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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION
FIFTH AIR FORCE

(AU - D5)

1 JULY THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1961



ROBERT M. STILLMAN
Major General, USAF
Commander

Prepared for the 313th Air Division Historical Division by:

Mr. Wayne G. Peterson Command Historian

(20 December 1962)

(Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, APO 239)

2-8272-1

MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT M. STILMAN

COMMANDER, 313TH AIR DIVISION

(5 OCTOBER 1961 -)



0530

313th AD, 1961-II

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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

1961

1 July The Airways and Air Communications Service and the Headquarters, Airways and Air Communications Service are relieved from assignment to Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and are redesignated as the Air Force Communications Service and the Headquarters, Air Force Communications Service, respectively, per MATS SO G-60, dtd. 25 May 1961.

Headquarters, 1962d AACS Group, at Kadena AB, is relieved from assignment to MATS and is assigned to the Air Force Communications Service, with no change in location, per MATS SO G-60, dtd. 25 May 1961. Simultaneously, the 1962d AACS Group is redesignated the 1962d Communications Group, per AFCS SO G-2, dtd. 1 July 1961.

The 1252d AACS Squadron, at Naha AB, is relieved from assignment to MATS and is assigned to the Air Force Communications Service with no change in location, per MATS SO G-60, dtd. 25 May 1961. Simultaneously, the 1252d AACS Squadron is redesignated the 2152d Communications Squadron (AFCS), per AFCS SO G-2, dtd. 1 July 1961.

General Curtis E. LeMay, erstwhile Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, assumes the position of Air Force Chief of Staff, succeeding General Thomas D. White, who retires.

Bolo Auxiliary Airfield, consisting of 625.29 acres of land, with an annual rental of \$177,868.39, is transferred to the U.S. Army, which plans to redesignate the area as Trainfire Range, Bolo Point. The remaining 51.98 acres of Air Force land comprised in the original Bolo Auxiliary Airfield area were previously redesignated as Kadena Site Number 1, per PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 10 March 1961.

Okuma Radio Beacon Annex (PIN 5070), a 7.26-acre parcel of land with an annual rental of \$772.47, formerly assigned to the real property account of Kadena AB, and inactivated effective 1 April 1956, is deleted from the PACAF installation list by reason of its transfer to the Department of the Army, per PACAF SO G-71, dtd. 25 September 1961.

1961

- 1 July A 35-acre parcel of land in Onna-Son, with an annual gross rental of \$3,854.50, is transferred from the International Broadcasting Service (IBS) to the Air Force, which assigns the acquisition to the Onna Point Administration Annex (PIN 4088) as a part of that installation.
- 6 July Major General Robert F. Tate replaces Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns as Commander, Fifth Air Force, per 5AF SO G-53, dtd. 6 July 1961.
- 15 July The U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS)/IX Corps is redesignated USARYIS. The IX Corps is continued as a separate headquarters and is assigned to USARYIS.
- 21 July Captain Virgil I. Grissom, USAF, becomes America's second space-man, after traveling 303 miles southeast of the Cape Canaveral launch site at a top speed of 5,280 miles-per-hour, during which he reaches an altitude of 118 miles. Grissom's flight differs from that of Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr., in that he is able to control his Mercury capsule, "Liberty Bell 7", by releasing hydrogen peroxide gas from small jets. After landing in the ocean, Grissom has a close brush with death, as a hatch blows off, causing the space capsule to become flooded.
- 25 July Detachment 911L (TM-76-B), Hq., 3415th Technical School, is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support (less field maintenance) and administrative support, and to the 18th Tactical Tactical Fighter Wing for logistical support (to include field maintenance only), per 313th AD SO G-1, dtd. 5 Jan. 1962.
- 28 July Condition III is declared for Tropical Storm Helen at 1545I.
- 1 Aug. The All Clear for Tropical Storm Helen is proclaimed at 0830I.
- 2 Aug. Lieutenant General Jacob E. Smart replaces Major General Robert F. Tate as Commander, Fifth Air Force, per 5AF SO G-64, dtd. 2 Aug. 1961.
- 6 Aug. Major Gherman Stepanovich Titov of the Soviet Air Force begins his first of 17 orbits of the earth, covering a period of 25 hours, 18 minutes, at a speed of slightly less than 18,000 miles-per-hour. The apogee of Titov's flight is 159.3 miles above the earth, while the perigee is 110.3 miles. Differing from Gagarin's space flight, Titov is able to pilot his "Vostok II". Each orbit of the earth requires 88.6 minutes, so that day is replaced by night and night by day every 44.3 minutes.

1961

- 9 Aug. A 34.57-acre parcel of land in the northwest portion of Kadena Air Base (near Kadena Village, between Highway 1 and the East China Sea) is released to its private owners. The remaining .77-acre of the original parcel is transferred to the U.S. Army for use as a right-of-way.
- 15 Aug. The 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) is redesignated the Headquarters, 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG), per PACAF SO G-62, dtd. 2 Aug. 1961.
- 31 Aug. Yonagusuku Radio Range Annex (PIN 4092), formerly assigned to the real property account of Kadena AB, and inactivated effective 19 February 1955, is deleted from the PACAF installation list by reason of release to its original private owner, per PACAF SO G-71, dtd. 25 Sept. 1961.
- 1 Sep. Major General Robert E. Cushman succeeds Major General Donald M. Weller as Commanding General of the Third Marine Division on Okinawa, with headquarters at Camp Courtney.
- 8 Sep. The 874th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy, is redesignated as the 874th Tactical Missile Squadron and organized at Kadena AB, Ryukyu Islands, and is assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group, per PACAF SO G-48, dtd. 15 June 1961.
- 10 Sep. Condition III is declared for Typhoon Pamela at 1040I, followed by Condition II at 1600I, and Condition I at 2100I.
- 11 Sep. Condition II is declared for Typhoon Nancy at 1300I. Simultaneously, Okinawa is reduced to Condition II for Typhoon Pamela.
- 14 Sep. Condition I is declared for Typhoon Nancy at 0700I.
- 15 Sep. The All Clear for Typhoon Nancy is declared.
- 25 Sep. Motobu Auxiliary Airfield (PIN 2987), hitherto assigned to the real property account of Naha AB, is inactivated, retroactive to 30 June 1957, per PACAF SO G-71, dtd. 25 Sept. 1961.
- 1 Oct. A new, greater Itoman-Cho (Town) is created through the merger of the rural districts of Miwa-Son, Takamine-Son, and Kanegusuku-Son with the old Itoman-Cho.
- Condition II is declared for Typhoon Tilda at 1500I.
- 2 Oct. Condition I is declared for Typhoon Tilda at 0300I.
- 3 Oct. The All Clear is declared for typhoon Tilda at 1200I.

1961

- 5 Oct. Major General Robert Morris Stillman assumes command of the 313th Air Division in succession to Major General John Reynolds Sutherland, who previously assumed his new duties as Vice-Commander, Fifth Air Force, on 29 September.
- 15 Oct. The current designations and assignments of all 313th Air Division installations are listed as follows in a consolidated PACAF SO G-78, dtd. 12 Oct. 1961, confirming all previous original PACAF or FEAF designations and assignments, including all changes thereto, up to and including this date:

| | <u>PIN</u> |
|---|------------|
| KADENA AIR BASE | 2988 |
| Awase Communications Annex | 3001 |
| Deragawa Communications Annex | 2993 |
| Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex | 4087 |
| Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield | 2997 |
| Irisuna Shima Air Range | 2983 |
| Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex | 2998 |
| Kadena Family Housing Annex | 3000 |
| Kadena Site Number 1 | 2995 |
| Kadena Site Number 2 | 7330 |
| Kadena Site Number 3 | 7331 |
| Kadena Site Number 4 | 7332 |
| Kadena TACAN Annex | 7208 |
| Koza Radio Relay Annex | 4086 |
| Onna Point Administration Annex | 4088 |
| Ryukyus Air Range | 4089 |
| Yontan Auxiliary Airfield | 2996 |
| | |
| NAHA AIR BASE | 2975 |
| Bucknerville Service Annex | 5061 |
| Hirara Air Strip | 2986 |
| Kume Shima Air Station | 2982 |
| Miwa Radio Beacon Annex | 2981 |
| Miyako Jima Air Station | 2984 |
| Motobu Auxiliary Airfield - inactive 30 June 1957 | 2987 |
| Naha Light Annex | 4774 |
| Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station | 2977 |
| Yuza Dake Air Station | 4200 |

- 26 Nov. Kameichiro Uehara (OPP), the official candidate of the Okinawa People's Party, and supported by an OPP/Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP) coalition, wins the election for the post of Mayor of Itoman-Cho by 7,676 votes to the 6,898 votes cast for his Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) opponent, Kotaro Miyagi. A total of 181 ballots are declared invalid.

1961

- 27 Nov. The AN/FPS-3 surveillance radar at Site P-53 (Miyako Jima Air Station) is decommissioned by a Bendix team, in preparation for its conversion to an AN/FPS-20A set.
- 29 Nov. Mr. Gerald Warner arrives at Naha to assume the post of Political Advisor (POLAD) to the U.S. High Commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands, with the personal rank of Minister. The American Consul General, Mr. W. Garland Richardson, has been acting as interim POLAD since the departure of the former Political Advisor, Byron E. Blankinship, for reassignment in the U.S. in September.
- 7 Dec. An F-100D of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, crashes into the village of Kawasaki, Gushikawa-Son, killing two Okinawans, injuring four others in varying degrees, destroying three homes, inflicting serious damage to three others, and partially damaging five more.
- 13 Dec. The AN/FPS-20A surveillance radar at Site P-53 becomes operational.
- 17 Dec. Junji Nishime, candidate of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, is elected Mayor of Naha City, as he receives 32,290 votes to 31,552 for Eiki Miyasato, representing the Communist-backed coalition of the Okinawa People's Party, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, and the Okinawa Socialist Party which functions under the short title of "Minto" (Joint Struggle Council for the Democratization of the Naha City Administration), 25,959 votes for Saichi Kaneshi, the incumbent mayor who ran as an independent, and 464 for Chotoku Ogimi, the Chairman--and forlorn hope--of the Ryukyu Nationalist Party. Tsumichiyo Asato earlier withdrew his own candidacy as representative of the OSMP and Kisaburo Owan withdrew his candidacy as the standard bearer of the OPP in favor of Miyasato.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

To the cursory reader, or even him who devoured words at a thousand-per-minute clip, the version of Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4--pertaining to the 313th Air Division's organization and mission--which became effective on 24 November 1961 and its predecessor of 8 June 1960 must have seemed as like as the proverbial two peas in a pod.

To begin with, the general mission was identical with the earlier one--namely, to maintain all assigned and attached forces in such a state of combat readiness as to insure the success of any military operations that might be directed.¹

In the matter of air defense, too, the 313th Air Division continued to be responsible for the same area as in the past--one encompassed within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.²

Here, however, the similarity ended. Where the 313th Air Division had formerly been provided with a headquarters and such other units and facilities as were necessary "to the accomplishment of its mission," the new directive added the carrying out of "Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in

the 313th Air Division area" to this organization's raison d'etre. This headquarters was located at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, in the Ryukyu Islands, on the same site previously occupied successively by the Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, from 19 July 1945 to 6 June 1946; by the Headquarters, 1st Air Division, from 7 June 1946 to 30 November 1948; by Headquarters, Thirteenth Air Force, from 1 December 1948 to 14 May 1949; and by Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force, from 15 May 1949 to 28 February 1955.

In addition to the appended phrase quoted above, several new items were sprinkled here and there among the multitude of things for which the Commander, 313th Air Division was responsible, and to which attention will be called in the cataloguing which follows. The Commander, then, was responsible for:

1. Exercising command of assigned units, except for such direct control as the Commander, Fifth Air Force retained over offensive tactical forces.
2. Controlling and/or supporting attached units, as directed.
3. Organizing, administering, equipping, and training assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies, and plans issued by Fifth Air Force and higher headquarters.
4. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, preparing such plans as should be required to support Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.
5. Insuring that combat training was conducted in accordance with existing directives and was oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with the tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders.

6. Insuring that all combat and combat direct support units were furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to the maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

7. Insuring the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

8. Monitoring the development and conduct of training programs to include:

- (a) The technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.
- (b) General military training, in accordance with applicable Air Force unit training standards.
- (c) Assisting in aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program, as required.
- (d) Other training, as directed. (Omitted was the combat readiness training prescribed in the older version.)

9. Contributing toward the development of:

- (a) The tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.
- (b) The requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.
- (c) The improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

10. Providing aircraft for and supervision over the annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel as outlined in AFR 60-3. (This was a new, additional responsibility.)

11. Providing administrative and logistic support, as directed.

12. Supporting the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and other USAF activities, in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units, as reflected on the current USAF programming document.

13. When directed, exercising operational control of forces other than those of the United States.

14. Exercising operational control of U.S. Army and Navy anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units (this was a specific reference to the eight Army Nike-Hercules batteries installed on Okinawa, the first of which had become operational at a temporary site as early as 30 November 1958, and to the Army's Hawk missile, which also occupied eight sites in or around Okinawa for defense against low-level air attack. The first of these units to become operational at its permanent location was Battery "D", 8th Missile Battalion, 1st Artillery, at Site 12 (Haneji-Son, north of Nago), on 14 June 1961), and other anti-aircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division Air Defense System.

15. Representing CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in the coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region. (This was another new responsibility.)

16. Conducting search and rescue operations as directed.

17. Organizing and administering an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units. (This, too, was a new responsibility.)

18. Providing for the sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations. (Stricken from the old regulation was the 313th Commander's responsibility for providing for the "local ground defense of assigned Air Force installations.")

19. Providing for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required in support of the mission.

20. Exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

21. Coordinating with and providing assistance to other United States military services and governmental agencies, including such matters as:

- (a) The formulation and joint planning of local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbance, typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuation, and special demonstration plans with local Army, Navy, Marine, and other governmental agencies.
- (b) Coordination with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used facilities and installations.
- (c) Participation in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and other governmental agencies, as directed by the Commander, Joint U.S. Forces.
- (d) The contribution of personnel to the Joint Service Ryukyus Armed Services Police Force (RASP) and the Ryukyus Army and Air Force Exchange Service (REX).

- (e) After the completion of appropriate agreements, the provision of a base, training facilities, and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations.
- (f) Support of the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands (Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA) in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership for the Joint Planning Group, all sub-committees, and panels.
- (g) Coordination with appropriate local U.S. governmental authorities of all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities.
- (h) Support of the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (another title held by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA, who was also Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, and--until 15 July 1961 when it was made a separate headquarters and assigned to USARYIS--Commanding General, IX Corps) in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

22. Insuring that all commanders and staff officers were familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2: "Unified Actions Armed Forces."

23. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

24. Insuring that mission directives had been prepared for all

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units within the 313th Air Division, and requiring that they be reviewed semi-annually, and brought up to date wherever this was found necessary.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might direct to the contrary.³

Besides the above Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4 describing the 313th Air Division's organization and mission, the 313th Commander's responsibilities and those retained by the Fifth Air Force Commander continued to be laid down in the so-called "Burns letter" of 1 August 1960.

According to this letter, which had been written by then Fifth Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns,* "a degree of direct control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters [Fifth Air Force] is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons." Moreover, this degree of direct control went beyond the "centralized control" ordinarily accepted in the employment of conventional forces. As further clarification of a knotty subject, he defined control as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations."

These lexicographic matters having been disposed of, General Burns went about the task of describing in detail "the minimum control that this headquarters intends to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces" of the 313th Air Division:

*Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns was replaced as Fifth Air Force Commander on a tacitly recognized but unstated temporary basis by Major General Robert F. Tate on 6 July 1961. The latter relinquished the title with the arrival of Lieutenant General Jacob E. Smart on 2 August 1961.

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1. The ordering, directing, and monitoring of maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.

2. The ordering and monitoring of routine and special force deployments.

3. The ordering, directing, monitoring, and evaluating of combat readiness training programs.

4. The controlling and directing of the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system would provide direct communication between Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and the tactical wings.

5. The control and direction of the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.

6. Such other control as operational necessity might dictate.

General Burns pointed out that the action of his headquarters in retaining direct control of tactical wings had reduced the requirement for personnel on 313th's operations staff. For, to have such officers would only mean a duplication of the Fifth Air Force effort in the direction and control of the strike forces. On the other hand, he did consider it "necessary and desirable" for the 313th Air Division Commander to keep himself and key members of his staff informed concerning the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned to his command, in order that he might be prepared to carry out effectively the responsibilities assigned to him in Annex E of the WPC.

One point on which the Burns letter placed emphasis was his belief that no augmentation of the 313th Commander's operations staff was warranted by

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the requirement of the mission directive that the latter assure the accomplishment of combat readiness training, the preparation of Plans and Orders, and the provision of command policy and guidance, along with sundry other responsibilities toward the command and control of tactical striking forces, warranted any augmentation of his operations staff. On the contrary, these responsibilities, extensive though they were, could well be discharged by the existing staff, assisted by the personnel of the Inspector General's office and those of the tactical wing staffs.

Finally, General Burns said, Fifth's control of the tactical striking forces would be exercised through direct communication with the tactical wings and groups, with information copies of all correspondence between the Fuchu headquarters and these tactical units, other than that of a routine nature, being furnished to 313th Air Division.⁴

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

Activations, Inactivations, and Redesignations at Kadena Air Base.

Headquarters, 1962d Communications Group: Effective 1 July 1961, the Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) and the Headquarters, Airways and Air Communications Service were relieved from assignment to the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and were redesignated respectively the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) and Headquarters, Air Force Communications Service. With this action the new Air Force Communications Service assumed the dignity of a major air command. Among the many former AACS units which were relieved from assignment to MATS and reassigned to the new AFCS with no change in location as a result of the transfer was the 1962d AACS Group at Kadena AB, Okinawa.⁵

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
Simultaneously with the transfer of the Headquarters, 1962d AACS Group from MATS to AFCS, the latter redesignated it as Headquarters, 1962d Communications Group. Also effective 1 July 1961, Detachment 1, Headquarters, 1962d Communications Group was designated and organized at Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield, Ryukyu Islands.⁶ Thus was formalized the existence of a unit which had operated the Receiver Site on Ie Shima for the GLOBECOM, STRATCOM, and AIRCOM stations on Okinawa since 1956.

Detachment 911L (TM-76B): On 25 July 1961, Detachment 911L (TM-76B), Headquarters, 3415th Technical School, was attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support (except for field maintenance) and administrative support, and was attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance support only.⁷ The purpose of Detachment 911L was to train the personnel of the 498th Tactical Missile Group in the operation and maintenance of the TM-76B (Mace) missiles with which that organization was being equipped during the historical period.


District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigation Squadron (IG): On 15 August 1961, the 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) was redesignated the Headquarters, 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG),⁸ and, in consequence, District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) at Kadena AB automatically became District Office #43, 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG).

The 874th Tactical Missile Squadron: As with its sister organization, the 873d Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy), the 874th Bombardment Squadron (VH) was originally constituted on 19 November 1943 and activated by the Second Air Force the following day at Clovis AAF, New Mexico, as an integral unit

THE FIRST TM-76B "MACE" MISSILES
ARE UNLOADED AT KADENA AIR BASE
FOR EMPLOYMENT BY THE 498TH
TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP




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
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
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
0554



0555



0556




0557



0558



0559




0560

CONSTRUCTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE TM-76B

MISSILE PROGRAM AT KADENA

AND THE SATELLITE LAUNCH SITES



Construction Agency:
U. S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
APO 331

Contractor:
Matsumura Gumi


Contract Nr.:
37-125

Percent Project Completed:
76%

Photo Description:
Cells: Back view of 8
Cells. Cell #3 door &
frame in place and con-
crete poured, Cell #4
formwork in place.

Location:
Site 1, Bolo Point

Date:
21 August 1961



Construction Agency:
U. S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
APO 331

Contractor:
Matsunaga Gumi


Contract No.:
E7-425

Percent Project Completed:
76%

Photo Description:
Control Area Nr. 1:
Launch Control Console
and Tester Group.

Location:
Site 1, Bolo Point

Date:
21 August 1961



Construction Agency:
U. S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
APO 331

Contractor:
Matsunura Gumi

Contract Nr.:
EM-425


Percent Project Completed:
59%

Photo Description:
Control Area Nr. 2: Back-
ground, Hydraulic Control
Panel; left & right, switch
gear.

Location:
Site 2, White Beach

Date:
21 August 1961

0564



Construction Agency:
U. S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
APO 331

Contractor:
International Constructors

Contract No.:
E7D-488

Percent Project Completed:
18%

Photo Description:
Formwork for arch of
Control Area L.

Location:
Site 3, Kin

Date:
21 August 1961



Construction Agency:
U. S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa
Corps of Engineers
AFO 331

Contractor:
International Constructors

Contract No.:
EP-460

Percent Project Completed:
98%

Photo Description:
O/M Test Stand: Grading &
Completion of base course.

Location:
Kadena Air Base

Date:
21 August 1961

of the 498th Bombardment Group (VH).

For two months, however, the fledgling 874th Bombardment Squadron was a combat organization in name only, since it had neither personnel, aircraft, nor equipment. It was not until 30 January 1944 that the first personnel were assigned. The first aircraft, a B-17, was received on 15 April 1944, and by the end of the month seven B-17's and one B-29 were on hand.

On 12 August 1944 the ground echelon of the 874th Bombardment Squadron, together with those of the 873d and 875th Bombardment Squadrons, boarded the Army transport USS Exchange, which sailed the following morning. After a two-day stop at Pearl Harbor, the Exchange put to sea, bound for Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, where she arrived late on 6 September. The first B-29 squadron flew in on 20 October 1944, and by 25 October six Superforts had arrived, the last of which brought in the 874th's Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Donald W. Saunders. Three days later, three of the newly-arrived B-29's participated in a warm-up strike against Truk Atoll.

The first mission flown against the Japanese home islands by the 874th Bombardment Squadron came on 24 November 1944, with 10 planes dispatched and all 10 reaching their target--the Nakajima Aircraft Engine Factory in Tokyo.

Following the cessation of hostilities on 15 August 1945, the B-29's of the 874th Group joined those of the other units of the Twentieth Air Force in making low-altitude parachute drops of food, clothing, and other supplies to prisoner-of-war camps scattered all over Japan. The first such mission, on 28 August, was not very successful, since many of the parachutes failed to open. Corrective measures, however, made the second and third drops on 29 and 31 August completely successful.

From 1 January through 14 August 1945, the aircrews of the 874th Bombardment Squadron had flown 684 combat sorties, during which they dropped 4,018.37 tons

of bombs. As a result of their efforts, in combination with those of the sister 873d and 875th Squadrons, the parent 498th Bombardment Group (VH) was enabled to lead the other groups of the 73d Bombardment Wing (VH) in almost every category of combat performance--and the entire Twentieth Air Force in some.

Following its return to the ZI from Saipan in November 1945, the 874th Squadron, as a part of the 498th Group, was assigned to the Continental Air Forces, its first station being MacDill Field, Florida, where it was assigned to the Third Air Force.

When Headquarters, Continental Air Forces was redesignated Headquarters, Strategic Air Command on 21 March 1946, the 498th and its components were assigned to the new organization. Then, when the Fifteenth Air Force, which had been inactivated in Italy on 15 September 1945, was activated in the United States on 31 March 1946, the 498th was further assigned to it.

On 31 May 1946 the 73d Bombardment Wing (VH) was inactivated; whereupon the 498th Bombardment Group came under the direct command of the Commanding Officer of MacDill Field Army Air Base.

On 15 July 1946 the War Department issued a letter directing that certain bombardment groups and squadrons be inactivated and certain other groups and squadrons be activated. Pursuant to this letter, effective 4 August 1946, the 498th Group and its three squadrons--the 873d, 874th, and 875th--were inactivated and, concurrently, the 307th Group and the 370th, 371st, and 372d Squadrons were activated. It also assigned the newly-activated squadrons to the newly-activated group, and assigned the personnel of Headquarters, 498th Bombardment Group (VH) to Headquarters, 307th Bombardment Group (VH) and those of the

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873d, 874th, and 875th Bombardment Squadrons (VH) to the 370th, 371st, and 372d Bombardment Squadrons (VH) respectively.*

Thus, the 874th vanished from view except in the pages of the history books and in the memories of its former members until 25 April 1961, when a Department of the Air Force letter informed PACAF that the inactivated squadron was to be redesignated as the 874th Tactical Missile Squadron and activated as an assigned unit of PACAF on or about 8 September 1961.⁹ Accordingly, the Hickam headquarters performed the required bit of administrative revivification and made it effective on the suggested date, 8 September 1961, with the 874th assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.¹⁰

Although the Table of Organization (O/T) strength of the reborn unit was set at 22 officers and 147 airmen, the 874th TMS was in reality a "paper giant," since only one man, a staff sergeant, was officially assigned for morning report purposes.¹¹

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron: From 1 January to 31 March 1960, the mission of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron (TDS), as set forth by Fifth Air Force in Volume III of Fifth Air Force Materiel Guidance, was "the receipt, ground transportation (local), storage, handling, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, inspection, storage inspection, technical supply, accountability, modernization, issuance, salvage, and demolition of atomic weapons; as well as the calibration and maintenance of its own technical equipment, including that in the hands of its deployed weapons maintenance teams."

*By a rather interesting coincidence, the 307th Bombardment Group, now designated "Medium" instead of "Very Heavy" though still equipped with the old World War II B-29's, was sent to Kadana AB in August 1950, where it was attached to FEAF Bomber Command for operational control and to the Twentieth Air Force for logistic and administrative support while engaged in bombing operations against targets in North Korea.

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On 1 April 1960, however, the mission changed with the transfer of the maintenance and delivery responsibility for the Strategic Air Command (SAC) weapons on Okinawa to the 7th TDS. At the same time, the security and personnel functions of the 7th TDS were transferred to the 6313th Air Base Wing (ABW) at Kadena Air Base. Henceforth, the 7th TDS played a dual role. Firstly, it served as a theater storage facility (AFK 5271) for all Air Force nuclear weapons on Okinawa, both PACAF and SAC, required to support PACAF Immediate Replacement Support Requirements (IRSR), requisitions for weapons, and components. Secondly, it provided complete maintenance for the PACAF and SAC nuclear weapons stored on Okinawa, as well as for the PACAF nuclear weapons stored at other locations.¹²

The squadron was also committed to serving as an emergency back-up depot for all weapon items which could not be furnished by the depot assigned to Air Materiel Forces Pacific Area (AMFPA). This materiel function also included the centralized receipt and redistribution of kits and materials required to perform modifications and alterations on all PACAF special weapons, with the exception of W-5 warheads assigned to tactical missile organizations.

The final portion of the mission was the providing of technical guidance and assistance to PACAF special weapons storage organizations. In particular, this included furnishing storage organizations with an interpretation and standardization of 11N-series technical order procedures when deemed necessary or upon request.

Under these general responsibilities, the mission of the 7th TDS was broken down into many varied activities and specific functions. The first of these involved the movement of nuclear weapons between either Kadena AB

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and the ZI or Kadena AB and the various storage locations in the PACAF theater. In accomplishing this, the squadron furnished the handling services, as well as the supply coordination necessary for the weapons involved in these shipments.

The second rather extensive function comprised the support of "High Gear" aircraft, a Kadena-based fleet of C-130 aircraft loaded with specific types of MK-28 weapons and MK-7 bomb nuclear capsules, placed in an alert status for immediate airlift to Japan in the event of implementation of the EWP. The 7th TDS had the responsibility for furnishing the weapons and capsules which made up the cargo for these planes. The squadron was also responsible for the handling and loading/down-loading of cargo.

The third function of the 7th TDS consisted of the maintenance of a capability to perform given assignments during actual warfare, as opposed to performing them preparatory to the onset of war. Some of these were (1) the capability to receive PACAF sub-allocated nuclear weapons and warheads in stockpile, ready, or operational conditions at rates up to 50 weapons per 24 hours; (2) the capability of storing and maintaining up to 150 nuclear weapons, including nuclear components, in each of the two storage areas, or up to the maximum capacity of each storage area, whichever was less--the number of weapons stored in one area not to exceed 150 without the approval of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force; (3) to attain and maintain a capability of processing nuclear weapons to "Completely Assemble for Ferry" (CAF) or "Completely Assemble for Strike" (CAS) configuration at the rate of six of one type or four of a combination of two types per 24 hours for each WMT available for duty at the 7th TDS; (4) to issue weapons to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at the rate and configuration specified in applicable Fifth Air Force

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operations plans; (5) to process, issue, and deliver SAC-allocated weapons and associated components to SAC tactical aircraft at a prescribed rate of delivery.¹³

To accomplish its mission subsequent to 1 April 1960, the 7th TDS was authorized a manning of 192 personnel. The Plant #1 Assembly Branch of the Operations Division was authorized seven weapons maintenance teams "WMT's)-- "A", "B", "C", "D", "F", "G", and "H"--whose purpose was to perform all nuclear weapons maintenance in the PACAF area for the 7th TDS. All were completely mobile in nature. WMT "E" was permanently deployed to another PACAF base, primarily for the purpose of performing weapons maintenance, though it retained sufficient mobility to permit deployment to problem areas if necessary.

Although the 7th TDS, a Headquarters, USAF-controlled (AFCON) O/T unit assigned to Fifth Air Force, was attached to the 313th Air Division, and further attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing, for logistical and administrative support, the Director of Armament Supply, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, acting as the agent of the Commander, retained direct operational control. However, it was provided that in the event of a loss of communications between Fifth Air Force and Okinawa, the Commander, 313th Air Division would assume operational control of the 7th TDS. In what would appear to be a contradiction of the foregoing, moreover, Fifth Air Force Regulation 23-15 of 16 June 1958 provided that the Commander, 7th TDS would exercise command, administrative, and operational control of the squadron, including the temporarily deployed weapons maintenance teams.¹⁴

WMT "E", permanently deployed, as we have seen, received a Quality Assurance inspection in January 1960 on units produced as a result of a readiness exercise of November 1959 and the routine maintenance performed

in December and January. When it was realized that a readiness exercise scheduled for 17 January would create an additional workload, the squadron received permission to use training units wherever necessary to meet the total commitments.

On 20 January 1960, WMT "E" deployed to Kunsan AB, Korea, for the purpose of performing limited periodic maintenance. This deployment was scheduled in conjunction with the local mobility program, thus providing C-124 transportation directly between Kunsan and Johnson Air Bases. The maintenance schedule ran two weeks in length, and transportation was programmed with a mobility flight in the forthcoming month. By using mobility aircraft, the team was provided with direct, rapid, and unrestricted transportation. The maintenance at Kunsan was accomplished while the work at Johnson was temporarily backlogged.¹⁵

As the year 1960 began, WMT "C" was at Itazuke AB maintaining classified equipment for the 8th Armament and Electronics (A&E) Maintenance Squadron. During this same period, the Northern Air Materiel Area Pacific (NAMAP) calibration team inspected and certified the test equipment of WMT "C", in the course of a normal six-monthly calibration visit. On 5 February, WMT "C" returned to Kadena and began inspections on the W-5 along with painting, maintenance, and beautification of MK-28's.¹⁶

During February 1960, the Quality Assurance Team continued its inspections, visiting Kadena and Osan AB, Korea, at which time it inspected a total of 13 units, including the battery shop installations at Osan, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing battery shop, and the 7th TDS battery shop.¹⁷

A PACAF Capability and Standardization Inspection of the 7th TDS was performed from 11 through 18 March 1960 by a team whose purpose was to test

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the 7th TDS against its assigned mission. A rating of Satisfactory was given on the over-all inspection. (Only ratings of Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory were considered and awarded in such inspections.)

During the latter part of March 1960 the Materiel Division of the 7th TDS received a message from PACAF directing consolidation with Detachment #1, 3d Aviation Depot Squadron (ADS), the local SAC special weapons storage agency, by absorption of the latter. A target date of 1 April 1960 was established. This action involved the consolidation of two AFK accounts and comprised the transfer of three new types of weapons, as far as the 7th TDS was concerned. Entailed in this transfer was the taking of a special inventory and inspection of all major assemblies, test, handling, and miscellaneous equipment. Six hundred new stock record cards had to be completed, along with new stock levels, an increase in stockpiling reportings, and the writing of new plans to support the SAC units during training and EWP operations.¹⁸

During the period of January through March 1960, the 7th TDS devoted itself to preparations for consolidation of its Personnel Section with that of the 6313th ABW. This action formally took place on 1 April 1960. Records of the 7th TDS, personnel manning slots, and over-all responsibility for personnel actions were also transferred to the 6313th ABW as a result of this change. Although the Personnel Section transferred to the wing, an Administrative Section still had to function at the 7th TDS. Consequently, some minor personnel functions were left in the hands of the Administrative Section.

Also on 1 April 1960, the Security Section of the 7th TDS was transferred to the 6313th Air Police Squadron, and the 6313th ABW assumed the security responsibilities heretofore borne by the 7th. Here again, other administrative functions--the preparation of access lists and clearances--were assumed by

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the Administrative Section. And again the workload was handled by the existing administrative personnel, no additional people having been either forecast or requested to assist with the augmented workload.

April 1960 also saw the reorganization of WMT "E" to make it compatible with the other WMT's--i.e., its strength became one officer and eight enlisted technicians. The following month, WMT "E" received, as part of its permanent team equipment, the latest type training units that the 7th had in its inventory. On 22 May a 3d Bomb Wing local training exercise and recall in which only the training units participated was conducted. The next day the 3d Bomb Wing was given an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) involving WMT "E". Added to this ORI was an annual PACAF inspection which lasted two days and took in the actual post-exercise operations and an acceptance of new training units. WMT "E" avoided any discrepancies.¹⁹

WMT "C" returned to Kadena from deployment at Itazuke AB on 1 June 1960 and spent the month painting igloos in the Annex, as well as performing plant maintenance, team equipment maintenance, and technical order posting.

WMT "E" continued to progress toward the 15 August 1960 deadline for completion of all outstanding work orders which would affect the transfer of their operations to an adjacent area. This deadline was not firm, but was merely established as a major maintenance cutoff date to aid contractors in dismantling buildings and structures within the current location.

The Quality Assurance Team performed a special inspection of four units at Tainan, Taiwan, in June, then proceeded to Kunsan AB, Korea, to inspect Lot 60-7, which also consisted of four units.

During the month of June the hospitalization of the Handling Officer made it necessary to name a substitute. Taking advantage of the situation,

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the Squadron Commander reorganized the Handling Section in such wise as to effect a more effective and efficient performance. Three teams were formed, each with an NCOIC, thereby bringing about a more flexible utilization of manpower. Extensive training was performed in preparation for the PACAF Capability Inspection scheduled for August, with special emphasis placed on safety of operation and proper operator vehicle maintenance.²⁰

Throughout the period from January through June 1960, the 7th TDS suffered from a shortage in the 702X0 career field. The manning percentages averaged between 70 and 80 per cent of authorized personnel strength--a low percentage when operational standards were so high. Although this condition existed, the 6313th ABW was continually advised and made aware of it. For its part, the 6313th ABW made it clear to the 7th TDS that this same condition was to be found throughout the PACAF area.²¹

In July 1960 emphasis was placed on preparation for the follow-up technical proficiency inspection (TPI) scheduled for August to determine the 7th TDS's capability on SAC-type weapons, the responsibility for which had been assumed on 1 April, as related above.

Johnson AB was programmed to phase down to the status of an air station during the first half of FY-61; consequently, the nuclear weapon stockpile was moved to Yokota AB, making it necessary to move WMT "E" there also. Since the facilities provided at Yokota did not allow full production on weapons maintenance (for an interim period), WMT "E" experienced an exceptionally heavy workload at Johnson AB when it endeavored to accomplish the storage inspections that were due on the weapons during the moving period.²²

The time and effort expended in preparation for the follow-up TPI reaped their reward in August, as the 7th TDS received a rating of Satisfactory in

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all phases of the inspection. That same month the 313th IG conducted an annual general inspection of the squadron, giving a Satisfactory rating to all aspects except certain portions of the Individual Military Training and Safety operations. Action taken immediately in the wake of the inspection resulted in correction of all major discrepancies by the end of the month.

Just before the TPI, official word had been received confirming earlier unofficial information that the MK-6 stockpile was to be retired. With the inspection out of the way, the squadron concentrated on preparing the MK-6 weapons for shipment. At the same time, Plant I devoted most of its effort to weapons maintenance on MK-28's, a number of which were prepared for shipment, in consonance with a realignment of theater assets.

WMT "E" found that even its doughtiest efforts were not sufficient to enable the weapons maintenance to be completed at Johnson AB in July; however, by 12 August the team had completed this work and moved on to Misawa AB 10 days later to perform scheduled weapons maintenance.

During August 1960, the Operations Division received and reviewed tech orders on the TX-43 and TX-54 weapons, both of which were programmed for the 7th TDS stockpile in 1961.²³

September began with a special inspection of all MK-28 weapons in the 7th TDS stockpile, as the result of a Hold Order from higher headquarters. Behind this order was the discovery of an unsafe condition brought about by a manufacturing deviation. Certain hold-down straps on MK-28 bolster assemblies had been found likely to fail under severe stresses, such as would be experienced in an aircraft accident. Since a large part of the 7th TDS stockpile of MK-28 weapons was loaded on High Gear aircraft, it was necessary

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to ascertain the status of those weapons first. The inspection revealed that 25 weapons assigned to High Gear did not meet the required specifications. The upshot was the initiation of a crash program on 2 September to repair them. Through close coordination between the Materiel and Operations Divisions, all of the defective weapons on the High Gear aircraft were completed within a day. Attention was then turned to the MK-28 weapons in the 7th TDS stockpile, with the result that 17 more were found lacking. A shortage of parts, however, prevented rectification of the defect until 6 September.

The Naval Air Facility at Naha Air Base had also been a recipient of the notice about defective MK-28 hold-down straps, and found, upon inspecting its own stockpile, that one weapon was affected by the Hold Order. Since the Navy personnel did not understand the intricacies of the delicate repair job which faced them, two of them visited the 7th TDS while the latter was carrying out its own repair work and received instruction on the proper procedures. Then a technician from the 7th TDS returned to Naha to act as a technical advisor during the NAF's weapon repair.

To help relieve the problem encountered in keeping the security covers of MK-28 weapons from deteriorating from mildew, the 7th TDS sought permission from Fifth Air Force to allow the covers to be removed from weapons stored on High Gear aircraft. The request being approved, it was decided to perform the operation simultaneously with the next scheduled inspection of each weapon.

Earlier in the year, word had been received from higher headquarters that an alteration program would be initiated before the end of 1960 to relieve a built-in safety hazard. The hazard lay in the circumstance that the tritium booster bottle in the warhead section of the MK-28 would release

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gas into the pit of the primary section of the weapon if subjected to extreme heat, such as would be experienced in an aircraft fire. The program, ALT-202, provided for a fusible plug to be added to the bottle, allowing the tritium gas to escape into the atmosphere rather than into the pit. Almost simultaneously, word was received that certain MK-28 warhead sections would have to be returned to the ZI. The result was that the following advance preparations were made: (1) the 7th TDS requested the 3079th Aviation Depot Wing (AMC) to require logistical support squadron aircraft to arrive at Kadana AB one at a time and remain for 48 hours (thus allowing sufficient time for warhead exchange); and (2) extra H-532-A bolster assemblies were borrowed from the 18th TOF to expedite the exchange.

Early in October 1960, a three-man team from the 3079th ADW arrived to conduct "second generation" training for the ALT-202 program. Before they left, the AMC people had certified 13 personnel of the 7th TDS as qualified to perform ALT-202.

Just before the end of October, the warhead exchange program got under way, forcing the Operations and Materiel Divisions to work many overtime hours, since the aircraft assigned to this program frequently arrived during non-duty hours and on weekends. The Handling Section alone reported 83 hours' overtime for the month.²⁴

WMT "I" received two weeks' special training during September 1960 in preparation for assumption of maintenance responsibility of the W-5 weapon for the 7th TDS, and testing and handling equipment was transferred from Plant I to Plant II. Just before the end of the month, however, higher headquarters advised that the 7th TDS was to turn in all W-5 warheads in

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its stockpile. The W-5's themselves were to be cannibalized before shipment by removal of the MC-333's and load coils, making the products of the cannibalization available for use as maintenance spares. In accordance with Plant II's assumption of maintenance responsibility for the W-5, the stockpile of this weapon was moved by the Handling Section from the Main Site igloo structures to the Annex igloo structures.²⁵

Planning for support of the 498th Tactical Missile Group was reviewed, and additional work orders submitted during October for the modification of existing facilities. The 498th TMG was scheduled for activation during the fourth quarter of FY-1961 (the actual activation occurred on 8 February 1961), and the 7th TDS would be responsible for maintenance of the nuclear warhead of the TM-76B missile.

On 31 October 1960 the Quality Assurance Team inspected the work of WMT "F" at Osan AB, Korea, and rejected it as not meeting minimum acceptable standards. WMT "F" thereupon re-worked the weapons, which then passed a second inspection.

October was also noteworthy for the squadron's obtaining a circuit in the Air Force World-Wide Communications System (AIRCOMNET), which also provided a back-up teletype communications circuit. Previously, the only circuit available to the 7th TDS had been the PACAF Communications Network.²⁶

WMT "E" had completely relocated its base of operations from Johnson AB to Yokota AB by 17 November. Thereafter, the team concentrated on preparing the working facilities to make efficient operations possible.

Throughout November, Plant II was absorbed in ALT-202 and in the warhead exchange program.

When WMT "F" fell to a strength of four personnel as a result of normal

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rotation of personnel and the non-arrival of replacements, it was made responsible for the repair of non-operational weapons in the field.²⁷

The ALT-202 and warhead exchange programs continued through the end of December 1960, accounting for the greater part of the Operations Division's workload. Plant II reconditioned the MK-28 training weapon and prepared the MK-6 training weapon for shipment. Detachment 1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC) conducted a training exercise and called for the SAC training weapons. Minimum delivery times were satisfied, Plant II preparing two units in 15 minutes.

The Quality Assurance Team went to Tainan in December to assist the 405th Fighter Wing in establishing a Theater Operations Facility. A training weapon was loaned to the 405th, enabling the team to conduct training for personnel of the wing from 5 through 8 December. In addition, the Quality Assurance Team performed an inspection at Clark AB immediately following the training period at Tainan, the result of which was a finding that the seven weapons worked by WMT "B" which were inspected were satisfactory. Just before the month's end, the Quality Assurance Team inspected two weapons at the home station and found both of them satisfactory.²⁸

On 25 March 1961, with the inactivation of Detachment #1, 3d Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC), the 7th TDS's commitment for maintenance of SAC weapons was reduced to that of possessing the capability of providing maintenance for non-operational nuclear weapons loaded aboard SAC transit aircraft which might land at Kadena AB.²⁹

A second variation of the tasks constituting the 7th TDS's mission was inaugurated on 15 May 1961 by an operational agreement concluded between the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 7th TDS. This agreement provided for the

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receipt, storage during maintenance, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, inspection, alteration, modification, preparation for shipment, technical supply, and emergency destruction of all PACAF sub-allocated weapons assigned to the 18th TFW. (The last commitment, emergency destruction, applied only to weapons physically located on a temporary basis within 7th TDS facilities.) Further, the agreement included the retrofit, repair, and maintenance of the associated weapons test and handling equipment assigned to the 18th TFW.

The third variation of these tasks was levied by Fifth Air Force Program Plan 60-P-11, which provided for a programmed capability within the 7th TDS for MK-28 warhead maintenance, modification, inspection, and warhead-to-missile installation in support of the 498th Tactical Missile Group.³⁰

The mission was further complicated by the fact that the 7th TDS was responsible for the assembly, disassembly, maintenance, inspection, alteration, and modification of all PACAF sub-allocated nuclear weapons and components located outside the Ryukyu Islands in the Far East. The squadron was responsible only for the alteration and modification of weapons located on Taiwan; however, it was not responsible for maintenance of W-5 warheads in Korea and Taiwan, this being the responsibility of the applicable missile units to which these warheads were assigned.

The Unit Manning Document (UMD) for 1 January 1961 showed a total authorization of 192 personnel. Of these, 121 were authorized the Operations Division, 53 to the Materiel Division, 16 to the Administrative Division, and two to the Command Section.³¹

In February 1961, the 7th TDS made arrangements with the Army Security Agency (ASA) for both its NCO's and enlisted men to eat the noon meal at the ASA's Torii Station. This was done to eliminate the excessive travel involved

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in transporting squadron personnel from the 7th TDS main site to Kadena AB, six miles distant. As a natural concomitant, this arrangement also decreased the amount of time consumed for the noon meal, thereby increasing the number of man-hours available for duty.³²

On 6 March the Squadron Commander and his staff officially opened the new Technical Training Center, the primary purpose of which was to give newly assigned personnel 90 hours of indoctrination training in weapons systems maintained in PACAF. Additionally, the center was to provide technical training for personnel who had been converted to the 331X0 career field from the 463X0 career field.

Throughout the month of March, negotiations were conducted among the 18th TFW, 6313th ABW, 18th A&E Maintenance Squadron, Detachment #1, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Squadron, and 7th TDS for the reallocation and utilization of the buildings and facilities which had become available for use upon the inactivation of Detachment #1, 3d MMS. These negotiations provided for the initial utilization of certain facilities within the annex area for the 18th Theater Operational Facility (TOF) and the 2703d EOD Squadron. It also located these organizations in a more centralized location to both the flight line and to the weapons in storage in which there was mutual interest. The 7th TDS also received a portion of this reallocation which included a storage warehouse and a maintenance facility for the necessary equipment and vehicles possessed by the Handling Section. An undesirable result of the negotiations was the location of three distinct and separate organizations within the same restricted area.³³

During April the 7th TDS received its own medical dispensary as a result of studies of the number of miles traveled and the man-hours lost by personnel

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reporting for sick call. In addition to the physical facility, the 6332d USAF Dispensary at Kadena arranged to have one of its medical corpsmen conduct sick call each day at the 7th TDS main site.³⁴

On 20 June 1961 a cloudburst hit central Okinawa, delivering a total of 4.41 inches of rain between 1430 and 1630 hours. At approximately 1605I, someone noticed that water was beginning to accumulate in the drainage ditches surrounding the Multicubicle Storage Area where war reserve weapons (WRW) belonging to the 18th TFW were stored. Contributing to the situation was a heavy runoff of water from the ramp and flightline areas, which were located on higher ground. When first observed, this runoff was following a slough adjacent to the Multicubicle Storage Area and commencing to back up. However, there was nothing to indicate that any water would back up into the Storage Area itself.

As the deluge continued, though, the slough became incapable of accommodating the flood that kept pouring into it, and at 1615 the runoff reached its crest, inundating the Storage Area at that time. Officials therewith decided to evacuate the 36 MK-28 weapons stored in the building. Unfortunately for putting this decision into effect, the very bulk of the weapons made speedy removal impossible. Consequently, all of them were exposed to the flood waters for at least a few minutes, and the last ones, which were evacuated by 1715 hours, had been submerged for as long as 40 minutes, the water inside the building having reached an average depth of 21 inches. Thirty minutes later, the rainfall having abated, all water had drained from the area. The question now was one of whether the damage was already done or not.

A primary inspection of the weapons by maintenance personnel of the 7th

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TDS indicated that since the warheads were pressurized, they could be returned to service after a complete inspection. However, the resulting more thorough inspection revealed that an excessive amount of water was present in the fuzes and tail sections of the weapons. This meant that the affected parts would almost certainly have to be shipped back to the ZI.

Following the primary inspection, all weapons were disassembled, and all visible water removed. Upon the completion of testing and replacement of certain cables, the warheads were certified as serviceable. On 23 June 1961, a civilian representative from Sandia Corps, Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, arrived at the 7th TDS and reinspected the flooded weapons. He found that the verdict of the previous inspection by the 7th TDS people had been accurate. Subsequently, on the basis of his recommendations, the squadron received instructions to ship all the affected fuzes and tail sections back to the ZI.

Meantime, Fifth Air Force had been notified of the incident immediately. At their direction and through coordination with the 7th TDS, all maintenance requirements were met, and the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's readiness to meet its GWP responsibilities was restored.

Personnel of the Base Civil Engineer's office who were assigned to study the situation to determine what had caused the inundation and what might be done to prevent a repetition found that the drainage system for the Multicubicle Storage Area, designed by the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa (USAEDO), did not provide sufficient capacity to take care of the runoff for the area involved. The surface runoff of the 16-acre area was greater than the carrying capacity of the 36" culvert. Therefore, the investigators recommended that an earth-filled diversion dam and approximately 550 feet of diversion channel

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be constructed. These two actions would reduce the previous runoff area by more than 50 per cent and divert the runoff from Area "A" into a 4' x 4' box culvert. Other recommended action was the realignment of the existing ditches and removal of silt and dense vegetation from the drainage network serving the reduced runoff area of the Storage Facility. By so doing, the presently-installed 36" culvert would be able to handle the runoff from the drainage network serving the reduced runoff area of the Storage Facility.³⁵

The recommendations of the Base Engineers were put into effect almost at once, owing to the high priority accorded special weapons storage, and less than a month later the measures taken were put to the acid test when approximately 16 inches of rain fell during a period of three days. When no flooding or damage was experienced, the 313th Air Division Civil Engineering Officer very understandably concluded that the revamped drainage system was adequate for its purpose.³⁶

On 24 November 1961 a new version of Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-15 was published, describing the mission of the 7th TDS and establishing the responsibilities of the Commander. The existing assignment and attachments remained unchanged, but the regulation directed that the 313th Air Division was to "levy resource requirements upon the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron only with the concurrence of the Director of Armament Supply, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force."

The responsibilities of the Commander, 7th Tactical Depot Squadron were as follows:

1. To maintain operational control over deployed weapons maintenance teams.
2. To operate two separate maintenance facilities.

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3. To perform operator maintenance on vehicles assigned to the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron.
4. To operate a special supply account.
5. To provide space for a limited communication center.
6. To conduct the theater quality assurance program.
7. To conduct a quality control and training program for the 7th TDS site and deployed maintenance activities, as well as to assist other related organizations with quality control and training programs to the extent permitted by available resources.
8. To maintain the squadron's capabilities in accordance with current Fifth Air Force Capabilities and Equipage letters.³⁷

Activations, Inactivations, and Redesignations at Naha Air Base.

The 2152d Communications Squadron (AFCS): We have seen above that on 1 July 1961 the Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) was relieved from assignment to the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) and redesignated the Air Force Communications Service (AFCS). As a part of this change, the block of numbers, 1800 to 2199 inclusive, used to designate MATS organizations, was withdrawn from MATS and assigned to the new AFCS for the designation of major air command-control (MAJCON) units. At the same time, MATS retained for its own use the block of numbers, 1200 to 1799 inclusive.

Within the area of the 313th Air Division, the 1962d AACS Group thus was not affected, since the 1900 block of numbers was included in those transferred to the new Air Force Communications Service. As a result, the 1962d became the 1962d Communications Group (AFCS) but did not shed its familiar numerical designation. However, the same was not true of the 1252d

AACS Squadron at Naha Air Base; for the 1200 block of numbers was comprised within those which MATS retained for its own use. As a result, it became necessary to redesignate the 1252d AACS Squadron, after first relieving it from assignment to MATS and reassigning it to AFCS with no change in location, as the 2152d Communications Squadron (AFCS).³⁸

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division: Organized at Naha Air Base on 1 July 1960, Detachment 3, 313th Air Division was under the direct operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, whose Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics exercised supervisory surveillance. At the same time, the unit was attached to the 51st Support Squadron for logistic support (less field maintenance) and administrative support (less the assignment and promotion of personnel), and to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for field maintenance only.³⁹ Because the detachment personnel were assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, their records were maintained by the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB.

The mission of Detachment 3 consisted of providing radar evaluation services throughout the PACAF area of responsibility, conducting an analysis of the Radar Quality Control Program, and acting as an advisory agency on matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics.

As for the Detachment Commander, he was responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force for:

1. Performing initial and special evaluations of all ground-type radars in the PACAF area of responsibility, as directed by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.
2. Continuously monitoring the PACAF Radar Quality Control Program by a systematic evaluation and analysis of data submitted in accordance

with AFM 100-28. This analysis was supposed to include such matters as the effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, the relationship of target aspect ratio to the probability of detection, and the validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft.

3. Providing special advisory service for specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the AC&W system.

4. Providing training for field personnel on Radar Quality Control procedures.

5. Conducting radar site surveys for new radar installations when directed by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

6. Supporting such other activities as might be directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

The Detachment Commander was authorized to communicate directly with Fifth Air Force Headquarters, the various air divisions, and all AC&W units in arranging evaluation schedules and field support requirements, and in carrying out the analysis functions associated with the Radar Quality Control Program. The details of scheduled evaluations outside the Fifth Air Force area of responsibility would be the responsibility of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.⁴⁰

On 7 July 1961, a team flew to Kokee, on the island of Hawaii, to perform a special evaluation of the AN/FPS-6 height finder at that AC&W site. The specified evaluation was itself completed in short order, but, as with almost all such trips, the members of the team found themselves being requested to perform additional work while they were there. In consequence, the team ended by evaluating the AN/FPS-6B at Koko Head and the AN/FPS-8 surveillance radar at Punamano, both on Oahu Island, Hawaii. Because of this additional work,

the team was unable to depart for home until 1 August.

