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



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





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HISTORY of the 313TH AIR DIVISION

JULY-DECEMBER 1958

NARRATIVE

VOLUME I

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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1958

DALE O. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Commander

Prepared for the 313th Air Division Historical Division by the following personnel:

Mr. Wayne G. Peterson	Command Historian
Mrs. Dorothy M. Henry	Clerk-Typist

(27 August 1959)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239)

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ONE OF THE NEW F-101C VOODOOS

WITH WHICH

THE 15TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON

WAS RE-EQUIPPED

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
U.S. AIR FORCE

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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1958

1958

1 July — The 18th Fighter Bomber Wing is redesignated the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing; the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron is redesignated the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron; the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron is redesignated the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron; and the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron is redesignated the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, per 5th AF GO 45, dtd. 26 May 1958.

Headquarters, 2720th Maintenance Group, Clark AB, is discontinued and the 17th Communications Construction Squadron, previously assigned to it, is reassigned directly to SAMAP, per AMC GO 53, dtd. 19 June 1958. With this action, operational control and administrative support are automatically vested in SAMAP.

The Koza Housing Annex (Permanent Installation No. 2992), comprising 41.40 acres with an annual rental of $6,652.75, and the Koza Parking Annex (Permanent Installation No. 4085), comprising 12.02 acres with an annual rental of $1,460.45, are transferred to the Department of the Navy, Marine Corps, per DAF GO 7, dtd. 9 Feb. 1959, and are deleted from the USAF installation list per PACAF GO 8, dtd. 9 Feb. 1959.

The Nodake Homar Beacon Annex, comprising 0.485 acres of land, with an annual rental of $5.50, is transferred to the U.S. Navy.

A one-year revocable permit is issued to the U.S. Marine Corps for use of 135 acres of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex (formerly the Bishagawa Billeting Annex) as a troop billeting area. This permit will expire 30 June 1959.

Detachment 3, 2705d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron, is activated in the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, per Ogden AMA GO 45, dtd. 1 July 1958. The 2705d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron itself is activated at Tachikawa AB, Japan, per Hq. AMA GO 55, dtd. 25 June 1958.

19 July — The F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 21, dtd. 24 July 1958.

1 Aug. — The advance echelon (three officers and seven airmen) of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (Medium) arrives at Naha AB from Tachikawa AB, Japan, in a permanent change of station.

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1958

4 Aug. Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns assumes command of the Fifth Air Force and U.S. Forces, Japan, relieving Lieutenant General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., who returns to the States to take command of the Air Training Command, per 5th AF GO 70, dtd. 4 Aug. 1958.

5 Aug. The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958, and 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 29 Aug. 1958.

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
5th Communications Group
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
17th Communications Construction Squadron
11th Air Postal Squadron
Headquarters, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot
1505th Support Squadron
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile
12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC)
District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958:

7th Tactical Depot Squadron
18th Tactical Hospital
15th Physiological Training Flight

The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment #2, 313th Air Division
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet

Detachment #5, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Yae Take Air Station, Ryukyu Islands, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for POL and ration support only, per 313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.

1958

5 Aug. The 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) moves PCS from Johnson AB, Japan, to Naha AB, where it is assigned to 313th Air Division. Operational control remains with Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. The flight is equipped with four TB-29 aircraft.

The 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight, ECM is relieved from assignment to the 41st Air Division and is reassigned to the 313th Air Division, per PACAF GO 35, dtd. 12 June 1958.

The 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight, ECM is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administration and logistic support, less field maintenance on specialized ECM, AN/APQ-13, and AN/ARN-21 equipment installed in the unit's TB-29 aircraft, per 313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958, and GO 45, dtd. 30 Dec. 1958.

The following units are attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958:

Detachment #1, 313th Air Division
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (including all detachments except Detachment #5, Yae Take Air Station, which receives POL and ration support from the 6313th Air Base Wing)
Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #1, 1962d AACS Squadron
33d Air Rescue Squadron
Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment #2, 24th Helicopter Squadron
Detachment #3, 1st Shoran Beacon Squadron
F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment
The Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

The 51st Tactical Hospital is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administration and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.

14 Aug. Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division (PACAF), assumes command of the 313th Air Division during the temporary extended absence of Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, per 313th AD GO 24, dtd. 14 Aug. 1958.

1958

15 Aug. A 12.06 acre portion of Kadena Family Housing Annex, with an annual rental of $1,239.05, is released to its Okinawan owners.

18 Aug. The first advance elements of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron arrive at Naha Air Base from Japan.

20 Aug. The following Pacific Air Forces installations assigned to Fifth Air Force are redesignated as follows, per PACAF GO 58, dtd. 20 Aug. 1958:

Former Designation	New Designation
KADENA AIR BASE	KADENA AIR BASE
Bolo Auxiliary Air Field	Bolo Auxiliary Airfield
Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Field	Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield
Okuma Radio Relay Annex	Okuma Radio Beacon Annex
Yontan Auxiliary Air Field	Yontan Auxiliary Airfield
NAHA AIR BASE	NAHA AIR BASE
Motobu Auxiliary Air Field	Motobu Auxiliary Airfield

26 Aug. The first three RF-101C Voodoo photo reconnaissance aircraft are received by the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, in its programmed replacement of RF-84F's with this type aircraft.

16 Sep. U.S. currency and coins become legal tender for the entire Ryukyu Islands, as Type B-yen are abolished effective 20 September.

19 Sep. The Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus, Provisional (formerly known as CASF Task Force Headquarters) is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 53, dtd. 13 Oct. 1958.

The following units, attached to the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus, Provisional, for operational control, are further attached for administrative and logistical support per 313th AD GO 53, dtd. 13 Oct. 1958, as follows:

477th Tactical Fighter Squadron to the 6313th Air Base Wing
522d Tactical Fighter Squadron to the 6313th Air Base Wing
499th Tactical Bomber Squadron to the 6313th Air Base Wing
Communications Task Element, 507th
Communications and Control Group to the 6313th Air Base Wing
Element, Detachment 2, 4505th Air
Refueling Wing to the 6431st Air Base Group

22 Sep. Detachment 3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 52, dtd. 5 Oct. 1958.

1958

24 Sep. The 5th Communications Group and its three component units--608th Communications Squadron (Operations), 2d Radio Relay Squadron, and 24th Communications Construction Squadron--are relieved from attachment to Fifth Air Force for operational control and are attached for this purpose to Thirteenth Air Force, per PACAF GO 64, dtd. 25 Sep. 1958.

25 Sep. Headquarters CASF (Composite Air Strike Force) Command, APO 239, is redesignated as the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus (Provisional), APO 239.

The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (M) is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group at Naha AB for administrative and logistic support, per 313th AD GO 31, dtd. 2 Oct. 1958. Operational control is retained by the 483d Troop Carrier Wing at Ashiya AB, the parent organization of assignment.

11 Oct. The U.S. Air Force launches a moon rocket, the Pioneer, 79,120 miles into space in an unsuccessful attempt to place it in orbit within 50,000 miles of the Moon, itself approximately 222,000 miles distant from the Earth. The failure is attributed to a 3° error in trajectory caused by gyroscopic "drift" in the auto-pilot of the first stage booster which resulted in the Pioneer's attaining a speed of 34,400 feet per second instead of the requisite 35,250 feet per second. The first stage is a Thor-Able booster, the second stage is a modified Vanguard, the third stage is an advanced version of the Vanguard carrying an 85-pound instrumented payload. The three stage rocket measures 88.1 feet and weighs more than 100,000 pounds.

15 Oct. The 558th USAF Band is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative (not to include the assignment and promotion of personnel) and logistical support, per 313th AD GO 37, dtd. 28 Oct. 1958.

24 Oct. Brigadier General Dale O. Smith resumes command of the 313th Air Division, vice Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, per 313th AD GO 35, dtd. 24 Oct. 1958.

28 Oct. The F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment at Kadena AB is deleted from the list of units attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 41, dtd. 10 Dec. 1958.

10 Nov. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, previously assigned to Fifth Air Force, is further assigned to 313th Air Division, per PACAF GO 70, dtd. 7 Nov. 1958.

15 Nov. The F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment at Naha AB is deleted from the list of units attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 16 Dec. 1958.

1958

15 Nov. The F-102-4 Mobile Training Detachment is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support, per 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 16 Dec. 1958.

The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron completes its PCS movement from Japan to Naha Air Base.

8 Dec. The 6313th Communications Squadron, Kadena Air Base, is attached to the 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron for operational control, per PACAF GO 73, dtd. 5 Dec. 1958.

15 Dec. The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron is reorganized with a Table of Organization strength of 41 officers, four warrant officers, and 357 airmen, per 5th AF GO 103, dtd. 9 Dec. 1958.

OSI District Office No. 3 is redesignated 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) PACAF, OSI District Office No. 43, per PACAF GO 73, dtd. 5 Dec. 1958.

A parcel of 11.85 acres in the southern portion of Naha Air Base, with an annual rental of $370.55 is released to its Okinawan owners.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Throughout the period of this history, from 1 July through 31 December 1958, the general mission of the 313th Air Division, as defined by Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4, was to conduct defensive operations and support offensive operations in 313th's operating areas and the area adjacent thereto.[1] Designated as the Okinawa Sector for purposes of air defense, this operating area was a geographical entity contained within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30°N., 125°E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.[2]

A Non-Table of Organization unit assigned to Fifth Air Force since its activation on 1 March 1955, the 313th Air Division was provided a headquarters at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, as well as such other units and facilities as were considered necessary by the Commander, Fifth Air Force and approved by the Commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).

Besides exercising command control over all assigned and attached units, the Commander, 313th Air Division was directly responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for:

1. Conducting air defense of the assigned area of responsibility.

2. Furnishing logistic support of Fifth Air Force tactical units stationed on or deployed to bases within 313th's area of responsibility to

a degree insuring their maximum operational readiness and EWP capability.

3. Organizing, administering, training, equipping, and preparing for combat all assigned and attached units.

4. Planning and conducting joint training and operations with friendly forces.

5. Developing tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

6. Exercising operational control over all Army anti-aircraft artillery units for air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine AAA units when shore-based, and control of AAA gunfire from ships' batteries, when such fire was in support of the defense of shore installations within the 313th Air Division's air defense sector.

7. Operational control of all shore-based Naval and Marine fighter aircraft made available for air defense or offensive operations.

8. Supporting Strategic Air Command (SAC) operations.

9. Supporting special activities, tenant, and/or attached units.

10. Directing the extent of security control of civil and military air traffic within the limits of the assigned area of responsibility.[3]

11. Establishing and monitoring disaster control measures in the 313th Air Division area of responsibility.

12. Issuing mission directives for all assigned units.

13. Coordinating with the appropriate United States governmental authorities in the Ryukyu Islands all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities.

14. Coordinating with the appropriate local Army and Navy commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used utilities and

installations.

15. Supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands in the discharge of United States Civil Administration responsibilities, except as otherwise prohibited.

16. Operating and maintaining all bomb and gunnery ranges within the 313th Air Division area of responsibility.

17. Executing all directives which the Commander, Fifth Air Force and higher headquarters might assign.

18. Maintaining the attached tactical hospital in a state of operational readiness. (During periods of deployment, operational control of the tactical hospital or elements thereof would automatically revert to the tactical wing).[4]

19. Providing local base helicopter rescue support during those hours in which tactical jet units were operating.[5]

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of his command, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and friendly force commanders, except as otherwise directed by Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters.[6]

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Organizational Changes at Kadena, 1 July - 31 December 1958.

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Is Assigned to the 313th Air Division: The 313th Air Division had been a lop-sided organization incapable of practicing that old maxim that "the best defense is a good offense" since

1 February 1957, when the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing at Kadena AB was relieved from attachment to this headquarters for all purposes and reverted directly to Fifth Air Force.[7] With its offensive wing thus clipped, the 313th Air Division controlled only the all-weather aircraft of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base. Meantime, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing continued to be assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark AB, Philippine Islands, as it had been without deviation during the wing's deployment to Japan and Korea during the Korean War, after its PCS transfer to Kadena for attachment to the Twentieth Air Force in 1954, and following the latter organization's replacement by the 313th Air Division on 1 March 1955, when it was attached for all purposes to the last-named headquarters.

At long last, however, on 1 October 1957, PACAF took cognizance of the unrealistic nature of the situation which saw the 18th assigned to a headquarters at a base from which it had not operated for seven years (unless we include the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, which had remained at Clark AB until 1955, before finally moving PCS to Kadena AB). The remedial action took the form of a PACAF General Order reassigning the 18th FBW from Thirteenth Air Force to Fifth Air Force as of 1 October 1957.[8]

On 1 July 1958, as this historical period got underway, the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing was redesignated the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing; the 12th Fighter Bomber Squadron was redesignated the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron; the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron was redesignated the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron; and the 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron was redesignated

the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron.[9]

Even with the 18th TFW assigned to Fifth Air Force, as it now was, it seemed rather illogical for the 313th Air Division to exercise no control over or possess any responsibility for the largest, and only offensive, Air Force organization in the Ryukyus. In recognition of this anomalous situation--and of similar ones obtaining in other areas of Fifth Air Force, with the various air divisions possessing no control over tactical fighter, bombardment, or reconnaissance wings--PACAF issued general orders further assigning the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing from Fifth Air Force to the 313th Air Division, effective 10 November 1958.[10] With this action, the 313th Air Division once more became an organization possessing both offensive and defensive capabilities commensurate with the importance of its geographical location.

The primary mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (excluding here any part of it classified Top Secret) was to plan, execute, and support tactical fighter missions with atomic weapons, as might be directed. Comprised within this primary mission were actions to be taken in the event of general war--these being covered by the Emergency War Plan; actions to be taken in the event of limited war--these being provided for in Contingency War Plans; and the maintenance of strip alert, insuring immediate retaliatory capability. The secondary mission of the 18th TFW was to maintain a limited capability to plan, execute, and support tactical fighter missions with conventional ordnance, if required.

In November the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron set a new 18th Wing record for one month's flying time, with 871 hours logged in the F-100

aircraft. An additional 147 hours were flown in T-33's. It also compiled the largest number of sorties, 427, flown by any squadron in the wing during a single month.

On 21 November, three pilots of the 12th TFS with their equipment and support personnel were deployed to Kunsan AB, Korea to meet "show of force" commitments directed by Fifth Air Force. Again, on 18 December seven pilots with their support personnel and equipment were deployed to Kunsan AB to fly "show of force" missions and carry out routine training. This deployment ended on 23 December.

The first F-100D-90 Supersabres for replacement of the older F-100D-20's with which the squadron had originally been armed early in 1957 began to arrive in September 1958, together with two new F-100F's. By the end of November the changeover was complete, and the older F-100D-20's had been turned over to the other two squadrons of the 18th Wing or to bases in Japan.[12]

The 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron sent two pilots, with support personnel and equipment to Kunsan AB for five days beginning 28 November, for the purpose of conducting routine training and special "show of force" missions which Fifth Air Force had directed. Following the Christmas holidays, the squadron devoted most of the days remaining in December to preparations for another deployment to Kunsan scheduled for early January 1959.[13]

The first 18th Tactical Fighter Wing "Turkey Shoot" was held in August as a means of providing operational competition and building morale for the three squadrons. In this competition each squadron flew a certain

number of sorties, dropping bombs in a specified manner and under certain conditions, with the winner to be awarded a trophy which would be passed on to the successful competitor in each succeeding shoot. The 44th TFS won the first "Turkey Shoot" on 1 August. A week later, a second "Turkey Shoot", specified in advance as an informal competition with no trophy at stake was staged, this time the 67th TFS was the winner. On 23 November the second official "Turkey Shoot" was held, but this time the competitors included not only the three squadrons of the 18th TFW but also the three Composite Air Strike Force (CASAF) units deployed to Kadena for the Taiwan crisis--viz., the 477th TFS (flying F-100D's), the 499th TBS (flying B-57B's), and the 522d TFS (equipped with F-101C's). Again the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron emerged victorious.[14]

Other Organizational and Administrative Changes: On 1 July 1958 the Headquarters, 2720th Maintenance Group at Clark AB was discontinued, and the 17th Communications Construction Squadron at Kadena AB, which had been assigned to it, was reassigned directly to Southern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (SAMAP), also located at Clark AB. The latter organization thereupon assumed operational control and the responsibility for administrative support of the 17th CCS.[15]

Also on 1 July, the 2705d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron was activated at Tachikawa AB, Japan,[16] and Detachment 3 was activated in the Bishagawa Billeting Annex simultaneously.[17]

Several real estate actions likewise became effective on 1 July. In one of these the Nodake Radio Beacon Annex (Permanent Installation No. 4535),

comprising 0.485 acres of land near Futema Auxiliary Air Field with an annual rental of $5.50, was transferred to the Navy.

In another, a one-year revocable permit was issued to the U.S. Marine Corps for the use of 135 acres of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex (Permanent Installation No. 2998, which had included the former Bishagawa Billeting Annex, PIN 2990, since 11 March 1958), as a troop billeting area. This permit was scheduled to expire on 30 June 1959.

In a third real estate action, the Koza Housing Annex (Permanent Installation No. 2992), comprising 41.40 acres with an annual rental of $6,652.75, and the Koza Parking Annex (Permanent Installation No. 4085), comprising 12.02 acres carrying an annual rental of $1,460.45, were transferred to the U.S. Marine Corps[18] and deleted from the USAF installation list.[19] Since the Koza Housing Annex was intended for occupancy by the Marines only until Camp Schwab near Henoko Village in Kushi Son, was completed and ready to receive the shore party and engineering personnel stationed there as a temporary measure, the 3d Marine Division simply renamed it "Camp Koza" and did not give it the name of a Medal of Honor winner as was the practice for the permanent Marine installations on Okinawa. The same policy, incidentally, was followed in connection with such other interim bases as Camp Mercy, Camp Awase, and Camp White Beach.

On 19 July the F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment arrived at Kadena and was attached to the 6515th Air Base Wing for logistical support in anticipation of the imminent re-equipping of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet with F-101C Voodoos in place of the F-84F's with which the unit had operated ever since its arrival on Okinawa in August 1956.[20]

On 14 August, Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, the 313th Air Division Deputy Commander, assumed command of the 313th Air Division when the regular Commander, Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, went to the ZI for an operation and subsequent hospitalization at Walter Reed Hospital.[21] Colonel Barrett continued to command this organization until 24 October, when General Smith returned to Okinawa and resumed his regular job.[22]

Effective 5 August the following units were attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (including the assignment and promotion of personnel) and logistic support:[23]

7th Tactical Depot Squadron

18th Tactical Hospital

15th Physiological Training Flight

Also effective 5 August the following units were attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support:[24]

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
5th Communications Group
17th Communications Construction Squadron
11th Air Postal Squadron
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot
1505th Support Squadron
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
15th Weather Squadron
Detachment #4, 15th Weather Squadron
12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC)
District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor

Likewise on 5 August, the following units were attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (not including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistical support:[25]

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment #2, 313th Air Division
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet

That same date, Detachment #5, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Yae Take Air Station, which had been inactivated on 1 June 1958, was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for POL and ration support only.[26]

On 15 August a 12.06-acre portion of the Kadena Family Housing Annex (Permanent Installation No. 3000), with an annual rental of $1,239.05, was released to its Okinawan owners.

On 19 September the Headquarters, Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) Command was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support. At the same time, the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron, the 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron, the 522d Tactical Fighter Squadron, and Communications Task Element, 507th Communications and Control Group, already attached to the Headquarters, CASF Command for operational control, were further attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support.[27]

On 22 September, Detachment 3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistic support.[28]

Two days later, September 24th, the 5th Communications Group and its three component elements--the 608th Communications Squadron (Operations), the 2d Radio Relay Squadron, and the 24th Communications Construction Squadron--were relieved from attachment to Fifth Air Force for operational control, and were attached to Thirteenth Air Force for this same function.[29]

On 25 September, Headquarters, Composite Air Strike Force Command, APO 239, was redesignated as the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus (Provisional), APO 239.[30]

On 15 October the 558th USAF Band was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative (not including the assignment and promotion of personnel) and logistical support.[31]

On 28 October the F-101-1 Mobile Training Detachment at Kadena AB was deleted from the list of units attached to the 6313th ABW for logistical support.[32]

On 8 December the 6313th Communications Squadron was attached to the 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) Squadron (MATS) for operational control.[33]

The final action of the period affecting Kadena Air Base came on 15 December, when District Office No. 3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) was redesignated District Office No. 45, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG).[34]

The 5th Communications Group: Although the 5th Communications Group had been assigned to the 313th Air Division since its PCS move from Gifu Auxiliary Air Field, Japan, to Kadena AB on 1 September 1957, Fifth Air Force retained operational control--a common practice of that headquarters.

Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-16 of 21 May 1958 had established the mission of the 5th Communications Group as that of providing mobile tactical, command, and administrative point-to-point communications in support of Fifth Air Force operations; of supporting the Joint Operations Center in the installation, operation, and maintenance of mobile communications

facilities; and of installing, operating, and maintaining the following tactical communications facilities in support of Fifth Air Force's EWP and contingency war plans:

1. Telephone centrals for operational, command and administrative traffic.

2. Communications centers with cryptographic capability.

3. VHF/FM and/or UHF/FM radio relay systems.

4. HF radio systems.

5. Teletypewriter systems.

In addition, as his role in execution of the group mission, the Commander of the 5th Communications Group was responsible for exercising command jurisdiction over all facilities and personnel assigned and/or attached to the 5th Communications Group, and was responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for:

1. Developing and maintaining such a high state of unit tactical mobility as would enable personnel and equipment to be redeployed as required for accomplishment of the assigned mission.

2. Effecting direct technical coordination with all parallel agencies to insure continuous, effective communications.

3. Performing special missions and assuming additional responsibilities, as directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

A Table of Organization unit, the 5th Communications Group was attached to the 513th Air Division for administration and to the 6513th Air Base Wing for logistical support. Besides the group headquarters, there were three component squadrons--the 2d Radio Relay Squadron, the 24th Communications

Construction Squadron (Mobile), and the 608th Communications Squadron (Operations-Mobile).

As mentioned above, by 24 September 1958 the work which the 5th Communications Group was performing in support of the USAF units deployed on Taiwan and of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force occupied such a large place in its over-all mission that PACAF issued general orders transferring operational control of the group and its three squadrons from Fifth Air Force to Thirteenth Air Force.[35]

Even before this, however--as far back as late 1957, in fact--there had been discussion of the advisability of moving the 5th Communications Group from Okinawa to the Philippines. The inchoate plan began to take shape in the fourth quarter of 1958 when Thirteenth Air Force requested that the group be prepared to commence this move in January 1959. On 24 November, accordingly, Lieutenant Colonel Marion R. Graham, the group commander, and key members of his staff met with Thirteenth Air Force officials at Clark AB to discuss matters pertaining to office and warehouse space, housing of troops and dependents, the base's supply capability for items peculiar to the 5th Communications Group, and personnel.

It was recognized that a number of problems would have to be resolved before any effective planning for the movement could be accomplished. One of the most important of these concerned personnel. Trained technical personnel, as well as officers currently familiar with the capability of the group, were due to rotate to the ZI in such numbers, as a result of completing their overseas tours, that it was estimated only one officer familiar with the workings of the organization would remain in the headquarters itself. Furthermore, by employing a retainability criterion of

12 months for accompanied and six months for unaccompanied personnel, it was estimated that less than one third of the total number of assigned people would be eligible for the move. There were also such problems as how soon would the buildings to be occupied at Clark AB be rehabilitated, when would troop and dependent housing become available, how long would it take to establish supply procedures capable of providing the organization essential items on a dependable basis, and others of a similar nature.

In view of the projected loss of personnel, the 5th Communications Group faced a major problem in maintaining its ability to meet EWP and Contingency War Plan commitments, since it was expected that well over a year would elapse before the organization could regain its current capability. On 27 December, however, Lieutenant Colonel Graham informed his staff that now the movement was not scheduled to occur until Fiscal Year 1960, with the initial steps being taken in July 1959 and the change of station completed by 1 December 1959.[36]

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron: Assigned to Fifth Air Force since 1 October 1955,[37] the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron at Kadena Air Base was under the direct operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force as the period began, while it was attached to the 313th Air Division for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistic support.[38] This headquarters had subsequently delegated these latter two functions to the 6313th Air Base Wing at the time that organization was designated and assigned to the 313th Air Division on 1 October 1957.[39] Now, on 5 August 1958, this headquarters issued new orders attaching the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron (TDS) to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistical support.[40]

The mission of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was intimately involved with the political and military doctrine of the United States, calling for massive retaliation upon any foe striking directly at our country, in that the squadron served as the storehouse and maintenance facility for the weapons which would be employed by PACAF in such retaliation. Thus, it was made responsible for the receipt, ground transportation, storage, disassembly, modernization, assembly, issue, technical supply, salvage, and demolition of atomic weapons and the calibration of its own technical equipment.

Although the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was responsible for the maintenance of all PACAF special weapons stored in the Far East, all PACAF weapons were not stored at Kadena AB; therefore, it was neither economically nor militarily feasible to transport weapons to Kadena every time they required storage inspection, modification, or testing. It was necessary, then, to have some method whereby the weapons could be inspected in the field at the local storage site; and it was from this necessity that the concept of the mobile weapons maintenance team (WMT) evolved.

The seven WMT's assigned to the 7th TDS during the first half of 1958 were increased to eight in the period of this history, but without involving any augmentation in manpower strength, since each of the seven teams had been authorized two officers and nine airmen (a total of 77 people), while, under the eight-team organization, each WMT was authorized only one officer and eight airmen (a total of 72 people). Actually, then, this entailed a saving of five personnel over-all. The WMT's were authorized all of the hand tools, test equipment, and handling gear required to inspect and repair

the delicate mechanism of an atomic bomb. Each team was completely mobile, in that it could be packed, loaded aboard an aircraft, and deployed from Kadena AB within 12 hours after the squadron was notified of a need for it at some other base. However, it was incombent upon the deployment site to furnish the team with a suitable building and electrical power facilities upon its arrival.[37]

Six of the eight weapons maintenance teams were subject to 12-hour deployment as described above; one was permanently stationed at Johnson AB, Japan; and the eighth one was maintained on permanent station status at the 7th TDS site, where its primary function was the training and standardization of the remaining teams and the fulfillment of the storage inspection requirements of the W-5 weapons maintained in the stockpile at Kadena. (W-5 weapons were employed in the warheads of TM-61A or TM-61B Matador guided missiles).

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was also responsible for storage, security, and stockpile monitoring of the weapons stored at Iwo Jima AB. From this requirement had grown Detachment #1, an organization permanently stationed approximately 800 miles from the parent organization in the Volcano Islands.[38]

On 8 January 1958 the 7th TDS was assigned the added responsibility for operational control of Detachment #1, 6139th Air Base Group, at Osan AB, Korea, and Detachment #1, 6170th Air Base Squadron, at Kunsan AB, Korea. In June WMT "F" was deployed to Osan AB, marking the first time a weapons maintenance team had visited that station, which had just become operational with the receipt of its full complement of weapons and was now ready for an

inspection of its war reserve weapons. As is true of most new undertakings, there were many problems at Osan, such as inadequate facilities in which to work, supply problems, and a flash flood which imundated the assembly and and housing facilities. In spite of these difficulties, WMT "F" completed its mission, thanks in part to the"splendid cooperation" of the personnel permanently assigned to Osan, enabling it to return to Kadena on 25 July.[59]

With the exception of this team and WMT "E", whose permanent duty station was at Johnson AB, Japan, all of the WMT's remained at Kadena during July, undergoing extensive training and completing numerous inspections of the nuclear stockpile maintained there. Much of this training was directed toward smoothing out the rough spots within each team in preparation for the annual PACAF Capability Inspection scheduled for August.

During the first week of March 1958 an emergency destruction and demolition course was arranged between personnel of the 7th TDS and the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot (ASSD) explosive ordnance disposal unit. Both groups benefited from the instruction, with men of the 7th TDS and the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot (ASSD) explosive ordnance disposal unit. Both groups benefited from the instruction, with men of the 7th TDS demonstrating the techniques and precautions to be observed in the salvage of atomic weapons involved in aircraft or ground accidents, while the 546th personnel demonstrated how to hook up electrical detonating systems, time fuzes, and the use of various devices employed in the demolition of atomic weapons.

On the morning of 12 March the chief of the Headquarters, USAF Inspector General team suddenly entered the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing Operations Center and directed the duty officer to implement Fifth Air Force Operations Order

No. 58-108 "No Notice"--a training exercise simulating the actual EWP Fifth Air Force Operations Order No. 1-57. The 7th TDS was also alerted, and a recall of its people who were on immediate alert status was initiated. As soon as these personnel arrived at the site, they began breaking out the nuclear weapons and preparing for the arrival of convoy vehicles from the 18th FBW to take weapons to the flight line. The 18th took 42 of the weapons to the flight line as scheduled, loaded them on strike aircraft, and began returning them to the 7th's storage site later that afternoon.

The standing operating procedure following a readiness exercise such as this one was to carry out a complete storage inspection of every weapon. First, each weapon was given a final assembly test--a process consuming some 18 hours for the entire lot--in order to detect any defective weapons. These would then be scheduled for rework ahead of the others, in order to insure that a reliable stockpile would be scheduled for rework ahead of the others, in order to insure that a reliable stockpile would be on hand in case the EWP were implemented while the 7th TDS was in the midst of the rework project. The WMT's were then placed on shifts containing two positions each, and all of the WMT's worked a straight six-hour shift each day. This meant that the squadron had two rework positions manned 18 hours a day. At the end of six days, the last weapon had been storage inspected and "put back to bed."[40]

On 17 March a portion of the Quality Assurance Team went to Andersen AFB, Guam, to attend a quality control conference conducted by the 24th Supply Squadron (Depot, Special) (AMC). The purpose in having the 7th's personnel attend was to have them learn as much about quality control methods

in general as possible, as well as their applicability to the quality control program of the 7th TDS. This participation was merely one facet of the 7th TDS's continuing effort to improve its inspection methods and thereby improve the stockpile of weapons being maintained for atomic capable units within Fifth Air Force.

On 22 April Exercise "Water Wing", a passive defense exercise simulating a loss of communications with Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, was initiated by 515th Air Division. The 7th's reaction to the situation was well coordinated and everything ran smoothly.[41]

When the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron prepared to move to a new location, in the 546th ASSD area, in May, the Materiel Division was made responsible for planning and executing the move. Thanks to efficient planning which also permitted the squadron to maintain unimpaired its ability to meet all the commitments of its mission, the three-day operation generally proceeded without an important hitch. By good fortune, no circumstances making it necessary to carry out the 7th TDS's established weapons delivery schedules arose while the move was in progress; but, even if events had taken such a turn, the Materiel Division's provisions for such a contingency had been so thorough that it seemed highly probable both weapons delivery and squadron relocation would have proceeded simultaneously without interference.

Among the advantages accruing to the squadron from the move were the following: (1) The squadron communications center was now located in a structure immune to destruction by typhoon winds; (2) the security alert flight acquired a quite adequate dormitory on the squadron site itself; (3) six monolithic type ordnance storage structures were obtained for the storage

of weapons, in place of the quonset huts in vogue at the old site; (4) three above-ground magazines--one for use as the assembly building and the other two for storage of equipment and supplies--were acquired, thus providing plenty of "breathing space"; (5) the squadron now had adequate office space, and the administrative division was in close proximity to the operational storage site; and (6) the communications set-up at the new location enabled the 7th TDS to enjoy an "in-commission" rate far exceeding anything which had been possible at the old site.

On 14 May the Quality Assurance Section was made a branch of the Operations Division in a transfer from the Production Control Branch. It was felt that by making the Quality Assurance function a separate branch, its mission as inspection agency for the Assembly Branch product could be carried out more efficiently.

WMT "C", which had deployed to Iwo Jima in April to handle weapon inspections due at that station, returned to Kadena in May and was put to work with the other teams reworking the weapons recently utilized in Operation "Big Nickel", the largest training exercise involving special weapons which had ever been initiated in Fifth Air Force up to this time. "Big Nickel" had run for two days, 12-14 May, and involved the deployment of three WMT's, including WMT "E" from Johnson AB, to various bases in Japan. WMT "C" had participated in the exercise while still TDY on Iwo Jima.

The remainder of May was devoted to reworking the weapons at the parent organization and deployed sites, in the course of which a few minor problems were encountered, due to the scarcity of some items of expendable supplies; but these were rectified, so that very little time was actually

lost in getting the weapons back in shape.

On 21 May WMT "A" deployed to Kunsan AB, Korea, to rework the weapons at that site which had been employed in Operation "Big Nickel". Ten days later, its work completed, the team returned to Kadena.

In the aftermath of "Big Nickel" the workload for the 7th TDS was extremely heavy until 20 June, when WMT "B" returned to Kadena from 43 days' deployment at Itazuke AB in connection with that exercise.[42]

During July the 7th TDS Security Division initiated a Base Defense training course for all its own personnel, as well as those assigned to the Operations, Materiel, and Administrative Divisions who did not have EWP assignments. The purpose of this training was to give the Security personnel additional instruction in an already familiar field and to provide trained augmentation personnel for the Security Division. The idea was to create an available trained force capable of warding off small-scale ground attacks on the storage site while the essential EWP personnel carried out the mission of the 7th TDS.[43]

The major event in August was the annual PACAF Inspector General's Capability Inspection, which ran from August 4th to 11th. 7th TDS OPLAN 110-58 was prepared and published for the inspection. During this inspection, WMT's "A", "E", AND "G" were checked on the Mark VII weapon storage inspection, WMT "C" was graded on its MK-28 inspection procedures, and WMT "D" was checked on its W-5 procedures. A few minor discrepancies were found in the procedures of the various teams, but no deficiencies of any significance were noted, and all WMT's were given a rating of satisfactory. The Nuclear Section was also monitored, with no defects being noted.[44]

At 1940 hours on 26 August a practice Air Defense readiness exercise, "Cocked Pistol", was called. The 7th TDS reacted by notifying all its personnel and initiating an operational recall. The exercise was subsequently called off when the tense situation in the Taiwan Straits caused the 513th Air Division to be placed in actual Air Defense Readiness Condition 4 ("Line Up") at 0800, 27 August. This condition was still in effect on the 29th, when the 7th TDS received a letter from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force directing that all personnel scheduled for rotation to the ZI be frozen in their present assignments, with all rotations being discontinued until further notice. According to the historical officer for the 7th TDS, "This was a difficult subject for our commander to pass to the personnel concerned. He presented the facts in such a manner as to give each and every airman involved a clear insight as to why he was being extended: the tense international situation; the possibility of an open conflict developing; and the needs of the service in this theater. The commander's explanation helped considerably to prevent an unfavorable morale situation."[45]

On 6 September WMT Four from the 2d Tactical Depot Squadron at Langley AFB, Virginia, arrived at Kadena to augment the 7th TDS as an element of the Composite Air Strike Force (CASAF) deployed to the Far East to supplement the forces already in place in the event of open conflict over Quemoy.* This team remained at Kadena until December 10th, when it departed for the ZI along with other CASAF units.

The Quality Assurance Branch conducted five Technical Proficiency Inspections of the WMT's during September, in keeping with the 7th TDS's

*Chapter III of this history, "The Taiwan Straits Crisis", gives a full account of the background for this deployment and its development.

policy of taking every possible precaution to insure that the teams were producing the highest possible caliber of workmanship. One deficiency uncovered was the lack of suitable means for destroying the nuclear stockpile in an emergency. As a result of this discovery, an order was placed for shaped explosive charges to replace the obsolete haversacks and CPS blocks that were currently in use— a measure generating considerable confidence that it would be possible to destroy the stockpiled weapons within a short time if circumstances ever made it necessary.

As one phase of the program whereby the PACAF forces were continually to be furnished more modern and easily-maintained nuclear stores, an exchange of nuclear capsules was made on 3 October, the 130DE capsules on hand at the 7th TDS being replaced by 240DE cores sent from the ZI especially for that purpose.

Utilizing the MK-28 weapon, the 7th TDS conducted a loading demonstration in November for personnel from the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Naha AB. The purpose of this demonstration was to check out the 21st TCS in the proper techniques for loading the MK-28 into a C-130 aircraft.[46]

This same weapon, the MK-28, introduced a new problem when it was test-loaded on F-100D aircraft. In two different cases the pulse plugs on the bomb were broken, causing the weapons to be non-operational. Squadron personnel tried to determine the cause of these failures, but when they were unable to do so, a technical advisor from the Sandia Corporation of Albuquerque, New Mexico, was sent for. This expert found that the pulse plugs and the lift lugs of the weapons in question were out of alignment, a situation which caused the pulse plug to break when the bomb was loaded. The only means

of determining whether any other weapons had the same defect was to conduct a tedious measurement program involving each weapon in the stockpile. After two weeks of measurement, this program was completed, and the defective units--of which several were unearthed--were earmarked.[47]

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet: The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, an assigned unit of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Yokota AB, Japan, was attached to the 313th Air Division and further attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB for administration and logistical support.[48] The parent wing retained operational control, however.

The mission of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) was divided into three categories--tactical, technical, and general.

The tactical mission comprised daytime reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, of enemy-occupied areas, with special emphasis on (1) front-line basic cover for photographic and tactical studies; (2) bomb damage assessment photography; (3) surveillance of enemy activity by regular coverage of recurring targets and specific targets of particular interest; and (4) observing and photographing targets of opportunity such as new construction of installations, movements of troops, accumulations of supplies, and other suspicious or unusual activities.

The technical mission consisted of (1) first echelon maintenance of aerial photographic equipment; (2) first and second echelon maintenance of aircraft; and (3) processing, printing, first phase interpretation, and reporting of the aerial photography accomplished.

The general mission called for (1) the maintenance of current staging and redeployment plans; (2) the maintenance of administrative, operational,

organizational, and logistical effectiveness; (3) the preparation and maintenance in a state of readiness of such other plans as might be prescribed; (4) conducting continuous research for means of improving reconnaissance effectiveness; and (5) acceptance of responsibility to the Commander, 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing for the foregoing.[49]

On 26 August the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron received its first three RF-101C aircraft under the program for replacement of the RF-84F's with which the unit had been operating since its old RF-86F's were turned-in in July 1956. In anticipation of this, all of the squadron pilots were required to fulfill the flight simulator requirements; however, the Mobile Training Detachment classes did not begin until 25 July, with the last class graduating on 17 October 1958. This imposed an extremely heavy burden on all sections which forced many of them to resort to "shift" work in order to accomplish the workload.

While the 15th TRS was making the transition, it was provided temporary assistance in the form of six RF-101C's from the 20th TRS at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, which were organized as "FA-82". These aircraft and the eight pilots who accompanied them returned to their home organization in December. By the end of September, 14 of the 20 super-sonic Voodoos had arrived, enabling the squadron to start transferring its RF-84F's as a progressive step in the conversion program. Six were sent to Kisarazu AB, Japan, and six were transferred to the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, which was then TDY at Kadena. This left the 15th TRS with seven Thunderstreak aircraft. The addition of thenew F-101C's created a temporary parking problem, but this was quickly solved by installing them on an unused taxiway.[50]

Transition training of the squadron pilots commenced on 15 September, and by the end of that month six officers had completed their novitiate and become qualified in the RF-101C, while two others had completed all but one flight, and an additional four had begun the program. Within 35 days from the start of the transition, 80 per cent of the squadron officers were combat ready, having completed the course without incident or accident. With the arrival of three new pilots who were already qualified in the RF-101C for duty with the 15th TRS, the squadron found itself possessed of its full complement.

By the end of November, the 15th's Communications Section was feeling the pinch of insufficient personnel. Although 20 people were authorized, only 15 were assigned. This situation was still in effect at the end of the year.

At the beginning of the period, the Photo Lab also suffered from an exiguity of personnel; however, new men began to report for duty as the year wore on, so that December found 30 men assigned, against an authorization of only 28. The photographic processing equipment followed a similar course, building up from a modest beginning to a good condition by the close of the period.

For the squadron as a whole, the six months' period was one of unusually great turnover in the personnel. On 1 July the assigned strength was 230, while it was 273 on 31 December, as 100 officers and airmen were lost and 143 were gained. Superficially, this preponderance of gains over losses would seem to have comprised an eminently satisfactory situation. In actual practice, though, it did not prove so good, as the

gains and losses by AFSC were inconsistent. For example, while the squadron had approximately 60 per cent overage in the 431X1 career field, the 232X0 and 641X1 fields were depleted to such a degree that a critical condition was brought about.[51]

On 25 October 1958, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was reorganized to give it a Table of Organization strength of 52 officers, two warrant officers, and 177 airmen, with all personnel to be furnished from sources under control of the Commander, Fifth Air Force.[52]

Organizational Changes at Naha AB, 1 July - 31 December 1958.

The 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM)Moves to Naha Air Base: The first organizational change of the historical period affecting Naha Air Base found the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) making a permanent change of station (PCS) movement from Johnson AB, Japan, to Naha on 5 August 1958. Heretofore assigned to the 41st Air Division, the 6023d REF (ECM) was reassigned to the 313th Air Division,[53] which attached it to the 6451st Air Base Group for administration and logistic support (less field maintenance on specialized ECM, AN/APQ-13, and AN/ARN-21 equipment which was installed in the organization's four TB-29 aircraft).[54] Although the 6023d REF (ECM) was now assigned to 313th Air Division, Fifth Air Force retained operational control.

According to the mission directive of Fifth Air Force, the Commander, 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) was responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for the following matters:

1. Performing initial and special evaluation for all air defense

ground radar in the PACAF area of responsibility, as directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

2. Assisting in the development and implementation of the PACAF Radar Continuous Evaluation Program, and monitoring this program on a continuous basis through systematic evaluation and analysis of data submitted by AC&W units throughout the PACAF area.

3. Acting as a technical advisory agency on matters pertaining to radiation characteristics of heavy radar equipment.

4. Providing special technical advisory service on specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the AC&W system, and conducting special research projects and studies as required or directed.

5. Conducting radar site surveys for new installations as directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

6. Performing ECM evaluations throughout the PACAF area, as directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

7. Providing ECM training for the complete AC&W ground environment and airborne interceptor units in the PACAF area of responsibility.

8. Assisting in the development of anti-jamming procedures and techniques, as well as anti-jamming programs for the AC&W squadrons and airborne interceptor units.

9. Supporting other activities, as the Commander, Fifth Air Force might direct.[55]

Although the reassignment of the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) did not become effective until 5 August, preparations and preliminary steps

in connection with the move to Naha AB had been made some weeks earlier. In fact, packing and crating had been commenced the latter part of June--an effort which was greatly intensified in early July, as flying activities were sharply curtailed in favor of preparations for the movement of unit equipment and eligible personnel.

On 12 July, a C-124 made the initial airlift of unit equipment from Johnson AB to Naha AB--19,900 pounds of cargo consisting mainly of heavy aircraft maintenance gear, as well as some communications-electronics equipment.

Fifth Air Force had established as the criterion by which the eligibility of personnel for transfer to Okinawa would be determined the number of months' retainability overseas which each individual possessed. For those men accompanied by dependents, one year's retainability was necessary; for unaccompanied or unmarried men six months was the minimum. At first it appeared that only 13 officers and approximately 35 airmen would accompany the unit to Naha AB. This was considerably less than 50 per cent of the authorized strength of 140 officers and enlisted men. However, all personnel were given an opportunity to extend their overseas tours in order to meet the eligibility requirements.

When the 20 airmen who extended were added to the 35 whose long retainability gave them no choice in the matter, the 6023d found itself with 55 airmen available for transfer to Naha. Adding this number to the 13 officers who made the move, we see that slightly less than 50 per cent of the authorized unit strength was involved in the exodus.

On 15 July the first wave, consisting of one officer and four enlisted

men, flew down to Okinawa on a permanent change of station basis to ready Buildings #1003 and #1007 for occupancy by the larger group scheduled to follow. Then, on 22 July the first concurrent travel transfers took place, as two officers and three enlisted men left Tachikawa for Okinawa with their families. Other family groups followed by air on the 24th and 26th.

Originally there had been some question whether any of the unit equipment would be airlifted. However, a letter was submitted by the 6023d REF on 12 June outlining the problems which would confront the unit if airlift were not favorably considered. Its justification was based primarily on the need for an immediate aircraft maintenance capability for the unit at Naha AB in view of the typhoon threat always posed by the month of August. The flight argued that if the unit mission equipment were transported by sea, the 6023d would be deprived of the necessary maintenance tools, parts, and equipment for an unconscionable length of time. The letter bore fruit in the form of airlift on 26 July for the UME, supplies, spares, and other miscellaneous impedimenta. That same day, 11 airmen of the 6023d flew down to Naha from Japan, arriving in time to lend a hand in off-loading and storing the materiel brought in by two C-124's, two C-130's, and a C-119. Nine more airmen who had landed at Naha on 28 July were immediately put to work with the earlier arrivals securing, storing, and uncrating the unit property urgently needed to set up shop.

On 30 July, TB-29 #234 took off from Johnson AB to become the first of the 6023d REF's aircraft to report in to Naha AB for duty. It was followed on 2 August by TB-29 #973. The third Superfort was scheduled to

be transferred to Okinawa prior to 6 August, but maintenance difficulties were encountered, necessitating a delay in its departure. The master control unit of engine #2 proved to be defective, and the maintenance personnel encountered unusual difficulty in making the requisite repairs. In consequence, this aircraft did not arrive at Naha until 18 August. The fourth TB-29, #346, had suffered damage in a hard landing at Itazuke on 22 July which necessitated the changing of all four engines, in addition to other related maintenance work. Because of great difficulty in obtaining parts for this obsolete type aircraft, it was not until 16 November that TB-29 #346 arrived at Naha operational and ready for service.[56]

Although the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight was officially in place at Naha AB and assigned to the 313th Air Division as of 6 August 1958, there remained considerable work to be done at Johnson AB. Most of the UME had already been airlifted to Naha, but more than half of the unit personnel were still at Johnson awaiting travel, limited in speed of transfer by the housing schedule published by this headquarters. Since a total of 45 different dependent quarters had been needed for the people of the 6023d at the time they first began moving to Okinawa in July, it was impossible, obviously, to accommodate all of them in one large mass movement. Ten of the 45 families had been given housing during July, but this still left 35 to be quartered in August and early September, if at all possible.

The Commander of the 6023d, Major Marion R. Rodgers, and his family left Tokyo International Airport (Haneda), together with nine other sponsors and their families, on 14 August. Four more family groups followed later the same day. Then, a week later, on August 21st, 10 more enlisted men flew

down to Okinawa from Japan with their families. Although this nearly completed the transfer of personnel from Johnson AB, it still left the flight less than 50 per cent manned at its new home.

Fortunately, this situation did not exist very long, as replacement personnel began to come in during the latter part of August. By the end of that month the unit manning had increased to 19 officers and 73 airmen.

On 4 and 5 November the 6023d REF employed two of its TB-29 aircraft on penetration missions against Site P-56, the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) for the 313th Air Division. The results of the testing indicated that P-56 performed the mission of an ADDC in an AC&W network with average effectiveness, but thoughtful officials of the 6023d could not help wondering whether the site's ability to cope with slow-moving aircraft like the TB-29 was any criterion of its ability to detect and track modern jets, with their vastly greater speed and altitude. It was also noted that the power output of the jamming transmitters on the TB-29's during these missions was never strong enough to prevent the ground radar from reading through the jamming. In the light of these observations, the 6023d concluded that high speed aircraft with greater ECM capabilities should be used in conjunction with the flight's TB-29's for optimum site evaluations in the future.

On 12 November, TB-29 #347 flew to Andersen AFB, Guam, to conduct ECM training for the Marianas Air Defense Division (MADD). ECM ground training was given the site personnel in the form of three lectures supplemented by ECM films and training aids. The 123 site personnel who attended the instruction courses generally expressed the opinion that it was quite beneficial. Approximately 45 hours were flown in support of the active ECM training.

Of this, 14 hours of airborne intercept jamming were administered, with 251 passes completed. Ten hours of actual jamming time were devoted to the site, in the course of which all of the site personnel were able to witness effective jamming on the scope. On 17 November the TB-29 was used in conjunction with a B-47 medium jet bomber based at Andersen AFB for an ECM mission, which was for all practical purposes the first realistic mission of this type which the flight had flown.[57]

Not so successful was the instruction trip to Hawaii. On 16 November, TB-29 #973 took off from Naha for Oahu, T.H., to conduct airborne ECM training for the Hawaii Air Defense Command. An ECM ground training team, consisting of two officers of the 6023d, preceded the TB-29 to lay the groundwork for its operations by means of lectures and to coordinate the airborne mission. The 199th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and the 109th and 169th AC&W Squadrons were composed of Air National Guard personnel; therefore, the ground training was accomplished at their monthly meeting, the lectures being conducted in a discussion atmosphere, since most of the men had no previous ECM experience. Altogether, 120 men attended, and they were unanimous in stating that the training had benefited them greatly.

Meanwhile, however, the TB-29 was experiencing difficulties. An inoperative landing gear limit switch had made it AOCP for five days at Wake Island; then, after the plane arrived in Hawaii, only one mission could be flown in support of the ECM training before it again became AOCP-- this time for a #3 cylinder on the #3 engine. By reason of these difficulties, the Superfort could not take off until the necessary parts arrived from the ZI. These eventually arrived and were installed, enabling the aircraft to

begin its homeward journey. On 11 December #973 set down on the runway at Naha AB.

Beginning on 4 December and continuing through the rest of the month, the Evaluation Section conducted a special evaluation of the new AN/FPS-20A surveillance radar at Site P-55 on Okino-Erabu Shima. As this was the first AN/FPS-20 to be installed in the PACAF area, it was also the 6023d's first evaluation of such equipment. In conjunction with this evaluation, the section gathered further data on sun strobe utilization in determining an antenna radiation pattern. However, a complete study had not been finalized by the year's end, since the evaluation itself consumed the greater part of the month.

On 19 December a special 8:20-hour mission was flown in connection with the evaluation of the AN/FPS-20A at P-55. Owing to poor weather conditions and the possibility that the output of the TB-29's jamming transmitters was too weak, the evaluation flight did not produce the results which had been hoped for. However, the mission commander did feel that it had contributed some useful data and provided additional possibilities of trouble sources in this area.

Although many problems were encountered and overcome during the historical period, there were some which defied solution. The most important of these had to do with maintaining the four TB-29 aircraft in an operational condition. If the 6023d was to fulfill its quarterly training requirement of 504 hours for so vast an expanse as the PACAF area, a minimum of three aircraft needed to be in an operational status at all times. Yet, this was an impossibility, considering the ECM potential. In reality, the flight

could equip only two aircraft at 100 per cent transmitter potential, and the other two at 50 per cent. On top of this, aircraft maintenance requirements called for a 200-hour periodic inspection, which usually put an aircraft out of commission for at least two weeks, owing to the bottlenecks in the supply channels through which the necessary parts must come. If the 6023d did not possess preplacement parts for either the aircraft themselves or for the ECM equipment which they carried, it had to await delivery through channels from the ZI.

As the year ended, the Evaluation Section of the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight was busily engaged in the preparation of a set of comprehensive radar coverage diagrams covering the entire PACAF area, requested by Headquarters, PACAF. The same diagrams were also depicted on coverage of search and tracking radar projected to mid-year of 1962. In both instances the work was done for the 500-foot, 5,000-foot, and 40,000-foot levels.[58]

Other Organizational and Administrative Changes at Naha: On 1 August 1958 the advance echelon--three officers and seven airmen--of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (Medium), which was equipped with C-130 aircraft, arrived at Naha AB from Tachikawa AB, Japan, in a permanent change of station. Although the last personnel did not arrive until 15 November, the 21st TCS was attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administrative and logistic support on 25 September 1958.[59] Operational control however, was retained by the 483d Troop Carrier Wing at Ashiya AB, Japan, the parent organization to which the squadron was assigned.

Effective 5 August, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administration and logistical support, while

the 51st Tactical Hospital was attached to the 6431st ABG for administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and logistical support.[60]

Also on 5 August, the following units were attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support only:[61]

Detachment #1, 313th Air Division
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (including all detachments, except Detachment #5, Yae Take Air Station, which would receive POL and ration support from the 6313th Air Base Wing)
Detachment #2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment #1, 1962d AACS Squadron
Detachment #7, 15th Weather Squadron
33d Air Rescue Squadron
Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG)
Detachment #2, 24th Helicopter Squadron
Detachment #3, 1st Shoran Beacon Squadron
F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF

On 15 November the F-86-24 Mobile Training Detachment at Naha AB was deleted from the list of units attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support and was replaced the same date by the F-102-4 Mobile Training Detachment.[62]

On 15 December the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was reorganized with a Table of Organization (T/O) strength of 41 officers, four warrant officers, and 357 airmen.[63]

That same date, Detachment #1, District Office #3, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) was redesignated Detachment #1, District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG).[64]

Still another action which became effective on 15 December was the release to its Okinawan owners of a parcel of 11.85 acres of land in the southern portion of Naha Air Base with an annual rental of $370.55.

The Air Defense Organization.

The mission of Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division as of 1 July 1958 was to operate the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), located in Building #602 at Naha Air Base, and to support the Chief of the Combat Operations Division (COD), 313th Air Division. The same individual acted as Commander, Detachment #1 and Chief, COD. To accomplish its mission, through the ADCC, Detachment #1 was responsible for:

1. Maintaining a complete and current record and a visual display of Air Defense information.

2. Monitoring the Air Defense System and insuring that the component elements complied with all Air Defense regulations, directives, and policies.

3. Monitoring and supervising all action taken against hostile or unidentified aerial objects within the Okinawa Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) area of responsibility.

4. Insuring compliance with the current rules of engagement.

5. Providing an Air Defense Warning Service for the Ryukyu Islands and for the adjacent Air Defense Commanders.

6. Maintaining liaison with the Army Anti-Aircraft Operations Center, the Navy, the Marines, and the Air Weather Service.

7. Monitoring Air Defense electronics and communication facilities and making sure that they were maintained and operated in accordance with applicable regulations and directives.

8. Providing records, information, and intelligence material to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, the Chief, COD, and Air Defense agencies.

9. Maintaining liaison with the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) for the passing of movements information required for the established air traffic identification procedures.

10. Supervising and coordinating training between the AC&W sites and the fighter interceptor squadrons.

11. Performing any other duties that might be assigned by the Commander, Fifth Air Force, the Commander, 313th Air Division, or the Chief, COD.

12. Acting as the central collecting and disseminating agency for Disaster Control (Passive Defense) for the Ryukyu Islands.

13. Operating the Typhoon Command Post for the 313th Air Division.

14. Through close coordination and supervision acting as the Sub-Rescue Coordination Center (Okinawa ADIZ area of responsibility) under the Rescue Coordination Center, Fifth Air Force, Combat Operations Center, Fuchu Air Station, Japan. The ADCC would be in charge of all search and rescue operations in the Okinawa ADIZ.[65]

During the latter part of July the ADCC cooperated with airborne early warning (AEW) R7V aircraft of the Seventh Fleet in a Navy Exercise named KNOCKOUT, whose purpose was to test the use of the Seventh Fleet as a replacement for the Taiwan radar net and position it for combat strikes from the Okinawa and Taiwan areas.[66]

At 0746Z on 25 August the ADCC received a message from the Fifth Air Force COC directing an "increased intelligence watch." This message the ADCC passed to all persons and agencies concerned. Shortly afterward, at 0800Z the same day, the ADCC received a second message from the COC at

Fuchu Air Station directing the 313th Air Division to "Get Prepared - Condition 5." (The condition referred to was defined in PACAF Regulation 55-43). Again, all agencies were informed. Then, at 0924Z on the 26th, the COC at Fifth Air Force directed the ADCC to assume "Air Defense Readiness." In this instance also, action was taken in accordance with PACAFR 55-43. Just 33 minutes later, at 0957Z, the ADDC at Site P-56 reported that all of the AC&W sites had received "Air Defense Readiness" and were manned accordingly. At 1040Z, 26 August, the Chief, COD, terminated "Air Defense Readiness."

The affected units of the command had scarcely begun to relax when a Top Secret message was received from the Fifth Air Force COC directing an increased interceptor alert status--i.e., four aircraft on five-minute alert, four on 30-minute alert, six on one-hour alert, and 70 per cent of all possessed aircraft combat ready.

At 0315Z, 29 August, the ADCC passed instructions for the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron to commence its deployment to Tainan, Taiwan. The first F-86D flight was airborne at 0317Z, and by 0532Z the last flight had departed Naha Air Base.[67]

The addition of the F-100D aircraft of the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron to the Okinawa Air Defense force during the hours of daylight (0600I through 1800I) following their arrival at Kadena AB early in September was of immeasurable value in improving the kill probability of the Okinawa Air Defense System. These aircraft were equipped with Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles and were on a five-minute alert status. A "hot" scramble line connected the "Armstrong" alert pad and the Kadena Tower to

the ADCC, and scrambles were accomplished either directly by the ADCC or by the Senior Controller or Fighter Branch Officer by connecting the ADDC scramble request line and the Armstrong scramble line. Under this arrangement, little or no delay was experienced, and the ADCC was given the opportunity of exercising some judgment in "weapons selection" (F-86D's or F-100D's) against inbound targets.

All available T-33's were also armed with .50-calibre machine guns and placed on alert at Kadena and Naha for use as CAP aircraft or as day fighters in case of a saturation type attack.

The ADA position at the ADCC was manned on a 24-hour-per-day basis for the duration of the Taiwan crisis. In addition, Navy AEW Super-Constellations were placed on 24-hour patrol west of Okinawa, where they flew a course of 350° for a distance of 100 miles and arrangements were made for continuous cross-tell of unidentified traffic between the AEW aircraft and the AC&W system. The purpose of the AEW patrol was to detect any attempt by low flying planes to penetrate the Okinawa Air Defense System from the west or northwest by underflying the radar net. Direct HF communications were maintained between the ADCC and the patrol aircraft, and UHF communications were maintained between the AEW aircraft and the GCI site at Kume Shima.

In addition, submarines were placed on station between Okinawa and the Chinese mainland to supplement the GCI sites and AEW aircraft, with HF communications maintained between them and the ADCC for the cross-tell of unidentified aircraft. These submarines possessed radar control equipment, as well as surveillance capability.[68]

Because of the Taiwan crisis, only one air defense exercise (ADX) was conducted during the period between 1 August and 31 December. "Zip's Idea", which was scheduled by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, lasted from 24 through 28 October, by which time much of the tension in the area had abated. RF-101 Voodoos of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing served as aggressor aircraft in testing the capability of the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. The exercise also provided an opportunity to test the effectiveness of the AN/FPS-20A surveillance set at Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station) which had been given its technical acceptance only a few days earlier, on 14 October 1958.

"Zip's Idea" proved well worth the time and effort expended by revealing two significant points in connection with the Ryukyus Air Defense System. Firstly, the F-86D aircraft was totally inadequate for intercepting high performance aircraft of the century series; whereas the F-100D was more nearly a match for the intruding F-101's. Even so, the Voodoo possessed higher performance characteristics than the F-100, but it was found that good surveillance and intercept tactics could make the Supersabre acceptable for intercept work. Secondly, the AN/FPS-20A radar at Okino-Erabu consistently made initial contacts with F-101 aircraft at ranges of approximately 220 miles from the station when the aircraft was at altitudes of about 35,000 feet. This indicated a substantial increase in the effectiveness of the system as a whole.

Out of 32 aggressor sorties flown during the exercise, 31 were detected, in response to which 55 F-86D intercepts were attempted by the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron and 78 F-100D intercepts by the 477th Tactical Fighter

Squadron. Of these, 54 attempted by the 16th FIS were unsuccessful--13 because of erratic aircraft performance, 10 through airborne equipment failure, 19 because of ground equipment failure, and 12 owing to director error. For its part, the 477th was guilty of only 16 misses--two through erratic aircraft performance, 12 by reason of ground equipment failure, and two because of director error.

The average scramble time for the F-86D's was 5.2 minutes; for the F-100D's 2.3 minutes. However, the average turn-around time for the F-86D's was only nine minutes, while it was 28.7 minutes for the F-100D's.[69]

The Okinawa Typhoon Command Post: Although Okinawa itself was practically exempt from the unwelcome attentions of any typhoons during the year 1958, on several occasions one of these storms approached closely enough to place the island in typhoon condition, and some of the Southern Ryukyus were less fortunate in escaping damage.

Typhoon Tess caused the Okinawa Typhoon Command Post in the ADCC-COD to declare Condition III at 1200I on 3 July and Condition II at 1400I on the 4th. When she veered away thereafter, Condition I was omitted, and the All Clear was declared at 0644I, 7 July.

The career of Typhoon Winnie followed a similar pattern. Condition III was declared at 0530I, 13 July, Condition II at 1500I the same day; but, when Winnie took a path away from Okinawa, Condition I was omitted, and the All Clear was called at 0830I, July 16th.

Even more innocuous was Typhoon Alice. After producing a Condition III at 2030I, 18 July, she displayed so little further interest in Okinawa that the All Clear announced at 0600I, 21 July, constituted the only subsequent reference to her existence.

Cut from much the same cloth was Typhoon Flossie, which caused the declaration of Condition III at 1002I, 22 August, followed directly by the All Clear at 0800I, 24 August.

Typhoon Grace produced a Condition III at 0901I on 1 September; Condition II at 0830I, 2 September; and All Clear at 0830I, 4 September. However, the Sakishima Gunto (Yaeyama and Miyako island groups) did not escape so lightly. A survey by GRI of the damage wrought in that area revealed that 439 houses were completely destroyed and 716 partially destroyed. Especially hard hit was Shirahama Sub-Village on Iriomote Island, where 100 of 105 houses were destroyed, forcing the villagers to seek temporary refuge in the school house, which, by good fortune, survived the storm. On Ishigaki Island to the east of Iriomote, 266 dwelling houses were completely destroyed, 353 partially destroyed, and four temporary school buildings of the Tonoshiro and Ishigaki Elementary Schools completely destroyed. In addition, eight persons were injured in varying degrees.

Besides the damage in Yaeyama, a dried-bonito plant in Sarahama Sub-Village on Irabu Jima in the Miyako Group was also completely destroyed.

Winds at Ishigaki blew a steady 30.35 meters per second, with maximum gusts reaching 40.2 meters per second, while at Yonaguni Island (most westerly of the entire Ryukyus chain, lying much closer to Taiwan than to Okinawa) winds of 41 meters, with maximum gusts of 54.5 meters were recorded.[70]

As soon as word of the disaster to the south was received on Okinawa, preparations were gotten underway to rush 100,000 pounds of emergency food and quantities of tentage to Ishigaki, Iriomote, Yonaguni, and Irabu. Meeting on the morning of 5 September, members of the Ryukyu Islands Voluntary

Agencies Committee (RIVAC--an organization made up of representatives of USCAR, GRI, Church World Service, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference) decided that the following assistance should be furnished the stricken areas: 40,000 pounds of flour, 25,000 pounds of corn meal, 20,000 pounds of rice, and 15,000 pounds of milk. Five thousand pounds of this rice were to be flown to Ishigaki Airfield in two trips by an Air Force C-47 the following day, while the balance of the gift food and the tentage would be shipped aboard the Ryukyu Kaiun Kaisha's Wakaba Maru and Shinryu Maru that same afternoon, September 5th. This food was part of a world-wide assistance program from the American people to others in need of help. Under this program, U.S. food reserves were made available by the Department of Agriculture, and actual distribution of the food was carried out by such voluntary aid agencies as Church World Service (Protestant) and the National Catholic Welfare Conference.[71]

Only a week of quiet followed the departure of Typhoon Grace from the Okinawan scene; then Typhoon Helen was discovered on 11 September to be within sufficient proximity of Okinawa to warrant declaration of Condition III at 1130I. As it turned out, she was to be the only typhoon of 1958 to run the full gamut of official conditions from III to All Clear. Condition II went into effect at 0948I, 13 September; Condition I followed at 0800I, 14 September; and the All Clear was announced at 0645I, 16 September. Winds of 150 miles-per-hour, with gusts as high as 220, were registered at the center of the storm; but, luckily, Helen took a course to the east of Okinawa, battering the sparsely populated Kita and Minami Daito Islands before racing north to rain destruction and death on Japan.

On Okinawa itself, two canoes were sunk off Yonabaru and Naha, but most of what damage was inflicted occured in costal farm areas. In the coastal land of Nakagusuku Son lying between Kuba and Tomari Sub-Villages, the sea water flooded farmland especially rice paddies--at those points where the seawalls razed by past typhoons remained unrepaired. Since most of these paddies were dependent on rain for their water supply, the drainage systems were generally poor; hence, the sea water which poured in could not run out, leading to the expectation that great damage would result from the salty deposits.

In the coastal area of Yonagusuku Son (on the Katsuren Peninsula) between Teruma and Yonagusuku Sub-Villages considerable amounts of sweet potatoes received tidal damage. Also damaged heavily were the rice paddies in Nago Cho along Highway #1, which were normally filled by small brooks feeding into them from the hills in the interior.[72]

The last typhoon of the season to affect life on Okinawa--albeit very slightly--was Lorna. At 0100I, 1 November, the island went into Condition III, but when it was seen that her interest in Okinawa was only passing, the All Clear was put into effect at 1500I the same day.

Rainfall Data for Detachments of the 15th Weather Squadron:

	Det 1 Clark AB	Det 2 Andersen AFB	Det 4 Kadena AB	Det 7 Naha AB	Det 25 Eniwetok
Jan	.63	5.36	4.14	4.11	2.54
Feb	.84	.68	9.56	10.83	.46
Mar	1.06	.69	4.29	4.25	1.72
Apr	.76	1.10	3.16	2.34	2.05
May	.96	2.25	11.93	11.69	3.39
Jun	13.53	7.70	5.86	7.27	2.54
Jul	16.17	11.80	6.75	5.93	15.00
Aug	15.93	5.59	3.50	3.42	7.82
Sep	15.18	14.61	2.42	2.47	4.31
Oct	3.96	7.34	2.33	2.91	6.78
Nov	.25	3.11	2.21	2.86	5.55
Dec	.14	6.12	5.39	4.90	5.22
	69.41	66.35	61.54	62.98	57.38

Thus, for the second year in a row, the rainfall on Okinawa fell well below the average of 84.4 inches, the year 1957 having registered only 71.99 inches at Kadena and 69.27 inches at Naha AB.

ADCC Operations Summary for July - December 1958:

	JULY	AUGUST	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC
Tracks Initially Unidentified	31	16	39	19	16	10
Tracks Remaining Unidentified	3	1	3	4	3	1
Total Fakers	16	0	0	32	(Statistics Not Available)	
Actual Scrambles	22	10	29	12	14	7
Air Defense Diversions	4	0	4	11	2	1
Actual Air Defense Sorties	53	20	69	35	30	14
Actual Intercepts	9	7	19	7	11	3
Identified Prior to Intercept	13	3	16	8	1	4
Identified Prior to Scramble	5	6	3	4	0	2
Weather Plots	1	0	0	0	1	0

Airborne and Other Emergencies Requiring Search and Rescue Action: On 2 July 1958, Navy A4D #5342 declared an emergency and advised that he was going to ditch. SA-16 #7151 of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron at Naha AB was scrambled, then recalled when it was learned that the pilot had been picked up by a fishing boat. He was later transferred to LSM-463 which brought him back to Okinawa.

On 4 July, H-19 #7517 was sent to Ie Shima to evacuate a patient. Taking off at 1040I, the helicopter proceeded to the little island off Okinawa's Motobu Peninsula and delivered the man safely to Kadena at 1135I the same day.

On 23 July, H-19 #487 was scrambled at 0850I to evacuate a wounded boy. The patient was delivered to the Army General Hospital.[73]

On 12 August the Marine battery commander at the Matsuda Firing Range in Ginoza Son requested medical evacuation for one of his men who had been injured. The ADCC scrambled an H-19 of the 33d ARS, and the victim was airlifted to the Army General Hospital.

In response to a request by Lieutenant Colonel Crescenzo F. Guida, the Administrative Officer for USCAR, the ADCC dispatched an SA-16 to Yaeyama on 16 August to evacuate a Ryukyuan woman who required emergency medical attention.

That same day, an H-19 helicopter was sent to Kume Shima Air Station to evacuate an airman who had accidentally wounded himself with a shotgun.

