOTAL	AUTH	5387	5321	5749	5869	5869	5611
	ASGD	5651	5721	6339	6366	6335	6245
	% MANNED	105	108	110	108	108	111
	PROJ'D						

* INCLUDES A/B

AIRMEN STRENGTH BY SKILL LEVEL

UNITS	SKILL LEVEL	SEPTEMBER AUTH	SEPTEMBER ASGD	SEPTEMBER % MANNED	OCTOBER AUTH	OCTOBER ASGD	OCTOBER % MANNED	NOVEMBER AUTH	NOVEMBER ASGD	NOVEMBER % MANNED	DECEMBER AUTH	DECEMBER ASGD	DECEMBER % MANNED
313TH AD ASGD UNITS	7	310	295	95	223	251	124						
	5	1209	1202	99	760	1066	140						
	3	537	750	140	777	532	68						
	1	1	11	1100	1	13	1300						
6313TH ABW	7	264	359	136	238	411	173						
	5	1059	1065	101	786	1296	165						
	3	523	587	112	973	679	70						
	1	55	40	73	54	44	81						
51ST FIW	7	217	145	67	170	172	101						
	5	496	500	101	393	539	137						
	3	160	253	158	271	243	90						
	1	3	5	167	1	7	700						
6341ST ABG	7	81	158	195	103	153	149						
	5	448	574	128	433	569	131						
	3	232	339	146	572	336	59						
	1	46	37	80	39	36	92						
COMMAND TOTALS	7	872	957	110	734	987	134						
	5	3212	3341	104	2372	3470	146						
	3	1452	1929	133	2593	1790	69						
	1	105	93	89	95	100	105						

* PAFSC

The Command 7 skill level increased 24% during Oct with a loss of 138 auth spaces and a gain of 30 asgd. The 5 skill level increased 4% with a loss of 840 auth spaces and a gain of 129 asgd. The 3 skill level decreased 64% with a gain of 1,141 auth spaces and a loss of 139 asgd. The 1 skill level increased 16%, 10 auth spaces lost & 7 asgd gains

PROBLEM AREAS

30 NOVEMBER 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	OFFICERS				
1416	Aeft Control Staff Off	7	5	20	71
1644	Intercept Controller	47	47	28	100
2054	Intelligence Off	5	3	67	60
3041	Ground Electronics Off	5	3	66	37
6416	Supply Staff Off	9	7	15	77
6424	Supply Off	41	30	54	73
	ENLISTED				
203X5	AP Chemo Tec	14	9	50	64
203X0	EW Maint	5	1	20	20
322X0	Fire Con Sys Tec	1	0	0	0
342X0	Flt Sim/Fi Ins Tec	16	8	66	50
361X1	Wire Maint	14	4	200	28
421X1	Aeft Prop Repmn	12	6	64	50
421X2	Apr aeft Hyd Repmn	20	20		76
461X0	Helicopter Mech	6	4	25	66
461X1	Mun & Wpns Maint	4	0	0	0
471X2	Sp Veh Repmn	24	7	26	29
542X0	Metals Proc Spec	13	12	75	92

The number of officer problem areas remained constant at six. The Supply field continues to be reflected as a problem area. The airmen problem areas increased by twelve.

OATT

PROBLEM AREAS

30 NOVEMBER 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
551X0	Const Helper	12	6		50
551X0	Roads & Grds Spec	21	14	128	66
551X1	Const Eq Opr	10	6	100	60
552X0	Wood Worker	66	45	124	68
552X1	Painter	10	4	200	40
564X0	Plumber	23	12	142	53
569X0	Pwr Sys Maint	9	4	400	44
582X0	Rubber Prod Repmn	2	1	100	50
601X0	Air Fac Spec	3	2	100	66
681C1	Mang Anal Tec	1	0	0	0
902X2	Oper Room Spec	6	3	33	50

