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



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


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HISTORY of the 313TH AIR DIVISION

313TH AIR DIVISION

JULY - DECEMBER 1960

NARRATIVE
VOLUME I

SECRET

SECRET

313I0-H-005

HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1960

ROBERT M. STILLMAN
Major General, USAF
Commander

Prepared for the 313th Air Division Historical Division by:

Mr. Wayne G. Peterson Command Historian

(29 November 1961)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239)

SECRET

EARLY STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION ON THE MACE MISSILE SITE

AT WHITE BEACH, SITE 2

SECRET



Construction Agency:
U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
APO 331

Contractor:
Matsumura Gumi Company, LTD.
ENG-425

3
Percent Project Completed:
2.98%

Photo Description:
Service Tunnel & Staircase; Shows excavation & sub-base concrete for the tunnel & staircase

Location:
Site 2; White Beach

Date:
22 Dec '60

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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1960

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1960

1960

1 July The 6313th Installations Squadron at Kadena AB is redesignated the 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron, per PACAF GO 20, dtd. 25 March 1960.

Detachment 3, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (MATS) at Kadena AB is redesignated Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (MATS), per ACIC GO 4, dtd. 20 June 1960.

Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (MATS) is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support, and to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for logistic support (to include field maintenance only), per 313th AD GO 33, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960.

The 6431st Installations Squadron at Naha AB is redesignated the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron, per PACAF GO 20, dtd. 25 March 1960.

Detachment #1, 3d Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC), at Kadena AB, is redesignated Detachment #1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC), per 3d AD GO 8, dtd. 3 June 1960.

Yae Take Air Station (PIN 2978), previously assigned to the real property account of Naha AB and comprising 43.10 acres with an annual land rental of $1,062.33, is inactivated and deleted from the Air Force installation list by reason of transfer to the Department of the Army, per PACAF GO 47, dtd. 21 June 1960, and USAF Message AFOCE-R 80395, dtd. 23 March 1960.

Yontan TACAN Annex (PIN 2979), with an annual land rental of $398.04 for the 10.84 acres previously assigned to Kadena AB, is inactivated and deleted from the Air Force installation list by reason of transfer to the Department of the Army, per PACAF GO 47, dtd. 21 June 1960, and USAF Message AFOCE-R 60647, dtd. 9 June 1960.

1960

1 July A one-acre portion of the U.S. Army Ordnance Ammunition Depot, Chibana, is transferred to the U.S. Air Force, which thereupon designates it the Kadena TACAN Annex, per USAF GO 27, dtd. 15 June 1960. The new acquisition is then assigned in an inactive status to the real property account of Kadena AB, per PACAF GO 65, dtd. 17 Aug. 1960. The annual rental for this parcel of land is $32.72.

Detachment 1, 313th Air Division is discontinued at Naha AB, per PACAF GO 45, dtd. 9 June 1960.

An 11-acre parcel of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex, with an annual rental of $251.35, is transferred from the Department of the Air Force to the Department of the Army to provide the additional land required by the latter for Hawk site facilities and an access road.

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, with personnel authorizations as contained in current Unit Manning Documents, is designated and organized at Naha AB, per PACAF GO 45, dtd. 9 June 1960, and is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support (less assignment and promotion of personnel). Detachment 3 is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic support (including field maintenance only), per 313th AD GO 30, dtd. 19 July 1960. Detachment 3, 313th Air Division remains directly under Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for operational control, per Ltr., Hq., 5th AF, sub.: Radar Calibration/Evaluation Function, dtd. 24 May 1960, and 5th AF GO 29, dtd. 24 June 1960. The DCS/Communications-Electronics, Hq., 5th AF, is to exercise supervisory surveillance over Detachment 3, 313th Air Division.

Radio Okinawa (KSDT), a Japanese language affiliate of the Ryukyu Shimpo, begins formal operations on a frequency of 1370 kilocycles, bringing the number of radio stations on Okinawa to six, of which three are Japanese language. The president of the new station is Seichi Kishimoto, who is also the Board Chairman of the Ryukyu Shimpo.

8 July The Headquarters, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing is reorganized under the appropriate Unit Manning Document with an O/T composition strength of 39 officers and 109 airmen, to be furnished from sources under control of CINCPACAF, per PACAF GO 41, dtd. 25 May 1960.

1960

8 Jul. The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium at Naha AB is reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents to give it an Organization Table strength of 64 officers and 106 airmen, per PACAF GO 26, dtd. 13 Apr. 1960. Personnel are to be furnished from sources under control of the Commander, 315th Air Division.

18 Jul. The following units at Naha AB are discontinued, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960:

6151st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron
6431st Air Base Group
6431st Air Police Squadron
6431st Civil Engineering Squadron
6431st Operations Squadron
6431st Supply Squadron
6431st Transportation Squadron

The Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group is designated and organized at Naha AB, where it is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 31 officers and 211 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron is designated and organized at Naha AB, where it is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 11 officers and 293 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The 51st Support Squadron is designated and organized at Naha AB, where it is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 27 officers and 512 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The 51st Materiel Squadron is designated and organized at Naha AB, where it is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 15 officers and 601 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The 51st Civil Engineering Squadron is designated and organized at Naha AB, where it is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of four officers and 590 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents with an O/T composition of 34 officers and 201 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

1960

18 Jul. The 51st Field Maintenance Squadron is reorganized under appropriate Unit Manning Documents with an O/T composition of seven officers and 579 airmen, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The 51st Air Base Group and the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron are assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

The following units are attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB for logistic support and administrative support, per 313th AD GO 32, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960:

Detachment 1, 315th Air Division
1252d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron (MATS)
Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group (MATS)
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General (USAF)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 1, District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
21st Troop Carrier Squadron (to receive certain specialized logistic support from Base Supply, 6313th Air BaseWing, Kadena Air Base.
817th Troop Carrier Squadron

The following units are attached to the 51st Support Squadron at Naha AB for logistic support and administrative support, per 313th AD GO 32, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960, and 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 14 Dec. 1960:

Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing
Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group
Detachment 3, 313th Air Division (UAL Equipment of this unit to be carried on the UAL of the 51st Support Squadron)

Operational control of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division is retained by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, per Ltr., Hq., 5th AF, sub.: Radar Calibration/Evaluation Function, 24 May 1960.

The 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron is assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, per PACAF GO 72, dtd. 7 Sept. 1960.

Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron, at Naha AB, is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support, per 313th AD GO 38, dtd. 30 Sept. 1960.

1960

22 July The 6351st USAF Dispensary (Class B) at Naha AB is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group, per PACAF GO 60, dtd. 27 July 1960.

8 Aug. Detachment 5, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron is discontinued at Yae Take Air Station, per PACAF GO 52, dtd. 5 July 1960. Personnel are to be absorbed by 313th Air Division or reassigned as directed by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces.

11 Aug. The 558th USAF Band is attached to the Headquarters Squadron Section, 6313th Air Base Wing for administration (not including the assignment and promotion of personnel), per 6313th ABW GO 3, dtd. 11 Aug. 1960.

12 Aug. The 31st Air Rescue Squadron makes a PCS movement from Clark AB, P.I., to Naha AB.

25 Aug. Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron is further attached to the 6313th Operations Squadron for administrative support (not including personnel assignment and promotion), per 6313th ABW GO 4, dtd. 25 Aug. 1960.

29 Aug. Major General Donald M. Weller, USMC, succeeds Major General Robert B. Luckey as Commanding General of the Third Marine Division.

31 Aug. The current designations and assignments of all 313th Air Division installations are listed as follows in a consolidated PACAF GO 71, dtd. 31 Aug. 1960, confirming all previous original PACAF or FEAF designations and assignments, including all changes thereto, up to and including this date:

	PIN
KADENA AIR BASE	2988
Awase Communications Annex	3001
Bishagawa Power Line Annex	4090
Bolo Auxiliary Airfield - inactive 8 March 1954	2995
Deragawa Communications Annex	2993
Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex	4087
Higashionna Ammunition Storage Annex	2989
Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield	2997
Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex	2998
Kadena Family Housing Annex	3000
Kadena TACAN Annex - inactive 1 July 1960	----
Koza Radio Relay Annex	4086
Okuma Radio Beacon Annex	5070
Onna Point Administration Annex	4088

1960

		PIN
31 Aug.	Ryukyus Air Range	4089
	Yonagusuku Radio Range Annex	4092
	Yontan Auxiliary Airfield	2996
	NAHA AIR BASE	2975
	Bucknerville Service Annex	5061
	Hirara Air Strip	2986
	Irisuna Shima Air Range	2983
	Kume Shima Air Station	2982
	Miwa Radio Beacon Annex	2981
	Miyako Jima Air Station	2984
	Motobu Auxiliary Airfield	2987
	Naha Light Annex	4774
	Okino Erabu Shima Air Station	2977
	Yuza Dake Air Station	4200

1 Sept. Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installations Agency (GEEIA) Squadron, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support, and to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (for field maintenance only), per 313th AD GO 37, dtd. 29 Sept. 1960.

8 Sept. The 558th Air Force Band is reorganized with an O/T Composition strength of 0 officers and 20 airmen, per PACAF GO 60, dtd. 27 July 1960.

16 Sept. The 313th Air Division Military Academy is redesignated the 313th Air Division School of NCO/Airmanship, per 313AD Sup 1 to 5AFR 50-5, dtd. 30 Aug. 1960.

The 498th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) and the 873d Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy) are redesignated as the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group and the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron respectively, and are activated and assigned to Pacific Air Forces for organization on or about 8 February 1961, per DAF Ltr., sub.: Activation of the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, and Certain Other USAF Units, dtd. 16 Sept. 1960. The O/T Composition of the Headquarters, 498th TMG is established as 23 officers and 84 airmen, while that of the 873d TMS is 22 officers and 127 airmen. The 873d TMS is further assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group. The 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron is constituted, then activated and assigned to Pacific Air Forces for organization on or about 8 February 1961 with an O/T Composition of 14 officers and 278 airmen, per DAF Ltr., sub.: Activation of the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, and Certain Other USAF Units, dtd. 16 Sept. 1960. The 498th MMS is further assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

1960

18 Sep. The 31st Air Rescue Squadron at Naha AB is discontinued per MATS GO 7, dtd. 26 Jan. 1960, and MATS GO 61, dtd. 4 May 1960, and in its place is organized Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron, per MATS GO 57, dtd. 29 Apr. 1960.

Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support, per 313th AD GO 40, dtd. 7 Oct. 1960.

30 Sep. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U.S. Army, succeeds General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General George H. Decker succeeds General Lemnitzer as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff.

8 Oct. Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group, at Kadena AB and Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group, at Naha AB, are discontinued, as part of the discontinuance of the 10th Weather Group, per AWS GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960. Simultaneously, Detachment 8, Hq., 1st Weather Wing, is organized at Naha AB, per AWS GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960.

10 Oct. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing weapons team, representing PACAF, wins second place in the 1960 William Tell meet at Nellis AFB, Nevada, with 47 points. As the highest tactical unit (the Nellis AFB team being considered in a different category because its pilots are instructors), the 18th team receives the Major Thomas B. McGuire trophy as the team compiling the highest total points in special weapons events.

13 Nov. In the election for the 29 seats in the GRI Legislature, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party wins 22 seats, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party five, the Okinawa Peoples' Party one, the independents one. Of the total 380,326 votes cast, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party obtains 181,961, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party 117,720, the Okinawa People's Party 41,114, the Okinawa Socialist Party 9,981, the Nationalist Party 4,495, and independents 20,970. Since a total of 448,887 voters were eligible to cast their ballots in the election, the voting rate comes to 84.726%, approximately 4.5% higher than the rate of the 1958 election, which was 80.24%. A total of 80 candidates ran for the 29 seats, the greatest number in post-war history. The new legislators are to take office on 1 December 1960.

1960

1 Dec. Akio Nagamine, Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party Legislator from the 21st District, is elected Speaker of the GRI Legislature, receiving 23 votes to Koichi Taira's (Okinawa Socialist Masses Party) six. Yasukuni Yamakawa, also OLDP, is elected Deputy Speaker by the same 23 to 6 margin over OSMP Hideo Chibana.

7 Dec. Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support, per 313th AD SO G-1, dtd. 13 Jan. 1961.

31 Dec. Bishagawa Power Line Annex (PIN 4090) is merged with Kadena Air Base (PIN 2988), per PACAF GO 101, dtd. 30 Dec. 1960.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Throughout the period from 1 July through 31 December 1960 the mission of the 313th Air Division--a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force since its activation on 1 March 1955--was one of maintaining assigned and attached forces at a degree of combat readiness which would insure the success of directed military operations.[1]

With respect to air defense, the 313th Air Division continued to be responsible for the same area as in past years--one encompassed within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.[2]

To enable the 313th Air Division to carry out its mission and fulfill its responsibilities, it was provided a headquarters and such other units and facilities as were necessary to the accomplishment of its mission. This headquarters was located at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, on the same site previously occupied seriatim by Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, from 19 July 1945 to 6 June 1946; by Headquarters, 1st Air Division, from 7 June 1946 to 30 November 1948; by Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force, from 1 December 1948 to 14 May 1949; and by Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force, from 15 May 1949 to 28 February 1955. The only change worth noting had occurred in the first week of April 1958, when

JERRYBUILT CONSTRUCTION AT ITS MOST FANTASTIC

THE OLD 313TH AIR DIVISION HEADQUARTERS BUILDING,

INCLUDING THE CONCRETE-BLOCK OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

(AT EXTREME RIGHT), ERECTED ONLY A FEW MONTHS BEFORE

THE ENTIRE EDIFICE WAS TORN DOWN, BECAUSE OF EXTENSIVE

TERMITE DAMAGE TO THE FORMER WOODEN STRUCTURE.

BUILDING T-4K WAS USED AS THE INTERIM HEADQUARTERS WHILE THE NEW PERMANENT BUILDING WAS BEING ERECTED ON THE SITE OF THE RAMSHACKIE BUILDING T-1.


HDQS
313
A DIV
T-4 K

IN THIS PICTURE IS SHOWN THE LEFT WING OF THE OLD BUILDING T-5 (OCCUPIED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), WHICH WAS CONNECTED WITH THE RIGHT WING BY THE SHORT BREEZEWAY AT THE RIGHT. THE MATERIEL DIRECTORATE OCCUPIED THE LARGER, RIGHT WING OF BUILDING T-5.



the 313th Air Division Commander moved into the new permanent type building which had been constructed on the exact site occupied since 1945 by the termite-ridden headquarters building officially listed on Kadena real property records as T-1; while the Operations, Materiel, and Personnel Directorates found a new home in the adjacent permanent type building erected at the same time to replace the even more decrepit, jerry-built T-5.*

The Commander, 313th Air Division was responsible for:

1. Exercising command of assigned units, except for that direct control which the Commander, Fifth Air Force retained over offensive tactical forces.

2. Controlling and/or supporting attached units, as directed.

3. Organizing, administering, equipping, and training assigned and attached units and combat crews, in accordance with directives, policies, and plans issued by Fifth Air Force and higher headquarters.

4. Insuring that combat training was conducted in accordance with existing directives and was oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with tasks assigned in current

*In June 1957, Contract AF 62(321)-949, in the amount of $140,251.74 had been awarded to Peterson-Sharpe Engineering Co. to raze the two existing headquarters buildings--T-1 and T-5--and construct two new concrete-and-steel single-story buildings in their place. (The two base projects--KAD-552-7 and KAD-529A-7--which served as the basis for the contract, euphemistically described the work as "restoration" of the existing structures!) During the ensuing fortnight or so, following the official opening of the new buildings, the greater part of the minor staff agencies, which had been housed in quonset huts on the periphery of the two major headquarters buildings, moved into Building T-4K, a Butler-type building in which the 313th Air Division Commander and the major staff agencies had taken refuge while the permanent buildings were under construction. One of the last staff sections to move into T-4K was the Historical Division--always conservative in its actions--and it is in that water-absorbent structure that the present work is being written.

war plans, operational plans, and operations orders.

5. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, preparing plans as required in support of Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.

6. Insuring that all combat units, as well as those units directly supporting them, were furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary for the maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

7. Insuring the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

8. Monitoring the development and conduct of training programs to include:

(a) Technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(b) General military training, in accordance with applicable portions of AFM 50-7, AF Unit Training Standards.

(c) Combat readiness training.

(d) Aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program.

(e) Other training, as directed.

9. Contributing toward the development of:

(a) Tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(b) Requirements for new weapons and weapons systems.

(c) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapons systems.

10. Providing administrative and logistic support, as directed.

11. Supporting the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and other USAF activities, in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units, as reflected in PD 62-1-1.

12. Exercising operational control of forces other than those of the United States, when so directed.

13. Exercising operational control of U.S. Army and Navy anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units (this was a reference to the eight Nike-Hercules batteries installed on Okinawa, the first of which had become operational at a temporary site as early as 30 November 1958), and other anti-aircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system. (The "other anti-aircraft artillery" spoken of was the Army's Hawk missile, a ground-to-air missile which was to be installed at eight sites* in or near Okinawa in 1961-62 for defense against low-level air attack.)

14. Conducting search and rescue operations, as directed.

15. Providing for internal security and local ground defense of assigned Air Force installations.

*No. 1 in Yomitan-Son (50 acres of land to be leased); No. 2 in Koza City (eight acres to be leased), Onna-Son (27 acres), and Ishikawa City (one acre); No. 3 in Katsuren-Son (17 acres); No. 4 in Haneji-Son (112 acres); No. 5 in Chinen-Son (36 acres); No. 6 in Miwa-Son (55 acres), Gushichan-Son (10 acres), and Kochinda-Son (six acres); and Nos. 7 and 8 on Tokashiki Jima (140 acres).

16. Providing for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required in support of the mission.

17. Exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

18. Coordinating with and providing assistance to other United States military services and governmental agencies, including such matters as:

(a) The formulation and joint planning of local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbance, typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuation, and special demonstration plans with local Army, Navy, Marine, and other governmental agencies.

(b) Coordination with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used facilities and installations.

(c) Participation in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and other governmental agencies, as directed by the Commander, Joint U.S. Forces.

(d) The contribution of personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyus Armed Services Police Force (RASP) and the Ryukyus Army and Air Force Exchange Service (REX).

(e) After the completion of appropriate agreements, the provision of a base, training facilities, and support

for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations.

(f) Support of the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands, in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership for the Joint Planning Group, all sub-committees, and panels.

(g) Coordination with appropriate local United States governmental authorities of all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities.

(h) Support of the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (Lieutenant General Donald P. Booth, USA, who was also Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, and Representative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in the Ryukyu Islands (CINCPACREP, RI) in the discharge of U.S. Civil Administration responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

19. Insuring that all commanders and staff officers were familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Actions Armed Forces.

20. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

21. Insuring that mission directives had been prepared for all units within the 313th Air Division, and requiring that all mission

directives be reviewed semi-annually, and brought up to date when found necessary.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the command, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might direct to the contrary.[3]

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Activations, Discontinuances, Redesignations, and Reorganizations at Kadena Air Base.

The 6313th Installations Squadron: On 1 July 1960, the 6313th Installations Squadron--which had been so designated since 1 October 1957, at which time its parent unit, the 6313th Air Base Wing, had come into being--was redesignated the 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron, in consonance with a PACAF-wide action affecting all similar squadrons within that farflung command.[4]

Detachment 3, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (MATS): On 1 July 1960, Detachment 3, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (which had been known as the Kadena Target Intelligence Center until its transfer from PACAF to MATS on 1 April 1960) was redesignated Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron (MATS).[5] Simultaneously, the diminutive organization, heretofore attached to the 1505th Support Squadron (Transport) at Kadena for administration and logistics by the tenuous thread of a mere verbal agreement, was formally attached by this headquarters to the 6313th Air Base Wing

for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support, and to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance only.[6]

It was not, however, until 25 August 1960 that the 6313th Air Base Wing got around to further attaching Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron to the 6313th Operations Squadron for administrative support (not to include personnel assignment and promotion.[7]

Detachment 1, 3d Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC): On 1 July 1960, Detachment 1, 3d Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC)--known as the 12th Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC) until that organization's inactivation on 1 October 1959--was redesignated Detachment 1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC), to correspond with the parent squadron's simultaneously effective redesignation at Andersen AFB, Guam.[8]

Although general orders to that effect were not issued at this time, the newly-designated Detachment 1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC) continued to be attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for administration and logistical support and directly to the 3d Air Division (SAC) at Andersen AFB, Guam, for operational control. The mission tasks remained the same as those which had devolved upon the organization at the time of its reincarnation as Detachment 1, 3d Aviation Depot Squadron (SAC), when its munitions storage handling, maintenance, and security functions had been transferred to PACAF organizations. The total manning authorized for Detachment 1, 3d MMS on the occasion of its birth was five officers and 47 airmen.[9]

3d Air Division Operations Orders in the 40, 44, 50, 51, and 67 series required Detachment 1, 3d MMS to establish procedures to provide timely, safe, and reliable munitions support for SAC Emergency War Orders under a wide variety of situations. This support included loading

special weapons, loading and torqueing ammunition, flight circuit testing, mating of assisted take-off (ATO) racks to aircraft, loading ATO units, loading and torqueing ECM chaff, and raising and lowering ECM pods. In addition, the detachment was expected to provide general ground support to assist in recovery or recycle missions.

At 1515I, 18 July, the "Glass Brick" B-52 scheduled for each month arrived at Kadena AB to train weapon loading teams and aircraft ground maintenance personnel. No complete loadings could be performed, however, because of a malfunction in the U-2A bomb rack latching pin, which would not seal in the "C" slot to the required tolerance. Nevertheless, much valuable training was obtained by the presence of this aircraft, as eight incomplete MK-36 Mod-2 loadings were performed, while the loading teams were also trained by the aircraft gunner to load ammunition cans and charge the 50-caliber machine guns. On July 18th the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Section received training on the location of B-52 ejection systems. The big jet departed Kadena on 20 July.

Further training was acquired on a B-47 loading training aid aircraft, with four complete MK-36 Mod-2 training loadings and 14 incomplete training loadings being performed. The average loading time for the four complete loadings was 51 minutes.[10]

On 24 August 1960, Detachment 1, 3d MMS received a letter dated 17 August 1960 from the 3d Air Division, transmitting a new Unit Manning Document (UMD). Under this, the authorization of the detachment was reduced to four officers and 35 enlisted men. Reorganization under this UMD was to start as soon as possible, and was to be in effect by 1 January 1961. Immediate action was taken to review the manning authorized by this

UMD to determine if Detachment 1 could fulfill its mission with the positions authorized. In addition, a review of the Unit Authorization List (UAL) was instituted to determine if any items should be deleted or added.[11]

Despite the scheduled reduction in the unit strength, the manning actually remained at 100 per cent during August, and on the 13th of that month an Assistant Chief of the Munitions Service Branch reported PCS from the ZI.

On 31 August the Loading Standardization Team previously selected to represent the 3d Air Division in the annual SAC Weapons Competition Meet left Kadena AB for temporary duty at Bergstrom AFB, Texas, having previously won a competition held at Andersen AFB.[12]

With the shipment of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron's last MK-6 Mod-6 weapon from its stockpile on 25 August, Detachment 1, 3d MMS ceased to possess the capability of loading these weapons.

On 15 August the monthly "Glass Brick" B-52 arrived at Kadena AB, but the loading training which constituted the chief purpose of these visits was pretty well made impossible by high winds. Only one MK-36 Mod-2 training loading was, in fact, accomplished, when the opportunity was seized during a brief lull in which the winds fell below 30 knots. However, the B-52 aircraft gunner gave detachment personnel 20 manhours' training on how to load .50-caliber ammunition cans into the B-52 aircraft. All loading teams also received 25 manhours of training in loading and torqueing chaff, as well as 40 manhours of flight circuit tester training. Base maintenance personnel and detachment personnel

received training on how to service the B-52 aircraft, with some 40 man-hours being expended on this training by each team.

The B-47 loading training aircraft was utilized for 14 MK-36 Mod-2 training loadings in August, with the average time per loading being 45 minutes. In addition, each team was given training on B-47 flight circuit test procedures. One team was given a standboard check and rated as satisfactory.[13]

Staffing of the Detachment Reorganization Plan, which had been begun in August with receipt of the new UMD, as we have seen, was continued in September. The final plan was published on the 15th of that month, but, because of correspondence from SAC pertaining to AFSC's, it was necessary to amend it on 30 September.

Some changes in the UMD were suggested to align the detachment manning more closely with SAC Project "Chin-Up Alpha" and to meet special requirements created by the detachment's isolated location. Reasons and justification for these changes were fully covered in the Detachment Reorganization Plan.[14]

On 19 September, the team which had participated in the SAC World-Wide Loading Competition at Bergstrom AFB returned to Kadena, having finished eleventh in a field of 12 teams. At least a part of their failure to do better the members of the team attributed to the lack of information on new loading procedures which had been available at Detachment 1 in the months before their departure, in conjunction with the habitual delay in receiving new information.

A Disaster Control Exercise was begun at 0800 hours, 28 September. An actual disaster situation was simulated, with various buildings and

areas being considered as contaminated by radioactive fallout. Teams were dispatched from their shelters to monitor and decontaminate the various areas and buildings suspected of contamination. The exercise revealed that sufficient instruments were not assigned to Detachment 1. Worse yet, subsequent attempts to obtain the necessary number from the Base to perform monitoring procedures properly in the event of an actual disaster were altogether unsuccessful. As a result, the detachment requested that the needed instruments be added to its UAL.

The monthly "Glass Brick" B-52 arrived at Kadena on 19 September. Before its departure on the 21st, Detachment 1 carried out the most successful loading training which it had enjoyed in several months. Six MK-36 Mod-2 training loads were completed by three loading teams with an average time of 81 minutes per load. This time was actually not remarkable, and was, in fact, above normal; but the slow progress was rendered unavoidable by the expenditure of considerable time in training the participating personnel in the course of each loading. Three standboard loadings were conducted, and each of the three loading teams received passing scores.

Once more, though, it was observed that the training given by the "Glass Brick" B-52 Electronics Warfare Officer in loading and torqueing chaff was not satisfactory, chiefly because these supposed specialists did not seem to have sufficient knowledge or the necessary equipment for properly training the loading teams. Consequently, it was recommended that each "Glass Brick" aircraft bring the necessary TO's and equipment with it in the future. A parallel effort on the part of the detachment to obtain these same items was met with failure.

Twelve training loadings were performed on B-47 aircraft during

September, the average time being 70 minutes.

On 9 September Detachment 1 received a new UAL dated 26 August 1960. After review by all interested sections for its compatibility with the unit mission and the new UMD, detachment officials found that several additions and deletions were desirable. This review was combined with that of the UMD, and all recommended actions were set forth in the Detachment Reorganization Plan.[15]

On 1 October 1960, Detachment 1 began reorganizing in accordance with the Detachment Reorganization Plan, all sections being realigned, except for the Weapons Release and ATO Maintenance Section, for which there were no personnel to provide manning. Most of the detachment personnel changed duties as the reorganization went into effect.

On 5 October the Detachment Commander visited Headquarters, 3d Air Division, on Guam to discuss the reorganization. The division's Director of Plans advised him that the reorganization plan should be service tested for two months, at the end of which a report was to be forwarded to 3d Air Division advising it of the results.[16]

In conformance with the detachment reorganization, all of the loading teams were reformed on 1 October. Where there had been five teams comprising five members each in the past, four teams of six men each now existed, including a Safety Supervisor.

The monthly "Glass Brick" B-52 arrived at Kadena on 17 October to conduct the regular loading training, and remained until the 20th. Unfortunately, seven hours and 55 minutes of the total 22 hours available were lost as the result of a fuel leak and the discovery that the U-2A bomb rack was out of tolerance. In the remaining useful time, three loading teams completed a total of five MK-36 Mod-2 training loads.

Since these teams had only recently been reformed, as mentioned above, this was not really enough training to enable them to maintain their "Ready" status on this aircraft-weapon combination; therefore, they were downgraded to a "Non-ready" status. Even worse, the fourth loading team received no loading training, as three of its members were in a "light duty" status.

Although all four teams were given training in chaff loading, ammunition loading, and changing the configuration from "F" to "G" and "G" to "F", the chaff and ammunition training was still not adequate, in consequence of there being no tools for torqueing chaff, while ammunition cans could not be removed from the aircraft and reinstalled. To eliminate these deficiencies, detachment officials sought to coordinate sufficiently in advance with the base supplying the "Glass Brick" aircraft to insure that future ones would bring the necessary equipment and a trained instructor with them.

Very little loading training was accomplished on the Class 26 B-47 during October, because the configuration in the aircraft was non-operational. However, it was possible to carry out training on configuration changing and high-density loading.[17]

November saw the service test period for the detachment reorganization plan brought to a conclusion. Not only was the plan as a whole found to be entirely satisfactory, but the proposed UMD was also found to be sufficient as recommended, with the following minor exceptions: (1) One man should be transferred from the Document Security Section to Unit Administration; (2) One airman first class position should be downgraded to that of airman second class. The Administrative Section would

still have a heavy workload, but, with a few hours' overtime, officials believed the proposed personnel could execute the job. A few minor changes were also recommended for the proposed UAL because of altered missions requirements and re-evaluation. These included equipment for recovery teams, a reduction in the number of beds and mattresses, and the addition of some furniture. A report of the service test was prepared by the Detachment Commander and forwarded to 3d Air Division.[18]

As a result of the detachment reorganization, with its subsequent consolidation of the files, all classified documents were turned in to the Document Security Section, which was charged with maintaining the only classified file in Detachment 1 at that time. After all sections had turned in their classified materials, officials discovered that they had on hand an overwhelming collection of some 3,800 documents. However, as a cursory study of each document was made, it was found that an extremely large percentage of the total were either obsolete or duplicates, the majority consisting of technical orders, teletype messages, local directives, and the like.

The upshot of this disquieting discovery was the institution of a crash screening program, as the result of which all obsolete and duplicate documents were removed from the files and destroyed. The thoroughness of the program is attested to by the statistic of 12½ cubic feet of classified documents destroyed in one day, 11 November. If not quite so complete as the historic destruction of the Alexandrian Library, it was nonetheless quite an impressive demonstration in the field of legal arson. Upon completion of the ensuing inventory, the Document Security people

found that they now had only some 500 active documents to safeguard and be accountable for.[19]

On 18 November a member of the SAC Inspector General (IG) team arrived at Kadena to conduct the annual SAC IG inspection of Detachment 1. In the process he tested key supervisor personnel, observed three teams perform a weapon loading, and inspected training plans and records, equipment maintenance records, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Section, Document Security, Production Control, and Standboard Team records. At the conclusion of his inspection he rated Detachment 1 as capable of carrying out its mission. Subsequently, the bulk of detachment operational effort was devoted to correcting the discrepancies noted during the inspection.

The monthly "Glass Brick" B-52 aircraft arrived on 15 November and remained until the 18th, by which time three loading teams had been declared ready to load MK-36 Mod-2 weapons in both B-52 and B-47 bombers. The fourth loading team was not assessed as ready, a paucity of physically qualified personnel having prevented its receiving any training. Three members of the team were on "light duty" status by virtue of sickness or injury. Two loading teams were declared ready to load MK-39 Mod-1 weapons on B-47 aircraft by the end of November. Making this achievement especially notable was the fact that as recently as 17 November Detachment 1 had possessed no teams considered "ready" to load any weapon on any aircraft.

Intensive loading training was conducted throughout November to get three loading teams qualified to load MK-36 Mod-2 weapons on B-52 heavy bombers and MK-36 Mod-2 and MK-39 Mod-1 weapons on B-47 medium

bombers. Most of the flight line training was conducted on the B-47, because of the availability of a type 26 aircraft. Twenty-four complete and two incomplete loadings were made on this aircraft. In addition, configuration change training, flight circuit test training, and ATO (assisted takeoff) training were also conducted. The B-52 was utilized for nine loadings and for configuration change training.[20]

By 6 December all the discrepancies noted during the SAC IG inspection had been corrected--most of them, in fact, having been taken care of in November, in the immediate wake of the IG visit.

On 13 December, at 1000 hours, the 6313th Air Base Wing War Capabilities Plan, 1-58, Annex N, was implemented. The detachment was 95 per cent manned at the time the operation began. All supporting activities were notified as to what their support requirements would be. However, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was the only activity involved with the Detachment 1 portion of the plan. The reaction time of the 7th TDS was good, all training weapons being in place at the loading sites ahead of schedule. The only problem seemed to be that weapons were not spotted on blocks to prevent them from sinking into the pavement. Upon the importance of this being explained to the 7th TDS, the latter promised that all weapons would be spotted on blocks in the future.[21]

The monthly "Glassbrick" B-52 arrived on 13 December and departed two days later. Because the U-2A bomb rack was out of tolerance, it was not possible for Detachment 1 personnel to carry out any complete loadings; however, much valuable training was received during the course of the nine incomplete loadings. All personnel in the Munitions Service Branch

received training in preparing and torqueing the chaff for the B-52, thanks to the Electronics Warfare Officer who accompanied the Superfort's having come prepared with the proper equipment.

Weapons loading, ATO, and configuration training were conducted on the Class 26 B-47 aircraft, and weapons loading time continued to decrease as each team became more proficient through training.[22]

Headquarters, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing: On 8 July 1960, the Headquarters, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was reorganized under the appropriate Unit Manning Document with an O/T composition strength of 39 officers and 109 airmen, to be furnished from sources under control of CINCPACAF.[23]

The 558th USAF Band: On 11 August 1960, the 558th USAF Band was attached to the Headquarters Squadron Section, 6313th Air Base Wing, for administration (not including the assignment and promotion of personnel).[24] On 8 September 1960 the 558th Air Force Band was reorganized with an O/T composition strength of 0 officers and 20 airmen.[25]

Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installations Agency (GEEIA) Squadron: On 1 September 1960, Detachment 1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installations Agency (GEEIA) Squadron was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support, and to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance only.[26] Detachment 1 had been organized as an operating location of the 2876th GEEIA Squadron, replacing the simultaneously inactivated 17th Communications Construction Squadron, back on 1 January 1959; but, apparently through inadvertence, it had never been formally attached to anyone for administrative and logistic support until now.

The action of 1 September 1960 evidently constituted a bit of belated bookkeeping by the Manpower officials of this headquarters.

The 313th Air Division Military Academy: On 16 September 1960, in one of the less momentous organizational actions of the historical period, the 313th Air Division Military Academy was redesignated the 313th Air Division School of NCO/Airmanship.[27]

The 498th Tactical Missile Group: The 498th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) had been originally constituted on 19 November 1943 and activated the following day, 20 November. The new group, as its parenthetical designation indicates, was equipped with B-29 aircraft. Three combat units were with the 498th Bombardment Group throughout its career--the 873d, 874th, and 875th Bombardment Squadrons (VH)--while the 876th Bombardment Squadron was assigned in 1943-44 (being inactivated on 20 May of the latter year), and the 514th Bombardment Squadron was assigned in the post-war months of 1945-46.

In October and November 1944 the 498th Bombardment Group moved from Kearney Army Air Field, Nebraska, to Saipan, where Isley Field became its home for the remainder of the war. The 498th was assigned to the 73d Bombardment Wing (VH), commanded by Brigadier General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., who led it and B-29's from other Isley Field-based groups in the first B-29 strike against the Japanese homeland from the Marianas.

When the war ended on 15 August 1945, the 498th BG had conducted 2,526 sorties, dropped 12,413.66 tons of bombs, destroyed 105 enemy planes, probably destroyed 161 others, and damaged 93 more. In the course of so doing, the group suffered the loss of 30 men killed, 272 missing, and 44 wounded; while its aircraft losses from all causes

totaled 54.

On 2 November 1945 the personnel of the 498th Bombardment Group boarded ship to return to the ZI, arriving at Los Angeles 15 days later. Stationed briefly at March Field, California, the group moved again to MacDill Field, Florida, in January 1946, remaining there until its inactivation on 4 August 1946.[28]

On 16 September 1960, the Headquarters, 498th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) was redesignated as the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, which was then activated and assigned to PACAF for organization on or about 8 February 1961. The O/T composition of the projected group headquarters was established as 23 officers and 84 airmen.[29] Although the 498th TMG was still only a paper organization as the year 1960 ended, construction had been proceeding apace for some time on four underground, hardened sites on Okinawa from which the TM-76B Mace guided missiles with which it was to be equipped could be launched in the event of war.

The 873d Tactical Missile Squadron: The 873d Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy) had been originally constituted on 19 November 1943 and activated by the Second Air Force at Clovis AAF, New Mexico, the following day, 20 November, at which time it was assigned to the 498th Bombardment Group (VH).

On 12 August 1944 the ground echelon of the 873d Bombardment Squadron, together with those of the sister 874th and 875th Bombardment Squadrons, boarded an Army transport at Los Angeles, arriving at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, on 7 September. As the personnel of the 873d BS filed down the gangplank, they became the first B-29 squadron to land in the Marianas. On 12 October 1944 the first of the 498th Bombardment Group's B-29's,

an aircraft of the 873d Bombardment Squadron, landed at Isley Field--also the first B-29 to land in the Marianas. An important passenger on this baptismal flight was Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell, Commanding General of the XXI Bomber Command, under whose aegis all Very Heavy bomber operations in the Marianas would fall.

Nine of the 873d's Superforts were among the 112 planes of the 73d Bombardment Wing (VH) that took off on the first B-29 mission against Japan from the Marianas, though three of the nine were forced to abort because of mechanical trouble.

On 11 October 1945, the war over, the aircraft of the 873d BS took off for the United States, each plane carrying eight crew members and 12 passengers, and landed at Mather Field, California, on the 14th. The ground echelon left Saipan on 3 November and arrived in Los Angeles Harbor two weeks later. After a brief sojourn at March Field from 15 November 1945 to 5 January 1946, the 873d, together with the balance of the 498th BG, moved to MacDill Field, Florida. Here the 873d Bombardment Squadron (VH) was relieved from its assignment to the 498th Group and inactivated on 4 August 1946.[30]

On 16 September 1960, the 873d Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy) was redesignated as the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, and formally activated and assigned to PACAF for organization on or about 8 February 1961. The O/T composition of the projected squadron was established at 22 officers and 127 airmen. The 873d TMS was further assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.[31]

The 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron: Unlike the 498th Tactical

Missile Group and the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, the 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron had no proud heritage of wartime deeds of which it could boast, no previous incarnation to give it esprit de corps. It was a new-born organization when the Department of the Air Force constituted it on 16 September 1960, then activated it and assigned it to PACAF for organization on or about 8 February 1961, with an O/T composition of 14 officers and 278 airmen. The 498th MMS was further assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.[32]

Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group: On 8 October 1960, Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group was discontinued, as one aspect of the discontinuance of the parent 10th Weather Group that same date. Simultaneously, Detachment 8, Headquarters, 1st Weather Wing was organized at Kadena Air Base to replace the discontinued unit.[33]

Activations, Discontinuances, Redesignations, and Reorganizations at Naha Air Base.

The 6431st Installations Squadron: On 1 July 1960, the 6431st Installations Squadron--which had received this designation at the time of its parent organization, the 6431st Air Base Group's, creation on 25 October 1957--was redesignated the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron, in conformance with a PACAF-wide action affecting all installations squadrons within the theater.[34] The new name was destined to be short-lived, however; for on 18 July 1960, the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron, along with all other units bearing the designation "6431st", was discontinued, as a part of the transformation of the 6431st Air Base Group into the 51st Air Base Group.[35] The same PACAF general orders

which did away with the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron remembered to designate and organize the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron, which was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition strength of four officers and 590 airmen.[36]

Detachment 1, 313th Air Division: Effective 1 July 1960, Detachment 1, 313th Air Division was discontinued, terminating a career which had had its beginnings on 1 March 1955, simultaneously with the establishment of the 313th Air Division itself.[37] Actually, the progenitor of the unit, Detachment 1, Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force, had originated on 16 August 1954, when it was created for the purpose of providing an Air Defense Commander for the Ryukyus Air Defense Sector and operating the Combat Operations Center.[38]

At the time of its demise, the Chief of the Combat Operations Division (COD), who was also the Commander of Detachment 1, functioned as the direct representative of the Deputy Division Commander for Air Defense in matters pertaining to the conduct of sector air defense operations. The COD provided a command post--the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC)--for a specialized staff through which the Deputy Division Commander for Air Defense, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander, or his representative, collected and evaluated air defense information as a basis for committing combat forces provided for sector defense.

In anticipation of the discontinuance of Detachment 1, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, this headquarters had begun transferring the personnel to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing or the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron some time before. As a result, the only

officer still assigned on 30 June 1960 was Major John F. Cercek, the Detachment Commander and Chief of the Combat Operations Division.[39]

The COD and its working agencies--the ADCC and the four radar sites--had two roles in the control of interceptor aircraft. The first was the responsibility of providing active air defense in the assigned area of responsibility, while the second was that of providing control for the interceptors during routine training. For active air defense, two F-102's were kept on five minutes' alert and two others on 30 minutes' alert; hence, all other aircraft not undergoing maintenance engaged in intercept training. The major cause of unsuccessful active air defense and training intercepts was airborne equipment failures. Other reasons for unsuccessful intercepts were pilots' error (PE), directors' error (DE), ground equipment failure (GEF), inadequate performance of the interceptor aircraft (ACP), identification prior to intercept (IPI), weather (WX), and a general category denoted as "other".[40]

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division: On 1 July 1960, Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, with personnel authorizations as contained in current UMD's, was designated and organized at Naha Air Base.[41] Simultaneously, the new unit was attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support (less the assignment and promotion of personnel), and to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for field maintenance only.[42] However, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force retained direct operational control of Detachment 3, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics exercising supervisory surveillance.[43]

Following the 6023d Radar Evaluation Squadron's discontinuance at Naha AB on 15 December 1959, the task of performing radar evaluation for

PACAF had been assumed by members of the deceased unit reassigned to the 6431st Operations Squadron. As the result of a Ground Radar Quality Control Conference held at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 19-20 May 1960, at which representatives of this command were in attendance, it was brought home to officials concerned that the evaluation functions previously performed by the 6023d REVRON could not be eliminated without serious detriment to radar operations. The unanimous decision of the conferees was that it was necessary to retain an evaluation unit in one form or another to cope with radar evaluation problems. At the same time, much of the mission and areas of responsibility for the proposed detachment were outlined.[44]

In pursuance of these discussions, when Detachment 3, 313th Air Division was accordingly organized on 1 July 1960, the same people who had exercised their electronic skills in the old 6023d REVRON and for the 6431st Operations Squadron provided the nucleus of the new outfit.

With the discontinuance of the 6431st Air Base Group on 18 July 1960 in the great reorganization of Naha Air Base, Detachment 3 was attached to the 51st Support Squadron for administrative and logistic support.[45] The direct operational control exercised by the DCS/C-E, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force remained in force.

The mission of Detachment 3 was to perform radar evaluation services throughout the PACAF area of responsibility, to conduct an analysis of the Radar Quality Control Program, and to act as an advisory agency on matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics.

The Commander, Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, was responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, for:

1. Performing initial and special evaluations of all ground-type radars in the PACAF area of responsibility, as directed by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

2. Continuously monitoring the PACAF Radar Quality Control Program by a systematic evaluation and analysis of data submitted in accordance with AFM 100-28. This analysis would include such matters as the effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, the relationship of target aspect ratio to the probability of detection, and the validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft.

3. Providing special advisory service for specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the AC&W system.

4. Providing training for field personnel on Radar Quality Control procedures.

5. Conducting radar site surveys for new radar installations when directed by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

6. Supporting such other activities as might be directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

The Commander of Detachment 3 was authorized to communicate directly with Fifth Air Force Headquarters, air divisions, and AC&W units in arranging evaluation schedules and field support requirements, and in carrying out the analysis functions associated with the Radar Quality Control Program. The details of scheduled evaluations outside the Fifth Air Force area of responsibility were the responsibility of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.[46]

From 21 to 30 June 1960, a three-man team headed by the detachment commander conducted a special radar evaluation of the AN/FPS-6B height

finder radar at Koko Head Crater on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, at the geographical coordinates 21°17'16" N., 157°41'22" W. The primary objectives of the evaluation were to determine the over-all condition of the set and its altitude accuracy. As a result of their study, the team determined that the powerful GE set was in good operational condition and able to perform its mission, despite a peculiarity of the site which produced an almost constant inversion layer at 7,000 feet. This in turn was responsible for some habitual altitude errors and anomalous propagation. This, of course, was something which the detachment team could do little about, but it was able to recommend that the missing or faulty test equipment be replaced at the earliest possible moment.

The Evaluation of the Tai-Mo-Shan Radar on Hong Kong: A two-man evaluation team visited the radar site operated by the Number 117th Signals Unit, Royal Air Force, at Tai-Mo-Shan, Hong Kong, from 1 through 19 September 1960. The geographical coordinates of the 3,081-foot Tai-Mo-Shan, the highest point in the British Crown Colony, on the summit of which were perched an AN/FPS-8 surveillance radar and an AN/FPS-6 height finder, were 114°07' E., 22°25' N.

This evaluation, directed by a PACAF message, was performed for the following reasons:

1. The AN/FPS-8 search radar had been recently overhauled.
2. Electrical and mechanical tilt angles of the antenna were unknown.
3. A loss of detection capability as compared with past performance of the search radar was observed.

4. A profile of the horizon and resultant screening angles had not been computed.

5. Operating personnel at Tai-Mo-Shan were of the opinion that excessive lobing and beam distortion were present in the search propagation pattern.

6. Site personnel did not know what effects weather anomalies actually had on beam shape.

All of these conditions were checked or computed, the final results being forwarded to Tai-Mo-Shan after the team's return to Naha AB. However, during this evaluation it was impossible to gather flight check data, normally obtained during this type of evaluation, because of mission requirements and limitations, such as aircraft availability and site location. The British personnel at the site agreed to forward this information to Detachment 3 at a later date. In fact, the data required were finally received during the latter part of September and the first part of October. Even then, though, no definite conclusions as to the cause of poor, spotty, and erratic tracking could be made, owing to lack of sufficient flight data. Further instructions concerning this problem were forwarded to Tai-Mo-Shan. The main problems encountered during the evaluation were a lack of systematic maintenance procedures and inadequate supply support. There was an excessive delay between the time items left the supply source at Clark AB, Philippine Islands, which had logistic responsibility for the site, and their arrival at Tai-Mo-Shan.

The Hong Kong site was found to be experiencing anomalous propagation on a day-to-day basis, but in most cases this merely produced an

increase or decrease in range. Radar holes were also produced, but the Detachment 3 team could not analyze this phenomenon without more flight data.[47]

Technical Assistance for the Naha Naval Air Facility: On 5 September 1960, a two-man team from Detachment 3 began a technical assistance program on an AN/MSQ-1 belonging to the Naha Naval Air Facility, at the request of the latter. The primary purpose of the program was trouble-shooting and preparing the set for operation, while a secondary objective was the training of naval personnel in proper maintenance procedures. The detachment personnel quickly discovered that the chief difficulty was an exiguity of supplies for this particular piece of equipment.

On 12 September the AN/MSQ-1 was transferred to Camp Schwab, a Marine base in the northern district of Kushi-Son, with one of the two airmen making up the team accompanying it to render technical assistance. By 23 September the maintenance checks and system alignment were completed, and the airman returned to Detachment 3 for duty.

The Annual IG Inspection: From September 12th through the 14th Detachment 3 was subjected to an annual general inspection, in accordance with AFR 123-1, dated 4 January 1960. The IG found that the detachment was operationally capable of performing its mission as set forth in Fifth Air Force Regulation 23-7, and there were no unusual discrepancies which could not be corrected--with one exception.

This exception concerned the Quality Control Program and its administration. The IG was of the opinion that Detachment 3 was not thoroughly discharging its responsibility for continuously monitoring the PACAF

Radar Quality Control Program by a systematic evaluation and analysis of data submitted to the detachment. In actual practice, Detachment 3 was making evaluation visits to radar sites only when specifically requested or when the performance of a site deteriorated for two consecutive months. Further, Detachment 3 was receiving only the over-all evaluation of the separate sites from the various air divisions. In the opinion of the IG, this information was not sufficiently detailed for complete analysis.

The detachment was already aware of this situation and had, in fact, submitted a proposal to PACAF on 25 August 1960 that PACAF Supplement 1A to AFM 100-28 be amended to require all air divisions within the PACAF area to forward copies of the individual radar sites' "Monthly Quality Control Graphs" to Detachment 3. This recommendation was accepted, and PACAF Supplement 1-A to AFM 100-28, dated 27 September 1960, incorporated the desired changes.[48]

Technical Assistance Is Given the ROKAF Radar Evaluation Unit: As the result of a request from Headquarters, Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) for technical assistance in connection with the concept, function, and organization of the ROKAF Radar Evaluation Unit, two members of Detachment 3 visited Seoul from 24 September to 4 October 1960. Here they conferred with representatives of ROKAF Headquarters, of the 314th Air Division, and of the 6146th USAF Advisory Group, with the result that a finalized mission directive for the ROKAF Radar Evaluation Unit was evolved, as well as a regular method by which future coordination would be arranged and assistance from Detachment 3 obtained.[49]

A Study of Interference at Site R-70: At the request of Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters, Detachment 3 dispatched a two-man team to Site R-70 on Clark AB, Philippine Islands (15°12' N., 120°32' E.). R-70 had been experiencing considerable interference for some time, but all efforts to identify the source had been unsuccessful. As is so often the case where mechanical devices are concerned, the radar sets insisted on functioning smoothly throughout the time the team was at the site hoping to find what was wrong with them. Although the presence of a typhoon in the area prevented any flying during the period of the team's visit, the detachment experts utilized a detailed analysis of information provided by site personnel to pinpoint a prime suspect source of the interference. The culprit was believed to be the test equipment used by armament and electronics maintenance personnel on the Clark AB flight line. Subsequently, after the detachment team had returned to Okinawa, the interference reappeared; but the site personnel were then able to attack the problem on the basis of the theoretical deductions provided them by the team and take action to eliminate the difficulty.[50]

The Evaluation of Site P-53 at Miyako Jima: The AN/FPS-3 surveillance radar at Site P-53 on Miyako Jima (24°45'30" N., 125°19'30" E.) had been overhauled by a maintenance depot assistance (MDA) team from Tachikawa AB, Japan, causing changes in the antenna system which altered the tilt error and beam shape of the set. As a result, 313th Air Division and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing both requested that Detachment 3 conduct a special evaluation. In the ensuing visit by a two-man team from 21 to 30 September 1960, it was found that the radar

was not functioning properly because of poor maintenance procedures and inadequate knowledge on the part of the crew. In addition, poor coordination for supplies and test equipment calibration existed between the various interested agencies, and the Quality Control Program was being administered improperly.

These points were analyzed in detail in the team's Evaluation Report, as a result of which the responsible agencies immediately initiated corrective action.[51]

Quality Control Training Visits: The first of a continuing series of Quality Control training visits was made to Site P-54 on Kume Shima (26°22' N., 126°45' E.) from 24 to 28 October 1960. The purpose of these visits was to insure an understanding of and compliance with existing directives. In conjunction with this mission, queries concerning the QC program where AN/FPS-20 search radars were in use were sent to Fifth Air Force and the Air Defense Command. Experience had shown that much confusion existed in the field because of the fact that the AN/FPS-20 was capable of detecting all targets at PRF (pulse repetition frequency) limits having a decibel (DB) rating equal to or higher than a T-33, which had a DB rating of negative 14 DB. However, definite action on this matter was still pending on 31 December 1960.

From 7 to 11 November 1960 a similar QC visit was made to Site P-55 on Okino-Erabu Shima (27°22' N., 128°34' E.), which also had a modified AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar, the AN/FPS-20A. The objectives were the same.[52]

The ECCM Training Mission at Yokota AB: An Electronics Counter-Counter-Measures (ECCM) training mission was undertaken by a two-man team

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from 1 to 10 December 1960 at Yokota AB, Japan. The purpose of the trip was to give technical assistance to members of the 6091st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron in preparing a course of instruction in ECCM work, chiefly in the operational and maintenance areas of ECCM capabilities. The 6091st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron had requested this assistance, and Fifth Air Force had approved it.[53]

Evaluation of the Radar Weapons at Site R-71: The last mission of the year was performed at Site R-71, near the mouth of Lingayen Gulf on the island of Luzon, P.I. (16°37' N., 120°17' E.), where an initial evaluation of the AN/FPS-6 height-range indicator and a special evaluation of an AN/FPS-8 were undertaken by a three-man team. It was found that considerable confusion existed concerning the Quality Control Program and the application of the necessary tools used in determining the capability of the set, with the unfortunate consequence that site personnel over-rated it. In addition, the maintenance personnel were failing to keep the sets up to minimum performance standards, primarily for lack of adequate test equipment. This same lack, incidentally, was found to be prevalent at most sites in the PACAF area throughout the period of this history. A secondary factor in the R-71 sets' sub-standard performance was inadequate personnel manning.

Upon their return to Naha from R-71, the team wrote and submitted a complete evaluation report giving a detailed analysis of set performance and shortcomings.[54]

Additional Projects: Additional projects were undertaken by Detachment 3 which were very time consuming, owing to the technical research involved, and, in most cases, these projects continued throughout

the historical period.

In July 1960, the detachment prepared a Radar Coverage Indicator (RCI) for the AN/FPS-20, to be used in the field on a trial basis. This RCI was constructed on the basis of information obtained from actual flight data and theoretical mathematical calculations. Extreme difficulties in the actual construction of the RCI's were overcome with the help of Fifth Air Force. This project was still continuing on 31 December.

New RCI's were constructed for all sites in the PACAF area that possessed an AN/FPS-3 or an AN/FPS-8 search radar. At the same time, a new DB rating list was forwarded to all sites in PACAF. The purpose of this project was to standardize the QC Program in PACAF and to eliminate possible errors resulting from faulty RCI's or erroneous DB lists.

In August the detachment began compilation of a Radar Evaluation Manual, which was intended to contain all the information needed by evaluation personnel in the field to perform any type of evaluation. At the same time, methods and procedures would be standardized, and all reports would contain information in an identical sequence, thus facilitating research. This manual was about 80 per cent complete as the year ended, but the detachment's intention was that it should be a continuing project, with new procedures, concepts, revisions, and information being incorporated as they were generated.

Two other projects were undertaken at the same time. One was the writing of a Quality Control Manual. This was believed to be warranted by the current QC Manual's almost exclusive reference to the AN/FPS-3 set.

By making the new manual non-specific, the detachment hoped that its provisions could be applied to any radar set. Although this project had not been completed by 31 December, it was planned that it would be submitted to PACAF for approval and distribution as soon as it was ready.

The other project concerned SIF (Selective Identification Feature). A brochure was written by detachment personnel to provide one-time special advisory service on this piece of electronic equipment, designed to increase the operating efficiency of the AC&W System. It was complete as the year came to a close, but had not yet been reproduced or distributed.

In November, composite radar coverage diagrams were begun for the Okinawa complex. These coverage diagrams were completed for five different altitudes. By December this project had been completed and forwarded to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and the 313th Air Division.[55]

Supply Problems: From the time of its establishment, Detachment 3 encountered continuous supply difficulties as a result of confusion as to where equipment was to come from and who would maintain records. The materiel with which it was equipped was that which had belonged to the now defunct 6023d Radar Evaluation Squadron (ECM), and the detachment's present possession of it was only on a quasi-legal basis.

However, in October 1960, a PACAF Equipment Review Authorization Activities Team arrived at Naha AB to study the problem. The result was that Detachment 3 received a Unit Allowance List (UAL) on 1 November. This UAL and all supply records and requests were to be handled by the 51st Support Squadron's Consolidated Supply Section. Subsequent to the authorization of this UAL and attendant organizational clarification,

supply problems practically disappeared.[56]

The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium: On 8 July 1960, the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, was reorganized under the appropriate Unit Manning Documents to give it an O/T strength of 64 officers and 106 airmen, the personnel to be furnished from sources under control of the Commander, 315th Air Division, a unit assigned directly to PACAF, although stationed in the Fifth Air Force area of control.[57]

The Reorganization of Naha Air Base: On 18 July 1960, a long-planned reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and other 313th Air Division-assigned units at Naha Air Base went into effect. The 313th Air Division Reorganization for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, dated 11 October 1959, had contemplated that the reorganization would take place on 1 July 1960. Before that date it was expected that PACAF would issue general orders directing the implementation of the reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, including the assignment of units to the wing; inactivating the 6151st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron and activating the 51st A&E Maintenance Squadron; inactivating the 6431st Air Base Group and all units assigned to it, and activating the 51st Air Base Group; inactivating Detachment 1, 313th Air Division; and assigning the 623d AC&W Squadron to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.[58]

This plan for reorganizing the unit structure at Naha AB had been in the mill for approximately a year; for it was back in July 1959 that the staffs of the 51st FIW and the 6431st Air Base Group had prepared a proposal for a Wing/Base reorganization designed to provide (1) a balanced, combat-ready, active air defense force; (2) an efficient logistical

and administrative organization capable of supporting the Air Defense force; and (3) a consolidation of all Wing/Base units under the Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

It was believed that this reorganization proposal, through its planned consolidation of certain responsibilities, functions, and facilities, would streamline the command/control structure and result in a net savings of 362 manpower spaces. Accordingly, the proposal was approved by the 313th Air Division Commander and forwarded to Fifth Air Force in September 1959 for concurrence. Fifth made several organizational changes, then forwarded the revised plan to Headquarters, PACAF and Headquarters, USAF in October 1959.

In April 1960, the 51st FIW received approval to proceed with an interim implementation of the reorganization, the target date to be 1 July of the same year. The Plans Division of the wing prepared 51st OPLAN 151-60, necessary organizational charts, and 13 regulations specifying the various individual unit mission statements.

During the period between 1 April and 1 July, all phases of the reorganization were completed, but PACAF General Orders Number 54 directed that 18 July 1960 was to be the effective date of reorganization, rather than 1 July.[59]

Since new units could not very well be created until the old, obsolete ones had been removed from the board, PACAF General Orders 54 thoughtfully took care to discontinue the following:

6151st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron
6431st Air Base Group
6431st Air Police Squadron
6431st Civil Engineering Squadron
6431st Operations Squadron
6431st Supply Squadron
6431st Transportation Squadron

The Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group, which had been inactivated only as recently as 25 October 1957, was designated and organized at Naha AB, where it was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 31 officers and 211 airmen. The 51st Air Base Group, in turn, was assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, instead of directly to the 313th Air Division, as the late 6431st Air Base Group had been.[60]

To replace the 6151st A&E Maintenance Squadron, the 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron was designated and organized at Naha AB, where it was initially assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition strength of 11 officers and 293 airmen.[61] Subsequently, when it was found that this arrangement was not too satisfactory, PACAF issued new general orders assigning the 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, retroactive to 18 July 1960.[62]

To replace the 6431st Operations Squadron and the 6431st Air Police Squadron, the 51st Support Squadron was designated and organized on 18 July 1960 at Naha AB, where it was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 27 officers and 512 airmen.[63]

In the same way, the 51st Materiel Squadron was designated and organized at Naha AB on 18 July 1960 as heir to the 6431st Supply Squadron and the 6431st Transportation Squadron, being assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition of 15 officers and 601 airmen.[64]

As related earlier, the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron was designated and organized at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, where it was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition strength of four officers

and 590 airmen.[65]

In other facets of the wing reorganization, the Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing itself was reorganized under appropriate UMD's with an O/T composition strength of 34 officers and 201 airmen; while the 51st Field Maintenance Squadron was reorganized under appropriate UMD's with an O/T composition strength of seven officers and 579 airmen. Both actions were effective 18 July 1960.[66]

The 623d Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron, which had been assigned directly to the 313th Air Division ever since the inactivation of the parent 529th AC&W Group on 15 March 1955, was assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, effective 18 July 1960.[67]

Also effective 18 July, the following units were attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support:[68]

Detachment 1, 315th Air Division
1252d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron (MATS)
Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group (MATS)
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General (USAF)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 1, District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron (also to receive certain specialized logistic support from Base Supply, 6313th Air Base Wing, at Kadena AB)
817th Troop Carrier Squadron

The same date, the following units were attached to the 51st Support Squadron at Naha AB for logistic and administrative support:[69]

Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing
Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group
Detachment 3, 313th Air Division (the UAL Equipment of this unit to be carried on the UAL of the 51st Support Squadron)

Likewise effective 18 July 1960, Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic

and administrative support.[70]

The 6351st USAF Dispensary: In a bit of rather inexplicable bookkeeping, PACAF assigned the 6351st USAF Dispensary (Class B) at Naha AB to the 51st Air Base Group, effective 22 July 1960, instead of on the more logical 18 July, the date which had seen the discontinuance of the 6431st Air Base Group, to which the 6351st USAF Dispensary had been assigned on 25 October 1957.[71] Thus, it appears that the 6351st USAF Dispensary was an organization without assignment below the level of Fifth Air Force for the four days 18-22 July 1960.

Detachment #5, 623d AC&W Squadron: Long one of the most important radar sites in the Ryukyus Air Defense System, Site P-52 at Yae Take Air Station, situated on Okinawa's Motobu Peninsula, had first begun its decline from glory on 9 December 1957, when it was relieved of its function as a primary Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) and was relegated to the role of alternate ADDC. The next step downward had come on 16 January 1958 when the 624th AC&W Squadron, whose headquarters was at Yae Take Air Station, was attached to the sister 623d AC&W Squadron for operational control and administration, including the assignment and promotion of personnel,[72] in preparation for the inactivation of the 624th AC&W Squadron on 8 March 1958.[73]

At the same time that the 624th AC&W Squadron went out of existence, Yae Take Air Station had been organized as Detachment #5, 623d AC&W Squadron.[74] However, on 1 June 1958, Yae Take Air Station was inactivated as an AC&W site, its functions as an alternate ADDC being transferred to Kume Shima Air Station (Site P-54).

On 1 July 1960, Yae Take Air Station was inactivated and deleted

from the Air Force installation list by reason of its transfer to the Department of the Army.[75] Then, rather belatedly it would seem, Detachment 5, 623d AC&W Squadron was discontinued at Yae Take Air Station effective 8 August 1960, with the personnel to be absorbed by 313th Air Division or reassigned as directed by Headquarters, PACAF.[76]

The 31st Air Rescue Squadron: Immediately prior to and during the historical period, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was engaged in reorganizing its air rescue program throughout the world. One effect of this was the discontinuance of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron at Naha AB on 18 March 1960,[77] as related in the previous history of the 313th Air Division. It was not long, however, before MATS began to realize that this was not exactly the wisest thing it could have done, and that an air rescue unit in the Ryukyus was an almost indispensable item. As a result, the 31st Air Rescue Squadron was moved PCS from Clark AB, P.I., to Naha AB on 12 August 1960.

This, too, proved an ephemeral action, as the 31st Air Rescue Squadron was discontinued on 18 September 1960, and in its place was organized Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron.[78] Detachment 3, 76th ARS was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support.[79]

Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group: On 8 October 1960, Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group was discontinued at Naha AB, as one aspect of the discontinuance of the 10th Weather Group itself. Simultaneously, Detachment 14, Headquarters, 1st Weather Wing was organized at Naha AB to replace the discarded unit.[80]

Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division: On 7 December 1960, Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division, at Naha AB, was attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for logistic and administrative support.[81]

Changes Involving Air Force Land in the Ryukyus.

On 1 July 1960, the Yontan Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) Annex (PIN 2979), with an annual rental of $398.04 for the 10.84 acres of which it was composed, and previously assigned to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, was inactivated and deleted from the Air Force installation list by reason of its transfer to the Department of the Army.[82]

On 1 July 1960, Yae Take Air Station (PIN 2978), comprising 43.10 acres with an annual rental of $1,062.33, previously assigned to the real property account of Naha AB, was inactivated and deleted from the Air Force installation list as the result of its transfer to the Department of the Army.[83]

On 1 July 1960, an 11-acre parcel of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex (PIN 2998), with an annual rental of $251.35, was transferred from the Department of the Air Force to the Department of the Army to permit construction of a Hawk surface-to-air missile facility and an access road.