On 25 August, again at the request of USCAR, an SA-16 made the long flight to Yonaguni Island to bring an injured Ryukyuan man to Okinawa for medical care.

Around daylight on 8 September, Helicopter #514 was scrambled to evacuate a patient from Ie Shima. This chopper aborted, however, making it necessary to call on #517. The latter was airborne at 0740I and arrived at Ie Shima 20 minutes later, where it took the patient aboard and returned to the hospital.

At 1256I on 13 September the ADCC received a report that a young Okinawan boy was drifting in a small boat or canoe four miles southeast of Kadena. H-19 #7514 was dispatched to rescue him at 1443I. Within 33 minutes the lad had been picked up and found to be uninjured, but rather frightened. The GRI police provided transportation from Naha Air Base,

where the helicopter delivered him, to his home.

On 1 October an F-101C crashed into the sea three miles northwest of Kadena Air Base. The news of this crash was reported to the Sub-Joint SAR Coordinating Center, which ordered rescue aircraft into the area to search for the downed aircraft and the pilot. One parachute had reportedly been seen, but both the H-21 and H-19 helicopters employed in the search were unable to locate the pilot, though an oil slick was found on the water where the plane had plunged into the sea.

On 8 October the USS LST Tom Green County requested that a crew member suffering from acute appendicitis be evacuated from the vessel. Both an SA-16 and an H-21 helicopter were dispatched to the scene to airlift the sailor to better medical facilities.

On 11 October a fighter aircraft from the USS Shangri-La called Yuza Dake Air Station (the primary ADDC for the Ryukyus Air Defense System) to request assistance in rescuing the pilot of another aircraft from the same carrier who had ditched in the sea 60 miles from the Shangri-La. The Sub-Joint SAR Coordinating Center directed an SA-16 to the scene, but, when the Albatross arrived over the area marked by a dye-marker, the aircraft commander found that a Navy destroyer was already on hand to save the pilot.

On 8 November a Ryukyuan woman on Ishigaki Jima became seriously ill as the result of pregnancy. When she commenced hemorrhaging, the Chief of the Yaeyama Civil Administration Team notified Site P-53 on Miyako Jima of her condition, and asked that the Sub-Joint SAR Coordinating Center at the ADCC be informed, through the ADDC at Yuza Dake, that the woman needed immediate evacuation. Since the airstrip at Ishigaki City had no lights

and her dangerous condition permitted no delay, an SA-16 flew down to the island in the middle of the night and, by means of the lights of all available trucks and cars which could be rounded up and assembled on the perimeter of the runway, made a successful landing. The woman was then placed in the amphibian, which returned her to Naha AB, where a waiting ambulance hurried her off to an Okinawan hospital. As a result, her life was saved, and she eventually recovered completely.

A report was received on 1 December that an F-100D had crashed into the East China Sea near Camp Mercy in Central Okinawa. A search of the area by an SA-16 and H-21 and H-19 helicopters revealed an oil slick 600 yards off shore. The pilot was not seen to eject from the aircraft and was presumed to have perished in the crash, although this could never be determined for sure, since the water at that point was approximately 300 feet deep.

On 12 December, the pilot of an F-100D of the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron reported by UHF radio to Yuza Dake Air Station that his flight leader had experienced a flame-out near Tonaki Jima. The pilot, Captain David H. Auld, ejected from the aircraft and drifted in his parachute into the sea near Irisuna Jima. An H-19 and an SA-16 were dispatched, but before they could arrive on the scene, a Ryukyuan fishing boat belonging to Yoshitaro Higa of Tonaki Jima fished the captain from the water and took him to the nearby island. The H-19 then landed on Irisuna Jima and transported the rescued pilot back to Kadena Air Base.

The humanitarian functions of the Sub-Joint SAR Coordinating Center were again put to use on 17 December, when a woman on Miyako Jima who was

suffering from severe abdominal pains and vaginal bleeding which could not be alleviated by the primitive medical facilities at Hirara City was evacuated to Okinawa by an SA-16 of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron.[74]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 19 May 1958.
2	--	313th Air Division Regulation (313ADR) No. 55-18, sub.: Operations: Air Defense Unit Alignment and Functions,
	--	27 March 1958; 5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations--Division Areas of Responsibility, 12 Nov. 1957.
3	1	Fifth Air Force Regulation 23-4C, sub.: Organization - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 14 Nov. 1958.
4	1	5AFR 23-4A, sub.: Organization - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 15 July 1958.
5	1	5AFR 23-4B, sub.: Organization - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 13 Oct. 1958.
6	--	5AFR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 19 May 1958.
7	--	Far East Air Forces (FEAF) General Orders (GO) 7, dtd, 19 May 1958.
8	--	Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957.
9	--	Fifth Air Force GO 43, dtd. 26 May 1958.
10	2	PACAF GO 70, dtd. 7 Nov. 1958.
11	--	Statement of primary and secondary missions of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing obtained by the Command Historian from a "slide" in the Wing Operations Center. This statement was framed in rather ambiguous language not calculated to present a clear picture of each organization's duties and responsibilities.
12	--	History, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 79-81.
13	--	Ibid., pp. 95-96.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
14	---	Ibid., pp. 43-45.
15	---	Air Materiel Command (AMC) GO 53, dtd. 19 June 1958.
16	---	AMC GO 55, dtd. 23 June 1958.
17	---	Ogden Air Materiel Area (AMA) GO 45, dtd. 1 July 1958.
18	---	Department of the Air Force (DAF) GO 7, dtd. 9 Feb. 1959.
19	---	PACAF GO 8, dtd. 9 Feb. 1959.
20	3	313th Air Division (AD) GO 21, dtd. 24 July 1958.
21	3	313th AD GO 24, dtd. 14 Aug. 1958.
22	3	313th AD GO 35, dtd. 24 Oct. 1958.
23	3	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
24	3	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958; 313th AD GO 27, dtd. 29 Aug. 1958.
25	3	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
26	3	Ibid.
27	3	313th AD GO 33, dtd. 13 Oct. 1958.
28	3	313th AD GO 32, dtd. 3 Oct. 1958.
29	2	PACAF GO 64, dtd. 25 Sept. 1958.
30	---	Daily Bulletin No. 185, Kadena AB, dtd. 25 Sept. 1958.
31	3	313th AD GO 37, dtd. 28 Oct. 1958.
32	3	313th AD GO 41, dtd. 10 Dec. 1958.
33	2	PACAF GO 73, dtd. 5 Dec. 1958.
34	2	Ibid.
35	2	PACAF GO 64, dtd. 25 Sept. 1958.
36	---	History, 5th Communications Group, 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 3-5.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
37	---	FEAF GO 118, dtd. 30 Sept. 1955.
38	---	5th AF GO 110, dtd. 16 Nov. 1955; 5th AF GO 118, dtd. 22 Dec. 1955.
39	---	313th AD GO 28, dtd. 24 Oct. 1957.
40	3	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
37	---	History, 7th Tactical Depot Squadron (TDS), 1 Jan.-30 June 1958, pp. 1-2; History, 7th TDS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 1-2.
38	---	History, 7th TDS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1958, p. 2; Telephone conversation by Command Historian with 7th TDS Administrative Section, 13 Aug. 1959.
39	---	History, 7th TDS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1958, p. 5; History, 7th TDS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, p. 3.
40	---	History, 7th TDS, 1 Jan.-30 June 1958, pp. 9-11.
41	---	Ibid., pp. 11-13.
42	---	Ibid., pp. 14-17.
43	---	History, 7th TDS. 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 4-5.
44	---	Ibid., p. 6.
45	---	Ibid., pp. 6-7.
46	---	Ibid., pp. 6-9, 11-12.
47	---	Ibid., p. 13.
48	3	313th AD GO 22, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
49	---	67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) Reg. No. 23-10 dtd. 19 Aug. 1957.
50	---	Monthly Historical Report, Director of Materiel (D/M), Hq., 313th Air Div., Aug. 1958, pp. 5-6; Sept. 1958, pp. 6-7; History, 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS), 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 2, 6#.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
51	--	History, 15th TRS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 2-3, 5-6.
52	4	Fifth Air Force (5th AF) GO 95, dtd. 21 Oct. 1958.
53	--	PACAF GO 35, dtd. 12 June 1958.
54	3	313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958; 313th AD GO 43, dtd. 30 Dec. 1958.
55	--	History, 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM), 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, p.3.
56	--	Ibid., pp. 5-11, 17-18, 26-28.
57	--	Ibid., pp. 11-15, 26-27.
58	--	Ibid., pp. 27-32.
59	5 3	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to Comdr. 315th Air Div., sub.: Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, 30 July 1958; 313th AD GO 31, dtd. 2 Oct. 1958.
60	3	313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
61	3	313th AD GO 23, dtd. 11 Aug. 1958.
62	3	313th AD GO 42, dtd. 16 Dec. 1958.
63	4	5th AF GO 103, dtd. 9 Dec. 1958.
64	2	PACAF GO 73, dtd. 5 Dec. 1958.
65	--	History, Det. #1, Hq., 313th Air Div., July 1958, pp. 1-2.
66	--	Ibid., p. 4.
67	--	Ibid., Aug. 1958, p. 4.
68	-- 6	Ibid., Sept. 1958, p. 8; Daily Staff Journal (DJ), Director of Operations (/O), 16 Sept. 1958.
69	7	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF COC, sub.: Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" 24 October through 28 October 1958, 30 Oct. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
70	--	News Article, "Relief Foodstuff to be Sent to Yaeyama by Air," Okinawa Times, 5 Sept. 1958; News Article, "Typhoon Strikes Yaeyama; 200 Houses Destroyed," Okinawa Times, 5 Sept. 1958.
71	--	Press Release #180, OPI, USCAR, "Typhoon Relief to be Rushed to Southwestern Ryukyu Islands," 5 Sept. 1958.
72	--	News Article, "Typhoon Helen Causes Tidal Damages at Each Place," Ryukyu Shimpo, 18 Sept. 1958.
73	--	History, Det. #1, July 1958, p. 6.
74	--	History, Det. #1, July 1958, p. 6; Aug. 1958, pp. 6-7; Sept. 1958, p. 7; History, COD, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 14-16.

CHAPTER II

READINESS INSPECTION OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE RYUKYUS

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INTRODUCTION

From 19 through 27 March 1958 a team headed by Colonel Frank Q. O'Connor, Office of the Inspector General, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), conducted a readiness inspection of the tactical and support units of the Ryukyus Air Defense System. In the course of their inspection, the members of the team observed and tested the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron, and Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division--all located at Naha Air Base--to determine their ability to fulfill their assigned missions, as defined in 313th Air Division regulations and PACAF readiness inspection criteria for fighter interceptor units. When the PACAF team had concluded its inspection and analyzed the over-all results, it found that the Ryukyus Air Defense System did not fully meet PACAF readiness inspection criteria.

GENERAL EVALUATION

The operational test portion of the inspection was in three phases, the results of which were as follows:

Phase I consisted of a 24-hour systems check, in which 34 non-controlled faker tracks (i.e., no IFF was used) were flown against Okinawa. Twenty-three of these tracks were detected, and a total of 128 interceptor sorties were either scrambled or directed from Combat Air Patrol (CAP) status against

19 of the faker tracks, with 11 being successfully intercepted, for a system effectiveness mark of 32 per cent. The detection and tracking capability demonstrated during this initial phase was adequate when B-57 tracks were involved, but against fighter type tracks with small reflector surfaces it was clearly inadequate. In general, the latter were either not detected at all, or, if spotted, were detected too late to permit effective intercept action. Over-all, then, the systems reaction time was considered too slow to provide effective tactical action against the high speed, high altitude tracks which were detected.

Phase II was a controlled phase designed to evaluate the pilot/controller team. During this phase the readiness inspection team conducted a total of 32 day and night faker tracks with T-33 aircraft carrying radar reflectors and having their IFF turned on. These tracks were flown at high mach and at altitudes ranging between 30,000 to 40,000 feet, except for one high/low track. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing's aircraft accomplished successful Phase III attacks on 19 of the 32 faker tracks, for an effectiveness rate of 59 per cent, as compared with the PACAF criterion of 75 per cent.

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS), one of the two tactical squadrons of the 51st FIW, successfully met the PACAF criterion during this phase, making successful Phase III attacks on 13 of 17 tracks for an effectiveness figure of 76 per cent, but the 25th FIS accomplished successful Phase III attacks on only six of 17 tracks, for a very low effectiveness rate of 35 per cent. An examination of the 25th's performance determined the primary causes of its lack of success to be (1) four cases of pilot error; (2) three cases of controller error; (3) two cases of system failure; and (4) two cases of airborne radar failure. During this phase the proficiency

demonstrated by the ground controllers was evaluated as eminently satisfactory.

Phase III of the inspection consisted of rocket firing by the F-86D's of the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons at 45' x 9' targets towed by B-57's flying at 30,000 feet. A total of 16 flights by three aircraft each were flown against five tow missions. Twelve of the flights acquired at least one hit on the target, giving the 51st FIW an over-all effectiveness mark of 75 per cent, precisely the PACAF minimum criterion for this phase. Each of the participating squadrons flew eight three-ship flights, and each acquired hits in six of the flights, for a 75 per cent effectiveness score.

During the operational test the aircraft-operationally-ready rate for the 51st Wing was 74 per cent, just one per cent below the PACAF standard. The rate for the 16th FIS was 73 per cent, while that for the 25th FIS was 75 per cent.

The average turn-around time for the 51st FIW was computed at 14.3 minutes, as compared with the PACAF allowable maximum of 15 minutes. The 16th FIS consumed 19 minutes on the average for turn-around, but the 25th FIS needed only 10.6 minutes for the operation, thus saving the wing as a whole.

The average time from scramble to becoming airborne was 7.2 minutes for the 51st FIW--seven minutes flat for the 16th FIS and 7.3 minutes for the 25th FIS.

In the matter of manning, the 51st Wing was authorized 62 pilots but had only 52 assigned, of which number 45 (75 per cent of those authorized) were operationally ready. In addition, there were 16 more operationally

ready pilots occupying supervisory positions in the squadrons and four on the 51st Wing staff.

Radio procedures and discipline were satisfactory, and the crew knowledge and use of terms and procedures as prescribed by JANAP was satisfactory.

A representative number of crews demonstrated a satisfactory ability to recover by GCI/GCA in combat trail formation.[1]

In summing up its general evaluation of the readiness inspection, the PACAF team wrote that

> The results . . . were the best observed by the RI team for defensive units to date. Ground and air crews and radar site personnel demonstrated enthusiasm and aggressiveness in attempting to meet the criteria. Especially noteworthy was the determined and cohesive efforts of squadron maintenance personnel in the sustained maintenance and turn around of aircraft. Command and staff participation and interest were excellent. Support rendered by the 6431st ABG was considered excellent.

MAJOR DEFICIENCIES OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

Shortcomings in Radar Equipment, Maintenance, and Operation.

The Readiness Inspection Team found that the direction, control, and recovery capabilities of the AC&W system were not adequate to utilize effectively the full potential of two fighter interceptor squadrons. The Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) at Yuza Dake Air Station, as then organized, was not considered adequate to handle the responsibilities of this system under wartime conditions. The ground radar equipment performance was below the standard required for the detection of high altitude aircraft having small reflective surfaces. In addition, the radar maintenance was generally unsatisfactory, due to a lack of essential test equipment, adequate field

maintenance, and supply support of available test equipment, failure of the 623d AC&W Squadron to comply with radar maintenance standards established by Fifth Air Force, and too few skilled radar maintenance personnel at some of the sites to make an effective radar maintenance program possible.

The AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar at the ADDC failed the very first day of the inspection--though, to give credit where it was due--the crew had it back in operation within five hours and 35 minutes after its initial breakdown. Not favorably disposed by this incident, the Readiness Inspection Team commented on the low skill level of radar operators in the AC&W system. Another observation was the frequency of delays in the ADDC's identification of tracks--a condition stemming primarily from lack of pre-plotted flight plan information and a requirement for the ADDC to research the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) at Naha AB for classified tracks before establishing identification. Then, even after the tracks had been identified, the ADDC was slow to scramble interceptors, mainly because of improper organization and lack of orderly procedures within its control section.[2]

The radar maintenance program was not adequate to achieve and maintain the required levels of equipment performance, it was found. The team inspected all of the sites to determine possible causes of the failure of the AC&W system to detect and plot "faker" tracks within its known range. As a result of the ensuing analysis, they concluded that the sub-standard performance was primarily attributable to the following factors:

First, some of the radar test equipment authorized by Equipment Component List (ECL) 23010 was not on hand at the radar sites. Since time and confused unit property records prevented the inspectors from making a complete inventory, these officials limited their study to the equipment

required in the maintenance functions of spectrum analysis, power output measurement, and measurement of minimum discernible signal (MDS) at the PPI scopes.

In specific terms, their findings were that Sites P-52, P-53, P-54, P-55, and P-56 were uniformly lacking in the equipment required to perform spectrum analysis of the AN/FPS-3 or AN/FPS-3A surveillance radars deployed at those detachments; while both AN/UPM-30 and TS-545 test sets for these same weapons were conspicuous by their absence at all five places. At Site P-54 (Kume Shima Air Station) there were, to be sure, three MX1309/URM-23 power measuring kits on hand, but every one of them was out of commission for lack of a bolometer, the last of these since 14 December 1957. Again, the single MX-1309/URM-23 power measuring kit at Site P-53 (Miyako Jima Air Station) was also inoperative for want of a bolometer. Site P-52 (Yae Take Air Station) had turned in a TS-497 ( )/URR signal generator to the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron at Naha AB for repair on 17 September 1957, but it had not ~~yet~~ been returned.

Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station) had turned in three of these same TS-497( )/URR's for repair--two in November 1957 and one in February 1958--and had received none of them back at the time of the team's visit. Other test equipment which had apparently lost its return ticket from the absorptive 51st Field Maintenance Squadron after departing Okino for purposes of repair included TS-352 and TS-297 multimeters and a TV-2/U tube tester. Some of these had been in a repair status for more than three months. Much the same situation obtained at Site P-56 (Yuza Dake Air Station) where a TS-497( )/URR signal generator which had been turned into the 51st FMS on

17 September 1957 was still gone when the inspectors made their rounds in March 1958.[3]

Second, the radar maintenance personnel at the sites and in the 313th Air Division command organization in general were failing to comply with Fifth Air Force maintenance notes in their entirety. In order to determine to what extent this situation was true, the inspectors checked the power output measurement, spectrum analysis, and the measurement of minimum discernible signal (MDS) at the Plan Position Indicator (PPI) scopes for each site. Although test equipment was available for this purpose at P-52, the personnel were not taking power output measurements on either the AN/FPS-3 or the AN/FPS-6 radars. With respect to magnetron spectrum analysis, no test equipment was available for the AN/FPS-3, while that which was on hand for the AN/FPS-6 was not being utilized. Again, test equipment was available for measuring minimum discernible signal at the PPI scopes, but no attempt had been made to use it, and the detachment had established no standards.

At Site P-53 the test equipment for measuring power output was out of commission at the time of the inspection, but such measurements had been performed on both the AN/FPS-3 and the AN/FPS-6 in the past when the testing apparatus was in good condition. As at Yae Take, no test equipment was available for conducting spectrum analysis on the AN/FPS-3, but, differing from the former, the maintenance personnel at P-53 were performing spectrum analysis on the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator (HRI). On the debit side of the ledger, the test equipment for measuring minimum discernible signal on the PPI scopes had been neglected, and no standards had been established.

The test equipment for measuring power output on the AN/FPS-3 and AN/FPS-6 radars at Site P-54 was not operational, but, as at Miyako, detachment personnel were conducting spectrum analyses of the AN/FPS-6. No equipment was available for spectrum analysis of the AN/FPS-3 surveillance weapon. Test equipment was available for MDS measurement at P-54, but it was standing idle, and no standards had been established for the site.

Site P-55, which possessed the newest radar equipment in the Ryukyus Air Defense System, was found to be measuring power output on both its AN/FPS-3A and its AN/FPS-6 weapons, as well as performing weekly spectrum analysis on the latter set. As was true elsewhere, no test equipment was available for corresponding spectrum analysis of the search radar. Further evidencing a well-run site, MDS measurement had been conducted on all of the PPI scopes approximately three weeks before the inspection. The sum of this conscientious endeavor to keep the equipment in as good condition as possible was that the PACAF team found P-55's compliance with Fifth Air Force Maintenance Notes to be satisfactory with only two exceptions. Unexpected breakdowns in the AN/FPS-3A could continue to occur as long as no spectrum analyses were carried out, and improvement in the present method of performing PPI scope measurement of MDS was badly needed.

The situation at Site P-56 (the ADDC) was almost identical with that at P-55, with power output measurements being made on both radars but spectrum analysis limited to the AN/FPS-6, there being no test equipment available for use with the AN/FPS-3A. However, despite the fact that P-56 was at that time the location of the 625d AC&W Squadron Headquarters (it was

soon to move to Naha AB), the test equipment available for performing minimum discernible signal measurement on the PPI scopes was being neglected, and no standards had been established for this site.[4]

Third, there were not enough skilled personnel at the radar sites to implement fully an effective radar maintenance program. While Sites P-52, P-53, and P-54 could all boast extremely low radar maintenance skill levels, the maintenance chief at Kume, the extreme case, was a "5" level A/2C, and an intercept controller was assigned the vital position of radar maintenance officer. At P-53 the maintenance chief was a "5" level A/1C, while the communications officer performed the duties of radar maintenance officer. At P-55 the maintenance chief was a "5" level staff sergeant, and a fully qualified radar officer was assigned (which may account for that site's superiority over the others in the degree to which it met established maintenance standards). Sites P-52 and P-56 were both relatively well manned skill-wise, although the radar maintenance officer at the latter was qualified only at the entry level.

At all five sites the assigned technical representatives ("tech reps" in the vernacular of the military) of General Electric, Philco, and Bendix were forced to carry the bulk of the maintenance load, owing to shortages of qualified maintenance personnel. This necessity on the part of the technical representatives for preoccupying themselves with primary maintenance duties was scored by the inspectors as being chiefly responsible for the inadequacy of the training being received by the military personnel assigned to the sites. This was the more deplorable when we realize that the tech reps' raison d'etre was supposed to be to train officers and airmen connected

with maintenance to a point where they could themselves assume full responsibility for such work after a reasonable period of instruction and supervision.[5]

But it was not in maintenance personnel alone that the AC&W sites were lacking. The operations men available at Sites P-53, P-54, and P-55 were plainly inadequate to maintain an acceptable air defense capability during routine operations. P-53 was authorized 25 radar operators, but had only 22 present for duty, three A/2C and one A/3C being assigned as crew chiefs. The operations crews averaged five men per crew, with seven functional positions needing to be manned. The solution--albeit an unsatisfactory one--was to have one man serve as both air surveillance PPI scope and height-finder operator. In even worse case were Sites P-54 and P-55, where the operations crews averaged four men each, their individual skill levels being approximately comparable to those at P-53. While such austere operations manning might permit satisfactory tracking of routine traffic, it could not be expected to provide adequate warning against hostile aircraft coming in at high altitude and high speed. And, when approached from the long view, the position of the 623d AC&W Squadron as a whole was little better than that of its constituent detachments, if any. Authorized 68 officers and 654 airmen, it actually had assigned only 57 officers and 479 airmen.[6]

If the training situation in the 623d AC&W Squadron was failing to achieve its purpose, it could not be said that that in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was doing much better. Militating against successful maintenance of the airborne radar installed in the F-86D interceptors of

the airborne radar installed in the F-86D interceptors of the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons was the ineluctable fact that frequent exercises and squadron details made it difficult for these maintenance people to obtain the continuous training of which they stood in great need. And, as was true of the 623d AC&W Squadron, the low experience level of the airborne radar maintenance personnel made it necessary to divert the technical representatives from their role of instructor to the more urgent task of trouble shooting far more often than was either desirable or intended.

Fourth and last was the aforementioned failure of the radar equipment at Site P-56 during the conduct of the exercise directed by the inspection team. On the afternoon of 19 March, the very first day of the exercise, the AN/FPS-3A at Yuza Dake Air Station went off the air as the result of the unexpected failure of a magnetron. There had been no hint of such a malfunction beforehand. This circumstance impelled the inspectors to suggest that if P-56 had been equipped to perform magnetron spectrum analysis, as it was supposed to be, the deterioration of the magnetron would most likely have been detected and a replacement of this defective part made, thus preventing equipment failure in the midst of critical operations.[7]

Owing to the antennas of the primary radars having been dismantled and reassembled since their last antenna tilt checks, none of the radar sites could be sure of the true tilt of their search or height-finder weapons. What was less venial, this condition had apparently been allowed to exist for from six to nine months, in spite of the fact that accurate knowledge of the true electrical antenna tilt was indispensable to the quality control program and to both the surveillance and control functions. At one site an

obviously incorrect screening angle of 5.5° was being used in place of the correct .55°. It seemed probable that the sorry performances which would naturally result from such conditions would have made themselves evident long since had it not been for their being concealed in some instances by perversion of the quality control program through a lack of knowledge and supervision at all levels which were inspected. In most instances the supervision of the program had been delegated to airmen in the air surveillance sections, where "it was allowed to produce obviously incorrect data" without any attempt at corrective action. It also seemed to be common practice at the radar sites to select the quality control tracks so as to reflect the highest possible performance, rather than to produce a representative sampling which could be studied with a view to improvement in methods or equipment. Of the sites inspected by the team, P-55 was the only one at which the quality control program was assessed as acceptable, even after allowance was made for the limitations imposed by the antenna tilt situation.[8]

Summing up the foregoing shortcomings, the PACAF team found that the radar maintenance records--such as maintenance logs, component record cards, and inspection records--were generally satisfactory at all of the radar sites. Within the limitations of available test equipment and the maintenance skills assigned, the site personnel were making a conscientious effort to provide satisfactory performance by the radar equipment. Even such examples of non-compliance with Fifth Air Force's maintenance notes as had been uncovered could be generally attributed to the failure of supervisory personnel to recognize that these notes were directive in nature, not merely advisory.

Furthermore, the AC&W sites had not been benefiting from the field maintenance of much of the essential test equipment on hand which the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron was supposed to provide. Yet, it could not be said that the latter organization was entirely to blame either, since it was not authorized the equipment required to maintain many of the items of test equipment allocated the AC&W units on ECL 23010.

Also working against successful radar maintenance was the fact that the training of airborne radar maintenance personnel in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was restricted by frequent exercises and squadron details which made it difficult for training personnel to maintain continuity. And, as had been true of the 623d AC&W Squadron too, the low experience level of the maintenance personnel made it necessary to divert the technical representatives from training duties to trouble shooting far more often than was desirable.[9]

Shortcomings of the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC)

Turning from the Intercept/Surveillance and Surveillance Stations to the Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) at Yuza Dake Air Station, the inspectors found that delays in the latter's identification of tracks were excessive both in duration and frequency. For 13 tracks of which the team made a study, the average time from the initial plot to identification was 4.6 minutes, with individual times varying from one to 11 minutes. From the resulting analysis the inspectors determined that the primary reasons for such delays were poor organization of the ADDC identification section and lack of adequate information immediately available to the identification section on which to base recognition. Representative of the former difficulty

was the requirement that the ADDC identification section research the Air Defense Control Center (ADDC) for classified track information before attempting to identify unknown tracks. As the PACAF inspectors observed, this procedure could be expected to "result in loss of critical early warning time in the event of hostile penetration."

Although an identification section pre-plot board was available in the ADDC, the team found that it was not being utilized. Yet, the express purpose for which this board had been designed was to expedite the identification of friendly tracks. Operations personnel at Sites P-53, P-54, and P-55 also reported excessive delays in obtaining track numbers and identification from the ADDC--a complaint which was borne out by the operations logs. The delays that had been encountered were estimated at a minimum of two and a maximum of 20 minutes, the delay seeming to vary in direct ratio to the amount of air activity. As the inspecting officers deduced it, this indicated that the ADDC possessed only a limited capability for processing air surveillance information efficiently.

The inspectors also noted that the control dais of the Direction Center was poorly organized, with an obvious lack of orderly procedures. The principal deficiencies observed were two in number: First, track and interceptor assignment was a hit or miss proposition, with the intercept directors, intercept control technicians, and the senior director frequently uncertain which intercept director a track had been assigned to, and which flight of F-86D's had been detailed to intercept the track. Second, the existing procedures under which scramble was executed by a master intercept technician acting on orders from the senior director could be described at best as

inadequate, inasmuch as these two individuals were physically separated by more than 15 feet and were not equipped with inter-phone communications. Thus it was quite easy for misunderstandings to occur in connection with a matter of the most vital importance.

The failure of the ADDC to scramble fighter interceptors immediately upon identification resulted in missed intercepts on several occasions. For example, in the case of three tracks detected at ranges of 130, 160, and 170 nautical miles, the scrambles were delayed two minutes, six minutes, and six minutes respectively, with the predictable result that all three interceptions failed of achievement. Nor were these isolated instances. Excessive delays in scramble were the rule rather than the exception, and the basic cause of these delays was lack of organization on the control dais of the ADDC. At least, that was the studied opinion of the PACAF inspectors.[10]

Only three UPA-35 control scopes were operational at P-56 (the ADDC) during the exercise, the fourth assigned having been out of commission for lack of needed parts for some two months. The result of this shortage of control scopes was a distinct limitation in the control capability of the site, particularly with respect to providing adequate recovery control.

During the control phase of the evaluation, one man at the ADDC functioned as the operator for both the Height-Range Indicator PPI and the air surveillance PPI--an arrangement which the inspectors regarded as unsatisfactory from either an air surveillance or a height information point of view.

Another deficiency observed was the inability to display tactical action results on the ADDC board in a timely manner. The procedure which was followed called for individual intercept control technicians to pass this information to the master intercept control technician, who then relayed it to the board. Unfortunately for the smooth operation of this system, the master intercept control technician was frequently delayed in passing the information by the pressure of his other duties. Actually, this clumsy method was unnecessary, since communications had been provided for intercept control technicians directly to the tactical action board, but it was not until the last day of the exercise that this convenience was utilized.

During much of the readiness inspection, the Intercept/Surveillance Station at Site P-54 and the Surveillance Stations at P-53 and P-55 had difficulty in obtaining current information on the operations in progress because of the erratic controller-to-controller contact between these places and the ADDC, particularly the last two sites.

During the entire evaluation it was noted that "skin" and IFF return from T-33 aircraft was substantially below normal at Yuza Dake. The "skin" return seldom exceeded 100 miles, and IFF was often barely discernible beyond 150.

The height information provided intercept directors was often neither timely nor accurate, in part because the time sharing feature of the AN/FPS-6 height finder had been disconnected from the UPA-35 control scopes. Orderly procedures for assigning height finder priority and passing altitude information from the HRI operator to the intercept technician had not been established.

Another shortcoming, whose effect would be felt in the long run rather than at any given time, was the lack of training being received by the entry level intercept controllers at Sites P-53 and P-55. Three of these men were assigned to both detachments, but since 1 January 1958 only 25 intercept missions had been executed by P-53 and 54 by P-55. Thus it was not likely that with this infrequent opportunity to practice their skills the six apprentices would find it possible to upgrade their AFSC's or even maintain the level of proficiency they had possessed upon first reporting to the squadron.

Skillwise, the assigned intercept directors displayed "a very satisfactory level of ability" in conducting lead-collision course intercepts, demonstrating their ability to handle multiple interceptors against single target tracks. However, the absence of effective operational procedures here too detracted from and had an adverse effect on these officers' "true capability".[11]

Shortcomings of the Power and Distribution Systems.

An inspection of the electrical power distribution systems at the AC&W sites disclosed that P-53 (Miyako Jima) and P-54 (Kume Shima) required considerable work to bring them up to a satisfactory standard. As examples of this, the radio and radar equipment electrical load should be transferred to a circuit separate from that supplying the balance of the base load. Large electric motors which connected across the lines, without benefit of line starters, created such radar and radio maintenance problems as rendering ineffective those automatic controls that were dependent on regulation of voltage and frequency. In addition, whenever any of the large electrical

motors were started, all lights in the system dimmed.

The organizational maintenance of all ground generators which were examined appeared to be good, but several of the 100-KW Cummins generators at the AC&W sites were overdue for their 6,000 or 12,000-hour inspections and overhauls.

The back-up electrical generator for the control tower at Naha Air Base was found to have sufficient power output, but it was unsatisfactory from the standpoint of time required to get it started, eight minutes elapsing between the failure of regular commercial power and the auxiliary generator's becoming operational. During the same power failure, the GCA unit required 11 minutes and the airfield lighting 14 to begin functioning. This hiatus in time was seen by the inspecting officers as a flying safety hazard of utmost importance should it coincide with the return of aircraft from a mission with a minimum amount of fuel aboard. The answer they offered to this situation was to provide an auto-start transfer panel on the back-up generators.[12]

Shortcomings of the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC).

As part of the evaluation of the AC&W system, members of the inspection team stationed themselves in the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) at Naha Air Base during active periods of the systems check phase. Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, which operated the ADCC, had an excellent physical plant and a well-equipped and adequately-manned control center, they quickly noted. However, the information displayed during the inspection was generally inaccurate, and it was seldom sufficiently timely to enable the Commander to make necessary decisions affecting the progress of

the simulated battle.

The team also found that those published regulations requiring that the ADCC be notified of any conditions of limited radar performance were ignored during the evaluation. When the inspectors arrived at P-56 at approximately 1100 hours, 19 March, they discovered that the radar equipment was operating in an extremely limited condition. This situation continued until 1500, when Condition III was declared. During this period of limited operation the status board at the ADCC indicated, in contradiction of actual conditions, that the radar weapons at P-56 were fully operational. Along the same line, although Site P-54 reported its IFF out of commission on one occasion, the entire facility was carried as in Condition III on the ADCC status board at the same time.[13]

Inadequacies of Communications and Navigational Aids.

Investigation of the point-to-point communications between Site P-53 and the ADDC revealed that they were not adequate for full utilization of the air surveillance information obtained by the former. The primary means of communication was supposed to be by VHF/FM radio of the AN/TRC-1 type from P-53 to P-54, whence the message would be relayed automatically to the ADDC. In fact, however, the primary communication was by HF radio from P-53 to P-54, from where the information was manually relayed to the ADCC by plot-tell. Controller to controller communication was by HF radio from P-53 direct to the ADDC, but even here the operations personnel at Miyako stated that contact with the ADDC on the controller net was unsatisfactory. The VHF/FM communications to P-54 had never been effective, owing to the excessively long transmission path (approximately 160 miles).

Another matter standing in need of improvement was the outside plant telephone facilities at several of the radar sites. P-54, for example, was encountering excessive cross talk. At P-55 cable failure prior to the exercise had made it necessary to resort to temporary arrangements which limited operation. Most of the troubles were blamed on bad cable and on deficiencies in both inside and outside plant installation.

At Site P-55 an LF homer had been located at the AC&W transmitter site, where its transmitter equipment shared the same building with that used by the detachment for communications transmission; while at P-54 a similar homer was under construction at the transmitter site, where it, too, would be housed in the transmitter building. This endeavor to make the maximum utilization of space was commendable, declared the inspectors, but it failed to take into consideration the inevitable, if only partial, screening of UHF transmission which would result from the proximity of the homer towers to the UHF transmitter farms at the two sites. Earlier, personnel from Southern Air Materiel Area, Pacific (SAMAP) had expressed the opinion that the technical limitations imposed at P-54 would not be serious; hence, final installation of equipment should be contingent on the results of a flight check of the facility after the homer tower was erected. Furthermore, the inspectors felt that locating the homers at Sites P-54 and P-55 was not consistent with the AN/FPS-20 modification programmed for these facilities, since it appeared probable that the full potential of this improved surveillance radar could be realized only if ample space and high quality air/ground communications were both available.

Besides the AC&W site communications, the inspectors found several other unsatisfactory conditions that were detracting from the ability of the Naha control tower to handle air traffic safely and expeditiously--if it be indeed possible to make a distinction between the two by describing air traffic handling as "safe but slow".

One of these conditions was the nature of the communications existing between the control tower and the GCA-EE-8 telephone, with an LS-124 speaker (12 key) as back-up. Because of the location of these two instruments, neither was readily available to the "A" controller for use in emergency pull-ups. Another condition was the use of the primary air traffic control frequency for communication between mobile control and the tower, this practice constituting a violation of AFR 100-24. A third deficiency was that an EE-8 used to communicate with the ADCC was so located that the "B" operator was quite likely to be delayed in answering calls in connection with scrambles. Fourthly, an EE-8 telephone was designated as the primary "crash phone", yet was not at all available to the "A" controller and was awkward for the "B" controller to use. Since it was imperative that this phone be immediately available to bothe controllers, the inspectors recommended that a complete and separate ring-down system be installed as the primary crash circuit. Finally, several vehicles and radio stations on Naha Air Base were using primary air traffic control frequencies, again in violation of AFR 100-24.[14]

There was also a general lack of essential communications within the maintenance systems of both the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons, with field phones being used, although known to be generally unreliable.

The radio communication between fire trucks and the fire department was well maintained; however, the primary crash alarm system between the control tower, fire department, and base operations consisted of only a field phone system which was unreliable.[15]

Deficiencies in Scramble and Recovery.

Although the scramble procedures of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing were generally good, the inspecting team expressed the opinion that the elapsed time could have been decreased by the simple expedient of parking those aircraft scheduled in the same flight side by side. The advantage of some such arrangement became especially apparent at night, when, with both squadrons taxiing on the same pavement, the flights became intermingled, making it questionable which one was entering the runway. Consequently, the airborne scramble time was invariably in excess of five minutes when more than one flight was trying to take off. As a matter of fact, there appeared to be no definite plan for conducting a two-squadron operation as required by an air defense exercise (ADX). In addition, the scramble alert hangars were constructed at an excessive angle to the runway, so that expeditious scrambles therefrom were rendered impossible, besides which they had no doors to keep out the elements during inclement weather.

The return of interceptors to their alert parking areas for turn-around and assumption of alert duty was hampered by excessive use of Taxiway 5 by reciprocating type aircraft when Runway 36 was active--a situation which could have been alleviated by diverting the routine traffic to Taxiway 6. Also, in several instances the control tower was guilty of poor control

technique. An SA-16 was cleared to taxi down the active runway, for example, at the same time that an F-86D jet interceptor was directed to make another go-around from its final approach, since the amphibian had not yet cleared the runway. As a result of this faulty assignment of priority, the interceptor pilot had to declare "emergency" fuel and request that the runway be closed to traffic again so that he might land. In another case of poor judgment, the tower directed a flight on a hot scramble to hold short of the runway in deference to a multi-engine aircraft making its final approach in a series of touch-and-go landings which it was shooting.

Under 313th Air Division Regulation 55-3, dated 6 June 1957, a recovery system for fighter interceptors had been established, with a series of radial corridors designated to funnel GCI-controlled flights to the GCA hand-off points. Although excellent in theory, this procedure had proved in practice to be quite limited in capacity because of the requirement for an eight to 10 mile separation between aircraft. In part as a result of this built-in weakness of the recovery system, several deficiencies manifested themselves to the inspectors. Most apparent was the difficulty encountered by the ARTC (Air Route Traffic Control) in providing clearance for flights to the GCA hand-off point with an assurance of proper separation between flights upon their arrival. Also, fighter interceptors were recovered by two separate AC&W sites without proper coordination between the GCA and GCI controllers had resulted in identification problems at the hand-off point and poor coordination of the GCI/GCA hand-off.[16]

Deficiencies in Rescue Procedures and Training.

To test the skill and training of fire department and medical personnel

in rescuing a pilot from a damaged aircraft, a member of the PACAF Readiness Inspection Team simulated a crash of an F-86D at Naha Airfield. The response and positioning of fire-fighting equipment around the plane was very good; however, after the crash crew had opened the canopy, they and the medical personnel exhibited hesitancy as to the proper procedures to be followed in evacuating the pilot from the cockpit. As a result, eight minutes were consumed in getting him out of the aircraft, and 11 minutes were required to clear the "burning" F-86D from the runway. Although there was no established standard by which this performance could be measured, the inspectors considered the times excessive, and recommended that the efforts of rescue personnel be directed toward lowering them to the absolute minimum through concerted training.[17]

A Brief Analysis of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron.

Authorized 31 aircrews, the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, one of the two tactical elements of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, had only 25 actually assigned, of which 22 were operationally ready, two undergoing training, and one awaiting reassignment. The average monthly flying time per pilot for the preceding six-month period was 15.4 hours, a figure described by the inspecting team as "minimum satisfactory" for meeting the annual training requirements set forth by Fifth Air Force Regulation 51-9. The average flight simulator time per pilot was 1:40 hours per month.

During the operational control phase of the readiness inspection, the 16th FIS demonstrated operational training procedures which were accepted as "satisfactory", the average pilot being found thoroughly briefed and

aware of what was expected of him under the ADC team concept. All flights were led by flight commanders and assistant flight commanders, and were thoroughly briefed on operating methods. Snake tactics were good during the climb-out and attack phase, but the inspectors noted that they tended to become ragged and out of position following an attack and during recovery.

The squadron intelligence officer held "well-planned" briefings three times a week every fortnight on the subjects of identification and performance of aircraft and current events. Intelligence reading information was also made available to the pilots through the Intelligence Section.[18]

A Brief Analysis of the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron.

Although the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, the second of the 51st FIW's tactical units, was likewise authorized 31 aircrews, it was slightly better off in this respect than the 16th FIS, having 27 assigned. Of this number, 23 were operationally ready, and the other four were undergoing O/R training. In the matter of average flying time, the 25th came even closer to the "minimum satisfactory" Primsoll mark, its pilots showing only 15 hours per pilot per month over the past half year.

The unit intelligence section of the 25th FIS was graded as "excellent", maintaining control as it did over all squadron classified matter in a satisfactory manner in accordance with AFR 205-1, and making available a classified monthly intelligence Pilot's Information File, which was required reading for all pilots. The section also prepared and presented daily, weekly, and monthly intelligence programs designed to keep the commander

and his people up to date on the latest air and ground orders of battle. As a means of recording the training received by each aircrew, the section maintained a unit intelligence card index.

The 25th's readiness building was assessed as the "finest air defense facility observed in PACAF," being of sufficient size to encompass the entire operation of the squadron. Included were adequate sleeping quarters, a gymnasium, dispatch, personal equipment, intelligence section, ground training, pilots' lounge, briefing room, and orderly room. In addition, the aircraft and pilot status boards, communications, weather, and NOTAM's (Notices to Airmen) were adequate and readily available to the dispatcher. This was in sharp contrast with the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's readiness building, which was only a small shack of some 15' x 20', naturally over-crowded, lacking a briefing room and sanitary facilities, and poorly lighted.[19]

Deficiencies in Security.

Although the inspectors found that adequate security measures were taken during the initial phase of the air defense exercise, they observed that when the ground defense portion of the alert was canceled, the flight line security underwent a noticeable deterioration. On two successive days, inspecting officers were able to gain access to the flight line without challenge.

Several times during the ADX the sabotage alert teams were activated, and in each instance the initial response to the given problem was satisfactory. However, when the strike forces arrived at the hypothetical

penetration point, their commanders failed to comply with established SOP's either by neglecting to deploy or by exhibiting indecision as to what action they should take to solve the problem successfully.

The base practice alert system was considered unsatisfactory, in that a great deal of confusion existed concerning the actual meanings of the various klaxon horn signals. Personal interviews conducted by the inspectors with 37 individuals revealed that only one man knew what the signals indicated and what his specific responsibilities were supposed to be when the alert was sounded. In conjunction with these interviews, nine major buildings where military and civilian personnel normally congregated were checked for placards displaying and explaining the alert signals. Only three of the nine exhibited the siren signals, and only one displayed the practice or klaxon placard.

By observing the reaction of personnel immediately after the klaxon horn was sounded for a practice alert, the inspectors discovered that many individuals were lackadaisical about the whole business, some going to their quarters to change clothing before reporting for duty, while others leisurely strolled to their assembly area. PACAF team members also noticed that the existence of two separate and distinct systems--one for practice and the other for an actual warning of impending attack--was a source of confusion to military and civilian personnel alike. In the interests of better training and definite procedures to be followed in the event of an actual alert, the inspecting team recommended that only one system be employed and that adequate distribution and display of instructions be insured.[20]

CORRECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE PACAF READINESS INSPECTION

Improvements Made or Contemplated in Radar Equipment, Maintenance, and Operation.

On 15 April 1958 the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing wrote PACAF of the measures it had already taken or planned to take in the near future to correct the shortcomings which the inspection team from the latter headquarters had described the previous month.

Respecting the test equipment which had been lacking, AN/UPM-30 sets had been requisitioned previously for Sites P-52, P-54, P-55, and P-56, but a check made with Naha Base Supply on 9 April as a result of the inspectors' comments disclosed that valid base requisitions had not been submitted for the first three of these, while the one for P-56, though valid, had failed to produce the desired equipment, making it necessary for the site to resubmit a requisition on 4 April. Even then, a check by the 51st with Base Supply on 9 April revealed that this latest requisition had not yet been received. P-52 resubmitted its requisition for an AN/UPM-30 on 7 April; P-53, which alone had not previously attempted to obtain this item, forwarded its requisition on 8 April; P-54 resubmitted on 8 April; and P-55 submitted for the second time on 7 April 1958.

The story of the TS-495 and TS-497 signal generators which had been submitted for repair was a frustratingly complex account of requisitions, cancellations, re-orders, follow-ups without result, unavailable parts, defective parts, and interminable delays. The news about the TS-297 and TS-352 multimeters was little better, if any, the latest word being that

the due-in date was approximately 181 to 270 days; and neither a check of the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron shops nor a telephone conversation with P-55 produced any evidence of a TV-2/U tube tester under repair by the former or on the supply account of the latter.

To augment the limited capacity of the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron for providing maintenance services and calibration of test equipment, all of the AC&W sites had been requested on 26 February 1958 to establish additional test equipment requirements, together with a statement of their ability to maintain shop standards at their respective stations. This procedure had been deemed necessary because the transportation problems encountered in connection with rough roads and over-water travel to off-island sites were causing excessive deterioration of the equipment.[21]

In response to the criticism that the radar maintenance personnel were not complying with Fifth Air Force maintenance notes, the Commander of the 623d AC&W Squadron had notified all detachment commanders in a letter of 26 March 1958 of their responsibility for following all directives pertaining to radar maintenance notes. In addition, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing would henceforth make the subject of compliance with these notes a point of investigation in staff visits by members of that headquarters.[22]

Regarding the criticism of the inspection team that there were not enough skilled personnel at the radar sites to maintain the equipment properly or to operate it effectively, the 51st FIW answered that every effort was being made to utilize the people efficiently and raise their skill levels through extensive training. As part and parcel of this program, the "tech

reps" were being employed in their proper role of instructors, devoting 50 per cent of their time to formal classroom teaching, instead of frittering away all their energies in plugging the dikes of continual breakdowns, as had happened in the past. In this same connection, groups of personnel were excused from all extra duty for periods up to six weeks to allow continuity of training, though air defense exercises, over extended periods of time, were of such a nature as to require the efforts of all assigned personnel. When other than normal squadron details were required they were being scheduled after hours or on other than normal duty days. Even as this indorsement was being written, a training building was in the process of establishment for the specific purpose of conducting E-4 maintenance schooling and OJT. If all went as planned, the present training program would be expanded on 25 April to include this new facility.

Along the same lines, a new Unit Manning Document which provided for manning seven positions at Sites P-53, P-54, and P-55 was being submitted. And,perhaps even more important, seven personnel with the AFSC 27370 had been assigned to the 51st Wing subsequent to the inspection for duty as crew chiefs. This was certainly a welcome accession to the wing's capability.

As an interim expedient for retaining the integrity of the Quality Control program until the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight at Johnson AB, Japan, could furnish a team to perform this function, each radar site had been directed to perform its own antenna tilt calibrations. The resulting findings would be forwarded to PACAF upon completionof the evaluation.

A request had originally been submitted to the 6023d Radar Evaluation

Flight for tilt evaluations at Sites P-54 and P-55 in November 1957, and this had been followed up on 10 March 1958 with a query concerning the tentative arrival date of the team. When the 6023d replied that they would forward their itinerary by 11 April, the 51st sent a message to 313th Air Division on April 10th, requesting that the 6023d conduct antenna tilt calibrations at P-52, P-53, and P-56, notwithstanding the fact that the weapons at Yuza Dake had been calibrated by local personnel employing local equipment just five days earlier, on 5 April. Instructions had also been issued to all five air stations, re-emphasizing the importance of making at least one Quality Control measurement each hour, stressing data pertaining to high altitude jet aircraft. Stress was also to be placed on the sampling's being truly representative, rather than comprising an exceptional or inflated figure designed to portray the site in a favorable light, as had been the practice too often in the past. The programs at all sites were to be patterned after that in effect at P-55, which the inspectors had singled out as the exemplar for the others.[25]

Improvements Made in the Air Defense Direction Center.

As the first step in reorganizing the Air Defense Direction Center at Yuza Dake, which had been perhaps the chief target of the readiness inspectors' animadversions, the 51st FIW informed PACAF that a field grade officer with a 1644 AFSC, who was thoroughly experienced in AC&W procedures, had been assigned as the operations officer for Site P-56 on 14 April. Foremost among the subjects in connection with which he had been directed to institute training and take corrective action was the reduction of delays in identification of tracks. And, almost equally important, he was to give his

personal attention to improving the existing system of scrambling interceptor aircraft. Not stopping here, the new operations officer was to make a thorough evaluation of all operations practices, taking whatever action he considered necessary to rectify the deficiencies in both internal functions and systems control.

This was expected to entail an almost complete rearrangement of the ADDC operations room, including scopes and communications facilities. On the materiel side, two additional UPA-35 scopes had been acquired for the ADDC and should be installed by 22 April, giving P-56 a total of six, since the fourth UPA-35, out of commission at the time of the inspection, was again fully operational. The pre-plot board at the ADDC, which had not been in use during the inspectors' visit, was now in use and would continue to be used, promisedthe 51st. Although the critical shortages of manpower which had frequently made it necessary for one man to perform the functions of two were still prevalent, the practice of having the same individual serve as air surveillance PPI and height-finder operator had been discontinued. As a matter of fact, this had been corrected on the final day of the ADX, and personnel changes made since then were expected to improve the situation further.

The 51st also advised that stress was currently being placed on the practice of having the ADDC serve as a coordinating agency for all of the sites, keeping them informed of the entire air picture; and it was anticipated that improved communications equipment scheduled to be received would greatly reduce this problem insofar as P-53 was concerned. It could likewise be expected that improved communications with P-55 resulting from greater

emphasis on maintenance of the HF relay point at Yae Take would greatly reduce the problem presented by that site.

In addition, a command policy had been put into effect calling for the participation of all stations in the air defense structure on a basis compatible with their manning and capability. Conscientious efforts were being made for each site to control the interceptors on a daily basis.[24]

The tardiness of the information displayed in the Air Defense Control Center, one of the subjects of keenest criticism by the inspection team, was ascribed to communication difficulties within the system, the low training level of the plotting and telling personnel, and lack of trained supervisory personnel. Holding out hope that an improvement would soon be forthcoming, the wing stated that new communications equipment which was programmed should materially assist forward telling, and a recently established training program for all personnel could be expected to cut down the excessive time lags. Besides, all corrective action had not taken place as a result of the inspectors' report. During the first two days of the readiness inspection, as a matter of fact, personnel at the ADDC, observing that tactical action was inordinately slow in appearing at the ADCC, had taken measures enabling them to pass similar data to the Control Center with satisfactory speed by the third day of the inspection.[25]

Improvements in Communications Resulting from the Inspection.

The PACAF Readiness Inspection Team had pointed out, it will be remembered, that HF radio communications were being employed between Site P-53 and the ADDC despite their inadequacy and the fact that VHF/FM communications were supposed to be used between P-53 and P-54, with automatic relay

from the latter to P-56. The indorsement prepared by the 51st FIW informed PACAF that VHF/FM directly linking P-53 with the ADDC was a programmed facility scheduled for completion that same month (April 1958).

On the same subject of communications, the visitors had noted that several of the radar sites--particularly P-54 and P-55 were encountering difficulty with their outside plant telephone facilities by reason of bad cable and faulty installation. No tangible improvement in this situation could be reported, but a letter had been sent by the 623d AC&W Squadron to 313th Air Division Headquarters on 2 April requesting assistance in correcting these discrepancies.

Apropos of the criticism that homers were being installed in conjunction with the communications transmitters at Kume Shima and Okino-Erabu Shima, with the probability of adverse effects on the UHF and the programmed AN/FPS-20 surveillance radar modifications, the Commander of the 1885th AACS Installations Squadron had advised the 51st FIW that no deleterious consequences would result from such a siting of the new facilities.

The inspectors had found that the "A" controller was unable to make quick use of the EE-8 telephone and LS-124 speaker in the event of an emergency pull-up because of their partial inaccessibility. The 6431st Air Base Group informed PACAF in its indorsement that the LS-124 speaker had now been moved so as to be immediately available to the aforementioned individual. In addition, a landline panel was presently being prefabricated and would be mounted so as to be available to the "A" controller when completed around 15 May.

To the PACAF team's notation that AFR 100-24 was being violated by the practice of conducting communications between mobile control and the control tower on the primary air traffic control frequency, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing replied that a request for the installation of telephones in the mobile control units had been submitted on 4 March 1958, which was previous to the readiness inspection. When it came the 6431st Air Base Group's turn to prepare an indorsement to the original inspection report, it was able to go even further than the 51st, adding the intelligence that a communications and electronics scheme providing for the installation of telephone cable to the north and south mobile control pads was being completed, and a work order would soon be submitted to the 17th Communications Construction Squadron. When completed around 1 June, this project would provide base telephone cable for the installation of either a dial phone or an EE-8 type telephone circuit to the control tower. Even so, officers manning the mobile control would be briefed on AFR 100-24 before going on duty.

With respect to the criticism that vehicles and radio stations on Naha AB were using primary air traffic control frequencies in violation of AFR 100-24, the wing was able to counter that one of the four call signs specifically listed by the inspectors had been removed from the primary air traffic control frequency. It was true, however, that another one which the inspectors had listed was being utilized primarily for monitoring tactical aircraft in the performance of their mission on tactical frequencies. But, in any event, the 51st FIW solemnly promised to adhere to the provisions of AFR 100-24 more closely in the future. To this the air base group added that the Airdrome Officer's vehicle was utilized by Base Operations primarily to coordinate with the control tower on the operation of jet crash barriers

which had to be checked frequently to insure their safe functioning. If the remote operating system failed to function properly, Base Operations personnel raised and lowered them manually. In view of Naha's air defense commitments, the 6431st deemed immediate coordination and communications essential for safe and expeditious operations. The call sign "Follow Me Alert" was utilized to monitor control tower instructions to taxiing aircraft to insure the efficient and prompt parking of transient planes. The air base group, too, had briefed all personnel on the provisions of AFR 100-24, and transmissions were being held to an absolute minimum.

The readiness inspection officers had commented that the EE-8 telephone used by the control tower to communicate with the ADCC was located so poorly that the "B" operator was delayed more often than not in answering calls in connection with scrambles. The air base group could now reply that this offending circuit had been relocated so that it was now immediately available to the "B" controller.

Again in connection with control tower communications, the team had commented that the EE-8 telephone functioning as the primary crash phone was inaccessible to the "A" controller, and was difficult for the "B" controller to use. This had now been relocated to a position where it was available to both the "A" and "B" controllers. Additionally, it was a complete and separate ring-down system, although an EE-8 was used for talking, and a sub-cycle ringer with key was included to provide ringing current for all subscribers on this system.

The inspectors had also found fault with the fact that the primary crash alarm system between the control tower, the fire department, and base

operations consisted of only a field phone system, and this, declared, was unreliable. To this the 6431st issued a strong denial, countering that this system had always been dependable, besides which it was checked every day to insure its proper operation. As a matter of fact, the maintenance of this system had the highest priority of all the circuits on Naha Air Base. The EE-8 with key ringing from the control tower had "always operated when required"--and what more could anyone ask? Furthermore, 102A key communications equipment was programmed for the control tower, with a scheduled installations date in the second quarter of 1959, at which time the system would be modernized. Line key units were already being constructed for the remote terminations, providing direct ring-down drops at all terminations on the primary crash system.[26]

Efforts to Improve Scramble and Recovery Procedures.

Subsequent to January 1958 the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had undergone a radical change in organizational structure and concept, the Commander having operational control over both the ADCC and the 623d AC&W Squadron, in addition to the two fighter interceptor squadrons at Naha AB. To provide control over these units the Commander had under him a Director for Operations, who functioned with a minimum staff. The Director for Operations was in turn responsible for supervising and exercising over-all direction over the operations and training of the assigned units, of the fighter branch and alert center, and the Plans and Requirements Section of the 51st FIW. The training of the AC&W personnel was accomplished through the medium of the 623d AC&W Squadron. Supervision of the active day-to-day operational mission of the entire AC&W system was exercised through the ADCC.

Thus, this operational structure placed all tactical elements under a common commander.

In reviewing the comments of the inspection team anent deficient procedures in the scramble and recovery of aircraft, the 51st Wing held firm to its belief that the above operational structure was sound, but felt that a better evaluation would be possible after several more months of operation under this concept. The mass scramble of all aircraft from both the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons in a short time interval presented an operational problem which many of the personnel currently assigned had never encountered before. Several ideas were being investigated as a prelude to the formulation of a firm plan. Meantime, better briefings by flight leaders, education of the tower personnel, painting parking areas designated for a flight, and anticipation of the problem by all concerned were being employed to reduce to a minimum the time lost heretofore. The 51st promised, however, that a firm plan for facilitating mass scrambles would be published by 1 May 1958.

It will be recalled that the inspectors had found that the alert hangars were not only situated at excessive angles to the runway, but they lacked doors to protect the aircraft from the weather. With this report in hand to justify and support its stand, the 51st submitted a crash O&M program as a supplement to the FY 1959 Military Construction Program, with a new alert hangar included as a major item. If approved and completed, this project should adequately answer the criticism leveled by the PACAF team.

The wing promised that the diversion of routine traffic to Taxiway 6 at those times when Runway 36 was active would henceforth be SOP as a means

of preventing congestion in turn-around areas. For its part, the 6431st Air Base Group, taking cognizance of the fault the inspecting officers had found with the relative priority being given piston-type aircraft at the expense of the F-86D jet interceptors in using the runway, noted that the tower operators had been instructed in the expeditious and safe operation of air defense aircraft. And, pursuing this program further, the group advised that certain AACS personnel would soon be attending the Director-Pilot School conducted by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, in order to obtain a better understanding of air defense operations. The first class to be attended by these people would commence on 28 April 1958.

Respecting the defects inherent in the recovery system established by 313th ADR 55-2 of 6 June 1957, the 51st believed that a new regulation, then in the final phases of coordination and likely to be published within 30 days, would provide a more efficient recovery procedure. One weakness of the existing system had been the frequent recovery of interceptor aircraft by two different AC&W sites without proper coordination between each other or between the sites and the ARTC. To correct this situation, the 6431st had now issued instructions designating Site P-56 as the primary station for all GCI and GCI/GCA recoveries. If for some reason either P-52 or P-54 should still find it necessary to control a recovery, P-56 would still be responsible for insuring that coordination was effected between these sites and the ARTC.

Another condition with which the inspecting team had found fault was the absence of direct communication between the GCA and GCI controllers--a deficiency which, they said, had resulted in identification problems as the hand-off point and poor coordination of the GCI/GCA hand-off. The 51st contradicted the accuracy of this particular criticism, declaring that, on

the contrary, direct communications with the GCA by both P-52 and P-56 had actually been existent and in use for coordination during the readiness inspection. And--even more to the point--these lines of communication were still operational and in regular use.[27]

Justification of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's Performance.

The inspectors had made it a subject for censure that the pilots of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron barely attained the minimum satisfactory number of flying hours during the six months preceding their visit. This the 51st accounted for with the explanation that flying had been greatly curtailed by adverse weather conditions in conjunction with a double deployment --to Taiwan for an exercise and to Kadena AB while the Naha runway was being resurfaced. With these two handicapping factors eliminated, the 16th FIS managed to compile an average flying time of 29.4 hours per pilot in the unit-equipped aircraft during March.

Although the operational training procedures had been generally evaluated as "satisfactory", and the average pilot described as "thoroughly briefed", the inspectors had observed that the flight formations became ragged following an attack and during recovery whenever "snake" tactics were employed. To this the 51st Wing made answer that the 16th's pilots had been re-briefed on recovery tactics in accordance with Fifth Air Force Manual 55-5, in addition to which the pilot-director team would henceforth make a concentrated effort to perfect the squadron's snake-in-trail recovery.[28]

Explanation of the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's Discrepancies.

The chief fault found with the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was the

same one which had been marked up against the 16th--namely, the failure of its pilots to fly more than the bare minimum number of hours required to be designated officially proficient and eligible for flight pay. The explanation given for this delinquency was likewise pretty much the same as that which the sister squadron had presented. During the past several months the 25th's flying had been greatly curtailed by adverse weather conditions and the necessity for operating out of Kadena while the Naha runway was being recapped. With the arrival of better flying conditions in March, the average had been boosted to approximately 28 hours per pilot, and the fine weather normally prevalent in April and May could be expected to increase this figure. In addition, the 25th FIS promised that its pilots would make the maximum utilization of the F-96D Simulator and T-33 training aircraft to assist in improving their efficiency.[29]

Correction of Power and Distribution System Shortcomings.

When they had come to study the power and distribution systems at the AC&W sites, the PACAF inspectors found that the radar and communications equipment were best disposed of if placed on a separate circuit from that feeding power to the rest of the base. The 51st FIW answered that such a project (NAH-2-58) had actually been prepared back in 1957, with a similar separation of power distribution lines contemplated for each of the five air stations. Before anything tangible could be accomplished, however, Fifth Air Force had directed that it be deferred because of funding limitations. Since the inspectors' visit, though, the Fuchu headquarters had reinstated the project packages for separation of power distribution at Sites P-54 and

P-55. If funded, these projects should be under contract before the end of Fiscal Year 1958.[30]

Also on the subject of power system shortcomings, the 6431st Air Base Group informed PACAF that a program was currently underway to modify the prime power generators at all five AC&W sites. When completed, these modifications were expected to rectify the power distribution problems. Emergency requisitions had been submitted on 14 April for line starters to be used with the air conditioning equipment. If and when received, these starters would eliminate the necessity for making direct line starts. As for the 6,000 and 12,000-hour inspections and overhauls of the 100-KW Cummins generators at the AC&W sites which the detachment personnel had been neglecting to accomplish, the air base group advised that the former were now being carried out by the Installations Engineering Office (better known in popular use by its former name of AIO) in accordance with a scheduled program, while the latter would be performed by a team from SAMAP beginning sometime within the next 60 days.

The inspectors had also called attention to the excessive delay involved in starting the back-up electrical generators for the control tower, the GCA, and the airfield lighting. The 6431st Air Base Group parried this thrust with the observation that, since the method of starting the first two of these was a manual operation, some time lag must be expected. On the positive side, moreover, the generators in question were in an operable condition, with the personnel working with them trained in generator operations. On the other hand, it was admitted that the 14-minute delay in starting the back-up power for the airfield lighting system could be laid

at the door of poor operating procedures. To correct this condition, personnel from the Base Fire Department had since been trained to start the back-up generators for airfield lighting. Finally, in line with the recommendation of the inspectors, the group was studying the feasibility of installing auto-start transfer panels for all back-up generators.[31]

The 6431st ABG Corrects the PACAF Inspectors' Personnel Strength Figures.

The Readiness Inspection Team had listed the over-all manning status of the four units sharing responsibility for the Ryukyus Air Defense System by comparing authorizations with assignments. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was authorized 107 officers and 751 airmen, but actually had assigned 99 officers and 808 airmen. The 623d AC&W Squadron, in far worse case, was authorized 68 officers and 654 airmen, but possessed only 57 officers and 479 airmen. Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division enjoyed just the reverse situation, being authorized 14 officers and 70 airmen, but having 15 officers and 74 airmen assigned. And, according to the Readiness Inspectors, the 6431st Air Base Group was authorized only 94 officers and 1,149 airmen, yet had assigned 104 officers and 1,082 airmen. In indorsing the PACAF report, however, the 6431st ABW was careful to point out that the inspectors had been mistaken in their assertion that it was overstrength in officer personnel, the true authorization at the time of the inspection having been 113 officers. Hence, the group had been understrength, in reality.[32]

Improvements in Rescue Training.

To reduce the time required to rescue a pilot from a damaged aircraft, the 6431st reported, it had instituted specialized training in the techniques

involved in this work for all personnel assigned to the Naha Base Fire Department. As a means of making these men familiar with the specific problems of rescuing a pilot from an F-86D, the interceptor type used by both squadrons, a Sabrejet fuselage had been located adjacent to the fire station for training purposes.[33]

Improvements in and Explanations of the Base Security System.

The inspectors had criticized the deterioration in security measures which had become conspicuous with cancellation of the ground defense portion of the alert. The 6431st Air Base Group explained that during normal duty hours each unit contributed to the pattern of over-all flight line security by close attention to its individual internal security measures--a system made necessary by the insufficiency of air policemen for guarding the flight line gates on a 24-hour basis. After duty hours and during alerts the air police were augmented by base complement personnel, and the flight line gates were guarded. Those gates not considered essential for egress and entry were closed. Emphasis was placed on security indoctrination within all units, especially those with a sensitive mission.

The PACAF team had also noted that the air police sabotage alert teams activated quite satisfactorily, but, when they arrived at the hypothetical point of hostile penetration, they exhibited fatal indecision concerning the proper course of action they should take. This condition, the 6431st said, was now being corrected by a continual training program for the air policemen performing sabotage alert duties, with frequent exercises included to increase and maintain the efficiency of the teams.

Regarding the confusion as to the meaning of the various klaxon horn

signals and too prevalent tendency to treat practice alerts with off-handed nonchalance, the 6431st explained that the siren system used for actual alerts was an island-wide affair employed by all military and civilian agencies. Moreover, there was an informal agreement by all these agencies not to use this system except under actual alert conditions or in the case of island-wide practice alerts. The close proximity of military installations to one another and to civilian communities prohibited one installation from using the siren system for practice without causing undue alarm and confusion in other areas. Besides, it was felt that frequent use of the siren system would breed familiarity at first and end in disregard. It was for these reasons that the 6431st had considered it wise to maintain a klaxon horn system for the practice alerts and exercises conducted at Naha Air Base.

Lectures for military and civilian personnel and their dependents had been and would continue to be held to disseminate information concerning each individual's responsibilities during an alert. New air raid warning siren and klaxon horn signal placards had already been issued and would soon be posted in prominent locations around the base. Finally, an intensified monitoring program had been set up in the Disaster Control Office.[34]

Additional Measures Taken by 313th Air Division.

Although it can be seen that the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the 6431st Air Base Group had either corrected most of the deficiencies described by the PACAF Readiness Inspection Team or had prepared specific plans which were expected to accomplish this end in the near future, there

still remained a few details which were beyond the control of these units and thus became the responsibility of 313th Air Division.

To tick them off in compendious fashion, the first was the shortage of skilled radar maintenance personnel at the AC&W sites. On this subject this headquarters informed Fifth Air Force in an indorsement of 21 May 1958 that its Manpower Division was making "a comprehensive study of space requirements for the Radar Maintenance Sections." Upon completion of this study, 313th would submit its recommendations for changes in the manning documents.

The second pertained to the need for calibrating the radar antennas at the various sites. 313th Air Division advised that two teams from the 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) had arrived on Okinawa on 21 April and were presently conducting antenna tilt calibrations. In addition, advantage was being taken of the team's presence to obtain instruction for local personnel in this procedure, so that calibrations might be conducted without delay in the future.

Then there was the inspectors' observation of a "general lack of necessary communications within the maintenance systems of both squadrons," with field phones being used, even though known to be unreliable. To this the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing had countered that adequate intercom systems had not been programmed for the 25th FIS with the necessary lead time, as items placed on the PC document were not scheduled to be installed for two more years. Such being the situation, the 51st had begun to install a BD-91C switchboard and lay telephone wire, as well as overhauling all phones in use. This combination of measures would, it was believed, provide

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a satisfactory system of communications for the interim period and should be completed in 60 days. Even so, adequate intercom systems were being programmed into future permanent structures. As for the 16th FIS, its Materiel Section was using a TIQ-3 Intercom System with seven call stations. This the 51st Wing considered adequate. However, the one field phone in use would be replaced with a regular type instrument as soon as the Base Communications Section could process the requirement submitted. After evaluating these interim measures taken by the 51st FIW, this headquarters concluded that they should provide a satisfactory system pending receipt and installation of the permanent programmed equipment.