PROBLEM AREAS

31 DECEMBER 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	OFFICERS				
1616	Aerp Control Staff Off	7	6	16	86
1644	Intercept Controller	47	42	15	89
6416	Supply Staff Officer	9	6	17	66
6424	Supply Officer	41	29	59	68
	AIRMEN				
29XX5	AP Chang Tec	14	9	50	64
30520	TV Maint	5	1	20	20
32220	Fire Con Sys Tec	1	0	0	0
34220	Alt Sim FI Inc Tec	16	8	66	50
36120	Wire Maint	14	4	200	28
42120	Aero Prop Repman	12	8	62	50
43120	Helicopter Mech	6	4	25	66
46120	Mun & Armt Maint	4	0	0	0
55220	Metals Tech Spec	18	12	75	66
55120	Roads & Grounds Spec	21	14	128	66
55120	Const Equip Opr	10	6	100	60
55220	Wood Worker	66	45	124	68
55220	Painter	10	4	200	40

The number of officer problem areas decreased by two during the month of December. Manning is not a problem area, however, percent skilled is extremely low. The airmen problem areas decreased by five. Manning is the primary problem in this area.

OATS

PROBLEM AREAS

31 DECEMBER 1957

AFSC	TITLE	AUTH	ASGD	% SKILLED	% MANNED
	AIRMEN (CONT'D)				
564X0	Plumber	23	12	142	53
562X0	Rubber Prod Repman	2	1	100	50
681X1	Mang Anal Tec.	1	0	0	0
902X2	Oper Room Spec	6	3	33	50

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AIRMEN TRAINING



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	2062	2031	2198	1978		
OJT-C	1866	1788	1983	1619		
OJT-A&D	100	141	150	120		
COMPLETED OJT	226	105	117	280		

NUMBER ON OJT-A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 — 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT-C = UPGRADING
OJT-A&D = CROSS TRAINING

The Command in-training rate decreased 9.6%, with a net loss of of 210 eligibles and 394 in-training, during the month of October. The completion rate was 16.1% during the month with 257 airmen being upgraded and 23 completing cross training. Our in-training rate of 97.5% during the month of September compares favorably to 96% for all Fifth Air Force Units, while our completion rate of 5.5% is below the 7.1% reported for all Fifth Air Force Units.

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AIRMEN TRAINING

51ST FIW



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	
700	677	348	267			ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG
660	604	305	239			OJT-C
35	63	15	8			OJT- A&D
63	52	13	54			COMPLETED OJT

%
100
75
50
25
0

HQ 313TH AD



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
713	700	807	583		
677	650	764	477		
27	28	43	27		
88	34	47	71		

NUMBER ON OJT — A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100

5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING

OJT — A & D = CROSS TRAINING

51st FIW: Reflected a slight increase in the in-training rate during the month of October. This increase resulted from a net loss of 81 eligibles and 73 in-training. Their completion rate was 21.9% with 53 airmen being upgraded and 1 completing cross training.

313th A.D.: The decreased in-training rate of 13.6% can be attributed to a net loss of 224 eligible and 303 in-training during the month. The completion rate was 14.1% with 69 airmen being upgraded and 2 completing cross training.

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AIRMEN TRAINING



6431ST ABG							6313TH ABW					
JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
		387	388			ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG	649	654	646	740		
		315	288			OJT-C	529	534	599	615		
		46	41			OJT—A&D	38	50	46	44		
		10	37			COMPLETED OJT	75	19	47	118		

NUMBER ON OJT — A-C-D / NUMBER ELIGIBLE FOR TRNG X 100 = 5TH AF % IN TRAINING

OJT — C = UPGRADING

OJT-A&D = CROSS TRAINING

6431st ABG: Their decreased in-training rate of 12.7% can be attributed to a net gain of 1 eligible and a net loss of 32 in-training during the month. Their completion rate was 11.2% with 32 airmen being upgraded and 5 completing cross training.

6313th ABW: Their decreased in-training rate of 10.7% can be attributed to a net gain of 94 elibible and 14 in-training during the month. Their completion rate was 17.9% with 103 airmen being upgraded and 15 completing cross training.