On 10 July another team headed by the Detachment Commander departed for P-Y-Do, Korea, to evaluate the remaining MSQ-1A (an S-Band automatic tracking radar), employed with the TM-61C Matador missile launching system. No difficulties were encountered during this evaluation, so that all team members were able to return to Naha AB by 20 July.

On 25 July Yuza Dake Air Station (Site P-56) requested assistance in orienting its radar equipment, there being a putative six degree error between the TACAN and radar readings. Although the detachment team made a very careful survey of the RAPCON facility at Kadena, the TACAN's at Naha and Kadena, and of P-56, the error reported by the AC&W people was not to be found. Consequently, the team could only conclude that the apparent six degree error did not actually exist and was but the result of improper reporting procedures.

On 14 August a team visited Site R-21 at Ilocos Norte, Luzon, in the Philippine Islands, to conduct a station evaluation. In order to provide on-the-job training for personnel of the detachment who had never been TDY and thus raise the training level of the organization, the Detachment Commander directed that a large team containing several supernumeraries be taken along. Several events made the trip eventful, but by far the most memorable were two that had no direct bearing on the purpose of the visit. The first of these involved the entire team's becoming ill from various tropical diseases; while the second consisted of its being stranded by the worst flood ever recorded in that particular section of the country. In spite of these difficulties, the evaluation, except for some portions of the AN/FPS-6, was completed. In addition, new plotting boards were made for Site R-21. During a lull in the evaluation, some team members were dispatched to the other AC&W sites in the

Philippines, where they accomplished the semi-annual quality control visit. The evaluation at Site R-21 was finally completed on 17 September.

On 20 August another team, under the leadership of the Detachment Commander, went to Korea to evaluate a total of five radar sites for the 38th Artillery Brigade (USA) and the 1st Artillery Brigade (ROKA). Weather, transportation, and site location were all obstacles that had to be overcome. They eventually were, but a great deal of time was consumed in the process before the team finally returned to Naha on 5 October, somewhat the worse for wear. Here, again, the working conditions encountered by the men took their toll, all of them becoming ill at one time or another during the trip.

Meanwhile, another team made the short drive to Yuza Dake AS in southern Okinawa on 19 September to perform a series of sun strobos designed to determine the proper electrical tilt for the AN/FPS-3A surveillance set. These presented no difficulty, and the electrical tilt was quickly furnished to the site personnel.

On 7 October a team went to Japan to work with the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) radar evaluation team on a special evaluation at Site P-42. This evaluation had been requested by higher headquarters because of the poor showing of the site during an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). The JASDF team prepared the formal report, and members of Detachment 3 confined themselves to making a staff visit report. All echelons of command were advised of the conditions found and of the possible corrective action to be initiated to improve Site P-42's capability.

On 21 October a team deployed to Korea to investigate a suspected radiation hazard at three AC&W sites. The team found that the hazard did in fact exist, and, moreover, was likely to exist at any site having an AN/GPS-4

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search radar installed. A report on this condition was forwarded through channels to correct the situation.

On 5 November the Detachment Commander took a team to Taiwan to evaluate all of the MSQ-1A radars in the complex. Even though these sites were due to phase out, PACAF believed that they should be evaluated and brought up to date because of the unsettled conditions in that portion of the world. These evaluations were carried out, the only difficulty encountered being that of obtaining the screening because of weather.

On 6 December the Detachment Commander left to take part in an ORI of the Korean Air Defense System. Three sites were visited during the one-week inspection, and an over-all rating of "satisfactory" was awarded.

On 7 December a team visited Site P-42 in Japan to assist the JASDF in painting a plotting board. There was a delay in getting the project started because of the inability of the JASDF to get all the people to the site that they wanted trained in these procedures. Eventually the trainees were all rounded up and transported to P-42; whereupon the work began without further difficulty.

On 15 December 1961, a team departed Naha to evaluate mobile search radars at Saigon, South Viet Nam, and Bangkok, Thailand. These two evaluations were still going on as the year ended.


On 26 December the Detachment Commander took a team to Yuza Dake Air Station to check on the condition of the radar reflector at the site. It was deemed expedient to make such a check in view of the belief of officials in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing that the sail needed replacing, and the realization on the part of the Detachment 3 people that all the work involved

EXTERIOR PHOTOGRAPH OF THE NEW HANGAR

FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM

COMPLETED AT KADENA AIR BASE

IN JULY 1961




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INTERIOR PHOTOGRAPH OF THE NEW HANGAR

FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM

COMPLETED AT KADENA AIR BASE

IN JULY 1961



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in a complete evaluation of P-56 scheduled for February 1962 would be nullified by such a replacement at a date subsequent to the evaluation. In the interest of economy, therefore, the team made this preliminary visit of 26 December. Their finding was that while some repair work was needed, complete replacement was unnecessary.⁴¹

CHANGES INVOLVING AIR FORCE LAND IN THE RYUKYUS

On 1 July 1961, Bolo Auxiliary Airfield, consisting of 625.29 acres of land, with an annual rental of \$177,868.39, was transferred to the U.S. Army, which planned to redesignate the area as Trainfire Range, Bolo Point. The remaining 51.98 acres of Air Force land which made up the original Bolo Auxiliary Airfield area had previously been redesignated as Kadena Site Number 1 in the TM-76B missile system on 1 April 1961.

Also on 1 July 1961, Okuma Radio Beacon Annex (PIN 5070), a 7.26-acre parcel of land, with an annual rental of \$772.47, which had formerly been assigned to the real property account of Kadena AB and which had been inactivated effective 1 April 1956, was deleted from the PACAF installation list as a result of its being transferred to the Department of the Army.⁴²

Again on 1 July 1961, a 35-acre parcel of land in Onna-Son, with an annual gross rental of \$3,854.50, was transferred from the International Broadcasting Service (IBS) to the Air Force, which assigned the acquisition to the Onna Point Administration Annex (PIN 4088), as a part of that installation.

On 9 August 1961, a 34.57-acre parcel of land in the northwest portion of Kadena Air Base (actually a satellite area near Kadena Village, between Highway 1 and the East China Sea) was released to its Ryukyuan owners. The remaining .77-acre of the original parcel was transferred to the U.S. Army

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for use as a right-of-way.

On 31 August 1961, Yonagusuku Radio Range Annex (PIN 4092), assigned to the real property account of Kadena AB until its inactivation as of 19 February 1955, was deleted from the PACAF installation list in consequence of being released to its Ryukyuan owner.⁴³ The Yonagusuku Radio Range Annex contained no permanent structures, but had 1,587 square yards of surfaced roads, 780 feet of water mains, 515 linear feet of storm drains, and 15 square yards of sidewalks.

On 25 September 1961, Motobu Auxiliary Airfield (PIN 2987), hitherto assigned to the real property account of Naha Air Base, was inactivated, retroactive to 30 June 1957.⁴⁴

FOOTNOTES

| <u>Footnote No.</u> | <u>Document No.</u> | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|---|
| 1 | 1 | Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961. |
| 2 | 1 | 5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations: Division Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 14 Jan. 1960. |
| 3 | 1 | 5AFR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission--Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961. |
| 4 | 2 | Letter (Ltr.), Hq., Fifth Air Force (5AF) to 313th Air Division (313th Air Div.), sub.: Hq. Fifth Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking Forces, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960. |
| 5 | 3 | Military Air Transport Service (MATS) Special Order (SO) G-60, dtd. 25 May 1961. |
| 6 | 4 | Air Force Communications Service (AFCS) SO G-2, dtd. 1 July 1961. |
| 7 | -- | 313th Air Div. SO G-1, dtd. 5 Jan. 1962. |
| 8 | 5 | Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) SO G-62, dtd. 2 Aug. 1961. |
| 9 | -- | Ltr., Department of the Air Force (DAF) (595m), dtd. 25 Apr. 1961. |
| 10 | -- | PACAF SO G-48, dtd. 15 June 1961. |
| 11 | -- | History, 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG), 1 July-31 Dec. 1961, p. 2. |
| 12 | -- | History, 7th Tactical Depot Squadron (TDS), 1 January-30 June 1960, pp. 4-5; History, 7th TDS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1960, pp. 4-5. |
| 13 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1961, pp. 7-9. |
| 14 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1960, pp. 4-5; History, 7th TDS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1960, pp. 4-5; History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1961, p. 4. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|-----------------|-----------------|---|
| 15 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1960, pp. 7-8. |
| 16 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 6, 9. |
| 17 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 10. |
| 18 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 12-14. |
| 19 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 15, 18. |
| 20 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 20-21. |
| 21 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 22. |
| 22 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 July-31 Dec. 1960, pp. 6-7. |
| 23 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 8. |
| 24 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 10-12, 15. |
| 25 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 12-15. |
| 26 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 16-17. |
| 27 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 18. |
| 28 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 21. |
| 29 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1961, pp. 4-5. |
| 30 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 5. |
| 31 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 11. |
| 32 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 15. |
| 33 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 19-20. |
| 34 | -- | <u>Ibid.</u> , p. 22. |
| 35 | -- | History, 7th TDS, 1 January-30 June 1961, pp. 31-32; |
| | 6 | Ltr., Hq. 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (18AE-F) to 313th Air Div. (MC-A), sub.: Transmittal of Formal Report of AFR 122-3 Investigation, dtd. 17 July 1961. |
| 36 | 7 | 1st ind. (Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313MC-A) to 313CE, sub.: Adequacy of Action, dtd. 20 July 1961), 313CE to 313MC-A, dtd. 24 July 1961. |
| 37 | 1 | 5AFR No. 23-15, sub.: Organization and Mission--Field: 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961. |

| <u>Footnote No.</u> | <u>Document No.</u> | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|--|
| 38 | 3 4 | MATS SO G-60, dtd. 25 May 1961; AFCS SO G-2, dtd. 1 July 1961. |
| 39 | -- -- | 5AF GO 29, dtd. 24 June 1960; 313th AD GO 32, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960; 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 14 Dec. 1960. |
| 40 | -- | 5AFR No. 23-7, sub.: Organization--Field: Detachment 3, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, dtd. 11 July 1960. |
| 41 | -- | History, Detachment 3, 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1961, pp. 1-7. |
| 42 | 5 | PACAF SO G-71, dtd. 25 Sept. 1961. |
| 43 | 5 | <u>Ibid.</u> |
| 44 | 5 | <u>Ibid.</u> |
| -- | 8 | 313th Air Division Special Orders, 1 July-31 Dec. 1961. |

CHAPTER II

IE SHIMA--THE FESTERING SORE

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THE BOMBING RANGE AND SCRAP COLLECTIONPrologue.

Many of the people of the United States who read the daily news of the world in recent years have doubtless often noted with contemptuous amusement the issuing by the government of Communist China of its latest "serious warning" in connection with an alleged offense against her sovereignty. The Red Chinese dragon may huff and breathe fiery words as much as he pleases, thinks the reader, but when all is said and done, all that he can show for his exhibition of wrath is a puff of smoke.

But, to turn the telescope around and look at ourselves from the viewpoint of an outsider, one wonders if much the same amusement has not been afforded the people of Ie Shima by the long succession of serious warnings given them over the years to stay out of the bombing range located on their island. Whether this be true or not, however, certain it is that the repeated warnings have been as repeatedly disregarded--and ofttimes defied.

After Seikan Ishikawa and Ryotoku Higa were killed on 6 September 1959 by the explosion of a bomb which they had brought home from the range on the west end of the island--as related in the 313th Air Division History for 1960--the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena, which had jurisdiction over and responsibility for the Ie Shima Bombing Range, issued a strong warning to the people of Ie Shima on 2 October 1959 against entering it. The

perverse reaction of the citizens of Maja, the village closest to the fatal installation, was to hold a meeting wherein it was resolved that the GRI Executive Branch, the Legislature, and USCAR should be petitioned to return their requisitioned lands immediately. According to their point of view, they had never actually rented their lands to the military; therefore, it was obviously the latter who should get out of Ie Shima, rather than the Ie Shimans who should stay out of the bombing range.

The intransigent rebel, Shoko Ahagon (who figures prominently in the earlier accounts of Ie Shima contained in these histories), was the instigator of this latest gathering, and he once more enunciated his pet doctrine that "We have not contracted a lease of the lands with the U.S. Forces, and we don't have the slightest intention to lease them. We are against the compulsory requisition of lands without proper compensation. No matter how many people may die of hunger or how many of them may die from blasts of shells, we will not part with the lands which we have inherited from our ancestors."¹ (Whether Ahagon-san had actually inherited the land which he now owned on Ie Shima or had instead acquired it later in life by the less politically-dramatic method of purchase is not certain, but the present historian does recall being told by Ahagon himself that the latter was born on the Motobu Peninsula of Okinawa, rather than on Ie Shima.)²

Accidents Outside of Ie Shima Add Fuel to Anti-American Feeling.

Igei-Ku Has Several Close Calls: The greater part of the wild, uncultivated mountain area in western Kin-Son and eastern Onna-Son between the villages of Nakagawa and Yaka comprised the Camp Hansen firing range, for which the 3d Marine Division paid annual rental to the Ryukyuan landowners.

In some areas the range extended as far east as Highway #13, the paved two-lane thoroughfare tracing the tortuous coast of the Philippine Sea; in others tiny farming villages existed as islands of backward civilization between the range and the highway.

On 14 November 1959, the villagers of Igei-Ku, a small hamlet lying about midway between Yaka Enlisted Recreation Center to the south and the comparatively important village of Kin-Ku to the north, were startled by the landing of an explosive-like object in an adjacent rice paddy. No damage other than to a few growing plants resulted, since the missile did not detonate, but to the already apprehensive citizens the incident was a portent of worse things to befall, if other shells were fired with similar inaccuracy from the contiguous range.

Their fears were strengthened only three days later, 17 November, when a shell fragment penetrated a tree growing close to the house of a Mr. Nijima. Then, on the 21st, two window panes in the Sakiyama Distillery were shattered by an exploding bomb which had been released too far afield by a practicing jet plane, while two more windows were broken in the village's community hall by the same errant bomb's too proximate explosion. Splinters of a bomb--perhaps the same one--fell in a field near the village, causing some of the people to seek safety in the ferro-concrete community hall, and others to remain within their homes all day long with their doors closed.³

Three Children Are Injured by an Exploding Flare Bomb: On 6 December 1959, Mrs. Tomi Uegusuku, a widow of Kin-Ku, went to the Camp Hansen firing range--as was evidently her wont on weekends, when maneuvers were not ordinarily conducted--to gather fragments of exploded bombs and shells for the money they would bring as scrap iron. Three of her children--Ansho (13 years

old), her eldest son; Toshiko (11 years old), her oldest daughter; and Setsuko (eight years old), her second daughter--accompanied Mrs. Uegusuku on the perilous mission. While some 30 meters away from their mother, the children found an object more interesting than the shell fragments for which they were supposed to be looking. It was apparently a flare bomb which had failed to function when originally fired. As the youngsters tampered with it, however, the perverse bomb suddenly burst into flames and exploded, inflicting serious burns on all three children. They were rushed to the Koza Hospital, 11 miles to the south, where their condition was described as "critical."⁴

A Shell Fragment Falls on a House in Kin Village: Around 2120 hours on 17 December 1959 a shell fragment weighing around 40 grams (88 pounds) landed on the roof of the home of Kiyomasa Nakama in Kin Village, Kin-Son, breaking two roofing tiles, but, by great good fortune, injuring no one. Since it was known that the Marines had been conducting artillery practice that same evening from approximately 2000 to 2300 hours on the nearby Ginbaru firing range, police officials found no difficulty in assigning responsibility for the incident to the 3d Marine Division. That it was only an incident and not a tragedy was the more remarkable in view of the fact that Nakama's residence was situated in the most densely inhabited section of Kin-Son.⁵

A Scrap Collector Is Mistaken for a Wild Boar: Although the Camp Hansen firing range was designated as a "permanent" off-limits area because of the hazard posed by unexploded ordnance lying around, in actual practice the local people were permitted to enter freely on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, at which times the range was not normally in use. This connivance

with illegality had come about as a result of friendly conversations by members of the Ryukyuan-American Community Relations Committee, made up of Kin-Son officials and leading Marine officers of Camp Hansen. The latter learned that 67 per cent of the 7,000-odd people of Kin-Son were farmers, whose main crops were sugar cane, sweet potatoes, and pineapples, which they supplemented with hog raising, and that 30,000 tsubo of paddy land, as well as 4,475,223 tsubo out of a total 6,789,886 tsubo of forest had been swallowed up in the omnivorous maw of the firing range. Therefore, they readily worked out the arrangement by which the farms and the forest would be made available to the villagers on weekends. Moreover, if a night maneuver were to be held, this fact would be made known by the sounding of a siren.

However, the other side of the coin was an agreement on the part of the persons entering the range that they would confine their efforts to tending their little farms, cutting wood for fuel, and gathering fodder for their livestock. Unfortunately, although the citizens of Kin were not so openly defiant as their counterparts on Ie Shima and did acknowledge that they had leased their land to the Marines, they were not immune to the importunities of greed. Thus, they did not habitually take their lives in their hands by slipping into the range to gather scrap metal while maneuvers were actually in progress, as did their Ie Shiman brethren, but not a few of them took advantage of the access permitted them on Saturday afternoons and Sundays to collect empty cartridges, shell fragments, and duds. The passport to the range and fortune (everything in this world, including fortune, being relative, after all) was a reaping-hook or a hoe.

Some, no doubt, went primarily to work their farms or gather wood, with any scrap iron or brass they chanced upon being only incidental to their

mission--though none the less welcome for being an unsought bonus. Others, we may be sure, made farming merely a cloak for their scrap-seeking expeditions.

As Policeman Shimoji of the Kin Police Box stated:

The scrap collection is a kind of vicious circle, and keeping scrap collectors out is a hopeless task. While entering the maneuver ground is permitted when no maneuvers are going on, scrap collecting is strictly prohibited. Tragedy has taken place now and then in the past from collecting scrap, and they ought to know well the danger that attends scrap hunting. There has been little or no friction with the American servicemen in the past; for there is the community relations committee, which holds a meeting once a month and makes things go smoothly.

Although the tacit agreement worked well enough for the time being, some people, including Tatsuo Ginoza, the Mayor of Kin-Son, looked ahead and recognized that things might not always go so smoothly. A new camp commander at Camp Hansen might prove less tolerant and forbid entry at any time, under any circumstances. In anticipation of such a situation, the mayor had petitioned the High Commissioner some time before, but the latter, while saying that he would try to comply with the request, gave no definite answer--nothing in writing. What Mayor Ginoza sought was the designation of a specific danger zone to which entry would be prohibited at all times, while the balance of the area would be thrown open to the local people.

In preparation for the spectacular CINCPAC Firepower Demonstration scheduled for 20 November 1959, the Marines conducted large-scale practice daily, while both Air Force and Marine jet fighters likewise engaged in frequent rehearsals for the big day. As a result, considerable quantities of brass and steel scrap were generated to tempt the cupidity of the local people.

On 20 November the Japanese-language Okinawa Times reported that the Ishikawa District Police Station had been assigning eight policemen to guard against such intruders each day since the 15th, but that the villagers were

generally successful in sneaking into the range during the intervals between firing practices. Those who were unable to elude the patrolling policemen invariably pretended to be farming their rice paddies or sweet potato patches when caught in flagrante delicto. The range officer, Major Smith, warned that live bullets, shells, and bombs would be used in the demonstration of 20 November, and asked the local inhabitants' cooperation, so that there would be no injury to anyone.⁶

Although the Ishikawa police were probably not too eager to arrest their own people--particularly such non-criminal-type farmers as those who took advantage of the firing range--the infiltrators were not permitted to enjoy complete freedom of operation in their "naishoku."^{*} During the week of 23-28 November the Camp Hansen range was practically overrun by the scrap collectors who sought to gather the rich metal harvest deposited like so much manna by the guns and aircraft participating in the CINCPAC Firepower Demonstration of the 20th. On one day the gendarmes counted 50 trespassers when they arrived on the scene, but only eight of these failed to make good their escape. However, many of those collectors who eluded the grasp of the law were out more than a little breath; for the police confiscated a number of baskets loaded with the scrap metal that the trespassers had already gathered. That more of the local citizenry were not dissuaded from continued scrap gathering by the arrest of their friends and relatives was most likely due to the lightness of the punishment meted out by the GRI courts. In fact, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one may reasonably suppose that only the most repeatedly apprehended offenders were not released with a mere warning. And, since the Marines were aware of the impecunious state of most of the scrap hunters, who, after all, were risking

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no one's life but their own--except when they took home a piece of dud ordnance which might prove to be surprisingly alive--they really felt no compulsion to make an issue of the generosity with which justice was administered in these cases. As for the police, they could fairly congratulate themselves for more than capturing a few score of trespassers and impounding a few baskets of scrap metal. When the CINCPAC Firepower Demonstration was all finished and done, not a single Okinawan had suffered injury.⁷

Whether for the first time or merely as the latest in a succession of similar expeditions we have no way of knowing, but it was on a Saturday afternoon, the day after Christmas, as a matter of fact, that Katsu Atokurane, a 55-year-old housewife of Kin Village, entered the Camp Hansen firing range in search of brass cartridge cases. That same afternoon, 26 December 1959, a 38-year-old Marine, Acting Gunnery Sergeant Charles T. Brown, stationed at Camp Hansen and only recently arrived on the island, chose to hunt for game in the heavy undergrowth of the range, together with a Marine companion. The villagers at Igei-Ku, a short distance south of Kin Village and similarly flanked on three sides by the firing range, had recently captured a wild boar, and two more of these feral beasts had reputedly been killed earlier that same year less than a mile away. Sergeant Brown and his friend had doubtless heard about the presence of the boars from other Marines; for it was this type of game which they were particularly seeking that Saturday afternoon.⁸

In any event, the two hunters approached to within 18 or 19 meters of some brush, with a rice paddy intervening, when they heard a rustling sound. Imagining the disturbance to be caused by a wild boar, Sergeant Brown fired into the thicket without actually seeing his target. Moments later, after

cautiously approaching the thicket where they were pretty certain Sergeant Brown's shot had taken effect, the Marines were horrified to discover that it was an Okinawan woman whom he had shot, rather than a wild boar! The two men hurriedly summoned a doctor from the Camp Hansen dispensary, but his examination only confirmed what they already virtually knew to be the case--that the woman was dead. She was identified as Katsu Atokurane by her son, Minoru, who had also been searching for brass in the range.⁹

An autopsy conducted on the 27th disclosed that one pellet had entered the left side of her skull and stopped inside below her left ear, while a second had entered the left side of her chest and also stopped inside. The wound in the head was determined to be the fatal one, having produced instantaneous death. The missiles were both of 5-mm. size and had been fired from the direction of the victim's right.¹⁰

Although the newspaper accounts, including those containing the comments of police investigators, are silent on this point, it seems probable that the reason for the pellets' striking both the head and the chest at such close range is that the victim was crouching on her hands and knees, hoping that the two Marines would not catch her red-handed in the illegal act of collecting scrap. This would also account for her being invisible--or only a darker shadow in the gloom in what was evidently not very high brush.

In the bitter aftermath of the tragedy, some Kin villagers were to claim that this was Mrs. Atokurane's first visit to the range and that she was not collecting scrap brass. Rather, she was only looking over the family's 200-tsubo rice paddy, which was located inside the restricted range. In substantiation of this version, those members of her family who were

interviewed by reporters of a Japanese-language Naha newspaper insisted that she had never been in the habit of salvaging scrap and was wont to "busy herself at home caring for her grandchildren and attending to household duties."¹¹

However, this picture of domestic bliss centered around a Ryukyuan Griselda is somewhat shattered by the discovery of 27 pounds of brass scrap in a basket beside Mrs. Atokurane's body.¹²

The afternoon following the accident, an on-the-spot investigation was conducted by several Marine CID (Criminal Investigation Division) agents, Major Smith, the Officer-in-Charge of the Camp Hansen firing range, Chief Arakaki of the Criminal Section of GRI Police Headquarters, Chief Investigator Ota, Mr. Hamagawa of the Criminal Identification Section, Procurator Tobaru of the Nago District Procurator's Office, Deputy Chief Nakayama of the Ishikawa Police Station, and Chief Investigator Miyagi.

After completing his investigation, Chief Arakaki told reporters that "It cannot be intentional. However, he Sergeant Brown should have approached a little nearer to the objective to identify it. It is an accidental killing."

Asked by a Ryukyu Shimpo newsman for his views on the case, Tatsuo Ginoza, the Son-Cho (Mayor) of Kin-Son, stated that "The question is that people are collecting empty cartridges and wood for fuel by taking advantage of the free access to the permitted farms. If he has a reaping-hook or a hoe, he is permitted to go through the gate on Saturday and Sunday, when firing practice is not carried out. However, the serviceman should have made sure of the objective before he fired." To a query as to why he did not prohibit the collection of empty cartridges, Mayor Ginoza replied

that it would be easy to issue such an order, but it would be impossible to enforce.

The Shimpo reporter then asked Seiken Yasutomi, the Ku-Cho (Mayor) of Kin Village, to tell what he thought about the tragedy. Yasutomi's rather cryptic comment (rendered so, it may be, by either faulty reporting or faulty translation) was that he still could not "understand the fact that this accident happened on the day when practice was not held. We are allowed to go to the permitted farms on the days when practice is not held." Nevertheless, he expressed his intention to "send a stern notice to each villager to be careful, so as not to let such a tragedy happen again."¹³

Subsequently, Ku-Cho Yasutomi was interviewed by a reporter for the decidedly more anti-American Okinawa Times. In response to the request for a statement, he expressed himself as follows:

About 10 days ago, during the maneuvers of the Marine Corps, a shell exploded in mid air, and a fragment fell in Kin Sub-Village, to the alarm of the village people. And now this unfortunate incident has taken place, so that the village people appear to be very anxious. While collecting of shells within the maneuver ground is prohibited, entrance into the ground on days when there is no maneuver is permitted tacitly. But the problem is that the man Sergeant Brown says that he killed her thinking it was a wild boar. There is the Ryukyuan-American Community Relations Committee in Kin-Son, and we have settled all problems through this committee. It follows, therefore, there is no anti-American feeling here, and, in fact, people here are rather pro-American, and I regret this unfortunate incident. I am afraid that the feelings of the people might get ruffled.

Knowing the tendency of the Okinawa Times to place Americans and the United States in an unfavorable light as often as possible, one can not help suspecting that the dispassionate comment of Ku-Cho Yasutomi was not what the reporter had expected he would be able to record when he got his pencil out and posed the question. However, he could surely count on the

widower of the deceased, Jukichi Atokurane, to give the Times' readers the virulent type of statement which Editor Kazufumi Uechi prescribed be dealt out in regular doses to make them aware that they were Japanese citizens and that the Americans were only brutish interlopers.

Unfortunately for the reporter's future career with the Times, the bereaved Atokurane-san confined himself to the observation that "Whether the sergeant shot her on purpose or accidentally cannot be determined until after questioning at the police station, and I have nothing to say on that point."¹⁴

Unable to obtain a quotation of the sort he wanted from the next of kin or local officials, the frustrated newsman resorted to a "sure thing" to get the headline he sorely needed. This maneuver consisted of seeking a statement from a member of the Kin-Son Youth Association. Deeply influenced by the teachings of their recent mentors of the Okinawa Teachers' Association (OTA), the members of the various Youth Associations on Okinawa were almost invariably pro-reversionist, anti-American, and often Communist-tinged. The "Mr. A." interviewed by the Times man did not disappoint. Declaring that he had "never heard of a wild boar lurking in a maneuver ground," he said that it was "a matter of common knowledge that wild boars cannot be found in the neighborhood of a maneuver ground, where guns are fired every day." This he assertively stated in complete disregard of the boar recently captured near Igei and the two others killed just a short distance away.

Despite the fact that the village officials and the widower, Jukichi Atokurane, had remained detached and objective in their comments, the Times chose to headline its on-the-spot report with the dogmatic assertion, "THERE ARE NO WILD BOARS ON MANEUVER GROUND."¹⁵

The reaction of the three chief political parties to the tragedy in Kin-Son was pretty much a reflection of their respective positions in the political spectrum. Yasukuni Yamagawa, Chairman of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party's Board of Directors, as well as that relatively pro-American party's representative in the GRI Legislature from the Fourth Electoral District,* refused to commit his party to any course of action until officials of the Executive Branch had presented the true facts of the case to the Legislators.

Ryosho Taira, the Secretary-General of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP), felt no similar obligation to wait until the facts were all in to form an opinion and give it wide dissemination. Declaring that "There can not be a wild boar in such a neighborhood of farmland with no mountain

*Yasukuni Yamagawa had served as Director of the GRI Social Affairs Department from 1 September 1953 until 31 October 1957, when he resigned under pressure from the Okinawa Doctors' Association, who wanted a doctor named to this position. On 16 March 1958 Yamagawa ran as an independent for the GRI Legislature from the Fourth Electoral District (Motobu-Cho and Ie-Son) and was elected. On 5 April 1958, two days before the Legislature convened, he and five other independents--Ansuke Arakaki, Choshin Tsukazan, Seikichi Iju, Shochi Ota, and Shinken Ohama--having found that they were of much the same mind in many matters, formed the Shinsei-Kai ("New Political Club"). The result of this maneuver was that the sextet, operating as a unit, exercised far greater influence over legislation than they ever would have been able to do as individuals. After enjoying their unique position for approximately a year-and-a-half, however, they finally joined with the Ryukyu Democratic Party and the faction of Chief Executive Jugo Thoma to establish a new and overwhelmingly powerful organization, the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, representing most of the conservative element of the Ryukyus and maintaining very close connection with the Japan Liberal-Democratic Party. Yasukuni Yamagawa was named Executive Board Chairman of the OLDLP. This important political step came on 5 October 1959. The following year, on 13 November 1960, Yamagawa was to be re-elected to his Legislative seat, sweeping to victory on the crest of the OLDLP whirlwind which captured 22 of 29 seats for that party. On the first day of the Fifth Legislature, 1 December 1960, Yamagawa was elected Deputy Speaker, receiving 23 votes to six for Hideo Chibana, one of five members of the OSMP to win election. On 7 December 1960, Yamagawa was replaced as Executive Board Chairman of the OLDLP by Tokumatsu Maeshiro.

located near," he added that "no one will believe such an excuse" [for Sergeant Brown's killing Mrs. Atokurane]. Taira added that the OSMP would not only file a strong protest with the U.S. military, but would also launch its own investigation of the accident "by calling out to each faction." (By this he meant that his party would seek to incite all the multifarious anti-American organizations on Okinawa to adopt resolutions against the United States' continued administration of the Ryukyu Islands and to bring pressure to bear to have it withdrawn.)*

* Ryosho Taira was 52 years of age at this time (1959) and evidently an unsuccessful businessman who had found a vocation commensurate with his abilities when he turned to politics. From November 1950 to July 1951 he had been president of the Okinawa Ice Manufacturing Company, Ltd. Just why he abandoned this career we do not know, though one can not help suspecting that his assets melted from the effects of poor management with greater rapidity than his product did from those of the scorching Okinawan summer sun. After this brief fling at playing the capitalist, Taira next emerges in 1954 as the candidate of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party for the Fifteenth Electoral District seat, which comprised the northern part of Mawashi City (subsequently merged with Naha City on 17 December 1957). His opponent, wearing the colors of the Ryukyu Democratic Party, was the popular Josei Onaga--elected later that same year as Mayor of Mawashi City--but Taira defeated him 4,106 to 3,933. Two years later, Ryosho Taira won re-election to the Legislature, this time drawing 4,683 votes to RDP opponent Seikichi Okuhama's 3,986. The 1958 election saw two formidable adversaries arrayed against him--Seitatsu Arakaki of the far-left wing Liaison Council for the Protection of Democracy (Minren) and Ginzo Shinzato of the RDP--but Taira managed to squeeze through to victory, obtaining 3,965 votes to 3,570 for Arakaki and 3,022 for Shinzato. The pinnacle of his political career was reached soon afterward, on 3 May 1958, when he was elected Secretary-General of the OSMP, a position he held until 12 April 1961. However, the rain which proverbially into each life must fall descended on Ryosho Taira in the 1960 Legislative election. Again it was a three-way race in the Fifteenth District, but this time it was old foe Josei Onaga, now wearing the favor of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, who bore off the prize, having received approving marks on the ballots of 6,702 citizens, while Taira and OPP candidate Sokei Miyagi obtained 5,192 and 3,362 votes respectively. On 12 April 1961 the tacitly recognized leader of the OSMP, Tsunichiyo Asato, who had not held a party title while he was serving as Speaker of the Legislature from 7 April 1958 to 30 November 1960, was elected to his second term as Chairman of the OSMP, notwithstanding the inglorious fact of his having finished third in his quest for re-election to the seat in the Nineteenth District. The incumbent chairman, Koichi Taira (no relation to Ryosho), was perforce dropped to the secondary slot of Secretary-General, and Ryosho Taira was relegated to the hitherto obscure post of Chief Treasurer. However,

It really did not make much difference which of the five OPP members of the Legislature the Times reporter turned to for comment on the Atokurane incident. Whichever individual happened to be selected as the spokesman for this unacknowledged Communist party could be depended upon to parrot the stereotyped phrases hatched in Moscow. Kisaburo Owan,* a member of the Okinawa Branch of the Japan Communist Party, as well as Executive Secretary of Minren, was the OPP Legislator selected for the congenial task. His lines were as follows:¹⁶

This recent incident candidly exposed the true character of the war-mongers. We intend to thoroughly protest against a train of this kind of incidents, including the one that occurred at Gushikawa-Son some time ago. This is the time for all prefectural people to fight, by presenting a united front and by letting the Japanese people know the real state of affairs. Under the Composite Penal Code, the U.S. stipulates the death sentence for a similar case if committed by the Okinawan prefectural people (toward an American), and so we absolutely can not allow such an act.

Early on the afternoon of the 28th, two days after the shooting tragedy, representatives of a number of strongly left-wing organizations motored to

in the months to come he was to keep his name before the public by having an opinion on almost every subject--and being generously ready to voice it.

*Kisaburo Owan served in the Naha City Assembly in 1953-1954, and in March of the latter year was elected to the Second GRI Legislature from the Nineteenth District (the southern part of Naha centering around Peri-Ku). Although he was re-elected in 1956 and 1958, a string of victories making him the most consistently successful standard-bearer of the OPP, Owan was never given any high position in party councils, for reasons that remain obscure. The greatest eminence he had achieved at this time was that of Central Committee member of the OPP, though on 2 April 1960 he would be named Vice-Chairman of the moribund Minren, and on 28 August 1960 he was to be again elected to the OPP Central Committee. In the Legislative election of 13 November 1960, Tsumichiyo Asato, Chairman of the OSMP, was to shift his candidacy from the Eighteenth District to the Nineteenth, thus bringing about a split in the Left-wing vote. The consequence of this ill-advised action was that Chokusei Uku, a little-known OLP man, slipped in ahead of his far better-known anti-American rivals with 3,321 votes to 2,991 for Owan and 2,792 for Asato.

Kin Village, whence, having obtained the services of Mayor Tatsuo Ginoza as guide, they proceeded to the scene of the accident. It is impossible to believe that all of the visitors had not already made up their minds as to what the evidence would show and what they would say. But, in any case, they unanimously stated, after studying the scene, that "It is unthinkable to mistake a person for a wild boar in the broad daylight in such a place. The local police's judgement that the shooting was made by mistake is a hasty conclusion."

Kansho Motonaga, the Business Manager of the Federation of Government Employees Unions, who also happened to be a member of the Okinawa Branch of the Japan Communist Party and a pillar of the Okinawa People's Party, though he did not advertize the connection, delivered himself of the following venomous comment:

My feeling upon inspecting the spot is whether it wasn't really possible to distinguish a human being from a wild boar, since it is still bright at 4 p.m. usually. As pointed out by her blood relative, there are suspicious points also in the places where the bag [containing the brass collected by the victim just prior to the shooting] was placed and where she was shot. Wasn't it a hasty conclusion that the police judged that the accident was caused by mistake? I think there was more room for study. . . . Why have the inhabitants to smuggle into the maneuvering ground and collect splinters of shells at the risk of such danger? . . . The compensation, of course, must be made in an amount satisfactory to bereaved family members. However, as can be seen from the Ishikawa jet incident [which had occurred on 30 June 1959], it will not go smoothly. We want to keep watching to see that compensation is made to the satisfaction of the bereaved family members. . . . Under the condition of the accident scene it is not justifiable to say that the shooting was made by mistaking for a wild boar. The neighboring area was bright, and an object on the spot [where Mrs. Atokurane was hiding] could be clearly confirmed from a distance of more than 30 meters. So, we can not but consider that the shooting was made by aiming at the object. The military should either completely ban the maneuvering there hereafter, or it should place the area under off-limits ban after making adequate compensation.

Motonaga ignored two important points in his statement. First, the Okinawa police were more qualified than he to determine whether or not the

victim would have been recognizable as a human being at the distance from which Sergeant Brown had fired his gun--and no precedent existed to make one believe they would be inclined in the least to whitewash or minimize the gravity of an offense committed by an American. Second, the Camp Hansen range where the shooting occurred was already an off-limits area for which rental was being paid to the landowners, and in all probability it was Mrs. Atokurane's awareness of its being off-limits which had impelled her to hide and remain as quiet as possible at the approach of two Marines.

The Council of Okinawa Prefecture Youth Associations was generally one of the most rabidly anti-American and pro-Soviet organizations in the Ryukyus. Therefore, it is surprising and rather inexplicable to note the moderate comment of Chairman Toyama, elected to his office only the month before. All he had to say was that "It is evident that there would be human beings in the neighboring areas, for there is paddy field. Even if it may be a mistake, the act ignores the dignity of human life, and herein is exposed the American way of thinking that ignores the Okinawans."¹⁷

From the accident scene the "neutral" investigating party proceeded to the home of the victim, where they prayed for the soul of Katsu Atokurane, each member lighting an incense stick from a candle and placing it on the family altar. Having thus paid their respect to the dead, the visitors engaged the members of the family in the same sort of conversation which appears to be common to both East and West on such sad occasions. Seiei Niiya (46), a younger brother of the victim, gave vent to his indignation by relating that he had experienced fighting on the battlefield (probably during World War II) and was, consequently, not an unqualified witness when he doubted that the shooting was accidental, judging from the location of the two wounds on his sister's body. Moreover, the shooting incident

was not a problem of concern to his family alone, but one "connected with all Okinawan fellow countrymen." For this reason, he desired the visiting representatives of the various organizations to "make efforts for the sake of our Okinawan fellow men. If such an incident is left without anything's being done, there is no telling how horrible an incident may take place hereafter."¹⁸

At 1600 hours that afternoon, 28 December, the funeral services for Katsu Atokurane were held at the home, with many friends, as well as local officials, in attendance.

It is to the credit of the representatives of the conglomeration of Left-wing organizations who tore themselves away from their normal employment (government positions, for the most part) that Monday afternoon that they wasted no time in hammering out a joint protest document, which they presented to High Commissioner Donald P. Booth, Civil Administrator John G. Ondrick, Chief Executive Seisaku Ota, and Speaker Tsumichiyo Asato the very next day. After expressing their indignation at the killing which had resulted from the "thoughtless action of the U.S. servicemen," the letter demanded the following:¹⁹

1. All results of investigations concerning the incident and the results of the court-martial should be announced to the public without fail.
2. Whatever reason he may have, the man who took such a thoughtless action, resulting in the loss of a life, should be punished severely.
3. An adequate compensation should be paid to the bereaved family.
4. An appropriate preventive measure should be taken so that such a disgraceful affair will not happen again in the future.
5. There are war consciousness and a contempt for the Okinawan people underneath the activity of the U.S. serviceman who causes such

a reckless accident. In order to remove such a way of thinking, strict military discipline should be enforced.

An unsigned commentary which appeared in the Kinko Mokuzetsu* column of the Ryukyu Shimpo on the 28th recalled, in connection with the recent tragedy, that "the keynote of the colonial policy of modern countries in Europe and America," was often said to be "a cannon and a missionary." If the skepticism of the deceased's family toward Sergeant Brown's story that he had truly mistaken his victim for a wild boar "in broad daylight at a close distance of 20 meters" was well founded, the conclusion that it had been "an inhuman act that belittles human life" became inescapable. However, since it was also an ineluctable fact that different races were forced by circumstances to live in the small island of Okinawa coetaneously, the columnist hoped that everyone would be able to "live together at peace as private diplomats." And, regardless of who was right or wrong in the shooting incident, he hoped that it "would not develop into an international issue." For the result would be that "a slight offense against good manners [might] destroy the effect of a hundred sermons" or "an hour . . . destroy what an age has built."²⁰

The Okinawa Times' commentary column corresponding almost exactly to that of the Shimpo was called the Daigen Shogen** column. Noting that a U.S. Military Incident Victims' Federation had been established about two

* The Kinko Mokuzetsu column drew its name from the Chinese words for "golden mouth" and "wooden tongue" respectively, thus signifying that it would contain matters of great importance, as well as ones of little consequence.

**The Daigen Shogen column derived its name from the Japanese words "daigen" meaning "big string" and "shogen" meaning "little string," the reference being to the strings on the koto, a 12-stringed Japanese instrument somewhat resembling a harp or a lute. The symbolism in the name was quite similar to that of the Kinko Mokuzetsu column, in that it implied that both big things and little things would be dealt with in it.

weeks earlier* (on 13 December 1959), the writer saw more than a little irony in the fact that a woman had been shot to death within that brief space of time. While the man who killed her claimed that he had mistaken his victim for a wild boar, the writer said any determination of the truth or falsity of this would have to await the results of a pending investigation by the police. However, he felt that such incidents had their roots in an underlying superiority complex on the part of the Americans on Okinawa.

Illustrative of this attitude was a small news item which had appeared on the same page with the article telling of the death of Mrs. Atokurane. The item reported how an American serviceman riding horseback had tried to run down an old woman walking along the road "and thus enjoyed himself." In this connection, remarked the columnist, it was common knowledge that servicemen frequently hired horses, then galloped at top speed along the busy streets of the local villages, "causing much trouble, so that the people have appealed to the authorities for a strict control."

If, though, one of these same servicemen were to gallop at top speed through an American residential area, it was extremely unlikely that he would be able to get away with it. "Unlike Japan, Okinawa was under American occupation during the war years," analyzed the writer, seeking the cause of this complex; and, "if the consciousness of the conqueror is still at work subconsciously, trouble will continue to be caused by foreigners until such consciousness is eliminated."²¹ Unfortunately, it must be admitted that there was more than a grain of truth in the Daigen-Shogen

*The U.S. Military Incident Victims' Federation elected as its president Seiko Matayoshi and as its vice-presidents Hankichi Taminato (who was already Chairman of the Ishikawa Jet Plane Accident Victims' Federation) and Seiyu Agarie.

columnist's evaluation.

As has been remarked earlier, the Okinawa Times was seldom notable for friendliness to the United States or for tolerance of the actions of American individuals on Okinawa. However, in its morning edition of 29 December, Editor-in-Chief Kazufumi Uechi displayed surprising understanding in discussing the recent tragedy.²² As he saw it,

Because American people actually live in Okinawa and there is also an American military base here, Okinawan people should learn to respect the dignity of the American people and make efforts not to hurt their feelings, and this holds true of the Americans also. While we are not judging all others by one example, a great majority of the American people are achieving great results through humanism, and it is lamentable indeed to stain it by the carelessness of some other Americans.

That is, the violence committed by Americans around Christmas is an unwarrantable act, and this is a sort of food for thought. This is not the product of servility of the ruled toward the ruler, but it requires caution; for it may be interpreted as an inadvertent manifestation of contempt for Okinawan people. Agreement mutually reached ought to be kept, and it is hoped that the people will refrain from entering restricted areas without good reason. But this case occurred inside the tacitly permitted farm land, and it has much to do with the still unsettled problem and the compensation problem. It requires a well-intentioned effort by both the military and the Okinawan side for its solution, and at the same time it is hoped that the result of the investigation will be made public.

That same morning, the Ryukyu Shimpo selected firing ranges as the subject for its editorial. In view of the numerous incidents which had occurred as the result of the existence of such U.S. facilities, it would, ideally, be desirable to have no ranges at all. Since they were a necessary evil, inseparable from the presence of military bases in the Ryukyus, however, the next best solution would be to locate them in an area having nothing whatsoever to do with the livelihood of the people. Again, though, this was easier said than done; for it was "very hard to select such an area

in the small island of Okinawa." This was amply demonstrated "by the frequent occurrence of incidents in Kin, Onna, and Ie Jima."

Anent the recent shooting incident at Camp Hansen, "both the U.S. military and the people should do something for the sake of the future." It might be argued by the military that Mrs. Atokurane's action in entering an unauthorized area was the direct cause of her death, but, said Shimpo Editor-in-Chief Shui Ikemiyagi, the U.S. military bore a large share of responsibility for not having made the limits of the forbidden area clear. Mayor Ginoza of Kin-Son was himself authority for the admission that it was "administratively difficult" to prevent villagers from entering the mountains and searching for scrap, since its collection was intimately linked with the livelihood of the villagers. Under the circumstances, a mere warning was not calculated to cause the farmers to abandon their efforts to supplement a monetary deficiency with large doses of iron or brass.

The hoisting of red signal flags had proved no deterrent to infiltration of the range; therefore, a fence should be erected around the danger zone to separate it from the outside, so that no one could enter the area. The village authorities had made representations to U.S. military authorities at Camp Hansen in the past, but the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) had failed to lend its full support. The recent accident had resulted from a mistake, said Editor Ikemiyagi, but "unless proper measures are taken to prevent the recurrence of such an incident, the local people will have to be in constant fear so long as the firing range exists."

Naturally, the bereaved family should be given compensation for their loss, but the most important thing was to work out proper measures to

prevent its repetition. And this was the joint responsibility of the Kin-Son authorities, the Ryukyuan Government, and U.S. military officials.²³

The idea of a fence around the danger area of the Camp Hansen firing range had been eliminated as impracticable, it so happened, at approximately the same time that Editor Ikemiyagi was suggesting this as a good solution to the problem of keeping the local inhabitants from harm. At his regular bi-weekly press conference held at 1500 hours on 28 December, the Civil Administrator, Brigadier General John G. Ondrick, USA, had answered a questioner that there was little possibility of a fence's being erected, because of the enormous amount of money which would be required. Furthermore, if the suggested alternative solution of posting guards around the perimeter were adopted, it would entail an inordinate expenditure of money for their salaries, only supposing that one guard were posted every 50 meters. And, even then, a man determined to get into the range would still find it entirely feasible. The only way in which the people could be kept out would be by their voluntary cooperation, and this would involve a strong effort on the part of the officials of Kin-Son to educate the villagers to obey the law forbidding entry to off-limits areas. "I wish that people would understand the reality of life and observe the rules before we discuss any penalty for illegal entry into off-limit areas," said the Civil Administrator.

General Ondrick also declared that "It is very regrettable that such a miserable incident happened. I wish to express my hearty condolence with the victim and her family. Also, I think that the serviceman who shot her by mistake will be feeling unhappy himself for the fact that an Okinawan woman lost her life because of his fault."²⁴

At 1030 on the morning of 29 December, Lieutenant Colonel David Foos, Jr., the Commanding Officer of Camp Hansen, accompanied by Sergeant Charles

T. Brown and a Navy chaplain assigned to the camp, paid a formal visit to the family of the late Katsu Atokurane. After offering incense to the spirit of the departed and expressing deep regret, they handed a condolence gift to the widower, Jukichi, saying, "This is a present of money in token of sympathy, and compensation will be taken into consideration." As the Ryukyu Shimpo described the melancholy scene, "Very impressive was the attitude of Sergeant Brown, who shed tears of repentance throughout the talks with the bereaved family. Deeply impressed by his contrition, the bereaved family and all those present wept with the sergeant."

Later in the day, Major General Robert B. Luckey, Commanding General of the 3d Marine Division, visited the Atokurane home to offer his regrets and assure the family that compensation would be paid for Katsu's death. Since human nature is much the same the world over, regardless of race, religion, or training, we may be reasonably certain that the sincere remorse so naturally expressed by Sergeant Brown did far more to make the anguished family forgive the offense than either the personal visit by so high an official as the Division Commander or his promise to pay compensation.

A sidelight of that same day, December 29th, was an event which was so predictable that one would be astonished and puzzled if it had not occurred. American reporters who visited the accident scene that Tuesday afternoon encountered the Chairman of the Okinawa People's Party and high priest of Communism in the Ryukyus, Kamejiro Senaga, together with OPP Legislator Kisaburo Owan. These two had in tow several Okinawan news photographers, who were taking pictures of the accident scene.²⁵

Meantime, the political parties had not been idle. After all, what was the use in having a tragedy, if no political advantage was reaped from

it? On the morning of 28 December, Zenko Yamashiro and Hatsuko Miyazato, two of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party Legislators from Naha City (the latter the first and only member of her sex ever to win such high office in the Ryukyus), called on Chief Executive Ota, Director Sosei Nishihira of the Police Department, and Procurator-General Higa. They stated that although similar "abominable" cases had occurred several times in the past, the eventual fate of the culprits was never learned on Okinawa, even though it was known that they had been convicted and sentenced by local courts martial. Whether they had actually served the prison sentences assigned at the time or had had their sentences greatly reduced or even reversed by subsequent case reviews and appeals was a matter never disclosed. Insofar as the people of the Ryukyus were concerned, the cases had simply faded away.

As for the present Atokurane case, the OSMF was not at all satisfied with the explanation that the victim had been mistaken for a wild boar, in broad daylight. For this reason it desired that GRI would conduct an "exhaustive investigation" to clarify where the responsibility lay; that it make "a strong representation" to the military in order that such an incident might not occur again; and that it take "a firm attitude" toward the question of compensation. (It was in this matter of "compensation" that the people of the Ryukyus appeared their least admirable. Whether they had always been greedy in this way or whether this near-obsession was a by-product of the liberality with which the United States Forces had provided compensation for injuries--even those resulting from the victims' own illegal activities--there is no way of determining. But, be that as it may, their attitude of "demand compensation at the slightest excuse" is excellently exemplified by the case of the Tsushima Maru. The only aspect

of this story which sets it apart from the vast majority of compensation cases is its concentration on Japan rather than the United States for the payment.)*

*As the forces of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur advanced up and across the Pacific Island chain toward the Japanese homeland in 1944, the Imperial Army decided to make a last-ditch stand on Okinawa. In preparation for this, the army began evacuating school children to Japan. Approximately 800 of them boarded the 6,754-ton Tsushima Maru, a passenger-cargo ship, at Naha Port on 21 August 1944. Other passengers, including teachers and parents, plus the crewmen, raised the total number on board to 1,800. There is no indication that the Tsushima Maru bore any special markings to indicate that her main cargo was children. Moreover, she was armed with depth charges and three deck guns. That same day, she set sail for Kagoshima, Kyushu, in company with two sister ships similarly loaded with school children and two escorting destroyers--the Uji and the Hasu.

Meantime, the USS Bowfin (SS-287), a submarine on her sixth war patrol and now commanded by Commander John H. Corbus, had recently left Minami Daito Jima, where she had attacked a small Japanese convoy, employing her torpedoes to such good purpose that not only were two vessels sunk, but a bus loaded with a liberty party was also sent to the bottom when the wharf onto which it had just driven was smashed by a third "fish". For this exploit the Bowfin was subsequently awarded the Navy Unit Citation.

At 2212 hours on 22 August, the Bowfin torpedoes the Tsushima Maru in the waters northwest of Akuseki Jima, in the Tokara Gunto (29° 32' N., 129° 31' E.), Commander Corbus of course having no inkling of the precious human cargo she was carrying. Four torpedoes shattered the ship's radio room and lifeboats, making it necessary for those not killed at once to swim for it and hope to find some wreckage to which they could cling. Nineteen persons were rescued that same night, and 235 more during the week that followed. This was all. Of the 800 Okinawan children aboard, 737 perished. Only 63 survived.

The Imperial Army isolated the 254 survivors of the tragedy and kept the story quiet "for fear it would damage the fighting spirit of the Japanese people" (according to a Japanese official who was asked about the story in 1962). Despite the stark nature of the tragedy, involving so many children, no American historians whose works have been seen by this writer appear to have known about it. They know that the Bowfin sank a ship called the Tsushima Maru--and when and where, but they seem unaware that 737 children went down with her. To look at the reverse side of the coin, we find that the story is widely known in the Ryukyus and Japan, but as recently as 6 March 1962 a writer for the Associated Press in Tokyo was unable to learn from either Japanese authorities or U.S. Navy officials what agency was responsible for sinking the vessel.

Police Director Nishihira replied to Zenko Yamashiro and Mrs. Miyazato that the inspection of the accident scene conducted immediately after word of the tragedy was received had shown that it was surrounded with shrubs as high as a human being and was some 20 meters distant from the spot where Sergeant Brown had stood when he fired his gun. On the basis of these factors, the police concluded that the killing had been accidental. However, he promised to have an even more thorough investigation conducted in order to determine with greater exactness the circumstances under which the fatal shot had been fired.

Some months earlier, the present writer received a letter of inquiry from an American living in Tokyo, wishing to know everything possible about the last voyage of the Tsushima Maru. In a second letter expressing his appreciation for the information supplied, the man in Tokyo provided an O. Henry ending by explaining the reason for his interest with the words, "For, you see, I married one of the survivors of the Tsushima Maru."