The inspectors had declared the primary crash alarm system between the control tower, the fire department, and base operations, which consisted of only a field phone system, to be unreliable. This the 6431st Air Base Group contradicted flatly in its indorsement of the PACAF report, as we have seen, asserting that, on the contrary, it had been quite reliable, in addition to which it was checked every day to insure that it continued to operate properly. Nevertheless, as a means of making good better, plans had been formalized for the acquisition of 102A key communications equipment for the control tower, with an installation date of October-December 1959, and line key units were already being constructed for the remote terminations, providing direct ringdown drops at all terminations on the primary crash system. After examining the group's current efforts, this headquarters expressed its belief that they should produce a satisfactory interim system.

In the matter of recovery procedure, the inspection team had commented on the difficulty encountered by the ARTC in providing clearance of flights to the GCA hand-off point with assurance of proper separation between flights upon arrival there. This headquarters happily advised Fifth Air Force that a new 313th Air Division Regulation providing for a point recovery system in place of the existing corridor recovery system had been given to the printers and would be effective very shortly.

Probably one of the most important of the criticisms leveled by the PACAF team had concerned the low number of hours flown by the pilots of the 16th and 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons--just barely meeting minimum standards, in fact. In its indorsement, 313th placed much of the blame right back on the shoulders of PACAF, since PACAF Supplement to AFR 60-16 had caused flight activity "to be curtailed when the weather would actually permit a limited amount of flying to be conducted safely." To eliminate this onerous situation, this headquarters had forwarded a proposed change to the PACAF Supplement to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

In response to the inspectors' commend that the point-to-point communications between Site P-53 and the ADDC were not adequate for full utilization of air surveillance information obtained by the site, the 51st had replied that VHF/FM radio communications between Miyako Jima and Yuza Dake Air Stations were already programmed. To this 313th added that it had submitted emergency programming action for a 12-channel tropospheric scatter system on 24 June 1957. USAF had approved an operational date sometime between April and June 1962, but afterward PACAF had requested that the date be moved up to the fourth quarter of FY 1960. As an interim means of

improving communications between the two places, Fifth Air Force had obtained a quantity of high gain AN/TRC-1 antennas, and these were now being tested by the 5th Communications Group for employment between Sites P-53, P-54, and P-56.

On the occasion of the inspection team's visit to Kume Shima, they had formed the opinion that the proximity to the existing UHF transmitter farm of an LF homer tower being erected at the AC&W site would result in some screening of UHF transmission. This headquarters replied that it had disregarded this criticism on the basis of the additional delay and costs which would be involved if the homer were relocated at this late date. At the same time, 313th recognized the possibility that the new tower might degrade radiation from the AC&W UHF air-to-ground transmission. Before installing the homer tower, this headquarters directed that flight tests be conducted and additional tests be carried out after the tower was installed, to determine the actual effect, if any. The main reason for 313th's optimism, however, was the knowledge that the 1885th AACS Squadron had deposed that no serious effects in connection with UHF transmission would be experienced.[55]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	—	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958, pp. 1-5.
2	—	Ibid., pp. 5-6.
3	—	Ibid., p. 6; Annex B to same, pp. 17-20.
4	—	Ibid., Annex B, pp. 18-19.
5	—	Ibid., Annex A, p. 14.
6	—	Ibid., pp. 7-8; Annex A, pp. 12-13.
7	—	Ibid., Annex B, p. 21.
8	—	Ibid., pp. 7-8
9	—	Ibid., pp. 21-22.
10	—	Ibid., p. 7; Annex C, pp. 33-34.
11	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 34-36.
12	—	Ibid., p. 9; Annex B, p. 25.
13	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 32-33.
14	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 31-32.
15	—	Ibid., Annex B, pp. 22, 25.
16	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 26-28.
17	—	Ibid., Annex C, p. 24.
18	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 28-29.
19	—	Ibid., Annex C, pp. 29-30; basic document, p. 10.
20	—	Ibid., Annex D, p. 38.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
21	--	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 51st FIW to CINCPACAF, 15 Apr. 1958, pp. 7-8.
22	--	Ibid., pp. 2, 7.
23	--	Ibid., pp. 2, 3, 9.
24	--	Ibid., pp. 2, 14-15.
25	--	Ibid., p. 14.
26	--	Ibid., p. 14; 2d ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 6431st Air Base Gp. to CINCPACAF, pp. 4-6.
27	--	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 51st FIW to CINCPACAF, 15 Apr. 1958, p. 12; 2d ind., Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Base Gp. to CINCPACAF, pp. 1-2.
28	--	2d ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 6431st Air Base Gp. to CINCPACAF, pp. 12-13.
29	--	Ibid., p. 13.
30	--	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 51st FIW to CINCPACAF, 15 Apr. 1958; 4th ind.,
	--	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 51st FIW to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 15 May 1958.
31	--	2d ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 6431st Air Base Gp. to CINCPACAF, pp. 1-2.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
32	—	Ibid., p. 3.
33	—	Ibid., p. 4.
34	—	Ibid., p. 7.
35	—	6th ind., (Ltr., Hq. PACAF to CINCPACAF, sub.: Report of Readiness Inspection of the Tactical and Support Units of the Air Defense System, Okinawa, 27 March 1958), Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 21 May 1958.

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CHAPTER III

THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS

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THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS

BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

Although Taiwan itself, the Pescadores, and the several clusters of tiny off-shore islands which flew the flag of Nationalist China had been under a technical state of siege ever since the expulsion of the Kuomintang from the mainland in 1949, it was only intermittently that the Chinese Communists brought the pot of war to boil. Following hard on the heels of the retreating Nationalists, the Reds had launched 20,000 of their troops against Quemoy Island--only four miles from the big port of Amoy--that same year, only to suffer the loss of 13,000 men in the abortive invasion attempt. Thus in this, their first reverse, the Communists learned that Quemoy would be a hard nut to crack.

The lethal nature of the potion being brewed in the Red cauldron was first appreciated by the United States in November 1950, when seemingly endless hordes of Chinese troops irrupted across the Yalu, just as Old Glory had been planted in the ice of that boundary river and the armies of the North Korean People's Republic, which had started the war, lay shattered and sundered. In a moment the tide of battle was reversed, and the United Nations divisions, hitherto all-victorious, found themselves suddenly caught in the jaws of a Red trap in the region of the Chosin Reservoir in mid-winter. During the weeks that followed, it was a desperate fight for life against overwhelming numbers of Chinese cavalry and infantry allied with bitter cold, as the encircled men of the X Corps made their painful way, with heavy losses,

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to the North Korean port of Hungnam, where the entire surviving force was evacuated by sea.

Earlier that same year, as incidents which went almost unnoticed in the West, unoffending Tibet had been quietly taken over by Communist China after some small-scale, hopeless resistance; and Communist fifth columns were introduced into Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, and the Malay Peninsula. Eventually, the struggle in Viet Nam--the name by which the eastern portion of Indo-China, comprising Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin-China, had come to be known after 1946--developed into a full-scale war between France and the anti-Communist Viet Namese forces on the one side and the Communist armies of Ho Chi Minh on the other. For the most part, success attended the Reds; but, even so, they eventually agreed to a truce which saw Viet Nam partitioned at the 17th Parallel on 21 July 1954 under the terms of a "Cease Fire" signed at Geneva, Switzerland. At the same time, Laos and Cambodia were made independent states.

Most of the latter half of 1954 the Chinese Communists devoted to the business of girding themselves for the next major project on their avowed schedule of aggrandizement--the conquest of Taiwan. In preparation for this hazardous enterprise, the Reds steadily probed and reconnoitered the outlying Nationalist islands of Quemoy, Matsu, the Tachens, Nanki, and Ichiang--seeking, while so doing, to ascertain whether or not the United States was likely to throw its military might into the scale should they attempt an invasion. On the night of 23 August 1954 a Red naval party of 40 men slipped ashore on Quemoy, one squad killing a single Nationalist soldier found bathing, while the other squad slew 10 Nationalists as they slept and captured one. This done, the Reds withdrew to boast their success. Generalissimo

Chiang Kai-shek responded by rushing more troops, ships, and planes from Taiwan, vowing to defend Quemoy (literally "Golden Gate") to the last man. And there was good reason for his determination, since Quemoy was a 50-square-mile cork in the bottleneck of Amoy Harbor, which would be the best staging base for an invasion of Taiwan itself.

Whether the United States would protect Quemoy against an all-out Red attack remained a mystery to all but top-level people in Washington. The Seventh Fleet was openly pledged to defend only Taiwan and the nearby Pescadores, and up to that time it had tacitly observed the 12-mile limit proclaimed by Peking, without formally recognizing it. If it continued to respect this line of demarcation, the planes and ships of the fleet would be barred from the Quemoy area. However, the United States had always insisted, in theory at least, on the traditional three-mile limit.

On 3 September 1954 the Chinese Communists opened the "vest pocket war" in the Taiwan Straits with an artillery bombardment of Quemoy. Within the week, 10,000 Red shells had been rained on the island. Nationalist guns replied, though not at the same high rate, destroyers sallied into Amoy Harbor, guns firing, and F-84G Thunderjets teamed up with old F-47 Thunderbolts to bomb and strafe the mainland for the first time.

After several months of relative quiet, the Communists suddenly turned to their next target, the island of Ichiang ("One River"), just eight miles from the Tachens, on 18 January 1955. For 22 minutes, 60 Soviet-built aircraft based in the Shanghai area to the north ranged over Ichiang and the Tachens, dropping some 200 bombs on shore installations and supply vessels. Then shore guns on Toumen ("Head Gate") Island, just five miles away, lobbed 96 shells into Ichiang. As flames rose into the air and smoke

shrouded the island, the 30-ship Red invasion fleet, led by two destroyers recently turned over to the Chicoms by the U.S.S.R., moved in and proceeded to pulverize the target. One hundred motorized junks and landing craft disgorged 3,000 troops. To oppose them there were only 720 irregular Nationalist guerrillas, but these put up such a bitter fight that it was more than 60 hours later before the last one was wiped out. According to the Nationalist Defense Ministry, the heroic garrison had inflicted 2,000 casualties upon the invaders before succumbing to overwhelming odds.

Even before the battle of Ichiang was over, the Communists had begun the battle of the Tachens, more than 200 aircraft blasting the tiny islands with bombs, in an air raid twice as heavy as any staged before in the Chinese civil war. In retaliation, the Nationalists, who had treated the mainland as "a privileged sanctuary" since signing an alliance with the United States on 2 December 1954, now ranged up and down the coast in their American-made planes, claiming the destruction or damage of 70 vessels of various types and sizes within one 24-hour period.

Intoxicated by their hard-won success in taking Ichiang, and keenly aware that the United States had not intervened on behalf of its Taiwanese ally, the Chicoms followed up their heavy bombing attack with preparations to seize the Tachen Islands in a similar amphibious operation, but on a larger scale, of course. Upper Tachen, a treeless black rock rising precipitously from the sea, covered only six square miles, but 10,000 regular troops of the Nationalist 46th Division garrisoned it, and its 662-foot peak was honeycombed with tunnels for connecting strong points and with caves for storing supplies. From the underground fire control center, all the 105-mm

and smaller caliber guns on both Upper and Lower Tachen could be directed within seconds against whatever beach might be assaulted. All beaches were guarded with barbed wire, mines, and underwater obstructions, and were covered by camouflaged machine guns and rocket launchers.

Notwithstanding the defensive strength of the Tachens and their undeniable value as radar outposts, President Eisenhower did not deem them to be a vital element in the defense of Taiwan. At his direction, Vice Admiral Alfred M. Pride, the Seventh Fleet Commander, urged Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Tachens, in return for which he offered new guarantees that the United States would support the Chinats in defense of other Nationalist-held islands. In the eyes of U.S. military policy planners, the effort which would be involved in defending the Tachens would end only in the total loss of the garrison or in all-out war by intervention of the United States. Either alternative seemed too high a price to pay. As a result, Chiang was forced to bow to the inevitable, vowing all the while that this would be his absolutely last retreat without a fight.

Washington's attempt to couple this acceptance of evacuation with an agreement for a cease-fire by the two opposing camps met with a sturdy rebuff from both sides. This, notwithstanding that the entire 18th Fighter Bomber Group--including the 44th Fighter Bomber Squadron, still stationed at Clark AB at that time--had been deployed with its F-86F Sabrejets to Chai-yi and Tainan Air Bases in Formosa to demonstrate to the truculent Communists that the United States would brook no interference with the evacuation and that they should be content with having forced the Nationalists to abandon one more bit of soil. And this, despite the fact that the U.S. Seventh Fleet, operating in Formosan waters, had been built up to a strength

of six carriers, four cruisers, 40 destroyers, and five submarines. At the same time, a cease-fire was rendered equally unpalatable for Chiang Kai-shek by his conviction that the evacuation of the Tachens had already begun to create a serious marale problem on Taiwan which could be scotched only by an American guarantee that the Nationalists would not fight alone if the islands of Quemoy or Matsu were attacked. In other words, these outposts should be covered by the same sort of declaration which had previously been applied to Taiwan and the Pescadores. As it was, all that really held the Nationalist structure tenuously together, in the opinion of U.S. military and diplomatic observers, was the fundamental hope that they could some day return to the mainland. This was their basic article of faith. As one young Nationalist colonel told an American newsman, "If the government ever gave up the principle of returning, there would be a revolution."

From 7 through 12 February 1955, more than 30,000 soldiers, guerrillas, and civilians, as well as tons of weapons, supplies, and vehicles, were loaded aboard U.S. and Nationalist naval units and convoyed to Taiwan under a protective aerial unbrella furnished by the carrier aircraft of the Seventh Fleet. While this exodus was taking place, demolition crews, working day and night in rain driven almost horizontally by a freezing wind, blew up everything of possible value to the enemy that could not be removed from the Tachens.

As an operation pure and simple, the evacuation was a masterpiece of efficiency, the Chicoms wisely refraining from interfering, in spite of their natural pugnacity, doubtless having realized that the islets would drop into their laps like so many over-ripe plums, without the necessity of lifting a hand. In addition, the U.S. Air Force and Navy had given their young pilots

much valuable training under combat conditions which could stand them in good stead some day.

However, a valuable early warning radar post for Okinawa had been lost, and, perhaps more important, Nationalist morale had received a heavy blow. The Kuomintang had known nothing but defeat and retreat since the forces of Mao Tse-tung first began to move south through the Chinese mainland in 1948, and this latest abandonment of real estate without so much as an attempt at defense made the Nationalists question their own ability to fight. No one was really surprised, then, when Chiang declared that this was positively his last uncontested evacuation. Henceforth, any territory which the Communists might acquire would have to be taken by sheer force, over the dead bodies of the Nationalist defenders. As Winston Churchill had reminded his fellow citizens rejoicing in the success of Dunkerque in 1940, "Wars are not won by evacuations."

Nevertheless, when the Chicoms began to make minatory gestures toward tiny Nanki (or Nanchishan) Island, a three-square-mile speck about midway between the lost Tachens and Matsu, the United States made it plain to Chiang Kai-shek that he should expect no help in holding onto it if the Communists attempted an invasion. The choice of evacuation or defense, then, was Chiang's, but it was a Hobson's choice with which he was saddled. For it was obvious that the Nationalists could not save the islet by themselves from the overpowering might which the Reds were able so easily to

bring to bear against the 4,000-man garrison.* There was nothing for it, under the circumstances, but to disregard his own heroic words and evacuate these fighting men, as well as the 2,000 people comprising Nanki's civilian population. This was accomplished during the first week of March 1955.

In the months that followed their bloodless victories in the Tachens and Nanki, the Communists continued to turn their guns on the Nationalist offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from time to time, supplementing this routine with an occasional simulated landing at night to gauge the alertness of the garrisons. As a part of this program, the island of Big Quemoy was treated to an especially savage bombardment in June 1957.

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS PREPARE FOR INVASION OF QUEMOY IN 1958

Beginning with the first week of July 1958, the forces of Communism went on the offensive at points all over the world, the first occurrence being an unsuccessful attempt by rebel elements of Socialist Gamal Jumblatt to overthrow the pro-American government of President Camille Chamoun in Lebanon. This was quickly followed on 14 July by a bloody coup d'etat of the army in Iraq, the keystone of the Western Baghdad Pact, in which King Faisal and Premier Nuri Said were killed, enabling Brigadier Abdel Karim Al Kassem to set up a 13-man cabinet in which he assumed the posts of premier

*Illustrating that unpraiseworthy, but not uncommon, propensity of mankind for hitting a man when he is down (it being much safer under those circumstances), a Bevanite left-winger in the British House of Commons, one Harold Wilson, proposed about this time that Chiang Kai-shek and his key aides be "safely stowed away" on St. Helena, the island in the South Atlantic where Napoleon I spent his second exile and last days. Perhaps this suggestion was made in jest. If it was, one must doubt that Chiang found it funny.

and defense minister. Fearful that Lebanon and Jordan would quickly collapse from combined internal and external pressures, the United States promptly reacted by landing 5,000 Marines south of Beirut, Lebanon, on July 15th, while the British airlifted troops into Jordan. As a result of these strong measures, both countries remained outside the Communist orbit, for the time being, at least.

In view of these events in the Middle East, with their accompanying risk that the U.S.S.R. might use this American intervention as an excuse for going to war, the 313th Air Division directed the Combat Operations Division (COD) at Naha Air Base to assume Condition 5 (Get Prepared), as prescribed by PACAF Regulation 55-43, pertaining to "War Emergency Alert Procedures". Under Condition 5, Air Force units were expected to accelerate their training programs, placing particular emphasis on combat readiness; while pertinent personnel, security, and materiel actions would be taken to insure that the accelerated training program was adequately supported. Simultaneously, existing war plans were to be reviewed to ascertain their adequacy and currency.[1] The COD was directed to make certain that all assigned and attached units were notified of this state of alert, as well as of any changes in alert condition which might subsequently be announced.[2]

Because of the distance from Okinawa at which these events in the Levant occurred, there might have been some tendency in this command to regard this latest Communist move with the clinical objectivity--and indifference-- of a disinterested spectator. If so, this illusion was abruptly dispelled when the Chinese Reds began to fulminate with more than ordinary ferocity that the Nationalists should abandon Quemoy or face annihilation. It would also seem that in so doing the Communists were hoist by their own

psychological petard, as their radio blasts produced the undesired effect of making the U.S. forces alert, ready for almost anything.

The tension continued unabated until 19 July, at which time this headquarters sent the following TWX to its subordinate units:

> Secret/313CR C-7-58. This message in five parts. Part I. Reference 5AF Top Secret Message 5FOOT-TOC 58-2690, date and time group 19/0942A. Part II. Commanders will take actions indicated in Part 2 of referenced message. Part III. Desire you take additional security precautions immediately, commensurate with the tense international situation and this not jeopardize our posture for immediate reaction. Part IV. Action addressees will advise this headquarters immediately of security precautions taken and daily thereafter except when significant changes occur. Reports will be marked ATTN: 313th. Unusual incidents, acts of sabotage or major changes in the security situation will be reported immediately to the Commander, 313th Air Division. Part B. For Commander, 6431st ABGRU and 623rd ACWRON. Commander 51 FIW was recipient of referenced message. Request you immediately contact Commander 51 FIW, who will make contents of subject message available to properly cleared personnel.

No changes of significance occurred in the international situation for the next few days, but there was no abatement in alert, and the U.S. military units in the Far East remained in Condition 5. On 22 July Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, the 313th Air Division Commander, sent the following message to Major Maurice Morrison, Commander of the 623d AC&W Squadron:

> Secret/313CR C-7-72. Personal for Major Morrison from Brig Gen Smith. Suspected reconnaissance by Russian air and surface units within our air defense area, coupled with the tense international situation, demands the utmost vigilance by our radar people, controllers, and interceptor pilots. Enjoin your personnel to be alert and combat ready, but do not allow high spirits to substitute for prudence. Defense is our mission. Vigilance is the price of safety.

On one occasion the air defense people were informed that USAF pilots flying in or near South Korea were being given false vectors, supposedly by North Korean forces using the call signs of GCI sites in the Republic of Korea. Local ADDC officials and interceptor pilots thereupon became alert for similar ruses on the part of the nearby Chinese enemy, but the ADIZ (Air Defense

Identification Zone) received no reports of any incidents of this nature. At the same time, existing plans were examined with a view to providing against almost every conceivable eventuality--strike and recovery routes were reviewed, and plans to receive evacuating Chinat aircraft were brought up to date.

Just when the tension had become so protracted that unremitting vigilance was becoming unnatural, the Nationalists announced that Communist MIG-17 fighters had shot down two Chinat F-84G Thunderjets over the Taiwan Straits, 60 miles south of Quemoy. This was followed on 6 August by Nationalist Rear Admiral Liu Hoh-tu's announcement that the Chicom MIG-17's were now stationed at Lungchi, 30 miles west of Amoy and 160 miles west of Taiwan--the closest to the Nationalist stronghold that enemy aircraft had been based up to that time.

Apropos of this situation, U.S. intelligence sources had commented as follows on 5 August:[3]

> The shooting down of two China F-84's by the Chicoms on 29 July has added to an already tense atmosphere in Taiwan. The Chinat Government has become increasingly uneasy over the Commie threat in Indonesia, the recent recognition of Communist China by Cambodia, and what it apparently regards as a pro-Communist trend in the Middle East. Suggestions of growing Chicom belligerence toward Taiwan, and unconfirmed reports of movements of Chicom aircraft to Southeast China airfields have further agitated the Chinat leaders. The immediate result of the aircraft shooting incident will probably be a China request for accelerated delivery of more modern U.S. aircraft. In this present tense atmosphere, the actual stationing of Chicom jet aircraft on airfields opposite Taiwan could well lead to at least local hostilities.

That the MIG-17's at Lungchi Airfield did not exist only in the ardent imaginations of the Nationalists was already known to U.S. Air Force officials, preliminary photographic interpretation from a reconnaissance mission of 4 August having indicated that 29 MIG-type fighters were present there at the

time the cameras shot the field. Our intelligence people did not know whether these 29 fighters at Lungchi were in addition to the 36 probable Frescos which had been photographed on Swatow Northeast Airfield the previous week, but they did feel certain that the Chinats would display increased apprehension over the appearance of fighters only 40 miles from Chinmen, their major outpost in the Taiwan Straits. And this apprehension was "likely to cause increased reconnaissance activity over the Straits, creating a situation which will considerably augment the probability of Chicom-Chinat air clashes."[4]

When the days went by without any further signs that the friction between generated by the two camps was going to produce a conflagration, Fifth Air Force directed a return to Condition 6 (the normal state of alert maintained during peacetime day-to-day operations) on 19 August for all units not scheduled for deployment or support of operations under 313th Air Division OPLAN 25-58. After all, a state of alert too long maintained is like a cake of ice left in the sun. Its usefulness dissipates with every passing hour. Even though the affected units may give lip service to the condition of alert, they, being only human, will inevitably let their guard down. This truth was demonstrated time after time during World War II in surprise air attacks staged by both sides.

Four days later, on 23 August, the Red Chinese guns emplaced on Amoy and the mainland area behind that port city suddenly opened up on Big Quemoy and Little Quemoy in a two-hour bombardment which Defense Ministry spokesman Liu Hoh-tu described as five times heavier than the worst previous bombardment of the islands in June 1957, more than 50,000 shells being rained on the two

highly concentrated targets.* Garrisons on the two islands lying on Communist China's doorstep answered the fire and also opened up with anti-aircraft guns against Chicom planes which overflew Quemoy during the shelling. The intensity of the assault naturally prompted speculation as to whether or not it heralded an imminent Red attempt to invade the Quemoys. For the most part, however, the military leaders in Taipeh were inclined to discount any such significance, since the Communists were well aware that the United States might intervene to save the 45,000-man garrison from destruction.

In course of the inevitable conjecturing as to the reason for this

*The reader of an inquisitive turn of mind may have asked himself the question just how the Chinese Nationalists were able to compute the number of artillery rounds fired against Quemoy or other off-shore targets, when the figures ran up into the thousands. The same question occurred to Associated Press correspondent James Carey, who set himself the task of obtaining an answer. Addressing himself to the Chinese Nationalist Defense Ministry, he learned that the system practiced was very much the same as that the United States Armed Forces had employed in World War II and the Korean War. The general principles were as follows: The company was the normal reporting unit, and it might or might not subdivide the job down to platoon or even squadron level. Each individual assigned as a tabulator from his point of vantage and relative security in a bunker was responsible for tallying the incoming artillery shells falling or exploding in the air within his assigned area, in a given period. After the bombardment had ceased, the shell holes and physical damage were added and the audited count revised--often downward--as the ground evidence indicated. This helped to eliminate the almost certain overlapping of counts from adjacent areas of observation. When the company's total was arrived at, it was forwarded to a central tabulating point--usually the command headquarters--for a final, over-all compilation. Thus, although the system was only "a refined estimate", at best, it did give the defenders a good picture of the enemy's artillery strength, its location, and his probable intentions. In addition, the post-bombardment examination of the shell holes and damage revealed the caliber and type of guns being employed by the Reds. As reporter Cary commented, "The duds perhaps are the most eloquent of all," since they established definitely that the Communists were equipped with Soviet 152-mm. howitzers and 122-mm. cannon.

sudden increase in the intensity of the vest pocket war in the Taiwan Straits, some quarters suggested that the bombardment was designed to feel out soft spots in the Chinat defenses, at the same time keeping the Nationalists on edge in fear of an invasion, as another episode in the protracted war of nerves. Others thought it might be intended to serve as a lever in Red China's unceasing maneuvering to obtain a seat at the next "summit" meeting of the great powers' representatives. Again, it was argued, the Communists might be probing the Nationalist outposts in the hope of prompting the United States to signify its intent of defending these islands. Thus far, the U.S. had stated only that it would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores from invasion, but whether or not this declaration was meant to include the off-shore islands had been deliberately left vague. If the Communists made a realistic enough show of attempting an amphibious landing on these places, the U.S. might be tricked into committing itself one way or the other.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles did reply to reporters' questions that the United States was "disturbed" by the build-up near the off-shore islands held by the Nationalist Government, adding that he hoped and believed the Communists would not try to take over the islands. In response to a letter calling attention to recent reports of a big Red aerial build-up on the mainland opposite both Quemoy and Matsu, Dulles commented:[6]

> We are, indeed, disturbed by the evidence of Chinese Communist build-up, to which you refer. It suggests that they might be tempted to try to seize forcibly the Quemoy or Matsu islands. As you know, these islands have been continuously in the hands of the Republic of China, and over the last four years the ties between these islands and Formosa have increased. It would be highly hazardous for anyone to assume that if the Chinese Communists were to attempt to change this situation by force now that it could be a limited operation. It would constitute a threat to the entire area. Therefore, I hope and believe that it will not happen.

THE U. S. AIR FORCE REACTS TO CHINESE COMMUNIST PRESSURE

On 24 August, the day following the initial heavy bombardment of Quemoy, four Red gunboats and six landing craft attempted to seize Tungting, a tiny island outpost 17 miles south of Quemoy which was used as an observation post for reporting Communist shipping entering or leaving Amoy. The amphibious attack was launched in the late evening, but Nationalist warships quickly arrived on the scene and opened fire on the enemy craft at 2006I. After a brief engagement the Red vessels retreated. Barely an hour later, at 2115I, a second Chicom force of five gunboats and 30 armed motorized junks moved in toward Tungting, but they, too, were beaten off before any troops could be put ashore.

The following morning, at 0005I, August 25th, Nationalist warships claimed the destruction of two high speed Communist torpedo boats in a 15-minute action near Tungting. Later that same day, however, Chicom torpedo boats attacked two Nationalist LST's bound from Quemoy to Taiwan with wounded troops, sinking one and damaging the other so badly as to make it necessary to tow it to safety.[7]

Meantime, Secretary Dulles had declared, in a statement made public on the 23d, that any Communist Chinese attempt to conquer the Nationalist-held islands off the mainland would be regarded as a threat to peace in the region. However, he did not specify what, if anything, the United States would do in the event of an all-out Communist attack on Quemoy or Matsu. Thus, it was left to the Reds to decide whether or not they should make the gamble of attempting to seize these islands.

On 25 August Fifth Air Force reacted to the stepped-up tempo of the

bombardment by notifying this headquarters to enter Condition 5 ("Get Prepared") again.[8]

Then, as the Communists continued to shell Quemoy unmercifully for the third straight day (a merciful bombardment is rather difficult to envision), this command was ordered to go into Condition 4 ("Line Up"--the primary objective of which was "to increase the over-all in-commission rate of the combat units in preparation for execution of the Emergency or Contingency War Plans").[9]

Normally, when Condition 4 was placed in effect, a state of air defense readiness would also be declared, though this did not preclude a prior declaration of air defense readiness by air force or air division commanders. In accordance with the terms of this condition of alert (1) strike and support units were alerted at their home bases and action taken to increase the over-all in-commission rate; (2) all Phase I airlift aircraft were loaded with atomic weapons and/or nuclear capsules; (3) all personnel were recalled to duty; (4) increased security measures were implemented; (5) passive defense measures were readied, consistent with the intelligence situation; (6) staff activities were reduced to provide the required augmentation for agencies engaged in preparing for the execution of war plans; (7) atomic delivery vehicles located at bases adjacent to nuclear storage sites were loaded with atomic weapons, in accordance with the current PACAF Wartime Capabilities Plan; and (8) tanker aircraft were placed on standby alert to carry out their refueling mission.[10]

Although probably no one suspected at the time that it would be so, Condition 4 continued to be the order of the day until 19 October 1958.

At 0630I on August 26th, the ADCC at Naha AB received a Top Secret message from the Fifth Air Force Combat Operations Center (COC) directing an increased interceptor alert status--viz., four aircraft on five-minute alert, four to be ready on 30 minutes' notice, six on one-hour alert, and 70 per cent of all possessed aircraft to be combat ready.

That same day, 26 August, the 623d AC&W Squadron was directed to place a lieutenant on temporary duty with the Chinat Air Defense Direction Center at Makung in the Pescadores, to provide both liaison and an English-speaking director for use with U.S. aircraft. Incidentally, it was not until 24 September that he returned to Naha.

As the atmosphere waxed hotter in the Taiwan Straits, this headquarters notified the 623d AC&W Squadron and the ADCC on 27 August that "Various sources interpret increased Chicom activity as intention to invade the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] held off-shore islands. Air defense readiness state is in anticipation that an invasion of the off-shore islands could be deemed a threat to Taiwan and the Pescadores. The U.S. has stated publicly that it will aid the GRC in defending Taiwan and the Pescadores against Chicom invasion attempts."[12]

That same day, August 27th, representatives of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 623d AC&W Squadron met to formulate plans for the dispersal of aircraft from Okinawa in accordance with Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division OPLANS 101-58. It was recognized that all air bases of this command were "in relatively close proximity to a potential enemy who possesses the capability to launch air attacks with little warning." In deference to this unpalatable situation,

313th Air Division OPLAN 101-58 had made provision for reducing the concentration of aircraft on these air bases by the evacuation of combat and combat support aircraft either to orbit points or to airfields which might not be regarded as primary targets by an enemy. Such dispersal would decrease the probability of damage to the aircraft and enhance their ability to execute or support retaliatory strikes subsequent to the initial enemy attack. Those aircraft assigned to active air defense missions were excluded from the dispersal plan, since they were expected to continue operating from their home base.

It was assumed that in the event of hostilities the enemy would be unable to neutralize all usable airfields in the Okinawa area in his initial attack, and not more than 40 minutes' tactical warning of such an attack should be counted on. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron would disperse their assigned combat aircraft upon implementation of the evacuation plans; the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing would continue with active air defense operations; and the 6315th Air Base Wing and 6431st Air Base Group would provide for the dispersal of their assigned combat support aircraft upon implementation of evacuation plans.[13]

All the radar sites of the 623d AC&W Squadron--now reduced to four in number by the inactivation of P-52 at Yae Take on 1 June 1958--were again directed to perform the most effective surveillance possible, the squadron headquarters instructing them that each detachment was to man two surveillance scopes and one height-finder scope individually on a 24-hour basis until further notice.[14]

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Deploys to Taiwan.

On 29 August 1958 the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base was directed to deploy its 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron to Taiwan as an Air Defense Task Force. The initial deployment directive was received at 1145 hours, and the first F-86D all-weather fighter was airborne at 1226I. Less than two hours after receipt of the movement directive, the first task force aircraft were in place and on five-minute alert at Tainan Airfield. By 1553 hours, 22 F-86D's had been flown in, and that evening the 16th assumed night defense alert responsibility for Taiwan.[15]

Meantime, the support task force of the 6431st Air Base Group at Naha AB had reported to the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron project officer with all requisite personnel and equipment, with the exception of refueling units, for transportation to Taiwan at 1300 hours on the 29th, in accordance with OPLAN 25-58. The refuelers were employed in refueling operations on the base up until just one hour before the allocated air lift was in place to take them aboard. The 6431st support force commander departed with one of the first aircraft and was instructed to survey the situation at Tainan immediately upon his arrival, with a view to determining that base's capability for providing the barest essential support for the 16th FIS, then advise the air base group of any additional requirements.

As a result of the information which the support force commander radioed back to Naha, the 6431st deployed all the support personnel and equipment which had been included in the original plans, then added four air policemen for which he now indicated a need. When noon rolled around the following day, 30 August, the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had

become fully operational at Tainan, with all personnel and equipment in place, four C-130's having made two round trips and two C-124's a single trip apiece to bring in approximately 308,511 pounds of materiel and equipment totalling 27,410 cubic feet, in addition to 170 men. Bulky items of lesser priority, such as two F-6 refuelers and the E-4 fire control mock-up van, were sent down to Taiwan in two partial LST loads which arrived three days later.

At 0345 hours, 30 August, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force directed that 25 sets of auxiliary fuel tanks be prepared for air lift from Naha at 0800 that same morning. Thanks to some strenuous efforts, the tanks were placed in position for loading before the hour announced for the cargo planes' arrival; but the latter did not appear until late afternoon, so it was 1900 hours when the fuel tanks finally took off for Tainan.

On 2 September the 6431st ABG was advised informally that two additional refuelers, an ambulance, a 1/4-ton truck, six squadron tents, and spares for a 0-10 fire truck were required. The truck, tents, and available 0-10 spare parts were immediately released and made available for air lift. However, before taking any action on the other items, the 6431st notified the support force commander that Fifth Air Force had already directed the air shipment of four refuelers from Yokota AB, Japan. The same message asked that he confirm the need for an ambulance by consulting with the Base Commander, Tainan. If the latter stated that one was indeed needed, the 6431st would act promptly to prepare an ambulance for shipment.

Twice-weekly C-47 flights, augmented by B-26 airlift for AOCP-ANFE items and supplemental heavy aircraft lift by the 315th Air Division for any out-size

items, were expected to provide adequate support for the 16th FIS. Additional housekeeping items would continue to be provided as requested by the 6431st ABW support force commander.[16] All ammunition, POL, and on-base transportation at Tainan were to be provided by the Thirteenth Air Force. For its part, the 313th Air Division inaugurated a daily flight by fast aircraft from Naha to Tainan to provide "positive requisitioning and administrative channels" and fly in electronic and aircraft spare parts. This headquarters maintained an engine change set-up at Tainan, but all periodic and field maintenance was performed at Naha Air Base.[17]

The remarkably rapid deployment achieved by the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron won from General Laurence S. Kuter, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, the encomium that "the completion of the deployment [in] three hours and 28 minutes . . . must be considered an outstanding performance. Recognizing the fact that this unit is not normally considered mobile and that a late change in deployment base was involved, the effectiveness of your operation exceeded our estimate . . ."

From this time until 19 December, except for 20 days in October, when personnel of the 25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron flew down from Naha to relieve them temporarily, the 16th FIS remained at Tainan Airfield, maintaining a 24-hour alert there, as well as a six-plane night alert at Taoyuan Airfield 130 miles to the north, for which the aircraft flew up in the afternoon and returned to Tainan the following morning.

At Tainan the 16th was housed in several Butler buildings which had been in the process of construction for a Matador missile unit. Rations and POL were furnished locally, but all aircraft support and all too many housekeeping

deficiencies had to be supplied from the parent base at Naha. Daily courier flights from Naha to Tainan employing C-47's and B-26's carried the smaller items, while the larger ones, such as aircraft engines, were flown down in such C-119 flights as could be obtained on an irregular basis.

While the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was operating out of Tainan, other units of the 51st Wing continued to provide air defense for the Ryukyu Islands; and, because of the Taiwan Straits tension, the alert commitment was at times increased to a point where two or three times the normal number of aircrews were on alert duty.

During its deployment on Formosa, the 16th flew more than 100 missions to within 15 miles of the Communist mainland as escort for cargo aircraft conducting air drops over beleaguered Quemoy. Although these missions were flown at all hours, most of them were made late at night, as that was the safest time for the slow-moving relief planes to place themselves within the range of the ringing Communist guns. On several occasions mandatory scrambles were made with weather below the GCA minimums, and recoveries were likewise made under emergency conditions with weather as low as 200 feet overcast and visibility limited to 1/16 of a mile. Ofttimes, too, it was necessary for the planes to recover at alternate bases with unfamiliar letdowns, at night, in foul weather, and near mountainous terrain. Such recoveries were made with the F-86D's in both single-ship snake formation and close formation, regardless of the weather.

On 19 December the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron moved from Tainan to Chai-yi Airfield, this time accomplishing the redeployment in 24 hours.

In a display of unusually fine maintenance work backed by vigorous supply support, the units of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing operating out of Taiwan maintained an operationally-ready rate in excess of 85 per cent during the entire deployment period--albeit at the expense of the tactical squadron left behind at Naha AB--major maintenance work being performed at Tainan and periodic maintenance for the deployed unit being accomplished at Naha. Of the 4,388 hours flown in that time, 3,481 were accounted for by the two squadrons during their sojourn on Formosa. A total of 195 "hot scrambles" were flown from the deployment bases, including 92 combat air patrol (CAP) sorties to provide cover for Nationalist missions resupplying the besieged Quemoy garrisons. Despite the great number of hours flown and the adverse conditions under which they occurred in many instances, the 16th FIS maintained a flying safety record unmarred by a single accident during the entire six months. For this performance the squadron was subsequently given the USAF Flying Safety Award.[18]

The 623d AC&W Squadron Continues to Support the Chinese Nationalists.

On 29 August, the same day that the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron made its move to Tainan, three more officers of the 623d AC&W Squadron were sent on TDY to Taiwan under Operation "Quick Kick", the Fifth Air Force plan for supporting the Thirteenth Air Task Force on that island by the dispatch of augmenting personnel to the Nationalist radar sites and fighter aircraft to the Taiwanese airfields. Two of these officers were further assigned to the ADDC at Makung in the Pescadores, while the third was eventually assigned to the combat reporting point at Weipu, Formosa. One of the pair sent to Makung returned to Okinawa on 4 October, while the other two officers both

came back one week later.

This was not to be the end of it, moreover, for two more 623d AC&W Squadron officers went to Taiwan on 8 September, one being detailed to the ADCC in Taipei and the other to the combat reporting point at Weipu. The latter returned to Naha on October 11th, the former on the 18th.

Continuing the trend, "Quick Kick" next claimed five non-commissioned officers of the 623d, who departed for Formosa on 10 September. The following day three more NCO's were "put out on loan". Then, on 19 September, a major was sent to the Thirteenth Air Task Force for duty in the Taipei ADCC, being followed about a week later by a warrant officer, who was assigned to the ADDC at Makung. These two officers returned to Okinawa on 4 and 11 October respectively.

On 19 October 1958, Fifth Air Force reduced the status of alert from Condition 4 to Condition 5, but this did not relieve the 623d AC&W Squadron of its obligation to support the Thirteenth ATF until replacements could be received from the ZI. As a result, on 22 October three more NCO's were detailed to replace the same number of men who had previously been dispatched to Taiwan. These last personnel finally returned to the 623d around 1 December.

A good description of the nature of at least a part of the work performed by these TDY people from the 623d AC&W Squadron has been given us by the historian of that organization:[19]

> During the height of the action in Taiwan, the directors and airmen participated by directing USAF fighter aircraft on the missions to escort the Nationalist Chinese transport aircraft in their drops of supplies on Quemoy. The Communist Chinese fighter aircraft constantly flew in close proximity to the cargo aircraft and frequently flew over

Quemoy while USAF aircraft were on escort duty. The 623d AC&WRON directors played a vital role in working and laying the ground rules for handling of USAF forces in the area and in making the rules under which Communist forces would be engaged. In the fluid situation that existed, it was often necessary to rely on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the directors on duty at the time of the incidents to determine the course of action to be taken. The intentions of the Communists were unknown, making the discretion of the directors and pilots of paramount importance. In many instances the skies along the coast line of China were swarming with Communist fighters; the plotting boards were mazes of hostile plots.

UNITS OF THE TACTICAL AIR COMMAND ARE DEPLOYED TO OKINAWA FROM THE ZI

Day by day tension in the Far East heightened as the Chinese Communist Government became almost hysterical in its threats of imminent assault upon the hated Nationalists. Whether it would risk involving the world in a conflict of global scope and itself in destruction, no one in the Western camp could be sure. But, remembering the Chinese Reds' treacherous entry into the Korean War, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were taking no chances of again being caught sadly unprepared for a sudden thrust. The forces in the field had already been alerted, as we have seen, but whether they alone were strong enough to match the air power which the Communists could bring to bear in the Taiwan Straits was a moot question. In matters of this kind one can not afford to be wrong even once, since a single mistake will probably prove fatal. Therefore, a high level decision was made to reinforce the air units on Okinawa and Taiwan with several squadrons of the Tactical Air Command (TAC), which would be sent to those two islands as quickly as possible, as elements of a special Composite Air Strike Force.

The command element for this Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) was drawn primarily from personnel of the Twelfth Air Force, its commander being Colonel

Victor E. Warford, the Inspector General of the Twelfth Air Force. The CASF to be dispatched to the troubled area was normally composed of tactical fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and light bombers. These aircraft could deploy to any point on the earth's surface in a matter of hours, with the assistance of in-flight refueling from KB-50J tankers--converted World War II B-29's augmented by two jet engines to provide increased altitude and speed characteristics.

The 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron Deploys to Kadena Air Base.

The first unit to be mustered up under Project Double Trouble was the 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron, based at Langley AFB, Virginia, whose B-57B twin-jet medium bombers left the United States on 2 September. Three days later, without benefit of mid-air refueling, they had spanned the Pacific, and were ensconced at Kadena Air Base on the evening of the 5th, having put down enroute at the islands of Oahu, Johnston, Kwajalein, and Guam. Along with the bombers came MATS C-124 Globemasters ferrying specialists in many fields, whose mission was to keep the B-57's flying, and TAC C-130 cargo planes loaded with tons of equipment and spare parts. These B-57B Canberras of the 499th TBS were armed with both 20-mm cannon and rockets, besides which they could carry napalm tanks if the situation demanded it. Capable of employing at least 30 different combinations of firepower, these B-57's could carry four 750-lb. bombs externally, or load four 1,000-lb. bombs in their bomb bays; while the Canberra's service ceiling was over 40,000 feet and its top speed in excess of 500 knots. Upon its arrival, the 499th TBS was assigned a quonset hut area on the east side of the runway at Kadena as its operations area.

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The 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron Joins Up.

The next squadron to take off for the Far East was the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron, an F-100D outfit, which departed its home station at Cannon AFB, Clovis, New Mexico, on 3 September, with only two hours' notice. After putting down briefly at George AFB, California, the Super Sabres of the 477th took off for Oahu, and were refueled by KB-50J tankers when 750 miles out. After reaching Hickam AFB, they were quickly airborne again, and were refueled over both Midway and Wake Islands before finally landing at Kadena AB. All support personnel of the 477th, from maintenance men to weather forecasters, along with all squadron equipment, were transported from Cannon AFB to Kadena in C-130's of the Tactical Air Command and C-124's of the Military Air Transport Service. The average flying time for crew members, incidentally, was in excess of 700 hours. However, the most notable thing about the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron was its armament, this being the first unit stationed on Okinawa to be equipped with the Sidewinder air-to-air missile.

The 522d Tactical Fighter Squadron Bolsters the 313th Air Division.

The third tactical unit ordered to Okinawa was the 522d Tactical Fighter Squadron of the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Bergstrom AFB, Austin, Texas. Equipped with McDonnell F-101 Voodoos with a range of 1,500 miles, the 522d TFS did not leave the United States until 8 September; but, once under way, its four flights completed the Pacific crossing in near-record time, the planes being refueled in flight by KC-135 jet tankers and KB-50J propeller-driven aircraft. Less than three days later they were in place

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at Kadena. Every pilot in this squadron had an average of 2,300 hours of flying time, and most had at least 1,200 hours in jet aircraft. As with the 499th TBS and the 477th TFS, all ground support and maintenance personnel, as well as tons of materiel and communications equipment, were airlifted with the squadron from Bergstrom to Okinawa in C-124 Globemasters and C-130 Hercules turboprop transports.

On 28 June the 522d TFS had set a new trans-Atlantic record by flying non-stop from Langley AFB to the Brussels World's Fair in Belgium at an average ground speed of 642 miles-per-hour.

While at Kadena, the F-101's flew daily routine training missions to whet their striking capability, operating out of a tent area erected at the north end of the runway.

The Part Played by Cargo Aircraft.

Mention has already been made of the important part played by MATS and TAC cargo planes in the execution of Project Double Trouble. While no figures on the number of TAC C-130's which participated in this operation are available, the records show that 32 MATS C-124's and 97 C-118's were utilized to bring in the support personnel, equipment, and supplies connected with the movement of the three tactical squadrons from their home stations to Okinawa.

Project Big Skip was dedicated to the business of transporting high explosives and ammunition from the States to Taiwan. The 15 MATS C-124's assigned to this duty left the ZI on 5 September, after loading their lethal cargoes at Oklahoma City, Memphis, and Myrtle Beach. A total of 438,354

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pounds of ammunition and explosives were routed through Kadena enroute to Taiwan.

The 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron Is Airlifted Into Taiwan.

In addition to the jet fighters and bombers hurried into Okinawa to give the Chicoms pause in any thoughts of aggression they might be entertaining, a squadron of F-104 Starfighter jets was dispatched to Taiwan under a project code-named "Jonah Alfa". The organization selected for this deployment was the 83d Fighter Interceptor Squadron, whose home station was Hilton AFB, California. Although the Starfighter was the "hottest" interceptor in the Air Force arsenal, holding the world's speed record of 1,404 miles-per-hour, as well as the altitude record of 91,249 feet, its range was rather short--1,000 / miles. In deference to this shortcoming, those responsible for planning Jonah Alfa provided for the F-104's to be airlifted to their destination in the bellies of a corresponding number of MATS C-124's, the slender fighters first being partially disassembled. The huge Globemasters began moving out of Hamilton AFB, California, on 7 September and landed seriatim at Kadena during the 10 days following, local personnel performing normal through-flight maintenance and refueling before the cargo planes took off for Taoyuan Airfield, Taiwan, where the Starfighters were reassembled and readied for combat. A total of 26 C-124's and C-97's were employed in Project Jonah Alfa, these cargo planes carrying, in addition to the F-104's themselves, spare parts for the missile-like interceptors. The fact that these Starfighters were equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air heat-seeking missiles did not distract from the restraining effect which they could be expected to exercise on the

Chinese Communists.

Still another American air unit dispatched to Taiwan was Marine Air Group (MAG) 11, which had been flown in on 8 September to participate in Exercise "Land Ho", a joint United States and Nationalist Chinese Marine training operation conducted 25 miles south of the port of Kaohsiung. This exercise--appearances to the contrary notwithstanding--had been planned long before the present crisis reared its ugly head. MAG-11 was equipped with Douglas F4D all-weather Skyrays and North American FJ Furies (the U.S. Marine nomenclature for the F-86 Sabre used by the Air Force to very good effect). These aircraft were used to fly aerial cover over American-escorted Nationalist supply convoys engaged in attempts to crack the Communist blockade of Quemoy.

313th Air Division Provides Logistic Support for the CASF Units.

The arrival of the three CASF squadrons at Kadena early in September came at an especially embarrassing time, with parking and operational space at a premium. The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, was then in the process of converting from RF-84F's to RF-101C's, and four of the latter had departed Hill AFB on 5 August, together with six "FA-82" RF-101's of the Tactical Air Command which were to be deployed at Kadena until 1 November 1958 to augment the PACAF EWP reconnaissance capability during the period that the tactical reconnaissance squadrons at Kadena and Misawa were converting from RF-84F's to RF-101's. On 26 August three of the RF-101C Voodoos to be assigned to the 15th TRS, as well as three of the six aircraft of the same type on loan from the TAC base at Shaw AFB,

South Carolina, had landed at Kadena. In the course of the next fortnight the number of RF-101C's comprising an integral part of the 15th TRS had grown to 14, and there were still on hand 19 RF-84F's, as well as the six FA-82 Voodoos on loan from TAC. This combination of circumstances conspired to produce a badly congested situation.[20]

At the direction of Colonel Wallace C. Barrett, who commanded the 313th Air Division (from 14 August to 24 October 1958) in the absence of Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, hospitalized in the ZI, room was made for the men of the deployed squadrons in permanent concrete buildings at Kadena, while the personnel who ordinarily occupied them were moved into outmoded quonset huts lying vacant around the base. Some hasty rehabilitation was performed on these temporary structures in order to make them a bit more comfortable. This treatment, by the by, came as a pleasant surprise to the CASF people, who had expected to be shunted into tents when they reached Okinawa. Of course, these TDY personnel, both officers and airmen, were crowded more than a little in their "sumptuous" quarters, as there were simply too many of them to permit their being housed in the same secluded privacy hitherto enjoyed by the regular occupants. Even so, this beat living in tents, as the airmen of the 307th Bombardment Wing who had been so quartered at Kadena for many months during the Korean War could attest.

On 5 September, Colonel Francis T. Brady, the Director of Materiel for this headquarters, called a meeting of representatives of 313th Air Division, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 6313th Air Base Wing, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, MATS, and the SAC Liaison Office to discuss the

logistic measures which would have to be taken on behalf of the CASF.

The first problem, that of housing, had already been taken care of, as we have seen. The second concerned the locations to which the aircraft themselves and their operations organizations would be assigned. The 12 B-57B's of the 499th Tactical Bomber Squadron would be housed in Area C of Kadena Airfield, where four buildings were available for their use, each structure having one telephone installed. It was also possible that the 3d Bombardment Wing would deploy to Kadena as one element of a PACAF Mobile Strike Force capable of deploying within 24 hours, this having been provided for under an operations plan unconnected with the present Taiwan emergency. If it did, the 16 Canberras belonging to that organization would likewise be assigned to Area C. The 12 F-100D's of the 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron would all be housed in the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Area, with the 18th acting as host. There would be three buildings, with adequate phone facilities, available for the squadron's use. Fourteen B-66's, which were at this time scheduled to arrive at Kadena, were to be housed in Area B, where four tents would be erected, there being no buildings available for their use.

Since some of the CASF F-100D's were to be assigned to air defense at all times, the conferees agreed that a maximum of four aircraft and two MA2 starters should be parked in Area A, where communications with the ADCC at Naha AB would be available. These four Super Sabres would be on five-minute scramble notice.

All tenancy of Areas A, B, and C was to be on a temporary basis, with the understanding beforehand that if SAC units moved into Kadena, the whole

area would have to be evacuated by the TAC squadrons.[21]

Two days later, on 7 September, Colonel Brady convened a meeting of representatives of this headquarters, the 6313th Air Base Wing, the 18th TFW, the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot (ASSD), and CASF to review 313th's position under OPLAN 25-58.

By now the 12 F-100D's of the 477th TFS had arrived and been turned over to the 18th TFW's 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, which was to act as their host unit. In addition, the squadron's support personnel were on hand, but all support equipment had not yet arrived. As soon as two cargo aircraft known to be due arrived with the missing items, the 477th anticipated no further difficulty, as it had been on such deployments before, had all its own equipment, and possessed its own maintenance capability. The 477th was to have a direct account with Kadena Base Supply for cost accounting purposes.

Ten of the 12 B-57B's of the 499th TBS had arrived by now (September 7th), and the other two were expected very shortly. Since this squadron contained the capability of loading its own bombs, it would be ready to go as soon as all of its ground support equipment (GSE) arrived. However, the 6313th Air Base Wing was to be responsible for transporting the bombs to the aircraft. The 499th had not brought its tugs with it; however, it did have modified tow bars which would be used with trucks. The 6313th ABW would act as host unit for this B-57 organization.

As yet, little information was available concerning the 522d Tactical Fighter Squadron, which had not yet put in an appearance; however, it was hoped that they would bring their own GSE with them.

With reference to refueling units, the Director of Materiel for the

6313th Air Base Wing reported that there were a total of 47 units of all types on Kadena, nine of which were undergoing repairs but should be ready within the next few days. The F-100D's and B-57B's were to be serviced by the hydrant system, while the F-101's and F-84's would be serviced by truck.[22]

On 19 September 1958, Headquarters, Composite Air Strike Force Command was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support, as were the 477th TFS, 522d TFS, 499th TBS, and Communications Task Element, 507th Communications and Control Group. Element, Detachment 2, 4505th Air Refueling Wing was attached for administrative and logistical support to the 6431st Air Base Group at Naha AB.[23]

Subsequently, on 25 September, Headquarters, CASF Command was redesignated as the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus (Provisional).[24]

On 16 September this headquarters received authority from Fifth Air Force to overhire 75 Ryukyuan civilians to be utilized in connection with the Taiwan emergency situation requirements for a period not to exceed 30 days. However, there was a "catch" to Fifth's generosity--viz., the funds from which the additional workers were to be paid would have to come from this command's own resources![25] Still, this was better than being denied permission to hire the men.

Although these additional laborers were of great help in meeting the vastly increased workload imposed by the presence of the CASF units, they were not numerous enough. Therefore, on 30 September, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Laybourn, Chief of 313th's Manpower and Organization Division, telephoned Fifth Air Force for permission to hire 25 more Ryukyuan supernumeraries on the same basis as the original 75. This request was granted.

Of the 100 overhire personnel, 38 were assigned to the 6313th Supply Squadron for work in line ordnance, 50 were allocated to the 18th Field Maintenance Squadron for the wing tip tank assembly project, and 12 were given to the 6313th Transportation Squadron to transport the wing tanks. Permission was also sought from Fifth to make all overhire authorizations good for a 90-day period.[26]

In October Fifth Air Force approved the temporary overhire of 15 Ryukyuan personnel for a period of 90 days to support the "urgent operational requirements" generated by the Taiwan crisis, then followed with an extension of 30 days on the overhire of the 38 Ryukyuans assigned to the 6313th Supply Squadron. To this headquarters' request for temporary overhire of 20 DAFC's to replace shortages of manpower brought about by the absence of airmen on TDY to Taiwan, Fifth Air Force replied that it was out of the question.[27]

Afterward, in the waning days of the Taiwan crisis, in December, 313th Air Division had the unpleasant task of informing the 6313th Air Base Wing that Headquarters, Fifth Air Force had disapproved its request for the overhire of Ryukyuan personnel for 30 more days to support Fifth Air Force's OPLAN 25-58--which had been responsible for their hire in the first place.[28]

QUEMOY BECOMES A BELEAGUERED PLACE

Even after the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron had deployed to Tainan--an action evincing America's determination to save Taiwan from destruction in the "Red" sea lapping on its shores--military authorities in Washington, D.C., who preferred to remain anonymous, expressed it as their belief that the Chinese Communists could take both Quemoy and Matsu, provided they were willing to sustain heavy casualties and risk American intervention.

Quemoy was known to be garrisoned by from 80,000 to 85,000 of Nationalist China's 300,000 combat-worthy Army troops--whose average age was 26, instead of 32, since the induction of native born Taiwanese into the armed forces to replace aging mainland Chinese personnel who had accompanied Chiang Kai-shek in his flight in 1949--and these men were dug in behind or under concrete in most vital positions. Equally important, their morale was still high, despite the heavy bombardment to which they had been subjected for a number of days. Matsu, some 80 miles northwest of the northern tip of Taiwan, had a much smaller Nationalist garrison of about 20,000 men and far less substantial fortifications. However it was about 25 miles from the Communist mainland, thus placing it out of range of the Red coastal guns. Still, Matsu should be a much easier place to capture than Quemoy, because of its greater isolation from Formosa, a circumstance making it dependent for help on the Nationalist Navy and Air Force.

In any gunnery duel between Quemoy and the Red mainland, the former operated under a distinct handicap, since its guns were emplaced in concrete bunkers, while the Chicom artillery enjoyed the advantage of mobility, which enabled it to escape concentrated counter-battery fire.

Unofficial estimates placed the manpower strength of the Nationalist Air Force at 87,000 men and its aircraft at about 500 in number, of which about three-fifths were jets--some 225 F-86F's and 150 F-84G's, both obsolescent MIG-15's, there were also some MIG-17's and even a few MIG-19's among them to give the Chicom Air Force a chic touch of modernity.

The U.S. Seventh Fleet was organized around four attack carriers and an anti-submarine warfare carrier, employing more than 300 planes, in all, as

the Taiwan crisis began, and another carrier was immediately summoned from the Mediterranean to reinforce it. The Nationalist Navy contained about 78 vessels, built around three destroyers and five destroyer escorts. Of peculiar value in the present business of resupplying the offshore islands were 19 LST's which had been turned over to the Chinats by the U.S. Navy. The Chicom Navy was reported to be larger, but was composed of small ships, for the most part. However, 17 submarines shipped from the U.S.S.R. in sections and assembled in Red China constituted a formidable threat to the U.S. and Nationalist naval units.

The situation in the Taiwan Straits took a turn for the worse on 6 September, when the Chinats indicated that their planes were preparing to bomb Communist gun positions on the mainland if the Reds subjected Quemoy to massive ground fire or bombing from the air. Should they carry out this threat, the following chain of events could conceivably be touched off: the Chicoms would carry out reprisal bombing against Taiwan or the Pescadores; the United States, bound by treaty, would protect these places; American aircraft would be shot down; the United States would find itself engaged in full-scale war with Communist China; and Soviet Russia, pledged to support Red China in such an event, would turn the "vest pocket war" into an internecine conflict of global dimensions.

The following day, September 7th, warships of the Seventh Fleet escorted two Nationalist supply vessels with 300 tons of ammunition to Quemoy in broad daylight, flaunting the 12-mile territorial limit along the Chinese coastline proclaimed the previous week by the Communist Government. To everyone's relief, no opposition was offered by either Communist warships or shore

artillery. That this was no one-shot operation, however, was made clear by Vice Admiral Wallace M. Beakley, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, when he told correspondents aboard his flagship that "This operation is going to become routine."

However, matters did not run so smoothly for the relievers of beleaguered Quemoy on 8 September when a second American-escorted convoy attempted to land supplies and fuel. Communist artillery hit and blew up a Nationalist tanker as it reached the beach, causing the captain of a second vessel loaded with food and stores to pull out without waiting to discharge his cargo. None of the U.S. destroyers was fired upon, despite the fact that they escorted the supply ships as far in as the three-mile limit, at which point they came to a halt to await the Nationalist vessels' return trip to Taiwan.

After heavy seas had suspended further resupply efforts for two days, a third convoy slipped into Quemoy on 11 September, but had unloaded only a few supplies before an intense saturation barrage from the mainland forced the Nationalist craft to withdraw to Makung in the Pescadores. The U.S. warships acting as escort remained well out of range four miles offshore.

That same day, a spokesman for the Thirteenth Air Task Force on Taiwan informed newsmen that United States air units were now in position on Formosa and had assumed alert responsibilities for night defense. (This was, of course, a belated reference to the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's assumption of these responsibilities on 29 August). If Communist planes should attack aircraft of the Thirteenth Air Task Force or the Seventh Fleet, they would be pursued to the coast of Communist China and possibly beyond. Except in such a contingency, however, the American pilots were instructed to fly no closer than 20 miles to the coast of China. If attacked, they would act

in accordance with the doctrine of "hot pursuit", chase the aggressors to the mainland, where it would be up to the individual pilots' discretion whether or not they should pursue any farther.[29]

Although the United States Government had by its partial intervention prevented aerial bombing of Quemoy or any attempts at amphibious landings by the Communists, the Nationalists on Taiwan were vehement in their criticism of the convoy escort system being practiced. By 14 September, four of five attempted relief expeditions to Quemoy had been driven back by the murderous fire of the Red guns sited in on the unloading beaches, and their failure to bring succor to the hard-pressed garrison was rendered more ironic by the passive presence of the American warships just beyond the three-mile limit of the Communist China coastline. Many Formosans felt the Seventh Fleet ships should steam in close and shell the Communist guns to reduce the heavy incoming fire on the beaches. The Independent Evening News, published in Taipeh, noted with considerable bitterness that "The U.S. fleet watches the fire from across the river. . . . The Americans watch impassively while our ships are shelled." American newsmen who rode the fourth unsuccessful convoy into Quemoy agreed that "The American escort destroyers were bloody nonsense as far as we were concerned." However, those in Washington formulating national policy had to consider what measures could be taken which would help the Nationalists, yet not involve the United States in full-scale war at the same time. Something obviously would have to be done to succor the Quemoy garrison, but the bellicose suggestions of the Kuomintang were not the answer.

The 14th day of September proved to be a successful one for the Chinats in several ways, which was especially fortunate, as Nationalist morale was

declining more and more with each new failure to throw supplies and men into Quemoy, only four miles from the guns on Amoy, under the cover of aircraft of the Thirteenth ATF and the Nationalist Air Force; and LST discharged a full cargo of supplies on Big Quemoy and managed to return to the Pescadores, though damaged by Red shellfire; and CNAF planes returned to Taiwan without loss after showering millions of leaflets on 12 provinces of the Chinese mainland. Besides leaflets, the Nationalist aircraft dropped safe conduct passes for any members of the Chinese Communist armed forces who might wish to defect, or "turn over to righteousness", as the leaflets sententiously put it.

A second successful air drop of supplies into Little Quemoy was carried out the following day, with both U.S. Air Force and Chinat fighters providing cover for the operation.

On the 16th U.S. officials on Taiwan announced that a program for the gradual evacuation of American service dependents from that island was being initiated. For the time being it would be on a voluntary basis, with the first group of evacuees to include pregnant women and the sick or nervous. The second group would comprise those wanting to go home and women whose husbands had only a few months more to serve on Taiwan. After that, if the situation continued to worsen, the balance of the dependents would be ordered home.

That same day, seven C-46's made a successful air drop of supplies on Little Quemoy, while an LST beached itself on Big Quemoy and unloaded all of its cargo in 20 minutes, using amphibious vehicles to speed the task. Following the air drops and the LST landing of supplies, the Communist

bombardment increased in intensity, 5,820 shells landing on the Quemoys in less than five hours. It was observed that the Red batteries were firing shells with deeper penetration qualities than had been true of the anti-personnel fragmentation shells previously employed. The purpose in this was apparently to destroy the strongly protected Nationalist gun emplacements, most of which had thus far withstood the withering fire from Amoy and the hinterland around Weitou.

Addressing the Nationalist parliament on 16 September, before news of the successful LST unloading on Quemoy had been received, Vice President Chen Cheng declared that if the Communists should succeed in sealing off Quemoy completely, it would automatically produce an extension of the conflict. Although he did not amplify further, Chen Cheng's words were generally interpreted as a threat that the Nationalists would resort to bombing the Red batteries which sought to inhibit resupply of the island garrison, regardless of the consequences.

On 18 September eight of the F-86F's which the U.S. had turned over to Nationalist China clashed with 30 MIG's near Quemoy and shot down five of them without loss to themselves. Air Force jets which were in company with the Chinat interceptors, flying protective cover over a supply convoy, incidentally, remained aloof from the engagement, but did overfly Quemoy. The Nationalist Defense Ministry also claimed the sinking of three torpedo boats and the damaging of another by Chinat planes. Six days later, on 24 September, the largest air engagement of the "vest pocket war" took place in the Matsu area, with 32 F-86F's tangling with more than 100 MIG-17's, according to the Nationalist report. In the ensuing dogfights, 10 MIG's were shot down, two possibly destroyed, and three possibly damaged, while the Sabrejets came

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through unscathed. A CNAF spokesman stated that the claim was based on careful evaluation of gun camera films by both Chinese and American experts. That same day, the Chinese Communists charged that six U.S. aircraft had flown over the mainland in the region of Fukien.

As September neared its end, the Nationalists had evolved a resupply system which seemed capable of standing off the Communists indefinitely, as long as the waters in the straits remained relatively calm. Under this new technique, waves of LVT's--amphibious tractors known as Alligators, and much used during World War II--swam out as far as four miles from Liao Lo Beach on Quemoy, where they met several LST's awaiting their arrival. After transferring supplies from the ships, the fully-loaded Alligators deployed in groups of two and three for the return trip, in which they hit the beach and hurried to a protected area. With the appearance of the monsoon season, however, the Taiwan Straits would become a nightmare of mountainous waves, in which such methods of resupply were out of the question--although these same conditions would also impose nearly insuperable difficulties for any contemplated Communist amphibious landing. Another shortcoming of this method of breaking the blockade was the small capacity of each LVT. Where some 350 tons of supplies were needed each day to keep the Quemoy garrison at top combat strength, the 59 Alligators successfully making the perilous dash on 28 September could boast a combined maximum capacity of only 177 tons. The LVT was admittedly not much good in waves more than six feet high, and the monsoon would bring waves many times this size, because of the shallow depth of the Taiwan Straits.[30]

While this surface convoy was bringing aid to Quemoy on 28 September, 20 C-46's were dropping supplies on Little Quemoy in the face of intense

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anti-aircraft fire from Amoy. The next day, however, the expected heavy seas connected with the monsoon made their appearance, forcing cancellation of the scheduled resupply expedition. Kai Ja-ting, the civil administrator of Little Quemoy, did manage to slip over to Big Quemoy on the 29th, though, to report on the situation existing in his tiny domain and to plead for more food. According to his story, more than two-thirds of the houses on Little Quemoy had been either destroyed or damaged; the island had run out of rice, forcing the 5,700 inhabitants to subsist on sweet potatoes and millet; every fishing boat on Little Quemoy had been destroyed by the shelling, so that it was now possible to reach Big Quemoy only by utilizing boats sent over from the latter place; the farmers were able to work the fields only during respites in the bombardment which forced them to spend the greater part of their time in underground shelters; and medicine was as badly needed as was food. A total of 22 civilians had been killed, 16 seriously injured, and 15 lightly injured since the bombardment began on 23 August, reported Kai Ja-ting. The three air drops made on Little Quemoy thus far had been successful, but all of the supplies had been for the military garrison. In normal times the islanders produced 80 per cent of their own food, but this was impossible, for obfious reasons, under the existing circumstances. The civilians living in shelters had no sanitary facilities, but thus far Little Quemoy had been spared an epidemic.

A spokesman for the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command disclosed on 30 September that the United States was planning to turn over 16 C-119 cargo aircraft and several LSD's (Landing Ships, Dock) to enable them to pierce the Communist blockade of Quemoy with greater success. The C-46's heretofore used for air drops had a capacity of 2-1/2 tons, while the C-119 Flying Boxcars could carry

five tons, besides which they were much better designed for such work. Thus, they could in one trip drop almost one-fourth of the 350-tons of supplies needed by Quemoy for one day's operation. The LSD's would possess an even greater advantage over the LST's which they were replacing, inasmuch as they could carry six times as much cargo, and were designed with a center section, or "well deck" which could be flooded to permit small amphibious craft to shoot out from the bowels of the ship for a rapid run to the beach.