On 1 July 1960, a one-acre parcel of the U.S. Army Ordnance Ammunition Depot, Chibana, with an annual rental of $32.72, was transferred to the U.S. Air Force, which thereupon designated it the Kadena Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) Annex.[84] The new acquisition was then assigned, in an inactive status, to the real property account of Kadena AB.[85]

On 31 December 1960, the Bishagawa Power Line Annex (PIN 4090), assigned to the real property account of Kadena AB, was merged with Kadena Air Base (PIN 2988).[86]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 8 June 1960.
2	1	5AFR 55-18, sub.: Operations: Division Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 14 Jan. 1960.
3	1	5AFR 23-4, sub.: Organization--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 8 June 1960.
4	--	Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) General Orders (GO) 20, dtd. 25 March 1960.
5	2	Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC) GO 4, dtd. 20 June 1960.
6	3	313th Air Division (313th AD) GO 33, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960.
7	4	6313th Air Base Wing (6313th ABW) GO 4, dtd. 25 Aug. 1960.
8	5	3d Air Division (3d AD) GO 8, dtd. 3 June 1960.
9	—	History, Detachment 1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Det. 1, 3d MMS), July 1960, p. 3.
10	—	Ibid., pp. 6-8.
11	--	Hist., Det. 1, 3d MMS, Aug. 1960, p. 4.
12	--	Ibid., p. 7.
13	—	Ibid., pp. 7-8.
14	—	Hist., Det. 1, 3d MMS, Sept. 1960, pp. 3-4.
15	--	Ibid., pp. 8-10, 12.
16	—	Hist., Det. 1, 3d MMS, Oct. 1960, pp. 3-4.
17	—	Ibid., pp. 7-9.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
18	--	Hist., Det. 1, 3d MMS, Nov. 1960, pp. 3-4.
19	--	Ibid., pp. 4-5.
20	--	Ibid., pp. 7-10.
21	--	Hist., Det. 1, 3d MMS, Dec. 1960, pp. 5-6.
22	--	Ibid., p. 6.
--	5a	Detachment #1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC) Reorganization Plan, 15 Sept. 1960.
--	5b	Ltr., Det. #1, 3d MMS to 3d Air Div. (DPL), sub.: Service Test Report of Det #1, 3MMS Re-organization Plan, 15 Sept. 1960.
--	5c	Ltr., Det. #1, 3d MMS to 3d Air Div. (DPL), sub.: SAC Inspector General's Report, 6 Dec. 1960.
23	--	PACAF GO 41, dtd. 25 May 1960.
24	4	6313th ABW GO 3, dtd. 11 Aug. 1960.
25	6	313th AD GO 37, dtd. 29 Sept. 1960.
26	3	313th AD GO 37, dtd. 29 Sept. 1960.
27	--	313th Air Division Supplement 1 to 5AFR 50-5, dtd. 30 Aug. 1960.
28	--	Hq. AAB, MacDill Field GO 33, dtd. 1 Aug. 1946.
29	--	Department of the Air Force (SAF) Ltr., sub.: Activation of the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, and Certain Other USAF Units, dtd. 16 Sept. 1960.
30	--	Brief History of th 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, 1943-1960, prepared by USAF Hist. Div., Jan. 1961.
31	--	DAF Ltr., sub.: Activation of the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group, and Certain Other USAF Units, dtd. 16 Sept. 1960.
32	--	Ibid.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
33	7	Air Weather Service GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960.
34	--	PACAF GO 20, dtd. 25 March 1960.
35	6	PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.
36	6	Ibid.
37	--	PACAF GO 45, dtd. 9 June 1960.
38	--	Twentieth Air Force GO 37, dtd. 14 Aug. 1954.
--	8	History, Combat Operations Division, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 July-30 Sept. 1959.
--	9	History, Combat Operations Division, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1959.
--	10	History, Combat Operations Division, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 Jan.-31 March 1960.
39	11	History, Combat Operations Division, Hq., 313th Air Div., 1 Apr.-30 June 1960, p. 4.
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75	—	PACAF GO 47, dtd. 21 June 1960.
76	6	PACAF GO 52, dtd. 5 July 1960.
77	14	MATS GO 7, dtd. 26 Jan. 1960.
78	14 14	MATS GO 7, dtd. 26 Jan. 1960; MATS GO 61, dtd. 4 May 1960; MATS GO 57, dtd. 29 Apr. 1960.
79	3	313th AD GO 40, dtd. 7 Oct. 1960.
80	7	AWS GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960.
81	— —	313th AD Special Order (SO) G-1, dtd. 13 Jan. 1961; 313th AD SO G-4, dtd. 6 Feb. 1961.
82	— —	PACAF GO 47, dtd. 21 June 1960; USAF Message AFOCE-R 60647, dtd. 9 June 1960.
83	—	PACAF GO 47, dtd. 21 June 1960; USAF Message AFOCE-R 80395, dtd. 23 March 1960.
84	—	USAF GO 27, dtd. 15 June 1960.
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CHAPTER II

THE AFTERMATH OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S VISIT

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REACTION TO THE HOSTILE DEMONSTRATIONS

In the preceding history of this command, covering the period from 1 January through 30 June 1960, a detailed account was given of the events leading up to the visit of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Okinawa on 19 June 1960 and the incidents that marked the great day itself.

Not officially scheduled, but nonetheless most notable, of course, were the violent demonstrations staged in Naha City against the President nimself and the United States in the abstract by Leftist elements who turned the welcome route into a Via Dolorosa and converted the occasion into a triumph for the security planners rather than the illustrious guest. So far a cry, in fact, was the reception accorded on U.S. administered Okinawa from those previously bestowed by tumultuously friendly multitudes in India, the Philippines, and Taiwan that officials responsible for the Presidential safety finally decided that Mr. Eisenhower might suffer injury or even worse if he attempted to retrace the route along Onaribashi Street to the junction with Highway No. 1 which his motorcade had taken on its way to the USCAR Plaza. To forestall such a calamity, these officials had the President and his entourage slip out the back way and make their surreptitious way to the friendly enclave of Naha Air Base over bumpy byways and vacant highways.

President Eisenhower's Own Reaction.

On 21 June President Eisenhower held a telephone conference with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, in which both men agreed that the good will trip to the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea had been "completely successful." As for his visit to Okinawa, Mr. Eisenhower regarded it as "very satisfactory", even though some "1,500 members of left-wing organizations" had demonstrated against him and his country at that time. According to the eternally optimistic Presidential Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty, Mr. Eisenhower had not been particularly disturbed by the demonstrations against him in Naha, and contrasted the "actual" turnout of anti-American elements with the 20,000 Okinawans whom the "Communist leader" on the island had boasted he would have on hand.

Somewhat contradicting this roseate picture was Hagerty's answer to a press query that the President was abandoning personal high level diplomacy and planned no further good will trips abroad. However, he insisted that he had been saying the same thing since the previous September--long before the Naha fiasco.[1]

The Reaction of the Japanese-Language Newspapers on Okinawa.

In an editorial written for the next morning's paper, the Japanese-language Ryukyu Shimpo observed that the demonstrators may have thought that they scored a victory by causing the pre-arranged parade route to be changed. However, mused the editor, their objective might actually have backfired, inasmuch as "hundreds of thousands" of people had welcomed the President along his progress route, making it appear by contrast that only "a very small number of Okinawans sympathized with the

demonstration group."[2]

The ardently pro-reversionist Okinawa Times found even less fault than the Shimpo with the anti-Eisenhower and anti-American demonstrations of 19 June, regarding as more objectionable the "weak" manner in which Chief Executive Seisaku Ota had presented the Ryukyus' desire for the return of administrative authority to Japan. The only real criticism which the Times made of the "petition demonstration" was that it probably set back the cause of reversion, rather than advancing it, by the sense of humiliation which it had given the President. Editor-in-Chief Kazufumi Uechi was pretty certain that the demonstrators had contributed nothing to the promotion of reversion, giving as they did the impression that their original plan of action had gotten out of control. Furthermore, he termed as ridiculous their claim that they had scored a victory by forcing Mr. Eisenhower to slip out the back door through fear of their violence. Said Uechi, "If they call it a victory, then it is no petition demonstration, but a mere spiteful mob action."

Moreover, added the Times editor, "Reversion to Japan is not anti-American, nor is it opposition to the existence of military bases; for it is the racial sentiment of the people. And the purpose of the demonstration should have been to give expression to this wish of the people, but some participants in the demonstration gave expression in the form of 'Yankee go home,' and though we don't believe that they tried to emphasize anti-American feeling, it is apt to be misunderstood and thus bring about adverse consequences."

One finds it hard to share Uechi-san's tolerance of the Leftists' violence and his unwillingness to characterize it as anti-American. Had the signs and slogans employed been manufactured in Moscow itself,

they could scarcely have been more unfriendly than they were. For the most part, the motif of the demonstrations was Communism rather than Japanese nationalism.

However, the Times editor was able to quote Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, the perpetual Pollyanna, as having asserted that the demonstration was "the work of only a small minority and is no problem at all." This point of view, said Uechi, promised to become "the key to the solution of many of the problems of Okinawa; for it may be used as a yardstick in measuring mass action of Okinawa or by means of which the political situation of Okinawa may be evaluated by outsiders." Furthermore, all leaders should realize that "any mass movement must be backed by public support" and that "actions that are likely to cause misunderstanding will lose public support." By his failure to present the cause of reversion to Japan in strong terms, Chief Executive Ota had become partially responsible for the mob action which marred President Eisenhower's visit.[3]

On 21 June, the same day that the aforementioned editorial appeared in the Okinawa Times, the "Kinko Mokuzetsu" column of the Ryukyu Shimpo compared the reception given Eisenhower in other countries of Asia with that accorded him on Okinawa--and the resulting picture was not at all flattering to the latter. Even before Eisenhower arrived in Seoul, South Korea, after leaving Okinawa, reporters of the ROK Nippo and the Toa Nippo who were in Naha to cover the Presidential visit had predicted confidently that the Republic of Korea would give America's President a hearty welcome. As justification for this optimism, the two visitors recalled that although the student revolutionaries who recently overthrew

the government of President Syngman Rhee had also burned his anti-Communist hall, a party of high school students from the same fanatical group had laid a wreath on the bronze statue of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, thus displaying their gratitude to the U.S. leader who had done the most to save their country from Communist aggression.

The Okinawan students who formed the greater part of the mob which rioted against President Eisenhower may have followed the example of the Korean students superficially, said the columnist; but, where the latter had exhibited magnanimity and gratitude, the former had revealed a myopic lack of generosity and even common courtesy. Making the students' treatment of the American President in Naha the less venial was its contrast with the hearty welcome which he had earlier been given in India. There, the warmth of the greeting which the millions of common people bestowed upon him was almost overwhelming, notwithstanding the United States' ill-concealed impatience with Prime Minister Nehru's determinedly neutral stand in the cold war between the Western and Communist blocs and its anger at the harsh words spoken about the U.S. in the U.N. Assembly by the Indian delegate to the United Nations.

Would it be possible, asked the Kinko Mokuzetsu columnist, for the people in the Naha mob who had cried, "Yankee, Go Home!" to make up Okinawa's annual economic deficit of $80,000,000? The answer was, of course, "No." "At any rate," he commented, "some people should have shown broadmindedness."[4]

Reaction in Tokyo.

Reporting on the effect of the Naha demonstrations on public opinion in Japan, the Tokyo Bureau of the Ryukyu Shimpo concluded that

though reactions were varied, most people were in agreement on three points: 1. That the violent nature of the demonstrations was "an accident resulting from excitement;" 2. That U.S. policy toward Okinawa would not change as a result of the demonstrations; and 3. That such demonstrations did nothing to advance the reversion campaign toward the attainment of its goal.

A probably unintended slap at the U.S.'s administration of the Ryukyu Islands was contained in the observation that "every circle shows astonishment at the fact that a demonstration nearly as strong as the demonstration in Tokyo was conducted in Okinawa, where there is no liberty similar to that in Japan, which is secured by the constitution." The irony of this comment--whether conscious or not--lay in the fact that the Japanese constitution had been imposed on that defeated nation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, while civil liberties were regarded as restricted in a far greater degree on Okinawa, where the United States enjoyed absolute control!

If the administrative policies of the United States in the Ryukyus were an example of national inconsistency, an equally excellent example of personal inconsistency was provided by Nobumoto Ohama, the Yaeyama-born president of Waseda University in Tokyo. Although he made no secret of having taken part in the anti-American and anti-Security Treaty demonstrations of 15 June, together with Tokyo University President Seiji Kaya, Ohama told a reporter that he could not condone the students' utilizing a demonstration as a means of displaying their sentiments. Besides, the time when reversion could be realized was not

yet at hand, and mere demonstrations--no matter how exuberant in form and pure in intent--could not hasten the day. Because of its basic emotionalism, the action of the students on Okinawa was rather similar to the kamikaze spirit of the old Japanese militarists. Rather than resorting to violence, he averred, the university students should have made their appeal for reversion by "publishing their written opinions for signature."

In a surprising revelation of perceptiveness, President Ohama concluded that U.S. policy toward Okinawa would probably not change simply because of the demonstration. To the reporter's question of whether he believed the demonstration had made a favorable impression on the U.S. side, he replied that he was inclined to take a negative view.[5]

Having exhausted the Ohama mother lode of gold nuggets of wisdom, the Shimpo reporter in Tokyo turned to Shien Yoshida, business manager of the Nampo Dobo Engo Kai ("Southern Brothers Assistance Association" or "Association for the Relief of Fellow People in the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands"), a special corporate body established by the Japanese Diet on 1 September 1957, whose chairman and main officers were appointed by the Prime Minister.

Yoshida quickly demonstrated that he possessed in abundant measure the proverbial politican's talent for straddling an issue. Having commented that the petition should have been presented to President Eisenhower "more coolly and in its natural form," even though reversion was the natural demand of the people, he quickly diluted any condemnation of the rioters that might be inferred from what he had said by recognizing

that the mobilization of armed soldiers may have placed "unnecessary pressure" on the local people and given rise to increased anti-American feelings among the Ryukyuans. While the violent turn taken by the demonstrations had, perhaps, caused misunderstanding and irritated the United States unnecessarily, it should not be surprising if the latter's employment of the bayonet-equipped troops were used for political purposes by those elements inimical to the West. In other words, the U.S. officials would have been well advised to display greater discretion in this business.[6]

Another politician with a penchant for political funambulism was Seiryo Kamiyama, Chairman of the Okinawa Prefectural People's Association in Tokyo. Knowing the Ryukyuans to be a passive, happy-go-lucky people by nature, he said he had been shocked to hear of the violent demonstrations which greeted the American President. If the information he had received about the hostile riots were true, he could only conclude that the students had been guilty of excesses. At the same time, however, he felt that the use of armed soldiers to guard the procession route was unwarranted.[7] Pursuing Kamiyama's reasoning to its logical conclusion, one gathers that he would have deplored any harm which came to President Eisenhower through the demonstrators' violence, but he opposed the taking of measures that would obviate its occurrence.

No fence-straddler was Mr. Ishii, a writer for the Foreign Affairs Department of the Tokyo Shimbun and a former secretary of the Okinawa Press Club in Tokyo, who was known for his considerable knowledge of Ryukyuan affairs. Evidently a rabid advocate of reversion, he found no intrinsic fault with the violent demonstrations of 19 June, regarding

them as "a natural consequence of the indignation of the Okinawan people against the United States." His only objection to tactics of this nature was that their very violence might cause more conservative people, who likewise desired reversion--and just as ardently as their radical compatriots, to shun the exponents of force in revulsion against their methods. Such a split in the ranks of the reversionists could well be fatal.[8]

The Shimpo's Tokyo Bureau also noted that the National Movement Liaison Council for the Settlement of Okinawan Problems--made up of the Japan Socialist Party, the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions, the Japan Youth Council, and various other organizations--would take advantage of a meeting of the anti-security pact forces on the 22d of June to make an appeal for support of the struggle on Okinawa.[9]

In its morning edition of 24 June, the Okinawa Times carried a letter to the editor written by a Ryukyuan resident of Tokyo, Ryoko Nakayoshi. The reports carried by newspapers and radio stations that "13,000 petition demonstrators centering around the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council" had expressed their desire for the return of Okinawa to Japan filled him with delight and gratitude; for it "served to show the world the spirit and courage of the Okinawan prefectural people."

While Nakayoshi suspected that the President must have been embarrassed by a welcome which so strongly expressed the "Ryukyuan people's racial consciousness as Japanese nationals," he also believed that Mr. Eisenhower could not help being deeply impressed by it. Since the American President was known as "a good, peace-loving man," Nakayoshi believed that he understood the significance of the greater part of the

placards which greeted him on all sides and accepted them in the spirit with which they were intended. As for those which bore such slogans as "Go Home, Ike", he thought that they had better been left unwritten, running counter, as they did, to a rule of etiquette long observed in Okinawa that you "Don't slap even a dog's face in welcoming." (President Eisenhower would surely have been flattered at hearing this application of a bygone Ryukyuan Emily Post's homespun injunction!)

Respecting the demonstrators' clash with U.S. Marines and GRI policemen, Nakayoshi found this news unpleasant, as it symbolized rule by arms. Another source of disappointment to him was the non-materialization of the prediction that the President would issue a statement while he was on Okinawa that the United States was planning to return the Ryukyus to Japan once the existing tension in Asia was alleviated.[10]

The Attitude of the Average Ryukyuan.

A Ryukyu Shimpo reporter who sought out "the man on the street" (not to mention his female counterpart) to ascertain his reaction to the mob violence which had greeted the President in Naha found that it was generally one of mild disapproval.

An employee of a private company, aged 45, who declined to permit the use of his name, felt that a wild demonstration such as this "did not make sense," even though the participants understandably wanted to make sure that the President realized the intensity of their desire for reversion of Okinawa to Japan. A calm demonstration would have conveyed their purpose just as well, he asserted, and would not have produced the unfortunate side effect of angering U.S. officials. Besides, Mr.

Eisenhower had come to Okinawa on a mission of friendship, not aggression, and should have been greeted as a chief of state. On the other hand, although he found it regrettable that the friendly greeters had been shoved out into the street by the unruly demonstrators behind them, the anonymous interviewee "felt no pleasure at seeing soldiers quieting the demonstrators with bayonets," because of the unpleasant memories of wartime days it evoked.

Miss Michiko Kina, also the employee of a private company, who declined to give her age, expressed her belief that "Every person is demanding reversion at heart," but at the same time she regretted that various organizations had conducted demonstrations in obvious imitation of those carried out in Japan. While wishing that the demonstrators "had been more polite," for their actions certainly did not constitute "gentlemanly behavior," Miss Kina exercised her inherent female prerogative of being inconsistent by declaring that "the guarding seemed too strict."

A 53-year-old employee of a private firm, who preferred not to have his name used, shared the others' regret that a disturbance had marred the Presidential visit, but went much further in his denunciation of the mob members' actions. While conceding that it was not necessary for the students of the University of the Ryukyus to take sides with the United States, he found it asinine for them to tease the troops who lined the progress route by mimicking their words of command. "If they hate Americans so much," he commented with considerable logic, "they had better withdraw from the university which was built and is operated with aid from the United States."

A female government employee, who was bold enough to give her age

(as 30) but not sufficiently daring to reveal her "definite opinion," as she expressed it, was of the opinion that the crowd should have behaved more courteously, and was "very much disappointed" to hear that Mr. Eisenhower had been forced to go back along an altered route.

Mr. Isamu Uehara, a company employee, had brought his family from the town of Itoman, a short distance south of Naha City, to see the President of the United States, and had waited for some hours in front of the Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce and Industry Office before learning from a megaphone-equipped patrol car that Mr. Eisenhower had departed over a route not previously announced and had, in fact, already taken off in a helicopter from Naha Air Base to board his waiting jet plane at Kadena. Instead of blaming the demonstrators for his disappointment, however, as might be reasonably expected, Uehara contended that the numerous policemen and military personnel lining the streets would have been well able to prevent any harm from coming to the President. As a result, he stated that he felt "rather deceived."

Mrs. Yoshiko Kayo, a housewife, was apparently chiefly annoyed by the stationing of armed military personnel along the route, though she did admit that the President should have been greeted in a friendlier manner and that the demonstration of hatred which he witnessed may have made him feel bad. Her fears of a bloody clash between the bayonet-armed Marines and the wild-eyed demonstrators when the Presidential motorcade left the USCAR Plaza and made the outward drive along Onari-bashi Dori (Street) had been relieved when she learned that Mr. Eisenhower and his party had taken a different route to reach Naha Air Base.

Shinichi Kaneshiro, a U.S. military employee, blamed the violent

turn taken by the demonstrators upon two factors--mob psychology induced by their sheer force of numbers and imitation (some probably conscious, some unconscious) of the activities of Zengakuren (the National Federation of Students' Self-Government Associations) in Japan. Kaneshiro noted that there invariably seemed to be "an immediate response in Okinawa to the social situation in Japan," despite the obvious fact that it was pointless for Okinawans to imitate extremes in the mother country.[11]

A letter indicating disillusionment on the part of its author appeared in the Kocho Column of the Okinawa Times on 22 June. Even if Mr. Eisenhower's visit had been only a brief stopover on his way to Korea, rather than the actual destination for his Far East journey, said the writer, it was the latter's personal belief that the President was "deeply interested in Okinawa" and "desirous of promoting Ryukyuan-American friendship." Yet, despite this obvious good will on Eisenhower's part, the demonstrators released a declaration to the effect that they had won by making the President run away. "They clearly consider the American President an enemy." Up to now the writer of the letter had been a supporter of labor unions, he asserted; but, having witnessed these recent events, he confessed to bewilderment and began to wonder whether he should not change his mind about whom he would support henceforth.

As a good Ryukyuan, he hoped for the eventual reversion of the islands to Japan. At the same time, however, as a realist he feared that any future repetitions of the violence displayed during the recent Eisenhower visit would only make the people regard the reversion leaders as terrorists, with the result that the former would lose their enthusiasm for the movement out of fear of its radical nature.[12]

The following day, the Times published a letter written by Jun Miyazato, a military employee of Kyan Village in Gushichan-Son (the extreme southeastern part of Okinawa). As Miyazato saw the demonstration of 19 June, the greater part of the participants had been Ryukyu University students who sought by their sheer vociferousness in shouting, "Yankee, Go Home!" to constitute themselves the voice of the entire people, much as their idolized counterparts in Japan, the Zengakuren rioters, had played a strong hand in altering the course of history by causing President Eisenhower's visit to Tokyo to be canceled.

Miyazato compared the students' activity to that of a "nuclear weapon launched in the wrong direction." It was, in fact, "a manifestation of energy and not intelligence" which was "characteristic of students." If he were to describe the students' words in a brief phrase, they would be compared to "those seen in an agitation leaflet."[13]

Another letter-to-the-editor writer who held no sympathy whatsoever for the rioters and their antics was Keiko Nagano, a citizen of Naha who identified herself as a government employee. Scoffing at their shrill claims of victory in having forced Eisenhower to alter his parade plans, the outspoken Keiko had nothing but scorn for the men who had behaved so boorishly toward "the greatest man in the world," when he had taken the trouble to come to Okinawa from a far away country. The crowds around her who came to see the President had felt only disgust for the disturbers of the friendly spirit of good will and had futilely asked that "someone" shut up the demonstrators.

While some of the hostile element may have been simply putting into action what they felt, Nagano-san suspected that many of them were persons

who saw themselves as heroes by participating in affrays of this sort. Furthermore, she could not help believing that their actions were in imitation of recent happenings in Japan. Yet, when one got right down to it, she asked, what had Japan ever actually done for the Ryukyus? "Though I am a Japanese," averred the outspoken Miss Nagano, "I dislike Japan very much." Yet, while hating Japan, she wanted it understood that she was definitely "not a pro-American person."

Apparently, Keiko-san was that rara avis, a Ryukyuan nationalist, in a country where the overwhelming majority of those who were interested in politics at all were irredentists![*] Before World War II Japan had treated the Ryukyus "like a different nation," she said, and after the war "she sold us to the U.S. in compensation for the defeat and has squeezed dollars from Okinawa." The basic indifference of Japan to the Ryukyu Islands was shown by the failure of any Prime Minister to visit Okinawa during the ensuing 15 years.

In her opinion, those Japanese who professed to oppose the United States because it was an aggressor nation seeking to bring on a war were in reality jealous of the wealth and power she possessed. On the contrary, President Eisenhower was "a great statesman" with an ardent desire for peace. As a patriotic Ryukyuan, the writer was naturally "regretful for and indignant at" Okinawa's existing situation as a military base. However, too many Okinawans were unappreciative of the

*Keiko Nagano was not, however, the only person on Okinawa who desired self government for the people of the Ryukyus. Chotoku Ogimi, the president of the Okinawa Commercial Inquiry Agency, was Chairman of the Ryukyu Nationalist Party, which had such aspirations, and in the Legislative elections of 13 November 1960 its candidates were to poll 4,495 out of the total 380,326 votes cast. Even so, it must be assumed that a goodly portion of these ballots were marked for the RNP candidates out of personal rather than political considerations.

many benevolences rendered them by the United States.

Miss Nagano was fully aware that the reversionists would probably be incensed at her sentiments, thinking that it was because of people like her that reversion remained so remote. Nevertheless, she stood firmly on her convictions, certain in her own mind that anti-American demonstrations alone could not save Okinawa.[14]

The Reaction of Prominent Okinawans.

Where the reporter for the Ryukyu Shimpo had sought the views of the ordinary "man on the street" concerning the Eisenhower visit and the accompanying pyrotechnics, the less friendly Okinawa Times addressed its query to the leaders of various organizations, the majority of them notorious for their hostility to the United States.

The first person interviewed was Mrs. Tsuru Yoshida, the Chairman of the Okinawa Women's Federation. While she was glad to hear the President's promise to promote the welfare of the Okinawan people, she said she was disappointed that he had made no mention of reversion or of the "immediate removal of every atomic-hydrogen bomb base." And, though she recognized that the current international situation might have made an immediate settlement of these problems impossible, she had still hoped that Mr. Eisenhower would give some indication of his intention to see them settled eventually. However, Mrs. Yoshida's dissatisfaction was not confined to the President of the United States. She also felt that Chief Executive Ota had made a "very weak" presentation of the Ryukyuan case to Mr. Eisenhower, having failed to bring up the subjects which she considered to be of greatest importance. Even so,

she was sufficiently fair-minded to recognize that Ota must find it very difficult, in his anomalous position of Chief Executive-by-appointment-of-the-United States, to speak his mind freely or express himself on subjects embarrassing to the United States. Caught as he naturally was between the desires of his own people and the pressures of the government for which he exercised limited executive powers, Seisaku Ota occupied an awkward position with which she could "heartily sympathize."

The next interviewee, General Affairs Department Director Arakaki of the supposedly nationalistic, but often Communist-leaning, Okinawa Teachers' Association, had much the same plaint as Mrs. Yoshida, but without the leavening of fair play which took some of the sting out of her remarks. To begin with, he had wanted to know exactly how President Eisenhower, "who is heartily crying out for world peace," could reconcile that would-be image of America with the same country's possession of atomic-hydrogen bomb bases on Okinawa and its refusal to permit the Ryukyu Islands to revert to Japan. In this desire he had, of course, been disappointed.

Secondly, Arakaki-san was of the opinion that even though the time which the Chief Executive had had at his disposal for presenting the problems and aspirations of the Ryukyuan people to the President was admittedly brief, Mr. Ota had been nonetheless derelict in his duty for not conveying a far stronger appeal.[15]

The third person approached by the Times' reporter was none other than Takeji Akamine, Vice-Chairman of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council (he was soon afterward to replace the figurehead chairman, Komei Fukuji), and leader of the recent anti-Eisenhower demonstration. One of the "coming young men" in the Leftist political world, Akamine had

been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Federation of Government Employees Unions since 22 November 1959, and, when time permitted, worked at the job for which he received a salary from the Government of the Ryukyu Islands--that of Sub-Section Chief in the Accounting Section of the Internal Affairs Department.

"If President Eisenhower's visit was truly a mission of friendship, peace, and good will," asked Akamine rhetorically, "why did they mobilize armed soldiers?" After all, bayonets symbolized "neither good will nor friendship at all." On the contrary, their only effect had been the predictable one of producing "a collision between the Okinawan people and the United States."

In a fine manifestation of hypocrisy flavored, it may be, with essence of irony, Takeji Akamine declared it to be a pity that the President, who was "said to be an apostle of peace," had changed his scheduled exit route and departed by way of the worst road in the area.

This from the one man probably most responsible for Mr. Eisenhower's finding retreat over a bad back road necessary! As a sanctimonious expression of hypocritical regret it calls to mind Shakespeare's comment that "The Devil can quote scripture for his purpose." Then, to compound the brazen impudence, Akamine described the President's message to the people of the Ryukyus as meaningless, because he had stated merely that he took an interest in the welfare of the Okinawan people, without describing any detailed programs "such as the U.S. defrayment of expenses for the nationalistic functions in the Ryukyus." While on the one hand Akamine was doing everything within his power to force the U.S. out of the Ryukyus, on the other he criticized it for not providing more money

for its government!

As for Chief Executive Ota's request which he had presented to Mr. Eisenhower during the brief time they were closeted together, it "made no sense at all," since nothing had been said about reversion of Okinawa to Japan, "which is the most important thing." If Ota had said, "'All the prefectural people of Okinawa are earnestly desiring reversion to our fatherland; I ask you for early reversion of Okinawa,' this alone would have been sufficient, and the rest could have been left unsaid," declared the one-track-minded Akamine.[16]

Eiichi Arakaki, the Chief Secretary of the Council of Okinawa Prefectural Youth Associations, an organization never renowned for its friendliness toward the United States or for its unfriendliness to the goals of International Communism, seems to have taken his lines from the same script as Akamine, if we may judge from the similarity between their comments.

If President Eisenhower were genuinely interested in the welfare of the Okinawan people, as he professed to be, suggested Arakaki, he would abolish the recently-signed security pact with Japan as quickly as possible, and would, at the same time, remove all atomic-hydrogen bomb bases from Okinawa and return the Ryukyus to Japan. These were the only powers in his possession by which the American President could contribute to the welfare of the Okinawan people, as Arakaki saw it.

Contrarily, "the mobilization of those thousands of armed soldiers" was a vivid indication of the fact of American imperialism." Another such indication was Eisenhower's action in altering his scheduled route and leaving Okinawa, despite the fact that he was "said to be an apostle

of peace." (This phrase, with its warped logic, has a familiar ring verging on the plagiaristic!) Nor should the Ryukyuan side be content with their success in forcing the President to change his exit route. Rather, they should publicize "the outrageous conduct of the U.S. side and our victory over them." (These words imply that Eiichi Arakaki had personally participated in the June 19th demonstrations, though the use of the pronoun "our" may have been merely an attempt to identify himself with an operation which he considered successful.) Continuing to pursue the offensive, he promised that the Okinawa Youth Council would "offer sharp protests against the mobilization of armed soldiers by the U.S. side and, at the same time, further promote the reversion campaign vigorously from now on."

As with the other persons interviewed by the Times, Arakaki charged Chief Executive Ota with weakness in not having broached the subjects of reversion and removal of atomic-hydrogen bomb bases from Okinawa. In addition, he complained that Ota had not employed the opportunity to seek a promise of complete compensation for the victims of the Ishikawa jet crash tragedy. All in all, "The appointed Chief Executive's speech and behavior . . . were an admission of the permanent colonization of Okinawa." If Ota really wished to carry out policies representing the true voice of the people, he "should become a Japanese as soon as possible."*

In an apparent endeavor to introduce at least a semblance of balance into his interviews--or it may be that even the Times reporter was

*This unsolicited suggestion rings strangely in view of the fact that Mr. Ota had spent the greater part of his adult life in Tokyo until Chief Executive Jugo Thoma summoned him to Okinawa to begin his public service as Deputy Chief Executive, G.R.I. on 21 December 1957.

becoming weary of listening to the same monotonous refrain, even though released on different labels—he requested Kunio Matsugawa, the Business Manager of the Ryukyu Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who had received a part of his education under an Army scholarship, in the United States, to give his views on the demonstrations. Representing the wealthy businessmen of Okinawa as he did, it is not surprising that Matsugawa's remarks took a different tack from those of the Left-wing gentlemen who had preceded him.

With respect to the President's official statement, he noted that it was "focused mainly on the problems concerning U.S. economic aid and the welfare of the Okinawan people," which were "very important indeed." Besides, it would "have a good influence upon the future of Okinawa that the President of the United States, who is also the highest administrative authority of Okinawa," had seen Okinawa with his own eyes. Admittedly, the Chief Executive had been forced by lack of time to make a hurried request of the President, and it should not be expected that great fruit would be borne immediately. In the long run, however, Matsugawa believed that the development of Okinawa would benefit from the personal conversation between the two men.

Having made his bow to objectivity, the Times man collared Kisaburo Owan, a faithful wheelhorse of the Okinawa People's Party and member of the Okinawa branch of the Japan Communist Party. Owan had first been elected to the GRI Legislature from the 19th Electoral District (comprising the southern part of Naha City) in 1954, and had followed up this initial success with victorious campaigns in 1956 and 1958. (He

had no way of knowing, of course, that he was to go down in defeat for the first time in the coming election of 13 November 1960, with a member of the hated Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLD), one Chokusei Uku, taking from him his long-occupied seat.) The 51-year-old Owan was a member of the Central Committee of the Okinawa People's Party (OPP), and only recently--on 2 April 1960--had been elected Vice-Chairman of the Liaison Council for the Protection of Democracy (better known as Minren), a political disguise under which the OPP and the Okinawa Socialist Party (OSP) worked together for the achievement of their remarkably similar goals.

Actually, though, Owan's remarks were not so strongly worded as had been those of Takeji Akamine or Eiichi Arakaki. After cavalierly dismissing the President's formal statement as containing "mere hackneyed phrases and no substance," he took Chief Executive Ota to task for disregarding the desire for reversion of the great crowd gathered along the streets by failing to present a strongly-phrased request to Mr. Eisenhower when he had such a wonderful opportunity to do so. Regarding the numerous written petitions which Ota was said to have handed the President, Owan doubted that they were read by the President himself. (In this he was probably correct.) More objectionable in his eyes was Ota's implied admission that the U.S. military bases had been established on Okinawa for the purpose of maintaining the security of the Far East. In actuality, asserted the OPP Legislator, this was contrary to Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. While it was true that Article 3 provided for U.S. provisional administration of Okinawa, the words of the Chief Executive seemed to accept permanent administration.[17]

The subject of the next interview was, indeed, a representative of the opposite end of the political spectrum. Katsu Hoshi, a stalwart of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, had represented the 29th Electoral District (comprising Ohama-Cho and Taketomi-Cho in Yaeyama Gunto) since 1 April 1954, having never known defeat. During a part of this period he had served as Secretary-General of the Ryukyu Democratic Party, exchanging this position for that of Chairman of the RDP's Policy Research Committee on 31 March 1958. Subsequently, with the formation of a new and overwhelmingly powerful conservative party, the OLDP, on 5 October 1959 through a fusion of the Ryukyu Democratic Party, the Shinsei Kai (right-wing independent legislators), and the faction supporting Chief Executive Jugo Thoma, Hoshi had again been named Policy Research Committee Chairman. Incidentally, to go ahead of our story a bit, Hoshi did not seek re-election to his 29th District seat on 13 November 1960, preferring to accept an appointment to the post of Director of the GRI Planning and Statistics Department.

Apropos of Ota's appeal for various measures aimed at helping the Ryukyuan people, Hoshi found it "a rich harvest" that the American President had vouched that he would settle these matters favorably. "Especially welcome" was Eisenhower's promise to provide a drastic increase in funds for nationalistic functions of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Furthermore, if the demonstrators had thought to achieve their ends by the methods they selected, they were far from the mark; for, if anything, it was acts such as these which retarded the settlement of problems. Where his Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party was concerned, they were "firmly determined to forward Japan-U.S. cooperation through

mutual understanding and friendship to the last."[18]

The final, and probably most important, person interviewed by the Okinawa Times reporter was the Speaker of the Legislature, Tsumichiyo Asato. One of the best-known individuals, as well as possessor of one of the keenest legal minds in the Ryukyus, Asato had had a checkered political career. When the elections for the four gunto governments (Amami, Okinawa, Miyako, and Yaeyama) were held in 1950, he had succeeded in winning the Yaeyama Gunto Governorship, serving in this capacity until 1 April 1952, when the gunto system was replaced by the centralized Government of the Ryukyu Islands. Meantime, he had thrown his hat into the ring as a candidate for one of the 32 seats in the new GRI Legislature.

Successful in this endeavor, Asato ran again in 1954 in the 18th Electoral District (comprising the Miebashi area of Naha City), the open election system employed in 1952 having been replaced by the small constituency system in the interim. This time he was defeated--by none other than Kamejiro Senaga, the high priest of Communism in the Ryukyus and leader of the Okinawa People's Party. In 1956, however, Tsumichiyo Asato staged a comeback, winning election to the coveted legislative seat, largely because many of the Left-wing votes were drawn off by Communist agent Kotaro Kokuba, who ran on the OPP ticket, while the Rightist votes were split between two independent candidates. In a revelation of the strength of his convictions, not to mention his sense of the dramatic, however, Asato, as the Chairman of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP), resigned from the Legislature on 15 July 1957 in protest against the U.S. land policy of forced acquisition. His hope

that all the other members of the 29-man body would follow his example by participating in a mass resignation was doomed to disappointment. Many talked of doing so, but when the time came, self-interest prevailed over empty idealism.

In 1958 Asato again ran for the 18th Electoral District seat and won, although he obtained just 39.9 per cent of the ballots cast in a three-way race that saw Choei Matsushima, a lawyer campaigning on the Minren ticket, come in a poor third. Once again the 18th District had demonstrated its Leftist leanings. When the new Legislature convened to choose its Speaker, it was Tsumichiyo Asato on whom the honor was conferred. This event and the subsequent wisdom of the new High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Lieutenant General Donald P. Booth, USA, in including the Speaker in all receptions and other social functions to which important outsiders were invited wrought a rather remarkable, though subtle, transformation in the longtime rebel. Where he had formerly been happy, if not eager, to share the same political platform with Kamejiro Senaga and mouth much the same anti-American ideas and phrases, he now became friendly and completely responsible in his public utterances, even though he never retreated an inch in his obsessive drive for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan. (To look ahead of our story again, it is interesting and revealing of the man to discover that once he had suffered defeat in the November 1960 Legislative election and no longer held public office, Asato promptly reverted to his old anti-American course, having no scruples in depicting their every act as motivated by villainy.)

In addition to his political career, Asato had been connected with

a number of other fields of endeavor. Perhaps the most incongruous of these was his position as president of the Kumejima Gold Mining Company—but it may be that he rationalized the contradictory circumstance of a socialist's being the head of a capitalist enterprise by noting its moribund condition and the fact that it had never actually brought much profit to any of its investors. Besides, this was no greater inconsistency than that of the founder of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, Tatsuo Taira, who held the posts of President of the People's Bank and Board Chairman of the Ryukyu Sulphur Company!

With less need for apology, Asato was also Chairman of the Okinawa War Dead Memorial Service Association and had recently served as president of the Chuzan Gate Restoration Association.

But to get to Asato's reply to the Okinawa Times reporter's question, we find that he correctly described President Eisenhower's brief prepared address as a mere courtesy statement containing no expression of his political views, and one to which it was "needless to apply any political interpretation." While he believed that Chief Executive Ota had not conveyed "the earnest desire of the people" for reversion of Okinawa to Japan, Asato condoned the demonstrations and thought that they had made it apparent to Mr. Eisenhower that this ardent desire existed. The "only regretful thing" was the ill breeding shown by the demonstrators in clamoring noisily under the window of the room where the President and the Chief Executive were conferring.[19]

Reaction of the Okinawa Morning Star.

The English-language Okinawa Morning Star also attempted a round-up of Ryukyuan opinion concerning President Eisenhower's visit and the

demonstrations accompanying it, employing Masao Nakachi, an Okinawan staff feature writer who had received his higher education in the States.

As he assessed indigenous reaction, the majority of the people felt that the President had left Okinawa with "a better understanding of its problems and aspirations." And such an understanding was "most important in the light of the future development of the Ryukyuan economy, which can be accomplished only with further assistance and cooperation from the United States." Others had been gratified simply by having witnessed the first visit in history of a United States President to the Ryukyu Islands.

According to Nakachi, "most conservatives, politicians and businessmen alike, seemed to agree with Asato" that the Presidential visit was purely ceremonial, for all intents and purposes; therefore, it was pointless to seek a political interpretation of it. The Morning Star reporter also wrote that Katsu Hoshi "and many others, including the man-on-the-street, recoiled in shocked bewilderment at the wild demonstrations which partly defaced Ike's tour through Naha Sunday."

In substantiation of his ascription of a censorious attitude to the "man-on-the-street", reporter Nakachi cited one Isamu Uehara, a citizen of Itoman-Cho, as having deplored the rough tactics, obviously imported from Japan, which the demonstrators had employed to harass both the Presidential party and the would-be welcomers.[20] (By some strange coincidence, which the present historian is unable to explain, Uehara was the same individual from whom the Ryukyu Shimpo reporter had elicited the reaction of the "man-on-the-street" as described earlier.)

In its editorial column of 21 June the Okinawa Morning Star opened up on the demonstrators with the full fury of its mordant style. Among the anti-American signs carried by "the hoodlum elements" who greeted President Eisenhower in Naha, a prominent place had been occupied by the banners identifying the Okinawa Teachers Association. Dipping his pen in caustic, the editor of the Star commented that "If the carriers of these banners were teachers, then it is understandable why the quality of teaching on Okinawa has been described as low." Communist elements in Japan had long hidden behind the cloak of respectability provided by teachers' groups, and it appeared that they were now making deep inroads into the Okinawa Teachers Association. The question now became that of how far "these irresponsible elements" would be allowed to go before "sensible Ryukyuan public opinion" recognized them for what they were.

While it was true that academic freedom guaranteed freedom of thought, freedom of thought did not guarantee freedom of action, and it assuredly did not give the school teachers the right to endanger the lives of school children in the furtherance of the former's political ideology. And there was no gainsaying that the rioters in Naha had constituted a physical threat to "the far larger crowds of mothers, children and elderly people who wished to present a friendly welcome to the American President." Despite the pleas of the police for the trouble makers to behave themselves, the banner-carrying elements, including self-identified representatives of the Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA), had milled about behind the crowds lining the streets and utilized bamboo poles to attempt to shove the front rows of spectators into the path of the President's automobile. And it was mothers and children which made up these

front rows.

By contrast with the actions of the representatives of the OTA and their equally bloodthirsty confederates, the Ryukyuan police stood out for the skill and determination with which they had handled the rioters. It was their prompt action which had been responsible for "the rescue of a large number of children from crushing mobs, as irresponsible elements within these mobs sought to create panic and confusion." It was "to the credit of the police that they were able to exercise common sense and humanity, even though demonstrators who carried OTA banners did not.[21]

In a companion editorial entitled "The Memory Lingers" the Okinawa Morning Star remarked that now that the President's visit was history, everyone was describing it in accordance with his own particular prejudices. To the Leftists, who calmly admitted that their "disgraceful action in Naha" was part of a planned military campaign, the calculated disturbance had assumed the dimensions of a great victory. And the Communists in Tokyo, who had "made a mockery of Japanese Government during the past few weeks," concurred in this evaluation. However, said the writer, "Not everyone here is expected to agree. To the average Okinawan the conduct of the Leftist demonstrators was a disgrace. It will remain a disgrace."[22]

The organization chiefly responsible for the anti-Eisenhower violence had been the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, as we have seen. Never one to permit duty to interfere with politics, the council's Vice-Chairman, Takeji Akamine, called a meeting of the Executive Committee for 1400 hours on 21 June to discuss events of the recent demonstration and work out plans for the future.

One incident which evoked considerable comment was that of a Marine's

allegedly snatching away a Rising Sun flag from members of the Ryukyus University Students Association who were participating in the demonstration. As the students told it, they had been marching along Kokusai Street (the main thoroughfare of Naha) enroute to the reversion rally to be held in front of the Okinawa Times building at 1000 hours. As the head of the column approached the corner near the Ryubo Department Store (one of whose entrances fronted on Onaribashi Dori, the route which the Eisenhower motorcade would be taking shortly), its further progress was blocked by a line of Marines. When the students attempted to force their way through, the Leathernecks tightened their line, with the result that a pushing and shoving melee ensued. In the midst of the confusion the Japanese flag carried by a student in the vanguard was snatched away and tossed into a prison car being used for barricading.

The conferees agreed that an investigation should be launched to determine the truth of the charge. If it were found to be true, they should lodge a strong protest with the U.S. High Commissioner against the insult to the Japanese national flag and demand its return.

The executive members of the council were also concerned by Chief Executive Ota's failure to convey a strong appeal for reversion to President Eisenhower. To ensure that he would be aware of their displeasure, they decided to call on him at 1000 hours the following day and present the usual "strong protest." (It would seem that Vice-Chairman Akamine's duties in the Accounting Section of the Internal Affairs Department at GRI did not require his presence too often!)

At the close of the executive committee meeting, Vice-Chairman Akamine issued a statement for the press. In it he stated that the U.S.

military had mobilized "15,000 armed Marines" who carried tear gas and "pointed bayonets at our chests, challenging us." The sight of these armed Marines had so enraged the reversion group, quoth Akamine, that they found themselves spontaneously shouting, "Yankee, Go Home!" despite the most strenuous efforts of the demonstration control committee, who "strove to suppress such unpleasant utterances." Actually, it was a tribute to the discipline of the demonstrators that they had observed the rules agreed on beforehand and caused no mishap. And, as for the masses of people who had welcomed the President along the progress route, they had done so only perfunctorily. A truer barometer of their feelings, he asserted, was to be found in the large number of these same people who conveyed their greeting by waving Rising Sun flags.

Not confining their wrath to the Marines and Mr. Ota, the Reversion Council also strongly protested the action of the police authorities in obstructing the demonstrators by lining the street and even "acting violently."

Another target for the Reversion Council's strictures were the information media, who they said had "intentionally distorted facts" in their reporting of the events of the historic day. Since more than 12,000 persons had participated in the petition demonstration, it was unfair and poor journalism for them to perpetuate the canard originally perpetrated by Presidential Press Secretary James Hagerty that "only a handful of people" were involved in the hostile demonstrations.

Finally, the fact that students, "who should devote themselves to study," had participated in the demonstration was deserving of high praise; for it indicated "their pure-hearted enthusiasm" (if not their

studiousness).[23]

True to their word, 10 representatives of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, including Vice-Chairman Takeji Akamine, called on Chief Executive Seisaku Ota the next day, 22 June; but it was 1400 hours, not 100 hours, when they made their descent. To the uninitiated this difference in time might appear to warrant an explanation, but for one acquainted with Ryukyuan mores and characteristics no elucidation is necessary, and it is doubtful that any apologies were offered by the various individuals involved. In all probability the worthy gentlemen making up the group which was to wait on Mr. Ota simply followed the ancient practice of observing "Okinawan time."

According to the ground rules governing "Okinawan time" one never arrives any place at the agreed-on time. Instead, he casually makes his appearance anywhere from 30 minutes to four hours later; whereupon--providing the other party has also arrived--he bows apologetically from the waist, utters a perfunctory "gomen nasai" (excuse me), and considers the case closed. This custom has been one of the chief sources of misunderstanding, and even friction, between Americans and Ryukyuans since the former first began to arrive on Okinawa in the post-war years. Many a budding friendship has foundered on the abrasive rock of "Okinawan time."*

Having gained entree, the council representatives were not diffident about expressing to Chief Executive Ota their displeasure at the tepidity with which he had presented the case for reversion to President Eisenhower. As they saw it, the only way in which the Chief Executive could honestly

*The writer even recalls that Mrs. Shuhei Higa, while the First Lady of the Ryukyus, reminded the Okinawan members of the International Women's Club that if they wished to enjoy amicable relations with the American members of the organization, they must make a point of punctuality, eschewing "Okinawan time." Whether her plea achieved its purpose is not known.

say that he was carrying out policies reflecting the desires of the people was by "appealing the true desire of the people more frankly to the President."

Although probably annoyed no little by the attempt of this pressure group to dictate to him what he should do, while at the same time causing him embarrassment, Mr. Ota was his usual suave, urbane self. Concealing any anger which he may have felt at the visitors' tone, he courteously explained that he had deemed it a more effective method to couch his appeal for reversion in the form of a hope that Okinawa would "be returned to its original state." Furthermore, he commented to Akamine and his cohorts, the majority of the people supported his moderate approach as being the best tactic under the existing circumstances. In his opinion the realization of reversion was impossible at this time; therefore, it was "more natural that the realization of reversion should be attained through mutual understanding and cooperation between the United States and Japan."

As was to be expected, this explanation of the Chief Executive was not at all to the liking of the council representatives, who had come prepared to be dissatisfied, no matter what line Mr. Ota adopted. Consequently, after expressing their displeasure in unequivocal terms, Akamine and his nine fellow representatives stormed out of the office to broadcast to all like-thinking citizens the weak-kneed attitude of the Chief Executive.[24]

Even before Takeji Akamine and his fellow Reversion Council representatives came together with Chief Executive Ota, it might have been predicted that they would not see exactly eye to eye. Only a day earlier,

the latter had told the persons present at a press conference that he entertained some apprehensions in connection with the demonstration conducted on 19 June. He had already read newspaper reports that some U.S. Congressmen, irritated by the violent riots in Tokyo against the Security Treaty and President Eisenhower's projected visit, were urging that aid to and even trade with Japan be sharply curtailed. Under these circumstances, the demonstrations on Okinawa against the President personally came at an especially awkward time. Only a short while before, Mr. Ota had reacted to a reported reduction of $1,500,000 in economic aid for the Ryukyus by requesting the U.S. Senate for its restoration through USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus). In addition, he had asked for an increase of aid for the Ryukyu Islands during his private meeting with the President. Besides this, the Price and Judd Bills--both calling for more assistance for Okinawa--were then under deliberation in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Under the circumstances, Ota felt that psychological effect of the recent demonstrations in Naha could well be fatal to the approval of these various measures. "The demonstration conducted in Okinawa may not have been anti-American," said the Chief Executive in a masterpiece of euphemism, "but such moves as can be misunderstood as being anti-American will rather result in making reversion impossible, in my opinion."[25]

That Chief Executive Ota was not alone in not sharing the Reversion Council's admiration for student demonstrators had been evinced even before President Eisenhower's visit to Okinawa. On 9 June the Okinawa Morning Star had made these pseudo-scholars the subject of an editorial captioned "Agents of Ignorance", though it was the Japanese student-rioters

who had succeeded in bringing about cancellation of Eisenhower's projected visit to Tokyo rather than their Ryukyuan imitators which inspired the Star's animadversions.

The editorial writer found it highly ironical that "the student today seems to be the advance agent of ignorance and intolerance." Moreover, he was "the perpetual juvenile who forms associations and engages in disciplined movements to limit academic and political freedom." Although Eisenhower's proposed visit to Japan was undeniably motivated by peace and friendship and had "as its ultimate goal the welding of two great and sovereign nations into a single force to maintain peace," the left wing students of Japan--called "Zengakuren" by themselves, but more accurately described as "professional school boys"--vehemently opposed it. Directed "by forces outside Japan," the student rioters in Tokyo were "against a strong Japan" and "against an alliance between strong and free nations to remain strong and free."[26]

The subject of students mixing in politics was apparently a favorite of the Okinawa Morning Star; for the following month we find another editorial adverting to this topic. Students, "that somewhat nebulous category of unemployed," were prone, said the writer, "to take themselves more seriously than their position and ability" warranted. And this was particularly likely to occur "when the student is having his first go-round with theory which is devoid of practice." Furthermore, "The student who spends his precious student days quarreling with society is unworthy of the serious attention of his teachers. The teacher who spends the classroom day in promoting politics is shortchanging his charges and is using his position to pervert the younger generation."[27]

Almost three months went by before the Okinawa Morning Star was again moved--either by indignation or by paucity of other material for an editorial--to castigate the students of the Far East. In an apparent paraphrase of Alexander Pope, the editor declared that "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing and a little success by the possessors of a little knowledge can be doubly dangerous." As evidence of this there was the self-magnification that had followed the "freakish success" scored by the students in the Republic of Korea and the "professional Japanese black beetles of the Zengakuren student-hoodlum union." (The appelation of "black beetles" was a reference to the black military-type school uniforms worn by male students in both Japan and the Ryukyus from junior high school through university.) Youths who substituted clubs and slogans for learning were not students, declared the Morning Star. Rather, they were "public nuisances who justify their conduct by wearing student uniforms and riding on trains at half price."

Waxing savagely sarcastic, the writer concluded that even though Japan's mental institutions were known to be bursting at the seams with their too-numerous clientele, there surely must be room in one of them for the leaders of the "balding, professional students who infest the public prints and block traffic in the name of the Zengakuren."[28]

More grist for the editorial mills was not long in presenting itself. On the evening of 20 October, the Okinawa Socialist Party sponsored a memorial ceremony and rally protesting the assassination of Inejiro Asanuma, Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, by a Rightist Japanese youth fanatic, Otoya Yamaguchi, on October 12th. Although the OSP Secretary General, Kansai Miyara, who was serving as Chairman of the Executive

Committee for the occasion, announced in his speech that no demonstration parade would be held, owing to his party's neglect to procure the permit required by Civil Administration Ordinance No. 132, it quickly developed that he did not speak for all the organizations present. When it came the turn of Ryoko Koki, the president of the Ryukyu University Students' Association, to address the crowd of approximately 1,000, he asserted that a demonstration parade would be essential if the deceased Asanuma were to be properly honored.

Secretary-General Miyara and 23 other OSP members, carrying a large, black-draped picture of Asanuma, proceeded quietly from the rally site near the Naha bus terminal along the Kokusai Street sidewalk to their party headquarters in the Asato area (about a mile away). Most of the other participants in the rally had dispersed within a few minutes, but some 200 members of the Ryukyu University Students' Association, the Nakagami (Central Okinawa) Youth Council, and the OPP snake-danced out of the vacant lot and wove their reckless way down the middle of Kokusai Street, in utter disregard of repeated police warnings. When they reached the Asato intersection, the snake-dancers turned a block east to Himeyuri-Dori, a street running almost parallel to Kokusai Dori, and moved relentlessly toward the Chief Executive's mansion, always a favorite target for Leftist troublemakers. After a brief but vociferous demonstration there, the snake-dancers broke up around 2115 hours.

The Ryukyuan police had planned beforehand that they would not physically interfere with the demonstrators, in order to avoid creating any politically awkward incident; therefore, their efforts were confined for the most part to warning the demonstrators repeatedly over sedan-

mounted megaphones that their action was illegal.

After conducting a careful study of the demonstration (including extensive photographic coverage), the GRI police began to consider an investigation of 12 participants whose actions revealed them to have been ringleaders. Of the three Nakagami Youth Council members included in this select group, one was Akira Nakane, president of the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council (Gensuikyo), whose public career has already been sketched in the preceding history of this command in the chapter dealing with President Eisenhower's visit to Okinawa. Subsequent to that event he had been selected as the Left-wing Okinawa Socialist Party's candidate for the GRI Legislature from the 11th Electoral District, comprising Koza City and Chatan-Son. Whether he was aware of it or not, Nakane and his two fellows were destined to enjoy a special immunity from arrest until the elections of 13 November 1960 had taken place; for the police, at USCAR's behest, were most desirous to avoid the appearance of interfering in local political affairs.

The other nine ringleaders of the 20 October demonstration and illegal snake-dance were all students of the University of the Ryukyus. Here again, the violators of the law were placed beyond its supposedly impartial clutches--but in this case by the invisible barrier of Oriental attitude. In the Far East the university student was habitually regarded as a being superior to ordinary mortals, and university grounds were looked upon as sacrosanct areas to which police control did not extend, because of the unique privileges of "academic freedom." To bring the nine students to justice, then, presented a perplexing problem.

After much deep thinking on the subject, the police decided that

their strategy should pursue the following lines: First, they would make every effort to persuade the culprits to report voluntarily to the police station for questioning, and only as a last resort would they obtain arrest warrants. This business of voluntary surrender would also be approached in gradual steps. Initially, the police would negotiate through university officials and democratic organizations in issuing individual notifications to the offending students. If this failed, the second negotiation would be through fellow student representatives from neutral, conservative, and radical groups. Should this method also fail, the university authorities would contact the parents of the students and request their assistance in negotiations. Then, if all of these gentler methods of moral suasion failed--and only then--the police would obtain arrest warrants and serve them on the students through the procuracy of the university authorities, democratic organizations, and their parents. No arrests would be made by force at this stage.

Unhappily for the police, reports indicated that the notorious nine were remaining constantly in the "privileged sanctuary" of the university campus to avoid arrest. They were supported by a group of students reputedly numbering some 200, who it was said would do their utmost to prevent the police from taking them into custody.[29]

Eventually the remarkable patience of the police neared the point of exhaustion, and they were on the verge of serving the warrants for the arrest of the students which they had already obtained, when the latter voluntarily reported to the GRI Police District Station in Naha at 0900 hours on 28 October. Having been advised of their legal rights by the police, the nine accused elected to remain silent. As a result,

their cases were referred to the GRI Procurator's office for further study and determination of the course to be followed.[30]

On 11 November the Ryukyus University Students Association held a general meeting at which two courses of action were decided upon. Firstly, a mass rally and march would be conducted that same night. Secondly, the students previously involved in the violation of USCAR's ordinance concerning parades and demonstrations should appear at the GRI Procurator's office as requested, asking only that this action be delayed two days, to the 14th of November. The Procurator's office, doubtless happy at seeing any evidence of cooperation on their part, acquiesced in the students' proposal for a postponement, while the police, for their part, issued a permit for the requested parade.

Cloaked with the unfamiliar mantle of legality, the students proceeded to march down Kokusai Dori on the night of 11 November in snake-dance formation until they reached the Naha Police Station. Here they abruptly violated the "gentlemen's agreement" under which the local gendarmerie had been able to relax for once by engaging in sit-down tactics in protest against the previous police interference with their "innocent" violations of the law.

Such inactivity, however righteous, was alien to the very natures of the students--both as individuals and as members of a mob--with the result that within five minutes they were back on their feet and marching again.

Throughout the demonstration the police made a point of acting with extreme discretion, merely watching attentively to be sure that it remained within bounds. Then, in accordance with their promise, the

nine accused students appeared at the Procurator's office on 14 November for the pre-trial investigation.[31]

It has been said that "It is an ill wind which blows no man good." And, even though the GRI police derived little profit from the exuberant excesses of the university students, there was one person who was probably—albeit unaware of it himself—pleased to hear of their antics. This decidedly non-Leftist individual was the editorial writer for the Okinawa Morning Star. To churn out one or more editorials every day was always an onerous chore, and finding a topic of local interest for the latest "sermon" was even more difficult. Hence, it is not really surprising to see that worthy pouncing on his favorite whipping boy, the Ryukyus University student, with abandon, in the wake of the snake-dance parade of 11 November 1960.

The reader may recall that the Star writer had previously described the leaders of the Zengakuren as "balding, professional students." Apparently he was moved to such admiration at the felicity of this phrase that he felt compelled to give it immortality by repeating it—with some slight modification. In any event, he declared that the recent "political panty raids" were evidently inspired "by balding sophomores who are students in name only," while they were carried out "by zealous, if misdirected, school boys who view themselves somewhat more seriously than they are generally received by the rest of the world."

Moreover, it was his belief that these students, by their determined attempt to "make snake dancing a popular Ryukyuan pastime," had only succeeded in estranging themselves from the greater part of the populace—serious, hard-working people. At the same time that they were erecting

a wall of distrust and contempt between themselves and the bulk of the Ryukyuan populace, the "snake dance specialists" had also performed a distinct disservice to their own group "by confusing brass knuckles and political slogans with higher education."

Where the last editorial on the subject of student demonstrators had ended on a note of hope--the hope that room could be found in a Japanese mental institution for the Zengakuren leaders--this editorial adopted a humorous turn. Noting that when some new enterprises are launched, it is customary to cut a ribbon, while other new endeavors are symbolized by the breaking of a bottle of champagne, the editor suggested that "The next time the student snake dancers begin a new campaign, someone should crack a pot in honor of the occasion."[32]

Shortly afterward, the GRI Procurator's office reported that it planned to bring to trial three of the nine October 20th demonstration leaders--Ryoshu Koki, Kei Miyagi, and Joko Kuwae--as being the most flagrant violators of the law. The trials of the other six would be held in abeyance pending their good behavior.[33]

On 3 December the GRI Procurator's office mailed summonses to the Messrs. Koki, Miyagi, and Kuwae, directing them to appear in court on 17 December. All three were not diffident in letting it be noised abroad that they would disregard any summonses they might receive.*

Notwithstanding their brave protestations of defiance, however, the troublesome trio evidently harkened to wiser counsel; for we find them

*Under existing procedures, disregard of a court order would be followed by a personal visit by the court bailiff, who would order the accused to appear. Should the bailiff's order then be ignored, the court would normally refer the matter to the police for enforcement of the summons.

appearing in the Central Circuit Court on 17 December, accompanied by approximately 30 student supporters.

Besides these immediate members of their "Praetorian Guard" two additional groups of about 40 youths each, carrying placards inscribed with such ingenious slogans as "Death Rather Than Humiliation", "Overthrow the Appointed Puppet Political Power", "Demand Acquittal", "Crush Abuse of Police Power", and "Return Okinawa", marched from the campus to the GRI Judicial Building. Here they snake-danced through the GRI parking area and assembled in the immediate vicinity of the Judicial Building, where they demonstrated in support of the three self-dramatized martyrs. A light rain dampened the demonstration, and may or may not have been responsible for the participants' disbanding shortly before noon.

Koki, Kuwae, and Miyagi appeared without legal counsel, claiming that since the student body was on trial, a decision regarding counsel had yet to be made. Finding itself not precisely in accord with this point of view, the court instructed the defendants to secure counsel immediately. Then, after considerable argument with the students, who stood in no awe of the court at all, set the next trial date for 24 December. The accused sought to have their case postponed until mid-January 1961, but this appeal was rejected.[34]

On the morning of 24 December, three groups of students (30 to 40 per group) marched from the university campus to the GRI Judicial Building, again snake-dancing through the GRI parking lot, to provide moral support to their three fellows. The same placards and banners that had been used a week earlier were again in evidence. Entering the building, the student contingent jammed the courtroom and hallway in order to hear the

proceedings. The defendants, accompanied by a legal representative this time, were present for the scheduled opening of the court at 1100.

Asked whether they admitted or denied the charges against them, the intransigent three accused answered that "We admit to having conducted a demonstration," but contended that the right to demonstrate was "a basic human right, and we cannot accept the ordinance [No. 132] as a law, since it was unilaterally applied [by USCAR] irrespective of the will of the inhabitants. Since it is impossible to punish a person without basis of law, we request revocation of the suit."

The student group, swollen to some 150 strong by the arrival of individual youths, dispersed at 1200 hours, when the court adjourned for the day, announcing that the next session for the present defendants would take place on 28 January 1961. Since the students had previously sought to obtain a postponement to mid-January, this decision of the court actually amounted to a victory for their side. In a sense, though, the honorable court could also feel that this had been a successful day. After all, a one-hour work day is not to be sneezed at, and, at the same time, a potentially unpleasant decision had been postponed for more than a month![*] It would seem that the court functioned in accordance with the philosophy of Wilkins Micawber, hoping that "something would turn up" to solve the knotty case in the meantime.[35]

[*]This case was evidently either extremely complex, or the judges were most averse to face an unpleasant situation for a showdown; for, after a brief session on 28 January 1961, marked by even more pro-Communist placard displays on the part of the student supporters, the trial was continued to 4 February, then to 22 February. Finally, though, on 29 April, all three students were found guilty, and each was sentenced to pay a fine of $30.00. Even this penalty was suspended for one year, despite the well-known fact that Koki, Kuwae, and Miyagi had all demonstrated their impenitence by participating in new demonstrations against the government in the meanwhile.

The Okinawa Morning Star had its final word of the year on the subject of "Students?" in its issue of Christmas Day, remarking that during the past decade the youth of the world had undergone a rude awakening "comparable perhaps to the Countess Lucretia Borgia's discovering for the first time that various concoctions brewed in an appropriate manner produce a reaction incompatible to most digestive systems." On the streets of New York the young folk were now wont to keep physically fit by engaging in "their own junior Olympics that make Nero's spectaculars seem as tame as a Russian history of the Hungarian Revolution." In Korea and Japan, moreover, the youth of those countries had "discovered that rioting beats sports rallies for extra-curricular excitement and toppling governments is as good a way as any to compile data for independent studies in civics." And, to complete the pattern of modern college life, there could be no denying that "snake dancing has it all over the bunny hop when it comes to campus social life."