As the result of long, continuous pressure exerted by the Okinawa Bereaved Families Federation (whose chairman was Atsuo Yamashiro, the former Vice-Governor of the Okinawa Gunto Government during the early post-war years), the Japanese Finance Ministry on 15 January 1961 approved an appropriation of ¥245,000,000 (\$680,555) for the payment of a solatium to war cooperators on Okinawa who died in the battle and to the next of kin of school children who perished in the sinking of the Tsushima Maru. According to Deputy Director Sato of the Prime Minister's Office, 11,500 war cooperators and 737 school children victims would be paid ¥20,000 (about \$55.00) each. The main argument advanced by the federation was that the Japanese Army had originally promised to put the evacuees aboard a Navy battleship, which could have reached Kyushu safely. Actually, in the light of the high mortality rate of Japanese capital ships (the battleship Kongo, for example, was sunk by a submarine), this premise does not hold too much water; and the sacrifice made by the bereaved families was no greater than that of many others, nor more than any patriotic person should expect to make.

On 5 May 1954 a modest memorial to the children of the Tsushima Maru, known as the Kozakura-No-To (Cherry Blossom Monument) was erected half way up Asahigaoka Hill in the Gokokuji Temple area at Naminoue, Naha City, with funds donated by school children of the Suzushiro Elementary School in Aichi Prefecture, Japan.

A little more than five years later, on 9 June 1959, a new and more imposing Kozakura Monument, designed by Ryukyuan sculptor Seikichi Tamanaha, was unveiled on the same spot and dedicated to the souls of the 737 children

Procurator-General Higa said that his office could actually do nothing beyond looking over the scene of the shooting, since the administrative agreement in force in Japan under which U.S. servicemen committing illegal acts against the persons or property of Japanese were subject to the jurisdiction of Japanese courts was not applicable to Okinawa. Here, only military courts martial could try members of the U.S. Forces. All he could suggest, under the circumstances, was that the matter be solved "on the political level."

As for Chief Executive Ota--an old hand at temporizing and turning away the wrath of opposing factions or hostile organizations--all he would promise was that he would do what he could "to solve this problem according to law."²⁶

Not wishing to appear behindhand in looking out for the interests of the Ryukyuan people, the OLDP sent a delegation of its own to confer with Chief Executive Ota (who was, incidentally, also the party president) and several other executive officials on the Atokurane case that same afternoon.

lost at sea nearly 15 years before. Among those in attendance at the impressive ceremony were Mrs. Fumi Nishizawa, widow of the captain of the Tsushima Maru; Keisa Yasuhara, a member of the doomed ship's crew; 200 family members of the deceased children; Chairman Atsuo Yamashiro of the Okinawa Bereaved Families Federation; Speaker Tsumichiyo Asato of the Legislature; and Mayor Saichi Kaneshi of Naha City. With Buddhist priest Hosho Nako of the Gokokuji Temple conducting the services, the snow white monument was unveiled as the sutra (o-kyo) were read by eight priests of the Okinawa Buddhist Association. Then three doves were released into the air. Funeral songs were sung in chorus by children of the Kumoji Elementary School, while memorial addresses were given by Mrs. Nishizawa and sixth grader Junsei Akamine of the Wakasa Elementary School, "moving all those in attendance to tears."

Perhaps the last act of the tragedy of the Tsushima Maru was played on 4 December 1962, when an eight-man party from Aichi Prefecture in Japan, headed by Doko Otsuka, Board Chairman of the Goddess of Mercy (Kannon) Association for International Goodwill and Peace, visited Okinawa to dedicate a bronze statue of the Goddess of Mercy at the Kozakura-No-To. The association had previously sent similar statues to 17 countries as a symbol of international good will and peace.

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...the case files, be forwarded to INVESTIGATOR ...
...not to enter this file until ...
...Police Director ...
...received ...
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This group was composed of Yasukuni Yamakawa, the Executive Board Chairman of the OLDP, Ansuke Arakaki, a member of the OLDP's Temporary Executive Board, Assistant Secretary-General Choshin Tsukayama, and several other Legislators of the same party. Three points were raised in their representation to the Executive Branch:

1. Although it was recognized that Ryukyuan police did not have the right of investigation in the shooting case, since the suspect was a U.S. serviceman and the area where the accident occurred was an off-limits area, they yet desired the Executive Branch to attempt to establish the responsibility clearly by exercising its right of investigation as far as possible.

2. Chief Executive Ota was requested to protest the killing to USCAR and request that military discipline be enforced strictly, so that a similar accident might not occur. In this connection, the military should make a thorough investigation and, at the same time, pay "appropriate" compensation to the bereaved family.

3. The Executive Branch was requested to reveal the "truth of the incident" to the general public, without fail, after the results of the investigation had made this possible.

Mr. Ota told the delegation that he was scheduled to meet with High Commissioner (Lieutenant General) Donald P. Booth the following day, and he would use the opportunity to relay their three points to him, with emphasis being placed on the payment of appropriate compensation to the bereaved Atokurane family.

Police Director Nishihira added that he would "make it known to all villagers not to enter into the off-limit area to collect the scrap." At the same time, he promised to investigate the case exhaustively "to clarify

the cause and obtain the result, so that people can understand it."²⁷

The meeting with the High Commissioner on 29 December, to which the Chief Executive had referred, was also attended by Major General Robert B. Luckey, 3d Marine Division Commanding General. The latter agreed to permit tacit farming within the firing range in the same way as in the past, and to allow the free collection of scrap metal on those days when there were no maneuvers. This latter dubious concession was made in recognition of the importance to the Kin Village economy of the revenue thus obtained. However, these concessions did not eliminate the possibility of future repetitions of the recent tragedy. To reduce the likelihood of such an occurrence, General Luckey desired that GRI or Kin-Son authorities designate representatives for the various villages adjacent to the firing range, who would be given one-day advance notice whenever firing or other training maneuvers were to take place. In addition, "thorough measures" should be worked out to persuade the villagers to stay out of the danger areas during these times. The three conferees agreed that the details of this plan should be taken up and developed at a meeting of representatives of the military, the GRI police, and the local inhabitants within the near future.

Chief Executive Ota then referred to the matters of compensation for the victim's death and solatium for the bereaved family, expressing the hope that the United States Government would not fail to provide both of them. General Luckey replied that consolation money (solatium) was being collected by voluntary contributions from the personnel at Camp Hansen, and full consideration would be given to the payment of compensation by the Marine Corps.²⁸

The very next day, December 30th, the Claims Officer of the 3d Marine Division Legal Office called on Mayor Ginoza at his office in Kin-Ku. Together they then visited the Atokurane home, where the Marine major informed the family that "We are filled with deep grief at this disaster. The Marine Corps is ready to compensate for her death, and we wish your early claim of payment for it."

Mayor Ginoza responded that "Such an accident as this has not taken place in this village before; so we, the officials concerned, will indicate the way to claim payment." Translated from the vague English of the Okinawan interpreter, it seems that what he had in mind was a meeting of Ku-Cho's (village chiefs) and chairmen of the various Kin-Son youth associations with the Son officials within the next few days, at which time the amount of compensation which the Atokuranes should claim would be worked out.²⁹

A day earlier, Director Nishihira of the GRI Police Department, true to his promise to the Legislative delegations, headed a group of experts in a visit to the shooting scene at Camp Hansen. In the party besides himself were Chief Omine of Police Headquarters, Chief Shingaki of the Criminal Affairs Section, Chief Hirata and Technician Tomigawa of the Identification Section, and Chief Kudaken and Policeman Onishi of the Ishikawa Police Station.

The situation that had existed at the time of the fatal shooting was reproduced as nearly as possible by erecting a tent 1.80 meters long and 1.70 meters high in the bush where Mrs. Atokurane's body had been found. In addition, Major Smith of the Marines had made available the Remington pump rifle with which she had been killed. Policeman Onishi fired two bullets at the bush to observe the angle of scattering at which they would

hit the target, after which an examination was made of the tent and the bush. It was found that the scattering bullets concentrated on the tent. The bush was next measured and found to be 1.50 meters tall. This meant that a person of short stature--such as Katsu Atokurane--standing behind it would have been invisible to one standing where Sergeant Brown was when he fired the lethal shot. Thus, the original finding of the GRI police that the killing had been accidental was confirmed.

Director Nishihira later told newspaper reporters that "No new facts could be found by the present on-the-spot inspection."³⁰

On 30 December 1959, Harriman N. Simmons, Director of USCAR's Public Safety Department, notified GRI Police Department Director Sosei Nishihira, his deputy, Sachio Yogi, Police Headquarters Chief Omine, First Public Safety Section Chief Tokugawa, Ishikawa District Police Station Chief Kudaken, Ishikawa District Police Station Public Safety Section Chief Tani, and Henoko Assistant Police Inspector's Office Chief Shimosato that the Camp Schwab firing range would thereafter be placed off limits on a permanent basis. This Marine range was situated in Kushi-Son, some seven miles north of the one at Camp Hansen. Differing from the latter, the Camp Schwab firing range would be closed to firewood collectors, purported farmers, and scrap collectors. Actually, since the area occupied by Camp Schwab proper, as well as its firing range, had always been rather arid wasteland, for the most part, there was little excuse for any Okinawan inhabitants of the region to claim that they were entering the range to farm their land, as in days of yore. Wood and grass had, indeed, been cut in that region, but there remained ample quantities of both in the area north of Camp Schwab and contiguous to Highway #13 to satisfy the needs of the not numerous population

of Henoko and Toyohara, the two nearest villages.³¹

Illustrating the perversity of human nature, within 10 days after the death of Mrs. Atokurane, the Ishikawa Police Station was again being annoyed by the illegal entry of scrap collectors and street vendors into the Camp Hansen firing range. They succeeded in arresting six women who were collecting scrap brass, in spite of the target practice going on at that very time, but many more got away, thanks to knowing every inch of the area. Whenever the Marines notified the police station that trespassers were on the range, policemen were immediately dispatched to apprehend them, while the firing practice was suspended; but, as soon as the lawmen appeared in sight, the collectors ran away and hid themselves in the familiar forest.³²

As sympathetic to its own people as it always was when their interests came into collision with those of the United States, the Okinawa Times could not forbear delivering a lecture to the foolish scrap collectors who invaded the Camp Hansen firing range. In an article headed "People Should Exercise Self-Restraint," the Times said:³³

The incident in which a woman was shot to death in Kin-Son military firing range is thought to have given a great shock to the local people. Public shock and sorrow have not yet cooled down, but it has lately come to the attention of the authorities concerned that the number of people entering the restricted area is on the increase.

.....

There is need for the U.S. military to make utmost efforts for the prevention of unforeseen accidents, and at the same time, the local people are required to exercise precaution. It is unreasonable for one to blame others, without having done what he ought to do.

What is required of the local people is to abide by their promises and regulations, so that no trouble may be given to the U.S. military. Peddling and scrap brass collection in restricted areas or during restricted hours should be suspended voluntarily. If one is unable to make a living without collecting scrap in the face of danger, he should have talks with the U.S. military, so that hours for scrap

collection may be provided so as to ensure safety. No one--either the U.S. military or the people--wants to have another tragic incident occur from scrap collection. However, in view of the increasing number of illegal entrants to the restricted areas, there is no assurance that no accident will take place in the future.

.....

Mayors and "ku" heads are also required to give villagers a warning against their illegal acts. It is a disgrace to villages that many a villager is arrested by the police for violation of the law. Such a state of disorder may finally cause village administration to be subject to public criticism.

There may be unavoidable circumstances that force villagers to enter firing ranges to search for scrap brass in the face of danger. There may be many unfortunate people who have to do so by the necessity of earning a livelihood as a result of the acquisition of their land and resulting unemployment. But the relief of such people is a different problem here.

Whether by coincidence or in imitation, the very next day after the Times delivered this lecture on the folly of scrap collecting, the Ryukyu Shimpo carried an editorial on the same subject. Taking the questionable asseveration of the Atokurane family at face value, the editor categorically stated that the shooting victim "had never entered the firing range before. On that day [26 December 1959, the day on which Katsu Atokurane met her death], she went to see her paddy field located in the military area, and then entered the firing range without knowing it." This fatal error had been possible, said the writer, because there was no fence around the area; and it was a reprehensible neglect on the part of the Marines that they had never seen fit to install one. Moreover, if the shooting of Mrs. Atokurane were simply disposed of as an unavoidable accident, it could easily produce a tendency on the part of the Americans to regard human life--in particular that of the Ryukyans--as of slight importance.

On the other hand, there was the reckless insistence of the people of

Kin-Son--mostly women--on entering the range to collect scrap. Having learned that it was extremely dangerous to do so in the daytime, they had adopted the practice of slipping in at night to search for the prized brass with the aid of flashlights, causing the wilderness of the range at such times to appear as though inhabited by so many fireflies or will-o-the-wisps. "Such an act," declared the Shimpo, "is tantamount to slighting their own lives. The U.S. military practice range is, so to speak, a lawless area. Any incident that takes place in the military area is out of the jurisdiction of local police." Moreover, if anything should happen to those who slighted their own lives, "there would be no use in appealing to the U.S. Nobody would show sympathy toward them as in the case of this shooting-to-death incident. Those who collect brass in the face of danger deserve severe punishment."

The story of Kin-Son was the story of Okinawa itself. Many inhabitants had had their lands taken from them for use as military bases. Nevertheless, the writer found it "hard to understand the feelings of the Kin-Son women who are piling up reckless tragedy upon this [the Atokurane] tragedy." It could be presumed that they felt they had to collect brass because they were unable to make a living without doing so, but one could not help wondering if there was "any need for them to live by going so far as to slight their own lives. . . . Those who commit such a mistake may be ignorant of the consequence that their ignorance will only result in digging their own graves."³⁴

On 30 December 1959, the Foreign Claims Officer from the Third Marine Division's Legal Office called on the Atokurane family and Mayor Tatsuo Ginoza to advise them to submit a compensation claim, as the Marines were

now ready to consider paying an amount they deemed equitable. It would seem that the wheels of business revolved at a rather leisurely pace in Kin-Son; for it was not until 4 January 1960 that an official from the yakusha (son office) visited the GRI Legal Affairs Department to learn the procedure for submitting a claim for compensation. The erudite men in that office were quick to agree that compensation must be paid for the accidental shooting, regardless of whether it had occurred within or without military-leased land. However, they also had to admit that there was no definite, established form of procedure for the submission of claims in such cases in the Ryukyus. Consequently, they told the Kin official that they did not know whether the Atokurane claim would be handled according to the method adopted by the Japanese Government's Procurement Agency or in accordance with the bereaved family's own calculation.

There had arisen two similar cases in Japan during the post-war period-- the Girard case, in which a woman scrap collector was shot to death under circumstances remarkably similar to those in which Etsuko Yonamine had been killed on Okinawa on 8 April 1956, and the Longpre case, in which a U.S. Air Policeman fired into a moving streetcar, killing a student. In the former case the survivors were paid \$2,220, while in the latter they received \$5,000--in addition to funeral expenses, in both instances. Some people believed that these cases might be used as a basis for calculation in the case of Katsu Atokurane, since the military had steadfastly refused to pay compensation in the Etsuko Yonamine case.

The most that Land Section Chief Shimabukuro of the GRI Legal Affairs Department could say was that "It is a rule that a claim for damages caused by the U.S. military is submitted by the bereaved family directly to the

U.S. military, and GRI can only help him to make up the procedure necessary for it. There is no definite method of calculation of compensation, and the decision reached at the military claims commission is regarded as final. However, we will do what we can to help the people concerned so that a satisfactory compensation is paid."³⁵

Subsequently, the Marine Foreign Claims Officer met with Mayor Ginoza on three separate occasions, the latter having asked for two recesses in the hearings in order that he might study the system used as a guide by the Third Marine Division in paying death claims. This system, according to Marine officials, had been approved by both the United States and the Japanese Governments under the Status of Forces Agreement.

On 25 January 1960, one month lacking a day from the date on which the tragedy had occurred, an agreement was reached, and Jukichi Atokurane, the widower, accepted a cash settlement of \$2,700 for his wife's death, although his claim had been for \$5,000. According to the English language daily Okinawa Morning Star, Mr. Atokurane declared that "I consider the payment fair."³⁶ The Ryukyu Shimpo, which also reported the payment and its acceptance, made no mention of this acknowledgement on Atokurane's part in its news story.³⁷

The Third Marine Division had fulfilled its legal responsibilities in the fatal "Mistaken Boar Shooting Case," but the individual members of the 3d Tank Battalion, to which Sergeant Brown was assigned, were apparently not satisfied that they had done all they could to demonstrate their regret for the accident and their sympathy with the bereaved family. Even while the legal wheels were grinding out an equitable settlement, the men of the unit were conducting a collection drive that enabled the battalion commanding

officer, Lieutenant Colonel David Foos, Jr., to visit the Atokurane home on 27 January and there present Jukichi \$250 which came from the hearts of the battalion.³⁸

The last act of the Camp Hansen tragedy was played on 20 February 1960. On that date Acting Gunnery Sergeant Charles T. Brown was tried by a general court martial, composed of five officers and three enlisted men of the Third Marine Division, on a charge of negligent homicide. The verdict rendered by the court was "Not Guilty."³⁹

It is easy to believe that this decision did not sit well with many Ryukyans, even those not actively opposed to the United States and all its works. The fairly friendly Ryukyu Shimpo remarked in its Kinko Mokuzetsu column, under the heading, "Fair Court Judgement Required," that "a difference in the weighing of an offense between American military courts and Okinawan courts is understandable, but it is hard to understand why that act did not even constitute an accidental homicide."

The writer added that "Although the incident took place within the military base, people's feelings will not agree with the court decision. Nobody is willing to offer their land for use by the military. We unwillingly have to cooperate and recognize the existence of the military base for the cause of defending the Free World. At the same time, we hope to promote Ryukyuan-American friendship, since we Ryukyans live in this land together with Americans."

A verdict of acquittal ignoring the feelings of the Ryukyuan people, he asserted, was "quite unfair." After all, if an Okinawan policeman were accidentally to kill someone by shooting, he would be unable to escape a charge of involuntary homicide. Why, then, had Sergeant Brown received a

verdict of "Not Guilty"? Under the circumstances, the inhabitants of towns and villages adjoining military bases could not live with a sense of security. If Ryukyuan-American friendship (an intangible commodity given substance, for the most part, by Americans in the form of both words and deeds, and by the Ryukyans in the form of requests for assistance) were to be promoted, the military authorities would have to judge with absolute fairness and impartiality those cases in which Americans transgressed against Ryukyans, instead of thinking that such matters could be settled simply by paying compensation.⁴⁰ The Shimpo commentator desired his pound of American flesh, in addition to the usual pound of American gold!

A revealing insight into the myopic nature of scrap collectors is provided by a GRI Police report of May 1960. According to this document, Marine guards at the Camp Hansen range arrested and turned over to the Ishikawa police a total of 13 Ryukyans on 13 and 14 May for trespassing in the restricted area. At the time of their apprehension, the suspects were on the impact range collecting scrap brass and steel. The GRI Police completed a pre-trial investigation, then turned the cases over to the GRI Procurator's Office for prosecution.⁴¹

A Ryukyuan Boy Suffers Loss of an Eye in Nakijin-Son: The payment of compensation for the "Wild Boar Shooting Case" had not yet been made when another incident involving the Marines occurred, this time on the Motobu Peninsula. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion from Camp Schwab was using an area in Nakijin-Son for maneuvers in which blank cartridges were fired in simulation of actual battle.

Since the maneuvering ground was only some 100 meters distant from the south gate of the Nakijin Primary School, the Ryukyuan school authorities

realized that the stage was practically set for tragedy. Consequently, when they noticed that the youngsters were gathering the used cartridge cases which the Marines had been firing, they ordered the children to turn in any which they found.

One 11-year-old lad, Susumu Uema, a fifth grader, did not do as he had been told, however, but kept the unfired blank cartridge which he found on 19 January 1960 alongside a road near the school, at a point where the Marines had set up a simulated road block. While he was playing with it, the cartridge detonated, a fragment hitting his left eye. Susumu was rushed to the Nago Hospital for emergency treatment, and was later transferred to the Shinzato Ophthalmic Hospital in Naha, where Dr. Shinzato removed the badly damaged eye.

The Marines, of course, had no way of being sure that the shell had been left there by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion during its recent maneuvers, since many U.S. Forces elements used the same area the year round. However, there was such a strong presumption that they were to blame that the battalion commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel John G. Babashanian, visited the Shinzato Hospital on the afternoon of the 21st and expressed his condolences on behalf of himself and the men of his battalion. He and his adjutant brought flowers and fresh fruit with them and "spoke kindly to the boy in bed and to his father" so that "All of the family members who were present were deeply moved by their kind inquiry." Moreover, Colonel Babashanian informed them that the Marines were prepared to discuss the question of compensation, if the Uema family had an intention of claiming it.⁴²

As was usual on Okinawa when harm befell Ryukyuan either directly, indirectly, or just supposedly at the hands of "the foreigners" (i.e.,

Americans), the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (a 29-man unicameral body) interested itself in the situation immediately with alacrity. After all, it was a lot more fun to make a trip out into the field for "investigative" purposes, at government expense, than it was to sit in the Legislative Building contemplating budgets, taxes, social problems, and the four walls! U.S. Congressmen and Senators had learned this truth many decades before, but the Ryukyuan Legislators displayed a remarkable faculty for mastering the same techniques within a far briefer span.

On 26 January 1960 the Education and Social Affairs Committee, headed by Saikichi Iju, an independent Legislator, and the Ishikawa Incident Special Measures Committee, whose chairman was Zenei Yanashiro, of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, conducted an on-the-spot inspection of the area near the Nakijin Primary School where young Susumu Uema had suffered the loss of his left eye. (The very fact that a committee brought into being on an ad hoc basis for the specific purpose of looking after the interests of the victims and next of kin of the Ishikawa jet crash accident of 30 June 1959 was now concerning itself with this incident up on the Motobu Peninsula demonstrates both how eager most Ryukyuan politicians were to blow up anything unfortunate involving Americans into a major incident and how easily they were able to tear themselves away from dull matters of state.)

Nakijin-Son Mayor Kenichi Oshiro and Principal Shimabukuro of the Nakijin Primary School first related all the circumstances surrounding the accident to the attentive Legislators, then made two requests that the recipients were only too happy to accept. The first of these was that, inasmuch as Nakijin-Son had "a comparatively large population for its area," military maneuvers be completely suspended there. The second was that

appropriate compensation be paid to young Uema, the accident victim.⁴³

The next episode in the Nakijin Primary School case took the form of a "strong request" submitted on 1 February 1960 by Secretary-General Ikehara of the Okinawa Child Protection Association to Chief Executive Seisaku Ota, Speaker Tsumichiyo Asato of the Legislature, and Chairman Seikichi Iju of the Education and Social Affairs Committee, whom we just saw visiting the school where the accident occurred. The essence of this "strong request" was that a ban on future maneuvers in the vicinity of schools anywhere in the Ryukyus be sought from the military. Not only were accidents such as that which befell Susumu Uema, or even worse, likely to occur, but the members of the association felt that an environment in which U.S. Forces carried out maneuvers in close proximity to Okinawan school children was not a wholesome one. Certainly, the sight of Marines or soldiers playing war outside their windows was not conducive to good scholarship.⁴⁴

Whether the compensation volunteered by Colonel Babashanian and requested by Mayor Oshiro and Principal Shimabukuro was actually paid to the Uema family is not known. The newspapers of that period make no further mention of the affair, and the Third Marine Division's Legal Office had no record of it at the time this account was being written.

Tragedy Strikes on Ukaba Jima: The tiny, uninhabited island of Ukaba Jima, two miles northwest of Itoman-Cho, on Okinawa's southwestern coast, had long served as a base of operations for illegal scrap collectors, who brought bombs and shells gathered from the whole southern region of Okinawa to this sequestered spot for disassembly. The powder thus acquired found a ready market among those fishermen who--no disciples of Izaak Walton--found dynamiting fish far easier and more lucrative than the more generally approved

forms of piscatology. As for the shells, once stripped of their lethal contents, they could also be sold quite readily for the brass and steel of which they were composed. Although the GRI police had a pretty good suspicion of what was going on, there was not too much they could do about it, since Ukaba Jima was only a very small part of the area over which they were expected to exercise control, and the canoes used by the scrap collectors were both fleeter and shallower of draft than the old and heavier patrol boat the forces of law and order were compelled to employ.

Around 1400 hours on Friday, 30 September 1960, two of these illicit scrap-powder collectors--Toyoji Uehara (23) and Shigeru Tobaru (32), both of Naha City--were apparently busily engaged in dismantling a heavy caliber shell or bomb. Suddenly an explosion shook the islet, sending up a column of water and smoke which was visible to a Ryukyuan policeman on the mainland nearby, as well as to an Air Force plane which happened to be flying in the vicinity. The pilot reported what he had observed to the USCAR Public Safety Office, which in turn notified the GRI Police Department. Investigators from that agency who visited the island that same night found the corpse of one of the accident victims and fragments of the other one, though accomplices of the two men had already fled the scene with the greater part of the cadaver.

The following day, as the police approached Ukaba Jima to conduct a more thorough investigation, they could see a canoe slipping away from the island, where its occupants had evidently been busily engaged in destroying as much evidence of their recent activity as was possible. This was indicated by the policemen's discovery of gunpowder burning when they arrived on the scene. That the guard boat's appearance had interrupted the criminals

in their work was demonstrated by the eight 100-lb. shells, of which five had been emptied of their powder, and 200-odd 150-mm. shells found hidden on the island. At the spot where the accident had occurred were hammers and cold chisels, as well as some object shaped like a bucket, which had been blown apart and smashed; while the pool of water close to the island's edge was tinted red with blood, presenting a gruesome sight.

Four Army demolition men of the 5th Ordnance Detachment accompanied the police in the guard boat for the purpose of disposing of the ammunition found in such dangerous profusion. Three times that day the squad detonated heaps of shells, but there were so many on hand that they had to return on 3 October to dispose of the remainder.⁴⁵

A Navy Drone Crashes Near the Gushichan Junior High School: At around 1515 hours on 12 October 1960, a radio-controlled, pilotless U.S. Navy drone used in air defense target practice crashed into a rice paddy in Gushichan-Son, southeastern Okinawa, only some 600 meters west of the Gushichan Junior High School. The little plane, with a wingspread of 10 feet, split in two and came down end-over-end before hitting with such velocity that a hole some 6.6 square meters in size and two meters deep was created. Moments later, an unfolded parachute, apparently belonging to the drone, came down in a field approximately 1,000 meters away.

Coming as it did at a time when the students of the nearby school were outdoors, practicing for an upcoming school athletic meet, and only a little more than a year after the terrible Ishikawa jet accident, the crash of the little target plane made everyone who knew of it far more apprehensive than would otherwise have been the case. In a matter of minutes, more than 1,000 anxious parents and other villagers had rushed to the scene, where they

found, much to their relief, that the only damage was to the paddy. The most anxious person, perhaps, was a farmer who witnessed the crash of the drone ahead of him as he was on his way to his farm. He knew that his wife had left for the paddy a short time before, and it was not until he saw her alive and uninjured that his fears were dissipated. It was then that he learned the drone had crashed just 50 meters in front of her.

Around 1700 that same afternoon, a helicopter arrived and airlifted the wreckage of the drone to the Naha Naval Air Facility for an analysis of the engine and other parts, in hopes of learning why it had crashed and why the parachute had failed to function.

Equally swift in arriving at the accident scene was a legal officer from the Naval Air Facility, who hastened to reassure the ku-cho and Masao Wannu, the farmer whose paddy had been the unintended target of the ailing drone, that the Navy would be ready to pay compensation for any equitable claim which the latter might submit.⁴⁶ Just what settlement was eventually arrived at is not known.

A Miwa-Son Farmer Is Mistaken for a Bird and Fatally Wounded: The region around Kyan Village in Miwa-Son (the southernmost district of Okinawa) had become a favorite haunt for hunters by the winter of 1960, some 20 Nimrods flocking to that locality every weekend, because of the spacious farms and paddies surrounded by windbreaks which made it ideal for their purpose. At the same time that the hunters--most of them Americans or Filipinos--found the Kyan area eminently satisfactory for getting a good bag of birds, the local inhabitants--as is almost universally the case--were far from pleased with the arrangement. Inevitably, their crops were trampled, their privacy

invaded, and their lives placed in jeopardy.

It was on a Friday morning, 9 December 1960, that two couples--Staff Sergeant Raymond Obermeier, of the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, and Fumiko Zakimi, together with A/2C McDowell and his Ryukyuan wife, Yuriko--went bird hunting in the Kyan region. As they strolled leisurely along the beach, they fired at several birds, with Airman McDowell succeeding in downing two, out over the water. While the others waited for the two birds to wash ashore, Sergeant Obermeier continued down the beach and became separated from the other members of the party.

As he walked along the shore, he approached an area of heavy brush approximately eight to 12 feet high, known locally as Shinajibaru. Here he found a narrow agricultural path connecting Kyan Village with the shore of Mabuni. When he had gone about 20 yards into the brush, he heard a movement of some sort. Unable to identify the source of the sound, Sergeant Obermeier looked around, trying to discover if some person was causing it. Not seeing anyone, he assumed that the rustling noise proceeded from birds or other small game. Just to make sure, though, he shouted, "Hai! Ano-ne! Nisan! Bcysani!" ("Hello! Give me your attention, young man, sonny!").

Receiving no response, he then fired his three-chamber, pump type Remington shotgun into the brush, hoping to flush any birds in the area. Immediately thereafter, he heard a groan. Running in the direction of his shot and the sound, the sergeant found an old Okinawan farmer in the pandanus thicket, spewing blood from countless wounds in his chest. Sergeant Obermeier attempted to render first aid, remaining at the scene, while Airman McDowell, who had come up meanwhile, summoned the police and a doctor. No actual licensed doctor of medicine was available, but Kyan Village's medical

serviceman, Masayoshi Maehara, who was licensed to operate a clinic, soon arrived on the scene, only to pronounce the victim dead. The shooting had occurred at approximately 1150 hours.

As the police began their investigation, they learned that the old man was Kame Omine, a 73-year-old farmer of Kyan Village, who had been engaged in collecting the aerial roots of pandanus trees. Having been shot from a distance of only some 46 feet, Omine-san's breast, especially his left lung, was said to look "like a beehive."⁴⁷

The immediate reaction of Kamado Omine, the widow, upon hearing of the death of her husband was one of Christian charitableness, even though it is unlikely that she was a Christian. Long bedfast from crippling neuralgia and almost completely dependent upon her husband for personal care, the 74-year-old woman expressed no hatred for his slayer, saying only that she was "too sad to speak" when told that Kame had been killed by an American Air Force sergeant who mistook him for "game." "What irony," she commented, "that a person like myself who am bedridden should outlive him, who was as healthy as a young man! I don't want his death to have been in vain. I hope that everyone will give due consideration, so that no such sad thing will occur again."⁴⁸

Morimasa, the victim's third son, who was the only other member of the family living at the parental home, had been on his way home from the Omine farm when a neighbor intercepted him with the sad tidings. Rushing to the scene at once, all he could say was, "It is too outrageous an act to shoot at the tremor of pandanus leaves without ascertaining whether it is really game." Then, yielding to the softening influence of natural sentiment, he recalled how his father, old though he was, had always been "so

strong that he used to beat me in farm work."⁴⁹

The body of the deceased was taken initially to the Naha Police Station, but the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID) removed it to the Army Hospital at Camp Kue the same day for performance of an autopsy. That same night, an Army surgeon conducted the autopsy, with GRI Police Surgeon Shinohara present as an observer. The official finding was that six pellets had penetrated the main arteries in the victim's chest, five had penetrated the diaphragm, and others had entered the kidney, spleen, stomach, lung, and bronchial tube. In all, there were 80 scars caused by steel shot throughout the body.⁵⁰

Following the autopsy at the U.S. Army Hospital, Morimasa Omine was given possession of his father's body. After having it cremated at an Okinawan crematory, the son carried the ashes home a little after 0800 on the 10th, the day after the accident. At 1400 hours that same day, the funeral for Kame Omine was conducted, with all Kyan villagers attending, as well as Mayor Seichi Oshiro of Miwa-Son. Before the cortege left the home, Sergeant Obermeier, accompanied by Colonel Edward P. Foote, the Naha Base Commander, and Lieutenant Colonel William R. Crooks, Commander of the 623d AC&W Squadron, to which the sergeant was assigned, came to offer incense to the spirit of the departed Kame. The wretched man then apologized to the deceased and to the bereaved family, accepting responsibility for the tragedy which his carelessness had brought about.

Interviewed by a reporter for the Okinawa Times who attended the funeral, Mayor Oshiro and Kyan Ku-Cho Naoichi Adaniya agreed that the matter of payment of compensation to the surviving family was the main thing, now that due respect had been paid to the dead. Both said that they intended "to

help the bereaved family obtain the compensation as soon as possible. We hope that the military authorities will understand that the surviving family member is a bedridden, sick old woman."⁵¹

That same day, the CID and GRI Police carried out a joint investigation of the Kyan tragedy to determine the nature of the offense with which Sergeant Obermeier should be charged. Their finding was that the shooting was accidental. Under Japanese Criminal Law, the Okinawa Times noted, the case would be dealt with as a severe offense, even though accidental. However, since the sergeant was, of course, a military person, he came under the jurisdiction of the military--which meant that if his case were brought to trial, he would be tried by an Air Force court martial.⁵²

Under ordinary circumstances, one could have predicted that the Okinawa Times would flay Sergeant Obermeier as a "wanton" slayer of innocent Ryukyans and would decry the pastime of hunting as barbarous and destructive of Ryukyuan crops. After all, the Times was generally anti-American in its tone and quite intolerant of offenses committed by members of the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, in the wake of the "Miwa-Son Shooting Incident," the editorial columns of the paper were strangely silent concerning it. True, there were detailed news stories, and the Daigen-Shogen column did discuss the tragedy, but in all cases the tenor of the remarks was moderate.

Two factors may have conspired to produce this tranquil atmosphere--though this can only be surmise. First, and probably the more important, Editor-in-Chief Kazufumi Uechi of the Okinawa Times was himself an ardent hunter, being, in fact, Chairman of the Okinawa Hunters' Association. It seems obvious, then, that he was not likely to argue that hunting was in itself evil and should be declared illegal. To do so would be to deprive

himself of his chief pleasure. Second, Uechi's daughter, Kazumi, was at that very time attending school at the University of Kansas on a U.S. Army scholarship, with all expenses paid. One would be extraordinarily ingenuous to imagine that it was pure coincidence which made her one of the handful of Ryukyans lucky enough to be selected for this wonderful opportunity for an excellent and free education. The cynic, for his part, might suspect that the officials responsible for choosing the scholarship students had had in mind the restraining effect the selection of his daughter might have on Editor Uechi. Not only would he be guilty of ingratitude if he filled his editorials with denunciations of the United States, but he could cause daughter Kazumi's scholarship not to be renewed.*

Whatever the cause, the article on "Accidental Shooting To Death of an Old Man" which appeared in the Daigen Shogen column on Sunday morning, 11 December, was not only temperate in spirit but easily recognizable as the work of an experienced hunter. Consequently, it appears very probable that it was Editor-in-Chief Uechi himself who wrote it.

Pointing out that "Hunting with a gun is a sport and is helpful in the extermination of harmful birds and animals," the unsigned author added that there was one condition--that "he be a good marksman and not cause accidents."

The Joint Ryukyuan-American investigation of the scene where Kame Onine was shot found that his death was accidental, but, even then, the moral responsibility of his slayer "could not be erased." It was doubtful that

*An ironical note demonstrating how "the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley" is injected into our story in connection with Miss Kazumi Uechi. We may safely suppose that the Army authorities had intended that she would eventually return to the Ryukyus, bringing with her both a university degree and a feeling of friendship for the United States, which she would unconsciously pass on to those with whom she came in contact. Unfortunately for these assumptions, Kazumi met a Korean scholarship student at the school, fell in love with him, married him, and returned to Korea to live, rather than to Okinawa.

Sergeant Obermeier knew the hunting regulations, which, among other things, made a distinction between beneficial birds, which were protected, and harmful birds, which could be killed freely. This very distinction implied that any hunter had to know exactly what he was shooting at before he fired his gun. Thus, a man who did not know this rule was "not qualified to handle a gun." It was probably owing to American hunters' disregard of this rule that Katsu Atokurane had been killed by Sergeant Brown a year earlier.⁵³

"By comparison," said Uechi (supposedly), "Okinawan hunters are behaving better; for, even though an accidental explosion wounded a hunting partner in one case, no one was every shot to death by them." (Here his memory played him false, or he chose deliberately to twist the facts; for the incident to which he obviously made reference was so similar to the Miwa-Son tragedy as to make one observe the coincidence at once. On 7 November 1960, just a month previously, Shigeru Morita of Ishigaki City, Ishigaki Jima, had fired 30 pellets into the legs of his friend Takashi Kano, of Naha City, when he mistook the latter for wild ducks while the two men were hunting together along a river on Kobama Jima in the Yaeyama Gunto. The badly wounded man had been rushed to Ishigaki Jima by boat, but, the doctor there not being able to extract the shot from his wounds, it had been necessary to dispatch a military aircraft from Okinawa to fly him to Naha for surgery. As a result of the U.S. Forces' cooperativeness, Kano had been enabled to have all the pellets removed a little after 1900 hours that same day.⁵⁴

Thus, the columnist was accurate in his recollection that the victim of a shotgun wielded by a careless Ryukyuan hunter had not been killed, but this difference in cases was only academic, since it was pure chance that

had caused the Ryukyuan to aim lower than had the American. Each had fired his gun with the intent to kill a target which was not what he thought it was.)

"Good marksmanship and good sense are essential in the prevention of accidents," commented the Daigen Shogen writer, who recommended that the law requiring American hunters to obtain a hunting license and register their guns be revised to include several additional qualifications. Finally, inasmuch as the areas in which hunting was most commonly done were limited in size, it seemed best that the American hunters become members of the Okinawa Hunters' Association.⁵⁵

Under the terms of the Game Law, of which the columnist spoke, all "B" class hunting licenses were issued by the Director of Police Headquarters. Any military personnel or civilian employees of the military desiring such a license could obtain it from any police station chief who was authorized to issue it on behalf of the Police Headquarters Director. Any applicant possessing a gun could easily get a license, provided he was not a minor, an idiot, or an insane person; and there is no record of anyone's having identified himself as any of these in making his application.

Ryukyuan applicants, on the contrary, were required to pass muster on such points as previous criminal record, possession of a permit for the ownership of a gun, and the like. All in all, at least in Ryukyuan eyes, it was much easier, from a procedural point of view, for American military or civilian employees of the military to obtain the licenses. In addition, besides the greater liberality with which hunting licenses were given out to American hunters, the Okinawa Times saw as another factor conducing to tragic accidents in the field the paucity of translations of the Game Law

available in English. Consequently, very few "foreigners" were acquainted with its provisions. One of the most important of these prohibited firing a gun near a residential area, but it was more often observed in the breach than in the observance.

It was this ignorance of the provisions of the pertinent law, as well as of the unwritten rules of good hunting, that had produced four shooting cases involving "foreign" hunters over the years--namely, a shooting case at Imbu Beach, Onna-Son; a shooting case at Yakena Village, Yonagusuku-Son; the Camp Hansen "wild boar" shooting case; and the recent Miwa-Son shooting incident.

Kazufumi Uechi, speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Okinawa Hunters' Association, asserted that true hunters "do not shoot for the mere reason that some noise is heard or there is a rustling in the brush. . . . Those who shoot at anything at random can not be said to be hunters." In his own outings he had come across "foreigners who fire their guns in rapid succession, even though not within shooting distance, probably because they have too great a supply of shells." Moreover, it was not surprising that hunters of this ilk were the ones who caused incidents like the one in Kyan Village.⁵⁶

The protest of the Ryukyu Shimpo in connection with the Miwa-Son shooting was mild indeed, but for anyone acquainted with this newspaper's editorial policy and journalistic style this restraint should occasion no surprise; for the Shimpo seldom became deeply indignant, and almost never wrathful.

In an editorial entitled "Prevention of Occurrence of Third Incident Desired," the Ryukyu Shimpo* noted that the death of Kame Omine had been

*See next page.

completely accidental, but still found it "quite undesirable that people are killed so simply." Any persons engaging in hunting should bear in mind that, with the exception of the mountainous northern region, the hunting areas were also residential areas, so that careless firing was almost bound to produce a tragedy. Furthermore, any "hunter who mistakes a human for a small bird is not a competent hunter," and the "Poor farmers are always the victims of such incidents."⁵⁷

*The Ryukyu Shimpo was originally founded in 1893 by Sho Jun, son of the last of the Ryukyuan kings, in large part as a result of the encouragement of the eighth prefectural governor of Okinawa, Shigeru Narahara (a Japanese, whose term of office--15 years and 10 months--was the longest of any of the pre-war appointed governors). The underlying reason for Narahara's interest in having a newspaper on Okinawa was his recognition that such an inspired organ could have an enormous influence in gradually winning over the people who still longed for the old connection with China to a realization of the benefits to be derived from the Japanese occupation. By such means, he hoped to speed up the assimilation of the Ryukyus into the Japanese Empire.

For 10 years, from 1893 to 1903, the Ryukyu Shimpo enjoyed its status as the only newspaper on Okinawa. In the latter year the Okinawa Shimbun was founded as the house organ of the Japanese merchants whose residence was on Okinawa. The Okinawa Mainichi followed in 1906. During the Taisho Era (1912-1926) four more newspapers appeared: the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun in 1914, the Okinawa Jiji and the Okinawa Nichi Nichi in 1916, and the Okinawa Times in 1921.

With the advent of the Showa Era in 1926, newspapers continued to proliferate, four more coming into existence: the Okinawa Nichi (reorganized in 1931), the Okinawa Nippo in 1933, the Okinawa Minshu Shimbun, and the Okinawa Maiseki Shimbun. However, by the time World War II hove onto the horizon, stiff competition had eliminated all but three of the above--the Ryukyu Shimpo, the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun, and the Okinawa Nippo.

In December 1940, in accordance with wartime controls imposed by the Japanese Government, whereunder there would be no more than one newspaper per prefecture, the Ryukyu Shimpo was combined with the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun and the Okinawa Nippo to form one newspaper, the Okinawa Shimpo. Choko Takamine, the Chief Editor of the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun, became, first, the Business Manager of the new Okinawa Shimpo, then, later on, the Chief Editor, as well. In 1944 he assumed the position of Managing Editor of the Okinawa Shimpo.

Not everyone on Okinawa was prepared to adopt such a tolerant attitude toward the shooting case at Kyan Village, however. On 12 December--three days after the incident occurred--representatives of 16 organizations, the Okinawa Teachers Association, the Government Employees Unions Federation (Kankoro), and the Okinawa Youth Council in the forefront, met at the Okinawa Kaikan (Hall) in Naha and formed the "Miwa-Son Farmer Fatal Shooting Incident Counter-Measure Committee." As a result of discussion, the participants concluded that the GRI police had been over-hasty in ruling the shooting to be accidental before receiving the results of the autopsy. This error should not be repeated in the future. In addition, they urged that Sergeant Obermeier be punished severely for having treated lightly the matter of taking the life of a fellow man.

On 23 March 1945, as it became almost certain that an American invasion of Okinawa was in the immediate offing, Takamine and 50-odd members of his newspaper staff moved into the huge maze of underground air raid shelters which the Japanese Army had dug under Shuri Castle. Here the quasi-official newspaper continued to publish even while the Battle of Okinawa was raging at its height in the world outside. The last issue was printed on 24 May 1945, one day before the Shuri fortress fell to the U.S. Marines.

Slightly more than two months later, on 26 July 1945, the Uruma Shimpo ("Uruma" is an old word for "Ryukyu") began publication as a tabloid two-page weekly newspaper in Ishikawa, the seat of the U.S. Naval Military Government at that time. After a time it developed into a semi-weekly, then into a daily. All employees during this period were paid by the U.S. military as public servants of the Okinawa Gunto Government, which had been established on 22 April 1946. The Uruma Shimpo was also delivered free of charge, since the U.S. military was providing both the ink and the paper. The first Editor-in-Chief of the U.S.-sponsored paper was Kiyoshi Shima, a member of the pre-war Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, who was also the titular president of the news organ. In March 1946 Shui Ikemiyagi relieved Shima of the duties of Editor-in-Chief, and continued to serve in this post when Kamejiro Senaga succeeded to the presidency upon the departure of Shima for Tokyo in August 1946. (Kiyoshi Shima, it is interesting to note, transferred his permanent residence to Japan and later became a Socialist member of the House of Councilors.)

Senaga, a life-long Communist, who had been imprisoned by the Japanese Government in the early 1930's, continued as president of the paper until

After winding up their discussion, the conferees visited the scene of the shooting. The fact that they were not trained students of the science of ballistics did not deter the fanatical group from expressing skepticism of the police determination that the shooting had occurred at approximately 46 feet distance. Their tentative belief was that the distance had been shorter--which implied that the hunter had been aware of what it was he was shooting at--but they withheld a final decision on lodging a strong protest with the U.S. military until the results of a more thorough investigation to be carried out the following day were known.⁵⁸

the winter of 1949. (It would be interesting to know who it was in the U.S. Military Government that picked both him and Shima for the job!) Then, when the main office of the Uruma Shimpo moved from Ishikawa to Naha, Senaga resigned, to be succeeded by Shui Ikemiyagi, who retained his erstwhile post as Editor-in-Chief. (During his presidency, Senaga was brought to trial on a charge of illegal possession of some engines belonging to the U.S. military.) An attack of tuberculosis forced Ikemiyagi to give up the presidency of the paper in August 1951, and, even with his overwhelming burden lightened, the continued deterioration of his health made it necessary for him to relinquish his position as Editor-in-Chief early in 1952.

The man elected to the presidency of the Uruma Shimpo upon the resignation of Ikemiyagi in August 1951 was Kowa Matayoshi, a distinguished citizen who had been president of the old Ryukyu Shimpo, beginning in 1939 and on through its wartime existence as the Okinawa Shimpo. In the early post-war years Matayoshi served as a member of the Okinawa Advisory Council appointed by the Naval Military Government, in 1945-46, then was named Fuku-Chiji (Vice-Governor) of the Okinawa Civil Administration from 1946 to March 1950. On 10 September 1951 Matayoshi changed the name of the newspaper from Uruma Shimpo to the name under which he had headed it before, Ryukyu Shimpo, supposedly in celebration of the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty in San Francisco just two days earlier. In April 1952 he was elected Mayor of Naha City.

With Kowa Matayoshi's death on 22 September 1953, the position of President of the Ryukyu Shimpo remained vacant for nearly two months, when, on 16 November 1953, Seihaku Oyadomari, who was then publishing the Okinawa Shirmimpo in Fukuoka Prefecture, Kyushu, accepted the post. (He did not arrive at Naha to take over the job until 17 December 1953.) Back in 1923, Mr. Oyadomari had joined the old Ryukyu Shimpo as a reporter, abandoning the Okinawa Weekly, which he had begun publishing two years earlier. In 1929 he became manager of the Okinawa Shoseki Kabushiki Kaisha (Educational

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That same day, 12 December, the Executive Department of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council issued the following provocative statement:

A similar accident took place last year, in which a woman was mistaken for a wild boar and killed by a gun fired by an American serviceman. There is no knowing who will be the victim next year. Under such circumstances, Okinawan inhabitants, including farmers, cannot work with peace of mind. We doubt the sincerity of the American's hasty action in firing on the old farmer.

Translated from translatoresese into English, what the reversionists were saying in that last sentence was that they were not at all convinced that Sergeant Obermeier had not fired at Omine-san intentionally!

Having said this, they requested (1) that the U.S. military pay complete compensation for the victim's death as soon as possible; (2) that "strict

Book Company), and, upon the establishment of the Okinawa Nippo accepted the position of its Business Manager, while continuing to manage the book firm. When the Nippo was consolidated with the Ryukyu Shimpo and the Okinawa Asahi Shimbun in 1940, he shared the position of Business Manager with Choko Takamine, and subsequently did the same with the position of Managing Director, continuing in this role until the demise of the Okinawa Shimpo described above. As this is being written, Seihaku Oyadomari is still the President of the Ryukyu Shimpo, as well as Chairman of the Board of Directors for Radio Okinawa, the Shimpo-affiliated station which began operations on 1 July 1960.

Following Ikemiyagi's resignation as Editor-in-Chief, the Ryukyu Shimpo employed Zempatsu Shimabukuro, a scholar who had been both Secretary-General and Director of Commerce and Industry for the Okinawa Civil Administration, and was currently Chairman of the Ryukyu Cultural Properties Preservation Commission, as well as a member of the Ryukyu Cultural Research Association. Already employed as an instructor at the University of the Ryukyus, Shimabukuro did not give up that position, but simply added the Chief Editor's title and duties to those he already had. (If this were not proof positive of Shimabukuro's industriousness, it may be mentioned that in 1951 he had written the pre-war section of a 600-page book entitled Naha-Shi Goikan (A General View of the City of Naha), while Seiei Shirado had authored the post-war section.) Cancer of the liver--and, probably, overwork--brought about Zempatsu Shimabukuro's death on 23 November 1953, at the age of 66.

The vacancy was filled by Hisamitsu Takehara, who served until the latter part of 1954, when he, too, died. Early in 1955, Shui Ikemiyagi, his health now restored, returned to his old post as Editor-in-Chief of the Ryukyu Shimpo, where he has served continuously to the period of this writing. Some of the information contained in this footnote, in fact, was obtained from him.

punishment be meted out to the serviceman who shot and killed the farmer; (3) that police authorities exercise strict control over hunters;" and (4) that American hunters cause no more damage to crops.⁵⁹

At his regular press conference held in the USCAR conference room on 12 December, the Civil Administrator, Brigadier General John G. Ondrick, told the reporters present that he wished to express his condolence "from the bottom of my heart to the bereaved family," though he was "also sorry for the serviceman." He added that the incident was still being investigated. As for possible future tragedies of a similar nature, the general hoped that they might be prevented by revising the existing hunting regulations to forbid hunting in a densely populated area or to establish a time limit.⁶⁰

The Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, though ardently in favor of reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, was generally as friendly to the United States Forces as a local political party could well afford to be and still hope to win elections. In the recent Legislative campaign held the preceding month, the OLDLP had captured 22 of the 29 seats; therefore, that party's Legislators could afford to be temperate in their condemnation of the Miwa-Son shooting incident, though they could not afford to ignore the issue entirely--nor, in all probability, were they inclined to do so anyway.

As a result, the OLDLP dispatched the 22d Electoral District Legislator, Juzo Uehara (Miwa-Son fell within his constituency), to conduct a personal investigation of the accident scene and, at the same time, convey the party's condolences to the bereaved members of the Omine family. Upon Uehara's return to Naha, the OLDLP Legislators held a general meeting on 13 December to formulate the stand which they would take in the matter. Seitoku Shinzato, the distinguished-looking Secretary-General of the party, who had

SEITOKU SHINZATO, SECRETARY-GENERAL

OF THE

OKINAWA LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY



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begun his first term as a Legislator less than two weeks before, after a lifetime career as a school teacher and more recently as Business Manager of the Okinawa Teachers Association, acted as spokesman for the conferees. According to his statement, the data obtained by Legislator Uehara, coupled with other information, led the OLDP solons to the inescapable conclusion that "this extremely unfortunate incident was caused by impermissible carelessness on the part of the American hunter." The sequel to this verdict was a decision (1) to request a public announcement of results of the investigation of the fatal incident, (2) to make strong representations to the military, so that a similar accident would never again be permitted to occur, and (3) to make a strong proposal "for removal of fear on the part of the inhabitants, who are terror-stricken by the recent careless shooting by an American hunter, to the authorities concerned."⁶¹

Mention has previously been made of the Miwa-Son Farmer Fatal Shooting Incident Counter-Measure Committee and its touching concern for seeing justice done. According to promise, eight members of the ad hoc committee journeyed south to Kyan Village on the afternoon of the 14th, where they first stopped at the Omine home to present \$20.00 in condolence money to the surviving members of the family, then proceeded to the scene of the shooting. This time they were equipped with a "professional hunter" (no doubt of the same crimson political tinge as the honorable members of the committee) who was to investigate the circumstances of the fatal shooting from the standpoint of where the firing occurred, the angle of fire, and other technical aspects. The names and background of four of the Counter-Measure Committee members give us some notion of just what sort of "impartial" finding they were likely to arrive at.

JIKKICHI FURUGEN
ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OKINAWA PEOPLE'S PARTY IN
THE 1960-1962 UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE



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Kansai Miyara, the Secretary-General of the Okinawa Socialist Party since 1958 and long a promoter of left-wing causes, had finally thrown his hat into the ring in 1960 and sought election to the GRI Legislature from the 18th District (the Miebashi District of Naha City). The fact that the left-wing vote was badly split by the entry of three candidates--representing the Okinawa People's Party, the Okinawan Socialist Party, and the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party--in the race was actually of only academic interest to Miyara, since he received just 777 votes out of 13,159 cast, or a percentage of 5.9.

