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
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JAN-JUN 1963

# STORY of the 313<sup>TH</sup> AIR DIVISION



1 January - 30 June 1963

NARRATIVE  
VOLUME I

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313TO-H-0029

2-8443-38A



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3/3 IO-H-0029

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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

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
APPROVED BY



A. P. CLARK  
Major General, USAF  
1 July 1964

FIFTH AIR FORCE, PACIFIC AIR FORCES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE







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313th AD, 1963-I

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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

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CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

1963

- 1 Jan. The Headquarters, 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG), Hickam AFB, Hawaii, is discontinued, per DAF Ltr., 946m, sub.: Reassignment of Certain Special Investigation Units, dtd. 7 Dec. 1962, and Headquarters Command Special Order (SO) G-86, dtd. 19 Dec. 1962. Simultaneously, the Office of the Deputy Director of Special Investigations (PACAF) is organized at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and assigned to the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG), USAF. In connection with this action, OSI District Office 43, at Kadena AB, and Detachment 1, District Office 43, at Naha AB, are organized and assigned to the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG), USAF, along with numerous other offices, per 1005th SIG SO GZ-31, dtd. 20 Dec. 1962.
- 8 Jan. The 6051st Air Police Squadron (Provisional) at Naha Air Base is discontinued, and in its place is organized the 51st Air Police Squadron, previously activated by DAF AFOMO Letter 885m, dtd. 9 Aug. 1962, which is assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition strength of two officers and 180 airmen, per PACAF SO G-93, dtd. 21 Nov. 1962.
- The 345th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, at Naha Air Base, is relieved from assignment to the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo), PACAF, and is assigned to the Tactical Air Command, without personnel or equipment. Simultaneously, the 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, previously activated by DAF AFOMO Letter 957m of 20 December 1962, is organized at Naha Air Base and assigned to the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo), per PACAF SO G-103, dtd. 21 Dec. 1962. The O/T strength of the new unit is established as 62 officers and 27 airmen.
- 10 Jan. The 498th Tactical Missile Group becomes fully operational, with all 32 launch bays in an operational status.
- 21 Jan. The Kadena Air Base Weather Station records a low of 41°F., "the coldest temperature ever recorded at Kadena."
- 23 Jan. Air Training Command (ATC) Field Training Detachments 909A and 909S are attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administrative and logistical support, per 313th AD SO G-1, dtd. 23 Jan. 1963.

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- 28 Jan. F-102A #55-3372, piloted by Captain Reed K. Rickabaugh of the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Naha AB, is lost when inoperative controls force him to bail out at 10,000 feet. The pilot is picked up by an H-19 helicopter of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron, also of Naha AB, after only six-and-a-half minutes in the water. The F-102A crashes into the sea and is not recovered.
- 31 Jan. All 32 TM-76B missiles of the 498th Tactical Missile Group attain a "hold status," with every one of them on-target.
- 1 Feb. Detachment 1 (PACAF Standardization/Evaluation Team), Headquarters, PACAF, is discontinued, and, simultaneously, Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group, is designated and organized at Kadena AB, where it is assigned to Pacific Air Forces, per PACAF SO G-2, dtd. 4 Jan. 1963. Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group is attached to the 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support, per PACAF SO G-3, dtd. 11 Jan. 1963. Unit attachment includes summary, special, and general court martial jurisdiction, non-judicial punishment under the provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, and administrative board actions. The 6002d is further attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for logistical support (excluding field maintenance) and administrative support, and is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for field maintenance support only, per 313th AD SO G-2, dtd. 30 Jan. 1963.
- 3 Feb. 313th Air Division Operations Order (OPORD) 300-63 ("Joss Stick Bomber") is published.
- 21 Feb. Fifth Air Force Operations Plan (OPLAN) 119-63 ("Nightmare Range Close Air Support Exercise") is published. Affected is the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.
- 23 Feb. Detachment 1, 315th Air Division, based at Naha AB, begins participation in Tien Bing III (Exercise "Sky Soldier") by dropping Army paratroopers over Taiwan.
- 1 Mar. The mission planning function for the Mace missiles of the 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) is transferred from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force to the Combat Operations Section of the 498th TMG.

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- 9 Mar. The code name "Acid Test" is assigned to the 498th TMG for use with 498th TMG OPLAN 4-62, which in turn supports 313th ADIV OPLAN 219-62 ("High Noon") and a practice no-notice operational readiness inspection (ORI).
- 11 Mar. PACAF OPLAN 188-63 (Liberty Head"), directing the quarterly testing of PACAF's General War Plan (GWP), is published. The entire 313th Air Division is affected by its provisions.
- 18 Mar. T-33A #02-9315, piloted by Major Elliot B. Black, Jr., Chief of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing ADCC, crashes into the Philippine Sea nine miles south of Naha AB. Captain Ralph M. Flinn, a weapons controller for the 623d AC&W Squadron, is also aboard, as a passenger. Although both men are picked up by an H-19 helicopter of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron after they successfully bail out of their inoperative aircraft, Major Black suffers a broken ankle, and Captain Flinn sustains minor cuts and bruises.
- 28 Mar. The last three-plane increment of the 83 F-105D Thunderchiefs assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing arrives at Kadena AB from the CONUS.
- 29 Mar. PACAF OPLAN 108-63 ("Bearcat"), outlining the procedures to be employed in a "no notice" ORI, is published.
- 8 Apr. The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Naha AB is reorganized under an appropriate unit manning document (UMD) with a table of organization (O/T) composition strength of 35 officers and 19 airmen, per PACAF SO G-10, dtd. 1 March 1963.

The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron at Kadena Air Base is redesignated as the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), and is reorganized under appropriate UMD with a total O/T composition strength of 29 officers and 172 airmen, the personnel to be furnished from the parent unit, per PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 21 Mar. 1963.

The 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, having been constituted and activated by DAF AFOMO Letter 990m, dtd. 13 March 1963, is organized at Kadena AB under an appropriate UMD, with a total O/T composition strength of eight officers and 383 airmen, these personnel to be furnished from the parent unit, per PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 21 March 1963. The 418th MMS is assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

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- 10 May Headquarters, 315th Air Division issues OPORD 5-63 (SEATO Exercise Dhanarajata) in connection with the airlift of U. S. Forces to operating locations in Thailand from bases throughout the Far East.
- 15 May 313th ADIV OPORD 108-63 ("Bearcat") is published, in support and implementation of PACAF OPLAN 108-63.
- 20 May 313th ADIV Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63 is published. It is designed to support Fifth Air Force COP 17-63 by prescribing actions to be taken which will assure an instant capability to initiate and sustain the direction of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force in the execution of war plans.
- 313th ADIV OPLAN 65-63 ("313th Air Division Weapons Withdrawal or Destruction Plan") is published.
- 29 May A PACAF ORI team announces that the 498th TMG has passed its Operational Readiness Inspection and is classed C-1.
- 1 Jun. Colonel John R. Roche assumes command of the 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena Air Base, succeeding Colonel Charles H. Pierce, who departed for the CONUS on 28 May.
- 10 Jun. Condition III is declared for Tropical Storm Rose at 1005I.
- 11 Jun. SEATO Exercise Dhanarajata commences in Thailand.
- 12 Jun. The All Clear for Tropical Storm Rose is declared at 0930I.
- 16 Jun. Condition III is called for Typhoon Shirley at 1515I, and Condition II follows at 2200I.
- 17 Jun. Condition I for Typhoon Shirley is declared at 2200I.
- 18 Jun. The All Clear is declared for Typhoon Shirley, the eye having come no nearer than 150 nautical miles WSW of Kadena at 1300I this same day.

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313th AD, 1963-I

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND RESOURCES

313th AD, 1963-I, Chap. I

## CHAPTER I

### MISSION AND RESOURCES

#### THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Although time marched relentlessly on and the 313th Air Division acquired new weaponry with which to play its part in making East Asian Communism rue aggression, the mission directive drawn up for it on 24 November 1961 had been couched so carefully that there was no need to change its terms throughout the period 1 January - 30 June 1963. Basically, the Fifth Air Force document directed that 313th maintain all assigned and attached forces in such a degree of combat readiness as would insure the success of any military operations which higher authority might direct.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to air defense, the 313th Air Division continued to be responsible for the same area as in years gone by - one encompassed within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E., west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.<sup>2</sup>

As a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force, the 313th Air Division was provided with a headquarters, situated at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, and such units and facilities as were essential to the performance of its mission and the execution of Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in the 313th Air Division area.

The Commander, 313th Air Division was responsible for the following specific tasks and duties:



1. Exercising command of all assigned units, except for such direct control as the Commander, Fifth Air Force retained over offensive tactical forces.

2. Controlling and/or supporting the various attached units, as directed.

3. Organizing, administering, equipping, and training the assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies, and plans issued by either Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters.

4. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, preparing such plans as should be required to support Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.

5. Insuring that combat training was conducted in accordance with existing directives and was oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with the tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders.

6. Insuring that all combat units, as well as those directly supporting combat units, were furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to the maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

7. Insuring the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

8. Monitoring the development and conduct of training programs to include:

- (a) The technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.
- (b) General military training, in accordance with applicable Air Force unit training standards.
- (c) Assisting in aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program, as required.
- (d) Other training, as directed.

9. Contributing toward the development of:

- (a) The tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.
- (b) Requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.
- (c) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

10. Providing aircraft for and supervision over the annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel, as was outlined in AFR 60-3.

11. Providing administrative and logistic support, as directed.

12. Supporting the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and other USAF activities, in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units, as reflected on the current USAF programming document.

13. Exercising operational control of forces other than those of the United States, when so directed.

14. Exercising operational control of U. S. Army and Navy anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units of the Army's 30th Missile Brigade (AD), and other anti-aircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

15. Representing CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in the coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region.

16. Conducting search and rescue operations as directed.

17. Organizing and administering an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units.

18. Providing for sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations.

19. Providing for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required to support the mission.

20. Exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

21. Coordinating with and providing assistance to other U. S. military services and governmental agencies as follows:

- (a) By formulating and jointly preparing plans for use in local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbances, typhoons, natural disasters, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuations, and special demonstrations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies.



- (b) By coordinating with the appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.
- (c) By participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marines, and governmental agencies, as directed by the Commander, U. S. Forces.
- (d) By contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Services Police (RASP) force and the Ryukyuan Army and Air Force Exchange Service (REX).
- (e) By providing a base, training facilities, and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations, upon the completion of the appropriate agreements.
- (f) By supporting the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands (Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA) in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership on the Joint Planning Group, all sub-committees, and panels.
- (g) By coordinating all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities with the appropriate local U. S. governmental authorities.
- (h) By supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu

Islands (another title held by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA, who was also Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) and IX Corps, and CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands) in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

22. Insuring that all commanders and staff officers were familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications: "Unified Actions Armed Forces."

23. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

24. Insuring that mission directives had been prepared for all units of the 313th Air Division, and requiring that they be reviewed semi-annually and brought up to date when found necessary.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, except as Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters might direct to the contrary.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to the foregoing Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4, which set forth the 313th Air Division's organization and mission, the responsibilities delegated to the 313th Commander and those specifically retained by the Fifth Air Force Commander continued to be laid down in the so-called "Burns letter" of 27 June 1960, as revised on 1 August 1960.

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According to this letter, which bore the signature of the Fifth Air Force Commander of that period, Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, "a degree of direct control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters [Fifth Air Force] is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons." Moreover, this degree of direct control extended beyond the "centralized control traditional in the employment of conventional forces." Then, by way of further clarifying a knotty subject, he defined control as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations."

These lexicographic matters having been attended to, General Burns devoted the next few paragraphs to describing in detail "the minimum control that [Fifth Air Force intended] to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces" of the 313th Air Division:

1. The ordering, directing, and monitoring of maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.
2. The ordering and monitoring of routine and special force deployments.
3. The ordering, directing, monitoring, and evaluating of combat readiness training programs.
4. The controlling and directing of the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system would provide direct communication between Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and the tactical wings.

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5. The control and direction of the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.

6. Such other control as operational necessity might dictate.

General Burns pointed out that the retention of direct control of tactical wings by his headquarters would work to reduce the number of personnel needed on 313th's Operations staff. For, to have such officers assigned would only mean a duplication of the Fifth Air Force effort in the direction and control of the strike forces. On the other hand, he did consider it "necessary and desirable" for the 313th Air Division Commander to keep himself and key members of his staff informed concerning the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned to his command, in order that he might be prepared to carry out effectively the responsibilities assigned to him by Annex "E" of the WPC.

One point on which General Burns placed considerable emphasis was his belief that no augmentation of the 313th Commander's Operations staff was warranted by the requirement of the mission directive that the latter assure the accomplishment of combat readiness training, the preparation of plans and orders, and the provision of command policy and guidance, along with sundry other responsibilities toward the command and control of tactical striking forces. On the contrary, these responsibilities, extensive though they were, could well be discharged by the existing staff, with the assistance of personnel of the Inspector General's office and the tactical wing staffs.

Finally, said General Burns, Fifth's control of the tactical striking forces would be exercised through direct communication with the tactical wings and groups, with information copies of all correspondence between

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the Fuchu headquarters and these tactical units, other than that of a routine nature, being furnished 313th Air Division.<sup>4</sup>

Revised Missions of Subordinate Organizations.

The Mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing: Although a new mission directive for the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base had been promulgated only a year earlier, on 17 January 1962, this headquarters found that several points needed clarification to the extent that a new edition seemed in order.

The new 313th Air Division Regulation (ADR) No. 23-6 of 21 January 1963 defined the mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW) as one of conducting air defense operations within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility and the areas adjacent thereto, including the activities of the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), the Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) radar stations, the fighter interceptor squadron, and the Army's air defense missile units. In addition, the 51st FIW was expected to provide administrative and logistical support for the units attached to Naha Air Base, in accordance with the directions of the Commander, 313th Air Division.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing was organized as an Air Force-controlled (AFCON) unit assigned to the 313th Air Division. As such, it was provided with a wing headquarters, an air base group with facilities, equipment, and personnel, and those assigned units considered necessary to carry out the mission.

The 51st FIW Commander, subject to policies established by 313th Air Division and directives of higher headquarters, exercised command

jurisdiction over the 51st Wing, including its assigned and attached units. He was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. The provision of such staff assistance and advice as might be required by the Commander, 313th Air Division on Air Defense matters. In addition, he was designated as Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division (Air Defense).
2. The provision of aircraft, equipment, and/or personnel incidental to the air defense mission, as directed.
3. The operational control of all U. S. Army anti-aircraft units for sector air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine anti-aircraft units when shore-based, and operational control of anti-aircraft gunfire from ships' batteries when such fire was in defense of shore installations located within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility.
4. The preparation and maintenance of plans for the conduct of combat operations.
5. The contribution of mobile strike forces, support personnel, and equipment in support of PACAF contingency war plans.
6. Augmentation of the defensive forces of other Fifth Air Force air divisions when the situation might so dictate.
7. Operation of the Okinawa ADCC.
8. The mutual coordination and standardization of air defense information and procedures with adjacent air defense sectors.



9. The provision of aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.

10. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

11. Developing and conducting aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other specialized training programs for military members of friendly foreign countries under the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

12. Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine Commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly-used facilities and installations.

13. Conducting combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies as frequently as necessary to insure the success of all planned joint operations.

14. The furnishing of field maintenance to organizations assigned, attached, or transient on Naha Air Base, to include the deployment of mobile maintenance teams, personnel, and equipment, as necessary, to support the Naha-based C-130 aircraft utilized in performance of their intra-theater airlift mission.

15. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division, to such an extent as was consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

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16. Issuing mission statements for all assigned units and insuring semi-annual review and updating, if required.

17. The performance of such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

The 51st FIW Commander was authorized direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Materiel Command (AMC) Depot Commanders and heads of civilian agencies on routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication on other than routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters, however, would require the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division.<sup>5</sup>

The Mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing: By contrast with the mission directive of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, that of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena Air Base was more than 3-1/2 years old when this headquarters superseded it with a new edition on 16 April 1963.

According to the new 313ADR 23-13, the mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) was to maintain assigned aircraft and personnel in a high state of readiness and to provide the capability to execute fighter missions designed to destroy enemy forces and facilities. In addition to this unclassified mission statement, a Secret directive made the 18th responsible for planning, exercising, and supporting tactical fighter missions utilizing nuclear weapons in support of immediate retaliatory capability ("Quick Strike"), general war plans (GWP), and contingency war plans (limited war). A secondary part of the classified mission called for the maintenance of a "limited war" capability to plan, exercise,

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and support tactical fighter missions with conventional ordnance, if required.<sup>6</sup>

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was organized as an AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division. As such it was provided with a headquarters, facilities, equipment, and personnel, together with the assigned tactical and maintenance units necessary for the execution of its mission.

Exercising command, administrative, and operational control of assigned and attached units, except when otherwise specified by competent authority, the 18th TFW Commander was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. The accomplishment of offensive aircraft operational staff requirements for 313th Air Division. When so designated, he was assigned additional duty as the 313th Air Division Deputy Commander for Offense.
2. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training and routine flying training programs of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for either of these purposes.
3. Providing supply, equipment, fuel, war readiness materiel (WRM), aircraft engine, and ammunition support to assigned and attached organizations and to the Military Assistance Program.
4. Providing continuation training for bomb commanders to insure their continued combat readiness status.
5. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and specialized personnel training and such other training programs as might be directed.

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6. Providing organizational and field maintenance support of assigned, attached, and transient aircraft, as required.
7. Issuing mission directives for each assigned unit of the 18th TFW and insuring their semi-annual review and updating, if required.
8. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with current plans, provided this was consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.
9. Performing special missions and such other tasks as might be directed by the 313th Air Division Commander or by higher headquarters.
10. Establishing and maintaining a Wing Command Center (WCC) which would operate 24 hours a day. The WCC would have display facilities and whatever communications were necessary to control offensive aircraft operations. The WCC would maintain the current status of aircraft, crews, and weapons, as well as display the strike routes of parent wing aircraft. In addition, it was to maintain status information on the aircraft of other wings in areas of mutual interest. The Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was authorized direct communication with local Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine commanders and heads of civilian agencies on routine administrative and logistical matters. All policy matters and direct communications with other major commanders would be handled by Headquarters, 313th Air Division itself, except when specific authorization to the contrary was granted. Direct communication between the 18th WCC and the Fifth Air Force Control Center at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, was authorized.<sup>7</sup>

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The Mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group: The classified mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) continued to be the maintenance of a 24-hour alert posture with TM-76B Mace missiles in hardened (100 PSI) launch sites on the island of Okinawa, where they provided a quick-reacting, all-weather, nuclear strike capability against high priority predetermined targets on the Communist Chinese mainland in support of PACAF war plans.<sup>8</sup> However, the unclassified mission directive which had been published on 17 January 1962 was superseded on 3 January 1963 by a new version of 313ADR No. 23-4.

The 498th TMG was organized as an Air Force-Controlled (AFCON) unit assigned to the 313th Air Division, its operational control vested in the Commander, Fifth Air Force. It was provided with a headquarters, two tactical squadrons--the 873d and 874th Tactical Missile Squadrons--the 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron, a unique supply facility known as MAST (Missile Automatic Supply Technique), a depot maintenance facility, and four operational launch sites, each of which included two underground Launch Control Centers (LCC).

The Commander, 498th Tactical Missile Group exercised command, administrative, and operational control of assigned units, and was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

1. Providing such staff assistance and advice as might be required by the Commander, 313th Air Division on tactical missile matters.

2. Fulfilling his responsibilities as laid down in PACAF OPLAN 112-62 of 19 February 1962.

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3. Developing flight profile planning to determine the proper courses and altitudes as required.
4. Augmenting the Fifth Air Force combat capability as directed.
5. Providing transition and continuation training to launch crews to insure their continued combat readiness status.
6. Developing and conducting training programs to insure fulfillment of technical and specialized organizational personnel requirements.
7. Conducting unit training in accordance with AFUTS 10-25.
8. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in support of current 313th Air Division and 6313th Air Base Wing plans, consistent with mission requirements.
9. Establishing and maintaining a Missile Command Center (MLCC) on a 24-hour-per-day basis. The MLCC would display the current status of the group's weapons, crews, targets, maintenance and supply back-up, launch bays, and sites. It was to be fitted with such communications as were necessary to control the 498th's offensive operations.
10. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units of the 498th TMG and requiring the semi-annual review and updating of all mission directives, if necessary.
11. The performance of such other tasks as the Commander, 313th Air Division should direct.

The Commander, 498th TMG was authorized direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marine, and AMC Depot Commanders and the heads of

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civilian agencies on routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication on other than routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters required the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division. Direct communication between the Fifth Air Force Tactical Operations Center and the 498th MLCC was authorized.<sup>9</sup>

Although the 874th Tactical Missile Squadron had been organized (by redesignating the former 874th Bombardment Squadron, Very Heavy) and activated as an assigned unit of PACAF on 8 September 1961, at which time it had been further assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group,<sup>10</sup> the unit had been in reality a "paper organization," since only one man, a staff sergeant, was officially assigned for morning report purposes. Early in 1963, however, the 498th's proposal to man the unit to its full UMD strength of 24 officers and 125 airmen was approved, and on 25 January 1963, full manning of the 874th commenced. By the end of February 1963, its full complement had been received. The personnel to man the 874th came from the 873d TMS, which was, in the process, reduced to one-half its original strength. The 874th TMS received its first commander on 15 January 1963, when Major Raymond E. Geer, the erstwhile Operations Officer of the 873d TMS, was assigned to that position.

#### THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION

##### Activations, Inactivations, Redesignations, and Attachments at Kadena Air Base.

Changes within 313th Air Division Headquarters: Although the Office

of the Inspector General, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, maintained a discreet silence on the subject in its final monthly historical report for 1962, it was nonetheless dissolved as of the year's end, and on 1 January 1963, the few remaining personnel whom rotational attrition had not returned to the United States were reassigned to various other agencies within the division headquarters. The commodious office space which the IG had formerly occupied was taken over by the shrunken Personnel Directorate, the Office of Information, and the Forms Management Branch of the Office of Administrative Services.

On 23 January 1963, Captain Neal C. Brigham, Chief of the 313th Air Division Electronics Branch, together with the manpower space he filled, was transferred to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB. Here he assumed the title of Assistant Chief of the Electronics Division on 26 January 1963.

On 6 March 1963, the Office of Procurement moved from the Butler-type building, T-4-M, which had been its home for many years, into the space recently vacated in permanent-type Building 15 by the Personnel Directorate.\*

As intimated above, the 313th Office of Information, except for the Historical Division, left behind its decrepit home in Building T-4-K, another part of the three-unit Butler building complex along with T-4-M and T-4-L, and moved across the street to Building 10 (the headquarters building, in which the Division Commander also had his office) in January 1963. The Historical Division remained in T-4-K until February, when it staged its own one-man exodus, taking over the space in Building T-45

\*Building 15 had been accepted by the Air Force on 29 April 1958 and had cost \$101,559.00.

formerly used as a briefing room by the 6922d Security Wing (AFSS). T-45 was a semi-permanent structure in "H" shape, created by the erection of two over-sized quonsets at each end of a concrete-block connecting corridor. In addition, situated between the two legs of the "H" formed by the four quonsets were, on the one side of the corridor, a large Butler-type wing and, on the opposite side, an over-sized quonset wing from which a concrete-and-steel vault projected.

The Civilian Personnel Office, which had occupied all of T-4-L and overflowed into one room in T-4-K, got the jump on the other evacuees by moving into Quonsets T-39, T-40, T-41, and T-42--also vacated by the 6922d Security Wing--in late December 1962.

The Staff Judge Advocate's Office moved from T-4-K to Building 15, where it took over the space formerly occupied by the Electronics Branch of the Operations Directorate.

Attached to Building T-4-K by bonds of inertia more than of affection or peculiar suitability, the Ground Safety Office was the last agency to abandon the old Butler complex, being finally persuaded to pick up and move to Building T-45 in March 1963.