0 A 8 3

DISCIPLINE

COMMAND



	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MILITARY STRENGTH	9037	9146	10,519	9,808	9,319	10,089
AWOL	2	3	0	2	5	3
OVERALL STRENGTH	9454	9721	11,183	10,299	10,000	10,570
OFFENDERS	140	163	156	122	94	129

= NO. AWOL / MIL. STRENGTH X 1000

= NO OFFENDERS / AVG STRENGTH X 100

AWOL: The Command reported ten AWOL's during the 1 October thru 31 December period as compared to five during the 1 July thru 30 September period. The average monthly rate during the Oct-Dec period per thousand persons assigned was 0.34 as compared to 0.17 during the Jul-Sep period.

OFFENDERS: The Command reported 345 offenders during the 1 October thru 31 December period in comparison to 459 reported during the 1 July thru 30 September period. The average monthly rate during the Oct-Dec period per hundred persons assigned was 1.1 as compared to 1.5 during the Jul-Sep period.

OABA

DISCIPLINE



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2826	2941	3067	3399	3210	3206	MILITARY STRENGTH	6211	6205	7552	6409	6406	6883
0	2	0	2	3	2	AWOL	2	1	0	0	2	1
3013	3117	3228	3504	3317	3311	OVERALL STRENGTH	6441	6604	7955	6795	6633	7259
58	54	45	31	40	30	OFFENDERS	82	109	111	91	54	99

= $\frac{\text{NO AWOL}}{\text{MIL STRENGTH}} \times 1000$

= $\frac{\text{NO OFFENDERS}}{\text{AVE STRENGTH}} \times 100$

NAHA: The average monthly AWOL rate per thousand persons assigned was 0.71 during the Oct-Dec period as compared to 0.23 for the Jul-Sep period. The offender rate per hundred persons assigned was 1.0 during the Oct-Dec period as compared to 1.7 for the Jul-Sep period.

KADENA: The average monthly AWOL rate per thousand persons assigned was 0.15 for the Oct-Dec and Jul-Sep periods. The offender rate per hundred persons assigned was 1.2 during the Oct-Dec period as compared to 1.4 for the Jul- Sep period.

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COURTS MARTIAL RATE

COMMAND



TRIALS	JAN - MAR	APR - JUN	JUL - SEP	OCT - DEC
GEN	7	2	3	5
SPEC	31	25	25	22
SUM	40	55	97	53

During the October thru December period the Command general court martial rate was 0.17 per thousand persons assigned. The special and summary rates per thousand persons assigned were 0.74 and 1.99, respectively. The General rate reflected a slight increase over the July thru September period, while the special and summary rates reflected a decrease.

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COURTS MARTIAL RATE



KADENA	JAN – MAR	APR – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
GEN	3	0	1	2
SPEC	13	18	17	15
SUM	21	38	49	32

NAHA	JAN – MAR	APR – JUN	JUL – SEP	OCT – DEC
GEN	4	2	2	3
SPEC	18	7	8	7
SUM	19	27	48	21

KADENA AIR BASE: Their general court martial rate was 0.10 during the October thru December period, while the special and summary rates were 0.76 and 1.63, respectively. The general rate reflected a slight increase over the July thru September period, while the special and summary rates decreased.

NAHA AIR BASE: Their general court martial rate was 0.27 during the October thru December period, while the special and summary rates were 0.64 and 1.94, respectively. The general rate reflected a slight increase over the July thru September period, while the special and summary rates decreased.

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DEPENDENT HOUSING STATUS



			JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AVE. NO.	AVAILABLE QTRS		2231.0	2244.0	2233.0	2221.0	2222.0	2222.0
	UNOCCUPIED	USABLE	9.1	1.0	3.3	4.0	0.0	0.0
		REPAIR	75.0	77.9	49.7	67.0	71.0	90.0
		COMMITTED	35.9	60.1	37.0	32.0	37.0	77.5
TOTAL NO.	NO. WAITING	MOS. WAIT	401 6	433 6	455 6	512 6	694 6	691 11
	NO. DRAWING	DEPARTS	60 78	101 99	74 37	62 52	23 33	26 106
	AVAIL.	FORECAST	2231	2244	2233	2221	2222	2222
	OCCUPIED	OFFICER	640	618	658	627	639	595
		AIRMEN	1459	1526	1488	1473	1476	1435
		CIVILIAN	21	28	28	32	25	32

The percentage of unoccupied quarters increased from 4.8% in Nov to 7.5% during Dec. This unfavorable condition continues due to the increased number of homes in the unoccupied repair and committed category. The increased months of waiting from 6 to 11 months can be attributed to the loss of 210 homes to the Army. It is tentatively planned to start returning these quarters in April 1958.