Jikkichi Furugen (also known as Jitsukichi, Gikkichi, and Saneyoshi Furugen) was a rather handsome young Okinawan of clean-cut appearance which gave no hint of his political leanings and bore no resemblance to the stereotyped figure of an Oriental Communist. Inclined to operate quietly, rather than with bombast, Furugen was neat in dress, possessed of an inquiring mind, and was inscrutable to the would-be analyst. Although a stalwart of the OPP, he had made his first campaign for a seat in the Legislature under the aegis of the Liaison Council for the Preservation of Democracy (or Minren, as the organization was better known, from the Japanese words forming the equivalent of these English words), a coalition of the extreme leftist forces of the OPP and the OSP. No right-wing candidate was entered in the 16th District race, but his opposition came from the representative of the OSMP--and a woman at that--Mrs. Hatsuko Miyazato. As a result, the voters of the South Mawashi district of Naha comprised within the 16th District split almost exactly down the middle. Mrs. Miyazato obtained 6,056 votes (50.2%), while Furugen received 6,004 (49.8%). Two years later, however, it was a different story. In the 1960 election, the OLDP

entered a candidate, Seichi Kishaba, who apparently lured away enough of Mrs. Miyazato's previous supporters to give young Furugen a decisive victory--7,362 votes to 5,912 for Mrs. Miyazato and 4,857 for Kishaba himself. What gave Furugen just cause for feeling a bit proud of his victory was the fact that he was the only OPP candidate to win election.

Kokichi Kameko had never revealed any definite affiliation with a particular political party, but it required no clairvoyance to realize that he was almost as far to the left and anti-American in his thinking as it was possible to go. In August 1960 he had been sent to Tokyo as a delegate to the 6th World Rally for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (he was to act in a similar role in August 1961), and in the wake of the accidental wounding of two scrap metal collectors on the Ie Shima Bombing Range by an F-100 of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on 10 March 1960, Kameko had shown his true colors by accusing the United States of deliberately using Okinawans as targets for their firing practice. An employee of the Ryukyu Telephone and Telegraph Company, a quasi-governmental organization, Kokichi Kameko was Director of the Education and Publicity Department of the Government Employees Unions Federation, as well as Director of the Information and Propaganda Department of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council. Subsequent to the present account, but within the compass of this history, Kameko would be named Representative Standing Director of the Okinawa Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council, on 31 October 1961, as well as Chairman of the All-Okinawa Communications Workers Union (Zentaro) on 19 November 1961. In between the receipt of these two honors, he was guest speaker on 5 November 1961 at the 12th extraordinary party convention of the Okinawa People's Party. The year 1962 was to bring Kokichi Kameko

into far greater prominence, but that must await a future history for the telling.

A fourth member of the "impartial" fact-finding committee which visited the scene of the Kyan shooting on 14 December was Kosho Fukuji, a member of the OPP, who also went by the names of Hiroaki, Hiroyuki, or Hiroshi Fukuji, and sometimes had the spelling of his surname changed to Fukuchi. In theory, Fukuji made his living as a school teacher, but it is hard to believe that his class room saw very much of him, so busy was he with outside interests--chiefly ones devoted to anti-American projects. At the time of the shooting incident, he was a member of the Okinawa Teachers Association (OTA) Secretariat and a leader in the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council (Gensuikyo). On 4 April 1961 he would be named Business Manager of the Okinawa Civil Liberties Union (which concerned itself almost exclusively with alleged offenses by Americans). On 8 April 1961 Fukuji was elected Chief of the Research and Investigation Section of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, and later in the year he served as the OTA representative on the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council's delegation to Japan.

As a result of their investigation, ostensibly--though far more likely as a result of their political persuasion, it must be said--the Miwa-Son Farmer Fatal Shooting Incident Counter-Measure Committee found many points that conflicted with the military announcement and declared that it was unthinkable that "the shooting was made by accident, if one actually inspected the site of the incident." The worthy members of the committee announced that they would draft a written protest based on their findings and present it to the Civil Administrator at an interview with him scheduled for 16 December. Besides protesting the Omine slaying, they would request

the complete payment of compensation to the bereaved family, the meting out of severe punishment to the sergeant who had killed Omine-san, the designation of a no-hunting district in residential areas, an elevation in the standards for issuing hunting licenses, and the prevention of any recurrence of a similar incident. Furthermore, the committee planned to lodge a strong protest with the police authorities for announcing that "the incident was caused by accident" immediately after the accident.⁶²

Although not so hysterically interested in seeing severe punishment dealt to Sergeant Obermeier as the Miwa-Son Counter-Measure Committee, High Commissioner Donald P. Booth was at least as deeply concerned that there be no repetition of the hunting tragedies at Kyan and Camp Hansen. Accordingly, on 16 December 1960 he appointed Colonel John Beall, USA, of USARYIS to head a new Hunting Problem Committee, which would serve as a consultative organ for the High Commissioner.

At General Booth's direction the committee held its first meeting that same day, its agenda including a possible revision of the existing hunting regulations and suggestions presented by members of the Okinawa Hunters' Association and representatives of the GRI police.

To the committee's query as to what improvement might be made in the system for issuing hunting licenses, Kazufumi Uechi answered that, firstly, it was essential for persons obtaining a hunting license to go through a training course given by the Okinawa Hunters' Association; secondly, pamphlets describing the habits of birds and animals which could be hunted in Okinawa should be prepared and distributed to all would-be hunters, regardless of nationality; and thirdly, since hunting accidents were mostly caused by beginners, such hunters should be accompanied by a professional guide.

The committee generally agreed with Mr. Uechi's recommendations, but,

before submitting any formal revision of the hunting regulations for servicemen to the High Commissioner, they determined that more data should be collected, then discussed at additional meetings of the members. Rather interestingly, 533 Americans had received hunting licenses for the current hunting season, which ran from 15 October to 31 March.⁶³

Thus matters stood until 8 February 1961, when Kamedo Omine, the 74-year-old widow, submitted a claim for \$8,000 in compensation for the death of her husband to the GRI Legal Affairs Department. The latter transmitted the papers, all completed in proper order, to the USCAR Legal Division on 1 March. USCAR then forwarded them to the 313th Air Division Judge Advocate's Office. The \$8,000 claim consisted of \$7,400 for the death of a human being--computed in accordance with the Hoffman Formula* to include both consolation money and compensation for the bereaved family--and \$600 for funeral and other expenses.⁶⁴

*Under Japanese law, in those cases where the future earnings of an adult were measured as an element of damages to be awarded the heir of a deceased person, the heir succeeded to the claim of the deceased against the tortfeasor for loss of future earnings, as an item of property belonging to the deceased. In calculating the value of lost earnings, the estimated living expenses were deducted from the expected earnings. The cash payment then made was computed to equal the sum which, at 5% interest during the deceased's normal life expectancy, would equal the total income lost by his premature death, minus the expenses of living during the period.

From these principles a formula for ascertaining damages had been drawn up, known as the "Hoffman System." Applying the formula, one first ascertained the amount of the deceased's expected income per month and subtracted the amount of money needed to sustain him for one month. One then multiplied this figure by 12 months and multiplied that figure by the number of years the deceased was expected to live and work, basing this on the life expectancy tables. The resulting figure would then be divided by one, plus the number of years of expected life, then multiplied by .05, which represented 5% interest per year.

The idea behind this formula was to arrive at the lump sum award which, when invested, would insure an income to the heir equal to the income of

On 13 July 1961, the Foreign Claims Commission in Japan presented a check in the amount of \$2,550.50 to Kamado Omine, who accepted it as complete and final payment for the death of her husband.⁶⁵

In the meantime, while an equitable settlement of the Omine claim was being evolved--and the Omine family was being persuaded that it was indeed equitable--Staff Sergeant Raymond Obermeier was facing the consequences of his carelessness. On 10 February 1961 a Special Court Martial at Naha Air Base tried him under Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on a charge of negligent homicide. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to be discharged from the service with a Bad Conduct Discharge, to be confined at hard labor for four months, to forfeit \$40.00 per month for four months, and to be reduced to the grade of airman basic.

On 2 March 1961, however, the 51st Air Base Group Commander (and ex officio Base Commander for Naha Air Base), Colonel Edward P. Foote, while approving the sentence and ordering it executed, directed that execution of the Bad Conduct Discharge be suspended until 31 August 1961, with provision for its automatic remission at that time, if not sooner vacated by misconduct on the part of the convicted individual.

Then, on 17 March 1961, the 313th Air Division Commander, Major General John R. Sutherland, acting on the recommendation of his Staff Judge Advocate, approved and ordered the execution of the sentence as partially suspended

the deceased minus his living expenses. The purpose of the Hoffman Formula or system was to ascertain what lump sum payment would produce the same amount of money to the survivors as would have been provided by the deceased had he lived his full expected life and earned his monthly income until his death. Such a system depended upon life expectancy tables and an estimate of the amount of money the deceased would have used to sustain himself out of his monthly earnings. It assumed that a survivor receiving a lump sum payment would be able to invest the money and bring in 5% interest per year on the payment made to him.

by the Naha Base Commander, but stipulated that the execution of that portion providing for a Bad Conduct Discharge, four months' confinement at hard labor, and reduction to airman basic be suspended until 31 August 1961, with provisions for automatic remission of the Bad Conduct Discharge at that time, if not sooner vacated by adverse action on the part of the subject.

In the event, the reader may be happy to know, Sergeant Obermeier avoided any trouble that might have caused the terms of his conviction to be reinstated, with the result that the only penalty he actually paid was the \$160.00 deducted from his salary, plus a few days' confinement.⁶⁶

A Pig Is Killed in Bise-Ku: Kame Omine had been dead only a few days, and public sentiment was still bubbling over the manner of his death, when, on 16 December 1960, the Japanese-language newspapers carried an account of an incident which had occurred the previous day. It seems that at approximately 1525 hours an object resembling the fuselage of a jet plane plunged from the skies over the Motobu Peninsula and smashed into a pigsty at the home of Saei Ameku in the village of Bise, Motobu-Cho. A 175-pound pig housed in the pen was killed and the sty itself was destroyed, but no other casualties or damage occurred, although local eye witnesses reported seeing fragments of some sort fall in four different parts of the village. The piece which hit Ameku's pigsty was described as about six feet long and two inches wide.

Further inquiry revealed that the incident had been brought about when First Lieutenant Donald L. Totten of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Kadena AB encountered engine trouble in his F-100D while flying over the Motobu Peninsula. He waited until he was out over the water before jettisoning a fuel tank near Minna Jima, but a strong wind blew the tank back toward

the land, where it apparently disintegrated before hitting the ground. The ailing aircraft made it safely back to Kadena. Colonel John H. deRussy, the 313th Air Division Vice-Commander, flew to the accident scene for an investigation as soon as he learned of it.⁶⁷

A Farmer in Kamimotobu-Son Is Hit by an Army Drone: The 16th Detachment of the U.S. Army's 3d Artillery was engaged in target practice at Motobu Auxiliary Airfield in Kamimotobu-Son on 27 August 1961, using the old runway as a launching and recovery point for the radio-controlled drone employed in the practice. The drone had circled the adjacent village of Yamagawa twice and was approaching a third time, when suddenly the engine stopped, and the plane crashed into a farm at the edge of the village, completely uprooting cycad trees for two to three square meters around. Fragments of the plane flew through the air and struck a 65-year-old farmer, Seisei Toyama, on the left shoulder and right foot, as he was walking in front of the Yamagawa Village civic hall on his way to a store to buy fertilizer. Other pieces of the drone were scattered all over the village.

An Army helicopter rushed the injured farmer to the U.S. Army Hospital at Camp Kue for treatment and examination, while other personnel collected the fragments of the plane and carried them off for the usual "autopsy". The initial, on-the-spot diagnosis was that it was failure of the generator which had produced the crash.

The local Ryukyuan officials were inordinately irate over the minor accident when it dawned on them that the 16th Detachment had been operating its target drones for more than a week without having first given the notification to all the people through the police and village offices that was customary whenever maneuvers containing the possibility of danger to the

local inhabitants were to be conducted. Furthermore, there was a rumor that another drone had crashed into the sea nearby on the very first day of the target practice, August 20th. As a result, Mayor Chiei Yohena of Kamimotobu-Son and other son leaders called upon the officer-in-charge of the Army unit at the airfield immediately after the crash and requested that further drone operations in the vicinity of habitations be halted. The officer concerned promised in reply that no maneuvers of this nature would be held in Kamimotobu-Son in the future.⁶⁸

In November 1961, Seisei Toyama, the injured farmer, filed a claim for compensation in the amount of \$10,879.78, alleging that the accident had totally incapacitated him for working, both legs and his left shoulder being irremediably damaged. Since he had been between his 65th and 66th years at the time of his injury, and calculating, as he did, that he would in the natural order of things have been earning \$60 a month up to the age of 80 years, Toyama-san asked \$10,800.00 for his vanished future earnings, plus \$79.78 which he had spent on medical expenses subsequent to his month's stay in the Army Hospital.

The U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) Claims Officer offered the old man \$490.82, but he rejected this sum as completely inadequate.

In September 1962, Toyama-san submitted a request for reconsideration of his claim, stating in his petition that he had now spent more than \$1,000.00 for medical treatment; that he had had no income since the accident, being forced to exist by borrowing money to pay the doctor's bills and support his family, which consisted of a son in junior high school, a daughter who attended high school while working part time, and his 65-year-old wife.⁶⁹

According to the USARYIS Claims Office, however, all was not exactly

as the plaintiff described it. Toyama had indeed spent one month in the Army Hospital immediately after the drone crash, but the greater part of this time had been devoted to "observation", because of the victim's age. The actual treatment itself had occupied only a few days. As for his specific injuries, a second examination in April 1962 had shown that the laceration on his right foot was well healed, with only a scar to show that it had been hurt, no bones having been broken nor arteries severed at the time of the crash; his left shoulder did experience some pain when he moved his arm to its extreme limits of motion; and as for the injury to his left foot or leg, the doctor who examined him in April made no mention of it in his report--nor had any been made at the time of his original hospitalization! In addition, he had a grown son able to support him.⁷⁰

Yet, it is possible to see injustice in this case, if we compare it with another case. As will be related later in this narrative, the Air Force had awarded the widows of Ryotoku Higa and Seikan Ishikawa \$2,797.60 and \$2,244.60 respectively for the deaths of the two men, who had lost their lives when a bomb they had carried home from the Ie Shima Bombing Range exploded while they were dismantling it. This was obviously the two victims' fault, and only theirs. Toyama, on the contrary, had suffered his injury through no fault of his own whatsoever. His claim was greatly excessive, it would seem, but not in comparison with those of the Mesdames Higa and Ishikawa.

Provocations of the Air Force on the Part of the People of Ie Shima.

Although the people of Ie Shima--particularly the citizenry of Maja-Ku--were ever ready to scream "Foull!" whenever the Air Force discommoded them in almost any way, they were themselves not without sin.

The Ie Shima Bombing Range actually consisted of three skip bombing targets, a dive-bombing target, a LABS-bombing target, and two strafing targets. To indicate whether the range was in operation or was closed, the three control towers erected on its perimeter displayed red or white flags. During those periods when the range was closed, the white flags informed the scrap metal collectors that they could go on the range to ply their trade without fear of either apprehension for trespass or accidentally being shot. Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the scrap collectors generally did not choose to be restricted in the hours of their operation, with the result that they ignored both the red warning flags and the "restricted area" signs that had survived theft and typhoon winds. As related in previous accounts of Ie Shima, the intrepid scrap gatherers threw personal safety to the winds and collected brass and steel between target passes by the jet aircraft, knowing that if they didn't glean the freshly-sown scrap immediately, someone else would. A cautious, law-abiding scrap collector could go awfully hungry on Ie Shima!

Obviously, though, all of this illegal activity did not transpire unbeknownst to the range personnel, who witnessed the infiltration of the range and the suicidal dash for the still hot scrap metal by the avid indigenes from their coigns of vantage in the control towers. Occasionally, even, the military personnel made an attempt to catch the trespassers, who apparently operated on the line of reasoning that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose, except their lives, in pursuing their chosen vocation. At such times, the tactic employed was to have the guards slip quietly toward that part of the range where the collectors were known to be, then radio for fake passes by the F-100's in order to cause the Ie Shimans to

seek cover while waiting for the bombs or cartridges to be released. The guards, knowing that the jets were making only "dry runs," would then use the crucial moments to move as surreptitiously as possible toward the temporarily-dug-in scrap collectors, hoping to nab them before the latter realized that no ammo was being released. Invariably, though, the local talent proved swifter than the American military men or their hired "mercenaries", and succeeded in making good their escape over the cliffs near the sea.

On one occasion it appeared that a metal collector had been hit by a strafing aircraft. As soon as this was learned, the range officer halted the firing runs and ordered a search to locate the victim. A trail of blood was followed to the cliffs, but no one was found, the wounded man having evidently been taken off in one of the boats which regularly hovered just off shore to evacuate those of their confederates for whom the pursuit on land was getting too hot.

It must not be supposed from the foregoing that the Ie Shimans confined themselves to the pursuit and collection of scrap metal generated as a by-product of jet aircraft training. This practice, though indeed illegal when performed during times when the red flag indicated that the range was off-limits, was not strictly immoral or dishonest, since the same persons were allowed to enter the range and collect the same metallic manna at such times as the white flag was hoisted. Not so venial a transgression was that which saw two 55-gallon oil drums and a 55-gallon gasoline drum stolen from the main control tower on 8 September 1959, as well as the theft of numerous tools from the storage quonset, which was broken into after the guards were relieved because of high winds during Condition I

for Typhoon Sarah on 14 September 1959.

During the month of November 1959, on different dates, approximately 10,500 feet of telephone field wire were cut and stolen from between the range control towers. A few days later, a local Ie Shiman telephone company was observed stringing wire, which, upon close examination, was found to be identical with the pilfered wire. A sample of the line was taken to the police station on the island. The civil police questioned the owner, but when he answered simply that he had purchased the wire on Okinawa, there was nothing the frustrated Air Police could do to prove that he was lying, even though they felt morally certain that that was precisely what he was doing.

On 9 December 1959, three strafing target cloths valued at \$15.00 apiece were cut off the unguarded targets and stolen during a period when there were not enough guards to cover all posts.

Another time, two salvaged 6x6 trucks were placed on the range as targets. The next day everything was gone except the truck beds, the vigilant vultures having made off with the rest.

The civil police on Ie Shima numbered only two, and had no vehicle in which to get about. They were formally notified each time a theft occurred, but in the opinion of the Air Police they were fairly well unconcerned about solving the case, even though they listened politely while the sordid tale was unfolded to them vicariously through an interpreter.⁷¹

In October 1959 a meeting had been held at the Ie-Son Office to discuss the related subjects of safety and security on the Ie Shima Bombing Range. In attendance were Lieutenant Colonel Arland Stanton, the 6313th

Air Base Wing Director of Operations; Mr. Harriman N. Simmons, Director of the USCAR Public Safety Department; Mr. John T. Sheehan, of USCAR's Land Department; Major Roy B. Bluhm, Jr., Commander of the 6313th Operations Squadron; Major Alton G. Smith of the 6313th Operations Squadron; Captain William C. McCluskey, Air Operations Officer for the 313th Air Division Headquarters; three members of the Motobu District Police; the two civil police of the Motobu District Police Station assigned on detached duty to Ie Shima; the Assistant Director of the GRI Police Department; Staff Sergeant Phillips, NCOIC of the Civilian Guard Section, 6313th Air Police Squadron; and Staff Sergeant Thweat, NCOIC of the Ie Shima Bombing Range.

At this meeting three suggestions were made, which it was decided should be discussed further at the next meeting. (For various reasons, this "next" meeting was never held.) The first of these suggestions was that salvage rights be given to someone on the island for the better control of the scrap collectors. The second was that a cooperative made up of the island residents be formed to share the metal collected from the range. The third, and least feasible, was that the range be fenced or placed "off limits."

In mid-January 1960, the task of guarding the bombing range was assigned to 15 people--an NCOIC, an Assistant NCOIC, an interpreter, and 12 civilian guards (Ryukyuan). The posts manned by these 12 guards were the main control tower, equipped with radio equipment and a storage quonset, 24 hours-a-day; a storage half-quonset containing tools and miscellaneous material and equipment, 24 hours-a-day; the two strafing targets, each consisting of three 6x12 timbers covered with cloth, 16 hours-a-day (1630 to 0700 hours); and the conventional dive bombing target, consisting of a

salvaged ambulance, 200 rubber tires, and numerous signs, 16 hours-a-day (1630 to 0700 hours).

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. De Raad, the 6313th Air Base Wing Provost Marshal, recommended that the existing situation be improved by moving the storage half-quonset to the main control tower, thus eliminating one 24-hour-a-day post; by posting the range with bilingual signs; and that the salvage rights be awarded to some person or to a cooperative on Ie Shima.⁷²

In the previous installment of the story of the Ie Shima Bombing Range* we have seen that this headquarters had notified USCAR on 17 June 1960 that it was willing to retreat from its earlier "no entry" stand to the extent of permitting scrap collectors to enter the bombing range one day a week, when it was closed. Normally this would be a Sunday, but if firing were in progress on that day, the range would be opened to them the following Sunday. This procedure was to be given a trial run until 1 January 1961, unless a violation occurred before then. In that case, the ban on entry at any time, including Sundays, would automatically be placed in force again. The deadline for the clearance of all crops being grown within the firing range was established as 30 June 1960.⁷³

Around this same time, Major Lloyd G. Rutter, Jr., who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Arland Stanton as 6313th ABW Director of Operations on 9 June 1960, wrote the Commander of the 6313th Operations Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel David H. Murray, under whom the operation of the bombing range came, that USCAR's letter to Chief Executive Ota of 29 June had recommended that the Mayor of Ie-Son contact the Air Force personnel on Ie Shima to

*History, 313th Air Div., 1 January-30 June 1960, Vol. I, pp. 252-256.

arrange for the collection of scrap. Under the circumstances, it would be wise for him to apprise the range people of this latest policy and conclude the necessary arrangements to permit scrap collection. Major Rutter also stressed that "under no condition" was this amendment in policy to permit farming within the range boundaries after the present crops were harvested. Furthermore, "all farmers should be removed from within the danger area not later than 30 June 1960."⁷⁴

Previously, in early February 1960, Colonel Stanton had advised this headquarters that the 6313th desired to burn that part of the bombing range contained within the bulldozed trail marking the restricted area whenever the weather was suitable and the range required burning. Normally, this burning would take place on Saturdays or Sundays when the range was closed to operations. In addition, the burning would be governed by the existence of light wind conditions, as to set fire to the high grass at any other time would be extremely dangerous. As a further precaution, only small patches of land would be burnt at one time, and, even then, fire equipment would stand by to preclude any spreading of the fire.

Not that he wished to paint an unpleasant picture, but Colonel Stanton found it "conceivable" that burning might "take place every week and until such time as the grass [was] reduced to a state where inadvertent fires [would] not be started by strafe and/or flares fired from the tower."

Not only did the 6313th D/O request that the proposed range burning be coordinated with the USCAR Land Department, but he suggested that it might be a good idea to publish the plan in the two Japanese-language daily newspapers, in order that the Ie Shimans might be informed of the Air Force's intentions.⁷⁵

On 13 January 1960, the 313th Staff Judge Advocate had prepared a

lengthy staff study on the subject of Ie Shima for the Vice Commander.⁷⁶

Under the heading of "Conclusions and Recommendations" the author noted that

As set forth above, the policy of the U.S. Government in the Ryukyus, as expressed in 313ADR 87-1, is to license military leased land not fully utilized by the military to Ryukyans for agriculture. We are informed by Mr. P. H. Clark, USAEDO [U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa], who is in charge of the licensing program, that this policy is desirably implemented by the issuance of a formal written license by USAEDO to the Mayor of an area for all the land involved. It is the Mayor's responsibility, then, to apportion the agricultural rights among the people involved. This procedure has worked out satisfactorily in other areas where the Mayors of such areas have seen to it that persons whose lands were leased and upon whose lands farming could not be permitted got their fair share of farming privileges within the areas where farming was permitted. It is the responsibility of the Base Commander to prepare a map of the areas under his jurisdiction upon which farming can be permitted, and request the USAEDO to issue the license. To date, no request to license the Ie Shima areas has been submitted to USAEDO. It occurs to us that, if such a license were issued for Ie Shima, the problem of insuring that everyone has their fair share of farming privileges could be thrown squarely upon the local community.

We have no easy solution for the problem of scrap salvagers on the range during operational hours, a problem which is unresolved after years of consideration by all authorities involved. However, it is clear that the expressed policy of the Air Force that it had no objection to salvagers entering during non-operational hours, provided they refrained from trespassing while the range was being used, has not worked. Certainly, such a policy does not put the Air Force in the strongest position it could have when injuries do occur. From a strictly legal point of view, it is unquestionable that the strongest position is that no unauthorized persons are permitted on the range at any time. We, therefore, concur in the recent bulldozing of the range boundary and recommend that the "No Trespassing" posting be completed at the earliest possible date.

Referring to this portion of the Judge Advocate's staff study, Lieut. Colonel Stanton requested the Kadena Base Engineer, in a letter of 4 February 1960, to prepare a map of Ie Shima, showing the lands presently under rental to the Air Force. He also wished the Base Engineer (i.e., the Real Estate Division) to ask USAEDO to issue a license permitting farming on such Air Force-leased land as was not required for Air Force projects.⁷⁷

Eleven days later, Colonel Stanton added a pinch of political dynamite to his original innocuous request by advising the Base Engineer that he would also like the farmers then cultivating land within the area bounded by the bulldozed trail (approximately 3,500-foot radius from the bull's-eye) to be evicted within 30 days and given suitable substitute land for farming within other rented areas on the island.⁷⁸

On 25 February 1960, Colonel James F. Risher, Jr., the 6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer, together with other representatives of the Air Force, the U.S. Army Engineer District Okinawa, and USCAR, met with Mayor Otomatsu Tamashiro of Ie-Son, Vice-Mayor Kamei Nakama, the Chief of General Affairs, Mr. Tamashiro, and Chief of Police Higaonna to discuss the familiar problem of scrap collection on the bombing range.

Colonel Risher informed the son officials that "effective immediately, unless otherwise notified by the Air Force that the range is open," there was to be no further trespassing at any time. In the next breath, however, he watered down this stern admonition with the qualification that any farmers presently growing crops within the range area might continue to do so until they were harvested. Once this was done, the farmers would no longer be permitted to enter the range. This meant that no new planting of crops within the restricted area was to be allowed. Colonel Risher said he realized that at first glance this measure appeared to be a harsh one, but if the Ie Shimans would bear in mind that the 313th Air Division had long and consistently encouraged those people whose farms lay within the restricted area to relocate them on other Air Force-leased land outside the range boundaries, they might be able to grasp the justice of the proposed action. Should this appeal to reason and fair play fail to produce cooperation, however,

the Air Force was prepared to ask USCAR to evict the "squatters" by whatever means were deemed necessary, including the use of force.

In the course of the meeting, Colonel Risher and his staff aides made a point of repeatedly pointing out the area of the bombing range on a map for the benefit of the Ie Shiman officials present. Then, to make sure that the latter were clear on this score, he had them board an Air Force truck for a personal inspection of the range, showing them a wide path which the Air Force had cut through the underbrush to delineate the off-limits area. The mayor was also told of plans for planting concrete posts inscribed with bilingual signs warning the inhabitants not to trespass on the range. These would be emplaced at 100-foot intervals. The 6313th Executive Officer further advised that the undergrowth covering the range would perforce be burned periodically, in order that the Air Force could obtain maximum benefit from its expensive installation.

Mayor Tamashiro promised that he would do all he could to prevent future trespassing on the bombing range, explaining that it was actually only some 100 persons--young men and even boys, for the most part--out of the island's total population of 7,500 who habitually engaged in the collection of scrap metal. But to control the activities of even this refractory 100 was more easily directed than achieved.⁷⁹ The harassed mayor also agreed to conduct a survey of the land then under cultivation within the target area of the bombing range.

How realistic Mayor Tamashiro was in stressing the difficulty of enforcing any ban on entering the bombing range which he might issue was graphically revealed by an event which occurred just 11 days later. On 10 March 1960, two young farmers from Nishizaki Village--Toshiichi Oshiro (17)

and Takemori Shimabuku (20)--were badly wounded, the latter having his right arm severed, when their greed for scrap metal and quick wealth led them to attempt to collect 20-mm. shells in the brief interval between firing passes by F-100D aircraft. But there is no need to go into detail about this incident, as it has already been described in the 313th Air Division History for January-June 1960.*

Colonel Risher, now acting as the 6313th ABW Commander, followed up Lieut. Colonel Stanton's letters to the Base Engineer on 14 March 1960 with a request that the U.S. Army Engineer District Okinawa be urged to evict immediately those farmers still farming within the Ie Shima Bombing Range danger zone. As a guideline for USAEDO in pursuing this onerous task, the 6313th Air Base Wing policy would permit any farmers expecting to harvest their crops before 1 June to continue cultivation and harvesting during those periods when the range was closed to aircraft, but all other farmers were to be evicted at the earliest possible date. At the same time, consideration would be given in January 1961 to permitting farmers whose crops matured at that time to return and harvest them, although no one would have been allowed to cultivate and otherwise care for them after the 1 June 1960 deadline. Finally, the recent accident involving Oshiro and Shimabuku made it imperative that swift steps be taken to post the danger zone and evict the farmers. To facilitate these measures, Colonel Risher desired the Base Engineer to give these projects his "personal attention."⁸⁰

At the same time that Air Force officials were concerned with the vital need to uproot the local people from the bombing range as soon as possible, the Okinawa Times was also expressing anxiety over the possibility of repetitions of the March 10th tragedy. For, despite the grim example furnished by that incident, the shell collectors were again to be seen on

the range every day, playing their deadly game of outguessing the jets. Indeed, there could be no denying the accuracy of one islander's explanation that "once a man gets a taste for empty shell collection, it is hard to go back to any other employment."

As the Times saw it, however, turning empty shells into two or three dollars a day might be "easy money indeed," but nothing was "more unprofitable than empty shell collecting; for the very life is at stake."

Even while it was condemning the collecting of shells in the intervals between jet fighter firing passes, the Okinawa Times expressed its understanding of the motivating force which caused the people of Ie Shima to risk their lives in this way--poverty. If they could secure jobs that paid well, "they would not be tempted to go shell collecting, but they cannot find such a job." As a result of the extensive requisitioning of the land on Ie Shima, jobs were quite scarce, making it only natural that the people--especially young men--should divert their energies into the only other available channel for making money, the collection of empty shells. Said the writer, "we are sorry for them, and we sympathize with them."

If trouble arose either from the shooting of Ie Shimans attempting to collect scrap discharged by the maneuvering aircraft or from the banning of the range to all of the local populace, "the American forces [would] have to answer charges." Admittedly, it was a very complicated situation; for, if entrance to the range were restricted severely, some of the islanders would be unable to support themselves. On the other hand, the scrap collectors might be able to reach an agreement among themselves in such wise as to make the collection of shells less risky than heretofore.⁸¹

CHOKO KUWAE (LEFT)
OKINAWA LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY REPRESENTATIVE IN
THE GRI LEGISLATURE FOR KOZA CITY AND CHATAN-SON



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A persistent rumor--given unwarranted currency by Shoko Ahagon and his little coterie of irreconcilables--had it that most of the landowners on Ie Shima were opposed to leasing their land to the U.S. military. To check the accuracy of this story, GRI sent the Director of its Legal Affairs Department, Ryojun Kugai, to Ie Shima on 2 March 1960. With him--though not necessarily at Kugai's suggestion--went Choko Kuwae, the extrovert, mustachioed Chairman of the Military Requisitioned Land Federation, who was also Vice-Chairman of the Association for the Acquisition of Pre-Peace Treaty (28 April 1952) Damage Compensation. Kuwae had been an unsuccessful candidate for election to the Ryukyuan Legislature from the 11th (Koza City) Electoral District on the Ryukyu Democratic Party ticket in 1956, but in the election of November 1960 (which still lay several months ahead in the future) he would emerge victorious in the same district, this time wearing the colors of the newly-formed Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party. (He was not a candidate in 1958.)⁸²

With his customary meticulousness for detail and striving for accuracy, Ryojun Kugai not only examined the official records of the Ie-Son office but also talked to many landowners on the island before returning to Okinawa. Thus, it was with considerable authority that he addressed the assembled department directors of the GRI Executive Branch on 10 March. According to his report, of the entire 7,667 parcels of land (constituting 75 per cent of the entire area of Ie Shima) which the military had acquired, the landowners had already entered into a contract with the military for 7,074--or 92 per cent of the whole. In addition, Kugai had found that there were 291 other parcels for which no contract had yet been formally concluded, owing to procedural obstacles, but whose owners desired to conclude a contract

as soon as possible. Therefore, it could be said that the owners of 96 per cent of all the parcels requisitioned by the Air Force were willing to lease their land, leaving only 27 landowners, controlling 150 parcels, who were opposed to signing a land lease contract with the military. This was certainly a far cry from the wholesale resistance to land requisition which Ahagon and his left-wing cohorts were wont to describe.⁸³

On 25 March 1960, Lieut. Colonel John W. Etter, the Kadena Base Engineer, wrote his superior at this headquarters that he had received the data concerning the land presently under cultivation within the target area of the bombing range which Mayor Tamashiro had promised to collect at the conference of 25 February. With this document in hand (and translated into English), he desired the 313th Civil Engineer to take "necessary and immediate action" with USAEDO to remove the Ie Shiman farmers from within the danger area bounded by the bulldozed trail.

In the future he proposed that those farmers expecting to harvest crops prior to 1 June 1960 would be allowed to cultivate them whenever the range was closed to aircraft. Upon completion of the present harvest, these farmers would not be permitted any further farming. A point of entry and exit would be established by range officials, and all farmers would have to enter through this point and proceed directly to their fields. Their presence on any other portion of the range was definitely prohibited. All other farmers were to be evicted at the earliest possible date. In January 1961 consideration would be given to allowing the farmers whose crops matured at that time to return and harvest them.

The Air Force was conducting controlled burning on weekends and on other days when the range was closed to aircraft, weather permitting, and

in so doing it was taking "extreme care" to limit the burning to small areas and to avoid the destruction of crops, trees, and other improvements.

The collection of scrap within the boundaries of the land leased to the Air Force was to be prohibited, any individuals other than those few farmers authorized entry who might be apprehended within the limits of the range established by the bulldozed trail would be considered trespassers and would be prosecuted.⁸⁴

On 6 April the Chief of the USAEDO Real Estate Division, Mr. J. E. Walther, requested the USCAR Land Division to notify his office when the Ie Shimans farming the area within the bulldozed trail had been removed.⁸⁵

The first hint that the speedy action desired by the Air Force might not materialize came nine days later in USCAR's indorsement to USAEDO that Chief Executive Seisaku Ota of GRI had been requested to "formally advise the Ie-Son Mayor of the clearance requirement within the Ie Shima Bombing and Gunnery Range."⁸⁶ This action--or rather, the announced intention to take such action--was conveyed to the 313th Civil Engineer by USAEDO on 20 April 1960.⁸⁷

Lieut. Colonel William W. Robertson, the 313th Civil Engineer, thereupon enclosed the District Engineer's correspondence, with its accompanying indorsements, in a letter to the 6313th Base Engineer on 26 April, apprising him that USCAR had "formally advised the Ie-Son Mayor of the clearance requirement by Air Force, within the Ie Shima Bombing and Gunnery Range."⁸⁸

While Director Kugai of the GRI Legal Affairs Department was employing statistics to emphasize the willingness of the people of Ie Shima to lease their land to the Air Force, and the 313th Civil Engineer was attempting

to get the farmers out of the target area while adhering to proper "channels" in his endeavor, some Air Force officials were weighing the desirability of releasing unused requisitioned land on Ie Shima to its native owners.

On 4 April 1960, Lieut. Colonel Etter wrote the 6313th Wing Commander, calling attention to the large area occupied by unusable airfield facilities left over from World War II, when the U.S. grand plan for the subjugation of Japan had called for the construction of two heavy and two medium bomber runways on Ie Shima. The abrupt termination of hostilities in August 1945 had caused one of the medium bomber runways to be deleted from the scheme of things, but the other three runways were completed before that year's end.

The longest of the three strips, a coral-surfaced runway 7,100 feet long, 100 feet wide, and 157,777 square yards in size,* was being carried on the Kadena real property accountable records, but it was unusable. The same was true of the coral-surfaced former medium bomber runway, which was 5,200 feet long, 150 feet wide, and 86,666 square yards in area; the coral-surfaced operational apron, with widths of 360 feet, 400 feet, and 480 feet, and lengths of 1,400 feet, 500 feet, and 400 feet; and a runway access taxiway, also coral-surfaced, which was 50 feet wide and covered 484,444 square yards. The only usable portion of the old airfield was the 7,000-foot primary runway, which was a bituminous surface laid over a coral base. Its width was 150 feet, and its area was 111,666 square yards. Colonel Etter pointed out that the other elements of the airfield were either non-existent or unrecognizable. In view of this condition, as well as the impending relocation of the farmers from within the boundaries of the bombing range,

*Multiplying 7,100 by 100 feet, one does not arrive at a figure of 157,777 square yards, but this is the figure contained in the letter signed by Lieut. Colonel Etter.

he recommended that these four items be dropped from the real property accountable records by abandonment in place.

Before final action was taken on his recommendation, however, Colonel Etter suggested that "a board of disinterested rated officers" be appointed to survey the area and review his recommendation to abandon these items of real property just as they were. Upon their findings being approved, a request form for approval of the disposal of buildings and improvements would be prepared and forwarded through channels for approval at Headquarters, USAF.

Colonel Risher turned the letter over to Lieut. Colonel Stanton, his D/O, who indorsed it to the 1962d Airways and Air Communications Service (AACS) Group, the organization having jurisdiction over the AIRCOM Receiver Site on Ie Shima, with the suggestion that it might be possible to release some of the land presently leased but not being used by that facility. As the first step in this direction, he requested that the 1962d indicate on a map of Ie Shima the group's present and projected requirements for leased land thereon, coordinating its action with the Kadena Base Engineer.⁹⁰

Lieutenant Colonel Lawson P. Wynne, the Commander, 1962d AACS Group, replied on 26 April 1960 that he had indicated on an attached map of Ie Shima the portion of the airfield occupied by the unit's antennas. In addition, he had attached another map showing the location of the receiver building and all the antennas, including two antennas for a proposed Osan circuit, whose actual future location was subject to change as the result of a terrain survey yet to be made.

Ie Shima had been originally selected for the AIRCOM Receiver Site because it offered an extremely quiet location from the standpoint of man-

made radio interference, as well as because the area around the antennas was not built up. The same principles would now apply to the release of any land near the antennas. As an example of this, the erection of an industrial plant using electrical machinery near the antennas could completely ruin radio reception. Accordingly, he stipulated that all land within 2,000 feet of any antenna must be restricted to farming, and, even then, only dry crop farming could be permitted within the antenna field itself. Rather unexpectedly, however, Colonel Wynne actually encouraged dry crop farming, since this meant that vegetation would be kept to a reasonable height--a condition not necessarily true of natural vegetation untended by man. At the same time, though, the 1962d people must be free to inspect the antennas, make any required repairs, and install new antennas at any time, without liability for any damage the crops might suffer. Of course, the farmers could be assured that the military personnel would make every effort to keep such damage to a minimum. In closing, he reiterated that the release of land should be restricted to that situated beyond the 2,000-foot radius referred to above.⁹¹

On 8 April 1960, Captain Edward W. Skaggs, Jr., the Officer-in-Charge of the Training Section of the 6313th Operations Squadron, wrote his commander that "The situation at Ie Shima so far as security is concerned has become intolerable. The local indigenous personnel roam the range at will, destroying targets and generally making a nuisance of themselves."

Experience had taught that the infiltrators could not be controlled with the existing security resources. Additional security guards could be hired, but Captain Skaggs seriously doubted that enough of them could be obtained to keep the clever scrap collectors off the range. The problem was like that of keeping ants out of a sugar bowl; for, as he bemoaned,

"They deploy onto the range from the sea as well as the land. They come onto the range when actual firing is in progress. They hide in the tall grass and cannot be seen from the tower." As many of his predecessors had discovered, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's pilots were greatly hampered in their training by the frequent necessity for shutting down the range until the intruders could be run off or caught.

The solution, as he saw it, was to introduce enough sentry dogs and handlers to make possible a 24-hour-a-day patrol. The range seemed "an ideal place for this type security measure," and Captain Skaggs was "sure that a test of this would prove most beneficial."⁹² The 6313th Operations Squadron Commander, Major Frank Zdybel, indorsed the captain's letter on up to the 6313th Air Base Wing with the comment that the measure proposed "could possibly alleviate the situation." Therefore, he requested that "favorable consideration be given to . . . using sentry dogs."⁹³

The Sabotage Incident of 8 April 1960: Out on Ie Shima, on the same day, coincidentally, that Captain Skaggs recommended that sentry dogs be sent to the bombing range, the more truculent citizenry were inadvertently providing ammunition to support his arguments for taking such a strong measure.

Early on the morning of 8 April, Technical Sergeant Walter B. Smith, the NCOIC of the Ie Shima Bombing Range, left the AIRCOM Receiver Site building, where he and the other range personnel lived, and proceeded to the range, where he started the generators at approximately 0710I hours. Upon his arrival at the skip-bomb area, where he put up the targets each day, Sergeant Smith noticed that some 30 of the white-painted tires used as markers were missing. Investigating more closely, he found that they had been thrown or rolled over a nearby embankment, at the bottom of which

they could be seen, retrievable—but only at the expenditure of some toil. Next, he found that the holes for the skip-bomb targets had been filled with rocks and coral. Still later, as the NCOIC approached the strafing targets around 0830I, he saw some Ie Shimans, but he was unable to chase them away, though they kept a respectful distance between themselves and him.

At Sergeant Smith's direction, an airman of the detachment telephoned the desk sergeant at Kadena's 6313th Air Police Squadron soon afterward, advising him of the damage to the skip-bomb targets and the presence of defiant natives on the strafing range. Somewhere in the course of the conversation the desk sergeant gained the erroneous impression that approximately 25 natives were in the skip-bomb area and refusing to leave.

For reasons best known to himself, the desk sergeant did not get around to notifying the 6313th Director of Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Stanton, until 1300. The latter phoned Ie Shima at 1320 to obtain additional information concerning the incident and was told by an airman manning one of the range towers that 25 natives had indeed been observed on the range. With this information in hand, Colonel Stanton informed the Base Commander, Colonel Glenn T. Eagleston, of the situation. The upshot was a meeting of the wing staff at 1340 hours, out of which came a decision to dispatch a group of air police to Ie Shima. Captain Elihu N. Root, who headed the tiny task force of two enlisted air police, nine Ryukyuan security guards, and an interpreter, was instructed to apprehend any indigenous personnel found on the range after 1600 hours, as well as any persons interfering with the mission of the range. They were to remain at the scene as long as there seemed to be a threat to the security of the range.

Meantime, around 1300 hours, as the jet aircraft of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing continued their scheduled practice sweeps, except for skip-bombing exercises, one of the airmen and a Ryukyuan security guard assigned to Ie Shima had gone in pursuit of seven natives seen loitering near the strafing target. As the pair approached, however, the trespassers jumped into their waiting boats and moved a short distance off shore, immune to the best efforts of the guards to capture them.

Upon the arrival of Captain Root's task force, the range officer called a halt to the F-100 runs, in order that the air police could comb the range for the intruders. As might have been expected, none were found.

A little later, the Chief of the Motobu District Police, Ryohei Nakayoshi, arrived at Ie Shima with 17 policemen, having boarded the patrol boat Asakaze ("Morning Breeze") soon after receiving a report of serious trouble between the American military and the local people on the island. After he had been briefed on the situation by Sergeant Smith and Captain Root, however, Chief Nakayoshi realized that the report was grossly exaggerated and that what he had to deal with was only a minor disturbance.

There being nothing more that could be done at this time, Captain Root recalled his troops late in the afternoon and went to the Receiver Site compound, where he phoned Colonel Stanton for instructions. The latter replied that Colonel Eagleston had directed that sentry dogs be employed on the range--immediately, if possible. Captain Root stated that the canine gendarmerie could be deployed on the Ie Shima beat the following morning, April 9th, and would probably comprise six dogs.

The Assistant Information Officer for the 313th Air Division, who had

accompanied the air police to Ie Shima, was told by Sergeant Smith that recent days had witnessed such activities on the part of the hostile natives as slitting of the cloth strafing targets, cutting of the telephone wires linking the observation towers, placing of rocks across the runway on which incoming aircraft had to land, damaging of the skip-bombing target by removal of the painted tires and filling of the target post holes, and entering the observation towers at night to destroy the property inside. The cause of this increase in sabotage he surmised to be a result of the intensified efforts to keep all natives off the bombing range.⁹⁴

The First Steps Are Taken for the Release of Airfield Real Property.

It will be remembered that back on 4 April the Base Engineer had recommended to the 6313th Air Base Wing Commander that a "disinterested board of rated officers" be appointed to survey various unused portions of the Ie Shima airfield. Colonel Eagleston had adopted the recommendation and appointed a board of rated officers drawn from the staffs of both the 6313th ABW Headquarters and that of the 313th Air Division. As the board pursued their investigation, they found that one of the unused runways and part of a taxiway located on the west end of the airfield were within the limits of the bombing range, while a portion of the taxiways on the east end of the airfield were included within the antenna fan which supported the AIRCOM facility. Not only were these airfield pavements unusable; in many instances they were even unrecognizable. In addition, being constructed only of impacted coral, they were "completely beyond repair."

As the Base Engineer pointed out to PACAF in his letter of 10 October transmitting the AF Form 300 for disposal of the unusable portions of the

Ie Shima airfield pavements, the deletion of these runways and taxiways from the real property accountable records would enable the 6313th ABW "to extend the farming permits for the farms being relocated from within the boundaries of the bombing range." Furthermore, USCAR had indicated that efforts would be made "to restore as much of this area as possible to arable land."⁹⁵

The Base Engineer followed up this letter to PACAF with one to the Land Division at USCAR on 19 October in which the latter was informed that the abandoned airfield pavements had been deleted from the real property accountable records. In consequence of this action, the land in the affected area could now be recovered "for cultivation of any type crop desired, provided a 15-foot right-of-way be maintained adjacent to the active runway and access roads." In any case, the recovery of this land should "be accomplished at no expense to the United States Government." As for farming within the bombing range, the Air Force position on this subject remained unchanged.⁹⁶

The AIRCOM Receiver Site Makes Its Debut as a Trouble Spot.

"Woodman, Spare That Tree": On 12 September 1960, Mr. Long, Chief of the Appraisal Section of USAEDO's Real Estate Division, arrived at the Ie-Son office with three other officials and ordered the local authorities to clear all the trees located within the antenna farm of the AIRCOM Receiver Site, explaining that they interfered with reception of incoming communications. The area involved in the order comprised 500,000 tsubo (one tsubo equals approximately 36 square feet) and 1,337 lots.

In an attempt to ward off the directed tree cutting, Deputy Mayor Kamei Nakama of Ie-Son addressed a letter to Chief Executive Ota on the 14th, requesting that the tree clearance be canceled. If this was not possible, he hoped that the clearance action would be held to an absolute minimum,

rather than including all the trees. Although in future dealings with the U.S. military he was to prove the bluntest of men, Nakama-san evidently considered it expedient in dealing with a fellow-Ryukyuan to remember the admonition of the poet, Eugene Field:

Strive not to hew your path through life--it really doesn't pay;
Be sure the salve of flattery soaps all you do and say.
Herein the only royal road to fame and fortune lies:
Put not your trust in vinegar--molasses catches flies!

Whether he was acquainted with Eugene Field and his precepts or not, the Deputy Mayor offered his "heartly congratulations" on the manner in which GRI's forestry policy performance had "steadily maintained brilliant success" in the past two or three years.

As he described the island of Ie Shima in the immediate wake of the bitter battle fought there in 1945, it had been nothing more than "a burned field." Because of their obvious hostility, in conjunction with the U.S.'s need for the greater part of the island, every native remaining on Ie Shima had been evacuated to the island of Tokashiki Jima, in the Kerama Retto, at the instance of the Tenth Army Commanding General. Once permitted to return to their homes in 1947, however, they had formulated an afforestation policy in which all the inhabitants participated. As a result, the bleak, scorched earth of Ie Shima had eventually been transformed into a scene of green beauty, and vegetable produce had also increased in quantity. In fact, the son authorities had been planning second and even third afforestation plans at the time USAEDO's Mr. Long delivered his bitter tidings that an inspection to determine which trees required cutting would commence on 15 September.

Naturally, said Nakama-san, the people were "very worried." The area

in question was situated in the center of the son's farmland, and 40 farm houses had been located there since before the war. Living as they did in a tacitly-permitted farming area on military-requisitioned land, these families were dependent on farming for their livelihood. If the trees around their property were cut down, their fields would be exposed to typhoon winds and cold winter breezes, with consequent probability of crop failure. This, then, was "just the same as taking away their living," declared the Deputy Mayor. Besides, "cutting trees [would] hinder the afforestation plan."⁹⁷

"The Houses Must Go": In his indorsement of 26 April to the Base Engineer's letter of 4 April concerning the disposal of portions of the Ie Shima Airfield pavements, Lieut. Colonel Lawson P. Wynne, Commander of the 1962d AACS Group, had emphasized that the very reason for the Receiver Site's existence would be defeated if any factors producing electronic interference were permitted to come into being. Ie Shima had been chosen in preference to other places "because the area around the antennas was not built up." (Of course, the presence of a usable runway which could be utilized for logistic support must also have had considerable weight in Air Force planners' decision to locate the GLOBECOM Receiver Site on Ie Shima rather than on, say, one of the Kerama islands, which were situated just as conveniently geographically and were equally free from electronic interference.) He had also stipulated that only dry farming should be allowed within a minimum distance of 2,000 feet of any antenna in the AIRCOM field.

Now, on 18 October 1960, Colonel Wynne informed the 6313th Base Engineer that "several houses have been built in the Ie Shima receiver antenna

field, and electric power lines have been constructed to service these houses." Without specifying at what date he had first become aware of the existence of these houses, he declared that the "power line, transformer, and any equipment operated by this power line are a potential source of serious interference to reception." Therefore, he requested that the power lines be "immediately removed" from the antenna field and that the use of land within 2,000 feet of any antenna be restricted to dry farming.

Finally, with either ingenuous or simulated casualness, Colonel Wynne requested that "a relocation program be put in effect to remove the houses at least 2,000 feet from the antenna to provide access to the antennas and to permit the people to use electrical power in their homes."⁹⁸ It is almost certain that Colonel Wynne could not foresee the great difficulties that lay ahead in bringing about the removal of the squatter houses, but, at the same time, one finds it hard to believe that he really imagined that the houses which he and his subordinates had carelessly permitted to spring up in the antenna field could be casually exorcised by waving a wand or uttering an incantation of banishment.

On the very same day, 18 October, that Colonel Wynne asked the Kadena Base Engineer to evacuate the Ie Shiman squatters from the antenna farm, the Base Engineer was informing the 313th Civil Engineering Officer of his plan for licensing farming and gathering of firewood on Air Force-leased land at the Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield. According to the license which he proposed, it would be understood that agricultural activities would be restricted to dry farming within the AIRCOM antenna field, and the U.S. Government would not be liable for any damage the crops might sustain during maintenance or replacement of the individual antennas. As for the bombing

range, no farming of any kind would be permitted therein. The cutting of trees and the gathering of firewood would be strictly prohibited. An attached site plan of Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield was marked to indicate that all airfield paving had been deleted from the real property accountable records except for the one active runway; any of this hatched area could be reclaimed for cultivation of any type, at no expense to the U.S. Government.

In all cases, however, it was to be understood that the United States would not be responsible for damage to property or injuries to persons which might "arise from or be incident to the exercise of the privileges" granted, or for damages to the property of the licensees, or "for injuries to the person of the licensee's officers, agents, servants, or employees, or others who may be on said premises at the invitation of any of them, arising from governmental activities on the said premises."⁹⁹

The 313th Civil Engineering Officer forwarded this correspondence to Fifth Air Force on 1 November 1960 with the remark that "This headquarters interposes no objection to the licensing of Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield for farming as indicated in basic letter. Recommend approval."¹⁰⁰

In his turn, the Director of Construction at the Fuchu Air Station headquarters informed PACAF on 18 November that Fifth Air Force had "no objection to the licensing of Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield for farming as indicated in basic letter."¹⁰¹

Compensation Is Paid to Two Scrap Metal Collectors' Widows.

In the previous installment of this history devoted to the subject of Ie Shima, several pages were given over to an account of the deaths of two Maja-Ku scrap metal collectors--Seikan Ishikawa (28) and Ryotoku Higa (38)--on 6 September 1959, when a dud bomb the former had snatched from the bombing

range the previous afternoon and brought home exploded as they were engaged in dismantling it.* An innocent passerby, Hidehiro Chinen (26), incidentally, was injured severely enough to require 10 days' medical treatment.

Although it would be hard to imagine a weaker case for seeking redress, the widows of the two victims had sufficient gall to submit formal claims for compensation on 20 January 1960. Besides his 38-year-old widow, Tsuru, Ryotoku Higa had left behind five children and a blind father. Perhaps calculating her loss on the basis of the great burden thrust suddenly upon her, Tsuru Higa filed for \$11,640 in compensation. More inexplicable, then, is the sum which the widow of Seikan Ishikawa claimed. In her husband's act of involuntary suicide, he had left behind besides herself only one child, a nine-months-old daughter; yet she filed for \$13,940 in compensation. As though to complete the illogical circle, the innocent passerby Hidehiro Chinen, submitted no claim at all!