On the occasion of President Eisenhower's visit in June the majority of the island's citizens had come out to pay their respects to a world leader who had journeyed to their land to confer with their chief executive "as one head of state to another." When the "student hordes" sought to thrust their views upon the President, the Ryukyuans, as well as the Americans, were "revolted by the blatant lack of courtesy" displayed on what was meant to be an occasion of good will.

In the light of these actions and similar ones on occasions both previous and subsequent, the writer could not help feeling that "When one group forces its opinions on others in a way which infringes upon the rights of the majority, they should no longer be permitted to hide

behind the cloak of democracy."[36]

THE PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

From the foregoing it will be apparent to the reader that the aspect of President Eisenhower's visit which had made the most lasting, and unpleasant, impression on the people of Okinawa was the employment of Marines with fixed bayonets to hold back the Leftist demonstrators. Even many persons otherwise inclined to deprecate the radical elements' hostile welcome of the head of a great nation had declared that some provocation for their actions was offered by the introduction of these minatory forces.

More than a year later, Brian Casey, a "veteran political writer" for the Honolulu Advertiser, as that paper described him, who had spent several weeks on Okinawa in August 1961 gathering material for a series of stories on the Ryukyu Islands, was to write as follows concerning the Eisenhower visit to Okinawa:[37]

> The U.S. suffered another shock only last year. The occasion was President Eisenhower's brief stopover enroute to Korea--after anti-American riots forced cancellation of his Japan trip. Although the command assured Washington that Ike would be warmly welcomed by America's Oriental charges, his visit was a failure.
>
> Briefly, this is what happened: Left-wing agitators and pro-Communist students appealed to the populace to demonstrate against Ike. They promised there would be no violence.
>
> But military commanders, understandably concerned, took what turned out to be "overcautious" security measures. The parade route was changed. Troops were posted at six-foot intervals along the highway, their back to the motorcade.
>
> In Naha, the capital city, a Marine lieutenant colonel panicked at the sight of several hundred Okinawans snake-dancing on the lawn fronting the government buildings. He ordered his fatigue-clad men to draw their bayonets.
>
> This maneuver infuriated even pro-American Okinawans. The ranks of demonstrators swelled.

> The upshot was that the President of the nation that runs Okinawa, after chatting briefly with local leaders, was whisked off along an unpaved back road. The din of "Yankee, Go Home" still rang in his ears. He was white-faced and angry.

What Advertiser correspondent Casey did not realize--and could not be told--was that the actual circumstances had been far different from those which he described, evidently on the basis of conversations with persons who either did not know all the facts, or who had selfish reasons for distorting them.*

Under the provisions of Operations Plan COSMOS 1-60, which had been developed to cover the visit of President Eisenhower to Okinawa,[38] the USCAR Executive Officer, Colonel Eugene A. Salet, USA, was designated as Control Group Commander, as well as Chairman of the ad hoc Area Joint Committee created for the occasion. On 17 June 1960, two days before Mr. Eisenhower was scheduled to arrive, Colonel Salet presided over a meeting at USARYIS Headquarters, the purpose of which was to draw up final recommendations regarding security measures. Among those present were Lieutenant Colonel Lewis J. Kolb, the Commander of District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG), at Kadena AB, and Major Frederick L. King, Chief of the General Investigations Division for the same office.

During the course of this meeting, Major King advised Colonel Salet that earlier that same day (17 June) information had been obtained from a reliable confidential informant of the OSI that the Okinawa People's Party (OPP) planned a mass demonstration on the 19th directed against President Eisenhower personally.

Approximately 5,000 OPP members and sympathizers would mass in vacant

*Internal evidence points to two probable sources: Larry J. Krebs, Editor and Publisher of the magazine This Week on Okinawa, and Edward O. Freimuth, Chief of the USCAR Liaison Office.

lots on each side of Onaribashi Dori (Street) in Naha, near that avenue's junction with Highway #1, the larger number stationing themselves immediately adjacent to the Okinawa Times building. Both groups would take their stand near the curb, but would allow a thin line of innocent spectators to occupy the frontal position, thus screening their ultimate purpose.

When the Presidential motorcade turned left off Highway #1 onto Onaribashi Dori and approached the point at which the OPP stalwarts were waiting, the two groups would surge out into the street, closing the jaws of the trap on their intended prey. With the cars brought to a halt and the procession now helpless, they would overturn the car in which President Eisenhower and Chief Executive Seisaku Ota were riding--thus demonstrating that they could outdo the violent treatment which Zengakuren students and other Leftist elements had accorded Presidential Press Secretary Hagerty in Tokyo. Whether an attempt at assassination or bodily injury would follow the automobile overturning was something the OSI agent had not been able to report. In any event, the President of the United States would undoubtedly be bruised and shaken up, as well as subjected to humiliation before a people still quite conscious of the matter of "face".

Colonel Salet was also informed by the OSI representatives that rumors had been picked up that some Ryukyu University students might attempt to stage a demonstration in the GRI Plaza while President Eisenhower was inside the GRI Legislature Building or in Chief Executive Ota's office.

The next day, 18 June 1960, Lieutenant General Donald P. Booth, the

High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, called a meeting in his office to review security procedures. Among those present were Colonel Salet, Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Self, the G-2 for USARYIS/IX Corps, Captain Frederick M. Culley, of the same office, the Secret Service representative of the White House Detail, Major King of the OSI, and a representative of the 3d Marine Division.

Colonel Salet briefed General Booth on the over-all security measures which had been decided upon. The High Commissioner expressed satisfaction with the plans in general. Captain Culley of USARYIS G-2 then briefed General Booth to the effect that his office anticipated no demonstrations during the President's visit.

In view of the information to the contrary possessed by the Kadena OSI, Major King presented General Booth the details of the planned demonstration described above. General Booth--more realistic than his staff officers and, perhaps, having read Shakespeare's Julius Caesar--was willing to err, if necessary, on the side of over-caution. Consequently, he directed the representative of the 3d Marine Division to station Marines in the open areas immediately adjacent to the Okinawa Times building in sufficient numbers to stand within arms' length of one another and line both sides of Onaribashi Dori. In addition, contingents of combat-clad Marines with bayonets would be held in reserve in the USCAR Plaza.

This, then, was the actual background of "a Marine lieutenant colonel's panicking" to the extent that he "ordered his fatigue-clad men to draw their bayonets." Brian Casey's story reflected an ignorance of the background and the actual facts. And the latter reveal that it

was frustration which lay at the bottom of the Leftists' subsequent criticism of the employment of bayonet-equipped Marines. Lieutenant Colonel F. I. Fenton, Jr., far from being panic-stricken, simply acted on instructions from Colonel Salet, the official in charge of all arrangements for receiving the President, including those connected with his safety.

All the while that the hostile groups were shoving forward and milling about, incidentally, Kamejiro Senaga, the perennial Chairman of the Okinawa People's Party, occupied a strategic point of vantage in the immediate rear of one group of his cohorts, whence he employed a public address system to marshal his forces and manipulate the movements of his misled marionettes. Fortunately for Mr. Eisenhower and American prestige, however, he had no ready answer for cold steel.[39]

The entrapment of President Eisenhower and accompanying overturning of his car was, beyond any question, a foul enough conspiratorial deed; but worse yet had been hatched and nearly carried through to completion--though unbeknownst to U.S. security officials at the time.

During the course of a meeting of the Standing Committee of the OPP at Itoman-Cho on 10 July 1960, Kajun Shimabukuro, the party Secretary-General and a secret member of the Okinawa branch of the Japan Communist Party,* served up a tidbit of intelligence calculated to rouse the drowsiest

*Despite his long service and important place in the OPP--or perhaps because of it--Kajun Shimabukuro's public career had been marked by almost uninterrupted failure. A candidate for the post of Mayor of Naha in 1953, he had been defeated 13,403 to 5,979 by Jugo Toma, a man who had held the same job at two different times in the past, and whose father and brother had likewise served as mayors of the city--the former, Jushin Toma, having been, in fact, the very first Mayor of Naha City. Shimabukuro's opponent, Jugo Toma, was appointed Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Islands on 11 November 1956, as the result of the sudden death of the incumbent, Shuhei Higa; so it was really no disgrace for the former

attendant to startled attention. According to Shimabukuro, a group of pro-Communist students at the University of the Ryukyus, whom he did not identify, had constructed an explosive device in the university's chemical laboratory on 18 June, the day before the U.S. President was due to arrive on Okinawa. This device they planned to conceal in a place where it could be detonated at the precise moment Mr. Eisenhower passed close enough for the explosion to kill him.

That same day, however, the device was discovered by some anti-Communist students at the school. Learning the intended use of the infernal machine, these young men were horror stricken at the murderous plot and immediately destroyed the device.

The U.S. security agencies, as well as their Ryukyuan counterparts, presumably, knew nothing of the assassination plot at the time. It was, in fact, not until mid-July that it came to their notice when a confidential Ryukyuan contributor who had been present at the Itoman OPP meeting in which Shimabukuro told the story reported it to OSI agents.[40]

Although 313th Air Division OSI personnel were fairly well convinced of the accuracy of the assassination story, their unremitting efforts to learn the identity of the student conspirators in the months that followed

that he had been beaten so decisively by a politician of such familial and personal eminence. However, it was probably harder for him to rationalize his defeat by OSMP candidate Zenko Yamashiro in the 1958 race for the GRI legislative seat from the 17th Electoral District, since his conqueror on this occasion was pretty much a political nonentity. Although he did succeed in winning election to the Naha City Assembly in the contest of 4 August 1957, more adversity was in store for Shimabukuro. On 28 August 1960 the OPP, which he had served so long and faithfully, replaced him in his post of party Secretary-General with Sakae Senaha; then, in the GRI legislative election of 13 November 1960 he finished third in a four-way race in the 17th Electoral District which was won by OLDP candidate Choko Iraha.

were fruitless, as those anti-Communist students who probably knew were apparently intimidated into silence, the Communists who certainly knew had every reason for not talking, and none of the latter were indiscreet enough to give the information to any agents of the U.S. Forces who had succeeded in penetrating the OPP organization. Thus, a highly interesting story must be left unfinished--perhaps only for the time being, perhaps forever.[41]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	17	News Article, "Okinawa Demonstrations Discounted by Eisenhower", Okinawa Morning Star, 23 June 1960.
2	18	Editorial, "In Welcoming President Eisenhower", Ryukyu Shimpo, 20 June 1960.
3	19	Editorial, "How Did It Impress the Other Party?", Okinawa Times, 21 June 1960.
4	20	Commentary, "Magnanimity Desired", Kinko Mokuzetsu Column, Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 June 1960.
5	21	News Article, "Reactions in Tokyo to Petition Demonstration", Tokyo Bureau, Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 June 1960.
6	21	Ibid.
7	21	Ibid.
8	21	Ibid.
9	21	Ibid.
10	22	Letter to the Editor, "Demonstration for Petitioning for Reversion during Ike's Visit Was a Success", Okinawa Times, 24 June 1960.
11	23	News Article, "Criticism Mounting against Demonstrators", Ryukyu Shimpo, 20 June 1960.
12	24	Commentary, "Is President Eisenhower Our Enemy?", Kocho Column, Okinawa Times, 22 June 1960.
13	25	Letter to the Editor, "Road to Peace", Okinawa Times, 23 June 1960.
14	26	Letter to the Editor, "What Do They Mean by Saying 'Victory'?", Ryukyu Shimpo, 23 June 1960.
15	27	News Article, "Reaction to Ike's Statement and Chief Executive's Request", Okinawa Times (evening edition), 20 June 1960.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
16	27	Ibid.
17	27	Ibid.
18	27	Ibid.
19	27	Ibid.
20	28	News Article, "Ryukyuans View Ike's Visit", Okinawa Morning Star, 21 June 1960.
21	29	Editorial, "Threat to Academic Freedom", Okinawa Morning Star, 21 June 1960.
22	30	Editorial, "The Memory Lingers", Okinawa Morning Star, 21 June 1960.
23	31	News Article, "Reversion Council Reflects on Its Petition Demonstration", Okinawa Times, 22 June 1960.
24	32	News Article, "Reversion Council Protests Against Chief Executive", Ryukyu Shimpo, 23 June 1960.
25	33	News Article, "Chief Executive Ota Fears Unfavorable Effect of Demonstration on Various Aid Bills", Okinawa Times, 22 June 1960.
26	34	Editorial, "Agents of Ignorance", Okinawa Morning Star, 9 June 1960.
27	35	Editorial, "Ability Is There", Okinawa Morning Star, 23 July 1960.
28	36	Editorial, "Little Knowledge Is Dangerous", Okinawa Morning Star, 13 Oct. 1960.
29	--	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 172 (16-22 Oct. 1960), dtd. 26 Oct. 1960.
30	--	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 173 (23-29 Oct. 1960), dtd. 2 Nov. 1960.
31	--	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 175 (6-12 Nov. 1960), dtd. 16 Nov. 1960.
32	37	Editorial, "Political Panty Raids", Okinawa Morning Star, 14 Nov. 1960.
33	--	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 176 (13-19 Nov. 1960), dtd. 22 Nov. 1960.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
34	---	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 178 (27 Nov. - 3 Dec. 1960), dtd. 7 Dec. 1960; USCAR Weekly Summary No. 180 (11-17 Dec. 1960), dtd. 21 Dec. 1960.
	--	
35	--	USCAR Weekly Summary No. 181 (18-24 Dec. 1960), dtd. 28 Dec. 1960.
36	38	Editorial, "Students?", Okinawa Morning Star, 25 Dec. 1960.
—	39	News Article, "Students Rally, Boycott Classes", Okinawa Morning Star, 21 June 1960.
—	40	News Article, "Ike Presents Gold Pen Stand to Chief Executive", Ryukyu Shimpo, 21 June 1960.
—	41	Editorial, "It Could Happen Here", Okinawa Morning Star, 15 Feb. 1961.
37	--	First Article in Feature Series, "Inside Okinawa: Island Paradox", by Brian Casey, Honolulu Advertiser, 3 Sept. 1961.
38	41a	HICOM and CINCPACREP Ryukyus Operations Order COSMOS 1-60, dtd. 13 June 1960.
39	--	Conversations by Command Historian, 313th Air Div., with Major Frederick L. King, Dist. Off. #43, 6001st Special Investigations Sq., 18, 20 Oct. 1961.
40	—	OSI PACAF Quarterly Counter Intelligence Report, 43d Dist. Office of Special Investigations, Kadena AB, Okinawa, 1 July-30 Sept. 1960, dtd. 1 Oct. 1960, pp. 1-2.
41	—	Conversation by Comd. Historian with Major Frederick L. King, OSI, 18 Oct. 1961.

CHAPTER III

THE MATADOR-MACE GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM

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EARLY PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MATADOR MISSILES IN THE RYUKYUS

Secretary Wilson's "Clarification of Roles and Missions".

On 26 November 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson disseminated to the members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, as well as to interested Congressional committees and the press, a lengthy memorandum entitled "Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense." Fortunately, the content of this paper was of such immense concern to the various armed services and to the nation at large that its formidable title did not succeed in frightening potential readers away, as it could so easily have done.

Under the sub-heading "Air Defense", the memorandum announced that the Army would henceforth be assigned responsibility for "the development, procurement, and manning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense."* Missile systems already developed which would fall into this category were Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, and land-based Talos (as distinguished from ship-borne Talos). Thus, with one stroke of his pen, Secretary Wilson nullified the months of planning for a Talos air defense system in the Ryukyus on which this headquarters had been working

*Point defense was defined by the same memorandum as having for its purpose the defense of specified geographical areas, cities, and vital installations. A distinguishing feature of point defense missiles was their acquisition of guidance information from radars located near the launching sites.

since 1954. Henceforth, the Army could enjoy a free hand in deploying its cherished Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft batteries on Okinawa as it listed, instead of contending with the Air Force for locations favored by both.

The "Clarification" went on to say that the Army would be permitted to continue its current development of surface-to-surface missiles for close support of Army field operations, but such missiles must be designed and programmed for use against tactical targets within the zone of operations--an area defined as extending not more than 100 miles beyond the front lines. Since such missiles would normally be deployed within the combat zone extending back of the front lines some 100 miles, this would impose a range limitation of about 200 miles on the design criteria for such weapons. Any tactical support functions not encompassed within the foregoing limitations placed on the Army would automatically remain the responsibility of the Air Force.

Furthermore, the Air Force was to possess sole responsibility for operational employment of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). To emphasize this point, Secretary Wilson directed that the Army should not plan "at this time" for the operational employment of IRBM's or for any other missiles with ranges beyond 200 miles. At the same time, though, this restriction was not to be interpreted as prohibiting the Army "from making limited feasibility studies in this area." The previous assignment of the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) to the Air Force was left unchanged.

Although he had laid down these general guide lines for the future

development of the various missile systems, Wilson realized that insufficient evidence concerning the performance of the respective competing weapons was yet available for absolutely final decisions to be made in all cases. For this reason he noted that there were "a number of other matters relating to research and development of particular weapons that will affect the choice of weapons to be used for various missions in the armed services." Consequently, a careful technical review of the capabilities of the various weapons under development would have to precede any selection of one over another. This was especially true of such rival missile systems as the Army's Nike and the Air Force's Talos or the Army's Jupiter and the Air Force's Thor. In any event, the Defense Secretary wanted it understood that "This memorandum does not attempt to answer those questions which can only be decided after studies now in progress are completed, and should not be so interpreted."

In the meantime, however, the various competing weapons systems were to be continued with financial support from Fiscal Year 1957 funds, until the completion of the technical evaluations referred to earlier in the memorandum. Budget support for the land-based Talos, as required, would be provided by the Army in Fiscal Year 1958, while that for the land-based IRBM program would be the responsibility of the Air Force.[1]

Thus we see that the ill wind which tore Talos out of the parental arms of the Air Force and left it in the strange hands of the Army was beneficent, nevertheless, in that it gave the Air Force jurisdiction over land-based missiles having a range in excess of 200 miles. Included in this category were not only such important weapons as the Atlas and Titan

ICBM's and the Thor IRBM, which had belonged to the Air Force all the time, but also such medium-range missiles as the TM-61B Matador and the TM-76B Mace, which are our immediate concern in the pages that follow.

Characteristics and Purpose of the Matador Guided Missile.

Built by the Martin Aircraft Company, the TM-61B Matador guided missile was, in effect, a swept-wing, T-tailed, jet-propelled pilotless aircraft, 42.1 feet in length and having a wing span of 22.9 feet. Designed to operate in the sub-sonic speed region, it was launched from a mobile zero-length launch platform, the initial flight speed being imparted by a detachable rocket booster or RATO unit, whose thrust was 108,000 pounds. The Allison J-33-A-41 jet engine integral to the TM-61B possessed a thrust of 5,200 pounds. When the missile was equipped with the ATRAN guidance system, its gross launching weight was 15,342 pounds; and when fitted with the Inertial Guidance system, this rose to 15,460 pounds.

At high level fuel range, it could fly an impressive 1,110 nautical miles, but this performance figure dropped sharply to only 475 nautical miles at low level fuel range--and under actual wartime conditions low-level flight would most likely be employed. Contrariwise, the TM-61B's speed at the high altitude maximum of 41,000 feet was 517 knots; whereas the missile could attain 572 knots at the minimum low altitude of 750 feet. As a matter of history, it may be noted that the first successful flight of a TM-61 Matador missile had taken place in December 1950.

Although intended primarily for high or low-level bombing, the Matador could also be used for tactical reconnaissance, for training, as

a drone (by virtue of its built-in capability for being recovered), as a decoy, in development tests, or in saturation attacks.

Mention has already been made of two alternative systems of guidance with which the TM-61B might be fitted. ATRAN (Automatic Terrain Recognition and Navigation), a radar map-matching system developed by the Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, enabled the Matador to attain its maximum aerodynamic range at either high altitude, low altitude, or a combination of altitudes. This was also true of the Inertial Guidance System developed by the AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors Corporation. Unlimited numbers of missiles could be launched without saturating either guidance system, but the Inertial Guidance System possessed the advantage of being impervious to jamming, since it emitted no signals. This same characteristic obviously also made it more difficult to detect.

Thermonuclear warheads with design yields as high as two megatons might be used in the TM-61B; whereas the older TM-61A and TM-61C Matadors had carried only a conventional atomic warhead with a maximum yield of 120 kilotons. Even so, the necessity for warhead test equipment and testing had been minimized and storage restrictions alleviated, with the result that the TM-61B warhead was simpler to handle.

Defensive Considerations of the Matador Weapon.

Matador, unlike Talos or Nike, was an offensive weapon, but one which would almost certainly not be fired until the Communist enemy had fired first. This was so, whether military planners charged with their country's preservation liked it or not, because of the basic moral and ethical standards of the United States, and its deep regard for "world opinion".

Even though intelligence might indicate an attack to be imminent and, in fact, almost certain, one finds it difficult to picture U.S. military forces' taking the offensive and striking the first blow. For this reason it would make little difference how powerful a warhead the TM-61B could carry or at what speed, if the launching sites and their missiles were exterminated before the latter could be put into the air. The attainment of minimum vulnerability for TM-61B ground units, therefore, became one of the prime objectives of planners at all levels of command concerned with this weapon.

One means by which invulnerability to destruction could be produced was through mobility, giving the Matador units greater dispersal ability and thus hindering the enemy's efforts to pinpoint them as targets for his own weapons. However, before a determination could be made as to the extent to which mobility should be incorporated into the TM-61B units, it was first necessary to anticipate the type of attacks which might be encountered and the various methods which might be employed to reduce their effectiveness. In addition, it was necessary to consider the effects of mobility on other aspects of Matador operations.

The greatest damage to TM-61B units would result from nuclear (and thermonuclear) attacks, quite palpably. Since a single nuclear weapon delivered by the Matador was capable of causing tremendous damage, far in excess of the cost of its mission, it was only logical that any enemy would himself be willing to expend nuclear weapons in order to destroy these missiles before they could destroy him. This situation was so simple as to be platitudinous, but it did not alter the fact that any

projected TM-61B units would be prime nuclear targets for the Communists.

Even so, the possibility of attack by conventional weapons delivered either by hostile bombers or as warheads of surface-to-surface missiles could not be dismissed without some thought of counter-measures. If Matador batteries were dispersed into small units whose exact location was not known to the enemy, he might be unwilling to commit nuclear weapons in combined search-attack missions. Moreover, in most areas where the TM-61B might be employed, the Communists could be expected to have agents and sympathizers who would attempt sabotage or actual ground attack. In addition, commando type raids by paratroops were always a possibility--though not too likely.

While it would not assist any specific unit in weathering a given attack, dispersion would undeniably reduce the number of units which could be so destroyed. This, in turn, would force the enemy to direct more of his capability and, possibly, to expend more time in attacking the Matador weapons. These factors were especially significant in enabling the TM-61B units to survive the initial attacks, especially those featuring the element of surprise.

In the absence of data on enemy warheads, the best means of estimating the yields which might be used against Matador units was through study of our own weapons. The Tactical Air Command was considering the employment of weapons yielding up to 10 megatons in explosive force during the interim period in which it was contemplated that the TM-61B would constitute the main medium range weapon in the Air Force arsenal. However, the warhead for Matador was being designed for yields ranging from 40

kilotons to two megatons. On the basis of these data, the dispersal distances required to prevent less than a 15 per cent probability of destruction of more than one unit by a given bomb would range from about two to 15 miles, depending upon the weapon yield.

Dispersal distances, however, were determined not only by considerations of vulnerability but also by the necessity of controlling and supporting the units. A dispersion of 15 miles would not make control impossible, but it would make operations difficult for the smaller units. Therefore, since it appeared probable that larger yield weapons would be used only against large concentrations, reduced dispersion between smaller units seemed warranted in the interests of improved control, even though the possibility of additional risk resulted therefrom.

Still other factors influencing dispersion were those of cost and difficulty in land acquisition, both of which placed a definite limit on the number of TM-61B sites that could be provided in time of peace, notwithstanding the ineluctable importance of dispersion. In view of the enemy's air power, it was unlikely that the number of sites encompassed within this limit would be sufficient to absorb and outreach his total weapon delivery capability. Therefore, initial dispersion alone could not be relied upon to provide invulnerability.

Fortunately, there was another means of minimizing the damage which would be caused by a nuclear attack. This was "hardening". As with the other methods, though, there were complications which rendered hardening something less than an outright panacea for the problem of potential destruction by enemy weapons. The most obvious of these factors was the

necessity for bringing the missiles to the surface for firing. Data obtaining from tests of atomic weapons indicated that open revetments were of little value against special weapons, and, while underground or reinforced concrete structures could be effective in protecting the ground equipment, this still would not insure access to or usability of the launch areas. Moreover, the number of such sites would naturally be limited by their great cost, with the result that an enemy could concentrate his attack on these few targets. For this reason it was at first considered infeasible to harden a site suitable for TM-61B launch operations sufficiently to preclude its being destroyed or, at least, put out of action by a determined nuclear attack.

On the other hand, limited hardening might be employed to reduce the distance by which peacetime sites must be dispersed. Besides, atomic tests had shown that foxholes and simple bunkers could be effective in protecting personnel from anything except direct overhead blasts and radiation effects.

Theoretically, concealment would be another major factor in reducing vulnerability, since an enemy obviously would not attack a site of whose existence he was unaware. However, experience with TM-61A squadrons in Germany had shown that the Communists knew the precise location of all Matador sites there; and it would be fatuous indeed to imagine that the same thing was not true of any area in the world where TM-61B units might be deployed, since there would undoubtedly be sympathizers or agents wherever U.S. forces operated. For this reason, camouflage techniques at fixed peacetime sites would offer little real protection, although they could hinder enemy pilots in pinpointing their targets.

Operation Sagebrush had proved that if wartime sites were not the same as those utilized in peacetime, concealment in the form of either natural or man-made camouflage might be used to good advantage to hamper enemy detection of TM-61A units. Included under the term "natural camouflage" was the employment of such cover as trees, ravines, overhanging cliffs, and river beds; while man-made camouflage involved the use of buildings, nets to disguise or conceal equipment lines, and paints to enable missiles and equipment to blend with the terrain. Among the more spectacular of these (if that which produces invisibility can properly be termed "spectacular") were at least seven infra-red camouflage paints developed for use by the Polish Air Force. Although much thicker than ordinary paints, these could be applied with a brush, and they also accepted organic pigments. On the negative side, all were inflammable. Aerial test photographs of the objects covered with these paints did reveal at least some trace of the camouflaged article, in many cases, but that which was revealed was so slight that, for all practical purposes, it was felt the treated objects could be considered invisible.[2]

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of camouflage in concealing TM-61B operations would be limited by the launching characteristics of that weapon. The smoke and dust created by the RATO bottle could be seen for miles, and they lingered long enough to be readily spotted. It is true that this would not affect those missiles already launched, but it might easily enable the enemy to detect and attack the ground crews and the missiles still on hand, thus preventing further launchings. Engine run-up over some types of soil could also create dust clouds visible from the air.

Moreover, the position of a unit could eventually be determined by photo-reconnaissance--unless the camouflage was extremely good--or by ferret reconnaissance made possible by electronic radiation.

All of this makes it evident that concealment would generally be ineffective in reducing the vulnerability of fixed peacetime sites; but, if the units could move during wartime to new sites, concealment might reduce vulnerability significantly. However, under the conditions which would obtain for World War III, it was extremely unlikely that there would be any opportunity to shift launching sites once hostilities began, since nuclear bombs rather than a formal declaration would announce that a state of belligerency existed.

Mobility was necessary within TM-61B units to supplement the benefits to be obtained from dispersion and concealment. In the first place, it would permit a greater degree of dispersal than would normally be feasible during peacetime. In the second place, it permitted units to move from known sites and, periodically, redeploy to new ones, greatly hindering the enemy's ability to locate them, and thereby increasing the time he would require to launch a successful attack against the Matador launchers. Before a significant advantage from mobility could be realized, however, the time required to position in an area, perform necessary operations, and move to the new location would have to be minimized.

While vulnerability of the TM-61B to nuclear attack was of prime importance, its susceptibility to attack by air or ground forces using conventional weapons also had to be considered. In this connection it is important to note that the mere fact of the weapon system's being

mounted on wheels would not affect its vulnerability to non-nuclear attack, but the tactics by which this mobility potential might be employed would most certainly do so.

Mobility, concealment, and dispersion would all reduce the Matador's vulnerability to aerial attack by conventional weapons in the same way that they would affect a nuclear assault, but hardening measures could be utilized to greater advantage.

An effective method of defending TM-61B units against ground attacks or sabotage would be by means of base hardening and preparation of adequate defenses. Mobility would be of little use in reducing vulnerability to such attacks, while it would, on the other hand, introduce the possibility of ambush while the units were deploying to their new locations.

In summary, it appeared that protection against attack by conventional weapons did not require a high degree of mobility, while hardening measures would offer significant advantages. If only non-nuclear attacks had to be considered, further analysis would be necessary to determine whether hardness or mobility should receive the emphasis. Since the probability was all for a nuclear attack, however, mobility was of the essence. In these circumstances, then, hardening measures, consistent with the requirements for mobility, should be taken to reduce the vulnerability of TM-61B units to attack by conventional weapons.

If mobility were incorporated in the TM-61B units, it would affect the manner in which they were organized and operated, since mobilization of the missile elements obviously required increased motor transport personnel and equipment. Besides, tactics utilizing mobility might tend to

reduce team fire rates, system reliability, and ease of maintenance. In addition, the more the number of vehicles was increased, the more difficult rapid deployment would become. It should be noted, however, that mobility would not specifically affect the personnel or equipment directly required to maintain and operate the missiles and their accompanying units.

Thus it becomes apparent that certain penalties would have to be paid as the price of mobility, especially in view of the fact that one of the major objectives of the weapon system was to minimize the number of personnel needed to make it operate. By reason of these unavoidable penalties, it seemed that the degree of mobility within TM-61B units should be held to a minimum. However, considerations of vulnerability to nuclear attack dictated that mobility be incorporated in the Matador system. Therefore, in order to satisfy these conflicting requirements, only those elements of the missile organization directly connected with the firing effort needed to be mobile. Cargo packs must be provided to maintain the necessary logistic support for wartime and peacetime operations. All other elements should be made transportable, but no vehicles needed to be assigned specifically to move non-mobile equipment.

The main variables in any operational concept for the TM-61B weapon system were, accordingly, mobility and facilities--factors which were established by the necessity of attaining minimum vulnerability to attack from nuclear weapons and a desire to minimize personnel and equipment within the organization. These considerations dictated that the TM-61B operational concept be one of partial mobility. All elements directly involved in the firing effort or necessary for logistic support should be

mobile, while all others need only be transportable. Finally, the facility requirements must be consistent with the demands of mobility and considerations of peacetime morale.

The Question of Site Locations for Matador Units in the Ryukyus.

The original plans for deployment of Matador missiles to the Far East contemplated locating two squadrons in Japan--at Brady and Ashiya Air Bases--during the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1959. These places were selected because the missiles they were scheduled to receive would be equipped with the ATRAN guidance system described above, which relied on enroute terrain check points--something that would be unavailable if the units were situated in the Ryukyus.

Dissatisfied with the target potential for missiles sited at Ashiya and Brady Air Bases, as well as with the reliability of the ATRAN guidance system, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) requested Headquarters, USAF in March 1957 to defer the proposed movement of the 591st Tactical Missile Group to the Far East until it could be equipped with Inertial Guidance instead of ATRAN. By so doing, USAF would make it possible to deploy the group to a more desirable location, since the Inertial Guidance System would be completely independent of ground environment. Besides, it had become apparent by this time that the almost morbid antipathy felt by the Japanese for the establishment of nuclear bases or weapons on their soil would make it unwise, if not impossible, to bring these offensive missiles into their country. As amicably disposed as the Kishi Government was to the United States, the Prime Minister was well aware that it would be political suicide for him to permit Matador bases to be established in

Japan.

In anticipation of USAF approval of its request, FEAF directed Fifth Air Force to investigate the possibility of a new deployment location for the 591st Tactical Missile Group. Given this latitude for planning efforts, Fifth Air Force turned quite naturally to the Ryukyu Islands as the site for one missile squadron. Here the natives might object just as violently as the Japanese to the entry of nuclear weapons, but they could do nothing about it, since the islands were under the complete control of the United States, even though the latter recognized the "residual sovereignty" of Japan.[3]

On 20 March 1957, Major John L. Mulligan, Chief of Fifth Air Force's Programs Plans Branch, arrived on Okinawa to discuss siting of the TM-61B missiles scheduled for the Ryukyus--provided USAF did indeed give the consent it was expected to give--with interested officials of 313th Air Division's Plans and Programs and Installations sections. To furnish a yardstick by which areas not suitable for the purpose in mind might be eliminated beforehand, Major Mulligan informed local officials that approximately 100 acres of real estate would be needed, and about 500 personnel would be involved in the deployment.

Although Fifth Air Force had advised in advance of Major Mulligan's coming that special attention was to be given to three possible sites--Yontan, Bolo, and Naha--the Operations and Training Division prepared a list of 10 sites, with the idea of obtaining the Installations Division's comments on the suitability or availability of each.

First on the list was Yontan Auxiliary Air Field, and Installations

could find little that was good about this site. To begin with, it was frequently used for Air Force mobility exercises and as an emergency cargo aircraft strip. Secondly, it was programmed for use as a bomber staging area. And finally, as though these two obstacles were not enough, the entire area on both sides of the strip, with the exception of a clearance area for the runway, taxiway, and hardstands, was scheduled to be used as an antenna farm for the Air Force Security Service (AFSS). This last would consume 380 of the total 935 acres comprising Yontan AAF.

The second suggested site was Bolo Auxiliary Air Field, which seemed at first blush to be a natural location for the Matador units, since the airfield there had long been inactive and the acreage was ample. However, Installations noted that 90 acres in the extreme southern portion were to be used as an antenna farm by the Air Force Security Service, while the northern portion was currently being utilized as an air-to-ground gunnery and bombing range by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing.

The third location given consideration because of the extensive acreage it comprised was the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot (ASSD) area, but it was rejected out of hand because of its proximity to areas in which ammunition was stored.

Fourth on O&T's list was Motobu Auxiliary Air Field, which possessed the advantage of being more distantly removed from other military installations, yet being located on Okinawa proper, where supply by road was possible. The area leased by the 313th Air Division consisted of 627.48 acres, and, since the airstrip itself was fairly inactive, the Okinawans to whom the land had formerly belonged were allowed to farm all of it

except the paved portions and the area occupied by the 6333d Technical Training Squadron's Escape and Evasion School facilities. Marine aircraft equipped with JATO bottles were also using the runway itself in connection with the school, practicing the short field landings and take-offs that would be part and parcel of the actual rescue of personnel down in unfriendly regions of the Far East.

The fifth suggested site, Okino-Erabu Shima, already the location of an AC&W site, was rejected almost as quickly as it was received for consideration for the simple reason that it was under Japanese control. As one of the Amami Gunto, Okino-Erabu had been returned to Japan on 25 December 1953, which meant that the same restrictions which had prevented introduction of the missile squadrons into Japan proper would hold true here, as well.

The sixth place given consideration was Kume Jima, likewise an AC&W site, which had previously been selected as the location for a Talos battery; but Kume--unlike Okino-Erabu to the north--was in that part of the Ryukyus under United States jurisdiction. Kume seemed to offer a good location for a TM-61B unit, though the additional cost involved in site development and difficulties of supply would weigh against its ultimate selection.

Miyako Jima, another off-island AC&W site, was the seventh location suggested; and, being 190 miles southwest of Kadena Air Base, it possessed the advantage of being able to cover target areas of the Chinese mainland unattainable by missiles situated on Okinawa proper. However, the same disqualifying factors of greater costliness and difficulties of supply which militated against Kume Jima's selection also held true here, although

Miyako did have a sod runway at Hirara which would ease the latter problem somewhat.

Eighth to be nominated as a Matador site was Yuza Dake, in southern Okinawa. Here was an excellent site in the vicinity of the 623d AC&W Squadron's Air Defense Direction Center (ADDC) at P-56, marred only by the fact that any northerly firings would have to traverse the greater part of the island. Under ordinary circumstances this would not be a matter of great significance, but if a TM-61B taking off on a wartime sortie with nuclear warhead installed were to crash before clearing Okinawa, the effect would be just as dire as if the bomb had been manufactured in the Soviet Union.

The ninth site suggested for Matador was the Hedo Misaki area at the northern tip of Okinawa. Mr. Jerry Goodman, Operations Analyst in the Operations and Training Division, considered it to be the best of the 10 locations under study, because its peninsular situation would permit the RATO units to drop off into the ocean instead of falling on land, and its remoteness from all other military installations would prevent its being a target for the nuclear shots by which the Communists would announce that a state of war existed. Or, at least, a launch site there would not be bombed unless espionage or aerial reconnaissance similar to that conducted by the U.S.'s U-2 flights made its presence known to the enemy.

However, a misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Goodman was actually responsible for his regarding Hedo Misaki with greater favor than would have been the case had he not been operating under this misapprehension. Confusing the village of Hentona with Henoko (a small village just south

of the future location of Camp Schwab, in Kushi-Son, on the east coast of north-central Okinawa), he argued that "Present Marine construction at nearby Hentona (7 miles south near Okuma) will offer a supply base. Good roads will be constructed." Mr. Goodman was correct in his statement that Hentona was seven miles south of Hedo Misaki, but he was in error in believing that it was there that the Marines were going to see construction carried out. The "good roads" of which he spoke were to be laid into the Henoko area from the existing terminus of the paved portion of Highway #13 at Kochi-Katabaru, not into Hentona.

Once this error in identity and location had been pointed out to him, Mr. Goodman and the other 313th Air Division staff planners lost further interest in Hedo Misaki, because of the rough, narrow, tortuous, and extremely dangerous nature of Highway #1 as it threaded its way along the East China Sea from the end of the pavement at Nago to the northern promontory at Hedo.

The tenth and last site given consideration was the Koza Billeting Annex, only a stone's throw outside Gate #2 at Kadena Air Base, which was then being used as a BOQ area for Department of the Air Force Civilians (DAFC's), after long serving as the headquarters and personnel cantonment for the Vinnell-Wunderlich Joint Enterprise during that firm's construction of the major airfields on Okinawa a few years earlier. There were 41.4 acres under lease here, but plans for their release to the 3d Marine Division or to their Okinawan owners were in the formative stage, since the 313th Air Division had heretofore seen no great need for the annex. As Mr. Goodman saw it, the Koza Billeting Annex could be used as the

peacetime base for a skeletal Matador unit, which could disperse to additional prepared areas at Hedo Misaki and Yuza Dake in the event of hostilities.[4]

By coincidence, on the very day that Mr. Goodman was listing these 10 possible TM-61B missile sites, the Chief of Staff, USAF, notified 313th that the earlier offer of 500 acres at Yontan Auxiliary Air Field for use by Navy and Air Force cryptological facilities would not satisfy the total requirements. As a result, there was an apparent shortage of suitable off-base land for the location of antennas, although some such land might be available on the southern portion of Bolo Auxiliary Air Field. At the same time, he realized the necessity for continuing to use Bolo for FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service--a function of the Central Intelligence Agency) operations and as an air-to-ground bombing and gunnery range. Nevertheless, in view of the priority accorded the cryptologic requirements and the necessity of holding land acquisition on Okinawa to an absolute minimum, the Chief of Staff hoped that this headquarters could make a portion of Bolo AAF available for the Navy-Air Force cryptologic operations.[5]

On 29 March 1957 this headquarters informed the USAF Chief of Staff that the 6920th Security Wing (AFSS) had already requested 380 acres on Yontan AAF, 70 acres adjacent to Yontan at the abandoned GLOBECOM Sobe Transmitter Annex,* and 90 acres in the extreme southern portion of Bolo AAF to meet an Air Force Security Service requirement. It might be that the land in the southern area of Bolo requested in the recent USAF TWX

*Looking ahead a bit, we find that the Department of the Air Force transferred the Sobe Transmitter Annex, amounting to 71.96 acres, to the Department of the Navy on 12 April 1958.

for the joint use of the Navy and the Air Force was actually only a duplication of the request from the 6920th Security Wing, but the officials of this headquarters believed that the two requests were separate and unconnected with each other. If this interpretation were accurate, this headquarters was prepared to make approximately 140 acres of additional land at Bolo available by turning over all of the area lying south of 26° 24' 29" North Latitude, since such a step would not interfere with the current or programmed utilization of the Bolo Bombing and Gunnery Range. The Chief of Staff was advised, however, that an exploratory survey to determine the suitability of this area as a possible TM-61B Matador missile site had already been initiated.[6]

The implication contained in this message was that if further study of the subject revealed Bolo AAF to be the best location for the TM-61B system, the Air Force Chief of Staff would have to decide between the two competing operations as to their relative importance in the over-all scheme of things, then eliminate the less vital one from access to the area desired by both.

In an attempt at clarification of the muddled situation, FEAF radioed the USAF Chief of Staff on 4 April 1957, enumerating the various official actions already taken in connection with release of certain land parcels and setting forth 313th Air Division's own present and future needs. In the first of these, on 14 January of that year, USAF had approved the utilization of approximately 380 acres at Yontan AAF for the 6920th Security Wing (AFSS). Next, on 17 January, FEAF had advised USAF that the 6920th also needed the 71.96 acres of the Sobe Transmitter Site as an antenna field. In the opinion of FEAF these acquisitions should satisfy all

requirements of the 6920th Security Wing on Okinawa. The land at Yontan had been made available with this understanding, and no acreage had been either requested by or offered to the Naval Security Service. Nevertheless, FEAF was well aware of the priority customarily accorded cryptological requirements and would investigate the feasibility of providing additional land from the south end of the Bolo Air Field parcel. Before the Chief of Staff rendered a definite decision in favor of the Security Service, however, he ought to know that FEAF's purpose in retaining the 100 acres of land at Bolo was to maintain a scorable bombing and gunnery range for the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing. Therefore, any project contemplating the erection of antennas should not be permitted to deny the 18th the use of such a range or interfere with safety precautions in its operation. This was particularly true of low-level LABS bombing training for the newly-received F-100D aircraft.[7]

On 8 April 1957, Major John L. Mulligan, of Fifth Air Force's Programs Plans Branch, and Mr. Walter Gentile, a civilian engineer from that headquarters' Installations Office, arrived at 313th Air Division for a three-day investigation of potential TM-61B missile sites in the Ryukyus. The places inspected were Yonabaru Naval Air Facility, Yuza Dake Air Station, Bolo AAF, Yontan AAF, the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot area, the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, Motobu AAF, Ie Shima AAF, the Awase Transmitter Annex, Easley Range (an area of rolling hills covered with dense vegetation for the most part, included in the 3d Marine Division's Camp Hansen, west and south of Kin Village), and the Higashi-Onna Storage Annex (an Air Force ammunition storage area which had been abandoned, but the disposition of which was then up in the air). Although the two visitors

made no positive commitments, they let it be known that they looked with the greatest favor upon Bolo, Yonabaru, Motobu, and Ie Shima.[8]

Shortly after returning to Moriyama Air Station (the location of Fifth Air Force Headquarters at that time), Major Mulligan informed this headquarters--albeit informally--that USAF had given FEAF permission to delay programming of the TM-61B missile to this theater until the Inertial Guidance System could be incorporated into the weapon in place of the less satisfactory ATRAN device.[9]

On 17 April Major Mulligan recommended to Headquarters, FEAF that the 591st Tactical Missile Group be stationed in either Korea or Japan, as the targets which could be hit from those countries were preferable to those which the TM-61B was capable of attacking from the Ryukyus. However, he attached a big and very important "if" to his recommendation. This was that his proposal be adopted only <u>if</u> the current restrictions on bringing nuclear weapons into Japan and South Korea were lifted before 1 January 1960. Barring the removal of such restrictions--and the likelihood of such a complete about-face in policy on the part of the two nations in question appeared slight indeed--the most suitable deployment area would be the Ryukyus.

Such being the case, Major Mulligan became more specific and recommended that a group and three squadron headquarters with their associated administrative and support personnel be located on Kadena, and that permanent peacetime launch sites be established in the Bolo-Yontan complex, at Yonabaru (which was leased by the U.S. Navy), at Motobu, and at Ie Shima. Under this plan, the entire missile unit equipment would be permanently

deployed to the peacetime launch sites, where it would be kept in a ready status at all times. The proximity of Bolo-Yontan and Yonabaru to Kadena would enable off-duty personnel from these sites to live at the latter base. He further envisaged having Motobu and Ie Shima serve as peacetime field training areas, as well as launch sites, with elements of the group rotating on field duty. Finally, he requested that if FEAF concurred in his recommendations, Fifth Air Force be informed as to what action would be necessary to enable this deployment to be included in the appropriate financial programs.[10]

FEAF replied within a couple of days that Fifth Air Force's recommendations were being considered, and the latter headquarters would be advised of its decision as soon as possible.[11]

This headquarters had received an information copy of Major Mulligan's TWX sent FEAF on the 17th, but the staff officers in the Operations Directorate who were asked to offer informal comments on it for the benefit of the Chief of the Operations and Training Division were far less noncommittal than FEAF had been. Major John C. Baird's sarcastic observation was, "Interesting! Now we locate according to off-duty housing." Evidently finding little likelihood of locating Matador sites in Japan, he suggested that the "old 623d area at Yontan" be used for the squadron headquarters. (He probably meant Bishagawa, that being the area where the 623d AC&W Squadron had been situated before moving to Yuza Dake Air Station in 1956.) Before 313th plunged too far into the abstract selection of sites, however, Major Baird believed some specific data concerning the storage of the missiles, as well as many other details that were as yet obscure,

should be obtained.

Major James M. Jones, Jr., Chief of the Defense System Operations Branch, wondered if locating Matador weapons on Yontan Airfield would eliminate the Bolo Air-to-Ground Gunnery Range. Even more fundamentally, how, in view of the Navy's announced plans for expanding its operations on Okinawa, could the Air Force see its way to placing all of its defensive and offensive weapons on the one little island? "One strike and FEAF is incapacitated," he reminded. However, if the 591st Tactical Missile Group had to be established on Okinawa regardless of the danger involved in putting all of the eggs in one basket, he considered Yontan AAF to be the best location. Ie Shima could also be utilized, but it should be treated as a "remote area" and the tours of duty shortened accordingly, in view of its relative inaccessibility. Even so, the problem of support should be looked at long and hard before Ie Shima was selected, because of this same quality of remoteness.

The comment of Major Ralph D. Terpening, Chief of the Projects Branch, is interesting, as revealing an ability to look at things from the long-range view. Instead of offering his ideas about the best sites for TM-61B missiles, he asked, "Why wait till 1960 for the Matador to get an inertial guidance system? 'Snark' has it now and has better range." Oddly enough, the 5,000-mile range Snark (or B-62) had actually been the subject of almost equally intensive study in the Ryukyus back in 1953 and 1954, at which time Bolo Airfield had been selected as the best site for this sub-sonic speed weapon. Since it is doubtful that Major Terpening was aware of this, it is rather remarkable that he should now plump so enthusiastically for

Snark, when asked to discuss Matador.

When it came the turn of Mr. Jerry Goodman, the Operations Analyst, to offer his comments concerning Fifth Air Force's proposals, he observed that Fifth Air Force had left too much unsaid. Anyway, he was not in agreement with the basic concepts underlying Major Mulligan's plans. As Mr. Goodman saw it, there really were no such things as "peacetime" offensive missile launching sites maintained in a ready status at all times. In addition, ZEL (Zero Length Launch) strikes should be integrated with ballistic missiles, but he knew of no plans for such integration. And it seemed rather foolish to locate either ZEL or Matador sites near any housing areas, as suggested by Fifth Air Force, since all equipment and personnel would thereby probably be destroyed by the first hostile strike. For this reason, he favored locating both of these weapon systems away from other target areas, in order to preserve 313th's offensive capability.[12]

The problem of whether the cryptographic facility program of the Air Force Security Service or the TM-61B weapon system should be given the higher priority in the limited area of the Bolo-Yontan complex, or whether a compromise permitting the two to co-exist was possible, continued to vex planners in the theater. As a result of this indecision, FEAF wired the Air Force Chief of Staff on 24 April that further study of the compatibility of the two competing requirements was necessary before a determination could be made one way or the other.[13]

By May 2d FEAF had reached a decision, which it proceeded to enunciate in the form of a long message addressed to both USAF and Fifth Air Force.

Although the Fuchu headquarters (FEAF was located at Fuchu Air Station at that time) recognized the priority to which cryptologic services were ordinarily entitled, it felt that proper dispersal of the 591st Tactical Missile Group in the Ryukyus demanded that the TM-61B units be given precedence over the security service at any point where the two organizations came into collision. A preliminary survey had revealed that the Matador weapon system could be dispersed to the following locations in the Ryukyus: the administrative and support elements on Kadena; the main facility area at Bolo; launch areas at Bolo, Yontan, Motobu, Ie Shima, Yonabaru, and, possibly, Naha Air Base. The chief point of conflict, then, would be Bolo Auxiliary Air Field, where 90 acres in the extreme southern portion were already being made available to the 6920th Security Wing, and additional land was reportedly sought. Should this extra increment be handed over to the AFSS or the Naval Security Service, it would be difficult to adhere to the dispersal and distance criteria established by USAF for the deployment of missile facilities.

This matter of assigning the TM-61B system a higher priority than the cryptographic facilities in the Ryukyus was the more important in that each passing month made it increasingly unlikely that the Matador--or any other missile, for that matter--would be deployed to either Japan or South Korea. In several previous instances where FEAF had attempted to position TM-61C and TM-61B missile systems in Japan--at Chitose, Brady, and Hakata Air Bases--the cryptologic requirements had similarly rendered an optimum dispersal of the missile components impossible. Therefore, if FEAF was to deploy programmed USAF missile forces effectively for the

accomplishment of its wartime mission, it would have to give them a high dispersal priority, so that they could be installed in the most favorable areas available.

In the case of the contemplated employment of the 591st Tactical Missile Group in the Ryukyu Islands, Bolo would be utilized as the primary operational site, from which units and personnel would move to the launch areas at Yontan, Naha, Motobu, Yonabaru, and Ie Shima. For this reason, FEAF "urgently requested" that no further action be taken that would deny use of the remaining portions of these areas to the Matador units. Going further, the TWX recommended that additional real estate requirements for both Air Force and Navy cryptologic facilities in the Pacific area be "thoroughly evaluated" to insure that there would be no conflict with present and planned weapon systems.

In the second part of the message, addressed to Fifth Air Force only, FEAF asked that headquarters to take the necessary planning action for deployment of the 591st TMG to the Ryukyus. Now that USAF had approved FEAF's recommendation that its TM-61B missiles be equipped with the Inertial Guidance System, there would be a slippage in the deployment of Matadors to the third quarter of the Fiscal Year 1960. And along with Inertial Guidance would come other complications besides that of delay. The current system in its existing state of development permitted immediate post-launch corrections of only 75 degrees, although the Air Research and Development Command was having its contractor, the AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors Corporation, conduct studies to determine if it were feasible to modify the equipment so that a reciprocal launch

would be possible. Until such a feature was incorporated into the TM-61B, FEAF could not regard Yonabaru Airfield as a desirable missile launch site, since it was located on the east side of Okinawa, and a neighboring range of hills inland of the runway made westward launching too hazardous. If Yonabaru were to be used at all, the missiles would have to be launched directly away from their potential target in Red China and reversed in their course approximately 180 degrees shortly thereafter. As a substitute for Yonabaru, Fifth Air Force was requested to investigate the feasibility of using a portion of Naha Air Base.

Since AFSS cryptologic facilities would occupy all of the area 1,000 feet on either side of the Yontan runway, it would be impossible under existing restrictions to construct facilities or effect permanent deployment in the remaining areas. Hence, Fifth Air Force should plan to utilize Yontan only as an Emergency War Plan (EWP) launch and training area.[14]

In passing, it may be mentioned that five Air Force tactical missile groups were now employing the Matador, three of them assigned to the 1st Tactical Missile Wing in Europe. A sixth group, equipped with the TM-61C, was deployed to Taiwan in May 1957, making it the first Matador unit in the Far East.[15]

Fifth Air Force's Concept for Deployment of the 591st TMG in the Ryukyus.

By 14 May 1957, Fifth Air Force had acquired enough information concerning the TM-61B missile and the respective features of potential sites in the Ryukyus to prepare a formal concept for deployment of the 591st Tactical Missile Group within this command area.

The study began with the premise that the 591st Tactical Missile

Group was scheduled to arrive in the Ryukyus during the third quarter of FY-1960, equipped with TM-61B missiles fitted with the Inertial Guidance System. The ability of the unit to retaliate in the event of a surprise attack--and, by extension, the degree to which it could act as a deterrent to aggression--would depend in large part on how it was manned, equipped, and deployed. If it were to possess a capability for retaliation, the 591st would have to have at least a limited degree of invulnerability. This imponderable quality could presumably be acquired either through hardening or dispersal of vital elements of the group, or it might be effected by development of a mobility which would prevent the enemy from pin-pointing their location. However, Fifth Air Force recognized that each method of obtaining relative invulnerability had its limitations. To harden all of the elements of the group sufficiently to insure survival against a high yield weapon would be prohibitively expensive. As for complete mobility, both terrain difficulties and the excessive support required in terms of personnel and equipment would stand in its way. In peacetime, especially, dispersal would likewise be restricted by difficulties connected with land acquisition and support requirements. In time of war, of course, the necessary land could simply be moved into without a "by your leave", but conditions of modern warfare made it extremely unlikely that there would be time for such redeployment.

In view of these disabling factors, Fifth Air Force's concept proposed that dispersal be confined as far as possible to land already under lease, that mobility be extended to those elements of the 591st TMG requiring it and for which mobility was feasible by reason of the nature of the

surrounding terrain, and that hardening be applied to the storage areas for warheads and RATO bottles.

The 591st Tactical Missile Group was to be capable of sustained independent action and would be composed of the 29th Tactical Missile Squadron, the 591st Support Squadron, and the 591st Communications and Guidance Squadron. These three squadrons would be the lowest standard elements of the group for command and administrative purposes. The 29th TMS would comprise six tactical missile flights, each of which, with 20 TM-61B missiles in its arsenal, must be capable of limited independent action. Of the total 120 missiles assigned to the group, 60 were to be assembled and maintained in a ready configuration, while the other 60 would be stored either centrally or with the individual launch flights, as determined by the deployment location.

The basic purpose of the support squadron and the communications and guidance squadron was to support the tactical missile flights; hence, personnel from these two organizations were attached to each flight to provide the necessary degree of self-sufficiency when deployed to its dispersal area.

During peacetime the main effort of the 591st Tactical Missile Group was to be directed toward maintaining a high degree of readiness to insure minimum danger in the event of a surprise attack. In addition, training must be conducted to develop the requisite individual and unit proficiency. At the same time, however, since the peacetime period could be indefinite in duration, consideration must also be given to the comfort and welfare of the personnel. In line with this thinking, as many elements of the group as practicable should be located close to Kadena Air Base, where

recreation and morale facilities would be available. (This was precisely the type of logic which Major Baird had inveighed against in his comment for the Chief of 313th's Operations and Training Division--viz., locating missile elements with a view to their proximity to established bases rather than to their security from destruction. It was a case of putting the cart before the horse.)

As a means of multiplying the enemy effort which would be required to destroy the entire group, the tactical missile flights would operate from dispersed launch sites. Ideally, each flight should operate from its own launch site; however, the aforementioned difficulties of land acquisition and logistic support stood in the way of such an ideal dispersal of the six flights of the 29th Tactical Missile Squadron in time of peace. Of the areas programmed to be available during the period 1 January-31 March 1960, only Bolo, Motobu, and Ie Shima appeared to be suitable as launch sites, although the development of an Inertial Guidance System permitting adequate post-launch course corrections would make it possible to add Yonabaru to the list. If sufficiently radical post-launch corrections were not incorporated into the guidance system by 1 January 1960, though, Yonabaru would have to be stricken from further consideration, since missiles launched directly toward the Chinese mainland from that airfield would perforce pass directly over populated areas.

Naha Air Base might be a suitable site from which to launch a small number of missiles; but the density of the population at the base itself and in nearby Naha City would make it extremely difficult to comply with explosive safety distance criteria. In this connection, although these

safety distance tables for the explosives to be used with the TM-61B were not then available to Fifth Air Force planners, some of these latter individuals suspected that they might be so stringent as to present a problem at all of the deployment locations. This was all the more likely in view of the necessity for mounting warheads on at least a part of the missiles at all times, in the interests of maintaining the desired state of readiness.

Other military facilities, such as Camp Hansen, the Higashi-Onna Storage Annex (near Ishikawa City), and the 546th ASSD area (near Bishagawa Billeting Annex), were accessible from the proposed launch areas at Bolo and Yonabaru, and could possibly be used for peacetime mobility training exercises to provide additional dispersal.

The Bishagawa Billeting Annex, near Kadena Air Base, would accommodate the following functions: Headquarters, 591st Tactical Missile Group; Headquarters, 29th Tactical Missile Squadron; Headquarters, 591st Support Squadron; Headquarters, 591st Communications and Guidance Squadron; the fixed Combat Operations Center; central housing and messing for the entire group; the central motor pool area; medical facilities; and a training building.

Bolo Auxiliary Air Field would accommodate two tactical missile flights; a packaged missile storage area for 30 missiles; a storage area for 30 warheads and boosters; assembly; maintenance, and storage buildings; a contractor maintenance facility; temporary living quarters and food service facilities to accommodate personnel on alert status; and an Alternate Combat Operations Center.

Yonabaru Naval Air Facility would, if found suitable as the result

of hoped-for developments in the Inertial Guidance System for TM-61B missiles, accommodate one tactical missile flight; assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; and temporary quarters and food service facilities to accommodate personnel on alert status.

Motobu Auxiliary Air Field would accommodate one tactical missile flight; a packaged missile storage area for 10 missiles; a storage area for 10 warheads and boosters; assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; and living quarters, food service, and medical facilities for personnel on rotational duty.

Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Field would accommodate two tactical missile flights; a packaged missile storage area for 20 missiles; a storage area for 20 warheads and boosters; assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; and living quarters, food service, and medical facilities for personnel on rotational duty.

Mobility was required for only those tactical elements of the 591st TMG directly supporting the launch effort at Bolo--as well as at Yonabaru and Naha if they were found to offer suitable launch sites. The functions requiring mobility were assembly, checkout, launch, some support operations, and calibration and radio relay teams. At Motobu and Ie Shima, on the contrary, terrain restrictions dictated an essentially fixed concept, although it was proposed that trans-launchers rather than fixed launchers be employed, even at these sites. Besides these tactical elements, the alternate COC, which was to be situated at Bolo, as we have seen, should also be capable of deploying when required. The remainder of the group--comprising administrative and support personnel not integrated with the

tactical missile flights, for the most part--need possess only the mobility provided by normal vehicular support.

The status of alert which would have to be maintained to insure retaliatory capability was largely dependent on the amount of warning time that could be anticipated. Although the exact amount could not be predicted, of course, there was no gainsaying that, under conditions of tactical warning (detection by radar, for example, as opposed to foreknowledge through intelligence), there would not be sufficient time for the unit to attain launch readiness from a no-alert status. For this reason, at least one-third of all elements directly supporting launch operations would have to maintain an alert condition at all times. These alert flights were, further, to maintain their missiles at that stage in the count-down for firing which was as close to the actual launching condition as possible for sustained periods. Communications equipment at the primary and alternate COC's, the launching sites, and the radio relay stations must be manned on a 24-hours' basis to support launch operations. In addition, both the primary and alternate COC's should have alert personnel on duty. Finally, security personnel would have to be on duty constantly at all areas.

The launch sites at Bolo and Yonabaru were close enough to the Bishagawa Billeting Annex to allow personnel living there to commute to the launch sites. Motobu and Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Fields, on the other hand, were too remote to make it practicable for personnel operating those sites to commute on a daily basis. Therefore, it was planned that these two places should serve as field training sites, with tactical

missile and support personnel serving on a rotational basis between them and the home base. This arrangement would also serve to kill two birds with one stone, since two-thirds of the alert commitment could be fulfilled by these personnel.

Of the total 835 personnel required to man the 591st Tactical Missile Group, 114 would come under the heading of launch personnel--42 on launch teams, 24 on armament teams, and 48 on radio terminal teams. Another 120 would be checkout personnel--36 assigned to nose checkout, 30 to basic missile checkout, 30 to power plant checkout, and 24 to the armament team. Still another 48 would serve on assembly teams and 12 on calibration teams. A total of 157 men would serve in the Combat Operations Center and as Group Headquarters personnel--46 in group headquarters, 34 in the tactical missile squadron headquarters, 20 in the communications and guidance squadron headquarters, 22 in the support squadron headquarters, three in COC communications, 17 on the distribution center team, and 15 on the center terminal team.

The Alternate COC would employ 61 men--20 in group headquarters, two each in the headquarters of the tactical missile, communications and guidance, and support squadrons, three in COC communications, 17 on the distribution center team, and 15 on the center terminal team.

The largest group of all was composed of the support personnel--four on the survey teams, 10 in computations, 40 in transportation, 20 in medical work, 38 in personnel work (supply and others), 45 in food service, 44 in warhead maintenance and supply, 52 in communications maintenance and supply, 15 in vehicle maintenance and supply, and 55 in

security.

In addition to these organic personnel of the tactical missile group, the Fifth Air Force planners estimated that approximately 100 support spaces would be required to augment the support group at the nearest main base to provide additional motor vehicle maintenance and housekeeping support for the 591st TMG.

Finally, the required surface stability should be available at all of the launching sites proposed for the 591st Tactical Missile Group through the use of existing hardstands, taxiways, or ramps.[16]

Mr. Joseph K. McCollum of Martin Aircraft Corporation, who had come to the theater primarily to assist the new TM-61C group in Taiwan, paid this headquarters a visit on 29 May 1957 to brief local officials on preliminary planning for the TM-61B Matador group programmed for the Ryukyus. Personnel from the Operations, Communications, Installations, and Training sections attended a meeting called to take advantage of his presence, and much information was obtained which was expected to assist in the development of 313th's military construction program (MCP), as well as further evaluation of the Fifth Air Force concept for deployment of the 591st TMG to the Ryukyus. Mr. Jerry Goodman, Operations Analyst for this headquarters, and Mr. McCollum inspected Bishagawa, Bolo, Easley Range, Higashi-Onna, Yonabaru, and Naha Air Base. Collating their impressions, the two experts concluded that Yonabaru and Naha were both unsuitable, because of their location and susceptibility to attack; while Camp Hansen (Easley Range) and Bolo AAF were assessed as excellent locations. Respecting the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, they deemed that its proximity to Kadena AB made it

advisable to reconsider utilizing it as a headquarters area and to investigate the feasibility of substituting the more distant Higashi-Onna Storage Annex.[17]

On 10 June 1957 the Fiscal Year 1959 Military Construction Program, including projects for Kadena Air Base, M-Sites, and Naha Air Base, was hand-carried to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. After officials at Moriyama Air Station had reviewed it, they deleted certain projects and returned a portion of the program to this headquarters for revision through coordinated efforts between 313th and the two bases. The revised portion and those projects in support of SAC's EWP requirements were hand-carried to Headquarters, FEAF (Advanced) on 17 June. The final submission approved by FEAF included projects for the following amounts: Naha Air Base--$1,529,000; Kadena Air Base--$23,014,000; SAC facilities at Kadena--$13,654,000; and M-Sites--$10,500,000.[18]

At various points in the planning for TM-61B deployment to the Ryukyus, both the Koza and Bishagawa Billeting Annexes had been studied as possible locations for the group headquarters. Before anything definite could be decided upon, however, a new factor thrust itself into the kaleidoscopic picture. This was the impending transfer of large elements of the 3d Marine Division to Okinawa from Japan, and the consequent need to find areas, preferably already under military leasehold, on which they could be stationed. Under the circumstances, Koza and Bishagawa were natural choices for such employment, since they were either only partially occupied at the time or, even where occupied, were serving as billets for personnel of low priority who could easily be housed elsewhere.

As a result, this headquarters took steps in August to permit the Marines to occupy the Koza Billeting and Parking Annexes, even though official instructions to that effect had not been received from Fifth Air Force. A Permit to Use (ENG Form 1362a) the land areas was processed, and ENG Forms 290 were prepared to transfer title to the structures to the U.S. Marine Corps. Meantime, without waiting for Fifth Air Force to make its dilatory decision, the 3d Marine Division set about the business of restoring and rehabilitating essential buildings and facilities.