The Government of Nationalist China received a heavy blow on the political front on 1 October, when President Eisenhower told a news conference that the islands of Quemoy and Matsu were not vital to the defense of Taiwan and that, as a soldier, he did not consider it a good thing to keep large forces on these offshore islands. However, in response to a question, the President admitted that he did not know whether demilitarizing these islands would offer a solution on which everyone concerned would agree. His remarks were prompted by reaction to a statement made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles three days earlier that "it was not wise or prudent" of Chiang to keep too many troops on the exposed islands if a dependable cease-fire could be arranged. Chiang Kai-shek had countered indirectly, in an interview with an AP correspondent, that he was opposed to a reduction of his armed forces on the offshore islands or to any change in their status. When a newsman at the President's press conference asked if Dulles' remarks were indicative of a strong modification of American policy which would amount to appeasement, Eisenhower replied with some acerbity that he "would not say that at all." Nevertheless, he declared emphatically that he believed an opportunity would be created for negotiating a taiwan settlement in good faith, if the U.S. could arrange a

cease-fire in the Quemoy-Matsu area.

The Red blockade of Quemoy tightened its grip unexpectedly on 3 October when four MIG-17's suddenly swooped in at low altitude to attack a C-46 making an air drop on the island fortress. The F-86F fighters flying high altitude cover for the low-flying transports were unable to descend to the attackers' level before the latter fled to safety, leaving the damaged C-46 to limp into a landing on Quemoy with two wounded crewmen.

With this development it looked as though the war was approaching a "no holds barred" phase, when the Communists, displaying their uncanny knack for doing the unexpected, illogically offered a cease-fire for one week in the Quemoy area. During this week the Nationalists would be free to bring in unlimited quantities of supplies to the offshore islands, said the Red Defense Ministry, "on condition there be no American escort." The Nationalists answered this curious offer by announcing that they were not rejecting it, but that they did intend to ignore it. Furthermore, they did not intend to allow the enemy to tell them how to fight their"war of resistance", nor would they withdraw their standing request for U.S. escorts for supply convoys to Quemoy.

Several hours after the Red announcement of a cease-fire at midnight on October 5th, a huge Nationalist convoy escorted by warships of the Seventh Fleet steamed unmolestedly into the waters of the besieged island and discharged its sorely-needed cargo. This convoy, incidentally, had been enroute from Taiwan long before the Peiping cease-fire announcement.

On 9 October American ships stopped escorting the Nationalist convoys as the cease-fire entered its fourth day, and the situation appeared to have resolved itself into one wherein the Communists could have peace in the

straits if they wanted it, the Nationalists having made it clear that they would not start shooting unless the Reds did so first. This abandonment of U.S. escort also indicated that the Communists had made some progress in their putative goal--if ever so slight--of driving a wedge between the United States and the Chinese Nationalists by refraining from interference with the latter's convoys.

The lull was broken, in the air, at least, on 10 October, when 20 MIG's from the mainland attempted to encircle six F-86F's on patrol southeast of Matsu. In the engagement which followed, four MIG-17's were shot down and a fifth MIG-17 and a Sabrejet were both lost when they collided at top speed.

At the time the Reds halted their bombardment, they had fired a total of 474,908 rounds against Quemoy, according to the Nationalist count, in the 44 days since the offshore island war erupted on 23 August. Now, with the seven-day truce nearing its end, the Reds could be seen busily engaged in constructing new batteries in the coastal areas and on the islands encircling Quemoy, as well as Matsu. In addition, they were replacing gun barrels eroded by constant use during the shelling or hit by Chinat counterfire. For their part, the Nationalists seized the opportunity to evacuate an estimated 6,000 civilians from Quemoy to Taiwan, to pour ammunition, oil, barbed wire, food, blankets, and other stores into the island, and to replace the few guns which had been knocked out by the Communist connonade, as well as introduce new ones of heavier caliber.

On 13 October the Chinese Communist Government announced that it was extending the cease-fire for two more weeks. No matter how much the Reds might protest that they were withholding further bombardment for purely

humanitarian reasons, commented the New York Herald Tribune, the real explanation was to be found in "the back-pedaling of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev after his initial threats to the United States" and the "renewed emphasis by both Red Chinese and Soviet officials that this is, as Marshal Peng Teh-Huai told the Nationalists, 'an internal matter between you and us, not a matter between China and the United States,'" thus demonstrating that another movement in Red strategy was involved. "The Soviet Union," said the Herald Tribune, "apparently hopes to disengage itself from the extremely risky position that insistence on continued attacks on the islands would involve. At the same time, the Reds of both Moscow and Peiping are trying to drive wedges between Nationalist China and the United States."

When the cease-fire extension had lasted only half the announced fortnight, the Communists opened fire on 20 October to the accompaniment of a proclamation that the order suspending bombardment of Quemoy was herewith rescinded, as a result of American warships' having escorted convoys into the Quemoy area on the night of the 19th. Despite the fact that the Reds had graciously suspended shelling two different times, the Taiwan authorities had shown no repentance and had "persisted in their obstinate attitude, refused to hold peace talks, stepped up war preparations, and loudly clamored for an attack on the mainland."

That the Communists were merely seeking an excuse for resuming the bombardment was revealed when Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy told a news conference in Saigon, South Viet Nam, that U.S. naval vessels had not

escorted Nationalist supply ships as charged, and this justification for the Reds' breaking their own cease-fire was "just dreamed up." In amplification of this refutation, Washington noted that American warships had even been keeping outside the 12-mile limit to avoid the possibility of stirring up trouble.

October 23d was an important day for the free world, as President Chiang Kai-shek culminated three days of talks with Secretary of State Dulles with an announcement in a joint communique that the Nationalist Government was renouncing the use of force as the principal means of returning to the Chinese mainland. Such a return remained his "sacred mission", but "the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and the hearts of the Chinese people." The principal means of successfully achieving that mission, then, was through nationalism, democracy, and social well-being, "and not the use of force." The communique also went a step closer toward an American commitment to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands, although it did not say so outright. The statement announced that the United States and the Nationalist regime "recognized that under present conditions the defense of the Quemoys together with the Matsus is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu (the Pescadores) in the Formosa Strait."

This was interpreted as a new warning that any Communist attempt to take the offshore islands might provoke U.S. intervention. The communique observed that the renewed Red bombardment of Quemoy and the Communist propaganda campaign aimed at dividing the United States and Nationalist China had had the opposite effect of drawing the two allies more closely together. Another paragraph stated that "It is hoped and believed that the Communists,

faced by the proven unity, resolution, and strength of the government of the United States and Nationalist Governments, will not put their policy to the test of general war and that they will abandon the military steps they have already taken to initiate their futile and dangerous policy."

THE STRAITS CRISIS TAPERS OFF INTO RELATIVE CALM

Shortly before midnight on 25 October, the Communist Defense Minister announced that the Reds were going to adopt a policy of suspending firing on the beach and wharf areas of Quemoy, as well as the airstrip and shipping, on even-numbered dates, and that they would not necessarily fire on the odd-numbered dates. Whether this was meant to imply that other sections of the islands would be shelled on the even-numbered days was not made clear. Since the day immediately following the announcement was an even-numbered date, there was some doubt as to whether or not it would be exempt from fire. The Communists supplied an answer to this question by opening fire at 0900, but considerately confined their targets to non-military portions of the Quemoys.

As the Reds continued to limit their bombardment of military targets to odd-numbered days, the U.S. Navy responded to the tension-easing overtures of the Communists by halting the movement of destroyers of the Taiwan Straits Patrol inside the 12-mile coastal waters claimed as the territorial limits of the Chinese mainland. Thus, the Red Government could claim to have won a moral victory, at least, as the United States Navy was thus tacitly acknowledging the Communist definition of offshore national sovereignty.

The chief Nationalist military spokesman, Rear Admiral Liu Hoh-tu, said that he now viewed the Communist shelling as a nuisance bombardment whose only

purpose was to save face, "because the Communists have known since the second week of their offensive that their chance to invade Quemoy was gone." At the time the Reds originally launched their artillery offensive on 23 August, they had expected neither a strong Nationalist Chinese defense nor a firm American stand. Made quickly aware of a grave miscalculation on both scores, they had first attempted to frighten the enemy with a greater show of belligerence; then, this failing, had sought to split the allies by political maneuver. When this proved equally unsuccessful, the Communists became now interested only in effecting a graceful, if temporary, retreat, without allowing the direction in which they were moving to become too obvious.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles commented that the Communist Chinese appeared to be "trying to save themselves from a loss of face and a defeat in the effort which they initiated but had been unable to conclude successfully. . . . It seems as though, at least for the moment, they do not want to raise up the level of their military effort. . ."

As of 30 October, according to an announcement made by the Nationalist Defense Ministry, 99 civilians had been killed on the Quemoys, 96 seriously wounded, and 156 slightly wounded since the Communists launched their offensive on 23 August. The shelling had destroyed 2,682 buildings and damaged 2,489 others.

Just as the every-other-day war in the Taiwan Straits with its Alice in Wonderland overtones was trailing off into oblivion, the Communists announced on 11 November through the powerful loudspeakers they had set up on Amoy Island that they were no longer going to refrain from bombarding the supply landing areas on Quemoy on even-numbered days.

Why the Reds issued this ominous warning is hard to understand in the light of subsequent events, for they did not fire a shot against any part of the Quemoy complex for 11 even-numbered days in a row, and the weight of the bombardment on the odd-numbered days was consistently light by comparison with that of the early days of the "vest pocket war".

With the struggle in the straits reduced to something more closely resembling comic opera than global conflict, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the special measures taken to muzzle the Red dogs of war could be relaxed. In consonance with this decision, the units of the Composite Air Strike Force quietly began moving out of Kadena in December, and by Christmas all of the personnel were presumably back home enjoying the day with their families.

One of the final notes of the Taiwan cantata, insofar as it concerned the 313th Air Division, came on 19 January 1959, when the vanguard of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's F-86D aircraft and personnel returned to Naha from their long sojourn on Formosa. By the end of that week, the balance of the 195 officers and airmen and more than 308,000 pounds of equipment which had been dispatched to Taiwan on such short notice the previous August were back on Okinawa, the pilots marking time until the promised F-102 super-sonic interceptors arrived to replace the faithful but obsolescent Sabres which had served so long.[31]

THE 5TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP PROVIDES A POST SCRIPT TO THE TAIWAN CHRONICLE

At approximately 1000I hours on 26 August 1958, Captain Paul R. Maradik, Assistant Operations Officer for Plans for the 5th Communications Group at

Kadena Air Base, received a telephone call from Lieutenant Colonel T. K. Jennings, Chief of the Telecommunications Systems Division, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, warning the group to be ready for a possible deployment within the next few hours. In course of the conversation Colonel Jennings inquired why the 5th Communications Group had not submitted its airlift requirements in compliance with instructions contained in "the message" of the previous night. Captain Maradik assumed that the colonel was referring to OPLAN 33-58. Upon being told that his assumption was correct, Maradik requested an estimate of the amount of materiel which was to be airlifted. Jennings answered that it should run around 97,783 pounds and 11,000 cubic feet of materiel for each communications task force (CTF), but he would either confirm or correct these figures by TWX as soon as possible. He also informed Maradik that two C-124 aircraft of the 315th Air Division should be sitting somewhere on the Kadena Airfield at that very moment waiting to transport the equipment and personnel of the 5th Communications Group to their destination. The latter organization should locate these aircraft and get in contact with the mission commander at once.

As soon as the telephone conversation had ended, Captain Maradik directed the 608th Communications Squadron to make up CTF's One and Two in accordance with Fifth Air Force OPLAN 33-58. As the first step, the C-124's were located and identified, and their crews were directed to stand by for further instructions while the 5th Commgru was waiting for enlightenment from "the message" mentioned by Colonel Jennings. This done, group officials computed the amount of airlift needed for the two task forces and transmitted this information to the Fuchu headquarters.[32]

Around 1350I that same day. Lieutenant Colonel Marion R. Graham,

Commander of the 5th Communications Group, received an OIC message from Colonel Jennings identifying the PACAF radiogram as PFOAC-P-447, but making no mention of its specific contents. Ten minutes later, Colonel Graham received a telephone call from Colonel Jennings concerning the deployment. The latter wished to correct the earlier data he had furnished pertaining to the weight and volume of the airlift which the two task forces would require. Both CTF One and CTF Two would actually need 116,076 pounds and 11,141 cubic feet each. Unfortunately, this was one of the few hard facts which were conveyed, since considerations of security in connection with classified information forbade many subjects' being discussed except in vague terms, and both parties had to spice their conversation with numerous blanks which the listener could supposedly fill in from his own knowledge of the subject. Although this method of communicating ideas could obviously result in misunderstandings on both sides, each officer eventually realized that he was discussing a different project from the other. Colonel Graham was referring to Fifth Air Force OPLAN 33-58, while Colonel Jennings had in mind the project outlined in PACAF message PFOAC-P-447. This TWX not being available to the 5th Communications Group, Colonel Graham requested that a copy be forwarded at once.

In the meantime, the Operations Officer for the 5th Communications Group, aware that the task forces of the 608th Communications Squadron were already formed and standing by for further directions, continued to press the Kadena Communications Center for the missing PACAF message. Information had also been received that two C-130 cargo aircraft were being made available to the 5th Commgru to airlift the personnel and materiel involved in

the mysterious deployment to no one knew where.

At 1800I, the Operations Officer, by now despairing of any imminent enlightenment on the destination of the CTF's in the next few hours and realizing that the aircrews were decidedly weary of standing-by on the flight line, gave the 315th Air Division mission commander a briefing on the situation as it then stood, and advised that the crews find quarters for the night, thereafter reporting periodically to the 5th Commgru Command Post as to where they could be contacted if the need arose.

At approximately 1900I, still on the 26th, Lieutenant Colonel Graham received a radphone call from Lieutenant Colonel Garrett of the 315th Air Division concerning utilization of the aircraft made available for the 5th Communications Group deployment. At about the same time, 315th Air Division message 315-C-O-CC-715-C was delivered to the 5th Commgru Commander by the Kadena Communications Center. This TWX gave Colonel Graham and other officials of the group their first knowledge of the specific destinations of the two communications task forces, as well as the information that Fifth Air Force OPLAN 25-58 was the one which they were to implement. The latter intelligence meant that the airlift requirements would have to be revised, since OPLAN 33-58 had been the guide followed up to now. Even so, the group could take no action, however, until the missing PACAF message was received, since the 315th Air Division exercised no control over 5th Commgru and its message was only informative in nature.

At the instigation of the 5th Commgru, the Kadena Communications Center initiated tracer action on the missing PACAF message in the form of an OIC dispatch to the Fuchu Communications Center around 1900I, 26 August. The

two 5th Commgru operations officers who were riding herd on this problem waited four hours, then requested and obtained OIC-to-OIC service between the Kadena and Fuchu Communications Centers. The problem of the missing TWX was thereupon presented to the Fuchu Communications Center supervisor, who acknowledged receipt, indicating that cooperation was going to be given at last in locating the vital message.

While the Kadena people were standing by, AIA in Fuchu broke into the network with a series of test tapes on the 5X5 circuit. The Kadena people made a number of determined attempts to break in, but the AIA blithely continued to test away, ignoring all their efforts. As soon as the tests were terminated, Kadena again queried the Fuchu Communications Center about the missing message, only to be informed that a change in shifts had taken place during the interim. The new supervisor proved to be completely uninformed about the TWX so badly needed by the 5th Communications Group, indicating that his predecessor had not taken the trouble to brief him properly. As a result of this negligence it now became necessary to initiate tracer action all over again, causing much valuable time to be lost in the process.

When it began to appear that the personnel on duty in the Fuchu Communications Center were not bestirring themselves to find the mislaid TWX, Colonel Graham himself got on the phone, and, notwithstanding the lateness of the hour (around 00301, 27 August), called the Commander of the 1st Communications Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, at Fuchu Air Station. In all probability because of this strong action, the Fuchu Communications Center supervisor finally advised Kadena around 01151 on the 27th that he had located PACAF message PFOAC-P-447 and would transmit it as soon as the

tape could be cut." (It is assumed that he was not referring to "red tape"). Some 15 minutes later, the message had been transmitted, delivered, and receipted for by the 5th Communications Group. Although it turned out that the 5th Commgru was an information addressee only, rather than an action addressee, Colonel Graham directed his people to proceed with preparation of the two CTF's, in view of the long delay and the fact that the aircraft crews were standing by for deployment orders.

Now that the correct requirements were known, it became necessary to reorganize the equipment and personnel which had been designated for deployment with the two task forces. This done, manifests were submitted to Detachment 56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron. The first aircraft, a C-124 took off for Clark AB at 0429I on 27 August, to be followed at 0645I by a C-130. Several hours went by; then at 1134I the first C-130 was airborne for Chia-Yi AB, Taiwan. A C-124 took off for Chia-Yi at 1147I; a C-130 (the same plane which had gone to Clark AB earlier in the day) followed at 1648I; and the last one (the same C-124 which had made the initial flight to Clark) left Kadena for Chia-Yi at 0830I, 28 August.[33] This aircraft brought the total of personnel and equipment deployed to Chia-Yi and Clark AB to 232,052 pounds.

For some time now a suspicion had been growing in the 5th Communications Group that Fifth Air Force Headquarters was suffering from an advanced case of confusion--and Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters gave some evidence of being similarly infected. This suspicion was confirmed when a telephone call was received from Fifth Air Force on the 27th requesting information concerning the status of the communications task force earmarked for Clark AB.

From the ensuing conversation, officials of the 5th Commgru now learned that it had been unnecessary to deploy this CTF to Clark AB at all, notwithstanding the provisions of Fifth Air Force and Thirteenth Air Force Contingency Plan 25-58.

In an effort to define additional emergency communications requirements in Taiwan more clearly, a 5th Communications Group representative met with the Thirteenth Air Task Force (Provisional) Communications and Electronics staff at Taipei from September 11th through the 18th. In these conferences tentative plans were discussed on the assumption that emergency communications requirements were known and that all remaining 5th Communications Group capabilities outlined in that organization's General Emergency Operating Plan (GEOP) 1-57, dated 5 February 1958, which the 13th ATF (P) was now requesting, were actually needed by the latter.

However, the 5th Communications Group liaison officer, who had been deployed to Headquarters, ATF 13 (P) expressly to coordinate 5th Commgru matters, later learned that war capability communications plans were practically non-existent, being only in the incubation stage at this time. Also although the liaison officer's principal duty was supposedly that of coordinating 5th Communications Group communications matters, ATF 13 (P) utilized him to assist in the preparation of ATF 13 (P) Emergency Communications and Electronics Plan. Such a diversion of his time and skills was contrary to the concepts previously developed by Fifth Air Force and 5th Commgru GEOP 1-57, which prescribed that area emergency plans based on communications requirements must be developed and well laid out prior to the arrival of 5th Communications Group CTF's whose purpose was to provide the necessary communications.

As an indication of the extent to which the crisis in the Taiwan Straits affected the 5th Communications Group, at one time each of the component

squadrons had only one officer on hand at Kadena, the others all being absent with the TDY personnel on Taiwan. Because of the rapid build-up required to cope with the emergency, military personnel with essential AFSC's were involuntarily extended for as much as 90 days.[34]

On 24 September the 5th Communications Group was attached to Thirteenth Air Force for operational control in a realistic recognition of the proportion of the group's over-all effort being devoted to the work on Taiwan.[35]

The confusion at Fifth Air Force which had permitted a task force to be sent to Clark Air Base by mistake did not end with this incident at the very onset of the Taiwan crisis, but continued to affect operations of the 5th Communications Group for weeks to come. On two different occasions in the past--2 May 1957 and 14 October of the same year--foresighted officers of the 5th Communications Group had sought permission of the Fuchu headquarters to conduct site surveys or coordination visits to Taiwan for the purpose of obtaining specific information concerning the situation and problems which could be anticipated if a deployment were made under Fifth Air Force CEOP 1-57. Both times the request had been turned down. Now the consequences of this short-sightedness of the higher headquarters manifested themselves in the loss of much valuable time and motion--a situation which could have been prevented by the preparation of basic plans beforehand.[36]

One of the consequences of this failure was a poor utilization of manpower and equipment. For approximately seven days after their arrival, the 160 personnel and 217,204 tons of equipment which by October had been airlifted to Taiwan and distributed at various locations ranging from Pingtong to Shimen remained idle. Every day the concepts of operation and the

VHF/FM down-island circuitry requirements seemed to change, while the 5th Commgru representative was referred from one staff agency to another as he sought to establish sound communications requirements.

On 9 October, using past experience and current coordination with Chinese military officials for site properties as a basis for procedure, the 5th Communications Group officer representative with 13th ATF (P) directed the installation of the USAF down-island UHF/FM multi-channel system in order to utilize idle manpower and equipment. Basically, the system was intended to be only an interim means of providing the 10 required voice channels, but it eventually resolved into a semi-permanent installation providing approximately 40 voice and eight teletype circuits.

As we have seen above, the Chinese Communists relaxed the pressure of their blockade and bombardment conspicuously in October, making it possible in December to commence returning to the ZI those people whose overseas tours had been extended involuntarily. Every effort was bent toward getting them home in time for Christmas.[37]

There were still some men who had to remain on Taiwan into the new year, however. Of these unfortunates, the last 24 personnel of the 608th Communications Squadron at Chia-Yi AB returned to Okinawa on 20 March 1959, to be followed the next day by the same number of people from Taoyuan AB. Even then, more than two months elapsed before the last 86 personnel of the 2d Radio Relay Squadron returned to Kadena from scattered points on Taiwan on 31 May 1959. With their exodus the redeployment to home bases was completed.[38]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	8	PACAF Reg. No. 55-43, sub.: Operations: War Emergency Alert Procedures, dtd. 8 May 1958.
2	--	3130C-P C-7-39, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to 623d AC&W Sq., Attn.: COD, 15 July 1958.
3	6	Daily Staff Journal (DJ), Director of Operations (D/O), Hq., 313th Air Div., 5 Aug. 1958.
4	6	Ibid., 11 Aug. 1958.
5	6 --	Ibid., 20 Aug. 1958; History, 623d AC&W Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, p. 17.
6	--	Quoted by the Okinawa Morning Star, 25 Aug. 1958, in AP article datelined Taipei, Formosa, 24 Aug. 1958.
7	--	Okinawa Morning Star, 26 Aug. 1958, carrying AP news story datelined Taipei, Formosa, 25 Aug. 1958.
8	--	5FOOT-TOC 1736, Comdr. 5th AF to Hq. 313th Air Div., 25/0800Z Aug. 1958.
9	--	TWX, 5AF to 313AD, 26/0924Z Aug. 1958.
10	8	PACAF Reg. No. 55-43, sub.: Operations: War Emergency Alert Procedures, dtd. 8 May 1958.
11	--	TWX, Comdr. 5AF to 313AD, 26/2030Z Aug. 1958.
12	--	3130C-I C-8-104, Hq. 313th Air Div. to 623d AC&W Sq., 27 Aug. 1958.
13	--	623d AC&W Sq. OPLAN 101-58: Aircraft Dispersal Plan, 28 Aug. 1958.
14	--	History, 623d AC&W Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 18-19.
15	--	History, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW), 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 14-15.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
16	-- 9	Ibid., pp. 18-19; 6431KMC 522698, Comdr. 6431st ABG to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 03/1410Z Sept. 1958.
17	10	313MC C-9-55, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/2305Z Sept. 1958.
18	--	History, 51st FIW. 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 14-15, 18-19, 22-23.
19	--	History, 623d AC&W Sq., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 20-21.
20	11 --	DJ, Director of Materiel (D/M), Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 Aug., 6 Aug., 27 Aug. 1958; History, D/O, July 1958, pp. 3-4.
21	12	Ltr., Hq. 6313th Air Base Wing to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Minutes of Meeting, 5 Sept. 1958.
22	13	Notes of OPLAN 25-58 Meeting of 7 Sept. 1958, taken by Capt. Arthur D. Reddrick, Logistic Plans Officer, D/M. Hq., 313th Air Div.
23	3	313th AD GO 33, dtd. 13 Oct. 1958.
24	--	Daily Bulletin No. 185, Kadena AB, dtd. 25 Sept. 1958.
25	6	DJ, D/O, 16 Sept. 1958.
26	6	Ibid., 1 Oct. 1958.
27	6	Ibid., 5 Nov. 1958; History, D/O, Oct. 1958, p. 6.
28	--	History, D/O, Dec. 1958, p. 5.
29	--	News Story, "Jet Warplanes Join US Formosa Forces," Okinawa Morning Star, 12 Sept. 1958.
30	--	News Story, "Amphibious Tractors Get Thru at Quemoy," Okinawa Morning Star, 27 Sept. 1958.
31	--	313th Air Division Skyblazer, 23 Jan. 1959.
32	14	Ltr., Hq. 5th Communications Gp. to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Narrative Report on the Deployment of 5th Communications Group Units to Chia-Yi, Taiwan and Clark AB, Philippines, 5 Sept. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
33	14	Ibid.
34	--	History, 5th Comm. Gp., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, pp. 2, 6, 7.
35	2	PACAF GO 64, dtd. 25 Sept. 1958.
36	--	History, 5th Comm. Gp., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958, p. 5.
37	--	Ibid., pp. 6-7.
38	--	Data obtained by Command Historian by study of 5th Commgru Status Board located at Group Operations Office, 11 Aug. 1959.
--	15	5FCIS83450, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 22/0735Z Aug. 1958.
--	16	PFICS-P13023, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 30/0600Z Aug. 1958.
--	17	313IS C-8-122, 313th Air Div. Information Services to CINCPACAF Information Services, 31/1715Z Aug. 1958.
--	18	OPP-W 115047, Comdr. 12th AF to Comdr. 13AF Command Element Prov. Kadena, et al., 17/1135Z Nov. 1958.
--	19	13OTO 14059, Comdr. 13th AF to Comdr. 5th AF, Oct. 1958.
--	20	5FOOT-P 103701, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 13th AF, 24/0805Z Oct. 1958.
--	21	CERPO 001015, Comdr. 13 AF Command Element Ryukyus (Prov), Kadena AB, to Comdr. 13th AF, 28/1234Z Oct. 1958.
--	22	OC-P 58-15949, Comdr. 67th Tac. Recon. Wg. to Comdr. 13AF Command Element Ryukyus, et al., 30/0645Z Oct. 1958.
--	23	13MLP 14166, Comdr. 13th AF to CINCPACAF, 30/0847Z Oct. 1958.
--	24	CERPO 001060, Comdr. 13 AF Command Element Ryukyus (Prov), Kadena AB, to Comdr. 67th Tac. Recon. Wg., 31/0245Z Oct. 1958.
--	25	OC-WOC-58-16026, Comdr. 67th Tac. Recon. Wg. to Comdr. 13th AF Command Element Ryukyus, 31/0320Z Oct. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
--	26	13MLP 14217, Comdr. 13th AF to Comdr. 13th AF Command Element Ryukyus (Prov.), Kadena AB, 03/0250Z Nov. 1958.
--	27	313MC C-11-8, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 07/2300Z Nov. 1958.
--	28	CERPO 001207, 13th AF Command Element Ryukyus (Prov), Kadena AB, 14/0845Z Nov. 1958.
--	29	313MC-S C-11-19, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 15th Tac. Recon. Sq., 11/0107Z Nov. 1958.
--	30	5FMLP-W 11-0427, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 17/0730Z Nov. 1958.
--	31	130DO 13391, Comdr. 13th AF to Comdr. 6200th ABW, 19/0946Z Sept. 1958.
--	32	Draft of news story prepared by the Office of Information Services, 313th Air Div., but never released.
--	33	DJ, Director of Personnel, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958.
--	34	DJ, Office of Installations, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958.
--	35	DJ, Office of Procurement, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958.
--	36	Ltr., 623d AC&W Sq. to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Evaluation of AN/FPS-6 for Search, 2 Oct. 1957.
--	37	Ltr., MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, to Hq. 313th Air Div., sub.: AN/FPS-3 Radalarm X-5, 8 Oct. 1957.
--	38	Ltr., Det. #1, 624th AC&W Sq. to Comdr. 624th AC&W Sq., sub.: Search Operations with AN/FPS-6 Height Finder Radar, 5 Oct. 1957.
--	39	Ltr., Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: AN/FPS-6 High Altitude Evaluation, 7 Nov. 1957.
--	40	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Early Warning Radar, 3 Dec. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
--	41	5FOAC-E-R 123935L, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. Rome AFD, 30/0830Z Dec. 1957.
--	42	MRF-5, Comdr. Rome AFD to Comdr. 5th AF, 03/1930Z Jan. 1958.
--	43	5FOOP-D-P 50052, Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 04/0035Z Jan. 1957.
--	44	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to District Engineer, OKED, sub.: Need for More Stringent Specifications and Inspection Procedures, Permanent Base Construction, 1 Apr. 1953.
--	45	Ltr., Hq. FEAF to CG, 20th AF, sub.: Rebuilding as Contrasted to Rehabilitation, 4 Feb. 1953.
--	46	313OC-E 3065-M, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 02/0530Z Dec. 1956.
--	47	Ltr., Office of the Globecom Liaison Officer, 1962d AACS Sq. to Comdr. AACS, sub.: Globecom Contractual Installation and Construction Progress and Status Report, 13 Dec. 1955.
--	48	Memo., Chief, Intelligence Div., Hq., 313th Air Div. to D/O, sub.: Civil Defense Plan for Indigenous and Other Non-Military Workers on 313th AD Bases and Installations, 21 July 1955.
--	49	Ltr., Hq. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, 15 Apr. 1957.
--	50	DX 13343 DO/COMM, Comdr. 20th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 16/1100I Nov. 1953.
--	51	Ltr., Hq. 529th AC&W Gp. to Comdr. 6351st ABW, sub.: AN/GPX-12 Interrogator Responder, 26 Oct. 1953.
--	52	Ltr., Hq. 20th AF to Comdr. 6351st ABW, sub.: Modification of AN/GPX-11 Interrogator-Responder for Use with AN/CPS-1.
--	53	FFOAC-E-A 8523, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/0442Z Nov. 1956.
--	54	5FFOP-D-A 26612, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 02/0047Z 1956.

APPENDIX 1

KEY STAFF POSITIONS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1958

HEADQUARTERS, 313th AIR DIVISION

POSITION	NAME
Commander	Brigadier General Dale O. Smith (1 July - 14 August)
	Colonel Wallace C. Barrett (14 August - 24 October)
	Brigadier General Dale O. Smith (24 October - 31 December)
Deputy Commander	Colonel Wallace C. Barrett (1 July - 14 August),
	Colonel Robert F. Hardy (14 August - 24 October)
	Colonel Wallace C. Barrett (24 October - 31 December)
Executive Officer	Colonel Elmer H. Nelson (1 July - 31 December)
Protocol Officer	Major Lawrence A. Starr (Additional Duty) (1 July - 31 December)
Aide de Camp	1st Lieutenant Judson C. Faurer (1 July - 8 December)
	1st Lieutenant Hugh M. Milton, III (8 December - 31 December)
Special Assistant to the Commander	Captain Bertram R. Wilson (26 November - 31 December)

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Inspector General	Colonel Robert F. Hardy (1 July - 14 August)

Position	Name
Inspector General	Lieut. Colonel Forrester M. Smith (14 August - 24 October)
	Colonel Robert F. Hardy (24 October - 31 December)
Provost Marshal	Lieut. Colonel Carl C. Conant* (Ad'l.Duty) (1 July - 31 December)
Director of Inspections	Lieut. Colonel Forrester M. Smith, Jr. (1 July - 14 August)
	Major Uriel J. Davis (14 August - 10 October)
	Major Norman W. Breit (10 October - 24 October)
	Lieut. Colonel Forrester M. Smith, Jr. (24 October - 31 December)
Maintenance Inspector	Major George O. McMahan (1 July - 31 December)
Supply Inspector	Major Walter R. Wick (1 July - 31 December)
Communications and Electronics Inspector	Major Uriel J. Davis (1 July - 28 August)
	Major Norman W. Breit (28 August - 31 December)
Personnel and Administrative Inspector	Major Thomas F. Steele (1 July - 4 July)
	Major Howard F. Smart (4 July - 31 December)
JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION	
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel John A. McLaughlin (1 July - 1 November)

*Assigned primary duty as Commander, 6313th Air Police Squadron.

Position	Name
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel Elmer P. Fizer (1 November - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INFORMATION SERVICES	
Information Services Officer	Major John J. O'Brien (1 July - 10 September)
	Lieut. Colonel Bernard Peters (10 September - 31 December)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
OIC, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa	Captain Frederick Forte (1 August - 31 December)
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES	
Chief of Administrative Services	Major Lawrence A. Starr (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services	Captain Bertram R. Wilson (28 August - 26 November)
	Vacant (26 November - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel Spencer A. O'Brian* (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN	
Staff Chaplain	Lieut. Colonel George J. Cameron (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	
Assistant for Safety	Major Ralph E. Hinckley (1 July - 31 December)

*Additional duty assignment. Regular assignment: Commander, 18th Tactical Hospital

Position	Name
OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER	
Staff Comptroller	Lieut. Colonel Richard D. Kiick* (1 July - 31 December)
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE	
Director of Operations	Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston (1 July - 26 July)
	Colonel William C. Adams (26 July - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieut.Colonel Earl H.Singleton (Ad'l.Dy.) (1 July - 2 September)
	Lieut. Colonel Alden L. Van Buskirk (2 September - 31 December)
Chief, Plans and Programs Division	Major Joe N. Swanger (1 July - 23 July)
	Lieut. Colonel James O. Tyler (23 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans Branch	Major Ralph D. Terpening (1 July - 7 December)
	Major Harrold L. Holtmann (7 December - 31 December)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Lieut. Colonel Earl H. Singleton (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Defense Systems Operations Branch	Major Russell E. Oakes** (1 July - 8 December)
Weapons Controller	Captain Eugene T. Malhiot (1 September - 31 December)

*Additional duty assignment. Regular assignment: Comptroller, 6313th Air Base Wing.

**Defense Operations Branch transferred to Combat Operations Division at Naha AB effective 8 December 1958.

Position	Name
Air Traffic Control Staff Officer	Major John F. Cercek (26 August - 31 December)
Special Assistant for Operations Analysis	Mr. Jerry Goodman (Civilian) (1 July - 1 August)
Chief, Operations Services Branch	Captain Thomas O. Batey (1 July - 23 July)
	Major Joe N. Swanger (23 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Division	Lieut. Colonel William Y. Brown (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Systems Branch	Major Ernest L. Watts (1 July - 31 December)
Ground Electronics Officer	Major John Holoviak, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Communications Officer	Captain Walter A. Proft (1 July - 31 December)
Electronics Engineer	Mr. Jerry Goodman (Civilian) (1 August - 31 December)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Major James P. Smith (1 July - 31 December)
OIC, Kadena Target Intelligence Center	1st Lieutenant John E. Cochrane (1 July - 1 September)
	Vacant (1 September - 24 September)
	Captain William M. Holly (24 September - 31 December)
Chief, Operational Intelligence Branch	1st Lieutenant Chester A. Barchiesi (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Lieut. Colonel John E. Laybourn (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Organization and Planning Branch	1st Lieutenant Billy J. Kittrell (29 October - 31 December)

Position	Name
Management Engineering Officer	Major Loren W. Mills (1 July - 31 December)
MATERIEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Materiel	Lieut. Colonel John T. Snyder (1 July - 8 August)
	Lieut. Colonel Joseph D.Morgan,Jr.(Actg.) (8 August - 19 August)
	Colonel Francis T. Brady (19 August - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Materiel	Lieut. Colonel Joseph D. Morgan, Jr. (1 July - 12 September)
	Major James T. Huckabay (12 September - 31 December)
Chief, Plans and Programs Division	Captain Arthur D. Reddrick (1 July - 12 September)
Chief, Plans and Logistics Division	Lieut. Colonel Joseph D. Morgan, Jr. (12 September - 31 December)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Vacant (1 July - 9 September)
	Major Burl K. Bush (9 September - 31 December)
Supply Officer	Captain Ronald S. Mikesell (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major James T. Huckabay (1 July - 12 September)
	Lieut. Colonel Lawrence S. Fulwider (12 September - 31 December)
Aircraft Maintenance Officer	Captain Barton W. MacNeill (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Transportation Division	Major Richard J. Gordon* (1 July - 31 December)

*Additional duty assignment. Regular assignment: Commander, 6313th Transportation Squadron.

Position	Name
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus and POL Officer	Captain Cyrus B. Gittings (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT	
Procurement Officer	Captain Joseph Fischle (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Contract Division	1st Lieutenant Arden B. Engebretsen (1 July - 1 August)
	1st Lieutenant Francis A. Seymour (1 August - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INSTALLATIONS	
Installations Officer	Lieut. Colonel William W. Robertson (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Installations Officer and Chief, Engineering Branch	Mr. Lloyd J. Heilmann (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Real Property and Programs Branch	Mr. James L. Mason (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Facilities Support Branch	Mr. Marion W. York (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Administrative and Damage Control Section	2d Lieutenant Russell J. Tagliareni (1 July - 31 December)
PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Personnel	Colonel William R. Farnell, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Kathleen McClure (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Officers' Division	CWO Wofford C. Taylor (1 July - 31 December)

Position	Name
Chief, Warrant Officers' and Airmen's Division	Major Burr S. Watters, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Training and Utilization Division	Captain Edward W. Lynch (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Personnel Services Division	Major Alvin E. Reilly (1 July - 31 December)
Staff Exchange Officer*	Lieut. Colonel Charles P. Downer (1 July - 18 August)
	Vacant (18 August - 17 September)
	Lieut. Colonel Samuel H. Pinder (17 September - 31 December)
Civilian Personnel Officer	Mr. Wallace E. Walker (Civilian)** (1 July - 31 December)

OSI DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 6001ST SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SQUADRON (IG) PACAF

Commander, OSI District Office #43	Lieut. Colonel Lewis J. Kolb (1 July - 31 December)

DETACHMENT NO. 2, HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

Detachment No. 2 Headquarters, 313th Air Division Commander	Major Wesley E. Britting (1 July - 31 December)

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel Robert C. Orth (1 July - 5 July)
	Colonel William S. Chairsell (5 July - 14 August)

*This function was transferred to the Materiel Directorate effective 1 Nov. 1958.

**Additional duty assignment. Regular assignment: Central Civilian Personnel Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

Position	Name
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel Gust Askounis (14 August - 23 August)
	Colonel Francis R. Royal (23 August - 31 December)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel William S. Chairsell (1 July - 5 July)
	Lieut. Colonel De Witt R. Searles (5 July - 25 August)
	Colonel Gust Askounis (25 August - 31 December)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Allen D. Read (1 July - 31 December)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Philip A. Watson, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
6318th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major George H. Spaulding (1 July - 1 October)
	Lieut. Colonel David H. Murray (1 October - 31 December)
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Joe T. Wilkerson (1 July - 10 August)
	Major Warren D. Curton (10 August - 31 December)
44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Major James B. Richards, Jr. (1 July - 25 November)
	Lieut. Colonel Joe T. Wilkerson (25 November - 31 December)
67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Major Blanton S. Keller (1 July - 31 December)
18th Tactical Hospital Commander	Colonel Spencer A. O'Brian (1 July - 31 December)

Position	Name
6313th Air Base Wing Commander	Colonel William C. Adams (1 July - 26 July)
	Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston (26 July - 31 December)
6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Frank L. Nicolai, Jr.* (1 July - 7 July)
	Lieut. Colonel John E. Petersdorf (7 July - 2 September)
	Colonel James F. Risher, Jr. (2 September - 31 December)
6313th Air Base Wing Special Assistant to the Commander	Lieut. Colonel John E. Petersdorf (2 September - 31 December)
6313th Supply Squadron Commander	Major Frank Zdybel (1 July - 10 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert C. Smith (10 July - 31 December)
6313th Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Richard J. Gordon (1 July - 31 December)
6313th Installations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John E. Petersdorf (1 July - 5 July)
	Lieut. Colonel John W. Etter, Jr. (5 July - 31 December)
6313th Air Police Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Carl C. Conant (1 July - 31 December)
6313th Communications Squadron Commander	Major John W. Berge, Jr. (1 July - 10 September)
	Major Julian M. Lacalle, Jr. (10 September - 31 December)
6313th Operations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Arland Stanton (1 July - 25 November)
	Major Roy B. Bluhm, Jr. (25 November - 31 December)

*Additional duty. Regular assignment: Administrative Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing Headquarters.

Position	Name
6313th Food Service Squadron Commander	Major Paul Torretti (1 July - 31 December)
6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel Spencer A. O'Brian* (1 July - 31 December)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel George G. Kellum (1 July - 31 December)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Howard K. Shaw (1 July - 31 December)
12th Aviation Depot Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Maurice E. Murphy (1 July - 31 December)
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander	Major James M. Jones, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
15th Weather Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel David C. Barrow (1 July - 31 December)
17th Communications Construction Squadron Commander	Major Dallas A. Brown (1 July - 4 July)
	Captain Roscoe C. Venable (4 July - 31 December)
5th Communications Group Commander	Lieut. Colonel Harry C. Ross (1 July - 8 August)
	= Lieut. Colonel Marion R. Graham (8 August - 31 December)
2d Radio Relay Squadron Commander	Major Milton K. Caston (1 July - 31 December)
24th Communications Construction Squadron Commander	Captain Marion E. Strange (1 July - 31 December)
608th Communications Squadron Commander	Major Arthur L. Vietinghoff (1 July - 22 July)
	Major Charles C. Culley (22 July - 31 December)

*Given primary duty title of Director of Base Medical Services, effective 29 September 1958, per 6313th ABW PAM 258, dtd. 30 Sept. 1958.

Position	Name
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot, Commander	Major George E. Thompson (1 July - 10 October)
	Major Paul E. Mensing (10 October - 31 December)
15th Physiological Training Flight Commander	Captain Simpson J. Roper (1 July - 31 December)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Major John B. Mills (1 July - 31 December)
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert J. Hennessy (1 July - 31 December)
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile Commander	Major John M. Pledge (1 July - 31 December)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander	Colonel Lester J. Johnsen (1 July - 31 December)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Garland E. Cain (1 July - 30 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Samuel A. Steere, Jr. (30 July - 26 November)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert W. Stewart, Jr. (26 November - 31 December)
51st Tactical Hospital Commander	Lieut. Colonel Norman I. Condit (1 July - 31 December)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Major Norman H. Frisbie (1 July - 1 November)
	Major Charles R. Foster (1 November - 31 December)
25th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Major Robert W. Denman (1 July - 31 December)

Position	Name
6431st Air Base Group Commander	Colonel Elliott H. Reed (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Air Base Group Executive Officer	Colonel Arnold R. Bredewater (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Operations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel James H. Hubbard (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Air Police Squadron Commander	Major William E. Frantz (1 July - 2 August)
	Major Vincent R. Chiodo (2 August - 31 December)
6431st Installations Squadron Commander	Major Jesse M. Doyle (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Supply Squadron Commander	Major Roland E. Deaton (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Harold G. Barber (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Food Service Squadron Commander	1st Lieutenant William E. Arnold, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Calof (1 July - 8 July)
	Major Bill C. Musick (8 July - 7 October)
	Major Horatio L. Holton, Jr. (7 October - 11 November)
	Lieut. Colonel Clyde W. Bradley, Jr. (11 November - 31 December)
6351st USAF Dispensary Commander	Lieut. Colonel Norman I. Condit (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment #1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division Commander	Lieut. Colonel William A. Beard (1 July - 31 December)

Position	Name
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Major Maurice Morrison (1 July - 31 December)
6023d Radar Evaluation Flight* (ECM) Commander	Captain Floyd W. Myers (5 August - 14 August)
	Major Marion R. Hodgers (14 August - 31 December)
Detachment #1, 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Captain Cleo V. Winter (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment #2, 24th Helicopter Squadron Commander	Captain David F. King (1 July - 31 December)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron Advance Detachment Commander	Major David T. Fleming** (18 August - 15 November)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron Commander	Major David T. Fleming** (15 November- 31 December)
Detachment #3, 1st Shoran Beacon Squadron Commander	1st Lieutenant James T. Whalen (1 July - 9 July)
	Captain Douglas Herrick (9 July - 31 December)

*The 6023d Radar Evaluation Flight (ECM) moved PCS from Johnson AB, Japan, to Naha AB on 5 August 1958.

** The advance detachment of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, commanded by Major Fleming, began arriving at Naha AB on 18 August 1958. By 15 November the entire squadron was in place, at which time, Major Fleming assumed command in place of Lieut. Colonel Maurice E. Lee, Jr., who had remained in Japan until this date, at which time he rotated to the ZI.

APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE

313TH AIR DIVISION PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1958

Appendix 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1958

July: Eighteen numbered contracts totalling $97,648.19 and 27 unnumbered contracts totalling $14, 562.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1201 for $9,838.71 was awarded to Far East Furnishings Company for custodial services for the Command Section, Hq., 313th Air Division.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1202 for $15,909.79 was awarded to Matsuoka Utility Company for maintenance of the electrical system at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1203 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors Company, Ltd., for vehicle parts for Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1204 for $20,000.00 was awarded to United Office Machine Company for maintenance and servicing of office machines for the combined Armed Services on Okinawa.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1205 for $2,000.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company for the maintenance of Thermofax machines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1206 for $844.00 was awarded to The National Cash Register Company for the maintenance of cash registers at the Kadena and Naha Air Base Commissaries.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1207 for $2,670.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction Company for the repair of wooden furniture for quarters and offices at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1208 for $672.00 was awarded to Mrs. Dorothy N. Barrett for teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1209 for $1,224.00 was awarded to Mrs. Lula P. Lyons for teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1210 for $672.00 was awarded to Mrs. Marian E. Gould for part-time clerical work at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

July: (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1211 for $250.00 was awarded to Miss Betty H. Parker for part-time teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1212 for $170.00 was awarded to Mrs. T. S. Tsao for part-time teaching services at Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1213 for $552.00 was awarded to Mr. Toru Kakimoto for part-time teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1214 for $3,640.00 was awarded to Mrs. L. S. Edds for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1215 for $5,562.00 was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for transit-mix concrete to be delivered to Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1216 for $16,638.24 was awarded to Nankai Doboku for the repair of a school building at Naha Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1217 for $1,631.00 was awarded to Fuji Potato Chip Company for potato chips for resale at the Kadena Air Base Commissary.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-1218 for $15,374.45 was awarded to Connell Brothers Company for plywood for Kadena Air Base.

Seven numbered contracts totalling $53,704.00 and 43 unnumbered contracts totalling $35,597.69 were closed during July 1958.

Two salvage contracts for the sale of surplus Air Force property totalling $12,571.00 were awarded during July 1958.

Aug.: Eleven numbered contracts totalling $45,555.73 and 44 unnumbered contracts totalling $52,231.00 were awarded to contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1219 for $2,030.24 was awarded to Kishi Gumi for the construction of a bulkhead at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1220 for $596.40 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Company for Palmyra Fiber for use at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1221 for $1,271.46 was awarded to Far East Construction Company for the installation of typhoon shutters on dependent housing at Kadena Air Base.

0210

Aug: (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1222 for $1,498.60 was awarded to Fuji Potato Chip Company for potato chips for resale at the Kadena Air Base Commissary.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1223 for $630.00 was awarded to Western Pacific Corporation for Elastomer Coating for use on Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1224 was not used.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1225 for $9,900.00 was awarded to Kishi Gumi for termite treatment service on Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1226 for $14,600.54 was awarded to R. C. Williams Co. for electrical supplies for Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1227 for $3,825.77 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Company for electrical wire for use on Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1228 for $1,984.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company for automotive maintenance at Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1229 for $926.00 was awarded to Miya's Garage for automotive maintenance for Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1230 for $8,292.72 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for modification of the Loading Center at Kadena Air Base.

Three numbered contracts totalling $20,838.39 and 26 unnumbered contracts totalling $23,796.47 were closed during August 1958.

No salvage contracts for the sale of surplus Air Force property were awarded during August 1958.

Sept.: Twenty-eight numbered contracts totalling $301,909.00 and 59 unnumbered contracts totalling $94,650.00 were awarded to contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1231 for $2,204.08 was awarded to Takayashi Gumi for the installation of runway lights at Naha Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1232 for $2,898.00 was awarded to Mrs. Ramona M. Parsons for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1233 for $724.50 was awarded to Mr. Teruo Teruya for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

0211

Sept.: (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1234 for $2,898.00 was awarded to Mrs. Betty J. Riley for teaching services at Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1235 for $1,000.00 was awarded to E. J. Griffith and Company for paint for Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1236 for $1,000.00 was awarded to Zamami Kami Shoten for office supplies for Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1237 was not used.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1238 for an estimated amount of $3,000.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company for the maintenance of vehicles for the United States Navy on Okinawa.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1239 for an estimated amount of $1,000.00 was awarded to Damari Paint Company for paint for Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1240 for $1,964.66 was awarded to Kimura Denki Sangyo, Ltd. for electrical repairs to the Naha Air Base control tower.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1241 for $3,609.00 was awarded to Sagawa Kensetsu Construction Company for repair of Buildings T-221 and T-222 at Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1242 for $1,505.27 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc. for construction of a concrete ramp at Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1243 for $11,796.74 was awarded to Tokwo Denki Co., Ltd. for the installation of an electrical distribution system at Kadena Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1244 for $3,519.76 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for the replacement of a boiler at Kadena Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1245 for $3,947.40 was awarded to Bireley's Soft Drinks, Inc. for furnishing soft drinks to the Kadena Commissary for resale.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1246 for $4,095.00 was awarded to Yonagusuku Beverage Company for furnishing Pepsi Cola to the Kadena Commissary for resale.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1247 for $5,893.65 was awarded to Okinawa Soft Drinks Kaisha for furnishing Coca Cola to the Kadena Commissary for resale.

0212

Sept: (r) Contract AF 62(321)-1248 for $2,756.25 was awarded to the Seven-Up Bottling Company for furnishing Seven-Up to the Kadena Commissary for resale.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-1249 for $3,245.40 was awarded to Canada Dry Bottling Company for furnishing assorted Canada Dry soft drinks to the Kadena Commissary for resale.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-1250 for $3,361.04 was awarded to Isa Construction Company for the construction of latrine facilities at Kadena Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-1251 for $226,843.14 was awarded to Nanyo Doken for the repair of hardstands at Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-1252 for $14,358.00 was awarded to Western Pacific Corp., for interior coating of POL storage tanks at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-1253 for $2,805.11 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc. for the rehabilitation of a Bailey Bridge at Naha Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-1254 for an estimated $3,000.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors, Inc. for Ford motor parts for Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-1255 for $2,614.50 was awarded to Miya's Garage for the maintenance of motor vehicles for Kadena Air Base.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-1256 for $5,532.40 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for the installation of display reefers at the Kadena Commissary.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-1257 for $875.80 was awarded to Mrs. Dorothy M. Barrett for teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-1258 for $200.00 was awarded to Miss Betty H. Parker for teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(cc) Contract AF 62(321)-1259 for $788.80 was awarded to Mrs. Marian E. Gould for services as clerical assitant, Kadena Air Base Education Center.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-1260 for $1,134.00 was awarded to Mrs. Lula P. Lyons for teaching services at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

0213

Sept.: (ee) Contract AF 62(321)-1261 for $5,276.38 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi for the installation of central heating plants at Kadena Air Base.

Eighteen numbered contracts totalling $71,146.00 and 22 unnumbered contracts totalling $25,801.00 were closed during September 1958.

No salvage contracts for the sale of surplus Air Force property were awarded during September 1958.

A total of $4,852.00 was expended for 174 cash purchase transactions by the Imprest Fund Officer during September 1958.

Oct.: Fifteen numbered contracts totalling $201,906.00 and 111 unnumbered contracts totalling $186,573.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1262 for $9,933.00 was awarded to Isa Construction Company for grass cutting services on Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1263 for $7,000.00 was awarded to Taki Kensetsu Kogyo for grading and packing various areas at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1264 for $30,174.00 was awarded to Chemi-Pure, Inc. for termite control treatment at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1265 for $1,131.00 was awarded to R. C. Williams Company for torque fluid for Naha Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1266 for $9,629.00 was awarded to Okinawa Tire Industry for the repair and retreating of tires for Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1267 for $54,058.00 was awarded to Williams International, Inc. for venetian blinds for Kadenaand Naha Air Bases.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1268 for $21,500.00 was awarded to Nankai Doboku Company for the replacement of hangar doors at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1269 for $21,000.00 was awarded to Toa Kensetsu Kogyo for the relocation of quonsets at Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1270 for $236.00 was awarded to Higa Upholstery Shop for re-upholstering eight staff cars for Kadena Air Base.

0214

Oct.: (j) Contract AF 62(321)-1271 for $519.00 was awarded to Iiya's Garage for the maintenance of industrial engines at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1272 for $12,162.00 was awarded to Tokwo Denki Company, Ltd. for the installation of Sundstrand facilities in the aircraft maintenance building at Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1273 for $3,000.00 was awarded to R. C. Williams Co., Ltd. for General Electric Co. radio replacement parts for Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1274 for $1,710.00 was awarded to Connell Brothers Company for neoprene coating at Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1275 was not used.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1276 for $22,565.00 was awarded to Fudeya Trading Company, Ltd. for modification of the electrical system in the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron area, Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1277 for $7,116.00 was awarded to Nankai Doboku Company for the repair of roofs on H-type buildings at Kadena Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1278 was not used.

Eleven numbered contracts totalling $7,444.00 were closed during October 1958.

No salvage contracts for the sale of surplus Air Force property were awarded during October 1958.

A total of $5,999.00 was expended for 176 cash purchase transactions by the Imprest Fund Officer during October 1958.

Nov.: Thirteen numbered contracts totalling $142,329.00 and 78 unnumbered contracts totalling $77,473.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1279 for $4,632.00 was awarded to Fuji Food Processing Company for potato chips for resale at the Kadena Air Base Commissary.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1280 for $376.00 was awarded to Mrs. M. C. Carroll for part-time clerical work at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

0215

Nov.: (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1281 for $1,702.00 was awarded to Matsuoka Utility Company for the repair of refrigerators at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1282 for $3,439.00 was awarded to Isa Construction Company for erosion control work on Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1283 for $2,150.00 was awarded to Rycom Watch Company for the repair of clocks at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1284 for $87,392.00 was awarded to R. C. Williams Company for washing machines at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1285 for $1,263.00 was awarded to Williams International for sodium hydroxide for Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1286 for $4,717.00 was awarded to Western Pacific Corporation for modification of the parachute drying tower building at Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1287 for $4,381.00 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi for repair of refrigerator rooms in mess halls at Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1288 for $18,175.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc. for marking of runways and taxiways at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1289 for $3,282.00 was awarded to Horikawa Steel Products Company for the installation of "torii" sign frames on Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1290 for $9,115.00 was awarded to Far East Service Company for paint for Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1291 for $1,705.00 was awarded to Star Motors for vehicle repair for Naha Air Base.

Twenty-three numbered contracts totalling $126,107.00 were closed during November 1958.

No salvage contracts for the sale of surplus Air Force property were awarded during November 1958.

A total of $7,408.00 was expended for 241 cash purchase transactions by the Imprest Fund Officer during November 1958.

Dec.: Thirty-one numbered contracts totalling $401,775.00 and 90 unnumbered contracts totalling $113,079.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

Dec.: (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1292 for $3,660.00 was awarded to Fuji Foods Processing Company for potato chips for resale at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1293 for $869.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction Company for helmet liners for Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1294 for $3,750.00 was awarded to American Engineering Corporation for air-conditioning Building #859 at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1295 for $10,000.00 was awarded to Western Pacific Company for modification of the electrical system at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1296 for $17,974.00 was awarded to International Dairy Supply Company for dairy products for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1297 for $63,835.00 was awarded to Nanyo Doken Company, Ltd. for the repair of quonsets and the runway at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1298 for an estimated $1,609.00 was awarded to Matsuoka Utility Company for the repair of refrigerators at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1299 for $2,373.00 was awarded to Sagawa Kensetsu Construction Company for the repair of Building #3510 at Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1300 for an estimated $3,101.00 was awarded to Miya's Garage for the repair of vehicles at Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1301 for $9,178.00 was awarded to Shonan Company, Ltd. for electric wire for Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1302 for $4,434.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company, Inc. for electric wire for Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1303 for $7,520.00 was awarded to Okinawa Trading Company for electric wire for Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1304 was not used.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1305 for $10,620.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne Associates for Title I architect/engineering services for Security Wing projects (KAD-132-9) at Kadena Air Base.

0217

Dec.: (o) Contract AF 62(321)-1306 for $1,260.00 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Company for concrete for Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1307 for $40,328.00 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc. for replacing window screens (Projects KAD-92-59, KAD-95-59, and KAD-96-59) at Kadena Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1308 for $1,549.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for a grounding system at Onna Point (Project KAD-124-59).

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-1309 for an estimated $31,561.00 was awarded to Y. Higa Enterprises for packing and crating for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-1310 for $55,760.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company, Inc. for space heaters for Kadena Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-1311 for an estimated $11,354.00 was awarded to Okinawa Tire Industry, Inc. for the repair of tires for Kadena Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-1312 for $200.00 was awarded to Mrs. T. S. Tsao as a part time instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-1313 for $258.00 was awarded to Mrs. R. H. Baird as a part time instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-1314 for $200.00 was awarded to Mrs. Betty H. Parker as a part time instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-1315 for $952.00 was awarded to Mrs. Lula P. Lyons as a part time instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-1316 for $731.00 was awarded to Mrs. Dorothy M. Barrett as a part time test administrator at Kadena Air Base.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-1317 for $662.00 was awarded to Mrs. M. C. Carroll for part time clerical work at Kadena Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-1318 for $22,626.00 was awarded to Nankai Doboku Company, Ltd. for modifying the aircraft alert shelter (Project NAH-74-9) at Naha Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-1319 for $33,722.00 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi for painting the interior of permanent barracks (Projects NAH-36A-9, NAH-36B-9, and NAH-36C-9) at Naha Air Base.

0218

Dec.: (cc) Contract AF 62(321)-1320 for $129,738.00 was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi for repair of the drainage system and base roads (Projects NAH-17-9 and NAH-20-9) at Naha Air Base, and repair of base roads and the road to the jet engine test stand (Projects KAD-8-7 and KAD-19-7) at Kadena Air Base.

(dd) Contract AF 62(321)-1321 for $12,674.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for replacement of electric cable at the Stilwell Park Dependent Housing Area at Kadena Air Base (Project KAD-128-9).

(ee) Contract AF 62(321)-1322 for $4,444.00 was awarded to Nanyo Doken Company for repairing and sealing the transient apron (Project NAH-105-59) at Naha Air Base.

(ff) Contract AF 62(321)-1323 for $11,118.00 was awarded to Nankai Doboku Company for painting the exteriors of temporary buildings (Project NAH-15-9) at Naha Air Base.

Eight numbered contracts totalling $68,564.00 were closed during December 1958.

One salvage contract for the sale of surplus Air Force property in the amount of $755.00 was awarded during December 1958.

A total of $4,946.00 was expended for 148 cash purchase transactions by the Imprest Fund Officer during December 1958.

0219

LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Document No.	Document Identification
1	Fifth Air Force Regulations, July-December 1958.
2	Pacific Air Forces General Orders, July-December 1958.
3	313th Air Division General Orders, July-December 1958.
4	Fifth Air Force General Orders, July-December 1958.
5	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to Comdr. 315th Air Div., sub.: Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, 30 July 1958.
6	Daily Staff Journals, Directorate of Operations, Hq., 313th Air Division, 1 July-31 December 1958.
7	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF Combat Operations Center, sub.: Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" 24 October through 28 October 1958, 30 Oct. 1958.
8	Pacific Air Forces Regulation No. 55-43, sub.: Operations: War Emergency Alert Procedures, dtd. 8 May 1958.
9	6431KMC 522698, Comdr. 6431st Air Base Group to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 03/1410Z Sept. 1958.
10	313MC C-9-55, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/2305Z Sept. 1958.
11	Daily Staff Journals, Directorate of Materiel, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1958.

5AF REGULATION)
NUMBER 23-4A)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 15 July 1958

ORGANIZATION - FIELD

313th Air Division

5AFR 23-4, 19 May 1958, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

4. r. Maintaining attached tactical hospital in a state of operational readiness. During periods of deployment, operational control of the tactical hospital or elements thereof automatically reverts to the tactical wing.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G. ESKRIDGE JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

5FODC
1

5AF REGULATION)
NUMBER 23-4B)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 13 October 1958

ORGANIZATION - FIELD

313th Air Division

5AFR 23-4, 19 May 58, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

4. s. Provide local base helicopter rescue support during hours of operation of tactical jet units.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G. ESKRIDGE JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

5AF REGULATION)
NUMBER 23-4C)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 14 November 1958

ORGANIZATION - FIELD

313th Air Division

5AFR 23-4, 19 May 1958, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

4. j. Directing the extent of security control of civil and military air traffic within the limits of assigned area of responsibility.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G. ESKRIDGE JR.
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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SECRET

APPENDIX I 2

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 64) 25 September 1958

ATTACHMENT OF UNITS: 1. The following units assigned, as indicated, are attached to Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force, for operational control, effective 24 September 1958:

UNIT	ASSIGNMENT
Headquarters 5th Communications Group	313th Air Division
2nd Radio Relay Squadron	5th Communications Group
24th Communications Construction Squadron (Mobile)	5th Communications Group
608th Communications Squadron (Operations-Mobile)	5th Communications Group

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ W. T. Coleman
/t/ W T COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 70) 7 November 1958

ASSIGNMENT OF UNITS: 1. The following units assigned to Fifth Air Force are further assigned, as indicated, effective 10 November 1958:

UNIT	ASSIGNMENT
3d Bombardment Wing, Tactical	41st Air Division
8th Tactical Fighter Wing	41st Air Division
18th Tactical Fighter Wing	313th Air Division
21st Tactical Fighter Wing	39th Air Division
67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing	41st Air Division

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

3. Reports will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ W. T. Coleman
/t/ W. T. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
X
20-Dir of Adm Svcs, HEDUSAF
15-5AF
16-PACAFBASECOMD
5-Eal3th AF,315th ADIV
5-EA Unit Concerned

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 73)

5 December 1958

Section

DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT.....I
DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT.....II
DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT.....III
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS.....IV
REDESIGNATION OF UNITS.....V

I. DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT. 1. Detachment 3, 11th Air Postal Squadron, is discontinued effective 10 January 1959 at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

2. Personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed by Detachment 1, Headquarters 6005th Air Postal Group.

3. Equipment and supplies rendered surplus by this action revert to stocks to fill present and future requirements of 6005th Air Postal Group.

4. Mission and responsibilities will be absorbed by Detachment 1, Headquarters 6005th Air Postal Group.

5. Records will be handled in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.

6. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

7. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

II. DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT. 1. Detachment 10, 1st Air Postal Squadron is discontinued effective 10 January 1959 at Shiroi Air Base, Japan.

2. Personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed by Detachment 4, 1st Air Postal Squadron.

3. Equipment and supplies rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed by Detachment 4, 1st Air Postal Squadron.

4. Records will be handled in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.

5. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

6. Secretarial findings to permit second permanent change of station in a fiscal year will be obtained prior to movement of any individuals concerned. Request for Secretarial findings will be forwarded to this headquarters at the earliest possible date.

7. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

GENERAL ORDERS 73, HQ PACAF, APO 953, San Francisco, California, 5 December 1958, Cont'd.

III. DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT. 1. Detachment 12, 1st Air Postal Squadron, is discontinued effective 10 January 1959 at Kimpo Air Base, Korea.

2. Personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed by Detachment 6, 1st Air Postal Squadron.

3. Equipment and supplies rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed by Detachment 6, 1st Air Postal Squadron.

4. Records will be handled in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.

5. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

6. Secretarial findings to permit second permanent change of station in a fiscal year will be obtained prior to movement of any individuals concerned. Request for Secretarial findings will be forwarded to this headquarters at the earliest possible date.

7. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

IV. ATTACHMENT OF UNITS. 1. The following PACAF units are attached as indicated for operational control effective 8 December 1958:

PACAF Unit	Unit of Attachment
6314th Communications Squadron	1246th AACS Squadron
1st Communications Squadron, AF	1956th AACS Squadron
6313th Communications Squadron	1962nd AACS Squadron

2. Authority: PACAF Supplement 1, AFR 20-27 and PACAACS Area Message PACN 25L36.

V. REDESIGNATION OF UNITS. 1. The following District Offices of the 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) are redesignated as indicated effective 15 December 1958:

OLD DESIGNATION	LOCATION	NEW DESIGNATION
District Office Number 1	Andersen AFB, M. I.	District Office Number 41
" " " 2	Clark AB, P. I.	" " " 42
" " " 3	Kadena AB, R. I.	" " " 43
" " " 9	Hickam AFB, T. H.	" " " 44
" " " 8	Osan AFB, Korea	" " " 45
" " " 6	Washington Heights Family Housing Annex, Japan	" " " 46
" " " 4	Itazuke AB, Japan	" " " 47
" " " 7	Misawa AB, Japan	" " " 48

2. Authority: AFR 20-27 and DAF letter, dated 21 October 1958, Subject: Numberical Re-designation of Overseas District Offices.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

KARL A LANGFORD
LTCOL USAF
Deputy Dir, Admin Svc

3

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 20)

23 July 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL WILLIAM C ADAMS, 3723A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Director of Operations, Headquarters 313th Air Division, APO 239, effective 26 July 1958, vice COLONEL GLEN T EAGLESTON, 9438A, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 21)

24 July 1958

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. - The F-101-1 MTD is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support, effective 19 July 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 22)

11 August 1958

	Section
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS	I
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT	II
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT	III

I. ATTACHMENT OF UNITS. 1. The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for purposes indicated below, effective 5 August 1958. Orders in conflict are rescinded.

a. Logistical Support:

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
5th Communications Group
17th Communications Construction Squadron
11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 1, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 4, 15th Weather Squadron
546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot
1505th Support Squadron
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile
District Office 3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment 56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
Detachment 3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
F101-1 Mobile Training Detachment

b. Administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and Logistical Support:

7th Tactical Depot Squadron
558th Air Force Band
18th Tactical Hospital
15th Physiological Training Flight

c. Administration and Logistical Support:

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Detachment 2, 313th Air Division
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforemention attached units.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and commanders of the aforementioned attached units will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of said attached units.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for all the aforementioned attached units including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

II. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. The Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistical Support, effective 5 August 1958. Orders in conflict are rescinded.

2. Parent unit retains military justice authority.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

III. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. Detachment 5, 623rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Yaetake Air Station, Ryukyus Islands, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for POL and Ration Support only, effective 5 August 1958. Orders in conflict are rescinded.

2. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 23)

11 August 1958

	Section
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS	I
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT	II

I. ATTACHMENT OF UNITS. 1. The following units are attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for purposes indicated below, effective 5 August 1958. Orders in conflict are rescinded.

a. Logistical Support:

Detachment 1, 313th Air Division
*623rd Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron (includes all detachments)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 7, 15th Weather Squadron
Detachment 1, 1962nd AACS Squadron
33rd Air Rescue Squadron
Detachment 1, District Office 3, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron
Detachment 2, 24th Helicopter Squadron
Detachment 3, 1st Shoran Beacon Squadron
F86-24 Mobile Training Detachment
*6313th ABW provides POL and Ration Support to Detachment 5, 623rd AC&W Squadron, Yaetake Air Station.

b. Administration (including personnel assignment and promotion) and Logistical Support:

51st Tactical Hospital

c. Administration and Logistical Support:

51st Fighter Interceptor Wing
6023rd Radar Evaluation Flight, ECM

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units.

b. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units.

c. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group and commanders of the aforementioned attached units will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of said attached units.

d. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for all of the aforementioned attached units including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

II. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. The Naha Resident Office, Auditor General, USAF, is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for Logistical Support, effective 5 August 1958.

2. Parent unit retains military justice authority.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 24)

14 August 1958

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division (PACAF), APO 239, effective this date, during the temporary absence of BRIGADIER GENERAL DALE O SMITH, 1074A, this headquarters.

WALLACE C BARRETT
Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 25)

14 August 1958

Section

STAFF ASSIGNMENT..... I
STAFF ASSIGNMENT..... II

I. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL ROBERT F HARDY, 1507A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL WALLACE C BARRETT, 1245A.

II. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL FORRESTER M SMITH, 7269A, this headquarters is assigned duty as Inspector General, 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL ROBERT F HARDY, 1507A.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 26)

29 August 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL FRANCIS T BRADY, 4438A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Director of Materiel, 313th Air Division, APO 239, effective 19 August 1958, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN T SNYDER, 18302A, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 27)

29 August 1958

ATTACHMENT OF UNITS. - 1. Effective 5 August 1958 the following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support. Orders in conflict are rescinded.