If ever the Air Force Claims Service had good reason to turn down a claim in its entirety, this would seem to have been such a case. The victims had trespassed on the bombing range in order to collect spent bombs or cartridges, in so doing exhibiting deliberate defiance of repeated warnings

* There was more than a bit of irony and even a trace of historical justice in the manner of passing of Seikan Ishikawa. Ever since the bombing range was first established, he had been one of the leaders of the opposition, an anti-American agitator, but, at the same time, a profiteer from its existence. Back on 11 January 1957 he had been one of 27 Ie Shimans filing claims for damages caused to their farmland, ranges, and forest by "seven or eight airmen from Kadena Air Force" who allegedly poured kerosene and gasoline over these areas, then set fire to them between 12-15 July 1956. More importantly, although Shoko Ahagon had prepared all of the claims, the "witness" listed on each of the 27 claims was Seikan Ishikawa. Yet, on each of the four occasions when the Claims Officer visited Ie Shima to conduct an investigation, Ishikawa was "both conveniently and mysteriously absent." Ahagon himself collected \$15.00 for the damage caused by the Air-Force-set fires, but Seikan Ishikawa, for all his cooperativeness in serving as a ubiquitous,

against entering an off-limits area. They had disregarded the rules of consideration for the safety of other people by taking the bomb home to the village. And they had violated the basic dictates of self-preservation by attacking the bomb with a hammer. In fact, so weak was their case that the two widows, even with the eager assistance of the professional agitators' entente, led by Shoko Ahagon, were unable to present any relevant argument to justify the Air Force in paying them compensation. This being so, they had fallen back on the emotional argument that "It is because our lands have been taken away without our consent that we are obliged to eke out our meager existence by collecting scrap metal. The incident of this time is the tragedy of those who lost their lands."

Apparently, however, expediency won the day. Since the amounts claimed by the two women exceeded the maximum figure which First Lieutenant Julius C. Ullerich, the one-man Foreign Claims Commission AF-12 at this headquarters, was permitted to award, the two claims went forward to the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, for processing. Considerations of political repercussions probably weighed heavily in the decision--the election for the GRI Legislature would be coming up on 13 November 1960, and the less ammunition the Leftist organizations had, the better it would be for the candidates of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party--for on 15 October 1960, Lieut. Colonel Robert E. Lee, Chief of the Claims Service, notified the claimants that they were to be paid, though not as much as they had sought. Tsuru Higa had been awarded \$2,797.60, while Tsune Ishikawa would receive \$2,244.60.

Both widows expressed dissatisfaction with the amounts awarded them,

argus-eyed witness, was given exactly nothing! (Memorandum Opinion by 1st Lieut. Harry O. Hinz, Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12, sub.: Multiple Claims Arising from Alleged Fire and/or Bombing Damage on the Island of Ie Shima, Ryukyu Islands, under the provisions of AFR 112-6, 31 Jan. 1957). He

but at last decided to accept the proffered compensation, figuring that if the settlement of their cases dragged on further, it was only they themselves who would be the losers in the long run. On 5 December 1960 they accepted the checks.

After receiving the payment, the two women attempted to show their appreciation for the moral support they had received in pursuing their claims to a successful conclusion by donating \$15.00 to the Okinawa Welfare Council for the expressed purpose of helping needy people.¹⁰²

Military Land Requisition Brings Prosperity as well as Tragedy to Ie Shima.

In the first part of December 1960, a reporter for the Ryukyu Shimpo was sent to Ie Shima to learn at first hand what effect the U.S. military requisition of land was having on the economy of the island. As background for the story he hoped to get, he already knew that "the greater part of Ie Shima" had been requisitioned by the Japanese military during World War II for the construction of an airfield--which, by the way, never did them any good in resisting the invasion of Okinawa--though most natives were prone to forget this fact when blithely engaged in denouncing the U.S. Forces' requisition of much of the island. Making their revilement all the more unfair was the historical fact that the Air Force paid compensation for every tsubo of land requisitioned, while the Japanese military had paid nothing. In addition, many Ie Shiman farmers were tacitly permitted to pursue their agricultural vocation on the very land for which they received rental payments from the U.S. Government, as long as the latter had no immediate use for it. Nevertheless, it was not this picture which the

had claimed \$234.44. (Memo. Opinion by Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-8, sub.: AMFPA/SAMAP/57-118 thru AMFPA/SAMAP/57-144, Multiple Claims Arising from Alleged Fire and/or Bombing in the Island of Ie-Shima, Ryukyu Islands, 11 July 1957).

people of Ie Shima and most politically-minded visitors presented to the outside world. Rather, it was a depiction of an island where 65 per cent of the land had been taken over for use by the United States, where forced evacuation of homes was commonplace, and where tragedies involving the death or injury of scrap collectors abounded.

Reporter Azuma quickly discovered upon entering Ie Shima that one could find many things which were not in consonance with its reputation as "the tragic island." A total of 3,401.5 acres had been requisitioned. For these the Air Force paid the landowners annual rental of approximately \$180,000. In addition, on 30 November some \$70,000 in 10-year advance payments had been paid. Thus, each household on Ie Shima had received, on the average, more than \$200 as military land rental in 1960, and a few individuals were paid around \$10,000.*

Another factor contributing to a prosperity the inhabitants were reluctant to acknowledge and for which they even felt embarrassment was the continuing high price commanded by black sugar. The 50-ton-per-day sugar manufacturing plant run by the Ie Agricultural Cooperative paid from \$23.57 to \$21.10 per ton for sugar cane, according to the sugar content as measured by the Brix scale, which meant that it brought from \$2.00 to \$1.50 more per ton than did cane on the mainland of Okinawa. Moreover, thanks to a typhoon-less season, the island was expected to produce approximately 150,000 kilograms (150 tons) of sugar, just twice the output of the year 1959, when Typhoons Charlotte and Emma had both hit. Since most of the sugar cane farmers preferred to deposit their receipts with the Ie Agricultural Cooperative

*A check with the Real Estate Office of the Okinawa Engineer District disclosed that one Ryozen Gima, of Agarie-Mae Village, did receive \$8,064.40 in 1960 as 10-year pre-paid rental for 12 lots comprising 8,439 tsubo (6.89 acres) on Lease 254.

because of their financially sound condition, that organization had \$300,000 cash on hand as of 30 November 1960.

Naturally enough, Okinawan businessmen were not slow to detect this new-sprung prosperity and to seek ways of tapping it to their own advantage. Hardly a day went by that bank officers did not visit Ie Shima to seek deposits of the growing wealth in their institutions, or salesmen did not arrive to sell their products—electrical appliances in particular. Although the island numbered only 1,400 households, they already possessed seven television sets, four tractors, eight cultivators, eight trimobiles, and seven hundred bicycles. So fertile was Ie Shima as a field for potential sales that warm competition was evident between the salesmen representing various Naha firms in the sale of radios, electric washers, and television sets. Another sign of good times was the appearance in rapid succession of bars, restaurants, and "other drinking establishments."

A third source of income for the islanders was tourism. In recent months the number of visitors coming to Ie Shima simply to see the place had risen to some 100 a week, and, according to Azuma's informants, "The money spent by such tourists on this island is never a small amount." So lucrative seemed the tourist potential, in fact, that Ie-Son officials were giving serious thought to the construction of a vessel which would be operated with that specific trade in mind, by the local government.¹⁰³

It should not be supposed, however, that this unconcealable prosperity brought contentment and satisfaction with their lot to the people of Ie Shima. "Man never is, but always to be, blest," Alexander Pope has shrewdly remarked. So it was with the good citizens of Ie Shima. Happiness lay ever just beyond the horizon.

Five months earlier, 36 islanders had submitted a petition to the USCAR Land Tribunal, asking that their combined annual rentals of \$10,013 be increased nearly eleven-fold, to \$109,220, on the ground that their lands had been improperly and poorly graded and classified by the military. On 13 December 1960, however, John P. King, the president of the USCAR Land Tribunal, denied the plaintiffs' petition, declaring that they were getting "fair and adequate rentals" and that their lands were "registered in a proper grade and classification." Further, ruled King, "The lands are now of the same registered grade and classification as they were when taken by the United States 15 years ago."

Under the procedures of the USCAR Land Tribunal, any petitioners not satisfied with a decision could appeal to the Secretary of Defense or his designee in the Pentagon. This, the 36 Ie Shimans indicated, was precisely what they planned to do.¹⁰⁴

An Ie Shiman Farmer Has Two Close Brushes with Errant Bombs.

Around 0930 hours on 2 December 1960, Captain Max L. Pettyjohn of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron was engaged in bombing practice at the Ie Shima Bombing Range, when he released a 25-lb. MD-6 practice bomb (a type containing a five-ounce spotting charge) which accidentally landed outside the target area in the yard of a farmer, Seicho Ogido, in Nichi-Agarie Village. Although the missile missed the latter's house by some 45 feet, a hole approximately eight inches in diameter was born in the cement tile roof, while a pit approximately three feet in diameter and five feet deep was dug in the farmland. The 313th Air Division Claims Officer, who visited the scene of the incident as soon as he learned of it, found the foregoing material damage, but was relieved to discover "no visible personal injuries"

to the occupants of the house. The Ogido home was located on military-leased land.

Some discreetly anonymous person unobservant of the ways of nature once stated that "Lightning never strikes twice in the same place." How wrong he could be was demonstrated at 1105 hours on 13 December 1960, when an F-100D piloted by Major Woodfin M. Sullivan, the Commander of the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, inadvertently dropped a similar MD-6 practice bomb in Seicho Ogido's yard, this time only some three feet away from the wall of his house. The bombing range people who visited the scene reported that no damage had been done, but the Kadena Claims Officer, who sought to forestall any future claims by paying a personal inspection visit to the site, observed a hole in the ground approximately six inches in diameter and five feet deep.

For some inexplicable reason, no mention of the earlier incident had been made in the Japanese-language papers on Okinawa, and the usually articulate anti-American clique on Ie Shima ignored it completely. When lightning struck the second time, however, both Naha dailies got wind of it, but even then were evidently unaware of the earlier wild bomb release. The Ryukyu Shimpo, habitually moderate in its views, reported that no one was injured, but that "considerable damages" were said to have been done to the crops on the Ogido farm. It also mentioned that the farm was situated on military-leased land. This fact in itself made the offense less heinous.

That same afternoon, 13 December, an investigation group from the 313th Air Division headed by Colonel John H. deRussy, the Vice Commander, flew out to Ie Shima to inspect the damage and endeavor to placate the much-abused Ogido family. Upon their arrival, Colonel deRussy conveyed his regrets to Mr. Ogido and Mayor Otomatsu Tamashiro of Ie-Son, saying, "I am pleased that there was no damage to the house or the occupants. A warning has been

issued by the Commander to all Air Force personnel, so as to prevent any similar incidents in the future."¹⁰⁵

On 15 December 1960, Seicho Ogido submitted a claim for \$897.80 as compensation for the errant bomb of 2 December. Of this total, \$555.80 was for repair of the house, \$91.00 for the cost of restoring the damaged farm land, \$51.50 for the growing crops destroyed, and \$200.00 for injury to his wife, Hisako.

For some reason, Ogido waited until 3 February 1961 to submit his claim for the misfire of 13 December 1960. In this case he was more modest in his demands, asking only \$500.00. While alleging no actual damage, he requested \$200.00 in compensation for the invasion of his property and \$300.00 for the emotional effect on the family as a whole resulting from the second off-range release's following so closely on the heels of the earlier incident.

Various Air Force investigators had visited the incident scene on the same days the two wild drops occurred, but the 313th Air Division Claims Officer supplemented their reports with a personal visit on 12 April 1961. Turning first to the \$50.00 claim for damage to sugar-cane (another \$1.50 had been claimed for damage to the peas and potatoes), First Lieutenant Del B. Rowe obtained an admission from Ogido-san that he had not actually had a crop planted in the area in question at the time of the incident; however, the farmer asserted that he had been prevented from cultivating there by the sour sub-soil strewn over the prepared land by the practice bombs.

In support of his claim for \$200.00 solatium for his wife, Ogido-san stated that she had been standing approximately 20 meters (65.6 feet) from the spot where the bomb hit and was knocked down by the impact. While alleging

no actual physical injury, he maintained that this traumatic experience was sure to cause her emotional disturbance in the future.

Because of the "unsupported and unrealistic" allegations of damage to the house, Lieutenant Rowe requested that a professional estimate be made to arrive at an accurate and equitable figure. The representatives from the Base Engineer's Office found no structural damage or lessening of the life expectancy of the dwelling; therefore, even employing a very liberal rule of thumb, they estimated that \$84.00 would cover all costs of repairs.

Regarding the \$200.00 solatium claim for Hisako Ogido, the Claims Officer considered it "unlikely that she could actually have been knocked to the ground by the explosion of the spotting charge contained in the MD-6." Besides, photographs taken of her immediately after the accident, as well as the statements of persons who had been there within five minutes after the bomb drop, established that she had suffered no actual injury.

In the matter of restoring the farm land, Lieutenant Rowe approved the method of computation established by the claims investigator and allowed Ogido-san a total of \$49.50--\$1.00 for the cost of a tractor, \$15.00 for breaking the soil, \$30.00 for tilling and turning the soil, and \$3.50 for fertilizer. Altogether, then, he was prepared to pay \$185.00 in settlement of the two claims by Seicho Ogido.¹⁰⁶

Since the two claims fell within the maximum figure for which Foreign Claims Commission AF-12 at Headquarters, 313th Air Division, could exercise jurisdiction, Lieutenant Rowe, the one-man commission, was authorized to make a determination of just what amount should be paid or whether any amount at all should be paid to the claimant. Nevertheless, being aware of the

importance of the political aspect of almost any matter involving Ryukyuans, he deemed it wise to consult the USCAR Legal Division before attempting any settlement with Ogido.

As a result of the advice thus received, Lieutenant Rowe reversed his original position and ruled that the two claims were denied entirely. As a basis for this rejection, he pointed out that Seicho Ogido's farm was situated on property leased by the Air Force from its Ie Shiman owners, these leasehold rights being "in all practicality a fee simple determinable interest in the property for the purpose of a Bombing Range." Consequently, the Air Force possessed "the sole right of control and entry on the property." True, Ie Shimans had been issued licenses to till the soil in the lands outside the target area but within the limits of the Air Force leasehold. But in no instance had the Air Force granted licenses to build houses, sheds, and barns on the property; and these farmers, including Ogido-san, had been told "time and time again" that they were farming at their own risk and accepting the hazards inseparable from the Air Force's mission in the area. Furthermore, Ogido was receiving the benefits of both his farming activities and the rental paid by the Air Force for the use of his land.

The legal people at USCAR additionally cited as grounds for denying the two claims the terms of HICOM Ordinance No. 20, "Acquisition of Leasehold Interest," dated 12 February 1959, which stated that no lands leased by the United States would be restored nor damages paid in lieu of restoration until the United States should terminate its estate in the leased lands.¹⁰⁷ On 11 May 1961, accordingly, Seicho Ogido was notified that both of his claims were disapproved in their entirety.¹⁰⁸

When one recalls that the widows of Seikan Ishikawa and Ryotoku Higa were awarded sizeable compensation sums for the deaths of their husbands

through circumstances of the victims' own contriving and with certain knowledge that they were engaged in the riskiest kind of enterprise, it may seem inconsistent that the Ogido claim for compensation was rejected out of hand. However, the probable explanation--aside from the fact that different claims officers were dealing with the two cases, that little publicity had attended the off-range releases, as contrasted with the extensive adverse publicity accompanying the deaths of the two scrap collectors, and that political considerations were this time not so important, since the OLDP had placed 22 of its candidates in the 29-seat Legislature and the next election would not occur until November 1962--the probable explanation, we say, is that Ogido's case was greatly weakened by his home's being built on Air Force-leased land, that his farm was similarly permissive in nature, and that the avarice which he had evidenced in his extravagant demand for compensation tended to turn U.S. officials against him.

Seicho Ogido may or may not have been approached and advised by the Ahagon anti-American clique at Maja-Ku, but whatever the influencing factors, on 7 June 1961 he addressed a bitter letter to Foreign Claims Commission AF-12, appealing for a reconsideration of his claims and asserting that Proclamation No. 20, under the terms of which the United States had requisitioned his land, was an act of confiscation.

Lieutenant Rowe paused long enough to formulate the wording of his reply, then wrote Ogido 48 days later, on 25 July 1961, that the latter's sentiments concerning the United States were "indeed unfortunate" and suggested that he contact "Ie Shima Okinawa Government Officials" (whoever or whatever they were!) to voice his grievances, if he still felt that he had been dealt with unjustly. However, said the lieutenant, with respect to

Ogido's claims for damages, "this Commission stands by its previous determination."¹⁰⁹

Ryofuku Henzan Is Killed on the Bombing Range on 1 February 1961.

At approximately 1700 hours on 1 February 1961, a 26-year-old farmer of Maja Village named Genichi Nakasone was descending a dirt path which led down the 60-foot cliffs adjoining the Ie Shima Bombing Range to gather water from the East China Sea. As he did so, he noticed someone in the bushes some 150 meters distant, inside the bombing range danger zone as indicated by a series of concrete boundary markers. Before the war this area had been the site of Yabaru Sub-Village (Sho-Aza-Yabaru), and, even though any remnant of the place had long since vanished, the local people still identified it by the old name. Scrap metal collectors were a commonplace sight on the bombing range--even though it was off-limits--and he would probably have thought nothing more about the vague figure, had a jet aircraft not come whizzing overhead from his left rear just after he had walked some five meters down the path.

As soon as the plane had passed, Nakasone saw smoke on the ground in the area where the unidentified person had been standing. Sensing that something was amiss, he waited about five minutes, half expecting and hoping to see the dim figure reappear. Then, filled with an ominous premonition that he had just been a witness to tragedy, he raced toward the spot where the other had been standing. Because of the distance and the high grass and brush, Nakasone was unable at first to find anything; but, after some 10 minutes' searching, he came upon the body of a man whom he recognized as a 20-year-old Maja villager, Ryofuku Henzan,* from his build and his

*His name was also variously transliterated from the Japanese kanji characters as Rifoku Hiyanzan, Ryofoku, and Heanzan.

hair, even though he was lying face down and Nakasone was apparently too fearful of what he would see to attempt to turn him over.

Nakasone leaned down and shook his friend, calling him by name about three times as he did so, but received no answer. Although no blood was visible, the Maja farmer was now coldly certain that something was seriously wrong. Afraid to investigate further with no witness at hand to lend moral support--and probably pretty sure that Henzan was dead--he hurried away, intending to go the victim's home. On the way, however, he ran into a fellow-villager, Chuei Chinen, Chairman of the Maja-Ku Youth Association, and related what had just happened to the latter. On Chinen's advice, they hastened to the home of Ryofoku's uncle, Riyoyu Henzan,* who, upon learning of the accident, sent Chinen to get Doctor Asato, while he and Nakasone returned to the scene of the tragedy.

After approximately 10 minutes, Riyoyu Henzan went back home, without waiting for the doctor to arrive. Genichi Nakasone, left alone with the dead man, became frightened and hurried straight home.¹¹⁰

In all this, it will be noted that no one thought of notifying the police of the occurrence of a serious accident. However, a Mr. Shuan Yamashiro heard two children discussing it (they had probably overheard either Chuei Chinen or Riyoyu Henzan telling someone about) and reported it to the local policeman, Sergeant Tomiya Gushiken, of the Ie Branch of the Motobu District Police Station at 1845 hours. The latter thereupon notified Technical Sergeant Charles R. Nunley, of the 6313th Operations Squadron, who was stationed on the island as NCOIC of the range, at 1900.

*Although Riyoyu Henzan was referred to as Ryofoku's uncle by the villagers, it seems that he was actually only his half-uncle, Riyoyu being one of five natural children born of a long liaison between Ryofoku's grandfather, Ryoichi Henzan, and a Maja Village woman, Matsu Yamashiro.

Nunley informed the NCOIC of the Air Police detachment on Ie Shima, Staff Sergeant Donald Broxon, who contacted Doctor Shiyoichiro Asato to ask him to accompany them to the accident scene. The doctor already knew of the incident as a result of having been informed by Chinen, but he evidently had no intention of entering the off-limits range unless requested to do so by U.S. officials. Upon arriving at the scene at 1955 hours, Dr. Asato pronounced Henzan dead. Although he could not determine the cause of death, the evidence indicated that some fast-moving projectile had entered the victim's left side, destroying the left elbow, and had passed through the body at an upward angle, exiting at the right armpit.

The fatal projectile could not be found, but all evidence available pointed to a 25-lb., five-inch-diameter skip-bomb's having been the lethal agent; for an F-100 aircraft had flown a skip-bombing mission at 1705 hours-- by coincidence, the last one that day--and its line of approach to the target, located southwest of the accident site, would have brought the jet directly across the victim's position.¹¹¹

If Genichi Nakasone's sworn testimony were not enough to prove that the victim had been in a forbidden area at a time when it was obviously very unsafe to be there, Sergeant Gushiken learned that Henzan had last been seen leaving his home around 1630 hours, 1 February, only some 30 or 35 minutes before he was killed. In addition, Gushiken stated that he knew that Henzan had been on the bombing range collecting scrap on numerous occasions.¹¹²

As soon as the opportunity presented itself, Sergeant Broxon telephoned the Air Police desk at Kadena AB to inform officials there of the accident.

AIR POLICE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE BODY

OF

RYOFUKU HENZAN



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As a result, Staff Sergeant Richard E. Wood, Investigator for the 6313th Air Police Squadron, Special Agent Thomas Scanlon, Jr., of District Office No. 43, Office of Special Investigations (O.S.I.), and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Peters, the 313th Air Division Information Officer, boarded a helicopter at 2130 hours. Arriving at the Ie Shima Bombing Range some 20 minutes later, the party proceeded directly to the scene of the accident, where they found Henzan's body lying face down in high susuki grass (also known in the Orient as Japanese pampas grass, and by botanists as miscanthus sinensis), the head toward the southwest and the feet toward the northeast. Flash bulbs were used to take photographs of the body and the immediate area. Although it was too dark to do any measuring of distances that night, when Sergeant Wood returned to Ie Shima the following morning, he found that the spot where the body had lain was 141 feet from the shoreline cliff, 27 feet from a gravel road, and 120 feet from the boundary marker. Ryofuku Henzan had obviously been where he had no right to be. Having done all that they could do at this time, the trio returned to Kadena at about 2330 hours.¹¹³

The initial investigation having been completed and photographs taken, the family of the victim was allowed to claim the body late that night. (Ryofuku's father, Ryohei, had been killed in the savage battle of Ie Shima, on 16 April 1945, but his mother, the former Matsu Nakaima, whom he had married on 9 July 1938, survived.)

For his part, Lieut. Colonel Peters returned to his office at 313th Air Division Headquarters to prepare a press release and advise higher headquarters of the range tragedy. The release, issued shortly after midnight, was as follows:

The body of Hiyanzan, Rifoku, 20, of 2-Han, Maja-Ku, Ie-Son, was discovered on the target area of the Ie-Shima Gunnery Range at

approximately 6 p.m. yesterday, 1 February, according to GRI Police and Air Force officials.

Local GRI Police and Air Force investigators proceeded immediately to the scene, but were unable to complete a full investigation due to darkness. Further investigation is underway.

The gunnery range was in use yesterday until approximately 5 p.m. and as is the regular procedure all the local populace had been informed by established warning measures.

GRI Police officer in charge, Sgt. Tomiya Gushiken, confirmed that the Air Force had taken all necessary precautions to insure that the local populace were notified in advance that the range was being used. Sgt. Gushiken also stated that the deceased had been reported seen leaving his home at approximately 4:30 p.m.

The cause of death is unknown, as is the reason for the presence of the deceased on the range target area.

In the TWX to higher headquarters, Lieut. Colonel Peters noted the "possibility" that Henzan might have been killed by the ricochet of a 25-lb. skip bomb or a shell fragment. However, this had not been determined and would not be reported unless confirmed, should press queries arise, although he admitted that the "possibility" existed that such speculation would appear in the indigenous press. In view of the well-known antagonism of the people of Ie Shima to the use of the bombing range and because the incident might be capitalized upon by anti-U.S. agitators, the "possibility" existed that "some adverse public reaction" might arise. Nevertheless, he hoped that the prompt issuance of the Air Force statement would "negate such a possibility."¹¹⁴

When the investigation was resumed the next morning, February 2d, the resident gendarme, Sergeant Tomiya Gushiken, was joined by Chief Arakaki of GRI Police Headquarters' Criminal Affairs Section in Naha, who flew over to Ie Shima together with Staff Sergeant Wood, the 6313th Air Police Squadron investigator, and Deputy Director Kadena of the Toguchi Police Station, who came on the police patrol boat, Asakaze, accompanied by other

OTOMATSU TAMASHIRO
MAYOR OF IE--SON (1957-23 APRIL 1961)



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police, as well as reporters.*

As the incident itself, as well as the victim's background, came under increasingly close scrutiny, it was brought out that Ryofuku Henzan was one of more than 10 landowners who had steadfastly refused to conclude a lease contract, declaring themselves opposed to the U.S. Forces' program of land acquisition. Deputy Director Kadena also uncovered the fact that the victim had once been caught by an Air Force sentry dog while trespassing on the range and had been turned over to the police at that time. It would seem, though, that this experience had not had the desired chastening effect.¹¹⁵

In the past men had suffered mutilation both on and off the Ie Shima Bombing Range as they sought the elusive phantom Wealth, and others had even died in their endeavors to separate powder from brass and steel. But this marked the first time that anyone had been killed inside the firing range itself. Thus, it was not unlikely that the glowing coals of resentment of land requisition that lay always dormant might be rekindled into active opposition, creating a difficult situation for both military officials and the Ie-Son authorities. And no one was more aware of this than Otomatsu Tamashiro, the harassed Mayor of Ie-Son. In answer to a reporter's question, he said that "Ever since the accident in which a man lost an arm in the same

*Typifying the inaccurate species of reporting prevalent on Okinawa on the part of all newspapers, both Japanese and English-language, was the statement of the Okinawa Times that "The victim is the eldest son of Mr. Ryohei Henzan (40)." Actually, according to the Ie-Son tohon (a duplicate of the official family register--the original having been destroyed during the war), the elder Henzan had been born on 15 May 1919, which would have made him 41 at the time of his son's death, if still living, but he had himself been killed on 16 April 1945, as mentioned earlier. In addition, the passage cited implies that Ryofuku had one or more younger brothers, when, in reality, he was the only son of Ryohei and Matsu Henzan. He did have a younger sister, Takako, born in 1943.

place the year before last,* I always warned against entering the place, but they seemed not to take heed, and it weighed heavy on my mind. Now that a man has been killed, we must do something about it, and I am worried, for it happened inside the firing range, and so it is a delicate affair."¹¹⁶

Chief Arakaki was even stronger in his denunciation of Henzan's wilful folly that led him to risk his life for the sake of a few quick dollars, averring that "He had only himself to blame. The scene of the accident is located within the target range, which is strictly declared to be an off-limit area. . . . It is not yet known for what purpose Henzan entered the target range, but it is said that the subject area is invaded by a number of scrap collectors almost every day, though it is declared off-limits, making pilots who are engaged in maneuvering feel nervous. On this point, the authorities had given repeated warnings to the son authorities."¹¹⁷

Equally unsympathetic with a man who insisted in asking for trouble and ended by finding it was Deputy Director Kadena of the Toguchi Police Station. His comment was as follows:¹¹⁸

I suppose that this man entered the firing range to collect scrap metal, driven by greediness, despite repeated warnings against entering the area. Such a person never attends the village round-table conferences, so that it is extremely difficult to supervise such people. The U.S. military authority expressed hope that the villagers would talk things over and fix one day every week as the scrap-collection day. The victim is said to have once been traced by a military dog for entering the range and was turned over to the police. Since scrap collection is the source of a considerable amount of the villagers' income, we wish to take this opportunity to stop such accidents once and for all. Since every person who causes such an accident is one who disregards the repeated police warnings, such accidents can not be prevented unless there is cooperation by every villager.

Investigations of the Range Accident Are Laid on Amain: Ryofuku

Henzan was definitely dead beyond recall, but, as is so often the case, the

*Actually, it had been less than a year before that Toshiichi Oshiro had suffered the loss of his arm as the result of being caught by a strafing F-100D.

circumstances of his death and the political implications attendant upon it would give his name a renown it had never enjoyed in life and his character a beatification that would have been unrecognizable even to himself. Part and parcel of this process was an attempt by each political party and politically-inclined organization to be foremost in uncovering the "true" circumstances of his death--circumstances that would inevitably reveal that the loathed U.S. military were to blame!

First to enter the investigation sweepstakes was the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (OSMP), which voted at a meeting on 7 February 1961 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the shooting incidents in both Ie Shima and Miwa-Son (the fatal wounding of Kame Omine by Sergeant Obermeier on 9 December 1960, described above), with an eye for "possible infringement of human rights." (The reader may be interested to know that other important decisions made at the meeting included participation in an upcoming "Prefectural People's Anti-Nike Firing Practice Rally" and correction of the "absurd" telephone system! In all probability, the eclectic range of their interests would have embraced a demand for repeal of the law of gravity, if it had been expounded by an American!)

The GRI police had determined that the death of Ryofuku Hengan was entirely his own fault, but--to employ a stereotyped phrase much beloved of anti-American organizations on Okinawa--there were "some points in the report that the party [could] not understand." To rectify this situation, the Messrs. Tsumichiyo Asato, Goro Kinjo, and Seiei Nagahama were appointed as members of a full-time investigation committee to look for "possible infringement of human rights." They were also to investigate the incident "in which a Miwa Village woman [sic] was shot to death." (Whether this

metamorphosis of the hunting accident victim into a woman was indicative of the accuracy with which the projected investigation would be conducted, or, mayhap, of the necromantic powers of the committee, is uncertain. It may even be that the transformation was the work of a careless Shimpo reporter! But, of course, this last possibility is almost unthinkable.)

The individuals chosen for the investigation seemed well qualified by present vocation or past experience for the task assigned them.

Tsumichiyo Asato* was a lawyer, to begin with. From 4 November 1950 to 31 March 1952 he had served as the elected Governor of the Yaeyama Gunto Government; in the latter year he had been elected Secretary-General of the OSMP, and subsequently, on 26 November 1955, was elevated to the party chairmanship, holding this post until 3 May 1958 (he would again be elected OSMP Chairman on 12 April 1961); he had won election to the GRI Legislature three times and had lost three times (once, on 5 December 1954, in a special by-election); and had been honored with the position of Speaker of the Legislature from 7 April 1958 to 30 November 1960.

Nevertheless, despite this impressive background, Tsumichiyo Asato was not the man to conduct an impartial, objective investigation where the U.S. military were involved in any way. A keen mind he might indeed possess, but he was also the owner of a sharp tongue which tended to assume a forked shape at times. In addition, his observance of factual accuracy in many statements he made was something less than laudable. Epitomizing these failings are the comments he would volunteer to an investigation party sent to Okinawa by the Japan Civil Liberties Union on 24 September 1961.

Alluding on that occasion to the Miwa-Son hunting incident in which

*A detailed sketch of Asato's career and character may be found in the History of the 313th Air Division, July-December 1960, Vol. I, pp. 80-82.

Sergeant Raymond Obermeier had shot and killed an old farmer whom he fired at in the mistaken belief that he was shooting at a covey of birds, Asato declared that "In the Raymond [sic] case, the ground condition was not such as to permit the hunter to mistake a human being for a boar or a bird. From our point of view, it may be considered a wilful shooting, and it is a plain trifling with human lives."

As another instance of American viciousness and injustice, Asato cited the Japan Civil Liberties Union investigators "the case of an innocent old man named Namizato in Ie Shima, who, after being beat up by an American serviceman, was indicted by the American court; but the case was dismissed for fear that the violent action of the American serviceman might be brought to light."

Readers of the History of the 313th Air Division for July-December 1955 may recognize this account as a highly perverted version of the incident of 12 March 1955, in which Seiji Namizato, a 60-year-old farmer of Maja-Ku, Ie Shima, threw himself on the ground in simulation of death to show the Army task force commander what the taking away of his land for the bombing range would mean to his family, then had tossed dust into the air in a dramatic gesture, only to have it blow directly into the commander's face, and had topped off the performance by being accidentally shoved with considerable force into the person of the much-tried lieutenant colonel. The latter, unable to accept all of this as mere histrionics gone out of control, had ordered Namizato's arrest and packed him off to Naha for trial, trussed up in a shelter-half with only his head left free. There Tsumichiyo Asato had undertaken to serve as his counsel; but, ere that worthy had an opportunity to display his forensic skills, Judge Peak had dismissed the case

when the plaintiff for the U.S. Government failed to appear in court.

To convince the Japan Civil Liberties Union visitors of the despotic nature of the U.S. administration of the Ryukyus, Asato told them that "When a taxi driver took an American boy who had broken his window to a police box, he was charged with kidnapping." His conclusion was that "All these cases are attributable to foreign administration of Okinawa, I think."¹¹⁹

The second member of the OSMP's investigation committee, Goro Kinjo, by contrast with Asato, had no political career that would account for his selection, and was not even an attorney. It would not, in fact, be until the following August (1961) that he would win his first political office-- a seat in the Naha City Assembly. However, for some time his skill as a public speaker had been put to use by the OSMP on behalf of other candidates for office at political gatherings, particularly those in which the representatives of various parties engaged in public debate. Moreover, there was in Goro Kinjo's past a career which made him an ideal selection for the work at hand, if it were facts that the OSMP really wanted. He had been an intelligence officer in the Japanese Army, and had been serving in Manchuria when the Soviet Armed Forces treacherously attacked the Japanese on 9 August 1945, just when the latter were already reeling in defeat. Taken prisoner, Kinjo spent nearly a decade in prisoner-of-war camps, most of the time in Siberia, before being freed. A series of long articles had appeared from his pen not long after his return to Okinawa, describing for readers of the Okinawa Times the conditions of Russian brutality, sordidness, and misery which he had witnessed and shared. Yet, for some strange reason, he emerged several years later as a stalwart of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party--an affiliation that demonstrates the contrariness of human nature!


Little is known about the third OSMP investigator to be sent to Ie Shima. Seiei Nagahama had made his first run for the GRI Legislature from the 27th Electoral District (Shimoji-Cho and Irabu-Son in Miyako) in 1956, only to lose to Ryukyu Democratic Party wheelhorse Tatsubin Yogi. Four years later, he again entered the lists, against the same adversary, and this time came away the victor. The fact that he was one of only five OSMP candidates to win in the 1960 race may account for his being named to the Ie Shima investigation committee.¹²⁰

While the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party was the first to announce that an investigation committee would be sent to the Ie Shima Bombing Range to look into Ryofuku Henzan's death, it was the rival governing Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party (OLDP) which was actually the first to conduct the indispensable on-the-spot investigation. On 9 February, Yasukuni Yamagawa, Vice-Speaker of the Legislature, and the bombastic Choko Kuwae, of whom mention has been made earlier, slipped quietly over to Ie Shima (Ie-Son was a part of the Fourth Electoral District, which Yamagawa represented) and reaped all the political hay they could by listening attentively while the bereaved family, various anti-American citizens of Maja-Ku, Ie-Son officials, and the police related all they knew about the case--and, in some cases, probably more.

According to these informants, the site of Henzan's death had been added to the expanded target area of the bombing range in November 1960 "without any notice whatsoever" being given to the Maja Ku-Cho (village chief or headman), the police, or the Ie-Son authorities. The natural consequence of this failure to publicize the enlargement was that "No villager was aware of the fact," if Yamagawa's source was accurate. Admittedly, as the Air Force had stressed in the wake of the tragedy, there was a sign post about six feet in height warning that this was a danger area, but the tall grass

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE RANGE BOUNDARY MARKER POSTS

TAKEN ON 1 MARCH 1961



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all around made it barely visible. In view of this situation, "it was questionable to blame the victim for the incident."

A decision on how the matter would be dealt with would be made after the Legislature had deliberated on the report which Yamagawa and Kuwae would prepare. Meantime, the two OLDP Legislators would meet with Air Force officials to let them know that the onus of responsibility for the tragedy had been laid at their door and to suggest "that they deal judiciously with the matter." This latter phrase was rather cryptic, but an educated guess would render it as meaning that Legislator Yamagawa trusted the Air Force would pay compensation for Henzan's death.¹²¹

The two OLDP Legislators had scarcely returned to Naha when the Maja Ku-Cho, Takehiro Nozato, and the Maja-Ku Youth Association Chairman, Chuei Chinen, appeared at the Legislature on 10 February to "announce the truth of the incident" and petition the abolition of the bombing range. (Chinen, it will be recalled, had been one of the very first persons to learn of Henzan's death.) As the visitors told it, the spot where the victim had been found was situated three or four meters from a narrow path leading to the spring near the seashore. It was true that four-sided posts measuring 5.9 feet in height and 7.88 inches in width on each side had been installed at intervals of some 164 feet the previous November, but the Air Force had made no announcement of the danger zone's having been expanded. As a result, the villagers had been unaware of any change in the area where they could safely go.

Ryofuku Henzan, according to their account, had been "a model young man . . . who did not drink liquor and, since his family is well off, had never been engaged in the collection of empty shells." (The reader will please make a mental note of the Henzan family's reputed affluence; for the

description is in striking contrast with the self-portrait Matsu Henzan, the deceased's mother, was to paint of a poverty-stricken family dependent upon the late Ryofuku when she later filed a claim for compensation from the U.S. Government.) On the day of the tragedy, he had simply gone out to cut grass and had "entered the area without knowing it to be a danger zone." Obviously, he was not to blame; ergo, "since the military is responsible for the occurrence of this incident, the firing range should be removed."

As an additional argument for eradicating the bombing range, Ku-Cho Nozato deposed that Henzan was not the only person to become a victim of the bombing and gunnery practice, besides which, stray bullets (he probably meant bombs) had been landing in Maja Village "several times a month."¹²²

The very next day, February 11th, representatives of the OSMP, the OPP, the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council (Gensuikyo), the Council of Okinawa Prefectural Youth Associations, the Ryukyu University Students Association, the Okinawa Teachers Association, the Shi-Cho-Son Government Workers' Union, the Okinawa Transportation Workers Union, the Nakagami-Gun (Central District) Youth Association, and various other organizations drove north to the Motobu-Cho port of Toguchi and there boarded the Ie Maru* for the purpose of conducting still another investigation of the Henzan shooting case--this one to distinguish itself from the earlier ones conducted by the GRI police and the United States Air Force by its attention to "objectivity."

Arriving on Ie Shima at 1300 hours, the party proceeded at once to the home of the deceased victim, where they burned incense for his soul's repose. This amenity disposed of, they went to the accident scene under

*The Ie Maru was a 50-ton wooden ship of 70-passenger capacity built in Japan for the express purpose of serving as a ferry between Toguchi-Ko and Ie Shima. It had been picked up in the shipyard by its captain, Keicho Uchima, and Mayor Takekichi Oshiro back in December 1955.

the guidance of Maja Ku-Cho Nozato, studying the terrain, the target setup, the vegetation, and the system of warning marker posts for about three hours, while listening to an explanation of the circumstances surrounding the expansion of the danger area early the previous November and the current method in which the Air Force maneuvers were conducted. That evening the Leftist group went to the Maja civic hall and listened to the complaints of the villagers.

As a result of their investigation, they learned that (1) the danger area had been expanded "only recently" without notice, (2) although signs indicating that it was a restricted area were posted at approximately 120-foot intervals, the grass around them had grown so tall that some had become invisible, and (3) because the only well from the Maja inhabitants drew their water was located on the beach close to the expanded maneuver ground, they had to pass near the danger area constantly.

During their afternoon's investigation, the visiting party had also been shown the spot where a bomb had allegedly fallen near a dwelling, about 330 feet outside the bombing range, at approximately 1600 hours on the same day that Ryofuku Henzan met his death. In addition, their zealous guides pointed out other places in the yards of dwellings and on farms and roads where stray bombs had fallen in the past.

As further evidence of the high-handed methods of the U.S. military, the local people (unidentified by name in the report brought back by the investigating party, but more than likely Shoko Ahagon, Takehiro Nozato, Ryoichi Henzan, Nayoshi Urasaki, or Seiken Ishikawa--all constantly active in their hostility to the United States) related that Genichi Nakasone,

the only known eye witness of the tragedy, had been taken to Kadena AB in a plane on 8 February, there being questioned about the circumstances of the accident, then "forcibly" required to sign a document written in English. He had been brought back to Ie Shima the following day, where he told the people that after signing the statement he had been given a five dollar bill by the investigator.

In a peroration delivered just before the investigation party returned to Okinawa on the 12th, Ku-Cho Nozato made the following statement:

We are exposed to the peril of death at any moment; for shells fall here and there in the village. When the firing maneuver continues every day, we are unable to work in the farm or even stay at home with peace of mind. It is not just the death of Mr. Ryofuku Henzan; for other unfortunate incidents have happened many times, so that we can no longer endure such tension. Although the place where Mr. Henzan lay shot dead is within the restricted area, most of the villagers do not know when this change took place. Nothing can be further from the truth than to say that Mr. Henzan's death was of his own making; for it is the infringement of human rights by the U.S. Forces. I hope that the requisitioned land will be released totally, so that we may live with peace of mind.

To newspaper reporters who met the joint investigators upon their return to Naha, the latter responded that they would first make a further study of their findings before arriving at a conclusion at the directors' meeting of the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council (Gensuikyo) scheduled for the 14th. After that, they would "issue some kind of announcement."¹²³

As might have been predicted, when the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council released their conclusions on 18 February, they found that Henzan's death was not his own fault; therefore, they demanded complete compensation for the killing, as well as the release of the entire bombing range to its original native landowners.

The reasons they gave for this conclusion were as follows: (1) Even though the bombing range had "apparently" been expanded in November, as the

Air Force now maintained, neither the Maja Ku-Cho nor the villagers themselves had been given any notification of it. (2) The boundary of the old danger zone had been delineated by bulldozed paths, but the expanded area was indicated only by six-foot signposts installed at intervals of 120 feet, more or less, and even then they were obscured from view by the high pampas grass. (3) The expanded danger area included a path which the villagers had long been accustomed to take in drawing salt water from the sea, as well as a well from which they were wont to obtain their daily drinking water. (4) The expanded target zone was known from pre-war days as a source of good fodder for the inhabitants' cattle, horses, and goats; hence, the Maja villagers had been going there to gather fodder in the intervals between bombing practices. (5) The skip-bombing target was located on elevated ground, but an approaching plane could not be seen from the lower ground where Henzan was killed. (6) The spot where the skip-bomb struck him was an authorized tacit-farming area. (7) The missile used in skip-bombing practice frequently bounced far beyond the danger area after striking the target.

¹²⁴
Led by Chairman Akira Nakane, six representatives of Gensuikyo invaded the GRI buildings on the afternoon of 22 February to petition the cooperation of Speaker Akio Nagamine of the Legislature, Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga, and Director Sosei Nishihira of the Police Department in seeking complete payment of compensation for the fatal shooting incident on Ie Shima. The sextet delivered a letter embodying the above findings and urged upon the officials that "Mr. Ryofuku Henzan, who was killed by shooting, is by no means blamable for his death. Shooting by mistake is responsible for his death. You are requested to give cooperation in requesting

the military to pay full compensation and release the practice area."¹²⁵

It is interesting to compare the arguments advanced by the Gensuikyo brain trust with the itemized data previously furnished the Civil Administrator, Brigadier General John G. Ondrick, USA, for possible use in his press conference of 13 February by Lieut. Colonel Bernard Peters, the 313th Air Division Information Officer.

On the first point--viz., the failure of the Air Force to notify the local authorities that the danger zone had been expanded, Peters did not provide a direct refutation. All he had to say was that "Suggestions and requests that scrap collectors do so [collect scrap] during non-firing periods have been to no avail," and that the Air Force had finally written a letter to Mayor Tamashiro on 18 March 1960 prohibiting scrap collection in the target area. Subsequently, white-painted concrete posts inscribed "Danger Area", "Restricted Area", "No Trespassing" in Japanese characters had been installed at 100-foot intervals on the perimeter of the gunnery range area. Early in November 1960, "in order to afford more protection in the danger area," the perimeter posts on the shoreward side had been relocated as they were at the time of the Henzan incident. This also answered Gensuikyo's second point, except that it failed to say whether or not the warning signposts were rendered useless by high grass's obscuring them from view. However, this was taken care of in another paragraph of the memorandum to General Ondrick stating that "Henzan's body was located approximately 100 yards inside the boundary of the target area. From where his body was found, the perimeter marker posts could clearly be seen."

The third point pertaining to the path used in drawing salt water and the well from which drinking water was obtained was evidently matter beyond

the ken of the 313th Information Officer. In any event, he made no comment concerning it.

As for the fourth argument involving the use of the Yabaru area as a source of fodder, Peters advised that it was wasteland having no farming capability, so that "the only attraction for being in the area would be scrap collecting."

On point five, the Information Officer and Gensuikyo were in basic agreement, though the former found the topographical situation of the skip-target range sufficient explanation of the inability of an F-100 pilot to see anyone in the danger zone and adequate reason for Henzan to have stayed away from there while skip-bombing practice was in progress. He wrote that "It is impossible for pilots using the strafing area to see anyone behind the targets, as they fly at 50 feet altitude into the silhouette of the target. The targets are located at the end of a flight path with a drop-off behind the targets to a lower plateau, then a further drop-off to the sea. The targets are located approximately a quarter-mile back from the sea edge." As for the Anti-A&H Bomb Council people, they viewed the same topographical situation from the aspect of Henzan's being unable to see an approaching plane, rather than the pilot's being unable to see him. Thus, each placed the blame on the other for a situation which both recognized, but in opposite ways! One is reminded of the primary school story of "Two Sides to the Shield" in which two knights coming from opposite directions fought to the death over the point of whether the shield was made of gold or of silver!

The weakest point raised by Gensuikyo was number six. Far from being "an authorized farming area," as they stated, the area was leased land, for which rental was paid, was off-limits, and was known as a dangerous place to

be during a firing practice. In addition, on the day in question, the skip-bombing practice had ceased at 1700 hours, "well within daylight hours." On point seven Peters did not comment.¹²⁶

On 12 February the Detective Bureau of GRI Police Headquarters announced that on the basis of its on-the-spot investigation, Henzan's death appeared to be entirely of his own contriving. With this verdict, quite predictably, the less objective-minded Legislators who had conducted their own investigation with the preconceived intention of finding the Air Force to blame were naturally dissatisfied. Moreover, although even men of such eminence as the august members of the Legislature could not overrule the police in matters coming so clearly under the latter's purview, they could "request" the police to "deal with the matter judiciously" on the ground that there were "too many doubtful points yet to be cleared up before blaming the victim." Since the scene of the accident was on military-leased land, however, all that the harassed gendarmerie could promise was to give a definite answer after seeking permission of the Air Force.¹²⁷

Commenting on the divergent views of the political parties and the police, the Okinawa Times recognized that "Ie Shima is certainly in a difficult position. . . . and though the land problem has been settled, we have a feeling somehow that Ie Shima was left out of it." This was why unfortunate incidents frequently took place--a situation which "might be compared to perfectly healed old wounds that start to hurt again." Most people were agreed that if Ie Shima was indispensable to the U.S. Forces as a maneuver ground, then the local inhabitants should not oppose its use for that purpose. Nevertheless, if the people were constantly assailed by a sense of peril, then it would be only natural for them to seek elimination

of the cause of the peril or bring about an improvement in the situation. To do so would be no manifestation of opposition to the American military base. If, then, a successful issue to the problem were to be brought about, it would be necessary for the villagers "to confer with the American authorities frequently on the basis of mutual respect for the position of the other." Granted that it was but human "to loath firing practice by talking things over, in "mutual recognition of human rights" and by protecting human life, instead of offering opposition to the Air Force's bombing and firing practice.¹²⁸

On 22 February 1961 the Government and Legal Affairs Committee of the GRI Legislature convened to deliberate on the petition that a thorough investigation of the Henzan case be conducted and that the land occupied by the bombing range be released, "so as to enable them [the Ie Shiman landowners] to earn a livelihood free from fear." Before adopting any course of action, however, the Government and Legal Affairs Committee decided to wait until it had completed an on-the-spot investigation which was scheduled for 1 March 1961.¹²⁹

In accordance with this plan, the seven members of the Government and Legal Affairs Committee--headed by Chairman Keiryō Shimosato (OLDP) and Vice-Chairman Choko Kuwae (OLDP), and including Seitoku Shinzato (OLDP), Yasukuni Yamakawa (the OLDP Vice-Speaker of the Legislature), Seiei Nagahama, whom we have seen serving as the third member of the OSMP's investigative triumvirate, Saneyoshi Furugen (OPP), and Choko Chinen (the lone independent legislator)--motored to Toguchi Port on the morning of March 1st, where they boarded the Toguchi Police Station's patrol boat. Accompanying the committee members was Ryojun Kugai, Director of the GRI Legal Affairs Department.

Arriving on Ie Shima at 1400 hours, the investigating party went at

once to the Ie-Son office (yakusho), and there received a briefing from Mayor Otomatsu Tamashiro on the circumstances under which the land requisition had taken place on the island. Although they were more than likely already familiar with almost every detail of the story, the Okinawa Times reporter, at least, who had been sent over to Ie Shima to cover the Legislators' visit, was most impressed by Mayor Tamashiro's reminder that the U.S. Forces had "forcibly destroyed houses" at the time the land for the bombing range was originally requisitioned.

From the yakusho the party proceeded to the Ie Sub-Police Station (of the Toguchi District Police Station), where our old acquaintance, stalwart, straightforward Sergeant Tomiya Gushiken, gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the tragedy and the results of the post-mortem examination of the body of the deceased Ryofuku Henzan. As he described it, the skip-bomb had entered the left side of Henzan's abdomen, penetrated the diaphragm, the heart, and the right lung, then gone out through the back.


Leaving the police station, the Legislators and Director Kugai--their ranks swollen by newspaper men, representatives of the Japanese-language radio stations, as well as Mayor Tamashiro, Sergeant Gushiken, and the inevitable Shoko Ahagon--climbed into the back of two trimobiles (motorcycles fitted with a cab and small flat-bed truck body) and drove to the AIRCOM Receiver Site. Here Captain Joseph P. McFarren, the Ie Shima Range Officer, who was assigned to the 6313th Support Squadron at Kadena and commuted to his duty station each day, since there was no arrangement for any personnel accompanied by dependents to reside on Ie Shima, was awaiting their arrival. Chairman Shimosato briefly explained the purpose of the party's coming to Ie Shima (as though the captain did not already know all too well!),

THE IE SHIMA BOMBING RANGE CONTROL TOWER



0749

A CLOSE-UP VIEW OF ONE OF THE SKIP-BOMB TARGETS
ON THE IE SHIMA RANGE



0751

AN F-100 OF THE 18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

MAKES A SKIP-BOMBING RUN AS THE

INVESTIGATING LEGISLATORS

LOOK ON



0753

following which Captain McFarren presented a concise briefing on the various bombing ranges and how they were used.

With these preliminaries out of the way, the official party climbed into an Air Force 6x6 truck provided with folding chairs for the occasion and drove to the range control tower, the two trimobiles following in close order. The 313th Air Division had been advised well in advance that the investigation party would be visiting Ie Shima on March 1st, but, instead of cancelling the usual bombing practice, it directed that skip-bombing and strafing sorties be flown, both for the actual benefit derived by the pilots and for the edification of the Legislators. The 6x6 truck stopped about 100 yards from the control tower, an excellent point of vantage for watching the skip-bombing which Captain McFarren said would take place shortly. As the exciting runs by four F-100 Super Sabres began, everyone stood on the bed of the truck or even on the chairs in order to see the spectacle better. Many of the Legislators, as well as Shoko Ahagon, had come armed with cameras, and all of these people attempted to capture the swift flight of the low-flying planes as they swept in one by one, dropped their bombs, and pulled up. The investigators were particularly interested in this aspect of the Air Force practice, since it was presumably by a skip-bomb that Henzan had been killed--although the lethal missile had never actually been found. They were thus able to see for themselves that any bomb which missed the target flew several hundred yards through the air before dropping into the sea.

The skip-bombing practice having concluded, Captain McFarren had the little caravan drive to the other side of the bombing range to observe the strafing practice which was to be held there. As they drove along, he invited the Legislators' attention to the white-painted "DANGER AREA: OFF LIMITS"

A VIEW OF THE STRAFING TARGETS ON THE IE SHIMA

BOMBING RANGE



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posts installed at intervals along the peripheral bulldozed path. When a spot where the target area became visible was reached, Captain McFarren halted the truck and announced that the party would have a look at that part of the range along the seashore in the vicinity of the light house.

Then the captain suddenly told everyone to look in the direction he was pointing; for they would thereby be able to see with their own eyes the notorious scrap metal collectors in action. Even with this coaching on the captain's part, most of the party were unable to see any persons, because of the distance involved. Those with better vision were, however, able to make out approximately 10 faint figures. Some were standing on a spot bare of grass, while others were boldly poised in the bulldozed path. As one of the F-100's made its strafing run, the vague shadows became identifiable as men, since they were abruptly galvanized into action by the vision of brass casings lying ready to hand still hot from firing.

One of the range sergeants who carried binoculars with him handed them to Keiryō Shimosato, the committee chairman, so that he might see for himself how the scrap scavengers operated. The latter tried vainly to adjust the binoculars to get a clear view, but at last gave up, exclaiming disgustedly, "I can't see anything. Everything is dark!" Only then, when he lowered the glasses, did he discover that it was the back of Legislator Choko Kuwae's head on which they had been directed! Having come to this realization, Shimosato made the necessary adjustment in stance and was soon shouting to his secretary in amazement, "Put this in the report! We saw the people! We actually saw the people with binoculars!" It would seem only seeing was believing.