The Bishagawa Billeting Annex was, however, a gift horse of a different color. Although the Marines were given permission to occupy it jointly with the Air Force for the time being, it was made clear by 313th Air Division that they would have to evacuate the area on 1 July 1959 to permit Matador construction to commence. Here too, a Permit to Use was prepared to cover the use of specified land areas and the structures built upon them.[19]

Unwilling, it would seem, to give the impression of having no mind of its own, Fifth Air Force Headquarters waited until 22 August 1957 to inform the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) that it was "in complete agreement" with FEAF's message of 1 May which had expressed a need for the entire Bolo area, if the tactical missile unit were to be deployed with maximum effectiveness. If, however, in spite of the requirement expressed in that earlier message, the National Security Agency should still feel that approximately half of Bolo was essential to the Security Service function, Fifth suggested that certain

facts be presented to influence their views on the subject. To begin with, two tactical missile flights equipped with 40 TM-61B missiles were scheduled for deployment to Bolo AAF. Twenty of these, equipped with a WX-28 warhead, would be mounted on trans-launchers dispersed at Bolo and maintained in a ready configuration. The other 20, with their corresponding WX-28 warheads, would be maintained in storage at that airfield. Approximately 250 Air Force personnel and 150 motor vehicles would be required to operate and maintain these missiles, while maintenance support facilities for personnel and equipment would also have to be constructed on Bolo. In addition, a contractor maintenance facility for performing specialized maintenance on items peculiarly associated with the missile operation was also planned for Bolo.

In order to keep the missiles in a ready condition, the jet engines which powered the Matadors would have to undergo a daily run-up. Furthermore, since the majority of the personnel who would be working at Bolo were to be housed at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, it would be necessary for vehicular traffic to pass through the Security Forces' portion of the Bolo-Sobe-Yontan complex with considerable frequency. Not only was it "extremely doubtful" that the missiles could be dispersed sufficiently to comply with quantity safety distance criteria if only the northern portion of Bolo AAF were made available, but it was also suspected (there really should have been no doubt about it at all) that the Security Service operation "would not be associated with operating and maintaining the missiles." However, Fifth could not determine with certainty whether or not such operations were mutually

compatible, owing to its limited knowledge of the technical aspects of AFSS functioning. Under the circumstances, therefore, Fifth Air Force suggested that PACAF inform the National Security Agency of the missile operations planned for Bolo and request the latter to conduct an engineering evaluation of their compatibility with its own operations.[20]

Headquarters, USAF was not long in coming to the conclusion that the $10,500,000 lump sum "package" submitted for the M-Site project in 313th's Fiscal Year 1959 Military Construction Program was "unduly high" in cost. The upshot of this sentiment was a request by Fifth Air Force on 25 September 1957 that this headquarters furnish detailed justifications and a breakdown of costs of all items which had been included in the "package". In so doing, 313th was to assume that all of the sites would be the same ones listed in the previous operations plan, excepting that Camp Hansen would be substituted for Yonabaru Naval Air Facility. However, since no specific location at Camp Hansen had been selected as yet, this headquarters was to make a tentative site selection and use it as a basis for the preparation of its cost estimate.[21]

This headquarters replied on 2 October that in place of the single "package" under which the $10,500,000 figure had been arrived at, five separate, though related, projects would be prepared--one for each of the major M-Sites.[22]

On 7 October the revised Kadena M-Site project estimate was submitted to Fifth Air Force. By eliminating some of the troop housing spaces at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex and reducing the estimated cost of barricades around the missile storage areas, staff planners had found it possible to decrease the total estimated figure to $9,726,000.

As the new scheme of things contemplated it, the command center would be located in the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, with launch sites at Camp Hansen, Bolo, Motobu, and Ie Shima. The 591st Tactical Missile Group was programmed for deployment to Okinawa in the fourth quarter of FY-1959. Structural costs were based on the "Pricing Guide for Permanent USAF Construction in the Continental U.S.A.", February 1957, modified by use of a location factor of 1.25, where applicable. In those cases where line items were not listed in the Pricing Guide, Installations engineers fell back upon local experience costs. The barricades surrounding sensitive storage areas were estimated on the basis of rock and earth composition, with slopes and tops sodded, containing approximately 4.7 cubic yards per linear foot. The facilities which would be located in the Bishagawa Billeting Annex were taken from authorizations contained in the USAF Installations Facilities Requirements Manual, dated January 1956.[23]

On October 8th and 9th a four-man team from PACAF headed by Lieutenant Colonel Evan Y. Rodgers visited this command to discuss programming and siting of the 591st TMG. After making a ground and aerial reconnaissance of the proposed site areas at Bishagawa, Camp Hansen, Motobu, and Bolo, the team met with members of 313th's Installations, Plans, and Communications Sections to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each place at some length.[24]

The same day that the PACAF party took its departure, representatives of this headquarters attended a meeting of the Special CINCPACREP Logistics Sub-Committee to prepare recommendations relative to future

use of the Kadena/Higashi-Onna Storage Annex. All members present agreed that the annex should be transferred to the U.S. Navy as of 1 January 1958, but with joint occupancy to be continued until such time as the Air Force materiel could be removed. Since the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO) required approximately 45 days to process transfer documents, the sub-committee members further agreed that 313th Air Division should seek authority from higher headquarters to proceed with the transfer. In this wise was Higashi-Onna disposed of as a possible M-Site.[25]

Meantime, on 4 October, this headquarters had asked Fifth Air Force to clarify its previous messages concerning the 3d Marine Division's utilization of the Koza Billeting and Parking Annexes. It was the belief of 313th Air Division that the matter would be best handled if the two areas were transferred to the Marines outright, rather than loaned to them by the issuance of a Permit to Use, as had been done in August. Fifth Air Force was so agreeable to this suggestion that it recommended to CINCPACAF that the 313th proposal be adopted.[26]

On 22 October PACAF informed Fifth Air Force that a number of the items in 313th's M-Site submission of October 7th could not be reconciled with actual requirements or costs. For one thing, the airman's dining hall and officers' club were too large. For another, there was no need for an automotive maintenance shop. Only a 50' x 175' maintenance shed seemed necessary. Again, the cost of underground POL storage at Sites 3 and 4, calculated at $80 per barrel, was excessive--it should be closer to $10. Too, PACAF found an apparent discrepancy in the cited

estimate of $442,000 each for the guided missile propellant storage facilities at Sites 1 and 3 as compared with the distinctly lower figure of $297,000 each for the same facilities at Sites 2 and 4. Fifth Air Force was requested to explain and justify the differences in cost.[27]

Informed by Fifth Air Force of PACAF's feelings in the matter, this headquarters prepared still another revision of the FY-59 Military Construction Program project for the construction of Matador facilities at Bishagawa, Bolo, Motobu, Ie Shima, and Camp Hansen on 26 October 1957. The new estimates reduced the cost from $9,726,000 to $8,462,000, chiefly through whittling down the storage requirements for the missiles and their components. More specifically, the estimated cost of base mogas storage and base diesel storage line items was reduced from $80 per barrel to $12,50--a rather remarkable transformation; the airmen's dining hall was reduced in size from 13,440 to 10,584 square feet, on the basis of an authorization of 18 square feet for each of the 588 airman dormitory spaces provided; the service club was reduced from 10,500 to 7,000 SF to provide an authorized facility for 501 to 750 men; the cost of asphaltic concrete paving was reduced from an estimated $5.00 per square yard to $4.50; the guided missile propellant storage was eliminated from all launch site plans, as the result of its being incorporated in the guided missile components storage design; and the road sub-line item previously included under the guided missile launching vehicle item was removed from all launch sites and replaced by a separate line item which included all interior and exterior roads required to serve each site.

The components storage line items for all of the launch sites were revised as the result of a re-study of Fifth Air Force's "Concept for Deployment of the 591st Tactical Missile Group in the Ryukyus" and USAF's "Installations Concept for TM-61 (Matador) Weapon System." One change was the elimination of the requirement for components storage at Site 2 (Camp Hansen), except for that area included within the guided missile assembly facility.

On the other hand, this headquarters did not change the automotive maintenance shop to an automotive maintenance shed, as suggested by PACAF, experience on Okinawa having taught that maintenance sheds did not satisfactorily serve the purpose for which intended, particularly during the period from October through May. The existing automotive maintenance shed at Kadena Air Base had, in fact, proved "to be highly unsatisfactory for the performance of any maintenance function."

This latest 313th Air Division project estimate consciously refrained from considering any savings which might accrue from the possible use of existing paving at any of the sites--specifically, Bolo, Motobu, and Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Fields. Neither did it take into account personnel requirements in excess of a total missile group strength of 100 officers and 735 airmen. However, local planners regarded this estimate of $8,462,000 as the best possible until detailed site plans were developed, specific site locations within the general areas under consideration were established, and detailed studies by experienced missile technicians were performed.[28]

Early in December 1957, Lieutenant Colonel P. E. White, Chief of the Requirements and Programs Branch, Headquarters, PACAF Installations

Section, paid a visit to Okinawa. Among the more interesting morceaux he let drop was the information that a USAF ad hoc committee had decided that the estimated cost of the Kadena M-Site should not exceed $5,000.000. Colonel White suggested that the projects be reviewed carefully by this headquarters; then detailed site plans should be prepared, including the absolutely minimum type of construction to reduce the estimated cost.[29]

The last word of the year 1957 on the subject of the Matador program for Okinawa came on 26 December in the form of a message from PACAF which listed significant new program changes affecting 313th Air Division as gleaned from a program review conference recently held at Headquarters, USAF. One of these changes concerned the designation of the missile unit scheduled to deploy to the Ryukyus and the date of its arrival. In place of the 591st Tactical Missile Group hitherto slated for movement to Okinawa in the third quarter of the Fiscal Year 1960, this headquarters learned that it would now receive the 590th Tactical Missile Group, which would not arrive until the first quarter of the Fiscal Year 1962.[30]

When the 3d Marine Division received the Air Force Permit to Use for the Bishagawa Billeting Annex and discovered that it stipulated 90 days as the limit of tenancy, its officials quite naturally took exception to such an arrangement. After all, they planned to spend considerable money in rehabilitation and improvement projects, but had a distinct disinclination to do this sort of thing only in time to turn the area back to its Air Force landlord. Mr. Emanuel Allen, Chief of 313th Air Division's Real Estate Office, explained to the Marines that this was only a formality adopted to regularize their current occupancy until USAF got around to granting permission for Marine tenancy through 30

June 1959, the date on which Matador units were scheduled to move to Okinawa.[31]

On 17 February 1958, the 3d Marine Division signed the 90-day Permit to Use for the Koza Billeting Annex, the Koza Parking Annex, and a portion of the Bishagawa Billeting Annex. Shortly afterward, the 313th Air Division Real Estate Office submitted requests to USAF for long term revocable permits for Marine Corps use of these areas until 1 July 1959, by which time it was hoped the permanent Marine establishment near Henoko in Kushi-Son, Camp Schwab, would be ready for occupancy.[32]

To assist Fifth Air Force in determining the various facility requirements for the M-Sites on Okinawa, PACAF furnished a detailed list of functions which were to be accommodated at the various areas already selected for Matador. The Bishagawa Billeting Annex was to contain the 590th TMG Headquarters, the 19th Tactical Missile Squadron Headquarters, the 590th Support Squadron Headquarters, the 590th Communications and Guidance Squadron Headquarters, the central housing and messing for the entire group, the Primary Combat Operations Center, the central motor pool area, medical facilities, and training buildings.

Bolo AAF would be used by Detachment 1, which would have two tactical missile flights (20 missiles); launch and ready missile storage sites for 20 missiles; a storage area for two warheads and two boosters; missile assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; a contractor maintenance facility; temporary living quarters and a messing facility to accommodate personnel on alert status; and communications facilities.

Motobu AAF would be used by Detachment 2, which would have one

tactical missile flight (10 missiles); a launch and ready storage area for 10 missiles; a storage area for 10 warheads and 10 boosters; missile assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; living quarters, messing, and medical facilities for personnel on rotational duty; and communications facilities.

Ie Shima AAF would be used by Detachment 3, which would have one tactical missile flight (10 missiles); a launch and ready missile storage area for 10 missiles; a storage area for 10 warheads and 10 boosters; missile assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; communications facilities; and living quarters, food service, and medical facilities for personnel on rotational duty.

Camp Hansen would be used by Detachment 4, provided negotiations with the 3d Marine Division then in progress were successful in gaining permission to utilize a certain area of the former Easley Range. This detachment would have two tactical missile flights (20 missiles); a launch and ready missile storage area for 20 missiles; a storage area for 20 warheads and 20 boosters; missile assembly, maintenance, and storage buildings; austere living quarters and a messing facility to accommodate personnel on alert status; the Alternate Combat Operations Center; and communications facilities.[33]

On 11 January 1958 this headquarters learned from CINCPACAF that the proposed FY-1959 USAF Military Construction Program would allocate just $5,000,000 for the Kadena M-Site project. At the same time, officials at Kadena were informed that the estimated manpower strengths for the sites would be as follows: (1) the Bishagawa Billeting Annex: 49

officers and 302 airmen; (2) Bolo AAF: eight officers and 146 airmen; (3) Motobu AAF: five officers and 112 airmen; (4) Ie Shima AAF: five officers and 112 airmen; (5) Easley Range: eight officers and 147 airmen. Besides these, an additional 100 spaces might be required at Kadena for specialized and peculiar heavy support of the operation.[34]

Six days later, January 17th, the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO) completed its preparation of a cost estimate for the FY-59 Military Construction Program Kadena M-Site package project. The total figure arrived at by USAEDO was $5,782,000. On 27 January, however, Fifth Air Force directed 313th to submit AF Forms 161, 1417, and 1418 in support of the Army Engineers' cost estimate for the project. The resulting estimate produced a figure of $5,816,000--$34,000 more than that of the District Engineer. Still, as might be expected, the difference in total estimated costs was not the result of whim or faulty arithmetic.

The USAEDO estimate provided for the construction of two single headquarters squadron structures of 2,950 square feet at a cost of $46,000 each, and one double structure of 5,310 square feet. Since only three squadrons would be involved, the Army estimate was reduced by $46,000. On the debit side, whereas the USAEDO estimate had provided for 600 airman dormitory spaces, on the basis of 80 per cent of 735 airmen, 313th's engineers increased this item by $52,000 to provide for 640 spaces. This higher figure represented 80 per cent of the 819 spaces to which Fifth Air Force had previously referred. Again seeking savings in costs, this headquarters reduced the 20 BOQ spaces (based on 20 per cent

of 100 officers) to 15 (20 per cent of 75) and in so doing reduced the cost of this item by $15,000. This economy was more than counter-balanced, however, by 313th's increase in the size of the airman dining hall from 10,227 to 11,790 square feet, on the basis of 18 square feet per each of 655 airmen, instead of the 588 used by USAEDO in its calculations (80 per cent of the total strength).

Through an oversight, the Army estimate had provided for only one launch pad instead of the two required at the Kin-Easley Range launch site; therefore, this item was increased by $4,000 to provide for the additional pad. The remaining difference arose from 313th's use of the nearest $1,000 on the submission forms, while USAEDO had employed more exact figures.

The Installations Officer for this headquarters added that close study of the instructions given USAEDO and the resulting cost estimates revealed several items which would require further evaluation. One of these was the academic classroom for Bishagawa, whose 4,000 square feet appeared inordinately large, at the same time that air conditioning was not included. Although Fifth Air Force had previously indicated that both Motobu and Ie Shima would have personnel strengths of five officers and 112 airmen, USAEDO made no provision for housing or messing these people at the rotational sites. USAEDO had included an underground base communications system for the Kin-Easley Range launch site at a cost of $152,000, to provide for an Alternate COC. This appeared to be in contradiction of previous instructions that the Alternate COC should be of the mobile type not requiring any structural facilities. The District

Engineer had provided a contractor maintenance facility at both the Bolo and Kin-Easley Range launch sites at a cost of $60,000 each, despite previous instructions that only one such structure was to be constructed--at Bolo.

Finally, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Robertson, 313th Air Division Installations Officer, reminded PACAF that it would be impossible to determine firm cost estimates until certain "major requirements" had been fulfilled. To begin with, the Kin-Easley Range launch site must be firmly located within an area available to the Air Force. The USAEDO cost estimate was based on an area immediately east of the village of Onna, on the west coast of Okinawa. Secondly, definitive information on launch site structures was needed, since the information presently available was inadequate for the preparation of firm cost estimates. Thirdly, the exact siting of the various facilities at all launch sites was required, as was the master plan for the Bishagawa Billeting Annex. Lastly, 313th needed a firm determination of the facilities required at all sites. In view of these problems, Colonel Robertson suggested that the site location team from PACAF scheduled to arrive at Kadena on 13 February be prepared to discuss all problems in connection with siting and estimating the M-site project.[35]

Officials of the 313th Air Division had scarcely had time to realize that the 590th Tactical Missile Group was not going to begin arriving on Okinawa until July 1961 when they received new information that once more revised the Matador's Ryukyuan debut. On 4 February 1958 the Plans and Programs Division of the Operations Directorate received Change 2 to

Interim PACAF Program, Volume II. Foremost among the significant changes affecting this command was the advancement of the 590th TMG's departure from the ZI to July 1960, with phasing to continue through June 1962. The group headquarters would be located at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, with detachments activated at Bolo, Camp Hansen (Kin-Easley Range), Motobu, and Ie Shima during July 1960.[36]

On 19 February a 26-man party of representatives from the Martin Aircraft Company (the prime contractor for the TM-61B), Tactical Air Command, PACAF, and Headquarters, Fifth Air Force arrived from Korea to conduct an on-the-spot survey of planned and possible TM-61C, TM-76B, and IRBM installations.[37] The sites considered for the TM-76B Mace which the party visited included the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, the northern portion of the 546th Ammunition Supply Squadron, Depot area, the Higashi-Onna Ammunition Storage Area, Bolo Auxiliary Air Field, Camp Hansen, Motobu Auxiliary Air Field, Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Field, and Yonabaru Naval Air Facility (which was given only a cursory look). Representatives of 313th's Office of Installations and Operations Directorate accompanied the team during the tour, which included a visit to the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa at Camp Kue. Although no final conclusions were expressed by the team, its head, Lieutenant Colonel W. Potter, of Headquarters, PACAF, announced that a meeting would be held at Fifth Air Force on 24 February to put the operational concept for both Okinawa and Korea into final form.[38]

A few days before the team's visit, PACAF had informed this headquarters that as the result of an initial review of the FY-59 Military

Construction Program at USAF, eight items remained in the program for this command. Of these the largest was $5,000,000 for Kadena M-Sites, for which this headquarters had submitted a revised cost estimate of $5,782,000 to PACAF.[39]

On 18 March 1958, PACAF radioed CINCPAC that it had "a firm requirement" for Yonabaru Naval Air Facility as a peacetime launch site for the 590th Tactical Missile Group. In addition, it had a tentative requirement for a portion of "Katchin Area B" (a Navy-leased area not far from the tip of the Katsuren Peninsula on Okinawa's east coast) for another special classified project. For these reasons, therefore, CINCPACAF requested that the Navy withhold release and disposition of these two areas until notified more definitely as to the Air Force's need or absence of need for them.[40]

THE TM-76B MACE REPLACES THE TM-61B MATADOR IN MISSILE PLANNING

PACAF Prepares Preliminary Operational Plan Number 112-58.

A message received from PACAF on 19 March 1958 notified this headquarters that its Preliminary Operational Plan No. 112-58 (to be published shortly) would establish a requirement for 60 TM-76B's for the 590th TMG rather than the 120 presently shown in the programming documents. The TWX added the confusing information that the 590th TMG was currently programmed to arrive on Okinawa in the second quarter of FY-1962 (Change 2 to Interim PACAF Program, Volume 2, had stated that deployment would begin in July 1960), but that PACAF was attempting to move the date up to the fourth quarter of FY-1960.[41]

As is indicated by this development, USAF Headquarters had definitely

decided by this time that the considerably superior TM-76B Mace guided missile should be sent to the Ryukyus in place of the TM-61B Matador. This decision having been made, the next step was for the responsible agency to prepare a preliminary operational plan which could serve as a guide in the development of USAF ground facilities to be used in support of the new weapon system. This plan we shall take up after first pausing to give a brief description of the TM-76B as to appearance and characteristics.

The TM-76B was a medium range, surface-to-surface, cruise-type guided missile designed for day, night, and all-weather operation by units of the Tactical Air Force. In physical appearance it was a swept-wing, T-tail, single turbojet engine monoplane. Composed of two main "packages"--an ellipsoidal nose section and the basic missile engine airframe--the TM-76B was further broken down into various sub-sections. In the nose section were the Inertial Guidance system, flight controls, and provisions for cooling, both on the ground and in flight, as well as a warhead section, just aft of the guidance section, capable of carrying a 1,670-pound nuclear weapon. This W-28 weapon--which could contain yields of 10 kilotons (KT), 60KT, 350 to 500 KT, or 1.1 megatons--was designed for detonation from either a low or a high altitude mission profile. In the low altitude mission the warhead was detonated by the "safeing and arming system" on a zero range-to-go signal from the guidance system. The climb or descent to the required detonation point was determined by an altitude and range program pre-set into the altitude programmer. However, PACAF was not entirely satisfied with this arrangement and planned to establish a requirement for a contact burst capability

in the low altitude profile.

In the case of a high altitude mission, the warhead was detonated by a barometric altitude fuzing system whenever an air burst was desired, or by an impact fuzing system whenever a ground burst was the objective. But the type of detonation had to be selected before the missile was launched. The impact fuze would detonate the warhead in the event of the failure of the barometric fuze. Should the Mace deviate excessively from its programmed guidance path, an independent heading sensing system, using a flux-value, would sense this aberration and actuate a guidance-lost circuit which would prevent the warhead from arming.[42]

The center fuselage section of the missile airframe provided for mounting the wings in a shoulder position. It contained fuel cells, an engine air intake duct on the underside, and portions of the control system for the Mace. The fuel, electrical, and hydraulic system components were contained in this section.

The aft fuselage section, which provided for mounting the empennage group, housed the J-33-A-41 turbojet engine, including provisions for a rocket booster and a launcher support featuring a shear pin designed to fail under rocket thrust. The Mace had a capacity of 1,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel with a weight of 6,643 pounds.

The TM-76B was equipped with folding wings attached to the center fuselage section, as we have seen, which split at the center line and folded to the side of the fuselage for transport, and unfolded and rotated into a locked position for flight. Transportation and assembling of the wing structure were performed by use of a special frame installed

on the translauncher. Finger type spoilers were built into each wing to provide roll and directional control of the missile.

The T-tail fin and stabilizer making up the empennage were mounted on top of the aft fuselage section. The movable, hydraulically-actuated stabilizer maintained the desired missile pitch attitude in response to the pitch control and airspeed system signals.

The primary propulsive force for the zero length launch (ZEL) was provided by a solid propellant rocket, approximately 11 feet long by two feet in diameter. Weighing approximately 2,950 pounds, this booster rocket developed a maximum thrust of approximately 108,000 pounds at 77° F. The rocket bottle was ejected from the missile when its propulsive force had been expended.

The over-all length of the Mace, including nose probe, was 50.5 feet, and its wing span was 22.9 feet. The total launch weight came to 18,556 pounds, including 15,534 pounds for the missile only, 6,586 pounds of fuel, 3,022 pounds for the booster assembly, 1,670 (plus or minus 50 pounds) pounds for the warhead, and 1,164 pounds for the guidance system.

At low altitude the maximum range of the TM-76B was 600 nautical miles, and at high altitude this increased to 1,200 NM; while the maximum speed at low altitude was .80 mach, as compared with .89 mach at high altitude. The J33-A-41 engine possessed a thrust of 5,200 pounds, and the missile had a fuel capacity of 1,020 gallons.

Several environmental factors could affect missile launches. The maximum headwind with which the Mace could contend successfully was 50 miles-per-hour, and the maximum tail or sidewind was 25 m.p.h. On

Okinawa, where high winds were not at all uncommon during the summer and autumn months, this could be a serious weakness. On the other hand, the limiting temperatures of 50° below zero to 103° above, at sea level, were only academic considerations insofar as the 590th TMG was concerned, since the thermometer never registered readings below 40° F. or above 92° F. in the Ryukyus. In the same way, the fact that the Mace could be launched at altitudes as high as 5,000 feet interested PACAF planners very little, since the highest point on Okinawa was 1,650-foot Yonaha Dake--and no one had the slightest notion of locating a launch site there.

In employing Inertial Guidance, the missile flight would need to know the position of the launch site to within approximately one second of latitude and longitude, and an azimuth reference must be provided to an accuracy of two seconds of arc. Certain data would be needed by the missile system prior to launch, these being obtained by computations made from the geodetic latitude and longitude of the launch and target points together with a determination of the flight profile.

The Inertial Guidance System could be expected to withstand, without deterioration, a storage period of two years, provided a regular inspection was made at six-month intervals. The gyros of the guidance system could be kept running 24 hours a day for seven days, after which the unit must be recycled. With the gyro heaters kept hot continuously from factory assembly, the reference platform should not drift more than .006°/hr during a flight. The guidance accuracy had been determined to be 4,000 feet for two hours of flight to a range of 1,200 nautical miles, and 3,000 feet for 90 minutes of flight to a range of 700 NM.[43]

Since the area in which the TM-76B missile group would operate came under PACAF's jurisdiction, that headquarters drew up Preliminary Operational Plan No. 112-58 on 21 March 1958 for the purpose of of stating, in specific terms, just what would be where.

According to this plan, the support base would be located at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex and would require permanent facilities for the tactical missile group headquarters, the tactical missile squadron headquarters, the support squadron headquarters, and the communications squadron headquarters. Besides these, primary Missile Operations Center facilities and troop housing and messing for the entire group would be needed. In addition, there was a requirement for a central motor pool where field maintenance of special purpose and general purpose vehicles and ground support equipment could be carried out. The motor pool area would be used for vehicular parking, for minor repairs, maintenance, and adjustments to the vehicles assigned to the squadron. It should consist of a paved area 400' x 500' in size, capable of supporting a 15,000-pound axle load, and should include a 20' x 30' administrative building with a five-kilowatt power supply. A 15' x 50' room should be provided at one end of the maintenance shed for maintenance of the multi-purpose power packs. An MM-1 operator and maintenance simulator would be required for the retraining of personnel assigned to these functions. In addition, an operator driving range should be established to provide a facility for the continuous training of the MM-1 operators. Should the existing terrain meet driving range criteria, of course, it would be unnecessary to construct an additional facility for this purpose.

A 52' x 120' typhoon-resistant structure should be provided for missile field maintenance activities, housing test equipment, bench sets, and the like. Another 52' x 120' supply warehouse should be erected for the storage of authorized stock levels of base supplies and equipment. A third 52' x 120' typhoon-resistant structure should be provided for use as a contractor maintenance facility. A base dispensary 4,012 square feet in size should likewise be constructed.[44]

By now PACAF had modified its thinking about the launch sites which were to be established in the Ryukyus. In place of the four sites hitherto contemplated, the Hickam headquarters now felt that three dispersal points should be sufficient, in view of the additional expenses entailed by every additional site. Retained under this new concept were Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields, while the formerly favored sites at Camp Hansen and Ie Shima AAF were abandoned in favor of Yonabaru NAF.[45]

PACAF could indeed substitute Yonabaru for Camp Hansen and Ie Shima, or make any other changes it chose. But this headquarters did not perforce have to give its benediction to the arrangement. In a personal message of 9 April 1958, Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, the 313th Air Division Commander, wrote his superior at Fifth Air Force, Lieutenant General Frederic C. Smith, Jr., that he believed this would be "unwise tactically", since the missiles based at Yonabaru would be fired over Kadena and other major military installations. Besides, on the basis of his familiarity with inter-service chicanery, he strongly suspected that the Navy was "anxious to unload Yonabaru, in order to permit justification for taking over Naha Air Base." The same cynicism impelled General Smith (of the 313th Air Division) to suggest that "USAF should take a hard look at

this before we get sucked in."[46]

Six days later, on 15 April, Lieutenant General Smith replied that "I share your views concerning suitability of Yonabaru as a deployment site for the 590th TMG." In lieu thereof, moreover, he was recommending to PACAF that very same day that the current siting plans be revised so as to incorporate a hardened site concept featuring Bolo and Yontan Auxiliary Air Fields.[47]

PACAF Preliminary OPLAN No. 112-58 envisaged the operational facilities at Bolo, Motobu, and Yonabaru being identical, for the most part. All structures at these dispersal sites were to be of typhoon-resistant construction, and any combat element should be capable of moving to a new location on short notice. The launch and ready missile sites should each be capable of handling 20 missiles, the pads being 100' x 100', located approximately 300 feet apart, and constructed of Portland cement concrete capable of supporting a 15,000-pound axle loading. Missile tie-down rings should be provided 20 feet apart, but any existing airfield pavements which were found to meet the loading and distance criteria should be utilized wherever possible. The perimeter of each pad was to be revetted with a standard barricade. A 30' x 80' alert building for personnel, administration, and communications, containing dormitory facilities, a day room, a washroom, and a communications room, should be provided. In addition, there should be a parking area whose entire perimeter would be inclosed with seven-foot-high security fencing.

Each launching site should also contain a 1,000' x 2,000' tactical storage area for warhead components, RATO bottles, and igniters. The two warhead storage buildings would be standard 60' ammunition storage igloos,

each capable of housing 10 warhead sections. The RATO storage building would be a standard 20' ammunition storage igloo, while the igniter storage building would be a 10' x 10' reinforced concrete block structure with a reinforced concrete roof and floor slab for the storage of 20 igniters. The connecting roads and parking areas were to be paved with a surface capable of supporting 15,000-pound axle loadings.

Adequate approach lighting was to be provided, and the surrounding terrain should be cleared of underbrush for at least 150 feet from the fence to permit the approach lanes to be checked visually. In addition, guard towers should be provided wherever possible.

A third facility which was to be common to all of the launch sites was a missile assembly and maintenance area, comprising a Portland cement concrete pavement 210' x 520' in size, capable of supporting a 15,000-pound axle load, together with a missile maintenance building, a nose section storage building, and an engine run-up shed. The missile assembly area should be located at least 500 feet from the nearest launch pad and be enclosed with the usual seven-foot security fencing. The missile maintenance building was to be a 52' x 120' reinforced-concrete block structure 26 feet in height, with a reinforced-concrete slab roof where the missile assembly operations--except for those connected with the nose cone section--would be performed. Besides the main building, there would be two small buildings adjoining--10' x 20' each--which would be used to store replaceable assemblies (known in professional circles as "black boxes") and for administrative purposes.

The nose section storage building would be a 36' x 60' structure

of reinforced concrete block with a reinforced concrete slab roof in which 20 nose sections could be stored for protection of the guidance systems during typhoons. This building would have overhead lighting and humidity control, a minimum power requirement of 20 KW, with 100 per cent emergency back-up power.

The engine run-up shed should be 20' x 40' in size, constructed of reinforced-concrete block with a reinforced-concrete slab roof, and was to be used for sheltering missile testing of the engine prior to launching or delivery to the ready missile pads.

Power was to be supplied by commercial means wherever possible and economical. In those cases where it was necessary to employ portable motor generators, a simple typhoon-resistant structure should be provided.

Water should be piped into the warhead assembly building in the warhead and booster storage area, the missile assembly buildings, the administrative buildings in the motor pool, and the alert buildings located in the launching area. The water supply should be based on an average quantity of 30 gallons per person per day for 100 persons in the assembly buildings and the administrative building in the motor pool area, and 50 persons in the warhead assembly and alert buildings. The water would be distributed by means of small pumping units of approximately 1/4 HP capacity, with pressure maintained through use of a pressure tank.

Buildings such as those used for assembly purposes need not be heated to more than 60° F., while the administrative and alert buildings should be heated to approximately 70° F., the heat being provided by

oil-fired hot air units with approximately 100 gallons' oil storage, located in above-ground tanks adjacent to the structure. Mechanical ventilation would be necessary.

Minimum temporary type troop housing and messing facilities and dispensary type medical facilities would be needed to accommodate personnel on alert or rotational duty at each dispersal site. The requirements for Bolo and Yonabaru should be based on one-third strength, since the operational plan called for one-third of the group's combat capability to be on alert status at all times. Because of the time and distance factor and the limited availability of transportation between Motobu and Bishagawa, requirements for temporary troop housing and messing facilities at the former must be based on full personnel strength. All facilities were to be typhoon-proof.

Base communications facilities would be required at each dispersal site, as would a 10' x 10' launch control officers' shed for each launch team at the various sites.[48]

The Question of Hardening M-Sites Comes to the Fore.

On 8 January 1958 General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, Tactical Air Command, General Laurence S. Kuter, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, and General Frank F. Everest, Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces, Europe, had recommended to General Thomas D. White, the Air Force Chief of Staff, that both manned and unmanned installations of the tactical air forces be hardened to at least 50 pounds per square inch (psi). General Curtis E. LeMay, the USAF Vice Chief of Staff, replied on 14 February that

though the desirability of hardening TAC facilities was unquestioned, priorities and inadequacies of funds prevented approval of so costly and time-consuming a project at that time. Next, on 31 March, USAF informed PACAF that the latter should prepare and submit operational plans for employment of the TM-76B system from sites which were both dispersed and hardened. Further, PACAF was directed to have a detailed document ready in the event priorities and funds became more favorable for this theater.

Since PACAF's Preliminary OPLAN No. 112-58 for the TM-76B weapon system on Okinawa had not incorporated the concept of hardening, that headquarters recognized that the plan would have to be rewritten in consonance with USAF's request. Meanwhile, Fifth Air Force could proceed with tentative planning for hardening the Okinawan M-Sites along the lines previously recommended by its Operations Analysis Office. This meant that such normal support type functions as maintenance, housekeeping, and vehicular maintenance would be left aboveground.[49]

It was a veritable Chinese puzzle which PACAF had handed Fifth Air Force to solve; for USAF had already emphasized that funds and priorities for hardening Mace facilities were not available. Hence, it was practically certain that any increase in the M-Site project for Okinawa resulting from hardening which was over and above the $5,000,000 currently in the Fiscal Year 1959 Military Construction Program would be disapproved and left unfunded. Faced with this dilemma, Fifth conducted an analysis to determine which combination of hardened deployment sites would afford the highest percentage of missile survival--always keeping an eye on the $5,800,000 ceiling approved by PACAF and presently awaiting action by USAF.

From the resulting analysis, Fifth determined that there were three different solutions to the problem. By the first of these, 40 missiles would be assigned to Bolo AAF and 20 to Yontan AAF, with 32 of those at Bolo being hardened to 70 psi and 16 of those at Yontan, making a total of 48 hardened missiles. Assuming a surprise attack on Okinawa such as had been theorized in a 27 February 1958 USAF Operations Analysis Working Paper entitled "System Vulnerability of the 590 Tac Missile Gp--2 Alternate Base Patterns", Fifth Air Force's Operations Analyst calculated that 26.9 of the 48 hardened missiles would survive.

According to the second alternative, Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields would be utilized as the dispersal sites, with 23 of the 40 missiles at the former being hardened and 11 of 20 at the latter, for a total of 34 hardened missiles. In this case, the hypothetical attack envisaged by USAF would leave 21.4 of the 34 hardened Maces untouched.

The third course of action would comprise a three-way dispersal of the missiles--20 at Bolo, 20 at Motobu, and 20 at Yontan. However, increased dispersal would likewise increase costs, so that only 10 missiles could be hardened at each of the three sites, or a total of 30. In the wake of an attack such as that contemplated by the USAF study, only 19.9 of the 30 hardened missiles would still be in existence.

To harden 48 missiles in a Bolo-Motobu complex, as had been proposed for Bolo-Yontan, would entail an expenditure of approximately $6,400,000, as compared with $5,800,000 for the latter combination. The difference in costs arose from the geographical remoteness of Motobu AAF, which would necessitate the support of rotational forces and, likewise, make

island-wide power unavailable. Yet, despite the $600,000 additional cost, it was calculated that only three more missiles would survive an attack on Bolo and Motobu than would be ready for retaliatory action after a similar nuclear assault on Bolo and Yontan.[50]

Fifth Air Force was omitting Yonabaru NAF from consideration as a possible hardened TM-76B site because of the "excessive" cost of determinable estate ($1,250,000--a figure arrived at by multiplying the annual rental of $73,415* by 16-2/3) and the fact that during Typhoon Faye in September 1957 Yonabaru had been inundated by three to four feet of water.

On the basis of the foregoing data, Fifth Air Force believed that the hardened peacetime launch bases for the 590th Tactical Missile Group should be Bolo (with two flights of 16 missiles each) and Yontan (one flight of 16 missiles). This number was considered sufficient, since four hardened missiles per flight would be either in maintenance or participating in mobility exercises. Besides, Fifth told PACAF, Yontan was not programmed for use by any other service or by any Air Force organization. (Exactly what had happened to the Air Force Security Service's plan to install an antenna farm on Yontan Auxiliary Air Field is not known to the present writer, but Fifth's statement would indicate that it had been abandoned.) Then, too, the construction of missile installations would not interfere with the emergency recovery and parking of fighter-bomber aircraft.

Getting down to specifics, Fifth Air Force pronounced the minimum facility requirements at the launch bases to be as follows: (1) for the

*The actual annual rental for Yonabaru, according to the USAEDO, was $73,414.90. (313IE-P C-4-37, Hq. 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/0140Z Apr. 1958.)

two flights at Bolo--an alert building 60' x 160'; a missile maintenance and assembly area consisting of a paved rectangle 420' x 1,050', two missile maintenance buildings each 52' x 120' in size; utilities, such as power, water, sewerage, heating, and ventilation; hardening for 32 missiles; and communications facilities. (2) For the single flight at Yontan--an alert building 30' x 60'; a missile maintenance and assembly area consisting of a missile maintenance building 52' x 120', fencing, an engine run-up shed 20' x 40', and a pavement 210' x 520' (this already existed at Yontan); a warhead maintenance building 52' x 120'; hardening for 16 missiles; utilities; and communications facilities.

Fifth Air Force did not consider a tactical storage area for warheads, boosters, and igniters to be necessary, in view of the concept of having missiles assembled, mounted on trans-launchers with warheads and boosters attached, and maintained in hardened facilities.

The maintenance facilities required for the main support base at Bishagawa were believed to be essentially those already described in PACAF's OPLAN 112-58 and in the Form 161's originally forwarded to PACAF by 313th Air Division. On the contrary, the same plan had stated that the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron would be responsible for major warhead maintenance, while Annex B to 112-58 showed an authorization of 10 technical personnel in the functional code 64000. These spaces were in addition to 643XX and 331XX spaces provided for each launch team. It was Fifth's belief that these men should be able to give the support squadron the capability of performing periodic maintenance and inspection of warheads, provided they were properly equipped under equipment component

lists (ECL's) 23312 and 23362. Thus would be provided an integrity of operation such as would be unobtainable if the 7th TDS were charged with the responsibility. It was recommended, therefore, that in the rewriting of OPLAN 112-58 the 7th TDS's responsibility for the maintenance of warheads be limited to that which the 590th TMG found to be beyond its own capacity for performing.[51]

The tantalizing game of "now you see it--now you don't" had meantime taken a turn in the latter direction on 25 March 1958 with USAF's release of Change No. 1 to its FY-59 Military Construction Appropriation Program, which announced that Kadena M-Site operational facilities in the amount of $6,816,000 had been deleted. PACAF submitted a protest to USAF, deposing that this action appeared to be inconsistent with USAF's intent to expedite the TM-76 program.[52]

Notwithstanding all the arguments which this headquarters, including General Smith himself, had advanced against the use of Yonabaru NAF as a Mace site, 313th received an information copy of a TWX from CINCPACAF on 11 April in which Fifth Air Force was requested to prepare to receive transfer of that airfield from the Navy on 1 July 1958. Unless notified otherwise, Fifth should assume that the current leases to the land occupied by Yonabaru were being continued, and the rentals should be funded from 450 funds which would become available in Fiscal Year 1959. It could also be assumed that these rentals would be included in the first revision of the FY-1959 financial plan. As soon as 313th received word that USAF had approved the use of Yonabaru as a Mace site, it was authorized to contact the District Engineer to arrange for the preparation and

submission of a real estate planning report.[53]

In an attempt at clarification of a suspected misunderstanding, PACAF informed this headquarters on 12 April that revised AF Forms 161 for unhardened facilities were still required for the FY-1959 MCP Kadena M-Site package, even though this would now be deferred one year. Although PACAF Preliminary OPLAN No. 112-58 currently did not incorporate the concept of hardening, it would be rewritten by PACAF in accordance with USAF's request that this be done. PACAF now desired 313th to furnish its comments and estimate of the cost of hardened facilities as soon as possible, in order that the figures could be forwarded to USAF for a comparison of the respective costs.[54]

Along this same line of thinking, CINCPACAF notified Fifth Air Force on 19 April that even though USAF had not called for the preparation of an operational plan for the 590th TMG involving the hardened concept, one would be developed and submitted to Headquarters, USAF for possible utilization at such time as funds and priorities might become more favorable. OPLAN 112-58 (unhardened) was considered the primary operational plan for the 590th TMG and would continue to be so through FY-1959, unless funds and priorities for hardening were obtained.

In what was truly an abrupt reversal of position, PACAF added that Yonabaru was going to be deleted from OPLAN 112-58, not only because of its inherent deficiencies of topography and situation, but also in consequence of its identification by the Price Armed Services Sub-Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives as a piece of land which ought to be returned to the Okinawan economy.[55]

Fifth Air Force responded to this message by informing PACAF on 23 April that it advocated the deployment of 40 missiles at Bolo, 20 at Yontan, and the establishment of 590th TMG Headquarters at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, whether on a hardened or unhardened basis. Furthermore, if hardening was not possible initially, the headquarters at all higher echelons of command should strive assiduously to bring it about as soon as possible. As an argument for the employment of hardening, Fifth noted that its concept of base utilization and hardening would actually cost less than an unhardened dispersal concept that satisfied USAF criteria and would, at the same time, offer an approximately nine-to-one ratio of survival while also simplifying communications, logistics, and personnel problems. As proof of this surprising calculation, Fifth Air Force cited the fact that hardening of Bolo-Yontan/Bishagawa would cost about $5,800,000, and 26 of the hardened missiles could be expected to survive a surprise attack. On the contrary, unhardened Mace installations at Bolo/Motobu/Ie Shima/Bishagawa would cost approximately $6,100,000, and only some three out of 60 missiles could be expected to survive a similar surprise assault. In addition, problems of communications, logistics, and personnel would be greatly magnified if M-Sites were established at Motobu and Ie Shima Auxiliary Air Fields.

A "bonus" benefit of hardening would also be reaped each typhoon season, when the value of having the missiles under cover and safely protected from debris, high winds, and pelting rain would be quickly demonstrated.[56]

Headquarters, 313th Air Division, an information addressee for this TWX, hastened to give Fifth Air Force the moral encouragement of its

concurrence in the views expressed to CINCPACAF. To bolster the resolve of the Fuchu headquarters, 313th radioed that it concurred "wholeheartedly" in the position taken by the former in connection with hardening and the location of missile sites. Not only would such action conform with the expressed opinion of the USAF Chief of Staff that "hardening is unquestioned," but it constituted the only insurance that tactical weapon systems located in forward areas such as Okinawa could survive to perform their basic mission of retaliation. This was made so by the fact that the distance from Communist China to Okinawa for modern aircraft or missiles would be measured in terms of minutes from the time of possible detection until the bomb release line was reached. Under these circumstances, this headquarters believed that Air Force planning should be based on tactical warning only (no advance warning derived from intelligence sources) or a surprise attack which would not leave sufficient time for the effective dispersal of missile units.

Of course it would be most satisfactory if enough funds could be obtained to harden a complete squadron of TM-76B Maces. Since this subjunctive thought was more Utopian than realistic, the next best solution seemed to be Fifth Air Force's idea of hardening as many missiles as the limitation on funds permitted. At first glance this might appear to involve a considerable reduction in over-all capability, but, in reality, it would enable the missile unit to survive a surprise attack and retain the power of immediate retaliation--a matter "of paramount consideration in view of the limited land mass and dispersal capability on Okinawa."

The employment of hardened bases at Bolo and Yontan Auxiliary Air

Fields would not only permit the survival of a maximum number of missiles under the severe restrictions of the $5,800,000 program, but would also offer many additional advantages worthy of consideration. For one, it would provide excellent command control. For another, it would comprise the most efficient management of personnel and resources of any combination then being considered for the 590th Tactical Missile Group. Thirdly, the existence of hardened--and by their very nature typhoon-resistant--facilities would enable the missiles to become operational immediately after a typhoon. If left unhardened, the facilities would have to be typhoonized and special measures taken to protect the missiles each time there was warning of a typhoon. Then, with the announcement of the "All Clear", a number of hours would necessarily elapse before the weapons could once more be readied for action. And such a period of hors de combat could well prove fatal, inasmuch as the rules of chivalry were not so closely observed in this Twentieth Century that an enemy could be relied upon to disdain the opportunity to launch his attack until the 313th Air Division had emerged from its typhoon-enforced hibernation.

Finally, even though the initial cost of hardened facilities would naturally be considerably greater, continuous and long-term savings to the Air Force would be realized in the realms of personnel, resupply, transportation, and the like.

For these reasons, this headquarters recommended that "Every effort be made to emphasize the requirement for hardening any future tactical unit programmed for Okinawa." Then, as an afterthought, 313th urged that Yonabaru be dropped from the PACAF program as a missile site for the

590th TMG. Furthermore, it should be released from future consideration for any Air Force activity.[57]

Fifth Air Force was won over so completely by this headquarters' arguments that it informed PACAF on 30 April that it concurred unreservedly in the above-mentioned proposal for hardening two sites, at Yontan and Bolo, as launch bases. And, as a natural corollary, since PACAF had already approved Fifth's recommendation that Yonabaru be deleted as a TM-76B site, the latter desired the Hickam headquarters to cancel the requirement for this base.[58]

Shortly before this exchange of correspondence on the subject of hardening, CINCPACAF had queried the USAF Chief of Staff anent the future plans of higher headquarters for Yontan and Bolo Auxiliary Air Fields. It was his understanding that a directive of the Secretary of the Air Force in mid-1957 had given all of the Yontan area adjacent to the runway to the Air Force and Navy security services. He also understood that the former USAFSS requirement for Bolo AAF had been disapproved in favor of the TM-76B missile project. What he wanted to determine was whether or not his understanding of these matters was correct, since the existing programming documents contained no indication of planned security service utilization of Yontan AAF.[59]

Back came a detailed reply from Headquarters, USAF the very next day, advising CINCPACAF that his information was accurate. On 26 March 1957 the Secretary of the Air Force had advised the Secretary of the Navy that the Air Force was agreeable to joint utilization of approximately 500 acres at Yontan AAF to meet combined Navy-Air Force needs for peacetime

radar interceptor facilities on Okinawa. The remaining area of Yontan would, however, have to be retained by the Air Force in order to permit continued use of the airfield for operational flying. After digesting this information for several months, the Secretary of the Navy had advised in a memorandum of 16 September 1957 that the Navy could not use Yontan under the conditions imposed, because of the interference with radio reception which could be anticipated. Subsequent discussions with representatives of the Navy confirmed that the plans for Navy Security Service use of Yontan had been abandoned. Therefore, said USAF, that airfield was available for other types of utilization by the 313th Air Division.

As for Bolo AAF, the Under Secretary of the Air Force had informed the Navy Secretary on 9 October 1957 that the Air Force was planning an extensive tactical missile operation there which would preclude the transfer of any part of it to the Navy. Anyway, because of a recent change in Air Force plans, the Air Force Security Service would utilize the Onna Point Receiver Annex and share the Sobe Transmitter Annex--under Navy control since its transfer on 12 April 1958--with the Navy and the Army under the terms of a tri-service utilization agreement.[60]

Notwithstanding all of the rebuffs which the hardening concept had sustained, CINCPACAF informed Fifth Air Force on 8 May that it intended to continue its past emphasis upon obtaining hardening for the tactical combat forces in the theater. The original project for tactical missile group facilities prepared in 1956 for the FY-1958 MCP had included underground installations for 20 per cent of the combat force. Subsequent

review by the Air Staff had resulted in elimination of the hardening feature and a reduction in the cost of the over-all project to the $5,300,000 figure now in effect. The latest information from USAF was that the facilities of the 590th TMG were to be included in the 1959 MCP on an unhardened basis.

Apropos of Fifth Air Force's proposal that the Mace launch sites be concentrated at Bolo and Yontan Auxiliary Air Fields, PACAF had given the idea much thought, and interested staff members had considered it from every angle. Despite a favorable predisposition toward the plan, these officials soon found themselves entertaining numerous misgivings as to its practicability. In the first place, even if the 590th TMG were confined to Bishagawa, Bolo, and Yontan, as recommended by Fifth Air Force, and the resulting savings were applied to hardening the launch facilities, there was no assurance that a subsequent Department of Defense, Congressional, or Bureau of the Budget review would not end in disapproval of the requisite funds. Thus, if PACAF were to adopt the Bolo-Yontan proposal, it might find itself in the position of having to deploy the TM-76B to unhardened facilities, all in the immediate vicinity of the Kadena Air Base complex--already a natural and obvious target for enemy attack. And, going a step further, when USAF came to review the M-Site project, it could conceivably be struck by the successive retreats in planning which had seen the four launch sites envisaged in 1957 reduced to three early in 1958, and now cut by Fifth Air Force to two that were not only located quite close together but also in close proximity to an existing major target complex. The not illogical consequence could be

that USAF, struck by the decreasing amount of imagination going into the site planning, would end by disapproving the entire plan for deployment of a guided missile group to Okinawa.

For these reasons, PACAF desired that any planning for TM-76B weapons would provide for the maximum dispersal permitted by the availability of U.S. controlled land. Still, since there was no escaping the fact that Ie Shima would be difficult to support and Yonabaru presented a number of disadvantages, it was almost necessary to limit the off-base dispersal areas to two places. However, in place of Fifth Air Force's candidate, Yontan, PACAF expressed a preference for Motobu AAF, which enjoyed the advantage of being more distant from Bolo, as well as from the great Kadena Air Base complex. Two TM-76B flights would be installed at Bolo AAF and one at Motobu AAF.

PACAF further advised Fifth that USAF had requested that a preliminary operational plan for the 590th TMG be prepared in accordance with a dispersed-hardened concept. The unhardened facilities required in support of this concept would be approximately the same as those provided for in the current plan (112-58). It was PACAF's intention to forward the hardened plan to USAF with a strong recommendation that it be approved instead of the plan currently under consideration. However, General LeMay's letter of 14 February 1958 on the subject of "Hardening for Tactical Air Forces", referred to above, had pointed out that little benefit would accrue to PACAF or other major commands if USAF were to approve their proposals for hardening missile sites at that time, since money from Fiscal Year 1959 could not be applied against them in any

event. In view of this observation of the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, PACAF felt there was little likelihood of obtaining approval of funds for the hardened concept in the Fiscal Year 1959 Program. As the most realistic approach, then, PACAF intended to expedite the construction of the requisite unhardened facilities in the FY-59 MCP and place a high priority on the funding of hardened facilities for essential combat elements in the FY-60 MCP. Admittedly, the Hickam AFB headquarters had "no indication that a hardened concept [would] be approved in [the] immediate future. Meanwhile, time [was] running out in planning for acceptance of [the] 590th TM Group."[61]

Although the chances of obtaining hardening for the Mace launch sites thus remained far from bright, Fifth Air Force went ahead with the formulation of specific plans for the form they should take, if and when approved. Information available indicated that the TM-76B had folding wings attached to the center fuselage section, which split at the center line and folded to the side of the fuselage, unfolding and rotating into a locked position for flight. Obviously, it would be vastly cheaper to construct hardened steel tube-like structures which could house a missile fuselage with its wings folded flat against the sides than to build reinforced-concrete structures large enough to garage a Mace with its wings pre-set into takeoff position.

Unfortunately, officials at Fifth Air Force possessed only a modicum of information concerning the design and characteristics of the Mace. In an endeavor to remedy this shortcoming, the Fuchu headquarters asked the Commander, Tactical Air Command (TAC) on 30 April 1958 to confirm

the prevailing impression that the Mace had folding wings. If this were the case, Fifth wished to know how much time would be required to unfold the wings and lock them in position for flight. In addition, TAC was requested to furnish data on the types and sizes of all support equipment which would need to be hardened to insure a launch capability following an attack.[62]

TAC replied that the TM-76B was equipped with manually operating folding wings which required 20 minutes to unfold and lock in position for flight.[63] The support equipment which would have to be hardened consisted of two prime movers, one launch control pack, and four translaunchers. As for the dimensions of this equipment, TAC was unable to supply this information immediately and would have to query Detachment #1 of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC).[64]

On 23 May, Fifth Air Force informed this headquarters that approximately 198 personnel would be working at Motobu Auxiliary Air Field, with billeting provided for them at Site P-52 (Yae Take Air Station).[65]

Yonabaru Is Rejected Once and for All as a Launching Site.

On 3 June 1958 the CINCPAC Representative, Ryukyus (CINCPACREP, RI), Lieutenant General Donald P. Booth, wired CINCPAC that he concurred in the transfer of Yonabaru to the Air Force. Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the U.S. Armed Forces should retain this air field to meet possible future requirements, even if the present Air Force interest in it as a launch site evaporated; for were the land to be returned to its indigenous owners, the business of reacquiring it to meet some future requirement would be "most difficult and would be accompanied by extremely

unfavorable political reactions."[66]

Four days earlier, on 30 May, CINCPACAF had queried Fifth Air Force about this same chameleon-like airfield, puzzled by a statement of Lieutenant General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., that Yonabaru was under water during typhoons, although a study of elevations of Yonabaru made at Hickam indicated that some portions were as high as 25 to 40 feet above sea level. As an example, approximately 40 acres in the northwest corner comprising large concrete pads and interconnecting taxiways were situated at these altitudes. Such being the case, PACAF wished to have immediate detailed information concerning any portions of Yonabaru, 10 acres or more in size, such as the northwest corner, which appeared suitable for missile deployment.[67]

This headquarters was an information addressee for this message from CINCPACAF to Fifth Air Force, and, considering that engineers on Okinawa were the persons best qualified to supply the detailed data desired, the Director of Installations handed the task of preparing an answer to Mr. James I. Mason, Chief of the Real Property and Programs Branch. The result was a very thorough description of the entire airfield, with each area receiving treatment according to its elevation.

The maximum elevation to be found on Yonabaru was 40 feet above sea level, as CINCPACAF had suggested, but this was true only of the northwest corner. Since sea water had reached as high as 15 feet during Typhoon Emma of September 1956, Mr. Mason did not believe that any portion of the airfield below that elevation should be considered for a missile site.

For Fifth Air Force's benefit, he explained that the areas above 15 feet in elevation and larger than 10 acres in size were (1) approximately

20 acres along the west boundary, 3,000 feet long and 250 to 300 feet in width, with elevations varying between 15 and 20 feet. This area did not seem suitable for a missile site, since the terrain rose to 200 feet within a horizontal distance of 1,000 feet, making it peculiarly susceptible to rainfall run-off. (2) Approximately 80 acres in the northwest corner of Yonabaru, 2,200 feet long and 1,100 to 1,800 feet wide, with elevations of 15 to 40 feet. About 30 acres of this area were below 20 feet elevation, a total of 50 were below 25 feet, and about 30 were above 25 feet. This last area exceeding 25 feet in elevation was 2,200 feet long and varied from 500 to 1,000 feet in width. It contained only one existing hardstand, while the whole 80 acres contained a runway warm-up pad and three hardstands with a connecting taxiway. None of this 80-acre parcel was considered suitable for missile use, because the terrain to the south rose to an elevation of 200 feet within a horizontal distance of 700 feet, the terrain to the west ascended to 500 feet in a horizontal distance of 2,300 feet, the area was subject to flash floods from rainfall run-off during and following recurring concentrated rain storms because of its bowl-like situation, and although generally above the level of tidal waves, the area was generally deluged with wind-driven salt water spray during typhoons.

All of the above areas were bounded on the north, west, and south by native villages and a principal paved road, Highway #13. Although Mr. Mason was unable to obtain specific engineering data concerning the flooding of Yonabaru Airfield on any occasion other than that following Typhoon Emma, the architect-engineer who had prepared preliminary

construction plans for the Navy indicated that drainage plans were calculated to handle flash floods during rainstorms, in addition to sea water swept in during typhoons, and it was estimated that construction of a sea wall adequate to protect the facilities at Yonabaru would cost an estimated $1,000,000.

For all of these reasons, therefore, it was "the position of this headquarters that Yonabaru [was] not suitable for fulfilling a missile requirement."[68]

Although PACAF was not yet aware of the contents of this message to Fifth Air Force, sufficient testimony had already been placed in evidence by the Fuchu headquarters to convince General Kuter that Yonabaru had little to offer the Air Force. Writing in an official vein reminiscent of Admiral William F. Halsey's wartime dispatches, CINCPACAF informed Fifth Air Force on June 6th that "The additional information you have provided on the waters of 'Lake Yonabaru' has effectively torpedoed the already sinking requirement for its acquisition by PACAF."

Even before this, the Plans people at Hickam AFB had become pretty well convinced by the TWX's emanating from this headquarters that the greater part of Yonabaru could be disregarded in future programming. Only a 10-acre plot of relatively high ground which might be used for the site of an IRBM unit had remained under consideration, and PACAF had been urging USAF to approve its recommendation for early deployment of an IRBM unit to Okinawa so that necessary action vis-a-vis CINCPAC could be taken to assure U.S. retention of any real estate required for launching sites. The 10 acres at Yonabaru, not subject to flooding,

would have met the USAF criteria for launch site locations. Fifth Air Force's information having shown even this portion of Yonabaru to be unsatisfactory, however--both by reason of its susceptibility to flooding from the drainage of adjacent hills and various attendant expenses--PACAF now intended to advise CINCPAC that "all of 'Lake Yonabaru', including the fishes, /would/ be declared surplus to PACAF requirements."[69]

The last word on the fate of Yonabaru was spoken the very next day in the form of a TWX from CINCPACAF to Fifth Air Force in which the latter was informed that the current reconsideration of the dispersal concept for the TM-76B weapon system on Okinawa eliminated any Air Force requirement for that airfield. Hence, PACAF no longer desired that the 313th Air Division have the Navy transfer this installation to it.[70]

As an interesting footnote, admittedly not falling within the strict scope of this history but serving to complete the story, Yonabaru Airfield was subsequently turned back to its Okinawan landowners, on 30 April 1959, in the largest return of real estate by the U.S. military since the beginning of the occupation of the Ryukyus.

FBIS Antennas at Bolo Point Pose Difficulties for the Mace Program.

By now the reader will, perhaps, have discerned that no matter what combinations of sites were considered for the TM-76B missiles, Bolo Auxiliary Air Field seemed invariably to figure as one of the recommended launch locations. Not unnaturally, the staff planners of this headquarters whose responsibility it was to assist in the final selection of sites arrived at the same realization at least as quickly as our more perceptive readers. Having made this observation, they paused and took

took a closer look at this large parcel of land to see whether guided missile operations there might perchance interfere with those of existing agencies of any kind, now that the Security Service organizations had been turned away from Bolo AAF by a decision made at the highest level.

As a result of this scrutiny, these officials discovered that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), an organic element of the Central Intelligence Agency charged by the National Security Agency with the task of monitoring foreign radio broadcasts, occupied a part of the airfield. Since its equipment included sensitive radio receivers and oriented antennas for intercepting broadcasts from distant, low-powered transmitters, any electrical disturbances generated within the nearby area would interfere with the FBIS mission.

Nevertheless, the FBIS would have been the last to maintain that the United States' ability to retaliate against a hostile attack should be either destroyed or shackled in favor of a knowledge of what the potential aggressor was thinking and saying. As a result, a series of meetings were arranged between officials of the FBIS's Okinawa Bureau and personnel of the 313th Air Division. In the first of these, Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann, the Assistant Installations Officer and Chief of 313th's Engineering Branch, and Mr. James I. Mason, Chief of the Real Property and Programs Branch, conferred with Mr. Robert C. Swanson, Chief of the FBIS Okinawa Bureau, and Mr. Amory F. Penniwell, the Chief Engineer for the same organization, on 30 May 1958. Later the same day, Brigadier General Dale O. Smith, the 313th Air Division Commander, met with Mr. Swanson. Then, on 2 June, Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston, Director of Operations, and Major Joe N. Swanger, Chief of the Plans and Programs

Division, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, conferred with the Messrs. Swanson and Penniwell.

From these talks the FBIS representatives learned that the Air Force was drafting site and construction plans for the installation of Mace launchers in the portion of Bolo AAF lying to the west of the FBIS antenna field. Included in the installation would be a maintenance building, a fire station, ready buildings, and a storage area--all to be supplied with electricity. In addition, at the launchers themselves there would be generator starters. Although all of the electric power lines and equipment constituted potential sources of interference to FBIS reception, Swanson and Penniwell were rather startled to learn that the Air Force had made no provision for eliminating or reducing it.

When a similar problem had arisen not long before in connection with the Nike site being built next to the ruins of Zakimi Castle, east of the FBIS operations area, several special features were incorporated in the construction drawings to protect the monitoring agency. These consisted of: (a) placing all electric power lines underground to a distance of 3,000 feet south of the FBIS installations; (b) installing a complete wire mesh shielding in the walls of all buildings grounded to a wire which encircled each building, with an additional radial running from each corner to a ground rod 50 feet away; (c) installing input power circuits in each building, by-passed to ground from each phase; (3) by-passing all motor equipment so that it would ground through capacitators; (f) installing a 12-foot cyclone-type fence on the FBIS side of the area, grounded so as to prevent ignition radiation into FBIS; (g) suppressing radio interference on all military vehicles and gasoline

engines; and (h) issuing an order forbidding the use of electric razors in the M-Site area.

Inasmuch as the Mace site would be located between the sensitive ends of the FBIS antennas and those transmitters from which most broadcasts were received, Mr. Swanson requested this headquarters to take "similar necessary steps to provide means in construction plans and drawings for eliminating potential sources of interference."[71]

Specific Details of Mace Structures and Their Costs Are Discussed.

FBIS officials had expressed their concern at possible interference from the Bolo Mace site and had indicated what measures the 313th Air Division could take to enable the two facilities to exist in close proximity to each other. This done, there was nothing more either side could do for long months to come, as definite plans for the TM-76B launch sites would first have to be adopted, design drawings would have to be prepared, specifications drawn up, funds appropriated, and construction actually gotten underway before the suggested preventive measures could be put into effect.

On 6 June 1958 CINCPACAF notified Fifth Air Force that Warner-Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) had established tentative criteria for an overseas contractor maintenance facility to support the 590th Tactical Missile Group. This would consist of 10,000 square feet of space in all, of which 2,000 square feet 10 feet in height should be temperature, humidity, and dust controlled. Another 3,000 square feet, also 10 feet high, was recommended, but not regarded as a necessity, for temperature and humidity control. The remaining 5,000 square feet of normal

maintenance area need be only properly ventilated. Fifth Air Force was to consider and include these factors in the programming and construction documents connected with development of the facility.[72]

On 31 March 1958 USAF had directed PACAF to prepare a TM-76B plan in place of OPLAN 112-58, which would reflect hardening and dispersal of the launch sites. CINCPACAF informed the Washington headquarters on 21 June that this could not be done until a detailed comparison of the cost of "hard" versus "soft" facilities could be worked out. At present PACAF was attempting to incorporate maximum hardening of the combat elements into the structure of the tactical missile group insofar as the $5,800,000 FY-59 MCP figure then under budgeting review would permit. A specific date for submission of the hardened plan could not be given, but as soon as it could be prepared, USAF might expect to receive it in short order.[73]

In response to a request by Mr. E. E. Clary, PACAF's Operations Analyst, in a telephone conversation of 2 June, Fifth Air Force submitted detailed data on the estimated cost of unhardened facilities for the 590th TMG, as they were outlined in PACAF OPLAN 112-58. The total estimated cost as worked out by the USAEDO would be $5,379,300--$2,299,300 for Bishagawa, $1,783,000 for Bolo AAF, and $1,297,000 for Motobu AAF. Not included in these figures were either contingency or design costs, but a total of $599,060 for the USAEDO for overhead, inspection/supervision, and engineering was included.