District Office No. 43, 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG):  
Effective 1 January 1963, the Headquarters, 6001st Special Investigations Group (IG) at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, was discontinued,<sup>11</sup> and simultaneously the Office of the Deputy Director of Special Investigations (PACAF) was organized at Hickam AFB and assigned to the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG), USAF. At the same time, Office of Special Investigations (OSI) District Office 43 at Kadena AB, as well as Detachment 1,



District Office 43, at Naha AB, were organized and assigned to the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG), USAF, along with numerous other OSI offices USAF-wide.<sup>12</sup>

Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group (PACAF): On 1 February 1963, Detachment 1 (PACAF Standardization/Evaluation Team), Headquarters, PACAF, was discontinued, and simultaneously, Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group was designated and organized at Kadena AB, where it was assigned to Pacific Air Forces.<sup>13</sup> The new group was attached to the 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support, including summary, special, and general court martial jurisdiction, non-judicial punishment under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and administrative board actions.<sup>14</sup>

Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group was further attached by Headquarters, 313th Air Division to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB for logistical support (excluding field maintenance) and administrative support. For field maintenance, it was attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB. While 313th retained general court martial jurisdiction, the exercise of special and summary court martial jurisdiction, as well as action under Article 15, UCMJ, and administrative board actions, was delegated to the 6313th ABW.<sup>15</sup>

The 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater): Effective 8 April 1963, the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron (TDS) at Kadena AB was redesignated as the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), and was reorganized

under the appropriate unit manning document (UMD) with a total table of organization (O/T) composition strength of 29 officers and 172 airmen, the personnel to be furnished from the parent unit.<sup>16</sup>

The 400th MMS (S) had its origin in the activation of the 3d Tactical Support Squadron (TSS) at Sandia Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, on 8 January 1953. On 1 April 1954, the 3d TSS, having arrived at Kadena AB, was relieved from assignment to Headquarters Command, USAF, and reassigned to Headquarters, Far East Air Forces (FEAF), with further assignment to Twentieth Air Force (the predecessor organization of the 313th Air Division in the Ryukyus).<sup>17</sup> Twentieth Air Force then assigned the 3d TSS to the 6332d ABW at Kadena AB for all purposes.<sup>18</sup>

On 8 July 1954 the 3d TSS was redesignated the 3d Tactical Depot Squadron,<sup>19</sup> and on 25 August 1954 was relieved from assignment to Twentieth Air Force and reassigned to Headquarters, Far East Air Logistic Force (FEALOGFOR), at Tachikawa AB, Japan, without a change in strength or station. At the same time, the 3d TDS was attached for logistic support to Twentieth Air Force,<sup>20</sup> which further attached it to the 6332d Air Base Wing (ABW) for the same purpose.<sup>21</sup>

On 8 December 1954, the 3d TDS was redesignated the 7th Tactical Depot Squadron.<sup>22</sup> Then, on 1 October 1955, the 7th TDS was relieved from assignment to Headquarters, FEALOGFOR, and was reassigned to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.<sup>23</sup> This was the situation which obtained on 8 April 1963, when the redesignation of the 7th TDS as the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) became effective. The 400th MMS (T) was a Headquarters,

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U. S. Air Force-Controlled (AFCON) O/T unit assigned to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, and attached to the 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support, with operational control retained by Fifth Air Force. The Commander, 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) was directly responsible to the Commander, Fifth Air Force, through the Director of Munitions at the latter headquarters.

Although the administrative action transforming the 7th TDS into the 400th MMS (T) became effective on 8 April 1963, it was not until 10 May that Fifth Air Force Headquarters dispatched a letter on the subject of the "Responsibilities and Duties of the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater)," which served as a mission directive, without having the wide dissemination which a Fifth Air Force regulation of the 23-XX series would have been given.

According to this letter, the 400th MMS (T) was responsible for receipting for, storing, issuing, handling, assembling and disassembling, maintaining, inspecting, altering and modifying, providing local ground transportation of, technical supply of, accountability for, and emergency destruction (except for initial "High Gear" material) of PACAF sub-allocated war reserve (WR) and training nuclear assets located within storage locations of the 400th MMS and those nuclear assets on initial "High Gear" aircraft.

The 400th MMS was also responsible for receipting for, storing, issuing, assembling and disassembling, maintaining, inspecting, performing alterations and modifications on, providing ground transportation of (upon its receipt and until made available in a mated missile warhead section),

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technical supply of, and accountability for PACAF sub-allocated WR and training nuclear assets allocated to the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena AB.

Further, the 400th was responsible for assembling, disassembling, inspecting, maintaining, and performing alterations and modifications on all WR and training (non-expendable shapes) nuclear assets allocated to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB.

It was likewise responsible for periodically inspecting the nuclear weapons maintenance quality level of all PACAF weapons. In line with this, a Quality Audit Team (QAT) from the 400th MMS was to perform an inspection of all PACAF nuclear weapons at least semi-annually.

The Fifth Air Force letter also made the 400th MMS responsible for conducting a training, standardization, and certification program for all PACAF Weapons Maintenance Teams (WMT's) and Weapons Maintenance Shops (WMS's) under which they would perform "-1" maintenance on all weapons and "-3" maintenance on MK-7 and MK-28 weapons.

The squadron was also to deploy WMT's to PACAF storage sites or dispersed bases to accomplish routine or special maintenance which the WMS's had not been certified to perform or where there was no WMS.

The 400th MMS would provide technical guidance and assistance to PACAF WMS's, the interpretation and standardization of 11N-series technical order procedures being provided to storage locations by the squadron either when deemed necessary or upon request.

Finally, the 400th MMS was to maintain a maneuver pool of nuclear training shapes, in such quantities as Headquarters, Fifth Air Force

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should direct, for use in simulating "High Gear" aircraft loads during transloading exercises.<sup>24</sup>

The 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron: On the same date that the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) came into being--8 April 1963--a similarly-named organization, the 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, having previously been constituted and activated by Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 990, of 13 March 1963, was organized at Kadena Air Base with an O/T composition strength of eight officers and 383 airmen. All personnel were acquired from the 18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, and, in the absence of any formal arrangement for obtaining office equipment and supplies, the 418th simply "took" half of the equipment on hand in the 18th A&E Maintenance Squadron--with the tacit consent of the latter, of course! Since, however, it would require the decisive methods of a Solomon to divide the incumbent squadron commander between the two organizations, Lieutenant Colonel George Wetzler, Jr., the erstwhile Commander of the 18th A&E Maintenance Squadron, was reassigned to command the new 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, and Major James A. Head, the Armament and Electronics Maintenance Supervisor, was elevated to command the 18th A&E Maintenance Squadron. It was almost a year later, incidentally, that the problem of the 418th's having no official supply account was finally cleared up, enabling it to obtain its requirements in a manner less exciting but more legal. The new squadron was assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.<sup>25</sup>

On 3 May 1963, Headquarters, 313th Air Division received a message from Fifth Air Force directing that the existing 418th MMS Category 1

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ammunition storage area be expanded to include two additional magazines. As a result, Project KAD 94-4 was submitted on 20 May 1963 to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for approval and funding.<sup>26</sup>

Activations, Inactivations, Redesignations, and Attachments at Naha Air Base.

The 51st Air Police Squadron: Less than a year had gone by since the 6051st Air Police Squadron (Provisional) was designated and organized at Naha Air Base, when PACAF, the same headquarters which had created it, published a special order directing its discontinuance. It was on 1 May 1962 that the 6051st Air Police Squadron (P) had been brought into being,<sup>27</sup> and it was on 8 January 1963 that a new organization, the 51st Air Police Squadron, was organized to replace it,<sup>28</sup> after being activated by DAF AFOMO letter 885m of 9 August 1962. The 51st Air Police Squadron was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group with an O/T composition strength of two officers and 180 airmen, and was entitled to the history and any battle honors, colors, and emblem which the former 51st Air Police Squadron might have had before its inactivation on 25 October 1957.<sup>29</sup>

The 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium: It was only as recently as 1 June 1962 that the 345th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, A C-130-equipped organization stationed at Sewart AFB, Tennessee, had been reassigned from Tactical Air Command (TAC) to PACAF and further assigned to the 315th Air Division. And it was even more recently, on 29 June 1962, that the 345th TCS had been attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB for logistic and administrative support.



Nevertheless, on 8 January 1963, the 345th TCS was relieved from assignment to the 315th Air Division and to PACAF and was reassigned to TAC, though without personnel or equipment. Simultaneously, the 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, which had been previously activated by DAF AFOMO letter 957m of 20 December 1962, was organized at Naha Air Base, where it was assigned to the 315th Air Division with an O/T strength of 62 officers and 27 airmen.<sup>30</sup> The personnel and C-130 aircraft for the new 35th TCS all came from the departed 345th Troop Carrier Squadron.

The 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, was attached to the 313th Air Division for general court martial jurisdiction and to the 51st Air Base Group for special and summary court martial jurisdiction and for action under Article 15, UCMJ, also effective 8 January 1963.<sup>31</sup>

Field Training Detachments 909A and 909S: On 23 January 1963, Air Training Command (ATC) Field Training Detachments 909A (Amarillo) and 909S (Sheppard), which were stationed at Naha AB for the purpose of conducting training on the F-102 and C-130 aircraft respectively, were attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for administrative and logistical support.<sup>32</sup> Operational control was retained by Headquarters, ATC. The 11 personnel making up FTD 909A were headed by a master sergeant, while a major commanded the 13 men composing FTD 909S.

The 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron: On 8 April 1963 the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Naha AB was reorganized under an appropriate UMD with an O/T composition strength of 35 officers and 19 airmen.<sup>33</sup>

PERSONNEL

A detailed list of key personnel of the Headquarters, 313th Air Division, as well as all assigned and attached subordinate units at both Kadena and Naha Air Bases, is carried as Appendix 1 to this history.

A base population report of the 313th Air Division listing the authorized and the assigned strength of each organization as of the end of each month during the period January - June 1963, is carried as Appendix 11 to this history.

FUNDS

The first revision of the Fiscal Year 1964 Annual Financial Plan for Kadena Air Base was defended at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 11 September 1963. The results by budget project were as follows:

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Previous ABA</u>	<u>30 September ABA</u>	<u>Additional Requirements</u>	<u>5AF Appvd. Additional Requirements</u>
458	\$16,132,000	\$11,742,000	\$11,873,000	\$4,259,000	\$2,481,000
472	28,000	11,800	11,800	16,200	16,200
478	252,500	238,300	238,300	14,200	10,200
721	431,000	403,000	427,000	4,000	4,000
722	512,000	254,000	254,000	258,000	258,000

Budget projects for the first six months of 1963 were identified as follows:

- P 458: Base Operations and Maintenance
- P 472: Initial Outfitting of Medical Facilities and War Readiness Materiel Procurement
- P 721: Operation, Military Family Housing
- P 722: Maintenance, Military Family Housing

The annual budget authorization for P 458 was increased in the amount of \$131,000 and P 721 by \$24,000 as a result of the Fifth Air Force action on the first revision. Additional increases were expected at such times as PACAF and USAF actions were completed. Of the \$2,481,000 recognized by Fifth Air Force as additional requirements, \$269,000 was within the civilian pay area, \$194,000 was for land rental, \$75,000 was for electricity, and \$84,000 was for accessorial charges - a total of \$622,000 which must be funded.

The funding picture at Kadena AB was much more roseate at the end of the historical period than it had been at a corresponding date one year earlier. On 30 June 1962, the total annual budget authorization had been \$10,301,000, or \$1,572,000 less than the 30 June 1963 approved funds.<sup>34</sup>

The FY-1964 Annual Financial Plan and FY-1965 Budget Estimate for Naha Air Base were submitted to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 18 January 1963. A three-year comparison of funding levels, using the 30 June 1963 close-out data is as follows:

<u>FUND PROJECT AND DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FY 1963</u>		
P 458 (Base Operation and Maintenance)	\$6,919,150	\$8,260,000	\$8,202,000
P 478 (Operation and Maintenance - Base Medical Treatment Facilities)	44,600	63,000	58,000
P 551 (Subsistence)	813,000	871,000	N/S
P 721 (Military Family Housing - Operations)	306,930	489,000	492,000
P 722 (Military Family Housing - Maintenance)	206,069	276,000	213,000



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All FY 1963 funds allotted to Naha AB were 100 per cent obligated on 30 June 1963, the close of the fiscal year. As for tenant unit funds allotted to Naha, they were also 100 per cent obligated except for the 2152d Communications Squadron (AFCS), which had 20 cents unobligated as of June 30th.<sup>35</sup>

#### AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT

##### The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Aircraft: Equipped with F-102A Delta Dagger all-weather interceptor aircraft since 1959, the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) comprised the only tactical organization in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base. In January 1963, the 16th FIS was authorized 26 F-102A's, actually possessed 27, and had 21 operationally ready. The authorization remained the same throughout the historical period, but the number possessed dropped to 23 in February, with only 19 of these being operationally ready. March saw a further decline in aircraft on hand to 22, as the total operationally ready sank to 15. In April, though the situation improved somewhat, as the F-102A's assigned rose to 23 and those operationally ready climbed to 18. May was even better, with 24 possessed and 20 operationally ready; while June brought the most favorable situation since January, as 21 out of 24 possessed aircraft were operationally ready.<sup>36</sup> One of the F-102A's was destroyed in an accident on 28 January 1963. Details of this are given in the section on Flying Safety.

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Base Flight Aircraft: The Base Flight Section of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing began the year with six T-33's, but on 18 March 1963 T-33 02-9315 was lost in an accident, leaving the section with five "T-birds" for the remainder of the period. Base Flight also had two H-19 helicopters assigned throughout the period, these being employed in transporting passengers and cargo and in water survival training pick-ups.<sup>37</sup>

33d Air Rescue Squadron Aircraft: An attached unit of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, the 33d Air Rescue Squadron (MATS) was equipped with seven SA-16 Albatross amphibian aircraft and two H-19 helicopters throughout the period 1 January - 30 June 1963.<sup>38</sup>

Detachment 1, 315th Air Division Aircraft: Detachment 1, 315th Air Division at Naha AB, which possessed three of the four squadrons assigned to that division, was equipped with 52 C-130A Hercules four-engine, turbo-prop cargo aircraft, divided among the 21st, 35th, and 817th Troop Carrier Squadrons (Medium).<sup>39</sup>

The 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron.

Detachment One: Detachment One of the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron, situated on Miyako Jima, 190 miles southwest of Naha AB, had as its radar equipment an AN/FPS-20A search radar, an AN/FPS-6 height finder, and an AN/GPS-T4 radar signal simulator console.

Detachment Two: Detachment Two, 623d AC&W Squadron, was located on Kume Jima, a small island some 62 miles west of Naha AB, its major equipment consisting of an AN/FPS-20A primary search radar, an AN/FPS-6 height finder, a GA-340/GPS-7A SIF/IFF aircraft interrogator, five OA-175 radar indicator consoles, six UPA-35 radar indicator consoles, two HRI radar height indicator consoles, a UPX-6 SIF/IFF interrogator, an AN/GPA-30 video mapper, an FPS-T2 target simulator, and an ACTER ECM (electronic countermeasures) simulator.

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Detachment Three: Detachment Three, 623d ACEW Squadron, at Yuza Dake Air Station, the only Ryukyus Air Defense System site actually situated on Okinawa proper, was equipped with the following electronic equipment: an AN/FPS-3A surveillance radar, an AN/FPS-6 height finder, an AN/GPX-7A SIF/IFF identification system, an AN/GPS-T2 radar simulator, an AN/GPS-T4 radar target simulator, five AN/UPA-35 PPI (plan position indicator) scopes, an AN/GPX-27 interference blanker, and an AN/GPA-110 correlator and integrator.

Detachment Four: Detachment Four, 623d ACEW Squadron, was located on Okino-Erabu Shima, an island of the Amami Group, which had been returned to Japanese control on 25 December 1953. Hence, it was the only one of the 623d's radar sites to be situated on soil not under the jurisdiction of the 313th Air Division. Detachment Four possessed an AN/FPS-20A search set, an AN/FPS-6 height finder, five AN/UPA-35 control scopes, an AN/GPA-30 video mapper, an AN/UPX-6 SIF/IFF interrogator, an AN/GPS-T2 radar signal simulator, and an AN/GPS-T4 radar signal simulator console.<sup>40</sup>

The 6313th Air Base Wing.

During the period 1 January through 30 June 1963, the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base had assigned to it 14 T-33 aircraft, two C-54 Skymasters, and five C-47 Skytrains (to use the official but almost unrecognizable designation for the ancient aircraft more familiarly known as the "Gooneybird" in Air Force jargon). The T-33's were flown a total of 2,244 hours during the six months, while the C-54's logged 761 hours and the C-47's 1,288 hours.<sup>41</sup>

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The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB, which was in the midst of a program for conversion from F-100D/F aircraft to F-105D's as the year 1963 got underway, had assigned to it on 1 January a total of 43 F-105D's, 36 F-100D's, six F-100F's, and 18 RF-101's.

On 1 February 1963 the F-105's numbered 50, while the F-100's had dwindled to 22. March 1st found the total F-105's grown to 69 possessed, but the F-100 Supersabres had, during the same period, declined by only one, for a total of 21 on hand. The figures remained unchanged briefly, but more F-105's soon began to come in, and on 24 March 1963 the 83d and last F-105 Thunderchief which the 18th was scheduled to receive arrived at Kadena AB. As of that same date, all but three of the old F-100's had been disposed of, these few being retained for the time being to provide the wing with a dart target tow capability until such time as the Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) could develop a modification for the F-105 which would enable it to tow darts.<sup>42</sup>

While the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, an attached unit of the 18th TFW, had 18 assigned RF-101's as of 1 January 1963, at the close of the period on 30 June this number had been reduced to 17 on paper and to 13 in actuality. One of the Voodoos had been permanently transferred to the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, two were undergoing time compliance technical orders at Misawa AB, Japan, and two more were on loan to the Chinese Air Force.<sup>43</sup>

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Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group.

Throughout the first six months of 1963, Detachment 2, 1045th Operational Evaluation and Training Group at Kadena AB had assigned to it two C-118 Liftmaster aircraft for use in the execution of its mission.<sup>44</sup>

The 498th Tactical Missile Group.

As of 30 June 1963, the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena AB possessed 36 TM-76B Mace missile air frames, 44 missile noses, 68 gimbal packages, and 37 launch racks.<sup>45</sup>

Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing (MATS).

Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing (MATS) at Kadena Air Base had, as its chief piece of electronic equipment, an AN/CPS-9 typhoon tracking radar, with a theoretical range of up to 400 miles, but a practical working range of approximately 200 miles. This facility had been installed on 1 February 1957. It also possessed an AN/GMD-1 rawinsonde.<sup>46</sup>

The 1962d Communications Group (AFCS).

The 1962d Communications Group (AFCS) at Kadena Air Base operated an AN/CPN-18 Ground Control Approach (GCA) search radar, an AN/FPN-16 GCA precision radar located between the two runways, a TACAN (Tactical Aid to Navigation), a VOR (Very High Frequency Omni-Range) facility, an Instrument Landing System (ILS), and a radio beacon.<sup>47</sup>

BASES AND FACILITIES

Kadena Air Base.

Easily the most important of all the Air Force facilities in the Ryukyu Islands, Kadena Air Base, the home of Headquarters, 313th Air

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Division, had assigned to it the following 16 installations throughout the first six months of 1963:

- Awase Communications Annex (the AIRCOM transmitter site)
- Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex
- Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield (including the airfield proper, the AIRCOM receiver site, and the bombing/gunnery range)
- Irisuna Shima Air Range
- Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex
- Kadena Family Housing Annex (known as Morgan Manor)
- Kadena Site Number 1 (the 498th TMG's Bolo Point launch site)
- Kadena Site Number 2 (the 498th TMG's White Beach launch site)
- Kadena Site Number 3 (the 498th TMG's Ginbaru (Kin) launch site)
- Kadena Site Number 4 (the 498th TMG's Tancha launch site)
- Kadena TACAN Annex
- Koza Radio Relay Annex (the microwave tower in Goya linking the Awase transmitter site with the AIRCOM communications center on Kadena AB proper)
- Motobu Auxiliary Airfield (inactive as of 30 June 1957, but retained against the day new use might be found for it)
- Onna Point Administration Annex (home of the 6927th Radio Squadron Mobile (USAFSS))
- Ryukyus Air Range
- Yontan Auxiliary Airfield

Naha Air Base.

Of the seven satellite installations assigned to Naha Air Base, four were elements of the Okinawa Air Defense System, while the others existed to fulfill a variety of functions. The seven were as follows:

- Hirara Air Strip (on Miyako Jima)
- Jume Shima Air Station
- Miwa Radio Beacon Annex
- Miyako Jima Air Station
- Naha Light Annex
- Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station
- Yuza Daka Air Station



## FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961.
2	2	5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations - Division/Wing Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 11 Sept. 1962.
3	1	5AFR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961.
4	3	Ltr., Hq. Fifth Air Force (5AF) to 313th Air Division (313AD), sub.: Hq. 5th Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking Forces, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960.
5	4	313ADR No. 23-6, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 51st Fighter-Interceptor Wing, dtd. 21 Jan. 1963.
6	--	History, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 1 Jan - 30 June 1963, p. 7.
7	5	313ADR No. 23-13, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, dtd. 16 Apr. 1963.
8	--	Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Operations Plan (OPLAN) 112-62, dtd. 19 Feb. 1962, par. 2.
9	6	313ADR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 498th Tactical Fighter Wing, dtd. 3 Jan. 1963.
10	--	PACAF Special Order (SO) G-48, dtd. 15 June 1961.
11	--	Department of the Air Force (DAF) Ltr., 946m, sub.: Reassignment of Certain Investigation Units, dtd. 7 Dec. 1962; Headquarters Command SO G-86, dtd. 19 Dec. 1962.
12	7	1005th Special Investigations Group (SIG) SO GZ-31, dtd. 20 Dec. 1962.
13	10	PACAF SO G-2, dtd. 4 Jan. 1963.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
14	11	PACAF SO G-3, dtd. 11 Jan. 1963.
15	16	313AD SO G-2, dtd. 30 Jan. 1963.
16	14	PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 21 March 1963
17	--	Far East Air Forces (FEAF) General Order (GO) 55, dtd. 19 Apr. 1954.
18	--	Twentieth Air Force (20AF) GO 13, dtd. 9 Apr. 1954.
19	--	20AF GO 24, dtd. 30 June 1954.
20	--	FEAF GO 129, dtd. 16 Aug. 1954.
21	--	20AF GO 40, dtd. 20 Aug. 1954.
22	--	Far East Air Logistic Force (FEALOGFOR) GO 63, dtd. 1 Dec. 1954.
23	--	FEAF GO 118, dtd. 30 Sept. 1955.
24	--	Ltr., Hq., 5th Air Force to 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), sub.: Responsibilities and Duties of the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), 10 May 1963.
25	14	PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 21 March 1963.
26	--	Monthly Historical Data Report (MHDR), 313th Air Div. Director of Materiel (313D/M), May 1963, p. 4.
27	--	PACAF SO G-29, dtd. 27 March 1962
28	8	PACAF SO G-93, dtd. 21 Nov. 1962.
29	9	<u>Ibid.</u>
30	9	PACAF SO G-103, dtd. 21 Dec. 1962.
31	19	313AD SO G-5, dtd. 14 June 1963.
32	15	313AD SO G-1, dtd. 23 Jan. 1963.
33	12	PACAF SO G-10, dtd. 1 March 1963.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
34	--	History, 6313th Air Base Wing, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, pp. 78-79.
35	--	History, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, pp. 106-107.
36	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 34.
37	--	Telephone conversation by 313th Air Div. Command Historian with Base Flight personnel, 23 Apr. 1964.
38	--	Telephone conversation by 313th Air Div. Command Historian with 33d ARS personnel, 23 Apr. 1964.
39	--	313AD Form 0-4: Daily Aircraft Status Report.
40	--	History, 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963 (carried as an appendix to History of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963), pp. 2, 4, 5, 9, 28, 35-37.
41	--	History, 6313th ABW, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, p. 44;
	--	Telephone conversation by Command Historian with SSgt Viney, 6313th ABW Operations Directorate, 24 Apr. 1964;
	--	Telephone conversation by Command Historian with 2d Lt. John F. Gee, III, 313th Air Div. Manpower Div., 24 Apr. 1964.
42	--	Hist., 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, pp. 30-31.
43	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
44	--	Telephone conversation by Comd. Hist. with Lt. Col. Merritt G. Garner, 313th IO, 24 Apr. 1964.
45	--	History, 498th Tactical Missile Group, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, p. 7.
46	--	Telephone conversation by Comd. Hist. with Det. #8 personnel, 24 Apr. 1964.
47	--	Telephone conversation by Comd. Hist. with Sgt. Keith, 1962d Comm. Gp. Flight Facilities Div., 24 Apr. 1964.
--	13	PACAF SO G-11, dtd. 5 March 1963.



Footnote No.	Document No.	
--	17	313AD SO G-3, dtd. 1 May 1963.
--	18	313AD SO G-4, dtd. 20 May 1963.
--	20	5AF SO G-24, dtd. 26 June 1963.
--	21	5AF SO G-25, dtd. 30 June 1963.

CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

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## CHAPTER II

### OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

#### OPERATIONS OF DETACHMENT 3, 313TH AIR DIVISION

The mission of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, located at Naha Air Base, was to perform radar evaluation services throughout the PACAF area of responsibility, conduct analyses of the Radar Quality Control Program, and act as an advisory agency on matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics. The detachment was also expected to analyze such matters as the effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, the relationship of target aspect ratio to probability of detection, and validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft. Detachment 3 was also to provide special advisory service on specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) system, as well as training for field personnel at new radar installations and electronic warfare training in support of ground radars. Finally, it was to support such other activities as might be directed by the Fifth Air Force Commander.<sup>1</sup>

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, came under the direct operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, whose Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations exercised supervisory surveillance. The detachment was attached to the 51st Support Squadron for logistic support (excepting field maintenance) and administrative support (less the assignment and promotion of personnel), while field maintenance was provided by the 51st Fighter

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Interceptor Wing. Unexpectedly, though, since the unit personnel were assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, their records were maintained by the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base.<sup>2</sup>

A six-man team from Detachment 3, headed by Captain Lee M. Brown, departed for the Philippines on 2 January 1963 to conduct Electronics Counter-Measures-Electronics Counter-Counter-Measures (ECM-ECCM) training at the various radar stations located there. On the same day, two enlisted men took off for South Vietnam for the purpose of painting the plotting boards at two of the radar stations.

On 9 January, Lieutenant Colonel Tang Chia-Nung of the Chinese Air Force (CAF) arrived at Detachment 3 to assist in the reproduction of evaluation reports of the Taiwan AC&W complex which had been produced by the CAF Radar Evaluation Team by advising concerning the format and translating from the Chinese language into English.

On 15 January a three-man team left for South Korea where it was to investigate the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) AC&W system continuous evaluation program and conduct training in quality control procedures.

Two of the six men who had gone to the Philippines on the 2d returned to Naha on 14 January, and the balance of the team returned on the 19th. The two airmen returned from South Vietnam the same day.

On 26 January two airmen departed for Ubon, Thailand, to paint the plotting board at that station, and on the 31st the three men returned from their quality control training visit to Korea.

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Captain Brown led a five-man team in a trip to Korea on 6 March for the purpose of conducting ECM-ECCM training in coordination with a series of ECM training flights to be carried out by the 6091st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron.

Two airmen departed Naha for Wallace Air Station (AS), Philippines, on 23 March to paint the plotting board.

All of the ECM-ECCM team except for Captain Brown returned from Korea the following day, he having stopped over at Fuchu AS to participate in a debriefing at Fifth Air Force Headquarters.

A six-man team headed by First Lieutenant James E. Wickell departed for South Vietnam on 17 April to provide technical assistance, in accordance with a message from Fifth Air Force. Five of the men returned a week later, and Lieutenant Wickell, who had remained behind to conduct flight checks, arrived back at Naha on the 27th.

A much shorter trip was made by a nine-man team headed by Captain Brown, which drove south to Yuza Dake Air Station on 29 April to perform technical assistance authorized by Fifth Air Force.

Far more desirable was the task undertaken by a four-man team under the leadership of the detachment commander, Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa, which flew to Hawaii on 4 May for the purpose of performing a special evaluation on the AN/FPS-8 surveillance radar assigned to the 169th AC&W Squadron at Koko Head, Oahu. While there, the team also conducted ECM-ECCM training at the 169th AC&W Squadron's Koko Head site and the 150th AC&W Squadron's detachment at Kokee, Hawaii. The four men, who had been joined on the 10th by a surveyor specialist, returned to Okinawa on 28 May.

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On 4 June, a six-man team headed by Captain Donald L. McGinnis, departed for a station evaluation at Wallace AS, Philippines. The detachment's RCA technical representative and a sergeant joined the sextet on the 7th, and on 21 June the entire augmented team returned to Naha.

Meantime, on June 7th and 21st respectively, the reports on the evaluations performed at Yuza Daka and Koko Head had been completed and published.<sup>3</sup>

#### OPERATIONAL READINESS

##### Detachment One, 315th Air Division.

All three of the Naha-based troop carrier squadrons - the 21st, 35th, and 817th - of the 315th Air Division's Detachment One participated in Tien Bing III (Exercise Sky Soldier) in late February 1963. On 23 February, some 40 of the units' C-130's dropped 2,500 Army paratroopers over their jump zones in Taiwan, then brought them back to Okinawa the following Tuesday and Wednesday, February 26th and 27th. More than 200 men of the detachment were involved in the actual flying operations, which were part of its annual ORI. Colonel Jack L. Crawford, Jr., Commander, Detachment One, 315th Air Division, was mission commander for the exercise. In the ensuing rating given by the PACAF inspecting team, Detachment One was awarded a grade of "outstanding."<sup>4</sup>

Incidentally, when the main body of 2,500 Army paratroopers jumped into Taiwan, they had been preceded by seven Air Force parachutists of Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron, based at Naha AB, as well as 60 specialists of the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, another Okinawa

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outfit, representing the Army. Once on the ground, the seven "aerial porters" set up a movement control center to assist the troop-laden C-130's in discharging their cargoes of men and equipment. In addition, they handled loadmaster and escort duties for the troops and equipment, as well as aiding in the planning stages.<sup>5</sup>

PACAF OPLAN 108-63.

April 1963 saw the receipt by this headquarters of PACAF OPLAN 108-63 ("Bearcat"), dated 29 March 1963. This plan outlined the procedures to be employed in a "no notice" ORI, which might be conducted by either a USAF Inspector General (IG) ORI team or a PACAF IG ORI team, or by both. The purpose of "Bear Cat" was to evaluate the ability of tactical fighter, defensive, reconnaissance, and missile organizations to perform their assigned mission and to meet the requirements outlined in the PACAF GWP, the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), and PACAF contingency plans. As a natural concomitant of this, Bearcat would serve as a vehicle for exercising and evaluating the organizations committed to support these units in the accomplishment of their mission.

After PACAF OPLAN 108-63 had been passed around 313th Headquarters to permit the agencies to determine the requirement for a supporting plan, the Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division published 313ADIV OPORD 108-63 on 15 May 1963, implementing the PACAF OPLAN. Unless operational considerations dictated otherwise, the 313th OPORT stipulated, the initial phase of the ORIT would be the simulation of GWP tasks with maximum practicable realism by the unit being tested.<sup>6</sup>

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PACAF OPLAN 188-63.

Another PACAF operations plan received at 313th headquarters during April was PACAF OPLAN 188-63 ("Liberty Head"), dated 11 March 1963, which was to be implemented quarterly to test PACAF's GWP. The movement of combat and support forces and weapons might be either actual or simulated, as directed by CINCPACAF. To increase realism, simulated nuclear detonations and associated damage and casualty information would be prepositioned throughout the command. Force losses resulting from hostile nuclear detonations and the prescribed attrition of combat forces were also to be simulated, in order to exercise the GWP fully. All other portions of the exercise, including weather, weapons available, in-commission status, and time, were to be actual. The exercise might be conducted on a "no notice" basis and would follow a scenario as directed by CINCPACAF.<sup>7</sup>

313th Air Division Continuity of Operations Plan 17-63.

313th Air Division Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63, dated 20 May 1963, was designed primarily to support Fifth Air Force COP 17-63 by prescribing actions to be taken which would assure an instant capability to initiate and sustain the direction of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force in the execution of war plans. It provided guidance, policy, and direction not covered in the emergency war plans, which would assure the readiness of Headquarters, 313th Air Division to carry on essential wartime functions of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

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In the event Headquarters, Fifth Air Force at Fuchu Air Station (AS) was knocked out by enemy action, an alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Advanced would be activated by the 41st Air Division at Yokota AB, Japan. Then, if both Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and 41st Air Division were rendered non-operational, facilities and personnel of the 313th Air Division were to be available to assume command of Fifth Air Force. The Headquarters, 313th Air Division staff agencies should (1) be prepared to perform the essential wartime functions of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, including (a) maintenance of required facilities, (b) thorough familiarity with the Fifth Air Force Alternate File and insuring that it was stored in a secure location, separate from and independent of the files of Headquarters, 313th Air Division; (c) a periodic review of the Fifth Air Force Alternate File to insure its state of currency and that adequate procedures were in effect for prompt use; and (d) thorough familiarity with the wartime mission and function of Fifth Air Force and assurance of 313th's readiness to perform these functions; (2) insure that communications facilities necessary to implement this plan were provided; (3) assume command and activate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Alternate, Kadena AB, at such time as it was determined that both Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and 41st Air Division were non-operational. This done, 313th should notify Headquarters, PACAF and all PACAF subordinate units of its assumption of command and the activation of Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force at Kadena AB (Building 159).

In this last condition, wherein 313th became Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing would pass command

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instructions to all Fifth Air Force offensive tactical fighter forces, as directed; the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing would, as the Deputy Commander for Defense, exercise Headquarters, Fifth Air Force Defense Combat Operations Center (COC) responsibility for the Okinawan Air Defense Sector only; the 498th TMG would provide staff supervision over offensive missile operations; and the 6313th Air Base Wing would provide housekeeping support and facilities, as necessary, for expanded operations.

The senior officer within Fifth Air Force would, whenever possible, serve as the Fifth Air Force Commander. However, to insure continuity of command, initially, upon the declaration of Condition Alpha until the senior officer could assume command, the Commander, 41st Air Division would act as Commander, with his command post at Yokota AB. In the event command could not be exercised by the 41st Air Division, the Commander, 313th Air Division would act as Commander, Fifth Air Force. If command could not be exercised as thus outlined, the senior officer of organizations in communication with each other would assume Fifth Air Force responsibilities for those organizations. At the time the senior officer assumed Fifth Air Force command responsibility, he might operate from one of the prepared Alternate Headquarters or he could establish a new headquarters as he deemed appropriate.<sup>8</sup>

313th Air Division OPLAN 65-63.

On 20 May 1963 Headquarters, 313th Air Division published OPLAN 65-63 ("313th Air Division Weapons Withdrawal or Destruction Plan").

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Under its terms, the 18th TFW, in addition to those tasks specifically identified in Fifth Air Force OPLAN 65-63 of 10 May 1963, would (1) develop an OPLAN providing for the withdrawal and/or destruction of nuclear weapons materials in its custody; (2) provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) services as required; (3) be prepared to provide sufficient F-105 aircraft to ferry nuclear weapons under Phase 7 or 8, if directed; and (4) be prepared to provide organic aircraft in support of withdrawal operations, if required.

For its part, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, in addition to those tasks specifically identified in 5AF OPLAN 65-63, dated 10 May 1963, would (1) develop an OPLAN providing for the withdrawal and/or destruction of nuclear weapons materials in its custody; and (2) provide for security and other support services for withdrawal and/or destruction operations.

The 6313th ABW was expected to (1) develop an operations plan which would provide for security and other support services for withdrawal and/or destruction operations; and (2) provide crews for organic aircraft, if required.

The 498th Tactical Missile Group would develop an OPLAN which would provide for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons materials in its custody to the Kadena AB complex, as well as for the emergency on-site destruction of nuclear weapons materials.

The 313th Air Division DCC would serve as the command post for withdrawal/destruction operations. Under normal conditions, upon

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execution of withdrawal/destruction operations by Commander, Fifth Air Force, all unit command posts would be operated on a 24-hour basis. Under emergency conditions, where the disruption of communications or other events had resulted in the loss of normal command control, the senior U. S. military officer present in the area would take whatever action was required to prevent the capture of nuclear material.<sup>9</sup>

#### SPECIAL TRAINING EXERCISES

##### Operation Joss Stick Bomber.

On 3 February 1963, 313th Air Division Operations Order (OPORD) 300-63 ("Joss Stick Bomber") was published and distributed to all units concerned as a supplement to the Thirteenth and Fifth Air Force operations plans pertaining to this annual exercise.

Under its provisions, four B-57's of the 3d Bombardment Wing at Yokota AB, Japan, four Canberra light bombers of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) at Base Butterworth, Malaya, and two transport type aircraft would participate in an exchange visit of approximately 10 days' length at Kadena Air Base. Approximately 55 RAAF and the same number of 3d Bombardment Wing personnel were to support the exercise.

The 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), as the host unit for Joss Stick Bomber, would coordinate the weapons delivery range schedules with the 3d Bombardment Wing (BW), provide suitable aircrew briefing facilities, make all arrangements for officially welcoming the participating units, provide a comprehensive briefing on

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flying safety and local flying area procedures, and assure the compatibility of air/ground communications pertaining to range control.

The proposed flying schedule called for takeoffs at 1030I and 1430I on 19 March 1963; while, on 20 and 23 through 26 March, the aerial gunnery range (W-178: Ie Shima) would be subjected to fire between 1100I and 1200I hours. The ordnance to be expended on W-178 would consist of .50-cal., 20-mm., inert rockets up to 2.75", and practice bombs up to and including ones of 2,000 pounds.<sup>10</sup>

Fifth Air Force Operations Plan 119-63.

Fifth Air Force Operations Plan (OPLAN) 119-63 ("Nightmare Range Close Air Support Exercise"), dated 21 February 1963, was received by 313th Air Division Headquarters in March. Under the terms of this order, the 18th TFW would participate in Operation Nightmare each month from August through December 1963 as one aspect of the inter-service training of the U.S. Eighth Army (in Korea) and Air Force units in the techniques of close air support operations under realistic conditions. Operating out of Osan AB, five F-105's of the 18th TFW would turn around once for both orientation and exercise sorties. The wing would provide 10 aircrews and one forward air controller (FAC).<sup>11</sup>

498th Tactical Missile Group OPLAN 4-62.

The nickname "Acid Test" was assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) on 9 March 1963 for use with 498th TMG OPLAN 4-62, which in turn supported 313th ADIV OPLAN 219-62 ("High Noon"), dated 15 January 1962, and a practice no-notice ORI. High Noon exercises were conducted

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at the direction of the Commander, 313th Air Division to provide an organized follow-up in deficient areas. Tactical evaluations, ORI's, and the PACAF exercises program were the primary vehicles used in the command determination of the operationally ready status of units. These methods did not provide for an organized follow-up in deficient areas, however, and to that end 313th Air Division OPLAN 219-62 was promulgated.<sup>12</sup>

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena AB, incidentally, initiated 10 High Noon exercises during the period of this history, as a means of facilitating preparation for the PACAF ORI which was known to be in the offing. These exercises, which were staged on 4 January, 25 January, 19 February, 25 March, 9 April, 15 April, 7 May, 24 May, 4 June, and 26 June, were designed specifically along the lines of an ORI - i.e., Phase I: General War Plan (GWP) force generation; Phase II: Nuclear weapons delivery; Phase III: Conventional weapons delivery; and Phase IV: Managerial and supervisory inspections. These exercises provided realistic ORI training, uncovering discrepancies which would probably have otherwise existed when the actual ORI took place, and which it was possible to correct at this time without prejudice to the wing's standing.<sup>13</sup>

Exercise Dhanarajata.

On 10 May 1963, Headquarters, 315th Air Division issued OPOD No. 5-63 (SEATO Exercise Dhanarajata - pronounced Tāñarāt) in connection with the airlift of U. S. forces deploying from bases throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia to operating locations in Thailand for this exercise. During Dhanarajata, units of 315th Air Division were to participate in

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a test of airfield saturation and conduct a tactical airdrop. Following the exercise, the deployed forces would be returned to their home station or originating location. U. S. Forces deploying from Okinawa were to provide liaison officers for duty with Detachment 1, 315th Air Division at Naha AB, and as required for deployment from operating locations in the exercise area. These liaison officers would constitute the primary contact between 315th Air Division and all units being airlifted. The Commander, Detachment 1, 315th Air Division, would have operational control of all 315th Air Division and 1503d Air Transport Wing aircraft and aircrews when operating from Okinawa during all phases of the exercise. During the Phase II tactical deployment, he would have operational control of all such aircraft, including those staging through Clark AB. During this period he would exercise command of Detachment 3, 315th Air Division (stationed at Clark AB) as required to insure success of the tactical mission.

C-124 and C-130 aircraft would be utilized to airlift personnel and equipment from Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines to bases in Thailand. The deployment phase would begin on approximately E-30 and continue until E-Day, 14 June 1963. The off-load bases were to include Don Muang, Udorn, Ubon, Chiang Mai, Koke Kathiem, Korat, and other operating locations in Thailand. The primary on-load bases would be Tachikawa AB, Kadena AB, Naha AB, and Clark AB. The tactical air drop planned for troops of the U.S. Army's Okinawa-based 503d Infantry at Roi Et on 14 June would consist of 638 troops and 200,364 pounds of heavy equipment.



The airframe requirement would be 16 C-130's and nine C-124's. Detachment 1, 315th Air Division was to plan and execute the heavy equipment drop, including deployment of the combat control team.

In a subsidiary aspect of Exercise Dhanarajata known as Exercise "Tidal Wave" the capability of Don Muang Airport for supporting a large-scale airlift was to be tested by the 315th Air Division and Military Air Transport Service (TRANSPAC). Twenty-one 315th Air Division aircraft would be scheduled so as to arrive at Don Muang during a 10-hour period on 9 June 1963, beginning at 1045I, with approximately 30-minute intervals between the successive aircraft. The planned ground time was to be two hours, with all planes to be refueled and airborne as soon as possible. MATS (TRANSPAC) would dispatch 22 aircraft from Clark AB to arrive at Don Muang at one-hour intervals during the saturation test.<sup>14</sup>

Making up the 25,000 troops in the SEATO army participating in Exercise Dhanarajata were a 7,000-man American task force built around two Army battle groups, some 1,300 jungle fighters from the Commonwealth countries of Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, and 16,000 indigenous Thai troops, as well as a small Philippine contingent. The SEATO field forces were commanded by Lieutenant General James K. Woolnough, USA, (Deputy Commanding General, USARPAC) who arrived in Bangkok on June 10th. General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Army's top military specialist in counter-insurgency operations, was also to land at Bangkok on the 10th in the role of observer. Although he returned to Saigon on 13 June, he planned to re-visit Thailand at a later date to observe other exercise highlights.

In addition to exercising the member nations of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the operations involved in repelling a would-be aggressor, Dhanarajata served to dramatize Western military readiness in a region where the Communist shadow had been lengthening in recent months. The SEATO force, the largest ever assembled in the history of the organization, was deployed along an imaginary battle line stretching through Thailand's northeast provinces - just across the border from Red-threatened Laos. Military experts believed that this area was the place most likely to become the next battleground in Southeast Asia should the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh succeed in their campaign to take over Laos. Dhanarajata would, then, test the ability of a joint army to fight under the conditions most likely to exist in the event of a Communist attack from across the Mekong River.<sup>15</sup>

Exercise Dhanarajata had its official beginning on 11 June 1963 in the form of a command post paper exercise, which ran for two days. The third day, June 13th, was devoted to a live firing demonstration at Lopburi, Thailand.

Meantime, also on 11 June, C-124's of the 1503d Air Transport Wing (MATS), based at Tachikawa AB, Japan, had taken off from Kadena AB after receiving aboard both men and equipment of the 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinforced), 503d Infantry, 25th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Robert L. Rowan, USA, for an airdrop over Roi Et on the 14th. The same day that the 2d Airborne "hit the silk", ground exercise was scheduled to get underway at four different locations. Involved in this phase would be Force Tango, composed entirely of Thai forces, and Forces Sierra, made up of

American and British Commonwealth forces. Commanding the latter would be Major General Lawrence J. Lincoln, USA, Deputy Commanding General, USARYIS and IX Corps. The Headquarters, IX Corps, would serve as the senior headquarters for all U.S. and Commonwealth tactical ground forces, and would operate directly under the Commanding General, SEATO field forces. In 1962, incidentally, this same Headquarters, IX Corps, had provided staff support to the U.S. Army for SEATO Exercise "Air Cobra."

Coordinating the movement of troops and supplies from Kadena was the 1505th Support Squadron (MATS), which was to provide support until the exercise was ended. PACAF supplied personnel for the staff of the exercise director, as well as manning and performing the functions of the Air Force component commander and the air operations center for Dhanarajata.

In addition to the PACAF units participating in the exercise, 18 F-100 Super Sabre jet fighters from the 527th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, four RF-101 Voodoo twin-engine jets of the 29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Shaw AFB, South Carolina, and 12 C-130 Hercules assault airlift aircraft from the 50th Troop Carrier Squadron at Sewart AFB, Tennessee, deployed to Thailand. Acting as mission commander of this TAC Composite Air Strike Force (CASAF) was Colonel Merle C. Brown, Deputy Commander of the troop carrier wing at Sewart AFB. Enroute to Thailand the fighter and reconnaissance aircraft were refueled by SAC KC-135 aerial tankers, making it necessary for them to stop only at Hickam AFB and Andersen AFB, Guam. The C-130's landed at Hickam, Andersen, and Clark AB, Philippine Islands. All of the CASAF aircraft and the equipment brought with them made the trip to Thailand in three days.



The movement of the CASAF from the continental United States (CONUS) to Thailand and their return at the conclusion of the exercise were controlled by the PACAF Control Center at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. However, during Exercise Dhanarajata, all aircraft in the force received their mission assignments from the Air Operations Center at Camp Erawan, the SEATO field force headquarters. The fighters flew numerous close air support strikes; the transports airlifted cargo and passengers and air-dropped both supplies and paratroopers; and the reconnaissance jets flew regular tactical visual and photo reconnaissance missions.

The 29th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, to which the four RF-101's in the CASAF belonged, had, incidentally, been personally awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for their work over Cuba the previous October and November during the missile crisis of that period.<sup>16</sup>

On 12 June 1963, Thai General Chitti Navisathien, the SEATO exercise director, announced that some elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division would remain in northeast Thailand, the area most threatened by Communist advances in Laos, for several weeks after the current Exercise Dhanarajata ended. This action, he said, was in response to a U.S. request that some troops be permitted to stay on to conduct small unit action training in the jungles of northeast Thailand. The extension of their sojourn would also be utilized to complete a number of civic action projects, such as building of schools and drilling of wells, which had been started during the exercise but were not finished as yet.

To the inevitable question of reporters covering Dhanarajata of just how long the American units would remain in Thailand, General Chitti

would give no definite terminal date, but did reveal that it would not be "as long as the last time." Here his reference was to the situation in 1962 which had led President Kennedy to dispatch both Marines and Army Infantrymen to Thailand in direct reaction to major Communist inroads into Laos. These troops had remained approximately three months before the President pulled them back to their Pacific bases, some staying on through late November.<sup>17</sup>

Although the original plans had called for the 2d Battle Group, 503d Infantry, to fly directly from Kadena AB to the drop zone at Roi Et, in order to dramatize American ability to rush to the aid of a beleaguered ally, storm conditions in the region of Okinawa made advisable to divert the C-124's to Clark AB at the last minute. After a two-day stopover at the big Philippine Islands base, the 706 Army paratroopers again boarded the nine Globemasters on 14 June. In the lead plane as they arrived over Roi Et was a 66-man Air Force combat control team of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron, whose members were to jump first for the purpose of preparing the drop zone for the main paratroop force. A crack 60-man Army assault team was to jump from the same plane, as would a six-man Marine paratroop unit from the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company in Hawaii, whose job it was to set up forward air control posts to guide the fighter planes to the targets provided by a mythical aggressor force.<sup>18</sup>

Everything went according to plan as the big airdrop took place on June 14th at remote Roi Et, some 285 miles northeast of Bangkok. The actual landing zone northeast of the small town was a paddy field area which advance intelligence had indicated might, in some places, be under

as much as six feet of water as the result of recent monsoon rains. As a precautionary measure, inflatable life jackets were worn by each jumper. In the event, muddy rice paddies were in plentiful supply as the troops touched down, but no water of a depth requiring the ready life jackets was encountered. The wind was a little higher than expected, but the 2d Airborne escaped with only four minor injuries. The experience of Colonel Robert Rowan, the 503d Commanding Officer, was typical. Landing in thick mud, he was dragged about 70 feet when his hands became so muddy that he couldn't loosen his chute releases. Every time he tried, his hands simply slipped off. A sergeant landed in a foot of water and was dragged some 10 feet before he could release his parachute. In the process he picked up "about 10 pounds of mud", most of it in his pockets and helmet.

As the troops landed in full battle gear, they came under theoretical attack from a mock aggressor group made up of other elements of the 503d Infantry, who had flown in a few days earlier to take up positions in the surrounding jungle. The role of the paratroops was to fill a gap in an imaginary battle line stretching from Thailand's north-central frontier with Laos to the extreme northeast boundary with that Communist-succumbing country. To the left of the paratroopers in the improvised battle line were 1,300 battle-hardened Commonwealth soldiers from Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, while to their right were the troops of another U.S. battle group, the Fifth Infantry "Bobcats," also of the 25th Infantry Division, but based in Hawaii rather than Okinawa. Further up the defense line, bending toward the north, were some 16,000 Thai troops (Force Tango), who faced an "aggressor" force composed of other Thai



forces. Also airdropped with the paratroops were 200,000 pounds of support equipment, including two self-propelled 106-mm. guns, vehicles, and supplies. As an AP reporter described it, "The several thousand spectators who ringed the drop area - most of them local villagers who had walked miles to watch the show - scattered for cover as the heavily-laden chutes seemed about to descend on them. But all dropped safely in the prearranged zone."<sup>19</sup>

According to the fictional scenario for Exercise Dhanarajata, a Communist uprising in Country "A" (Laos) had been crushed, but this had been followed at once by an invasion of Communist forces (presumably North Vietnamese and/or Communist Chinese). Having overrun Country "A", the Red armies had then moved against Country "B" (Thailand).