Now that the people in the truck and the trimobiles knew better what it was they were looking for, practically everyone was able to see the

KEIRYO SHIMOSATO (OLDP), CHAIRMAN OF THE IMA SHIMA
SHOOTING INCIDENT INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE
REPRESENTING THE GRI LEGISLATURE, LISTENS
INTENTLY AS CAPTAIN MC FARREN BRIEFS THE
VISITING PARTY



0759

THE IE SHIMA LIGHTHOUSE AT THE EDGE
OF THE BOMBING RANGE



0761

scurrying figures which emerged immediately after the second F-100 had roared across on its strafing run. Seitoku Shinzato, the distinguished-looking, silver-thatched OLDP Legislator from the First Electoral District (Kunigami, Higashi, and Ogimi Sons in the northernmost part of Okinawa), who had been the Business Manager of the Okinawa Teachers Association, was heard to murmur, "For goodness sakes! They are no better than thieves." Then he turned to Mayor Tamashiro, who was also anxiously watching the tiny figures from his seat at the back of the truck, and almost shouted, "Mayor, can't you stop them? Don't you know it's too dangerous there?"

"Well, I have tried and am still trying to stop them from going into the ranges," replied the harassed mayor, who knew from long experience how little his efforts availed.

"Where is the policeman?" excitedly asked one Legislator. Sergeant Gushiken, who had also been an interested spectator of a scene which was to him all too familiar, stiffened and stood at attention. "Yes, sir?" he responded.

"Do you see the men in the range?"

"Yes, sir."

"Why don't you do something about it?"

"The mayor and I have tried desperately to stop them. But what can we do? They come there by boats or by walking along the seashore," he answered.

"Since there is no farming area in the range, why can't we arrange somehow to put up fences all around the area?"

This was the opportunity Shoko Ahagon had been waiting for, and he did not neglect it, as he injected a flat "We can't. A fence is useless against them."

"How do you know?" asked Kuwae, thus serving as the unintentional foil

for the old fox's punch line.

"I can prove it," coolly replied Ahagon. "They even stole the fence for scrap before." (In all probability at the same Ahagon's instigation!) But, to demonstrate that he was not altogether negative in his approach to the problem, he thereupon offered the constructive suggestion that "The best way to solve the matter is to get rid of the firing ranges. You can't realize how these villagers feel about it unless you actually live here."

"Isn't there a possibility that we can talk to the U.S. military to set up certain dates on which people can pick up the bullets?" asked Chairman Shimosato, who evidently did not read the papers too thoroughly.

Mayor Tamashiro, to whom this suggestion was presented, replied that "As a matter of fact, we made a deal before. Some 30 people signed affidavits, for that matter." Then, to the query of a radio reporter, the mayor answered that he didn't know how many people actually wished to have their land released by the Air Force; however, he suspected that some might desire it, while others might be content to leave matters as they were.

The strafing practice having ended, the little convoy took the bulldozed path toward the seashore in the vicinity of the lighthouse. Several range NCO's headed toward the scrap collectors, ostensibly in the hope of capturing them, but, more likely, for the purpose of showing the Legislators the latters' modus operandi. As soon as it became clear to the scrap gatherers that the Air Force men were coming their way, they dashed down the path leading from the top of the cliff to the beach and leaped into the sea, wading out to shoulder depth in some cases, as five canoes fitted with outboard motors plucked them from the water and rapidly sailed away. Chairman Shimosato, a Ryukyuan before he was an investigator, perhaps, muttered to no one in particular, "They are thieves all right, but I am kind of

relieved seeing them all picked up out of the water."

Captain McFarren then called the party's attention to several large rocks which had been placed across an access road by the scrap scavengers as a means of interfering with patrol vehicles, so that the Ie Shimans would have ample time to make their escape when being pursued on the range.

About this time a weapons carrier truck driven by a range sergeant drove up to report to Captain McFarren that although they had counted 24 intruders on the range, every one had succeeded in getting away.

Someone asked the captain what the distance between the concrete off-limits posts was. He stated that it was about 50 feet, but later corrected himself and estimated it at about 100 feet, confessing that he could give no accurate figure without first measuring it.

As the party drove along, they came to a sharp curve to leftward in the bulldozed path, and Captain McFarren explained that this inroad into the area of the bombing range had been created by the Air Force's desire to avoid cutting into a farm already in existence there. By making this jog in the road, it was possible to leave the farm intact, an action showing the military's sympathy with the local people. No sooner had he given this explanation, however, than Ahagon retorted--in Japanese, which the captain could not understand--that the real reason was that "Women villagers resisted the military's taking their farm land." In other words, the Air Force's action had not been voluntary, prompted simply by good will, but had been the result of irresistible pressure!

As though to emphasize Ahagon's obsessive theme, a sign on a wooden post in Maja Village, just outside the skip-bomb target, proclaimed, "Life is valuable. Give us back the land!"

Returning to the bombing range, the caravan stopped at the top of a

IE SHIMA POLICE SERGEANT TOMIYA GUSHIKEN SHOWS
THE GRI LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING PARTY THE
SPOT WHERE RYOFUKU HENZAN WAS KILLED



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hill, whence the entire party, except for Legislator Shimosato, who had an ailing leg which compelled him to walk with a cane, hiked down a path to the scene of the tragedy of 1 February.

Sergeant Gushiken explained the circumstances under which he had found the body and pointed out the spot where the bomb had apparently struck the ground before bouncing into the unfortunate Henzan. Miscanthus grass was growing three or four feet high throughout the vicinity, and some cycad trees (sago palms) appeared here and there, as well as numerous adan plants with their long, spine-fringed leaves. Naturally, he was requested to show the exact spot where Genichi Nakasone had found the corpse of Ryofuku Henzan. This prompted someone to inquire where the witness now was. A local inhabitant replied that Nakasone had left Ie Shima to work some place else.

Shoko Ahagon seized the opportunity to inform his attentive audience that the newspapers and radio stations had not told the truth when they reported that there was no grass suitable as fodder for animals in the area where Henzan had been killed. "This spot is the best place for gathering fodder," he declared, pointing to a patch of short miscanthus (pampas) grass. Other villagers chimed in that this was so. Ahagon also said that Henzan had been sent by his uncle to gather fodder at the time he met his death. Moreover, he had always been a good boy.

Some of the Legislators proved to be not so gullible as Ahagon had expected, however, expressing doubts that this grass was actually suitable for fodder and even questioning whether the victim had actually come there to gather grass for that purpose. One point contributing to this skepticism was the absence of a sickle, which would have been an indispensable implement if fodder gathering were his true mission. All the glib Ahagon could offer in rebuttal of this shrewd observation was that "the sickle may possibly

OKINAWA PEOPLE'S PARTY (COMMUNIST) LEGISLATOR
JIKKICHI FURUGEN EXPRESSES HIS SKEPTICISM
OF THE OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
UNDER WHICH RYOFUKU HENZAN MET HIS DEATH
AS OLDP LEGISLATORS SEITOKU SHINZATO AND
CHOKO KUWAE LISTEN ATTENTIVELY



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have been blown off toward the sea" by the skip-bomb!

One point which disturbed the investigators was the seeming contradiction between the size of a skip-bomb and the dimensions of the hole left in Henzan's body by its passage. The bomb was close to three inches in diameter; so the Legislators reasoned, not illogically, that if such a missile had hit Henzan, his body would have been completely altered from its original shape. In order to reconcile these two points, they decided to ask the military authorities to give them a briefing on the characteristics of the skip-bomb and how it operated.

The reporter representing Radio Okinawa asked Captain McFarren whether it was true, as the villagers alleged, that they had received no notification at the time the bombing range was enlarged. And, if they were notified, how had it been done?

The range officer replied that "We moved the posts. This indicated that the area was being placed off limits as the danger zone."

"Is that all?" pressed the reporter.

"The last time we enlarged the range," answered Captain McFarren, "we notified the mayor through our interpreter." This seemed to satisfy the radio reporter, although the captain's statement was more than a little ambiguous, since the range had been further expanded on 22 February 1961, subsequent to the fatal accident, and he left it unclear whether he had reference to that expansion or to the one in question preceding Henzan's death.

Some of the villagers who had joined the original party near the accident scene complained that the road they had been accustomed to take down the cliff to get salt water from the sea was now inside the danger zone, so that they could no longer obtain even this simple item without much unnecessary difficulty. To this Ahagon added that the fresh water which the people

OPP LEGISLATOR JIKKICHI FURUCEN TAKES NOTES OF HIS
OBSERVATIONS, AS HE QUESTIONS EVERYONE AND EVERY THING--
THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING PARTY
TO DO SO.



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of Maja were wont to draw from a well down the cliff next the sea in times of drought was now barred to them, notwithstanding the newspaper's statement that the path to it was not in the off-limits area.

As evening began to fall, most of the party walked back up the hill to the waiting 6x6 truck and trimobiles, and the latter set off for the village office in Maja-Ku for a further discussion of their findings and questioning of the local officials by the Legislators. Shoko Ahagon, however, declined to leave with them, telling Captain McFarren that a few people were still down below the cliff, out of sight. The interpreter for the 313th Air Division Information Office, Seitoku Kyoda, who had accompanied Captain McFarren to Ie Shima, volunteered to see if he could find any stragglers from the visiting group, as it was beginning to get dark. He walked down the narrow, rocky path leading to the sea, but returned in a short while to report that there seemed to be no one left. However, Ahagon insisted that some of the people who had gone down there earlier had never come back.

While Captain McFarren waited a decent interval to ensure that none of the Legislators were accidentally left behind, he and Ahagon engaged in a dialogue that resembled a fencing bout between two skilled swordsmen. Each knew that the other represented the enemy, but each also disguised this enmity by cloaking each sharp point with a jesting manner. Ahagon repeated his favorite thesis that the best way to solve the problem of the bombing range was to get rid of it. The captain replied that the 313th Air Division had tried to move the range to uninhabited Torishima, a tiny coral islet near Kume Shima, but scrap collectors had still come there by boat to ply their trade--collecting shells and cartridges.

After a time, several more members of the party, including OPP Legislator

Saneyoshi Furugen, did make their appearance from the mysterious area at the bottom of the cliff next the sea, thus proving that Ahagon was not always unreliable in his utterances.

Ahagon no longer had any valid excuse for remaining on the bombing range, but he persisted in hanging behind, as though he would not return to the village with the others, and even told Captain McFarren that he would stay behind. The latter reminded him that it had been all right for Ahagon to enter the range in company with the official party and the captain himself, but that at any other time he would be considered a trespasser and would be subject to arrest. All of this was said laughingly, but Ahagon could tell very well that the range officer meant it and was couching his warning in this guise only to make it easier on both of them by persuading the former to comply. Ahagon, incidentally, had no conceivable reason for remaining on the off-limits bombing range with nightfall coming on and would, in fact, have been most unhappy, in all probability, if he had been left there to walk all the way back to the village, especially in view of the meeting at the Maja Village office which was even then already in session. Thus, the last thing in the world he wanted would have been acquiescence in his insistence upon remaining behind on the deserted range.

Because of this, undoubtedly, Shoko Ahagon finally allowed himself to be persuaded to walk back up the hill to the waiting truck with Captain McFarren, Interpreter Kyoda, and the present writer. As they walked, the captain warned the foxy trouble-maker against entering the bombing range at any time, unless he (the captain) accompanied him, on pain of being arrested. Ahagon, utterly unabashed, retorted laughingly, "Well, it is quite the

contrary. It is the landowners who have the right to arrest trespassers, not the Americans."

"As long as the land is leased to us, we have the right to do so," coolly advised the captain.

A few minutes later, Furugen, Ahagon, and the others had been safely deposited at the Maja Village community center, where they joined the other members of the investigation party. This taken care of, the range officer, the 313th Information Office interpreter, and the 313th Air Division Command Historian proceeded to the airstrip, where the C-47 was waiting impatiently to return them to Kadena.¹³⁰

The Question of Compensation for the Death of Ryofuku Henzan: Winter turned into spring, spring into summer, and summer into autumn, but the claim for compensation which Ryukyuan spokesmen had demanded to a man--and which the Air Force Judge Advocate officials awaited with distaste--was not forthcoming. Just as the latter were beginning to relax and remarked that it looked as though, for once, the victim of an accident involving the United States or one of its citizens in some way was not going to seek compensation, the legal bomb fell! On 6 October 1961, Machi Henzan,* the mother of the slain Ryofuku Henzan, filed a claim for \$14,900.00 in compensation for his death with the 6313th Air Base Wing. Why she had waited so long to submit the claim is not known, but, in any case, the 6313th's Claims Officer, First Lieutenant Alfred W. Metzger, Jr., rejected it outright on 8 February 1962--

*In all the claims correspondence which followed, the name of Ryofuku's mother appears as "Machi", but in the tohon (an extract copy of the official family register, known as the koseki shohon, which was maintained by the Ie-Son Office), which was drawn up and certified on 16 February 1962, her name is given as "Matsu." To the uninstructed this might appear to be a discrepancy; however, a Ryukyuan translating the Chinese character into English would render it as "Machi", while a Japanese would write it as "Matsu".

just slightly more than a year after the tragedy's occurrence.

In so doing, he noted that the claim was for the death of a Ryukyuan whose demise was the direct result of bombing practice on land reserved exclusively for this purpose. Due notice of the danger attendant upon being present in the bombing range while practice was in progress had been given to the residents of the area both by the posting of signs in the village and by word of mouth. Furthermore, in order to discourage suicidal trespassing, the Civil Administrator had established a penalty of fines and imprisonment for those caught violating the off-limits proclamation. Since Henzan's body had been found within the confines of the bombing range at an hour when it was off-limits by reason of being used by the aircraft of the 18th TFW, and inasmuch as an aerial practice bomb had been the agent of his death, the fact of trespass was clearly established. Hence, the victim's own disregard of the warnings and proclamations had contributed to his death.¹³¹

Having reached the verdict that Machi Henzan's claim should be rejected, the 6313th Staff Judge Advocate's office forwarded the claim to the corresponding office at this headquarters, where First Lieutenant Del B. Rowe, the one-man Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12, studied it, then sent it down to the Legislative and Legal Department at USCAR for review and comment. In so doing, his only remark was that it was "apparent that the victim was within the boundaries of the active range and also that he had actual knowledge he was a trespasser."¹³²

Mr. Eugene V. Slattery of the USCAR Legislative and Legal Department, to whom the claim and associated correspondence were initially given for study, noted that the investigation did not reveal why Henzan was at the spot where he was at the time he was killed. He also observed that the

claims officer recommended disapproval of the claim on the grounds that the victim had been trespassing at the time he was struck by the skip-bomb, that such trespassing constituted negligence on his part, and that this negligence had contributed to his death.

With this recommendation Mr. Slattery declared he could not agree. On the basis of the evidence available, it appeared that the fatal skip bomb had been dropped either at 1700 hours or, more likely, a few minutes later, in which case the deceased might not have anticipated that the Air Force would be engaged in bombing practice at the time he was trespassing on the range.

Then, in a definition of the subtle nuances of law, he stated that "A trespasser is not denied the right to recover because a trespass is a wrongful act, but because (since his presence is not to be anticipated) the property owner owes him no duty to take precautions for his safety." In other legal cases it had been argued that the presence of a trespasser was not to be anticipated; thus, a reasonable man would not take steps to protect him. By the same token, "In a civilization based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a man to use his own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there without permission or right."

However, Slattery went on, there were many instances in which the anticipation of the presence of a trespasser by a land occupier had been the basis of liability for injury. And, in fact, the present claim could "be deemed to arise out of so-called 'noncombat activities' of the Air Force," which meant that it was not necessary for Machi Henzan to allege or prove negligence or a wrongful act on the part of the Air Force in order to recover for damage or injury arising therefrom. If, then the Henzan

claim was considered to derive from the non-combat activities of the Air Force, it would "not be necessary to make any determination as to whether the Air Force was negligent in engaging in bombing practice at the time when the deceased was killed."

Having thus placed himself in opposition to the opinion of the 6313th ABW and 313th Air Division Judge Advocate Offices, Mr. Slattery concluded by expressing his realization that the Air Force Foreign Claims Commission that was to review the Henzan claim would be the official arbiter of these points, but, at the same time, he did "not feel that it has been established by the investigation made by the claims officer that the conduct of the deceased at the time of his death was such as to bar the claim for his death." Nevertheless, he did "believe that the amount of the claim is greatly excessive under Japanese standards."¹³³

In part on the basis of Slattery's memorandum remarks, the USCAR Legislative and Legal Department wrote a letter to the 313th Air Division Staff Judge Advocate for consideration by the Foreign Claims Commission, "which must exercise its independent judgment concerning this claim."

After reviewing the circumstances under which Henzan's body had been found, the letter brought up the allegation of the Maja villagers that they obtained their fresh water, as well as sea water, from a place near the bombing range, and that the path leading to these water sources was within the range, since its recent enlargement. It also asserted that there was "some evidence" that the villagers living in the vicinity of the range "assumed" that bombing practice would ordinarily be held from 0800 to 1700 hours, unless they were otherwise notified. There was "no evidence" that the Air Force had given such notification that bombing practice would continue

after 1700 hours on the day that Ryofuku Henzan was killed.

Respecting the statement of Lieutenant Rowe, Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12, in his letter of 23 February 1962, that the victim was found within the boundaries of the active range and that he had "actual knowledge" that he was a trespasser, USCAR rebutted that "In cases where a trespasser is killed or injured, the true test of the property owner's liability is whether he has acted as a reasonably prudent man would act in view of the probability of injury to others." According to legal precedent as established in U.S. courts, a trespasser was not denied the right to recover damages by reason of a trespass's being a wrongful act, but because--since his presence could not be anticipated--the property owner owed him no obligation to take precautions for his safety.

Finally, "In order to prevent any undue adverse political reaction in the event of disapproval of the subject claim in whole or in part, there should be a definite determination of the deceased's reasonable right to assume that the bombing practice would be over by 1700 hours and, if he was negligent, whether such negligence was the sole and proximate cause of his death." The Foreign Claims Commission should also study the question of previous frequent intrusions upon the bombing range and whether the Air Force had been ¹³⁴aware of them and acquiesced therein.

Upon receipt of this rather pro-Henzan letter, the Judge Advocate at this headquarters sent it down to the corresponding office at the 6313th Air Base Wing for research into the questions raised by the USCAR legal people.

Taking up as the first point the "reasonable right" of the deceased to assume that the bombing practice would be over by 1700 hours, Lieutenant

Colonel John E. Cleary, the 313th Staff Judge Advocate, reported that 313th Air Division Regulation 50-2 stated that the bombing range would be open from 0600 to 1800 hours. Therefore, if Ryofuku Henzan kept himself abreast of current Air Force regulations, he would have known that jet aircraft might be engaged in bombing practice at the very time he was on the range. More to the point, though, Colonel Cleary had checked the records of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's Training Section for the month of January 1961 and the first four days of February. These showed that the aircraft had returned to Kadena AB from their training flights after 1730 hours. In view of the speed of the F-100 aircraft and the proximity of Ie Shima to Kadena, the bombing range, even during the early dark months of winter, must have been in use after 1700 hours, since it was less than a five-minute flight from the little island off the Motobu Peninsula to the home base of the 18th TFW.

Investigation revealed that there was a water gathering point farther north from where the body had been found. However, Henzan's corpse had been discovered in the area where some of the skip bombs usually came to rest; besides which, there were no water-gathering implements, such as pails or similar containers, near the body or even anywhere in the vicinity. It was, in fact, to prevent just such an accident as this that the posts delineating the danger area had been moved prior to the tragedy.

Colonel Cleary then turned to the realistic aspect of the affair by reminding his superior at 313th that skip-bomb passes were made at an altitude of 50 feet and at a speed of 450 knots. To expect a pilot traveling at such speeds and aiming his aircraft at a target to be able to spot a person crouching in the tall grass in the skip impact area down a 50-foot cliff more than 200 yards away was "mere folly." In the case of LABS practices, the approach was made at 200 feet, while a strafing run was made

at a 10° dive at the same speed.

Moreover, remarked the 6313th Judge Advocate, "To say this resident of Ie Shima was without knowledge of the dangers involved, the boundaries of the range, the impact area for the various projectiles, and even of the type run being made by any approaching aircraft is to overlook a matter of common knowledge born of close daily association and observation of one of the major income-producing areas of the small island." Nor should it be overlooked that all aircraft were required to make a "dry" pass before actually dropping any bombs or firing any live ammunition on the Ie Shima range.¹³⁵

Other points which Colonel Cleary might have made in the process of shooting holes in the claim of Machi Henzan were these: Although there was a water source used by the Ryukyuan whose access required passage close aboard the bombing range, there was no need to use it while practice bombing was in progress. Besides, both Machi Henzan in her formal claim and Shoko Ahagon in his unofficial briefing of the GRI Legislative party on 1 March 1961 stated that Ryofuku had gone to the range to gather fodder, not to bring home water. Yet, there had been no sickle in evidence when his body was found. In addition, Sergeant Gushiken--certainly not an observer predisposed in favor of the U.S. Forces, since he was, after all, a Ryukyuan himself--had told the Air Force official investigators immediately after the accident that he knew that Henzan had entered the bombing range "numerous times" to collect scrap. Furthermore, Deputy Director Kadena of the Toguchi Police Station had disclosed the Henzan had been physically apprehended while trespassing on the range at one time and turned over to the local police.

Finally, the USCAR legal officials' hair-splitting argument that the

victim had not known that he was trespassing and imperiling his life in visiting the range after 1700 hours was torn asunder not only by Sergeant Gushiken's testimony but also by the fact that the Legislative investigators of 1 March had themselves witnessed the spectacle of scrap collectors diligently practicing their chosen vocation in broad daylight, well before 1700 hours, and with the recent example provided by Ryofuku Henzan's death serving as the most sober kind of warning and deterrent.

On 9 April 1962 the Machi Henzan claim was forwarded by this headquarters to the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, in view of the claim's being in excess of the amount over which Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12 had jurisdiction. The letter of transmittal called the attention of the higher authority to the inclusion in the file of documents substantiating the statement that the range was closed to "all unauthorized persons at all times, including the hours after 1700 daily."

A little more than a month later, on 17 May 1962, Machi Henzan was notified by the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, that her claim had been disallowed, in view of the fact that her son had been trespassing in a restricted area to gather shells when he met with the accident, and he was fully aware of this violation, since an off-limits warning was clearly posted.

Far from being satisfied with this rejection of her claim, and just as little inclined to accept it without further effort to have the decision reversed, Machi Henzan addressed a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Claude M. Raley, Chief of Foreign Claims Commission No. 25 and of the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, which she forwarded to GRI on 20 June 1962.

After giving some background details of the circumstances of her marriage with Ryosei Henzan, Machi Henzan stated that she had reared her son

"with all my life" and that "he was a very fine son."^{*} Furthermore, he "was not the type to collect scrap." The reason he had gone to the bombing range was that his uncle, Ryohei Henzan, had planned to build a pen for his two goats and a cow the following day, and it was in preparation for this Cheopsian project that Ryofuku had gone to gather grass for the livestock. (Just why he had to obtain fodder for the three animals merely because a pen was being built for them is not at all clear; for they surely must have had to be fed on less ceremonious occasions, as well! Unless it was that Uncle Ryohei wished to celebrate the building completion by providing his four-footed friends provender of a special sort.)

Unable as she was to forget the terrible experience of losing her husband in the war, Machi Henzan had been particularly careful to forbid her son to enter the bombing range in quest of scrap. Anyway, Ryofuku had "always liked to farm and raise livestock, and he had never collected scrap metal." (This is not what Sergeant Gushiken and Deputy Director Kadena of the Toguchi Police Station had testified about him!)

After committing this prevarication, which even the myopia of mother love could render neither venial nor palatable, Machi compounded the offense by declaring that "It is not my desire to obtain any money in claim by making false statements or by asking for money because our life was made difficult by the involuntary seizure of our fertile farm land." Then, to ensure that she got her point across, the bereaved mother repeated that "My son never collected scrap, despite the assertion of the Military and Foreign Claims

^{*}In a reversal of standard feminine practice, Machi Henzan stated that she had been 20 years old when she was married, although she was born, according to the tohon, on 16 July 1919 and was married on 9 July 1938. However, she may have been employing the common Ryukyuan practice of regarding herself as one year old when she was born. Her letter also gave the impression that Ryofuku had been her only child. Actually, she had a daughter, Sachiko, born in 1939, and a second daughter, Takako, born in 1943.

Commission stating that the place where my son was killed was in the bombing range and that he was regarded as a trespasser." (In Machi Henzan's insistence on the angelic nature of her son she was mindful of the fabled mother crow who, describing her offspring to a hunter avowedly on his way to shoot the feathered pests that had been eating his corn as "beautiful children, white as the driven snow," was horror-stricken a short time later to see him carrying home her offspring, which he had been unable to recognize and, consequently, spare on the basis of her description.)

Machi Henzan went on to say that the posts defining the range limits "were hidden in the pampas grass and difficult to see," and it was not until after the death of her son, when the grass was cleared, that they were found.

Perhaps the most telling point she made, however, was in her assertion that the danger area had always been marked by a bulldozed perimeter path of some three to four ken (18 to 24 feet), besides which the area thus enclosed had been kept clear of grass and trees by frequent burning with kerosene or gasoline. The new area of the bombing range created by the expansion preceding the fatal accident, on the contrary, had "not been bulldozed at all and was covered with green grass normally used for livestock." (Together with this contention, she attached a photograph to provide visual evidence in confirmation of what she said. Even so, this did not explain her son's being in an area where he was obviously exposed to great danger from the practicing F-100's.

Having made these appeals to the reason of the U.S. claims officials, the widow Henzan (or her ghost writer, more likely, if the truth were known) delivered a peroration aimed at their hearts and sympathies. She wrote as follows:¹³⁷

Placing yourselves in my shoes, you will understand my predicament of a person dying young, leaving his young wife and a son. In addition, having your land taken away by foreign military troops, and on top of it your son being killed. Can you imagine the great tragedy? You too would feel hatred, anger, and pain if the testimony of a young wife [43 years old] had been ignored as biased and false because of a statement furnished by the military.

The capacity for pain and suffering of any human being, regardless of Okinawans or Americans, is the same. True humanitarianism and love are obscured and lessened, and the goodness in human beings becomes lost when one aspires to power, accumulation of wealth or honors. My son was my joy, my dependence, and was the only property I had. The loss of him was my greatest sorrow.

Finally, I would like to ask, by leaving all personal feelings aside that you will accede to our request and give this testimony of the mother your greatest attention.

To buttress this appeal by the claimant, 33 prominent citizens of Ie Shima, including Mayor Kamei Nakama (the erstwhile Deputy Mayor of Ie-Son, who had been elected to succeed Mayor Otomatsu Tamashiro on 23 April 1961), Deputy Mayor Hikoyoshi Chinen, Chairman Kinzo Shimabukuro of the Ie-Son Assembly, and eight ku-cho's, added an appeal of their own. Not only did they attest "that all the statements of Machi [Henzan] are true and correct," but they also entreated the claims commission "to pay this claim as soon as possible."

According to an "Explanation" which accompanied their petition, neither the people, the mayor, the ku-cho, nor the policemen had been informed of the enlargement of the bombing range. Also, since none of the villagers had been given any notification concerning the hours during which the bombing practice would be conducted on the fatal day, nor the form it would take, they had assumed that it would begin at 0800 and conclude at 1700 hours. However, when this assumption proved erroneous, tragedy had been the result.

As for the aspects of Ryofuku Henzan's character which bore on the case,

he was "a conscientious man and was respected by his friends." Moreover, he "as the only child, and his parents had placed all their future in him." (An only son he may have been, but the existence of both an older and a younger sister rendered his classification as an "only child" a bit preposterous.)

As proof positive that the responsibility for Henzan's demise was assuredly not his own, the "Explanation" noted that the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, the Okinawa People's Party, the Okinawa Teachers' Association, the Council of Okinawa Prefectural Youth Associations, the Okinawa Transportation Workers' Union, and sundry other organizations which had investigated the accident had concluded that "the United States Air Force was responsible for the death."

A second document which accompanied the petition was entitled "Reason for Making the Claim." Signed by the "Committee To Protect the Land of Ie Shima" (the chairman of which was Ryoichi Henzan, the deceased Ryofuku's grandfather, and the assistant chairmen of which were Nayoshi Urasaki and Shoko Ahagon), this paper recalled that "The United States Military Forces until today have burned or destroyed our homes, chased us with dogs, caused injuries and death by firing, incarcerating our persons, and inflicted other sufferings by acts of violence not permissible in the society of democratic nations."

This generalization having been attended to, the committee protested that land had been taken away from the people of Ie Shima by proclamation--a method which should have been applied only under conditions of war--and that they were being reimbursed only 1.89¢ per tsubo (approximately 36 square feet) for land whose actual yield had exceeded \$1.00. Not only was

this disparity "outrageous," but it was a violation of Article 46 of the Code of Land Warfare, as well as the principles contained in the proclamation of the World Human Rights Organization. It was a well-known rule of government that laws should be made to benefit the people, and the government of the United States was obviously a government of the people; therefore, in appealing to the conscience of the U.S. Government, as the committee members were, they believed that the compensation demanded for the death of Ryofuku Henzan would be paid "most expeditiously."¹³⁸

On 28 June Shoko Ahagon and Chokuryo Urasaki called on Chief Executive Seisaku Ota to present him this 33-man petition, together with the written statement of Machi Henzan. At the same time, they made a personal appeal for his efforts on behalf of the widow's claim.¹³⁹

In due time (19 July 1962, to be exact), Chief Executive Ota transmitted Machi Henzan's letter, as well as the petition from The Thirty-Three, to USCAR's Legislative and Legal Department. The latter then forwarded it to this headquarters on 10 August 1962. Ten days later, the 313th Judge Advocate sent the increasingly bulky correspondence on to the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, for reconsideration of the claim.¹⁴⁰

At this point in the story there appears a strange aberration, which, fortunately for the Air Force's interests, was confined to U.S. Forces administrative channels. On 24 August 1962, Major Timothy G. O'Shea of the 313th Air Division Staff Judge Advocate's Office, who had arrived on Okinawa only a short time before to assume the duties of Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-12 on 16 July, wrote an interim reply for the Vice-Commander's signature to USCAR's letter of 10 August, for the purpose of enabling the legal people at the latter agency to answer any queries that

might be received while the request for reconsideration of the Henzan claim was being studied in Japan.

Unfortunately, Major O'Shea either did not inform himself sufficiently concerning the background of the case, or else he confused the Henzan case with one of the other strange-sounding files with which he was having to become acquainted in too short a time.

As has been seen above, Machi Henzan's claim for \$14,900.00 was denied in its entirety on 17 May 1962. However, Major O'Shea wrote that the claim had been adjudicated "over a year ago" (actually, only slightly more than three months earlier) and that "subsequent offers have been made to the claimant, and at the present time the question is that of amount rather than whether a claim will be honored." Pursuing his mistaken course with gentle but confident step, he went on to say that while the Air Force had the deepest sympathy with the claimant in her bereavement, "the standard of adjudication has long been established by a formula applied to all such claims in Japan and Okinawa, with the exception that Okinawan settlements are considerably higher." The major added by way of explanation that to be successful, appeals of this nature must be predicated on new evidence previously unknown to the Claims Service at the time the original adjudication was made, "and no such evidence appears in this file." (A shrewd guess would be that Major O'Shea was confusing the Henzan case with the Miyagi case, which grew out of the crash of an F-100 into Kawasaki Village on 7 December 1961.)

Fortunately, he concluded his letter with the admonition that in order to preclude the raising of false hopes, he wanted Mrs. Henzan to be advised that any revision of the former offer was improbable.¹⁴¹

The very fact of Major O'Shea's having written so misinformed a letter

is strange enough, but even more incomprehensible is USCAR's failure to correct him in his misapprehension or to make any mention of the error! In fact, no one seems to have noticed the inconsistency of the letter until the present writer called it to the attention of Major O'Shea, who could account for it in no other way than through his newness to the job.

On 17 September 1962, Lieutenant Colonel John V. Knaus, who had replaced Lieut. Colonel Raley as Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, notified Machi Henzan that the Foreign Claims Commission had "carefully considered" the various points raised in her appeal of 28 June, but in the end the result had been a determination that the original decision rejecting any liability on the part of the Air Force would "not be disturbed," as there was "no new material evidence presented" in her appeal which would warrant such action. Consequently, her appeal or request for reconsideration was "respectfully denied."¹⁴²

This letter was sent to Major O'Shea, with a request that one copy be furnished the claimant, Machi Henzan, a second copy be given the High Commissioner, and a third be transmitted to Chief Executive Ota.¹⁴³ This Major O'Shea did on 1 October 1962.¹⁴⁴ With this action, the Ryofuku Henzan case was seemingly closed once and for all. However, any person acquainted with the history of claims by Ryukyans against the United States Forces would properly be reluctant to give any odds that it had been laid to eternal rest; for these "little" people had demonstrated time and time again that they never forgot any offense by the occupying power or its individuals, no matter how small. And sooner or later, they seemed to have their way, receiving compensation even where the guilt was their own, by sheer force of continuous, unremitting clamor.

FOOTNOTES

| <u>Footnote No.</u> | <u>Document No.</u> | |
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| 19 | 24 | News Article, "24 Groups File with Military against Killing Case in Kin-Son," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 30 Dec. 1959. |
| 20 | 25 | Commentary, "Shooting To Death Incident," <u>Kinko Moku-zetsu</u> column, <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 28 Dec. 1959. |
| 21 | 26 | Commentary, "Damages Caused by U.S. Servicemen," <u>Daigen-Shogen</u> column, <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 28 Dec. 1959. |
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| 124 | 115 | News Article, "Release the Entire Firing Range Demands the Anti-H and A Bomb Council in Ie Shima Shooting Incident," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 19 Feb. 1961. |
| 125 | 116 | News Article, "Ie Shima Incident Inspection Group Demands Complete Payment of Compensation for Shooting-to-Death Case," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 23 Feb. 1961. |
| 126 | 117 | Memo., Lieut. Col. Bernard Peters, 313th IO, to Brig. Gen. John G. Ondrick, sub.: Ie Shima Accident, 13 Feb. 1961. |
| 127 | 118 | News Article, "Ie Shima Incident: Police Headquarters Asks Official Report about Truth to Military," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 13 Feb. 1961. |
| 128 | 119 | Editorial, "The Settlement of Ie Shima Problem Should Be Sought through Talks," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 16 Feb. 1961. |
| 129 | 120 | News Article, "Legislators To Conduct On-the-Spot Investigation on Ie Shima Next Month," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 23 Feb. 1961. |
| 130 | 121 | News Article, "The Ieshima Incident: The Bouncing Bullet Is Questionable," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 2 March 1961; Memo. for Record by Seitoku Kyoda, 313th Air Div. IO Interpreter, 4 March 1961. |
| | 122 | |
| 131 | 123 | AF Form 1156, Hq., 6313th ABW, sub.: Report of Claims Officer, 8 Feb. 1962. |
| 132 | 124 | Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div., to USCAR (HCR-LL), sub.: Claim of Machi HIYANZAN for Death Victim of Ie Shima Bombing Range, 23 Feb. 1962. |
| 133 | 125 | Memo. for Record by Eugene V. Slattery, USCAR Legislative and Legal Department, 21 March 1962. |

| Footnote No. | Document No. | |
|-----------------|-----------------|---|
| 134 | 126 | Ltr., USCAR (HCRI-LL) to Comdr. 313th Air Div. (SJA), sub.: Claim of Machi HIYANZAN for Death Victim of Ie Shima Bombing Range, n.d. |
| 135 | --- | Ltr., Hq., 6313th ABW (JA) to 313th Air Div. (JA), sub.: Claim of Machi HIYANZAN, 30 March 1962. |
| 136 | 127 | Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (JA), to U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, sub.: Claim of YIYANZAN, Machi, 9 Apr. 1962. |
| 137 | 128 | Ltr., Machi Hiyanzan to Ryojun Kugai, Chief, Legal Affairs Dept., GRI, sub.: Reconsideration of the Matters Pertaining to Demand in Claims, 20 June 1962. |
| 138 | 129 | Report of the Matters Regarding the Reconsideration of Claim, dtd. 28 June 1962, with attachments B ¹ ("Explanation") and C ¹ ("Reason for Making the Claim"). |
| 139 | 130 131 | News Article, "Claim for Ie Shima Maneuver Victim Rejected," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 28 June 1962; News Article, "U.S. Military Turns Down Compensation Claim in Connection with Ie Shima Shooting Incident," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 28 June 1962. |
| 140 | 132 | 1st ind., (Ltr., USCAR (HCRI-LL) to Hq. 313th Air Div. (JA), sub.: Request for Reconsideration of Claim for Death of Ryofuku Henzan, Ieshima, 10 Aug. 1962), Hq. 313th Air Div. to U.S. Armed Forces Claims Service, Japan, 20 Aug. 1962. |
| 141 | 133 | Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. (313JA) to USCAR (HCRI-LL), sub.: Request for Reconsideration of Claim for Death of Ryofuku HENZAN, Ie Shima (Interim Reply), 24 Aug. 1962. |
| 142 | 134 | Ltr., Lt. Col. John V. Knaus, Chief, Claims Service, Japan, to Machi Hiyanzan, sub.: Claim of Machi Hiyanzan (CSJ/63-3108/FS), 17 Sept. 1962. |
| 143 | 135 | Ltr., Lt. Col. John V. Knaus, Chief, Claims Service, Japan, to Major Timothy G. O'Shea, sub.: Claim of Machi Hiyanzan (CSJ/63-3108/FS), 17 Sept. 1962. |
| 144 | 136 | Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313JA) to USCAR (HCRI-LL), sub.: Claim of Machi Hiyanzan, 1 Oct. 1962. |
| --- | 137 | Memo., sub.: AMFPA/SAMAP/57-118 thru AMFPA/SAMAP/57-114 Multiple Claims Arising from Alleged Fire and/or Bombing in the Island of Ie-Shima, Ryukyu Islands, prepared by Foreign Claims Commission No. AF-8, SAMAP, 11 July 1957. |

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

313th AD, 1961-II Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

| <u>POSITION</u> | <u>NAME</u> |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Commander | Major General John R. Sutherland (1 July - 28 September) |
| | Colonel John H. deRussy (acting) (28 September - 5 October) |
| | Major General Robert M. Stillman (5 October - 31 December) |
| Vice Commander | Colonel John H. deRussy (1 July - 31 December) |
| Protocol Officer | Major Bertram R. Wilson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Special Assistant to the Commander | Major Bertram R. Wilson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Aide de Camp | 1st Lieutenant Ronald J. Silva (1 July - 27 November) |
| | Vacant (27 November - 31 December) |

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Chief of Administrative Services* | Lieut. Colonel Robert M. De Bord (1 July - 20 November) |
| Director of Administrative Services* | Lieut. Colonel Robert M. De Bord (20 November - 31 December) |

*The duty title of the Chief of Administrative Services was changed to Director of Administrative Services, effective 20 November 1961.

313th AD, 1962-II Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|--|
| <u>INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION</u> | |
| Inspector General | Colonel Dexter L. Hodge (1 July - 31 December) |
| Director of Security and Law Enforcement | Vacant (1 July - 18 July) Major Theodore J. Newman (18 July - 31 December) |
| Maintenance Inspector | Major Frank A. Downey (1 July - 31 December) |
| Supply Inspector | Lieut. Colonel George C. Edwards* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Personnel and Administrative Inspector | Vacant (1 July - 3 July) Major Thomas E. Wynne (3 July - 31 December) |
| Operations and Training Inspector | Major Frank B. Brown (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION</u> | |
| Staff Judge Advocate | Lieut. Colonel William C. Craft (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF INFORMATION</u> | |
| Information Officer | Lieut. Colonel Henry A. McPhillips (1 July - 31 December) |
| Command Historian | Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December) |
| OIC, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa | Captain Frederick Forte** (1 July - 27 July) Major Henri L. Tapie** (27 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel effective 15 August 1961.

**Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|--|
| <u>OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY</u> | |
| Flying Safety Officer | Major John W. Brunson* (1 July - 18 October) |
| Safety Officer | Major John W. Brunson* (18 October - 31 December) |
| Ground Safety Officer | Vacant (1 July - 5 September) Mr. Jack B. Stephens (Civilian)** (5 September - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON</u> | |
| Staff Surgeon | Colonel George E. Drury*** (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN</u> | |
| Staff Chaplain | Lieut. Colonel Edgar H. Brimberry**** (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER</u> | |
| Staff Comptroller | Major Karl D. McCormick (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Flying Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing, until 18 October, when assigned primary duty as Safety Officer, 313th Air Division.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Ground Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6332d USAF Dispensary, and Director, Base Medical Service, Kadena Air Base.

****Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Base Chaplain, Kadena Air Base.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|---|
| <u>OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE</u> | |
| Director of Operations | Colonel Wallace R. Jordan (1 July - 31 December) |
| Assistant Director of Operations | Lieut. Colonel Howard S. Askelson* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division | Lieut. Colonel Charles V. Garino (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Plans Branch | Captain Ray A. Ragsdill (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch | Lieut. Colonel Charles W. Borders** (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Operations and Training Division | Lieut. Colonel Howard S. Askelson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Current Operations Branch | Major Robert E. Nash, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| Passive Defense Officer | 1st Lieutenant Bernard H. Hahn, Jr. (1 July - 14 August) |
| | Captain Donald D. Bendell*** (14 August - 31 December) |
| Chief, Special Operations Activities | Lieut. Colonel Lawrence P. Smith (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Intelligence Division | Lieut. Colonel Russell Powell (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Operations Intelligence Branch | Captain Johnny W. Shanks (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, 313th Air Division Air Operations Center | Major Dudley J. Sleeper (1 July - 31 December) |

* Additional duty. Regular assignment: Chief, Operations and Training Division.

** Promoted to rank of lieutenant colonel effective 15 August 1961.

*** Promoted to rank of captain effective 10 October 1961.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1.

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|---|
| Chief, Manpower and Organization Division | Lieut. Colonel Bernard A. Minnehan (1 July - 31 December) |
| Manpower Management Officer | Major David W. Thompson (1 July - 31 December) |
| Organization and Management Engineering Officer | Major Robert Jones (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Communications and Electronics Division | Vacant (1 July - 2 July) Major Joseph C. Morris (2 July - 1 August) Major Tilmon B. Cantrell* (1 August - 14 November) |
| Chief, Communications Branch | Vacant (1 July - 12 July) Major Tilmon B. Cantrell (12 July - 1 August) Vacant (1 August - 14 November) |
| Chief, Electronics Branch | Captain Neal C. Brigham* (1 July - 14 November) |
| <u>TELECOMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE</u> | |
| Director of Telecommunications | Lieut. Colonel Lawson P. Wynne* (14 November - 31 December) |
| Chief, Electronics Branch | Captain Neal C. Brigham* (14 November - 31 December) |
| <u>MATERIEL DIRECTORATE</u> | |
| Director of Materiel | Colonel George S. Roberts (1 July - 31 December) |

*Effective 14 November 1961, the Communications and Electronics Division of the 313th Air Division Headquarters was replaced by the Telecommunications Directorate, and the Commander of the 1962d Communications Group, Lieut. Colonel Lawson P. Wynne, was given the additional duty assignment of Director of Telecommunications.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1.

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|---|
| Assistant Director of Materiel | Major George H. Robb* (1 July - 13 September) |
| | Vacant (13 September - 31 December) |
| Chief, Logistic Plans Division | Major Robert J. Morris (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Supply and Services Division | Major Francis Sikorski (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Inter-Service Supply and Service Branch | Captain Donald W. Pfister (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Supply and Seaweed Branch | Major Edward H. Freedman (1 July - 31 December) |
| Missile Staff Programming Officer | Captain Alan B. Myler, Jr.** (1 July - 31 December) |
| Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus, and POL Officer | Captain Isaac E. Alexander (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Maintenance Division | Major Evan L. Stoll (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Armament Division | Captain Ralph L. Tyler (1 July - 15 July) |
| | Major Edward Newman (15 July - 31 December) |
| Air Force Representative with the Ryukyus Exchange System | Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks (1 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Transportation Division | Major George H. Robb (1 July - 13 September) |
| | Captain Louise N. Miller (13 September - 31 December) |

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief, Transportation Division.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 498th Tactical Missile Group.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|--|
| Air Traffic Coordinating Officer | Vacant (1 July - 17 July) Captain Louise N. Miller (17 July - 1 September) Vacant (1 September - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING</u> | |
| Civil Engineering Officer | Lieut. Colonel Fred A. Spencer (1 July - 31 December) |
| Assistant Civil Engineering Officer | Mr. Lloyd H. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December) |
| Civil Engineering Liaison Officer for Air Force Operational Facilities | Lieut. Colonel Joseph E. Mills (1 July - 31 December) |
| Real Estate Officer | Mr. Ramon W. Wasano (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December) |
| PACAF Regional Fire Protection Specialist (Okinawa-Korea) | Mr. Victor B. Robinson, Jr. (Civilian) (20 July - 31 December) |
| <u>OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT</u> | |
| Procurement Officer | Major Walter V. Karlson (1 July - 23 October) Major Lynn J. Corp (23 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Contracts Division | 1st Lieutenant Alexander H. Newlands (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE</u> | |
| Director of Personnel | Major Bruce B. Bright (Acting) (1 July - 21 July) |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|---|
| | Colonel Robert H. Workman (21 July - 31 December) |
| Assistant Director of Personnel | Vacant (1 July - 21 July) |
| | Major Bruce B. Bright (21 July - 31 December) |
| Chief, Officer Personnel Division | Major John F. Jureka (1 July - 11 December) |
| | Vacant (11 December - 31 December) |
| Chief, Airmen's Division | Captain Glenn T. Ciarfeo (1 July - 16 October) |
| | Vacant (16 October - 31 December) |
| Chief, Individual Training and OJT Utilization Division | Major Charles L. McMillin (1 July - 29 November) |
| | Vacant (29 November - 31 December) |
| Chief, Personnel Services Division | Major Robert B. Wilbur (1 July - 29 November) |
| | Major Charles L. McMillin (29 November - 31 December) |
| Dependent Schools Officer | Captain John E. Eckstein (1 July - 31 December) |
| Civilian Personnel Officer | Mr. Louis W. Conroy, Jr. (Civilian) (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>OSI DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 6001ST SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS SQUADRON (IG) PACAF</u> | |
| Commander, OSI District Office #43 | Lieut. Colonel William L. Mann (1 July - 31 December) |
| <u>DETACHMENT NO. 2, 1045TH OPERATIONAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING GROUP</u> | |
| Detachment No. 2 Commander | Lieut. Colonel Harry C. Aderholt* (1 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to rank of lieutenant colonel effective 15 August 1961.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|--|
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander | Colonel Francis S. Gabreski (1 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer | Major Dorne P. Ohlemacher (1 July - 17 July) |
| | Major Thomas B. Huddleston, Jr. (17 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Samuel A. Steere, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Max A. Pinkerton (1 July - 1 August) |
| | Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr. (1 August - 31 December) |
| 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Floyd White (1 July - 31 December) |
| 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Major Woodfin M. Sullivan (1 July - 31 December) |
| 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Frank M. Haynie (1 July - 31 December) |
| 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander | Lieut. Colonel Earl A. Butts (1 July - 15 December) |
| | Major Russell F. Crutchlow (Acting) (15 December - 31 December) |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group Commander | Lieut. Colonel Clyde R. Borchers (Acting) (1 July - 1 August) |
| | Colonel Warren E. Vinzant (1 August - 31 December) |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Deputy Commander | Lieut. Colonel Clyde R. Borchers (1 August - 12 October) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Ralph F. Jones (12 October - 31 December) |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|---|
| 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron (PACAF) Commander | Captain Alan B. Myler, Jr. (Acting) (1 July - 7 August) |
| | Major Edwin C. Elledge* (7 August - 31 December) |
| 873d Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander | Captain Edwin C. Elledge (Acting) (1 July - 24 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel John A. Evans (24 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 2376th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency Squadron Commander | 2d Lieutenant Arthur D. O'Loughlin (1 July - 12 October) |
| | Captain Marvin D. Meadows (12 October - 31 December) |
| 658th Tactical Hospital Commander | Captain Richard B. Crabb (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Commander | Colonel Charles H. Pierce (1 July - 24 July) |
| | Colonel George B. Simler (24 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Deputy Commander | Colonel Charles H. Pierce** (3 August - 31 December) |
| 6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer | Vacant (1 July - 24 July) |
| | Colonel Charles H. Pierce (24 July - 1 September) |
| 6313th Materiel Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby (1 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to the rank of major effective 1 September 1961.

**Additional duty assignment, per 6313th ABW SO P-292, dtd. 7 Aug. 1961, until 1 September 1961, when it became his primary duty assignment, per 6313th ABW SO P-395, dtd. 26 Sept. 1961.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|--|
| 6313th Air Police Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Nimmo (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6313th Support Squadron Commander | Major Knox B. McKee, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6332d USAF Dispensary Commander | Colonel George E. Drury (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 4, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander | Captain William H. Greendyke (1 July - 31 December) |
| 15th Physiological Training Flight Commander | Major George S. Johnson* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 6313th Air Base Wing Commander (Ie Shima) | Major John J. Mahoney (1 July - 10 July) |
| | Major Stephen W. Prime (10 July - 14 August) |
| | Master Sergeant Robert E. Faucher** (14 August - 31 December) |
| 7th Tactical Depot Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |
| 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander | Major Howard K. Shaw (1 July - 31 December) |
| 1962d Communications Group Commander | Lieut. Colonel Lawson P. Wynne (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6922d Radio Group, Mobile (USAFSS) Commander | Colonel Robert T. Engle (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6927th Radio Squadron, Mobile (USAFSS) Commander | Major Edward E. Grant (1 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to the rank of major effective 1 September 1961.

**Master Sergeant Faucher actually carried the duty title of First Sergeant, Detachment #1, 6313th Air Base Wing, but he performed much the same duties as Major Mahoney and Prime had done.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|---|
| 1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander | Lieut. Colonel Frank D. Schwikert (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing Commander | Captain Clyde E. Routt (1 July - 15 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Henry Baldi (15 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 3, 2703d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron Commander | Captain William Green, Jr. (1 July - 31 December) |

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|---|
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander | Colonel William W. Inghutt (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Air Base Group Commander | Colonel Edward P. Foote (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Air Base Group Executive Officer | Lieut. Colonel Clyde W. Bradley, Jr. (1 July - 15 July) |
| | Vacant (15 July - 30 August) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Robert E. Woody (30 August - 31 December) |
| 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel James A. Hearn (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel William J. Mickish (1 July - 5 August) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Frank W. Allen (5 August - 31 December) |
| 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander | Major Lindell F. Collins (1 July - 18 July) |
| | Captain Howard C. Ramstad (18 July - 28 July) |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|---|--|
| 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Jesse W. Simpson (28 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Support Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Carl E. Vega (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Materiel Squadron Commander | Major Sam L. Almon (1 July - 31 December) |
| 51st Civil Engineering Squadron Commander | Captain Dallas H. Pope* (1 July - 31 December) |
| 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Edward A. Sanders (1 July - 31 December) |
| 6351st USAF Dispensary Commander | Lieut. Colonel Robert H. Epler** (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 5, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander | Captain Paul Pavilack (1 July - 23 October) |
| | Captain John R. Rogers (23 October - 31 December) |
| 21st Troop Carrier Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Leon A. Smith (1 July - 22 July) |
| | Lieut. Colonel Ned M. Letts (22 July - 31 December) |
| 817th Troop Carrier Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel George J. Nied (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 315th Air Division Commander | Colonel Leslie W. Bray, Jr. (1 July - 1 August) |
| | Colonel Jack L. Crawford, Jr. (1 August - 31 December) |
| Detachment 3, 313th Air Division Commander | Captain William B. Etheridge (1 July - 31 December) |

*Promoted to the rank of captain effective 15 October 1961.

**Additional duty as Director, Base Medical Service, Naha Air Base.

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 1

| <u>Position</u> | <u>Name</u> |
|--|---|
| Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing Commander | Major Horace W. Meredith (1 July - 31 December) |
| 2152d Communications Squadron Commander | Major John C. Horton (1 July - 31 December) |
| 33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander | Lieut. Colonel Ernest M. Magee (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division Commander | Captain James C. Warren* (1 July - 31 December) |
| Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron Commander | Major Herbert L. Ballard (1 July - 15 November) Major Oscar W. Yetez (15 November - 31 December) |
| Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander | 1st Lieutenant Victor A. Prosper (1 July - 31 December) |

*Additional duty assignment. Regular duty assignment: 21st Troop Carrier Squadron.

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE
313TH AIR DIVISION OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

July: Fourteen numbered contracts totalling \$66,329.00 and 122 unnumbered contracts totalling \$64,303.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1814 for \$473.00 was awarded to Mrs. J. G. Newton for services as an instructor at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-1815 for \$250.00 was awarded to Mr. A. Shinjo for services as a test examiner at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1816 for \$1,260.00 was awarded to Mrs. A. C. Wesling for services as an instructor at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1817 for \$91.00 was awarded to Mr. R. Isa for services as an instructor at the Naha Air Base Education Center.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-1818 for \$90.00 was awarded to Mrs. B. Kambeitz for services as an instructor at the Naha Air Base Education Center.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-1819 for \$91.00 was awarded to Mr. S. Uema for services as an instructor at the Naha Air Base Education Center.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1820 for \$120.00 was awarded to Mr. T. Toyosato for services as an instructor at the Naha Air Base Education Center.
- (h) Contract AF 62(321)-1821 for \$36,844.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for custodial services at Kadena Air Base.
- (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1822 for \$1,000.00 (estimated BPA) was awarded to Kogoda Stamp Company for rubber stamps for Kadena Air Base.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-1823 for \$750.00 (estimated BPA) was awarded to Kogoda Stamp Company for rubber stamps for Naha Air Base.