For Bishagawa the breakdown of items and their respective costs was as follows: (1) a vehicle refueling station--$5,900. (2) Vehicle

refuel, 2,400 barrels of mogas--$13,900. (3) Headquarters, Squadron "A"--$66,100. (4) Five four-man BOQ's--$80,200. (5) Headquarters, Squadron "B"--$41,200. (6) Post Exchange store--$30,000. (7) An automotive maintenance shop--$84,600. (8) A two-stall fire station--$69,500. (9) An operations building (Missile Operations Center)--$8,000. (10) A 400-man dining hall--$207,000. (11) Five 94-man barracks--$724,100. (12) Base theater--$165,000. (13) Auto open storage--$73,200. (14) Auto maintenance administration building--$14,000. (15) Headquarters, 590th TMG--$120,500. (16) Dispensary--$122,800. (17) Training building--$65,000. (18) A pilotless aircraft test shop--$81,500. (19) A pilotless aircraft engine test shop--$65,100. (20) A 400-KW electric sub-station--$9,200. (21) Base warehouse--$57,400. (22) A 250,000-gallon water storage--$35,000. (23) Fence--$8,700; and (24) Roads--$151,000. Of the $2,299,300 total, $255,610 was for engineering, inspection-supervision, and overhead by USAEDO.

For Bolo Auxiliary Air Field, where two tactical missile flights possessing a total of 40 TM-76B missiles would be deployed, the breakdown was as follows: (1) a two-stall fire station--$49,080; (2) two 20' x 40' run-up sheds--$13,000; (3) a 2,400-square foot alert building--$25,130; (4) two 6,240-square foot missile maintenance buildings--$97,720; (5) four 200-square foot technical administration buildings--$6,000; (6) a 96' x 30' RATO storage building--$47,400; (7) two 100-square foot igniter storage buildings--$3,000; (8) two 35' x 60' warhead maintenance/assembly buildings--$66,400; (9) four security towers--$12,400; (10) a 100-square foot guard house--$2,300; (11) a 6' x 6' gate house--$800;

(12) a 176' x 30' warhead storage building--$78,800; (13 two 36' x 60' nose storage buildings--$46,560; (14) 2,100 linear feet of security fence for the storage area--$8,850; (15) water supply, storage, and distribution--$150,150; (16) electrical utilities--$186,000; (17) a sewer system--$10,000; (18) site preparation/grading--$20,000; (19) earth barricades in the southwest area--$20,000; (20) 35 launch pads with revetments--$472,420; (21) paving and an eight-foot perimeter fence--$314,490; (22) USAEDO cost for overhead, inspection/supervision, and engineering--$199,480; and (23) government-furnished equipment--$25,480. The total for Bolo was thus $1,783,000.

For Motobu Auxiliary Air Field, which would house a single flight of 20 missiles, the breakdown was as follows: (1) a two-stall fire station--$51,530; (2) a 20' x 40' run-up shed--$6,830; (3) a 2,400-square foot alert building--$26,390; (4) a 6,240-square foot missile maintenance building--$52,610; (5) two 2,000-square foot technical and administration buildings--$1,650; (6) a 49' x 30' RATO storage building--$24,500; (7) a 100-square foot igniter storage building--$1,580; (8) a 35' x 60' warhead maintenance/assembly building--$34,860; (9) four security towers--$13,040; (10) two 100-square foot guard houses--$4,840; (11) a 6' x 6' gate house--$840; (12) a warhead storage building--$39,100; (13) a 36' x 40' nose storage building--$24,440; (14) a seven-foot high security fence--1,940 linear feet in length--$8,600; (15) site grading--$20,000; (16) electrical utilities--$153,000; (17) water supply and distribution--$150,150; (18) a sewer system--$10,000; (19) earth barricades in the southwest area--$21,000; (20) government-furnished equipment--$19,440; (21) USAEDO cost

for overhead, engineering, and inspection/supervision--$143,970; (22) 20 launch pads with revetments--$274,250; (23) paving and an eight-foot perimeter fence--$214,380. Thus the total for Motobu was $1,297,000.

Having presented the costs for unhardened facilities, Fifth Air Force sought to show PACAF how money could be saved if hardening were approved before any construction began under the unhardened concept. At Bolo AAF $117,430 could be saved on the tactical storage area and $120,050 on the 35 revetments around the launch pads. At Motobu AAF $84,840 could be saved on the tactical storage area and $86,200 on the 20 revetments around the launch pads. The total economy in this case would amount to $408,520.

On the basis of $40,000 estimated cost for hardening one TM-76B missile, Fifth calculated that $1,920,000 would be required to harden 48 TM-76B missiles. Therefore, if the saving of $408,520 were subtracted and the $1,920,000 for hardening were added to the total unhardened cost of $5,379,300, the estimated cost of 48 hardened missile pads would be $6,890,780.[74]

Armed with these figures provided by Fifth Air Force, PACAF was finally able to answer USAF's request of 31 March that hardening and dispersal of launch sites be incorporated in a new operations plan. Assuming that the enemy should make a surprise nuclear attack of one megaton yield on Bolo, Motobu, and other high priority military complexes on Okinawa, PACAF's operations analyst had determined that only one TM-76B would survive, if the facilities were left unhardened. Furthermore, during the period in which the TM-76B would be deployed to Okinawa, the Communists would possess an instantaneous strike capability in the form

of IRBM's, according to intelligence estimates. In order for 313th Air Division's forces to retaliate after such a surprise attack, they would have to be dispersed from the existing major target complexes and hardened. Dispersal alone would not insure survival, since a flight of missiles constituted an offensive force of sufficient importance to warrant the assignment of a nuclear weapon to its destruction. However, dispersal would force the enemy to program additional weapons for the destruction of the TM-76B force. Thus, his task of neutralizing the U.S. missile force would be made more difficult, but it could nonetheless be easily accomplished, making the Air Force's tactical missile group an expensive toy which would be destroyed before it was ever used.

"Survivability" being the ne plus ultra, then, hardening became the indispensable ingredient in the recipe for retaliation. In the past, unfortunately, hardening concepts for missiles had been complex and highly expensive. An example of this difficulty was to be found in Alaska. Now, however, PACAF had developed a hardened concept which was at the same time effective and economical, centering as it did around a steel culvert of the type which had passed various tests successfully during Operation Plum-Bob at Frenchman's Flat. Utilizing 48 of these steel culverts for the same number of Mace missiles, and assuming a surprise nuclear attack employing weapons of one megaton yield, the 590th TMG should have approximately 35 Missiles and their essential support equipment in commission when the dust cleared. Not only would these steel culverts provide hardening and survivability during a surprise attack, but they would likewise provide protection of the missiles and essential

supporting equipment during the seasonal typhoons which hit Okinawa almost every year. In the past, these typhoons had cost the Air Force millions of dollars in damage to aircraft. The same degree of damage to the unmanned but very similar Maces could be looked for if the missile launching sites were not hardened. Conversely, adoption of the steel culvert would enable the 313th Air Division to possess an offensive capability immediately following a typhoon--something which its battened-down, hangar-secured, or evacuated aircraft obviously did not have.

In computing the minimum number of TM-76B items which a single launch team would need to permit self-sufficient combat operations from a hardened site, PACAF made the following assumptions: (1) Each launch team would possess four operational missiles; (2) the missiles would be launched within the area immediately surrounding the hardened culvert; (3) the only communications required by a launch team would be vehicular radio and land-line; (4) completely assembled and serviced missiles could be moved into and out of shelters; (5) boosters and noses (together with the warheads) would be installed before the missiles were placed in shelters; (6) power for lighting, ventilation, heating the gyros, etc., would be provided in the launch team shelter complex; (7) theodolite would be available in the launch control pack; (8) a power pack would be installed on the MM-1 prime mover with the launch control pack; and (9) alert crew facilities would be available in the shelter.

On the basis of these assumptions, PACAF concluded that one MM-1 (with its launch control pack, theodolite, and power pack), one MM-1 (with a fifth wheel), and four trans-launchers (with four completely assembled ready missiles) would comprise the minimum equipment required

for one launch team.

If USAF were to approve hardening for the 590th Tactical Missile Group before any construction was begun under the unhardened concept set forth in OPLAN 112-58, an estimated $488,520 could be saved through elimination of the revetments and reduction in the size of the tactical storage areas. Both of these facilities would be required under the unhardened plan to provide minimum typhoon protection for missiles, warheads, and nose cones. Adverting to the figures furnished by Fifth Air Force, PACAF said that one missile could be hardened, using the suggested culvert design, for about $40,000. Therefore, to harden 48 missiles would cost some $1,920,000. Considering the OPLAN 112-58 unhardened cost of $5,379,300, less the saving of $408,520, plus $1,920,000 for hardening, PACAF estimated that the total cost of facilities for the 590th TMG, with the essential combat elements hardened, would be around $6,890,780. Under the attack conditions envisaged above, in which one-megaton yield thermonuclear weapons would be employed by the enemy, it could be expected that only one missile would survive, in which case the unhardened installation unit cost per surviving missile would be $5,379,300. Since an estimated 35 missiles would survive under the hardened concept, the unit cost per surviving missile would be only $196,880--making this a far more economical approach to the problem. More importantly, 35 surviving missiles could inflict 35 times as much damage to the attacker as could one. And retaliation was the basic reason for having missile sites in the first place.

In view of the apparent advantages to be obtained by the use of simple steel culverts to harden the TM-76B missiles, PACAF strongly

recommended that USAF approve this concept and authorize the requisite installations actions to provide facilities in the FY-59 Military Construction Program. If USAF should approve these recommendations, the Form 161's would be corrected to include hardened facilities, and their design would be initiated accordingly. A postponement of hardened facilities to a later MCP would result in a waste of $408,520, as it would be necessary to spend this amount for typhoon protection under the unhardened concept. Inasmuch as one TM-76B Mace missile cost the Air Force $240,000, PACAF considered it quite possible for hardening to pay for itself during one typhoon season on Okinawa, by sparing any number of the missiles from destruction or damage.[75]

Not long after this important recommendation was sent to USAF, a representative of that headquarters visited Hickam AFB, providing PACAF officials an opportunity to give him an informal presentation of their hardened concept for the Mace sites to be established on Okinawa. His reaction was "very favorable." However, he did indicate that several changes should be made with an eye to enhancing the plan's chances of acceptance by the Air Staff. The over-all cost should be reduced by decreasing the size of the structures and substituting certain items for more costly ones presently contemplated. Precautions should also be taken to insure that the proposed structures, including the doors, could withstand blasts of approximately 70 pounds-per-square-inch. PACAF should further ascertain positively that the new rapid fire development would be compatible with this concept. The USAF representative estimated that two months' time remained for these revisions to be made before

procurement of the equipment designed under the old concept would have to be commenced.[76]

THE PACAF MACE CONFERENCE OF 28 JULY - 6 AUGUST 1958

On 28 July 1958, Headquarters, PACAF convened a joint conference at Hickam AFB in connection with the future activation and deployment of the 498th Tactical Missile Group on Okinawa. Represented at this conference, which lasted through 6 August, were personnel from PACAF itself, Fifth Air Force, 313th Air Division, the Tactical Air Command, the Air Research and Development Command, the Glenn L. Martin Company, the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa, and the Pacific Ocean Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Shortly before the conference, Headquarters, USAF had advised that the 498th Tactical Missile Group would be deployed to the Ryukyu Islands in place of the 590th Tactical Missile Group, previously scheduled.

The chief achievement of the conference was the development of an operations plan and appropriate annexes for the 498th TMG. Reversing the recent trend in planning, which had seen the launching sites reduced to two in number--Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields--the conferees agreed that "nests" for the missile "birds" should be built at six different places. Although this was the type of thinking which might well have been brought to bear on the Matador-Mace project long before, the concept of dispersal in itself produced certain difficulties which had not existed under the two-site plan. It now became necessary for the 313th Air Division to obtain additional parcels of real estate then under the control of the Army or the Marines--viz., the Motobu Quarry (formerly

operated by the Army, but now abandoned), Ginbaru (a small area adjoining the Philippine Sea, which took its name from a small village just north of Kin Village, where the Marines maintained an artillery firing point), Camp Schwab, and West Easley Range (the portion of Camp Hansen farthest removed from the quonset area comprising the existing temporary camp).

Basing their calculations on the new concepts of hardening, dispersal, and rapid fire (or Quick Strike, as we have seen it termed), the conferees prepared a budgetary estimate to cover both hardened and unhardened facility requirements for the program. There was general agreement that current Air Force definitive drawings could be utilized essentially for the unhardened facilities.[77]

The Division Engineer Prepares Cost Estimates for the Mace Sites.

On 7 August 1958, just two days after the PACAF conference ended, the Division Engineer, U.S. Army, Pacific Ocean, estimated, on the basis of the best available information concerning direct costs for igloos built of 10-gauge corrugated steel on steel channel ribs 4" x 15"--with 14 per cent added for engineering, inspection, and overhead--that the cost of the various hardened Mace sites would run roughly as follows: Bolo AAF: $899,000; Motobu AAF: $1,241,000; Motobu Quarry: $901,000; West Easley Range: $711,000; Camp Schwab: $511,000; Ginbaru: $920,000; Bishagawa Billeting Annex (only the MOC/Communications Center): $95,000; and Yae Take (only the Alternate MOC/Communications Center): $95,000. The total of these figures would be $5,373,000. The various soft housekeeping and maintenance facilities would, of course, be in

addition to this.

These estimates were arrived at by calculating each four-bird Quick Strike complex, less air-conditioning, at $493,000; the air-conditioning itself at $73,000; $207,000 for each of the four-bird Normal Launch complexes, less air-conditioning (the existing power and water supplies for Motobu Quarry were deemed adequate); $48,000 for the air-conditioning system in each four-bird Normal Launch complex; $270,000 for each of the eight-bird Normal Launch complexes, less air-conditioning; $90,000 for air-conditioning each eight-bird Normal Launch complex; $225,000 for primary power (450-KW) generated by diesel generators at the sites for which island-wide power was unavailable; $30,000 p[illegible] mile for primary power obtained from the island-wide power system; $24,000 per mile for access roads (including improvement of Highway #112 and a dilapidated Bailey bridge linking Nago and the Motobu Quarry site); $21,000 for water and sanitation facilities, on the basis of 16 men per site--the water supply consisting of a well, a pump and storage, or storage and haul, and the sanitation comprising a simple septic tank and disposal system. The fire protection for the sites would be provided by foamite or CO_2 costing $500 per nozzle and operated manually.

Incidentally, the Division Engineer accepted as valid the results of the tests conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission in Operation Plum-Bob, which had shown the ribbed corrugated steel culverts to be capable of withstanding 70 psi or more, as long as they were buried completely.[78]

Even as he listed theseestimates, the Division Engineer entertained enough doubts as to their accuracy that he requested the

District Engineer, Okinawa, to advise PACAF if he felt any or many revisions were in order. Since the latter did find that his estimates of various items were different from those worked up by his superior, he dispatched a TWX to CINCPACAF on 15 August setting forth the points of variance. At the same time, however, he accepted the over-all figure of $5,373,000, recognizing that there were too many imponderables connected with the program which he was not qualified to assess.

In the case of the four-bird Quick Strike complex, he estimated it at $482,000 (instead of the $493,000 submitted by the Division Engineer); the air-conditioning for the same complex he figures at $70,000 (instead of $73,000); the four-bird Normal Launch complex he estimated at $211,000 (instead of $207,000); air-conditioning for the four-bird Normal Launch complex he calculated at $37,000 (instead of $48,000); the eight-bird Normal Launch complex should be $325,000 (instead of $270,000); air-conditioning for the eight-bird Normal Launch complex should be $65,000 (instead of $90,000); primary power generated at the sites should cost $173,000 (instead of $225,000); primary power obtained from the island-wide system should be $31,000 (instead of $30,000); access roads should require $29,000 per mile (instead of $25,000); and water and sanitation were calculated at $23,000 (instead of $21,000) for a maximum of 16 men per site.[79]

Just when it thus seemed that a compromise had been found between fund limitations and minimum acceptable strengths of essential combat components of the Mace system, the Division Engineer threw a very wet blanket on PACAF's plans. According to information received from the

Office of the Chief Engineer in Washington, D.C., the steel culverts which PACAF had regarded so highly would not resist even a 50 psi blast wave--let alone the necessary 70 psi--because of the high drag pressure loading. Although no test data on such structures reinforced with stiffened ribs were available, the Division Engineer did not believe that such culverts built aboveground would be capable of resisting collapse even if covered with earth. True, the similar steel culverts employed in Operation Plum-Bob had successfully withstood blasts of 70 psi, but they had been completely buried, so that high drag pressures were not exerted against them. In place of the steel culverts, then, the Office of the Chief Engineer recommended reinforced-concrete igloos covered with earth. For 25-foot wide structures, a 12-inch barrel and an 18-inch monolithic mat footing would be required. A separate four-inch slab on resilient material could be added where the contents were sensitive to high floor accelerations. For the rear and wing walls and for the front wall, 15-inch concrete covered with earth would be satisfactory. The wing walls should be perpendicular to the front wall, if at all possible.

For 12-foot wide structures, all thicknesses could be proportionately less. In the final design, the blast door should be made as small as possible, and both the door and exposed portions of the front wall should be designed to resist reflected and drag pressures, in accordance with specifications set forth in technical manuals.

Where it was necessary to protect personnel within the structure, shielding from both initial and nuclear radiation should be provided.

For 50 psi range, 5-1/2 feet of earth should be laid over one foot of concrete, or 4-1/2 feet of concrete with no earth fill would serve as a minimal requirement against initial radiation.*

In the light of these facts, the Division Engineer asked the Okinawa District Engineer to revise the budget estimate in such wise as to reflect reinforced-concrete structures such as the Chief Engineer had recommended, forwarding the amended figures to CINCPACAF not later than 22 August 1958.[80]

With just two days in which to meet this deadline, engineers at USAEDO worked frantically to convert their calculations from those for steel culvert structures to ones for reinforced concrete. Somehow the date was met, and a TWX went off to CINCPACAF reflecting the new thinking. Since construction featuring concrete is less expensive than that utilizing steel on Okinawa, because of the savings introduced by the employment of low-paid Ryukyuan labor (and labor plays a much larger part in concrete construction than it does in that involving steel), the new estimates reduced the figures for all three types of launching complexes. The four-bird Quick Strike complex was now estimated to cost $440,000 (instead of $482,000); the four-bird Normal Launch complex would cost $184,000 (instead of $211,000); and the eight-bird Normal Launch complex would cost $275,000 (instead of $325,000). This meant that the formerly estimated total cost of the entire M-site project would be reduced from

*Initial radiation is that five per cent of the total energy released in a nuclear explosion within the first minute or so of the detonation. Its emanations are mainly gamma rays and neutrons, both of which can travel great distances through the air and can penetrate considerable thicknesses of material.

$5,373,000 to $4,997,000.[81] On the surface this was a happy development, as it implied that both hardening and dispersal could be incorporated at a cost even lower than the fund allocations permitted. Time and subsequent events were, however, to reveal the fallacy of these figures.

Fifth Air Force had been an information addressee for the Division Engineer's message to the District Engineer, Okinawa, in which the former had asserted that definite defensive limitations existed for steel culvert-type shelters. Rather than deferring automatically to the wisdom of the Division Engineer, Fifth mulled over the points made in the former's TWX and ended by taking issue with several of them. Writing PACAF on 27 August, the Fuchu headquarters alluded to the alleged inability of the structures to resist 50 psi blast waves because of "the high drag pressure loading." Since most of the structures were to be located in such a way as to utilize the terrain to minimize drag loading by trenching into slopes or utilizing depressions, commented Fifth, this argument was not valid. Where such siting was not feasible, Fifth planned to widen the earth buttresses and reduce their slopes to decrease the transmitted drag force. Besides, notwithstanding what the Division Engineer had said, the Plum-Bob structures at Frenchman's Flat had <u>not</u> been completely buried. Also, the rib-strengthened culverts had shown considerably greater blast resistance than had those which were unreinforced.

Fifth Air Force was agreeable to adoption of the Division Engineer's proposed measures for minimizing reflection pressure on the

door, "insofar as feasible," but observed that "reflection pressure effect is important only when the burst is directly in front of the shelter." And the odds favoring such an unlucky burst were relatively small. Even though an enemy nuclear weapon landed in such a position, a 100-psi door should still be good to at least 20 psi. As for a burst from the rear, the proposed design promised protection to the 100-psi level. Furthermore, the average should run above 50 psi, considering the probability of a burst at other angles and the degree of protection to be expected from each. The planned thickness of at least eight feet of earth cover would afford sufficient protection against radiation.[82]

PACAF replied on 30 August that the Okinawa District Engineer had estimated the reinforced-concrete earth-covered igloos recommended by the Office of the Chief Engineer to be less costly than the rib-stiffened steel structures originally proposed. Therefore, the installations plan to be presented to Headquarters, USAF was being revised to reflect the Chief Engineer's recommendations. The over-all plans and agreements formulated during the recent PACAF Mace Conference remained unchanged, since the feasibility of attaining the desired invulnerability at a tolerable cost was the significant factor--not the specific type of construction. The details of design would, in fact, be subject to further investigation and possible modification if the hardened concept were adopted by USAF.[83]

PACAF PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PLAN NUMBER 112-58A

An Analysis of Survival Probabilities Under a Hypothetical Attack.

It was generally recognized that hardening of the TM-76B sites on Okinawa would be much more expensive than leaving the same number of sites in a "soft" condition; and there was not much disagreement with the assumption that dispersed, hardened sites would be considerably more costly than concentrated, hardened packages. Not only would the cost of installation be somewhat greater, but the operating costs would continually widen the gap. However, there were few who would gainsay that cost was of little moment when compared with survivability and eventual ability to retaliate. After all, the ultimate object was not to save money but to preserve the United States of America from destruction by so severely crippling an enemy in the wake of his initial surprise attack that a second strike would be greatly weakened, and a third one impossible.

Although manned bombers were the delivery vehicles available in the greatest numbers to the Communist Far East strike forces in August 1958, it was expected that in the years between 1962 and 1965 a portion of the offensive responsibility would be transferred to cruise or ballistic missiles. If missile units were not deployed to Communist China in the decade beginning with 1960, the missile threat to Okinawa would be solely from U.S.S.R.-based IRBM's or from submarine-launched missiles, probably turbojet rather than rocket types. This seemed a reasonable expectation, since logic pointed to the Soviet ICBM force's being reserved for the United States proper and deployed SAC forces, while the shorter range missiles would be programmed for targets in Japan, South Korea, and Europe.

According to estimates prepared by the Directorate of Estimates, ACS/Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF, for the USAF Ad Hoc Committee on

Missile Force Survival, the Soviet bloc would have the following offensive forces directed against targets in the Far East by mid-1964: 1,350 light jet bombers (580 Soviet, 680 Chinese Communist, and 90 North Korean), of which 1,012 should be operationally ready; 240 medium jet bombers (180 Soviet and 60 Chinese Communist), with 160 of these probably operationally ready; and 40 Soviet IRBM's--20 to be delivered in the initial strike, 10 two hours later, and the final 10 four hours after the first launch. In addition, the Headquarters, USAF Ad Hoc Committee on Missile Force Survival estimated that the Russians would then have a total of 150 submarine-launched turbojet cruise missiles with a range of 500 nautical miles and about 170 improved submarine cruise missiles with a 1,000-nautical mile range. The number of missiles in this last category was expected to level off at 300 in the 1966-1970 period.

The same USAF ACS/I Directorate of Estimates assessed the nuclear yield of the weapon which would be carried by medium bombers of the Soviet Air Force during the decade of the Sixties at 10 megatons, that carried by light bombers at two to three megatons, that installed in IRBM warheads until 1965 at one megaton, and that installed in IRBM warheads after 1965 at three megatons. The USAF Ad Hoc Committee on Missile Force Survival estimated that Soviet IRBM's would land within one to two nautical miles of their intended target, while the submarine-launched cruise missiles would vary between one and 10 nautical miles in accuracy.

Turning aside from the study of Target Okinawa, the USAF ACS/Intelligence people sought to envisage the entire world-wide picture

as Soviet planners would see it in preparing an IREM attack in 1964. Again, as with Okinawa, it was expected that 50 per cent of the missiles would be launched in the initial attack, 25 per cent two hours later, and the final 25 per cent four hours after the first ones had been sent on their way. With an estimated three missiles assigned to each target, 432 IREM's should be launched against the 144 tactical missile sites, 189 more should be directed against the 63 fighter bomber groups, and 300 should be aimed at targets of opportunity. The warhead yields would vary between 20 kilotons and two megatons. It could be expected that an additional 479 missiles would be kept in reserve. Besides the IREM's, 50 submarines would launch 100 missiles against 50 U.S. naval bases and air bases overseas.

It could be expected that the possibility of obtaining strategic warning of an impending Soviet attack would diminish greatly with the transfer of a major portion of the offensive role from manned bombers to missiles. The number and scope of preparatory actions required for an attack against American forces would be reduced to a minimum in the 1960-1970 missile era. For example, if the preparatory actions necessary for an attack by manned bombers were carried out over a long period of time, they might be concealed, particularly if disguised in the form of routine air maneuvers involving mass flights, large scale operations at advanced bases, and polar and ocean reconnaissance. Strategic indicators of impending attack could, in fact, become so subtle and ambiguous that an interpretation or recognition of them would become impossible.

The second type of warning--tactical warning--was largely dependent

on adequate detection equipment (radar) and swift communications. The ballistic missile posed a particular threat through its ability to overfly the detection capability of equipment either on hand or programmed; and, even if it were detected, its tremendous speed would sharply curtail the reaction time. If a large force of Soviet Badger and Beagle aircraft made a level approach at 50,000 feet, the Ryukyus Air Defense System might be expected to detect them at 220 to 230 nautical miles, giving defense and retaliatory forces a warning time of 23 to 26 minutes. Should the same force approach at 1,000 feet, then climb to an altitude of 20,000 to 25,000 feet for the bombing run, however, the detection range should shrink to 90 to 100 nautical miles, and the warning time to 11-13 minutes. As for the IRBM missiles' attack, there would be no detection and no warning.

Because they would allow no warning, the IRBM's could be expected to compose the weapon delivery vehicles assigned for the initial attack on Okinawa. Reference has previously been made to the Russian submarine-launched missile force. Actually, it was unlikely that it would be employed against Okinawa, owing to the fact that the submarines' inferior accuracy should make it more profitable to assign them to area targets on the coastal periphery of the United States, or to urban targets in Great Britain, the European continent, or even Japan. Besides, IRBM's could easily reach Okinawa from launching bases within the Soviet Union.

Following the initial IRBM attack by 10 to 15 missiles, it was believed that a manned bomber mission would be mounted, consisting of 60-70 Soviet Badgers and 50-100 Chinese Communist Beagles. Since Okinawa

contained the greatest concentration of U.S. nuclear-capable forces in the Far East, it was assumed that the Badgers would carry weapons of 10-megaton yield--the largest these aircraft could accommodate. As for the Chinese Beagles, they were expected to carry only high explosive bombs of conventional type. If a third wave were found desirable to annihilate the 313th Air Division's offensive capabilities, it would probably take the form of another IRBM attack, in this case by only five to eight missiles, each carrying a one-megaton yield warhead.

In evaluating the attacks by manned bombers, analysts assumed that 90 per cent of the aircraft taking off would be able to deliver their weapons, subject to circular error probability (CEP) limitations, against the target, unless they were first destroyed by active defense. Further, on the premise that some 80 Badgers and Beagles would be sent against Okinawa and that they would employ the tactic of a low approach, only climbing for the bombing run, it could not be expected that the fighter interceptor aircraft would be able to contribute significantly to the island's defense, in view of the mere 11 to 13 minutes' warning time. As a result, the total active defense reaction would have to be assumed by the Nike Hercules defense missiles assigned to the Army on Okinawa. Since it was probable that White Beach, as well as Kadena, Naha, and Futema Airfields and the Mace sites, would be subjected to first-wave missile attacks, four of the Nike Hercules sites would likely be knocked out, leaving only four to oppose the 80 aircraft comprising the second attack wave. According to calculations worked out by the Rand Corporation, local defense missiles of this type could be expected to account for two

kills per site, making a total of eight planes destroyed, with the other 72 free to attack their targets.

There were three possible configurations which the Mace project could assume. First, two unhardened launching sites could be built at Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields. Second, the two launching sites at Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields could be hardened and all 60 missiles concentrated there. Third, hardened launching sites could be constructed at Bolo AAF, Motobu AAF, Motobu Quarry, Ginbaru, West Easley, and Camp Schwab, thus providing a degree of dispersal.

If only two IRBM's were dispatched against unhardened sites at Bolo and Motobu, it was estimated that none of the 60 TM-76B missiles would survive this initial attack. If, however, these two facilities were hardened, 37 Maces should survive a similar attack by one IRBM against each site. Again, if four IRBM's were employed, 30 Maces could be expected to come through. Should eight IRBM's be unleashed, the number of surviving Maces should be only 18. Anf if 12 IRBM's were directed against hardened sites at Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields, it should not be expected that more than three TM-76B missiles would remain operational. This was infinitely better than the showing which would be possible for the same number of soft sites, but it was far from satisfactory, inasmuch as the same analysts anticipated that 10 to 15 IRBM's would be used in this initial attack. The immense advantages of dispersal when combined with hardening were, therefore, made manifest by the calculations evolved for the six-site system. Under this arrangement, if only two missiles were employed against Mace installations on

Okinawa, 48 out of 60 birds could and should survive. If four IRBM's were launched, there should still be 41 surviving TM-76B's. Even when eight IRBM's were thrown against the six sites, 35 missiles could be expected to remain operational. Finally, if 12 IRBM's were brought to bear, 27 Mace missiles should be available for the retaliatory strike.

Under the terms of the theoretical attack conjured up by the analysts, the assault delivered by the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles would be followed up by a second assault from 80 medium/light bombers, each carrying thermonuclear weapons with a yield of 10 megatons. If two aircraft were sent against the 37 birds remaining at hardened sites on Bolo and Motobu Auxiliary Air Fields following the first wave, 22 per cent of the missiles would survive. If four bombers attacked the two sites, only five per cent would emerge unscathed. If six bombers were employed, just one per cent would remain. And if 12 aircraft were utilized, none of the TM-76B missiles would survive.

By contrast, if two bombers were sent against the surviving missiles at the six hardened sites which the PACAF conference favored, 73 per cent of the missiles would still come through. Should the number of bombers assigned to their destruction be increased to four, 46 per cent of the Maces should survive. Six bombers would reduce the operational weapons to 21 per cent. While 12 bombers would leave only four per cent of the Mace missile force available for retaliation.

From the foregoing calculations, the analysts concluded that if the PACAF Mace system were limited to a soft configuration, the U.S.S.R. would not have to increase its missile or bomber force requirements

significantly to render the Okinawa offensive missile forces completely ineffective. In the next instance, if the Mace installations were restricted to just two sites but were hardened, the Soviet force would have to employ nuclear weapons in the megaton rather than the kiloton range. However, such a configuration would not appreciably increase the Russians' requirement for high accuracy sorties by nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. The Mace retaliation capability could be effectively countered by 12 to 15 missiles launched from bases within the Communist Far East.

In the third arrangement, with hardened launch sites prepared at six different locations, Communist forces would be unable to extirpate the Mace weapons by use of a missile force alone. At the same time, it would force the Soviet Union to increase by some 300 to 600 per cent the number of sorties and the nuclear yield of the weapons used against the TM-76B sites.[84]

Measures Included in PACAF OPLAN 112-58A To Enhance Survival Possibilities.

Dispersal and Hardening: The 498th Tactical Missile Group was programmed for deployment to Okinawa in the second quarter of the Fiscal Year 1961 (October-December 1960), equipped with the TM-76B Mace missile, which would feature the Inertial Guidance System. PACAF's Preliminary Operational Plan No. 112-58A of 30 August 1958, which derived largely from the conference of 28 July-6 August at Hickam AFB, placed primary emphasis on maximum utilization of the weapon system's all-weather day and night instant strike capability in support of PACAF's contingency and emergency war plans. In accomplishing this, the planners made every

effort to provide the unit with enough dispersed and hardened facilities for the launch elements and critical support functions to endow the system with the maximum chance of survival.

Since Inertial Guidance would render the TM-76B missiles independent of a ground guidance environment, they would be capable of a quick reaction to enemy attack--a quality greatly enhancing the Pacific Air Forces' EWP potential. The ability of the unit to reply immediately to a surprise attack--hence, its role in the determent of aggression--would depend to a large extent on the manner in which it was manned, equipped, and deployed. Quite obviously, if the group were to possess a high retaliatory capability, it must also have a high degree of invulnerability. Such invulnerability might be acquired by hardening or dispersal of vital elements of the unit, by development of a mobility which would prevent the enemy from pinpointing such vital elements, or by a combination of these methods. However, each method of obtaining invulnerability had its inherent limitations. To harden all elements of the unit sufficiently to insure total survival against thermonuclear weapons would be unconscionably expensive and would not permit the desired rapid rate of fire. On the other hand, complete mobility for the group was limited by terrain considerations, the excessive support in terms of both personnel and equipment that would be involved, and the difficulty of reconciling it with the necessity for having a rapid fire capability permitting instant retaliation. Additionally, in time of peace dispersal would be restricted by the difficulties of land acquisition in an area where every parcel was like a tooth and every owner reluctant to lose it.

In an acknowledgement of these considerations, PACAF's Preliminary OPLAN provided for a combination of hardening and dispersal of the critical combat elements of the 498th Tactical Missile Group in the following manner:

1. Dispersal to the greatest extent possible while confining the sites to real estate already under lease to one of the U.S. Forces.

2. Mobility for those elements of the group having such a requirement, but taking into account terrain limitations (road nets), the tactical situation, and the limitations imposed by the Quick Strike system.

3. Protection of missiles, critical support equipment, and alert personnel to at least 50 psi. Such hardening would provide the weapon system with the ability to survive a nuclear attack, at least in part, and the concomitant capacity for dealing out instant retaliation. Although this was not of prime importance, the fact that hardening would protect the weapon system during typhoons was a bonus benefit not to be dismissed lightly.

The Mission and Projected Deployment of the 498th Tactical Missile Group: The mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, when deployed in the Ryukyu Islands, would consist primarily of providing an all-weather atomic strike force with an immediate and high rate of retaliatory fire. It should be capable of operations in support of (1) instant retaliation; (2) counter-air and interdiction; and (3) the destruction of heavily-defended targets.

The following deployment and dispersal were planned:

1. The Bishagawa Billeting Annex would contain the following:
   a. The 498th Tactical Missile Group Headquarters.
   b. The 873d Tactical Missile Squadron Headquarters.
   c. The 498th Support Squadron Headquarters.
   d. The 498th Communications Squadron Headquarters.
   e. Central housing and messing for the entire group.
   f. The Missile Operations Center (the only hardened facility at Bishagawa).
   g. The central motor pool.
   h. Field maintenance facilities.
   i. Contract maintenance facilities.
   j. A field training detachment.
   k. Supply facilities.
   l. Medical facilities.

2. Bolo AAF, Motobu Quarry, Motobu AAF, and West Easley Range would each house one Quick Strike (QS) and one Normal Launch (NL) hardened package, each of which would contain five missiles. Four of these would be hardened, while the fifth missile of each type would constitute a spare, which meant that tie-down rings would be needed for them. Thus, there would be a total of 10 missiles at each site--eight of them hardened, giving these four sites 32 hardened and eight unhardened missiles.

3. In addition, Camp Schwab and Ginbaru would both accommodate two NL hardened packages, each site supporting 10 missiles—

eight of them hardened. Again, tie-down rings would be required for the two unhardened birds at each site. The 20 TM-76B missiles at Ginbaru and Camp Schwab added to the 40 at Bolo, Motobu AAF, Motobu Quarry, and West Easley Range brought to 60 the total number of Mace missiles to be assigned the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

4. Housekeeping for the rotational personnel on duty at the Motobu Auxiliary Air Field and Motobu Quarry launch sites would be performed by the former Yae Take Air Station--inactivated as an AC&W site on 1 June 1958--which would also serve as the main communications relay point. (Yae Take was already acting as a microwave relay point between the STRATCOM Receiver Site on Ie Shima and the STRATCOM Communications Center at Kadena Air Base). Logistic support of the other four launch sites--Bolo AAF, West Easley Range, Camp Schwab, and Ginbaru--would be performed at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex. In addition, Kadena Air Base itself was to accommodate three H-21's or equivalent helicopters, as well as administrative support aircraft, to support the remote missile and communications sites.

In the event that cross-service agreements could not be arranged to permit acquisition of the Motobu Quarry, Ginbaru, selected portions of Camp Schwab, or West Easley Range, certain criteria should be observed in selecting substitute sites. First, they should not be closer than three miles to an adjacent site or major target complex. Second, every effort should be made to select sites located along existing road nets. Third, real estate already under lease to U.S. Forces should be utilized if at all possible.

Target Requirements of the 498th Tactical Missile Group: The 498th Tactical Missile Group was to be assigned specific pre-planned PACAF contingency and EWP targets which were regarded as threats to PACOM and were, at the same time, susceptible of attack by the weapon system. Normally, Fifth Air Force would be expected to assign these targets to the group, taking full advantage of the day and night all-weather atomic strike capability of the TM-76B missile. For its part, the group was to be constantly capable of attacking all targets within its effective range, initiating the necessary strikes in accordance with procedures set forth in applicable atomic SOP's.

Command Control of the 498th Tactical Missile Group: The 498th Tactical Missile Group would be assigned to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, and would execute atomic strikes only. Under current planning and procedures, any strikes would be launched only after the Fifth Air Force Commander had given specific approval. The individual launch teams were not delegated the "authority to expend" their missiles under peacetime planning. However, PACAF recognized that this very restrictive policy might be revised in the future, in view of the strong possibility that communications with the sites might be completely destroyed by an enemy nuclear attack. For this reason it seemed rather likely that a contingency clause would subsequently be included in the procedures to permit individual launch action under certain specified conditions. After all, it would be sheer folly to have the Mace missiles sit idly by awaiting destruction, for lack of instructions from the Fifth Air Force Commander to launch them in retaliation. It was entirely possible that

the first hostile bombs would have wiped out not only the communications systems but even the Commander himself.[85]

Mobility Requirements of the Mace System: To incorporate hardening into the TM-76B weapons system would not necessarily detract from its mobility, although that would seem to be the natural consequence, because the equipment was to remain on wheels. PACAF Preliminary OPLAN 112-58A did, however, substitute standard military vehicles and flat bed trailers for MM-1's wherever possible, as it was difficult to justify employment of the latter specialized type of vehicles on an island as small as Okinawa. Moreover, incidentally, this substitution would result in a considerable savings in funds which would otherwise have had to be spent on the expensive MM-1's.

Manpower Estimates for the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

Perhaps the foremost concept connected with the Mace weapon system was that the 313th Air Division would thereby acquire a Quick Strike capability. Yet, the PACAF planners quickly discovered that Quick Strike and hardening were inimical to each other, since the former demanded manning on a 24-hour-a-day basis, 365 days a year, while the existing organization tables (OT's) provided for manning only eight hours per day. Furthermore, the current OT's were not compatible with the requirements for manning and equipping the Quick Strike packages. Consequently, it became necessary to deviate from existing organization tables in preparing OPLAN 112-58A, so that a new organisational concept came naturally into being.

The manpower estimates for each unit were as follows: the 498th

Tactical Missile Group Headquarters would consist of 23 officers and 51 airmen; the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron would be made up of 35 officers and 329 airmen; the 498th Communications Squadron would comprise six officers, one warrant officer, and 311 airmen; and the 498th Support Squadron would contain 21 officers, four warrant officers, and 424 airmen. Thus, the total strength of the group would be 1,205 men--84 officers, five warrant officers, and 1,115 airmen.

The group headquarters, to be situated at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, would include all of the functions--command, unit supply, personnel, operations, intelligence, materiel, maintenance, training, and communications--considered normal to a missile organization headquarters. In addition, it would have a consolidated personnel records section and would assume responsibility for data computation.

The 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, with its headquarters similarly located at Bishagawa, would contain five tactical missile flights each composed of five launch teams. Four of these teams would operate Quick Strike sites, while the fifth would operate a Slow Strike site. The QS sites would operate on an alert status, 24 hours per day, the ground power repairmen and electrical power production repairmen both being provided by the 498th Support Squadron. Each launch team would include 13 different AFSC's.

The 498th Communications Squadron would be responsible for operating and maintaining point-to-point VHF/UHF primary and HF secondary communications equipment on a 24-hour-a-day basis. Its personnel would man the two Communications Centers--Bishagawa and Yae Take--the MOC

(which was to be hardened), three missile flight headquarters (likewise hardened), and four relay sites. The construction of land lines would be the responsibility of the 5th Communications Group and the 24th Communications Construction Squadron, assisted by the 6313th Communications Squadron, until such time as the 498th TMG became operational. Crypto operation and organizational maintenance would be provided by the 498th Communications Squadron, but field maintenance would be furnished by Kadena. Radio operation and maintenance would provide visual as well as concealed radio service at each of the six operating sites.

The 498th Support Squadron at Bishagawa would be responsible for all housekeeping services for the personnel based there and at Yae Take. In this connection, incidentally, food service was not included under the heading of "organic support", as it was to be supplied by the 6313th Food Service Squadron at Kadena AB on a 24-hour-per-day feeding schedule. Maintenance and repair were similarly to be the responsibility of the 6313th Installations Squadron, while medical services would be furnished by the 6332d USAF Dispensary at Kadena.

Although the original plans had contemplated that the launch crews would assemble their missiles, it was now deemed wiser to add personnel with those AFSC's peculiar to guidance and control mechanization not found in the launch or maintenance capability. The team would assemble new missiles--i.e., those required for training or found to be damaged after the unit had been declared operationally ready. Periodic and field maintenance of the three helicopters to be assigned the group would be the responsibility of the 18th Field Maintenance Squadron at Kadena. To provide fire protection the 498th Support Squadron would operate the

necessary fire trucks or supporting equipment on a reduced basis for structural fires at each of the seven sites, 24 hours a day. Organizational type maintenance of motor vehicles would be performed at Bishagawa, but the responsibility for field maintenance would rest with the 6313th Transportation Squadron at Kadena. Other functions of the 498th Support Squadron would include security, special weapons, supply administration, warehousing, POL, ground power equipment maintenance, and motor vehicle operation.

Tactics and Functions of the Mace Missile Flights.

Under the provisions of PACAF Preliminary OPLAN 112-58A, the 498th Tactical Missile Group was to be constantly capable of destroying preselected EWP and contingency targets located within operational range of the weapon system on Okinawa.

The 498th TMG would be equipped with 60 TM-76B missiles, which were to be uncrated, assembled, and checked out by the missile maintenance and launch team at Bishagawa before delivery to the hardened complexes. At the launch area final assembly would be completed with the mounting of the nose section and booster bottle on the "bird" proper, the latter nesting on its trans-launcher. The assembled missiles would then be driven into their respective hardened shelters--those in the Quick Strike igloos being connected to the hardened launch control packs and maintained on a QS alert, while those in the Normal Launch hardened shelters would be stored and maintained in an operationally ready condition until such time as they were required for launching.

In the Quick Strike complexes, any malfunctions of the weapon system

would be indicated automatically, since the missiles were continually monitored by the launch control equipment. If any missile went out of commission, this fact would be reflected on the launch control panel by metering which would display to the alert launch team personnel the news that the missile was in a "no-go" status. As soon as the launch control team was apprised of this, it would contact the missile maintenance people, who would, through the use of the systems test van, determine which components had malfunctioned. The offending "black box" would then be removed by the maintenance team and turned into Supply, which would immediately issue a new component for installation in the missile. Supply, for its part, would turn in the malfunctioning unit to the Martin contract facility for repair, the missile maintenance personnel being unable to repair the so-called "black boxes".

Roving maintenance or launch teams would check the status of missiles in the Normal Launch hardened shelters periodically. The concept of turn-in and replacement of malfunctioning parts evolved for the QS missiles would also apply to the Normal Launch birds.

One-third of the 498th's combat strength was to be on alert at all times. Until actual experience could provide a more accurate yardstick, it must be assumed that 20 per cent of the missile unit equipment would be undergoing maintenance or be MOCP (Missile Out of Commission for Parts) at all times. For this reason, the actual number of missiles on alert would be one-third of 48--or 16. This alert requirement would be fulfilled by the use of four launch teams each eight-hour shift, employing hardened launch control QS equipment capable of launching four missiles per team

in a 23-minute period. Combat support activities would be maintained in a similar degree of alert.

Each QS complex would be issued five missiles, of which four would be classified as "hot birds" (missiles ready for instantaneous firing) and would be housed in individual igloos hardened to a minimum of 50 psi. All four igloos would be placed under the same earth cover facing a common aircraft paved area with two Portland-cement concrete blast-off pads, two underground igloos for alert control, and one underground igloo for the alert crew. These structures were all to be air-conditioned and equipped with filters against chemicals, biological agents, and radiation. The entire area was to be protected by security fencing and lighting.

In order to be capable of immediate retaliation at all times, these QS sites were to be manned 24 hours a day. This made it necessary to provide five launch teams for each QS package--i.e., four hardened missiles on continuous alert--making a total of 20 launch teams for QS operations. In addition, there were to be two types of Normal Launch complexes--those with four missiles, which would be operated from an alert control igloo, and those with eight missiles, which would be operated from a mobile control pack. The Normal Launch missiles were to be houses two per igloo--said igloos being air-conditioned, equipped with chemical-biological-radiation filters, and having one blast-off pad per complex. In each case, a security fence and lights would be required.

Five more launch teams would be needed to man the two Normal Launch packages on a rotational basis. As an example of how this would work,

the five teams at Motobu AAF would make the staffing of the four hardened QS missiles located there on a 24-hour basis their primary task. However, having fired these alert birds, the teams would then turn to the four hardened Normal Launch birds stored immediately adjacent and attend to their launching. In the case of the Normal Launch packages at Camp Schwab and Ginbaru, the rotational launch teams would fire their missiles at the normal rate of fire possible from these locations.

If the situation prevented anything more than tactical warning, it would theoretically be possible to launch 17 Maces in 23 minutes; while strategic warning, permitting full utilization of all launch crews and available equipment, would make it possible to launch 10 birds in the first eight minutes, or a total of 26 missiles in the initial 23 minutes. These time factors were based on current ARDC planning for "rapid fire", with additional time allowed for the movement of the missiles from their shelters to the launch position.

In computing the minimum TM-76B items that would be required in the QS package, PACAF made the following assumptions:

1. The missile would be launched within the immediate area of the culvert-shelter.

2. Communications would be available in each shelter.

3. Completely assembled and serviced missiles could be moved into and out of the shelters.

4. Boosters and nose cones (with warheads) would be installed before the missiles were placed in the shelter.

5. The power necessary for launching the missiles and maintaining heat on the gyros would be hardened within each complex, making it self-sufficient.

6. The theodolites would be installed on the missile prime-mover for the Normal Launch packages and in the shelter for Quick Strike missiles.

7. The alert personnel required to launch missiles would be located within the hardened culverts. Additional equipment which was to be hardened within the package included prime-movers, power packs, launch control packs, 150-KVA diesel-driven generators, Inertial Guidance hold units, engine start units, launch control boxes, hydraulic units, missile air-conditioning units, and combustion units.

8. Provisions for radiation detection, ventilation (air-conditioning), fire hazard control, and personnel escape would be incorporated into each shelter complex.

The major difference between the Quick Strike and Normal Launch hardened packages was that in the latter the wings were folded, while in the former they were unfolded, thus necessitating a structure 26 feet wide for Quick Strike missiles and only 12 feet wide for the Normal Launch weapons.

Quick Strike Complex Construction.

The four hardened missile igloos or "tunnels" in the QS complexes, each housing a single missile, were to be constructed as reinforced-concrete barrel sections with separate concrete slab floors laid over resilient material. These igloos would be 75 feet long, 25 feet wide, and have a clear height of 16'6". At one end there would be a blast-resistant, positive-opening drawbridge-type door, which would drop over

a debris moat. The concrete floor would be designed to support a 15,000-pound axle loading, with center tracks installed for the missile vehicle. The igloos would be air-conditioned and provided with a manually-operated foam deluge system for fire protection. The air-conditioning equipment would be installed in an area at the far end of one of the tunnels, where it would serve the entire hardened complex.

Additional hardened structures for the launch control equipment would be located between the missile tunnels, enabling each to control two missiles. These buildings--34 feet long, 12 feet wide, and 10 feet high--would comprise reinforced-concrete barrel sections with separate concrete slab floors on resilient material. Within would be areas 15' x 12' in size for the launch control room itself and 12' x 12' for the storage room. Each structure would be air-conditioned and provided with a manually-operated foam deluge system for fire protection.

A hardened alert crew igloo would be provided in the center of the four-missile tunnel complex, it, too, being built in the form of a reinforced-concrete barrel section with a concrete slab floor on top of resilient material. Sixty-four feet long, 12 feet wide, and 10 feet high, this alert crew tunnel would include areas 25' x 12' in dimension for the alert living quarters, 12' x 14' for a communications room, and 18' x 12' for a generator room housing two 150-KW diesel-driven generators. A personnel access tunnel with a blast door would permit replacement of the generators when needed. This alert crew building would also be air-conditioned, quite naturally, and would be equipped with a manually-operated foam deluge fire protection system. Circulation for the personnel would be supplied by means of a seven-foot diameter reinforced-

concrete pipe passageway.

The missile tunnels, launch control igloos, and the alert crew structure were to be connected with one another by seven-foot diameter passageways designed to withstand pressures equal to those which the missile tunnels were capable of withstanding. Blast doors would be provided at each tunnel opening. These seven buildings (four missile igloos, two launch control tunnels, and one alert crew structure) were to be constructed as a group or complex, with hardening provided by a continuous cover of compacted earth sufficiently deep to furnish protection against a minimum of 50 psi overpressure. A hardened fuel storage tank would also be located underground in each complex.

Normal Launch Complex Construction at Sites Having Quick Strike Complexes.

The two missile tunnels in the Normal Launch complexes installed at sites also having QS complexes (Bolo AAF, West Easley Range, Motobu Quarry, and Motobu AAF) would be designed to accommodate two missiles each, stored in tandem, and were to be structurally similar to the QS facilities described above. However, since each tunnel would be housing two missiles instead of one, the tubes had to be 125 feet long; while the fact that the wings would be folded permitted reduction of the width to 12 feet. Of course the clear height remained the same--16'6".

As with the QS complexes, a hardened structure containing launch control equipment would be constructed between the two missile tunnels. In design it would be similar to the Quick Strike facilities described above, though its dimensions of 55' x 12' x 10' clear height made it somewhat larger. Included would be a launch control room, two 150-KW

diesel-driven generators, a communications room, air-conditioning equipment, and a parts room. A seven-foot wide passageway with blast doors, similar to that to be provided for the QS complexes, would connect the two missile tunnels and the launch control igloo. These three structures were to be grouped and hardened in a manner similar to that adopted for the QS complex. In those cases where terrain conditions permitted, the QS and Normal Launch complexes could be located side by side and hardened by continuous earth mounding.

Normal Launch Complex Construction at Camp Schwab and Ginbaru.

The four Normal Launch tunnels containing two missiles each, to be located at both Camp Schwab and Ginbaru, would be identical with the corresponding Normal Launch igloos at the other four sites--i.e., 125' x 12' x 16'6". The other facilities would also be generally the same, except that the two launch control buildings would follow the design of those used with the Quick Strike complexes--34' x 12' x 10'.

Support Facilities for the Launch Sites.

Each of the launch sites was to be provided with an access road, utilities, and a chain link security fence with anti-climber and security lights, a guard house, and a guard tower. An asphaltic-concrete paved area 130' x 230' in size would be constructed for each QS complex and for the eight-bird Normal Launch complexes at Camp Schwab and Ginbaru. The corresponding area for the four-bird Normal Launch complexes at Motobu Quarry, Bolo AAF, West Easley Range, and Motobu AAF would be only 130' x 150' in dimensions. There would also be a concrete blast pad 50 feet square and two feet thick for each missile tunnel. Hardened

trenching from the launch control room to the launch pad would be provided for the electronic system connections required for launching missiles. In addition, a revetted area with tie-down rings was to be prepared for the fifth (back-up) missile at each complex, primarily to secure the un-garaged birds against typhoons. Other items which would be accommodated at the sites were fuel and water storage, water supply, buildings for the storage of Mace equipment, and sentry shelters, their exact locations being dependent upon the arrangement of cross-service agreements.

Support Base Requirements.

The support base for the 498th Tactical Missile Group, to be located at the Bishagawa Billeting Annex, would contain the following typhoon-resistant, but unhardened, facilities:

(1) A 7,360-SF building for the group headquarters, housing personnel for the normal administration and peacetime operation of the unit, to cost $120,000.

(2) A 5,545-SF building for the normal administration and peacetime operation of the 498th Support Squadron, to cost $66,000.

(3) A 5,545-SF building for the 873d Tactical Missile Squadron, containing areas for administration, operations and training, to cost $66,000.

(4) A two-stall fire station, to cost $70,000.

(5) A 6,240-SF building for use as a contractor maintenance facility, to cost $82,000.

(6) A 6,240-SF building for the missile field maintenance activities, to cost $65,000.

(7) A 6,240-SF supply warehouse for the storage of missile supplies and equipment, to cost $57,000.

(8) Facilities for a central motor pool for the field maintenance of special purpose vehicles, general purpose vehicles, and ground support equipment. The motor pool area of 22,220 square yards, to cost $73,000, would be used for the parking and maintenance of assigned vehicles, and should be designed to support a 15,000-pound axle loading. In addition, a vehicle refueling station ($6,000), a 2,400-barrel mogas storage tank ($14,000), and an 8,750-SF automotive maintenance shop ($84,000), as well as a 652-SF automotive maintenance administration building ($14,000) were to be provided. Necessary security fencing, to cost $8,000, should also be included.

(9) Personnel support facilities would consist of nine 94-man dormitories, costing $1,300,000; a 500-man dining hall, costing $207,000; five four-man BOQ's, costing $80,000; a 4,000-SF post exchange, costing $30,000; a 4,012-SF dispensary, costing $122,000; and a 300-seat theater, costing $165,000.

(10) Utilities support facilities would include an electric sub-station ($10,000) and a 250,000-gallon water storage tank ($33,000).

(11) A hardened Missile Operations Center (MOC) 200' x 60' in size, costing $95,000, would be constructed of corrugated steel culvert sections with steel reinforcing ribs. Half of the structure would be given over to the MOC proper, while the other half would house the Communications Center. The entire building would be

hardened by a covering of compacted earth of suitable depth. In addition, the access would also be hardened. The MOC would be air-conditioned and should contain two 15-KW generators for emergency power.

(12) An identical hardened Alternate MOC, also costing $95,000, was to be provided at the Communications Center at Yae Take Air Station, as stand-by for the primary MOC, in the event of the latter's being knocked out.[86]

THE USAFE HARDENED STRUCTURE FOR M-SITES IS FAVORED OVER THAT OF PACAF

At the same time that PACAF and its various subordinate headquarters and the Pacific Ocean Division Engineer were engaged in designing the best possible hardened structures for the Mace missiles, the U.S. Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) were equally busy drawing up their own plans for the same type of weapon. Thus, Headquarters, USAF had an opportunity to study the two designs side by side, comparing their relative points of superiority and inferiority, and eventually to decide that one should be adopted in preference to the other. Perhaps the greatest putative advantage possessed by the USAFE design over that of PACAF was the feature which allowed the missile to be fired from within the structure, thus reducing both exposure and reaction times. What was more, the cost of this eight-bird igloo had been estimated at roughly the same figure as that for two of PACAF's four-bird Quick Strike shelters.

There was, however, one defect in this concrete panacea which USAFE had devised. As yet, all that was known about it was what had been worked out on the drawing boards and cranked out of the calculating

machines. Whether it would actually be feasible to fire the TM-76B missiles from within their shelters, in view of the attendant pressures which would be developed, was something which could not be known until tests had been conducted. This was a case in which the mathematical must yield to the empirical. Too much would be at stake to risk everything on more calculations unsupported by experiments. In this connection, Headquarters, USAF was already developing a test program to determine the practicability of the USAFE shelter and firing system, but it would be some time before any definite conclusions could be arrived at.

On 20 September 1958, CINCPACAF informed Fifth Air Force that drawings and cost estimates of the USAFE structure were being hand-carried to Fuchu Air Station by members of a USAF/PACAF missile team. As soon as Fifth's Installations people had had an opportunity to study these data, they should prepare a cost estimate and express the position of their headquarters relative to the substitution of the USAFE structure for that of PACAF.[87]

Headquarters, USAF had indicated to PACAF that the personnel requirements of the latter's OPLAN 112-58A were excessive. As the first step in trimming unnecessary fat, PACAF eliminated some of the communications spaces that had been included in the plan. And, as of 20 September, when its TWX was dispatched to Fifth Air Force, further reductions were in the mill, based upon guidance recently provided by the Tactical Air Command. Worse yet, CINCPACAF was at pains to point out, no additional 1959 MCP facility funds were available, so that full group deployment

would probably have to be phased into Okinawa in conformance with phased construction.

When these various actions had been completed, CINCPACAF would amend its OPLAN 112-58A accordingly and submit it to USAF for approval.[88]

In the event, after officials at Fifth Air Force had been briefed on the USAFE structure by representatives of USAF Headquarters, they found themselves in agreement with PACAF's opinion that it should be adopted instead of the PACAF design. At the same time, though, they wished to provide against the possibility that the tests soon to be made would demonstrate firing from within the structure to be impracticable. For this reason, they desired that the USAFE igloo be redesigned in such a way as to permit the missile to be hauled outside for firing, as had been proposed originally by Fifth at the time the PACAF structure was being conceived and pieced together. This precaution was felt to be desirable in order to prevent the question of hardening the Mace missiles from becoming bogged down in debate such as had smothered the ZEL project when a difference of opinion arose about launching the fighter-bomber aircraft from within the proposed ZEL structure.*

Since the USAF representative had stated that his headquarters would design and test the USAFE shelter and would furnish design drawings to Fifth Air Force, the latter proposed to take no action on the structure until it had received these drawings. Meantime, Fifth would proceed with the necessary real estate action to obtain cross-service agreements for those launch areas required for Mace but not presently

*See History of the 313th Air Division, 1 January - 30 June 1956, Vol. I, pp. 453-484, for an account of the ZEL project.

under USAF control--viz., Motobu Quarry, Camp Schwab, Ginbaru, and West Easley Range.[89]

On 7 October CINCPACAF advised USAF and Detachment #1, ARDC, of his headquarters' stand on the relative merits of the PACAF and USAFE hardening plans in language which was virtually an echo of Fifth Air Force's TWX. While concurring in the substitution of the USAFE hardened launch structure for the type of shelter described in OPLAN 112-58A, PACAF made its acquiescence contingent upon successful test firing of Mace missiles from within the igloo. If the actual tests revealed this to be impracticable, PACAF asked that the structure be redesigned to permit external launchings such as were specified in OPLAN 112-58A. While understanding that Headquarters, USAFE would initiate the necessary action for the design of a standardized hardened eight-missile launch complex, PACAF hoped that engineers from its headquarters would be ordered on temporary duty to USAFE Headquarters at Wiesbaden, Germany, to expedite completion of the coordinated USAFE/PACAF design.[90]

In a follow-up to its promise of 1 October to PACAF, Fifth Air Force formally requested 313th Air Division on the 27th of that month to begin whatever real estate action was necessary for the acquisition of the projected Mace sites which were under the control of other services.[91]

Meanwhile, Headquarters, USAFE had indicated its desire that the TM-76B facilities for both the European and Pacific theaters be designed in the United States. Respecting this request, USAF immediately began to seek a design agent. In the interim, PACAF was asked to obtain data

on soil composition of the Okinawan sites to a depth of 20 feet, including the shear modulus and the average or specific seismic velocities. In conveying this message to Fifth Air Force, PACAF asked that headquarters to furnish, at the earliest possible date, site maps showing all boundaries of the area which would be required to accommodate the TM-76B facilities. These plans should be sufficiently complete to permit definite location of the sites on which the soils investigations would be made.[92] As for the soils investigations themselves, PACAF proposed that the Pacific Ocean Division of the Army Corps of Engineers carry them out, after first obtaining the required authorization and P-313 funds from the Office of the Chief Engineer.[93]

In a manifestation of sweet unreasonableness, Fifth Air Force radioed this headquarters at 1400I on 5 November that it had an "urgent need" for the geographical coordinates of the missile sites at Bolo, Motobu, Motobu Quarry, West Easley Range, Camp Schwab, and Ginbaru. Perhaps the reader of these lines will ask what was unreasonable about such a request, since the information was presumably already available or, even if it was not, was at least obtainable without too much difficulty. The answer is that the last paragraph of Fifth Air Force's message indicated that the data should be submitted to PACAF not later than November 5th--but the TWX was not received by this headquarters until November 6th![94] This called for a bit more prestidigitation than the engineers here at 313th were capable of performing. Under the circumstances, the best they could do was get off a radiogram with the information desired at 1000Z, 7 November. Therein PACAF was informed that the Bolo site would be located at

26°35' N., 128°08' E.; and Ginbaru would be 26°27' N., 127°57' E.[95]

By 13 November this headquarters felt that the M-sites at Bolo, Motobu AAF, Motobu Quarry, Ginbaru, and Bishagawa had become sufficiently firm to permit soils investigations. In apprising Fifth Air Force of this situation, however, 313th noted that a definite siting for the Mace shelters on the West Easley Range was still under study, while that at Camp Schwab could be determined as soon as a field survey then being performed by the Okinawa Engineer District was completed.[96]

Great temerity is demanded of those who would plunge into the morasses of fiscal matters. This makes it, then, all the more to the credit of CINCPACAF that he informed the USAF Chief of Staff on 20 November that the cost of the Okinawa M-site program would run approximately $3,100,000 above the present estimate. A total of $7,816,000 had been included in PACAF's FY-60 Military Construction Program--$5,816,000 in the FY-59 Military Construction Authorization Program and $2,000,000 in the FY-60 MCP. The latest cost estimates, however, indicated that the Okinawa M-site operational facility would cost around $10,900,000. Obviously, then, additional funds in the approximate amount of $3,100,000 would be needed. This cost figure was based on $3,200,000 for soft housekeeping and maintenance facilities, plus a hardened communications facility at Bishagawa; $115,000 for a hardened communications facility at Yae Take; and approximately $7,600,000 for the hardened firing complex--based on the USAFE design--at the six launch sites.

Since PACAF had been advised that design work on the hardened TM-76B firing complex would be done in the United States, probably under

the aegis of ARDC, it was recognized that no realistic cost estimate could be prepared until these shelters had been designed and site-adapted to Okinawa. The cost estimates for the hardened firing complex could be refined at a later date, after ARDC had completed the final design.[97]

Back on 8 July 1958, PACAF had assured Headquarters, USARYIS that the 313th Air Division would provide billeting, messing, and support facilities at Yae Take Air Station for the tropospheric scatter terminal which the Army planned to install there, as well as 3.116 acres for the facility itself. On 7 October, however, CINCPACAF was forced to notify CINCUSARPAC that recent planning in connection with a new weapons system for Okinawa (Mace) had revealed a previously unrealized requirement for the use of all facilities at Yae Take beginning with the second quarter of the Fiscal Year 1961. In view of this altered situation, PACAF would now have to deny the Army the promised support for its personnel at Yae Take after that date.[98]

It would seem that USARYIS did not give up easily, however; for we find representatives of this headquarters again informing the Army officials early in December that a "new PACAF requirement" might make it impossible to provide the facilities committed earlier. Since no Organization Tables for the 498th Tactical Missile Group were available, 313th had no way of determining the exact number of 498th personnel who would need to be supported at Yae Take. But, assuming that the Quick Strike concept were adopted, it appeared that there would be insufficient billeting to accommodate the USARYIS personnel additionally. The normal billeting capacity of the former Yae Take Air Station had been 10 officers and

120 airmen, while the messing facilities had been designed to support around 300 people.

On the optimistic side of the picture, however, there were two buildings--one a 1,370-square-foot transmitter building now enjoying desuetude, the other a 3,350-square-foot AC&W operations building equally idle--which would probably not be required for their original purposes when the site was reoccupied by personnel of the 498th TMG. Thus, it was possible that the Army might be able to rehabilitate these structures to accommodate its personnel for the tropospheric scatter terminal.[99]

Thus stood the Mace Missile Program as 1958 came to an end. No construction had been started, and the actual design of the shelters was itself inchoate. In addition, there was talk that the support area might not be located at Bishagawa after all, but might be built on Kadena Air Base proper. However, the general areas for the launching sites had been settled on, and the months ahead would see the project getting up a full head of steam. The Mace Missile story will be continued in the 313th Air Division History for January-June 1961.