Now, as Exercise Dhanarajata hurled the 25,000-man SEATO army against these imaginary "aggressors" in northeast Thailand, reports of a fresh outbreak of actual fighting in neighboring Laos were received on 16 June. News dispatches from the Laotian administrative capital of Vientiane said that pro-Communist Pathet-Lao forces, backed by North Vietnamese troops had penetrated to within 50 miles of the Mekong River border separating that country from Thailand. One report said that Pathet Lao troops had captured the town of Tha Thom, only 42 miles north of Thailand.

In the mock war, meantime, SEATO field forces headquarters were issuing a communique stating that "under cover of darkness SEATO forces staged a voluntary withdrawal from "Country A" to inside Thailand." It added that throughout the night "aggressor patrols and probing actions" supported by artillery fire had taken place. Considerable difficulty was encountered

from hordes of refugees who were clogging all avenues of withdrawal in their attempt to escape the "aggressor forces." The SEATO forces were doing everything in their power to aid the refugees and get them to the rear as soon as possible, but, owing to their great numbers, they were not only hampering the actual troop withdrawal but were also holding up the steady flow of supplies to the front.

Aggressor aircraft were especially active at night and seriously damaged several SEATO planes on the ground, while inflicting numerous casualties. Under heavy pressure, the SEATO forces continued to retreat, seeking only to slow down the enemy momentum while final defensive positions along a vital line of resistance were prepared.<sup>20</sup>

Following four successive days of defensive withdrawal, the SEATO forces finally launched a smashing counter-offensive all along the north-eastern Thailand front on 18 June, repelling the Communist invaders' advance and turning it into a general retreat. The attack on the ground was coordinated with a parachute drop of "C" Company, 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinforced), 503d Infantry, at Udorn, 50 miles south of the border fronting on troubled Laos. The SEATO counter-offensive, made realistic by harassing raids and attacks staged by the "aggressors," was supported by F-100 jet fighters of the 527th Tactical Fighter Squadron and by the 509th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, as well as by aircraft of the Thai, British, Australian, and New Zealand Air Forces.

SEATO forces were aided in their efforts by a friendly Thai civilian population which had "volunteered to a man" to do anything they could to halt the invaders from overrunning their beloved country. In contrast to such civilian aid for the SEATO army, intelligence reported general

civilian uprisings occurring in various areas under "aggressor" control. These uprisings forced the enemy to re-deploy his tactical elements in an attempt to gain control of the situation.

Earlier in the day, U.S. and Commonwealth troops had been given a personal welcome by King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand, who visited the field headquarters of the SEATO army and commented that the troops "have been able to see conditions in this country . . . similar to those they may some time have to fight in."

By evening of the 18th SEATO officials were claiming that "aggressor air forces had been reduced to 50 per cent of their operating capability as a result of the four days' aerial counter-offensive." Operating from seven different Thai airfields under operational control of the Air Component Command (ACC), which was commanded by Major General Theodore R. Milton, the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force, 90-odd tactical aircraft of the participating SEATO nations flew more than 222 sorties against the invaders. Of this number, 125 were made in less than 48 hours. Tactical offense sorties flown in air strikes against "enemy" airfields and supply lines, as well as in close tactical air support of the SEATO field forces, made up 201 of the total missions; aerial reconnaissance sorties flown in response to requests from SEATO unit commanders comprised another seven; and air defense interceptor sorties against aggressor aerial assaults numbered 14 of the total.<sup>21</sup>

By Wednesday, 19 June, the 25,000-man SEATO army had driven the "invaders" across the border in such a state of rout that a spokesman for



the former was able to claim victory over the Communists. With this announcement, the eight-day air-ground exercise, the most ambitious yet held by the eight-nation alliance, came to a close. All that remained were concluding ceremonies and a critique of the exercise's effectiveness at Lopburi, the headquarters for the SEATO field forces. Most of the 706 men in the 2d Airborne Battle Group returned to Okinawa almost immediately after the field maneuvers were finished, while the men of the 1st Battle Group from Hawaii also boarded the aircraft which were to fly them back home, without waiting for the parade and other ceremonies.<sup>22</sup>

Prime Minister Marshal Sarit Thanarat, speaking to an audience of top SEATO diplomats and military observers at Lopburi on 20 June, described Thailand as an "immediate target area" of the Communists, but declared that "after this demonstration of unity and purposefulness we . . . will rest assured that, if we should be attacked, we will be able to rely on SEATO."

Thai General Chitti Navistira, in an obvious reference to Chinese descriptions of SEATO as a "paper tiger," then asserted that "our alliance is not as some people claim it to be, deprived of will and means. It has some teeth to bite if need be."

Senior military observers of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Pakistan expressed general agreement with Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasab, his country's chief representative at the war games, that Dhanarajata had proved that "SEATO is, in fact, a fighting alliance." Earlier the same day, the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister, General Thanom Kittikachorn, had told newsmen covering the war games that the exercise should

"make the enemy think twice before committing any aggression" in that region. He added that the exercise had served to boost the morale of both Thailand's soldiers and its people.<sup>23</sup>

On 24 June the SEATO troops still in Thailand paraded down Bangkok's broad Rajdamnern Avenue before King Bhumibol Adulyadej and crowds estimated in the tens of thousands. Included in the military might displayed for the sweltering throngs were tanks, "Little John" missiles, and conventionally-armed troops from Thailand, the United States, the SEATO Commonwealth members, and the Philippines.<sup>24</sup>

Exercise Dhanarajata over, UPI reporters covering the operation conducted a poll of the staff and field officers of the SEATO nations who had participated to ascertain their opinions about its success. One Commonwealth officer stated that "If Dhanarajata had been a real Communist-inspired revolt followed by an invasion, Thailand would have been another Korea." And this exercise had provided the first opportunity SEATO had ever had to put the combined defensive forces "on the testing block." In the process, it had been found that "the machinery was badly in need of a tune-up," but he believed that all would be fit "once these bugs were eliminated."

An American colonel felt that the most important benefit derived from the 10-day exercise was the exposure of SEATO's weaknesses. This, in his opinion, was more important than the demonstration which had been given that air power could be delivered to Southeast Asia from the United States in less than two days, and that paratroops could be dropped in the fighting area in a matter of hours. Of the weaknesses exposed by

Dhanarajata, he considered the communications and supply problems of the greatest concern, since they "could have been fatal in a real attack."

The Thai officers who were interviewed were of the same opinion - that communications failures were the most important weakness revealed by the test.<sup>25</sup>

The SEATO Commander for Exercise Dhanarajata, Lieutenant General James K. Woolnough, USA, when asked by a newsman at Kadena AB on his return to Hawaii whether he thought the recent operation would act as a deterrent to further Communist attempts at expansion in Southeast Asia, answered that "You'd really have to ask the Communists . . . but we're more than satisfied with our show of strength." As the general saw it, the greatest lesson learned had been that of "working together successfully on a joint staff, and working together all the way down the line from top to bottom." Quite impressive to friend and foe alike had been the arrival of F-100 jet fighters in Thailand from their Stateside bases within 24 hours. On the reverse side of the coin, problems had arisen all right, but none had been of a kind that could not be solved.\*

General Woolnough was emphatic in his belief that Dhanarajata had been the most valuable exercise SEATO had yet held. "All the nations involved now have an idea of terrain and communication problems of that area and will be able to operate better from the lessons learned," he concluded.<sup>26</sup>

\*One problem, which General Woolnough was probably not thinking of when he made his remarks, had materialized after the maneuvers themselves had ended and the exercise participants were starting to return to their widely scattered home stations. The U.S. 125th Signal Corps unit from



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Exercise Small Change VII.

From 27 through 29 June 1963, the Okinawa Air Defense Sector conducted Exercise Small Change VII in competition with the other four PACAF F-102-equipped wings at Misawa AB, Itazuke AB, Yokota AB, and Clark AB. These were respectively the 4th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, the 68th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, the 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, and the 509th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. At stake were honors in air defense operational areas, interceptor flying, weapons directing, aircraft and electronic maintenance, and munitions loading, with the winner earning the privilege of representing PACAF in the upcoming USAF-sponsored Air Defense Weapons Competition. The equipment for the contest included the radar scopes at the four AC&W detachments, the F-102A's, themselves, GAR missiles, T-33 "target" aircraft, and other items.

Small Change VII awards were to be given to the best pilots, the best wing, the best AC&W sector, and the best interceptor squadron. Also to be graded would be the air defense direction centers (ADDC's), including their intercept directors, technicians, and height finder operators; the munitions loading teams; and materiel support at the installations. The exercises would include 16 F-102 sorties, some for actual missile firings, and some for profile firing or combatting a simulated attack by a hypothetical aggressor employing offensive tactics against defense systems.

Hawaii, wishing to ship its 11 jeeps and vans back to Bangkok from remote Udon by rail, visited the local Thai railroad headquarters to make the necessary arrangements, which were expected to prove routine. The visitors were told, instead, by the chief of staff for the Sixth Military District,

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Personnel of the 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group at Kadena AB acted as judges of the events, visiting each of the five bases in turn.<sup>27</sup>

Although the results were not learned until August, it seems proper to record here that the seven-man munitions loading team of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing scored 460 out of a possible 600 points to take first place in that phase of the competition and win the right to represent PACAF in the biennial "William Tell" interceptor meet at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Unhappily for Naha AB, the 4th Fighter Interceptor Squadron from Misawa AB, Japan, took first place in both the flying category of the contest and the materiel support phase.

one Colonel Poon Piya Rutut, that it would cost about \$7.50 for each jeep and \$11 for each van (in baht, the Thai currency) before any of the equipment could be loaded at Udon. JUSMAG (Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group) authorities in Udon had the authority to arrange American military shipments, but they did not have the 2,000 bahts! At last reports the U.S. Army was reported to be attempting to contact the JUSMAG authorities in Bangkok, hoping either to obtain a better credit rating in Udon or to find 2,000 bahts (about \$100.00), so the 125th Signal Corps people could pack up their impedimenta and go home. (News Article, "U.S. Army Vehicles Stranded in Thailand," Pacific Stars and Stripes, 21 June 1963).

Fortunately for good relations between the two countries and the success of future operations, many of the Thai people of humbler position were less mercenary in their attitude toward the U.S. Army than were the military officials. Many of the airborne troopers who parachuted in at the commencement of the ground maneuver phase of Dhanarajata were handed cold soft drinks and fruit by the friendly country people, and everywhere they were greeted with smiles and hand waves. One sergeant told of being brought mats and pillows by the Thais near whose farm house he and his companions were sleeping one night. Another NCO summed up his opinion of the Thais as "about the friendliest people we ever encountered." (News Article, "Troops Cement Thai Friendship," Pacific Stars and Stripes, 22 June 1963).

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Worse yet, it was not a USAF team at all, but a Japanese Air Self Defense Force team from the vicinity of Misawa AB, which walked off with the prize in the weapons controller's category! Since the JASDF team operated the AC&W site in the Misawa-based 4th FIS air defense sector, its victory in that class of the competition gave the 4th Fighter Interceptor Squadron a runaway winning score of 7,656.6 points, as compared with 7,114.2 points for the 51st's second place finishers. As a result of Misawa's triumph, the 39th Air Division won the laurels of the top air division; the Northern Air Defense Sector (JASDF) was the top AC&W sector; Captain Gerald B. Hurst, of the 4th FIS, was the top interceptor pilot; and Captain Takayuki Masanobu of Site P-42 was the top weapons director.<sup>28</sup>

Although an intangible dividend of Small Change VII, the lessons learned from the competition promised to bear rich fruit in the months to come. The judges not infrequently heard such comments as "I never knew that procedure was in the check list or tactics manual until we began preparing for Small Change VII." Furthermore, the close coordination between the AC&W people and the interceptor pilots definitely increased their joint operational capability. Men who had never before worked closely together realized for the first time that there was a need for daily team work in the business of air defense.<sup>29</sup>

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## FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
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7	--	PACAF OPLAN 188-63 ("Liberty Head"), dtd. 11 Mar. 1963.
8	--	313AD Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63, dtd. 20 May 1963.
9	--	313AD OPLAN 65-63 ("313th Air Division Weapons With- drawal or Destruction Plan," dtd. 20 May 1963.
10	--	313AD OPORD 300-63, dtd. 3 Feb. 1963.
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12	--	313AD OPLAN 219-62 ("High Noon"), dtd. 15 Jan. 1962; 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) OPLAN 4-63.
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19	32 33 34	News Article, "SEATO Air Drop Bullseye," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 16 June 1963; News Article, "Mass Drop Successful - But a Bit Soggy," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 20 June 1963; News Article, "503d Airborne Strikes in SEATO Exercise," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> (official weekly newspaper of the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands), 14 June 1963.
20	35 36	News Article, "Reds Add Realism to SEATO 'Script,'" <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 18 June 1963; News Article "SEATO Troops Withdraw in Third Day of Exercise," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 21 June 1963.
21	37 38 36	News Article, "SEATO Set To 'Hit Back,'" <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 20 June 1963; News Article, "SEATO Planes Smash 'Enemy,'" <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 19 June 1963; News Article, "SEATO Troops Withdraw in Third Day of Exercise," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 21 June 1963.
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CHAPTER III

THE 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP

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### CHAPTER III

#### THE 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP

##### THE 498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP BECOMES FULLY OPERATIONAL

As related in the preceding History of the 313th Air Division, on 31 December 1962, 30 of the 32 launch bays assigned to the 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) contained TM-76B missiles, 27 of them in a "quick strike" status. On 10 January 1963, the group became fully operational, with all 32 launch bays in an operational status. Finally, on 31 January 1963, the 498th attained its zenith when all 32 "birds" entered a "hold status 600B" (i.e., 100 per cent of the missiles were on target). The PACAF standard called for an operational capability of only 80 per cent.<sup>1</sup>

##### MODIFICATION OF THE LAUNCH SITES

Despite the fact that extensive modifications to the launch sites had been completed in 1962, it was found necessary during the latter part of the historical period to initiate a new program of "follow-on" modifications for the purpose of correcting known design deficiencies and improving the operational environment at the launch facilities. Included in the 15 modifications were seven critical in nature, since they forced the operational shut-down of a four-bay complex for 14 days and two complete sites for 72 hours.

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Easily the most important of these modifications was that providing an emergency system (previously lacking) for the opening of exhaust tunnel doors. Also critical in its need was the installation of new seals on all the launch bay doors for the purpose of providing a tighter and more durable seal which would prevent shock-wave overpressures from entering the launch bays. A third of the vital modifications concerned the water-filled launch bay doors, which leaked continuously. To correct this, the contractor drained the doors and refilled them with a special light weight, porous concrete having the same density as water.

Still another modification replaced the existing switch, which prevented missile launch until the cell door was open to at least 74 degrees, with a more reliable, moisture-resistant switch. It also included the replacement of the "firing line" circuit cabling with a new shielded type. A fifth modification provided a positive shut-off of diesel exhaust gases from the main or auxiliary exhaust plenum. This change had been found necessary to permit the maintenance of blast valves in the plenums without requiring shut-down of the generator - a situation which would have rendered a complex non-operational.

Although not essential, the sixth modification, limited to Sites III and IV, improved the reliability of the diesel water valves responsible for switching the cooling system from external to internal cooling when a launch alert was initiated. The seventh critical modification, affecting only Sites I and II, called for installation of a common-header to separate the two compressed air tanks so as to permit maintenance on a single tank without making it necessary to shut both down.<sup>2</sup>

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TRANSFER OF THE MISSION PLANNING FUNCTION TO THE 498TH TMG

Ever since the 498th Tactical Missile Group's activation, mission planning functions had been performed at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force - an arrangement which proved quite unsatisfactory, primarily because mission data frequently had to be electrically transmitted from Japan to Okinawa, and errors often occurred during such transmission.

A joint conference of Fifth Air Force mission planners and 498th launch officers and controllers agreed that mission planning should not be isolated from the using operational unit. In consequence, on 1 March 1963, the entire mission planning function was transferred to the 498th TMG, where it was integrated into the Combat Operations Section of the Operations Directorate, and on March 20th the last remaining officer in the Mission Plans Section of Fifth Air Force Headquarters was transferred to the 498th TMG, where it was integrated into the Combat Operations Section of the Operations Directorate. Thereafter, all planning actions were performed locally. With the addition of Mission Plans to the Command Center's responsibilities, the position of Combat Operations Officer was established, and the incumbent was made responsible for Mission Plans (which included Intelligence), the Duty Controller functions, and War Room operations. All of these functions were physically located in and constituted the Group Command Center.

On 10 May 1963, mission planning personnel from the 498th attended the SIOP planning conference at PACAF and then at JSTPS in Omaha, Nebraska. New launch times for the group were incorporated into the 1964 SIOP, and

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the 498th continued to enjoy precedence in their TOT times. Group officials of a more thoughtful tendency recognized, however, that, as time passed, an ever-increasing targeting problem would arise, as existing areas of conflict were aggravated by the introduction of other weapons systems and the advancement of their capabilities.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION OF THE 498TH TMG

##### The Nature of the Inspection.

A PACAF team of 21 officers headed by Colonel James A. Wilson conducted an operational readiness inspection (ORI) of the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena Air Base from 24 through 29 May 1963 for the purpose of testing and evaluating the state of training of the 498th TMG and its ability to execute its wartime mission.

In accordance with the procedures and criteria outlined in PACAF Operations Order (OPORD) 108-63, the inspection was conducted in three phases. Phase I was a test of the 498th's ability to react in consonance with the General War Plan (GWP), Emergency Actions Message, as well as to comply with the PACAF Procedures for Positive Control. Phase II was a test of the unit's ability to place and maintain the TM-76B missile on alert status. Phase III was an inspection of the unit's training, maintenance, and administrative operations.

##### The Test and Evaluation.

At 1000I, 23 May 1963, Colonel Warren E. Vinzant, Commander of the 498th TMG, and his staff were given a briefing by the PACAF ORI team

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notifying them officially of the impending ORI, its purpose, scope, and objectives. Being thus warned, Colonel Vinzant placed the group in alert condition "Round House" at 1500I that same day. An exercise emergency action (EEA) Hardrock -0 message establishing the exercise situation was received by the 498th Missile Command Center (MLCC) at 1717I.

Phase I was initiated at 0933I on 24 May with the MLCC's receipt of a Hardrock -9A PACAF message directing the removal of the safing and arming jack from each umbilical outlook box (UOB) at the four launch sites. This task was accomplished within five minutes after the sites had received and decoded the TWX.

The 313th Air Division began a recall at 0938I, and at 0945I the 498th TMG "Cocked Pistol" was completed, with 30 missiles being reported as operationally ready.

A Hardrock -1A message was sent by PACAF at 1021I, and at 1031I the MLCC received a Hardrock -1A voice call from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, but was unable to copy it because of a temporary circuit outage. At 1036I the Hardrock -1A message from PACAF was received and was relayed to the sites at 1048I. However, this TWX contained an Attack Option 3 and a country deletion which prevented missile launch. E-Hour was established as 1015I.

At 1058I a voice Hardrock -3A message was received from Fifth Air Force, to be followed one minute later by a PACAF Hardrock -3A. This message was relayed by conference call to the missile sites at 1105I, and authentication was confirmed to the MLCC by all of the launch sites at 1110I. The PACAF Hardrock -3A contained a valid task and a new E-Hour of

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1045I for the country deleted from the target list. The simulated launch of the missiles in relation to the new E-Hour was as follows:

<u>TIME TO LAUNCH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF MISSILES</u>
Under 30 Minutes	1
30 - 39 Minutes	17
40 - 49 Minutes	4
50 - 59 Minutes	4
60 Minutes and Over	6
TOTAL	<u>32</u>

The simulated missile launch time commenced when the Launch Control Officer (LCO) completed his message authentication. Twenty missiles were launched in 16½ minutes. Of the 12 that required more than 16½ minutes for launch, four were delayed awaiting a free launch time. Although six missiles had been among those reported as operationally ready at "Cocked Pistol," they developed the following malfunctions:

1. One missile was delayed because of a rupture in a hydraulic line of critical importance in launching.
2. One missile suspension system did not become rigid.
3. Three missiles developed launch/exhaust door opening problems.
4. One missile was delayed because of the delay in launching the preceding missile.

The two remaining missiles were not operationally ready at "Cocked Pistol." One of these was in recycle, while the other was in a memory stabilization period. A summary of the missile launch times is as follows:

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<u>TIME IN MINUTES</u>	<u>MISSILES</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE MISSILES</u>
Within 12	15	15
Within 13½	2	17
Within 15	2	19
Within 16½	1	20
Over 16½	12	32

Before Phase I got underway, the ORI team attended the morning shift change briefing held in the MLCC, which included special instructions, intelligence, roll call, and a maintenance status report. The ORI team then accompanied the respective launch crews to the launch sites. After the change of shifts, a 30-minute memory run of all operationally-ready missiles was recorded on graph paper. Five of the missiles were found not to be within the required specifications during this time period. After "fade out" was declared, the ORI team asked the launch officer to have the responsible crew member read and record all pre-set mission data set-ins--i.e., missile warhead data, missile guidance data, and the guidance hold and monitor console azimuth data set-ins. A comparison of the results with the master target mission data set-in file at the MLCC target section revealed that the data set-in information recorded on nine missiles did not agree with the master target folder nor with the tolerances outlined in T.O. 21-TM76B-101. The ORI team ruled that these nine missiles would have missed the assigned target DGZ.

Phase II of the test was inaugurated as soon as "Fade Out" for Phase I was declared and the various missiles had been returned to a normal alert status. One complex of four missiles was converted to training

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configurations for engine run-up tests, while 12 launch crews demonstrated their ability to recycle missiles at selected missile sites. One crew demonstrated their ability to perform initial set-up and recycle count-down at the complex configured with training missiles. As the final demonstration for Phase II, one crew simulated a rapid fire multiple launch (RFML) at the training complex, momentarily running up the four missile engines to their maximum allowable RPM.

Phase III of the ORI was conducted in conjunction with Phases I and II for the purpose of evaluating the managerial functions and general operational aspects of the 498th TMG and the individual missile sites.<sup>4</sup>

The Missile Launch Control Center. The ORI team found the Missile Launch Control Center located in the 498th TMG headquarters building, where a large room had been partitioned into two sections by a curtain. One section contained the MLCC with its associated communications equipment, display boards, and the like, while the other section was normally used by the Mission Planning Branch. However, the Group Battle Staff occupied the planning room at such times as it was activated. Although access to this room was controlled, the MLCC was physically located adjacent to the group briefing room, access to which was not controlled at all times, and normal conversations conducted in the MLCC could be heard and understood in the briefing room, owing to the nature of the partition dividing them. Consequently, it was possible for conversations of MLCC personnel concerning classified subjects to be monitored by unauthorized persons.

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While noting this undesirable situation, though, the ORI people were also fair enough to add that a contract to remodel this area, enlarging the facility and providing substantial partitions between areas had already been drawn up, and the project was scheduled for completion in the fall of 1963.<sup>5</sup>

The Mission Planning Branch: While the Mission Planning Branch, recently assigned to the 498th TMG from Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, was found to be operating in inadequate facilities, all the personnel in that office were well informed and proficient in mission planning procedures. The ORI team spot-checked the master target folders for both content and accuracy, but found no discrepancies.<sup>6</sup>

The Standardization/Evaluation Section: The 498th TMG Standardization/Evaluation Section was graded as "satisfactory," the officers assigned to that office appearing to be well qualified. The records examined indicated that the evaluations conducted for crew upgrading to an operationally-ready status were thorough and that training conducted at the sites was being monitored by this section. The standardization-evaluation officers closely followed the training progress of newly-assigned crews to insure their rapid upgrading to an OR status.<sup>7</sup>

Mission Briefings: On the debit side of the 498th ledger the ORI people found that the mission briefings being given before each change of shifts usually started late, because the crews did not report on time. Moreover, the required number of crew members was never in attendance at the briefings observed by the ORI team. Not only was extraneous intel-

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ligence material covered on several occasions, but the quality of most briefings was poor.<sup>8</sup>

The General Situation at the Launch Sites: Area security at the four launch sites was found to be satisfactory, all procedures being followed and adequate weapons, ammunition, and equipment available. The receipt of exercise messages at the sites was timely, and decoding procedures were completed accurately within five minutes except at one site. However, several Launch Officers utilized their personal watches, some of which were in error. A standard GMT timepiece, which was frequently hacked, was not available in all of the Launch Control Centers, and at Site 4 the master clocks in the two LCC's did not keep accurate time in either case.