1962nd Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron
15th Weather Squadron
12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC)

2. Legal Proceedings.

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and commanders of the aforementioned attached units will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of said attached units.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for all the aforementioned attached units including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority: AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 28)

12 September 1958

AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS. - So much of Section I (a), General Order 22, Headquarters 313th Air Division, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6313th Air Base Wing, is amended to delete: "11th Air Postal Squadron".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 29)

18 September 1958

	Section
RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDERS.....	I
AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS.....	II

I. RESCISSION OF GENERAL ORDERS.- General Order 28, this headquarters, dated 12 September 1958, pertaining to amendment of General Order 22, dated 11 August 1958, which pertains to Attachment of Units to the 6313th Air Base Wing, is hereby rescinded.

II. AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS.- So much of Section I (a), General Order 22, this headquarters, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6313th Air Base Wing, is amended to delete: "Detachment 1, 11th Air Postal Squadron".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 30)

23 September 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL BERNARD PETERS, 5573A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Staff Information Services Officer, 313th Air Division, APO 239, effective 10 September 1958, vice MAJOR JOHN J O'BRIEN, A0728307, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 31)

2 October 1958

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. - 1. Effective 25 September 1958 the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (M) is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for administrative and logistic support.

2. Legal Proceedings.

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group and Commander, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (M) will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 32)

3 October 1958

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. - 1. Effective 22 September 1958, Detachment 3, 2703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistic support.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and Commander, Detachment 3, 2703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including such actions as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is OOAMA General Orders No. 53, 16 July 1958, No. 54, 16 July 1958, No. 66, 9 September 1958, and Fifth Air Force message 5FOMO-M 83680, 25 August 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
A

SECRET

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 33) 13 October 1958

Section
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT..... I
ATTACHMENT OF UNITS..... II

I. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. Effective 19 September 1958, the Thirteenth Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus, Provisional (formerly known as CASF Task Force Headquarters), is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative and logistical support.

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Pacific Air Forces Supplement 1 thereto; Message SECRET/PFCNC 13485, Pacific Air Forces, 17 September 1958; and 13th Air Force Secret General Orders 48,25 September 1958.

II. ATTACHMENT OF UNITS. 1. Effective 19 September 1958, the following units (attached to the 13th Air Force Command Element, Ryukyus, Provisional, for operational control) are further attached for administrative and logistical support as follows:

Unit	Major Air Command	Supporting Organization
477th Tactical Fighter Sq	Tactical Air Command	6313th Air Base Wing
522nd Tactical Fighter Sq	Tactical Air Command	6313th Air Base Wing
499th Tactical Bomber Sq	Tactical Air Command	6313th Air Base Wing
Element, Detachment 2, 4505th Air Refueling Wg	Tactical Air Command	6431st Air Base Group
Communications Task Element 507th Communications and Control Group	Tactical Air Command	6313th Air Base Wing

2. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Pacific Air Forces Supplement 1 thereto; PACAF OPLAN 152-58 and 13th Air Force Secret General Orders 48, 25 September 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ L. A. Starr
/t/ L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION:
X:A minus Subordinate Units.
5-EAORG Listed above

SECRET

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 34)

14 October 1958

Section

STAFF ASSIGNMENT I
STAFF ASSIGNMENT II

I. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - MAJOR JOHN E CLEARY, 19793A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Staff Judge Advocate, to Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing, APO 239, effective 10 October 1958, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN F TAYLOR, A0726953, relieved.

II. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN F TAYLOR, A0726953, this headquarters, is assigned as Special Assistant to the Commander, 313th Air Division, APO 239, effective 10 October 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 35)

24 October 1958

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby resumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL WALLACE C BARRETT, 12454, this headquarters, relieved.

DALE O SMITH
Brigadier General, USAF
Commander

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 36)

24 October 1958

	Section
STAFF ASSIGNMENT.....	I
STAFF ASSIGNMENT.....	II

I. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL WALLACE C BARRETT, 1245A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL ROBERT F HARDY, 1507A, relieved.

II. STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL ROBERT F HARDY, 1507A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Inspector General, 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL FORRESTER M SMITH, 7269A, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 37)

28 October 1958

	Section
AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS	I
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT	II

I. AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS. - So much of Section I (b), General Order 22, this headquarters, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6313th Air Base Wing, is amended to delete "558th Air Force Band".

II. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. - The 558th USAF Band is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administrative (not to include assignment and promotion of personnel) and logistical support, effective 15 October 1958.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over personnel assigned to the 558th USAF Band.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over personnel assigned to the 558th USAF Band.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and Commander, HEDRONSEC, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise Article 15, UMCJ jurisdiction concurrently over airmen personnel assigned to the 558th USAF Band.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for this unit, to include actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4, AFR 20-27, and 313th Air Division 1st Indorsement, 15 October 1958, to 6313th Air Base Wing letter PC, subject: Request for Clarification of Status of 558th USAF Band, 25 September 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R WILSON
Captain, USAF
Ass't. Chief, Administrative Services

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 38)

7 November 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ELMER P FIZER, 3026A, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Staff Judge Advocate, 313th Air Division, effective 1 November 1958, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A MCLAUGHLIN, 3862A, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R Wilson
BERTRAM R WILSON
Captain, USAF
Ass't. Chief, Administrative Services

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313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 59)

26 November 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - CAPTAIN BERTRAM R WILSON, A0586477, this headquarters, is assigned as Special Assistant to the Commander, 313th Air Division, APO 239, effective this date.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 40)

8 December 1958

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - FIRST LIEUTENANT HUGH M MILTON, III, A03029579, this headquarters, is assigned duty as Aide-de-Camp to BRIGADIER GENERAL DALE O SMITH, 1074A, this headquarters, effective this date, vice FIRST LIEUTENANT JUDSON C FAURER, 27233A, relieved.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 41)

10 December 1958

AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS. - So much of Section I (a), General Order 22, this Headquarters, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6313th Air Base Wing, as amended by General Order 28, this Headquarters, dated 12 September 1958, is further amended to delete: "F101-1 Mobile Training Detachment", effective 28 October 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 42)

16 December 1958

	Section
AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS	I
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT	II

I. AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDER. - So much of Section I (a), General Order 23, this Headquarters, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6431st Air Base Group, is amended to delete "F86-24 Mobile Training Detachment", effective 15 November 1958.

II. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT.

1. Effective 15 November 1958, the F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistical support.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise General Courts-Martial jurisdiction over the F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment.

b. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group will exercise Special and Summary Courts-Martial jurisdiction over the F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment.

c. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group and Commander F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment will exercise Article 15, UCMJ, jurisdiction concurrently over members of the F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment.

d. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board action for the F102-4 Mobile Training Detachment, including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 35-66, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority is AFR 11-4 and AFR 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

E H Nelson
E H NELSON
Colonel, USAF
Executive Officer

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Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 43)

30 December 1958

AMENDMENT OF GENERAL ORDERS. - So much of Section I (c), General Order 23, this Headquarters, dated 11 August 1958, pertaining to Attachment of Units to the 6431st Air Base Group, as reads: "6023rd Radar Evaluation Flight, ECM", is amended to read: "6023rd Radar Evaluation Flight, ECM, less field maintenance on specialized ECM, AN/APQ-13 and AN/ARN-21 equipment installed in the units TB-29 aircraft."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L A STARR
Major, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 95)

21 October 1958

	Section
REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN USAF UNITS	I
COMMENDATION MEDALS - Awards - Amendment	II

I. REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN USAF UNITS. 1. The following units are reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents, effective 25 October 1958, with capability as cited in Part I of Organization Tables as indicated. The strengths herein are not the authorized strengths but represent the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the Organization Table:

UNIT	ORGANIZATION TABLE COMPOSITION	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	AIRMEN
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet	R1535, 1 June 1958, Paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIC)	32	2	177
45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet	R1535, 1 June 1958, Paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIC)	32	2	177
67th Field Maintenance Squadron	4245K, 30 April 1956 Paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIB)	7	5	236

2. Personnel will be furnished from sources under control of Commander, Fifth Air Force.

3. The above are category F units and are authorized Unit Essential Equipment, Base Support Equipment and Field Support Equipment as listed in columns 3a, b and c of Master Equipment Authorization List (including general purpose tactical type vehicles as required) and Table of Allowance 1-21 items in Unit Mission Equipment column of Unit Authorization List. Unit Mission Equipment column of Unit Authorization List will be prepared in conformance with paragraphs 3B and C, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 2, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Variable items, Table of Allowance 1-21 and Master Equipment Authorization List will be based on Unit Manning Document strength of units. Units are authorized additional equipment in Unit Support Equipment column of Unit Authorization List in conformance with paragraph 3D, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 3, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Commercial type vehicles will be substituted for general purpose tactical type vehicles to extent practicable and within criteria contained in paragraph 9, Air Force Manual 77-1.

4. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

5. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Headquarters Pacific Air Forces message PFOMO-O 52864, 15 October 1958.

General Orders Number 95, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, APO 925, 21 October 1958, (Continued)

II. COMMENDATION MEDALS - Awards - Amendment. So much of Section I, General Orders Number 94, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, 17 October 1958, pertaining to the award of the Air Force Commendation Medal to MASTER SERGEANT JOHN H BIDDLE, AF14078296 as reads: "MASTER SERGEANT JOHN H BIDDLE, AF 114078269" is amended to read: "MASTER SERGEANT JOHN H BIDDLE, AF14078296".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

STEPHEN F CELEC
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 99)

12 November 1958

REORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN USAF UNITS. 1. The following units are reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents, effective 15 November 1958, with capability as cited in Part I of Organization Tables as indicated. The strengths herein are not the authorized strengths but represent the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the Organization Table:

UNIT	ORGANIZATION TABLE COMPOSITION	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	AIRMEN
7th Tactical Depot Squadron	R4325R, 1 May 1958, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Part I (PART II: 1 X A, 8 X B, 1 X C)	34	1	169
18th Communications Construction Flight	R4195R, 1 January 1958, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Part I (Part IIB)	2		69

2. Personnel will be furnished from sources under control of Commander, Fifth Air Force.

3. The above are category F units and are authorized Unit Essential Equipment, Base Support Equipment and Field Support Equipment as listed in columns 3a, b and c of Master Equipment Authorization List (including general purpose tactical type vehicles as required) and Table of Allowance 1-21 items in Unit Mission Equipment column of Unit Authorization List. Unit Mission Equipment column of Unit Authorization List will be prepared in conformance with paragraphs 3B and C, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 2, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Variable items, Table of Allowance 1-21 and Master Equipment Authorization List, will be based on Unit Manning Document strength of the units. Units are authorized additional equipment in the Unit Support Equipment column of the Unit Authorization List in conformance with paragraph 3D, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 3, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Commercial type vehicles will be substituted for general purpose tactical type vehicles to extent practicable and within criteria contained in paragraph 9, Air Force Manual 77-1.

4. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

5. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Headquarters Pacific Air Forces message PFOMO-O 54766, 5 November 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:
F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

W. D. THOMPSON

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

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	~~ADJ~~

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 100)

12 November 1958

DISCONTINUANCE OF DETACHMENT. 1. Detachment 3, 6123rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron is discontinued at Suwon Auxiliary Air Field, Korea, effective 14 November 1958.

2. Manpower spaces revert to control of Commander, Fifth Air Force. Personnel, equipment and supplies revert to control of Commander, 6123rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

3. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

4. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Headquarters Pacific Air Forces message, PFOMO-0 54962, 7 November 1958.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

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GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 101)

12 November 1958

COMMENDATION MEDAL - Awards. By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, under the provisions of paragraph 29, Air Force Regulation 900-7, 16 July 1957 and paragraph 5, Department of the Air Force General Orders Number 16, 28 March 1958 the Air Force Commendation Medal for meritorious achievement is awarded to the following named officers and airmen:

FIRST LIEUTENANT OWEN H BELLAMY, JR., A03039940
15 October 1958
FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT PADDEN, 47008A
15 October 1958
FIRST LIEUTENANT DOUGLAS D SMITH, A03070400
15 October 1958
SECOND LIEUTENANT JIMMY S CADDELL, A03071591
15 October 1958
TECHNICAL SERGEANT GILBERTO AGUIRRE, AF38453646
15 October 1958
TECHNICAL SERGEANT RAPHAEL R DONOGHUE, AF13527096
15 October 1958
STAFF SERGEANT ARVIL H MCQUEEN, AF38233634
15 October 1958
AIRMAN SECOND CLASS WILLIAM J THALBERG, AF17445228
15 October 1958

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 103)

9 December 1958

REORGANIZATION OF THE 16TH AND 68TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS. 1. The 16th and 68th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons are reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents with capability as cited in Organization Table R1635, 1 June 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2k, Part I (Part II-I); strength, forty-one (41) officers, four (4) warrant officers, and three hundred and fifty-seven (357) airmen, each, effective as indicated. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the Organization Table.

UNIT	EFFECTIVE DATE
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron	15 December 1958
68th Fighter Interceptor Squadron	15 March 1959

2. Personnel will be furnished from sources under control of Commander, Fifth Air Force.

3. The above are Category F units and are authorized Unit Essential, Base Support, and Field Support Equipment as listed in columns 3A, B, and C of the Master Equipment Authorization List (including general purpose tactical type vehicles as required), and Table of Allowance 1-21 items in the Unit Mission Equipment column of the Unit Authorization Lists. The Unit Mission Equipment column of the Unit Authorization Lists will be prepared in conformance with paragraphs 3b and c, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 2, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Variable items, Table of Allowance 1-21 and the Master Equipment Authorization List, will be based on Unit Manning Document strength of units. Units are authorized additional equipment in the Unit Support Equipment column of the Unit Authorization Lists in conformance with paragraph 3d, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 3, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Commercial type vehicles will be substituted for general purpose tactical type vehicles to the extent practicable and within the criteria contained in paragraph 9, Air Force Manual 77-1.

4. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

5. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force letter, AFOMO 965k, 6 October 1958, Subject: Reorganization of the 16th and 68th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

	D COMDR	
	ADJ	

OFFICIAL:

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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W. D. THOMPSON

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 104)

9 December 1958

REORGANIZATION OF THE 421ST AIR REFUELING SQUADRON, TACTICAL. 1. The 421st Air Refueling Squadron, Tactical is reorganized effective 15 December 1958, under appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in Organization Table R1345, 1 June 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIB); strength, sixty-six (66) officers, one (1) warrant officer, and one hundred and fifty (150) airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the Organization Table.

2. Personnel will be furnished from sources under control of the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

3. The above unit is a category F unit and is authorized Unit Essential, Base Support, and Field Support Equipment, as listed in columns 3A, B, and C of the Master Equipment Authorization List (including general purpose tactical type vehicles as required), and Table of Allowance 1-21 items in the Unit Mission Equipment column of the Unit Authorization List. The Unit Mission Equipment column of the Unit Authorization List will be prepared in conformance with paragraphs 3b and c, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 2, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Variable items, Table of Allowance 1-21 and Master Equipment Authorization List, will be based on Unit Manning Document strength of unit. This unit is authorized additional equipment in the Unit Support Equipment column of the Unit Authorization List in conformance with paragraph 3d, Air Force Regulation 67-96 and paragraph 3, Section 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Commercial type vehicles will be substituted for general purpose tactical type vehicles to the extent practicable and within the criteria contained in paragraph 9, Air Force Manual 77-1.

4. Reports will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

5. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force letter, AFOMO 6m, 7 November 1958, Subject: Reorganization of the 421st Air Refueling Squadron, Tactical.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

D COMDR
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W. D. THOMPSON

D COMDR
ADJ

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 925, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 105)

19 December 1958

Section
COMMENDATION MEDAL - Awards - Meritorious Service. I
COMMENDATION MEDAL - Awards - Meritorious Achievement II

I. COMMENDATION MEDAL - Awards - Meritorious Service. By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, under the provisions of paragraph 29, Air Force Regulation 900-7, 16 July 1957 and paragraph 5, Department of the Air Force General Orders Number 16, 28 March 1958, the Air Force Commendation Medal is awarded to the following named officers and airmen for meritorious service for the period indicated.

COLONEL MANAH R HALBOUTY, 19183A
5 July 1957 to 5 June 1958
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES A BULEN, 20548A
2 August 1955 to 4 July 1958
MAJOR JOHN A COSTELLO, A0571345
30 July 1955 to 10 October 1958
CAPTAIN HOWARD E MILLER, A01863165
29 April 1957 to 15 June 1958
MASTER SERGEANT CLIFFORD C CRIDER, AF13270814
1 December 1957 to 16 September 1958
MASTER SERGEANT JAMES C EMBRY JR., AF35481487
1 May 1956 to 23 October 1958
MASTER SERGEANT VERNON J FREEMAN, AF18306598
1 October 1954 to 3 December 1955
MASTER SERGEANT MARVIN S WADE, AF14268083
26 March 1956 to 1 May 1958
TECHNICAL SERGEANT GRADY E DICKEY, AF34821868
28 March 1956 to 1 June 1958
TECHNICAL SERGEANT ODELL C TUCKER, AF34399630
28 May 1957 to 10 March 1958

II. COMMENDATION MEDAL - Awards - Meritorious Achievement. By direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, under the provisions of paragraph 29, Air Force Regulation 900-7, 16 July 1957 and paragraph 5, Department of the Air Force General Orders Number 16, 28 March 1958 the Air Force Commendation Medal for meritorious achievement is awarded to the following named officers and airmen.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM W ROBERTSON, A0920170
1 January 1958 to 30 June 1958
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN T SNYDER, 18302A
1 March 1958 to 30 June 1958

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MAJOR JAMES J JOHNS, AO578068
1 January 1958 to 30 June 1958
CAPTAIN JAN GARCIA, 38383A
10 January 1958 to 10 May 1958
CAPTAIN JOHN L REDRUP, AO2101660
20 September 1957
FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES A ALFORD, AO3004524
20 Septemter 1957
FIRST LIEUTENANT ROBERT T BEAUCOND, 24993A
27 September 1957
TECHNICAL SERGEANT JOSEPH D CASWELL, AF14243972
26 September 1957
TECHNICAL SERGEANT GEORGE W WALKER, AF18323744
15 August 1958 to 17 August 1958
STAFF SERGEANT JACK L SEYMOUR, AF17372758
21 July 1958 to 8 August 1958
AIRMAN SECOND CLASS KENNETH MERTZ, AF13529155
26 September 1957

FOR THE COMMANDER:

LADSON G ESKRIDGE JR
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

F. T. BUTLER
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 953, San Francisco, Calif.

PFOMO 30 July 1958

SUBJECT: Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron

TO: Commander
315th Air Division (Combat Cargo)
APO 323

1. Take necessary action to prepare and move the unit indicated in paragraph 2 below, from Tachikawa Air Base, Japan to Naha Air Base, Okinawa. Movement will constitute a permanent change of station. Advance echelon and main body of unit will be attached to 6431st Air Base Group upon arrival for logistical support and such administrative support as may be required.

2. Unit designation, approximate strength and other data:

a. Unit, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (less advance echelon); approximate strength, 52 officers and 188 airmen; Command Manpower Operating Program, 2nd quarter, FY 1959.

b. Advance echelon; approximate strength, 3 officers, 7 airmen.

c. Commander, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron will coordinate with Commander, Naha Air Base, to determine what USE requires movement. No movement of UME or spares is authorized. UME and spares support has been provided at Naha through AFSD action.

3. a. Instructions for preparation and movement are contained in AFM 75-37 and AFR 204-1. Necessary TDY required to expedite and accomplish unit movement is authorized if accomplished in the best interest of the service.

b. Secretarial findings to permit second permanent change of station in a fiscal year will be obtained prior to movement of any individuals so concerned. Request for secretarial findings will be forwarded to this headquarters at the earliest.

4. Unit will move through Tachikawa Aerial Port of Embarkation and Yokohama Surface Port on call of Port Commanders only. Readiness dates at home station are:

a. Advance echelon - 1 August 1958.

b. Main body of unit - 15 November 1958.

5. Following means of transportation will be utilized:

PFCAS #9104

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PFOMO, Hq PACAF, APO 953, 30 Jul 58, Subj: Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron

a. Military Personnel - Military air.

b. Dependents - Military air transportation will be utilized to the maximum in accordance with current policy.

c. Household goods and POV - Surface transportation.

d. Organizational equipment and impedimenta - Surface transportation where possible. Military air transportation may be utilized when it is necessary to maintain operational capability of the unit.

6. a. Direct communication is authorized. Information copies of all such communications will be furnished this headquarters, ATTN: Director of M&O.

b. APO 235, San Francisco, California, and complete military address as indicated in paragraph 31, AFM 75-37 (POM) will be used.

7. Reporting of the date of departure and arrival and other activities will be made by means of the Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (RCS: AF-01).

8. Cost of unit movement will be borne by Project 531.16 (appropriation 5793500) funds which have been made available to Fifth Air Force and programmed in the Fifth Air Force FY 1959 Annual Financial plan, and in accordance with provisions of AFM 172-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ W. T. Coleman
/t/ W T COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, Calif.

PFOMO 15 August 1958

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 1, Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron

TO: Commander
315th Air Division (Combat Cargo)
APO 323

Letter, this Headquarters, PFOMO, Subject: Movement Orders, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, dated 30 July 1958, is amended to delete paragraph 2c and substitute the following therefor:

2c. Commander, 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, will coordinate with Commander, Naha Air Base, to determine what USE requires movement. UME and spares support has been provided at Naha through AFSD action. However, the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron is authorized to move those items of UME previously coded as on hand and not provided through AFSD action.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

/s/ Howard H. Cloud, Jr.
/t/ HOWARD H. CLOUD, JR.
Colonel, USAF
Director, Manpower & Organization
Asst Chief of Staff Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

6

2 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. PRAVDA PREVIEWS NEW TU-114D (Conf): On 30 May, Pravda carried a photo of a new version of the Cleat, the TU-114D. The aircraft is to be used for carrying a limited number of passengers plus mail and cargo on long-distance routes. The article indicates that the TU-114D has a built-in accomodation ladder and that synthetic materials are used extensively in this construction. Preliminary analysis indicates that the basic Bear airframe and engines were used in the TU-114D. A pressurized cabin apparently has been installed aft of the wing where at least 12 passenger windows are visible. The publicity accorded this aircraft indicates the possibility of variations of the Cleat: The original 170-passenger version displayed at Nvudovo in 1957 (described as standard configurations), a 120-passenger model for long-distance routes, a 220-passenger model for internal short hauls, and the latest TU-114D. It is possible that the TU-114D was designed as a high-speed military transport and may be produced only in limited numbers. (Major Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

12817 SECRET

SECRET

3 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. CRAB SPIDER MISSILE POSSIBLY BEING DEPLOYED ON B200 SITES AROUND MOSCOW (Secret Noforn): In February a modified ZIS-151 truck towing a trailer was seen in Moscow. The trailer had four wheels and a canvas-covered X-member framework. It was reported to be 27 feet long and 7 feet high. The framework and canvas covering are the same type used on earlier Sam trailers. The estimated dimensions are compatible and match closely the dimensions of the second stage of the Sam guided missile displayed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow Parade. The missile, which is designated 32-B has the nickname Crab Spider. This is the first sighting of this particular type of trailer and it could indicate that the Crab Spider missile is now being deployed on the B200 sites around Moscow. The boosters may be transported separately and attached at the missile sites. (Maj Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

7 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. MIRAGE IV TO REPLACE VAUTOUR BOMBER (Secret): The first prototype of a new French tactical bomber, the Marcel Dasaut Mirage IV, is scheduled for completion in late summer of this year. The Mirage IV is a D-Wing aircraft with two afterburning jet engines mounted side-by-side in the rear of the fuselage. Its two crew members are seated in tandem cockpits with separate entrance hatches, as in the B-58. The first aircraft will be equipped with Atar-9 engines, but it is planned to replace this engine with an all-steel, high-Mach number version when it is available. The aircraft will utilize the "weapon pod" concept, with a streamlined pod semi-submerged in the fuselage. A long range interceptor version which would carry air-to-air guided missles is being studied. The aircraft will have an estimated maximum speed of Mach 2.0, limited by strength factors. Combat weight will be 45,000 - 50,000 pounds. The Mirage IV is in competition with the Super Vautour as the proposed replacement for the Vautour bomber. Reportedly the Mirage IV has been selected. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. IMPROVEMENT OF AIR/GROUND COMMUNICATIONS (Unclas): Major Holoviak of 313th Air Division and Mr. Reicher and Mr. Higgins, Philco Technical Representatives, are visiting 51st Fighter Bomber Wing Communications personnel in an effort to produce and compare ways and means of improving the air/ground communications. (Major Holoviak/43247)

3. EXPANSION OF KADENA TELEPHONE EXCHANGE (Unclas): Installation of switching equipment which will expand capacity of the Kadena Telephone Exchange from 2000 to 4000 lines is 90% complete. Cutover had been anticipated during July but will now be delayed pending rehabilitation of the electrical power system. A survey conducted by Kadena Installations Engineers 1 July in preparation for minor re-wiring work determined that a major project is necessary to replace existing transformers and possibly the auxiliary generators as well. Several months will be required. (Lt Colonel W. Y. Brown/46166)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

8 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. TUSHINO AIR SHOW (Conf): According to information received by the U. S. Air Attache in Moscow, this year's Tushino Air Show will be held on 20 July and will be exclusively a civilian flying demonstration in contrast to previous emphasis on military aviation. The announced program is to include demonstrations by various piston aircraft, gliders, helicopters, and civil transport aircraft, and is scheduled to conclude with paradrop displays. Sport flyers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia will participate for the first time in the Tushino event. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. PACAF SURVEY TEAM (Unclas): A Fifth Air Force Manpower Survey Team of 9 officers under the supervision of Colonel James L. Cornett arrived approximately 1700 hours, 5 July 1958. They will conduct a manpower survey of areas not previously covered by the PACAF IG Survey Team. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

3. VISIT OF TM-61C TEAM (Secret): A TM-61 Matador Team, headed by Mr. E. E. Clary (PACAF), will visit Kadena Air Base on the afternoon of 8 July 1958. Team, consisting of PACAF and Martin representatives, are completing a visit to the 17th Tactical Missile Squadron at Tainan, Taiwan, and will spend the night at Kadena prior to departing for Fifth Air Force and Korea. Fifth Air Force advises that Team is not particularly interested in our Matador project on this trip. Major Swanger will meet and escort Team during their stopover at Kadena. (Major Swanger/46136)

4. ATMOSPHERIC RADIATION READINGS (Conf): Atmospheric radiation readings at Kadena Air Base on 5 July were approximately ten times the normal reading. Recordings were as follows:

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1910I	.15MR/HR
2010I	.1MR/HR
2110I	.15MR/HR
2210I	.2MR/HR
2240I	.1MR/HR
2320I	1MR/HR
2400I	.1MR/HR

At 0900I, 7 July 1958, USARYIS/IX Corps ABC activity on Okinawa reported 6.MR/HR.

The higher readings are probably the result of the current series of tests being conducted at Eniwetok Proving Ground. Information has been passed to Fifth Air Force, and follow-up readings and inspections are being conducted. (Major Swanger/46136)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

9 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. TM-76 MATADOR PROGRAM (Secret): Message from PACAF states an informal presentation to Headquarters USAF on the "HARDENED CONCEPT" for the Matador Mace (TM-76 Missile), programmed for Okinawa the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1962, was met with favorable reaction. In order to receive Air Staff approval, Headquarters USAF representatives made certain recommendations which include:

a. A reduction of over-all cost by reducing the size of structures and substitution of certain items of use by less costly items.

b. Insure that proposed structure, to include door, can withstand approximately 70 PSI blast effect.

c. Insure that the new rapid-fire development is compatible with this concept.

PACAF will hold a meeting at their headquarters on 28 July 1958 to revise the current PACAF Operation Plan accordingly. (Major Swanger/ 46136)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. COUP PLANNED AGAINST GOVERNMENT OF KING IDRISS (Secret): Egyptians in Libya are reportedly planning a coup against the government of King Idriss. According to a usually reliable source, the plan calls for action upon the death of Idriss. If the 68-year-old King does not die within a year, a coup would be attempted anyway and might include the use of violence against the King himself. His successor, Crown Prince Hasan Al Rida, who has little popular support, could be easily put aside. In recent months, the Libyan government's pro-western policies have been severely criticized, particularly by cairo Radio; nearly 400 Egyptian school teachers employed by the Libyan government, local newspapers, and even some members of the Libyan Parliament have reportedly been engaged in propoganda and Intelligence activities under the direction of the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli. Furthermore, the presence of the American

SECRET

Air Base at Wheelis near Tripoli and the alleged inadequacy of American aid have been the primary targets of criticism. A success in Lebanon for UAR President Nasser and signs of Libyan interest in joining the Machrebian Federation with Tunisia and Morocco might serve to accelerate a UAR move against Libya. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

3. TACAN FOR F-102 (Secret): Fifth Air Force advised that the F-102 aircraft to be assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing will be equipped with TACAN navigational equipment (but not VOR or radio compass). The Kadena TVOR which had been scheduled to be moved to Naha will now be inactivated upon completion of Kadena TACAN (within the next few months) and will be transferred to the 1st AACS Squadron Mobile in Japan. Naha TACAN is scheduled for installation during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1959. (Lt Col W. Y. Brown/46166)

4. AC&W STATUS REPORTING (Unclas): Instructions for a revised ACW Daily Status Report were forwarded to the detachments. The new report includes all elements of system capability - controllers, radars, scopes, air-ground, and point-to-point communications. It will be used to fulfill r porting requirements to higher headquarters and to furnish data for Division briefings and staff action. (Major Holoviak?43247)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

10 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. ISRAELI AIR FORCE OFFICERS VIEW LEBANESE SITUATION WITH CONCERN (Secret): According to a reliable source, there is apprehension among Israeli Air Force (IAF) officers over the current situation in Lebanon. They feel that, if the rebels with UAR assistance are successful in overthrowing the legitimate Chamoun government, the next target for Nasser would be Jordan. According to the IAF officers, the Israeli Government would never tolerate this, as the establishment of a long UAR border opposite Israel would mean trouble. If the UAR should take action in Jordan similar to that now in evidence in Lebanon, the Israeli Government undoubtedly would move to take politive action. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. COMMUNICATIONS VULNERABILITY STUDY (Conf): A joint service study on the vulnerability of Okinawa long haul communications to interruption by enemy attach (short title CATS PAW) was completed on 30 June 1958. Study was directed by CINCPAC and accomplished by USARYIS Signal and 3130C-E. A copy is being circulated to the staff. (Lt Col W. Y. Brown/46166)

3. REVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON MANNING (Unclas): Revised UMD for the 6313th Communications Squadron was completed and will be forwarded to Fifth Air Force upon receipt of notification that changes are again being accepted for processing by that headquarters. This revision reduced total manning from 287 to 246 and other changes in mission. (Lt Col W. Y. Brown/46166)

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

4. ATMOSPHERIC RADIATION READINGS (Conf): Atmospheric radiation readings as reported in the Daily Journal on 8 July 58 as being ten times normal have dropped, and are again indicating the normal background count. The higher readings were probably the result of the current series of tests being conducted at Eniwetok Proving Ground. (Major Swanger/46136)

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5. PROGRAM CHANGE ON 590TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP (Secret): Change Number 3 to the PACAF Program, Volume 2, advances the date some six months for movement of th 590th Tactical Missile Group from the ZI to Okinawa. The programmed date of second quarter Fiscal Year 62 has been changed to the fourth quarter Fiscal Year 61 (April 1961). (Major Swanger/46136)

6. F-105 EQUIPPING (Secret): Secret message from Fifth Air Force indicates that the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing will be equipped with three F-105 Squadrons beginning in Fiscal Year 2/62. This is based on information from USAF which is reflected on the new program and on the revised production rates. (Major Swanger/46136)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

11 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. DEPLOYMENT OF TAC RF-101'S TO KADENA (Secret): TAC plans to deploy six (6) RF-101's to the Far East to augment the PACAF EWP posture during the period 1 Aug to 1 Nov.58. Fox Able 82 is the designation given the unit which will deploy and provide target coverage while Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons at Kadena and Misawa convert from RF-84F's to RF-101's. Fox Able 82 will be deployed in conjunction with the first element of PACAF'S RF-101's. Unit is scheduled to deploy to Kadena from the ZI approximately 1 August 58. (Major Swanger/46136)

2. CLASSIFICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO QUICK STRIKE CAPABILITY (Secret): Fif the Air Force SECRET message is quoted for the information of all concerned:

> "5FOOT-P 71269. Effective immediately, all correspondence which contains the words 'Quick Reaction', 'Quick Strike' and/or '15 Minute Alert Capability' will carry a minimum classification of SECRET. All messages which make reference to the subject Quick Strike but do not contain the words previously stated, and do not include classified material, will be EFTO."

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. EAST GERMAN OPPOSITION GROUP SUBJECTED TO INCREASING ATTACKS (Secret): East German Party Secretary Ulbricht, bolstered by the Hungarian executions and the intensified Bloc-wide campaign against "revisionism," may soon settle the score with his old enemies. Recent information indicates that the opposition (Schirdewan, Wollweber, and Oelssner), purged last February, are being subjected to increasing harassment by Ulbricht, with East German Party publications beginning to characterize them as "hostile" elements. Wollweber, former Minister of State Security, is particularly singled out. Ulbricht's reported statement that "Wollweber"s case is not just a party matter, but one for the courts," suggests that he may soon stand trial. Selbmann, a

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top-flight economic expert and member of the opposition, although not purged with his cohorts, may soon undergo a similar fate. Reportedly he has been called before the Politburo for an accounting of his activity. (Major Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

1 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. COMMUNIST CHINA CONTINUES PRESSURE ON JAPANESE GOVERNMENT (Secret) Communist China has announced that it will not extend its agreement with Japanese fishing interests, which expired on 12 June. The results of the recent Japanese general elections indicated that the Chinese Communists' efforts to influence the Japanese electorate by harassment of the "unfriendly" Kishi government had failed. However, the economic condition of small and medium Japanese firms dependdent on China mainland trade is now becoming serious. As Chinese Communist harassment of Japanese fishing is intensified and as long as the Japnese economic recession continues, conservative political and industrial leaders, as well as the opposition Socialists, can be expected to put increasing pressure on the Government to effect a rapprochement with Communist China. The Kishi government, with a new mandate from the electorate, will probably be able to avoid hasty action on this issue, but might well consider it necessary to take some steps short of recognition, such as the conclusion of fishery, postal, and sea rescue agreements. (Major Smith/40102).

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

A TRUE INFORMATION COPY:

BRIAN T. SHEEHAN
1st Lieut., USAF
Asst. ISO

SECRET

SECRET

15 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS OFFER TECHNICAL AID TO FINLAND (Secret): Early warning radar, and long term military technical aid, were offered to Finland by the Soviets during the recent visit of the Finnish President to the USSR. The Soviet offer was declined on the grounds of limited Finnish air facilities, linguistic limitations in translating technical material, and year-to-year military appropriations that preclude long-term air programs. ACS/I COMMENT: President Kekkonenhed indicated prior to the visit that the acceptability of a small number of MIG-TYPE fighters might be in order for the purpose of off-setting the British-made Gnats soon to be delivered to Finland. It is probable that this was advanced as a concession to the Soviets in return for a favorable Soviet reaction to Finnish proposals for amending the 1947 peace treaty. As such a reaction was not forthcoming, the Finnish delegation apparently reverted to the policy of no acceptance of Soviet offers of military assistance. (Major Smith/40104)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

16 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SPUTNIK III CARRIER PHOTOS ANALYZED (Conf): Preliminary analysis of photos of the carrier rocket of Sputnik III, which were taken on 8 June when the carrier was at a range of 800,000 feet (150 miles), indicates that the carrier rocket is about 75 feet. A 500-inch Roti camera was used. The length of the Sputnik II carrier had been estimated to be 76 feet, plus or minus 6 feet; however, in this case, the instrumented satellite was an integral part of the carrier. The difference between the estimated lengths for the carrier rockets of Sputnik II and III is small; therefore, it is considered likely that the carriers are similar. (Major Smith/40102)

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

1. ASSIGNMENT OF ACW SUPERVISOR (Unclas): T/Sgt C. A. Castagner, 27370 (ACW Supervisor) has reported for duty with the Defense Systems Branch of Operations and Training. Sgt Castagner is the replacement for T/Sgt Charles W. Kessinger of this section. (Sgt Kessinger/44101)

2. VISIT TO ADCC (Unclas): T/Sgt Claude A. Castagner and T/Sgt Charles W. Kessinger of the Defense Systems Branch of Operations and Training made a routine staff visit to the Air Defense Control Center. Purpose of this visit was to introduce Sgt Castagner to the personnel of the Control Center and to acquaint him with local operating procedures. (Sgt Kessinger/41101)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

17 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. HUNGARIAN DESIGNED HELICOPTER UNDER CONSTRUCTION (Secret): According to the Hungarian press, a Hungarian-designed helicopter is under construction, and the prototype is expected to fly this summer. The estimated performance characteristics of the aircraft as given in the press item are: 9,840 foot ceiling with two persons aboard; 70 knots horizontal flight speed, and 65 knots (6,600 feet per minute) "maximum speed in tactical flight." It is said that the appearance of the helicopter is conventional but two innovations included in the aircraft are:

(1) Gyroscopic stability provided by rotating weights, and

(2) "Steering gear" system which provides pilot-feel when the helicopter digresses from desired positions.

This information appears reasonable except for the speed figure for "vertical" flight. A rate of climb of 6,600 feet per minute would be fantastically high for this type of helicopter. The figure more likely represents an airspeed of 65 knots for inclined climbing flight. The general description and timing of the first flight agree with reports of two years ago that a Hungarian helicopter would be completed about 1958. (Major Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

18 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. GAF UNOFFICIALLY CHOOSES F-104 AS INTERCEPTOR (Secret): The German Air Force (GAF) has unofficially chosen the Lockheed F-104 as its advanced interceptor. The program will include about 150 aircraft, and procurement will be arranged under the Military Assistance Program. Initial plans call for the assembly of the F-104 in Germany; later, the aircraft will be solely produced in Germany, utilizing Lockheed jigs, dies, and tooling no longer needed in the U. S. The choice of the F-104 ends a long search by the GAF for a high-performance interceptor to equip their air defense squadrons during the 1960-62 period. The first F-104 Squadron, according to the latest GAF schedule, will be activated in April 1960. The original program of about 250 advanced interceptors of the F-104 type in operational units is being partially revised in favor of surface-to-air missiles. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. IMPROVEMENT OF ARC-27 AIR/GROUND DIFFICULTIES AT MAXIMUM RANGES (Unclas): Mr. Reicher and Mr. Higgins, Philco Contract Technical Representatives, have loaned the 25th FIS a "modifier" AN/PRM-10 test oscillator as a possible fix for the ARC-27 receiver sensitivity check requirement project mentioned in Daily Journal of 1 July 1958. It is hoped a trial period of approximately ten days will show the desirability of this oscillator to perform the required qualitative tests needed in checking receiver sensitivity of airborne radio equipment. (Major Holoviak/43247)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

21 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. POLITICAL CRISIS IN ARGENTINA (Secret): After only ten weeks in office, general dissatisfaction with resident Frondizi is growing. He is at odds with Navy leaders over their role in politics, and reportedly had two key Naval officers under house arrest for eight days, including Rear Admiral Rial. Army officers are said to be concerned over his softness toward Peronism, and some are accusing him of pro-communist leanings. Himself a Liberal Constitutional lawyer, he most recently has run into trouble in an attempt to reorganize the judiciary. Argentina's leading jurist has resigned in protest, and a wave of sympathetic judicial resignations has followed. It appears that unrest is not sufficient at present to overthrow the administration, but existing controversies probably increase the chances for a coup by disaffected military elements. (Major Smith/40102)

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION

2. WEAPONS MEET POSTPONED (Unclas): The PACAF Fighter Weapons Meet interceptor phase at Naha Air Base has been postponed indefinitely by higher headquarters. (Lt Colonel Singleton/44210)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

22 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. PROGRAMMED MOVE OF 1st AACS SQUADRON TO KADENA (Secret): Major Gilbert H. Bertie, 1st AACS Squadron, Mobile (MATS) visited this headquarters and the 6313th Air Base Wing on 17 and 18 July 1958, regarding the scheduled move of this unit to Kadena in August 1959. Proposed move was discussed with Lt Col McClure (PC) and Major Swanger (OC-P) this headquarters. The officer was turned over to Lt Col McKenney (DM 6313th ABW) to discuss units' requirements and the bases capability to support it. (Maj Swanger, 46136)

2. VISIT TO 7th TDS (Unclassified): Lt Colonel James Tyler, Major Joe N. Swanger and Captain Thomas O. Batey, this directorate, visited the new 7th TDS facilities on 21 July 1958 for the purpose of attending a briefing conducted by Lt Colonel George Kellum on the organization and mission of the 7th TDS. (Major Swanger, 46136)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

23 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. AUSTRIAN AIR SPACE VIOLATED BY U. S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT (Secret): The government of Austria has charged that Austrian air space has been violated by U. S. military aircraft and has stated that, temporarily, flights by military aircraft of any nation will not be cleared. The U. S. Air Attache, with concurrence of the U. S. Ambassador, requested that no U. S. military aircraft, without prior clearance, overfly Austria except those engaged in Operation Blue Bat, and that these aircraft operate at maximum altitude. He further suggested that all return flights to the USAFE area be made by way of France or Switzerland. The Attach addressed this report to Headquarters, USAFE, as well as USAF. (Major Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

24 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. MOROCCO TO PRESS FOR EVACUATION OF AMERICAN AIR BASES THERE (Secret): The Moroccan Government may shortly press the U. S. to declare that the U. S. is willing in principle to evacuate the five American Air Bases in Morocco. Istiqual Party leader Allal El-Fassi and at least two Moroccan officials have recently suggested in private that, because of rising anti-americanism in Morocco, such a declaration would facilitate the negotiations begun in May 1957 for a Base Rights Agreement. Morocco is pressing for a similar declaration from the French Government before proceeding with negotiations on withdrawal of French ground forces and the continued French use of air and naval training facilities in Morocco. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. RIGID RADOME SERVICEABILITY SURVEY (Unclas): Mr. Amos, a SAMAP representative, visited this headquarters on 18 July 1958 to check on corrosion and caulking problems of Rigid Radomes. He is also interested in obtaining data on how serviceable the equipment has turned out to be. (Major J. Holoviak/43247)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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SECRET

25 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. CLAIMS OF ATOMIC BOMB STORAGE FACILITIES IN BRIEG (Secret): In early 1957, a Soviet Air Force officer, who claimed to be a member of a Soviet organization stationed in Brieg in Southwestern Poland, stated that there were atomic bomb storage facilities in Brieg, but he failed to describe the location or provide any details. It is possible that such an installation exists on or in the vicinity of Brieg Airfield. However, this cannot be confirmed on the basis of available evidence. Brieg Airfield, currently occupied by Beagles, is one of the major Soviet Airfields in Poland. Its reinforced concrete runway is 7,200 by 220 feet and the entire facility is undergoing steady improvement. (Maj Smith/40102)

GLENN T. EAGLESTON
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

28 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SERVICES DIVISION

1. TRAVEL TO HONG KONG (Conf): Effective immediately and until further notice, all personnel on leave will be restricted from going to Hong Kong. Only essential official business will be authorized travel to Hong Kong. (Captain Batey/43104)

2. FLIGHTS TO HONG KONG (Secret): Effective immediately and until further notice, all flights to Hong Kong will be suspended. The above actions are being taken as a precautionary measure due to high potential of communist inspired local disturbances. (Captain Batey/43104)

3. AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES (Unclas): Lt Colonel Beard, Commander, Det 1, 313th Air Division, will give a briefing to all pilots, navigators and radio operators assigned to Kadena Base Flight on authentication procedures. Two meetings are scheduled, 1100 and 1300 on 29 July 1958 at the Keystone Theater. (Captain Batey/43104)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

4. CHINA CONSIDERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Secret): Chinese Communist spokesman stated that China is considering obtaining nuclear weapons and will launch an earth satellite "in the near future." This is the first indication that an understanding may have been reached with the Soviets on deliveries of nuclear weapons. Soviets would probably control use of such weapons. CIA estimates the Soviet Union, with nominal Chinese participation could launch a 500 pound satellite from Chinese territory in six months. The probable purposes of these statements are:

(1) CHICOMS hope to deter stationing of U. S. long range nuclear weapons in the Far East by threatening to secure these weapons themselves.

(2) Actual possession of nuclear devices and earth satellites by CHICOMS would increase pressure for acceptance of them on major international councils. (Major Smith/40102)

WILLIAM C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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29 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. STRATEGY BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE (Secret): The strategy behind Khrushchev's proposal for a summit conference to deal with the Middle Eastern crisis is apparently:

(1) To bring pressure on the West to limit the scope of their action; in the ultimate, to withdraw their forces from the Middle East.

(2) The advancement of long-standing Soviet demand for a major voice in any discussion or settlement of the Middle Eastern issues.

Or, failing these,

(3) To force the U. S. and Britain into the uncomfortable position of rejecting an ostensibly constructive Soviet initiative for settling the Middle Eastern crisis. (Major Smith/40102)

WILLIAM C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

30 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS DEVELOPING AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SIMILAR TO US SAGE (Secret): Reliable information indicates that the Soviets have one thousand engineers involved in the development of an air defense system similar to the U. S. Sage. The Soviet system reportedly utilizes electronic computers, and it will display the entire defense situation in the USSR on a large wall in the central control center. Previous information indicated that in 1957, the Soviets would have automatic equipment to transmit and display track and scramble intercept vector headings, intercept speeds, times to intercept, rate of climb, and target change information. On the basis of this information, ATIC estimates that the Soviets now have a ground-to-air and air-to-ground data transmission system for ground control of interceptors, operational in at least certain critical target areas. (Major Smith/40102)

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION

2. PACAF FIGHTER WEAPONS MEET, INTERCEPTOR PHASE (Unclas): Information has been received that the PACAF Rocket Meet will be held at Naha Air Base 4 through 9 August 1958. It is anticipated that competing teams and support units will arrive 31 July and 1 August with practice firing scheduled for 2 and 3 August. New schedules are in the process of being published. (Lt Colonel Singleton/44210)

WILLIAM C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

31 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. THREAT OF COUP IN VENEZUELA DIMINISHES (Secret): The threat of a coup in Venezuela appears to have abated temporarily with the resignation of Defense Minister Castro Leon, leader of the opposition to the Larrazabal Regime. The increased prestige of the Communists and the Leftists, plus the split in the military, the remaining civilian-military difference, are all factors which indicate continuing instability in Venezuela. Following the resignation of General Castro, Junta President Admiral Larrazabal appointed the ineffective General Jose Vicente Lopez, present Chief of the Air Force, as the new Defense Minister. Some reports suggest that General Castro Leon and some of his military supporters will be given assignments outside of Venezuela. Meanwhile, it is reported that the situation in the Barcelona-Puerto La Cruz Area is chaotic. Officers at the Maracay Air Force Base reportedly have refused to obey the order of the new Defense Minister, General Lopez. As a result of this week's development, the Communist Party is in a position to make further gains, particularly as long as President Larrazabal continues his soft attitude toward the Communists. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

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1 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION OF NEW IRAQI REGIME GAINING MOMENTUM (Secret): With a new Government apparently firmly in control of Iraq, a general covenant to recognize the new regime appears to be gaining momentum. As could have been expected, the Sino-Soviet Bloc was the first to grant recognition and did so unanimously. Normal Afro-Asian announcements are now being made. India's 23 July statement of recognition was preceded by those from Indonesia, Sudan, and Tunisia. Others will follow shortly. Reports indicate that both the UK and West Germany may be moving toward de facto recognition of the new government. In the Middle East, a Lebanese Foreign Ministry official has stated that Lebanon faces an extremely delicate problem since "sentimentally" the government wishes to refuse, but will have to face realities. The action of the great powers will be important to Lebanon and present indications point toward early de facto recognition by Western European Posers. (Major Smith/40102)

OPERATIONS SERVICES DIVISION

2. TRAVEL TO LEBANON AND JORDAN (Conf): Visits by U. S. Military to Lebanon or Jordan will be made only with concurrence CINCPAC and approval by Service Chief or Commander established by the JCS. (Captain Batey/43104)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

3. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS FOR KADENA INSECT AND RODENT CONTROL (Unclas): Arrangements were completed between the Division Manpower office, Civilian Personnel office, and Installations Engineer of Kadena Air Base for immediate emergency insect and rodent control. The Division Manpower office has begun a thorough study of the long-range insect and rodent control requirements for both Kadena and Naha. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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5 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. FUTURE MOVES AGAINST DUVALIER REGIME PROBABLE (Secret): The Duvalier Governments success in checking an attempted coup by former Army officers on 29 July does not remove the threat of further attempts. Opposition leaders have long been plotting with the covert support of Dominican Dictator Trujillo. It is doubtful that the failure of one attempt would discourage future moves against the Duvalier Regime. (Major Smith/40102)

2. UNEASINESS GROWS IN TAIWAN (Secret): The shooting down of two China F-84's by the Chicoms on 29 July has added to an already tense atmosphere in Taiwan. The Chinat Government has become increasingly uneasy over the Commie threat in Indonesia, the recent recognition of Communist China by Cambodia, and what it apparently regards as a pro-Communist trend in the Middle East. Suggestions of growing Chicom belligerence toward Taiwan, and unconfirmed reports of movements of Chicom aircraft to Southeast China airfields, have further agitated the Chinat leaders. The immediate result of the aircraft shooting incident will probably be a Chinat request for accelerated delivery of more modern U. S. aircraft. In this present tense atmosphere, the actual stationing of Chicom jet aircraft on airfields opposite Taiwan could well lead to at least local hostilities. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

3. FIFTH AIR FORCE UE OPTIMIZATION PROJECT (Unclas): Colonel Shane, Logistical Plans, Director of Materiel, Fifth Air Force, conducted a meeting from 1300 to 1500 hours on Tuesday, 29 July, at the office of the Kadena Base Commander to brief the Kadena base staff and the Division Manpower office regarding a Fifth Air Force study project which will take place in the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing in approximately two months. The study will attempt to determine the optimum number of aircraft to be assigned the Tactical Fighter Squadron. The results are expected to be extremely useful in determining the number of missiles to be assigned to missile units. The Colonel pointed out that, in World War I, twenty-three (23) squadrons of twenty-five (25) Spad aircraft were determined as the optimum number, and that we are operating on the same

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concept today. The study is expected to prove the proper number of squadrons in a wing and the number of aircraft in each squadron, based on the assumption that Manpower will be at the same strength and possess the same skills as today. Colonel Shane is expected to return to Kadena within the next two months and the test is expected to take approximately eighty (80) days (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

6 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. MOVEMENT OF THE 21ST TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (M) (Secret): Movement orders for the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (M) have been received at this headquarters, and are on file in 3130C-M. Copy is addressed to Commander, 6431st Air Base Group. Main body to move from Tachikawa Air Base to Naha effective 15 November 1958. Advanced echelon (3 officers, 7 airmen) in place effective 1 August 58. Main body, less advanced echelon, approximately 52 officers, 188 airmen. Unit equipped with C-130 aircraft. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

2. MOVEMENT OF 6023RD RADAR EVALUATION FLIGHT, ECM (Unclas): The 6023rd REFECM moved from Johnson Air Base to Naha effective 5 August 1958. Unit assigned 313th Air Division, operational control remaining with Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. Unit equipped with TB-29 aircraft. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

3. VISIT BY FIFTH AIR FORCE C-E DIRECTOR (Unclas): Colonel John Crawford, Director Communications-Electronics, Fifth Air Force, visited this headquarters and Naha Air Base relative to arrival of the 6023rd Radar Evaluation Flight. The Flight will be based at Naha with 4 RB-29 aircraft. The unit performs radar evaluation and electronic counter measure training throughout PACAF under operational control of Fifth Air Force. (Lt Colonel Brown/46166)

4. MUTUAL RADAR INTERFERENCE (Confidential): On 1 August, an "L" Band frequency alignment check was made between P-56 radar site at Yuza Dake and the five radar sites of the 97th AAA Group. Direct communication was maintained by Captain Dewisse, 97th AAA Group.C and E officer, at the AAOC, and Major Holoviak, 313th Air Division C and E, at the P-56 radar maintenance scope, while each site was "brought on the air." All AAA site radars were aimed at P-56 while transmitting and then turned off and on one at a time for several tries. Except for a very

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minor "running rabbit" type of interference from Army site 14, the scopes at P-56 were exceptionally clear of all radar interference, even when all five sites were on at the same time. One known Navy ship, the aircraft carrier Hancock, was about 80 miles WNW of P-56 during the time of the check (1300-1400 hours). It is felt that, when the Navy agrees to the above "frequency control" method as previously outlined in letter dated 21 January 1958, addressed to 623rd AC&W Squadron, 97th AAA Group, and USARYIS/IX Corps, the mutual radar interference problem on Okinawa will be leiminated. Above checks were accomplished as part of the Rocket Meet requirements to provide good scope coverage for all teams participating in the Meet. (Major Holoviak/43247)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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7 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. KADENA TACAN (Secret): Kadena TACAN, installed on Yontan Mountain, North of Kadena, was flight tested 30 July 1958 but did not pass the test. Equipment is being re-aligned. This facility was sited on Yontan as an enroute aid because the amount of turn required from a radial arc to the runway heading at one nautical mile from end of runway is 28 degrees and exceeds ANC criteria (20 degrees). A jet penetration using Yontan TACAN must, therefore, be based on circling minimums (1100 feet and 3 mile visibility). This shortcoming, plus lack of IIS or other terminal aid, will seriously limit operation of F-101C aircraft which are equipped with TACAN only (no VOR or ADF). Fifth Air Force has proposed re-programming Chitose or Minneyama TACAN to Kadena on an emergency basis to be sited as a terminal aid. (Lt Colonel Brown/46166)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. PRESENCE OF BRITISH TROOPS PREVENTS REVOLT IN JORDAN (Secret): The view is widely held in Jordan that the presence of British troops is all that prevents a successful revolt, since King Hussein can no longer count on the loyalty of the Army, and even the support of the desert tribes is in doubt. It is difficult to see how Jordan can survive unless the British are prepared to continue to occupy the country, or alternately, the UN takes action to guarantee its integrity. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

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11 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. 29 MIG-TYPE FIGHTERS ON LUNGCHI AIRFIELD (Secret): Preliminary photo interpretation from a reconnaissance mission of 4 August indicates that 29 Mig-type fighters were on Lungchi Airfield (24/34N-117/30E), opposite Taiwan. This marks the second appearance of combat aircraft in substantial numbers in the immediate Taiwan Straits area. It is not known whether the fighters at Lungchi are in addition to the 36 probable Frescos that were photographed on Swatow Northeast Airfield last week. The Chinat Government can be expected to display increased apprehension over the appearance of fighters only forty miles from Chinmen -- this is their major outpost in the Taiwan Straits. This apprehension is likely to cause increased reconnaissance activity over the Straits, creating a situation which will considerably augment the probability of Chicom-Chinat air clashes. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. "CIRCUITS IN OPERATION" BOOKLET (Unclas): The "Circuits in Operation" Booklet was published and distribution will be made beginning 28 July 1958. This booklet is an adjunct to Chapter 12 of the 313th Air Division CEI and numbers and controls all long line telephone and teletype, VHF/FM and Microwave Circuits pertaining to the Air Force on Okinawa and Off-shore Sites. (M/Sgt D. E. Clark/41102)

EARL H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

12 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. CORRECTION OF ANTENNA FEED HORN (Conf): Bendix radar team arrived to correct antenna feed horn adjustments on all search radars. These adjustments have been outside technical order tolerances and are suspected to have degraded previous radar performance. (Major Holoviak/43247)

2. MODIFICATION OF AN/FPS-20 (Conf): Bendix radar team will arrive approximately 20 August 1958 to convert the search radar at Okino to AN/FPS-20. Follow-up is in progress to determine arrival date of the modification equipment for Kume. (Major Holoviak/43247)

3. FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS CONTRACT AWARDED (Unclas): Philco Corporation was awarded the contract to furnish contract technicians for Fire Control Systems previously held by Hughes and Hazeltine. This has resulted in reassignment of eight (8) Philco CTS personnel within the Air Division. (Major Holoviak/43247)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

4. USAF INTELLIGENCE INSPECTION TEAM DUE IN SEPTEMBER (Conf): An Intelligence Inspection Team from the Directorate of Readiness and Materiel Inspection, Office of the Inspector General, USAF, will conduct an inspection of the intelligence system within the 313th Air Division during September 1958. Tentative dates for this inspection are 21 - 28 September. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

13 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SERVICES DIVISION

1. H-21 HELICOPTER OFF-ISLAND SUPPORT FLIGHTS (Unclas):
Due to lack of requirements, scheduled H-21 flights to Kume Jima have been discontinued until further notice. H-21 airlift to Kumi is available upon request.

H-21 flights in support of Okino are conducted Tuesday through Friday. (Captain McCluskey/43104)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

15 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SERVICE BRANCH

1. UTILIZATION OF KADENA AB BY SAC UNITS (Secret): A letter from Major General Schott, Commander, Third Air Division (SAC), to General Smith stated that the Kadena SAC liaison officer is being instructed to make available to key staff personnel, this command, pertinent planning data on utilization of Kadena Air Base by SAC units. This will include specific information on type and number of aircraft, flow of aircraft and personnel, and support required therefor. (Major Swanger/43104)

2. UTILIZATION OF NAHA AB FOR CONDUCTING TESTS (Secret): Letter from Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, requested permission for utilization of Naha Air Base as the Base of Operations for conducting a CINCPACFLT directed operational suitability test. Test will involve four AD-6's operating out of Naha Air Base and using Tori Shima Range 176 from 21 to 26 September 1958. Approximately 25 officers and 60 enlisted personnel are involved. Coordination has been effected with the 6431st Air Base Group, and a reply is being forwarded concurring in proposed operation. (Major Swanger/43104)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. DUVALIER WARNS OF INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY (Secret): There is no evidence to support President Duvalier's contention that an international conspiracy is directed against the governments of Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela, and Haiti. It is fairly well established however, that the Dominican Republic has been plotting with opposition leaders to overthrow the Duvalier Regime, as well as meddling in Guatemalan political affairs. The situation is precarious. With the loyalty of the Army in doubt, Duvalier is placing his main reliance on armed Secret Police and other civilian partisans. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

18 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. MISSILE ACTIVITY IN CHINA (Secret Noforn): Probable visits to Communist China during 1955 and 1956 of East German specialists experienced in guided missile or related research may indicate that a missile program is under way in China. In addition, East Germany is constructing a telecommunications complex in China which would be highly suitable as a research center for a missile program. The appearance of German missile scientists in China could add significance to the numerous unconfirmed reports of missile activity in China. Among these have been statements that missile launching bases would be constructed in China, particularly in Southern Manchuria and along the coasts of Chekiang and Fukien Provinces, the Shanghai Area and Hainan Island. Missiles at these locations could be used for defensive purposes, or could give China an ICBM capability against Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and most of Continental Southeast Asia. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

19 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

MANPOWER & ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. MOVEMENT OF THE 21ST TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (M) (Unclas):

a. The move of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron to Naha, Okinawa, has been downgraded from Secret to Unclassified per Headquarters PACAF message PFOMO-M, dated 9 August 1958. This action is effective immediately.

b. The following 315th Air Divison correspondence is down-graded from Secret to Unclassified:

(1) Letter 3150C-PM, Subject: Indigenous Authorizations in 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (M), 2 January 1958.

(2) Message 3150C-PM 123-C, 20 February 1958.

(3) Letter 3150C-PM, Subject: Conversion of Civilian Authorizations to Military, 24 February 1958.

(4) Message 3150C-PM 640-C, 1 August 1958.

(5) Message 3150C-PM 655-C, 7 August 1958.

(6) Message 315CR 614-C, 23 July 1958.

(Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

20 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. RETURN TO ALERT CONDITION 6 (NORMAL PREPAREDNESS) (Secret): Return to Alert Condition 6 (normal preparedness) was directed by Fifth Air Force Message 5FOOT-TOC/1700 on 19 August 1958. This decrease in alert condition from 5 to 6 is applicable to all units who are not scheduled for deployment and/or support of operations under 313th Air Division Oplan 25-58. Subordinate units have been informed. (Major Terpening/46136)

2. OPERATIONAL SURVEY OF FIFTH AIR FORCE EWP TACTICAL AIR REQUIREMENTS (Secret): Operational survey of Fifth Air Force EWP Tactical Air Requirements will be made in the near future by a team from the Directorate of Readiness and Materiel Inspection, Office of the IG, USAF, Headquarters Fifth Air Force advised in Message 5FOOT-TOC/82711 on 19 August 1958. Message also directed that all EWP be brought up to date and reviewed to insure conformity to Fifth Air Force mission. Subordinate units have been informed. (Major Terpening/46136)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. NEW CLASS SOVIET SUBMARINE UNDER CONSTRUCTION (Secret): Construction of a new class of Soviet submarine is under way at a Leningrad shipyard. Two of these boats have completed fitting-out and are now believed to be undergoing trial and training in the Baltic Sea. They are estimated to be 310 to 330 feet long, with a beam of 27 to 30 feet. They have at least two diesel engines and are snorkel equipped. External configuration suggests the presence of both active and passive sonar systems, two periscopes in a probable Snoop Plate Radar, and other unidentified equipment on retractible masts. This is the fourth post-war designed class of Soviet submarines detected to date. The new class, although modern in appearance, shows no evidence of nuclear propulsion or guided missiles. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

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21 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. AA ACTIVITY IN DAMASCUS AIRFIELD AREA (Conf NOFORN): On 10 August, a reliable source observed Syrian anti-aircraft units apparently firing upon a twin engine transport aircraft in the Damascus Airfield area. The plane evaded and disappeared in the direction of Lebanon. It later developed that the aircraft was MEA (Lebanese commercial passenger plane) en route from Jerusalem to Beirut and flying at the approved altitude of 6,000 feet, according to MEA. The aircraft had been ordered by Damascus control to descend to 3,000 feet, allegedly to permit Syrian AA units to fire on intruder aircraft which are flying the same course at a higher altitude. The MEA pilot complied, but, when fired upon at 3,000 feet, dived and fled for the Lebanese border. He was ordered by Damascus control to return and land at Damascus, but refused the order.

Again, on 11 August, the Damascus AA batteries were observed firing on an unidentified target. The Damascus Press subsequently reported that an enemy plane, violating the Damascus air space, had been routed on 12 August. These incidents underline the seriousness of recent Syrian Government announcements that aircraft violating forbidden Syrian air space will be shot down without warning. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

2. 313TH AIR DIVISION OPLAN 101-58, AIRCRAFT DISPERSAL (Unclas): 313th Air Division OPlan 101-58, Aircraft Dispersal, was completed and distributed on 20 August 1958. A meeting will be held at 1330 hours 9 September in the Division Conference Room to coordinate supporting plans of tenant and subordinate units. (Major Terpening/46136)

3. TRANSFER FROM JAPAN TO KADENA (Secret): Transfer of 1st AACS Squadron and 6922nd Radio Group Mobile from Japan to Kadena was the subject of Fifth Air Force Message 5FOAP-Bu 83062, dated 20 August 1958. Message to PACAF, info this headquarters, recommended programming be changed as follows:

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a. 1st AACS movement to Kadena changed from June 1959 to September 1960.

b. 6922nd RGM movement to Kadena changed from September 1960 to July 1959.

Commander Kadena Air Base has been advised. (Major Terpening/46136)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

22 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIET DME DETECTED IN BLACK SEA AREA (Secret NOFORN): A pulsed aircraft signal on 850 megacycles per second has been intercepted in the Black Sea Area. The source of the report states that it is probably transmitted by the airborne component of the Soviet distance measuring equipment (DME). It is known that the Soviets have an aircraft DME, the SD-7, which works in conjunction with a ground beacon, the RD-A. The equipment provides an aircraft pilot with a continuous indication of the slant range between the ground beacon and the aircraft, and permits the aircraft to orbit the ground station at various radii. What are possibly RD-1 ground installations have been observed at a number of airfields in the USSR and at one airfield in East Germany. The present intercept is the first one which can be, with any certainty, stated as probably eminating from airborne DME equipment. It is not known from which type of aircraft this signal came, but the signal characteristics closely resemble those expected from such equipment according to information from other sources. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

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26 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. PACAF MOBILE STRIKE FORCE (Secret): PACAF Mobile Strike Force concept is outlined in a letter received from Fifth Air Force. The plan designates one squadron of 18TFW, one squadron of 3rd Bomber Wing, one task force from 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, and units of 315th Air Division to comprise subject force. 313th and 41st Air Divisions are designated as task units for support. Mobile Strike Force will be capable of deploying within twenty-four (24) hours. This headquarters is required to prepare a supporting plan. Fifth Air Force plan is currently in circulation to appropriate staff sections. (Major Terpening/46136)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. INCREASED DETERMINATION TO OUST PRESIDENT BATISTA (Secret NOFORN): The Cuban rebel movement and the political opposition are showing increased determination to oust President Batista. Reports of plotting by exile opposition leaders and by Dissident Army groups, some of which may be coordinated with rebel activity, have increased in recent weeks. Despite the announced "all-out" offensive against the rebels, the Cuban Government has been unable to defeat them decisively. A reliable source reports, however, that the Cuban Army had a substantial victory in an encounter with the rebels during the first week of August. Reported rebel casualties were between 370 and 450. Although Batista still has the backing of organized labor and the support of the Cuban Army, prolonged strife is increasing popular dissatisfaction. The Government's failure to resolve the conflict may convince some officers of the necessity for replacing Batista with a military-civilian Junta. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

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27 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. BEAGLES IN ELECTRONICS/PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE ROLE IN EAST GERMANY (Secret): Beagle jet light bombers that are believed to be employed in the electronics- or photo-reconnaissance role have recently reappeared in East Germany during probable training exercises. These aircraft exhibit a number of electronic and equipment variations, including:

a. A large radome in the area of the bomb bay, possibly housing ECM equipment.

b. An antenna in the rear of the fuselage underside, indicating possible jamming equipment.

c. An additional small radome behind the nose-gear door, possibly carrying a down-scanning radar.

d. A modified bomb bay, possibly indicating camera and flare installations.