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	Memo., Secretary of Defense to Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, sub.: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense, 26 Nov. 1956.
2	--	Daily Journal, Director of Operations (DJ, D/O), Hq., 313th Air Division, 23 Dec. 1958.
3	--	5FOPR-P 51606, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 14/0515Z March 1957.
4	--	Disposition Form (DF), 3130C-T to 313MC-I, sub.: Siting of Squadron, 20 March 1957.
5	--	AFOOP-OP-U 53700, COFS, USAF, to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 20/2010Z March 1957.
6	--	313CC-P C-3-96, Comdr. 313th Air Div. to COFS, USAF, 29/0410Z March 1957.
7	--	FFODP-BU 3108, Comdr. FEAF to COFS USAF, 04/0822Z Apr. 1957.
8	--	Historical Report (HR), D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., Apr. 1957, p. 6.
9	-- --	DJ, D/O, 16 Apr. 1957; 3130C-P C-4-40, Hq., 313th Air Div., to Comdr. FEAF, 16/0815Z Apr. 1957.
10	--	5FOPR-52249, Hq., 5th AF to Comdr. FEAF, 17/0800Z Apr. 1957.
11	--	FFCOT-P 16103, Comdr. FEAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 19/0175Z Apr. 1957.
12	--	Memo., 313th Air Div. O&T Div. Officers to Lieut. Col. Peter F. English, Chief, O&T Div., circa 18 Apr. 1957.
13	--	FFCIE-CR 3475 NOFORN, Comdr. FEAF to COFS USAF, 24/0127Z Apr. 1957.
14	--	FFCOT-P 3649 NOFORN, Comdr. FEAF to COFS, USAF, and Comdr. 5th AF, 01/0741Z May 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
15	--	FFCIS-P 3725, Comdr. FEAF to Comdrs. 5th AF and 13th AF, 06/0420Z May 1957.
16	--	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 18th Air Base Gp., sub.: Concept for Deployment of Tactical Missile Group, 22 July 1957.
17	--	HR, D/O, Hq., 313th Air Div., June 1957, pp. 1, 3.
18	--	Monthly Historical Data Report (MHDR), Office of Installations, Hq., 313th Air Div., June 1957, p. 5.
19	--	Ibid., Aug. 1957, pp. 8-9.
20	--	NOFORN/5FOOT-P 82979, Hq., 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 22/0135Z Aug. 1957.
21	--	5FCIS-P-P 93614/NOFORN, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 25/0655Z Sept. 1957.
22	--	313IE C-10-2, Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 02/0125Z Oct. 1957.
23	-- --	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, sub.: Kadena M-Site Package Project, FY-59 MCP, 7 Oct. 1957; DJ, Office of Installations, Hq., 313th Air Div., 8 Oct. 1957.
24	--	DJ, D/O, 10 Oct. 1957; DJ, Office of Inst., 9 Oct. 1957.
25	--	DJ, Office of Instl., 10 Oct. 1957.
26	--	Ibid.
27	--	PFCIE-ER 13286, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 22/0300Z Oct. 1957.
28	-- --	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, sub.: Kadena M-Site Package Project, FY-59 MCP, 26 Oct. 1957; DJ, Office of Instl., 28 Oct. 1957.
29	--	Ibid., 3 Dec. 1957.
30	--	DJ, D/O, 27 Dec. 1957.
31	--	DJ, Office of Instl., 7 Jan. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
32	--	DJ, Office of Instl., 18 Feb. 1958.
33	--	PFCIE-ER 5145, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5AF, 08/0131Z Jan. 1958.
34	--	PFCIE-ER 5312 NOFORN, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5AF, 11/0345Z Jan. 1958.
35	--	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to CINCPACAF, sub.: Kadena M-Site Package Project, FY-59 MCP, 6 Feb. 1958.
36	--	DJ, D/O, 4 Feb. 1958.
37	--	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 6313th ABW, sub.: On-the-Spot Survey of Planned Missile Sites, 18 Feb. 1958; DJ, D/O, 17 Feb. 1958.
	--	
38	--	HR, D/O, Feb. 1958, pp. 8-9.
39	--	DJ, Office of Instl., 14 Feb. 1958.
40	--	PFCIE-CR 7513, CINCPACAF to CINCPACFLT, 18/0219Z March 1958.
41	--	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 6313th ABW, sub.: PACAF Program Guidance, 31 March 1958.
42	--	Annex A to PACAF Preliminary OPLAN 112-58A for the 498th Tactical Missile Group, sub.: Characteristics, 30 Aug. 1958.
43	--	Ibid.
44	--	Hq., PACAF Preliminary Operational Plan No. 112-58, dtd. 21 March 1958.
45	--	PFCIE-ER 7921, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 29/0423Z March 1958.
46	--	313IE-P C-4-39, Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 09/0250Z Apr. 1958.
47	--	NOFORN 5FOOT-P 42247, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 15/0300Z Apr. 1958.
48	--	Hq., PACAF Preliminary Operational Plan No. 112-58, 21 March 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
49	--	5FOOT-P 41304, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 08/0930Z Apr. 1958.
50	--	5FOOT-P42246D, Comdr. 5th AF to PACAF, 15/0126Z Apr. 1958.
51	--	Ibid.
52	--	PFCIE-ER 827, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 10/0350Z Apr. 1958.
53	--	PFCIE-CR 8311, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 11/0045Z Apr. 1958.
54	--	PFCIE-ER EIBM, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 12/0330Z Apr. 1958.
55	--	PFOOP 154, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 19/0252Z Apr. 1958.
56	--	5FOOT-P GREGTIE, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 23/0815Z Apr. 1958; 5FGOL-P 43698, Comdr. 5th AF to
	--	CINCPACAF, 24/0423Z Apr. 1958.
57	--	NOFORN 3130C-P C-4-126, Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 25/0845Z Apr. 1958.
58	--	5FOOT-P 44640, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 30/0900Z Apr. 1958.
59	--	PFCIE-CR 8835, CINCPACAF to COFS USAF, 24/1955Z Apr. 1958.
60	--	AFOIE-R50049, Hq., USAF to CINCPACAF, 25/2147Z Apr. 1958.
61	--	PFDOP 9536, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/0300Z May 1958.
62	--	5FOOT-P 44511, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. TAC, 30/0405Z Apr. 1958.
63	--	TMAR-M8 10808, Comdr. TAC to Comdr. 5th AF, 061642Z May 1958.
64	--	TMAR-M8 10824, Comdr. TAC to Comdrs. 5th AF and Det. #1, ARDC, 08/1617Z May 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
65	--	5FOOT-P 53621, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 23/1000Z May 1958.
66	--	RIJC YO8849, CINCPACREP Ryukyus to CINCPAC, 03/0134Z June 1958.
67	--	YPFCIE-CR 10051, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 30/0002Z May 1958.
68	--	313IE-P C-6-19, Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 6 June 1958.
69	--	PFDOP 10260, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 06/2015Z June 1958.
70	--	PFCIE-CR 10265, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 07/0020Z June 1958.
71	--	Ltr., Chief, FBIS Okinawa Bureau to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: Matador Launchers at Bolo Point, 5 June 1958.
72	--	PFCIE-ER 10254, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 06/0258Z June 1958.
73	--	PFOOP 10681, CINCPACAF to COFS USAF, 21/0105Z June 1958.
74	--	5FOOT-P 63358, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 23/0900Z June 1958.
75	--	PFOOP 10868, CINCPACAF to COFS USAF, 27/0345Z June 1958.
76	--	PFOOP 11113, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 08/0155Z July 1958.
77	--	DF, 313IE-E to 313OC, 313PC, etc., sub.: PACAF Conference--498th Tactical Missile Group Deployment, 26 Aug. 1958.
78	--	PODGB 6061, Div. Engr., USA, Pac Ocean, to Dist. Engr., USA, Okinawa, 07/0054Z Aug. 1958.
79	--	PODGM 2517, Dist. Engr., USA, Okinawa, to CINCPACAF, 15/1325Z Aug. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
80	--	PODGB 6063, Div. Engr., USA, Pac Ocean, to Dist. Engr., USA, Okinawa, 20 Aug. 1958.
81	--	PODGM 2595, Dist. Engr., USA, Okinawa, to CINCPACAF, 22 Aug. 1958.
82	--	5FCIE-P-P 84055, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 27/0200Z Aug. 1958.
83	--	PFCIE-ER 13033, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 30/0600Z Aug. 1958.
84	--	Ltr., Hq., PACAF to D/O, Hq., USAF, sub.: PACAF Preliminary Operational Plan Number 112-58A, dtd. 30 Aug. 1958, Annex H: Survival Analysis.
85	--	Ibid.
86	--	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to D/O, Hq., USAF, sub.: PACAF Preliminary Operational Plan Number 112-58A, dtd. 30 Aug. 1958, Annex G: Installations; 498th Tactical Missile Group Facilities Requirements (1011 Personnel).
87	--	PFCOP 14030, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 20/0339Z Sept. 1958.
88	--	Ibid.
89	--	5FCOT-P 100176, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 01/0800Z Oct. 1958.
90	--	PFCDC 14852, CINCPACAF to COFS USAF and Comdr. Det. #1, ARDC, 7 Oct. 1958.
91	--	5FCIE-P-P 103782, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 27/1030Z Oct. 1958.
92	--	PFCIE-ED 15621, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5th AF, 28/0521Z Oct. 1958.
93	--	5FCIE-P-P 11-0016, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 03/0446Z Nov. 1958.
94	--	5FCIE-P-P 11-0096, Comdr. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., 05/0500Z Nov. 1958.
95	--	313IE-P C-11-9, Hq., 313th Air Div., to CINCPACAF, 07/0100Z Nov. 1958.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
96	---	313IE-P C-11-15, Hq., 313th Air Div. to Comdr. 5th AF, 13/0600Z Nov. 1958.
97	---	PFCIE-ER 16568, CINCPACAF to COFS, USAF, 20/1912Z Nov. 1958.
98	---	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. to CG, USARYIS/IX Corps, sub.: Utilization of Yaetake Air Station, 22 Oct. 1958.
99	---	5FOPR-P-P 12-0520, Comdr. 5th AF to CINCPACAF, 12/0745Z Dec. 1958.
---	42	313th Air Division OPNS PLAN 130-56, sub.: Exercise Dragon Fly, dtd. 8 Oct. 1956.

CHAPTER IV

THE STONE OF KONNOI

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THE STONE OF KONNOI

Ireland has long had its Blarney Stone, Scotland (or Westminster Abbey, in more recent times) its Stone of Scone, Massachusetts its Plymouth Rock, Iran its Behistun Rock, and the British Museum its Rosetta Stone. In the period of this history Kadena Air Base acquired a rock of its own, the Stone of Konnoi.

The story of this less celebrated stone begins in August 1960. Four Okinawan laborers--Shigeru Yomitan (the foreman), Kosei Oba, Seiso Tomon, and Mysaichi Oshiro--were engaged in the prosaic task of digging a drainage ditch behind the organizational building of Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group, not far from the Base Operations building at Kadena Airfield. When a pick struck a hard object some 20 inches down, the wielder simply swung a little harder to shatter the stubborn obstacle. Finding that this did not solve his problem, he aimed his pick a bit to one side and found that with the assistance of the other three men he could lift out the whole offending rock in one piece. In size it was about 20 inches long, 11 inches wide, and six inches thick, but quite uneven.

By chance, they turned the stone over when they laid it down beside the trench, enabling them to discover that on this side were inscribed Oriental characters of some sort. Thanks to the stone's having been buried face down, the inscription had escaped defacement from the blows of the workmen's picks, while several small chunks had been chipped out



from the exposed upper side. Fortunately for fair science, Foreman Yomitan, recognizing that the stone might have some value, even though he was unable to read the ancient characters, called it to the attention of Major Roger H. Olds, Materiel Officer for Detachment 2. The latter, although no archaeologist, was at once deeply interested in the stone and had it brought inside his building to protect it from the elements and vandalistic hands.

Remembering that Mr. James Baker, an Air Force civilian employee with Special Projects, 1802, located nearby, was an amateur archaeologist, Major Olds asked him to come over and look at the find, to see what he could make of the rough-surfaced, tan-colored stone and its inscription. Mr. Baker quickly found that he was not only unable to read any of the characters, but was rendered even more curious by two polished surfaces which produced a beveled effect in the upper left corner of the stone. What their significance might be he declined even to hazard a guess.

There was, however, one obvious way that he might learn the meaning of the characters and, perhaps, the significance of the stone. That was to take it to the Shuri Museum for study by the Ryukyuan cultural experts there. This he did. Week followed week, but invariably his queries as to their progress were met with the same answer. The experts had not yet succeeded in deciphering the characters, but, given a little more time, they should be able to come up with a translation.

Meantime, soon after the mysterious stone's discovery, the Command Historian for the 313th Air Division, Mr. Wayne G. Peterson, had called the attention of Major General John R. Sutherland, the Division Commander, to it, and the latter had thereafter taken a deep personal

interest in learning everything possible about its origin and significance. At his suggestion, the Historian finally asked Mr. Baker to recover the stone from the museum and bring it back to 313th Air Division Headquarters, regardless of the august curators' ability to arrive at a translation.

Thus instructed, Mr. Baker returned to the museum on his next day off and made it clear that the stone must accompany him to Kadena, whether they were ready to relinquish it or not. Sensing the futility of opposing him, apparently, the museum people turned it over to him with the depreciating explanation that the stone was only a boundary marker for a village and about 60 to 100 years old. Furthermore, there should be many more similar to it which had served a similar purpose in their day.

Oddly enough, by way of affirming their identification, they could now offer a translation of the characters on the stone. This was rather strange, since they had heretofore professed complete bafflement in their endeavors to decipher the inscription. According to the Shuri officials, the character at the top meant "sign"; the one in the center was "Kuni", the name of a village which they said had existed in approximately the same position as that where Yomitan and his crew found the stone (actually, the name of this village was "Konnoi"); and the character at the bottom meant "field". All in all, the stone held little archaeological interest, according to their description. Nevertheless, they let Mr. Baker understand that the museum would like to have the stone when the Air Force had finished studying it.

All of this was relayed to the 313th Historian by Mr. Baker when he delivered the stone to the Historical Office. Mr. Peterson was at once struck by the contradiction between the Shuri officials' deprecatory


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reference to the stone and their overly-casual desire to have it back. If it were actually as commonplace an object as they said, why would there be the slightest velleity on their part to make a place for it in the never too commodious confines of the museum? Sixty-year-old boundary markers should be a drug on the market.

Since he had this suspicion that the Shuri Museum was attempting to acquire a possible cultural find through the stratagem of minimizing its value, the Historian determined to ask some disinterested experts study the inscription to offer their opinions concerning its meaning. A number of Japanese or Japanese-speaking scholars were requested to see if they could make out the meaning of the four characters (there were actually two in the center, rather than the single character the Ryukyuan curators had described). Finally, three of these gentlemen--Tokuo Hase and Kakuji Ikeda (both Japanese training instructors working for the Kadena Central Civilian Personnel Office) and Toru Kakimoto (a Nisei assigned to the Civilian Personnel Office at Naha AB)--succeeded in translating the elusive characters.

Viewing the stone as the face of a clock, they determined that the character at 12 o'clock was of Chinese origin and could be translated as "fortune" or "happiness". The next one, at 3 o'clock, was Japanese and emerged as "country", "nation", or "island". The third character, occupying the 6 o'clock position, was Chinese and was deciphered as "forever", "everlasting", or "eternal". However, it was the fourth character, situated at 9 o'clock, which offered the greatest difficulty in translation, either because it had not been inscribed as well as the others originally, or because it had not survived the ravages of time

as well, for some reason. Using a wax crayon impression and photographs of the stone, the trio were nevertheless able eventually to work out the meaning of this Japanese character. Literally translated, it meant "to get fat", but rephrasing this in more metaphorical language, one could translate it as "to grow", "to prosper", "to become greater", or the like.

Now arose the question of the inscription's age. Was it 60 years, 100 years, or mayhap 500 years old? After talking it over and drawing on their knowledge of Japanese literature and history, the three scholars agreed that the characters were of a type in vogue approximately 300 years earlier. Further, they suggested that the inscription was the work of a person of evident erudition and that it had been carved to commemorate a solemn celebration of some sort.

With these points settled, the only matters remaining to be clarified were the probable original location of the stone and the cause of the smooth surfaces in the upper left-hand corner of the rock. Had the Messrs. Yomitan et al., exhumed it from its original resting place, or had it simply been dumped there as fill material after the U.S. began to develop Kadena Airfield? No one could say for certain, of course, but a geologist should be able to tell whether the rock was of a variety found around Kadena or was indigenous to other parts of the island only.

To furnish the answers to these questions, the Historian asked Mr. John C. Bowman, Jr., a geologist with the U.S. Army Engineer District, to look over the stone. On the first point, he described its composition as being a sandy limestone, of a kind found quite extensively in the area of Kadena and evidently affected by the action of water in eons gone by. Therefore, there was no valid reason why the stone should have been brought

to Kadena from a remote area, since the raw material was conveniently at hand. Besides, a village known as Konnoi had existed from ancient times in approximately the same area where the stone was unearthed. This village had been caught in the crossfire of war in 1945, as were the nearby villages of Shimoseidu, Kamiseidu, and Sunabe, and practically obliterated. Thus, it was only natural to name the mysterious slab "The Stone of Konnoi."

As a bonus, Mr. Bowman offered the interesting theory in connection with the beveled surfaces that some unlettered person had found the stone at a date some time subsequent to its being inscribed and relegated it to the pedestrian role of whetstone for the sharpening of his knives and sickles. In lieu of a better, this seems as good an explanation as any.[1]

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	---	The entire contents of this chapter are based on the personal experiences, observations, and conversations of the Command Historian.

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

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KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1960

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

POSITION	NAME
Commander	Colonel John H. deRussy (1 July - 7 July)
	Major General John R. Sutherland (7 July - 31 December)
Vice Commander	Vacant* (1 July - 7 July)
	Colonel John H. deRussy (7 July - 31 December)
Protocol Officer	Major Bertram R. Wilson (1 July - 31 December)
Special Assistant to the Commander	Major Bertram R. Wilson (1 July - 31 December)
Special Assistant to the Commander	Colonel Claude G. McKinney, Jr. (7 September - 27 November)
Aide de Camp	Captain Norman C. Bausch (1 July - 31 December)
Inspector General	Lieut. Colonel Roy L. Bowlin, Jr. (1 July - 15 July)
	Colonel Dexter L. Hodge (15 July - 31 December)
Provost Marshal	Lieut. Colonel Joseph J. De Raad** (1 July - 31 December)

*The post of Vice Commander was rendered vacant by the temporary service of Colonel deRussy as the Commander, while awaiting the arrival of General Sutherland.

**Additional duty until 14 July. Regular assignment: Commander 6313th Air Police Squadron and Base Provost Marshal, Kadena Air Base. After 14 July primary assignment.

Position	Name
Maintenance Inspector	Major Gordon H. Johns (1 July - 31 December)
Supply Inspector	Major Earl S. Pitt (1 July - 31 December)
Personnel and Administrative Inspector	Major Howard F. Smart (1 July - 31 December)
Operations and Training Inspector	Major Frank B. Brown (1 July - 31 December)
JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION	
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel William C. Craft (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES	
Chief of Administrative Services	Lieut. Colonel Barney H. Clary (1 July - 18 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert H. De Bord (18 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF INFORMATION	
Information Officer	Lieut. Colonel Bernard Peters (1 July - 31 December)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
OIC, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa	Captain Frederick Forte (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel George E. Drury* (1 July - 31 December)

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6332d USAF Dispensary, and Director, Base Medical Service, Kadena Air Base.

Position	Name
OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN	
Staff Chaplain	Lieut. Colonel George J. Cameron* (1 July - 4 July)
	Major John H. Deutschlander (Acting) (4 July - 28 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Edgar H. Brimberry (28 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY	
Flying Safety Officer	Captain Jimmy B. Magill** (1 July - 31 December)
Ground Safety Officer	Mr. Kenneth G. Millington (Civilian)*** (1 July - 7 July)
	Vacant (7 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER	
Staff Comptroller	Major Karl D. McCormick**** (1 July - 31 December)
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE	
Director of Operations	Colonel Wallace R. Jordan (1 July - 31 December)
Deputy Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Alden L. Van Buskirk (1 July - 27 August)

* Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Base Chaplain, Kadena Air Base.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Flying Safety Officer, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Ground Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

****Duty title changed to Accounting and Finance Staff Officer as of 1 April 1960, with additional duty as Division Comptroller.

Position	Name
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Roy L. Bowlin, Jr. (15 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division	Lieut. Colonel Howard S. Askelson (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Plans Branch	Major Charles W. Borders (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Guided Missile Division	Lieut. Colonel Clyde R. Borchers (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Operations Services Branch	Major Robert E. Nash, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Defense Systems Operations Branch	Major Lamar A. Will (1 July - 31 December)
Passive Defense Officer	Captain Ray A. Ragsdill (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Special Operations Activities	Lieut. Colonel Lawrence P. Smith (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Division	Lieut. Colonel Russell H. Marks (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Communications Systems Branch	Major John Holoviak, Jr. (1 July - 31 December)
Ground Electronics Officer	Major Norman W. Breit (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Programming Branch	1st Lieutenant Boyd L. Dailey (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Lieut. Colonel Russell Powell (1 July - 31 December)
OIC, Kadena Target Intelligence Center	1st Lieutenant Robert D. Storms (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Operations Intelligence Branch	Vacant (1 July - 28 July) 1st Lieutenant Richard W. Millar, Jr. (28 July - 3 October) Captain Johnny W. Shanks (3 October - 31 December)

Position	Name
Chief, 313th Air Division Air Operations Center	Major Dudley J. Sleeper (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Lieut. Colonel Bernard A. Minnehan (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Manpower and Management Branch	Major Robert E. Duncan (1 July - 3 September)
Manpower Management Officer	Major David W. Thompson (20 October - 31 December)
Organization and Management Engineering Officer	Captain Robert Jones (1 July - 31 December)
Management Engineering Officer	Major Loren W. Mills (1 July - 3 July)
	Vacant (3 July - 31 December)

MATERIEL DIRECTORATE

Director of Materiel	Colonel Francis T. Brady (1 July - 12 December)
	Colonel George S. Roberts (12 December - 31 December)
Logistics Plans Officer	Major Arthur D. Reddrick (1 July - 31 December)
Programming Officer, Logistic Plans Division	Captain Alan B. Myler, Jr. (14 October - 31 December)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Major Burl K. Bush (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Supply and Seaweed Branch	Captain Robert S. Chambliss (1 July - 28 October)
	Vacant (28 October - 31 December)
Inter-Service Supply Support Officer	Captain Michael L. Szafranski (1 July - 31 December)

Position	Name
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus, and POL Officer	Captain Lloyd R. Rolen (1 July - 19 September)
	Captain Curry W. Hall (19 September - 31 December)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major Hubert E. Weber* (1 July - 12 November)
	CWO (W-3) Henry C. Simmons (12 November - 31 December)
Missile Maintenance Officer	CWO (W-3) Henry C. Simmons* (19 October - 12 November
Chief, Armament Division	Major George Wetzler, Jr. (1 July - 1 August)
	Vacant (1 August - 27 September)
	Captain Ralph L. Tyler (27 September - 31 December)
Chief, Transportation Division	Major George H. Robb (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING	
Civil Engineering Officer	Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 July - 25 July)
	Lieut. Colonel John W. Etter, Jr. (25 July - 25 November)
	Lieut. Colonel Fred A. Spencer (25 November - 31 December)
Assistant Civil Engineering Officer	Vacant (1 July - 25 July)
	Mr. Lloyd H. Hellmann (Civilian) (25 July - 31 December)

*Major Weber suffered a heart attack on 9 November and died on the 12th. CWO Simmons assumed his position as Chief of the Maintenance Division and relinquished his own erstwhile position as Missile Maintenance Officer.

Position	Name
Civil Engineering Liaison Officer for Air Force Operational Facilities	Lieut. Colonel Joseph E. Mills (26 September - 31 December)
Real Estate Officer	Mr. Ramon W. Wasano (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December)
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT	
Procurement Officer	Major Walter V. Karlson (1 July - 31 December)
Chief, Contracts Division	Captain John J. Mobley (1 July - 31 December)
PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	
Director of Personnel	Colonel Merrill A. Kempton (1 July - 31 December)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Major Burr S. Watters, Jr. (1 July - 15 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks (15 July - 5 August)
	Vacant (5 August - 24 August)
	Major Bruce B. Bright (24 August - 31 December)
Air Force Representative with the Ryukyus Exchange System	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks (1 July - 15 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks* (15 July - 5 August)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks (5 August - 31 December)
Chief, Officer Personnel Division	Major Bruce B. Bright (1 July - 24 August)
	Major John F. Jureka (24 August - 31 December)

*Additional duty. Primary duty assignment: Assistant Director of Personnel.

Position	Name
Chief, Warrant Officers' and Airmen's Division	Major Perry R. Blackwell (1 July - 18 August)
	Vacant (18 August - 26 September)
	Captain Glenn T. Ciarfeo (26 September - 31 December)
Chief, Individual Training and OJT Utilization Division	Vacant (1 July - 8 August)
	Major Charles L. McMillin (8 August - 31 December)
Chief, Personnel Services Division	Major Robert B. Wilbur* (1 July - 31 December)
Dependent School Officer	Major Robert B. Wilbur (1 July - 31 December)
Civilian Personnel Officer	Mr. Wallace E. Walker (Civilian)** (1 July - 31 December)

OSI DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 6001ST SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SQUADRON (IG) PACAF

Commander, OSI District Office #43	Lieut. Colonel Lewis K. Kolb (1 July - 10 July)
	Lieut. Colonel William L. Mann (10 July - 31 December)

DETACHMENT NO. 2, 1045TH OPERATIONAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING GROUP

Detachment No. 2 Commander	Major Harry C. Aderholt (1 July - 31 December)

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel Francis R. Royal (1 July - 14 July)

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 313th Air Division Dependent School Officer.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Central Civilian Personnel Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

Position	Name
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel James A. Wilson (14 July - 2 August)
	Colonel Francis S. Gabreski (2 August - 31 December)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer	Major John F. Jureka (1 July - 18 July)
	Major Dorne P. Onlemacher (18 July - 31 December)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Philip A. Watson, Jr. (1 July - 24 October)
	Lieut. Colonel Samuel A. Steere, Jr. (24 October - 31 December)
18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Ralph F. Jones (1 July - 31 December)
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter J. Russell (1 July - 31 December)
44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Major Woodrin M. Sullivan (1 July - 31 December)
67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Frank M. Haynie (1 July - 31 December)
658th Tactical Hospital Commander	Captain James F. Wittmer (1 July - 18 July)
	Captain Joseph F. Lupo (18 July - 31 December)
6313th Air Base Wing Commander	Colonel Joe C. Briley (1 July - 31 December)
6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer	Colonel James F. Risher, Jr. (1 July - 5 December)
	Colonel Charles H. Pierce (5 December - 31 December)

Position	Name
6313th Headquarters Squadron Section Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald C. McKenney (1 July - 6 July)
	Captain Archie L. Weatherly (6 July - 31 December)
6313th Transportation Squadron Commander	Major Richard J. Gordon (1 July - 31 December)
6313th Supply Squadron Commander	Major Frank Zdybel (1 July - 1 August)
	Major Paul E. Mensing (1 August - 25 August)
	Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds (25 August - 31 December)
6313th Civil Engineering Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John W. Etter, Jr. (1 July - 25 July)
	Colonel James F. Risher, Jr.* (25 July - 14 December)
	Lieut Colonel Theo J. Sowerby (14 December - 31 December)
6313th Air Police Squadron	Lieut. Colonel Joseph J. De Raad** (1 July - 14 July)
	Major Vincent R. Chiodo** (14 July - 31 December)
6313th Operations Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel David H. Murray (1 July - 31 December)
6313th Food Service Squadron Commander	CWO W-2 Manuel C. Sisson (1 July - 1 September)
	Captain Fred R. Martin (1 September - 31 December)

*Additional duty. Primary duty assignment: Executive Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing until 5 December 1960.

**Additional duty as Base Provost Marshal.

Position	Name
6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel George E. Drury (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment 4, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain Russell P. King (1 July - 31 December)
15th Physiological Training Flight Commander	Captain Robert W. Ruffin (1 July - 25 November)
	Captain Rudolph A. Lucchesi (25 November - 31 December)
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander	Lieut. Colonel Earl A. Butts (1 July - 31 December)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander	Major Orval D. Collings (1 July - 22 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (22 July - 31 December)
Detachment #1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Edward G. Siebold (1 July - 31 December)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Howard K. Shaw (1 July - 31 December)
1962d Airways and Air Communications Service Group Commander	Lieut. Colonel Lawson P. Wynne (1 July - 31 December)
6922d Radio Group, Mobile (USAFSS) Commander	Colonel Dwight E. Bonin (1 July - 31 December)
6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile (USAFSS) Commander	Major Edward E. Grant (1 July - 31 December)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Frank D. Schwikert (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert D. Higgins (1 July - 8 October)
Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert D. Higgins (8 October - 31 December)

*Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group was discontinued on 8 October 1960, per AWS GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960, and Detachment 8, Hq., 1st Weather Wing was organized simultaneously in its stead.

Position	Name
Detachment 3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron Commander	Captain Glendon E. Marks (1 July - 20 July)
	Master Sergeant Daniel G. Bertrom (Acting) (20 July - 13 August)
	Captain William Green, Jr. (13 August - 31 December)
Detachment 56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron Commander	Captain Richard H. Pitcher ((1 July - 31 December)
Operating Location #1, 2876th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency Squadron Commander	CWO (W-2) Donald D. Ferguson (1 July - 31 December)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

Position	Name
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander	Colonel William W. Ingenhutt (1 July - 31 December)
6431st Air Base Group Commander*	Colonel Edward P. Foote (1 July - 18 July)
51st Air Base Group Commander*	Colonel EdwardP. Foote (18 July - 31 December)
6431st Air Base Group Executive Officer*	Lieut. Colonel Clyde W. Bradley, Jr. (1 July - 18 July)
51st Air Base Group Executive Officer*	Lieut. Colonel Clyde W. Bradley, Jr. (18 July - 31 December)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel James A. Hearn (1 July - 31 December)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major William J. Mickish (1 July - 31 December)

*The 6431st Air Base Group and its assigned squadrons were discontinued at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960, which designated and organized the 51st Air Base Group simultaneously.

Position	Name
6151st Armament and Electronics* Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Lindell F. Collins (1 July - 18 July)
51st Armament and Electronics* Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Lindell F. Collins (18 July - 31 December)
6431st Headquarters Squadron Section** Commander	1st Lieutenant Homer R. Hunt (1 July - 18 July)
6431st Operations Squadron Commander***	Lieut. Colonel Carl E. Vega (1 July - 18 July)
51st Support Squadron Commander***	Lieut. Colonel Carl E. Vega (18 July - 31 December)
6431st Air Police Squadron Commander****	Captain Charles Doughty, Jr. (1 July - 18 July)
6431st Supply Squadron Commander*****	Major Harold J. Lochow (1 July - 18 July)

*The 6151st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron was discontinued at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960, which simultaneously designated and organized the 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron.

**The 6431st Air Base Group and its assigned squadrons were discontinued at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960 which simultaneously designated and organized the 51st Air Base Group.

***The 6431st Operations Squadron was discontinued on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960, which simultaneously designated and organized the 51st Support Squadron.

****The 6431st Air Police Squadron was attached to the 6431st Operations Squadron for administrative control until the discontinuance of both organizations on 18 July 1960, in accordance with PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

*****The 6431st Supply Squadron was discontinued on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

Position	Name
6431st Civil Engineering Squadron* Commander	Major Howard S. Montin (1 July - 18 July)
51st Civil Engineering Squadron* Commander	Major Howard S. Montin (18 July - 31 December)
6431st Transportation Squadron** Commander	1st Lieutenant Ronald E. Hollod (1 July - 18 July)
51st Materiel Squadron Commander***	Major Harold J. Lochow (18 July - 29 July)
	Major Sam L. Almon (29 July - 31 December)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel William R. Crooks (1 July - 31 December)
6351st USAF Dispensary Commander	Lieut. Colonel Russell C. Payne (1 July - 18 September)
	Captain Richard P. Clancy (18 September - 31 December)
Detachment 5, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain William P. McDefitt (1 July - 31 December)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Leon A. Smith (1 July - 31 December)
817th Troop Carrier Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Frank Hatten (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division Commander	Colonel Leslie W. Bray, Jr. 1 July - 31 December)

*The 6431st Installations Squadron at Naha AB was redesignated the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron on 1 July 1960, per PACAF GO 20, dtd. 25 March 1960. On 18 July 1960 the 6431st Civil Engineering Squadron was discontinued, and the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron was designated and organized in its place, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

**The 6431st Transportation Squadron's military personnel, except for the Commander and First Sergeant, had been incorporated into the 6431st Supply Squadron on 11 April 1960, but all civilian employees remained in the squadron until its discontinuance on 18 July 1960,per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

*** The 51st Materiel Squadron was designated and organized at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, per PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.

Position	Name
Detachment 3, 313th Air Division* Commander	Captain William B. Etheridge (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group** Commander	Lieut. Colonel Richard C. Suehr (1 July - 8 October)
Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing** Commander	Lieut. Colonel Richard C. Suehr (8 October - 10 December)
	Major William A. Squires, Jr. (10 December - 31 December)
1252d Airways and Air Communications Service Squadron Commander	Major Cleo V. Winter (1 July - 10 August)
	Major John G. Hall (10 August - 2 September)
	Major John C. Morton (2 September - 31 December)
31st Air Rescue Squadron Commander***	Major Willard D. Welch (1 July - 27 July)
	Lieut. Colonel Ernest M. Magee (27 July - 18 September)
Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue**** Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Ernest M. Magee (18 September - 31 December)
7th Aerial Port Detachment Commander	Major Herbert L. Ballard (1 July - 31 December)

*Detachment 3, 313th Air Division was designated and organized at Naha AB on 1 July 1960, per PACAF GO 45, dtd. 9 June 1960.

**Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group was discontinued on 8 October 1960, per AWS GO 28, dtd. 10 Aug. 1960, which simultaneously organized Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing, at Naha AB.

***The 31st Air Rescue Squadron officially completed its permanent change of station from Clark AB to Naha AB on 12 August 1960.

****On 18 September 1960 the 31st Air Rescue Squadron was discontinued, per MATS GO 7, dtd. 26 Jan. 1960 and MATS GO 61, dtd. 4 May 1960. Simultaneously, Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron was organized in its place by MATS GO 57, dtd. 29 Apr. 1960.

Position	Name
7th Aerial Port Detachment Commander	Major Herbert L. Ballard (1 July - 31 December)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	1st Lieutenant Richard L. Gaisford, Jr. (1 July - 12 July)
	1st Lieutenant Theron A. Henry, Jr. (12 July - 31 December)

APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE

313TH AIR DIVISION PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1960

Appendix 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1960

Jul.: One hundred and two unnumbered contracts totalling $33,265.00 and three numbered contracts (3 less complex) totalling $16,195.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. One hundred and nine petty cash actions totalling $3,215.00 were written during the month of July.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1569 for $13,742.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for custodial services at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1570 for $1,223.00 was awarded to the National Cash Register Company for the repair of cash registers at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1571 for $1,230.00 was awarded to Barclay and Company for the repair of Thermofax machines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

Two contracts for sales were awarded as follows:

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-S-125 for $3,802.70 was awarded to Nishin Shoki for scrap metal at Naha Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-S-126 for $3,000.00 was awarded to Ozato Industrial Company for garbage at Kadena Air Base.

Seven numbered contracts totalling $377,958.98 were closed during the month of July 1960

Aug.: One hundred and sixty-two unnumbered contracts totalling $98,724.00 and 14 numbered contracts (10 less complex and 4 complex) totalling $190,010.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. One hundred and seventy-one petty cash actions totalling $7,382.00 were written during the month of August.

Aug.: (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1572 for $18,856.00 was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi Company for repair of dependent school buildings in the Morrison-Knudsen area at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1573 for $16,314.00 was awarded to Zentaro Gumi, for the interior painting of airman barracks at Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1574 for $24,349.00 was awarded to Blackledge Company, for the repair of Building 2415 at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1575 for $50,495.00 was awarded to Blackledge Company, for the installation of the LOX plant at Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1576 for $16,740.00 was awarded to Arai Company Inc., for the purchase of lumber to be used at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1577 for $4,440.00 was awarded to Thomas B. Bourne Company for architect-engineer services for Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1578 for $6,900.00 was awarded to Blackledge Company to clean and paint water towers at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1579 for $4,152.00 was awarded to Maruyama A & E Company, Ltd., for architect-engineer services at Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1580 for $2,104.00 was awarded to Maruyama A & E Company, Ltd., for architect-engineer services at Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1581 for $3,035.00 was awarded to Arai Company, Ltd., for the repair of wooden furniture at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1582 in the estimated amount of $10,000.00 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Company for the repair of office machines at Naha and Kadena Air Bases.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1583 for $24,700.00 was awarded to the M.G. Construction Company for erosion control at Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1584 for $16,065.00 was awarded to Arai Company, Ltd., for purchase of lumber to be used at Kadena Air Base.

Aug.: (n) Contract AF 62(321)-1585 for $1,860.00 was awarded to Rutledge Construction Company to modify the Base Operations building at Kadena Air Base.

Four contracts for sales were awarded.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-s-127 for $21,190.00 was awarded to Ota Shoten Company for scrap steel at Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)s-128 for $575.00 was awarded to Higa Teiho Company for scrap rubber at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)s-129 for $5,000.00 was awarded to Ozato Industrial Company for trash at Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)s-130 for $3,625.00 was awarded to Kina Shoten for scrap lumber at Kadena Air Base.

Six numbered contracts totalling $54,093.62 were closed during the month of August 1960.

Sep.: One hundred and four unnumbered contracts totalling $68,584.00 and seven numbered contracts (7 less complex) totalling $19,010.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. One hundred and eighty-seven petty cash actions totalling $5,290.00 were written during the month of September.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1586 for $4,900.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for grass cutting on off-base sites.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1587 for $5,227.00 was awarded to Chojin Plywood Company for procurement of plywood for Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1588 for $2,018.00 was awarded to Okinawa Oxygen Company for carbon dioxide gas for Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1589 for $2,320.00 was awarded to Ryukyu Fertilizer Company for fertilizer for Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1590 for $4,561.00 was awarded to Furugen Brothers Company to repair electric fans for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1591 for $984.00 was awarded to Frazar & Company, Inc., for a radio transmitter for Kadena Air Base.

Sep.: (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1592 in the estimated amount of was awarded to Yonagusuku Beverage Company for delivery of beverages to Kadena Air Base.

One contract for sale, Contract AF 62(321)s-132 for $1,561.00 was awarded to Yoshinobu Kobashigawa Company for bones, fats and garbage at Kadena Air Base.

Nine numbered contracts (3 construction contracts, 6 estimated requirements contracts) were closed during the month of September 1960. Total amount of the three construction contracts was $26,243.00. The six estimated requirements contracts do not show a total amount.

Oct.: Ninety-nine unnumbered contracts totalling $48,657.00 and twenty-six numbered contracts (10 complex and 16 less complex) totalling $314,161.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. Two hundred seventeen petty cash actions totalling $6,279.00 were written during the month of October.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1593 for $3,681.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for maintenance of trucks at Naha Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1594 for $1,627.00 was awarded to Daimaru Paint Company for painting of the control tower at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1595 for $4,846.00 was awarded to Westpac Company for installation of commercial power to the ILS middle marker at Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1596 for $10,500.00 was awarded to Ryukyu Asphalt Industry Company for hot mix asphalt for Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1597 for $856.00 was awarded to Tokai Electric Company for utilities for the weather facilities at Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1598 for $5,402.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for a C-130 wash rack at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1599 for $3,100.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for overhaul of a Coleman tractor at Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1600 for $167,985.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc., for repairing the operations apron at Kadena Air Base.

Oct.: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1601 for $18,915.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for vegetation control at Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1602 for $1,800.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for repair of vehicles at Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1603 for $5,331.00 was awarded to Pan Ocean, Ltd., for screen frames for Kadena Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1604 for $22,337.00 was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for carbon remover for Naha Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1605 for $3,196.00 was awarded to D. F. Fischer and Sons, Ltd., for an internal duct system at Kadena Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1606 for $1,550.00 was awarded to Furugen Brothers for construction of mail boxes at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1607 for $37,026.00 was awarded to D. F. Fischer and Sons, Ltd. for installing a hangar door at Naha Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1608 for $8,921.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings, Inc., for modifying alert facilities at Naha Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1609 for $98.00 was awarded to T. Tayosote for services as an interpreter at Naha Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-1610 for $150.00 was awarded to B. Kambeitz for services as an instructor at NahaAir Base.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-1611 for $60.00 was awarded to H. Saito for services as an instructor at Naha Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-1612 for $103.00 was awarded to S. Uema for services as an instructor at Naha Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-1613 for $103.00 was awarded to R. Isa for services as an instructor at Naha Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-1614 for $4,923.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Co. for an addition to Building #1700 (residence of the Commander of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing) at Kadena Air Base.

(w) Contract AF 62(321)-1615 for $9,300.00 (estimated) was awarded to Fuji Foods for potato chips at Kadena Air Base.

Oct.: (x) Contract AF 62(321)-1616 for $6,731.00 was awarded to H.G. Construction Company for a visibility wind indicator at Naha Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-1617 for $920.00 was awarded to Wakugawa Trading Company for civilian guard uniforms at Kadena Air Base. This contract was subsequently cancelled.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-1618 for $4,100.00 was awarded to H.G. Construction Company for supplying commercial power to MCT at Naha Air Base.

One contract for sale, Contract AF 62(321)-S-131, in the amount of $1,561.00 was awarded to Yoshinobu Kobashigawa for bones and fat at Kadena Air Base.

Thirteen numbered contracts totalling $455,926.20 were closed during the month of October 1960.

Nov.: Ninety-nine unnumbered contracts totalling $48,178.00 and 29 numbered contracts (8 complex and 21 less complex) totalling $207,243.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. One hundred and seventy-seven petty cash actions were written during the month of November.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1619 for $5,414.00 was awarded to Ganaha Shokai for steel sheets for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1620 for $1,520.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for overhauling transmissions at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1621 for $15,745.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1622 for $120.00 was awarded to Kagado Stamp Maker for miscellaneous rubber stamps for Naha and Kadena Air Bases.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1623 for $50.00 was awarded to Mr. G. Garther for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1624 for $60.00 was awarded to Mr. Y. Itai for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1625 for $100.00 was awarded to Mrs. J. M. Lofton for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

Nov.: (h) Contract AF 62(321)-1626 for $50.00 was awarded to Mrs. J. J. Pierce for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62 (321)-1627 for $108.00 was awarded to Mrs. J. E. Coberly for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1628 for $6,624.00 was awarded to Stanbo Protective Coatings for protective coating (paint) for Kadena Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1629 for $4,042.00 was awarded to Yomitan Industries for erecting a utility building at Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1630 for $2,350.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction for cushion covers for Kadena Air Base.

(m) Contract AF 62(321)-1631 for $9,945.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction for cushion covers for Kadena Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1632 for $4,377.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for installing a rotating beam on the AN/GMQ-13 (Facility 2277) at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1633 for $2,465.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for aggregate gravel for Kadena Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1634 for $865.00 was awarded to O. M. Saiseko for aggregate gravel for Kadena Air Base.

(q) Contract AF 62(321)-1635 for $220.00 was awarded to Mr. Vic Ares for piano tuning at Kadena Air Base.

(r) Contract AF 62(321)-1636 for $6,238.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for air conditioning the telephone exchange at Onna Point.

(s) Contract AF 62(321)-1637 for $4,436.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for sheet glass for Kadena Air Base.

(t) Contract AF 62(321)-1638 for $14,700.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply Company for lumber for Kadena Air Base.

(u) Contract AF 62(321)-1639 for $548.00 was awarded to Wakugawa Trading Company for civilian guard uniforms for Kadena Air Base.

(v) Contract AF 62(321)-1640 for $325.00 was awarded to Style Shoe Makers for combat boots for Kadena Air Base.

Nov.: (w) Contract AF 62(321)-1641 for $9,913.00 was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi for painting ammo storage area fence for Kadena Air Base.

(x) Contract AF 62(321)-1642 for $603.00 was awarded to Wakugawa Trading Company for white uniforms for use by MATS flight line personnel, Kadena Air Base.

(y) Contract AF 62(321)-1643 for $43,000.00 was awarded to Westpac Inc. for replacement of primary 15KV cable circuit #7 at Kadena Air Base.

(z) Contract AF 62(321)-1644 for $9,229.00 was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi for modifying the refrigeration system in the commissary sales store (Bldg. 1303) at Naha Air Base.

(aa) Contract AF 62(321)-1645 for $2,409.00 was awarded to Taiyodo Tokeiten for repairing aircraft watches for Naha Air Base.

(bb) Contract AF 62(321)-1646 for $24,817.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for repainting BOQ's and airmen's barracks at Kadena Air Base.

(cc) Contract AF 62(321)-1647 for $36,970.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for repairing tile in dining halls at Kadena Air Base.

The following contract modifications were made.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1546 with Fischer-Stanbo Joint Venture had an increase in price of $11,908.00.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1607 with D. F. Fischer and Sons Ltd. had an administrative modification.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1563 with Maeda Gumi had an increase in price of $733.00.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1550 with Blackledge, Inc. had an increase in price of $4,393.12.

One contract for sale, Contract AF 62(321)s-132 for $5,001.00 was awarded to Gitoku Arakaki for scrap aluminum at Kadena Air Base.

Four numbered contracts totalling $44,925.00 were closed during the month of November 1960.

Dec.: Sixteen numbered contracts totalling $224,608.00 and ninety-nine unnumbered contracts totalling $29,972.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa. One hundred twenty-three petty cash actions totalling $4,271.00 were written during the month of December.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1648 for $23,438.00 was awarded to Daimaru Paint Company for repair of roofs in the Stilwell housing area Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1649 for $4,725.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply for lumber (red lauan) for use on Kadena Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1650 for $28,822.00 was awarded to Blackledge Company for repair of alert crew quarters at Naha Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1651 for $12,027.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for overhauling engines for Naha and Kadena Air Bases.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1652 for $6,355.00 was awarded to Ojana Motors for overhauling engines for Naha and Kadena Air Bases.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1653 for $42,469.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc. for installing air conditioning in Bldg 750 at Kadena Air Base.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1654 for $551.00 was awarded to Maruyama Architect Co. for modifying commercial power in Bldgs 907 and 900 at Naha Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1654 for $551.00 was awarded to Maruyama Architect Co. for modifying commercial power in Bldgs 907 and 900 at Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1655 for $119.00 was awarded to Mr. T. Toyosato for services as a counselor and test examiner for Naha Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1657 for $106.00 was awarded to Mr. S. Uema for services as a counselor and instructor for Naha Air Base.

(k) Contract AF 62(321)-1658 for $106.00 was awarded to Mr. R. Isa for services as a counselor and instructor for Naha Air Base.

(l) Contract AF 62(321)-1659 for $150.00 was awarded to Mrs. B. Kambeitz for services as an instructor for Naha Air Base.

Dec.: (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1660 for $45.00 was awarded to Mr. H. Saito for services as an instructor for Naha Air Base.

(n) Contract AF 62(321)-1661 for $4,488.00 was awarded to Maruyama Architect Company for epidemiological drainage at Naha Air Base.

(o) Contract AF 62(321)-1662 for $57,809.00 was awarded to M.G. Construction for repair of parking vehicles at Naha Air Base.

(p) Contract AF 62(321)-1663 for $473.00 was awarded to Mrs. J.C. Newton for services as an instructor at Kadena Air Base.

Eighteen numbered contracts totalling $348,037.00 were closed during the month of December 1960.

There was one salvage contract awarded during the month of December 1960 to KinaShoten for $2,610.00 for scrap metal at Naha Air Base.

APPENDIX 3

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1960

FROM OKINAWA TO	NUMBER OF PASSENGERS CARRIED BY AIR			PASSENGER POUNDS CARRIED BY AIR		
	July	August	September	July	August	September
UNITED STATES	953	939	617	214,425	222,275	138,825
HICKAM	38	19	23	7,425	4,275	5,175
CLARK	286	110	52	64,350	24,750	11,700
GUAM	1	1	--	225	225	---
TACHIKAWA	304	325	289	68,400	73,125	64,025
TAIPEI	68	94	59	15,350	21,150	13,275

	October	November	December	October	November	December
UNITED STATES	536	587	630	120,600	132,075	141,750
HICKAM	19	20	31	4,275	4,500	6,975
CLARK	128	75	147	28,800	16,875	43,075
GUAM	4	1	9	900	225	2,025
TACHIKAWA	365	363	348	82,125	81,675	78,300
TAIPEI	82	75	59	18,450	16,875	13,275

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1960

AIR FORCE PASSENGERS CARRIED BY AIR

TO OKINAWA FROM THE UNITED STATES

Month	Number of Passengers
July	280
August	339
September	365
October	530
November	507
December	344

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1960

FROM OKINAWA TO	CARGO POUNDS CARRIED BY AIR					
	July	August	September	October	November	December
UNITED STATES	184,000	246,000	130,000	196,000	200,000	168,000
HONOLULU	1,000	9,000	18,000	8,000	16,000	8,000
MANILA	4,000	8,000	3,000	22,000	4,000	5,000
GUAM	-0-	-0-	-0-	4,000	2,000	-0-
JAPAN	33,000	78,000	42,000	156,000	64,000	69,000
FORMOSA	-0-	7,000	-0-	2,000	2,000	1,000

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1960

AIR FORCE PASSENGERS CARRIED BY WATER

FROM OKINAWA TO	July			August			September		
	Cabin	Troop	Total	Cabin	Troop	Total	Cabin	Troop	Total
UNITED STATES	40	-0-	40	30	-0-	30	8	-0-	8
OKINO	21	40	61	11	23	34	14	43	57
KUME	24	61	85	15	53	68	17	42	59
MIYAKO	6	16	22	6	48	54	5	23	28
IE SHIMA	-0-	3	3	1	2	3	2	4	6

	October			November			December		
	Cabin	Troop	Total	Cabin	Troop	Total	Cabin	Troop	Total
UNITED STATES	10	-0-	10	4	1	5	8	-0-	8
OKINO	19	38	57	18	70	88	10	26	36
KUME	37	61	98	14	34	48	7	52	59
MIYAKO	3	3	6	4	13	17	2	5	7
IE SHIMA	2	5	7	-	2	2	7	8	15

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1960

FROM OKINAWA TO	MEASUREMENT TONS OF CARGO CARRIED BY WATER					
	July	August	September	October	November	December
UNITED STATES	2708	1694	1611	1069	924	1614
HONOLULU	-0-	84	-0-	18	-0-	580
MANILA	-0-	58	201	62	49	480
GUAM	-0-	217	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
JAPAN	1455	219	73	9	185	422
FORMOSA	4	-0-	13	290	51	47

APPENDIX 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

1960

MONTHLY COMPARISON PROFIT AND LOSS

	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
Jul	$ (848)	$ 1,158	$(450)	$4,882	$(2,503)	$4,636
Aug	146	2,689	(1,300)	3,369	1,662	3,738
Sep	(2,769)	4,524	3,456	4,522	1,915	2,495
Oct	203	(1,314)	3,110	2,270	1,408	1,174
Nov	3,907	844	1,716	1,965	4,109	1,999
Dec	1,281	(3,521)	4,146	2,196	2,902	3,347

NET PROFIT AND LOSS

FISCAL YEAR TO DATE

	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
Jul	$ (848)	$1,158	$ (450)	$4,882	$(2,503)	$4,636
Aug	(701)	3,847	(1,750)	8,251	(842)	8,374
Sep	(3,470)	8,371	1,706	12,773	1,073	10,839
Oct	(3,267)	7,057	4,816	15,043	2,481	12,043
Nov	640	7,901	6,523	17,008	6,590	14,042
Dec	1,921	4,380	10,678	19,204	9,492	17,389

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1960

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
July:						
Dues	$2,632	$1,542	$2,066	$1,166	$1,556	$1,109
Vending Machine	4,800	6,352	8,693	6,060	7,208	3,856
Other	755	2,242	392	3,105	428	887
Bar Operation	5,509	3,398	7,394	6,932	6,259	5,569
Food Operation	5,903	4,383	7,454	2,895	5,823	3,363
Other (Sales)	3,068	966	3,950	2,797	3,301	4,739
August:						
Dues	$2,728	$1,647	$1,967	$1,230	$1,202	$1,226
Vending Machine	5,137	6,694	6,644	6,959	6,495	3,690
Other	297	1,606	695	678	655	307
Bar Operation	5,798	2,647	7,438	7,302	6,294	5,424
Food Operation	6,598	5,790	6,521	3,504	8,164	3,632
Other (Sales)	3,507	1,401	4,906	3,927	4,447	5,095
September:						
Dues	$2,832	$1,743	$1,908	$1,232	$1,300	$1,265
Vending Machine	5,191	7,612	7,968	7,809	6,581	2,283
Other	307	1,475	343	667	217	208
Bar Operation	5,252	3,313	7,264	7,812	6,148	5,748
Food Operation	6,250	6,774	7,116	4,419	11,197	3,165
Other (Sales)	2,391	1,680	3,719	4,018	3,813	5,410
October:						
Dues	$2,844	$1,713	$1,856	$1,270	$1,348	$1,224
Vending Machine	4,583	3,398	8,184	6,946	5,596	3,229
Other	221	1,240	378	674	410	206
Bar Operation	4,825	2,641	6,133	6,916	6,286	4,575
Food Operation	6,259	5,920	5,939	3,143	9,864	2,722
Other (Sales)	3,186	1,771	3,310	3,321	4,283	5,031

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1960

	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
November:						
Dues	$3,533	$1,701	$1,842	$1,236	$ 1,330	$1,185
Vending Machine	6,231	5,966	7,206	6,721	7,816	3,367
Other	290	1,617	316	637	239	219
Bar Operation	7,726	2,920	6,746	7,038	6,478	4,999
Food Operation	5,839	5,138	5,596	3,918	10,024	2,920
Other (Sales)	2,494	1,483	4,461	4,012	4,526	4,722
December:						
Dues	$3,556	$1,713	$2,010	$1,305	$2,000	$1,388
Vending Machine	4,625	1,307	7,807	6,826	8,964	3,830
Other	259	1,374	717	647	347	203
Bar Operation	4,330	2,702	6,180	7,157	7,226	5,552
Food Operation	6,933	4,654	6,863	4,580	4,706	2,680
Other (Sales)	4,133	2,575	4,028	3,574	9,631	5,547

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1960

	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
July:						
Salaries (Mil)	$1,213	$ 341	$ 2,133	$1,245	$1,703	$1,319
Salaries (USCiv)	120	557	180	200	-0-	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	10,512	6,756	11,017	6,677	10,831	5,668
Salaries (Other)	-0-	388	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	4,810	4,421	5,964	5,121	7,283	3,867
Dep & Misc	2,052	1,295	2,637	2,281	1,594	1,504
Other	4,808	2,968	8,243	2,549	5,666	2,575
August:						
Salaries (Mil)	$ 910	$ 105	$2,019	$1,207	$1,490	$1,333
Salaries (USCiv)	125	579	200	209	-0-	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	10,680	7,065	11,153	6,984	11,016	5,774
Salaries (Other)	-0-	378	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	4,882	5,021	5,319	5,577	7,176	3,557
Dep & Misc	2,295	1,325	4,087	1,636	2,271	1,486
Other	5,026	2,893	6,467	4,618	3,642	3,211
September:						
Salaries (Mil)	$ 922	$ 21	$1,750	$1,267	$1,546	$1,370
Salaries (USCiv)	-0-	568	352	206	215	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	11,118	7,499	9,548	7,242	11,449	5,808
Salaries (Other)	-0-	371	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	5,000	5,300	4,929	6,803	7,248	4,233
Dep & Misc	2,251	1,318	2,210	1,654	2,201	1,497
Other	5,700	2,996	5,848	4,243	4,681	2,422
October:						
Salaries (Mil)	$ 898	$ 11	$1,660	$1,299	$1,468	$1,286
Salaries (USCiv)	-0-	1,124	345	207	200	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	10,559	7,413	9,688	7,029	11,372	5,742
Salaries (Other)	-0-	-0-	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	4,166	5,029	3,953	5,381	5,810	4,206
Dep & Misc.	2,082	1,331	2,089	2,059	2,472	1,478
Other	4,009	3,088	4,728	4,425	5,027	2,827

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1960

	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmens Club	Naha Airmens Club
November:	$					
Salaries (Mil)	$ 809	$ 15	$ 2,021	$1,854	$ 1,395	$1,396
Salaries (USCiv)	-0-	935	200	208	267	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	10,970	7,319	10,164	7,291	12,110	5,752
Salaries (Other)	-0-	-0-	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	3,691	5,227	4,110	6,551	6,218	3,982
Dep & Misc	2,154	1,499	2,449	1,614	2,296	1,473
Other	4,582	2,986	5,469	4,474	4,007	2,525
December:						
Salaries (Mil)	$ 767	$ -0-	$1,844	$1,398	$1,777	$1,364
Salaries (USCiv)	-0-	946	291	208	110	-0-
Salaries (Ind)	10,661	7,205	9,996	7,343	12,060	5,775
Salaries (Other)	-0-	-0-	225	-0-	-0-	275
Entertainment	3,558	5,048	5,215	5,981	8,653	4,405
Dep & Misc	2,145	1,302	1,694	1,694	2,744	1,501
Other	5,425	3,346	4,195	5,269	4,629	2,535

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1960

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Month	Kadena Officers Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Kadena NCO Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Kadena Airmens Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena Off	NCO	Amn
Jul	13	1	223	21	1	229	19	0	230	2.8:1	8.2:1	6.2:1
Aug	11	1	223	20	2	236	13	0	235	2.9:1	7.6:1	4.8:1
Sep	10	0	222	19	3	230	15	1	242	3.0:1	7.6:1	5.0:1
Oct	10	0	220	20	2	225	15	1	246	3.1:1	7.5:1	5.1:1
Nov	9	0	214	19	1	215	12	1	247	3.2:1	7.8:1	5.1:1
Dec	10	0	213	21	2	215	18	1	254	3.2:1	8.4:1	7.3:1

Month	Naha Officers Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Naha NCO Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Naha Airmens Club Mil	US Civ	Ind/O	Ratio of Members to Employees Naha Off	NCO	Amn
Jul	5	2	144	10	1	116	10	0	122	3.4:1	*	*
Aug	2	2	145	10	1	124	10	0	116	3.8:1	9.7:1	*
Sep	2	2	149	10	1	123	12	0	115	3.9:1	9.7:1	*
Oct	1	3	146	11	1	125	12	0	116	3.9:1	9.5:1	*
Nov	1	3	147	11	1	125	10	0	115	3.8:1	9.3:1	9.9:1
Dec	0	3	145	11	1	122	11	0	119	3.9:1	*	*

*Ratio over 10:1.

KUME SHIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss FY to Date	Dues	Mil	Civ	Ind/O	Ratio Members to Employees
July	$ 276	$ 276	$92	5	0	2	*
August	566	842	90	5	0	2	*
September	269	1,111	76	2	0	16	4.2:1
October	513	1,624	90	5	0	4	*
November	297	1,921	83	4	0	5	9.4:1
December	626	2,547	77	4	0	4	*

*Ratio over 10:1.

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YOZA DAKE NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss to Date	Dues	Mil	Civ	Ind/O	Ratio Members to Employees
July	$(169)	$ (169)	$115	4	0	19	*
August	980	811	125	4	0	21	*
September	695	1,506	116	4	0	20	*
October	164	1,670	116	6	0	22	8.3:1
November	21	1,691	106	4	0	24	7.5:1
December	338	2,029	110	4	0	22	8.5:1

*Ratio over 10:1.

MIYAKO JIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss FY to Date	Dues	Mil	Civ	Ind/O	Ratio Members to Employees
July	$ 268	$ 268	$58	2	0	5	9.3:1
August	401	669	71	3	0	8	6.5:1
September	575	1,244	75	3	0	10	5.9:1
October	919	2,163	85	11	0	5	5.4:1
November	525	2,688	67	3	0	14	3.9:1
December	440	3,128	78	3	0	14	4.8:1

*Ratio over 10:1.

OKINO ERABU NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss FY to Date	Dues	Mil	Civ	Ind/O	Ratio Members to Employees
July	$ 87	$ 87	$77	6	0	10	4.1:8
August	23	111	70	4	0	8	5.8:1
September	(143)	(32)	68	4	0	9	5.2:1
October	(186)	(218)	69	8	0	4	5.6:1
November	(553)	(771)	60	3	0	8	5.5:1
December	(107)	(878)	71	3	0	9	5.9:1

*Ratio over 10:1.

APPENDIX 5

AIR FORCE DEPENDENT HOUSING

ON OKINAWA

APPENDIX 5

AIR FORCE DEPENDENT HOUSING ON OKINAWA

As of 31 July 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	348	173	1107	468
Enlisted	763	431	2209	1309
Civilian	11	7	54	18
Private Rental				
Officer	77	106	*2002	*1058
Enlisted	420	244		
Civilian	48	27		

As of 31 August 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	349	174	1078	478
Enlisted	764	435	2218	1333
Civilian	14	7	63	18
Private Rental				
Officer	82	111	*2075	*1137
Enlisted	535	270		
Civilian	48	24		

*Total dependents in private rental. Breakdown figures not available.

AIR FORCE DEPENDENT HOUSING ON OKINAWA

As of 30 September 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	349	174	1127	478
Enlisted	764	438	2256	1350
Civilian	14	25	54	18
Private Rental				
Officer	105	123	*2,134	*1,247
Enlisted	562	292		
Civilian	56	27		

As of 30 October 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	349	171	1129	478
Enlisted	764	440	2282	1372
Civilian	14	7	54	18
Private Rental				
Officer	98	147	*2292	*1460
Enlisted	616	328		
Civilian	56	31		

* Total dependents in private rental. Breakdown figures not available.

AIR FORCE DEPENDENT HOUSING ON OKINAWA

As of 30 November 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	349	173	1139	522
Enlisted	764	443	2311	1392
Civilian	15	7	59	18
Private Rental				
Officer	108	156	*2337	*1591
Enlisted	629	360		
Civilian	57	32		

As of 31 December 1960:

	Families		Dependents	
Government Quarters	Kadena AB	Naha AB	Kadena AB	Naha AB
Officer	349	172	1135	507
Enlisted	764	438	2305	1405
Civilian	15	8	59	22
Private Rental				
Officer	93	161	*2382	*1757
Enlisted	651	406		
Civilian	58	31		

*Total dependents in private rental. Breakdown figures not available.