Local procedures required the launch enabling unit (LEU) to be locked with a padlock, the key to which was kept in the Launch Control Officer's pouch. However, no check was made at the changing of crews to insure that the transferred key and lock were functioning properly.

Two factors appearing to have a detrimental effect on unit morale were observed at the launch sites during the inspection. Some men expressed a desire to work a 12-hour shift instead of the eight-hour one in practice, since this would decrease the time they spent traveling to and from the sites, as well as the number of required crew briefings and shift changes. As for the food available to the site crews, it was admittedly edible and nutritious, but it still left a lot to be desired.

While the latrine facilities at the sites were not at all satisfactory, new ones hoped to be entirely so were scheduled for installation. The original site construction specifications had provided for chemical

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toilets in each complex. Then, after they were installed, the predictable came to pass--viz., the crews were most reluctant to use the new facilities because of the stench always present and the need for their frequent emptying. For a time the feasibility of installing septic tanks under the Launch Control Center floor for sewage disposal was studied, but sanitary engineers vetoed this solution in view of the dangerous sewer gas that might leak into the site atmosphere. As a result, the "clean-up" contract let by the District Engineer for the various launch sites included an item providing for the installation of flush toilets at each site.

Besides inspecting the physical aspect of the launch sites, the ORI team administered examinations to the Site Commanders, the Operations Officers, and 17 of the Launch Control Officers to determine their general knowledge of their respective launch sites and emergency action file (EAF) procedures. From these examinations it was learned that the Site Commanders and Operations Officers were definitely lacking in knowledge of the procedures for positive control (PPC) and the content of the emergency action file. Even worse, perhaps, their knowledge of missile systems and launch procedures was also limited, despite the requirement of 498th TMG Regulation No. 51-2, dated 20 March 1963, that squadron Operations Officers and Site Commanders be operationally ready within 90 days of their assignment or of the date of the regulation.

The 17 Launch Officers demonstrated satisfactory knowledge of general procedures, but eight were unsatisfactory in PPC/EAF procedures and 13 possessed a limited job knowledge of specific interlock controls designed to prevent an inadvertent launch with either unsafe or unreliable conditions.<sup>9</sup>

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The Test of Site 1: Upon receipt of the Hardrock -3A message at Site 1 (Bolo Point), proper authentication procedures were followed and simulated launches begun. In Complex "A" it was found that the missiles in Bays #1 and #2 could be launched during the first available free period; whereupon a simulated launch of both "birds" was conducted. Free launch time was also determined for Bays #3 and #4, but a hydraulic pressure failure prevented the launchings. The leak having been located in Bay #2 and isolated, the LCO worked out a new launch time, enabling both missiles to be launched.

In Complex "B" the normal launching sequence was initiated upon receipt of the Hardrock -3A message. Bay #6 had to be shut down because of failure of the flight control ready light, but Bay #8 was launched as soon as possible. The launch from Bay #5 was delayed by a failure of the flight control ready light, but the missile was not shut down. Bay #7 was delayed two minutes by a hydraulic problem which prevented opening of the main door. A minor adjustment was made, and the missile was then launched. Bay #5 followed soon after, though the operation of the flight control ready lights was only simulated. Launch control power was turned off to all bays. After a minor adjustment of the hydraulic system and a recheck of the flight control ready light, a free time was established and Bay #6 was successfully launched.

On the positive side of the picture, the ORI examiners found that the Launch Control Officers and Mech I's (enlisted men performing a specific type of maintenance) demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the PPC and

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emergency action file (EAF) procedures. Also, the two-man concept was adhered to in every respect.<sup>10</sup>

The Test of Site 2: Site 2 (White Beach) got off to a bad start at the very beginning of the ORI when Complex "B" was unable to authenticate the Hardrock -9A message in consequence of the MLCC's having passed the wrong message edition to the LCO. The possession of this erroneous edition in turn resulted in an envelope compromise, and the discrepancy became all the worse when the LCO failed to report the compromise. When the Hardrock -3A message and edition were received, the LCO used the previously-compromised edition to authenticate them, then gave the wrong edition to the Mech I, as a result of which the latter was unable to authenticate. At last, discovering that he had read the edition number incorrectly, the LCO corrected his error and passed the proper edition to the Mech I.

Not to embarrass the Complex "B" Launch Control Officer by allowing him to possess a monopoly on mistakes, the LCO in Complex "A" proved to be insufficiently familiar with the PACAF EAF to understand the intent of the Hardrock -1A message. In addition, assuming that the Hardrock -3A message was a Hardrock -1A message, he erroneously used the task given as an attack option.

The inspectors also found that the launch alert checklist was not followed at Site II, with the result that the site entrance doors were not locked. In addition, one missile suspension system was made "rigid" during the launch alert, while the missile was in Step 600B. Worse yet, perhaps, the LCO proceeded with the simulation of an engine start before the launch door in the bay had been opened.

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During a recycle of Bay #5, the missile target angle (MTA) exceeded the limits in Step #211, necessitating a shutdown and reinitiation of the recycle checklist. During the recycle of Bay #1, at Step 600B, the automatic monitor malfunction light indicated a missile had failed to operate properly. Arming was accomplished, but the missile was shut down after initial trouble-shooting procedures proved unsuccessful. The total time required to restore the missile to an operational status was 11 hours and 40 minutes.

The recycle of Bay #2 was completed without any equipment malfunction, and the inspectors found that the launch teams were well qualified, proper checklist procedures being followed. However, during the three recycles mentioned above, the two-man concept was violated on two occasions, only one man being inside the missile launch bay at these times.

As a whole, the training records at Site 2 were satisfactory, and all appropriate technical orders and regulations were both available and current. The entire area was also conspicuous for its cleanliness. The shift changeover was carried out by checklist and without difficulty.<sup>11</sup>

The Test of Site 3: During the alert count-down phase, all eight missiles at Site 3 (Ginbaru) were launched within the free time. Two of these were initially delayed in simulated launching by malfunctions, but both were corrected and "on their way" within 10 minutes. More serious was the observation of the inspecting team that the azimuth data set-in used on Bay #3 was incorrect, being actually applicable to Bay #4. This error would have caused the missile to miss the DGZ.

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Four crews were tested on their recycle capabilities. The system malfunctions which occurred were traced to specific components, following which the malfunctions were eliminated by use of the available test equipment and trouble-shooting guides. However, two crews failed to utilize the external mire in aligning the azimuth alignment unit (AAU), the two crew chiefs involved being unfamiliar with the location of the external mire target. During two recycles, the AAU was not leveled. One crew chief did not follow his checklist during the leveling, while another crew could not continue the recycling check because of their failure to follow the checklists requiring installation of the arming plug wing destruct.

Be it said to their credit, however, that the two-man concept was adhered to by the personnel at Site 3 in every instance observed by the inspection team.<sup>12</sup>

The Test of Site 4: At Site 4 (Tancha), the ORI officials found that the Launch Control Officers followed correct positive control and emergency action file procedures for the messages received in Phase I, though an excellent opportunity for error existed, thanks to the EAF index file that was used having been thermofaxed from the PACAF EAF, in consequence of which some of the reproduced dates were illegible. This condition could easily have caused the LCO's to interpret the messages incorrectly. As it was, one LCO did employ the wrong "E" Hour in computing his launch times; nevertheless, the simulated launches still fell within the proper free times.

Verbal questioning of the LCO's disclosed that they lacked a complete

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knowledge of the PACAF EAF, as they did not know the proper launch times under various force generation levels and attack options.

On the other hand, the alert countdown was carried out in accordance with the appropriate checklist - the crew chief called out the required steps, and the LCO simulated the proper actions and verbally replied to each item. All simulated launches were made within the prescribed single integrated operational plan (SIOP) free times.

Four crews who were tested on their recycle capabilities performed the recycles in accordance with the checklists, except that the external mire was not used for azimuth alignment. The system malfunctions which occurred were traced to specific components and eliminated, through use of the available test equipment and trouble-shooting guides. Excessive delays occurred in three attempted recycles because of delays in receiving test equipment and components. In this connection, the ORI team found insufficient serviceable test equipment on hand at Site 4 to perform simultaneous recycles in both complexes.<sup>13</sup>

Findings in the Maintenance Complex: Although the support provided by maintenance personnel was sufficient to meet the operational requirements of the 498th TMG, the ORI examiners found that the manning of the maintenance complex presented a potential problem area for the future, in that only 49 per cent of the space authorizations for supervisory maintenance technicians in the grades of staff sergeant to master sergeant were manned. On the other hand, the authorizations for mechanics in the grades of airman third class and airman second class were manned approximately 400 per cent.

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Yet, no relief for this unhealthful situation was to be seen in the projected gains and losses of personnel.

Numerous and excessive delays in the setup of Complex "A" at Site 1 for recycle and training exercises were observed by the ORI team, these delays apparently being caused by delayed delivery of the inert rocket motor, a stripped tension splice bolt on the warhead nose section, and the assignment of too few launch crew mechanics to support a reconfiguration of launch bays.<sup>14</sup>

Findings in the Area of Safety Practices and Procedures: A satisfactory safety program organized according to existing directives was found in being in the 498th TMG. Command support of the safety program was satisfactory, two officers and an NCO having been assigned safety as their primary duty. Administrative procedures had been developed to minimize the potential for unauthorized destructive acts, accidents, and to prevent lone individuals from gaining access to weapon systems. In line with this concern, the "human reliability" program pertaining to personnel occupying sensitive jobs was considered effective; however, the medical records of many dependents were found not to be marked. The two-man policy had been effected by training "buddy" mechanics, who monitored each other.

The ORI people assessed the current procedures for formation and convoy control as comprehensive, noting that each convoy team was briefed by the convoy commander. However, they felt that the assignment of a portable air police radio to the convoy commander's vehicle would enable him to maintain immediate and continuous contact with both the MLCC and Central Security Control (CSC). The two-frequency radio currently installed in

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the convoy vehicle limited the convoy commander's ability to control the entire convoy positively. As it was, he lost contact with either the 498th TMG or the security personnel, depending on which frequency he selected.

Perhaps the most serious deficiency uncovered was the lack of a fire detection system for the missile launch bays, notwithstanding the fact that the 498th had been trying continuously since November 1961 to acquire such a facility. Thus far, all efforts had been in vain.

During Phase II, the 498th TMG OPLAN 5-62 (Disaster Control Plan) was exercised in order to evaluate the 498th's plans and procedures for coping with a peacetime nuclear accident, as well as the 6313th Air Base Wing's ability to respond to the accident and provide all the assistance needed. According to the imaginary problem presented by the ORI team, an electrical fire had broken out in the lower center section of a missile located in one of the launch bays. Fuel draining from the fuel wafer had ignited and was burning underneath the missile. An attempt to control the fire by use of the fire hose located in the bay had proved unsuccessful, enabling the fire to spread to the fuel wafer, and it was now blazing out of control, the warhead engulfed by the flames. The responsible personnel working in the launch bay and in the Control Center were told to take the necessary emergency actions in this unpromising situation!

The Launch Control Officer took the appropriate action specified by the emergency procedures checklist, presumably bringing the fire under control. The examiners noted, however, that the checklist did not provide for a possible fire in the launch bay with the door open. In view of

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this, they suggested that the 498th consider the addition of steps to the checklist which would provide for coping with an accident in a launch bay with the door open. Additionally, they recommended that in the event of a low order detonation resulting from an uncontrollable fire which engulfed the weapon, consideration be given to closing the launch bay door in order to contain the resulting contamination.

At the Missile Launch Control Center (MLCC) the ORI officials observed that action was taken in conformance with the appropriate emergency checklist as soon as the simulated electrical fire in the launch bay was reported. As the examiners saw it, the MLCC's response indicated "a high degree of readiness to cope with an emergency at a Site and notify Base Emergency Units of required assistance."

Tests given to 10 NCO's and airmen and to six officers to determine their general knowledge of disaster control indicated that adequate training in all aspects of unit disaster control was being received, the average grade for the test being 86 per cent. The response by emergency units of the 6313th Air Base Wing was also satisfactory.<sup>15</sup>

Findings in the Supply Branch: An analysis by the ORI team of the Missile Automatic Supply Technique (MAST) support to the Maintenance Complex for the preceding four months disclosed that it had been excellent. Of 951 line items requested in January, 875 (92%) had been supplied; of 1,089 requested in February, 1,006 (93%) had been supplied; of 1,235 requested in March, 1,146 (93%) had been supplied; and of 1,400 requested in April, 1,260 (90%) had been supplied. A further yardstick of the MAST system's effectiveness was offered by the Missiles Out of Commission for

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Parts (MOCP) rate for the year 1964. In January the percentage had been 2.0, in February 0.9, in March 6.1, in April 1.2, and in May, as of the 26th, 2.6. Given all this evidence, the ORI officials recommended that the TM-76B continue to be supported under the MAST concept.<sup>16</sup>

Findings in the Area of Security: The disaster control exercise began at approximately 1600 hours on 24 May and was well covered by the air police. Yet, it was 1609I when the Central Security Control (CSC) queried the air police at Site 1 regarding a reported simulated fire within the site. This hiatus was indicative, said the ORI evaluators, of a complete lack of information concerning emergency happenings within the site on the part of the air police. If a communications line with a "hot" microphone were installed between the gatehouse and a specified office within the launch site, a mutual exchange of information would become possible, as well as a means of overhearing various emergencies. Unless such a communications link were established, the air police guards above ground could conceivably be liquidated without the Site Commander's having any intimation of trouble. Conversely, trouble within the site could become known much sooner.

In line with this same deficiency, the air police access controller was not positively segregated from and placed beyond the reach of personnel reporting for identification and access to the restricted area, nor did he have any means of surreptitiously indicating that he was under duress. The access door within the gatehouse had a glass panel which was neither barred nor grilled, and the outside windows of the gatehouse were similarly unequipped.

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The ORI team was pleasantly surprised to learn that immediately upon the CSC's receiving any word concerning an emergency situation which might have a bearing on mission launch, information concerning off-base roads that was constantly kept posted within the CSC was furnished to all air police convoy personnel, as well as to the unit involved in movement of the weapons. Included in this information were such items as holes in the road which might affect weapon movements to the sites, detours, traffic jams, road repair, parades, etc.

In summary, the inspection team found physical security in the 498th TMG to be adequate during the period of the ORI. At the same time, they learned that 400, or 61 per cent, of the assigned air police had come to the 6313th Air Police Squadron directly from Lackland AFB. In the words of the ORI people, "These inexperienced, mostly teen-age, air police guards subject the 313th Air Division and its mission to additional hazards which should not be permitted through personnel assignment actions."<sup>17</sup>

Findings in the Areas of Personnel and Administration: The Human Reliability Program (AFR 35-9) was reviewed and found to be satisfactory. Of 36 records of 498th TMG personnel having access to the TM-76B weapons which were reviewed, only one - a missile launch officer - did not contain the required Human Reliability Certificate, AF Form 286.

The ORI inspectors also found the over-all On-the-Job Training (OJT) program satisfactory and the personnel manning of the group adequate.<sup>18</sup>

Findings in Connection with Communications: Since secured circuits between the MLCC and the launch sites were non-existent, it was necessary to use KAC-125, a procedure delaying the receipt of exercise messages at

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the launch sites. However, on the basis of initial telephone contact and assuming a tactical situation permitting transmission in the clear, alert notification was actually satisfactory. Secured circuits of the type mentioned by the inspectors were already programmed, and were deemed to be badly needed if the timely receipt of messages in which security was a vital factor was to be insured.

The team found that the TRC-75 radio net connecting the MLCC and the four launch sites was not operating satisfactorily. At Complexes 3B and 4A the equipment was non-operational. The receivers at the other locations were noisy, and the transmitter at the MLCC was barely marginal, owing to poor modulation.<sup>19</sup>

The 498th TMG Is Rated Fully Operationally Ready.

In concluding its official report of the Operational Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group which it had just conducted, the PACAF ORI team found that the 498th "was performing its mission in a satisfactory manner." Both the 873d and 874th Tactical Missile Squadrons were rated C-1 - fully operationally ready. The testing of the 498th TMG in its Disaster Control Plan during Phase II of the ORI had demonstrated the implementation of and the response to the plan to be satisfactory. Moreover, the Central Security Control facility of the 6313th Air Base Wing was "considered superior to any other such facility in PACAF."

Rebuttal of ORI Team Evaluations and Adoption of Recommendations.

Perhaps the criticism concerning which the 498th Tactical Missile

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Group was most sensitive was the ORI team's allegation that 11 missiles with inaccurate readings on the mission data set-in equipment had been found during the inspection. Officials of the 498th objected to the justness of this indictment on the ground that the launch teams had believed they were being tested on their theoretical knowledge of the procedure for making set-ins, rather than on the accuracy of the ultimate set-ins. Hence, they had not made any special effort to insure accuracy in this task. Besides, the requested readouts of the set-ins had been made during the period immediately following the launch evaluation, when the crews were primarily occupied with closing the launch doors and returning the sites to an operationally-ready condition. The ORI officials had vouchsafed no explanation of the reason behind their request, and, upon being given the set-ins, had taken them and returned to Kadena AB, making no attempt to verify the suspected discrepancies before leaving the site.

Colonel Vinzant, the 498th TMG Commander, informed of these alleged discrepancies and understandably exercised over a suspected injustice, visited Site 2 that same evening to check on the five deficiencies reported as existing there. To his relief (and probably his indignation), he found that no actual discrepancies existed. As a matter of fact, a close scrutiny of the alleged erroneous set-ins revealed that only two of the 11 which the inspectors described as wrong were actually incorrect, and even of these two, only one would have missed its target because of the error.<sup>20</sup>

Respecting the lack of standard GMT timepieces at all of the Launch Control Centers, the 498th TMG was able, in its indorsement of 10 June 1963 to the PACAF report to answer that standard mechanical clocks had

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been on order for all the sites since 8 May 1962. However, periodic follow-up action had been fruitless until 6 June 1963, a week after the inspection, when seven clocks were finally received from Base Supply. The remainder were scheduled to be delivered on 6 July.<sup>21</sup>

In connection with the ignorance of emergency action file (EAF) procedures and the procedures for positive control (PPC) which many affected officers had revealed, the group stated that it was now requiring all Site Commanders, Operations Officers, and Launch Control Officers to achieve 100 per cent on a quarterly examination in these two subjects. In addition, an extensive training and evaluation program had been established to insure that LCO's and supervisory personnel were completely familiar with PPC and EAF. All Site Commanders and Operations Officers were to become operationally ready not later than 20 June 1963. As for the LCO at Complex 2A, who had been unable to comprehend the meaning of the Hardrock -1A message because of his unfamiliarity with the PACAF emergency action file, the 498th assured PACAF that he had been given "additional individual training" (not to mention a sharp dressing-down, if human nature ran true to form!).<sup>22</sup>

One of the gravest errors with which the 498th had been charged by the ORI team had concerned the passing of a wrong message edition to the Launch Control Officer at Complex 2B, which had produced a self-generating succession of additional errors. The 498th TMG rebutted this accusation by pointing out that all eight complexes had been contacted simultaneously by conference call, making it impossible for a bad message edition to have been passed to a single complex only. What had actually happened was

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that the LCO copied the code group wrong and compromised an envelope before verifying the correct edition number. He then directed his attention to the expend actions and neglected to report the compromise. As a result of this debacle, the group was now placing special emphasis on compromise procedures in the PPC/EAF training program.<sup>23</sup>

The inspecting officers had noted that two crews at Site 3 and four crews at Site 4 failed to utilize the external mire in aligning the azimuth alignment unit (AAU), and during two recycles, the AAU was not leveled. According to the 498th, however, this omission was not as reprehensible as the foregoing criticism might make it seem. In the first place, the pertinent technical order did not require use of the external mire for leveling at every recycle, the internal mire being authorized for this purpose. Because of ground heat wave distortion, the 498th deliberately did not employ the external mire, except at sunrise or sunset. T.O. procedures required the comparison and verification of external and internal setting angles only once every 30 days. Nevertheless, those crew chiefs who had been found to be unfamiliar with the location of the external mire targets were now fully aware of their location.<sup>24</sup>

The alleged thermofaxed copy of the EAF index file at Site 4 had in actuality been a typewritten copy, but the 498th was reproducing it to insure its readability. In addition, the LCO who had used the wrong "E" Hour in computing his launch times, supposedly because of misreading the blurred EAF, had now been rebriefed and would be spot-checked to insure that his future computation procedures for launch time were correct.

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Another fault - albeit one of omission - of which Site 4 had been found guilty was its paucity of test equipment such as was needed to complete quick recycles of its missiles. The 498th recognized that test sets "L" and "MB-1" were both sorely needed. Equipment Component List (ECL) 267 had been changed to authorize an increase of three test set "L's," and they were now enroute to Kadena AB. Of the 14 MB-1 testers authorized, six had been on hand and six had been at the Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) at the time of the ORI. During the Hi-Value Conference held in April, the representatives of Warner-Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) had agreed to obtain and ship two additional MB-1's, with an estimated delivery date of 15 July 1963.<sup>25</sup>

In the field of safety, the inspectors had observed that the emergency procedures checklist contained no provision for a fire in the launch bay when the doors were open. The 498th advised that the new launch bay fire emergency procedures promulgated since the ORI included contingencies for emergencies with the launch doors either open or closed.<sup>26</sup>

While the ORI officials had considered the convoy control procedures exemplary, they had nonetheless believed that the arrangement could be made even better, if a portable air police radio were carried in the convoy commander's vehicle. Without specifically agreeing to do this, the 498th replied that the MLCC, the CSC, and the weapons convoy commander would henceforth utilize a common frequency during convoy movement and that check point reporting had been standardized to minimize frequency use.

Respecting the criticism that the missile launch bays did not have a

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fire detection system, the 498th noted that the USAF Directorate of Nuclear Safety, in an operational review of the TM-76 MK-28 weapons system dated 12 April 1963, had recommended that a fire detection device or method be installed on "an expedited basis." The 498th also understood that PACAF had approved, in principle, a television system, based on a 498th TMG study of 1962. At the time this indorsement was being written (10 June 1963), the 1962d Communications Group (AFCS) at Kadena AB was supposed to be preparing an Advanced Communications-Electronic Requirements Plan which would outline details. It would be forwarded by 15 July 1963.<sup>27</sup>

Sharp exception was taken to the ORI team's recommendation that a communications line with an open microphone be installed between each air police gatehouse and its associated launch site. Contrary to what the inspecting official had believed, a direct link existed between the gatehouse and the LCC at Site 1, and, during an emergency, a launch crew member always stood by this phone at each of the LCC's. Moreover, neither the 498th nor the Central Security Control people desired an open microphone intercom type device, as it would result only in creating confusion in the LCC. After all, if the present telephone were found to be out of order, the LCC could be contacted by the extra dial phone; and, if all phones were out of commission, the LCC might still be contacted by CSC radio through the CSC or the MLCC. In any event, it was not the desire of the 498th to rely on the guard personnel as the primary source of information concerning an emergency. This was the function of the crew NCOIC, who always reported to the scene. The initial notification of emergencies could be adequately reported to launch control officers by use of the existing direct phone line.

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Anent the shortcomings in gatehouse security written up by the ORI personnel, the 498th replied that these were primarily the result of design deficiencies. Since the inspection, however, work orders had been prepared to segregate the controller, to provide an electric lock on the access door, to provide for a device by which the LCC would be warned that the guard was acting under duress, and to install grillwork in the windows and glass panels of the doors.<sup>28</sup>

The Readiness Inspection team had found that the TRC-75 radio net connecting the MLCC and the various launch sites was not operating satisfactorily, being non-operational at Complexes 3B and 4A. The 1962d Communications Group (AFCS), which assumed the responsibility for replying to these criticisms, pointed out that even before the ORI they had described the TRC situation to PACAF and predicted the failure of three additional TRC-75's. During the week of 27 May the anticipated failures had indeed occurred, and a temporary repair had been achieved by the expedient of using a transient Marine maintenance van which was being deployed to Korea. The TRC-75's at Complexes 3B and 4A had been inoperative because replacement components for the PP-2352/TRC power supplies were being awaited and because of the 1962d's inability to troubleshoot the R-761 receivers.

The ORI people had also mentioned that the transmitter at the MLCC was only marginal, because of poor modulation. The 1962d Communications Group had, however, requested test equipment for analyzing the transmitter output and for adjusting the balanced modulators. Owing to the lack of suitable test equipment, the modulation adjustment had to be made by checking the transmitter with a distant receiver. Admittedly, this method

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was "highly unsuitable" for single sideband equipment, but it was the only one possible at the time. In consequence of the gradual deterioration of the R-761 receivers, it was "entirely possible" that the apparent poor modulation of the transmitter was in reality poor receiver performance. The TRC-75 operated in the HF band and was not squelch equipped. Since this band was normally cluttered with random noise and interference, the presence of noise at the receiver was an inherent characteristic of this type system.