The appearance of these aircraft is further confirmation of estimates that Beagles are used in many electronic counter-measure roles, including chaff dispensing. It is likely that these special purpose aircraft are assigned in small numbers to tactical air Army units. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

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25 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS USING LOX TRAILER OF ESTIMATED 12-TON CAPACITY (Secret): The Soviets have developed a four-wheel, liquid-oxygen trailer, for use in support of their missile program. The trailer is similar to the German equipment used to service the V-2 missile. However, the Soviet LOX trailer has an estimated capacity of 12 tons, while the German trailer had only a $6\frac{1}{2}$ ton capacity. The Soviets, when designing the trailer, can be expected to have chosen a capacity related to an individual missile requirement. This would then relate the trailer to the 350-NM-range missile. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

29 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIET EJECTION SEAT BAILOUT EXPERIMENTS AT SUPERSONIC SPEEDS, (NOFORN) (CONF). A reliable domestic source, who attended the Conference of the Federation Aeronautique Internationale in Los Angeles during April 1958, reported that during a discussion with one of the Soviet representatives at the conference it was revealed that the Soviets have recently conducted ejection seat bailouts at supersonic speeds. The Soviet representative further stated that they had helmets for windblast protection but did not use downward ejection seats and had no ejectionable capsules. From this information, it can be speculated that the Soviets are, in all probability, specifically concerned with determining the performance limits of their present ejection seats and are attempting to obtain physiological data for establishing human tolerance to windblast effects and deceleration during ejection seat bailout at extremely high speeds. Such experiments could lead to the development of new bailout techniques and radically changed aircrew protective equipment for advanced Soviet air weapons. (Major Smith/40102)

OPERATIONS SERVICE BRANCH

2. COMET COURIER FLIGHTS (Unclas). The following message from Commander, Fifth Air Force is quoted for your information. Quote. /UNCLAS/5FOOD-S 84148H. EFFECTIVE 1 SEPTEMBER 6000TH SUPT WG WILL TEMPORARILY DISCONTINUE OPERATION OF COMET COURIERS BETWEEN TACHIKAWA AND OSAN AND BETWEEN TACHIKAWA AND KADENA VIA ITAZUKE. (Unquote. (Major Swanger/43104)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

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2 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. MODIFIED ROCK CAKE RADAR OBSERVED IN SOVIET BLOC, (Secret NOFORN): The Rock Cake radar, first observed about a year ago is now the prinicpal Soviet height finder. The Rock Cake has had one obvious deficiency, however, in that it has had numerous side lobes of relatively high intensity. These side lobes would provide undesirable returns from large targets illuminated by the lobes. A height finder closely resembling the Rock Cake, but with an antenna with a longer reflector and repositioned feed, has recently been observed in the Soviet Bloc. Electronic Intelligence has revealed that the side-lobe radiation has been drastically reduced, and the performance presumably improved considerably. There is reason to believe that some Rock Cake radars have already been modified to utilize the new antenna and feed. It is anticipated that further modification(or replacement) of Rock Cakes will take place at least in those locations which are of primary importance to the Soviets. The new height finder resembling the Rock Cake has been nicknamed Stone Cake. It is possible that the Stone Cake will eventually replace the Rock Cake in the Soviet Radar inventory. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. Singleton
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

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3 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. PRODUCTION OF NEW YAK FIGHTERS UNDERWAY, (Secret) (NORFORN): Assembly of Flashlight (YAK-25) jet fighters ended at the Saratov Plant 292 in March 1957, and production of two variants of the same design, possibly designated YAK-27 and YAK-29, was begun. It is believed that Plant 292 is now producing both versions of this new aircraft. The two models are described as resembling the Flashlight in configuration. The wings reportedly are thinner and of greater chord and angle of sweep, but with a wingspan similar to the Flashlight. The engines are reportedly more powerful, with Nacelles about one-half meter longer than those of the Flashlight. The fuselage is similar though perhaps of smaller diameter. The only difference between the YAK-27 and YAK-29 is that the latter reportedly will have a rocket engine mounted in the tail. Plant 292 has been engaged in a conversion program for some time, and the reported new production appears highly plausible. It is estimated that as many as 30 of these new fighters have been assembled and that deliveries will be made to operational units by late 1958. The new YAK fighters will probably be produced in limited numbers until such time as the new MIG and Sukhov designs are available in quantity. (Major Smith/40102)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

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5 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. DELTA-WING AIRCRAFT OBSERVED AT PLANT 23, (Secret NOFORN): On 27 August, reliable observers sighted a large Delta-wing aircraft on the airfeild at Plant 23, Moscow/Fili. The aircraft was estimated to be two-thirds the size of a Bison, of mid-wing configuration, with a large raked tail and a Delta horizontal stabilizer -- possibly lower than mid-wing -- and a slim, tapered nose extending forward of the wing about one-fourth the length of the fuselage. There were pods or tanks of about 300-gallon size on each wing tip. The observers got the impression that the aircraft had an ovalshaped fuselage with maximum dimensions in the horizontal plane. The aircraft was seen mainly from the rear and the fuselage was tilted nose-high, about 20 degrees from the horizontal. The engines were not seen, but the observers had the impression of jet efflux (or effluxes) in the tail of the fuselage. The source indicates that the sighting was very brief, and under unfavorable conditions. This is the latest of several sightings of probable Delta-wing bomber aircraft in the past year. This report is particularly significant in that the aircraft was seen at a known bomber production plant, an area adjacent to a design bureau. Other sightings include those in the Barenta Sea area, during the period 22 October to 1 November 1957, and in the Moscow area in the latter part of June 1958. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP (Secret): The requirement for the 6313th Air Base Wing in support of 498th Tactical Missile Group was forwarded to Fifth Air Force. (L/Col Laybourn/46135)

3. OVERHIRE OF RYUKYUAN NATIONALS (Unclas): This office disapproved the request of the Base Supply Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing, for temporary overhire of civilian personnel since the present on-the-roll- civilian strength is greater than the civilians authorized this command. (L/Col Laybourn/46135)

E. H. SINGLETON
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Operations

SECRET

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8 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SERVICES DIVISION

1. SCHEDULED AIRLIFT FOR TAINAN (Confidential): Effective immediately, a daily flight is being scheduled to Tainan to provide necessary support and re-supply to deployed units. Flights will depart Naha Air Base at 0800 daily. First priority is given to supply; i.e., AOCP, ANFE, etc. Schedule by type aircraft is as follows:

C-47 Flight -- Monday, Wednesday, Saturday.
(Note: The Wednesday flight will continue to Clark and return on Thursday.)

B-26 or T-33 Flight -- Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Sunday.

(Major Swanger/43104

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. SUPPORT REQUIREMENT FOR 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP (Secret): Disregard Journal item, subject as above, appearing in 313th Air Division Daily Journal, dated 5 September. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

10 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIET TROOP ROTATION PREPARATIONS BEGIN IN EAST GERMANY (Secret): Preparations for the annual rotation of recruits and troops scheduled for discharge between the USSR and East Germany apparently have begun. United States officials in Heidelberg report that East German rail authorities have been ordered to equip about 400 troop cars by 31 August. Cars are to stay in operation from 31 August to 31 December 1958. Large-scale Soviet troop rotation movements normally begin in late September or early October. Troop cars are generally equipped and ready for operation in early September. Empty shuttle trains usually depart for Brest on the Soviet border, where they are loaded with recruits destined for Soviet units in East Germany. On subsequent trips, troops are carried in both directions. Troops scheduled for discharge include those inducted in 1955 and consist primarily of men born in 1936. Incoming recruits will be predominantly from the class of 1939. (Major Smith/40102)

A. L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant, Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

11 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. PRODUCTION OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DOWN IN USSR. (Secret NOFORN): There has been a marked drop in production of fighter aircraft in the USSR since 1957. In the seven-year period, 1950 through 1956, Soviet production of fighters averaged approximately four thousand aircraft per year. In 1957, about 2700 fighters were assembled; 1958 production is not expected to exceed 1150, representing 68 and 23 percent, respectively, on a 7-year average. This downward trend in fighter production, by unit, is undoubtedly the result of several factors, including:

(1) Production difficulties with new high-performance models.
(2) High cost and rapid rate of obsolescence of modern fighter aircraft.
(3) Difficulties with new and complex electronic equipment.
(4) Increased effectiveness of modern fighters, reducing quantity requirements.
(5) Introduction of missiles into weapons inventory.

The most important single factor influencing the current slowdown in delivery of new models is probably production problems resulting from complex performance characteristics required of the most modern designs. These problems are imposed essentially by speed and altitude requirements. Design and equipment requirements, special metals, sensitive instrumentation, and complex electronic gear for supersonic aircraft are major deterrents to a rapid production build-up. It is significant that available plant information indicated that none of the new fighters: Fitter, Fish Pot, Face Plate and Fish Bed, are in quantity production, nor have any appeared in operational units. Since July 1956, when these new fighters were observed on Aviation Day in Moscow, not a single fighter more modern than the Farmer has been confirmed in operational units. (Major Smith/40102)

A. L. VAN BUSKIRK
Colonel, USAF
Assistant, Director of Operations

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

12 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. NEW FINNISH CABINET EXCLUDES COMMUNISTS (Confidential NOFORN): A new 5-party coalition government was formed in Finland on 29 August. As anticipated, the Commie-front Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), although the largest party in the Finnish diet, was excluded from the new government. K. A. Fagerholm, who has twice before headed the Finish Government, was designated Premier. Because of the bitterness between the agrarian and social Democratic parties, and a split within the ranks of the latter, it is doubtful that the coalition will be effective in dealling with the pressing economic problems now confronting the Finish Government -- particularly an anticipated rise in unemployment during the Winter Months. The SKDL and left-wing Social Democrats, who claim to represent the bulk of labor's strength, stand to benefit from the coalition. (Major Smith/40102)

A. L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant, Director of Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

16 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. AIRCRAFT EARLY WARNING (AEW) (Secret): There is currently a Navy (USAF Type RC-121) Early Warning Aircraft operating in the region of northern Taiwan (a course of 350° for a distance of 100 miles). This aircraft stays on station twenty-four hours a day and is operating primarily in the interest of detecting low-flying aircraft. This activity increases materially the surveillance area to the West of Okinawa. This aircraft reports on UHF to Kume. Communications have been reported as excellent. The call sign of this aircraft is "Rainproof." (Lt Colonel Van Buskirk/42119)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. OVERHIRE OF RYUKYUAN PERSONNEL (Secret): Authority has been granted by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, to overhire seventy-five (75) Ryukyuan civilians to be utilized in connection with the Taiwan emergency situation requirements for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days. Fifth Air Force and PACAF will grant an extension of time if necessary. Overhire funds are to be provided from resources within this command. A letter will be sent to all subordinate commanders and staff agencies of this command prescribing the method by which overhire will be controlled. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. DOG IN SPUTNIK II PROBABLY DEAD WITHIN TEN MINUTES (Secret NOFORN): Preliminary analysis by ATIC of the rate of spin and tumble of Sputnik II, although based upon tenuous evidence, indicates a spin rate of approximately 120 RPM and a tumble rate of less than 2 RPM. The dog in Sputnik II was spinning at this rate, and it probably died within ten minutes. Death would be due primarily to Hypoxia, caused by pooling of the blood in the extremities. Extrapolation of UMSM medical research data indicated that the dog would be in serious trouble almost immediately, and that death would occur sometime between five and ten minutes. Although there is no supporting evidence to indicate that the dog was on a stabilized platform, such an arrangement is technically feasible. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant, Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

17 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL SUBMARINES DESTINED FOR THE UAR (Secret NOFORN): Four Soviet "W" class submarines and their tender, en route from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, were positioned at 37/05N-02/32E off the Algerian coast at 27/059Z. No firm indication has been received of the ultimate destination of these vessels; however, one source states that they are en route to Alexandria, Egypt. Egypt has five "W" class and one "M" class submarines which were previously received from the Soviet Bloc via the same route as the above vessels, and Alexandria is the primary submarine base. Another possible destination for these submarines is Albania. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

18 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. INCREASED JAPANESE CONCERN OVER U.S. - JAPANESE SECURITY RELATIONS (Secret NOFORN): The opposition Socialists in Japan, with substantial popular support, have persistently demanded urgent Government action to modify the Japanese - U.S. Security Treaty of 1953. They have placed particular emphasis on banning nuclear weapons from Japan and giving Japan control over the disposition and employment of U. S. forces and materiel based in Japan. Widespread Japanese concern over the recent shipment of U.S. arms from Japan to the Indonesian Army and over the increased military tension in the Taiwan Strait area will probably give new strength to the Socialist revision demands. These are expected to form an important part of the Socialist legislative proposals at the special Diet session early this fall. This rising pressure will probably lead the Kishi government to seek an early re-definition of U.S. - Japanese security relationships. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

19 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE STORAGE AND LAUNCH FACILITY IN CASPAIN SEA AREA (Secret NOFORN): The existence of a Soviet guided missile storage and launch facility in the Caspian Sea area was recently reported by a fairly reliable source. The report, which is based on a conversation in late 1954 with a Soviet Air Force Major, describes the storage facility as being a vertical bunker of concrete construction, with a narrow-gauge railway leading from the bunker to the launch site. A missile allegedly was observed to have been raised in vertical position from the bunker, placed on a flat car, transported to the launch site, and hoisted on the launch stand. The missile is stated to have weighed approximately 70 tons, to have been 262 feet long, and to have had a thrust of 992,000 pounds. The SAF Major, who was a student at the Leningrad Air Engineering Academy, told the source that visits to missile installations and aircraft plants occurred regularly during the last two years of the five-year course. Although the Major did not know of any association between the Academy and the missile bunker facility, he had heard that the facility was initially operated by military technical and engineering officers assigned to a special branch of the MVD. The unusual dimensions of the missile (weight too low, too long, and thrust larger than any currently estimated missile) tend to downgrade the validity of the information in this report. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. COMMAND POST EXERCISE (Confidential): USARYIS/IX Corps will conduct an Army Command Post Exercise, named "Back Stop", during the week of 21 September 1958 which will last approximately twenty-four hours. No Air Force units are involved. (Lt Colonel Tyler/46136)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

22 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF USSR BY MOROCCO EXPECTED SHORTLY (Conf. NOFORN): A Moroccan Foreign Ministry official recently stated that a Soviet Ambassador could be expected in Rabat within two months, and a Moroccan Ambassador may be sent to Moscow somewhat later. Meanwhile, the Tunisian Government, which in June agreed to coordinate its foreign policy with that of Morocco, may reluctantly follow Morocco's action. Morocco concluded a second trade agreement with the Soviet Union last April. Soviet trade personnel have since worked hard to expand trade between the two countries, apparently for the express purpose of enhancing their political stature in North Africa. From the Moroccan Government viewpoint, there are certain obvious reasons for taking such steps now. One of these is probably to bring pressure on the West, particularly on France and the U.S., so as to affect the Algerian and base negotiations respectively. Another, and probably more important, reason is the strong desire by all Istiqlal moderates, who still control the Moroccan Government, to show to the restive left-wingers that they, too, are in favor of progress on the International scene. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. VISIT OF GENERAL ELECTRIC PACIFIC AREA SUPERVISOR (Unclas): Mr. Parker, G/E Pacific area technical representative (CT/R) supervisor, visited this headquarters 18 September 1958 to coordinate tech rep matters. General FPS-6 height-finder radar problems and possible future modifications and improvements were also discussed. Several improvements have been developed by General Electric for the Height Finder (FPS-6) radar. Requests have been submitted to Fifth Air Force for stock numbers and other data necessary for submission of Catagory V modification changes. (Major Holoviak/43247)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

24 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS CLAIM NEW RECORD IN SINGLE-STAGE ROCKET FIRING (Secret NOFORN): Soviet news releases in March claimed that a new record had been set by Russia when they fired a single-stage rocket to an altitude of 225 nautical miles with an unprecedented payload of 3350 pounds. The rocket was said to have been fired in the interest of the IGY, and the launching took place on 21 February from a site in European USSR. Several weeks later, a photograph of this rocket in flight appeared in a Polish magazine. Subsequent photographs have appeared and have shown both the rocket vehicle and the payload section alone lying on the ground. The analysis of these photographs suggests that the rocket used was a large missile displayed in the 7 November 1957 parade in Moscow. Had this rocket been fired on a minimum-energy trajectory to obtain maximum horizontal range, it would have reached an estimated distance of approximately 650 nautical miles with a 3000-pound payload. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

25 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. COUP RUMORS BUILDING UP IN CARACAS (Secret NOFORN): Coup rumors are building up again in Caracas, Venezuela, and one source indicates that an attempt to overthrow the government is imminent. To control the situation, the Venezuelan Minister of Interior has reportedly placed his ministry on an alert status in anticipation of internal disturbances. The divided armed forces of Venezuela, apparently reluctant to clash openly with civilians, have suffered a substantial decline in prestige and power in recent months. The military, however, may still unite for a violent showdown with civilian groups before the elections if they feel that their role in the government is seriously endangered or that the Junta has become captive to periodic mob action. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. MOVEMENT OF THE 21ST TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON (M) (Unclas): Message from CINCPACAF, EFTO/PFOMO-O 13859, dated 15 September 1958, authorized the Commander, 315th Air Division, to re-deploy four (4) C-130's from Ashiya to Naha on or about 25 September 1958, and further granted 315th authority to move personnel and equipment required for this and succeeding increments. (Sgt Rodgers/44124)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

26 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. FLOW OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES TO WEST BERLIN INCREASING, (Secret NOFORN): The increasing number of East Germans fleeing to the West--reportedly now approaching 1,000 per day -- is becoming a serious problem to the East German regime. Particularly disturbing is the rising percentage of intellectuals, professionals, and technicians included among the refugees. Since these individuals are essential to East Germany's goal of catching up economically with West Germany by 1961, set forth at last July's Party Congress, their exodus will have an adverse effect on this program. Reportedly, the problem is so serious that the East German regime is now confronted with the choice of introducing even harsher controls than those already imposed over the flow of East German traffic to Berlin, or lessening the motivations for continuing flights to the West. East German Party Chief Ulbricht, during his vacation in the USSR last month, is reported to have discussed this problem with Premier Khrushchev. Ulbricht is said to advocate harsher measures, while Khrushchev wishes to avoid any action which could be construed as violating the Four-Power status of Berlin. (Major Smith/40102)

2. 18TH TFW OPLAN 101-58, AIRCRAFT DISPERSAL (Secret): Was received in this headquarters on 25 September 1958. Plan is on file in Plans Section, Directorate of Operation. Exercise of this plan will be in coordination with subordinate units of this command. (Major Terpening/46136)

3. CHANGE NO. 1 TO 5AF OPLAN 27-58, (Unclas): Was received 25 September 1958. This is a major change, which will require similar changes to 313th Air Division OPLAN 27-58. (Major Terpening/46136)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

29 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS APPARENTLY TO RECOMMENCE NUCLEAR TESTING (Secret): The Soviet Ministry of Defense has warned foreign and domestic shipping and aircraft to avoid certain areas above the Arctic Circle in the Barents and Kara Seas adjacent to Novaya Zemlya during the period 20 September through 25 October 1958. "Naval maneuvers with modern weapons" are about to take place in the area, according to the Ministry of Defense, which further warned that it would not be responsible for damage to ships and planes which violate the danger zone. This announcement parallels the announcement made by the USSR in September 1957, prior to the series of nuclear tests at their Novaya Zemlya proving ground in September and October. Recently, on 29 August, Khrushchev made it clear, in an interview with PRAVDA, that the Soviet Union "was relieved of its obligations" under its unilateral nuclear test ban by the "actions" of the United States and Great Britain in continuing nuclear testing. In the light of these Soviet actions, it is extremely probable that nuclear testing will be resumed at Novaya Zemlya in the near future. If the Soviets resume testing at Novaya Zemlya, their high-yield proving ground, they probably will also conduct a series of low-yield tests at Semipalatinsk. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. MOVEMENT OF FIRST AACS SQUADRON MOBILE (Secret): Movement of 1st AACS Squadron Mobile has been adjusted to coincide with the 3rd Bomber Wing's programmed stay at Johnson Air Base, Hqs. PACAF advised by SECRET message PFOMO 14041, dated 16 September 1958. This changes the planned move to Kadena from June 1959 to June 1961. Holders of PACAF Operating and Budget Program Vol. 2, April 1958, should correct their copy accordingly. (Major Terpening/46136)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

30 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGNECE DIVISION

1. UNCERTAIN ARMY POSITION JUSTIFIES CONCERN OVER BURMESE ELECTIONS (Confidential NOFORN): Both Premier Nu's "clean" faction and former Deputy Premier Kyaw Nyein's "stable" faction of the formerly all-powerful Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) have expressed confidence of victory in the November general election. Neither group, however, can be sure of a clear majority. The bitterness between the two leaders and their followers is increasing, and could well result in bloodshed by election time. This growing dissension and bitterness among the non-Communists, and the consequent neglect of the serious Communist problem by both factions, are aiding the efforts of Communist and extreme leftist elements to strenghthen their organization and campaign tactics. Many key Burmese Army leaders are friendly toward Kyaw Nyein's faction, which openly predicts that it will receive Army support. General Ne Win, the Supreme Commander of Burmese armed forces, has officially assumed a neutral position. However, his attitude appears to be changing to one of defeatism, possibly because of distrust of Kyaw Hyein and his reportedly increasing disgust with the pre-election tactics of Premier Nu. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. ANNEX L TO OPLAN 25-58 (Secret): Advance copy of 13th ATF (Prov.) Annex L (Air Defense of Taiwan) to OPlan 25-58 has been received and is on file in Plans Section, Directorate of Operations. (Major Terpening/46136)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

3. COMMAND RELATIONSHIP AND MESSAGE ADDRESSES OF U.S. TAIWAN JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER AND COMMANDER, U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND (Secret): The following Taiwan Defense Command message is quoted for information and guidance:

"U.S. TAIWAN JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER AUGMENTED WITH U.S. PERSONNEL TO PERFORM THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONAL TASKS ASSIGNED COMMANDER U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND. THE JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER WILL HAVE JOINT REPRESENTATION OF ALL U.S. SERVICES AND COMUSTDC WILL EXERCISE CONTROL OF JOC THROUGH HIS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER: IN THE FUTURE ALL MESSAGES TO THE JOC SHOULD

SECRET

BE ADDRESSED TO U.S. TAIWAN JOC INFO COMUSTDC. ORIGINATORS IN JOC WILL DISCONTINUE USE OF NAVSEC JOC OR USSEC JOC. U.S. TAIWAN JOC IS INTEGRATED PORT OF U.S. TAIWAN COMBAT OPERATION CENTER, TITLE U.S. TAIWAN COC SHOULD BE USED IF COMBINED ACTION AT COMUSTDC-GND LEVEL IS INTENDED. WHILE U.S. TAIWAN JOC IS SECURE ADDRESS, ATOMIC OPERATIONAL MATTERS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED U.S. TAIWAN JOC SPECIAL OPERATIONS CENTER."

(Lt Colonel Brown/46166)

4. ENCRYPT FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY (EFTO) PROCEDURES (Confidential): The following PACAF message has been quoted to Commanders, Kadena and Naha Air Bases, for dissemination to all message drafters:

"CONFIDENTIAL/FROM PFOAC-S-O/S 13673 IN ORDER TO ASSIST MESSAGE ORIGINATORS IN THE APPLICATION OF EFTO (ENCRYPT FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY)PROCEDURES, REQUEST THE FOLLOWING BE DISSEMINATED TO UNITS UNDER YOUR JURISDICTION: A. REFERENCES: AFR 205-53, AFM 10-2 AND SUPPLEMENTS THERETO. B. UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGES ORIGINATED WITHIN PACIFIC AIR FORCES THAT LIST PERSONNEL POSSESSING THE FOLLOWING AFSC'S SHOULD BE AFFORDED EFTO PROTECTION: (1) OFFICERS: 3116, 312X, 3275, 1816 AND 1824. (2) AIRMEN: 31XXX, 33 XXX, 432X2, 463XO and 99125."

(Lt Colonel Brown/46166)

OPERATIONS SERVICE BRANCH

5. VISIT OF HONORABLE NEIL H. McELROY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Unclassified): Air Force participation during the visit of the Secretary of Defense and his party is as follows:

a. The Honorable Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, is scheduled to arrive Kadena Air Base approximately 1415I hours, 3 October 1958. The Sedretary and party will proceed after off-loading in front of Base Operations to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (WOC) at which time they will be gimen a TOP SECRET briefing by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

b. Upon completion of the briefing, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing will participate in a demonstration for the benefit of the Secretary of Defense and his party.

c. Helicopters will be standing by in the 18 TFW area and, at approximately 1500I hours, the Secretary and his party will be airlifted to Easley Range for a Marine demonstration. Upon

completion of Marine demonstration, the Distinguished Visitors will be flown to the Plaza Area.

The Secretary of Defense is scheduled to depart Okinawa at 10001 hours, 4 October 1958. (Major Swanger/43104)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

6

1 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. TWO TYPES OF AI RADAR EQUIPMENT REPORTED IN FLASHLIGHT (Secret NOFORN): Available information indicates that the Soviets have employed at least two types of AI radar equipment in the Flashlight. In the early model Flashlight, the detection range of the radar is reportedly sixteen nautical miles and a later model reportedly has a 27-nautical mile detection range. (A third AI radar, designated "PODSNEZHNIK," is also reported. The detection range is undnown, and whether it is for use in the Flashlight cannot be determined from the present information.) Electronics Intelligence data tend to confirm the existence of the 16-NM radar; however, no data can yet be knowingly associated with the 27-NM radar, or other type of radar equipment possibly used in Flashlight. The information regarding the 27-NM radar, if true, would confirm initial ACS/Intelligance estimates that the Soviets have a Flashlight AI radar with about 30-NM detection capability. Presently, there are no Flashlights identified in the Chicom inventory of aircraft. Periodically, low level reports have indicated the possibility of Flashlights in China. (Major Smith/40102-Intelligence Div.)

2. TEMPORARY CIVILIAN OVERHIRE AUTHORITY INCREASED (Secret): Telephone approval for the 313th Air Division to temporarily overhire an additional 25 Ryukyuans for the existing emergency was received on 30 September from Headquarters Fifth Air Force. This brings temporary overhire authority to a total of 100. Of the 100, 38 have been hired for line ordnance at Kadena. Action is being taken to hire 62 for the current wing tip tank assembly project at Kadena. Fifty of the 62 are for the maintenance task of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and 12 are for the 6313th transportation task. Fifth Air Force has been requested to make all overhire authorizations good for a ninety-day period. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135 - Manpower and Organization Div.)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

2 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. KISHI REVERSES DECISION TO ADOPT SUPER TIGER GRUMMAN F-11F-1F. (Confidential NOFORN): Japanese Prime Minister Kishi reportedly has agreed to proposals to scrap the former decision to adopt and locally produce the Super Tiger Grumman F-11F-1F as the basic fighter for the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). In addition, Kishi is said to have established a special committee to pick a new fighter to replace the F-86F which is now the main aircraft in the JASDF inventory. The decision to adopt and produce the F-11F-1F was made in April 1958, after considerable political wrangling and behind-the-scenes positioning by various U.S. plane manufacturers. If the F-11F-1F program is scrapped, it will again throw the whole question back into the arena of political and economic manipulations by politicians and interested U.S. plane manufacturers. Substitute proposals include recommendations to manufacture either the F-100, the F-104, or to modify the F-86 with a super-performance engine. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. 5TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP ATTACHED TO 13TH AIR FORCE FOR OPS CONTROL (Secret): CINCPACAF message PFODC 14180 is quoted in part:

"THIS MESSAGE IN 4 PARTS: PART I: GENERAL ORDERS THIS HEADQUARTERS BEING PUBLISHED ATTACHING THE 5TH COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, 608TH COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (OPERATIONS), 2ND RADIO RELAY SQUADRON AND 24TH COMMUNICATIONS CONSTRUCTION SQUADRON TO 13AF FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL EFFECTIVE 24 SEP 58. PENDING RECEIPT OF GENERAL ORDERS, THIS CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY. PART II: THIS ACTION IMPERATIVE TO SUPPORT PRESENT TAIWAN SITUATION AND OTHER CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS OF 13AF. PART III: MOBILE C-E REQUIREMENTS OF 5AF TO MEET CONTINGENCIES AND EWP WILL BE LEVIED ON 13AF WITH INFORMATION COPIES OF REQUEST TO HEADQUARTERS PACAF. ELEMENTS OF 5TH COMM GP AUTHORIZED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO KOREA BY PACAF MESSAGE PFOAC-S-R 14137 WILL REMAIN UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF 5AF UNTIL COMPLETION OF MISSION."

This message was addressed to fAF, info this headquarters, and is on file in 3130C-M. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

3 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. CHEMICAL SPRAY TANKS SEEN ON POLISH FAGOTS (Secret NOFORN): Externally-carried chemical spray tanks have been observed on some Fagot aircraft in the Polish Air Force (PAF). The tank employed has been described as cigar-shaped, approximately seven feet long and twenty inches in diameter. The front end of the tank is said to have a small orifice of unknown diameter and the rear extended "like the neck of a bottle." This rear extension was about twelve inches long. Two tanks were attached to the underside of the wings of each aircraft observed. Tanks of three different colors were seen, but it does not appear that the color had significance insofar as the function of the individual tanks was concerned. The overall description of these tanks shows a striking similarity to the Soviet spray tank which is designated UCHAP-500 Universal Spray Device. However, the reported dimensions of the Polish spray tanks are somewhat larger. This could be an error in reporting, or these tanks, while similar in design, may actually be larger than the UCHAP-300. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

6 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. RE-ALIGNMENT OF 313 AIR DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS AND FACILITIES (Secret): The planning staff for the re-alignment of the 313th Air Division communications and facilities, to meet increased air defense capability, will be working this week at Naha to complete its plan on Thursday, 9 October 1958. The planning committee membership is listed below, and will be augmented by Colonel Murphy and Lt Colonel Janek of Fifth Air Force. Members may be contacted through Thursday at Naha, WAbash 3140 or WAbash 3268.

Ad Hoc AC&W Planning Committee

Lt Col Alden L. Van Buskirk	Chairman
Lt Col William Y. Brown	Communications
Major William S. Webb	Communications (Phasing)
Lt Col William A. Beard	ADCC AC&W Functions and Procedures
Major John T. Winter	ADCC AC&W Functions and Procedures
Major John F. Cercek	AA and NIKE Participation
Major Vincent J. Clarke	Fighter Procedures
Commander J. L. McMahon, Jr.	Naval Advison
Lt Col John E. Laybourn	Personnel Requirements & Organization
Major Russell E. Oakes	Personnel Requirements & Organization
CWO William R. Dunn	Plan Compilation
Major Ralph D. Terpening	Plan Compilation

(Lt Colonel Van Buskirk/42119)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

9 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. INDICATIONS OF NUCLEAR-POWERED AIRCRAFT UNDER DEVELOPMENT BY SOVIETS (Secret NOFORN): Recent information indicates that the Soviets are engaged in research and development of nuclear radiation shielding materials and designs for aircrew shielding. An observer saw two high, steel lattice towers with a metal cylinder suspended between them a few miles southeast of Serpukhovo (about sixty miles south of Moscow). The cylinder appeared to be six to nine feet in diameter and twelve to eighteen feet long, and seemed to be suspended in such a manner so that it could be raised and lowered. The towers were located in an entirely deserted area with no settlement or noticeable structures nearby. The possibility that this is some sort of nuclear-shielding test-tower facility for determining the best means of protecting aircrews from nuclear radiation is supported by the fact that installations similar in appearance are used in the United States for this purpose. This report lends credence to the estimate that the Soviets have under development a nuclear-powered aircraft. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. MOVEMENT OF 6922ND RADIO GROUP, MOBILE TO KADENA AIR BASE (Unclassified): This office received PACAF Movement Orders directing the movement of the 6922nd Radio Group, Mobile, to Kadena Air Base on or about 15 January 1959. Unit strength is one (1) officer and one (1) airman. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

3. MOVEMENT OF THE F101-1 MTD (ATC) FROM KADENA AIR BASE TO MISAWA AIR BASE, JAPAN (Unclassified): Authority was received by Fifth Air Force to move F101-1 Mobile Training Detachment (ATC) from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, to Misawa Air Base, Japan, on or about 20 October 1958. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

10 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. MOROCCO TO PROHIBIT "STRATEGIC" USE OF U.S. BASES (Secret NOFORN): On 17 September, Moroccan Prime Minister Balafrej told U.S. Ambassador Yost of a 15 September Cabinet decision to inform the U.S. that its bases in Morocco cannot be used for "strategic" purposes. Balafrej stated that Moroccan policy is "firmly" anchored to non-alignment. Therefore, he indicated that Morocco cannot be associated militarily with other powers nor permit its soil to be used for strategic or offensive purposes. After being informed that U.S. bases were entirely defensive, Balafrej withdrew reference to the word "offensive" but maintained that Morocco could not accept involvement in war which might result from the strategic use of bases in that country. While maintaining that the main point to be settled is the nature of the use of the bases, Balafrej indicated that the Cabinet had been thinking in terms of permitting the U.S. to remain in the bases for two or three years rather than the seven proposed by the U.S. The Prime Minister agreed, however, to withhold the formal dispatch of a note pending further discussion and instructions from Washington. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

13 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. ISRAELI NAVY PURCHASES UNDERWATER "SCOOTERS" FROM FRANCE (Confidential): The Israeli Navy has been reported to be purchasing underwater propulsion units ("scooters") from France. Their characteristics are as follows:

Maximum speed.....	3 knots
Cruising speed.....	2 knots
Maximum speed endurance..	1½ hours
Cruising speed endurance.	6½ hours
Propulsion.....	Battery and electric motor
Displacement.....	95 Kg. (209 lbs.)
Length.....	1.4 meters (4'7")
Maximum diving depth.....	30 meters (90.5').

The hull is constructed of a light alloy which gives the craft very low magnetic properties. The use of a battery-powered electric meter greatly increases acoustic security, and the scooter is reported to be inaudible at short range. The Israeli Navy is known to have a capable UDT force. This new underwater "scooter" with its excellent low magnetic and acoustic properties is well adapted for coastal swimmers and mine demolition activities. The craft will have limited use for attack swimmers because of its endurance and size. Israeli PT boats will probably be utilized to transport these small "scooters" and the associated frogmen. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

14 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. REVISION OF OPSPLAN (Unclas): 313ADIV OPLAN 106-58, Reorganization of the Okinawa Defense System, the plan for reorganization of certain facilities of the 313th Air Division designed to develop a greater air defense potential, was completed 9 October. The concept and basic plan were agreed on informally by Fifth Air Force Staff personnel.

The first draft of this plan is now being reviewed and coordinated. While some sections may have little interest in the mechanics of the plan, it is pointed out that one aspect of this plan is reorganization. Certain changes are called for which should be of interest.

Comments are requested by 15 October 1958. (Lt Colonel Van Buskirk/42119)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. REORGANIZATION OF TACTICAL HOSPITAL (Secret): In answer to our query regarding the authority for October 1958 inactivation of the 18th and 51st Tactical Hospital, and the activation of the 6188th Tactical Hospital at Kadena, the following Fifth Air Force message, information copy to 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, is quoted for information:

> "Headquarters PACAF has requested Headquarters USAF extension of reorganization of Tactical Hospitals from October 1958 to January 1959. At this time, complete details of PACAF proposal for reorganization of the Tactical Hospitals is not known. Upon receipt of implementing instructions for reorganization your headquarters will be advised."

(Lt Col Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

15 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN-OWNED OIL COMPANY SUSPENDED IN NORTHWEST SYRIA (Secret NOFORN): On 5 October, the Syrian Region of the UAR suspended all operations of the American-owned Menhall Prospecting and Engineering Company and provided for the liquidation or freezing of the funds of a Syrian Branch of the Company. The Menhall interests control Syria's only proven oilfield, located in Northwest Syria, near the Iraqi border. The decree suspending operations charges unspecified violations of exploration licenses. This move probably presages the forcing-out of the American firm and may be followed by the ousting of a West German firm, the only other Western oil interest in Syria. This action does not necessarily mean nationalization of Syrian oil since neither the Americans nor the Germans had permits to exploit oil discoveries. It is likely to be used to pressure the American-owned tapline for substantial increases in the Syrian share of its revenues. This latest UAR action provides a further indication that Nasser is attempting to develop a single oil policy for the Arab world to use in its dealing with the West. One objective would be to increase the share of oil revenues retained by Arab countries, and possibly the diversion of such revenues to possible Arab development projects. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION

2. SUCCESSFUL RECLAMA OF FIFTH AIR FORCE PROPOSED OPERATIONS OFFICER CUT FOR 6431ST AIR BASE GROUP (Unclas): A cut of one major as operations officer for the 6431st Air Base Group was proposed by Colonel Cornette, Chief of the Fifth Air Force Manpower Survey Team which recently examined the 313th Air Division units. As a result of a Division reclama letter, the cut will not be made. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

16 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. DELTA-WING FIGHTERS SEEN AT TBILISI, (Secret NOFORN): In Mid-July, three Delta-wing fighters were seen at Tbilisi/Boganlug Airfield, which serves Tbilisi Airframe Plant 31. Two other fighter aircraft tails which were described as swept but "unusually large" were seen protruding from the sheds. Only two Delta-wing fighter types have been publicly displayed by the Soviets; the Fishbed and Fishpot. The former is believed to be a Mig-designed product, while the latter has been credited to Sukhoi. Plant 31 has a consistent recent history of Mig production, and for this reason, the aircraft seen are believed most likely to be Fishbed types. Three or five aircraft on the field is indicative of a low rate of production and probably means that series production is just getting under way. Since 1954, Plant 21, in Gorkiy, has performed the role of pilot plant for Mig designs and therefore is probably further advanced along the build-up curve than is the plant at Tbilisi on this new model. Consequently, with the possibility of two plants now engaged in production of the Fishbed, it is expected that these aircraft will soon begin to appear in operational units. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

17 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. OFFENSIVE TACTICS OF AN NKA CORPS WITH AIR SUPPORT AND A-WEAPONS (Conf): (Evaluation: F-6) The report is extracted in full:

"Source stated that he heard this information at a briefing given by the III Corps Commander on the first day of the 1st Division CPX held in early March 1957.
Description: Source said he heard that an NKAF Regiment was assigned to the III Corps for close ground support during a CPX held in early March 1957. During this time Source observed two MIG type aircraft flying low over the area. According to the Source all CPX's in North Korea are presently based upon the use of atomic weapons. Prior to ground offensive, NK aircraft, artillery, and 160 mm mortars (chemical) would concentrate fire into the area opposite the NKA Corps sector. This fire would be directed primarily between the second and third lines of enemy defense. When it is necessary that atomic weapons be directed between the MDL (Ed: Main Defense Line) and the second line of defense, the NKA MDL would be withdrawn approxi0 mately four (4) kilometers. Artillery and 160 mm Mortars (chemical) would concentrate fire on the flanks of atomic detonations. Source stated that NK artillery might have atomic capability, but he had never heard of it. Source also stated that regulations permitted between three (3) and six (6) atomic detonations to be used in support of an NKA Corps offensive or counter-offensive, but he would not estimate the size of the atomic weapons. The artillery and aircraft offensive would last for approximately half an hour, after which time the Corps ground forces would begin their offensive within one hour."
(Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. RELOCATION OF 1009TH SPECIAL WEAPONS SQUADRON TO KADENA AIR BASE (Secret): Changes Errata No. 6 to Volume 2, PACAF Program April 1958, dated 19 September 1958, indicate relocation of 1009th Special Weapons Squadron, 9M403 to Kadena. Errata Change indicated this was a "new entry" effective F/Q 1/58 through 4/62. As no prior planning data was available, this office requested:

SECRET

(a) Date of movement.

(b) Unit strength.

(c) Physical space requirements.

(d) Off-base requirements.

(e) Support required.

(f) Officer and airman dependent housing requirements.

Dissemination of planning data will be effected upon receipt. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

3. ORGANIZATION OF DETACHMENT 1, 5TH COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (Secret): The 315th Air Division has proposed to proceed as soon as possible with the organization of Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron at Naha. Unit mission is in support of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron. Approximate strength is ten (10) airmen. Unit will be attached to the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron for administration and logistics and is anticipated to be operational ready 15 November 1958. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

4. AUGMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR OPLAN 25-58 (Unclas): On 16 October 1958, Lt Colonel Laybourn and Major Duncan hand-carried to Fifth Air Force the requested augmentation requirements for OPLAN 25-58. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

5. BEAMO CIRCUIT CHANGES (Unclas): AMFPA Message 4650 is quoted for your information:

"Effective 0800, 13 October 1958, Hawaii Time, the Kadena Air Base, Okinawa-SMAMA, McClellan transceiver data circuit will be terminated on a 24 hour basis Monday through Friday at Hickam AFB instead of McClellan AFB. The traffic on this circuit will be manually relayed between Hickam AFB and SMAMA, McClellan AFB over the submarine cable. The Kadena-SMAMA traffic on Saturday and Sunday will be transmitted as in the present manner. Effective 0800, 13 October 1958, Hawaii time, when the Fuchu-Hickam AFB transceiver data circuit is not being used by Hqs 5th AF or Hqs PACAF for statistical traffic, the circuit will be used to transmit traffic between NAMAP, Tachikawa, Japan and

Hickam AFB for manual relay over the submarine cable between Hickam AFB and SMAMA, McClellan AFB. Because of personnel shortage, this operation will be conducted Monday through Friday, Hawaiian time only. Target date for 24-hour, 7-day-week operation of Hawaii relay center is 0800, 3 November, Hawaiian time. Your headquarters will be kept posted."

(Major E. L. Watts/46166)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

20 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. NEW RADAR AT MOSCOW/KHIMKI AIRFIELD (Secret): Reliable Western source reports a new radar at Moscow/Khimki Airfield, USSR. It is described as a Big Mesh in the Strike Out mode, since the usual slant-beam reflector on the Big Mesh has been placed on top of the radar cabin in a horizontal position. There has been much evidence recently of Soviet dissatisfaction with the performance of their early native-designed radar equipment. This dissatisfaction probably stems from the lack of solid high-level cover, long range detection, and high discrimination in many of their earlier radars. In the past year, their attempts to remedy these shortcomings have been seen in the form of new radars for early warning, height finding, and GCI. The present radar, which has been nicknamed Cross Cut, is another example of Soviet attempts to overcome their AC&W deficiencies. It has no height-finding capability; but, based on the estimated performance of Big Mesh and Strike Out, it should have good target discrimination at long ranges, probably being capable of detecting targets with B-47 type reflectivity flying between 30,000 and 100,000 feet at ranges in the region of 180 nautical miles. So far, there has been no signal evidence of this radar, but it is probably safe to assume that it operates in the S-Band, and that it may well have an L-band channel, too. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

21 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. REDEPLOYMENT OF THE 6922ND RADIO GROUP, MOBILE, HEADQUARTERS AND THE 6902ND SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (Secret).

a. In support of Air Force participation in the combined Army, Navy, Air Force Intelligence Center scheduled at Sobe, Okinawa, the 6920th Security Wing will accomplish the following:

(1) Redeploy the 6922nd Radio Group, Mobile, Headquarters, from Ashiya, Japan, to Kadena Air Base on or about 15 January 1959.

(2) Redeploy the 6902nd Special Communications Group from Shiroi, Japan, to Kadena (June - July 1959).

b. Total Air Force participation will be 28 officers and 300 airmen. This represents the 6922RGM (confirmed strength of one officer and one airman), and the 6902SCG. One C-54 will move with the 6902nd. (Sgt Rodgers/44124).

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. FEDERAL SERVICE OVERSEAS FUND CAMPAIGN, (Unclas): All envelopes for the Federal Service Overseas Fund Campaign should be returned to key workers or Lt Barchiesi prior to 27 October 1958. Anyone who has not received a contribution envelope within the Headquarters, 313th Air Division, may obtain an envelope from Lt Barchiesi, Intelligence Division, Directorate of Operations. LET'S BACK THE DRIVE! (Lt Barchiesi/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

23 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

1. 5AF PROGRAM PLAN 58-P-6 (Secret): Fifth Air Force Program Plan 58-P-6, F-102A conversion, was received at this headquarters on 22 October 1958. Distribution has been made to MC, PC, OC-T and OC-P. Copy #45, assigned to OC-P is being circulated to CR, VC, OC, OC-M and OC-E. (Major Terpening/46136)

2. CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET SITE SURVEY (Confidential): Civil Reserve Air Fleet Site Survey Report was received on 22 October 1958. This report covers the visit made to Kadena Air Base on 21-22 August 1958 by CRAF survey team. Of the two copies received, one was forwarded to 6313th Air Base Wing and one copy is being circulated within the headquarters. Report will be on permanent file in OC-P. (Major Terpening/46136)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SWEDISH RADAR REPORTED (Secret NOFORN): A recent report states that the Swedish Draken J-35B all-weather fighter will be equipped with a Swedish radar, designated RV-2. The radar will be used in connection with the Saab-built Sau gunsight which reportedly includes electronic presentation, an optical presentation, and the related computer. This fire-control system is described as a collision-course system, which has been developed entirely by the Swedes. The planned armament configuration includes unguided rockets, guided missiles, and two Aden 30-mm revolver guns. This native development of a lead-collision fire-control system to be utilized in the Swedish Air Force as a replacement for lead-pursuit equipment is significant. It represents the first reliable information that any country, outside the United States, has developed such equipment. It is felt that this achievement provides a basis for support of the estimate that the Soviets, too, are developing equipment for this capability and will likely achieve success. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

24 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

1. STATUS OF PLAN 106-58 (Secret): The draft plan of 106-58, calling for rearranging certain 313th Air Division facilities, is awaiting the Commander's final approval and will be forwarded next week. Also completed is:

a. Circuit wiring diagrams and implementing instructions.

b. Detailed supporting operating procedures.

c. Operations training program.

The recorders are being purchased this week to allow for full testing of the new system. Beginning next week, a briefing team will visit each site to outline the procedures and plan objectives. It is proposed that command approval for testing be secured immediately in order to begin implementing changes on or about 1 November. (Lt Colonel Van Buskirk/42119)

2. PLAN 167-58 (Secret): Plan #167-58, calling for exercising the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron in an operational role, will be in effect from 0600, 24 October 1958, through 27 October 1958. The air defense facilities of the 313th Air Division will be exercised, but no ground defense alerts will be called. Both F-86D's and F-100's will be employed in the defense role.

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. SOVIET AIRCRAFT NAMING SYSTEM TO INCLUDE GUIDED MISSILES (Confidential NOFORN): The present Soviet aircraft naming system as defined by Air Standard 100/1A has now been amended by agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, to include Soviet guided missiles. This amendment is incorporated into Air Standard 100/1B. Four major categories of Soviet guided missiles will be recognized, and titles assigned to each missile will bear an initial letter to describe its operational role, as follows:

"S" for surface-to-surface types.
"G" for Surface-to-air types.
"A" for air-to-air types.
"K" for air-to-surface types.

SECRET

Titles will be assigned without regard to the number of syllables, after the missile has been satisfactorily identified by configuration and/or characteristics. The following titles have been assigned to the Soviet guided missiles displayed during the Moscow Parade on 7 November 1957:

SHYSTER (Uncl) - Larger surface-to-surface guided missile (Uncl).

SCUD (Uncl) - Smaller surface-to-surface guided missile (Uncl).

GUIDELINE (Uncl) - Surface-to-air missile (Uncl).

It is not porposed, at this time, to name any other known or suspected Soviet guided missiles until more information is available. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS,
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

27 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. BRITISH FIRESTREAK TO BE PUT INTO SQUADRON SERVICE (Secret NOFORN): According to the press, British air-to-air missile, FIRESTREAK, will be put into squadron service next year. First firing trials will be carried out within a few months. The FIRESTREAK is equipped with a passive, infrared homing device designed for stern attacks. It is one of three air-to-air missiles which have been under development in the United Kingdom. The British guided missile program has suffered considrable slippage due to insufficient financial, economic, and technical means, but is now being stepped up appreciably. Placing the FIRESTREAK into squadron service will significantly bolster the RAF's diminishing air defense capability. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

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28 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AID TO INDONESIA INCREASING, (Secret NOFORN). The Indonesian Government has signed a contract for the purchase of engineering equipment valued at $15,000,000 from the USSR under the terms of the $100,000,000 Soviet loan of last February. This material, consisting primarily of road building equipment, water-purifying sets, and tools, is to be used by the Indonesian Army. The outstanding feature of the stepped-up Sino-Soviet Bloc activity in Indonesia has been a sharp rise in military aid during this year. Early this year, Poland and Czechoslovakia extended arms credits to Indonesia aggregating at least $100,000,000 and in February the Indonesian Parliament ratified the long-pending $100,000,000 loan for economic development, part of which may also be used for military equipment. Under these and other Bloc credits of lesser value, the Indonesian Navy and Air Force are procuring a considerable part of their current military requirements. Thus far, Indonesian arms deals with the Communist Bloc are estimated to run between $125,000,000 and $200,000,000. (Major Smith/40102).

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst. Director of Operations

SECRET

29 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

USSR TO SUSPEND NUCLEAR TESTING BY 31 OCTOBER, (Conf. NOFORN). An official of the Soviet Embassy in London told a U.S. Embassy officer that the USSR will definitely suspend its current series of nuclear tests by 31 October, when talks are scheduled to begin in Geneva on a test-cessation agreement. By meeting the Western condition that tests be suspended for the duration of the talks, the USSR probably hopes to strengthen its position on a permanent test-cessation agreement. Although Soviet leaders know that the US and the UK will not enter into such an agreement without an effective control system, they may anticipate using this gesture of "good faith" and willingness to enter immediately into a permanent and unconditional test-cessation agreement to place the US and the UK in an unfavorable position. The 30 March unilateral suspension and 30 September resumption of Soviet nuclear tests appear to have been politically inspired, at least in part. Although Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in his 3 October press statement, reserved Soviet freedom to continue testing until it had reached the equivalent of the US-UK tests conducted since 31 March, he did not state that the USSR actually intended to do so. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst. Director of Operations

30 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

1. OPLAN 106-58 COMPLETED (Unclassified): 313th Air Division OPlan 106-58, "Reorganization of the Okinawa Air Defense System," was completed and distributed on 30 October 1958. Twelve copies were forwarded to Fifth Air Force by Hot Rod courier, together with a letter requesting authority to implement this plan on a ninety-day trial basis. (Major Terpening/46136)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst. Director of Operations

SECRET

6

4 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. RELOCATION OF THE 1009TH SPECIAL WEAPONS SQUADRON (Secret): In response to our query, Fifth Air Force advises that 1009th Special Weapons Squadron, Tactical Missile 403, programmed for Kadena, is in error. Fifth Air Force has requested PACAF to amend Volume 2, PACAF Programs accordingly. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

2. ORGANIZATION OF 15TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON, PHOTO JET (Unclas): Received Fifth Air Force General Order 95, dated 21 October 1958, reorganizing the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, effective 25 October 1958, to F-101 fighter weapons capability cited in Organization Table R1535, 1 June 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part IIC). Current strength as indicated in the latest Manning Document applies. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

3. UNIT MANNING DOCUMENT AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE 16TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1959 (Secret): The October Unit Manning Document contains 46 officers and 362 airmen for a total of 408 manpower authorizations for the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, effective January 1959. Fifth Air Force Program Plan 58-P-6 (F-102 Conversion), received 29 October 1958, increased and decreased various functional areas, the results being a deletion of three (3) officers and an increase of nine (9) airmen. Information is not available as to what circumstances created these changes. This office was informed by telephone on 30 October 1958 that Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, had submitted manpower revisions to PACAF for approval effective January 1959. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

5 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

1. TRAINING OF F-102 CREWS (Conf): The following message from Fifth Air Force to CINCPACAF, info to 16th FIS and this headquarters, was received on 4 November 1958:

> "Confidential/5FOPR-P-P104465. Reference your Secret message PFPMO-X-P9190 dated 3 May 58 and 5 AF Confidential message 5FOOD 041634D dated 10 April 58. Latest aircraft delivery dates available indicate delivery of fifteen (15) F-102's to 16th FIS by 31 March 1959. In view of above, request your Hq contact ADC to establish aircrew training date of 7 January 1959 for six (6) aircrews from 16th FIS."

(Lt Colonel Tyler/46136)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. DISAPPROVAL OF TEMPORARY OVERHIRE OF DAFC (Unclas): Headquarters Fifth Air Force notified Division in an indorsement dated 30 October 1958 that authority would not be granted, as requested by this headquarters in support of OPlna 25-58, to overhire up to twenty (20) DAFC's. The only overhire authority granted by Fifth Air Force is for one hundred (100) Ryukyuans authorized, fifty-eight (58) of whom are currently allocated by the Division Manpower Office and approximately that number is on the payroll. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

3. MANDATORY RATED OFFICERS REQUIREMENTS (Unclas): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has notified this headquarters that mandatory rated officer requirements would be reflected in the January 1959 CMOP. Determination of these identified requirements were accomplished at Headquarters Fifth Air Force with PACAF guidance. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

6 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. PLOT TO OVERTHROW DUVALIER (Secret NOFORN): A group of Haitian Army officers is planning to overthrow President Duvalier in the near future and to replace him with a military junta. The plotters fear that Duvalier may be moving to increase the power of the secret police at the expense of the regular armed forces. Chief of Staff Maurice Flambert is said to support the plot. The arrival on Haiti on 31 October of a U. S. Marine Mission to assist in the reorganization of the armed forces apparently stimulated, in part, the planned removal of Duvalier. President Duvalier's proposed reorganization is aimed at eliminating or reducing the political role of the Haitian Army and making it a unit of highly trained specialists. Duvalier hopes to accomplish this by separating the police from the armed forces, a move which the army may view as a means of increasing the power of the President's ferret police at the expense of the military. It is rumored that Duvalier plans to install a member of his secret police as Minister of the Interier and National Defense. Duvalier, never having commanded the full support of the armed forces, purposely weakened them through "divide and rule" tactics and relied primarily on the secret police to maintain his position. Reported Army apprehension over the emergence of the secret police in a dominant position, if well founded, may serve to unite the Army against Duvalier. If so, the President's chances for survival are slight. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. SLIPPAGE IN F-102 CONVERSION PROGRAM (Secret): The following message from Fifth Air Force was received this date:

> "Reference PACAF SECRET Message PFLDP 15559, dated 25 Oct 58. Referenced message advised this headquarters of the following slippage in F-102 conversion program. 68th FIS from FY 4/59 to FY 1/60; the 16th FIS conversion remains FY 3/59 and 4th FIS conversion remains FY 2/60."

(Major Terpening/46136)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

7 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. CINCPAC RECOMMENDATION ON LAND DISPOSAL ACTION (Secret): The following CINCPAC message, received this date, is quoted for your information:

> "My 191623Z Aug NOTAL refers. HYCOMRY Okinawa RYIS 020100Z Sep NOTAL recommended disposal action on Yonabaru be deferred until implementation of new land policy currently under discussion this headquarters and until new USBRO requirements as of 1 Jan 1959 are received from the field. At the request of DA this recommendation has been approved by SECDEF."

(Colonel Adams/41119)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. SOVIETS SEEK U.S. INERTIAL SENSING DEVICES (Secret NOFORN): Recent information indicates that the Soviets are attempting to procure selectedcomponents of the most advanced inertial guidance system for U.S. ICBM's. The specific components they have selected as target items are revealing. Selected for acquisition were stabilized platforms (2), two-degree-of-freedom gyros (3), and vibrating string type accelerometers (4). Omitted was a requirement for the airborne solid state digital computer, which from the sensor inputs continuously compute location, speed, and direction and provide output signals for steering, engine cutoff, and warhead arming. This selection is in agreement with previous Soviet selections wherein they expressed requirements for U.S. floated gyros and inertial elements. The continuing requirement for inertial elements could indicate that they are limiting factors in the performance of Soviet ICBM inertial guidance systems. This would also be in accordance with U.S. experience in the development of inertial guidance systems. It is significant that the system in which the Soviets have interest is suited for interplanetary guidance, when combined with automatic optical-tracking equipment. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

3. CMOP AUTHORIZATION CHANGE (Unclas): This headquarters has been notified by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, that our request for re-establishment of 313th Air Division Assistant for Safety and Ground

Safety functions has been approved. The authorization of a major, AFSC 1416, for an Assistant for Safety, and a DAFC, AFSC 7354, for Ground Safety Director, will be reflected in the January 1959 CMOP. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

10 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. OKINAWA-JAPAN COMMUNICATIONS (Confidential). CINCPAC has turned down the Fifth Air Force proposal to allow the Japanese telephone company (NTTPC) to extend a tropospheric forward scatter radio-telephone system into Okinawa via Amami Oshima. (L/Col Brown, 46166)

2. DOWNGRADING OF MESSAGE REGARDING EFTO (Unclas). Content of PACAF message PFCAC-S-0/S 13673 disseminated by journal item 29 September 1958 has been downgraded to Unclassified. Request entire item entitled Encrypt for Transmission Only (EFTO) Procedures 29 September 1958 be downgraded to Unclassified and disseminated accordingly. (Authority 5AF message 5FOAC-T-T/S 104599K, 31 October 1958). (L/Col Brown, 46166)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. RESEARCH IN MANNED SPACE EXPLORATION GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY BY SOVIETS. (Conficential NOFORN). A Western scientist recently visited Professor G. Tikhov, astronomer and astrobiologist at the Astronomical Observatory in Alma-Ata. When asked to be shown the laboratories, Professor Tikhov stated that it was impossible because his laboratory had been commissioned by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to work on "Man's survival in Sputniks". During the last summer, the laboratory was ordered to stop its studies on astrobiology and work exclusively on this project. Dr. Kosleve, a female scientist and botanist, is chief of this research facility. The Department of Astrobotany in the Academy of Sciences, Kazak SSR, Alma-Ata, was established to direct and coordinate astrobotanical research. The task given to the Astrobotanical Institute to work on, "man's survival in Sputniks", probably concerns a close ecological system. The fact that the chief of this laboratory is a botanist indicates that the main line of work may be directed to the development of bilogical gas exchangers, such as the use of algae. This report provides additional evidence of the high priority given by the Soviets to areas of research applicable to manned space exploration. (Major Smith/40102).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

12 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. PREMIER KUBAAR SEEKS TO CHANGE US AID PROCEDURES IN LIBYA, (Secret NOFORN): On 25 October, Libyan Premier Kubaar informed U.S. officials of his desire to change U.S. aid procedures and/or the amount of aid. He said it is impossible to explain to his own Parliament and people why he continues to turn down the numerous Soviet offers of aid of all types. Kubaar also dwelt on complaints arising from military operations at Wheelus AFB and the point emerged that Libya would prefer a fixed rent to U. S. economic aid so that the Libyan Government could spend the proceeds as it sees fit. Kubaar continued that the planned reduction of economic aid from $4 million to $1 million in 1960 is unacceptable in any case; it would be better to close the base entirely. A separate unconfirmed report indicates that Kubaar is seeking to renegotiate the base-rights agreement in an effort to obtain arrangements similar to his understanding of the U.S. - Spanish agreements. Despite all this, Kubaar reaffirmed his Western orientation. These references to base rights are undoubtedly designed to enhance Libya's bargaining position in the forthcoming annual U.S.-Libyan aid negotiations. The present Libyan Government is under heavy UAR and Soviet pressure to break with the West. Nevertheless, thepresent regime seems determined to maintain their U.S. and British ties. Further, Wheelus is important to the economy of Libya. (Major Smith/40102).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

13 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SHAKE-UP IN BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE (Conf NOFORN): Contrary to initial reports, no high-ranking Brazilian Air Force (FAO) officers now holding responsible positions are supporting the anti-Lott movement, nor were any involved in the recent large-scale arrests of FAO personnel. The movement was let and supported primarily by the same group of officers involved in last year's disturbances which led to the dismissal of Air Minister Brigadier Fleuis. The present arrests have been confined largely to those officers who have been unassigned since that time. The U.S. Air Attache in Rio believes that the incident would have subsided quickly had it not been for the excessive publicity given it by the Brazilian Press. It has been suggested that, as a possible consequence of this affair, War Minister Lott may transfer the Air Force to the Navy. While Lott may be considering some action to repair any political damage which he may have suffered from this incident, it seems more likely that an Air Force shake-up will occur. If this is so, the replacement of Air Minister Mello could well result. (Major Smith/40103)

OPERATIONS SERVICES BRANCH

2. ASSIGNMENT OF HELICOPTERS (Secret): 315th Air Division Operations Order 17-58, dated 8 November 1958, assigns two (2) additional H-21 helicopters with necessary instructor and maintenance personnel to Detachment #2, 24th Helicopter Squadron, for the purpose of training selected Burma Air Force personnel in the operation of H-21 aircraft. The nick-name assigned this project is "SOUTH BOUND." (Major Swanger/43104)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

14 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. ASSIGNMENT OF THE 18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING TO THE 313TH AIR DIVISION (Unclas): Colonel D. A. Baccus, Office of DCS/Operations, Fifth Air Force, verbally authorized this headquarters to treat as unclassified the assignment of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to the 313th Air Division. He will confirm this by message. (Colonel Adams/41119)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. RUMANIA TIGHTENS INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROLS (Secret NOFORN): Recent press reports of widespread unrest, mass repression, and deportations in Rumania appear to be exaggerated. Although the regime has been waging a vigorous campaign against all forms of anti-state activity and has been tightening internal discipline, the measures adopted have generally been precautionary in nature. This campaign, initially aimed at those found guilty of economic crimes, was later expanded to include individuals believed to be ideologically suspect or professionally incompetent. The harassment and expulsion of foreign nationals -- also apparently one aspect of the present campaign -- appear to be subsiding. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

17 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SUDANESE OPPOSITION PRESS ATTACKS U.S. OFFICIALS IN KHARTOUM (Secret NOFORN): The Sudanese pro-Communist and opposition press, as a part of a concerted attack on Western-oriented Prime Minister Khalil, has been attacking U.S. Ambassador Moose and Embassy officers in Khartoum. These attacks were duplicated in the Damascus press, which accused American officials in Sudan of forming a center for conspiracy and espionage in the Middle East. This appears to be part of a pro-Communist and pro-UAR opposition attack on the Khalil government prior to the opening of the Sudanese Parliament, now scheduled for 17 November. The political situation in Sudan is such that Khalil may be moving for a showdown with the opposition in order to prevent anarchy. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

16 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. VISIT OF CHINESE OFFICERS (Unclas): Approximately ten Chinese and three USAF officers will arrive at Naha today at 1100 hours for a two-day familiarization visit to the Air Defense Combat Center and to the air defense facilities of the 313th Air Division. The group is from the Chinese Air Force Combat Air Command and HAAG advisory team assisting that organization (CATAT). The visitors are being briefed and hosted by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. (Col Van Buskirk/42119)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. HAWKER HUNTERS DUE TO ARRIVE SOON IN JORDAN (Secret NOFORN): The UK was to have the first two of twelve Hawker Hunter VI's ready to depart for Jordan on 31 October, according to a reliable source, and the second two should be ready about mid-November. Of the remaining eight, three will be available about 28 November, and the other five in mid-December. The RAF detachment of six Hawker Hunters which was deployed to Amman Airfield, Jordan, early in the recent crisis departed for Cyprus on 27 October. These aircraft have been financed by the U.S. and are to be flown to Jordan by the RAF. Efforts to obtain overflight clearance from the UAR are currently in progress. The advance party of the UK Hawker Hunter training group arrived in Amman in late October and, when fully staffed, will be composed of approximately thirty officers and men, plus their dependents. It has been reported that RAF Wing Commander Dagleish, who has acted in an advisory capacity to King Hussein throughout the past crisis, will serve as an advisor to the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) for a period of one year and will be paid by Jordan. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

19 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. U.S. CONSTRUCTION OF LAUNCHING BASES FOR GOOSE DECOY MISSILE REPORTED (Secret): The West German Press has given the British Press credit for alerting the USSR to U. S. construction of launching bases for the Goose Decoy Missile--presumably in England. The article says, furthermore, that Soviet scientist, Peter Kapitza, has been ordered to produce anti-rockets against the Goose, in series, and that production peak will be reached in 1960. The bare essentials of the Goose have already been released to the American public; namely, that it is a decoy vehicle designed to confuse a potential enemy. The appearance of this article may represent a Soviet-planted fishing expedition to determine:

a. When and where Goose facilities may be built.

b. An attempt to sow seeds of dissension and distruct between the U. S. and UK by alleging security breaches on the part of the British.

or

c. An attempt to determine more characteristics of the Goose than have been published, by studying U. S. -UK reaction to the article.

Kapitza is a recognized top-notch Soviet scientist. If he has been assigned the anti-decoy project, then the Soviets apparently recognize U. S. capabilities in this field, and may be emphasizing early acquisition of a reliable system to defeat the decoy. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. ASSIGNMENT OF 18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING TO 313TH AIR DIVISION NOW UNCLASSIFIED (Unclas): The assignment of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to 313th Air Division, as per Secret message 5FODC 11-0248, is down-graded to Unclassified per Unclassified message 5FOMO-111372, dated 14 November 1958. (Lt Kittrell/44124)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

20 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. UAR APPEARS TO BE BUILDING UP MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE SINAI. (SECRET NOFORN). On 3 November, a competent source in Egypt made the following observations in the Suez Canal Zone: (1) A seven-car train with three cars of troops was waiting to cross Ferdan Bridge to the Sinai; (2) Two trucks with about 40 men in battle dress were waiting for a ferry to cross into the Sinai; (3) A hospital train was at Isamilia rail station; (4) A military camp at the 71 kilometer point on the Canal, which normally is unused, had about 50 trucks and much activity -- ten of the trucks were tank trucks for water or fuel; and (5) a large tow truck and one truck loaded with ammunition was crossing the Canal to the east of Qantara. The following day, a reliable source observed six self-propelled guns, six tank transporters, and one Air Force gas tanker waiting to cross Ferdan Bridge to the east. On 11 November, another reliable source reported the movement of approximately 500 troops and a large number of communication equipment into the Sinai. These reports suggest that the UAR may be gradually, and with as little fanfare as possible, building up its military strength in the Sinai. There has been no indication to date of the movement of major units. While the Air Force refueling truck may have been enroute to occupied Kabrit Airfield, on the east bank of the Canal near the southern end, it also could represent pre-positioning of Ground handling equipment at an advanced staging base. Three little-used airfields in the Sinai have paved runways adequate for supporting Fresco-Fagot jet fighters--Gebel Gedeira Main (30/27N-33/09E), Bir Hamma (30/40N-33/38E) and El Arish (31/04N-33/49E). This activity, like the previously reported redeployment of a number of naval vessels to the Gulf of Suez, apparently reflects UAR apprehension over possible Israeli actions if the internal situation in Jordan should worsen. It is not considered indicative of the initiation of aggressive action by the UAR. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

21 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. WITCH FOUR ANTENNA POSSIBLY ASSOCIATED WITH NEW SOVIET IFF SYSTEM (Secret): Reliable sources have seen, and photographed in one case, three Token radars in the USSR bearing the Witch Four antenna installation. Several Big Mesh and Strike Out radars have previously been observed in East Germany, Hungary, and the USSR. with the Witch Four antenna mounted on them. However, this is the first report of the four-element Witch Four appearing on Token radars. The appearance of Witch Four on Token, the most common Soviet radar, after apparently having been tested in service on Big Mesh and Strike Out, would suggest that the system, of which Witch Four is part, has been accepted into the Soviet AC&W inventory. Recent photography from East Germany shows the Witch Four antenna to be more complicated than previously estimated, but it does show the presence of four dipoles that could operate conventionally in the 560 to 680 mcs region. Furthermore, Elint intercepts have been made in the past of signals of the interrogator type on 660 to 670 mcs emanating from areas containing Big Mesh and Token radars. The association of the interrogator type of signals on 660 to 670 mcs with Big Mesh and Token sites, followed by the photography placing Witch Four operation most probably in the 560 to 680 mcs region, leads to the conclusion that Witch Four may be part of the expected new Soviet IFF system. (Major Smith/40102)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

24 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

OPERATIONS SERVICES BRANCH

1. TRANSFER OF H-19 HELICOPTER (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has directed 313th Air Division to prepare H-19 Helicopter (52-7496) for immediate shipment to Clark Air Force Base, P.I., to be on loan for an indefinite period to the Aerial Survey Team (AST-7), 1370th Photo Mapping Group. Fifth Air Force has advised informally that it will be approximately sixty days before the second H-19, assigned this command, will be out of IRAN. The transfer of our H-19, which will probably depart by airlift on Wednesday, 26 November 1958, will leave this headquarters only H-21's for D.V. and off-island support flights. (Major Swanger/43104)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

25 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. FRENCH CBR FIELD TRIALS HELD IN ALGERIA, (SECRET). French Chemical-Biological-Radiological Field Trials have been conducted in Algeria, and the tests may be continuing with Dutch and Belgian teams participating. Artillery shells and rockets were tested. At least one of the agents tested was Sarin. This field testing of CBR material reflects continued interest of the French in chemical warfare. The inclusion of Belgian and Dutch teams in the tests probably signifies a pooling of information which will result in more effective research and development co-operation among these nations. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

26 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. TACAN COVERAGE SURVEY (Unclas): A study is being made of the extent of coverage furnished by Yontan Tacan en-route aid, Kadena Tacan terminal aid, and Naha Tacan Terminal aid. If operationally allowable, it is economically desirable to delete Yontan Tacan. The 6023rd REF has agreed to perform the mechanics of the survey. The study will be completed by 21 November 1958.