APPENDIX 6

REENLISTMENT RATES

APPENDIX 6

REENLISTMENT RATES

1960

July	Eligible to	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
KADENA			
First Term Airmen	5	5	100%
Career Airmen	37	37	100%
TOTAL	42	42	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	14	1	7.14%
Career Airmen	24	24	100%
TOTAL	38	25	65.5%
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	19	6	20.0%
Career Airmen	61	61	100%
TOTAL	80	68	80.0%

August	Eligible to Reenlist	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
KADENA			
First Term Airmen	3	3	100%
Career Airmen	60	60	100%
TOTAL	63	63	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	25	0	0.0%
Career Airmen	29	29	100%
TOTAL	54	29	53.7%
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	28	3	10.7%
Career Airmen	89	89	100%
TOTAL	117	92	78.6%

REENLISTMENT RATES

1960

September

KADENA	Eligible to Reenlist	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
First Term Airmen	1	1	100%
Career Airmen	37	37	100%
TOTAL	38	38	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	24	0	0.0%
Career Airmen	23	23	100%
TOTAL	47	23	48.9%
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	25	1	4.0%
Career Airmen	60	60	100%
TOTAL	85	61	71.8%

October

KADENA	Eligible to Reenlist	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
First Term Airmen	2	2	100%
Career Airmen	42	42	100%
TOTAL	44	44	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	12	0	0.0%
Career Airmen	14	14	100%
TOTAL	26	14	53.8
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	14	2	14.3%
Career Airmen	56	56	100%
TOTAL	70	58	82.9%

REENLISTMENT RATES

1960

November	Eligible to Reenlist	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
KADENA			
First Term Airmen	18	18	100%
Career Airmen	36	36	100%
TOTAL	54	54	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	28	7	25.0%
Career Airmen	17	17	100%
TOTAL	45	24	53.3%
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	46	25	54.3%
Career Airmen	53	53	100%
TOTAL	99	78	78.7%

October	Eligible to Reenlist	Total Reenlistments	Total Rates
KADENA			
First Term Airmen	7	7	100%
Career Airmen	48	48	100%
TOTAL	55	55	100%
NAHA			
First Term Airmen	50	11	22.0%
Career Airmen	69	69	100%
TOTAL	119	119	100%
COMMAND			
First Term Airmen	50	11	22.0%
Career Airmen	69	69	100%
TOTAL	119	80	67.2%

APPENDIX 7

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAM

313th AD, 1960-II, Appendix 7

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TRAINING

24 June 1960 - 23 July 1960

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN
Supply Officer	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg	4	
Airframe Repair Tech	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg		1
Radar Eval Tng	Taiwan	51 AB Gp	2	
Orgn Commander	Viet Nam	51 Ftr Intcp Wg	1	
Dentistry Residency	Korea	6313 AB Wg	1	
Supply Inspection Tech	Korea	6313 AB Wg		2
Staff Supply Officer	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Altitude Training	Taiwan	6313 AB Wg	9	
			19	3

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF*	AMN*
Personnel Staff Off	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Administrative Off	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Fire Crash Rescue	Korea	51 AB Gp		2
Prod Control Off	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg	2	
Metal Process Spec	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg		1
Munitions Spec	Korea	6313 AB Wg		2
Munitions Supv	Korea	6313 AB Wg	1	
Firefighting Supv	Taiwan	51 AB Gp	2	
Supply Inspection Tech	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
Inventory Mgt Supv	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
TOTAL			9	9

*In MAP Training within the Division as of 24 July 1960.

313th AD, 1960-II, Appendix 7

Military Assistance Program Training

24 July 1960 - 23 August 1960

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN
Planning Engineer	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Personnel Staff	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Administrative Officer	Korea	6313 AB Wg	2	
Metal Proc Spec	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg		1
Production Control Officer	Korea	51 Ftr Intcp Wg	2	
Munitions Specialist	Korea	6313 AB Wg		2
Altitude Training	Taiwan	6313 AB Wg	8	
TOTAL			16	3

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF*	AMN*
Munitions Supervisor	Korea	6313 AB Wg		1
Firefighting Supervisor	Taiwan	51 AB Gp	2	
Supply Inspection Tech	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
Inventory Management Supv	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
TOTAL			2	5

*In MAP Training within the Division as of 24 August 1960.

313th AD, 1960-II, Appendix 7

Military Assistance Program Training

24 August 1960 - 23 September 1960

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN
Firefighting Supervisor	Taiwan	51 AB Gp	2	

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF*	AMN*
Supply Inspection Tech	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
Inventory Mgt Supv	Viet Nam	51 AB Gp		2
Munitions Supervisor	Korea	6313 AB Wg		1
TOTAL				5

*In MAP Training within the Division as of 24 September 1960.

Military Assistance Program Training

24 September - 23 October 1960

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN
Supply Inspection Tech	Viet Nam	51 FIWg		2
Supply Reds Supervisor	Viet Nam	51 FIWg		2

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN*
Munitions Supervisor	Korea	6313ABWg		1

*In MAP Training within the Division as of 24 October 1960.

Military Assistance Program Training

24 October - 23 November 1960

COURSE TITLE	COUNTRY	TNG UNIT	OFF	AMN
Munitions Supervisor	Korea	6313ABWg		1

This completed the Military Assistance Training Program for the year 1960.

APPENDIX 8

AOCP, ANFE AND ANOR/S RATES

313th AD, 1960-II, Appendix 8

PERCENT ANOR/S RATES

July - December 1960

Unit	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
6313 AB Wg						
L-20	0.	0.	0.			
T-33	5.3	5.5	5.6	2.8	8.2	7.7
C-47	0.	0.	0.	6.4	0.	0.
C-119	5.3	35.4				
C-54		0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
18 Tac Ftr Wg						
F-100	1.8	1.7	2.2	4.5	5.5	1.2
15 Tac Recon Sq						
F-101	0.	4.4	0.8	1.0	2.6	3.2
* 6431 AB Gp						
L-20	0.	0.				
B-29	0.					
C-47	2.1	0.	0.	5.3	0.	0.
T-33	15.8	1.2	10.0	3.2	15.3	0.
H-19	0.	0.	1.8	20.4	7.7	0.
H-21						
51 Ftr Intcp Wg						
F-86						
F-102	1.0	4.1	7.2	6.2	0.9	0.
C-130	6.9	8.6	7.8	7.6	2.3	0.
SA-16		0.	1.0	3.2	0.	0.
Kadena Totals	1.9	3.3	2.2	2.2	5.7	1.6
Naha Totals	4.1	4.7	6.7	6.7	6.7	0.
313 Air Div Total	2.7	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	.8

*Redesignated 51st Air Base Group as of 18 July 1960 per PACAF GO 54, dated 12 July 1960.

SECRET

313th AD, 1960-II, Appendix 8

PERCENT ANFE RATES

July - December 1960

Unit	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
6313 AB Wg						
L-20	0.	0.	0.			
T-33	0.	0.	0.	2.8	1.4	0.
C-47	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
C-119	33.3	35.4				
C-54		0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
18 Tac Ftr Wg						
F-100	1.3	1.0	2.2	3.1	4.8	.4
15 Tac Recon Sq						
F-101	1.9	3.2	0.8	0.	0.	0.
* 6431 AB Gp						
L-20	0.	0.				
B-29	0.					
C-47	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
T-33	0.	0.	0.	0.	5.8	0.
H-19	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
H-21						
51 Ftr Intcp Wg						
F-86						
F-102	0.	0.9	4.5	1.9	0.6	.1
C-130	0.	5.7	4.3	6.2	2.3	0.
SA-16		0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kadena Totals	2.0	2.1	1.4	1.4	3.9	0.
Naha Totals	0.	2.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	0.
313 Air Div Total	1.2	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.4	0.

* Redesignated 51st Air Base Group as of 18 July 1960 per PACAF GO 54, dated 12 July 1960.

SECRET

PERCENT ACCP RATES

July - December 1960

Unit	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
6313 AB Wg						
L-20	0.	0.	0.			
T-33	5.3	5.5	5.6	0.6	6.3	7.7
C-47	0.	0.	0.	6.4	0.	0.
C-119	5.3	0.				
C-54		0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
18 Tac Ftr Wg						
F-100	1.8	0.7	0.	1.0	4.8	.9
15 Tac Recon Sq						
F-101	0.	1.6	0.	1.0	0.	3.7
* 6431 AB Gp						
L-20	0.	0.				
B-29	0.					
C-47	2.1	0.	0.	5.3	0.	0.
T-33	15.8	1.3	10.0	3.2	10.7	0.
H-19	0.	0.	1.8	20.4	7.7	0.
H-21						
51 Ftr Intcp Wing						
F-86						
F-102	1.0	3.6	5.3	6.0	0.3	0.
C-130	6.9	3.7	4.7	3.4	0.	0.
SA-16		0.	1.0	3.2	0.	0.
Kadena Totals	1.9	1.2	0.5	0.5	2.5	2.5
Naha Totals	4.1	2.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	0.
313 Air Div Totals	2.7	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.3

*Redesignated 51st Air Base Group as of 18 July 1960 per PACAF GO 54, dated 12 July 1960.

SECRET

APPENDIX 9

RADAR OUT OF COMMISSION FOR PARTS (ROCP)

AND

RADAR NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY (RNFP)

RATES

(JULY - DECEMBER 1960)

ROCP AND RNFP RATES BY MONTHS

July - December 1960

July 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako)	.4%	5.8%
Site P-54 (Kume)	.8%	1.6%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	.1%	2.7%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	.4%	2.4%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.4%	3.3%

August 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako)	.3%	3.9%
Site P-54 (Kume)	.8%	3.0%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	.0%	2.9%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	.3%	3.4%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.3%	3.3%

September 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako)	.1%	1.6%
Site P-54 (Kume)	.4%	4.4%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	.05%	.9%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	.10%	2.1%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.20%	2.2%

October 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako)	.4%	.5%
Site P-54 (Kume)	.5%	5.1%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	0.0%	1.1%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	0.0%	2.8%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.2%	2.3%

November 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako	.1%	.4%
Site P-54 (Kume)	.3%	4.1%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	0.0%	.5%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	.3%	4.1%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.1%	2.1%

December 1960

	% ROCP	% RNFP
Site P-53 (Miyako)	.02%	.9%
Site P-54 (Kume)	0.00%	5.8%
Site P-56 (Yuza Dake)	0.00%	.8%
Site P-55 (Okino-Erabu)	.10%	2.6%
OVERALL AVERAGE	.04%	2.4%

APPENDIX 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

AT KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

(July - December 1960)

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

July 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	702,913	2,352,301	5,263	148	741
Naha	484,872	1,353,502	10,916	69	326
TOTAL	1,187,785	3,605,823	16,179	217	1,067

August 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	675,088	2,154,695	6,709	367	851
Naha	519,777	1,324,031	7,144	60	666
TOTAL	1,194,865	3,478,726	13,853	427	1,517

September 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	663,853	2,272,525	6,005	58	1,036
Naha	552,522	1,306,261	11,988	103	600
TOTAL	1,216,375	3,578,786	17,993	161	1,636

October 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	894,659	2,379,268	8,853	65	1,453
Nana	582,564	1,489,535	9,955	38	585
TOTAL	1,477,223	3,868,803	18,808	103	2,038

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

November 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	760,212	2,324,310	8,126	160	788
Naha	533,828	1,393,137	7,846	30	676
TOTAL	1,294,040	3,717,447	15,972	190	1,464

December 1960

Base	115/145	JP-4	1100 Oil	1010 Oil	7808 Oil
Kadena	1,001,563	2,333,455	9,616	34	990
Naha	467,195	1,738,260	7,289	18	1,238
TOTAL	1,468,758	4,071,715	16,905	52	2,228

APPENDIX 11

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1960

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1960

Month	Kadena	Naha
July	6.57	6.03
August	8.54	9.05
September	3.36	3.59
October	1.38	1.30
November	3.71	4.70
December	4.39	3.79
TOTALS	27.95	28.46

5AF REGULATION
NO. 23-4

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 8 June 1960

Organization - Field

313TH AIR DIVISION

PURPOSE: To state the mission, responsibilities and outline command relationships of the 313th Air Division.

1. Mission. The mission of the 313th Air Division is to maintain assigned and attached forces at a degree of combat readiness that will insure the success of directed military operations.

2. Organization. The 313th Air Division is a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force. It is provided with a headquarters and such units and facilities necessary to accomplish its mission.

3. Responsibilities. The Commander, 313th Air Division, will:

a. Exercise command of assigned units except for that direct control retained by the Commander, Fifth Air Force, over offensive tactical forces.

b. Control and/or support attached units as directed.

c. Organize, administer, equip, and train assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies and plans issued by this and higher headquarters.

d. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities prepare plans as required in support of Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.

e. Insure that combat training is contracted in accordance with existing directives and oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans and operations orders. Emphasis will be placed upon the specific plans and directives listed in Attachment 1.

f. Insure that all combat and combat direct support units are furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to maintain a high degree of combat readiness.

*This regulation supersedes 5AFR 23-4, 21 Apr 59.
OPI: 5FODC (5FOMO)
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PACAF, PFCAS-PE...2

g. Insure the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

h. Monitor the development and conduct of training programs to include:

(1) Technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(2) General military training in accordance with applicable portions of AFM 50-7, AF Unit Training Standards.

(3) Combat readiness training in accordance with paragraph 3e.

(4) Aircrew, ground crew, technical and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program.

(5) Other training as directed.

i. Contribute toward development of:

(1) Tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(2) Requirements for new weapons and weapons systems.

(3) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapons systems.

j. Provide administrative and logistic support, as directed.

k. Support the Strategic Air Command, Military Air Transport Service and other USAF activities in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units as reflected in PD 62-1-1.

l. When directed, exercise operational control of forces other than those of the United States.

m. Exercise operational control of US, Army and Navy antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units, and other antiaircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

n. Conduct search and rescue operations as directed.

o. Provide for internal security and local ground defense of assigned Air Force installations.

p. Provide for the development, construction, maintenance and operation of assigned installations required in support of the mission.

q. Exercise general courts-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

r. Coordinate with and provide assistance to other United States military services and governmental agencies to include:

(1) Formulating and jointly planning local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbance, typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuation and special demonstration plans, with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies.

(2) Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

(3) Participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies as directed by the Commander, Joint US. Forces.

(4) Contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Services Police Force and the Ryukyuan Army and Air Force Exchange Service.

(5) After completion of appropriate agreements, providing a base, training facilities and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations.

(6) Supporting the CINCPACREP, RI, in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership to the Joint Planning Group, all subcommittees and panels.

(7) Coordinating with appropriate local United States governmental authorities, all Air Force activities which have an impact on the civil economy or affect civil activities.

(8) Supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyu Islands.

s. Insure that all commanders and staff officers are familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Actions Armed Forces.

t. Insure preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters 313th Air Division.

u. Insure that mission directives have been prepared for all units within the Division and require that all mission directives be reviewed semiannually and updated where required.

4. Miscellaneous. On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the Air Division, the Commander, 313th Air Division is authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate and friendly force commanders, except as otherwise directed by this or higher headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDWIN L. WALKER, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

1 Attachment:
Listing of Plans and Directives

LISTING OF PLANS AND DIRECTIVES

(1) Training:

(a) PACAFM 51-2 as amended

(b) PACAFM 51-3 as amended

(c) PACAFM 51-4 as amended

(d) PACAFM 51-6

(e) 5AF OPlan 138-59

(f) 5AF OPlan 138-59

(2) Operations:

(a) PACAFM 55-4

(b) PACAFM 55-5

(c) PACAFM 55-7

(d) PACAFM 55-8

(e) PACAFM 58-1

(f) 5AF OPlan 109-59

(g) 5AF OPlan 146-60

(h) 5AF OPlan 164-60

(i) 5AF OPlan 175-60

(j) PACAF SOP 1-59

(3) Emergency and Contingency War Plans:

(a) 5AF WPC 1-58

(b) 5AF OPlan 25-58

(c) 5AF OPlan 27-58

(d) 5AF OPlan 32-59

(e) 5AF OPlan 33-58

(f) 5AF OPlan 55-59

(g) 5AF OPlan 152-59

313TH AIR DIVISION REGULATION) NUMBER 23-6)

HEADQUARTERS 313TH AIR DIVISION
APO 239 26 August 1960

Organization - Field

51ST FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING

PURPOSE: To state the mission and responsibilities of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

1. To Whom This Regulation Applies. This directive is applicable to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

2. Mission. The mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is to:

a. Conduct air defense operations within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility and the areas adjacent thereto, including the activities of the Air Defense Control Center, AC&W Radar Stations, fighter interceptor squadron and air defense missile units.

b. Provide, as directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division administrative and logistical support for units attached to Naha Air Base.

3. Organization: The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is organized as an O/T unit assigned to the 313th Air Division. It is provided with a Wing Headquarters, an Air Base Group, facilities, equipment and personnel, and assigned units as are considered necessary to carry out the mission.

4. Responsibilities. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, subject to policies established by 313th Air Division and directives of higher headquarters; exercises command jurisdiction over the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing with its assigned and attached units. He is directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for:

a. Accomplishment of defensive operational staff requirements for 313th Air Division. He is assigned the additional personal duty as Deputy Division Commander for Air Defense.

b. Providing aircraft, equipment and/or personnel incidental to the air defense mission as directed.

c. The operational control of all US Army anti-aircraft units for sector air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine anti-aircraft units when shore-based, and operational control of anti-aircraft gunfire from ships' batteries when such fire is in defense of shore installations located within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility.

d. Preparing and maintaining plans to conduct combat operations.

*This regulation supersedes 313ADR 23-6, 21 January 1960
OPI: 3130C-M
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e. Contributing mobile strike forces, support personnel, and equipment in support of PACAF contingency war plans.

f. Augmenting the defensive forces of other Fifth Air Force Air Divisions when situations so dictate.

g. Operation of the Okinawa Air Defense Control Center.

h. Mutually coordinating and standardizing air defense information and procedures with adjacent air defense sectors.

i. Providing aircraft for, and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.

j. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

k. Developing and conducting aircrew, ground crew, technical and other specialized training programs for military members of friendly foreign countries under the Military Assistance Program.

l. Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine Commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

m. Conducting combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies as frequently as necessary to insure the success of all planned joint operations.

n. Providing field maintenance to organizations assigned, attached or transient on Naha Air Base. This is to include the deployment of mobile maintenance teams personnel and equipment, as necessary, to support the Naha based C-130 aircraft utilized in performance of their intra-theater airlift mission.

o. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by this headquarters, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

p. Issuing mission statements to all assigned units.

q. The performance of such other tasks as may be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

5. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is authorized direct communication with local Army, Marine and AMC Depot Commanders and heads of Civilian Agencies on routine operational, logistical and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication on other than routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters requires the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

5AFR 23-7
1 - 3

5AF REGULATION
NO. 23-7

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 11 JULY 1960

Organization - Field

DETACHMENT 3, HEADQUARTERS 313TH AIR DIVISION

PURPOSE: To state the mission of Detachment 3, Headquarters 313th Air Division and the responsibilities of the Commander.

1. Mission. The mission of Detachment 3, Headquarters 313th Air Division is to perform radar evaluation services throughout the Pacific Air Forces' area of responsibility, conduct analysis of the Radar Quality Control Program, and to act as an advisory agency on matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics.

2. Organization. Detachment 3, Headquarters 313th Air Division is an organized detachment under the direct operational control of Headquarters Fifth Air Force. The commander, 313th Air Division is responsible for providing the detachment with personnel, facilities and support considered necessary to carry out the unit's mission.

3. Responsibilities. The Commander, Det 3, 313th Air Division, is responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, for the following:

a. To perform initial, and special evaluations for all ground-type radars in the Pacific Air Forces' area of responsibility as directed by this headquarters.

b. To monitor continuously, the PACAF Radar Quality Control Program by a systematic evaluation and analysis of data submitted in accordance with AFM 100-28. This analysis will include such matters as effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, relationship of target aspect ratio to probability of detection, and validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft.

c. To provide special advisory service on specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the ACW system.

d. To provide training for field personnel on Radar Quality Control procedures.

e. To conduct radar site surveys for new radar installations when directed by this headquarters.

f. To support such other activities as may be directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

OPI: 5FODC (5FOMO-P)
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4. Direct Communication. The Commander, Det 3, 313th Air Division is authorized to communicate directly with Fifth Air Force, air divisions, and ACW units for the purpose of arranging evaluation schedules, field support requirements and to carry out the analyses functions associated with the Radar Quality Control Program. Details for scheduled evaluations outside the Fifth Air Force area of responsibility will be the responsibility of Headquarters Fifth Air Force.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDWIN L. WALKER, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

*5AFR 55-18
1 - 3

5AF REGULATION)
NO. 55-18)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 14 January 1960

OPERATIONS

DIVISION AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

PURPOSE: To delineate the air defense sectors assigned to air divisions within Fifth Air Force.

1. Applicability. The provisions of this regulation are applicable to air division commanders and pertain only to the area of responsibility chargeable to Commander, Fifth Air Force.

2. Definitions:

a. Area of Responsibility. The geographical area assigned for the purpose of allocating surveillance and reporting responsibilities in consonance with air defense capabilities.

b. Air Defense Sector. The area of responsibility assigned to an Air Defense Control Center.

c. Air Defense Region. The area of responsibility assigned to Fifth Air Force.

3. Responsibilities:

a. The air division commander has operational jurisdiction over the air defense forces in his sector and is responsible for the conduct of the air defense operation in his area of responsibility.

b. The Fifth Air Force region is divided into the following areas of responsibility:

(1) 39th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 45°45' N 145°45' E thence south along this meridian to 44°26' N 145°45' E thence southwest to 44°03' N 145° 19' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°30' N 145°22' E thence to 43°24' N 145°35' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°26' N 145°48'30" E thence to 43°23'15" N 145°50'35" E thence 43°20' N 145°52' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°16' N 145°44' E thence to 42°47' N 146°23' E thence generally northeast, staying 40 nautical miles off the eastern flank of the Kurile Island chain to 52°30' N 160° E thence south to 38° N 160° E thence west to 38° N 144°38' E thence northwest to 39° N 142°30' E thence west to 39° N 140° E thence northwest to 42° N 131° 41' E thence generally northeast staying 40 nautical

miles off the eastern flank of the USSR to 45°45' N 138°45' E thence east to starting point 45°45' N 145°45' E.

(2) 41st Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 38° N 160° E south to 30° N 160° E west to 30° N 123° E north to 32° N 123° E west to a point 40 nautical miles off the China coast thence generally northwest along a line 40 nautical miles off the coastline to 33° N 121°50' E to 33° N 127° E northeast to 35°13' N 129°48' E to 36° N 130°30' E to 37°17' N 133° E then north to 41°35' N 133° E then southeast to 39° N 140° E to 39° N 142°30' E then southeast to 38° N 144°38' E then east to starting point 38° N 160° E.

(3) 313th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 30° N 145° E southwest to 23° N 132° E west to 23° N 123° E north to 30° N 123° E thence east to starting point 30° N 145° E.

(4) 314th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 41°35' N 133° E south to 37°17' N 133° E southwest to 36° N 130°30' E to 35°13' N 129°48' E to 33° N 127° E west to 33° N 121°50' E thence generally north, east and south along a line 40 nautical miles off the China-North Korea coast to a point 40 nautical miles southwest of the western end of the DMZ thence along center of DMZ to point 40 nautical miles northeast of eastern end of DMZ thence generally north along a line 40 nautical miles off the North Korea-China coast to a point 42° N 131°40' E thence southeast to starting point 41°35' N 133° E.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDWIN L. WALKER, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

2

Headquarters
AERONAUTICAL CHART AND INFORMATION CENTER
Air Photographic & Charting Service (Mats)
United States Air Force
Second & Arsenal
St. Louis 18, Missouri

20 June 1960

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 4)

REDESIGNATION OF CERTAIN UNITS, AERONAUTICAL CHART AND INFORMATION CENTER

1. The following units are redesignated as indicated below, effective 1 July 1960.

PRESENT DESIGNATION	NEW DESIGNATION
1357th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	7650th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 1, 1357th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 1, 7650th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 2, 1357th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 2, 7650th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 3, 1357th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 3, 7650th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 2, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 2, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 3, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron
Detachment 4, 1358th Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron	Detachment 1, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron

2. Organization records will be processed in accordance with AF Manual 181-5.

3. Appropriate entries will be made in the Morning Report for the above units in accordance with AFM 171-6. Action directed herein will

be reported by means of the Air Force Organization Status Report (RCS: AF-01) in accordance with AFR 20-49.

4. AUTHORITY: Department of the Air Force letter, AFOMO 419m, 25 May 1960, subject: "Designation of the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center as a Separate Operating Agency," and AFR 20-27, 2 October 1959.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM O. WOMBLE
1st Lt., USAF
Acting Chief of Administration

3

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 26)

1 July 1960

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - COLONEL DEXTER L. HODGE, 8185A, this Headquarters, is assigned as Inspector General, effective this date vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROY L. BOWLIN, JR., 9806A.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

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BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

(GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 27)

7 July 1960

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL JOHN H de RUSSY, 1682A.

JOHN R SUTHERLAND
Major General, USAF
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

(GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 28)

12 July 1960

So much of General Orders 26, 1 July 1960, this Headquarters, relating to Staff Assignment of COLONEL DEXTER L HODGE, 8185A, as reads: "effective this date", is amended to read: "15 July 1960".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 29)

14 July 1960

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M DE BORD, 35512A, this Headquarters, is assigned as Chief, Administrative Services, effective 18 July 1960, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL BARNEY H CIARY, 36325A.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 30)

19 July 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. - 1. Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, is attached to the 6431st Air Base Group for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support (less assignment and promotion of personnel) effective 1 July 1960. Detachment 3, 313th Air Division is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Logistic Support (to include field maintenance only) effective 1 July 1960. Detachment 3, 313th Air Division will be under Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for Operational Control.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary court martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group and Commander, Detachment 3, 313th Air Division will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6431st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27, PACAF General Orders 45, 9 June 1960 and Letter, Hq Fifth Air Force, Subject: (U) Radar Calibration/ Evaluation Function, 24 May 1960.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 31)

20 July 1960

15 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON - REVOCATION I
15 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON - REVOCATION II
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT..... III

I. 15 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON - REVOCATION. General Orders 16, this Hq, 27 April 1960, relating to attachment of unit, is revoked.

II. 15 TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON - REVOCATION. General Orders 24, this Hq, 29 June 1960, relating to attachment of unit, is revoked.

III. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. The 15 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, is attached to the 18 Tactical Fighter Wing for Operational, Logistical and Administrative control, and Logistical Support in Field and A&E Maintenance, effective 15 March 1960. The 15 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo Jet, is attached to the 6313 Air Base Wing for Logistical Support (less Field and A&E Maintenance) and Administrative Support (to include the assignment and promotion of personnel) effective 15 March 1960."

2. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

a. Commander, 313 Air Division will exercise general courts-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6313 Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary courts-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6313 Air Base Wing and Commander, 15 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo-Jet, will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6313 Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. AUTHORITY. Air Force Regulation 11-4 as amended, Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Hq 5AF General Orders 17, 8 April 1960.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 32)

1 August 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNITS - 1. The following units are attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Logistic Support and Administrative Support effective 18 July 1960:

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division
1252nd AACS Squadron (MATS)
Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group (MATS)
Naha Resident Office, Auditor General (USAF)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron
Detachment 1, D.O. #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
21st Troop Carrier Squadron (Receives certain specialized logistic support from Base Supply, 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena Air Base).
817th Troop Carrier Squadron

2. Detachment 3, 313th Air Division will be under Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for Operational Control. Reference letter, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Subject: (U) Radar Calibration/Evaluation Function, 24 May 1960.

3. The following units are attached to the 51st Support Squadron for Logistic Support and Administrative Support effective 18 July 1960:

Headquarters, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing
Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group

4. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units, with the exception of the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

b. Commander, 51st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units with the exception of the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

c. Commander, 51st Air Base Group and commanders of the aforementioned attached units will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of said attached units with the exception of the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

d. Commander, 51st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for all of the aforementioned attached units including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

General Orders 32, Hq 313th Air Div., 1 Aug 60, continued.

e. The parent unit will retain military justice authority over the Naha Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

4. Authority: Air Force Regulation 11-4 as amended and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert M. DeBord

ROBERT M. DEBORD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 33)

10 August 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support effective 1 July 1960. Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for Logistic Support (to include field maintenance only) effective 1 July 1960.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary courts martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and Commander, Detachment 3, 7651st Aeronautical Chart and Information Squadron will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. Authority: Air Force Regulation 11-4 as amended and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 34)

12 August 1960

General Orders 32, this Headquarters, 1 August 1960, as pertains to units attached to the 51st Fighter Inteceptor Wing, be amended to include: "Orders in conflict are rescinded".

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 35)

13 September 1960

STAFF ASSIGNMENT. - LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W ETTER, JR., A0370845, this Headquarters, is assigned as Civil Engineering Officer, effective 25 July 1960, vice MR LLOYD J HELLMANN.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 36)

26 September 1960

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, during the temporary absence of MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. SUTHERLAND, 617A.

JOHN H. de RUSSY
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 37)

29 September 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support effective 1 September 1960. Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for Logistic Support (to include field maintenance only) effective 1 September 1960. This support will be rendered under the provisions of AFR 11-4 as amended and the Concurrent Use and Support Agreement in effect between the Air Materiel Command and the Pacific Air Forces for support of Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary courts martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and Commander, Detachment 1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. AUTHORITY: AFR 11-4 as amended and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION
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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 38)

30 September 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron, is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Logistic and Administrative Support effective 18 July 1960.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 51st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary court martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 51st Air Base Group and Commander, Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 51st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. AUTHORITY: Air Force Regulation 11-4 as amended, Air Force Regulation 20-27 and letter, Headquarters, 315th Air Division, Subject: Logistical and Administrative Support and Court Martial Jurisdiction, Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 39)

3 October 1960

RESUMPTION OF COMMAND. - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, I hereby resume command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL JOHN H de RUSSY, 18882A.

JOHN R. SUTHERLAND
Major General, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION
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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 40) 7 October 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Logistic and administrative Support effective 18 September 1960. This support will be rendered under the provisions of AFR 11-4 as amended and the Concurrent Use and Support Agreement in effect between Headquarters, Air Rescue Service (MATS) and Pacific Air Forces for support of Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 51st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary courts-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 51st Air Base Group and Commander, Detachment 3, 76th Air Rescue Squadron will exercise Article 15, USMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 51st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives.

3. AUTHORITY: AFR 11-4 as amended and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

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BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 41)

20 October 1960

DETACHMENT 7, 10TH WEATHER GROUP - AMENDMENT I
DETACHMENT 14, 10TH WEATHER GROUP - AMENDMENT II
DETACHMENT 1, 3RD AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON - AMENDMENT III

I. DETACHMENT 7, 10TH WEATHER GROUP - AMENDMENT. So much of paragraph 1, General Orders 31, 9 December 1959, this Headquarters, as reads "Detachment 7, 10th Weather Group" is amended to read "Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing", effective 8 October 1960.

II. DETACHMENT 14, 10TH WEATHER GROUP (MATS) - AMENDMENT. So much of paragraph 1, General Orders 32, 1 August 1960, this Headquarters, as reads "Detachment 14, 10th Weather Group (MATS) be amended to read "Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing (MATS), effective 8 October 1960.

III. DETACHMENT 1, 3RD AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON - AMENDMENT. So much of paragraph 1, General Orders 30, 30 November 1959, this Headquarters, as reads "Detachment 1, 3rd Aviation Depot Squadron" is amended to read "Detachment 1, 3rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron", effective 1 July 1960.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 42)

14 December 1960

	SECTION
STAFF ASSIGNMENTS	I
DETACHMENT 3, 313TH AIR DIVISION - RESCISSION	II
ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - AMENDMENT	III

I. STAFF ASSIGNMENTS. - 1. COLONEL GEORGE S ROBERTS, 8482A, is assigned as Director of Materiel, effective 12 December 1960, vice COLONEL FRANCIS T BRADY, 4438A.

2. LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRED A SPENCER, A0435711, is assigned as Civil Engineering Officer, effective 25 November 1960, vice LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN W ETTER, JR., A0370845.

II. DETACHMENT 3, 313TH AIR DIVISION - RESCISSION. - So much of paragraph 1, General Orders 32, 1 August 1960, this Headquarters, as pertains to Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, is rescinded, effective 18 July 1960.

III. ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - AMENDMENT. - Paragraph 3, General Orders 32, 1 August 1960, this Headquarters, relating to attachment of units is amended to include Detachment 3, 313th Air Division (UAL Equipment of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division will be carried on the UAL of the 51st Support Squadron), effective 18 July 1960.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Assistant Chief, Admin Svcs

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 43)

30 December 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNITS - 1. The following units are attached to the 6313th Support Squadron for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support effective 5 January 1961. All orders in conflict are rescinded.

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing
558th Air Force Band

2. The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support effective 5 January 1961. All orders in conflict are rescinded.

18th Tactical Fighter Wing
11th Air Postal Squadron
District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
Headquarters, 1962D AACS Group (MATS)
Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing (MATS)
1505th Support Squadron (MATS)
Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron (MATS)
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF (Hq Comd)
Detachment #2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group (Hq Comd)
Detachment #1, 3rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC)
6922D Radio Group Mobile (USAFSS)
Detachment #3, 2703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (AMC)
Detachment #1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron (AMC)
F100-8 Mobile Training Detachment (ATC)
Air Force Special Security Office

3. The following units are attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support (to include assignment and promotion of personnel) effective 5 January 1961. All orders in conflict are rescinded.

7th Tactical Depot Squadron
15th Physiological Training Flight

4. The following units are attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for Logistic Support (to include field maintenance only) effective 5 January 1961. All orders in conflict are rescinded.

Headquarters, 313th Air Division
Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing
558th Air Force Band
11th Air Postal Squadron

District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron
Detachment #3, 9th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron
Detachment #56, 7th Aerial Port Squadron
Headquarters, 1962D AACS Group (MATS)
1505th Support Squadron (MATS)
Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron (MATS)
Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF (Hq Comd)
Detachment #2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group (Hq Comd)
Detachment #1, 3rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC)
6922D Radio Group Mobile (USAFSS)
Detachment #3, 2703rd Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron (AMC)
Detachment #1, 2876th GEEIA Squadron (AMC)
F100-8 Mobile Training Detachment (ATC)
Air Force Special Security Office, Headquarters, 313th Air Division

5. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units, with the exception of the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary court-martial jurisdiction over all of the aforementioned attached units with the exception of the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and commanders of the aforementioned attached units will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of said attached units with the exception of the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for all of the aforementioned attached units including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17, 35-66 and other directives. Exceptions for certain units regarding the processing of board actions will be governed by the existing Concurrent Use and Support Agreement presently in effect between the Major Air Command concerned and Pacific Air Forces.

e. The parent unit will retain military justice authority over the Kadena Resident Office, Auditor General USAF.

6. AUTHORITY: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Air Force Regulation 11-4 as amended and the Concurrent Use and Support Agreements presently in effect between the Major Air Commands concerned and Pacific Air Forces.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

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HEADQUARTERS
6313TH AIR BASE WING (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 1)

6 February 1960

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. -Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of 6313th Air Base Wing, effective this date, during the temporary absence of COLONEL GLENN T. EAGLESTON, 9438A. This assumption of command will be terminated upon the return of COLONEL EAGLESTON.

JAMES F. RISHER JR.
Colonel, USAF
Commander

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5-313th AD PC-O
5-Individual
1-AG
1-18th Tac Ftr Wg ATTN: PC

HEADQUARTERS
6313TH AIR BASE WING (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 2)

25 April 1960

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND. - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Headquarters 6313th Air Base Wing, effective 25 April 1960, vice Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston, 9438A.

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5-Individual
5-313th AD PC-O
1-AG
2-PC-O

JOE C. BRILEY
Colonel, USAF
Commander

HEADQUARTERS
6313TH AIR BASE WING (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

11 August 1960

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 3)

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. The 558th USAF Band is attached to HEDRONSEC, 6313th Air Base Wing for Administration (not to include personnel assignment and promotion) effective this date.

2. AUTHORITY: Air Force Regulation 11-4, Air Force Regulation 20-27 and 313th Air Division General Order Number 5, dated 19 May 1959.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CONSTANCE HAMMOND
1st Lt, USAF
Admin Officer

DISTRIBUTION:
5-HEDRONSEC, 6313th Air Base Wing
5-558th USAF Band
10-Hq 6313th Air Base Wing
18-313th Air Division

HEADQUARTERS
6313TH AIR BASE WING (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 4)

25 August 1960

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT - 1. Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron is further attached to 6313th Operations Squadron, 6313th Air Base Wing for Administrative Support (not to include personnel assignment and promotion) effective this date.

2. AUTHORITY: Air Force Regulation 11-4, Air Force Regulation 20-27 and 313th Air Division General Order Number 33, dated 10 August 1960

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. S. SUTHERLAND
CWO W-2, USAF
Asst Admin Officer

DISTRIBUTION:
5-6313th Operations Squadron
10-6313th Air Base Wing
18-313th Air Division
5-Detachment #3, 7651st Aeronautical Charting and Information Squadron

5

HEADQUARTERS
3D AIR DIVISION (SAC)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 334, San Francisco, California

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 8)

3 June 1960

REDESIGNATION OF DETACHMENT 1, 3D AVIATION DEPOT SQUADRON 1. Effective 1 July 1960, Detachment 1, 3D Aviation Depot Squadron is redesignated as Detachment 1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron.

2. Authority: Section II, paragraph 1, SAC General Orders Number 34, dated 25 May 1960 and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
See Reverse Side

/s/ R. E. Stuart
/t/ R. E. Stuart
Major, USAF
Director of Admin Services

5a

UNCLASSIFIED

DETACHMENT # 1

3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUAD.

(SAC)

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

UNCLASSIFIED

600644

EXHIBIT #1

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

CHANGE 1 to DET 1, 3MMS(SAC))
REORGANIZATION PLAN 1-61)

30 September 1960

REORGANIZATION OF DETACHMENT # 1, 3rd MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

1. Make the following pen and ink changes to the plan as indicated:

a. Table of Contents: Add 'TAB 10 - Map of Base.'.

b. Basic Plan:

(1) Paragraph IV A 8, page 4, line 2: Correct 'SMSF' to read 'SMSG'.

(2) Paragraph IV A 12, page 5, line 3: Correct 'Beavy' to read 'Heavy'.

(3) Consolidated UMD, page 9, line 4 under MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION: Change AUTH AFSC and PROPOSED AFSC from 45130 to 46250, and title of the position from 'Prod Sched Spcl' to 'Weapons Mech'.

(4) Grade Recap, page 10, line 3: Change Lieutenant PROPOSED GRADE from '1' to '0'.

c. Basic Plan, Consolidated Unit Authorization List:

(1) Item # 63, page 15: Change PROPOSED USE from '50' to '40'.

(2) Item # 95, page 17: Change PROPOSED USE from '-' to '0'.

(3) Item # 108, page 18: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(4) Item # 109, page 18: Change AUTH USE from '-' to '0'.

(5) Item # 111, Page 18: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(6) Item # 114, Page 18: Change PROPOSED USE from '-' to '0'.

(7) Item # 116, page 18: Change PROPOSED USE from '-' to '0'.

(8) Item # 120, page 18: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(9) Item # 124, page 19: Change PROPOSED USE from '-' to '0'.

(10) Item # 126, page 19: Change PROPOSED USE from '-' to '0'.

(11) Item # 128, page 19: Delete.

(12) Item # 129, page 19: Change PRESENT USE from '-' to '0'.

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Chg 1 to Det 1, 3MMS(SAC) Reorganization Plan 1-61, dated 15 September 1960.

(13) Item # 130, page 19: Delete.

(14) Item # 131, page 19: Change PROPOSED UTE from '-' to '0'.

(15) Item # 132, page 19: Delete.

(16) Item # 133, page 19: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(17) Item # 135, page 19: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(18) Item # 136, page 19: Change PROPOSED UME from '-' to '0'.

(19) Item # 137, page 19: Delete.

d. TAB 5, JGRR UAL Listing, page 5-4: Delete the following:

(1) Line 13, Tent, Artic.

(2) Line 15, Jacket, Flying.

(3) Line 16, Trousers, Flying.

(4) Line 18, Sleeping Bag.

e. TAB 6, Manning, page 6-2, change line 6 from 'Prod Sched Spcl' AFSC '45130' to read 'Weapons Mech' AFSC '46250'.

f. TAB 6, Manning Justification, page 6-4, Paragraph 5, Production Scheduler, change PRIMARY DUTY to read: 'PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46250, Weapons Mechanic, Production Scheduler'.

2. The reason for deletion of the four items from the consolidated UAL programmed plan is due to higher Headquarters releasing this organization from the responsibility of maintaining or supporting 'Recovery Team' operations.

3. The reason for change of AFSC 45130 to AFSC 46250 is compliance with Hq SAC Ltr, DPL[illegible], Subj: AFSC Conversion and/or Change List, dated 31 Aug 60.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Ralph H. Geiwitz

RALPH H. GEIWITZ
SSGT., USAF
NCOIC, Pers/Admin Br.

DISTRIBUTION:
5-3rd Air Division
3-File

600611

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DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 1

COMMAND

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

600611

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REORGANIZATION PLAN)
NUMBER 1-61)

15 September 1960

REORGANIZATION OF DETACHMENT # 1, 3rd MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON

I. OBJECTIVE

A. To reorganize Detachment # 1, 3rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron, in accordance with Strategic Air Command letter subject: Reorganization of Overseas Munitions Maintenance Squadrons, dated 25 July 1960, and recommend manning and equipment requirements that will best fulfill the mission of this organization.

II. FACTORS CONSIDERED

A. Requirement to administratively and logistically support Detachment 2, 27th Communications Squadron.

B. Requirement for additional specialized training.

C. Requirement for operation of a manual AFM 66-1 time accounting system.

D. Requirement for a document security section.

E. Requirement for a separate personnel section.

F. Requirement for dual reporting through PACAF as well as SAC.

G. Requirement for operation of Unit Supply and AFK supply accounts.

H. Requirement for budgeting and monetary accounting.

I. Requirements because of remote location.

J. Requirement to provide a clerk for SAC Liaison as well as administrative and operational support.

III. BACKGROUND

A. A complete study of the reorganization plan for overseas munitions maintenance squadrons has been accomplished by this organization. In this study, service test reports of this new organization were reviewed and compared with this units operation. It is realized that it is difficult to arrive at one Unit Manning Document which would adequately support all overseas units of this type. Because of this, a thorough study was made of all facets of this units' operation to arrive at the most logical and economical method of manning and equipping.

B. This unit is a tenant on a PACAF base and several deviations which apply to this organization must be considered which were not considered in service test reports. FIRST - this organization maintains its' own personnel records and those of Detachment 2, 27th Communications Squadron. This requires well trained capable personnel technicians since no personnel officer is assigned. SECOND - because of location and mission specialized training plus normal training, must be accomplished effectively and proper records maintained. If this is to be the best, and it should be, for the unit to perform its' mission, then this will require full time service from one individual. THIRD - AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto must be utilized to analyze manhour expenditures. Because this unit is a tenant and located a distance from the base proper, a manual system must be used for economy reasons. This system requires expenditures of additional manhours for efficient operation. FOURTH - there is no Director of Administrative Services to aid in the processing of classified and unclassified correspondence, therefore all pickup, control, handling and delivery must be accomplished be personnel of this unit. FIFTH - as a tenant

organization there is a heavy requirement for dual reporting through SAC and PACAF channels which increases the administrative work load. SIXTH - as a tenant organization this unit must maintain a file of PACAF publications as well as the normal Air Force and SAC publications. SEVENTH - this unit must maintain a Unit Supply Account because of its' tenancy as well as an AFK Special Account to support its' primary mission, without a Supply Officer. EIGHTH - this unit must budget all fund expenditures of its' own and Detachment 2, 27th Communications Squadron, and insure that accurate accounting of funds is maintained. NINTH - the unit is located three miles from the base which necessitates the expenditure of many additional manhours. TENTH - the requirement to provide an administrative clerk for the SAC Liaison Office and give general administrative and ligistical support.

C. After fully considering all the factors outlined in paragrarh B above, manning and equipping by functional code as outlined in TABS 1 through 7 is considered optimum for this organization.

D. Recommended organization will be service tested during the period 1 October through 1 November 1960.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Manning and equipment be provided by functional code as outlined in TABS 1 through 7 and the changes listed below be made in the Unit Manning Document:

1. SSG - AFSC 46150, functional code 6400031, Accountable Supply, be converted to TSGT - AFSC 46270, functional code 6400030, Maintenance Supervision, to serve as Training NCO.

2. MSG - AFSC 73170, functional code 03000, Unit Administration, be converted to A1C, AFSC 70250, functional code 03000, Unit Administration, and individual be utilized in Document Security Section.

3. Lt - AFSC 3275A, functional code 6400032, Munitions Service, be converted to SMSF - AFSC 46290, functional code 6400032, Munitions Service, and individual be utilized as NCOIC of Munitions Services.

4. One A2C - AFSC 70230 be added to functional code 03000, Unit Administration, and be utilized as Publications Library Clerk, Document Security Section.

5. A2C - AFSC 70230, functional code 03000, Unit Administration, be raised to A1C - AFSC 70250, to insure well qualified clerical personnel for the positions of Chief Clerk.

6. SSG - AFSC 73250, functional code 03000, Unit Administration, be raised to TSG - 73270, to insure fully qualified personnel to perform the duty of NCOIC of Personnel and Administration Section.

7. A2C - AFSC 70230, functional code 6400030, Maintenance Supervision, be raised to A1C - AFSC 70250, to insure qualified personnel to assist and handle administrative workload of Munitions functions.

8. One TSG - AFSC 46270 and one A1C- AFSC 46250 be added to functional code 6400032 to provide a Weapons Release and ATO Systems & Equipment Maintenance Section.

9. One SSG - AFSC 70250 be added to functional code 03000 to be utilized as the SAC Liaison Office Administrative Clerk.

10. Manning requirements of Det 2, 27th CommRon, be transferred to Det 1, 3MMS's UMD, for more efficient administration.

11. Four AFSC 461X1's be transferred to the Nuclear Safety Office, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena Air Base.

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12. Document Security Section, normally placed under functional code 640003X, be placed under functional code 03000, because of its' unusually heavy purely administrative workload and to facilitate proper controlling of records by records management procedures.

EDWARD G. SIEBOLD
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Commander

DISTRIBUTION:
5 - 3rd Air Division
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PROPOSED FUNCTIONAL CHART FOR DET 1, 3MMS(SAC)



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DETACHMENT 2, 3 MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (3MS) ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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UNIT MANNING DOCUMENT PLAN

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	PROPOSED AFSC	PROPOSED GRADE	PROPOSED NUMBER
COMMAND	01000						
Commander		3216	Major	1	3216	Major	1
TOTAL				1			1
UNIT ADMINISTRATION 03000							
First Sergeant		73170	MSG	1	None	None	0
Personnel Tech		None	None	0	73270	TSG	1
Personnel Spcl		73250	SSG	1	None	None	0
Personnel Spcl		73250	A1C	1	73250	A1C	1
Admin Specialist		70230	A2C	1	70250	A1C	1
TOTAL				4			3
DOCUMENT SECURITY 03000							
Admin Specialist		None	None	0	70250	A1C	1
Apr Admin Spcl		None	None	0	70230	A2C	1
TOTAL				0			2
SAC LIAISON OFFICE 03000							
Admin Specialist		None	None	0	70250	SSG	1
TOTAL				0			1
ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY 6400031							
Inv Mgt Supv		64570	TSG	1	64570	TSG	1
Orgn Sup Spcl		64650	SSG	1	64650	SSG	1
Munitions Spcl		46150	SSG	1	None	None	0
TOTAL				3			2

UNIT MANNING DOCUMENT PLAN (CONT)

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	PROPOSED AFSC	PROPOSED GRADE	PROPOSED NUMBER
MAINTENANCE SUPERV.	6400030						
Nuclr Wpns Off		3275B	Capt	1	3275A	Capt	1
Wpn Maint Supt		46290	SMSgt	1	46290	SMSgt	1
Wpn Maint Tech		46270	TSG	1	46270	TSG	2
Prod Sched Spcl		45130	SSG	1	45130	SSG	1
Admin Specialist		70230	A2C	1	70250	A1C	1
TOTAL				5			6
MUNITIONS SERVICES	6400031						
Nuclr Wpns Off		3275A	Capt	1	3275A	Capt	1
Nuclr Wpns Off		3275A	Lt	1	None	None	0
Wpns Maint Supt		None	None	0	46290	SMSgt	1
Wpns Maint Tech		46270	MSG	2	46270	MSG	2
Wpns Maint Tech		46270	TSG	2	46270	TSG	3
Wpns Mech		46250	SSG	5	46250	SSG	4
Wpns Mech		46250	A1C	4	46250	A1C	5
Apr Wpns Mech		46230	A2C	11	46230	A2C	12
TOTAL				26			28

GRADE RECAPITULATION

GRADE	AUTH	PROPOSED	APPROVED
MAJOR	1	1	
CAPTAIN	2	2	
LIEUTENANT	1	1	
SMSGT	1	2	
MSGT	3	2	
TSGT	4	7	
SSGT	9	7	
A1C	5	9	
A2C	13	13	
TOTAL OFFICERS	4	3	
TOTAL AIRMEN	35	40	
TOTAL STRENGTH	39	43	

CONSOLIDATED UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
1	ECL 681 Col M	JGRJ	-	004	1	0	-	-
2	ECL 681 Col W	JGRJ	n/c	004	4	4	-	-
3	ECL 691 Col M	JGRJ	-	004	1	0	-	-
4	ECL 691 Col W	JGRJ	n/c	004	4	4	-	-
5	1005-554-0228							
	Revolver Cal 38	JGRR	n/c	004	0	43	31	0
6	1005-670-7675							
	Carbine T M2	JGRR	-	004	-	-	8	0
7	1005-714-0329							
	Rack Arm Car	JGRR	-	004	-	-	1	0
8	1095-650-7453							
	Rack Arm Pistol	JGRR	-	004	0	1	1	0
9	1375-212-4600							
	Chest Engineer	JGRW	-	767	1	0	-	-
10	1375-212-4618							
	Reel Assy Cab	JGRW	-	767	1	0	-	-
11	1375-310-1081							
	Mach Blast	JGRW	-	767	1	0	-	-
12	2320-540-1428							
	Truck Pickup	JGRW	n/c	004	4	4	-	-
13	2320-702-3537							
	Truck 2½ Ton	JGRW	n/c	004	6	6	-	-
14	3460-221-1106							
	Vise Bench	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
15	" "		JGRW	041	0	1	-	-

this line not used

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CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
16	3540-026-9209							
	Reel	JGRR	n/c	808	-	-	1	1
17	3540-234-6742							
	Sealer	JGRR	n/c	808	-	-	1	1
18	3540-241-8292							
	Stretcher Box	JGRR	n/c	808	-	-	1	1
19	3610-203-5640							
	Printing Mach	JGRW	JAAC	006	-	-	1	1
20	3610-278-0643							
	Dup Machine	JGRJ	JAAC	006	-	-	1	1
21	3570-527-8049							
	Mower Lawn	JGRR	n/c	808	-	-	1	1
22	" "		JGRR	041	-	-	0	1
23	3930-554-1524						-	-
	Tractor Whse	JGRW	n/c	004	2	2	-	-
24	3930-554-5204							
	Truck Fk Lft	JGRW	n/c	004	1	1	-	-
25	4210-270-4395							
	Extinguisher	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
26	4230-246-1186							
	Decontaminati	JGRW	n/c	004	6	6	-	-
27	4240-217-1094							
	Breathing App	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
28	4240-368-6098							
	Mask Prot Fld	JGRR	n/c	016	-	-	39	43
29	" "	JGRW	-	004	6	0	-	-

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CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
30	5120-395-8620							
	Frame Jaw	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
31	5120-398-4116							
	Jaw Cone	JGRW	-	766	2	0	-	-
32	5120-544-3892							
	Jaw Str	JGRW	-	766	2	0	-	-
33	5120-544-3893							
	Extender	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
34	5120-544-3896							
	Wrench	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
35	5120-604-5057							
	Wrench	JGRW	-	766	2	0	-	-
36	5120-754-0567							
	Dearmer	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
37	5130-293-1849							
	Drill Ele	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
38	5130-529-5679							
	Drill Ele Pt	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
39	6115-548-1384							
	Generator Set	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
40	6130-504-0329							
	Charger Bat M	JGRW	-	004	1	0	-	-
41	6230-519-0839							
	Light Floor	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	2	2
42	6625-539-8444							
	Galvnometer	JGRW	-	767	1	0	-	-

CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED UME
43	6645-526-5062							
	Watch Wrist	JGRW	-	766	4	0	-	-
44	6645-526-6266							
	Stamp Time Ele	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
45	6645-526-9463							
	Clock Wall Ele	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
46	" " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
47	" " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
48	" " "	JGRW	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
49	6650-530-0973							
	Binocular	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
5	6665-092-8012							
	Charger Radiac	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
51	6665-217-1096							
	Detector Kit	JGRW	n/c	004	1	1	-	-
52	6665-526-8648							
	Radiac Set		JGRW	041	0	2	-	-
53	6665-580-3020		"					
	Radiac Set	JGRW	-	766	1	0	-	-
54	" "		JGRW	041	0	2	-	-
55	6670-526-6233							
	Scale Platform	JGRW	JGRR	004	-	1	1	-
56	6730-297-1657							
	Screen Proj	JGRJ	n/c	004	1	1	-	-
5	6730-297-9781							
	Projector Sti	JGRJ	n/c	004	1	1	-	-

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CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
58	7105-141-5385							
	Chr S W/Arm	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	4	4
59	7105-269-5342							
	Table Night	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	2	2
60	7105-269-8457							
	Chr Str	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	2	2
61	7105-270-2248							
	Chr Str	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	25	40
62	7105-270-9833							
	Davenport	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	1	1
63	7105-274-3822							
	Bed Dble Deck	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	35	50
64	7105-559-6375							
	Table Occas	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	1	1
65	7110-132-5390							
	Stand Cab Vis	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
66	7110-132-6163							
	File Vis 6 X 11	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
67	7110-132-6650							
	Blackboard	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
68	" "		JAAC	041	-	-	0	1
69	7110-205-1422							
	Safe 2 Shelf	JAAC	-	006	-	-	1	1
70	7110-262-6650							
	Bksw	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	3	9
71	" "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	3	2

600644

CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK NUMBER & NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
72	7110-262-6650							
	Bkcsw	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	3	13
73	" "	JGRW	-	006	-	-	3	0
74	7110-262-6663							
	Table O-M 60X34	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	1	2
75	" " "	JGRJ	-	006	-	-	1	0
76	" " "		JGRR	006	-	-	0	1
77	7110-264-5205							
	Dsk Mtl 42x24	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	1	1
78	7110-270-9838							
	Dsk Tp 60 x 34	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	2	5
79	" " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	3
80	" " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
81	" " "	JGRW	-	006	-	-	1	0
82	7110-270-9840							
	Dsk Mtl 60 x 34	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	2	1
83	" " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	3	1
84	" " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
85	" " "	JGRW	n/c	006	-	-	4	2
86	7110-270-9842							
	Dsk Mtl 45 x 34		JGRJ	006	-	-	0	2
87	" " "		JGRW	006	-	-	0	2

This line not used

This line not used

This line not used

This line not used

600644

CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK # NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL. DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
88	7110-273-8785							
	Chr S W/O Arm	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	1	10
89	" " " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	4
90	" " " "		JGRR	006	-	-	0	1
91	" " " "	JGRW	n/c	006	-	-	1	2
92	7110-273-8791							
	Chr Rot Tp	JAAC		006	-	-	2	5
93	" " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	3
94	" " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
95	" " "	JGRW	-	006	-	-	1	-
96	7110-273-8793							
	Chr Rot Ex Mtl	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	2	1
97	" " " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	3	3
98	" " " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
99	" " " "	JGRW	n/c	006	-	-	4	4
100	7110-286-3797							
	Cab F Cap Sz5		JAAC	006	-	-	0	3
101	" " " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	3
102	" " " "		JGRR	006	-	-	-	1
103	" " " "	JGRW	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
104	7110-582-0982							
	Tbl Office	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	25	28
105	7110-663-6362							
	Cab F C/6 4D	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	1	3
106	" " " "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	0
1	" " " "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1

CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK # NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL. DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
108	7125-269-8534 Cab Storage	JGRW	-	766	2	-	-	-
109	" "		JAAC	006	-	-	-	2
110	7125-559-6382 Bin Stor Disp	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	6	10
111	7195-205-0437 Table Work 72X36	JGRW	-	766	1	-	-	-
112	7195-275-5824 Rack Wear 6Ma	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
113	" "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
114	" " "	JGRR	-	006	-	-	1	-
115	" " "		JGRW	006	-	-	-	1
116	7195-275-5825 Rack Wear 12Ma	JGRW	-	006	-	-	2	-
117	7210-682-6505 Mattress Innr	JGRR	n/c	012	-	-	35	40
118	7330-274-7086 Jug Insulated	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	4	4
119	7420-264-6942 Add & Sub Mach	JGRJ	n/c	004	1	1	-	-
120	7430-281-6978 Typewriter Po	JGRW	-	766	1	-	-	-
121	7430-634-5062 Typewriter NP	JAAC	n/c	006	-	-	2	3
122	" "	JGRJ	n/c	006	-	-	1	3
123	" "	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1

600641

CONSOLIDATED UAL (Cont)

	STOCK # NOMENCLATURE	PRESENT SECTION	PROPOSED SECTION	ALL. DOCU AUTH	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE
124	Typewriter NP	JGRW	-	006	-	-	1	-
125	7430-634-5064							
	Typewriter NP		JAAC	006	-	-	0	2
126	" "	JGRJ	-	006	-	-	1	-
127	7190-526-3799							
	Polisher Floor	JGRR	n/c	006	-	-	1	1
128	8340-551-5459							
	Tent Artic	JGRR	n/c	016	-	-	6	6
129	8345-656-1439							
	Flag Natl US		JGRR	006	-	-	-	1
130	8415-269-0418							
	Jacket Fly	JGRR	n/c	016	-	-	24	24
131	" "	JGRW	-	766	2	-	-	-
132	8415-269-0517							
	Trouser Fly	JGRR	n/c	016	-	-	24	24
133	" "	JGRW	-	766	2	-	-	-
134	8415-272-3022							
	Cover All Vesi	JGRR	n/c	004	6	6	-	-
135	" " "	JGRW	-	766	2	-	-	-
136	8415-281-7812							
	Apron Tox Agt	JGRW	-	766	1	-	-	-
	8465-238-8105							
137	Sleeping Bag	JGRR	n/c	016	-	-	24	24

JUSTIFICATION OF UAL CHANGES

LI 5,6 & 7 Present authorization of hand guns is based upon AFSC. 461XO, 462XO and officer personnel are authorized to be issued hand guns. All assigned 732XO, 702XO and 64XXO are authorized to be issued hand guns if their duties entail the protection of classified documents. During normal peace time operations four (4) 702XO, one (1) 732XO and one (1) 645XO are involved in daily use, couriering, and handling of classified documents. During an EWO operation all support AFSC's (732XO, 702XO and 64XXO) are directly involved in preparation, handling, and couriering of classified documents. Based on the above the UAL should reflect an authorization of 43 revolvers, Cal.38., one (1) for each assigned person. This will delete the requirement for carbines, carbine storage rack and associated carbine maintenance and cleaning equipment.

LINE 9,10,11,14,25,27,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,42,43,49,50,53,108,111,120,131,132, 135 and 136 ECL 767 and ECL 766 are for the support of EOD personnel and operations. This unit no longer possesses authorization for such personnel and does not have a mission for EOD support. All EOD operations will be handled by the base.

LI 15 Required for Weapons Release and ATO Maintenance Section use.

LINE 22 Due to the maintenance of two (2) areas more than three (3) miles apart, ie. the barracks area and OSA, it has become necessary to utilize two (2) lawn mowers. The barracks area is approximately one (1) block and a mower is in use two to three days weekly at that location. The Ordnance Storage Area, located three and one half miles from the barracks, is approximately 5 square blocks and the mower is in use daily to cut the grass. The over lapping periods of grass cutting required prohibit the use of only one mower to accomplish the detail in minimum time and create a loss of effective man-hours due to transportating mower from one area to the other.

LINE 28 & 29 MEAL 004 requirements for 6 masks, Protective, Field will be voided by the TA 006 requirements of 43, one for each assigned UMD position.

LINE 40 This unit has no Electric Fork Lift Requirement therefore no use for a battery charger.

LI 52 and 54 Radiacs. This organization is required by SACR 355-1 to have a Disaster Control capability. SACR 355-1 states that tenant units will establish an individual disaster control program if the host base cannot support the unit. At the present time, Kadena Air Base does not have the personnel or equipment to effectively support this organization. Disaster Control teams have been trained from assigned personnel. Radiological equipment is required for monitoring in the event of suspected or actual radiological hazard. Two PAC-1S's and two AN/PDR-39's are required to provide adequate monitoring capability.

LINE 61, 63, 104 & 117 Requirements for barracks room furnishings have in the past been based on what average number of personnel would be residing in the barracks. Present barracks space is 1 C.Q. room, 8 NCO rooms and 20 two man airmen rooms. Although under most conditions, a small percentage of NCO's and airmen would be living in private or Government Quarters, the housing availability situation on this base coupled with the fact that seven (7) personnel are permanently attached to this unit for Qtrs, messing and admin, (Det 2, 27th ComRon), it is imperative that maximum authorization of furnishin be given on the basis of assigned UMD positions which total 38 NCO's and airmen and 28 rooms. Beds, matresses and chairs for each man and a table for each room.

LINE 68 Presently a black board is required for both the training classroom and the conference room. These rooms are located in different buildings approximately one block apart and are both is in use daily which prohibits the utilization of one black board for both rooms.

LINE 70 - 73 Present and future requirements for publications bookcases are well defined and have been reduced to an absolute minimum. The Administrative section maintains a master publications library which files AFR's, AFM's, AFP's SAC Publications, 3AD Publications, PACAF, 313AD and 6313th ABWg Publications except supply directives, required for daily operation of the Detachment. This takes 6 bookcases. Also on file in the library are all unclassified Technicial Orders pertaining to the operation and maintenance of the Detachment Mission and equipment. These require three bookcases. Accountable supply maintains the publications required for their activity which are the AFM 67-1 and all related documents. Those require a minimum of 13 bookcases. Maintenance Supervision has a sub-file of directives which require frequent daily reference for their operations. These require a minimum of 2 bookcases. The total requirement of 24 bookcases is then an absolute minimum. Any amount under this figure would cause loose filing, loss of control and loss of directives and saves dollars in replacement costs of lost or excessively worn and frayed publications.

LINE 74 - 76 Requirements for the office table are broken down as follows. One table for administration used for a base for the Duplicating Machine, Gestetner Stencil cutting machine and a reading table. One table for the Document Security Section for use in the classified cage for the purpose of a reading table for classified documents and classified technicial orders. It is also used for filing, distribution, and sorting of documents during records reviewing and destruction. One table for Acct Supply Section for use as reading and research table for publications. Other miscellanious uses are filing, distribution, etc. Other sections could utilize tables also but is felt that locally constructed wooden tables will be adequate for their uses and will enable this unit to keep it's UAL to an absolute minimum of accountable equipment.

LINE 78-87 The desks are based on space requirements as well as duty performed by each position. Typing desks are required for 2 - AFSC 732X0, (Personnel Spcl) 1 - 46270 - Training NCO, 4 - AFSC 702X0(Admin Spcl) 1 - AFSC 45130, (Prod Sched Spcl) and 1 - 645X0, Unit Supply Spcl. Desks, metal, 60 X 34, are required for the three assigned officer positions plus NCOIC Munitions Services and one for Acct Supply NCOIC. Due to space available, the requirement for 4 desks, metal, 45 X 34 is established instead of the 60 X 34 size, for the following positions; Maintenance Supervision NCOIC, Maintenance Technician (Controller), Munitions Spcl in Loading Standardization Office and one for the motor vehicle NCO which is located in a seperate building. These desk authorizations have been studied closely and constitute a minimum requirement for sustained operations. Requirements exists for many more working spaces but again it is felt that through use of locally constructed equipment the UAL can be kept at a minimum requirement for operation of this facility.

LINE 88-91 A unique situation exists when seating requirements for an organization normally are heavy compared to desk authorizations. In supporting functions of this unit, a requirement is established for frequent and daily use of the conference room. The majority of these conferences have a minimum of eight (8) people in attendance both from this unit and associated units of this base. At the same time requirements exists in the other offices for seating space both for researching publications, general work, interviewing, counselling, etc. By evaluating all these requirements a composite picture is taken and requirements for chairs can be evaluated on the basis of moving chairs from desk or office to office to perform the required functions. Based on the above, the minimum requirement has been established as follows:

Administrative Section	6 - Conference Room
	1 - Commanders Office
	1 - Document Security
	2 - Administrative/Personnel
Maintenance Supervision Section	1 - Maintenance Chief
	1 - Controller
	2 - Maintenance Supervisors Section
Accountable Supply	1 - Reading Table
Munitions Services	1 - Officers Desk
	1 - Training NCO desk

LINE 92-99 The chairs, Rotary, Typist and Chair, Rotary, Executive, metal, are based upon the requirements for desks as established by paragraph 10 above.