As the 1962d had stated in earlier correspondence, it could not guarantee the operation and quality of the TRC-75 communications system without having a bench mock-up and adequate test equipment available. After Rome Air Materiel Area had disapproved a bench mock-up for the 1962d, the latter had requested that it be permitted to utilize one of the TRC-75's at the MLCC for this purpose. Fifth Air Force had, however, disapproved this suggested solution of the problem, thus leaving the 1962d with no where to go.<sup>29</sup>

#### ACCEPTANCE OF THE 498TH TMG OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

The completion and transfer of the 498th Tactical Missile Group's operational facilities from the contractors to the Air Force occurred as follows:

Site No. 1 (Bolo Point): The Engineer Form 290 was signed as accepted on 7 April 1962. The total dollar value was \$2,963,854.00.

Site No. 2 (White Beach): The Engineer Form 290 was signed as accepted on 25 August 1962. The total dollar value was \$2,875,213.00.

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Site No. 3 (Ginbaru): The DD Form 1354 was signed as accepted on 1 January 1963. The total dollar value was \$2,931,124.44.

Site No. 4 (Tancha): The DD Form 1354 was signed as accepted on 1 January 1963. The total dollar value was \$2,952,856.44.

Operational support facilities for the foregoing, which were located on Kadena Air Base, were accepted and the Engineer Form 290 was \$1,079,348.00.<sup>30</sup>

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## FOOTNOTES

<u>Footnote No.</u>	<u>Document No.</u>	
1	--	Historical Report (HR), 498th Tactical Missile Group (TMG), 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, p. 8.
2	49	Facility Modification Program.
3	--	HR, 498th TMG, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1963, pp. 12-14.
4	--	Readiness Inspection Report, Hq. PACAF (PFCIN) to 498th TMG, 313th Air Div., 5th AF, sub.: Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, 29 May 1963, pp. 1-4.
5	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 4-5.
6	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 5.
7	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
8	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
9	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 5-7.
10	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 7-8.
11	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 8-9.
12	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 9.
13	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 9-10.
14	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex A: Materiel - Maintenance, p. 1.
15	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex A: Materiel - Safety, pp. 1-4.
16	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex A: Materiel - Supply, pp. 2-3.
17	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex B. Part I: Security, pp. 1-2; Part II: Security, p. 2.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
18	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex C: Personnel and Administration, p. 1.
19	50	<u>Ibid.</u> , Annex D: Communications, p. 1.
20	51	1st Ind., (Report, PACAF (PFCIN) to 498 TMG, 313AD, 5AF, sub.: Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, 29 May 1963), Hq., 498th TMG to 313AD, 5AF, PACAF (PFCIN), 10 June 1963; HR, 498th TMG, 1 Jan. -
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	52	30 June 1963, pp. 10-12; PFCIN 63-0274, PACAF Readiness Inspection Team to CSAF, PACAF, 5AF, 313ADIV, 498TMG, 29 May 1963, p. 1.
21	51	1st ind., (Report, PACAF (PFCIN) to 498 TMG, 313AD, 5AF, sub.: Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, 29 May 1963), Hq., 498th TMG to 313AD, 5AF, PACAF (PFCIN), 10 June 1963, p. 2).
22	51	<u>Ibid.</u>
23	51	<u>Ibid.</u>
24	51	<u>Ibid.</u>
25	51	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 3-4.
26	51	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 4.
27	51	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 4-5.
28	51	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 5.
29	53	1st ind., (Readiness Inspection Report, Hq. PACAF (PFCIN) to 498th TMG, 313th AD, 5AF, sub.: Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, 29 May 1963), 1962d Comm. Gp. to Far East Communications Region (FECR), 7 June 1963.
30	54	Ltr., Hq., 6313th ABW (CEI-RP) to 313th Air Div. (OI-H), sub.: Report of Real Estate Highlights from March 1962 through 10 June 1963, dtd. 12 June 1963.
--	55	PODGB 6063, DISTENGR USA PACOCEAN to DISTENGR USA OKINAWA, 20/0415Z Aug 1958.



Footnote No.	Document No.	
--	56	PFCIE-ER 16568, CINCPACAF to COFS USAF, 20/1912Z Nov. 1958.
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--	58	313IE-P C-4-16, HEDADIV 313TH to 5AF, 09/0145Z Apr. 1959.
--	59	PFCIE-ER 8459, CINCPACAF to COMDR 5AF, 16/0218Z, Apr. 1959.
--	60	PFCIE-ER 8464, CINCPACAF to COMDR 5AF, 16/0352Z Apr. 1959.
--	61	Ltr., Hq. 5th AF to Comdr. 313th Air Div., sub.: 498th Tactical Missile Group Support Complex, 20 Apr. 1959.
--	62	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq. USAF (AFOCE-CO) to Hq. PACAF, sub.: Support Facilities for TM-76B (MACE), 28 Apr. 1959), Hq. PACAF to Comdr. 5AF, 6 May 1959.
--	63	Disposition Form (DF), 313OC-E to 313IE, sub.: 498th TMG Headquarters Building and MOC, 18 May 1959.
--	64	5FOPR 05224, 5AF to PACAF, 22/0735Z May 1959.
--	65	1st ind., (Ltr., U.S. Army Engineer District Okinawa (USAEDO) (POOGM) to Hq., 313th Air Div., sub.: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Site, 10 Apr. 1959), Hq., 313th Air Div. to DE, USAEDO, 30 Apr. 1959.
--	66	1st Ind., (Ltr., USAEDO (POOGM) to Hq., 313th Air Div., sub.: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Sites, 22 Apr. 1959), Hq., 313th Air Div. to DE, USAEDO, 30 Apr. 1959.
--	67	PFSCE-PP 9148, CINCPACAF to Comdr. 5AF, 05/1631Z May 1959.
--	68	313OC-E C-5-63, 313AIRDIV to 5AF, 27/0222Z May 1959.

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--	70	313IE-E C-6-10, 313AIRDIV to 5AF, 04/0722Z June 1959.
--	71	Ltr., Hq. 313th Air Div. (313CE-E) to 5AF (5FOPR-P), sub.: Camp Mercy as Proposed TM-76B Launch Site (S), 9 July 1959.
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--	74	PF00P 148, HQ PACAF to 5AF, 03/0246Z Sept. 1959.
--	75	5FOPR-P 09547, 5AF to 313AIRDIV, 04/0838Z Sept. 1959.
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--	77	DF, 313OC-P (Lt. Col. James O. Tyler) to 313OC-E, 313OC-M, 313PC, 313CE, 313IG, sub.: TM-76B Program, 14 Sept. 1959.
--	78	5FOPR 10049, 5AF to 313AIRDIV, 16/0737Z Sept. 1959.
--	79	5FOPR 10132, 5AF to PACAF, 18/0147Z Sept. 1959.
--	80	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313CE) to 5AF (5FSCE), sub.: Transmittal of M-Program, 24 Sept. 1959.
--	81	5FOPR-P 11463, 5AF to 313th AirDiv, 25/0906Z Sept. 1959.
--	82	313CE C-9-103, 313AIRDIV to PACAF, 29/0450Z Sept. 1959.
--	83	5FSCE-C-R 11-0353, 5AF to PACAF, 04/0433Z Nov. 1959.
--	84	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to 5AF (5FSCE-C-P), sub.: Siting Review of Proposed Facilities in the Okinawa Missile Program, 13 Nov. 1959.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
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--	86	Ltr., Hq. 5th AF to 313th Air Div., sub.: Appointment of Project Officer Okinawa Missile Program, 18 Dec. 1959.
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--	88	Ltr., Hq., 5th AF to 313th Air Div., sub.: Tactical Missile Program, 18 Dec. 1959.
--	89	313CE C-12-68, 313AIRDIV to 5AF, 30/0100Z Dec. 1959.
--	90	WODT 1-8121, 6920 Security Wg. to 313th Air Div., 09/0250Z Jan. 1960.
--	91	News Article, "'Mace' Missile Coming to Okinawa," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 21 Jan. 1960.
--	92	News Article, "'Mace' Missile Site Be Established in Okinawa, U.S. Defense Department Demands of Congress Again," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 30 Jan. 1960.
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--	95	WRNI WB-230, WRAMA Robins to PACAF, 26/2215Z Feb. 1960.
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--	97	AFOCE-CD74500, HQ USAF to PACAF, 01/2056Z Mar. 1960.
--	98	PFSCE-PR 186, CONCPACAF to CINCPAC, 07/2351Z Mar. 1960.
--	99	Memo. for Record, Office of the Civilian Deputy Engineer, USAEDO, sub.: Siting of Operational Site No. 3, Gimbaru, 8 March 1960.



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--	101	PFSCE-PR 197, Hq. PACAF to 313ADIV, 17/0343Z Mar. 1960.
--	102	313IO C-3-44, 313th Air Div. to 5AF, 17/0547Z Mar. 1960.
--	103	PFSCE-E-186/CAT "AC", Hq. PACAF to DE, USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, 01/0335Z Apr. 1960.
--	104	PFSCE-ED 196, Hq. PACAF to 313th Air Div., 05/2329Z Apr. 1960.
--	105	PFSCE-ED-198, Hq. PACAF to COFS USAF, 07/0001Z Apr. 1960.
--	106	SECRET/RADNOTE/For Lt Col Norman Tucker, 313th AIRDIV to PACAF, 08/0614Z Apr. 1960.
--	107	PFSCE 025, Hq. PACAF to COFS USAF, 12/0319Z Apr. 1960.
--	108	Ltr., The Martin Company to Comdr. AMC, Aeronautical Systems Center, USAF, sub.: Contract No. AF33(600) 38016, Item 6, Partial Compliance, Weapon System Operational Capabilities Report, 12 Apr. 1960.
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--	111	PFSCE-ED 231, Hq. PACAF to DE USAEDO, 21/0324Z Apr. 1960.
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--	117	HC-LL 0192, HICOMRYIS Okinawa to Dept. Army, 05/0939I 1960.
--	118	Ltr., DE, USAEDO, to DE, USAENGRDIV PACOCEAN, sub.: Review Conference, Air Force Operational Facilities, Okinawa, 16 May 1960.
--	119	Ltr., USAEDO to Ast. Chief of Staff/Civil Eng., Hq., PACAF, sub.: Climatic Conditions on Okinawa - Relative to the Installation of the TM 76B on Okinawa, 16 May 1960.
--	120	POOGM 9034, DE, USAEDO to Comdr. 5AF, 18 May 1960.
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--	124	WRG-593, WRAMA to PACAF, 23/1828Z May 1960.
--	125	PFMDC 128, Hq. PACAF to WRAMA, 08/0030Z June 1960.
--	126	WRG-641, WRAMA to PACAF, 13/1800Z June 1960.
--	127	5FOPR 0-1544, 5AF to PACAF, 24/0755Z June 1960.
--	128	PFSCE-PFSCE-E 328, Hq. PACAF to 5AF, 21/0334Z June 1960.
--	129	PFSCE 061, Hq. PACAF to DE, USAENGRDIV PACOCEAN, 25/0319Z June 1960.
--	130	POOGM 9036, DE, USAEDO to DE, USAENGRDIV PACOCEAN, 27/0115Z June 1960.
--	131	POOGM 9037, DE, USAEDO, to DE, USAENGRDIV PACOCEAN AND CINCPACAF, 27/0830Z June 1960.
--	132	5FMSS-AM 1206, 5AF to PACAF, 30/1000Z June 1960.

<u>Footnote No.</u>	<u>Document No.</u>	
--	133	WRG 706, WRAMA to PACAF, 07/1530Z July 1960.
--	134	PFCCS 488, PACAF to WRAMA, 12 July 1960.
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--	139	MC 7-7, Kadena AB to 5AF, 15/0700Z July 1960.
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--	142	BE-EP 7-9, 6313ABW to 5AF, 19/2320Z July 1960.
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--	152	WFOCE-CA 90032, Hq. USAF to WADD, 30/2256Z Sept. 1960.
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--	154	5MSS-AM 2692, 5AF to PACAF, 27/0915Z Oct. 1960.
--	155	Ltr., Hq. PACAF to USAF, sub.: Officers' Quarters and Airmen Dormitory Requirements at Kadena Air Base, 27 Oct. 1960.
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--	163	News Article, "Construction of Mace Weapons Sites Under Way," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 14 March 1961.
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--	171	News Article, "Argument Centers on the Tense Atmosphere in the Far East," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 25 March 1961.
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--	174	News Article, "OLDP Has Trouble in Adopting Two Resolutions," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 27 March 1961.
--	175	News Article, "The Draft Resolution against Bringing in of the Mace Missile Completed," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 30 March 1961.
--	176	Editorial, "Establishment of Compensation Measure Precedes Opposition Resolution," <u>Okinawa Nichi Nichi</u> , 31 March 1961.
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--	182	News Article, "'We Don't Want War' -- Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council Held a Rally," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 21 June 1961.
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CHAPTER IV

MATERIEL

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## CHAPTER IV

### MATERIEL

#### SUPPLY AND SERVICES

##### Evaluation of the BEMO at Naha and Kadena Air Bases.

Since the inception of the Base Equipment Management Office (BEMO) operation by the 313th Air Division on 1 July 1962, the Materiel Directorate of this headquarters had maintained a close surveillance over it. As with any new system, the actual implementation and operation had resulted in the detection of several procedurally-deficient areas. In an endeavor to improve the effectiveness of the BEMO operation, officials of the 313th Inter-Service Supply and Services Branch called a conference with BEMO people from both Naha and Kadena Air Bases on 3 December 1962, at which time problems were discussed and solutions that appeared to be mutually agreeable were worked out. The recommended procedural changes designed to correct inadequacies of the system were forwarded to Headquarters, PACAF on 12 December 1962. Included among these were the following problems:

- (1) Processing and scheduling of the Monthly Registered Equipment Management System Status Listing.
- (2) Documentation of accountability transfer for Equipment Authorization Inventory Data (EAID) property.

(3) Quarterly preparation and processing of mechanized custody receipts.

(4) BEMO responsibility in the Base Procurement Service Store (BPSS) supplies area.

(5) Development of an organizational property authorization (mechanized) for managers.

(6) Improved methods of BEMO EAID Punch Card Accounting Machine (PCAM) card file maintenance.

Upon receipt of the original BEMO implementation and operation instructions, the Inter-Service Supply and Services Branch of the 313th Air Division Materiel Directorate had conducted a review of the procedure, which disclosed that the prescribed manually-maintained "audit trail" was inadequate for the volume of records accumulated in the operation. It was further considered mandatory that the BEMO be provided a tool which would machine-reconcile this account periodically as used to provide an accurate "audit trail." Through the application of basic techniques of electronic data processing, 313th developed a procedure for the mechanization of the BEMO "audit trail." Basically, the procedure eliminated manual procedures currently prescribed and provided a complete reconciliation of accounting actions at 90-day intervals, together with a machine listing (computed and balanced), which provided a transaction history or "audit trail" for the entire BEMO account. The procedure was proposed to higher headquarters in a letter of 28 August 1962, with the subject title of "Mechanization of BEMO Audit Trail."

Approval for a service test of the proposed procedure was received



from PACAF on 28 November 1962, and the procedure was implemented on a test basis at Naha AB on 5 December 1962. It was planned to service-test the system for a period of three months, at the end of which a determination would be made whether or not to introduce the procedure PACAF-wide and recommend it to Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) for USAF implementation. For service test purposes, the reconciliation frequency was reduced from 90 to 30 days.

A machine reconciliation for the first 30 days' operation was conducted on 4 January 1963. The resulting review of the product obtained indicated that the 313th procedure was far superior to the currently prescribed manual procedure.<sup>1</sup>

From 8 through 28 January 1963, a PACAF Command Equipment Maintenance Office (CEMO) team visited this headquarters, primarily for the purpose of reviewing and evaluating the BEMO operations at Kadena and Naha. At the latter base the visitors found the BEMO to be in such excellent condition that they announced their intention of using it as a standard against which to evaluate other PACAF BEMO operations. Unfortunately, the BEMO program at Kadena AB had not yet attained the standard desired.

The results of the mechanized BEMO "audit trail" procedure then being service tested at Naha AB were evaluated by the PACAF CEMO team. So enthusiastic were the team members with the results, they indicated that they wished to put the program into operation throughout PACAF. In addition, they planned to recommend it to AFLC for adoption by USAF.

On 16 January, the Kadena Resident Auditor advised that the Kadena BEMO "audit trail" had been lost subsequent to BEMO implementation on 1

July 1962. The Kadena BEMO had attempted to maintain the manual "audit trail" prescribed by AFLC, but this system was evidently too slow to keep pace with the heavy inflow of data. In hopes of correcting this situation, local officials met with the visiting PACAF CEMO personnel to propose that a machine (electronic data processing) procedure be developed to reconstruct the lost records. PACAF concurred, enabling 313th to draw up a detailed step-by-step procedure which was expected to reconstruct the lost trail balance and reconcile the account. It was agreed that approximately 45 days would be required for completion. The final procedure was approved by the PACAF CEMO personnel on 18 January. Armed with this sanction, officials of the 313th Inter-Service Supply and Services Branch set about instructing the Kadena BEMO personnel in the method of operation, and on 21 January 1963, the procedure was put into effect.<sup>2</sup>

The service test of the mechanized "audit trail" procedure was completed by the Naha AB BEMO on 5 March 1963, and the final local evaluation was completed one week later. This done, the results were forwarded through command channels to Headquarters, PACAF. The test procedure proved to be completely successful, and the final evaluation contained recommendations that the procedure be implemented PACAF-wide immediately. As a result of a preliminary review by PACAF representatives, this headquarters received authority to continue the procedure at Naha AB and implement it at Kadena AB.

During the period 22-26 March, PACAF CEMO representatives visited the Kadena BEMO to review progress on the correction of deficiencies detected during their January visit. Upon completion of their inspection, they

expressed satisfaction with the progress being made and approved the 10 May completion date for reconstruction of the BEMO "audit trail" which 313th proposed.<sup>3</sup>

Members of the 313th Materiel Directorate conducted informal staff visits from 1 through 11 April, calling on Redistribution and Marketing, the Commissary, Food Service, the Base Equipment Management Office, Base Supply, and the Clothing Sales Store and Housing Services Supply. Although all of these activities were generally operating in an effective manner, most noteworthy was the progress which had been made by BEMO and the improvement in the appearance and decor of the dining halls.<sup>4</sup>

The Kadena Base Equipment Management Office completed its reconstruction of the lost "audit trail" on the scheduled date of 10 May, using the machine procedures furnished by this headquarters. The account was now in condition for formal audit.<sup>5</sup>

#### The Special Projects Office.

Effective 1 January 1963, a Special Projects Office was formed within the Materiel Directorate of 313th Air Division Headquarters from the personnel with short tours of duty remaining when the Inspector General's Office was disbanded, comprising a lieutenant colonel and two non-commissioned officers. The Special Projects Office was primarily responsible for the F-105D and the TM-76B Mace programs for the 313th Air Division; however, it was also expected to provide assistance whenever and however possible in maintenance aspects of the ground transportation area. All of the people assigned to this function were overages and would rotate during the summer



months. By that time it was anticipated that the need for a Special Projects Office would have ceased to exist, the F-105 having become C-1 (operationally ready) and Mace maintenance having been absorbed into the PACAF system completely.<sup>6</sup>

During February the Special Projects Office investigated the capabilities of the command for producing gaseous nitrogen. It was found that the LOX Plant at Kadena could service the nitrogen carts with 2,500 psi, a figure adequate to meet flight line requirements. However, it was recognized that additional nitrogen servicing carts would be required when the F-105 achieved a fully operational status. At the same time, a check was made to learn why four new LOX servicing tanks were in Redistribution and Marketing. The investigation revealed that instructions to ship these tanks to Clark AB in the Philippines had subsequently been received.<sup>7</sup>

In March the Special Projects Office conducted an inquiry into the suspected servicing of an F-102 aircraft at Naha AB with liquid nitrogen instead of liquid oxygen. Investigation revealed, however, that the suspicion was unwarranted, no F-102 having in fact been serviced with liquid nitrogen.<sup>8</sup>

Another action of the Special Projects Branch during March was to check into the possibility of flight engineers at Kadena AB's being placed on separate rations because of their abnormal tours of duty. The Base Inspector for the 6313th ABW, contacted on this problem, reported that messing facilities were open at all times for these men, and a phone call from their NCOIC would be sufficient to permit their being fed at other than normal meal hours. Moreover, flight lunches were readily available whenever cross country flights were scheduled or on those occasions when

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local flights extended past meal times.<sup>9</sup>

In June the Special Projects Branch, at the request of PACAF, conducted a survey to determine the feasibility of consolidating the Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratories (PMEL's) at Naha and Kadena Air Bases, as Fifth Air Force had proposed in a message of 15 May. After studying the proposed consolidation from all angles and discussing the proposal with representatives from both Kadena and Naha, the Special Projects Branch recommended that the two PMEL's not be consolidated.<sup>10</sup>

The Armament Division.

The first shipment of GAM-83 liquid rocket motors was received by this command on 18 January 1963.<sup>11</sup>

Two M16E3 rocket motors for the TM-76B missile were repaired by the thread chasing method during February, at a saving of \$30,000.

Thirteen Chinese Air Force munitions officers visited the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing from 18 through 22 February to observe munitions operations in a USAF activity. During their visit they were given both classroom and field orientation training. The visiting officers expressed much satisfaction with the information received and stated that it would be greatly beneficial to them in performing their job responsibilities.<sup>12</sup>

This headquarters was notified that effective 4 May 1963 all air shipments of Class "A" and "B" explosives destined for Japan and Korea would be trans-shipped via Okinawa. In view of the lack of a suitable unloading area for cargo aircraft at Kadena AB, the lack of covered storage space to serve as a "holding area," and the decided undesirability of transporting

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explosives from Kadena AB to Naha AB over a highly congested highway, 313th requested Fifth Air Force and PACAF to rescind this plan.

As a result of this request, Colonel Howard Rose of Fifth Air Force flew down to Kadena on 10 May to discuss the air trans-shipment of Class "A" and "B" explosives by way of Okinawa. He explained that Fifth Air Force had concurred in this way of handling the matter on the basis of a statement by Military Air Transport Service (MATs) that they had the handling capability within their resources on Okinawa. This proved of small comfort to 313th Armament officials, who would still have to face the problems which had worried them previously.<sup>13</sup>

#### The Chief of Supply Concept.

On 15 February 1963, the Chief of Supply concept was introduced at Kadena and Naha Air Bases under the provisions of Fifth Air Force Manpower and Organization Objectives Document (MOOD) 63-3. Under this concept a Chief of Supply and a Chief of Maintenance were designated under the Director of Materiel of the tactical wing at each base. The Chief of Supply was responsible for the operation of Base Supply, the Base Equipment Management Office (BEMO), Base Fuels Supply, War Readiness Materiel (WRM), and the Base Engine Manager functions.<sup>14</sup>

#### Commercial Carrier Service.

Commercial carrier service went into effect for the period 11-15 March at Kadena in connection with the pick-up and delivery of perishable and non-perishable subsistence supplies from the Machinato U.S. Army Depot to Kadena Air Base, with the exception of special requisitions and loose items.

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Commercial carrier service for the pick-up and delivery of non-perishable subsistence supplies from the U.S. Army Depot at Machinato to Naha AB was begun on 2 April 1963.<sup>15</sup>

Support of the Boy and Girl Scout Camping Program.

Early in May the Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS)/IX Corps requested that the Air Force lend the Army three M-37 field ranges and immersion water heaters for use in the Boy and Girl Scout summer camping program to be held on Taiwan from 31 May to 19 July 1963. The items in question were obtained from the food service activity at Naha AB and issued to the USARYIS Quartermaster on a temporary custody receipt.<sup>16</sup>

Housing Supply.

A review of the furniture requirements for initial equipping of the 500 family quarters to be constructed at Kadena AB was conducted during June 1963. From this it appeared that the list of items previously submitted had been unrealistic, due consideration not having been given to authorization and allowance documents, actual needs, the size of quarters, and numerous other factors relating to furnishing the dependent homes for the first time. The upshot of this discovery was a meeting by officials of the Materiel Directorate with representatives of Housing Services, Base Supply, and BEMO for the purpose of validating or amending the requirements as was found necessary. Uniform realistic factors were applied, in consequence of which the original requirements were reduced from an astronomical \$1,612,252.46 to a more palatable \$1,156,132.50 - a total reduction of \$456,119.96. Base representatives were instructed to submit requisitions

for additional requirements or to carry out cancellation action, as seemed necessary to align requisitions with confirmed requirements.

The foregoing emphasized the need for an examination of internal procedures in Housing Supply and related support functions. A detailed study was conducted, and, as the period ended, the Materiel Directorate was developing procedures for the proper operation of housing supply and supporting elements, whereunder functional responsibilities were aligned with applicable activities on the basis of current directives and organizational structures. These procedures were programmed for completion by 15 July 1963, thus permitting their early implementation.