Major Fitch, 1962 AACS, supplied locations of Tacan units. Recent flight tests checked out the operational Kadena and Yontan Tacans. Major Fitch mentioned a problem that has arisen in connection with daily ground checkout of Kadena and Yontan Tacans from Kadena Control Tower. A small knoll prevents direct line-of-sight between Kadena Tower and Yontan Tacan, making check-out difficult. A work order has been submitted for removal of the knoll (a few days work for a bulldozer). (Lt Colonel Brown/46166)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. CEYLON TO ASK FOR ADDITIONAL USSR ECONOMIC AID (Secret NOFORN): The deteriorating economic situation in Ceylon is causing government officials to consider asking the USSR for a loan of approximately $50 million. It is believed that most of the $50 million economic aid fund provided by the USSR last February is still available to Ceylon. Conflicting interests within the Bandaranaike government and his vacillating leadership have con tributed to the failure of the government to deal effectively with serious political and economic problems. The opposition Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) believes it can bring down the Bandaranaike government by means of individual strikes without being saddled with the onus of having directly created a crisis by calling a general strike. Prime Minister Bandaranaike is to face a vote on a no-confidence motion in Parliament on 20 November. The Soviets are not likely to meet this request, if and when it is actually made, but they might suggest alternative financial arrangements which would be designed to increase their influence in Ceylon. The opposition does not appear to have sufficient grounds to support a no-confidence vote. Despite the growing dissatisfaction with the present government, no one other group appears to have gained enough strength to challenge it constitutionally before the scheduled elections in 1961. However, the government's

ability to cope with any new crisis is problematical, and new violence, which the government fails to cope with promptly, could lead to a seizure of power by the Governor General, supported by the Security Forces, to restore law and order. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

28 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIETS APPLY TELEVISION RECONNAISSANCE, (Confidential). An article in Soviet Aviation states that the Soviets have airborne television equipment installed in 2-engine transport aircraft and helicopters which are being used for ice reconnaissance along the Arctic Sea route, as an aid to shipping. This new application of television to unusual reconnaissance requirements. Soviet capabilities and practices in this area may be of increasing importance. This is indicated, for instance, by articles in other Soviet publications that have discussed the future use of television reconnaissance for lunar observations. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

6

1 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. GUINEA AND GHANA FORM "UNITED REPUBLIC", (SECRET NOFORN). Premiers Bsekou Tourec of Guinea and Nkrumah of Ghana agreed on 23 November to form a "United Republic" which would become the nucleus of a future federation of West Africa. The two countries would coordinate defense and foreign policies but retain autonomy in their internal affairs. Union of the two African states poses special problems. Separated by 350 miles of French territory, the two nations lack common traditions and close economic ties. In addition Nkrumah and Tourec are natural rivals for West African nationalist leadership. Another obstacle to a federation of all West African states would be the certain opposition of political leaders of Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria who have expressed opposition to a Nkrumah-dominated federation. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

2 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. REPORTS OF MISSILE SITE CONSTRUCTION ALONG THE POLISH BALTIC COAST APPARENTLY FALSE (Secret): A reliable Western observer reports that, as of September, there was no evidence of the of the establishment of missile bases along the Baltic Coast of Poland. The source has traveled extensively throughout all areas accessible to foreigners (all of the area is open except for posted military installations) and reports no indications of construction of missile launching sites, no reconstruction of World War II coastal emplacements for missile use, and no indications of marked sensitivity along the Baltic Coast. He also states that low level reports and rumors of modification of old coastal gun emplacements and "V-2" type installations have proved to be false. Numerous low level reports of missile site construction and modification along the Polish Baltic Coast have been received over the past two years. These have involved areas stretching from Stettin on the West to Braniewo (Braunsberg) near the Soviet Baltic Coast area. Other Western observers, during the summer of 1958, have likewise encountered no type of missile activity, Polish or Soviet, in these areas. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. MISSION OF HEADQUARTERS 313TH AIR DIVISION (Unclas): Assumption of command of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing by 313th Air Division constituted a change in the mission of this headquarters to include additional offensive responsibilities. Unclassified message, received from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, on 26 November 1958, indicated that appropriate revision to 5th Air Force mission regulation is being developed and will be furnished. (Lt Colonel Laybourn/46135)

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Assistant Director of Operations

SECRET

3 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. SOVIET ANTARCTIC FLYING INDICATIVE OF GOOD MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY, (Confidential). A United States Weather Bureau expert who recently completed one year in the Antarctic with the Soviets published an article on his experience in the Saturday Evening Post. He noted among other items of interest that: (a) The Soviet personnel on the expedition were obviously a carefully selected group. (b) During the year when the U.S. expert was in the Antarctic, the Soviets reportedly flew 3,500 hours without an engine failure. While the personnel performing maintenance on aircraft, and the pilots flying them, were highly experienced and carefully chosen, the capability to operate for a full year and to fly 3,500 hours without losing an engine is a significant accomplishment. It is probable that the aircraft and engines were as carefully selected as the personnel and it is possible that engines were changed more frequently than is normally required--a practice sometimes followed by U.S. forces under such conditions. This degree of success is not typical, but it does reflect a high capability for cold weather operations under selected conditions. (Major Smith/40102).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

4 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

1. ACTIVATION OF 13AF AOC TELETYPE CENTER (Unclas). Following 13AF message has been quoted to the bases and 13AF CER(P) for information and dissemination to agencies preparing messages for electrical transmission to the 13AF Air Operations Center: "UNCLAS/EFTO/13ODU 11718. EFFECTIVE 10 NOV 58, THIS HEADQUARTERS ACTIVATED THE 13AF AIR OPERATIONS CENTER TELETYPE SECTION. ALL FUTURE TACTICAL OPERATIONSL TRAFFIC WILL BE ADDRESSED TO 13AF AOC, CLARK AB, PHIL. COMOC REPORTS 100, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 130, and 160, AND ALL OTHER COMBAT REPORTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THIS ADDRESS. MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO 13AF AOC WILL TERMINATE IN THE AOC. UNCLASSIFIED AND CLASSIFIED MESSAGES UP TO AND INCLUDING SECRET WILL BE PROCESSED THROUGH THIS SECTION." (Capt W.A.Proft/46132).

2. ADDRESSING OF MESSAGES FOR ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION TO 5AF AND/OR 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER (Unclas). The following Fifth Air Force message has been quoted to Air Base Commanders for dissemination to communication centers and all draftees of messages prepared for electrical transmission to 5AF and/or the Fifth Air Force Operations Center: "UNCLAS/5FOAC-T-T 112767L. IN A RECENT REORGANIZATION THE 5AF COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (COC) AND THE 5AF TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (TOC) WERE COMBINED TO FORM THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER (5AFOC). THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER IS NOW LISTED IN JANAP 117(C) WITH THE ROUTINE INDICATOR RJAPYC. TO ASSURE PROPER ROUTING BY COMM CENTERS OF ELECTRICALLY TRANSMITTED MESSAGES DESTINED FOR THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT ORIGINATORS ADDRESS THESE MESSAGES TO THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER AND NOT TO THE COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE (COMAFFIVE). IF THE MESSAGE IS DESTINED FOR BOTH THE OPERATIONS CENTER AND ANOTHER STAFF AGENCY IN HEADQUARTERS 5AF IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO BOTH THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER AND THE COMMANDER FIFTH AIR FORCE. MESSAGES WHICH WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING: COMOC REPORTS; OPERATIONAL MESSAGES GENERATED BY EXERCISE OR IMPLEMENTATION OF EWP AND RELATED OPERATIONAL PLANS; OPERATIONAL MESSAGES CONCERNING DAILY AIR DEFENSE AND TACTICAL OPERATIONS; MESSAG S CONCERNING SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUCH AS WEATHER, AIR RESCUE, ETC; AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORTS; AND THOSE REPORTS SO SPECIFIED BY EXISTING 5AF OR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVES. IT IS REQUESTED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE DISSEMINATED BY UNIT ADJUTANT OR ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS TO ALL POSSIBLE ORIGINATORS OF MESSAGES DESTINED FOR THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER. ANY INQUIRIES CONCERNING MESSAGES THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE 5AF OPERATIONS CENTER WILL BE ADDRESSED TO COMAFFIVE ATTN: 5FOOT-C. (Capt. W. A. Proft/46132)

SECRET

Directorate of Operations (Contd)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

3. POSSIBLE USE OF BULL AS TANKER, (Secret). More than 25 BULL (B-29 type) bombers were observed at Sescha Airfield, Western USSR, on 11 September. Bomb-bay tanks located near the aircraft indicate the possibility that the BULL's may be logistic support aircraft for operations in remote areas, such as the Central Arctic. However, due to the limited numbers of BISON jet heavy tankesrs, the BULL's may have been put into service as interim tankers. Although the BULL is estimated to be a poor choice as a tanker, since its speed and operational ceilings are too low, the Soviets could be making an all-out effort to develop an operational air-to-air refueling capability. (Major Smith/40102).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

5 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES, (SECRET). Evidence obtained from returned German scientists indicates the Soviets could have two air-to-air missiles in operation at the present time. The most probable of these is an infra-red homing winged rocket carrying a 25-pound HE warhead, which can be carried by all Soviet interceptors. There is no intelligence on the detailed characteristics of this missile, but estimates are based on Soviet capability in the infra-red field. Such a missile could have a capability of being launched from 5,000 to 10,000 feet above or below the target. In general, this missile would be limited to tail quarter attacks, launched from one to 2½ miles from the target, and limited to fair weather operation. This missile probably is invulnerable to ECM, but is rendered useless by excess moisture in the air. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

8 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. FINLAND'S CABINET MAY GO (Secret NOFORN): Prime Minister Fagerholm is faced with resignation offers from all members of his cabinet. The members wish to clear the way for all the formation of a cabinet more acceptable to the USSR. President Kekkoken is believed to desire a coalition of all the non-Communist parties with the exception of the influential regular Social Democrats, whom the USSR regards as too pro-Western, in the hope of ending Soviet economic pressures on Finland. (Major Smith/40103)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

9 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. POSSIBLE COUP IN HONDURAS (Secret NOFORN): The Honduran armed forces reportedly are planning to overthrow the government as early as this week and establish a triumvirate composed of one military and two political representatives. Military leaders are said to be reluctant to take such action, however, until and unless they receive unofficial approval from the U.S. Government and firm assurance of economic aid after the coup. Under a new constitution adopted in late 1957, the armed forces were granted near autonomy under a Chief, whose authority in military matters exceeds that of President Villeda. Friction between the civil government and the autonomous armed forces has been mounting. These conflicts are attributable to some extent to the inept leadership of Villeda, as reflected in government aid inefficiency, graft, and a serious financial crisis. While these deficiencies have also resulted in a loss of popular support, Villeda's popular backing may still be sufficiently stron to spark serious disorders should a coup attempt be made at this time. (Major Smith/40102)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

2. ENCRYPT "JINGLE BELLS" MESSAGES (Confidential): PACAF has directed that all messages pertaining to 12AF OPLAN 37-58, "Jingle Bells" be given transmission security protection, "EFTO" (encrypt for transmission only) to prevent unauthorized disclosure of CASF redeployment. (Capt W. A. Proft/40158).

ALDEN L. VAN BUSKIRK
Lt Colonel, USAF
Asst. Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

10 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. BRITISH AIRPASS (Secret NOFORN): The AIRPASS (Airborne Interception Radar and Pilots' Attack Sight System) fire-control system, developed by Ferranti Limited for Britain's P.1B all-weather fighter, was recently demonstrated to the German armed forces. The AIRPASS consists of two major components: an airborne interception radar (Al Mk. 23), and a pilot's attack sight (PAS Mk. 1), which gives it a day and night capability and is compatible with either one- or two-place all-weather interceptor operation. The radar unit is housed in a single bullet-shaped container, which in the case of the British P.1B, is located in the air-intake-duct island. The radar and antenna are combined in a single unit, providing considerable weight saving, since the radar "bullet" forms part of the actual aircraft structure. The packaged design of the AIRPASS makes it small enough to be installed in lightweight fighters. The total weight of the radar, including all accessories and cabling, is 325 pounds; the weight of the optical sight system is 62.25 pounds, for an overall weight of 387.25 pounds. This equipment is particularly significant as an example of a small, light-weight system to provide an AI capability. It is designed for use with guided or unguided missiles and with guns. A fire-control system of this type would give both all-weather and optical lead-pursuit fire-control presentations. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. FIFTH AIR FORCE WCP 1-58 (Secret): Fifth Air Force WCP1-58, which replaces GEOP 1-57, has been received. This plan will be coordinated with all necessary staff sections. The plan requires this headquarters to prepare and forward a supporting plan (313ADiv-WCP 1-58) prior to 8 January 1959. The Fifth Air Force plan will be available for review in Operations Plans, Programs and Requirements Division. (Major Holtmann/46136)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

11 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. MOVEMENT OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION DEFENSE OPERATIONS BRANCH (Unclassified): Effective 8 December 1958, the Defense Operations Branch was moved from the Operations and Training Division to Combat Operations Division, Naha Air Base. All Queries, coordination, information, etc., concerning the Air Defense system should be directed to the C.O.D. Telephone numbers are WAbash 3141 - 1258 - 3122. Normal routing of correspondence will be through the chief clerk, Operations, to Naha. (Lt Colonel Singleton/42119)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

2. COUP IN LAOS LIKELY (Secret): A reformist coup in Laos now appears more likely than ever before. If it occurs, it probably will be in the next two to six months. Although such a coup might produce unprecedented stability in Laos, the Communist reaction would be dangerously unpredictable. Laos, the strategic gateway for possible Communist aggression against Southeast Asia, is also in the eyes of Peiping and Hanoi a Free World salient into their own territory, a salient that they have tried assiduously to bring into their fold. If the Communists should now let Laos go by default, it would constitute laxness out of character with their past performance. (Major Smith/40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

12 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. ATTEMPTED COUP IN IRAQ (Secret NOFORN): Reports indicate that the alleged coup attempt in IRAQ has resulted in arrests and shakeups among the security forces. An Iraqui official has been at pains to identify the plotters as civilians and tribal leaders of the Ramadi area, West of Baghdad, who were dissatisfied with the regime; however, this explanation seems tailored for Western consumption and designed to demonstrate the loyalty of the Iraqi Army and government to Qassim. Local speculation has it that the "foreign power" behind the plot was the UAR, but that Qassim and the Communists are not ready to challenge Nasser openly. The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reports the city is relatively calm, although there are signs of increasing tension and ill-will toward foreigners. Meanwhile, fears that Qassim is increasingly indebted to Communist support for his position finds further support in the report that a total of three shipments of arms from the USSR have arrived, or are on their way, and by the air that Qassim apparently received from the Commies in foiling the attempted coup. While Qassim appears again to have maintained his independent position against a threat from pro-UAR elements and seems not to have lost crucial support from the Army, it seems unlikely that the action taken was sufficiently thorough to prevent future attempts to unseat him. (Major Smith/40102)

PLANS AND PROGRAMS DIVISION

1. AF/NAVY UTILIZATION OF NAHA AIR BASE (Unclas): Colonel Noel T. Cumbaa, Headquarters PACAF, Director of Plans, and Commander W. T. Luce, Headquarters PACFLT, are scheduled to arrive at 1600 hours on Sunday for a conference with Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division representatives on Monday on the joint USAF/NAVY use of Naha Air Base. They will also check on potential facilities at Bishigawa, Futema, Yontan, IeShima, Motobu, Yonabaru, and Bolo. (Lt Colonel Tyler/46136)

2. DELETION OF TB-26 AIRCRAFT FROM 6431ST INVENTORY (Secret): Headquarters Fifth Air Force is taking action to delete TB-26 aircraft from the inventory of the 6431st Air Base Group. Tow target responsibility of the 6431st will be reassigned to the 3rd Bomb Wing which is located at Johnson AB, Japan. (Major Holtmann/46136)

Daily Digest, 12 Dec 1958, Directorate of Operations (Cont'd)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

1. REVIEW OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE STAFF MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO FACILITATE POSSIBLE REORGANIZATI N OF THE 6200TH AIR BASE WING (Unclas): The following personnel from Clark Air Base visited this headquarters on 8 - 9 December 1958 for the purpose of reviewing offense and defense staff manpower requirements to facilitate possible reorganization of the 6200th Air Base Wing at Clark Air Base:

Lt Colonel Quinn L. Oldaker
Lt Colonel Paul E. Blow
Major Harrison L. Fisher
Captain William F. Giles
M/Sgt Jack S. Hammons
M/Sgt William A. Witt

(Major Duncan/44124)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

15 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

1. JOINT AIR FORCE/NAVY USE OF NAHA FACILITIES (Unclas): Meetings are being held at Naha Air Base on the joint Air Force/Navy use of Naha facilities. Correspondence containing guidelines for the agreement has been received from Headquarters PACAF AND Fifth Air Force. These guidelines provide for eventual approval of a signed agreement between CINCPACAF and CINCPAC based on the status-quo as of 20 November 1958. The agreements will provide:

a. CINCPACFLT will continue to utilize ramp space and other facilities.

b. No change will be made without agreement of CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT.

c. Details concerned in the agreement will be resolved between Air Force and Navy units on Okinawa and a finalized draft of the Joint Tenancy Agreement will be forwarded to Fifth Air Force prior to 15 January 1959.

d. The agreement will provide that organizations will evacuate facilities which are determined to be outside their scope as soon as possible.

e. The mission of CINCPACFLT will be stated as it presently exists with the provision that its mission will be accomplished utilizing facilities designated by the agreement. Support navy aircraft will be designated by number and type.

f. Participants in the meetings will include Colonel Combaa, Director of Plans, PACAF; Commander Luce, CINCPACFLT; Major Mulligan, Headquarters Fifth Air Force; Colonel Adams and Major Holtmann from 313th Operations; Lt Colonel Morgan from 313th Materiel; Colonel Reed; Colonel Bredewater; staff, and navy personnel. (Major Holtmann/46156)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

16 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. CAMELS IN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE (Secret): Routed deviations by Aeroflot Camels flying the Moscow-Amsterdam-Paris route have caused Dutch authorities to suspect photo reconnaissance by these aircraft. Royal Netherlands Air Force interceptors, investigating these route deviations, have encountered general radio jamming of the Dutch fighters when within two to three miles of the Camel. The jamming was probably unintentional, because the Soviets would be loathe to jeopardize their overflight privileges. On the other hand, in view of the limited number of scheduled Camel flights into Western Europe, the Soviets are probably taking maximum advantage of each flight to gather intelligence data by either visual or photographic means. (Major Smith/40102).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

18 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. LENIN JOINS ICEBREAKER FLEET, (CONF NOFORN). The Soviet atomicpowered icebreaker, Lenin, is expected to join the North Sea Fleet early in 1959. This advanced vessel, which was launched in Leningrad in December 1957, is reported to have been fitted with 3 atomic reactors that will permit it to operate at 18 knots for 12 months without refueling. The reactors consume 45 grams (1.59 ounces) of nuclear fuel in 24 hours and generate 44,000 horsepower. The addition of the Lenin will increase the Soviet Icebreaker Fleet to 16 vessels. (Major Smith/40102)

MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION DIVISION

2. APPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF THE 51ST FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR WING (Unclas). This headquarters has been informed by Major McCabe, Headquarters Fifth Air Force Manpower representative that the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing proposed reorganization has been approved by Fifth Air Force. Minor grade adjustments within resources of the 51st FIW were accomplished with the assistance of L/Col Steers, representative of the 51st FIW. The additional Col and L/Col required to reorganize will be requested from the resources of PACAF. (Major Duncan/46135)

PLANS, PROGRAMS & REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

3. USARYIS/IX CORPS TO PARTICIPATE IN FIELD EXERCISE (CONF). USARYIS/IX Corps is scheduled to participate, for a week during the month of February 1959, in a field exercise to be known as "Keystone". L/Col James O. Tyler, OC-P, is the Air Force monitor. (L/Col Tyler/46136)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

19 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS

1. JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT WITH THE NAVY (Unclas). A phone call was received from Colonel Cumbaa, PACAF, this morning reminding us of the urgency of completing the Joint Tenancy Agreement with the Navy at Naha. He requested that the agreement be hand carried to Fifth Air Force when completed and that we call him when the document left the 313th Air Division. (Col Adams/41119)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

22 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

1. PACAF DISAPPROVAL OF REQUEST (Secret): PACAF disapproved our request to modify the F86D to incorporate Sidewinder capability. (Colonel Adams/41119)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

23 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1. INFRARED CAMOUFLAGE PAINT PROGRAM IN PAF (Secret): A reliable report indicates an advance infrared camouflage paint program in Poland. Specifications called for a paint that would cause treated objects to appear in infrared photography as though they were a part of the background terrain. So far, the Polish Air Force has accepted seven of the paints developed as being infrared proof to the extent required. The paints accepted organic pigments. They are much thicker than ordinary paints, but can be applied with a brush. All of them are inflammable. In aerial test photos of objects covered with these paints, many of the photos showed at least some trace of the camouflaged article. However, the source of information was so slight that it was felt, for all practical purposes, the treated objects could be considered invisible. The PAF was to put into service in 1958 the paints that had been accepted as satisfactory. (Major Smith/ 40102)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

31 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

MANPOWER DIVISION

1. REORGANIZATION STUDY OF THE HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION. (Unclas). The Reorganization Committee, composed of Lt Colonel Laybourn - 3130C-M, Lt Colonel McClure - 313PC, Lt Colonel Tyler - 3130C-P, and Major Huckabay, 313MC, has completed the reorganization study of the Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and a report in two copies will be furnished the Directorate of Operations, the Directorate of Material, and the Directorate of Personnel. Other staff agencies interested in reading the report may contact one of these directorates. (L/Col Laybourn/56135).

PLANS, PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION

2. JOINT UTILIZATION OF NAHA AIR BASE, (Unclas). After discussions between B/Gen Dale O. Smith, Capt R. L. Friede, USN, and other Air Force representatives an agreement has been reached locally between the Air Force and Navy on the Joint Utilization of Naha Air Base. The local finalized agreements was forwarded to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force by aircraft courier in an F-86. The aircraft departed Naha 2400I, 29 Dec 1958. (Major Holtmann/46136)

COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

3. REORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF 5TH COMM GROUP (Secret). Headquarters PACAF advises that the 5th Communications Group will be reorganized into the PACAF Communications and Control Group on 1 April 1959 and be assigned to and under Operational control of Fifth Air Force, with station at Kadena Air Base until January 1961. At this time the group will move to Clark Air Force Base and be assigned to and under the operational control of 13th Air Force. Fifth Communications Group will continue to provide communications support for our units deployed to Taiwan. (Major Watts/46166).

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

SECRET

SECRET

7

Headquarters
313TH AIR DIVISION
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

3130C

30 October 1958

SUBJECT: Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" (RCS: FAF-V8) 24 October through 28 October 1958

TO: Commander
5th Air Force CGC
ATTN: Operations Analysis
APO 925, San Francisco, California

1. In accordance with 5th Air Force Regulation 55-12 dated 5 May 1958 and 67th TAW Operation Plan 167-58, (Subject same as above) the following report is submitted.

2. When inclosures is withdrawn or not attached, the classification of SECRET on this letter will be cancelled in accordance with paragraph 37h, AFR 205-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

3 Incls
1. Report of AAA Activities
2. Report (RCS: FAF-V8)
3. Overlay Maps (1 thru 31)

W. C. ADAMS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Operations

S-1-507

SECRET

INCL #3

Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" (HQS: FAF-V8) 24 October thru 28 October 1958

AIR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

PART I

1. ACW OPERATIONS:

a. Radar Status: The following represents Radar Equipment outages during alert periods of Exercise "Zips Idea":

Site P-53: Primary Radar AN/FPS-3 was inoperative due to scheduled preventive maintenance from 25/0500Z to 25/0800Z.

Site P-54: Had no Radar Outages during alert periods of this exercise.

Site P-55: Secondary Radar AN/FPS-6 was inoperative due to scheduled maintenance and power supply difficulties from 26/2200Z to 27/0200Z. The AN/FPS-6 went condition II at 27/2132Z due to arcing and decreased output. It remained condition II until after exercise "Zips Idea" was terminated.

Site P-56: Primary Radar AN/FPS-3 was inoperative due to scheduled preventive maintenance from 24/2200Z to 25/0050Z.

b. Communications Status: Communications outages which occured during alert periods of Exercise "Zips Idea" were:

Site P-53: F/M Circuit 851-4V Tactical action to P-56 was inoperative from 27/1037Z to 28/1600Z due to amplifier difficulties.

Site P-54: F/M Circuit 851-4V channel 3 to P-56 was inoperative from 23/2215Z to 24/0115Z due to a malfunctioning ringer. This malfunction occured again from 28/0045Z to 28/0515Z.

Site P-55: Had no Communications Outages during alert periods of exercise "Zips Idea."

Site P-56: Microwave channel 19 to Kadena Base Operations was inoperative from 26/0315Z to 27/0245Z. Receiver difficulties were the cause of this outage. From 28/0622Z until 28/0706Z the ringers were inoperative at P-56. The problem was solved by having ADCC personnel continuously monitor the lines to P-56 for the duration of the ringer outage.

c. Statistical Summary:

(1) Total Aggressor Flown 32.

(2) Total Aggressors Detected 31.

(3) Total Scrambles by Flights.

(a) 16th FIS F86D's 28.

(b) 477th TFS 100's 29.

(4) Total Individual Intercepts Attempted.

(a) 16th FIS F86D's 55.

(b) 477th TFS F100's 78.

(5) Successful Intercepts.

(a) 16th FIS F86D's MA's 1 VMA's 5.

(b) 477th TFS F100's VMA's 62.

(6) Total Unsuccessful Intercepts.

(a) 16th FIS F86D's (54) (Reason Missed) (ACP-13) (AEF-10) (GEF-19) (DE-12)

(b) 477th TFS F100's (16) (Reason Missed) (ACP-2) (GEF-12) (DE-2)

2. INTERCEPTOR OPERATIONS:

a. Total interceptor aircraft possessed by 16th FIS and 477th TFS at time of (Cocked Pistol) and (Fade Out).

(1) 477th TFS F100's - 14

(2) 16th FIS F86D's -26

b. Aircraft Operational Ready by 16th FIS and 477th TFS at time of (Cocked Pistol) and (Fade Out).

(1) 477th TFS F100 - 71%

(2) 16th FIS F86D's - 70%

Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" (RCS: FAF-V8) 24 October thru 28 October 1958 (Cont'd)

c. Number of Ground Aborts and Reason for each.

(1) 16th FIS F86D's 3 excessive Tail Pipe Heat, Radio Failure and Lock-up Light on.

(2) 477th TFS F100's - None.

d. Number of Air Aborts and Reason for each.

(1) 16th FIS F86D's -2 - Emergency Fuel System, Radio Failure.

(2) 477th TFS F100's - 1- Heat Vent, over heat light came on in flight.

e. Average Scramble time by type of interceptor.

(1) 16th FIS F86D's - 5.2 minutes.

(2) 477th TFS F100's - 2.3 minutes.

f. Average turn around by type of interceptor.

(1) 16th FIS F86D's - 9 minutes.

(2) 477th TFS F100's - 26.7 minutes.

3. FAKER MISSION SUMMARY:

a. Overlays inclosed with this report.

4. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Alerts and Warnings ("Cocked Pistol")

(1) "Apple Jack", and "Snow Man" called by the 313th COD on exercise "Zips Idea."

(2) The following Organization's were notified of "Cocked Pistol," "Apple Jacks", and "Snow Man" by the 313th COD. From 24 October 1958 through 28 October 1958.

(a) Organizations Notified.

1. 5th AF COC

2. Clark ADCC

3. Guam ADCC

4. Formosa ADCC

5. Navy Plms

(b) Disaster Control.

(1) Not implemented

(c) Scatter

(1) Not implemented

(d) ECM Activity

(1) Negative Report

(e) Security and Base Defense

(1) Not implemented

(f) Conclusions and Recommendations

(1) Conclusions: The AN/FPS-20 Radar at Site P-55 has increased the surveillance and intercept capability of the Okinawa Air Defense System. This was the first ADX for this radar in the 313th Air Division. Communications difficulties did not seriously hamper the ADX. Due to their limited capability the F-86D interceptors are experiencing difficulty in intercepting RF-101 type aircraft.

(2) Recommendations: It is recommended that the F86D interceptors be replaced with Century series aircraft as soon as possible. To increase the capability of possessed aircraft, it is recommended that the F86D interceptors be equipped with "Side Winder" missles. To increase the kill rate on targets with a speed advantage, it is recommended that F86D pilots and GCI directors practice 110° beam intercepts. To present more realistic training for the Okinawa Air Defense System, target and "Faker" aircraft should include evasive action in their tactics when possible. It is recommended that more frequent interceptor training missions be scheduled with Century type aircraft as targets. Every effort should be made to closely monitor the present HF Cross-Tell System between Itazuke ADCC and the Okinawa ADCC to insure the telling of all significant tracks. This addition to/or extension of the Okinawa early warning capability is of critical importance in employing the F86D interceptors against high speed and high altitude aircraft.

Analysis of Exercise "Zips Idea" (MCS: FAF-V8) 24 October thru 28 October 1958 (Cont'd)

PART II

AAA ACTIVITIES:

a. AAA Summary inclosed with this report.

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
97TH ARTILLERY GROUP (AIR DEFENSE)
FORT BUCKNER, APO 331

31 October 1958

SUBJECT: Report of ADX Activities

TO: Commanding General
313th Air Division
APO 331

1. Reference: 5AF Regulation Number 55-12, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, dated 23 January 1957.

2. Attached hereto is "Part II, AAA Activities," of the report of Army Air Defense activity during the ADX "ZIPS IDEA," conducted during the period 24-28 October 1958.

3. Regraded Unclassified 31 October 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
a/s

J. L. BRIDGES
Captain, Arty
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT: ADX,"ZIPS IDEA"

Part II: AAA Activities

1. Participation. All elements of the 97th Artillery Group (Air Defense) participated in the Air Defense Exercise (ADX) "ZIPS IDEA" conducted during the period 24-28 October 1958.

2. Commentary. Coordination in:

a. ACW operation.

(1) It appeared at times during this ADX that aircraft recovery procedures as specified in 313th Air Division Regulation Number 55-3, dated 1958 were not followed. Specifically, interceptor aircraft being recovered were not directed on a course to keep them outside the Gun Defended area until hand off points were reached. Recovery infomation was not forward-told to the Army Air Defense Command Post (AADCP), and as a result at times it was questionable whether interceptor aircraft in the process of recovery, or the faker aircraft were being tracked.

(2) The procedure of identifying faker aircraft fiendly prior to their entering the range of Air Defense Artillery (AD) weapons defeats training realism for ADA units.

(3) Additionally fourteen (14) of the faker aircraft did not overfly the defense; again this did not produce training realism.

(4) In some instances after identifying the faker aircraft friendly, the ADCC would tell the AADCP to "scrub" the track. Subsequently the aircraft would overfly the defense. In future exercises it is recommended that even though intercept aircraft have identified the fakers, the tracks on these aircraft continue to carry the faker designation until the defense has been overflown or the faker aircraft assumes an outbound heading. This will minimize confusion and assure that ADA units do not drop these targets.

b. Base Defense Operations. Ground defense plans were not practiced.

c. Naval AAA Integration. Naval AAA did not participate.

3. Statistical Summary.

a. Total strikes against AAA: (32)

b. Total fakers within range of:

(1) Skysweeper: (1)

(2) 120mm Guns: (18)

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Number of fakers engaged by:

(1) Skysweeper: (1)

(2) 120mm Guns: (11)

d. Unidentified tracks engaged by:

(1) Skysweeper: None

(2) 120mm Guns: None

4. Regraded Unclassified 31 October 1961.

8

PACAF REGULATION NO. 55-43

HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC AIR FORCES
APO 953
8 May 1958

OPERATIONS

(U) War Emergency Alert Procedures

Purpose: To establish a positive procedure for alerting units in preparation for and execution of the Emergency War Plans or Contingency War Plans.

1. Applicability: Applies to all staff sections of Hq PACAF, the commander of each PACAF subordinate unit and the commander of each USAF unit under the jurisdiction of the Theater Air Force commander.

2. General: The orderly and timely execution of war plans requires the establishment of a means of alerting and conditioning our forces for impending hostilities and a positive method of sending the execution order. Preparation on the part of the forces will achieve a standardized condition of readiness throughout the command. This preparation, culminating with the execution of war plans, will result in automatic completion of appropriate Emergency Pacific Air Staff Actions (EPASA). To this end, a series of alert conditions are established which progressively condition our forces from routine to war. To implement these conditions, supporting actions must be accomplished simultaneously by staff agencies and units. (Reference Attachment 1)

3. Conditions of Alert:

a. Condition 6 - NORMAL - This is the normal state of alert maintained during peacetime day-to-day operations in the performance of routine operations. During this condition, combat units will train and be supported to achieve a minimum Unit Commander's Overall Index of Operational Readiness of seven, as defined in paragraph 12c, AFR 55-6. War Plans will be prepared and kept current to support the plans of the next higher command. All personnel will be familiar with their responsibilities and tasks to be accomplished when the plan is implemented.

b. Condition 5 - GET PREPARED - Under this alert condition, which may be dictated by an increased intelligence watch, units will accelerate training programs with particular emphasis placed on combat readiness. Pertinent personnel, security, and materiel actions will be implemented to assure that the accelerated training program is adequately supported. War Plans will be reviewed for adequacy and currency.

c. Condition 4 - LINE UP - The primary objective of this condition is to increase the overall in-commission rate of the combat units in preparation for execution of the Emergency or Contingency War Plans. Normally, at the time this condition goes into effect, a state of Air Defense Readiness will be declared. This does not preclude a prior declaration of Air Defense Readiness by air force or air division commanders. Actions to be accomplished under this alert condition include:

(1) Strike and support units will be alerted at their home bases and action taken to increase the overall in-commission rate.

(2) Prepare to execute Weapons Movement Schedule. All Phase One airlift aircraft will be loaded with atomic weapons and/or nuclear capsules.

(3) Recall all personnel to duty.

(4) Increased security measures will be implemented.

(5) Maintain readiness to provide passive defense consistent with the intelligence situation.

(6) Reduce staff activities to provide required augmentation to agencies engaged in preparing for the execution of the War Plans

(7) Atomic delivery vehicles located at bases adjacent to nuclear storage sites will be loaded with atomic weapons in accordance with the current PACAF Wartime Capabilities Plan.

(8) Place tanker aircraft on standby alert to accomplish refueling mission.

d. Condition 3 - ON YOUR MARK - This is the minimum condition dictated by the initial declaration of a Defense Emergency. Under this situation, the following actions are required.

(1) Prepare to execute the War Plan.

(2) Troop carriers will execute appropriate Weapons Movement Schedule. (Depending upon this situation, Condition 3 may be declared with or without this action.)

(3) Loaded aircraft will deploy to strike bases as required. Remaining aircraft will be loaded at home bases with nuclears inserted.

(4) Tanker aircraft will deploy to forward staging bases as required and placed on standby.

e. Condition 2 - GET SET - This is the alert status immediately prior to the execution of the war plans and includes the following final actions:

(1) Complete the preparations for the execution of the War Plan.

(2) Troop carriers execute appropriate Weapons Movement Schedule if not previously executed under condition 3. (Depending upon the situation, Condition 2 may be declared with or without this action.)

f. Condition 1 - GO - Execute the Emergency War Plan.

4. Procedures: PACAF forces will be directed in the following manner to assume any of the various conditions of combat posture:

a. CINCPACAF, through PACAF's Command Center, will direct the PACAF staff and the immediate subordinate commands by wire, telephone, radio, or any other means available, to implement any of the outlined alert conditions. This directive will contain proper authentication as prescribed in the appropriate War Plan.

b. Each subordinate commander will bring his units to the state of alert as directed.

c. As the subordinate commands reach the combat posture and accomplish the supporting actions required, they will report to CINCPACAF through the PACAF Command Center.

d. Under a period of increasing world tensions, it is possible to progress gradually from normal activity through the various conditions of alert readiness to the execution of the Emergency War Plan. In the event that no period of buildup or warning occurs, PACAF must be prepared to counter surprise attack immediately by declaring Condition 1. In this event, every action item of the various conditions will be accomplished at the earliest possible time. Emphasis will be placed on those emergency actions which must be accomplished on a priority basis to permit execution of the Emergency War Plan.

5. Checklists: To assure standardization, checklists covering each state of alert will be prepared in accordance with Attachment 1. These checklists will be forwarded to the next higher echelon for approval as to their accuracy and completeness. Such checklists will include all appropriate EPASA.

a. PACAF. A complete checklist for each condition of alert will be established. The appropriate staff agency will develop that portion of the checklist peculiar to his responsibilities. This checklist will be utilized to assure complete and timely action by PACAF as any of the various states of readiness are assumed. The appropriate portion of this checklist will be maintained in the Command Center. The PACAF staff agency will be responsible for reviewing and approving the checklists of the next subordinate echelon of command. (See Continuity of Operations Plan 17 - 58.

b. Subordinate commands will:

(1) Develop their own checklists to implement each alert condition. These checklists will be forwarded to Hq PACAF for approval.

(2) Direct their subordinate units to develop detailed checklists, and approve these checklists for completeness and accuracy.

6. References:

a. AFR 55-6 Operational Readiness Reports

SECRET

PACAFR 55-43A
1, 3, 4, 5

PACAF REGULATION
No. 55-43A

HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC AIR FORCES

Operations

(U) WAR EMERGENCY ALERT PROCEDURES

PACAFR 55-43, 8 May 1958, is changed as follows:

1. Applicability: Applies to the commander of each PACAF subordinate unit and to commander of each USAF unit under the jurisdiction of the Theater Air Force commander.

3. c. (2) Prepare to execute Weapons Movement Schedule.

(7) At bases having nuclear storage sites, atomic delivery aircraft will be loaded with atomic weapons and nuclear components will be installed in accordance with the current general war plan. At those bases not having nuclear storage sites, the aircraft planned to pre-strike stage to receive their nuclear components or MK-28 weapons at strike bases will be loaded or prepared for deployment. Nuclear components will not be installed in the warheads of missiles until called for in normal sequence of action in countdown procedures.

d. (3) Aircraft required to deploy to strike bases will be deployed; however, they will deploy without nuclear components installed or MK-28 weapons loaded. The nuclear components or MK-28 weapons will be installed or loaded at the strike bases. All remaining aircraft other than those loaded under paragraph 3c(7) will be loaded at home bases and nuclear components installed upon receipt or they will be prepared for weapon loading and loaded with MK-28 weapons upon receipt.

4. a. CINCPACAF, through PACAF's Command Center, will direct PACAF subordinate commands to implement any of the outlined alert conditions. Receipt of directive will be formally acknowledged. Condition numbers and titles without their related meanings are unclassified.

5. a. Delete.

b. Redesignate as paragraph 5a.

*This regulation supersedes PACAFR 55-43A, 13 June 1958.

SECRET

PACAFR 55-43A
6

6. b. Delete

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

W. T. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

W. T. COLEMAN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

SECRET

9

PRIORITY

AF ORIG

COMDR, 6431ST AIR BASE GROUP, NAHA AIR BASE, OKINAWA

COMDR, 313TH AIR DIVISION, KADENA AIR BASE, OKINAWA

SECRET6431KMC 522698 . ATTN: MAJOR HUCKABY.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF 6431ST AIR BASE GROUP ELEMENTS I/A.W YOUR VERBAL REQUEST. (A) AIR BASE GROUP SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF A DEPLOYMENT TO CHAI-YI. WHEN DEPLOYMENT TO TAIWAN WAS ABRUPTLY DIRECTED, NO CHANGE OF PLAN WAS MADE DUE TO LACK OF INFORMATION. (B) SUPPORT TASK FORCE REPORTED TO THE 16TH FIS PROJECT OFFICER WITH ALL PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LESS REFUELERS FOR TRANSPORT AT 1300 HOURS, 29 AUGUST 1958. REFUELERS WERE EMPLOYED IN ON BASE REFUELING OPERATIONS UNTIL 1 HOUR BEFORE ALLOCATED AIR LIFT FOR REFUELERS WAS IN PLACE FOR LOADING. (C) THE AIR BASE GROUP SUPPORT FORCE COMMANDER DEPARTED WITH ONE OF THE FIRST AIRCRAFT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO SURVEY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL BASE SUPPORT CAPABILITY FOR THE 16TH FIS IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL AT TAINAN AND ADVISE THIS ORGANIZATION OF ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS BY OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE MESSAGE. (D) AS A RESULT OF THE SUPPORT FORCE COMMANDERS RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS, ALL PREVIOUSLY PLANNED SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE DEPLOYED, AND IN ADDITION, AUGMENTED BY FOUR AIR POLICE PERSONNEL. (E) IMMEDIATELY SURFACE LIFT FOR ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION WAS PROVIDED FOR THROUGH COORDINATION WITH THE U.S. ARMY TRANSPORTATION CORP. AN LSM WAS ALLOCATED, LOADED WITH EQUIPMENT AT NAHA PORT AND WITH AMMO AT WHITE BEACH, AND SCHEDULED FOR DEPARTURE TO TAIWAN AT 0500 HRS 30 AUG 58. (F) AT 0345 HRS 30 AUGUST 1958 FIFTH AF DIRECTED THAT 25 SETS OF AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS BE AVAILABLE FOR AIR LIFT FROM NAHA AT 0800 HRS AND AIR LIFT TO TAINAN AT APPROXIMATELY 1900 HRS 30 AUG. (G) AT 0800 HRS

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6431st KMC

2 SEP 58 THIS ORGANIZATION WAS ADVISED INFORMALLY OF A REQUIREMENT FOR TWO ADDITIONAL REFUELERS; ONE AMBULANCE; ONE TRUCK, 1/4 TON; 6 SQUADRON TENTS; AND SPARES FOR 0-10 FIRE TRUCK. THE TRUCK, TENTS, AND AVAILABLE 0-10 SPARES REQUESTED WERE RELEASED AND MADE AVAILABLE FOR AIR LIFT. THE SUPPORT FORCE COMMANDER WAS ADVISED BY OPSIM[illegible]EDMSG OF FIFTH AF DIRECTED AIR SHIPMENT OF FOUR EACH REFUELERS FROM YAKOTA AND WAS REQUESTED TO RECONFIRM THE NEED FOR AN AMBULANCE WITH THE BASE COMMANDER, TAINAN, AND ADVISE. UPON CONFIRMATION, AN AMBULANCE WILL BE PREPARED FOR SHIPMENT. REQUISITIONS FOR ADDITIONAL BEDDING AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT WERE PLACED ON BASE SUPPLY BY THE 16TH SQUADRON AT APPROXIMATELY 1100 HRS 2 SEP 58, AND WERE ISSUED FOR AVAILABLE REQUESTED AIR LIFT AT 1600 HRS. (H) PENDING FURTHER GUIDANCE, THIS ORGANIZATION PROPOSES TO SUPPORT THE 16TH FIS IN TECHNICAL SUPPLIES, INCLUDING BENCH STOCK, DIRECTLY FROM OUR BASE SUPPLY. TWICE WEEKLY SCHEDULED C-47 FLIGHTS, AUGMENTED BY B-26 LIFT FOR AOCP-ANFE ITEMS WITH SUPPLEMENTAL HEAVY AIRCRAFT LIFT AS REQUIRED FOR OUTSIZE ITEMS, SHOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT. ADDITIONAL HOUSEKEEPING ITEMS WILL CONTINUE TO BE PROVIDED AS REQUESTED BY THE 6431ST AIR BASE GROUP SUPPORT FORCE COMMANDER, WHO IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO COORDINATE HIS ACTIONS IN THIS AREA WITH THE COMMANDER, 16TH FIS, AND 13TH ATF COMMANDER. (I) THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS OF THIS ORGANIZATION DURING PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT WARRANT COMMENDATION: MAJ FRANK THOMAS, ABG D/O; MAJ ROBERT DENHAM, BASE SUPPLY OFFICER; MAJ ROLAND DEATON, COMMANDER 6431ST SUPPLY SQUADRON. (J) CAPT ARTHUR REDDRICEK, 313TH PROJECT OFFICER PROVIDED INVALUABLE AID AND GUIDANCE ON THE SPOT THROUGHOUT THIS OPERATION. (H) LT COL CRUM AND PERSONNEL OF THE 315TH AIR DIVISION INCLUDING MAJ FLEMMING, COMMANDER, 21ST TROOP CARRIER SQUADRON, MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE EFFICIENT LOADING AND DISPATCH OF PERSONNEL AND CARGO.

KMC 03/SEP/58 1410Z

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ALWINE H. DOYLE
CWO, W-2, USAF, Asst Admin Office

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10

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

FROM: HEDADIV 313KADENA AB OKINAWA

TO: COMAF 5 FUCHU AS JAPAN

INFO: CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB TH
COMAF 13 CLARK AFB PI
COMATF 13 (P) TAIPEI TAIWAN
COMABG 6214 TAINAN TAIWAN
COMAPG 6431 NAHA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)
COMFIW 51 NAHA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)

SECRET/313/C C-9-55. Reference PACAF OPLAN 25-58 and conversation with Commander ATF 13(P). This headquarters support plan for the 16th Fighter Intercepter Squadron is as follows. The 16th Fighter Intercepter Squadron and support units will place all repeat all requisitions on Captain Jensen, Support Commander at Tainan. All aircraft and electronic spares will be placed on the Base Supply Officer at Naha Air Base. Housekeeping requirements will be coordinated with Lt Colonel Lee, Commander 6214th Air Base Group, Tainan. Those items that cannot be satisfied by ATF 13 will be requested through Naha Air Base until 13th Air Force is able to take over this responsibility. This headquarters understands that all Ammo, POL and on-base transportation is provided for by 13th Air Force. This Headquarters has inaugurated a daily flight by fast aircraft from Naha to Tainan to provide positive requisitioning and administrative channels plus carrying aircraft and electronic spares. This flight will be augmented by a twice a week transport flight from Naha to Tainan and return to carry bulky cargo. This will be supplemented by 315th Air Division aircraft on an as required basis. This headquarters is maintaining

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an engine change capability at Tainan, but plan to do all periodic and field maintenance at Naha Air Base. So far this system has given no major problems, however this headquarters is keeping a close eye on the 13th Air Force's ability to take over the housekeeping responsibilities and plan to phase out as soon as possible.

1600Z/8 Sep 58

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

11

1 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PURGING OF EXCESSES AT ALL AC&W SITES (Unclas): In support of request from Headquarters Fifth Air Force to place special emphasis on turn-in of excesses from all AC&W sites, this headquarters has forwarded directive to 623rd AC&W Squadron and 6431st Air Base Group requesting that all sites establish a step by step time-phased plan. To insure the turn-in of all types of excesses at the sites, suspense dates for each step will be established. Copy of this time-phased plan will be furnished this headquarters not later than 21 July 1958. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

2 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. COMING VISIT OF COL RALPH C ROCKWOOD (Unclas): Col Ralph C Rockwood, Commander SAMAP, and staff will visit 313th Air Division bases on 7-8 July 1958. Purpose of visit is orientation and meeting of commanders. Capt Barton W. MacNeill has been designated as project officer for the visit. Activities scheduled include briefings at 313th Air Division Headquarters and Naha Air Base, tour of Kadena Air Base to include 17th Communications Squadron and 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron (Depot), and tour of Naha Air Base on 8 July 1958. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. CALIBRATION OF E-4 FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM TEST EQUIPMENT (Unclas): NAMAP has advised that the capability now exists at that depot to check and calibrate test set, computer service, and alignment S/N 7CAC-801319-55. A schedule for testing of these sets has been furnished using organizations. The schedule calls for checking and caliberation of each set six times per year. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

3 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

COMPLETED IRAN PROGRAM ON C54D 42-72520 (Unclas): Word has been received that IRAN was completed on C54D S/N 42-72520 on 27 June 1958. Pilot and crew departed this station on 23 June 1958 to deliver C54D S/N 42-72652 to IRAN and pick up 42-72520. Detachment #2, 313th Air Division gained 42-72520 on AF Form 1108 as of 1700 hours 27 June 1958. This IRAN program was accomplished by the Hong Kong Engineers Corps, Kai Tae Airport, Hong Kong, B. C. C. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

'SECRET'

8 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. SAC LIAISON REQUESTED SIMULATED CRASH-RECLAMATION EXERCISE (Secret):

a. On 7 July, Capt Reddrick represented this headquarters in observing a crash-reclamation exercise simulating a B-47 crash on the active runway. This exercise was called by the SAC Liaison Officer. The test pointed up numerous shortcomings in Kadena's crash-reclamation capabilities. Major deficiencies were as follows:

(1) Lack of grid maps to fix crash location.

(2) Failure of notification of some organizations and/or activities directly involved.

(3) Equipment arriving at scene in an inoperative condition.

(4) Lack of proper equipment to handle large aircraft.

(5) Lack of understanding of responsibilities and/or procedures of some personnel.

b. A complete report is being prepared by 6313th Air Base Wing and a critique will be held, with all interested organizations invited. This is a joint effort responsibility of 6313th Air Base Wing and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

'SECRET'

SECRET

9 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. C47D/43-49903 AT TAINAN, PERIODIC INSPECTION COMPLETED (Unclas): The periodic inspection has been completed on C47D/43-49903 at Tainan and aircraft returned to Kadena Air Base at 1515 hours 8 July 1958. This periodic inspection was performed under contract with the CAT facility in Tainan. Aircraft is assigned to the 6313th Operations Squadron, Kadena Air Base. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

2. VRC-19 RADIO EQUIPPED VEHICLES FOR SAC: SEA WEED (Secret):

a. On 8 July 1958, Capt Reddrick represented this directorate at a meeting conducted by Lt Col Heino, SAC Liaison Officer, with the Base Transportation, Communications, and Project Sea Weed Officers. Purpose of this meeting was to coordinate the painting (yellow) and radio equipping of twelve weapons carriers to be utilized under EWP and during exercises as a SAC Maintenance Expeditor Communication System. Vehicles are to be equipped with AN/VRC-19 or AN/ARC-3 radio sets and will be carried in a "Joint Utilization" status with flight line organization when not assigned to the Blue Sheild program.

b. Information received from Rome Air Force Depot on 4 July 1958 states that seventeen VRC-19 radios were shipped on 3 July 1958. This leaves a remainder of only three to be shipped at an early date. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

10 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

(MC & TSA) MILITARY CLOTHING AND TEXTILE SUPPLY AGENCY (Unclas): The following information has been disseminated to Clothing Sales and Base Supply Officers of this command. Wilkins Air Force Station has advised that the Clothing and Textile Distribution Division will be intergrated into the MC&TSA operation effective 1 July 1958. All follow-ups on requisitions should be forwarded direct to MC&TSA, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The Air Force Clothing and Textile Requirements Division will be transferred to the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot on 1 July 1958. All policy matters pertaining to the operation of the retail clothing stock fund management should be forwarded to the Air Force Clothing and Textile Stock Fund Requirements Division, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, 2800 South 20th Street, Philadelphia 45, Pennsylvania. This Division will be an Air Force tenant organization on the Quartermaster Depot with command responsibility assigned to Headquarters, Middletown Air Materiel Area.
(M/Sgt. Pearlstein/44230)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

11 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT COMMITTEE, MONTHLY MEETING (Unclas):

a. Captain Reddrick of this directorate represented the Air Force at the regular meeting of the ISSC held on 10 July 1958, at Headquarters USARYIS.

b. Primary subject discussed was the possibility of consolidating all procurement activities on Okinawa. No action could be taken pending further staff study by the various services. However, final action was taken on the consolidated contract for office machine repairs. Copies of the contract awarded by the Air Force (P&C) were given to the other services representatives by Capt Fischle who was present at this meeting as guest Air Force representative. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

14 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. COMPLETION OF TECH ORDER ON ELECTRICAL POWER REQUIREMENT ON C-47 A/C No 43-15539 (Unclas):

a. Tech Order 1C-1-532 was completed on C47A S/N 43-15539 at SAMAP on 3 July 1958. Aircraft was not returned to Kadena until 10 July 1958 because of Typhoon Tess. This C-47 is assigned to the 6313th Operations Squadron, Kadena.

b. The purpose of the modification of TO 1C-1-532 was to provide facilities for additional AC and DC power and adequate power distribution during single engine operation. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

15 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

Constant review on typhoonization progress on bases and routine activities accomplished by this directorate.

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

16 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

ACTION TAKEN DURING CONDITION 5 (Secret): Upon declaration of Condition 5, War Emergency Alert Procedures, this directorate notified Project Sea Weed Officers to survey all prestocked and joint utilized equipment to ascertain its operational status and to expedite the repair of any equipment found unserviceable. The GEOP (General Emergency Operation Plan 1-57) was reviewed and Capt Reddrick briefed General Smith and certain members of his staff on our logistic responsibilities under EWP conditions. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

17 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

MAJ GEN ROBEY POSTPONES TRIP INDEFINITELY (Unclas): Maj Gen P. H. Robey from Ogden Air Materiel Area has postponed his proposed visit to units of PACAF indefinitely. His visit here was scheduled for period from 1 to 2 August. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

21 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY CLOTHING AND TEXTILE CONFERENCE HELD AT TACHIKAWA AIR BASE JAPAN ON 15 JULY 1958 (Unclas):

a. This conference was sponsored by Utah General Depot (Army), Ogden, Utah, and attended by Utah General Depot, *MC&TSA, NAMAP, Fifth Air Force, and Fifth Air Force bases.

b. The supply of military clothing and textiles has been assigned by the Department of Defense to the Army for single manager responsibility, and it is managed by the *Military Clothing and Textile Supply Agency (MC&TSA) (Army) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Utah General Depot has been assigned the responsibility for Pacific area support by MC&TSA.

c. The purpose of the conference was for Utah General Depot to outline their methods of operation and instruct the bases in procedures to be followed in obtaining support for Pacific area bases. Both Naha and Kadena were represented at this conference. (Captain Mikesell/ 41123)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

23 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. IMPROPER SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT ITEMS FROM KADENA WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACCOUNT TO NAHA WEAPONS SYSTEMS ACCOUNT (Unclas): As a result of a complaint from the Naha Base Supply Officer, a visit to Naha Base Supply was made by Capt Mikesell, this directorate, to obtain information on a reported improper shipment of equipment items from the Kadena Weapons System supply account. It was found that equipment had been shipped as serviceable and, on receipt, was found to be reparable; shipping documents were improperly marked; items had been shipped with technical order compliance dates past due; and equipment had been shipped without proper pickling as required in technical orders. After discussion with Naha Base Supply personnel, it was decided that corrective action on all items would be taken by Naha, since the items were required, provided that no further improper shipments were made. Correspondence to the 6313th Air Base Wing directing corrective action has been initiated by this directorate. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

2. FOOD SERVICE STAFF VISIT TO SITES (Unclas): A staff visit covering food service operations at site activities under the 623rd AC&W Squadron is being performed by Mr. J. F. Nemeth, General Supply and Services Division, this directorate. Yaetake was visited on 15 July, Yozadake on 18 July, and Miyako on 22 July. Remaining sites (Kume and Okino) will be visited in the near future. (Mr. Nemeth/44203)

3. STAFF VISIT OF FIFTH AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO 313TH AIR DIVISION (Unclas): This directorate was notified by telephone that Col Shane and Col LeClare, Directorate of Materiel, Fifth Air Force, will arrive 313th Air Division on 28 July for the purpose of conducting a staff visit. Length of visit is unknown at present. (Maj Huckabay/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

24 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT TO 6431ST TRANSPORTATION SQUADRON (Unclas): At their request, a staff assistance visit was rendered to 6431st Transportation Squadron maintenance section by T/Sgt Reginaldo R Lopez, Ground Equipment Maintenance Staff NCO, 313th Air Division, to assist squadron in establishing procedures to insure proper accomplishment of technical order compliances, files and usages. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

2. CRITIQUE BY SAMAP AREA ASSISTANCE TEAM (Unclas): Mr. Cobert J. Burns and a team of 18 people from Headquarters SAMAP, as requested by the Director of Materiel, 313th Air Division, have completed a management survey of supply and maintenance areas at Kadena Air Base. A critique and briefing on their findings and recommendations will be held on Thursday, 24 July 1958, at 1300 hours in the 313th Air Division conference room. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

3. PACAF A-4 ASSISTANCE FIELD VISIT (Unclas): Colonel Fred E. Hild and a party of eight officers from PACAF will arrive Kadena Air Base the evening of 25 July 1958 to perform a PACAF A-4 Assistance Field Visit. Organizations to be visited are Headquarters 313th Air Division and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on 25-29 July. Areas of interest for the visit include:

a. Maintenance:

(1) Statistics and charts maintained in the maintenance control center.

(2) Current status of Project Little Barney and power pack kits for KB-50 aircraft. Current statistics on J-57 engine 50-hour inspection.

(3) Current materiel problems and what assistance team can furnish to alleviate or reduce materiel problems.

b. Supply:

(1) Warehouse facilities.

(2) Supply improvement program.

(3) Disposal operations.

(4) POL.

(5) Check discrepancies noted on previous staff visits. (S/Sgt Lynch/44204)

Directorate of Materiel, 24 July 1958 - Continued

4. SCHEDULED VISIT OF BRIG GEN PIDDOCK (Unclas): Brigadier General Charles A. Piddock, Assistant Chief of Staff, Materiel, PACAF, and one officer will arrive Kadena Air Base approximately 1010 on 25 July 1958 for an orientation visit in conjunction with the PACAF A-4 Assistance Field Visit being made by Colonel Fred E. Hild and party. Reservations have been confirmed for both parties. (S/Sgt Lynch/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

25 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS ON 100KW CUMMINS GENERATORS (Secret): This headquarters received an information copy of a message from Fifth Air Force to 6431st Air Base Group directing redistribution of six each Cummins 100 KW Generators from the Yaetake Air Station to the following destinations: four each to Misawa, and two each to Kadena Project 66-8. In addition to the requirement for Kadena Project 66-8 (1962nd AACS), requirements for an additional seven each 100 KW generators exist within this command. They are as follows: three each for the ramp electrification at Naha Air Base for the F-102 program, two each for the 7th TDS at Kadena Air Base, and two each for the micro-wave relay station at the Yaetake Air Station. A message has been sent to Fifth Air Force informing them of the local requirements for these generators and asking that their redistribution instructions on the four each to Misawa be reconsidered. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

2. POST-DEPLOYMENT CONFERENCE (Conf):

a. Lt Col Joseph D Morgan and Capt Arthur D. Reddrick represented this headquarters at a post-deployment conference conducted 22-24 July 1958 at Headquarters ATF 13, Taipei, Taiwan. Representatives of Fifth Air Force, Thirteenth Air Force, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 6313th Air Base Wing, 6431st Air Base Group, and 5th Communications Group were also in attendance.

b. The purpose of this conference was to rewrite the Fifth Air Force logistic support plan for deployments to Taiwan, fix areas of responsibility, and resolve any problems encountered during the last deployment.

c. As a result of this conference, a much closer understanding exists between the organizations involved and better support of future deployments is anticipated. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

28 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. CHANGE IN VISIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL PIDDOCK (Unclas): The orientation visit of Brigadier General Piddock, A/CS, Materiel, PACAF, originally scheduled for 25-29 July 1958 has been changed to 30 July - 1 August. Units to be visited are 313th Air Division and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing. Quarters and transportation arrangements have been revised. (S/Sgt Lynch/44204)

2. PACAF A-4 ASSISTANCE TEAM VISIT DATE CHANGED (Unclas): The PACAF A-4 Assistance Field Visit team, accompanying General Piddock has revised their itinerary. Team will now arrive approximately 1700 on 30 July and depart approximately 0700 on 2 August. Areas of interest remain the same. Billeting and transportation arrangements have been revised. (S/Sgt Lynch/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

29 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PACAF MATERIEL ASSISTANCE TEAM VISIT (Unclas): PACAF A-4 Assistance Team consisting of Colonel Fred E. Hild, Chief; Colonel Luther W. Burns, Supply and Services; Colonel James L. Steele, Programs and Procurement; and Lt Colonel Topper of the Comptroller's Office arrived approximately 1830 hours 28 July, ahead of schedule. They are accompanied by five assistants, two lieutenant colonels and three majors. They will join General Piddock upon his arrival on 30 July. In the meantime, they are visiting 6313th Air Base Wing and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing activities. (Maj Huckabay/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

30 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

INFORMATION-EXPLORATORY VISIT BY FIFTH AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES (Conf): Colonel R. A. Shane, Director of Logistics Plans, and Lt Col W. B. Leclaire, Materiel Programs Division, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, arrived at Kadena Air Base on 28 July for an on-the-site exploratory survey visit to seek information to be used in the Air Force programming for the utilization of Okinawa through 1962. All major organizations and key personnel are being contacted during their visit. Primary subjects of interest are the F-101 and F-102 conversion, possible relocation of the 15th TRS and 21st TCS (C-130A's), and the missile program. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. CONFERENCE ON DELIVERY OF SUBSISTENCE SUPPLIES (Unclas):

a. At 1300 hours on 30 July 1958, a meeting was held in the 313th Air Division Conference Room for the purpose of discussing the feasibility of the U. S. Army Transportation Group's making delivery of all subsistence supplies to the ration break-down points at each Air Force base. Representatives of the Army Transportation Group, 6313th Transportation Squadron, 6431st Transportation Squadron, and the Kadena and Naha commissaries were present.

b. The Highway Operation Chief of USARYIS Command has advised that he will make an immediate study of local available transportation within the Army to determine the feasibility of assuming the responsibility of delivering all subsistence supplies to supported organizations.

c. In our opinion, the following joint Air Force/Army Regulations clearly lay this responsibility on the Department of the Army: AFR 75-95/AR 55-15, AFR 145-27/AR 31-1, and AFR 145-43/AR 31-17. (Mr. Nemeth/44203)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

1 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. FALSE ALARM ON 1010 ENGINE OIL CONTAMINATION (Secret):

a. No problem exists; however, local Sub-Area Petroleum Office advised on 30 July that supplies of 1010 A/C engine oil, "Batch #3," would no longer be used because of contamination and/or chemical breakdown due to age, etc. They advised that "Batch #2" was questionable but could be used in emergency after being filtered properly. This information was disseminated promptly. Also, action was taken to airlift 1010 oil from Japan. Action to test oil already in aircraft (F86D, T-33, and B-47) was directed. No dangerous evidence was found.

b. Batch #2 was cleared for use on 31 July --message was received during night of 30-31 July by local petroleum office. All interested users were notified at once. We have arranged for adequate stocks of 1010 oil. All is clear. (Lt Col Morgan/44204)

2. RF101C AIRCRAFT ENROUTE FAR EAST (Secret): The 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing has advised that four of the RF101C aircraft designated for delivery to 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and the six aircraft of "FA-82" (Tactical Air Command deployment aircraft) will be ready to depart Hill AFB on 5 August 1958 for Kadena AB. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. SEPTEMBER AMFPA RF101C WEAPONS PHASING CONFERENCE AT KADENA (Unclas): Headquarters AMFPA has expressed their desire to hold a Pacific Area Weapons Phasing Conference at Kadena approximately 16 September 1958. Captain Greenwood, 6313th Air Base Wing, has been appointed project officer for this conference, to assist AMFPA in arrangements. Fifth conferees are expected to attend from AMFPA, PACAF, Fifth Air Force, and assigned units. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. C-119 QUICK ENGINE CHANGE KITS (Unclas): The 6313th Air Base Wing has requested Fifth Air Force to assist in obtaining two Quick Engine Change Kits from Ashiya Air Base for the C-119 aircraft at Kadena. If these kits are obtained, a built-up engine capability can be established for C-119 aircraft at Kadena. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

4 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

QUICK ENGINE CHANGE KITS FOR C-119 AIRCRAFT AT KADENA (Unclas):
Fifth Air Force has requested the 483rd Troop Carrier Wing to release two Quick Engine Change kits to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

5 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

AIR MATERIEL AREA ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORTS (Unclas): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has advised that, effective immediately, all AMA Assistance Visit Reports will be indorsed through channels to Headquarters Fifth Air Force showing corrective action taken on problems affecting supply performance. Replies to Assistance Visits are to be forwarded so as to arrive at Headquarters Fifth Air Force no later than 33 days after date of Assistance Visit Report. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

6 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR SECOND INCREMENT OF RF101C AIRCRAFT SLATED FOR THE 15TH TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON (Secret): Ogden Air Materiel Area advises that the second flight of ten each RF101C aircraft scheduled for the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron will depart Ogden on/about 27 August 1958. Approximate arrival date of the aircraft at Kadena is 1 September 1958.

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

11 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

AIR MATERIEL COMMAND AREA ASSISTANCE VISIT REPORTS (Unclas): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has advised that, effective immediately, all AMC Area Assistance Visit Report will be indorsed through channels to Headquarters Fifth Air Force showing corrective action taken on problems affecting supply performance. Replies to Assistance Visit Reports will be forwarded to arrive Headquarters Fifth Air Force no later than 33 days after date of report. Bases assigned this command have been advised that replies to AMC Area Assistance Visit Reports will be forwarded so as to arrive this headquarters no later than 27 days after date of report. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

14 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. ASSIGNMENT OF TB-29 AIRCRAFT TO NAHA. (6023RD RADAR EVALUATION FLIGHT) (Confid): Four TB-29 Aircraft of the 6023rd Radar Evacuation flight (ECM) were assigned to Naha Air Base on 5 August 1958. Two aircraft are in place, one aircraft is at Johnson Air Force Base, Japan, awaiting pilot pickup and one aircraft is at Itazuke Air Force Base, Japan, awaiting evaluation of major damage sustained at that base. The 6023rd Radar Evaluation Flight expects to be operational approximately 1 September 1958. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

2. J-33 ENGINE BUILD UP, TEAR DOWN AND MINOR REPAIR, (Unclas): At a joint meeting of representatives of 313AD and 18TFW the following policy was agreed upon to support J-33 engines (used on T-33 Acft) on Okinawa.

(a) 51 Field Maint Squadron of the 51st FIW will continue to perform Fld Maint Minor Repair on J-33 engines for all AF Organizations on Okinawa and build-up and tear down J-33 engines for all units based on Naha AB.

(b) The 18th Fld Maint Squadron of the 18th TFW will build-up and tear down J-33 engines for all units based at Kadena AB.

In order to help implement this procedure two (2) of the three (3) Quick Engine Change Kits that are available will be positioned in the 18th Fld Maint Squadron, since the larger of the pre-issue requirement is at Kadena. This agreement was based on the fact that special tools needed to perform Fld Maint Repair on J-33 engines are not presently available to 18th FM Squadron and the number of man-hours involved in minor repair alone would not justify procuring them. The major unfavorable factors that were eliminated by this agreement were the man-hours and transportation expended by transporting engines to Naha for build-up and tear down.