313th AD, 1961-II Appendix 2

- July: (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1824 for \$8,160.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply, Inc. for maintenance of the sprinkler systems in Buildings 762 and 766 at Kadena Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-1825 for \$6,070.00 was awarded to Barclay and Co. for thermofax paper for Kadena Air Base.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1826 for \$9,800.00 was awarded to Ryukyu Asphalt Co., Ltdl, for asphaltic concrete for Kadena Air Base.
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-1827 for \$3,080.00 was awarded to Island Builders, Inc. for screen cloth for Kadena Air Base.

Seven numbered contracts were closed during the month of July 1961.

Five salvage contracts totalling \$35,600.00 were awarded during the month of July 1961.

A total of \$2,663.75 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 72 cash purchase transactions during the month of July 1961.

Aug.: Fourteen numbered contracts totalling \$56,183.00 and 104 unnumbered contracts totalling \$47,348.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1828 for \$465.00 was awarded to Koshin Higashionna for the repair of hand mowers for Naha Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-1829 for \$5,000.00 was awarded to Yamazen Gumi for vegetation control at Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1830 for \$64.00 was awarded to Mr. R. Isa for services as a personnel counselor for Naha Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1831 for \$64.00 was awarded to Mr. S. Uema for services as a personnel counselor for Naha Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-1832 for \$91.00 was awarded to Mr. T. Toyosato for services as a personnel counselor for Naha Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-1833 for \$1,010.00 was awarded to Kinjo Shokai for cement for Naha Air Base.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1834 for \$3,680.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply, Inc., for the repair of wood furniture for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (h) Contract AF 62(321)-1835 for \$8,170.00 was awarded to Pan-Ocean, Ltd. for screen frames for Kadena Air Base.

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- Aug.: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1836 for \$3,848.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., to replace generators at Kadena Air Base.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-1837 for \$3,035.00 was awarded to Chajin Plywood Co. for plywood for Kadena Air Base.
- (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1838 for \$7,085.00 was awarded to Kokuba Shoji for Philippine mahogany for Kadena Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-1839 for \$3,036.00 was awarded to Chibana Cement Co. for concrete for Kadena Air Base.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1840 for \$4,839.00 was awarded to Kanehisa Kensetsu for grass cutting at Naha Air Base.
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-1841 for \$15,796.00 was awarded to Kanehisa Kensetsu for grass cutting at Kadena Air Base.

Nine numbered contracts were closed during the month of August 1961.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of August 1961.

A total of \$3,715.00 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 154 cash purchase transactions during the month of August 1961.

Sept.: Thirteen numbered contracts totalling \$69,901.00 and 108 unnumbered contracts totalling \$38,477.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1842 for \$4,996.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for an addition to the Base Commander's house at Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-1843 for \$5,800.00 was awarded to Yamane Gumi for sand for Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1844 for \$23,780.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply, Inc., for lumber for Kadena Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1845 for \$12,000.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for lighting for the ammunition area for Kadena Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-1846 for \$6,380.00 was awarded to M.G. Construction Co. for repair of the taxiway at Naha Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-1847 for \$2,804.00 was awarded to Island Builders Supply, Inc. for sash locks for Naha Air Base.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1848 for \$2,508.00 was awarded to Stanbo, Inc., for aluminum roof coat for Kadena Air Base.

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- Sept.: (h) Contract AF 62(321)-1849, an open allotment contract, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for rubber stamps for Kadena Air Base.
- (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1850, an open allotment contract, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for rubber stamps for Naha Air Base.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-1851 was written in September but not awarded until October.
- (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1852 for \$7,975.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for electrical and communications duct for Kadena Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-1853 for \$493.00 was awarded to Mr. J. G. Newton for services as an instructor at the Kadena Air Base Education Center.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1854 for \$1,125.00 was awarded to Tomy Motors for the major repair of vehicles for Naha Air Base.
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-1855 for \$2,040.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for the major repair of vehicles for Naha Air Base.

Five numbered contracts were closed during the month of September 1961.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of September 1961.

A total of \$3,285.00 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 143 cash purchases during the month of September 1961.

- Oct.: Twenty-one numbered contracts totalling \$361,474.00 and 134 unnumbered contracts totalling \$54,018.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.
- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1851 for \$16,695.00 was awarded to Kokuba Shoji for plywood for Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-1856 for \$48,500.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for resealing of roofs at Naha Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1857 for \$37,742.00 was awarded to Blackledge, Inc. for repair of the field maintenance building #792 at Kadena Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1858 for \$19,279.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of air conditioning at Kadena Air Base.

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- Oct.: (e) Contract AF 62(321)-1859 for \$7,370.00 was awarded to Okinawa Motors for repair of engines for Naha Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-1860 for \$49,712.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of electrical extensions at Kadena Air Base.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1861 for \$8,712.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of electrical overhead lines at Naha Air Base.
- (h) Contract AF 62(321)-1862 for \$2,531.00 was awarded to Alcan Pacific for repair of windows damaged by typhoons at Kadena Air Base.
- (i) Contract AF 62(321)-1863 for \$49,673.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for repair of the Installations building at Kadena Air Base.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-1864 for \$7,550.00 was awarded to Fukuyama Shoji for the installation of an air conditioner in Building #14 (7th Tactical Depot Squadron) at Kadena Air Base.
- (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1865 for \$16,568.00 was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for repair and modification of Building #220 at Kadena Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-1866 for \$22,000.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of air conditioning at Naha Air Base.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1867 for \$3,116.00 was awarded to Taiyodo Tokeiten for the repair of clocks and watches for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-1868 for \$31,154.00 was awarded to Yomitan Industries, Ltd., for repair of BOQ's, dining halls, and airman dormitories at Kadena Air Base.
- (o) Contract AF 62(321)-1869 for \$166.00 was awarded to Matakiko Tanaka to tune pianos for Kadena Air Base.
- (p) Contract AF 62(321)-1870 for \$19,410.00 was awarded to Alcan Pacific for repair of family housing at Kadena Air Base.
- (q) Contract AF 62(321)-1871 for \$4,934.00 was awarded to D. F. Fisher, Inc., for repair of an incinerator at Kadena Air Base.
- (r) Contract AF 62(321)-1872 for \$7,500.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of street lights at Naha Air Base.

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- Oct.: (s) Contract AF 62(321)-1873 for \$2,489.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the replacement of underground cable in the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron area at Kadena Air Base.
- (t) Contract AF 62(321)-1874 for \$23,913.00 was awarded to Rutledge Construction Co. for repair of various facilities at Kadena Air Base.
- (u) Contract AF 62(321)-1875 for \$9,581.00 was awarded to United Office Machine Co. for repair of office machines for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (v) Contract AF 62(321)-1876 for \$11,403.00 was awarded to Mr. Daniel R. Cuck for custodial services at Naha Air Base.
- (w) Contract AF 62(321)-1877 for \$18,000.00 was awarded to D. F. Fisher for repair of the airmen's and officers' swimming pools at Naha Air Base.

Seven numbered contracts were closed during the month of October 1961.

Salvage contract AF 62(321)s-151 for scrap metal was awarded to Ota Shoten for \$8,194.00.

A total of \$4,384.00 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 165 cash purchases during the month of October 1961.

Nov.: Seven numbered contracts totalling \$85,864.00 and 152 unnumbered contracts totalling \$116,873.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-1878 for \$2,888.00 was awarded to Okinawa Textile Industries for fireman uniforms for Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-1879, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Y. Higa Enterprises, Ltd., for movement of household goods for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-1880 for \$5,150.00 was awarded to Yamane Gumi for sand and cement for Kadena Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-1881 for \$3,767.00 was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for lumber for Kadena Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-1882 for \$6,193.00 was awarded to Nakachi Construction Co. for cushion covers for Naha Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-1883 for \$16,731.00 was awarded to De Mauro Construction Co. for repair of a parking lot at Naha Air Base.

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Nov.: (g) Contract AF 62(321)-1884 for \$2,550.00 was awarded to Okinawa Oxygen Industry Co. for welding oxygen for Naha Air Base.

Ten numbered contracts were closed during the month of November 1961.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of November 1961.

A total of \$6,329.00 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 247 cash purchases during the month of November 1961.

Dec.: Thirteen numbered contracts totalling \$107,295.00 and 93 unnumbered contracts totalling \$36,316.00 were awarded to local contractors for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa.

(a) Contract AF 62(321)-1885 for \$5,460.00 was awarded to Kinjo Shokai for cement for Kadena Air Base.

(b) Contract AF 62(321)-1886 for \$1,440.00 was awarded to Maruyama Architect Engineers for A&E project, Repair Central Security, at Naha Air Base.

(c) Contract AF 62(321)-1887 for \$752.00 was awarded to Ryukyu Fertilizer for the delivery of fertilizer to Kadena Air Base.

(d) Contract AF 62(321)-1888 for \$1,405.00 was awarded to United Office Machine Co. for the repair of office machines for Kadena Air Base.

(e) Contract AF 62(321)-1889 for \$35,780.00 was awarded to D. F. Fisher for the repair of approach lights at Naha Air Base.

(f) Contract AF 62(321)-1890 for \$32,500.00 was awarded to Maeda Gumi for the repair of a pier at Kogome Village, Okino-Erabu Shima.

(g) Contract AF 62(321)-1891 for \$5,848.00 was awarded to Yamane Gumi for grass cutting at Kadena Air Base.

(h) Contract AF 62(321)-1892 for \$20,700.00 was awarded to Maeda Gumi for repair of the parking lot at the NCO Club, Naha Air Base.

(i) Contract AF 62(321)-1894 for \$1,350.00 was awarded to Trans-Asia Associates for A&E services in connection with construction of Building #342 at Kadena Air Base.

(j) Contract AF 62(321)-1895 for \$1,360.00 was awarded to Trans-Asia Associates for A&E services in connection with security lighting and fixtures for Kadena Air Base.

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- Dec.: (k) Contract AF 62(321)-1896, a requirement type contract with no dollar amount specified, was awarded to Kogodo Stamp Maker for rubber stamps for Naha Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-1897, a requirement type contract with no dollar amount specified, was awarded to Kogodo Stamp Maker for rubber stamps for Kadena Air Base.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-1903 for \$333.00 was awarded to Angela G. Wesling for services as an advisor for the Kadena Air Base Education Center.

Twelve numbered contracts were closed during the month of December 1961.

Salvage Contract AF 62(321)s-153 for \$4,823.00 was awarded to Kina Shoten for aluminum scrap.

Salvage Contract AF 62(321)s-154 for \$7,577.50 was awarded to Kobashigawa Shokai for iron and steel scrap.

A total of \$3,845.00 was expended by the Imprest Fund Officer for 154 cash purchase transactions during the month of December 1961.

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APPENDIX 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

KADENA AIR BASE

| | <u>JULY</u> | <u>AUGUST</u> | <u>SEPTEMBER</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$5,676.58 | \$5,554.89 | \$5,177.91 |
| Category 21 (Initial Issue) | 47.75 | 14.55 | 16.84 |
| Category 22 (Health & Appearance) | 37.50 | 35.15 | 60.25 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | 59.50 | 2,319.25 | 151.55 |
| TOTAL | \$5,821.33 | \$7,923.84 | \$5,406.55 |

| | <u>OCTOBER</u> | <u>NOVEMBER</u> | <u>DECEMBER</u> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Cash Sales | \$7,457.76 | \$7,404.27 | \$7,016.23 |
| Category 21 (Initial Issue) | 00.00 | 487.75 | 23.15 |
| Category 22 (Health & Appearance) | 00.00 | 83.55 | 41.80 |
| Category 61 | ----- | ----- | 2.15 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | 133.35 | 1,881.85 | 561.25 |
| TOTAL | \$7,591.11 | \$9,857.42 | \$7,644.58 |

TOTAL SALES - \$44,244.83

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 3

SUMMARY 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

NAHA AIR BASE

| | <u>JULY</u> | <u>AUGUST</u> | <u>SEPTEMBER</u> |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$2,231.75 | \$2,975.61 | \$2,567.84 |
| Category 21 (Initial Issue) | --- | 00.00 | 00.00 |
| Category 22 (Health & Appearance) | --- | 32.45 | 00.00 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | <u>107.65</u> | <u>460.55</u> | <u>217.60</u> |
| TOTAL | \$2,339.40 | \$3,468.61 | \$2,785.44 |

| | <u>OCTOBER</u> | <u>NOVEMBER</u> | <u>DECEMBER</u> |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Cash Sales | \$3,131.24 | \$3,155.13 | \$3,259.65 |
| Category 21 (Initial Issue) | 00.00 | 00.00 | 69.25 |
| Category 22 (Health & Appearance) | 18.90 | 127.50 | 36.35 |
| Category 69 (Miscellaneous) | <u>312.95</u> | <u>567.05</u> | <u>160.65</u> |
| TOTAL | \$3,463.09 | \$3,849.68 | \$3,525.90 |

TOTAL SALES - \$19,432.12

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES
TOTAL COMBINED INVENTORY VALUE FOR KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

| | <u>JULY</u> | <u>AUGUST</u> | <u>SEPTEMBER</u> |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Bulk Warehouse | \$40,412.63 | \$33,143.65 | \$37,283.45 |
| Retail Outlets | <u>21,978.05</u> | <u>20,072.00</u> | <u>23,713.15</u> |
| TOTAL | \$62,390.68 | \$53,215.65 | \$60,996.60 |

| | <u>OCTOBER</u> | <u>NOVEMBER</u> | <u>DECEMBER</u> |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Bulk Warehouse | \$50,000.62 | \$35,595.40 | \$62,205.75 |
| Retail Outlets | <u>22,524.01</u> | <u>32,105.99</u> | <u>29,398.60</u> |
| TOTAL | \$72,524.63 | \$67,701.39 | \$91,904.35 |

TOTAL NON-AVAILABILITY - \$1,075.00

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APPENDIX 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

1961

MONTHLY COMPARISON PROFIT OR LOSS

| | <u>Kadena Officers Club</u> | <u>Naha Officers Club</u> | <u>Kadena NCO Club</u> | <u>Naha NCO Club</u> | <u>Kadena Airmen's Club</u> | <u>Naha Airmen's Club</u> |
|------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| July | \$ 3,775 | \$ 1,199 | \$(1,146) | \$ 4,810 | \$14,682 | \$ 4,266 |
| Aug | 3,950 | 14 | 9,426 | 3,591 | 5,607 | 3,025 |
| Sep | 1,608 | 752- | 10,574 | 4,424 | 7,209 | 2,687 |
| Oct | 5,232 | 5,207 | 8,752 | 3,163 | 7,942 | 2,304 |
| Nov | 1,118 | 2,513 | 9,063 | 6,769 | 4,997 | 1,099 |
| Dec | 5,191 | 2,155 | 8,375 | 6,019 | 3,086 | 1,273 |

NET PROFIT OR LOSS

FISCAL YEAR TO DATE

| | <u>Kadena Officers Club</u> | <u>Naha Officers Club</u> | <u>Kadena NCO Club</u> | <u>Naha NCO Club</u> | <u>Kadena Airmen's Club</u> | <u>Naha Airmen's Club</u> |
|------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Jul | \$ 3,775 | \$ 1,199 | \$(1,146) | \$ 4,810 | \$ 14,682 | \$ 4,266 |
| Aug | 7,725 | 1,213 | 8,280 | 8,401 | 20,289 | 7,291 |
| Sept | 9,333 | 1,965 | 18,854 | 12,825 | 27,498 | 9,978 |
| Oct | 14,565 | 7,172 | 27,606 | 15,988 | 35,440 | 12,282 |
| Nov | 15,683 | 9,685 | 36,669 | 22,757 | 40,437 | 13,381 |
| Dec | 20,874 | 11,840 | 45,044 | 28,776 | 43,523 | 14,654 |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1961

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | Naha Officers Club | Kadena NCO Club | Naha NCO Club | Kadena Airmen's Club | Naha Airmen's Club |
|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>July:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 3,420 | \$ 1,530 | \$ 1,736 | \$ 1,135 | \$ 1,796 | \$ 1,194 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 9,261 | 5,792 | 10,768 | 12,078 | 16,436 | 4,962 |
| Other | 79 | 309 | 916 | 713 | 3,507 | 306 |
| Bar Operation | 5,593 | 2,281 | 5,313 | 6,141 | 9,601 | 5,571 |
| Food Operation | 6,957 | 5,754 | -0- | 3,129 | 9,042 | 3,347 |
| Other (Sales) | 2,064 | 1,186 | 4,535 | 4,232 | 11,559 | 5,345 |
| Concessions | 164 | 1,240 | -0- | 8 | -0- | -0- |
| <u>August:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 3,775 | \$ 1,593 | \$ 1,940 | \$ 1,130 | \$ 1,768 | \$ 1,194 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 9,030 | 3,873 | 15,888 | 11,906 | 11,640 | 4,959 |
| Other | 90 | 1,290 | 55 | 857 | 1,698 | 340 |
| Bar Operation | 7,526 | 1,985 | 8,905 | 6,514 | 10,047 | 5,467 |
| Food Operation | 8,141 | 5,932 | 6,895 | 3,587 | 6,979 | 3,037 |
| Other (Sales) | 3,707 | 1,136 | 5,609 | 3,837 | 10,917 | 4,848 |
| Concessions | 180 | 1,206 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| <u>September:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 4,125 | \$ 1,617 | \$ 1,868 | \$ 242 | \$ 1,893 | \$ 1,213 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 8,971 | 3,529 | 14,769 | 11,199 | 13,270 | 5,037 |
| Other | 45 | 375 | 6,035 | 757 | 1,327 | 283 |
| Bar Operation | 6,690 | 2,135 | 8,513 | 7,195 | 10,165 | 5,896 |
| Food Operation | 7,399 | 6,202 | 5,618 | 3,784 | 7,349 | 3,075 |
| Other (Sales) | 3,142 | 1,862 | 5,437 | 4,164 | 10,995 | 4,884 |
| Concessions | 169 | 1,164 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1961

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Kadena Officers Club</u> | <u>Naha Officers Club</u> | <u>Kadena NCO Club</u> | <u>Naha NCO Club</u> | <u>Kadena Airmen's Club</u> | <u>Naha Airmen's Club</u> |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>October:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 4,185 | \$ 1,734 | \$ 1,891 | \$ 144 | \$ 2,004 | \$ 1,069 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 8,386 | 7,138 | 14,676 | 10,951 | 11,306 | 3,951 |
| Other | 110 | 705 | 110 | 795 | 3,189 | 235 |
| Bar Operation | 6,999 | 1,950 | 7,485 | 6,076 | 9,142 | 4,951 |
| Food Operation | 8,457 | 6,321 | 7,363 | 2,763 | 7,814 | 2,511 |
| Other (Sales) | 4,386 | 1,959 | 5,935 | 4,217 | 10,523 | 6,462 |
| Concessions | 165 | 1,464 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| <u>November:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 4,320 | \$ 1,701 | \$ 2,094 | \$ 134 | \$ 2,104 | \$ 1,117 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 6,980 | 6,606 | 16,936 | 12,416 | 12,826 | 3,755 |
| Other | 1,301 | 861 | 116 | 990 | 1,552 | 260 |
| Bar Operation | 6,816 | 2,151 | 8,203 | 7,767 | 9,172 | 4,886 |
| Food Operation | 7,161 | 5,044 | 8,408 | 3,868 | 7,230 | 2,499 |
| Other (Sales) | 3,838 | 1,581 | 6,807 | 5,088 | 12,029 | 7,140 |
| Concessions | 173 | 890 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| <u>December:</u> | | | | | | |
| Dues | \$ 4,405 | \$ 1,683 | \$ 2,200 | \$ 96 | \$ 2,694 | \$ 1,169 |
| Vending Mach. (net) | 7,365 | 6,313 | 18,749 | 11,257 | 12,780 | 4,102 |
| Other | 1,624 | 626 | 853 | 760 | 2,481 | 262 |
| Bar Operation | 5,756 | 1,894 | 8,345 | 6,971 | 9,458 | 4,424 |
| Food Operation | 10,134 | 5,747 | 8,113 | 5,089 | 7,149 | 2,145 |
| Other (Sales) | 4,983 | 2,152 | 8,092 | 6,959 | 11,674 | 6,393 |
| Concessions | 176 | 1,541 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1961

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Kadena Officers Club</u> | <u>Naha Officers Club</u> | <u>Kadena NCO Club</u> | <u>Naha NCO Club</u> | <u>Kadena Airmen's Club</u> | <u>Naha Airmen's Club</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>July:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | \$ 1,101 | \$ 511 | \$ 1,531 | \$ 1,349 | \$ 1,748 | \$ 1,271 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 251 | 253 | 250 | 209 | 209 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 11,450 | 8,046 | 7,426 | 7,564 | 15,110 | 6,467 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | 916 | 713 | -0- | 275 |
| Entertainment | 3,589 | 3,429 | 5,289 | 6,050 | 9,056 | 4,272 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 2,437 | 1,695 | 2,193 | 2,029 | 4,615 | 1,579 |
| Other | 4,931 | 2,958 | 7,499 | 5,424 | 6,522 | 2,596 |
| <u>August:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | \$ 1,086 | 925 | 1,802 | 1,249 | 1,845 | 1,299 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 253 | 253 | 336 | 297 | 246 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 12,857 | 8,313 | 9,755 | 8,071 | 15,835 | 6,565 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | 225 | -0- | -0- | 275 |
| Entertainment | 4,068 | 2,787 | 7,444 | 6,814 | 9,336 | 4,305 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 2,533 | 1,690 | 3,187 | 2,132 | 4,164 | 1,562 |
| Other | 7,701 | 3,093 | 7,117 | 5,676 | 6,016 | 2,814 |
| <u>September:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil) | \$ 1,100 | \$ 576 | \$ 1,936 | \$ 1,352 | \$ 1,872 | \$ 1,330 |
| Salaries (US Civ) | 116 | 251 | 551 | 258 | 588 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 12,637 | 8,039 | 12,426 | 7,746 | 14,635 | 6,917 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Entertainment | 4,460 | 2,705 | 6,829 | 6,369 | 8,935 | 4,602 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 4,007 | 1,756 | 4,317 | 2,283 | 5,490 | 1,563 |
| Other | 6,613 | 2,805 | 5,608 | 4,911 | 6,270 | 3,230 |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1961

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Kadena Officers Club</u> | <u>Naha Officers Club</u> | <u>Kadena NCO Club</u> | <u>Naha NCO Club</u> | <u>Kadena Airmen's Club</u> | <u>Naha Airmen's Club</u> |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>October:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil.) | \$ 1,109 | \$ 511 | \$ 1,820 | \$ 1,320 | \$ 1,841 | \$ 1,207 |
| Salaries (U.S. Civ.) | 103 | 253 | 596 | 257 | 619 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 12,533 | 7,700 | 11,273 | 7,656 | 14,761 | 7,021 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Entertainment | 4,135 | 2,378 | 6,396 | 5,921 | 9,007 | 4,238 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 2,774 | 1,751 | 2,830 | 2,045 | 4,154 | 1,681 |
| Other | 6,804 | 3,571 | 5,793 | 4,585 | 5,654 | 2,728 |
| <u>November:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil.) | \$ 1,349 | \$ 606 | \$ 2,088 | \$ 1,542 | \$ 2,058 | \$ 1,398 |
| Salaries (U.S. Civ.) | 176 | 251 | 755 | 256 | 629 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 13,099 | 8,216 | 12,055 | 7,368 | 15,725 | 7,132 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Entertainment | 5,433 | 2,589 | 7,933 | 6,972 | 9,635 | 5,040 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 2,539 | 1,547 | 3,084 | 2,432 | 4,091 | 1,619 |
| Other | 6,877 | 3,113 | 7,586 | 4,924 | 7,778 | 3,369 |
| <u>December:</u> | | | | | | |
| Salaries (Mil.) | \$ 1,217 | \$ 548 | \$ 1,934 | \$ 1,416 | \$ 2,121 | \$ 1,318 |
| Salaries (U.S. Civ.) | 71 | 250 | 743 | 257 | 654 | -0- |
| Salaries (Indig.) | 12,446 | 7,990 | 12,012 | 8,035 | 14,886 | 6,941 |
| Salaries (Other) | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- |
| Entertainment | 5,689 | 3,144 | 12,149 | 6,857 | 13,433 | 4,565 |
| Deprec. & Misc. | 2,560 | 2,204 | 3,111 | 2,497 | 3,771 | 1,414 |
| Other | 7,269 | 3,665 | 8,028 | 6,052 | 8,285 | 2,984 |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1961

NUMBER OF MEMBERS

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Officers Open Mess</u> | <u>KADENA</u> | | <u>Officers Open Mess</u> | <u>NAHA</u> | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| | | <u>NCO Open Mess</u> | <u>Airmen's Open Mess</u> | | <u>NCO Open Mess</u> | <u>Airmen's Open Mess</u> |
| July | 714 | 1,736 | 1,796 | 513 | 1,239 | 1,373 |
| August | 756 | 1,940 | 1,768 | 532 | 1,233 | 1,314 |
| September | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| October | 868 | 1,891 | 2,004 | 571 | 1,418 | 1,192 |
| November | 883 | 2,094 | 2,104 | 574 | 1,424 | 1,318 |
| December | 891 | 2,220 | 2,694 | 571 | 1,446 | 1,274 |

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1961

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

| Month | Kadena Officers Club | | | Kadena NCO Club | | | Kadena Airmen's Club | | | Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena | | |
|-----------|-------------------------|--------|-------|--------------------|--------|-------|-------------------------|---------|-------|--|-------|-------|
| | Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Mil | US Civ. | Ind/O | Off | NCO | Amn |
| July | 9 | 3 | 223 | 19 | 1 | 202 | 16 | 1 | 309 | 3.0:1 | 7.8:1 | 5.5:1 |
| August | 9 | 3 | 231 | 19 | 2 | 207 | 18 | 1 | 294 | 3.1:1 | 8.5:1 | 5.6:1 |
| September | 9 | 2 | 231 | 19 | 3 | 219 | 17 | 2 | 294 | 3.5:1 | 7.8:1 | 6.1:1 |
| October | 12 | 2 | 231 | 19 | 3 | 222 | 19 | 2 | 307 | 3.5:1 | 7.8:1 | 6.1:1 |
| November | 22 | 3 | 239 | 23 | 4 | 225 | 20 | 2 | 309 | 3.3:1 | 8.3:1 | 6.4:1 |
| December | 21 | 3 | 235 | 23 | 4 | 219 | 21 | 3 | 306 | 3.4:1 | 9.0:1 | 8.1:1 |

| Month | Naha Officers Club | | | Naha NCO Club | | | Naha Airmen's Club | | | Ratio of Members to Employees Naha | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|--------|-------|------------------|--------|-------|-----------------------|---------|-------|--|-------|-------|
| | Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Mil | US Civ | Ind/O | Mil | US Civ. | Ind/O | Off | NCO | Amn |
| July | 6 | 1 | 149 | 15 | 1 | 127 | 10 | 0 | 130 | 3.3:1 | 8.7:1 | 9.8:1 |
| August | 20 | 1 | 146 | 14 | 1 | 129 | 11 | 0 | 132 | 3.2:1 | 8.6:1 | 9.2:1 |
| September | 8 | 1 | 146 | 13 | 1 | 129 | 11 | 0 | 129 | 3.7:1 | 9.1:1 | 9.3:1 |
| October | 7 | 1 | 143 | 13 | 1 | 128 | 11 | 0 | 131 | 3.8:1 | * | 8.4:1 |
| November | 7 | 1 | 142 | 12 | 1 | 129 | 12 | 0 | 127 | 3.8:1 | * | 9.5:1 |
| December | 6 | 1 | 142 | 13 | 1 | 130 | 12 | 0 | 128 | 3.8:1 | * | 9.1:1 |

*Ratio over 10:1.

KUME SHIMA AIR STATION NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit Or Loss | Net Profit Or Loss By To Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees | | | Ratio Members to Employees |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|-----|-------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | | Mil | Civ | Ind/O | |
| July | \$ 1,385 | \$ 1,385 | 100 | \$ 98 | 3 | 0 | 3 | * |
| August | 1,128 | 2,035 | 105 | 103 | 4 | 0 | 3 | * |
| September | 1,671 | 3,706 | 114 | 112 | 4 | 0 | 3 | * |
| October | 392 | 4,098 | 104 | 102 | 4 | 0 | 3 | * |
| November | 286 | 4,384 | 103 | 101 | 4 | 0 | 3 | * |
| December | 190 | 4,574 | 105 | 103 | 4 | 0 | 3 | * |

*Ratio over 10:1.

YUZA LAKE AIR STATION NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit Or Loss | Net Profit Or Loss FY To Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees | | | Ratio Members to Employees |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|-----|-------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | | Mil. | Civ | Ind/O | |
| July | \$ 1,204 | \$ 1,204 | 178 | \$ 89 | 5 | 0 | 16 | 8.5:1 |
| August | 782 | 1,986 | 213 | 106 | 4 | 0 | 16 | * |
| September | 1,017 | 3,003 | 215 | 108 | 4 | 0 | 15 | * |
| October | (22) | 2,981 | 196 | 98 | 6 | 0 | 16 | 8.9:1 |
| November | 576 | 3,557 | 212 | 187 | 5 | 0 | 16 | * |
| December | 397 | 3,954 | 210 | 105 | 6 | 0 | 16 | 9.5:1 |

*Ratio over 10:1.

MIYAKO JMA AIR STATION NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit Or Loss | Net Profit Or Loss FY To Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees | | | Ratio Members to Employees |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|-----|-------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | | Mil | Civ | Ind/O | |
| July | \$ 379 | \$ 379 | 42 | \$ 39 | 4 | 0 | 8 | 3.5:1 |
| August | 592 | 971 | 57 | 56 | 3 | 0 | 10 | 4.4:1 |
| September | 502 | 1,473 | 58 | 58 | 6 | 0 | 13 | 3.1:1 |
| October | 655 | 2,128 | 66 | 66 | 3 | 0 | 12 | 4.4:1 |
| November | 305 | 2,433 | 66 | 15 | 8 | 0 | 12 | 3.3:1 |
| December | 190 | 4,574 | 91 | 27 | 4 | 0 | 13 | 5.4:1 |

OKINO-ERABU SHIMA AIR STATION NCO CLUB

| Month | Net Profit Or Loss | Net Profit Or Loss FY To Date | Number of Members | Dues | Number of Employees | | | Ratio Members to Employees |
|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|-----|-------|----------------------------------|
| | | | | | Mil | Civ | Ind/O | |
| July | \$ 302 | \$ 302 | 81 | \$ 64 | 4 | 0 | 11 | 5.4:1 |
| August | 379 | 681 | 91 | 67 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 7.6:1 |
| September | 320 | 1,001 | 87 | 78 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 7.9:1 |
| October | 333 | 1,339 | 88 | 67 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 9.8:1 |
| November | 265 | 1,604 | 93 | 81 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 9.3:1 |
| December | 270 | 1,874 | 101 | 83 | 6 | 0 | 16 | 9.5:1 |

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 5

RATIONS ISSUED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMISSARIES
ON OKINAWA

1 JULY - 31 DECEMBER 1961

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 5

KADENA AIR BASE

| <u>Ration Issues</u> | <u>July</u> | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> |
|---|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| Field Ration "A" | 109,315 | 110,432 | 110,895 |
| Meal Combat Incl. | --- | --- | 27,610 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 2,426 | 1,467 | 1,614 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 507 | 152 | 51 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 961 | 847 | 944 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 244 | 204 | 147 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 4 | --- | 4 |
| Republic of Korea AF Personnel - Meals | 53 | 56 | 14 |
| Chinat AF Personnel - Meals | 23 | --- | --- |
| New Zealand AF Personnel - Meals | --- | 93 | 115 |

| <u>Ration Issues</u> | <u>October</u> | <u>November</u> | <u>December</u> |
|---------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Field Ration "A" | 108,140 | 120,055 | 114,789 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 1,848 | 1,683 | 1,989 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 111 | 28 | 131 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 1,153 | 769 | 526 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 163 | 394 | 309 |
| U. S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 21 | 115 | 61 |
| Thai AF Personnel - Meals | 59 | 67 | 116 |
| Chinat AF Personnel - Meals | 5 | 12 | --- |
| Philippine AF Personnel - Meals | --- | 51 | 57 |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 5

NAHA AIR BASE

| <u>Ration Issues</u> | <u>July</u> | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| Field Ration "A" | 51,425 | 57,526 | 55,956 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 1,947 | 3,034 | 2,244 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 30 | 8 | 81 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 129 | 243 | 138 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 338 | 518 | 582 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 2 | 1 | 9 |
| U.S. Coast Guard Personnel - Meals | --- | 7 | 12 |
| Thai AF Personnel - Meals | --- | --- | 8 |

| <u>Ration Issues</u> | <u>October</u> | <u>November</u> | <u>December</u> |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Field Ration "A" | 54,298 | 56,354 | 56,903 |
| Inflight Box Lunches | 1,090 | 1,271 | 1,169 |
| Inflight Food Packets | 104 | 60 | 7 |
| U.S. Marine Personnel - Meals | 113 | 128 | 141 |
| U.S. Army Personnel - Meals | 583 | 626 | 653 |
| U.S. Navy Personnel - Meals | 76 | 36 | 33 |
| U.S. Coast Guard Personnel - Meals | 3 | --- | 2 |

313th AD, 1961 II, Appendix 5

KADENA AIR BASE

| <u>Commissary Sales</u> | <u>July</u> | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$167,690.85 | \$185,089.05 | \$178,968.70 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 26,831.18 | 33,626.99 | 36,459.43 |
| Troop Issue | <u>115,341.51</u> | <u>132,219.88</u> | <u>122,478.79</u> |
| Total | \$309,863.54 | \$350,935.92 | \$337,906.92 |

| <u>Commissary Sales</u> | <u>October</u> | <u>November</u> | <u>December</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$178,754.02 | \$195,609.06 | \$200,723.28 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 37,753.49 | 41,109.75 | 41,299.38 |
| Troop Issue | <u>138,156.63</u> | <u>139,962.04</u> | <u>133,387.09</u> |
| Total | \$354,664.14 | \$376,680.85 | \$375,409.75 |

NAHA AIR BASE

| <u>Commissary Sales</u> | <u>July</u> | <u>August</u> | <u>September</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$67,704.79 | \$66,294.37 | \$69,433.92 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 17,435.60 | 19,121.74 | 17,338.82 |
| Troop Issue | <u>58,704.13</u> | <u>64,864.39</u> | <u>68,431.27</u> |
| Total | \$143,844.52 | \$150,280.50 | \$155,204.01 |

| <u>Commissary Sales</u> | <u>October</u> | <u>November</u> | <u>December</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Cash Sales | \$75,405.80 | \$76,287.60 | \$81,682.99 |
| Bulk Sales to Clubs | 20,188.15 | 22,369.36 | 17,474.90 |
| Troop Issue | <u>62,525.87</u> | <u>62,645.58</u> | <u>62,651.29</u> |
| Total | \$158,119.82 | \$161,302.54 | \$161,809.18 |

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

JULY 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|
| Scrap Received During July | 884,261 [#] |
| Transferred to DOD Agencies | 374 [#] |
| Utilized Within the Air Force | 67,955 [#] |
| Scrap Disposed of by Sale | 792,300 [#] |
| Scrap on Hand 1 July | 156,775 [#] |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total Excesses Received During July | \$525,826.84 |
| Total Excesses Transferred (DOD) | 1,467.78 |
| Utilized Within Air Force | 666.44 |
| Total Excesses Expended, Destroyed or Inventoried | 999,145.48 |
| Total Excesses Disposed of by Sale | 128,101.14 |
| Total Excesses on Hand 1 July | 884,776.45 |
| Total Excesses on Hand 1 August | 285,222.45 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|
| Money Collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 4,740.18 |
| Money Collected from Retail Store | 18,577.54 |
| Money Collected from Sealed Bid Sales | <u>30,298.35</u> |

TOTAL \$ 53,616.07

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

AUGUST 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|---|----------|
| Scrap received during August | 883,798# |
| Transferred to DOD Agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 877# |
| Utilized within the AF | 26,270# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 569,800# |
| Scrap on Hand 1 August | 180,407# |
| Scrap on Hand 1 September | 467,258# |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total excesses received during August | \$663,243.49 |
| Total excesses transferred (DOD) | 1,152.91 |
| Utilized within the AF | 96,228.34 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or in- ventoried | 520,294.61 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid & Retail) | 148,108.72 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 August | 285,222.45 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 September | 182,681.36 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|--|--------------|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 11,408.80 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store which was open the 2nd & 4th Wednesdays | 7,837.96 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | 1,278.21 |
| Total money collected during August | 20,524.97 |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix G

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

SEPTEMBER 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|---|----------|
| Scrap received during September | 411,570# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 0 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 4,768# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 391,014# |
| Scrap on hand 1 September | 467,258# |
| Scrap on hand 1 October | 483,046# |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total excesses received during September | \$296,608.62 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 2,516.84 |
| Utilized within the AF | 6,661.25 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or in- ventoried | 223,991.09 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid & Retail) | 103,569.17 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 September | 182,681.36 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 October | 142,751.63 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|--|-----------------|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 12,022.44 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store which was open the 2nd & 4th Wednesdays | 25,311.14 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | <u>1,330.82</u> |

TOTAL \$ 38,664.40

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

OCTOBER 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|---|------------|
| Scrap received during October | 860,395# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 0 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 16,709# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Seal Bid, Retail) | 1,023,468# |
| Scrap on hand 1 October | 483,046# |
| Scrap on hand 1 November | 303,264# |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total excesses received during October | \$449,013.72 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 3,640.18 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 5,424.00 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or in- ventoried | 204,506.19 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid & Retail) | 61,532.40 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 October | 142,751.63 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 November | 316,662.58 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|------------------|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 3,858.49 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store which was open each Wednesday | 7,697.23 |
| Money collected from Scaled Bid Sales | <u>28,823.18</u> |

TOTAL \$ 40,378.90

313AD, 1961-II, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

NOVEMBER 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|---|----------|
| Scrap received during November | 657,446# |
| Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 120,793# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 3,988# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or Sealed Bid, Retail) | 493,285# |
| Scrap on hand 1 November 61 | 303,264# |
| Scrap on hand 1 December 61 | 342,644# |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total excesses received during November | \$657,413.95 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 5,567.33 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 12,054.03 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 329,682.87 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid & Retail) | 208,326.96 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 November | 316,662.58 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 December | 418,445.34 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 18,775.36 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 5,720.21 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | <u>3,629.91</u> |

TOTAL \$ 28,125.48

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix G

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REGULATION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

DECEMBER 1961

(1) Scrap & Waste

| | |
|---|----------|
| Scrap received during December | 730,847# |
| Transferred to D.O.S. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines) | 19,279# |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 25,571# |
| Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal Bid, Retail) | 24,171# |
| Scrap on hand 1 December 61 | 342,644# |
| Scrap on hand 1 January 1962 | 404,470# |

(2) Surplus Excesses

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Total excesses received during December | \$420,193.08 |
| Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.) | 1,405.95 |
| Utilized within the Air Force | 45,173.43 |
| Total excesses expended, destroyed or inventoried | 262,370.60 |
| Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot Bid & Retail) | 157,940.85 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 December 61 | 418,445.34 |
| Total excesses on hand 1 January 62 | 371,747.59 |

(3) Monies Received

| | |
|---|-----------------|
| Money collected from Spot Bid Sales | \$ 10,609.43 |
| Money collected from the operation of the Retail Store | 5,163.15 |
| Money collected from Sealed Bid Sales | <u>3,417.30</u> |

TOTAL \$ 19,189.88

313th AF, 1961-II

APPENDIX 8

AOCP, ANFE AND ANOR/S RATES

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 8

PER CENT AOCF RATES

July - December 1961

| Unit | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>6313 AB Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| T-33 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0 | 0 | 4.2 | 1.9 |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4.2 |
| C-54 | 3.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>18 Tac Ftr Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| F-100 | 1.2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.9 |
| RF-101 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 4.6 | 1.1 | 1.7 |
| <u>51 Ftr Intep Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| SA-16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-47 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| T-33 | 1.6 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
| H-19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.5 | 0 | 0 |
| F-102 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 0.9 |
| C-130 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0 |

PER CENT ANFE RATES

July - December 1961

| Unit | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
| <u>6313 AB Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| T-33 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-54 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9.6 |
| <u>18 Tac Ftr Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| F-100 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 0.1 | 0.09 | 0.1 |
| RF-101 | 0 | 1.7 | 0 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 0 |
| <u>51 Ftr Intep Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| SA-16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| T-33 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| H-19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| F-102 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0 |
| C-130 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 0 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0 |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 8

PER CENT AMOR/S RATES

July - December 1961

| Unit | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>6313 AB Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| T-33 | 6.7 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 0 | 4.2 | 1.9 |
| C-47 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4.2 |
| C-54 | 3.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9.6 |
| <u>18 Tac Ftr Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| F-100 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| RF-101 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 1.9 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 1.7 |
| <u>51 Ftr Intcp Wg</u> | | | | | | |
| SA-16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| C-47 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| T-33 | 2.6 | 0 | 0 | 1.0 | 0 | 0 |
| H-19 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7.5 | 0 | 0 |
| F-102 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 0.9 |
| C-130 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 0 | 1.3 | 0.6 | 0 |

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL READY RATES

| | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| F-100 | 79.6 | 82.3 | 85.0 | 81.7 | 82.9 | 85.0 |
| RF-101 | 78.1 | 82.8 | 85.6 | 82.8 | 86.2 | 86.0 |
| F-102 | 74.0 | 74.0 | 71.0 | 70.0 | 73.0 | 75.0 |
| C-130 (21 Trp Carr Sq) | 78.0 | 74.0 | 76.0 | 70.0 | 79.0 | 78.0 |
| C-130 (817 Trp Carr Sq) | 78.0 | 79.0 | 79.0 | 70.0 | 79.0 | 78.0 |
| T-33 (Naha) | 79.0 | 94.0 | 81.0 | 78.0 | 82.0 | 85.0 |
| T-33 (Kadena) | 76.0 | 80.3 | 75.6 | 75.3 | 73.6 | 62.0 |
| C-47 (Naha) | 79.0 | 59.0 | 41.0 | 54.0 | 48.0 | 85.0 |
| C-47 (Kadena) | 62.8 | 72.2 | 75.6 | 85.5 | 83.4 | 80.0 |
| H-19 (Naha) | 86.0 | 78.0 | 83.0 | 80.0 | 64.0 | 0 |
| C-54 (Kadena) | | | | 50.6 | 83.4 | 64.0 |

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 9

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1961

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1961

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Kadena</u> | <u>Naha</u> |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| July | 18.84 Inches | 17.13 Inches |
| August | 6.01 Inches | 6.15 Inches |
| September | 5.81 Inches | 6.82 Inches |
| October | 12.21 Inches* | 11.91 Inches |
| November | 1.79 Inches | 3.01 Inches |
| December | <u>5.50</u> Inches | <u>4.56</u> Inches |
| TOTALS | 50.16 Inches | 49.58 Inches |

* The rain gauge at Detachment 8 (Kadena AB) was neglected by the station personnel during Typhoon Tilda, making it necessary for them to estimate the rainfall. When the 313th Air Division Command Historian called to obtain the various typhoon data shortly after the "All Clear", he was furnished an estimated figure of five inches of rain for the period of the typhoon. However, when he called on 3 January 1962 to obtain the rainfall data for 1961, the personnel at Detachment 8 reported the estimated rainfall for Typhoon Tilda as 10 inches. The latter figure is the one used in the total for October.

313th AD, 1961-II

APPENDIX 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM
AT KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

313th AD, 1961-I, Appendix 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

July 1961

| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>1100 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
|-------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kadena | 791,749 | 2,533,092 | 10,517 | 144 | 1,098 |
| Naha | 412,251 | 1,132,221 | 7,073 | 84 | 813 |
| TOTAL | 1,204,000 | 3,665,313 | 17,590 | 228 | 1,911 |

August 1961

| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>1100 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
|-------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kadena | 801,205 | 2,761,016 | 10,338 | 120 | 1,436 |
| Naha | 514,847 | 1,528,677 | 11,095 | 46 | 624 |
| TOTAL | 1,316,052 | 4,289,693 | 21,433 | 166 | 2,060 |

September 1961

| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>1100 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
|-------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kadena | 761,152 | 2,251,263 | 6,015 | 132 | 985 |
| Naha | 467,916 | 1,105,610 | 11,512 | 79 | 1,524 |
| TOTAL | 1,229,068 | 3,356,873 | 17,527 | 211 | 2,509 |

October 1961

| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>110 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
|-------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Kadena | 730,623 | 2,614,011 | 9,092 | 286 | 1,314 |
| Naha | 459,388 | 1,328,078 | 7,264 | 12 | 1,234 |
| TOTAL | 1,190,011 | 3,942,089 | 16,356 | 298 | 2,548 |

313th AD, 1961-II, Appendix 10

ISSUE OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

| | <u>November 1961</u> | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>1100 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
| Kadena | 605,659 | 2,959,126 | 6,866 | 0 | 810 |
| Naha | 535,351 | 1,645,966 | 8,235 | 15 | 1,866 |
| TOTAL | 1,141,010 | 4,605,092 | 15,101 | 15 | 2,676 |

| | <u>December 1961</u> | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <u>Base</u> | <u>115/145</u> | <u>JP-4</u> | <u>1100 Oil</u> | <u>1010 Oil</u> | <u>7808 Oil</u> |
| Kadena | 594,439 | 2,253,004 | 5,102 | 18 | 894 |
| Naha | 389,022 | 1,812,020 | 5,745 | 30 | 1,139 |
| TOTAL | 983,461 | 4,065,024 | 10,847 | 48 | 2,033 |

5AFR 23-4

5AF REGULATION
NO. 23-4

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 24 November 1961

Organization and Mission - Field

313TH AIR DIVISION

PURPOSE: To state the mission and responsibilities, and outline command relationships of the 313th Air Division.

1. Mission. The mission of the 313th Air Division is to maintain assigned and attached forces at a degree of combat readiness that will insure the success of directed military operations.
2. Organization. The 313th Air Division is a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force. It is provided with a headquarters and such units and facilities necessary to accomplish its mission and to carry out Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in the 313th Air Division area.
3. Responsibilities. The Commander, 313th Air Division, will:
 - a. Exercise command of assigned units except for that direct control retained by the Commander, Fifth Air Force, over offensive tactical forces.
 - b. Control and/or support attached units as directed.
 - c. Organize, administer, equip, and train assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies and plans issued by this and higher headquarters.
 - d. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, prepare plans as required in support of Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.
 - e. Insure that combat training is conducted in accordance with existing directives and oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders. Emphasis will be placed upon the specific plans and directives listed in Attachment 1.

This regulation supersedes 5AFR 23-4, 8 Jun 60.

5AFR 23-4

f. Insure that all combat and combat direct support units are furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to maintain a high degree of combat readiness.

g. Insure the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

h. Monitor the development and conduct of training programs to include:

(1) Technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(2) General military training in accordance with applicable AF Unit Training Standards.

(3) Assist in aircrew, ground crew, technical and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program as required.

(4) Other training as directed.

i. Contribute toward development of:

(1) Tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(2) Requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.

(3) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

j. Provide aircraft for, and supervision over, annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel outlined in AFR 60-3.

k. Provide administrative and logistic support, as directed.

l. Support the Strategic Air Command, Military Air Transport Service and other USAF activities in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units as reflected on current USAF programming document.

m. When directed, exercise operational control of forces other than those of the United States.

n. Exercise operational control of US Army and Navy antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units, and other antiaircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

o. Represent CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region.

- p. Conduct search and rescue operations as directed.
- q. Organize and administer an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units.
- r. Provide for sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations.
- s. Provide for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required in support of the mission.
- t. Exercise general courts-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.
- u. Coordinate with and provide assistance to other United States military services and governmental agencies to include:
 - (1) Formulating and jointly planning local ground defense search and rescue, civil disturbance, typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency noncombatant evacuation, and special demonstration plans, with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies.
 - (2) Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.
 - (3) Participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies as directed by the Commander, US. Forces.
 - (4) Contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Services Police Force and the Ryukyuan Army and Air Force Exchange Service.
 - (5) After completion of appropriate agreements, providing a base, training facilities and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations.
 - (6) Supporting the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands, in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership to the Joint Planning Group, all subcommittees and panels.
 - (7) Coordinating with appropriate local United States governmental authorities, all Air Force activities which have an impact on the civil economy or affect civil activities.
 - (8) Supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyu Islands.

5AFR 23-4

v. Insure that all commanders and staff officers are familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, Unified Actions Armed Forces.

w. Insure preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Hq 313th Air Division.

x. Insure that mission directives have been prepared for all units within the division and require that all mission directives be reviewed semiannually and updated when required.

4. Miscellaneous. On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the Commander, 313th Air Division, is authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate and friendly force commanders, except as otherwise directed by this or higher headquarters.

OFFICIAL:

JACOB E. SMART
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

GREGORY Q. STANLEY
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Asst Director of Administrative Services

1 Attachment
Listing of Plans and Directives

LISTING OF PLANS AND DIRECTIVES

1. Training:

- a. PACAFM 51-2
- b. PACAFM 51-3
- c. PACAFM 51-4
- d. PACAFM 51-6
- e. 5AF OPlan 135-59
- f. 5AF OPlan 138-59

2. Operations:

- a. PACAFM 55-4
- b. PACAFM 55-5
- c. PACAFM 55-7
- d. PACAFM 55-8
- e. 5AF OPlan 109-59
- f. 5AF OPlan 146-60
- g. 5AF OPlan 164-60
- h. 5AF OPlan 175-60
- i. PACAF Procedures for Positive Control

3. Emergency and Contingency War Plans:

- a. 5AF GWP 1-61
- b. 5AF OPlan 25-61
- c. 5AF OPlan 27-60
- d. 5AF OPlan 32-59
- e. 5AF OPlan 152-60

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5AFR 23-15

5AF REGULATION
NO. 23-15

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
APO 925 24 November 1961

Organization and Mission - Field

7TH TACTICAL DEPOT SQUADRON

PURPOSE: To state the mission of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron and establish the responsibilities of the Commander.

1. General:

a. The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is an Air Force controlled (AFCON) table of organization unit. It is provided with a squadron headquarters, two operating facilities and equipment necessary to carry out its mission.

b. The mission of the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is defined in detail in current Hq Fifth Air Force Capabilities and Equipage Letters.

c. The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron is assigned to Hq Fifth Air Force under command supervision of the Director of Armament Supply (5FMAS). Hq Fifth Air Force exercises operational control over the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron, which is attached to the 313th Air Division for administration and logistical support only. The 313th Air Division will levy resource requirements upon the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron only with the concurrence of the Director of Armament Supply, Hq Fifth Air Force.

2. Responsibilities. The Commander, 7th Tactical Depot Squadron will:

a. Maintain operational control over deployed teams.

b. Operate two separate maintenance facilities.

c. Perform operator maintenance on 7th Tactical Depot Squadron assigned vehicles.

d. Operate a special supply account.

e. Provide space for a limited communication center.

f. Conduct the theater quality assurance program.

This regulation supersedes 5AFR 23-51, 16 Jun 58.

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5AFR 23-15

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g. Conduct a quality control and training program for 7th Tactical Depot Squadron site and deployed maintenance activities. Assist other related organizations with quality control and training programs as resources permit.

h. Maintain capabilities in accordance with current Hq Fifth Air Force Capabilities and Equipage Letters.

OFFICIAL

JACOB E. SMART
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

GREGORY Q. STANLEY
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Asst Director of Administrative Services

5AF REGULATION)
NO. 55-18)

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE
AFO 925 14 January 1960

OPERATIONS

DIVISION AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

PURPOSE: To delineate the air defense sectors assigned to air divisions within Fifth Air Force.

1. Applicability. The provisions of this regulation are applicable to air division commanders and pertain only to the area of responsibility chargeable to Commander, Fifth Air Force.

2. Definitions:

a. Area of Responsibility. The geographical area assigned for the purpose of allocating surveillance and reporting responsibilities in consonance with air defense capabilities.

b. Air Defense Sector. The area of responsibility assigned to an Air Defense Control Center.

c. Air Defense Region. The area of responsibility assigned to Fifth Air Force.

3. Responsibilities:

a. The air division commander has operational jurisdiction over the air defense forces in his sector and is responsible for the conduct of the air defense operation in his area of responsibility.

b. The Fifth Air Force region is divided into the following areas of responsibility:

- (1) 39th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 45°45' N 145°45' E thence south along this meridian to 44°26' N 145°45' E thence southwest to 44°03' N 145°19' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°30' N 145°22' E thence to 43°24' N 145°35' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°26' N 145°48'30" E thence to 43°23'15" N 145°50'35" E thence 43°20' N 145°52' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°16' N 145°44' E thence to 42°47' N 146°23' E thence generally northeast, staying 40 nautical miles off the eastern flank of the Kurile Island chain to 52°30' N 160° E thence south to 38° N 160° E thence west to 38° N 144°38' E thence northwest to 39° N 142°30' E thence west to 39° N 140° E thence northwest to 42° N 131° 41' E thence generally northeast staying 40 nautical

miles off the eastern flank of the USSR to $45^{\circ}45' N$
 $138^{\circ}45' E$ thence east to starting point $45^{\circ}45' N$
 $145^{\circ}45' E$.