The decentralization of housing support responsibilities between Kadena and Naha Air Bases which Headquarters, Fifth Air Force had directed was completed on 30 June, except for the transfer of accountability of property on custody receipt to Naha AB personnel residing off-base. The validity of all custody receipts was verified prior to the formal transfer of accountability. This final phase of the decentralization of housing support was scheduled for completion by 15 July 1963.<sup>17</sup>

#### The Question of a Materiel Control Branch.

Officials of the 313th Air Division's Supply and Services Division met with their counterparts from the Manpower Division in June 1963 in an endeavor to resolve manning problems presented by the Vehicle Maintenance personnel at Kadena. The Vehicle Maintenance section had requested that manning be provided for the establishment of a Materiel Control Branch, which would require seven 646XX personnel. However, the justification

presented by the organization was contrary to the functional responsibilities outlined in AFM 66-1, AFM 67-1, and Fifth Air Force MOOD 63-3. In consequence, the manning proposal was not favorably considered, and it was recommended that action be taken at base level to realign functional responsibilities with current directives. In addition, the operating personnel were advised that PACAF was currently developing guidelines for the operation of a Vehicle Maintenance Materiel Control activity.<sup>18</sup>

#### MAINTENANCE

Mr. Edward H. Adamic, Field Liaison, Directorate of Maintenance, Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMAMA), and Senior Master Sergeant Goforth, also of SMAMA, arrived at Kadena AB on 23 January 1963 as one aspect of a technical assistance visit to all supported organizations. While on Okinawa, the two men visited the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha.<sup>19</sup>

Lieutenant Colonel William I. Lutener, of the Chanute Technical Training Center, visited 313th Air Division in February to coordinate the forthcoming 66-1 course to be conducted at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.<sup>20</sup>

A 12-man on-the-spot maintenance assistance team from Republic Aircraft Company arrived at Kadena on 11 March. This team, which was assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to assist in the F-105 maintenance program, was expected to remain at Kadena until September.

A visit of a different kind occurred the same month when Colonel



James R. McBrayer and Major Woodrow Brack, both of the Security Policy Division, Headquarters, USAF, called on the 313th Maintenance Division on 14 March. The purpose of their visit was to check on security procedures and control of classified material in connection with contract technical representatives.<sup>21</sup>

General Johnson and Colonel Robinson, both of the Systems Project Office for F-105 aircraft, Air Systems Division, visited 313th Headquarters on 22 April.<sup>22</sup>

In the course of a staff visit to this headquarters in May, Major Hammer of Fifth Air Force discussed the Queen Bee project vis-a-vis the J-33-A35 and J-33-A41 jet engine field maintenance (JEFM) program, as well as the feasibility of consolidating the Naha facilities for JEFM with those at Kadena. The reason such a consolidation seemed advantageous was that the bulk of such field maintenance would originate at Kadena AB, where both the assigned T-33A aircraft and the TM-76B missiles of the 498th TMG would be involved.

Approval for proceeding with such a consolidation of JEFM facilities at Kadena was granted by Fifth Air Force in June. As the period ended, the 313th Maintenance Division was coordinating the consolidation, with particular emphasis placed on realignment of the available manpower.<sup>23</sup>

Final arrangements were made for replacement of the doublerectification column in the 5-ton/day liquid oxygen plant as June drew to a close. A Superior Air Products representative was supposed to arrive with a new doublerectification column early in July, at which time the 5-ton/day plant was expected to be shut down for approximately seven days. In

anticipation of this shutdown, personnel of the 313th Maintenance Division made staff visits to the 18th TFW and the 51st FIW to advise the Chiefs of Maintenance of the need for strict oxygen/nitrogen discipline during that period.<sup>24</sup>

In the matter of foreign object damage (FOD) to jet engines during the period 1 January - 30 June 1963, January saw a J57-23 engine of the 18th TFW damaged sufficiently to necessitate its return to the depot. The suspected culprit was a bonny socket. As for the 51st FIW and the 498th TMG, neither sustained any FOD in January.

February and March produced no FOD for any of the three organizations equipped with jet engines, nor did April, for that matter. However, 313th Air Division could not boast a spotless record for the last-named month; for a J57-21 engine on an aircraft of the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing, on temporary duty at Kadena AB, was badly damaged when a washer or similar flat piece of metal was sucked into its innards. Before the engine was actually returned to the depot for overhaul, personnel analyzing the damage estimated that 400 man-hours and \$15,000.00 would be required to restore it to workable condition.

Fortunately for all concerned, May and June brought no further FOD cases at either Kadena or Naha Air Bases.<sup>25</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	Monthly Historical Data Report (MHDRO, 313th Air Division Materiel Directorate, Dec. 1962, pp. 8-9.
2	--	MHDR, 313th Air Division (AD) Materiel Directorate (D/M), Jan. 1963, p. 7.
3	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , March 1963, p. 7.
4	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , April 1963, p. 7.
5	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , May 1963, p. 7.
6	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Jan. 1963, p. 2.
7	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Feb. 1963, p. 12.
8	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , March 1963, p. 11.
9	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
10	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , June 1963, p. 12; May 1963, p. 5.
11	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Jan. 1963, p. 4.
12	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Feb. 1963, p. 5.
13	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , May 1963, p. 4.
14	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Feb. 1963, p. 8.
15	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , March 1963, p. 10.
16	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , May 1963, p. 9.
17	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , June 1963, p. 5.
18	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
19	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Jan. 1963, p. 5.



<u>Footnote No.</u>	<u>Document No.</u>	
20	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Feb. 1963, p. 6.
21	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , March 1963, p. 5.
22	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Apr. 1963, p. 5.
23	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , May 1963, p. 5; June 1963, p. 11.
24	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , June 1963, p. 11.
25	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Jan. 1963, p. 5; Feb. 1963, p. 6; Mar. 1963, p. 5; Apr. 1963, p. 5; May 1963, p. 5; June 1963, p. 11.

CHAPTER V

SPECIAL SUBJECTS

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## CHAPTER V

### SPECIAL SUBJECTS

#### THE RYUKYUS AREA JOINT COMMITTEE

##### The Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board.

In the military establishment many things have a way of repeating themselves - of running full circles - probably, in part, because the continuous rotation of personnel renders the latest ones to arrive on the scene ignorant of the lessons learned through rude experience by their predecessors of by-gone years.

It may have been this type of time-induced unawareness that caused officials of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Ryukyus to revive in 1962 the "A" sign system for eating and drinking places of business after the same system had been consigned to the trash heap of abandoned programs in 1958. For Ryukyus Command Headquarters Circular #107 had stipulated back in 1953 that effective on 1 November that year, Ryukyuan food-serving establishments must display a sign of approval, procured through a U.S. sanitation inspection, to be eligible for patronage by U.S. Forces personnel. As initially set up, the "A" sign system applied to eating places only, and did not encompass those bars selling beverages alone.<sup>1</sup> Subsequently, the system was modified to include drinking establishments, with a red "A" marking those restaurants that were "approved" and a blue



"A" designating "approval" for bars, cabarets, and such places dispensing spirituous beverages only.

This system continued in force until 15 November 1958, when the military announced that, except for those public establishments which had previously been declared "off-limits" to U.S. personnel, all restaurants, bars, and cabarets would be unrestricted, and the free use of these establishments would be granted. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI) had been given jurisdiction over the enforcement of health and sanitation in all public bars and food establishments, and each was to be graded with a GRI rating of either "1," "2," or "3," commencing on November 1st.

Grade "1" signified that a particular establishment maintained the highest standards of sanitation, quite comparable, in fact, to those which had been necessary for military "A" certification. Grade "2" indicated the existence of sanitary standards below those of the former "A"-certified establishment. Grade "3" implied that sanitary conditions were quite bad. Any place not bearing one of these three GRI ratings displayed conspicuously near the front entrance and inside the premises had not been inspected at all. While it was thus no longer mandatory for military personnel to patronize the highest rated places, the command emphasized that personal discretion and wisdom dictated such a course of action. In other words, each individual who eschewed the establishment not graded as "1" would by the deprivation of his revenue act as a one-man improvement agency. If enough men stayed away from the "2" and "3" restaurants and bars, these places would either labor to better their sanitary conditions or go out of business.<sup>2</sup>

In February 1959 the Okinawa Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, comprising senior representatives of the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy, was established to monitor the "Grade 1-2-3" system, as well as to determine what places and areas should be placed "off-limits" to U.S. Forces personnel, though the responsibility for conducting inspections of eating and drinking establishments continued to rest with GRI.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of the second meeting of the Okinawa Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board (OAFDCB) in early March 1959, the Ryukyuan bar and cabaret community was advised that "prostitution would not be tolerated," and "if evidence of a second offense of prostitution in any of the bars came before the board, it would be put off-limits without warning, the restriction to apply for approximately six months."<sup>4</sup>

The first wave of "off-limits" directives hit various parts of Okinawa on 9 February 1962, when 120 bars and cabarets catering to service personnel were barred to the military on the grounds of constituting a source for the spread of venereal diseases. All of these establishments had received previous warnings to change their ways, but had blithely disregarded them, thinking that Fabian tactics would win the day. At the same time that these 120 places were shut down, insofar as their chief clientele were concerned (Ryukyuan and non-military foreigners were free to patronize them), the authorities issued new warnings to a number of other bars and cabarets.<sup>5</sup>

Not unnaturally, a rumor quickly became current that the U.S. military authorities were planning to impose an "off-limits" restriction on all the 2,000 bars and cabarets throughout Okinawa. Taking no chances in a matter

so vital to their very existence, 13 Koza City "service enterprisers" met the same day at the home of Yonezo Seda, chairman of the Koza City Service Enterprisers' Federation, to discuss how they should most effectively forestall the impending disaster. As a species of reconnaissance mission, three representatives of the federation were dispatched to the office of the USARYIS Provost Marshal the same day to check on the accuracy of the rumor. The Military Discipline Officer responded to their inquiries with a flat denial of its truth, saying that the military had no intention of making the off-limits standards more strict, nor did they intend to place 2,000 bars and cabarets off-limits. However, while they would assuredly not place an establishment off-limits without warning, once a warning was issued, they would "not hesitate to place fit off-limits" if no improvements were made after the issuance of such a warning.<sup>6</sup>

The "second wave" of the tide against which the service enterprisers were fighting with the desperation of men fearful that their tainted money might get washed away at the same time that their establishments were swept clean struck on 28 March 1962. At this time, 39 bars and cabarets in Koza City (contiguous to Kadena Air Base and only a long stone's throw from Camps Hauge and Kinzer) and eight in Henoko Village (adjacent to Camp Schwab, in northern Okinawa) were declared "off-limits," all 47 having failed to heed the warnings given them back in February. In addition, letters of warning were issued to 41 establishments on March 28th. However, 21 other places designated as "off-limits" on 9 February were restored to favor and public patronage on 28 March, having made the



required changes in their modus operandi and physical appearance in the interim.<sup>7</sup>

At a meeting of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board which Masuaki Kinjo, Director of the GRI Welfare Department, attended, he was told that there were so many bars and cabarets with licenses ranging from first to third class that difficulty was experienced in conducting supervision over them all. One solution, they suggested, might be to restrict the number of such establishments under a proposed "A" sign system. To this Kinjo pointed out that since all of these enterprisers had been approved in accordance with the pertinent laws, their number could not be arbitrarily reduced. However, if the military believed there were too many, strict enforcement of the food sanitation law, the hotel business law, and the law governing businesses affecting public morals might be employed to weed out those establishments not acceptable in their eyes.

The military officials then showed Kinjo samples of certificates which they had prepared. Some said "A sign" and others "Excellent." The Welfare Department Director commented that some other mark might better be used, since an "A sign" was likely to be mistaken for the symbol abandoned in 1958. The military officials also proposed that only some 1,250 places be approved, as a means of facilitating the task of supervision, but Kinjo countered that at least 4,000 should be allowed to operate.\* After all, he was an Okinawan himself, and had no desire to hurt his own people.<sup>8</sup>

\*The version of Director Kinjo's contribution to the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board meeting of March 27th which the USCAR Office of

When the new system was enforced, the existing first-grade establishments would be given "A" signs, but their total number would be limited to approximately 1,000 or 1,200 at most. Any other establishments not blessed with an "A" sign would be off-limits to military personnel. Such a strong action was felt to be unavoidable, in view of the prolific rate at which new establishments were springing to life in the "gay quarters" of central Okinawa, while morals and sanitation were utterly neglected. Repeated complaints by the military had been unproductive of any response; so the "A" sign system was being revived, dusted off, and thrown into action in defense of the morals and good health of the "fighting men" on Okinawa. Chairman Seda of the Koza City Service Enterprisers' Federation astutely observed that "Since the military authorities declared that they still intend to impose off-limits on establishments which have been warned twice on suspicion of spreading V.D., it is considered that it will be difficult to avoid off-limits unless venereal diseases are eradicated." At the same time he did not believe that the new "A" sign system would pose a problem, "since its objective is to improve morals and sanitation, apart from the off-limits problem."<sup>9</sup>

Public Affairs presented in a press release was considerably different from the account given here. According to the OPA, Kinjo had suggested that the U.S. troops be informed of the meaning of an "A" sign posted on the outside of an establishment, and that they be advised to patronize only those places which the sign indicated met the requisite sanitary standards. Since this suggestion was almost identical with the desires and half-formulated plans of the AFDCB, the latter gladly laid hold upon and adopted it. It was the publication of this American version giving Mr. Kinjo the "credit" for originating the idea of reviving the previously-buried "A" sign system that caused him to go to the length of issuing a public denial of its accuracy and to substitute his own version presented above. By attributing

On 11 April 1962 the Disciplinary Control Board announced that an approval or certification system had been adopted for bars, cabarets, restaurants, and other establishments patronized by Armed Forces personnel. Under the new system, the proprietors of drinking and eating businesses would apply to have their places inspected by teams composed of U.S. Forces and GRI personnel. When they had satisfactorily met the standards set, they would be given approval signs carrying the certificates of the Police and Welfare Departments, thus certifying their compliance with GRI health and welfare laws and apposite ordinances of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR). The board expected that the initial inspections would be completed by 1 June.<sup>10</sup>

A joint meeting of representatives of the military, USCAR, the GRI Welfare Department, and the various Ryukyuan health centers was held at the Military Police Group office on 23 April 1962 to discuss the method of inspection and approval which would be employed for bars and cabarets catering to American servicemen. After due discussion, the military members "decided" (what they had probably determined to do before ever coming to the meeting) that the Armed Forces would take over from GRI the direct responsibility for inspecting would-be approved establishments and for determining the procedures for such approval. This meant that an application for operating a bar or a cabaret or a restaurant - which hitherto would have been submitted to the GRI Welfare Department - would now be filed with the U.S. Military Police Group and that the provisions of the

the origin of the new "A" sign system to Director Kinjo, USCAR OPA was, whether by advertence or not we have no way of knowing, certainly giving him the "kiss of death" insofar as his place in Ryukyuan esteem was con-



Ryukyuan Food Sanitation Law would be applied. At the same time that military personnel would be prohibited from patronizing establishments not in possession of an "A" sign, the military authorities proposed to approve only some 1,200 establishments throughout the island out of the 3,000-odd applicants from the ranks of the bar and restaurant operators. The diminished number had been decided upon on the basis of the military's capacity for inspection.<sup>11</sup>

Sadahiko Tokumine, Vice-Chairman of the Center Street (Koza City) Bar and Cabaret Operators' Association, told a reporter that there was "no need for concern, since it is said that the inspection will be conducted jointly by the military and Ryukyuan officials concerned." However, he did feel that "it would be more convenient for the enterprisers if the Welfare Department, which is in charge of food sanitation, were responsible for the approval."<sup>12</sup> Undoubtedly, they would be a lot easier to satisfy!

Less optimistic was Yusei Kuda, Chief of the Public Health Section of the GRI Welfare Department, who declared that the new system had been adopted "one-sidedly by the military," and he was afraid that it would "cause great impairment of Ryukyuan-American friendship and result in loss of GRI dignity." Furthermore, in the event an American visited a bar or cabaret patronized by Okinawans and not seeking the "foreigners' custom, it was not clear whether he alone would be punished or whether the proprietor would also receive punitive treatment."<sup>13</sup>

cerned! The present historian has accepted the Kinjo version as more likely the true one, since it would seem out of character for him to have recommended the creation of a system whose chief beneficiaries would be the members of the U.S. Armed Forces and whose chief sufferers would be his own people.

April 25th had been set as the date on which the formal inspections of would-be "A" sign establishments would commence. Hoping to obtain a postponement of this dreaded event, Mayor Chojo Oyama of Koza City, Chief Minoru Hara of the Koza Health Center, and Chairman Seda of the Service Enterprisers' Federation, who were acting as spokesmen for a group of vastly interested persons, requested the military authorities to delay the inauguration of inspections for a month, in order to give the proprietors time to make the required improvements in their facilities. As things stood, the "A" sign system was scheduled to come into force on 1 June 1962, and as of 23 April 1,113 applications for the indispensable badge had been made. Of this number, 80 per cent had been filed by bar and cabaret operators in central Okinawa, which included Koza City.<sup>14</sup>

That all of these valiant efforts were not in vain was revealed when the deadline for effectuation of the "A" sign system came and went without the military's having taken any action to close those establishments not so decorated. However, June 1st did see the issuance of the first 104 "A" signs to the same number of bars and cabarets in Koza City who had passed the preliminary inspection earlier.<sup>15</sup>

Such was the situation which obtained until 28 June 1962, when the Military Police suddenly swooped down on 13 bars in Koza City, Futenma Village, Ishikawa City, and Tairagawa Village, confiscating their "A" signs. The reason given for this harsh action was that barmaids of these establishments had been guilty of practicing prostitution with American servicemen or of pandering. The bar owners were told that if they wished to obtain approval again, they would have to submit a written petition and go through

all the tedious procedures required for re-issuance of the "A" signs, which would then be issued six months after completion of all necessary procedures.

Rather than condemning the proprietors of these places of business for their immoral activities which had made the military's stern counter-measures unavoidable, Mayor Oyama of Koza and other city officials reacted as they invariably did in similar circumstances. Which is to say, they appealed to the High Commissioner to remit the severity of the punishment in the interests of the economic well-being of the affected bar owners.<sup>16</sup>

Almost as solicitous of the financial well-being of the errant bar owners was the Okinawa Times, which noted that "all of the enterprisers have spent a considerable sum of money to obtain the A-sign by renovating the interior of the establishments or completing the sanitation facilities, in compliance with the military requirements." Under the circumstances, it was, then, only natural for the proprietors "to cringe under the threat of suspension of business." While coercive measures might be proper for the enterprisers whose establishments were unsanitary or who had encouraged prostitution, "a surprise inspection should be avoided, and the inspection carried out after issuing an advance notice."

In conclusion and as an unanswerable argument to clinch the point that erring enterprisers should be dealt with gently, the Times hauled out that ubiquitous, all-purpose shibboleth, "Ryukyuan-American friendship," in whose name all things were possible and permissible. It would "never do to believe that so long as one was engaged in a business catering to the American forces, one must resign himself to this sort of trouble,"



quoeth the commentator. "This has a bearing on Ryukyuan-American friendship, and it is hoped that both the party who offers the service and the one who receives it will strive for the creation of better relationship."<sup>17</sup>

At a press conference which he called on 25 July 1962, Colonel Robert H. Workman, USAF, the President of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board (and Director of Personnel, 313th Air Division), told the reporters in attendance that the prevalent view that reinstitution of the "A" sign system had been determined upon unilaterally by the military was not correct. The board was composed of 10 members representing the several service branches, USCAR, as well as the Directors of the GRI Police and Welfare Departments, who acted as advisors. He also stated that the "A" sign system had been worked out on the basis of suggestions offered by Ryukyuan officials, and the Ryukyuan Government was not excluded from administrative affairs of this kind.

Commenting on Colonel Workman's statement in an editorial the following day, the Okinawa Times wryly observed that "It is all very well for the Okinawan side to participate in the enforcement of the A-sign system as advisers, but what counts in this case is whether or not they have a voice in the matter." In lieu of the existing arrangement, the writer desired that the enforcement of the "A" sign system be entrusted to GRI, "since it concerns Okinawan enterprisers, and the government should make itself responsible." Moreover, "Under no circumstances should direct administration by the American forces be welcomed; for the Government of the Ryukyu Islands is established as an agency of USCAR."<sup>18</sup>

By August 6th the number of establishments catering to American servicemen which had seen their "A" signs revoked totaled 42, the uniform cause being prostitution, soliciting, and venereal disease. In addition, several districts containing practically no business establishments but bars and the like were placed off limits. Thus far, incidentally, Mayor Oyama and his fellow sin-condoners had been unsuccessful in their endeavors to meet with High Commissioner Caraway.<sup>19</sup>

In the meantime, turning their repeated rebuffs to what advantage they could, the enterprisers and Koza officials professed themselves to be at a loss what to do about the situation, since the reason for cancellation of the "A" signs was "not clear." (Just what additional explanation was needed to make the reason clear is "not clear!")<sup>20</sup>

While the reason for various places' being deprived of their "A" signs was perfectly obvious to anyone not determined to be uninformed, more than a little confusion appeared to exist in the ranks of the U.S. side as to the ground rules for the issuance of new "A" signs. On 9 August Captain John J. Hammer, the Air Force Liaison Officer with the Ryukyus Armed Services Police (RASP), who was in charge of the approval of "A" sign establishments, told a delegation of officials of the All-Ryukyu A-Sign Enterprisers' Council that the Military Police would not cancel a license simply because an establishment was small in size, and even a small bar or cabaret would be granted an "A" sign if it met the standards set up. He also clarified - if clarification were actually needed - that the basic reason for the "A" sign's being confiscated was the encouragement

or condoning of prostitution by an establishment and its definite identification as a source of venereal infection. However, by way of encouragement, Captain Hammer added that the "A" sign would be re-issued within a month, if improvements were made.

A different story was told by Mr. Edward K. Shultz, the Deputy Civil Administrator, in an interview the same day with GRI Legislator Tokuichi Igei and officials of the Kin-Son Bar and Cabaret Operators' Association. As he saw it, "A" signs would definitely not be issued to small establishments, and he hoped that such places would consolidate. In consonance with this philosophy, the issuance of "A" signs would be restricted thenceforth, since he felt that small businesses were likely to neglect the improvement of their facilities.

As the Okinawan reporter who described the substance of the two conferences of 9 August noted, "The enterprisers are puzzled at the two conflicting views of the American authorities and are asking, 'Which is true?' Understandably, they were also 'entertaining great fear and doubt about the lack of unity of the American authorities' policy."<sup>21</sup>

More bad news for the bar operators came on 10 September, following a meeting of Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga, Welfare Department Director Masuaki Kinjo, and Legislator Choko Kuwae of Koza City with the chairman and another member of the Disciplinary Control Board. The Army officers informed the people from GRI that "A" signs would not be re-issued to those whose licenses were revoked because of prostitution, no matter how well constructed and elaborately appointed their establishments were rendered.<sup>22</sup>



The bar and restaurant proprietors who had successfully survived the first two waves of "A" sign revocation were just beginning to breathe easily, when the Disciplinary Control Board struck again on September 10th and 11th, withdrawing the "Duncan Hines" certifications from 35 establishments in Koza City, Ginowan City, Urasoe-Son, and Naha City. Although no reason for this action was given, the consensus of the "bar-risters" was that the practice of prostitution was the primary cause. And, to add bad to worse, rumor had it that five more establishments would forfeit their prized "A's" in the near future.<sup>23</sup>

As though the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board were not making life miserable enough for the bar owners and their ilk, on 12 September the Koza police suspended the business of four cabarets for operating after the legally-established closing hour.<sup>24</sup>

A few days later, the military authorities issued "off-limits" warnings to 103 bars and cabarets, and followed this with similar notices to 18 more in Koza City on 24 September - nine for soliciting customers for prostitution and the other nine for spreading venereal disease. Again it was emphasized that their "A" signs, once confiscated, would not be re-issued.<sup>25</sup>

On 2 October Mayor Oyama of Koza City received a letter from the Disciplinary Control Board confirming that "A" sign licenses would be canceled permanently for prostitution, while the existence of unsanitary conditions would result in suspension of the license for 30 days, after which it would be restored, provided conditions were corrected. The

board also asked that Koza authorities limit the number of bars in their city, as well as recommending enactment of a law restricting the bar quarters.<sup>26</sup>

Becoming fearful of their survival, approximately, 1,000 operators of bars and restaurants catering to U.S. servicemen met at the Koza Ryukyuan-American Friendship Center on 8 October to work out the strategy to be pursued in countering the blows dealt so freely by the Disciplinary Control Board. Three proposals were adopted, calling for the prompt issuance of "A" sign licenses (some establishments had been waiting for five months), the re-issuance of licenses which had been cancelled, and an improved method of control and supervision. In addition, most of the attendants agreed that (1) any cancellation of a license should be preceded by a notice of warning, together with a satisfactory explanation; (2) licenses should not be cancelled for any alleged pandering for which the operators had no immediate responsibility; (3) control of the "A" sign program should be the joint responsibility of the military and civilian authorities; and (4) the military authorities should immediately cease the practice of conducting secret investigations of the places suspected of violations.<sup>27</sup>

At the November meeting of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, GRI Welfare Department Director Kinjo presented three requests: firstly, that the issuance of "A" signs to 114 applicants be expedited; secondly, that "A" signs be issued through GRI; and thirdly, that the sanitation inspections be conducted as a joint military-Ryukyuan affair.