0488

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

OFFICERS

NAHA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
5,037	1,043	2,889	3,234	4,729	2,354
46,995	48,038	50,927	54,162	58,724	10,518

$ THOUSAND $

6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6

KADENA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
-5725	-280	-1,566	847	5,477	1,901
35,968	35,688	34,122	34,969	40,446	42,348

NET PROFIT / LOSS

NET WORTH

NAHA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,083.65 during the months of November and December. This increased there total profits for calendar year 1957 to $ 29,849.27 and is in comparison to a net profit of $10,750.00 for calendar year 1956.

KADENA: The Officers Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,379.36 during the months of November and December. Club operations during calendar year 1957 resulted in a net loss of $1,667.92. This loss compares unfavorably with a net profit of $21,393.00 during calendar year 1956.

0 A 8 9

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

NCO

NAHA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
6,002	6,267	5,371	7,283	5,053	6,681
110,655	116,922	122,293	129,568	134,621	141,303

$ THOUSAND $

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NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
7,054	10,393	7,425	7,969	7,049	144
59,356	69,749	76,215	84,184	91,233	91,378

NAHA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $11,735.25 during the months of November and December. This increased there total profits for calendar year 1957 to $54,289.33 and is in comparison to a net profit of $29,678.00 during calendar year 1956.

KADENA: The NCO Open Mess reflected a net profit of $7,193,53 during the months of November and December. This increased there total profit for calendar year 1957 to $45,825.69 as compared to a net profit of $202.00 during calendar year 1956.

0890

OPEN MESS FACILITIES FINANCIAL STATUS

AIRMAN

NAHA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
2,480	3,227	4,333	4,695	2,853	2,356
48,894	52,121	56,454	60,592	63,445	65,802

$ THOUSAND $

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NET PROFIT/LOSS
NET WORTH

KADENA



JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
-1,503	3,031	2,603	2,269	5,078	3,533
51,560	54,591	57,194	59,463	64,428	67,963

NAHA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $5,210.09 during the months of November and December. This increased there total profit for calendar year 1957 to $24,970.83 as compared to a net profit of $7,164.00 during calendar year 1956.

KADENA: The Airmen's Open Mess reflected a net profit of $8,611.31 during the months of November and December. This increased there total profit during calendar year 1957 to $23,913.94 as compared to a net profit of $3,996.00 during calendar year 1956.

0891

313TH AIR DIVISION

SAFETY

THIS PERSONAL STAFF AGENCY PROVIDES HEADQUARTERS WITH ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL MATTERS RELATIVE TO THE FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND GROUND SAFETY.

IMPLEMENTS AND GUIDES OVERALL 313TH AIR DIVISION SAFETY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES.

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	NOV 57		1957 CUMULATIVE			
	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	ACDTS	HRS FLOWN	RATE	0 20 40 60 80 100
25TH FIS	0	610	0	6301	0	
6313TH ABW	0	447	0	4907	0	
6431ST ABG	0	250	0	3441	0	
DET #2 313TH AD	0	80	0	80	0	
161H FIS	0	57	2	6052	33.0	
336TH FDS	0	0	2	4277	46.8	

RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}} \times 100{,}000$

313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-NOV 1956) - - - - - (25.5)
313TH AD AVERAGE (JAN-NOV 1957) ..... (16.0)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of November with a total of 1,958 hours flown. The cumulative totals for the first eleven months of calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 25,058 hours flown. Our present rate of 16 is lower than the 25.5 reported for the same period of calendar year 1956. The Fifth Air Force cumulative rate was 22 in October as compared to 17.3 for the Division.