- (2) 41st Air Division. The area encompassed by the points $38^{\circ} N 160^{\circ} E$ south to $30^{\circ} N 160^{\circ} E$ west to $30^{\circ} N 123^{\circ} E$ north to $32^{\circ} N 123^{\circ} E$ west to a point 40 nautical miles off the China coast thence generally northwest along a line 40 nautical miles off the coastline to $33^{\circ} N 121^{\circ}50' E$ to $33^{\circ} N 127^{\circ} E$ northeast to $35^{\circ}13' N 129^{\circ}48' E$ to $36^{\circ} N 130^{\circ}30' E$ to $37^{\circ}17' N 133^{\circ} E$ then north to $41^{\circ}35' N 133^{\circ} E$ then southeast to $39^{\circ} N 140^{\circ} E$ to $39^{\circ} N 142^{\circ}30' E$ then southeast to $38^{\circ} N 144^{\circ}38' E$ then east to starting point $38^{\circ} N 160^{\circ} E$.
- (3) 313th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points $30^{\circ} N 145^{\circ} E$ southwest to $23^{\circ} N 132^{\circ} E$ west to $23^{\circ} N 123^{\circ} E$ north to $30^{\circ} N 123^{\circ} E$ thence east to starting point $30^{\circ} N 145^{\circ} E$.
- (4) 314th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points $41^{\circ}35' N 133^{\circ} E$ south to $37^{\circ}17' N 133^{\circ} E$ southwest to $36^{\circ} N 130^{\circ}30' E$ to $35^{\circ}13' N 129^{\circ}48' E$ to $33^{\circ} N 127^{\circ} E$ west to $33^{\circ} N 121^{\circ}50' E$ thence generally north, east and south along a line 40 nautical miles off the China-North Korea coast to a point 40 nautical miles southwest of the western end of the DMZ thence along center of DMZ to point 40 nautical miles northeast of eastern end of DMZ thence generally north along a line 40 nautical miles off the North Korea-China coast to a point $42^{\circ} N 131^{\circ}40' E$ thence southeast to starting point $41^{\circ}35' N 133^{\circ} E$.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDWIN L. WALKER, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Chief, Administrative Services

SECRET

2

HEADQUARTERS
FIFTH AIR FORCE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 925 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 5FODC

27 June 1960

Revised 1 August 1960

SUBJECT: (S) HQ Fifth Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking Forces
(This supersedes letter dated 27 June 1960)

TO: 313th Air Div

1. This paper clarifies paragraph 3a, 5AF Regulation 23.4 which is the mission directive of the 313th Air Division. A degree of direct control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons. This degree extends beyond the "centralized control" traditional in the employment of conventional forces.

2. Control is defined as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations." The following is the minimum control that this headquarters intends to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces of your division:

a. Ordering, directing and monitoring maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.

b. Ordering and monitoring routine and special force deployments.

c. Ordering, directing, monitoring and evaluating combat readiness training programs.

d. Controlling and directing the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system provides direct communication between this headquarters and tactical wings.

e. Controlling and directing the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.

f. Such other control as operational necessity dictates.

3. The necessity for retention of direct control of tactical wings by this headquarters has reduced the requirement for personnel on your operations staff. It is not necessary or desirable that your staff duplicate the efforts of this headquarters in the

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direction and control of our strike forces. I do however, consider it necessary and desirable that you keep yourself and key members of your staff informed on the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned your division in order that you may be prepared to carry out effectively, the responsibilities assigned to you in Annex E, and described in the Command Relationships Annex, of the WPC.

4. You will note that your new mission directive requires that you assure the achievement of combat readiness training, the preparation of plans and orders and the provision of command policy and guidance along with other responsibilities toward the command and control of tactical striking forces. I do not intend that these requirements should prompt an expansion of your operations staff. I believe that these responsibilities may be discharged within your present staff capabilities with the assistance of your inspection system and tactical wing staffs.

5. The control of tactical striking forces outlined in paragraph 2 above will be exercised through direct communication with tactical Wings and Groups. Information copies of all correspondence between this headquarters and tactical units of other than routine nature, will be furnished to your headquarters.

ROBERT W. BURNS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander

31310-H-0074

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3

HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-60)

25 May 1961

DESIGNATION OF THE AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE AS A MAJOR AIR
COMMAND

1. Effective 1 July 1961:

a. The Airways and Air Communications Service and the Headquarters Airways and Air Communications Service are relieved from assignment to Military Air Transport Service and redesignated as the Air Force Communications Service and the Headquarters, Air Force Communications Service, respectively.

b. The Air Force Communications Service is designated as a major air command.

c. The following units, together with all personnel and equipment, are relieved from assignment to Military Air Transport Service and are assigned to Air Force Communications Service with no change in location. Further assignment within the gaining command will be in accordance with AFR 20-27:

1800 Support Squadron
3 AACS Squadron, Mobile
1865 AACS Facility Checking Flight
Hq, AACS Continental Systems Region
Hq, 2045 AACS Group
2044 AACS Squadron
Hq, 2049 AACS Group
Hq, North Atlantic AACS Region
1856 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1292 AACS Squadron
1912 AACS Squadron
1913 AACS Squadron
1917 AACS Squadron
1932 AACS Squadron
1933 AACS Squadron
1936 AACS Squadron
1971 AACS Squadron
1983 AACS Squadron
2000 AACS Squadron
2004 AACS Squadron
2016 AACS Squadron
2017 AACS Squadron
2018 AACS Squadron
2019 AACS Squadron
2042 AACS Squadron
2043 AACS Squadron

SO G-60, Hq MATS, USAF, Scott AFB, Illinois

25 May 1961

Hq, Southeastern AACS Region

1852 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1275 AACS Squadron
1278 AACS Squadron
1279 AACS Squadron
1919 AACS Squadron
1920 AACS Squadron
1926 AACS Squadron
1928 AACS Squadron
1934 AACS Squadron
1938 AACS Squadron
1942 AACS Squadron
1943 AACS Squadron
1948 AACS Squadron
1968 AACS Squadron
1978 AACS Squadron
1999 AACS Squadron
2020 AACS Squadron
2021 AACS Squadron
2022 AACS Squadron
2023 AACS Squadron
2024 AACS Squadron
2025 AACS Squadron
2047 AACS Squadron

Hq, Midwestern AACS Region

1853 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1277 AACS Squadron
1910 AACS Squadron
1911 AACS Squadron
1915 AACS Squadron
1918 AACS Squadron
1963 AACS Squadron
1966 AACS Squadron
1991 AACS Squadron
2001 AACS Squadron
2007 AACS Squadron
2009 AACS Squadron
2026 AACS Squadron
2027 AACS Squadron
2028 AACS Squadron
2029 AACS Squadron
2030 AACS Squadron
2031 AACS Squadron
2032 AACS Squadron
2046 AACS Squadron

Hq, Southwestern AACS Region

1854 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1900 AACS Squadron
1908 AACS Squadron
1923 AACS Squadron
1924 AACS Squadron
1927 AACS Squadron
1940 AACS Squadron

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25 May 1961

1984 AACS Squadron
1996 AACS Squadron
2002 AACS Squadron
2010 AACS Squadron
2013 AACS Squadron
2015 AACS Squadron
2040 AACS Squadron
2041 AACS Squadron
2048 AACS Squadron

Hq, Western AACS Region

1850 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1293 AACS Squadron
1901 AACS Squadron
1302 AACS Squadron
1303 AACS Squadron
1304 AACS Squadron
1905 AACS Squadron
1906 AACS Squadron
1907 AACS Squadron
1925 AACS Squadron
2034 AACS Squadron
2035 AACS Squadron
2036 AACS Squadron
2037 AACS Squadron
2038 AACS Squadron
2039 AACS Squadron

Hq, Alaskan AACS Region

1855 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1931 AACS Squadron
1995 AACS Squadron

Hq, European-African-Middle Eastern AACS Area

2 AACS Squadron, Mobile

Hq, Central European AACS Region

1857 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1233 AACS Squadron
1235 AACS Squadron
1237 AACS Squadron
1272 AACS Squadron
1283 AACS Squadron
1284 AACS Squadron
1287 AACS Squadron
1945 AACS Squadron
1946 AACS Squadron
1947 AACS Squadron
1952 AACS Squadron
1990 AACS Squadron
1992 AACS Squadron
1994 AACS Squadron
2005 AACS Squadron

Hq, Spanish AACS Region

1864 AACS Facility Checking Flight

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25 May 1961

1238 AACS Squadron
1262 AACS Squadron
1286 AACS Squadron
1288 AACS Squadron
1375 AACS Squadron
1381 AACS Squadron
1389 AACS Squadron
Hq, Mediterranean AACS Region
1859 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1240 AACS Squadron
1949 AACS Squadron
1950 AACS Squadron
2003 AACS Squadron
2006 AACS Squadron
2008 AACS Squadron
Hq, United Kingdom AACS Region
1858 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1230 AACS Squadron
1245 AACS Squadron
1261 AACS Squadron
1263 AACS Squadron
1264 AACS Squadron
1266 AACS Squadron
1268 AACS Squadron
1276 AACS Squadron
1280 AACS Squadron
1969 AACS Squadron
1970 AACS Squadron
1979 AACS Squadron
Hq, Pacific AACS Area
1 AACS Squadron, Mobile
1862 AACS Facility Checking Flight
1958 AACS Squadron
Hq, 1957 AACS Group
Hq, 1961 AACS Group
1265 AACS Squadron
Hq, Far East AACS Region
1861 Facility Checking Flight
1227 AACS Squadron
1232 AACS Squadron
1246 AACS Squadron
1953 AACS Squadron
1955 AACS Squadron
Hq, 1962 AACS Group
1252 AACS Squadron
Hq, 1956 AACS Group

d. The block of numbers, 1800 to 2199, inclusive, is withdrawn from MATS and assigned to Air Force Communications Service for the designation of major air command-control (MAJCON) units. MATS will retain for its use the block of numbers, 1200 to 1799, inclusive. The Command concerned will redesignate its MAJCON units as required to assure agreement with this re-allocation of numbers. Present numerical designations in the 1200-1799 series initially reassigned to Air Force Communications Service

SO G-60, Hq MATS, USAF, Scott AFB, Illinois

25 May 1961

will revert to MATS after redesignation, and those in the 1300-2199 series initially retained by MATS will pass to Air Force Communications Service. In neither case will the numbers thus returned be used to designate like kind or type units.

e. The Commander, Air Force Communications Service will redesignate:

(1) The following units, as indicated:

| <u>PRESENT DESIGNATION</u> | <u>NEW DESIGNATION</u> |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| AACS Sq, Mobile, 1, 2, 3 | Mobile Communications Sq, 1, 2, 3, |
| Hq, AACS Continental Systems Region | Hq, Continental Systems Region |
| Hq, (named) AACS Area | Hq, (named) Communications Area |
| Hq, (named) AACS Region | Hq, (named) Communications Region |

(2) MAJCON (4-digit) units to conform to revised nomenclature:

| | |
|---|--|
| <u> </u> AACS Group or Squadron | <u> </u> Communications Group or Squadron |
| <u> </u> AACS Facility Checking Flight | <u> </u> Facility Checking Flight |

f. Hq MATS will furnish staff support (i.e., Medical, Chaplain, etc.) to Headquarters, Air Force Communications Service for those staff activities for which Headquarters, Air Force Communications Service has not been provided with a capability. This support arrangement will continue in effect during the period of co-location of these two Headquarters.

2. When action directed herein has been accomplished, report will be made to Headquarters USAF by means of the Air Force Organization Status Change Report (RCS: AF-01) in compliance with current instructions.

3. AUTHORITY: Department of the Air Force letter, AFOMO 602m, Subj: Designation of the Air Force Communications Service as a Major Air Command, 10 May 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. J. ATKINS
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

4

HEADQUARTERS
AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-2)

1 July 1961

REDESIGNATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE UNITS I
ORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE DETACHMENTS II

- I. REDESIGNATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE UNITS.
1. The following units are redesignated as indicated, with no change in assignment or location, effective 1 July 1961:

| <u>OLD DESIGNATION</u> | <u>NEW DESIGNATION</u> |
|---|---|
| Hq, European-African-Middle Eastern AACS Area | Hq, European-African-Middle Eastern Communications Area |
| Hq, Pacific AACS Area | Hq, Pacific Communications Area |
| Hq, AACS Continental Systems Region | Hq, Continental Systems Region |
| Hq, North Atlantic AACS Region | Hq, North Atlantic Communications Region |
| Hq, Southeastern AACS Region | Hq, Southeastern Communications Region |
| Hq, Midwestern AACS Region | Hq, Midwestern Communications Region |
| Hq, Southwestern AACS Region | Hq, Southwestern Communications Region |
| Hq, Western AACS Region | Hq, Western Communications Region |
| Hq, Alaskan AACS Region | Hq, Alaskan Communications Region |
| Hq, Mediterranean AACS Region | Hq, Mediterranean Communications Region |
| Hq, Spanish AACS Region | Hq, Spanish Communications Region |
| Hq, Central European AACS Region | Hq, Central European Communications Region |
| Hq, United Kingdom AACS Region | Hq, United Kingdom Communications Region |
| Hq, Far East AACS Region | Hq, Far East Communications Region |
| Hq, 1956 AACS Group | Hq, 1956 Communications Group |
| Hq, 1957 AACS Group | Hq, 1957 Communications Group |
| Hq, 1961 AACS Group | Hq, 1961 Communications Group |
| Hq, 1962 AACS Group | Hq, 1962 Communications Group |
| Hq, 2045 AACS Group | Hq, 2045 Communications Group |
| Hq, 2049 AACS Group | Hq, 2049 Communications Group |
| 1 AACS Squadron, Mobile | 1 Mobile Communications Squadron |
| 2 AACS Squadron, Mobile | 2 Mobile Communications Squadron |
| 3 AACS Squadron, Mobile | 3 Mobile Communications Squadron |
| 1227 AACS Squadron | 2127 Communications Squadron |
| 1230 AACS Squadron | 2130 Communications Squadron |
| 1232 AACS Squadron | 2132 Communications Squadron |
| 1233 AACS Squadron | 2133 Communications Squadron |
| 1235 AACS Squadron | 2135 Communications Squadron |
| 1237 AACS Squadron | 2137 Communications Squadron |
| 1238 AACS Squadron | 2138 Communications Squadron |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

| | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1240 AACS Squadron | 2140 Communications Squadron |
| 1245 AACS Squadron | 2145 Communications Squadron |
| 1246 AACS Squadron | 2146 Communications Squadron |
| 1252 AACS Squadron | 2152 Communications Squadron |
| 1261 AACS Squadron | 2161 Communications Squadron |
| 1262 AACS Squadron | 2162 Communications Squadron |
| 1263 AACS Squadron | 2163 Communications Squadron |
| 1264 AACS Squadron | 2164 Communications Squadron |
| 1265 AACS Squadron | 2165 Communications Squadron |
| 1266 AACS Squadron | 2166 Communications Squadron |
| 1268 AACS Squadron | 2168 Communications Squadron |
| 1272 AACS Squadron | 2172 Communications Squadron |
| 1275 AACS Squadron | 2175 Communications Squadron |
| 1276 AACS Squadron | 2176 Communications Squadron |
| 1277 AACS Squadron | 2177 Communications Squadron |
| 1278 AACS Squadron | 2178 Communications Squadron |
| 1279 AACS Squadron | 2179 Communications Squadron |
| 1280 AACS Squadron | 2180 Communications Squadron |
| 1283 AACS Squadron | 2183 Communications Squadron |
| 1284 AACS Squadron | 2184 Communications Squadron |
| 1286 AACS Squadron | 2186 Communications Squadron |
| 1287 AACS Squadron | 2187 Communications Squadron |
| 1288 AACS Squadron | 2188 Communications Squadron |
| 1292 AACS Squadron | 2192 Communications Squadron |
| 1293 AACS Squadron | 2193 Communications Squadron |
| 1850 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1850 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1852 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1852 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1853 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1853 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1854 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1854 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1855 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1855 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1856 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1856 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1857 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1857 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1858 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1858 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1859 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1859 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1861 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1861 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1862 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1862 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1864 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1864 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1865 AACS Facility Checking Flight | 1865 Facility Checking Flight |
| 1900 AACS Squadron | 1900 Communications Squadron |
| 1901 AACS Squadron | 1901 Communications Squadron |
| 1902 AACS Squadron | 1902 Communications Squadron |
| 1903 AACS Squadron | 1903 Communications Squadron |
| 1904 AACS Squadron | 1904 Communications Squadron |
| 1905 AACS Squadron | 1905 Communications Squadron |
| 1906 AACS Squadron | 1906 Communications Squadron |
| 1907 AACS Squadron | 1907 Communications Squadron |
| 1908 AACS Squadron | 1908 Communications Squadron |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

| | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| 1910 AACS Squadron | 1910 Communications Squadron |
| 1911 AACS Squadron | 1911 Communications Squadron |
| 1912 AACS Squadron | 1912 Communications Squadron |
| 1913 AACS Squadron | 1913 Communications Squadron |
| 1915 AACS Squadron | 1915 Communications Squadron |
| 1917 AACS Squadron | 1917 Communications Squadron |
| 1918 AACS Squadron | 1918 Communications Squadron |
| 1919 AACS Squadron | 1919 Communications Squadron |
| 1920 AACS Squadron | 1920 Communications Squadron |
| 1923 AACS Squadron | 1923 Communications Squadron |
| 1924 AACS Squadron | 1924 Communications Squadron |
| 1925 AACS Squadron | 1925 Communications Squadron |
| 1926 AACS Squadron | 1926 Communications Squadron |
| 1927 AACS Squadron | 1927 Communications Squadron |
| 1928 AACS Squadron | 1928 Communications Squadron |
| 1931 AACS Squadron | 1931 Communications Squadron |
| 1932 AACS Squadron | 1932 Communications Squadron |
| 1933 AACS Squadron | 1933 Communications Squadron |
| 1934 AACS Squadron | 1934 Communications Squadron |
| 1936 AACS Squadron | 1936 Communications Squadron |
| 1938 AACS Squadron | 1938 Communications Squadron |
| 1940 AACS Squadron | 1940 Communications Squadron |
| 1942 AACS Squadron | 1942 Communications Squadron |
| 1943 AACS Squadron | 1943 Communications Squadron |
| 1945 AACS Squadron | 1945 Communications Squadron |
| 1946 AACS Squadron | 1946 Communications Squadron |
| 1947 AACS Squadron | 1947 Communications Squadron |
| 1948 AACS Squadron | 1948 Communications Squadron |
| 1949 AACS Squadron | 1949 Communications Squadron |
| 1950 AACS Squadron | 1950 Communications Squadron |
| 1952 AACS Squadron | 1952 Communications Squadron |
| 1953 AACS Squadron | 1953 Communications Squadron |
| 1955 AACS Squadron | 1955 Communications Squadron |
| 1958 AACS Squadron | 1958 Communications Squadron |
| 1963 AACS Squadron | 1963 Communications Squadron |
| 1966 AACS Squadron | 1966 Communications Squadron |
| 1968 AACS Squadron | 1968 Communications Squadron |
| 1969 AACS Squadron | 1969 Communications Squadron |
| 1970 AACS Squadron | 1970 Communications Squadron |
| 1971 AACS Squadron | 1971 Communications Squadron |
| 1975 AACS Squadron | 1975 Communications Squadron |
| 1978 AACS Squadron | 1978 Communications Squadron |
| 1979 AACS Squadron | 1979 Communications Squadron |
| 1981 AACS Squadron | 1981 Communications Squadron |
| 1983 AACS Squadron | 1983 Communications Squadron |
| 1984 AACS Squadron | 1984 Communications Squadron |
| 1989 AACS Squadron | 1989 Communications Squadron |
| 1990 AACS Squadron | 1990 Communications Squadron |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

| | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| 1991 AACS Squadron | 1991 Communications Squadron |
| 1992 AACS Squadron | 1992 Communications Squadron |
| 1994 AACS Squadron | 1994 Communications Squadron |
| 1995 AACS Squadron | 1995 Communications Squadron |
| 1996 AACS Squadron | 1996 Communications Squadron |
| 1999 AACS Squadron | 1999 Communications Squadron |
| 2000 AACS Squadron | 2000 Communications Squadron |
| 2001 AACS Squadron | 2001 Communications Squadron |
| 2002 AACS Squadron | 2002 Communications Squadron |
| 2003 AACS Squadron | 2003 Communications Squadron |
| 2004 AACS Squadron | 2004 Communications Squadron |
| 2005 AACS Squadron | 2005 Communications Squadron |
| 2006 AACS Squadron | 2006 Communications Squadron |
| 2007 AACS Squadron | 2007 Communications Squadron |
| 2008 AACS Squadron | 2008 Communications Squadron |
| 2009 AACS Squadron | 2009 Communications Squadron |
| 2010 AACS Squadron | 2010 Communications Squadron |
| 2013 AACS Squadron | 2013 Communications Squadron |
| 2015 AACS Squadron | 2015 Communications Squadron |
| 2016 AACS Squadron | 2016 Communications Squadron |
| 2017 AACS Squadron | 2017 Communications Squadron |
| 2018 AACS Squadron | 2018 Communications Squadron |
| 2019 AACS Squadron | 2019 Communications Squadron |
| 2020 AACS Squadron | 2020 Communications Squadron |
| 2021 AACS Squadron | 2021 Communications Squadron |
| 2022 AACS Squadron | 2022 Communications Squadron |
| 2023 AACS Squadron | 2023 Communications Squadron |
| 2024 AACS Squadron | 2024 Communications Squadron |
| 2025 AACS Squadron | 2025 Communications Squadron |
| 2026 AACS Squadron | 2026 Communications Squadron |
| 2027 AACS Squadron | 2027 Communications Squadron |
| 2028 AACS Squadron | 2028 Communications Squadron |
| 2029 AACS Squadron | 2029 Communications Squadron |
| 2030 AACS Squadron | 2030 Communications Squadron |
| 2031 AACS Squadron | 2031 Communications Squadron |
| 2032 AACS Squadron | 2032 Communications Squadron |
| 2034 AACS Squadron | 2034 Communications Squadron |
| 2035 AACS Squadron | 2035 Communications Squadron |
| 2036 AACS Squadron | 2036 Communications Squadron |
| 2037 AACS Squadron | 2037 Communications Squadron |
| 2038 AACS Squadron | 2038 Communications Squadron |
| 2039 AACS Squadron | 2039 Communications Squadron |
| 2040 AACS Squadron | 2040 Communications Squadron |
| 2041 AACS Squadron | 2041 Communications Squadron |
| 2042 AACS Squadron | 2042 Communications Squadron |
| 2043 AACS Squadron | 2043 Communications Squadron |
| 2044 AACS Squadron | 2044 Communications Squadron |
| 2046 AACS Squadron | 2046 Communications Squadron |
| 2047 AACS Squadron | 2047 Communications Squadron |
| 2048 AACS Squadron | 2048 Communications Squadron |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

2. Organizational records will be processed in accordance with AFM 181-5.

3. Redesignation of UAL's in support of this action will be accomplished by Hq AFCS.

4. Appropriate entries will be made in the Morning Report for the above units in accordance with AFM 171-6. Action directed herein will be reported in accordance with AFR 20-49.

5. AUTHORITY:

- (a) AFR 20-27, 2 October 1959.
- (b) Letter, Department of the Air Force, AFOMO 602m, subject, Designation of the Air Force Communications Service as a Major Air Command, dated 10 May 1961.
- (c) Military Air Transport Service Special Orders Number G-60, 25 May 1961.

II. ORGANIZATION OF CERTAIN AIR FORCE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE DETACHMENTS.

1. The following detachments are designated and organized at locations indicated effective 1 July 1961:

| <u>DETACHMENT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|---|-----------------------------|
| Det 2, Hq Continental Systems Region | Ent AFB, Colo |
| Det 1, Hq 2045 Communications Group | Davidsonville RRL, Md |
| Det 2, Hq 2045 Communications Group | Brandywine CST, Md |
| Det 2, 2044 Communications Sq | Pentagon Hq, Virginia |
| Det 3, 2044 Communications Sq | Washington National Apt, Va |
| Det 1, Hq 2049 Communications Group | Davis CST, Calif |
| Det 2, Hq 2049 Communications Group | Lincoln CST, Calif |
| Det 1, 1910 Communications Sq | F E Warren AFB, Wyo |
| Det 2, 1910 Communications Sq | Air Force AF Ctr, Colo |
| Det 1, 1911 Communications Sq | Lincoln AFB, Nebraska |
| Det 1, 1915 Communications Sq | Bakalar AFB, Indiana |
| Det 1, 1918 Communications Sq | Aero Chart Inf Center, Mo |
| Det 1, 2046 Communications Sq | Gentile AFS, Ohio |
| Det 1, 1984 Communications Sq | Davis Field, Oklahoma |
| Det 1, 2013 Communications Sq | Matagorda Isl Range, Texas |
| Det 1, 1905 Communications Sq | Portland IAP, Oregon |
| Det 2, 2037 Communications Sq | Indian Springs AFB, Nevada |
| Det 1, 2193 Communications Sq | Lookout Mountain AFS, Calif |
| Det 1, Hq North Atlantic Commu- cations Region | Cape Dyer DEW, Canada |
| Det 1, 1917 Communications Sq | Grenier Field, NH |
| Det 3, 1932 Communications Sq | Goose River ACS, Canada |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

| | |
|--|----------------------------------|
| Det 1, 1936 Communications Sq | Santa Maria Apt, Azores |
| Det 2, 1936 Communications Sq | Cinco Picos CST, Azores |
| Det 3, 1936 Communications Sq | Villa Nova CST, Azores |
| Det 1, 1971 Communications Sq | Grindavik CST, Iceland |
| Det 3, 2016 Communications Sq | Martinsburg Apt, W. Va |
| Det 1, 2019 Communications Sq | Niagara Falls MAP, NY |
| Det 4, 1931 Communications Sq | Bettles Apt, Alaska |
| Det 5, 1931 Communications Sq | Gulkana Apt, Alaska |
| Det 6, 1931 Communications Sq | McGrath Apt, Alaska |
| Det 7, 1931 Communications Sq | Wildwood AI, Alaska |
| Det 8, 1931 Communications Sq | Ft Yukon AFS, Alaska |
| Det 9, 1931 Communications Sq | Kotzebue AFS, Alaska |
| Det 10, 1931 Communications Sq | Unalakleet AFS, Alaska |
| Det 11, 1931 Communications Sq | Northway Apt, Alaska |
| Det 12, 1931 Communications Sq | Drift Station B AFS, Alaska |
| Det 1, 1995 Communications Sq | Big Delta Cy, Alaska |
| Det 1, 2 Mobile Communications Sq | Evreux Hsp, France |
| Det 2, 2 Mobile Communications Sq | Sculthorpe RAF, U. K. |
| Det 1, 1992 Communications Sq | Marseille-Marigne Apt, France |
| Det 2, 1992 Communications Sq | Bordeaux Cy, France |
| Det 1, 2135 Communications Sq | Cp New Amsterdam AB, Netherlands |
| Det 1, 1975 Communications Sq | Bled El Faïda CMF, Morocco |
| Det 2, 1975 Communications Sq | Sidi Yahia RRL, Morocco |
| Det 3, 1975 Communications Sq | Ndjili Apt, Republic of Congo |
| Det 1, 2186 Communications Sq | Moron AB, Spain |
| Det 1, 1950 Communications Sq | Bengasi TCN, Libya |
| Det 2, 1950 Communications Sq | Misurata BCN, Libya |
| Det 1, 2130 Communications Sq | Barford St John RAF, U. K. |
| Det 2, 2130 Communications Sq | Kingston Wood CST, U. K. |
| Det 1, Hq 1957 Communications Group | Johnston Island AFB, J. I. |
| Det 2, Hq 1957 Communications Group | Bellows AFB, Hawaii |
| Det 3, Hq 1957 Communications Group | Wheeler AFB, Hawaii |
| Det 4, Hq 1957 Communications Group | Wake Island NAS, Wake |
| Det 1, Hq 1961 Communications Group | Don Muang Apt, Thailand |
| Det 2, Hq 1961 Communications Group | Manila Adm, P. I. |
| Det 3, Hq 1961 Communications Group | John Hay AB, P. I. |
| Det 4, Hq 1961 Communications Group | Cp O'Donnell AI, P. I. |
| Det 1, 2165 Communications Sq | Shu Lin Kou ASN, Taiwan |
| Det 3, 2165 Communications Sq | Kung Kuan AB, Taiwan |
| Det 1, 1958 Communications Sq | Agana NAS, Guam |
| Det 2, 1958 Communications Sq | Andersen CST, Guam |
| Det 3, 1958 Communications Sq | Wettengel CST, Guam |
| Det 1, Hq Far East Communications Region | Cp Zama AFD, Japan |
| Det 2, Hq 1956 Communications Group | Funabashi CST, Japan |
| Det 3, Hq 1956 Communications Group | Owada CST, Japan |
| Det 1, Hq 1962 Communications Group | Ie Shima AAF, Ryukyu Islands. |
| Det 1, 1953 Communications Squadron | Wakkamai RRL, Japan |
| Det 1, 1955 Communications Squadron | Nomaike BST, Japan |
| Det 1, 2146 Communications Squadron | Taegu CST, Korea |
| Det 2, 2146 Communications Squadron | Paengyong Do AAF, Korea |

Special Orders G-2, Headquarters Air Force Communications Service (USAF),
1 July 1961, continued

a. Mission Category Code for the above detachments is R-33.

b. Unit kind code for the above detachments is 4555.

2. Manpower authorizations and personnel will be furnished from sources available to the Commander, Air Force Communications Service.

3. Realignment of UAL's in support of this action will be accomplished by Headquarters AFCS. New UAL's, if required, will be developed by the parent Area/Region Equipment Review Authorization Activity.

4. Appropriate entries will be made in the Morning Report for the parent units of the above detachments in accordance with AFM 171-6. Action directed herein will be reported in accordance with AFR 20-49.

5. Authority: AFR 20-27, 2 October 1959.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:

Hq USAF (AFCAS-50) (20)
 (AFOMO) (3)
 (AFCIG) (3)
 (AFCSG) (3)
 (AFASC) (3)
 (AFOOP) (3)
 (AFPDC) (3)
 (AFPMP) (3)
 (AFASC-6B) (1)
 (AFOAC) (3)
AF Depots (5)
AUL (2)
ARRC, Denver, Colo (2)
AFLC (MCSDE) (2)
 (MCJ-Library) (2)
 (Areas) (5)
AFCS (Each Staff Agency) (5)
 (Each Area) (15)
 (Each Rgn) (12)
 (Each Gp) (8)
 (Each Sq) (4)
 (Each Det) (2)

I F MUSTAIN
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

5

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-48)

15 June 1961

ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF UNIT:

1. The 874th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy, is redesignated as the 874th Tactical Missile Squadron and organized at Kadena Air Base, Ryukyu Islands. Effective date of organization is 8 September 1961 under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in Organization Table (O/T) 1735, 1 March 1959 (revised 1 March 1960), paragraphs 1, 2b, 3a(4), Part 1 (Part 11: 1 x J; 20 x L); strength, twenty-two (22) officers and one hundred and forty-seven (147) airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part 11 of the O/T. This unit is assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.
2. For equipping purposes the above is a Category F unit and is authorized Unit Essential, Base Support and Field Support Equipment as listed in columns 3A, B and C of Master Equipment Allowance List (MEAL), columns 2A B and C Table of Authorization (T/A) O10 and T/A O16 items in Unit Mission Equipment (UME) column of Unit Authorization Listing (UAL). UME column of UAL will be prepared in conformance with paragraph 4c, Chapter 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1. Variable items, T/As O10, O16 and MEAL, will be based on Unit Manning Document (UMD) strength of unit. Unit is authorized additional equipment in Unit Support Equipment (USE) column of VAL in conformance with paragraph 4d, Chapter 6, Volume XXI, Air Force Manual 67-1.
3. Upon organization this unit is entitled to the history and to any battle honors, colors, and emblem belonging to the 874th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy, inactivated 4 August 1946. Unit history will be forwarded through automatic distribution. Requisition for appropriate colors can then be made as prescribed in Air Force Regulation 35-75, 29 January 1954.
4. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-O1) will be submitted in compliance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.
5. Authority: Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 595m, 25 April 1961, and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

JOHN L WARREN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-62)

2 August 1961

REDESIGNATION OF UNIT:

1. The 6001st Special Investigations Squadron (IG) is redesignated the Headquarters 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG) effective 15 August 1961 without change of assignment.
2. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.
3. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

DISTRIBUTION:
20 - 6001 SI Sq (IG)
75 - PACAF Staff
1 - File

JOHN L WARREN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER
G-71

25 September 1961

1. Special Orders G-20, this headquarters, 17 March 1961, announcing the consolidated listing of the designation and assignment of all Pacific Air Forces installations are superseded/amended as indicated. Authority: Air Force Regulation 87-5.

a. Kokee Air Force Station is designated as such and assigned to the real property account of Hickam Air Force Base, Pacific Air Forces Base Command, effective 29 October 1959. This installation was activated on 1 February 1961. Location: Kauai, Hawaii.

b. Ashiya Air Base, Facility (FAC) 5014, Permanent Installation Number (PIN) 2818, having been inactivated 23 December 1960, is reassigned as an off-base installation for the purpose of record custody to the real property account of Itazuke Air Base, Fifth Air Force, effective 23 December 1960.

c. Kadena TACAN Annex, PIN 7208, assigned as an off-base installation to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, Fifth Air Force, and previously carried in an inactive status, was activated effective 20 May 1961.

d. The following installations were inactivated on dates indicated:

| <u>PIN</u> | <u>Installation</u> | <u>Inactivation Date</u> |
|------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1070 | Kaukonahua Communications Annex | 30 September 1958 |
| 2987 | Motobu Auxiliary Airfield | 30 June 1957 |
| 4892 | Cheju-Do Weather Station Annex | November 1959 |
| 4799 | Kimpo Quarry Annex | December 1959 |
| 4834 | Kongsa-Ri Air Range | February 1958 |
| 4835 | Kyongjong-Ni Quarry Annex | June 1956 |
| 4825 | Osan-Ni Air Range | 30 April 1954 |
| 4828 | Osan-Ni Communications Annex Nr 2 | March 1959 |
| 4830 | Osan-Ni Communications Annex Nr 3 | January 1958 |
| 4826 | Osan-Ni Radio Relay Annex Nr 1 | January 1958 |
| 4829 | Osan-Ni Radio Relay Annex Nr 2 | September 1957 |
| 4801 | Seoul Air Station | June 1957 |
| 4817 | Taegu Communications Annex | March 1958 |

e. Nakayama Radio Beacon Annex, FAC 3160, PIN 7000, previously assigned to the real property account of Tachikawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 30 June 1961.

f. Koreizan Radio Relay Annex, FAC 5045, PIN 2947, previously assigned to the real property account of Itazuke Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and delted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 30 June 1961.

g. Nomozaki Radio Relay Annex, FAC 5052, PIN 2943, previously assigned to the real property account of Itazuke Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 30 June 1961.

h. Hirao Small Arms Range Annex, FAC 5004, PIN 2927, previously assigned to the real property account of Itazuke Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 11 September 1961.

i. Wakkanai Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1046, PIN 3772, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, and inactivated 1 November 1959, is deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 31 August 1961.

j. Yonagusuku Radio Range Annex, PIN 4092, previously assigned to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, Fifth Air Force, and inactivated 19 February 1955, is deleted from installation list by reason of release to private owner, effective 31 August 1961.

k. Okuma Radio Beacon Annex, PIN 5070, previously assigned to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, Fifth Air Force, and inactivated 1 April 1956, is deleted from installation list by reason of transfer to the Department of the Army, effective 1 July 1961.

l. Higashionna Ammunition Storage Annex, PIN 2989, previously assigned to the real property account of Kadena Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of transfer to the Department of the Navy, effective 30 June 1961.
Authority: Headquarters USAF message, AFOCE-R 0014-M, 20 July 1961.

m. Toyooka Communications Annex, FAC 3060, PIN 2885, previously assigned to the real property account of Yokota Air Base, Fifth Air Force, and inactivated March 1957, is deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 18 September 1961.

n. Omori Radio Relay Annex, FAC 4132, PIN 2938, previously assigned to the real property account of Itazuke Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 1 October 1961.

Special Order G-71, Hq PACAF, 25 Sep 61

o. Bikuni Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1053, PIN 5877, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

p. Fukuyama Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1012, PIN 6954, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

q. Henashi Radio Relay Annex, FAC 2008, PIN 2904, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

r. Obira Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1052, PIN 5878, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

s. Sasayama Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1055, PIN 6217, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

t. Teshio Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1018, PIN 2905, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

u. Tomamae Radio Relay Annex, FAC 1017, PIN 2903, previously assigned to the real property account of Misawa Air Base, Fifth Air Force, is inactivated and deleted from installation list by reason of release to the Japanese Government, effective 15 October 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

JOHN L WARREN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

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HEADQUARTERS
PACIFIC AIR FORCES
United States Air Force
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER
G-78

12 October 1961

CURRENT DESIGNATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF PACIFIC AIR FORCES INSTALLATIONS

The following consolidated listing of the current designation and assignment of all Pacific Air Forces installations is announced, effective 15 October 1961.

FIFTH AIR FORCE (JAPAN)

Permanent Installation Number (PIN) and Installation

| | |
|------|---|
| 2918 | ITAZUKE AIR BASE |
| 2818 | Ashiya Air Base - inactive 23 December 1960 |
| 7066 | Ashiya Air Range |
| 7261 | Ashiya Far East Network Station |
| 4452 | Brady Auxiliary Airfield |
| 4891 | Cheju-Do Auxiliary Airfield (K-40) |
| 4949 | Cheju-Do Liaison Annex |
| 4892 | Cheju-Do Weather Station Annex - inactive November 1959 |
| 2940 | Hakato-Ko Dock Annex |
| 2924 | Hirao Annex |
| 2945 | Najima Annex |
| 2923 | Nakabaru Annex |
| 2929 | Nomaike Loran Beacon Annex |
| ---- | Sakuradani Small Arms Range Annex |
| 2941 | Seburiyama Liaison Annex |
| 3028 | Takaoyama Housing Annex |
| 2936 | Takaoyama Tactical Air Navigation (TAGAN) Annex |
| 2920 | Torishima Air Range |
| 2934 | Yamada Ammunition Storage Annex |
| 3027 | Yonago Loran Beacon Annex |
| 2893 | MISAWA AIR BASE |
| 2895 | Abashiri Shoran Beacon Annex |
| 2900 | Amagamori Air Range |
| 3770 | Chitose TACAN Annex |
| 2894 | Matsumae Loran Beacon Annex |
| 2896 | Nemuro Shoran Beacon Annex |
| 3775 | Ominato Housing Annex |
| 3773 | Tomari Liaison Annex |
| 7335 | Wakkanai TACAN Anex |

Special Order G-78, 12 October 1961

2972 TACHIKAWA AIR BASE
3007 Fuchu Air Station
2892 Funabashi Communications Annex
6157 Grant Heights Family Housing Annex
3004 Green Park Family Housing Annex
2973 Haneda Service Annex
3009 Iwo Jima Air Base
6161 Lincoln Center Family Housing Annex
6154 Marcus Island Weather Station Site
6158 Momote Village Family Housing Annex
6179 Ofuna Central Exchange Annex
3008 Showa Family Housing Annex
6159 Washington Heights Family Housing Annex
3973 Yamato Air Station
3766 Yokohama Dock Annex

2898 WAKKANAI AIR STATION (Detached)

2812 YOKOTA AIR BASE
5807 Dake San Radio Relay Annex - inactive 25 July 1957
2815 Hamura School
2871 Johnson Air Station
2880 Mineokayama Liaison Annex
2883 Mito Air Range
2848 Nagoya Far East Network Station
2889 Niigata Loran Beacon Annex
2888 Niigata TACAN Annex
2890 Sado Shima Liaison Annex
2875 Wajima Liaison Annex - inactive 30 June 1960

FIFTH AIR FORCE (OKINAWA)

2988 KADENA AIR BASE
3001 Awase Communications Annex
2993 Deragawa Communications Annex
4087 Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex
2997 Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield
2983 Irisuna Shima Air Range
2998 Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex
3000 Kadena Family Housing Annex
2995 Kadena Site Number 1
7330 Kadena Site Number 2
7331 Kadena Site Number 3
7332 Kadena Site Number 4

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| | |
|---------------|---|
| 7208 | Kadena TACAN Annex |
| 4086 | Koza Radio Relay Annex |
| 4088 | Onna Point Administration Annex |
| 4089 | Ryukyus Air Range |
| 2996 | Yontan Auxiliary Airfield |
| NAHA AIR BASE | |
| 2975 | Bucknerville Service Annex |
| 5061 | Hirara Air Strip |
| 2986 | Kume Shima Air Station |
| 2982 | Miwa Radio Beacon Annex |
| 2981 | Miyako Jima Air Station |
| 2984 | Motobu Auxiliary Airfield - inactive 30 June 1957 |
| 2987 | Naha Light Annex |
| 4774 | Okino Erabu Shima Air Station |
| 2977 | Yuza Dake Air Station |
| 4200 | |

FIFTH AIR FORCE (KOREA)

| | |
|----------------------|---|
| 4792 | KIMPO AIR BASE (K-14) |
| 4196 | KUNSAN AIR BASE (K-8) |
| OSAN AIR BASE (K-55) | |
| 4818 | Chinchon-Ni Administration Annex |
| 4795 | Chinchon-Ni Liaison Annex (K-53) |
| 4794 | Kangnung Auxiliary Airfield (K-18) |
| 4823 | Kangnung Liaison Annex |
| 4821 | Kimpo Radio Beacon Annex |
| 4798 | Kongsa-Ri Air Range - inactive February 1958 |
| 4834 | Koon-Ni Air Range |
| 4824 | Kyongjong-Ni Quarry Annex - inactive June 1956 |
| 4835 | Osan-Ni Air Range - inactive 30 April 1954 |
| 4825 | Osan-Ni Communications Annex Number 1 |
| 4827 | Osan-Ni Communications Annex Number 2 - inactive March 1959 |
| 4828 | Osan-Ni Communications Annex Number 3 - inactive January 1958 |
| 4830 | Osan-Ni Radio Relay Annex Number 1 - inactive January 1958 |
| 4826 | Osan-Ni Radio Relay Annex Number 2 - inactive September 1957 |
| 4829 | Seoul Air Station - inactive June 1957 |
| 4801 | Seoul Auxiliary Airfield (K-16) |
| 4800 | Seoul Housing Annex |
| 7458 | Suwon Auxiliary Airfield (K-13) - inactive 30 June 1957 |
| 4839 | Taegu Communications Annex - inactive March 1958 |
| 4817 | Taeyongpyong Radio Relay Annex |
| 7068 | Tok-Choko-To Radio Relay Annex |
| 4820 | Tunpo-Ri Liaison Annex |
| 4838 | |

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THIRTEENTH AIR FORCE

2959 CLARK AIR BASE
2964 Bamban Radio Beacon Annex
2970 Bataan Ocean Petroleum Depot
2963 John Hay Air Base
2961 Mariveles Training Annex - inactive April 1942
7209 Mindanao Weather Station Site - inactive 27 October 1959
3021 North Tinian Auxiliary Airfield - inactive April 1949
5780 Seafont Administration Office
2965 Silang Annex - inactive December 1950
2962 Wallace Air Station
3024 West Tinian Auxiliary Airfield - inactive April 1949

5729 SHU LIN KOU AIR STATION (Detached)

5728 TAINAN AIR STATION
5730 Taipei Air Station

PACIFIC AIR FORCES BASE COMMAND

1066 HICKAM AIR FORCE BASE
1077 Bellows Air Force Station
1067 Bonham Air Force Base
1069 Dillingham Air Force Base
1079 Haleakala Annex - inactive June 1947
1071 Hickam Petroleum Products Storage Annex
5475 Hickam Recreation Annex Number 1
5733 Hickam Recreation Annex Number 2
6827 Hickam Small Arms Range Annex
1082 Johnston Island Air Force Base
6327 Kaena Point Missile Tracking Site
1070 Kaukonahua Communications Annex - inactive 30 September 1958
1073 Kaukonahua Storage Annex
---- Kokee Air Force Station
1074 Koko Crater Air Force Station
1075 Punamano Air Force Station

1068 WHEELER AIR FORCE BASE
4775 Kunia Communications Annex

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

JOHN L. WARREN
Colonel, USAF
Director of Administrative Services

SECRET

6

HEADQUARTERS
18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 18AE-F

17 JUL 1961

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Formal Report of AFR 122-3 Investigation

TO: 313 Air Div (MC-A)
APO 239, San Francisco, California

1. Transmitted herewith is Formal Report of Investigation submitted in accordance with AFR 122-3.
2. Attention is invited to paragraph 2.b.(2) AFR 122-3.
3. Upon removal of attachments the classification of this correspondence will be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DORNE P. OHLEMACHER
Major, USAF
Executive Officer

1 Atch
Subj Report

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
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HEADQUARTERS
18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 18AE-F

17 JUL 1961

SUBJECT: Formal Report of Investigation (AFR 122-3)

1. On 20 June 1961 heavy intermittent rainfall at Kadena AB, Okinawa, commenced at approximately 1430I. The intensity of rainfall increased throughout the period from 1430I to 1630I, for a total rainfall of 4.41 inches. At approximately 1605I it was noted that water was beginning to accumulate in the drainage ditches surrounding the Multicubicle Storage Area, see Tab A. Heavy runoff of water from the ramp and flightline areas, having higher elevations, was being experienced, see Tab B, partial picture of storage area. This runoff was following a slough adjacent to the Multicubicle Storage Area, and commencing to back-up. At this time it was not apparent that there would be any back-up into the Storage Area. However, the intense rainfall continued, and at 1615I the runoff reached its maximum flow and flooding of the Storage Area began. The decision was made, at this time, to evacuate the thirty-six (36) MK 28 War Reserve Weapons contained within the Storage structure. By 1630I the depth of water in the Storage Area had reached an average of twenty-one (21) inches (see Tab C), occurring before total weapon removal was possible. In order to avoid subjecting the weapons to submersion for a possible prolonged period, evacuation action was continued. By 1715I all weapons had been withdrawn from the flooded area, and by 1745I all water had drained from the area.

2. Fifth Air Force was immediately notified of the incident. By their direction and through coordination with the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron all maintenance requirements and restoration of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's GWP posture was accomplished.

3. All appropriate key personnel of Kadena AB were notified at the time of the incident. Among those responding were the Commander, 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron, and the Base Engineer.

4. No physical damage to structures or appurtenances resulted. Inundation was for a very limited period with negligible erosion and no silting. Area crosshatched on map (see Tab H) indicates the maximum extent of flooding.

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5. Findings - that the drainage system for the Storage Building area designed by the Corps of Engineers, US Army, did not have sufficient capacity to take care of the runoff for the area involved. Further, the surface runoff of the area (approximately 16 acres as shown on Tab H) was greater than the carrying capacity of the 36" culvert (see 1 Tab H).
6. Conclusions are that a design deficiency existed and that flooding of the Storage Building resulted due to construction which incorporated the design deficiency.
7. Recommendations which have been translated into action and accomplished by the Base Civil Engineer Forces are:
 - a. Construction of an earthfilled diversion dam shown in center foreground of Tab F and Item 3 on Tab H.
 - b. Construction of approximately 550 feet of diversion channel shown on Tab F and Item 4 on Tab H. These two actions reduce the previous runoff area by more than 50 percent and divert the runoff from Area "A" Tab H into a 4' x 4' box culvert, See Tab E and Item 2 on Tab H.
 - c. Realignment of ditches and removal of silt and dense vegetation from the drainage network serving the reduced runoff area of the Storage Facility, See Tabs "D" and "C".
8. Computations utilizing the Talbot Formula and verified by flow diagrams in Drainage Handbooks confirm that the 36 inch culvert (shown in Tabs "G" and "D" and Item 1 on Tab H) has sufficient capacity to handle the runoff from the drainage network serving the reduced runoff area of the Storage Facility. Reduced area encompassing the Storage Facility and serviced by the 36 inch culvert is shown as Area "B" on Tab H. Actions taken in 7a, b, and c above, correct the design deficiency, are concurred in by both the original design agency, Corps of Engineers US Army, and the Base Civil Engineer and will preclude subsequent reflooding of the Storage Facility.
9. This report is classified Secret Formerly Restricted Data in accordance with USAF SWOG, 1 January 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER

DORNE P. OHLEMACHER
Major, USAF
Executive Officer

Ltr, Hq 18TFW(18AE-F), 17 Jul 61, (U) Transmittal of Formal Report of
AFR 122-3 Investigation

1st Ind (313MC-A)

8 AUG 1961

Hq 313 Air Div, APO 239 San Francisco, Calif

TO: 5AF (5FCAS)

1. Attached Formal Report of Investigation has been reviewed. Cor-
rective actions accomplished to preclude recurrence of similar incidents
are considered adequate.

2. This indorsement contains no classified information.

FOR THE COMMANDER

IRVING HENDLER, DAFC, USAF
Ammunition Inspector

Originator

MR HENDLER, USAF/313MC-A/44278/3Aug61/fp

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 313MC-A/Captain Tyler/48102/dh

SUBJECT: (U) Adequacy of Action

20 July 1961

TO: 313CE

1. Request your comments regarding the adequacy of the action taken to preclude repetition of the incident.
2. Since this directorate must forward an answer prior to 27 July 1961, an early reply is requested.
3. This letter may be downgraded to Unclassified subsequent to removal of the attachment.

RALPH L. TYLER
Captain, USAF
Chief, Armament Division

Ltr 31MC-A, 20 Jul 61, Adequacy of Action (U)

1st Ind (313CE/L.J. Hellmann/40103)

24 Jul 1961

TO: 313MC-A (Capt Tyler)

1. Actions taken to avert flooding of subject facility are considered adequate. This is further attested by the recent rains of approximately sixteen inches in three days, with no flooding or damage.
2. On-site investigation by the Kadena Base Civil Engineer at 0700 hours, 24 July 1961, confirms that subject facility is now appropriately safeguarded against flooding previously experienced.
3. This indorsement contains no classified information.

FRED A. SFENCER
Lt Colonel, USAF
Civil Engineering Officer

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-9)

12 July 1961

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. The 33rd Air Rescue Squadron (MATS) is attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Logistic and Administrative Support effective 18 June 1961.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 51st Air Base Group will exercise special and summary courts martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 51st Air Base Group and Commander, 33rd Air Rescue Squadron (MATS) will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 51st Air Base Group is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions such as those required by AFR's 35-62, 35-66, 36-2, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority: Air Force Regulation 11-4, as amended, Air Force Regulation 20-27, and MATS Special Order Number G-52, 18 May 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION
A

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-10)

24 July 1961

STAFF ASSIGNMENT - COLONEL ROBERT H. WORKMAN, 3512A, this headquarters,
is assigned as Director of Personnel, 313th Air Division, effective 21 July
1961, vice MAJOR BRUCE B. BRIGHT, 38312A.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-11)

26 July 1961

ATTACHMENT OF UNITS - AMENDMENT. So much of paragraphs 2 and 4,
General Orders 43, 30 December 1960, this Headquarters, as reads, "F100-8
Mobile Training Detachment (ATC)" is amended to read "724A Mobile Training
Detachment (ATC)", effective 5 January 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDERS)
NUMBER G-12)

27 July 1961

By Direction of the President, LT COLONEL CLYDE R. BORCHERS, 12124A,
is appointed Commander of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, PACAF, APO 239,
effective 19 July 1961. Authority: Paragraph 29c, AFR 35-54.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DISTRIBUTION:
A.

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER
NUMBER G-13

13 September 1961

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT. 1. Detachment 12, Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistic Support (less field maintenance) and Administrative Support effective 15 March 1961. Detachment 12, Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for Logistic Support (to include field maintenance only) effective 15 March 1961.

2. Legal Proceedings:

a. Commander, 313th Air Division will exercise general court-martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

b. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing will exercise special and summary courts martial jurisdiction over the aforementioned attached unit.

c. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing and Commander, Detachment 12, Air Materiel Force, Pacific Area will exercise Article 15, UCMJ jurisdiction concurrently with respect to members of the attached unit.

d. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing is responsible for the processing of administrative board actions for the attached unit including actions such as those required by AFR's 35-66, 39-16, 39-17 and other directives.

3. Authority: Air Force Regulation 11-14, as amended, and Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Bertram R. Wilson
BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Asst Chief, Admin Svcs

DISTRIBUTION
A

HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER
G-14

5 October 1961

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. SUTHERLAND, 617A



ROBERT M. STILLMAN
Major General, USAF
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)
United States Air Force
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER
G-15

18 October 1961

STAFF ASSIGNMENT - LIEUTENANT COLONEL LAWSON P. WYNNE, 12591A, this headquarters, is assigned as Director of Telecommunications, 313th Air Division, effective 27 September 1961.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Bertram R. Wilson

BERTRAM R. WILSON
Major, USAF
Dep Dir, Admin Svcs

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