LINE 100-103 This Detachment was activated on 1 October 1959 and most of the records of the previous unit, which this Det assumed the responsibility for, were either retired or destroyed IAW 181-5, Since activation of this unit a very stringent records control program has been in effect and requirements for filing cabinets are based on the records established so far this year. At present, one year of operation has created the following cubits of records.

a. Personnel/Administration - 18 cubic feet
(1) These include subjective files, forms, personnel records, etc. The need also exists for space requirements for the succeeding years subjective files up to three years.

b. Maintenance Supervision - 14 cubic feet
(1) See a(1) above.

c. Accountable Supply - 6 cubic feet
(1) See a(1) above.

d. Sub Motor Pool - 6 cubic feet
(1) Requires additional file cabinet due to physical location.

e. Training Section - 6 cubic feet
(1) Training Records, programs and related aids.

Based on the above, the following allocations of filing cabinets are required:
Admin Sect - 3 ea., Maint Supr - 3 ea., Acct Supply - 1 ea., Mun Svcs - 1 ea., Training Sect - 1 ea.

LINE 105 The filing cabinet safe with combination lock is required for both Document Security and Accountable Supply. Document Security section has 20 cubic feet of current records, subjective files, Ops plans, etc., and requires a minimum of 3 safes. Accountable Supply although only possessing 6 cubic feet of classified material requires a safe due to its physical location being remote from the Document Security Section precluding ready access to a centralized classified document storage section.

LINE 109 Although 2 cabinets are presently authorized for this unit by ECL 766, the loss of the EOD function will eliminate the authorization for this item. Administrative section has been using these cabinets for storage of office supplies and the requirement will continue. Unit Administration maintains a 30 day "Bench Stock" level of supplies for all sections except supply which is required to maintain a 90 day level. The cubic footage of these supplies required for operation is 20 cubic foot and will fully utilize both cabinets.

LINE 110 Accountable Supply and Munitions Services requires space for storage of approximately 325 various and sundry items such as office supplies and equipment, personnel equipment, parts and spaces of loading equipment, etc. The physical location of a consolidated storage is required to conform to space requirements and in order to operate the facility with a minimum number of personnel, proper warehousing procedures must be used. Bins for storage of this equipment must be adjustable for the numerous sizes and must be able to store these items approximately 30 - 40 inches off the floor. Previous flood damage to this activity shows a record height of 36 inches of water in present warehouse. Under normal conditions all lower bins will be utilized by larger items of equipment that will be repositioned during typhoon alerts, however, the work involved of moving and restoring multitudes of small items can be alleviated by the authorization of sufficient storage bins to raise the items above the water level. Previous losses to flooding more than justify the minor additional cost of these bins. Present cubic footage and numbers of items warrant a minimum of 10 ea. of the bin units, however even more could be effectively utilized.

LINE 116 This unit has no requirement for 12 man wearing apparrel racks.

LINE 121-126 The typewriters are justified by the positions as shown in para 10 above. Each of these positions has carefully been screened and it has been determined that each machine will be in operation a minimum of 4 hours daily. Any fewer number of machines could seriously impair efficient operation if one or more machines were being repaired.

LINE 129 Due to the location of this unit being off the base of Kadena, it has been established that it should fly the flag over it's area as it has in the past. The flag pole had been erected upon construction of the Ordnance Storage Area and as all Administration buildings are located within the area, it acts as the Headquarters unit for the area.

NOTE: Some items have been reassigned from one section to another. This was done to place the area of reaponsibility for the equipment under the section which would be utilizing it the greatest. A close scrutiny of the UMD positions, functional chart, and the areas of responsibility for each position will show that the equipment had been mal-assigned on the basic U/L.

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 1

COMMAND

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

600611

COMMAND

T [illegible]	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
Commander	01000	3216	Major	1	Edward G Siebold	Lt Col	3216

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 3216, Commander of Munitions Maintenance Squadron Detachment.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Alternate Top Secret Control Officer. (2) Alternate Custodian of Classified Documents. (3) Alternate Custodian of Registered Documents. (4) Detachment Postal Officer. (5) Administrative Officer for Oaths. (6) Unit Supply Officer. (7) Accountable Officer for Special Account AFK 4712. (8) Custodian of Unit Fund. (9) Retention Officer.

JUSTIFICATION: The Commander is required, above the normal functions of his position to be extremely capable in financial matters. He directly plans, controls and maintains all finalcial matters for the unit. He has to plan his annual, semi-annual and quarterly requirements, submit the request for monies to 3rd Air Division Comptroller, who in turn, returns to him Obligations Authorities for his management of the funds required. The financial matters of Detachment 2, 27th Communications Squadron also fall under his responsibility. This in itself is a very time consuming and meticulous job. This position is authorized by AFM 66-1 and SAC SUP's thereto and needs no further justification.

UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS REQUIRED FOR COMMAND (JAAC)

	Nomenclature	Stock Number	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
1.	DESK, MTL 60x34	7110-290-9858	0	0	1	1	1
2.	CHR ROT EX MTL	7110-273-8793	0	0	1	1	1
3.	BKCSM 13X33 M	7110-262-6650	0	0	0	1	1
4.	CHR STGT W/O ARM	7110-273-8785	0	0	0	1	1


BLDG 4630
SPACE
UTILIZATION
PLAN
REST ROOM
BOILER ROOM
VAULT
COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER
1-4
600611

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 2

UNIT ADMINISTRATION

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

UNIT ADMINISTRATION

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT NAME	GRADE	AFSC
NCOIC Personnel & Administration	03000	73270	T3G	1	RALPH H. GEMITZ	3SGT	73270
Personnel Specialist	03000	73250	A1C	1	CHARLES C BOITNOTT	A1C	73250
ADMIN Chief Clerk	03000	70250	A1C	1	GORDON J GALE	A1C	70250
TOTAL				3			

1. NCOIC, Personnel and Administration Section

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 73270, NCOIC Personnel/Administration.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Casualty Reporting Officer. (2) Publications Distribution Officer. (3) Records Management Officer. (4) Forms Management Officer. (5) Personal Affairs Officer. (6) Retention NCO. (7) NCOIC of First Aid Team. (8) NCOIC of Documents Destruction Team. (9) OJT Program Coordinator. (10) Customs Inspector. (11) Fire Warden Building 4030.

JUSTIFICATION: Due to the nature of this unit, its location in respect to its Headquarters, and the fact that it is a SAC unit on a PACAF base, it is imperative that a fully qualified and widely experienced personnel technician be assigned to advise the Commander, perform liaison with the base, and efficiently run the Personnel/Administration Section. The unit will maintain records for approximately 50 assigned and attached airmen and 6 assigned and attached officers. All personnel actions, comparable of a consolidated unit personnel office, are performed by the detachment. These include assignment, reassignment, classification, training, personal affairs, special actions, morning report, casualty reporting, retention, separation and reenlistment, retirement, and all related actions. As the Commander with an AFSC of 3216 would normally be unfamiliar with the details of a personnel unit, he will be forced to rely upon the knowledge, experience, and ability of the Personnel Technician to advise him and guide his judgement in all personnel actions. This technician will be required to be as much a worker as a supervisor also. As he will be in charge of all administration of the unit also, he will have to have extensive knowledge in administrative matters. In consideration of the AFSC for this position, it has been determined that it is much easier to learn administrative procedures than it is Personnel thereby warranting the 73270 for this position instead of 70270. This NCO will be primarily responsible for the control and administration of all TDY monies and SAC to SAC PCS Funds that are used by this unit. This requires a bookkeeping system to be maintained and much additional administrative work is required to perform the necessary liaison with 3rd Air Division Comptroller to insure proper handling and use of these funds.

2. Personnel Specialist.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 73250. Personnel Specialist.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Classified Document Destruction Team Member. (2) Classified Document Courier. (3) Member of First Aid Team. (4) Recorder for Boards and Councils.

JUSTIFICATION: The requirement for this position is readily apparent as it is responsible for the bulk of the personnel workload such as pay, morning report, records maintenance and special actions. The unit prepares 29 reports from the records of which 16 are monthly reports and 9 are quarterly reports. Other miscellaneous reports are required semi-annually, annually, or on a one time or 'as directed' basis, which bring the total reports for this section to 42. Workload requirements of the personnel activity were monitored from 1 Apr 60 through 1 Sep 60 and have shown that the section would warrant even another position computed on a forty hour per week basis. It is felt however, that if both personnel specialists were well qualified, that the workload could be handled by the two of them without much overtime.

3. Administrative Chief Clerk.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 70250, Chief Clerk.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Postal Clerk. (2) Distribution Clerk. (3) Courier. (4) Member of First Aid Team.

JUSTIFICATION: The location of the administrative unit necessitates the establishment of a courier and distribution run twice daily to the on base activities which average 3 to 4 miles from the administrative area. Each courier run takes 1½ to 2 hours. The morning run stops at the Base Communications Center, 6313th ABMG Headquarters Distribution Center, and the Base Post Office. This run also stops at the C.O's room and any special stops required to accomplish the mission. The afternoon run stops at the Post Office, Communications Center, Publications Office and 6313th ABMG Distribution Center. As a postal facility this unit handles all mail for Det 1, 3MMS, Det 2, 27th CommRon, and SAC Liaison Office. The rest of the responsibilities for this position are: (1) Forms & Publications Requirements and Distribution of Det 1, 3MMS, Det 2, 27th CommRon, and SACLO. (2) Control of Correspondence. (3) Management of Detachment Postal Room. (4) General Administrative typing and filing. (5) Reproduction. (6) Maintaining appropriate levels of "Bench Stock" of office supplies. The above duties themselves would require 50-55 hours of work per week however it is intended to have smaal assistance from the position of Publications Library Clerk as outlined in Tab 3. Presently this organization is using 25 reams of 8 x 10½ mimeo paper and 7 reams of 8 x 13½ mimeo paper per month in the reproduction phase of its work. Also received are 600 - 750 pieces of publications and correspondence per month. This section would prepare duty rosters, recall plans, administrative reports, Detachment Memorandums, Policy Letters, etc., as part of its function.

4. ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ALL CLERICAL POSITIONS. Further justification for the seemingly ample number of clerical type personnel as requested by this overall plan are the requirements levied on this unit for EWO operations support. The unit administrative section supports not only Detl, 3MMS, but Det 2, 27th CommRon, and SAC Liaison Office as part of the Kadena Task Force. These additional support requirements add approximately 15% more workload to the section. The Administrative Section is also the backup manpower for all EWO and Disaster Control operations, that the unit is required to perform for the support of the SAC EWO requirement. When an operation is placed into effect, the unit goes on a 24 hour per day basis by splitting into 12 hour shifts. The five man clerical force fills the following positions, any one of which not filled could seriously impair any EWO operation.

a. The publications library clerk alternates shifts with the document security clerk in order to man the section 24 hours daily. Access to and control of classified documents is even more important during an operation and failure to adequately man this position with experienced clerical personnel could result in mis-handling or compromise of the classified information.

b. The chief clerk alternates shifts with the Maintenance supervision clerk to man that position 24 hours daily. Both of these clerk operate in the munitions control room processing required paperwork, schedules, and preparing necessary reports including M-22.

c. The NCOIC and Personnel Specialist alternate shifts manning the administrative section, acting as couriers, providing SACLO support for quartering, messing, and assistance of TASK Force and Air Crew personnel. They are also available for all other jobs as required for unscheduled or unplanned administrative actions or support.

5. RESULTS OF WORKLOAD SURVEY. The above UMD positions would be an absolute minimum required for operation of the Detachment. A survey of the past 9 months has proven that even though we have had a 60% reduction in assigned strength, the normal workload of the Detachment administrative unit has only been reduced by approximately 15%. On 1 Jul 59 four 732X0's and eight 702X0's were assigned with an average weekly workload of 55 hours per man. With the reorganization of the Detachment on 1 Oct 59, manning authorizations were reduced by 50% in the administrative and personnel fields to three each 732X0 and 702X0. Although a general 60% reduction of assigned strength had been affected on 1 Apr 60, completing the consolidation, it resulted in only a 15% reduction of the administrative workload which increased the average manhour week to 62 hours per man for the period 1 May 60 thruogh 15 Jun 60. Through the necessity of short manning an efficient program of position consolidation was effected which resulted in an additional decrease of 10% in the administrative workload by 15 Jul 60. Since that date the workload has remained fairly static. Due to the surplus of personnel created by the reduction of authorized positions, the workload requirement was reduced to 40 - 43 hours per week per man for the five 702X0's, three 732X0's and one 73170 assigned. Based on the workload from 15 Jul 60 to the present, the above requested manning is based on a 40 hour week but does not take into consideration such things as leaves, sickness, injuries, EWO operations, and base support requirements or details. In order to adequately cover the outlined 'loss of time' absenses, a minimum of one additional position would be required above the programed UMD authorizations. It would be preferable to have this position filled by an AlC - 73250 due to the extra workload required in the personnel function, however a 70250 could cover the position.

6. DELETION OF THE FIRST SERGEANT POSITION. The position of First Sergeant, AFSC 73170, is not required as a separate position. The duties performed by the First Sergeant, such as duty rosters, supervision of Administrative Unit, Messing and Quartering of troops,

disciplinary actions, etc., can easily be absorbed by the administrative unit. The title and position along with the authority would then be awarded as an additional duty to the Senior Ranking NCO of the Detachment. With the small number of assigned personnel, the grade and AFSC, MSGT - 73170, is considered as surplus to actual needs. USAF concept for planning is formulating a policy of deleting the AFSC 73170 and allowing the Commander to appoint his First Sergeant from the Senior Ranking NCO's assigned. It is felt that this unit requires the more experienced and broader AFSC of 73270 to Supervise the Administrative unit. It also needs more 'workers' and less supervisors to perform the work requirements. Recommend that the First Sergeant position be deleted.

UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS FOR UNIT ADMINISTRATION SECTION (JAAC)

	NOMENCLATURE	STOCK NUMBER	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
1.	PRINTING MACH	3610-203-5640	0	0	0	1	1
2.	DUPL ICATING MACH	3610-278-0643	0	0	0	1	1
3.	CLOCK, WALL ELE	6645-526-9463	0	0	1	1	1
4.	SAFE 2 SHELF	7110-205-1422	0	0	1	1	1
5.	BOOKCASE 18x33	7110-262-6650	0	0	3	0	0
6.	TBLE O-M 60-X 34	7110-262-6663	0	0	1	1	1
7.	DESK TP 60 X 34	7110-290-9838	0	0	2	3	3
8.	CHR ST W/O ARM	7110-273-8785	0	0	1	8	8
9.	CHR NOT TP MTL	7110-273-8791	0	0	2	3	3
10	CAB F CAP 525	7110-286-3797	0	0	0	3	3
11	CAB STORAGE	7125-269-8534	0	0	0	2	2
12	RACK WEAR 6 MA	7195-275-5824	0	0	1	1	1
13	TYPEWRITER NP	7430-634-5062	0	0	2	3	3
14	BLACKBOARD	7110-132-6650	0	0	0	1	1


BLDG 4020
SPACE
UTILIZATION
PLAN
Rest Room
Boiler Room
COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER
2-7
600641

DET.CHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 3

DOCUMENT SECURITY

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

DOCUMENT SECURITY

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
Administrative Clerk	03000	70250	A1C	1	Robert Richardson	SSgt	70250
Publications Library Clerk	03000	70230	A2C	1	Ronald L Jackson	A2C	70230
TOTAL				2			

1. Administrative Clerk, Document Security Section.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 70250, Document Security Clerk.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Assistant to the Unit Historian. (2) Document Destruction Team. (3) First Aid Team. (4) Classified Courier. (5) Top Secret Control Clerk. (6) Registered Documents Control Clerk.

JUSTIFICATION: This position is required for daily operation of the Detachment, since the functions normally accomplished by the Director of Administrative Service in reference to classified documents has to be accomplished by this section due to its Command status and location in reference to the base. At present there are approximately 820 classified documents on file in this Headquarters, mostly pertaining to the Command and administrative section in correspondence and all the documents and technical orders for the munitions function. Steps are being taken to attempt to reduce this to an operating inventory of approximately 600 classified documents and technical orders. Due to the nature of this unit and it's mission, approximately 35-40 % of it's correspondence is classified and will continue to be so. The unit averages receipt of 50 classified documents per month, not including technical orders and technical publications. The unit averages receipt of 30 to 35 classified technical orders or changes thereto per month. All classified documents are controlled, acted on, filed, handled, couriered and packaged by this section. The daily access to, checking out of, checking in of, maintenance of, posting to and preparation of inventories is alos the responsibility of this section. This position also controls, ahndles and files all Top Secret Documents for this unit and is the Alternate Top Secret Control and Storage facility for the SAC Liaison Office. Preparation of Unit Monthly Histories is also performed by this clerk. The average weekly workload of this position is 42 hours. The physical location of this section is apart from the administrative unit, however due to the fact that this is not a normal Munitions Maintenance setup, it has to handle a greater varity of documents that are not considered pertinent to most MMS's such as Personnel matters, Host-Tenant Joint Agreements, Support Agreements, Liaison activities with other activites and a multitude of other purely administrative matters, which warrants the placing of this section on the Administrative Functional Code.

2. Publications Library Clerk.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 70230, Administrative Clerk, Publications Library.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Assistant Administrative Clerk, Administration Section. (2) Alternate Postal Clerk. (3) Alternate Distribution Courier. (4) First Aid Team.

JUSTIFICATION: The requirements levied on this unit are very unusual due to its' mission, organization, location and responsibilities. The requirements for a 'Specialized' Reference Publications Library is very clear cut and defined. Because of its attachment to a PACAF base, the unit requires PACAF, 5th AF, 313th ADIV, and 6313th ABWG Regulations and directives for its daily operation in addition to the normal AF, SAC, 3rd ADIV and 3960th CmbtSuppGp regulations and directives. These publications alone fill five and one half bookcases size 13 X 32 inches and are as of this date still incomplete. Under this new reorganization the relocation of the munitions services office to the administration building has allowed the incorporation of the unclassified technical orders of three sections into one master file. These technical orders at present require the space of 7 bookcases, however with the consolidation this can be reduced to approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$. A monthly average of $2\frac{1}{2}$ cubic feet of new and revised publications are received plus an average monthly total of $1\frac{1}{4}$ cubic feet of new or revised technical publications. The manhours involved at present for the posting, filing, and maintenance of these files are extremely high even with fully qualified personnel doing the work. The already austere manning of the unit cannot provide the required manhours to have this most important job done adequately and proper without severely cutting into primary workload hours. An estimated 170 manhours is presently utilized for maintaining publications files but by the establishment of this master library this workload can be reduced to approximately 11[illegible] manhours per month and produce a highly reliable and up-to-date reference library. This position will serve a dual purpose in that he will be utilized by the administrative section as alternate courier and mail clerk plus other administrative jobs in addition to serving as publications clerk and keeping these files up to date.

UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS REQUIRED FOR DOCUMENT SECURITY (JA..C)

	NOMENCLATURE	STOCK NUMBER	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
1.	BOOKCASE 13 X 33	7110-262-6650	0	0	0	8	8
2.	DESK TP 60 X 34	7110-290-9838	0	0	0	2	2
3.	TBLE O-M 60 X 34	7110-262-6663	0	0	0	1	1
4.	CHR ST W/O ARM	7110-273-8785	0	0	0	1	1
5.	CHR ROT TP MTL	7110-273-8791	0	0	0	2	2
6.	CAB F C/S 4D	7110-663-6362	0	0	1	3	3
7.	TYPEWRITER MP	7430-634-5064	0	0	0	2	2


BLDG 4020
SPACE
UTILIZATION
PLAN
Radio Room
Battery Room
COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER
600641
3-5

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 4

SAC LIAISON OFFICE

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

600644

SAC LIAISON OFFICE

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
SACLO Administrative Clerk	03000	70250	SSGT	1	Donald W Poucher	A1C	70250

1. SAC Liaison Office Administrative Clerk.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 70250, Administrative Clerk.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: AFSC 27430, Command Post Specialist. (1) Courier (2) Top Secret Control Clerk. (3) Classified Documents Control Clerk for SACLO.

JUSTIFICATION: The Kadena SAC Liaison Team has in the past procured their administrative clerks on a 179 day TDY basis. This system has many drawbacks such as cost, rotation of personnel at about the time when he is becoming fully qualified, orientated and effective, lack of proper records control and administration of the position. As each of the two SAC Liaison Officers rotate on six month intervals, the efficiency of the office can be increased greatly by the PCS of the clerk in the position. Average movement of an entire family of four to and from Okinawa costs approximately $3500.00. The TDY of five clerks to cover this same period is approximately $3250.00 plus the loss of the individual at his assigned UMD position. The average cost of a PCS clerk to an authorized UMD position will be less than the TDY of 5 clerks and will insure greater efficiency of both the clerk and the SAC Liaison Officers who will then have someone who is familiar with the continuing nature of their work. The actual workload requirement does not need explaining as the position is evident therefore the justification herein is to authorize a UMD position for the clerk for PCS assignment.

DETACHMENT 2, 27th COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
NCOIC, SSB Radio	8441000	30473	MSGT	1	Walter F. Moore	MSGT	30473
GND COM EQ RPM	8441000	30453	A1C	1	Winford C Strickland	A1C	30453
Ground Radio Opr	8442000	29350	SSG	1	Philip J Robb	SSG	29330
Ground Radio Opr	8442000	29350	SSG	1	Harell A Edwards	SSG	29330
Ground Radio Opr	8442000	29350	A1C	1	LeRoy J Heath	A2C	29350
Ground Radio Opr	8442000	29350	A1C	1	Leo P. Durgin	A2C	29350
Ground Radio Opr	8442000	29330	A2C	1	Robert A Klein	A2C	29350
TOTAL				7			

1. These personnel are attached to Detachment 1, 3143S(SAC), for quarters, messing, administration and NON-Judicial punishment. It is felt that a more streamlined and less complicated administration and control of these personnel could be had if these positions were authorized on the Detachment 1 Unit Manning Document and the personnel were assigned directly to Detachment 1, as will be the case with all other SAC personnel with the exception of the SAC Liaison Officers, at this station. At present Detachment 1 has no justification to request field equipment, quarters equipment, etc., for these personnel on the UAL, and to this date difficulty has been had in adequately supporting these permanently attached personnel in this area. Also due to these personnel being assigned to the 27th Communications Squadron, unnecessary extra procedures are encountered in the personnel and administrative adreas by both this unit and 3960th Combat Support Group along with 3rd Air Division. It is felt that if these UMD positions were transfered to Detachment 1 and the personnel assigned duty with the SAC Liaison Office in a like manner as the SAC Liaison Administrative Clerk, much of the extra work in handling these personnel can be alleviated.

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 5

ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY

TITL	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
INV MANAGEMENT SUPV	6400031	64570	TSG	1	Mark L Schaefer	MSGT	64670
ORGN SUPPLY SPECISLIST	6400031	64650	SSG	1	Donald E Robinson	A2C	64650
TOTAL				2			

1. NCOIC, Accountable Supply.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 64570, Inventroy Management Supervisor, NCOIC Accountable Supply.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: The NCOIC of the supply activity has an additional requirement placed on his position because of the nature of this unit. He must handle monies of the Operations and Maintenance category in the form of Obligation Authority granted by the Comptroller of 3rd Air Division for the Commander. Bookkeeping of these monies is necessary and a good knowledge of budgeting is an additional requirement. The primary function of this position will be to manage the AFK 4712 Special Account for the Commander with the additional job of supervising the Unit Supply Activity. This position is required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto.

2. Organizational Supply Specialist.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 64650, Organization Supply Specialist.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: This unit possesses a greater quantity of items than most unit supplies. Over the Unit Supply activity is larger than most unit supplies of Air Force Organizations, and handles more transactions than most activities. This coupled with the responsibility for the accounting of the funds required for purchasing the supply items required for the operation of this unit, create a workload which recuires fully qualified personnel for the operation of this activity. This position is required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto and needs no further justification.

600644

UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS FOR ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY (JGRR)

NOMENCLATURE	STOCK NUMBER	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
Revolver 38c	1005-554-0228	0	43	31	0	43
Carbine T M2	1005-670-7675	0	0	8	0	0
Rack Arm Car	1005-714-0329	0	0	1	0	0
Rack Arm Pistol	1095-650-7453	0	1	1	0	1
Reel	3540-026-9209	0	0	1	1	1
Sealer	3540-234-6742	0	0	1	1	1
Stretcher, Box	3540-241-8292	0	0	1	1	1
Mower, Lawn	3750-527-8049	0	0	1	2	2
Mask Prot Fld	4240-368-6098	0	0	39	43	43
Light Floor	6230-519-0839	0	0	2	2	2
Clock Wall Ele	6645-526-9463	0	0	1	1	1
Scale Platform	6670-526-6233	0	1	0	0	1
Chr-S-W/Arm	7105-141-5385	0	0	4	4	4
Tble Night	7105-269-5342	0	0	2	2	2
Chr Strgt	7105-269-8457	0	0	2	2	2
Chr Strgt	7105-270-2248	0	0	25	40	40
Davenport	7105-270-9833	0	0	1	1	1
Bed Dble Deck	7105-274-3822	0	0	35	40	40
Tble Occasnc	7105-559-6375	0	0	1	1	1
Stand Cab Vis	7110-132-5390	0	0	1	1	1
File V 6X11	7110-132-6163	0	0	1	1	1
Bkcsw 13X33M	7110-262-6650	0	0	3	13	13
Table O-M 60X34	7110-262-6663	0	0	0	1	1
Dsk Mtt 42X24	7110-264-5205	0	0	1	1	1
Dsk Tp 60X34	7110-270-9838	0	0	1	1	1
Dsk Mtl 60X34	7110-270-9840	0	0	1	1	1

ACCT SUPPLY (CONT)

Chr S W/O Arm	7110-273-8785	0	0	0	1	1
Chr Rot Tp	7110-273-8791	0	0	1	1	1
Chr Rot Ex Mtl	7110-273-8793	0	0	1	1	1
Cab F Cap SE 5	7110-286-3797	0	0	0	1	1
Tble Office	7110-582-0982	0	0	25	28	28
Cab F C/6 4D	7110-663-6362	0	0	1	1	1
Bin Stor Disp	7125-539-6382	0	0	6	10	10
Rack Wear 6MA	7195-275-5824	0	0	1	0	0
ttress Innr	7210-682-6505	0	0	35	40	40
Jug Insulated	7330-274-7086	0	0	4	4	4
Typewriter NP	7430-634-5062	0	0	1	1	1
Polisher Floor	7910-526-3799	0	0	1	1	1
ent Artic	8340-551-5459	0	0	6	6	6
Flag Natl US	8345-656-1439	0	0	0	1	1
Jacket, Fly	8415-269-0418	0	0	24	24	24
Trouser, Fly	8415-269-0517	0	0	24	24	24
Coverall Vesi	8415-272-3022	6	6	0	0	6
Sleeping Bag	8465-238-8105	0	0	24	24	24



Key

CHR ROT TP MTL

CHAIR ROT FX MTL

(1) CAB F VIS

(2) CAB F C/L 4D

(3) CAB F CAP 325

(4) CKRM 13x33

(5) RACK, ARM PIS.

SPACE
UTILIZATION
PLAN
BLDG T-4033

600641

5-5



SPACE UTILIZATION PLAN BLDG. 4032



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DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB C

MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION

REORGANIZATION PLAN

1ST SEPTEMBER 60

MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
CHIEF MAINT SUPV	6400030	3275A	CPT	1	Earl Furnace	CPT	3275A
MAINT SUPV	6400030	46290	SMS	1	Clayton L Kent	SMS	46190
MAINT SUPV TECH	6400030	46270	TSG	1	John F McAvoy	TSG	46170
TRAINING NCO	6400030	46270	TSG	1	Mack L Hardin	SSG	46150
PROD SCHED SPCL	6400030	45130	SSG	1	Austin H Dresher	MSG	73170 *32370
ADMIN CLERK	6400030	70250	AIC	1	Alfred W Walker	SSG	70250
TOTAL				6			

1. Chief, Maintenance Supervision Section.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 3275A, Nuclear Weapons Officer, Maintenance Supervisor.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Top Secret Control Officer, (2) Classified Documents Control Officer, (3) Registered Documents Control Officer, (4) Alternate Postal Officer, (5) Security Officer, (6) Transmission Security Officer, (7) Investigating Officer, (8) UR Control Officer, (9) Typhoon Officer, (10) Disaster Control Officer, (11) OIC, Emergency Destruction Team, (12) Class A Pay Agent.

JUSTIFICATION: Original manning of this position calls for a Capt - AFSC 3275B, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer. Since this activity is losing it's EOD personnel and no longer will have the EOD support requirement, it is felt that the highly trained EOD Officer could better be utilized by the AF in an EOD unit whereas the Nuclear Weapons Officer - AFSC 3275A will fill all the requirements needed for this position. This position will function as the Operations Officer and will directly control all Munitions functions. This positions requirement and the functions associated with it are clearly outlined in AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplement thereto.

2. NCOIC, Maintenance Supervision Section.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46290, Weapons Maintenance Superintendent, NCOIC Maintenance Supervision Section.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Quality Evaluation Supervisor, (2) Acting First Sergeant, (3) Military Courtesy NCO, (4) Communications NCO and (5) Customs Inspector.

JUSTIFICATION: As Quality Evaluation Supervisor this NCO will inspect all Supervisory and operational aspects of Maintenance Supervision in the unit. He will make periodic reports to the Chief, Maintenance Supervision Section, recommending improvements in production methods, policies, procedures and controls. He will review, analyze, process and assist in the preparation of unsatisfactory reports, monitor the TOC program and assist the Chief in effectively managing the maintenance and service functions of the munitions operation. He will draft and process reports and correspondence as necessary to accomplish his job. He will assist the Chief, in formation and preparation of plans and programs affecting the EWO capability of the Unit. As Acting First Sergeant, he will monitor the preparation of detail rosters, quartering and messing of personnel, and the personal affairs program for them. He will further lead all Unit formations, handle disciplinary actions as directed by the Commander, inspect the barracks and personnel and be responsible for the Units Morale and Welfare, recreational facilities and act as liaison for the men with the Commander. He will also assist whenever possible the counselling and silving of personal problems of the men.

3. NCOIC, Munitions Production Control.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46270, Munitions Maintenance Technician, Munitions Controller.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: The NCOIC, Munitions Production Control, will plan, schedule and direct all maintenance, inspections, loadings, off loadings and configuration changes for the Unit. He will supervise the preparation of daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly master schedules for the maintenance and service activities to be performed by the unit. He will exercise control of all work orders, required to insure accomplishment of scheduled work; establish and maintain visual references depicting aircraft availability and status; EWO generation capabilities; vehicle and critical equipment status ; personnel status; EWO organization; functional areas and lines of command and supervision; and specialist utilization dispatching). He will coordinate with the Training NCO to insure smooth integration of all Unit Training requirements within the weekly schedules. He will direct the "breakout" and dispatch of munitions as required. He will further monitor all work accomplishment to insure compliance with approved schedules. This position is required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto.

4. Training NCO

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46270, Weapons Maintenance Technician, Training NCO.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: The training NCO is required under AFM 66-1/SACSUP 8 to monitor the overall training program for the Detachment. He will plan, program and coordinate all training. He will establish job standards for each job. He will, in conjunction with the Quality Evaluation Supervisor, evaluate proficiency and locate areas of weakness in training . He will establish and maintain training records. He will program ground training under SACR 50-24, SACR 50-9 and AFR 50-8. He will schedule and conduct physical training and testing under AFR 50-5/SACSUP-1. He will plan, program and coordinate

additional training in conjunction with various agencies on Kadena Air Base. This training includes drivers school, Management school, Passive Defense and other subjects. He will review course materials, training aids and similar training tools prior to and during use. He will, in some cases, prepare course outlines, lesson plans and similar material. He will prepare training reports as required. AFM 66-11 SACSUP-8 requires the Commander to appoint a training NCO. Because of the location of this organization in respect to its Headquarters and because the unit is not located on a SAC base, the training NCO's position and responsibilities are equal to a base training NCO. For these reasons plus the heavy workload of other sections, the training NCO should be authorized on the UMD and manned as a primary duty.

5. Maintenance Production Scheduler

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 45130 (Undergoing planned conversion by AFM 35-1), Production Scheduling Specialist.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: The production scheduling specialist will assist the NCOIC, Production Control in the performance of his duties. He will prepare the weekly, monthly and quarterly master schedules and distribute them. He will compile the weekly and monthly consolidated work analysis. He will spot check all Specialist Job Records for accuracy and neatness. He will also assist the Administrative Clerk as required. This position is required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto. He will process all Specialist Job Records and control the time accounting system. Due to the location of this unit all Time Accounting Functions must be manually controlled and computed requiring many additional manhours of labor as compared to the machine run operation.

6. Maintenance Supervision Administrative Clerk

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 70250, Administrative Specialist, Maintenance Supervision Clerk.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: This position is necessary for effective management of the maintenance supervision area of responsibility. The administrative clerk will consolidate and maintain all of the administrative requirements, including filing, for the Maintenance Supervisor, Munitions Service Branch, Munitions Controller, and the Training Control Division. Man power surveys conducted by this unit indicate that filling this position will relieve five (5) non-administrative personnel from performing clerical duties. These personnel are presently utilizing 40% to 50% of their time in performing these clerical duties. They are subsequently being hampered in retaining the high qualifications required by their primary duties. The consolidated files for these activities total 14 cubic feet and include Subjective files, Operations Orders, schedules, inspections, etc, which pertain directly to Maintenance Supervision and Munitions Service. Normal administrative workload of these offices require approximately 100 manhours per week. If the administrative workload is consolidated under this position, the workload can be reduced to approximately 60 manhours and possibly less. This position is further justified by AFM 66-1 and Sac Supplements thereto.

IT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS FOR MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION (JCRJ)

NOMENCLATURE	STOCK NUMBER	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
ECL 681 Col M		1	0	0	0	0
ECL 681 Col W		4	4	0	0	4
ECL 691 Col M		1	0	0	0	0
ECL 691 Col W		4	4	0	0	4
Dup Machine	3610-278-0643	0	0	1	0	0
Stamp Time Ele	6645-526-6266	0	0	1	1	1
Clock Wall Ele	6645-526-9463	0	0	1	1	1
Screen Projector	6730-297-1657	1	1	0	0	1
Projector, Sti	6730-297-9781	1	1	0	0	1
Blackboard	7110-132-6650	0	0	1	1	1
Bkcsw 13X33M	7110-262-6650	0	0	3	2	2
Tble C-M 60X34	7110-262-6663	0	0	1	0	0
Dsk TP 60X34	7110-270-9838	0	0	1	3	3
Dsk Mtl 60X34	7110-270-9840	0	0	3	1	1
Chr S W/O Arm	7110-273-8785	0	0	1	4	4
Dsk Mtl 45X34	7110-270-9842	0	0	0	2	2
Chr Rot Typ	7110-273-8791	0	0	1	3	3
Chr Rot Ex Mtl	7110-273-8793	0	0	3	3	3
Cab F Cap Sz 5	7110-286-3797	0	0	1	3	3
Cab F C/6 4D	7110-663-6362	0	0	1	0	0
Rack Wear 6MA	7195-275-5824	0	0	1	1	1
Add&Sub Mach	7420-264-6942	1	1	0	0	0
Typewriter N P	7430-634-5062	0	0	1	3	3
Typewriter N P	7430-634-5064	0	0	1	0	0


BLDG 4020
SPACE
UTILIZATION
PLAN
REST ROOM
BOILER ROOM
VAULT
COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER
6 - 6

600641

ENCLOSURE # 1
USAF MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE DIVISION (SAC)

TAB 7

MUNITIONS SERVICES

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

MUNITIONS SERVICES

TITLE	FUNCT CODE	AUTH AFSC	AUTH GRADE	AUTH NUMBER	INCUMBENT	GRADE	AFSC
OIC MUN SVC	6400032	3275A	CPT	1	Ronald L Carter	CPT	3275A
NCOIC MUN SVC	6400032	46290	SMS	1	Ernest H Fry	SMS	46190
NCOIC WEA REL & ATO MAINT	6400032	46270	TSG	1			
WEA REL & ATO MECH	6400032	46250	A1C	1	Benjamin C Hayes	A1C	46150
SAFETY SUPV	6400032	46270	MSG	2	William A Kersey	MSG	46170
SAFETY SUPV	6400032	46270	MSG		Sheridan A Nickerson	TSG	46170
SAFETY SUPV	6400032	46270	TSG	2	David W Martin	TSG	46170
SAFETY SUPV	6400032	46270	TSG		Robert M Crady	TSG	46170
TEAM CHIEF	6400032	46250	SSG	4	Thomas L Yates	TSG	46170
TEAM CHIEF	6400032	46250	SSG		Howard H Dixon	SSG	46170
TEAM CHIEF	6400032	46250	SSG		Ray G Cobb	SSG	46170
TEAM CHIEF	6400032	46250	SSG		Elisha C Davis	A1C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #2	6400032	46250	A1C	4	Ronald J Senes	A1C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #2	6400032	46250	A1C		Perry E Deiwert	A1C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #2	6400032	46250	A1C		John W Rickey	A1C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #2	6400032	46250	A1C		Frank E Scott	A1C	46150

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TEAM MEMBER #3	6400032	46230	A2C	12	William C McKee	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #3	6400032	46230	A2C		Robert La Rosa	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #3	6400032	46230	A2C		James A Ward	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #3	6400032	46230	A2C		Schultz Pratt	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #4	6400032	46230	A2C		Randolph H Johnson	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #4	6400032	46230	A2C		John W Hughes	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #4	6400032	46230	A2C		Louis B Dickman	A2C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #4	6400032	46230	A2C		William H Brady	A3C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #5	6400032	46230	A2C		Donald L Rice	A3C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #5	6400032	46230	A2C		Frederick E Marshall	A3C	46150
TEAM MEMBER #5	6400032	46230	A2C		Thomas R Cilbrith	A3C	46130
TEAM MEMBER #5	6400032	46230	A2C		Morton L Schmoe	A/B	46150
TOTAL				28			

1. OIC - Munitions Services.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 32754, Nuclear Weapons Officer, Officer in Charge, Munitions Services Section.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Asst Security Officer, (2) Asst Typhoon Officer, (3) Nuclear Safety Officer, (4) Asst Disaster Control Officer, (5) Class A Pay Agent, (6) Customs Declaration and Certification Officer (7) Unit Fire Marshall, (8) Unit Historian, (9) Communications Officer (10) Motor Vehicle Officer, (11) Ground Safety Officer.

JUSTIFICATION: He will supervise the overall conduct of the checkout, munitions section, weapons release and maintenance section. He will determine the capability (ready/non-ready) of all teams to handle, load and install MK quality munitions through consideration of onboard evaluations, training records and recommendations of the loading supervisor. He will insure that the maximum number of loading teams commensurate with assigned personnel are organized and trained. He will insure that time-phased flow plans for the loading section are complied in such a manner that it can accomplish all EWO functions on a time basis. All inspection reports will be reviewed and corrective action implemented. It is his responsibility to initiate and review all reports originating in the Munitions Service Branch. He will conduct periodic EWO and operational briefings for his assigned personnel. He will supervise organizational maintenance inspection, modification and TCO's on all munitions servicing equipment for which he is responsible. He will establish and monitor a T.O. familiarization program. Accomplish other additional duties that the Commander may direct.

2. NCOIC - Munitions Services.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46290, Munitions Maintenance Superintendent, NCOIC Munitions Services Section.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: This position is desired in place of the Lt - 3275A that was authorized by the UMD. The duties performed by the person assisting the OIC of Munitions Services do not warrant nor justify the use of a commissioned officer. A Senior Master Sergeant with the proper authority could very effectively perform the following tasks. He will schedule at the weekly scheduling meeting. He accounts for and controls all enlisted munitions services personnel, insure that work is accomplished as scheduled, coordinate scheduling with Training NCO, and insure that training is accomplished as planned. He will be responsible for the general housekeeping of the section and the buildings assigned to the section. He will organize teams and control team status, submit reports as required for team status, vehicle status and Equipment status. He will advise the OIC and carry out his orders for the proper functioning of the section. The requirement for an assistant to the OIC of the section is authorized by the present UMD, however it is felt that this can better be manned by the Senior NCO than a Commissioned Officer thereby releasing the Officer for more critical Air Force needs.

3. NCOIC Weapons Release and ATO Systems Maintenance Section.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46270, Weapons Maintenance Technician, NCOIC Weapons Release and ATO Systems Maintenance Section.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: Reference TAB 8, This Plan.

JUSTIFICATION: This position is required for the "ready" status of the associated equipment used by the loading teams in the support of SAC EWO requirements. This NCO will be in charge of the maintenance section for upkeep, repair, modification and preventive maintenance of all loading support equipment such as hoist, motors, aircraft configurations, ATO racks, ammunition cans, etc. The special training required for this type of maintenance had previously fell upon the A&E units of base or the CAMRON. The

maintenance, by qualified personnel, of this support equipment, is the key factor in having ready EWO support on a continuing basis. At present and for the next 30-48 months, the consolidation of 462X0 and 461X0 personnel will cause a major retraining program to be placed into effect to qualify all personnel into the new AFSC. At present MMSs are manned by both 461X0's and 462X0's with the 461X0's scheduled for retraining into the 462X0 field. However until such time as all 461X0 personnel become fully qualified in the 462X0 field, the maintenance of this support equipment will have to be preformed by the qualified 462X0 personnel drawn from the A&E field.

4. Weapons Release and ATO Systems Maintenance Mechanic.

PRIMARY DUTY: AFSC 46250, Munitions Maintenance Specialist, Weapons Release and ATO Systems Mechanics.

ADDITIONAL DUTY: See TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: Thsi position is required to perform the work and assist the NCOIC of the section in the maintenance of all associated loading support equipment. The requirement for qualified personnel in this position is outlined in paragraph 3 above. The maintenance section will perform all maintenance of support equipment for four loading teams and handle the maintenance of a/c associated equipment for as many aircraft as necessary to perform the EWO Support duties. This section can, as a specific maintenance section for the equipment, schedule periodic maintenance with a better reliability in repair and preventive factors than if the maintenance was performed by the individual teams. Specialized maintenance of this equipment can prevent an accident which could cost thousands of dollars and many lives caused by improper maintenance by unspecialized personnel.

5. Munitions Loading Teams (Four)

#1&2 1 - MSgt - AFSC 46270 - Safety Supervisor
1 - SSgt - AFSC 46250 - Team Chief
1 - A1C - AFSC 46250 - Team Member
3 - A2C - AFSC 46230 - Team Members

#3&4 1 - TSgt - AFSC 46270 - Safety Supervisor
1 - SSgt - AFSC 46250 - Team Chief
1 - A1C - AFSC 46250 - Team Member
3 - A2C - AFSC 46230 - Team Members

PRIMARY DUTIES: (A) AFSC 46270, Munitions Supervisor, Safety Supervisor. (B) AFSC 46250, Munitions Specialist, Loading Team Chiefs or Loading Team Members. (c) AFSC 46230, Apprentice Munitions Specialists, Loading Team Members.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES: (1) Technicial Instructors. (2) Ground Safety NCO. (3) Nuclear Safety NCO (4) Loading Standardization Team NCOIC (5) Conventional Munitions NCO (6) Motor Vehicle NCO (7) Munitions Services Supply NCO (8) Reference TAB 8, this plan.

JUSTIFICATION: (1) Safety Supervisors: The safety supervisors will observe all loadings operations. They will make "on-the-spot" corrections of any actions which may be, or lead to, a potential safety hazard. They will critique the loading teams after each operation.

They will report areas of weakness and required training to the OIC, Munitions Services. As an integral member of the team they will conduct the proficiency and on-the-job training of the team members. These positions are required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplement thereto and therefore are considered essential to the primary mission accomplishment. (2) Loading Team Chiefs and Loading Team Members. These positons are essential to the accomplishment of the primary mission and are required by AFM 66-1 and SAC Supplements thereto and require no further justification.

6. Utilization of Loading Teams: Although the primary purpose of a team is the direct support and accomplishment of the SAC EWO requirements there are many functionally related additional tasks which must be handled to insure proper support facilities. The teams perform these additional tasks as indicated in the following breakdown, adding further justification to the over all manning requirements.

TEAM #1; LOADING STANDARDIZATION TEAM. This team is to observe and evaluate other munitions loading teams periodically on all assigned munitions. They will assist the other teams in standardizing loading functions, assist the loading standardization team NCO in maintaining records, time standards and evaluations of all teams. They will review all Technicial Orders for correctness and will recommend changes thereto. They will assist in training of all munitions services functions, reporting any discrepancies.

TEAM #2: SUPPLY AND CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS TEAM. This team will assist the munitions services supply NCO to maintain all supply functions of the munitions services branch. They will receive, issue,turn in and identify all equipment in the branch. They will maintain a running inventory and all records on assigned equipment. They will coordinate with the other branch activities and forecast equipment shortages and needs. They will requisition all supplies and will inspect, assemble and process all conventional munitions.

TEAM #3: MAINTENANCE TEAM. This team will assist the Weapons Release and ATO Equipment Maintenance Section. Under the supervision and instruction of the personnel of that section, they will perform maintenance on loading equipment whenever needed. This will be one of the primary training areas in which the 461XO personnel will receive specialized retraining to qualify them for the 462XO AFSC.

TEAM #4: SUB-MOTOR POOL AND COMMUNICATIONS TEAM. This team will assist the Motor Vehicle NCO and Communications NCO in their specialized additional duties. They will dispatch vehicles and equipment, perform periodic inspections, conduct 1st echelon maintenance of all assigned vehicles, trailors and tractors. They will maintain vehicle records and coordinate with the Base Motor Pool on all vehicle matters. They will insure a sufficient vehicle readiness to meet EWO requirements at all times. They will check, inspect and insure proper communications facilities are in a state of readiness and coordinate all repair matters with the AACS on base.

ALL TEAMS: All teams will be required to perform maintenance as necessary for the upkeep and repair of all assigned buildings. Because of all the additional duties involved in the proper functioning of the unit, any deletion of a position required by this proposed UMD would create additional workload on other primary mission personnel and would lower the proficiency of the teams. A planned 60% of the teams time will be actual loadings, classroom training and technicial order study. A planned program of team rotation will insure complete training of all personnel in all areas related to the munitions function.

UNIT AURTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS FOR MUNITIONS SERVICES (JGRW)

NOMENCLATURE	STOCK NUMBER	PRESENT UME	PROPOSED UME	PRESENT USE	PROPOSED USE	TOTAL
Chest Engine	1375-212-4600	1	0	0	0	0
Reel Asy Cab	1375-212-4618	1	0	0	0	0
Mach Blast	1375-310-1081	1	0	0	0	0
Truck, Pickup	2320-540-1428	4	4	0	0	4
Truck 2½ T	2320-702-3537	6	6	0	0	6
Vise, Bench	3460-026-1106	1	1	0	0	1
Printing Mach	3610-203-5640	0	0	1	0	0
Tractor, Whse	3930-554-1524	2	2	0	0	2
Truck, Fk Lift	3930-554-5204	1	1	0	0	1
Extinguisher	4210-270-4395	1	0	0	0	0
Decontaminati	4230-246-1186	6	6	0	0	6
Breathing App	4240-217-1094	1	0	0	0	0
Mask Prot Fld	4240-368-6098	6	0	0	0	0
Frame Jaw	5120-395-8620	1	0	0	0	0
Jaw Cone	5120-398-4116	2	0	0	0	0
Jaw Str	5120-544-3892	2	0	0	0	0
Extender	5120-544-3893	1	0	0	0	0
Wrench	5120-544-3896	1	0	0	0	0
Wrench	5120-604-5057	2	0	0	0	0
Dearmer	5120-754-0567	1	0	0	0	0
Drill Ele	5130-293-1849	1	0	0	0	0
Drill Ele Pt	5130-529-5679	1	0	0	0	0
Generator	6115-548-1384	1	0	0	0	0
Charger Batt M	6130-504-0329	1	0	0	0	0
Galvaometer	6625-539-8444	1	0	0	0	0
Watch, Wrist	6645-526-5062	4	0	0	0	0

UNIT AUTHORIZATION LIST ITEMS FOR MUNITIONS SERVICES (JCRW) (CONT)

Clock Wall Ele	6645-526-9463	0	0	1	1	1
Binocular	6650-530-0973	1	0	0	0	0
Charger Radiac	6665-092-8012	1	0	0	0	0
Detector Kit	6665-217-1096	1	1	0	0	1
Radiac Set	6665-526-8648	0	2	0	0	2
Radiac Set	6665-580-3020	1	2	0	0	2
Scale Platform	6670-526-6233	1	0	0	0	0
Bkcsw 13X33	7110-262-6650	0	0	3	0	0
k TP 60X34	7110-270-9838	0	0	1	0	0
Dsk Mtl 60X34	7110-270-9840	0	0	4	2	2
Dsk Mtl 45X34	7110-270-9842	0	0	0	2	2
Chr S W/O Arm	7110-273-8785	0	0	1	2	2
Chr Rot Typ	7110-273-8791	0	0	1	0	0
Chr Rot Ex Mtl	7110-273-8793	0	0	4	4	4
Cab F Cap Sz 5	7110-286-3797	0	0	1	1	1
Cab Storage	7125-269-8534	2	0	0	0	0
Tble Work 72X36	7195-205-0437	1	0	0	0	0
Rack Wear 6MA	7195-275-5824	0	0	0	1	1
Rack Wear 12MA	7195-275-5825	0	0	2	0	0
Typewriter PO	7430-281-6978	1	0	0	0	0
Typewriter NP	7430-634-5064	0	0	1	0	0
Jacket, Fly	8415-269-0418	2	0	0	0	0
Trousers Fly	8415-269-0517	2	0	0	0	0
Coverall Vesi	8415-272-3022	2	0	0	0	0
Aprom TDX Agt	8415-281-7812	1	0	0	0	0



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

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

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

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

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DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 8

ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

600644

ADDITIONAL DUTIES

Air Division and Air Base Wing Regulations require this unit to perform the following additional duties to support the base requirements.

FIRE WARDENS (8 Personnel)

OJT INSTRUCTORS (6 Personnel)

BARRACKS CHIEF (1 Person)

BAY CHIEFS (2 Personnel)

CBR INSTRUCTORS (2 Personnel)

DISASTER CONTROL TEAM MEMBERS (24 Personnel)

- SURVEY (4)
- MONITOR (4)
- DECONTAMINATION (10)
- SHELTER (4)
- ASST NCOIC (1)
- SHELTER NCO (1)

EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION TEAM (12)

INSPECTORS FOR SERIES 50 TAGS (6)

INSPECTORS FOR DANGER TAGS (4)

STANDARDIZATION TEAM (6)

ASST MOTOR VEHICLE NCO (1)

REQUIREMENTS FOR DETACHMENT BOARDS & COUNCIL

PROMOTION BOARD	2 Off, 5 Amn	(6 times yearly)
GROUND SAFETY COUNCIL	2 Off, 6 Amn	(Monthly)
OUTSTANDING AIRMAN BOARD	6 Amn	(Monthly)
OUTSTANDING NCO BOARD	3 Off, 1 Amn	(Semi-Annually)
OUTSTANDING NCOT BOARD	3 Off, 1 Amn	(Annually)
UNIT FUND COUNCIL	1 Off, 6 Amn	(Monthly)
NCO ADVISORY COUNCIL	7 Amn	(Monthly)
TRAINING COUNCIL	1 Off, 7 Amn	(Monthly)
SENIOR NCO TEST COUNCIL	5 Amn	(When Required)
RETENTION SCREENING BOARD	2 Off, 3 Amn	(Semi Annually)

REQUIREMENTS FOR 6313th ABWG & 313 ADiv BOARDS

6313th ABWG Staff	1 Off	(Weekly)
313th ADIV Staff	1 Off	(Weekly)
BASE SECURITY COUNCIL	1 Off	(Monthly)
BASE PLANNING BOARD	1 Off	(Monthly)
BASE UTILIZATION BOARD	1 Off	(Quarterly)
BASE CLASSIFICATION BOARD	3 Off, 3 Amn	(Monthly)
BASE SURVEY BOARD	1 Off	(Monthly)
Summary Courts Martial Officer	1 Off	(When Required)
Investigating Officers for Base	2 Off	(When Required)

DETACHMENT # 1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)

TAB 9

DISPOSITION OF ASSIGNED SURPLUS PERSONNEL

REORGANIZATION PLAN

15 SEPTEMBER 60

RECOMMEND DISPOSITION FOR THE FOLLOWING PERSONNEL.

1. 2LT George M. Colton. AFSC 3275A. Can be considered as replacement for Capt Carter who is rotating on 8 Nov 60.

2. Capt Whatley. AFSC 3275B. Should be cancelled from assignment. Capt Whatley is considered as Capt Carters replacement by SAC. This officer is EOD qualified and not required by this unit.

3. A1C James V. Harrison. AFSC 73250. This airman will fill slot currently held by A1C Boitnott who in turn will replace SSgt Geiwitz upon his rotation on 1 Dec 60. SSgt Geiwitz's requisitioned replacement should be cancelled.

4. Major Robert F. Hilbun. AFSC 3216. Reassignment action has been received. Major Hilbun will be reassigned to 4026th Strat Wg, Wurtsmith AFB, Mich., on 11 Oct 60.

5. It is recommended that the following technicians be transferred to the uclear Safety Office, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (PACAF) Kadena Air Base. This section will furnish EOD support for SAC Mission:

SSgt Wallace E. Asay, AFSC 46171.
SSgt Robert H. Dayberry, AFSC 46171.
SSgt Robert G. Golden, AFSC 46131.
A/1C James A. McLean, AFSC 46131.

6. SSgt Raymond W. Pivinski. AFSC 29150. Reassignment to Det 2, 1045th Operations Evaluation and Training Gp., pending final approval of SAC.

7. A2C Jerry S. Marshall. AFSC 46150. Airman's PUHLES profile prohibits retraining or retaining in present AFSC. Medical evaluation for separation from service recommended for this case. Airman has low AQE scores.

UNCLASSIFIED

5b

DETACHMENT #1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: MMSC

SUBJECT: Service Test Report of Det #1, 3MMS Re-organization Plan, 15 Sep 60

TO: 3rd ADIV (DPL)

1. The Service Test of the plan for re-organization, having been under close observation for a two month period, and complete analysis having been made of the time accounting of each position, the following recommendations are made.

a. COMMAND SECTION

(1) UMD - Recommend approval as is.

(2) UAL - Recommend approval as is.

(3) Space Utilization - Recommend approval as is.

b. UNIT ADMINISTRATION

(1) UMD - Recommend that the Publications Library Clerk position be reassigned from the Document Security Section to Unit Administration and that title of position be changed to Publications and Distribution Clerk.

(a) Primary Duties - Duties should be changed to reflect individual is responsible for publications control, postal clerk and mail room activities, and the courier and distribution runs, as well as forms management and distribution.

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EXHIBIT #1

(b) Additional Duties: This position will still have a dual responsibility of performing work in both Unit Administration and Document Security. Position analysis has proven that 4 hours and 15 minutes overall daily time is required for distribution, courier and mail duties leaving only 3½ hours to perform duties in administration support areas of publications, forms and direct support of document security clerk and unit administrative clerk, which normally requires 5 to 6 hours daily.

(2) UAL - Recommend that the UAL requirements for the position of Publications Library Clerk be changed from document security section to unit administration as follows:

(a) Desk TP 60X34, 7110-290-9838 - 1 ea.

(b) CHR Rot TP MTL, 7110-273-8791-1 ea.

(c) Bookcase, 13X33, 7110-262-6650 - 4 ea.

(d) One additional bookcase, 13X33, 7110-262-6650, be added to unit administration making total of 7.

(3) Space Utilization - Recommend that the space programmed for the publications library clerk of document security in the unit administration office be changed to reflect assignment of space to unit administration.

c. DOCUMENT SECURITY - Changes as recommended for unit administration will affect this section as outlined in paragraph b above.

d. SACLC CLERK - Recommend approval as is programmed.

e. ACCOUNTABLE SUPPLY -

(1) UMD - Recommend acceptance as is.

(2) UAL - Change as follows:

(a) Recommend reduction of bookcase, 13X33 MTL, 7110-262-6650, from 13 to 11.

(b) Due to revised and re-initiated requirement for recovery teams, recommend re-establishment of ½ the original requirements for tent, artic, 8340-551-5459; jacket, flying, 8415-269-0418; trouser, flying, 8415-269-0517; and sleeping bag, 8465-238-8105.

(c) Recommend increase of 1 to the requirement for Cab F Cap 7110-286-3797 to total of two.

(d) Reduce the number of bed, dble deck, 7105-274-3822 and mattress, inna, 7210-682-6505 from 40 to 38.

(e) Authorized 1 fan, 16", electric, for each room of the barracks for a total of 28. (Stock Number 4140-256-9913) Approved by WEE&A team, 2 Nov 60.

(3) Space Utilization - Recommend approval as is.

f. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISION

(1) UMD - Recommend the following change:

(a) Dowgrade the Administrative clerk position from A1C - 70250 to A2C - 70250.

(2) UAL - Recommend the following changes:

(a) Change the authorization of 2 ea desks MTL, 60X34, 7110-270-9840, to a total of 4 ea.

(b) Delete the requirement of 2 ea desk MTL, 45X34, 7110-270-9842.

(c) Add the requirement for 3 ea, lamp, desk, flex arm, flourescent, stock number 6230-643-2076.

(3) Space Utilization - Recommend approval as is.

g. MUNITIONS SERVICES

(1) UMD - Recommend approval as is.

(2) UAL - Recommend following changes:

(a) Delete the requirement for the truck, fork lift, 3930-554-5204.

(b) Add the requirement of 1 ea, breathing apparatus, 4240-217-1094.

2. An analysis of all administrative positions, including command and SAC Liaison Office positions was conducted for October and November 1960. This analysis also included the manhours worked by two additional administrative personnel who were assigned but not authorized under the programing plan. Normal duty day is computed at 7 hours and 45 minutes per day as additional 15 minutes are authorized for the noon meal due to the extreme distance to the dining hall. A normal day, with all authorized personnel present would have a total of 62 man hours available for duty. Following is the Oct- Nov, or test period analysis of time accounting for administrative positions:

	OCT	NOV
Manhours avail daily (average)	77:30	77:30
Manhours spent productive labor (average daily)	76:15	76:45
Manhours spent Non-productive labor and absence (average daily)	1:15	:45
Manhours overtime (monthly total)	86:30	106:55
Total manhours spent over and above normal authorized manpower	396:30	447:55

It can be easily determined that the administrative workload for this unit is heavier than programed or planned for. About 60% of these additional manhours during October can be attributed to the re-organization of the unit itself. Consolidation of offices and files, plus developement of new administrative procedures were of greater concern the first three weeks of the Service Test period. However, after 1 november, the workload became as normal as can be forecasted for the next 24 months with the exception of two unauthorized positions which expended a total of 382:30 hours during November doing administrative work required to bring the quality of the administrative functions up to acceptable standards utilizing a minimum amount of normal time. On the basis of the manhour analysis, approximately 10 hours per man per month overtime will be required to perform the duties now programmed, plus any additional time required to cover non-productive and absence time. It is felt that the overall administrative workload will be reduced a maximum of 10% in the next 24 months but this will depend entirely on the mission, requirements levied by the host base and higher headquarters, and prompt distribution to this unit of publications.

It is therefore recommended that the programmed authorizations for administrative personnel be approved and that requested personnel authorizations, even though they will be required to perform overtime, are considered minimum for the operation of this unit.

Edward G. Siebold

EDWARD G. SIEBOLD
Lt Colonel, USAF
Commander

5c

CONFIDENTIAL

DETACHMENT #1
3RD MUNITIONS MAINTENANCE SQUADRON (SAC)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: MMSC

6 December 1960

SUBJECT: SAC Inspector General's Report

TO: 3AIRDIV (DPL)
APO 334

1. Reference your SECRET message, cite: DPL 11-1408, dated 28 November 1960, answers to the SAC Inspector General's report are as follows:

a. Item C(1)(a). A specialist dispatch board has been constructed in the Production Control Center and is being used to plot specialist utilization.

b. Item D(2). Two of the four personnel were assigned to this organization less than two weeks prior to the inspection. All four are undergoing training and will be retested 9 December 1960. Monthly testing of pertinent supervisory personnel will be conducted in the future.

c. Item E(2)(a). Installed T-249 was inspected 2 December 1960 in accordance with T.O. 11N-T249-2. It was properly grounded 21 November 1960.

d. Item E(2)(b). Maintenance and inspection manuals for T-267's and T-304's are now available. All "T" items on hand were entered on EMR cards on 22 November and will receive inspection and maintenance by 7th TDS as required.

e. Item G(1)(a). Class 26 aircraft rehabilitation was completed 6 December 1960. The aircraft is now scheduled for regular monthly inspection and maintenance. Loading Standardization Team will monitor this program.

f. Item G(1)(a)1. T-249 was properly grounded 21 November 1960.

g. Item G(1)(a)2. Pneumatic release system bottles and gauges were checked operationally and pressurized 28 November 1960.

h. Item G(1)(a)3. The hydraulic system was repaired and determined to be operational 6 December 1960.

i. Item G(1)(a)4. The ATO warning light circuit was repaired 30 November 1960.

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EXHIBIT #2

j. Item C(1)(a)5. U-2 latch light system was repaired 28 November 1960.

k. Item C(1)(b). Complete inspection of the type III training unit had been last accomplished 10 August 1960. However, due to Det 1, 3825 reorganization of loading teams and the urgent requirement to advance the teams to ready status, no time was programmed for maintenance. Rehabilitation of the unit was completed 5 December 1960. A joint check-list to provide daily inspection by both 7th TDS and this organization is now in use. Monthly maintenance on the unit will be performed by 7th TDS.

l. Item C(1)(b)1. The rubber "O" ring was not missing as indicated. However, it is not visible when the procedures in T.O. 11K-336-1 and 11K-336-3 are properly accomplished.

m. Item C(1)(b)2. The parachute has been repaired and the static line lengthened by 7th TDS maintenance personnel during rehabilitation.

n. Item C(1)(b)3. The unit was scraped to bare metal and repainted during rehabilitation.

o. Item C(1)(b)4. The fins were repainted during rehabilitation.

p. Item C(2). Deficiencies contained in this section have been made a part of the Loading Standardization Team discrepancy file. All loading team members were briefed 21 November 1960. Further training in correct loading procedures will be given during December. The offending teams will receive continued emphasis from the LST and safety supervisors on their respective discrepancies.

q. Item C(2)(a)1. The need for proper inspection and the serious consequences which can result from improper inspection were discussed with the team. The team chief was directed to train his team thoroughly in this respect, and as outlined in 18-47B-16A chg 2 dtd 10 July 1960. Supervisory personnel will monitor compliance.

r. Item C(2)(a)2. The team was cautioned to handle the aft protective cover carefully to avoid damaging it. and to comply with loading instructions in TO 18-47B-16A.

s. Item C(2)(b)1. This was a procedural error. Continued training in use of proper procedures will be accomplished. and steps as outlined in 18-47B-16A will be followed.

t. Item C(2)(b)2. The team was instructed in the proper method for checking sway braces. Henceforth, sway braces and pads will be checked for tightness and proper surface contact prior to lowering the bolster. IAW 18-47B-16A.

u. Item C(2)(b)3. The team specified this as a reject item at the time of the inspection. The static line itself was not long enough. This was corrected during unit rehabilitation.

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v. Item G(2)(e)1. The team was instructed in the proper method for checking sway braces. Henceforth, sway braces and pads will be checked for tightness and proper surface contact prior to lowering the bolsters. prescribed by 18-478-164

w. Item G(2)(e)2. The team members were briefed to clean oil and other foreign matter from the unit in the area where the lanyard will be taped immediately prior to taping it. This [illegible] included in checklist procedures.

x. Item G(2)(e)3. Number 2 man on the team has been instructed to cut off excess safety wire after safety wiring the detent pin. T.O. 18-478-164.

y. Item G(2)(e)4. The team specified this as a reject item at the time of the inspection. The static line itself was not long enough. This was corrected during unit rehabilitation.

z. Item G(3). A chart was completed on 29 November 1960 for visual display of recurring discrepancies by the Loading Standerdization Team. All 16 discrepancies are monitored on a recurring basis by the L.S.T.

2. Reference Item D(2), the IG representative stated that a master list of three hundred questions was dispatched to all organizations by the SAC IG office approximately one year ago. All questions used for testing purposes during the annual inspection are taken from this master list. This detachment did not receive such a list. The low comparative rating given the detachment in this area is a direct result of not having these questions. Request your assistance in obtaining the master list as soon as possible for use in training personnel.

3. Reference Item G(1)(b), seventy two (72) loadings were made using this training unit during period 10 August thru 18 November 1960.

Edward G. Siebold

EDWARD G. SIEBOLD
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Commander

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