0893

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

UNITS	DEC 57 ACDTS	DEC 57 HRS FLOWN	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE HRS FLOWN	1957 CUMULATIVE RATE
25TH FIS	0	481	0	6782	0
6313TH ABW	0	575	0	5482	0
6431ST ABG	0	361	0	3802	0
DET #2 313TH AD	0	179	0	259	0
16TH FIS	0	460	2	6514	30.7
336TH FDS	0	0	2	4277	46.8



RATE = $\frac{\text{NO OF ACDTS}}{\text{FLYING HRS}}$ X 100,000

313TH AD AVERAGE (1956)- - - - - - (25.5)
313TH AD AVERAGE (1957)..... (14.8)

The Command went major aircraft accident free during the month of December with a total of 2,058 hours flown. The cumulative total for calendar year 1957 are four (4) accidents with 27,116 hours flown and a rate of 14.8. This compares favorably to fifteen (15) accidents with 58,772 hours flown and a rate of 25.5 during calendar year 1956.

0894

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	NOV 1957 UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	RATE	RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100
ALL CAUSES	336th FDS	0	2	46.8	
	51st FIW	0	2	12.7	
	COMMAND	0	4	16.0	
PILOT ERROR	336th FDS	0	0	0	
	51st FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
SUPV. ERROR	336th FDS	0	0	0	
	51st FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAINT. ERROR	336th FDS	0	0	0	
	51st FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
MAT. FAILURE	336th FDS	0	0	0	
	51st FIW	0	2	12.7	
	COMMAND	0	2	8.0	
MISCELLANEOUS	336th FDS	0	0	0	
	51st FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	0	0	
UNDETERMINED	336th FDS	0	2	46.8	
	51st FIW	0	0	0	
	COMMAND	0	2	8.0	

313TH AD RATE (... NOV 1956).....

The Command went accident free for the fifth consecutive month, decreasing the accident rates accordingly.

0895

MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
CAUSE FACTOR ANALYSIS

CAUSE FACTORS	DEC 1957 UNITS	ACDTS THIS MO	1957 CUMULATIVE NO OF ACDTS	RATE
ALL CAUSES	336TH FDS	0	2	46.8
	51ST FIW	0	2	11.7
	COMMAND	0	4	14.8
PILOT ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
SUPV. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAINT. ERROR	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
MAT. FAILURE	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	2	11.7
	COMMAND	0	2	7.4
MISCELLANEOUS	336TH FDS	0	0	0
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	0	0
UNDETERMINED	336TH FDS	0	2	46.8
	51ST FIW	0	0	0
	COMMAND	0	2	7.4

RATE 0 20 40 60 80 100

313TH AD RATE (1956).....

The Command went major aircraft accident free for the sixth consecutive month, decreasing the accident rates accordingly. The overall rate of 14.8 accidents per 100,000 hours flown during calendar year 1957 compares favorably to the rate of 25.2 for calendar year 1956

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MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	NOV 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE	
	NO OF DIS INJ	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	COST OF INJ
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
6431ST AP & INSTL	1	40	1,200	2	1,410
6431ST ABG	0	0	0	2	1,560
322ND TCS	0	0	0	5	2,010
313TH AD	0	0	0	6	2,370
624TH AC&W	1	35	1,050	4	2,550
6431ST SUP & TRAN	0	0	0	8	2,550
6313TH AP & INSTL	2	17	510	8	3,030
6313TH SUP & TRAN	2	28	840	8	5,520
6313TH ABW	1	10	300	17	7,560
51ST FIW	0	0	0	16	21,840



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—NOV 1956).....($ 2,017)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN—NOV 1957)-------($ 4,015)

The Command reported seven (7) dissbling injuries during the month at a total cost of $3,900.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are eighty (80) injuries at a cost of $52,200.00. This is $25,980.00 higher than last years cost for the same period.