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

15 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT COMMITTEE, MONTHLY MEETING (Unclas): The regular monthly meeting of the Interservice Supply Support Committee was held on 14 August 1958 in the Division Conference Room. Captain Mikesell of this directorate represented the Air Force. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

2. UNIFIED MAINTENANCE (AFM 66-1) IMPLEMENTATION (Unclas):

In a telephone conversation with Colonel Ryan, Materiel Fifth Air Force, the following points pertinent to this manual were stated by Colonel Ryan.

a. A letter will be forthcoming giving more specific guidance to this division. This letter should arrive within the next ten days.

b. A team of Fifth Air Force personnel will arrive Okinawa on or about 1 September. The purpose of this team is to write a Fifth Air Force Supplement to Air Force Manual 66-1. This supplement will outline the procedures working tenant organizations into the consolidated maintenance concept.

c. It was realized that the date set for the implementation of Chapter II, Part One is unrealistic and will be changed. (Major Huckabay/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

18 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

SURVEY VISIT TO CHIA-YI, TAIWAN (Secret): Captain Reddrick represented this headquarters on an "on-site" survey of Chia-Yi in connection with deployments under Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division OPLANS 124-58. Personnel representing task units and support organizations were included in the survey team. Next deployment under this OPLAN is tentatively scheduled for the period 7 September to 6 October and will include a F-100 task force from the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and a F-86D task force from the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. Persons interested in this deployment may contact Capt Reddrick at 42108. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

19 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

T-33 AIRCRAFT IRAN, S/W 52-9302 (Unclas): T-33 aircraft S/W 52-9302 assigned to the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, departed Kadena Air Base to Kawasaki Aircraft Company, Gifu Air Base, Japan, on 18 August 1958 to undergo IRAN program. This is the first aircraft dispatched under the FY-59 T-33 IRAN schedule which has recently been firmed up and sent to Fifth Air Force units. (T/Sgt Mye rs/42121)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

20 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. F-102 TEAM FROM SAN ANTONIO AIR MATERIEL AREA TO VISIT PACAF BASES 4 - 5 SEPTEMBER 1958 (Conf): The team is headed by Col John J. Fairly, Deputy Director of Supply and Services, San Antonio Air Materiel Area, and is comprised of materiel and comptroller type personnel. The itinerary calls for a visit to Naha Air Base on 4 and 5 September. The purpose of the visit is to brief PACAF bases on Proposed Base Materiel Management System (Automatic Resupply) and proposed Weapons System stock control list with recommended levels for AFW 5272. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. RELEASE OF STORAGE STRUCTURES FROM THE 546TH ASSD TO 313TH AIR DIVISION (Unclas): A meeting was held in the Division Conference Room on 19 August to program the release of four above-ground magazines from the 546th ASSD to the 313th Air Division. Those in attendance were a representative of the Directorate of Materiel this headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Materiel, Kadena Air Base Supply Officer, and the Commander 546th ASSD. It was determined that, due to the physical location of these storage structures, they would be utilized by Kadena Air Base as deemed necessary by the commander. The Commander, 546th ASSD, indicated that these structures would be released on a permanent basis.

a. Items presently being stored in them will be moved to a new location by commercial contract which will be funded by SAMAP. The first magazine will be made available to Kadena approximately 15 September 1958 and one additional magazine will be made available every 30-45 days thereafter, to the final completion date of 1 January 1959.

b. A letter to Kadena, outlining the requirements for following necessary safety criteria and regulations for the storage of materiel in this area, is in the process of preparation. Kadena will be requested to release a portion of the storage space in the Naha/Machinato area for use by Naha as a result of the additional space being made available in the 546th ASSD area. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

22 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

ARRIVAL OF COLONEL BRADY, 313MC (Unclas): Colonel Francis T. Brady, incoming Director of Materiel, 313th Air Division, arrived on Okinawa 19 August 1958. Colonel Brady's prior duty station was with the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Colonel and Mrs. Brady and three children are residing at 2250 Stearley Heights. (Lt Col Morgan/44204)

JOSEPH D. MORGAN, JR.
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Director of Materiel

SECRET

27 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. ARRIVAL OF SIX (6) RF-101C AIRCRAFT AT KADENA (Secret): Three RF-101C aircraft assigned to the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron arrived on Kadena Air Base 26 August 1958. These are the first of 20 aircraft to arrive to convert the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron from RF-84F to RF 101C aircraft. There is no firm date when the next RF-101C aircraft will arrive on Kadena Air Base. Three RF-101C aircraft from Shaw AFB, South Carolina, also arrived which will support the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron mission during the changeover from the RF-84F to RF-101C aircraft. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

2. STAFF VISIT TO RADAR SITE (Unclas): An informal staff visit to Site P-53 was conducted by Colonel Brady and Major Huckabay of this directorate on 25 August. This staff visit was performed in conjunction with the delivery of the pulse transformer for the FPS radar. (Maj Huckabay/48244)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

28 August 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. ANTICIPATED FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT (Unclas):

a. The Interservice Supply Support Agreement was developed through the cooperative efforts of the four military services for the primary purpose of establishing interdepartmental policies for increasing interservice supply support and encouraging field organizations of the respective services to collaborate in providing support to each other.

b. In this connection, it has been stated that the policy and approved objective of the Air Force is to develop supply operating and fiscal procedures which will facilitate interservice supply support. Future revisions to the Operation and Maintenance Financial Plan will require that anticipated reimbursements include sufficient funds to enable adequate implementation of the Interservice Supply Support Program. These anticipated Interservice Supply Support reimbursements are to be shown separately in budget authorizations issued by USAF and are available for use premised and conditioned upon the anticipated reimbursements actually being earned for supplies and services furnished to activities of other services. A separate record of interservice supply support rendered will be established at each installation and maintained current. Anticipated reimbursement information will be immediately available. This information will be required for inclusion in the next O & M Financial Plan Revision. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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CONFIDENTIAL

2 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

VISIT OF SAAMA F-102 TEAM (Conf): Reference 313th Air Division Staff Journal, Materiel, dated 20 August 1958. An F-102 team from SAAMA is scheduled to visit 313th Air Division on 3-4 September. The team consists of Colonel John J. Fairly, team leader, and seven civilian members representing Supply, Maintenance, and Comptroller. A meeting of the 313th F-102 Phasing Conference is called for 4 September 1958 to coincide with the team's visit. Billeting and air travel reservations have been made. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

5 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. DISPOSITION OF F-86D S/N 52-4021 (Unclas): Disposition instructions on F-86D aircraft S/N 52-4021 of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, which was damaged when the nose gear collapsed during landing on 15 May, have been received from NAMAP. The aircraft will be reclaimed. NAMAP has requested AMC to forward a "save list" to the 51st FIW. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. WEATHERED FUEL IN STORED AIRCRAFT (Unclas): SBAMA advises that a project to determine the time limitation for fuel in tanks of stored aircraft and of aircraft undergoing extensive maintenance or modification is under way at that AMA. As a precautionary measure and until the above criteria can be established and incorporated in applicable TO's, SBAMA has outlined the following procedures to be adhered to when aviation gasoline has remained in aircraft fuel tanks for a period of 30 days or longer, and when jet fuel has remained in aircraft fuel tanks 60 days or longer:

a. Prior to first flight, fuel will be tested to determine if still serviceable.

b. When testing is not feasible, the fuel system will be completely drained of fuel and processed in the same manner as when a fuel system is being removed from extended storage status. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. PACAF-AMFPA RF-101 WSPG CONFERENCE POSTPONED (Unclas): The AMFPA-PACAF RF-101 WSPG Conference, which was scheduled for 16 September at Kadena, has been cancelled and will be rescheduled at a later date. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. VISIT BY GENERAL ROBEY AND PARTY TO PACAF BASES (Unclas): PACAF advises that General Robay, Commander, Ogden Air Materiel Area, and party are in the PACAF area and plan visits to SAMAP, NAMAP, Fifth Air Force, Thirteenth Air Force, Kadena, and Misawa. No definite schedule of itinerary was furnished. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

8 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

RECLAMATION OF TYPHOON DAMAGED SA-16 S/N 59-086 (Unclas): AFTO Form 92 (Condition Inspection Report) on typhoon damaged SA-16A aircraft S/N 49-086 has been reviewed by NAMAP, and reclamation action has been directed. This action was deemed necessary because factors not originally considered have increased the man hours required to this aircraft to a safe flyable condition, to an excess of the maximum man hours allowable in TO 1-1-638. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

9 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

ACQUISITION OF RANGES FOR KADENA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL (Unclas): Capt John J. Bilon, USARYIS Food Advisor, advises that Col Jack F. Hudson, Commanding Officer, U. S. Army Quartermaster Group, has authorized the release of two new Vulcon Hart oil burning, single oven ranges complete with burner, for use in the Kadena Elementary School, M & K Area. These are considered in excess of Army requirements and are furnished on a non-reimbursable basis. The price of the ranges is $445 each. It is anticipated that they will be installed and ready for use on 9 September 1958. (Mr. Nemeth/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

11 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. DELIVERY OF RF-84F AIRCRAFT TO KISARAZU AIR BASE (Secret): Fifth Air Force has requested the immediate delivery of six (6) RF-84F aircraft from the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron to Kisarazu Air Base. Airlift has been arranged and will arrive this station 11 August 1958. This action is necessary because of congestion caused by the arrival of RF-101C aircraft. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

2. SHORTAGE OF F-100 TIRES AND TUBES (Secret): AFW 5270 is experiencing a critical shortage of F-100 tires and tubes. Investigation by this office reveals sufficient routine stock replenishment requisitions have been forwarded to the Weapon System Manager, SMAMA, McClellan Air Force Base, California. Nonsupply of these routine requisitions has resulted in the current situation. Arrangements have been made between Kadena, Itazuke, Misawa, and Fifth Air Force whereby 70 tires and 80 tubes will be airlifted to Kadena. As a result, 40 tires and 40 tubes were received by Kadena 11 September 1958. A Kadena Base aircraft was dispatched to Itazuke 10 September 1958 to pick up the additional 30 tires and 40 tubes and should return this date. (S/Sgt Stover/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

12 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT COMMITTEE, MONTHLY MEETING (Unclas):

a. The regular monthly meeting of the Interservice Supply Support Committee was held on 11 September at Headquarters USARYIS/IX Corps. Captain Mikesell of this directorate represented the Air Force. Major Bush, also of this directorate, who will soon replace Captain Mikesell on this committee, also attended.

b. This past month, a new consolidated contract for delivery of fuel oil has been negotiated. Past delivery prices ranged from .008 to .019; under the new contract, the price will be .00769. This indicated an approximate $4,000 saving for the Air Force over a one-year period. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

18 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. VISIT TO NAHA MAINTENANCE FACILITIES (Unclas): Lt Colonel Pulwider, incoming Chief of Maintenance, visited maintenance facilities and personnel at Naha Air Base on 17 September for the purpose of orientation and familiarization. He was accompanied by Mister Greenblatt, who is field service representative for Hughes Aircraft Company at Fifth Air Force. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE GAR-8 WEAPON (Conf):

a. A meeting concerning the operational capability and utilization of the GAR-8 Weapon was conducted at the Olympic Theater on 17 September 1958 by a team from MAAMA and ARDC. Two films were shown. The first film expounded on the initial development and operational capability of the GAR-8 Weapon by the Navy. The second film showed the Air Force training program and research into the optimum utilization of the weapon by the Air Force. Personnel attending were from all career fields representing all units assigned and/or attached to the 313th Air Division.

b. At the completion of the meeting at the theater, supply personnel were requested to adjourn to a separate supply meeting held at Base Supply Office, Kadena Air Base, and conducted by Mr. K. L. Hoover, GS-11, MAAMA. The supply meeting covered the entire logistic support area relative to the GAR-8 Weapon. Mr Hoover explained the operation of the supply support system, step by step, and passed out a pamphlet pointing out each step. The principal fact obtained was that the GAR-8 Weapon would be supported by the Automatic Resupply System through the use of the Weapon Systems Stock Replenishment Notice (WSSR). After the briefing a question and answer session was held. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

23 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. MAJOR GENERAL ANDERSON'S VISIT RESCHEDULED TO SUNDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1958 (Unclas):

a. SAMAP message received on 22 September 1958 states that Major General A. V. P. Anderson will arrive Kadena at either 0800I or 1000I (garbled) and depart Kadena at 1400I on 28 September. Prior information stated Gen Anderson would arrive Kadena 1100I and depart 1330I on Thursday, 25 September.

b. Headquarters SAMAP has been queried by Operational Immediate message this date for clarification of ETA and for further information as to composition of Gen Anderson's party (what staff areas members of his party represent). (Lt Col Morgan/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

24 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. REQUEST FOR RELOCATION OF DETACHMENT 2, 24TH HELIRON, ON NAHA AIR BASE (Unclas): The 315th Air Division has requested Fifth Air Force to consider relocating Detachment 2, 24th Helicopter Squadron from the west side of Naha Air Base to the east side of the air base adjacent to Base Operations. Positioning of aircraft for loading of passengers and freight, undesirability of having aircraft located near the salt water, and inaccessibility of the present area were cited as justification. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. AIRCRAFT INVENTORY (Unclas): This headquarters has furnished SAMAP an inventory of aircraft physically located within this command, to assist that headquarters in programming logistical support. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. STUDY ON LOGISTIC SUPPORT (Secret): This directorate is preparing a study at Gen Kuter's request, of the logistic impact resulting from possible deployment of SAC elements to Kadena during Phase II or III of PACAF OPLAN 25-58 while TAC-CASF units are still deployed to Kadena. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

4. SHORTAGE OF MA-1A'S (AIRCRAFT STARTING UNITS FOR RF-101C) IN 15TH TRS (Secret): The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron has received four MA-1A starting units. Three units were received short adapters, four units were short batteries, and four units were short suitable hose assemblies. Arrangements for the 15th TRS to borrow on hose assembly were made with the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing. Batteries have been installed, and two hose assemblies and two adapters were shipped by OGAMA on 15 September. In addition, the 15th TRS has two MA-1's on loan from the 18th TFW, plus one Navy unit borrowed from Naha, giving them a total of four serviceable starting units. (Major Huckabay/44204)

5. F-100 TIRES AND TUBES (Secret): The F-100 tire and tube situation this command is still critical. Forty (40) tires were received from Itazuke on 23 September 1958. Fifth Air Force advises that an additional 70 tires were to be shipped from NAMAP, Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, the evening of 22 September 1958. These tires have not been received to date. The Weapon Systems Manager, SMAMA, Sacramento, California, advises that 330 tires were shipped from Sacramento on 20 and 22 September 1958. Upon receipt of these shipments, the tire problem will be alleviated, provided the F-100 weapons system account, this command, receives continuing support from Sacramento. (S/Sgt Stover/44203)

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DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL, 24 Sep 58 (Cont'd)

6. PORTABLE NOSE SHELTERS (Secret): PACAF has granted authority to locally manufacture portable radar nose maintenance shelters for F-102A aircraft. Hughes Aircraft Company has provided 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing with plans and photographs to aid in manufacturing subject shelters. (S/Sgt Stover/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

25 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. PRESENT STATUS AND PROGRAMMED ACTION ON LIQUID OXYGEN PLANT (Secret)

a. Kadena Air Base has five liquid oxygen plants assigned. Four of the five are producing oxygen and one is inoperative. The two electric plants (one of which is inoperative)and the Superior Products plant require depot rebuild. The capability for this rebuild for the two electric plants is at NAMAP. The rebuild of the Superior Products plant will have to be performed by a factory technician.

b. The parts for the Superior Products plant are on order and should arrive by 30 September 1958. Memphis AFD is taking action to send a factory technician to perform this rebuild.

c. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing has requested that NAMAP send qualified personnel to Kadena to perform the repair of the two electric plants, as all of the parts are on order and will arrive by 30 September 1955. NAMAP has advised 18th TFW that the qualified personnel are of Japanese nationality and obtaining diplomatic clearances for them would be a lengthy process, and suggested that plants be airlifted to NAMAP. This headquarters and 18th TFW did not concur in this as it would take one plant which is now producing, thus reducing our liquid oxygen capability. We have suggested that NAMAP provide us with two serviceable plants to replace the two that require rebuild in order that we may retain our capability when the two plants are shipped for rebuild.

d. NAMAP has requested that the 3960th ABG release three reparable AIA Diesel plants at their base to NAMAP for repair, so that they may be used to replace plants at Kadena for evacuation to NAMAP for repair.

e. A new plant has been shipped from Memphis AFB to Kadena; however, it was marked for Base 477. Fifth Air Force has been advised that this headquarters has no record of this location and that we desire to retain this plant to release one electric plant to NAMAP for overhaul. The new plant will be placed in production on 25 September 1958. By utilizing the plant received from Memphis AFD, the requirement for two plants from NAMAP is reduced to one. (T/Sgt Gibson/ 48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

SECRET

26 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. TRAILER TANK REFUELING UNITS F-6 (Unclas): A specialized team from SAMAP has reported with supplies and equipment to Okinawa to perform interior lining coating on twelve F-6 refueling units. Four units have been successfully completed and delivered to using organization; and three more are to be released on/about 30 September 1958. The remaining five units were previously coated with "Cook Products" which is a coat with different ingredients and no longer used by the Air Force. Coating presently used is "Thermoline Process." The estimated time of completion of these units is unknown since Cook coating must be completely removed from the inside of the tank before Thermoline process is applied. It is anticipated that it will take approximately two weeks per unit (from 6 October) for Thermoline process. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

2. VISIT BY SAMAP REPRESENTATIVES--FY 60 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (Unclas):

a. This office was visited on 25 September 1958 by Lt Col Kurek, WO Wiley, and S.Sgt Cook from SAMAP. The purpose of the visit was to discuss and outline changes in a proposed IRAN program for C-119, C-47, C-54, and D-26 aircraft in FY-60. In essence the program is as follows:

(1) Time phase scheduling for IRAN is discontinued.

(2) In depot work time is reduced.

(3) Organizational and field level maintenance will include corrosion control, -6 requirements, and urgent action TOC and/or other maintenance within the capability of the using command.

(4) AMA's and depots are responsible for time compliance technical orders, cycling repair work, modernization programs, and other specific maintenance as negotiated between the user and the AMC activity.

b. A conference was held at 1300 on 25 September 1958 to determine the approval or disapproval of the organizations affected by this new concept. Information gathered at this meeting will be presented at the IRAN conference to be held at NAMAP on 15 October 1958, where it will be decided if the program will be adopted for FY-60. (T/Sgt Myers/42121)

3. REPAIR OF 275 GALLON FUEL TANK - F-100D (Secret): NAMAP has dispatched an aeronautical engineer and two structural repairmen to the 18th TFW to arrive 26 September 1958. The team will evaluate

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Directorate of Materiel, 26 Sep 58 (Cont'd)

and assist in determining extent of repairs required to resolve the difficulty being encountered with the 275-gallon fuel tank on the F-100D aircraft. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. TRANSFER OF WAR CONSUMABLE SUPPORT ASSETS (Secret):

a. Authorization received from Headquarters Fifth Air Force to transfer certain war consumable support assets in the event a change in operating plans causes further deployment of units committed to OPLAN 25-58.

b. Fifth Air Force message 5FMLP-PR 93741 dated 24 September outlines the reasons 320-gallon B-57 tanks were prepositioned at Naha instead of Kadena. It indicates this was because of the original plan to deploy B-57's to Naha. It indicates there has been some discussion and thought of further deploying the B-57 squadron from Kadena to Naha due to overloading Kadena. It is further stated that, if in the final analysis it is decided to retain the B-57 squadron at Kadena, the quantity of 320-gallon B-57 auxiliary fuel tanks allocated to support OPLAN 25-58 should be diverted from Naha to Kadena. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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29 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. TANK ASSEMBLY AND TAIL FIN MODIFICATION OF 275-GALLON TYPE II WING TANKS FOR F-100D (Secret):

a. Lt Col Yous, on TDY from Fifth Air Force Maintenance, TWXed his headquarters 26 September requesting clarified instructions to all interested activities at Kadena as follows:

(1) The 18th TFW is to be responsible for accomplishing tank assembly and quality control, assisted as required by NAMAP.

(2) The 6313th ABW is to deliver uncrated tank components to the 18th TFW at a daily rate as determined by project capability and pick up and crate completed tank assemblies at the same daily rate.

(3) The 6313th ABW is to recruit and hire local indigenous labor as required to augment NAMAP personnel.

b. On 24 September, the 18th TFW submitted a UR in reference to the collapse of the tail fins of two of these tanks and subsequent damage to aircraft in flight. A fix was determined locally and immediate CASAF requirements are being modified by the 18th TFW. Lt Col Yous further recommended to his headquarters the following:

(1) Immediate evaluation and approval of fix by NAMAP and expeditious volume production of necessary brackets to satisfy total Fifth Air Force requirements.

(2) Continuation of tank assembly projects for dry rear cone tanks.

(3) Discontinuation of assembly of wet rear cone tanks until appropriate fix has been determined.

(4) Establishment of modification project augmented by NAMAP teams.

c. As a direct result, NAMAP sent an aeronautical engineer and two structural repair specialists on 27 September to the 18th TFW to jointly resolve the problem. The 18th Field Maintenance Squadron had worked out and test flown two fixes. Twelve additional sets (left- and right-hand tanks) have been modified to meed CASAF immediate requirements.

d. The NAMAP team and the 18th FMS have designed simple fixes which require 15 minutes for installation and have been successfully test flown. This is for the dry tail cone assembly. (Lt Col Fulwider/48244)

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Directorate of Materiel, 29 Sep 58 (Cont'd)

2. TIRE REBUILD (Unclas): Headquarters USARYIS indicated that tire rebuild service on non-reimbursable basis will no longer be provided to bases of this command. In view of this, repair of tires through contract facilities will be established. This headquarters has requested from SAMAP $60,000 for Kadena and $20,000 for Naha to support tire rebuild in this command for FY-59. This information was forwarded to the bases suggesting that, in the event an emergency requirement for tire recapping exists, a one-time purchase request be submitted in accordance with AFR 67-3. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

3. REFUELING UNITS F-6 (Unclas): An additional $3,750 will be furnished by SAMAP for cross service agreement with the Army for the repair of nine additional F-6 units from Kadena. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

4. F-100 TIRES (Secret): An additional 70 each F-100 tires were received by AFW 5270 Thursday, 25 September 1958. This brings total F-100 tires received during September to 220 each and has enabled F-100 units of 18th TFW to stay operational. However, insufficient tires to establish a level in AFW 5270 have been received. Information received from PACAF indicates tires (quantity unknown) were shipped from Sacramento AFD on 20 and 22 September 1958. These shipments have not been received to date. (S/Sgt Stover/48102)

5. F-100 TIRES (Unclas): PACAF has advised that a new 20 ply, fabric tread tire has been manufactured and is now being introduced to supply channels. The old tires, which are still in use in this area, are good for an average of 8 to 10 landings only. The monthly consumption has been approximately 200 tires per month and has increased to about 375 tires per month, due to increased flying commitments. The new 20-ply, fabric tread tire was designed for higher speeds than the old tire and is reported to be good for an across-the-board average of 20 landings. Receipt of the new tires should reduce our consumption rate considerably. (S/Sgt Stover/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

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30 September 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. F-100 TIRES AND TUBES (Unclas): A total of 418 tires and 626 tubes have been recently shipped from SMAMA, Sacramento, California, to Kadena Air Base. These tires have not been received to date. Kadena advised SMAMA of the critical shortage of tires and tubes in this area and requested their assistance in resolving this difficulty. In reply, SMAMA advised that Travis AFB has been contacted and tracer action has been initiated as of 26 September 1958. Further, they stated this command would be advised complete status of all shipments within 48 hours. Action has also been taken by SMAMA to automatically ship Kadena a total of 160 tires and tubes directly from the contractor each week. These shipments will be made once a week until further notice. (S/Sgt Stover/48102)

2. SUPPORT OF SAC UNDER OPLAN 25-58 (Secret): On 29 September 1958, Colonel Brady, 313th Air Division Director of Materiel, conducted a conference to discuss possible operational concept of a SAC deployment to Kadena under OPLAN 25-58. Basic ground rules were outlined and requirements established. Assigned and attached units affected were given the responsibility to determine their capability to meet these requirements and retain an EWP capability. Organizations and units represented were 313th Air Division Operations and Materiel; 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Materiel and Field Maintenance; 6313th Air Base Wing Commander, Materiel, POL, Sea Weed, Blue Shield, Transportation, and Operations; 12th ADS; and SAC Liaison. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

3. CLUTCH ASSEMBLY FOR H-19 (Unclas): This was received Monday, 29 September, placing aircraft from AOOP status to AOCM, Unscheduled Maintenance. Aircraft is estimated to be in commission on 1 October 1958. (Lt Col Fulwider/48244)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

SECRET

11

1 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. ACQUISITION OF RANGES (Unclas): The USARYIS Quartermaster recently released five oil burning ranges to Naha Base Supply on a non-reimbursable basis. Two are new, Vulcan Hart valued at $450 each, and three are Montague, slightly used. Three of these ranges will be utilized at off-island site dining facilities and the other two will be utilized at Consolidated Dining Hall #1, Naha Air Base. (Mr Nemeth/44203)

2. REQUEST FOR SAC SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS (Secret): This directorate has requested through SAC Liaison that SAC provide this headquarters with basic support requirements for any plans or exercises that utilize Kadena as a base of operation. Type information requested includes parking requirements, housing and messing, minimum turn-around time, and war consumable requirements with rates of issue when applicable. This information is necessary for capabilities planning to preclude violation of our reserve EWP levels. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

3. STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT (Unclas): Representative of this office performed a staff assistance visit to inquire into problem areas concerning the operation of the Supply Expediter System at AFW 5270. The present system involves the use of telephones to call in aircraft parts requirements from 18th TFW and 15th TRS operating organizations. This poses no particular problem for the AFW account, but it does constitute a problem for the operating organizations in that the maintenance personnel requiring an aircraft spare part must go to a telephone to make his requirement known. Installation of a radio net in AFW 5270 and the use of mobile radio units on the flight line would provide for more expeditious supply support service. Action is being initiated to obtain the necessary authorization and equipment to allow installation of a ground radio station in the AFW account. It is the understanding of this office that the mobile units for use on the flight line are now available. (S/Sgt Stover/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

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2 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. MOVEMENT OF 320-GALLON AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS FOR B-57 AIRCRAFT FROM NAHA TO KADENA (Secret): As a result of redistribution action taken by Headquarters Fifth Air Force, 263 each of the above tanks were received at Naha on 30 September. Correspondence being forwarded this date requesting these tanks be moved from Naha to Kadena for possible need of Thirteenth Air Force Command Element Ryukyus Provisional (CASF). (Capt Mikesell/41123)

2. MOVEMENT OF F-86D MTD FROM NAHA (Conf): Fifth Air Force has requested the concurrence of PACAF to move the F-86D MTD from Naha to make space available for the F-102 MTD which will arrive in November. The request contained the recommendation to return the unit to Chanute Air Force Base since no further requirement exists in Fifth Air Force. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. F-6 REFUELING UNITS (Unclas): Structural repairs and Thermoline treatment have been completed on the last five F-6 refueling units from Kadena and the units delivered to using organization. Three refueling units from Naha are in the process of Thermoline treatment. Structural repair on all three has been completed. Approximate date of delivery is 10-15 October 1958. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

3 October1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIAL

1. FURNISHING OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, FACILITIES, AND SERVICES TO COMMERCIAL AIR CARREIRS UNDER CONTRACT (Unclas): As a result of a PACAF message quoting a message from Headquarters USAF, a requirement has been laid on for Air Force bases to provide support to commercial carriers operating under contract of the Air Force, in the following areas:

a. Passenger aircraft - originating and terminating:

(1) Ramp service. (Landing, towing, parking, APU's, fire guard, engine starts, loading stairs and baggage carts.

(2) Crew transportation (flight line).

(3) Passenger processing.

(4) Passenger manifesting and documentation.

(5) Baggage handling (weight, tag, and load).

(6) Customs Clearance.

(7) Medical clearance. (Passengers and crew)

(8) Clearance facilities (weather, operations).

(9) Fuel servicing.

(10) Fire and crash rescue.

b. Cargo aircraft - originating and terminating:

(1) Ramp service.

(2) Crew transportation (flight line).

(3) Cargo receiving, processing, and documentation.

(4) Loading positioning.

(5) Loading and tie-down and unloading.

(6) Manifesting.

(7) Customs clearance.

(8) Materials handling equipment.

(9) Clearance facilities

(10) Fuel servicing.

(11) Fire and crash rescue.

c. Enroute stations:

(1) Passengers:

(a) Ramp service. (Landing, towing, parking, APU's, fire guard, engine starts, loading stairs.)

(b) Crew transportation (flight line).

(c) Passenger transportation on base.

(d) Clearance facilities (weather, operations).

(e) Fuel servicing.

(f) Fire and crash rescue.

(2) Cargo:

(a) Ramp service.

(b) Crew transportation.

(c) Clearance facilities.

(d) Fuel servicing.

(e) Fire and crash rescue.

(3) Except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) above, other services at military bases, where commercial facilities are not available, may be made available to the contractor on an emergency basis only. Services furnished on such basis shall be in accordance with and subject to the provisions of AFM 67-1, as amended, or as the same may be hereafter amended, and Secretary of the Navy letter 239P53, subject: Use of Naval Aviation Facilities by Civil Aircraft, dated 20 May 1952. (Capt Mikesell/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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6 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

EXTERNAL TANKS FOR F-100, 265-GALLON (Unclas): By Operational Immediate TWX, NAMAP informed SMAMA that the third fix evolved between them and the 18th TFW is a satisfactory solution and that manufaturing drawings for the field modification would be completed 3 October. It is anticipated that NAMAP will manufacture the necessary brackets and distribute them at the earliest possible date. (Lt Col Fulwider/ 48244)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET.

7 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. QUARTERLY VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS REPORTS (Unclas): The Quarterly Vehicle Requirements Reports for Kadena and Naha Air Bases for the period ending 30 September 1958 were forwarded on 7 October 1958. Redistribution of one (1) each excess M-62 truck crane and one (1) each excess warehouse crane from Naha to Kadena to fill requirements there, has been directed. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

2. AUTHORITY TO MAKE SEA WEED HAND TOOLS AVAILABLE (Unclas): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has authorized the Project Sea Weed Officer, Kadena Air Base, to make available Sea Weed hand tools necessary for assembly of 275-gallon tanks. Since these items are war readiness tools, positive measures will be taken to assure that tools are not available within the 18th TFW or 6313th ABW prior to issue from Sea Weed. Strict accountability will be maintained on any tool placed on loan. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

3. UPGRADING OF USAF PRECEDENCE RATING AND MISSION CATEGORY (Secret): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has advised that USAF Precedence Rating 1-5, Mission Category I will apply to all units engaged in, or in support of operations supporting the Government of the Republic of China. This priority was to apply to all requisitions submitted for items to replace supplies and equipment withdrawn from EWP resources or other units, and all items shipped to units in support of OPLAN 25-58. Kadena and Naha Air Bases were instructed to forward a message advising of the upgrading in Precedence Rating and Mission Category to all depots supporting their accounts, and to request that depots upgrade all requisitions previously submitted to these categories. Bases have advised this headquarters that this action has been accomplished. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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8 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. REQUEST FOR MA-2's (Secret): The 477th TFS has requested two additional MA-2 multi-purpose power units to assist them in their air defense capabilities. This headquarters advised Fifth Air Force that none were available here. Fifth Air Force has gone forward to PACAF recommending that they request TAC to provide these two items. (Major Bush/41123)

2. H-19 AIRCRAFTED IN IRAN (Unclas): Fifth Air Force advised that H-19 aircraft which were returned from Operation Hardtack have been placed in IRAN. The first available aircraft for Naha will be on 1 December 1958. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

10 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. NAMAP - 18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING AREA ASSISTANCE TEAM VISITS OKINAWA UNITS (Unclas): A team consisting of Captain James Coleman, Captain Raymond Henderson, and Mr. Gilbert Moore, NAA Technical Representative, arrived Kadena Air Base 2100 hours 9 October via Transocean Airlines. Purpose is to assist in stepping up area assistance to the 18th TFW in relation to NAMAP's recently assigned maintenance responsibilities. (S/Sgt Lynch/44204)

2. MAINTENANCE EXPEDITER SYSTEM FOR NAHA (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has advised that immediate emergency programming action is being taken by that headquarters to obtain an operational expediter system for Naha Air Base. Fifth Air Force has requested SAMAP to confirm the availability of 16 vehicular radio (VRC-19) sets for immediate shipment to Naha. (Captain MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

13 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. AMFPA F-102 WEAPONS PHASING GROUP CONFERENCE (Conf): AMFPA has been advised that facilities are available at Naha for AMFPA F-102 Weapons Phasing Group Conference on 13-14 November. Lt Colonel Donald F. Lynch, Director of Materiel, 6431st Air Base Group, has been named project officer. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. SAMAP MONITORSHIP OF PROJECT SEA WEED (Unclas): Monitorship of Project Sea Weed by SAMAP will be discontinued effective 31 October 1958. Information copies of the 1AF-S11 Report are not to be furnished SAMAP. No effort will be made by SAMAP to ascertain excesses or recommend distribution. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

14 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. NAHA TO GAIN C-47 (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has requested the 6000th Support Wing to transfer C-47 aircraft S/N 43-15330 to 6431st Air Base Group as soon as possible. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. COMPLETION OF C-54 S/N 42-72510 (Unclas): NAMAP advises that C-54 S/N 42-72510 will be ready for release on 14 October 1958. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. NAMAP REQUESTS ENGINEER FROM SMAMA ON 275 GALLON DROP TANKS (Secret): NAMAP has requested that SMAMA dispatch a qualified engineer to the 18th TFW to design and assist in installation of a prototype fix to alleviate the problem encountered with fin flutter on F-100 aircraft external tanks. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP (PACAF PRELIMINARY OPLAN 112-58A) (Secret): This directorate has coordinated with the 6313th ABW and the 18th TFW on capabilities of Kadena to logistically support the 498th TMG. Some increase in the manning of support functions will be necessary, but only one (1) major problem is anticipated provided construction is completed prior to the arrival of assigned personnel. Kadena cannot absorb the number of personnel involved without additional construction. The one problem area is in the periodic maintenance of three helicopter aircraft by the 18th TFW. A more feasible solution would be a slight increase in 498th maintenance personnel to provide them with the capability for accomplishing periodic inspections. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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16 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. AOCP/ANFE STATUS, NAHA AIR BASE (Unclas): On 15 October 1958, 6431st Supply Squadron Base Supply Priority Section, Naha Air Base, informed this office that 61 days have elapsed since that base has had an F86-D AOCP. That section also reported that the AOCP/ANFE status of all aircraft assigned to the 6431st Air Base Group is ZERO PER CENT. (A/1C Adams/48102)

2. FLIGHT TEST OF 275-GALLON TYPE II TANK (Secret): SMAMA has advised that they are currently conducting a special flight test program jointly with North American Aviation to determine flutter characteristics of the Type II 275-gallon tank. Tests are 90 per cent conplete and fix will be formulated as soon as complete data is available. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

17 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

SHIPMENT OF TYPE D-5 HYDRAULIC TEST STANDS TO KADENA (Unclas): Commander WRAMA has advised that six each type D-5 hydraulic test stands are being shipped ffom Topeka AFD to Kadena Air Base. These stands are being supplied to alleviate the present situation at Kadena due to the lack of spares for the repair of MJ-3 test stands already on hand. Upon availability and shipment of spare parts for the MJ-3 test stands, disposition instructions will be furnished for the D-5 stands. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

20 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

IMPLEMENTATION OF AFM 66-1, ORGANIZATIONAL AND FIELD MAINTENANCE (Unclas): Lt Colonel Yous of Fifth Air Force Maintenance and Lt Colonel Fulwider of this directorate conferred with Colonel Johnsen, Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, in regard to the implementation of this program. The rough organizational chart, discussed previously with Colonel Hardy, was reviewed and discussed. Colonel Johnsen indicated that he saw no problems in implementing the plan as charted. It was agreed that the 51st FIW will develop their proposal around this draft and discussion and forward it through 313th Air Division to Fifth Air Force for review. (Lt Col Fulwider/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

21 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

CROSS-SERVICING AND INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT AGREEMENTS (Unclas): During the visit of Mr. McIntyre, Under Secretary of the Air Force for Logistics, his representative held a conference on the subject of support of the Air Force by the Army. It was emphasized by this representative that the Army was attempting to withdraw support to the Air Force in many areas. On Okinawa, the Army has indicated that this withdrawal in the areas of vehicle maintenance, tire rebuild, etc. has been or soon will be accomplished. The Department of Defense has requested that any unilateral support withdrawal by any service be forwarded through channels to the DOD. It is evident that this area must be under close staff surveillance to prevent the 313th Air Division from finding itself in an awkward position, insofar as Army support is concerned. Action to request authorization for an additional captain, AFSC 6424, to perform duties as Interservice Supply Officer, has been taken by this directorate. (Major Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

22 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. LOSS OF MTD UNITS (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has directed the F-101 MTD at Kadena and the F-86D MTD at Naha to cease training programs and prepare for subsequent transfer. The F-101 unit will move to Misawa, Japan, on/about 28 October 1958. Disposition instructions on the F-86D unit have not yet been received. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. TENTATIVE MTD SCHEDULE (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has advised that the F-102 MTD will be assigned PCS to Naha Air Base. The unit will be in place at Naha from approximately 30 November 1958 to 1 April 1959. From 1 April 1959 to 15 July 1959, the unit will be TDY to Itazuke with subsequent TDY scheduled at Misawa from 15 July to 1 November 1959. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. CONDEMNATION OF LETTUCE (Unclas): The Veterinary Service, U.S. Army Medical Service Group, has advised that two shipments of lettuce totalling 75,180 pounds, received on 15 and 16 October, have been inspected and found to be unfit for human consumption. This lettuce has been disposed of as garbage. No lettuce will be available until 3 November 1958; the next shipment is due on/about 1 November 1958. The amount is 40,000 pounds. (Mr. Nemeth/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

23 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. MODIFICATION OF 275-GALLON EXTERNAL FUEL TANKS (Secret):

a. Reference the collapse of the leading edge of two of these tanks in normal flight and the subsequent damage to CASF F-100 aircraft. The 18th Field Maintenance Squadron developed and tested a rigid fix which was applied to 6 sets for the 18th TFW and 28 sets for the 477th TFS (CASF). Later, NAMAP and 18th FMS jointly developed and tested a "floating" type fix adaptable to both wet and dry rear cone tanks. Twenty-eight sets were manufactured and installed on tanks in a flight line stock pile, per Colonel Barrett's instructions; the two types were sufficient for three sorties.

b. In the meantime, NAMAP had asked for assistance from SMAMA, who, in conjunction with the manufacturereg, Royal Jet Inc. and North American Aviation Company, developed and flight tested a fix, the results of which have been inconclusive.

c. A manufacturer's representative is due in NAMAP and Okinawa on/about 24 October to complete a fix satisfactory to SMAMA for AMC and ARDC approval and application to world wide stocks. (Lt Colonel Fulwider/48244)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
COLONEL, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

24 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PACAF R & R PROGRAM FOR CASF PERSONNEL CANCELLED (Unclas): A Thirteenth Air Force message dated 22 October 1958 established an R & R program for CASF personnel located in Thirteenth Air Force area and Okinawa. The plan was to give personnel three days and three nights in either Hong Kong or Japan. However, CINCPACAF unclassified message PFMDC 53608, dated 23 October 1958, just received, states in part: "Cancel repeat cancel this program immediately. In the future, any program of this scope and nature will be referred to this headquarters prior to implementation. Repeat cancel this program immediately." (Lt Col Morgan/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

27 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. RETURN OF MD-3 GENERATORS TO SEA WEED (Conf): CINCSAC message received at this headquarters on 23 October 1958 directed the return to Sea Weed storage of 8 each MD-3 generators from the 18th TFW and 1 each MA-1A compressor from the 477th TFS. The MA-1A has been returned and is no longer required due to the recent receipt of 2 each MA-2's by the 477th TFS. One each of the MD-3's is currently out of commission for an ammeter and will be returned to storage upon receipt and restoration to serviceable condition. The remaining 7 each MD-3's are urgently needed by the 18th TFW. This directorate has requested assistance from Fifth Air Force in obtaining permission to retain these units in the 18th TFW. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

2. ASSEMBLY OF 275-GALLON AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS FOR F-100 AIRCRAFT (Secret):

a. Headquarters Fifth Air Force has been informed that, of the 1,280 each 275-gallon auxiliary fuel tanks on hand at Kadena, 1,237 tanks have been assembled. This is approximately 50 per cent of the established inviolate reserve level, which this headquarters feels is satisfactory to meet requirements for this item. The balance of 53 tanks on hand are short components and/or parts for assembly. Receipt and assembly of additional tanks, in addition to the 840 unassembled wet-tip tanks, would pose a storage problem, as well as extending our corrosion control requirements.

b. It was further recommended that the NAMAP team, totalling six personnel, on TDY for the purpose of supervising the assembly and instruction on corrosion control, be authorized to terminate their TDY at Kadena Air Base. Concurrence or advice was requested. The 6313th Air Base Wing and 18th Tactical Fighter Wing were advised to discontinue assembling these tanks pending receipt of further instructions from Fifth Air Force and this headquarters. (Lt Col Fulwider/48244)

3. STAFF VISIT TO TAIWAN (Secret): Capt Reddrick of this directorate visited Tainan and Taipei, Taiwan, during the period 21-24 October 1958, to check on the logistic support of the 25th FIS deployed to Tainan. Support by the 6214th Air Base Group and resupply by the parent base, Naha, were being accomplished in a highly satisfactory manner with no major problems existing at this time. Specific areas covered included tip tank support, inventory of deployed equipment, location and return of missing support equipment, return of support personnel to Naha, and retention of equipment by 6214th ABG upon termination of deployment. A formal staff visit report will be submitted. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

28 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR OKINAWA (Unclas): Information received 27 October 1958 from PACAF-AMFPA states that, effective 1 November 1958, NAMAP will assume responsibility for AMC support of units on Okinawa. Exception to this realignment of responsibility lies in the communications/electronics, engineering, and installation support, which will remain at SAMAP until 1 January 1959, when GEEIA assumes responsibility. SAMAP will also retain command of the 546th ASSD until 1 July 1959. (T/Sgt Warner/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

29 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

MOVEMENT OF 6902ND SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS GROUP TO KADENA (Secret): Lt Col Morgan and Capt Reddrick of this directorate visited the 6927th Radio Squadron (Mobile) at Onna Point on 28 October 1958, and attended a briefing pertaining to the movement of the 6902nd Special Communications Group and the 6922nd Radio Group (Mobile) to Kadena Air Base during the fourth quarter of this fiscal year. A total of 33 officers, 527 airmen, and 1 civilian will be involved in this move. Operations will be established in the 313th Air Division Academy area with billeting in the White Horse area. The 6922nd will arrive with one officer and one airman, but, after arrival, will be phased up to 12 officers, 52 airmen, and 1 civilian and will continue operations in permanent facilities at Kadena. At the same time, the 6202nd Special Communications Group will be phased down and redesignated the 6202nd Special Communications Squadron with approximately the same number of personnel assigned. This organization will continue to be billeted on Kadena but will operate from a joint Army-Navy-Air Force communications operations center at Sobe. A briefing is to be set up for other Division and Base personnel to discuss logistic support facilities, augmentation, dependent housing, and other problems relative to the move of this organization to Kadena. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

SECRET

30 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. BAGGAGE ALLOWANCE REDUCTION FOR AIR TRAVELERS (MATS) (Unclas):

a. Reliable information just received through Military Air Transport Service channels limits baggage for all air travelers via MATS system to 65 pounds, repeat 65 pounds, per passenger. Formerly, air baggage allowance to accompany air travelers was 100 pounds for dependents over 12 years of age and 65 pounds for all other passengers including military personnel. This reduced baggage allowance is being disseminated to all organizations as rapidly as possible. It will be published in the Daily Bulletins at both Naha and Kadena in the very near future.

b. However, priority baggage, called hold baggage for surface travelers, which may be shipped via air freight, has not been reduced. Pri-bag weight allowances are usually more than adequate; therefore, the reductions mentioned above should create no inconvenience to anyone, provided they are aware of the change prior to beginning travel. (Lt Col Morgan/42108)

2. INVIOLATE LEVEL OR OPLAN 25-58 RESERVE FOR ASSEMBLED RF-101 T NKS (Secret): Headquarters Fifth Air Force has advised that no inviolate or OPLAN 25-58 reserve level has been established for assembled RF-101 tanks. Fifth Air Force has recommended that seventy (70) tanks be assembled, which was derived at after computing total sortie rate from WPC59 for the first 15 days applied against expenditure rates established in USAF WPC57-2-II. In arriving at this figure, consideration was also given to assembly time based on SMAMA's estimate that approximately one (1) manhour is required to assemble. This headquarters was requested to consider the quantity recommended above against any additional factors at your base, such as storage facilities, experienced assembly time, etc., and submit our recommendations. Correspondence has been forwarded to 6313th Air Base Wing requesting their comments relative to the recommended quantity and their recommendations in view of the additional factors to be considered. (M/Sgt Pearlstein/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

31 October 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD (Unclas): The first meeting of the 313th Air Division Technical Review Board convened at 0930 on 30 October in the Division Conference Room. Representatives from 313th Air Division, 6313th Air Base Wing, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, and 6431st Air Base Group were in attendance. The policy, procedures, and purpose of the committee were explained by Colonel Brady. The general aircraft supply picture was discussed and each AOCP and ANFE item for Kadena and Naha was discussed for adequacy. (Major Huckabay/44204)

2. T. O. DROP TANK KITS (Unclas): Shortage of T. O. drop tank kits, which has been in existence for the past year, is still critical. Of 1193 each on order, 32 each have been received. TWX to SMAMA revealed 80 each ready for shipment to AFB 5272 on trip 977/24 departing Travis AFB, California, 24 October 1958. Aircraft arrived Kadena on 29 October 1958 without drop tank kits aboard. Supply difficulty letter has been forwarded to Fifth Air Force for command assistance in desolving this difficulty. (A/1C Adams/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

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3 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

NAMAP ENGINE MANAGER TEAM (Unclas): The NAMAP Engine Manager Team, consisting of Captain Silverman and M/Sgt Colay, is visiting Kadena and Naha this week to check into compliance with existing directives pertaining to the Engine Manager program. (Maj Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

4 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. MODIFICATION OF 275-GALLON TYPE II AUXILIARY FUEL TANKS FOR F-100 AIRCRAFT (Secret): NAMAP and Royal Jet Inc. (manufacturer) representatives visited Kadena the week of 28 October and reviewed the circumstances encountered and the fixes developed (as related in journal items on 29 September, 23 October, and 27 October). Our deductions were confirmed that this task, Type II, had never been test flown before or after manufacture and issue. It was generally agreed and reaffirmed that this tank was never designed nor intended for other than a one-time flight, and certainly not for recurring training flights; however, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and 477th Tactical Fighter Squadron (CASF) consider them acceptable for limited use when modified by either of the two fixes developed locally and which have been submitted to NAMAP for approval and quantity production of like kits. The NAMAP and Royal Jet Inc. representatives were non-committal on any decisions, saying they would forward us a copy of their report upon return to and evaluation at NAMAP. (Lt Colonel Fulwider/42121)

2. SHIPMENT OF GENERATORS (Conf): Information has been received that action has been taken to ship six each MD-3 generators from SMAMA to Naha Air Base to replace six each C-26 generators. The actual shipment of the units will be delayed due to the necessity of performing TO modifications prior to shipment. Expected delivery date is 31 December 1958. Receipt of these units should eliminate the problem encountered in supporting the E-4 Radar Mock-Up at forward bases during deployment of the 16th FIS and 25th FIS. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44204)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

5 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

CONTROLLED MISSION EQUIPMENT LISTINGS FOR F-100 AND RF-101C AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has directed 18th TFW and 67th TRW to submit lists of deficient controlled mission equipment (CME) for the F-100 and the RF-101C aircraft. It was suggested by Fifth Air Force that a meeting be held at the 21st TFW at Misawa Air Base with representatives of the 8th, 18th, and 21st TFW's attending. Purpose of the meeting is to prepare a consolidated listing of critically short CME items for submission to Fifth Air Force Headquarters for forwarding to the Logistic Support Manager. Applicable support bases will also be provided copies of this listing. Listing for the RF-101C aircraft will be prepared at a meeting of representatives from67th, 15th, and 45th TRS, held at 67th TRW. These listings will constitute the first reports submitted in accordance with AFR 67-90. RCS: AF-S83 will apply. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

6 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

VISIT OF COLONEL PACKARD (Unclas): On 4 and 5 November, Colonel Packard, Director of Supply and Services, NAMAP, along with several members of his staff, visited Kadena and Naha on a familiarization tour. This visit was in conjunction with NAMAP's taking over area assistance support for the 313th Air Division, which was effective 1 November. (Maj Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

7 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. THEATRE CLEARANCES (Unclas):

a. Mr. Charlie W. Stone, Aircraft Programs Officer, SAAMA, has been granted a theatre clearance by PACAF to attend AMFPA F-102 WSPG Conference on 13-14 November 1958 at Naha Air Base.

b. Mr. Sam C. Moland, WRAMA, has been granted theatre clearance by PACAF to visit 18th TFW, Kadena Air Base, for approximately thirty days to train personnel on operation and maintenance of MJ-3 hydraulic test stands. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. LOAN OF MD-3 GENERATORS (Secret): Due to the fact that the period of time for which 7 each MD-3 generators were loaned to the 18th TFW from Sea Weed prestockage has expired, it has become necessary to request an extention on the loan for an indefinite period of time, until receipt of MA-5 generators from ZI. This action is mandatory due to the vital use to which the MD-3's are being put, namely support of Operations Order 117-58. CINCSAC has advised that, before approval of the extention of the loan, the following additional information is required:

a. The number of hours which have been accumulated on each generator.

b. Positive steps taken to insure that generators are not being used in day to day operations.

c. Action taken to obtain authorized items.

d. Length of desired loan extention.

Direct communication from Kadena Air Base to CINCPACAF has been authorized. This headquarters has requested that it be included as info addressee. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

10 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. QUARTERS FURNITURE FOR NAHA AIR BASE (Unclas): Request has been tendered to Fifth Air Force for special airlift (315th AD) to transport 40 complete sets of furniture from Japan to Naha. Of these 40 sets, 22 are to be picked up at Tachikawa Air Base on 14 November 1958, and 18 are to be picked up there and delivered to Naha on 20 November 1958. (Lt Col Morgan/42188)

2. JET ENGINE TEST CELL INDOCTRINATION COURSE (Unclas): Mr. J. D. Garrett, WRAMA representative will conduct a jet engine test cell indoctrination course at Yokota Air Base, Japan, on 12, 13, and 14 November. Fifth Air Force has allocated 51st FIW and 18th TFW two spaces each for this course. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (Unclas): The monthly PIP Report from 6313th ABW indicated continued interest and support by using organizations. The October monthly totals for Unsatisfactory Reports and Failure Reports submitted on Kadena were 86 and 1,583 respectively. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. FIFTH AIR FORCE STAFF CHANGE (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has announced the following staff change, effective 1 November 1958. The Exchange Service staff function is being transferred from DS/S Personnel to DC/S Materiel. The office symbol for the new staff location of this function is 5FMSS-G-S. Fifth Air Force recommends the transfer of this function at base level to align with this change. (Maj Huckabay/44204)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

12 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

REWORK OF C-54 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): A request has been forwarded to SAMAP for rework of two C-54 aircraft of Detachment 2, 313th Air Division. The aircraft were received from IRAN with faulty fuel cell sealing and will be resealed upon approval of the rework request by SAMAP. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

13 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. DECEMBER TRAVEL SPACE ALLOCATION VIA MATS TO ZI CONFIRMED (Unclas):

a. Space allocation in the amount of 815 seats, as requested, have been awarded and confirmed for Air Force personnel travel from Okinawa to Travis (DNA-SUU) for December 1958.

b. Therefore, provided November travelers are enabled to depart in November, no problem is anticipated in effecting December travel. However, approximately 300 seats requested for additional November travelers eligible due to cancellation of OPLAN 25-58 extendees have not been confirmed as of 13 November. It is anticipated confirmation will be received momentarily. (Lt Colonel Morgan/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

14 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. ALIGNMENT CHECK COMPLETE ON C-54-510 (Unclas): NAMAP has advised that no major discrepancies were found as a result of the alignment check performed at the Tachikawa Depot on C-54 aircraft S/N 42-72510 of Detachment 2, 313th Air Division. New surfaces have been installed and a weight and balance check will be performed prior to test flight. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. INTERSERVICE SUPPLY SUPPORT COMMITTEE MEETING (Unclas): Major Bush of this directorate attended the fourteenth meeting of the Interservice Supply Support Committee on 13 November in the Division Conference Room. At this meeting, the chairmanship, which rotates semi-annually, was transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. (Maj Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

17 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

REPAIR OF MAJOR ORDNANCE ASSEMBLIES BY ARMY DEPOT (Unclas): Information has been received this date (17 November 1958) that details of the problem of obtaining satisfactory major ordnance assembly overhaul and replacement for Air Force bases on Okinawa has been forwarded to PACAF for resolution. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

18 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF FA-82 AIRCRAFT (Secret): This headquarters has been advised by Fifth Air Force that, pending a decision by PACAF/TAC on support responsibilites for the FA-82 aircraft (6 each RF-101's) at Kadena, subject aircraft will be attached to the 15th TRS for organizational and periodic maintenance support. Fifth Air Force had previously assigned camera repair responsibilities to that organization. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

2. TRANSFER OF T-33 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): The 51st FIW transferred T-33A 53-5135 to Johnson Air Base. Pilot is to pick up T-33 55-4410 to replace the aircraft transferred. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

SECRET

19 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. LOSS OF AIRCRAFT (Unclas): The 25th FIS of the 51st FIW lost F-86D S/N 52-3981 to 26th FIS at Clark Air Base PI on 16 November 1958. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

2. LOAN OF SEA WEED MD-3 GENERATORS (Secret): The temporary loan of 7 each MD-3 Generators to the 18th TFW from Sea Weed stockage to support Operations Order 117-58 has been extended by CINCSAC for a period of sixty days. This extention should cover the time involved for the 18th TFW to receive their own authorized equipment from the ZI. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

3. LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF FA-82 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Unclassified message from 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing states that Fifth Air Force has instructed that a FA-82 detachment is to be attached to the 15th TRS for administrative and logistic support. Operational control will remain with the 13th Air Force Command Element Ryukyus (Provisional), i.e. CASF. The FA-82 aircraft will be maintained and supported as if they were 15th TRS aircraft, and the FA-82 maintenance personnel will be under the supervision of the 15th TRS Maintenance Officer. (Lt Col Fulwider/42121)

4. ACQUISITION OF B-21 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): On 14 November, the 24th Helicopter Squadron, Naha Air Base, received two each B-21 aircraft, 51-15844 and 52-8670, making a total of five helicopters assigned. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

20 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PACAF AIR TRANSPORTATION STAFF VISIT BY MAJOR EDWARD E. LANE, (Unclas): Major Lane, Transportation, DCS/M, Headquarters PACAF, on his Western Pacific Area visit, spent 19 November here working with Division Transportation Officer and our ATCO, Lt Weidenhamer. His area of primary interest was ir transportation. He approved our urgent request for additional tonnage to transport Hi-Value cargo to ZI. This need arose due to unanticipated generation of cargo by CASF units. Considerable information of value was supplied by Major Lane during his visit coordinating on air transportation matters. He indicated that good progress is being made on the program to effect direct cargo shipment to Okinawa. In fact, seven additional C-124 round-trip flights have been added during November. This will increase in future months, with Kadena becoming one of three main MATS terminals in the Far east. (Lt Col Morgan/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

21 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

SURVEY VISIT BY AST-7, 1370TH PHOTO MAPPING GROUP (Secret): On 20 November, this headquarters was visited by Major Bonafede and Capt Perresult of the Aerial Survey Team No. 7, 1370th Photo Mapping Group, stationed at Clark Air Base. The purpose of this visit was to coordinate operation of their unit in this area during the period 1 February to 1 July 1959. This unit will have three (3) H-19 helicopters which will utilize Naha Air Base for periodic and unscheduled maintenance. One H-19 is expected to be on Naha at all times. Fifth Air Force is furnishing eight (8) maintenance personnel for this support. The unit's B-50 aircraft will operate out of Kadena and are scheduled to RON in a 1, 2, 1, 0 sequence. Ramp facilities for two aircraft and normal transient aircraft support will be required. Six (6) airmen will be stationed at Kadena during the period to operate a radio relay station for communication with the parent unit at Clark Air Base. (Capt Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

25 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

TRANSFER OF AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Two each F-100D aircraft, 55-3509 and 55-3565, were transferred to 21st TFW, Misawa Air Base, Japan, from 18th TFW, this station, as of 1100 hours on 23 November 1958. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

26 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

LOAN OF AIRCRAFT (Unclas): H-19 helicopter S/N 52-7496 is being loaned to the 1370th Photo Mapping Group, Clark Air Force Base, P. I., for an indefinite period. This information was received by Fifth Air Force message on 25 November 1958. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

24 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. DEPOT SUPPORT OF FIFTH AIR FORCE UNITS (Unclas): Major Broughten, representing Fifth Air Force, and four representatives from NAMAP held a discussion with Materiel representatives of 313th Air Division on 24 November 1958 concerning the Aircraft Time Compliance Technical Order and Modernization Program. The discussion was primarily for familiarization with the program and explanation of the realignment of NAMAP to provide a Weapons System Control Division to furnish better depot support to using agencies. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. TRANSFER OF H-19 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has directed the transfer of H-19 aircraft S/N 52-7496 to 1370th Photo Mapping Group, Clark Air Force Base. The 6431st Air Base Group will prepare the aircraft to be air shipped on/about 26 November 1958. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

28 November 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

VISIT BY FIFTH AIR FORCE TEAM--QUARTERS FURNITURE (Unclas): Major Crawford, Supply and Services Division, Headquarters Fifth Air Force, accompanied by representatives from General Services Administration, is visiting this command for the purpose of reviewing the status of quarters furniture. This command is exerting every effort to secure approval for obtaining sufficient quarters furniture to replace obsolete and worn out furniture with the PACAF standard furniture. (Major Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

11

1 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

DISPOSITION OF EXCESS B-26 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has requested PACAF to give disposition instructions on four B-26 base support aircraft located at Naha Air Base as soon as possible. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

2 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

DEPOT SUPPORT OF GAS TURBINE COMPRESSORS FOR MA-2 MPSU'S (Unclas): The problem of timely receipt of replacements for the MA-2 multi-purpose servicing units used in support of F-100 aircraft was brought to the attention of the Commanding Generals of SMAMA and WRAMA in a personal message from the Commander, 313th Air Division, on 20 November 1958. In reply WRAMA message, dated 26 November 1958, contained revised instructions for ordering replacement GTU's. Under the new concept, the using organization need not wait until the maximum number of starts per unit have been used, but may order the replacement unit well in advance of this time so as to have the replacement GTU on hand when mandatory exchange is due. Disposition instructions on the reparable unit will be received simultaneously with the shipping instructions for the new unit. This will result in more rapid return of reparable units to the repair facility. This system is expected to alleviate the problem by furnishing sufficient and timely replacements for reparable GTU's. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Personnel

3 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

TAPE RECORDERS FOR "PLOT-TELL" CIRCUIT (Unclas): Information received from Fifth Air Force indicates their concurrence on purchase of tape recorders for "plot-tell" circuit. Equipment Review and Authorization Activity, Fifth Air Force, has forwarded request for subject recorders to CINCPACAF for final action. Pending PACAF action, purchase of recorders is to be held in abeyance. (T/Sgt Werner/44203)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

4 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

AIRCRAFT LOSS (Unclas): RF-101C aircraft S/N 58-225 of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was dropped to Itazuke Air Base, Japan, for maintenance. During November, this airdraft was involved in a landing accident which sheared the nose gear. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

5 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. LOAN OF MD-3 GENERATORS (Secret): On 20 November 1958, CINCPACAF requested CINCSAC to change the loan extension on the seven Sea Weed MD-3 generators to the 18th TFW from 60 to 90 days. These generators are currently being used in the 18th TFW alert area. An info copy of the reply from CINCSAC has been received. CINCSAC has refused the extension and stated that it was deemed unnecessary due to the fact that, inthe near future, that command expected to have sufficient MD-3 Generators excess to permit them to recommend to SMAMA that the required generators be permanently transferred to the 18th TFW. (T/Sgt Caffrey/44203)

2. INSTALLATION OF CHAFF DISPENSERS IN T-33 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has issued a revised listing of T-33 aircraft which will have T. O. IT-33A-554 complied with. (This T. O. provides for the installation of chaff dispenser.) Aircraft S/N 51-4394, 52-9315 and 53-4979 of the 51st FIW are programmed for this tech order. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

8 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

JET ENGINE TEST CELL MODIFICATION (Unclas): A team of three civilian employees of Space Corporation arrived Kadena Air Base on 6 December 1958 to accomplish modifications on the engine test cell installed at Kadena Air Base. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

9 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

SERVICE TEST ON THE F-100D/F POST FLIGHT (Unclas): Effective 1 December 1958, a service test on the F-100D/F post flight inspection will be conducted on selected aircraft assigned to the 18th TFW. The test will be conducted on the aircraft assigned to two of the squadrons in the wing. The service test provides for the post flight to be performed after the twelfth flying hour but before the thirteenth flying hour. This is for comparative purposes between present dash six handbook and proposed changes thereto. Test is to cover a six-month period from 1 December through 1 June 1959. The aircraft assigned to the third squadron of the 18th TFW will have the post flight inspection performed as presently outlined in the dash six handbook. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

10 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR J-57 JET ENGINE FIELD MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (Unclas): Two SAAMA representatives will visit Kadena Air Base in January 1959 to render technical assistance and advise for an effective JEFN program. A maintenance representative from Fifth Air Force will accompany the team. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

11 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. SERVICE TEST ON F-100 POST FLIGHTS (Unclas): Major Spencer of Fifth Air Force and Mr. Dressler of SMAMA are visiting the 18th TFW in connection with the proposed service test on F-100 post flights which will begin approximately 15 December 1958 and run until 15 June 1959. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. CHANGE OF ASSIGNMENT CODES ON C-54 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Permission to interchange assignment codes between C-54 aircraft S/N 42-72652 and S/N 42-72510 has been requested from Fifth Air Force. If granted, aircraft 652 will be utilized in CS Code and 510 in SF Code. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. IRAN OF C-54 AIRCRAFT S/N 42-72510 (Unclas): SAMAP has been queried about the possibility of accelerating the IRAN schedule for C-54 aircraft 42-72510 of Detachment 2, 313th Air Division. The aircraft is presently due into IRAN on 10 April 1959. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

4. RECLAMATION OF B-26 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): AMC has sent authorization to PACAF for the reclamation of the B-26 aircraft assigned 313th Air Division. An appropriate save list will be forwarded to Naha Air Base from AMC as soon as possible. Action is pending word from Fifth Air Force. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

5. F-102 MTD SCHEDULE (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has advised that the F-102 MTD will be in place at Naha from arrival (approximately 20 December) until 15 May 1959. This represents a 45-day extension of training over what was planned previously. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

12 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PARTIAL PRESSURE SUITS REQUIREMENTS FOR F-102 SQUADRONS (Unclas): PACAF has advised that, pending the outcome of a 30-day service test by ADC of the MC-4 partial pressure suit and the MD-1 anti-exposure suit, requirements for this equipment will be waived until further notice. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

15 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PROCUREMENT OF PACAF STANDARD FURNITURE (Unclas): Information received from Headquarters Fifth Air Force indicates that the production of PACAF quarters furniture is to be discontinued until after the beginning of FY 60. In the meantime, specific planning data and funding requirements are being compiled and forwarded to Headquarters Fifth Air Force to insure that subject furniture will be programmed for this division in the next fiscal year. (Major Bush/41125)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

16 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. IMPLEMENTATION OF AFM 66-1 (Unclas): Fifth Air Force letter has been received prescribing the procedures for integrating separate tenant squadrons into the AFM 66-1 consolidated maintenance program. Essentially, separate squadrons will participate and be integrated maintenance-wise in the same manner as any other squadron of parent or host wings. The letter has been forwarded to the pertinent wing commanders with instructions to notify and include all separate squadrons and detachments on their respective bases. Problems that could not be resolved through normal channels are to be referred to the 313th Air Division Committee for the Implementation of AFM 66-1 at its regular meetings. (Lt Col Fulwider/42121)

2. RECLAMATION OF B-26 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force has authorized reclamations of four B-26 aircraft assigned to 6431st Air Base Group. Demilitarization and reclamation will be performed by 51st Field Maintenance Squadron. Aircraft status code has been changed to XS. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

17 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. OBLIGATION AUTHORITY FOR REWORK OF C-54 AIRCRAFT S/N 42-72520 (Unclas): The 6313th Air Base Wing has been requested by this headquarters to prepare and forward to SAMAP obligation authority for $10,000 for contractual coverage of desealing and resealing the fuel cells of C-54 aircraft S/N 42-72520 of Detachment 2, 313th Air Division. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. REWORK OF C-54 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): SAMAP has been requested to schedule rework of C-54 aircraft S/N 42-72520 in early February, after receipt of obligation authority from 6313th Air Base Wing. Aircraft will undergo resealing of the fuel tanks. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

3. IRAN OF C-54 AIRCRAFT 42-72510 (Unclas): SAMAP has advised that the IRAN input date for C-54 aircraft S/N 42-72510 of Detachment 2 cannot be accelerated. Aircraft is scheduled 10 April 1959. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

18 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

TRANSFER OF C-47 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): Fifth Air Force message has instructed the transfer of C-47 aircraft 43-49351 from 6313th Air Base Wing. Instructions from CINCPACAF as to the recipient of this aircraft are being awaited. (M/Sgt Abell/42121)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

19 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

ASSIGNMENT OF LOCKHEED REPRESENTATIVE (Unclas): Mr. Lloyd, representative of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, is presently on duty at Naha to assist in solving problems pertaining to maintenance and supply of the C-130 aircraft. He is expected to be there approximately six months. (Maj Bush/41123)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

22 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

LIQUID OXYGEN EQUIPMENT (Secret): On 18 December, Captain Reddrick, Logistic Plans and Programs Officer, hand carried a personal letter from General Smith to General Burns with a detailed staff study of our requirement for new LOX generators adequate to meet our operational and EWP requirements. General Burns stated that this requirement would be given immediate attention by his staff and that Fifth Air Force would exert every effort to assist this headquarters in obtaining a satisfactory LOX production capability. Within one (1) hour after presentation of the study to General Burns action had been initiated in the Materiel, Installation Engineer, and Procurement sections to arrive at a satisfactory solution to our problem. (Captain Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

SECRET

24 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

ADDITIONAL LOX GENERATORS (Secret): This headquarters has been advised, by an information copy of CINCPACAF message to Memphis AFD, that two (2) additional type AIA liquid oxygen generators are to be shipped to Kadena to relieve the emergency situation resulting from the Superior Air Products generator's becoming inoperative. These generators added to our inventory will allow for rotation of units for preventive maintenance and necessary repairs and increase our production capability approximately ten gallons per hour. The two (2) generators will be added to the Sea Weed inventory. (Captain Reddrick/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

12917 SECAF

29 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES AND TIRE REBUILD (Unclas): Agreement has been reached between Department of Air Force and Department of Army on respective maintenance responsibilities. This agreement has been formalized in AFR 66-14/AR 750-11, dated 12 November 1958. As regards tire rebuild, above regulation states that rebuild of tires for the Air Force is a responsibility of the Department of Army in CONUS only. Reparable tires may also be turned in for sales return credits under the Army Stock Fund. However, since Department of Army has not yet designated a turn-in point for reparable stock fund items in Okinawa, it appears that the procedure outlined in T. O. 00-25-68 (Contract Maintenance of Air Force Equipment) is the most effective means of accomplishing tire rebuild on Okinawa at this time. (T/Sgt Lopez/48244)

2. C-133 SCHEDULED FAMILIARIZATION VISIT 13-15 JANUARY 1959 (Unclas): Information from MATS discloses that a C-133 Cargo Master, turbo-prop aircraft, 45-ton payload transport will arrive Kadena on 13 January 1959. An information briefing for interested personnel will be given on 14 January 1959 as follows:

1000 - 1040 General information and flight characteristics
1050 - 1130 Flight planning
1300 - 1340 Ground operations
1350 - 1430 Enroute maintenance
1440 - 1520 Cargo loading
1530 - 1600 General discussion

The C-133 aircraft will depart on 15 January 1959. Request those interested staff members contact this office prior to 8 January 1959 to insure that seat space in Base Operations Briefing Room is available. (Lt Col Morgan/42108)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

12971 AFCAG

SECRET

30 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

1. SALVAGE OF B-26 AIRCRAFT (Unclas): OOAMA has been requested to expedite the save list for reclamation of the four B-26 aircraft at Naha. Reclamation action is pending receipt of this list. (Capt MacNeill/42121)

2. F-100 SUPPLY SUPPORT DIFFICULTY (Secret): On 18 December, a personal message from Gen Smith was sent to Gen Price, Commander, SMAMA, regarding the rapidly deteriorating F-100 supply support being received at Kadena Air Base. The increase of AOCP rates from 3 to 13 per cent was attributed to a poor fill rate on routine supply requisitions and, until a better fill rate is experienced, the trend is expected to increase accordingly. Requisition fill rates were as follows: September - 59%, October - 48%, November - 61%. Mr. Bennett, WSMO at Kadena, is making every effort to remedy this situation; however, until positive supply action is received, the situation cannot possibly improve. (A/1C Adams/48102)

3. F-100 SUPPLY SUPPORT (Secret): On 22 December a reply was received from Gen Price to Gen Smith indicating current AOCP requirements were being processed for immediate shipment to Kadena Air Base. This shipment of supplies should satisfy the current AOCP situation and provide small quantities to alleviate other anticipated AOCP's. A study of Kadena AB fill rates is being made by SMAMA and Kadena AB will be advised of results upon completion of the study. (A/1C Adams/48102)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

SECRET

31 December 1958

DIRECTORATE OF MATERIEL

PREPARATION OF C-47 FOR TRANSFER (Unclas): Four each 100-gallon ferry tanks have been requisitioned for C-47 aircraft S/N 43-49351 of 6313th Operations Squadron. Tanks are needed to prepare aircraft for transfer to AMC for Project AMC-9C-165. (Capt MacNeill)

FRANCIS T. BRADY
Colonel, USAF
Director of Materiel

1201 SAC HQ 800000