The following is a breakdown of various reasons for injuries that occured during Nov:

	Had Been Drinking	Total Injuries	Acdts 2 Wheel Veh	Acdts 4 Wheel Veh	Fighting	Sports	Falls	Lifting	Misc.
November	2	7	1	0	0	1	2	0	3
Cumulative	17	80	13	11	6	10	20	2	18

The Command has reported one fatality as compared to three in 1956 for this same period.

0897

MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES

UNITS	DEC 1957			1957 CUMULATIVE	
	NO OF DIS INJ	MAN DAYS LOST	COST OF INJ	NO OF DIS INJ	COST OF INJ
623RD AC&W	1	3	90	1	90
18TH FDM	0	0	0	1	420
18TH FBW	0	0	0	3	1,380
6431ST AP & INSTL	0	0	0	2	1,410
6431ST ABG	2	12	360	4	1,920
322ND TCS	0	0	0	5	2,010
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	4	2,550
6431ST SUP & TRANS	1	4	120	9	2,670
6313TH AP & INSTL	1	3	90	9	3,120
6313TH SUP & TRANS	2	14	420	10	5,940
6313TH ABW	0	0	0	17	7,560
313TH AIR DIV	4	185	5,550	10	7,920
51ST FIW	0	0	0	16	21,840



313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (1956)———(2,192)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (1957)·····(4,525)

The Command reported eleven (11) disabling injuries during the month at a total cost of $6,630.00. Our cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are ninety-one (91) injuries at a cost of $58,830.00. This is high in comparison to a total of seventy-three (73) injuries at a cost of $28,500.00 during calendar year 1956. Seventy-two (72), or 79.1%, of the total injuries during this calendar year occured off-duty and twenty-one (21), or 23.1%, of the total injuries involved personnel who had been drinking.

The Command reported one (1) fatality during calendar year 1957 as compared to three (3) during 1956.

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	NOV 1957 ACDTS	NOV 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	NOV 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST OF ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AD	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
6431ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0
6431ST SUP & TRAN	0	0	0	2	10
6431ST AP & INSTL	0	0	0	2	159
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	1	351
6313TH AP & INSTL	1	1	201	9	394
6313TH SUP & TRAN	1	7	238	5	430
6313TH ABW	1	1	4	10	2,251

COST OF ACCIDENTS ——— $100
0 2 4 6 8 10

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-NOV 1956)- - - - - ($ 525)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (JAN-NOV 1957)..... ($ 275)

The Command reported three (3) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $443.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are twenty-nine (29) accidents at a cost of #3,595.00. This is $3,206.00 less than last years cost for the same period.

The three (3) accidents this month resulted from driving into a fence post, cement embankment and a crash stand.

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MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS

UNITS	DEC 1957 ACDTS	DEC 1957 DAYS OUT OF SERVICE	DEC 1957 COST OF ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE ACDTS	1957 CUMULATIVE COST ACDTS
18TH FBW	0	0	0	0	0
18TH FDM	0	0	0	0	0
51ST FIW	0	0	0	0	0
313TH AIR DIV	0	0	0	0	0
322ND TCS	0	0	0	0	0
623RD AC&W	0	0	0	0	0
6431ST ABG	0	0	0	0	0
6431ST SUP & TRANS	0	0	0	2	10
6431ST AP & INSTL	0	0	0	2	159
624TH AC&W	0	0	0	1	351
6313TH AP & INSTL	0	0	0	9	394
6313TH SUP & TRANS	2	4	49	7	479
6313TH ABW	0	0	0	10	2,251

COST OF ACCIDENTS ——— $100
0 2 4 6 8 10

313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (1956).....($ 606)
313TH AVERAGE COST PER UNIT (1957)-----($ 280)

The Command reported two (2) motor vehicle accidents during the month at a total cost of $49.00. The cumulative totals for calendar year 1957 are thirty-one (31) accidents at a cost of $3,644.00. This compares favorably to a total of forty-three (43) accidents at a cost of $7,873.00 for calendar year 1956.

The two (2) accidents this month resulted from driving into a private vehicle and backing without a guide.

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