In response, the board replied that "A" signs would be issued to 42 establishments shortly, that 14 others required a re-inspection, and that the licensing of the remainder would be withheld. He was also told that the "A" signs of 10 places would be revoked in the near future, the waitresses having solicited plain-clothed investigators. (This last was a tender point with the Ryukyuan bar owners, who felt that it was not cricket for an investigator to attempt to uncover and expose would-be prostitutes by initiating the ugly overtures - i.e., by asking the suspect to engage in an immoral act. In the United States, incidentally, the U.S. Supreme Court had thrown out a lower court's conviction of several drug peddlers when testimony brought out that the narcotics agents had actually been the aggressors, asking the suspects to sell them "dope" rather than waiting for the suspects to approach them and offer to sell it to them.)

The board gave Mr. Kinjo no definite reply concerning his request for a jointly-conducted inspection. They did advise him, however, that no restriction had been placed on the number of "A" signs issued, but that the actual mechanics of issuance were restricted by such factors as the military's capacity for conducting inspections. Also, priority for inspection was given to establishments having larger and better facilities.<sup>28</sup>

On 9 November the GRI Welfare Department passed on the Disciplinary Control Board's reply to an earlier petition by the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association. According to the letter, in the event an "A" sign enterpriser



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failed to observe the legally-established closing hour, he would have his license revoked. Also, the "A" sign would not be re-issued to 61 enterprisers from whom it had been withdrawn. Whether the enterprisers liked it or not, the investigators would continue to wear civilian clothes, thus disguising their true vocation; however, if any of them were guilty of an abuse of the enterprisers' rights, the latter should report this fact to the Military Police Group, giving the circumstances.<sup>29</sup>

The Koza City Office was notified by the Disciplinary Control Board on 18 November that nine bars in the city were about to lose their licenses for offering prostitutes to military inspectors, for poor sanitation, or for being the source of venereal disease infection. Besides these, 27 restaurants and bars were warned about unsanitary conditions which would result in the revocation of their "A" sign licenses unless improvement was forthcoming.<sup>30</sup>

On 14 December 1962 the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board announced the adoption of new standards to govern the certification of drinking and eating establishments catering to U.S. Forces personnel in the Ryukyu Islands. The "bombshell" document containing the new criteria was handed to GRI officials by the Disciplinary Control Board at a meeting attended by Colonel Robert H. Workman, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Kermit B. Blaney, USA, president and secretary of the board respectively, as well as by Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga, Welfare Department Director Kinjo, and Police Chief Choeki Kochi of GRI. The major specifications of the edict were as follows:

Bars, cabarets, and night clubs catering primarily to U.S. Forces personnel would be located on main streets or main routes of travel and would be well-lighted, free of open drainage ditches, and in areas presenting an over-all sanitary and attractive appearance.

Such establishments were normally to be in business districts and not in industrial or residential areas, and should be generally limited to no more than three large bars (accommodating 40 or more patrons) or six small bars per city block (200 meters by 200 meters), and there should be no more than one such establishment in a single building. Moreover, there should be separate flush-type toilets for men and women.

The brochure containing these stipulations also provided engineer drawings and specifications to guide enterprisers in the construction of new eating and drinking establishments.

An application for certification was to be filed by the enterpriser with the mayor of his municipality, who would then forward to GRI such applications as he believed met the criteria. The latter would inspect the establishment and forward the application to the AFDCB for final inspection and approval by local military commanders.

Certificates would be issued to the proprietor by name. If he sold the establishment or otherwise transferred ownership, the certificate would be automatically withdrawn.

In presenting the new criteria, Colonel Workman noted the "proliferation of bars, cabarets, and night clubs" for U.S. Forces patronage and their role as transmission agencies of diseases, as well as their "bad moral influence on Americans and Ryukyuans alike." He pointed out that the

objectives of the new criteria were to "protect the health and welfare of the present and future generations," to "improve the social environment of Okinawa," to "reduce the crime rate," and to "give the cities and towns a bright, wholesome aspect, attractive to residents and tourists." All in all, it was "clearly to the interest of the Ryukyuan people, as well as that of the United States military forces, to correct a situation that has so many adverse social and economic consequences."

Colonel Workman summed up the situation by remarking that "This is not exclusively a U.S. military problem or a problem for the Government and the people of the Ryukyu Islands. It is a joint problem and can be solved only by a joint attack."<sup>31</sup>

As might have been expected, the best defense the "A" sign operators could summon against the abhorred criteria was procrastination. Thus it was that on 8 January 1963 some 30 representatives of municipal governments and enterprisers, including the inevitable Mayor Chojo Oyama of Koza City, called on Welfare Department Director Kinjo to request that enforcement of the new rules be at least postponed, if it could not be avoided altogether. They also contended that the new standards were entirely too strict, and the smaller establishments would doubtless become bankrupt before they could fully comply with demands so severe.<sup>32</sup>

Two days later, 10 January, approximately 75 representatives of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, the USCAR Public Health and Welfare Department, the Legislature, the GRI Welfare and Police Departments, various central Okinawan municipalities, and the All-Ryukyu A-Sign Enterprisers' Federation, as well as Deputy Chief Executive Hiroshi Senaga,



met at the GRI Police Headquarters. Following a briefing on the new criteria for approved eating and drinking establishments serving military personnel, Colonel Workman, USAF, the recent Chairman of the Disciplinary Control Board (he had been succeeded by Colonel Edwin W. Grenelle, USA, effective 1 January 1963), made it clear that these same criteria, previously applied only to newly-constructed bars and cabarets, would be extended to the existing approved establishments in the future. Also, the approval system would continue to remain in effect, though requests for revision of the criteria by reason of peculiar circumstances would be entertained, if submitted in writing. The date on which the new rules would become effective was not yet certain.

In course of the general discussion which followed, it became apparent "that the total effort of the GRI representatives present would be directed toward an attack on the 'A' sign program" each speaker in turn offering one or more reasons why the system would not work, or else presenting alternate solutions. In substance, their arguments were as follows: (1) there was no legal basis for such a policy; (2) the GRI law and licensing system, which had been approved by the High Commissioner, were adequate and should be strengthened to replace the "A" sign program; (3) the existing state of the Ryukyuan economy could not support the standards laid down by the "A" sign program; and (4) the system had been established without any consultation with GRI or individuals concerned with this type of problem.

The speakers repeatedly recommended that the program be discontinued, or at least be delayed for five years! The members of the AFDCB were struck by the fact that "at no time during the entire discussion did the GRI representatives present any specific questions concerning the published new criteria, but rather concentrated on what they thought was wrong with the system."

The board replied that the "A" sign program was not based on any law, but was simply the military commanders' method of informing their troops where they could go for recreation "with assurance of adequate sanitary and moral conditions." Colonel Workman answered complaints that certain portions of the new criteria were impossible of realization with the reminder that the "A" sign program imposed no new demands on those places already possessing "A" sign certification, as it was "based strictly on GRI standards." Mayor Oyama's contribution to the discussion, incidentally, was to request that the "A" sign system be abolished - because it was "undemocratic!"<sup>33</sup>

Despite the rebuff given Mayor Oyama and the other proponents of profits at the expense of morality on 10 January 1963, 50-odd Okinawan attendants at the morning meeting reassembled at the police headquarters that same afternoon and agreed to request the military to revise the criteria in such wise as to make them both more palatable and less difficult of compliance.<sup>34</sup>

Again, on 14 January, 20 Ryukyuans interested in the "A" sign problem, including GRI Deputy Chief Executive Senaga, Welfare Department Director Kinjo, and Police Department Director Sachio Yogi, met to discuss a revision

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the criteria requested by Mayor Oyama, the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association, and sundry officials of central Okinawa. This request, which was to be submitted to the AFDCB in the near future, asked (1) that the new criteria be applied to the existing establishments three or four years later, instead of within the year suggested by the military board; (2) that establishments conforming to either GRI or municipal laws be approved, regardless of whether or not they met the standards specified in the new criteria or were located in commercial or residential areas; and (3) that any cancellation of licenses be determined upon only through mutual agreement between GRI and the Disciplinary Control Board.<sup>35</sup>

At the regular meeting of the AFDCB on 17 January 1963 it was decided that henceforth any establishments whose "A" signs had been suspended would be required to meet the new criteria before the precious "talisman" could be returned. The adoption of this policy would automatically eliminate the current policy calling for a 30-day suspension as punishment for sanitary violations.<sup>36</sup>

At the same meeting, the USARYIS Surgeon, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel C. Gallup, USA, presented the following statistics on personnel injured and killed as the result of motor vehicle accidents and affrays during the month of December 1962, as well as the number of these individuals requiring hospitalization at the U.S. Army Hospital:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Deaths, motor vehicle accidents	1						1	

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	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Injuries, 2-wheeled motor vehicle accidents	8	8		1	2	1	3	1
Injuries, 4-wheeled motor vehicle accidents	8	8		3	0	1	2	2
Days lost, all motor vehicle accidents	342	342		110	32	18	150	32
Injuries, affrays								
Individuals hospitalized	10	10		4			5	1
Days lost	179	179		50			117	12

The USARYIS Surgeon also reported the lost time resulting from venereal diseases as follows for the month of December 1962:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
In-patient treatment	1	1			1			
Days lost	6	6			6			

Discussion also took place on the question of continuing the certification of an establishment which might change the nature of its operation. The members of the board finally concluded that, on the basis of the GRI law requiring re-licensing in such instances, any place which altered the nature of its operation or major characteristics would have to be recertified by application through the prescribed channels.<sup>37</sup>

Subsequently, on 25 January, the committee set up by the Okinawan side to achieve a revision of the obnoxious criteria added an item to the three-point request prepared at the meeting of the 14th. This one called for the AFDCB's approval of wooden structures conforming "to applicable standards provided in the city planning," in addition to the concrete-block

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buildings which the military was presently demanding.<sup>38</sup>

The "A" sign enterprisers and the local politicians could fulminate and petition for moderation of the criteria to be applied to the licensed bars, cabarets, and restaurants all they pleased, but the determination of the military was shown to be adamant, when the Disciplinary Control Board announced on 14 February 1963 that the new rules would become effective on 1 August. This date had been established by Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA, the Representative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in the Ryukyus (CINCPACREP), on 4 February in his indorsement to the AFDCB's minutes of its 17 January meeting. Fortunately, the new criteria would be restricted to new enterprisers at the beginning, but no doubt was left that the existing businesses would be likewise affected in due course of time. The latter, hearing the dire tidings, wailed that as many as 80 per cent of them would have to shut down their bars and restaurants when the criteria were made applicable to them.<sup>39</sup>

The persons affected by the CINCPACREP's pronouncement reacted by calling an emergency meeting in Koza City of the chairmen of the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Associations from throughout the Ryukyus for the following morning, 15 February. Also attending were a number of Koza City assemblymen. Having found in the past that the GRI Executive Branch was decidedly ineffectual in obtaining any amelioration in the severity of the measures imposed by the military, the conferees decided to turn to the GRI Legislature as the medium through which a betterment of conditions for themselves should be sought.<sup>40</sup>

After all, the 29 members of the Legislature were elected by direct vote of the Ryukyuan people, while the officials of the Executive Branch were appointed by the Chief Executive, who was himself appointed by the High Commissioner--albeit after being nominated by the majority party in the GRI Legislature.

Three Koza City assemblymen visited the Army Provost Marshal's office that same day to seek a postponement, as well as an alleviation, of the new "A" sign criteria. As had been the case the previous August when a delegation from the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association had waited on RASP, the visitors were given a far more optimistic reply than they and their politician-advocates had been obtaining from other U.S. sources. The military spokesman introduced a "where there's life, there's hope" note into the situation by explaining that the enterprisers' petition for amending the new criteria had not yet been received from GRI. Furthermore, if it should reach the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board before the 21st, when that agency's next session was scheduled to be held, the board would consider the proposal--and might adopt it.

(It would seem that the Provost Marshal official to whom the three assemblymen addressed themselves was probably side-stepping an unpleasant subject and attempting to ease some unwanted callers out of his office by raising unwarranted hopes for an early solution to the problem.)

Meanwhile, 15 representatives of the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association were appealing to the new Director of GRI's Welfare Department, Seichu Agarie, for his assistance in preventing enforcement of the feared criteria.<sup>41</sup>



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At the regular February meeting of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board on the 21st, the USARYIS Surgeon presented the following statistics on personal injuries and deaths resulting from motor vehicle accidents and affrays during the month of January 1963 which necessitated the hospitalization of the individuals concerned at the U.S. Army Hospital:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Deaths, motor vehicle accidents	2							2
Injuries, 2-wheeled motor vehicle accidents	6	3		2			1	
Injuries, 4-wheeled motor vehicle accidents	18	9		2		1	2	4
Days lost, all motor vehicle accidents	856	428		201		27	110	90
Injuries, affrays								
Individuals hospitalized	28	14		5	1	2	6	
Days lost	72	363		174	10	87	92	

The USARYIS Surgeon reported that there had been no hospitalized cases resulting from venereal disease during the month of January 1963.<sup>42</sup>

A survey conducted about this time by the Commerce-Industry-Tourist Section of the Koza City Office revealed that there were 338 "A" sign establishments in the city, employing 2,165 people, and that the average cost for remodeling the existing establishments to obtain an "A" sign license was \$757.33.<sup>43</sup>

At its 28 February special meeting, the Disciplinary Control Board devoted its entire time to a letter received from the GRI Welfare Department which requested a softening of the severity of the "A" sign standards.

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The Welfare Department had declared that it was "not proper" from the standpoint of "free enterprise" to limit the number of places of business. To this the board countered that there was nothing in the new criteria which imposed "any numerical limitation on the total number of "A" sign establishments to be licensed."

The second point raised by the Welfare Department had been to urge that establishments located on streets that were "well lighted, safe, free of open drainage ditches, and sanitary" be approved, even if the streets were not "boulevards." Here the board yielded ground for almost the only time, agreeing that businesses situated on a pedestrian arcade "from which wheeled vehicles were physically restricted by barriers placed at each end of the arcade" would be acceptable.

The Welfare Department had also desired that no limitation be set on the number of establishments per square block which could be approved. For its part, the AFDCB had set the quota at three large bars or six small bars per block (200 meters square). In reply the board reaffirmed its belief that this was a proper provision; however, GRI should note that it had actually recommended for approval establishments in excess of the number provided "when the quality of the recommended establishment was felt far to exceed the quality of the then approved establishments within the area."

In the matter of toilet facilities the board took what was probably its most uncompromising stand. The Welfare Department had hoped that the AFDCB would approve toilet facilities which were physically located in a different structure from the main place of business, because of the relation of existing drainage ditches and the site on which the establishment

was built. In no uncertain words the Okinawan side was told that "The primary concern of this Board is approving establishments for issuance of "A" signs is a concern for the health, welfare, safety, and morality of the service personnel with whom the establishment will do business. A very secondary consideration is the local economic situation." What was more, the board would not "in any way relax the requirements which have to do with health, safety, welfare, or morality as stated in the new criteria for "A" sign establishments."

With respect to the GRI request that the existing bars and restaurants be granted a two-year period of grace for the improvement of their toilet facilities, the board responded coldly that "more than ample time" had already been given them; hence, any place which could not meet the new criteria within that length of time would "never be able to meet it without completely rebuilding." Thus, this petition was in no way valid.

Apropos of the toilet facilities, the Welfare Department had asked that the existing ones be approved, since it was difficult to relocate flush toilets. In its reply the Disciplinary Control Board expressed its realization that there had been some misconceptions on this subject - perhaps intentional, perhaps innocent - that a central sewage system was required. Actually, said the board, the criteria simply called for flush toilets which might be flushed into either a central sewage system or properly-serviced septic tanks or cesspools. If either of the latter facilities were used, however, the enterpriser must bear in mind that the accent was on the phrase "properly serviced" and in no case should they be allowed to become a health hazard.



Another important breach which the Welfare Department had sought to effect in the solidity of the Disciplinary Control Board's requirements concerned the necessity for replacing establishments of wood construction with ones of concrete-block or its equivalent. The GRI office hoped that "A" sign certificates would be issued to the existing bars, cabarets, and restaurants regardless of the material used in their construction, so long as the interior was conformable to standards. Such a dispensation was sorely needed, since only 30 per cent of the present places were built of concrete. The board's reply to all this was less than sympathetic. Not only was wood construction unacceptable, but the use of concrete block was itself merely "a minimum acceptable standard." It would be entirely proper for the enterprisers to employ cut stone, field stone, rubble, or brick; while reinforced concrete or steel frame with masonry facings would assuredly be "more than acceptable."

One of the last points taken up by the board concerned the Welfare Department's fears about the impact any rigid enforcement of the new standards would have on the Ryukyuan economy. While recognizing this factor, the AFDCB considered it a "very minor" consideration by comparison with "the health, welfare, safety, and morality of American troops." And it felt that "more than ample time" had been allowed for the correction of existing conditions, "if these conditions were, in fact, correctible." Finally, as far as the economic effect of the new "A" sign criteria was concerned, the board observed that "any reduction in the number of certified establishments would not necessarily produce a corresponding reduction in

the local income; this income would merely flow in through more acceptable establishments."

Seichu Agarie, the Welfare Department Director, who was present at the board's 28 February meeting, appealed the case of those establishments who, through no fault of their own, would soon be losing their "A" signs, the municipal governments in question having failed to put the streets, sewage ditches, and other external facilities into such a condition as to comply with the upcoming criteria. Since they were themselves not to blame, he pleaded that they be given the "A" certificate anyway.

Colonel John F. Brownlow, Jr., USA, the USARYIS Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and president of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board since 15 February 1963, retorted, rather colloquially, that "It is then time for the government to get with it, if they are interested in this - and they obviously are - and the government is going to have to start cooperating with the citizenry - and it will. In the few weeks that I have been here, I have been waited on by several committees about this matter, and the committees were not made up of bar tenders; they were made up of government officials; so the government is interested, and it should be."<sup>44</sup>

Although not itself revoking the licenses of the establishments, the Disciplinary Control Board recommended to the GRI Welfare Department early in March 1963 that the latter cancel the "A" signs of 27 bars and cabarets in central Okinawa whose rest room conditions were completely unsatisfactory. The specific conditions cited were (1) poor ventilation; (2) absence of toilet paper and towels; (3) lack of water for the flush toilet;

and (4) unsanitary condition of the toilets themselves. The Welfare Department responded that it was sending copies of the criticism to the various health centers and would itself take measures to bring about an improvement in the situation.<sup>45</sup>

We have seen how the chairmen of the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Associations determined on 15 February that the best tack to take was an appeal to the GRI Legislature for palliation of the restrictions under which bars and restaurants were operating. One month later to the day, the Internal Affairs Committee of the Legislature deliberated on the petition it had received and decided to appeal in turn to the High Commissioner, the Disciplinary Control Board, and the GRI Executive Branch for such a mitigation. The seriousness of the problem was underscored by statistics showing that 215 of the 1,236 "A" sign bars and restaurants had lost their badge of approval during the period from July 1962 through the end of February 1963.<sup>46</sup>

A new twist was given the problem of "A" sign issuance and revocation in mid-March when all nine places of business, including restaurants, holding the old "A" signs in the northern town of Nago voluntarily turned them in in protest against the system and the expenses it involved for them. Rather than make the extensive improvements required to retain their badges of sanitation, they preferred to take their chances on making a living by catering to the local Okinawan populace and to tourists, neither of whom could be punished by the military for patronizing a place not "A" sign-equipped. After all, as one of the Nago enterprisers observed, almost all of the Marines at Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen, who might have visited Nago on their liberty, actually went to Koza and Ishikawa for their recreation. Since this renunciation left Army personnel stationed at the Yae



Take Relay Station and at the Tanno Dake Hawk Site with no nearby place to enjoy liberty, USARYIS arranged to have regular bus schedules set up to take the men to the Sukiran and Naha areas for their recreation.

One military officer, unidentified, asseverated that the furor over the "A" sign system arose chiefly from "a natural instinct on the part of Ryukyuans to balk at any change in the norm - or what Ryukyuans consider to be the norm."

Lieutenant Colonel Kermit B. Blaney, USA, secretary of the Area Joint Committee, declared that "Military commanders cannot back off from certain standards just because certain groups [such as the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association and officials of the GRI Executive and Legislative Branches] don't understand it or appreciate the system." As justification for the system's existence and extension, he cited the fact that since the preceding June there had been "a significant decrease in the venereal disease rate among U.S. service personnel."

Colonel Blaney, an articulate spokesman for the military point of view, added that "Every aspect of the criteria has sound logic, and it is designed to not only protect the U.S. personnel, but raise the standards for the Ryukyu Islands. We want well-lighted streets and sidewalks to protect servicemen and Ryukyuans alike from traffic hazards. We want sewage systems and better toilet facilities. And this is for the health protection of the entire community - civilian and military."<sup>47</sup>

That the civilian community stood in need of an improvement of its health standards was attested to only two days later, when GRI announced that

it was putting aside \$60,000 in its FY-1964 budget to finance an all-out assault on venereal disease in the Ryukyus. This drastic action came in the wake of a report by the Welfare Department expressing concern at the alarming rise in the syphilis rate in Ryukyuans within the 20-30 age bracket. During 1962 GRI had reported 1,464 syphilis cases; therefore, by extending this figure, officials estimated that another 12,000 were afflicted but not seeking treatment. When compared with the 1955 total of only 276 reported, it was apparent that conditions sorely needed correction.<sup>48</sup>

Colonel Blaney conceded that there would be a certain amount of expense involved for any business seeking to meet the AFDCB's criteria; but, on the other hand, the military were prepared to help these enterprisers meet the goal with a minimum of financial outlay. "We'll help them with the design of their structures," he said, "and show them how sewage and toilet facilities, and lighting, and sidewalks can be brought up to standard without an outlandish outlay of money."

As a bonus, so to speak, those establishments meeting the military criteria would "stand a better chance of getting the tourist trade. The A-sign system is well known throughout the Far East, and when a tourist or serviceman newly arrived on the island sees an A-sign, they /sic/ would feel more inclined to patronize the establishment."<sup>49</sup>

On 18 March five Legislators called on Colonel John F. Brownlow, USA, the president of the Disciplinary Control Board, to plead that the new criteria be applied only to new establishments and, as a natural corollary, that the existing places of business be subjected to less stringent rules.

Colonel Brownlow did not encourage the Legislators in any supposition that their pleas would be heeded, and they left his presence pretty well resigned to seeing the new criteria enforced as originally set forth, effective 1 August 1963.<sup>50</sup>

At the same time that the Legislative quintet were attempting to influence the thinking of the AFDCB, several hundred bar and restaurant enterprisers were holding a rally in Koza City, the most tangible product of which was a resolution declaring that "The new military criteria disregard the economic power of the A-sign enterprisers. This is a problem which will affect the livelihood of more than 10,000 enterprisers, employees, and their dependents." It further petitioned (1) approval of wooden structures, (2) alleviation of floor space restrictions, and (3) abolition of the bloc system.<sup>51</sup>

The Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board met the next day, March 19th, and studied the petitions submitted by the Koza City, Kin-Son, and All-Ryukyu A-Sign Enterprisers' Associations. When they had finished their ponderings, they instructed the USARYIS Provost Marshal to send copies of the minutes of the special meeting held on 28 February to the petitioners, thus providing the latter with the board's views on the points raised in the letters. In other words, the petitioners were told that the new criteria would still be enforced on 1 August, as previously planned. The AFDCB also voted to revoke permanently the "A" sign certificates of eight Nago bars and cabarets which had voluntarily returned their "A" signs to the board, saying that they no longer desired such certification.<sup>52</sup>



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Learning of the board's unshakeable determination, the All-Ryukyu A-Sign Enterprisers' Liaison Council decided that, since the new criteria would be enforced only after the High Commissioner had given his approval, they would enlist the assistance of the Executive and Legislative Branches of GRI in conducting political negotiations with USCAR.<sup>53</sup>

However, the possibility of an adroit bit of "buck-passing" was indicated when High Commissioner Paul W. Caraway, USA, told Seisaku Ota, the Chief Executive, that moderation or postponement of the "A" sign criteria was beyond his purview, and the best he could do was to convey to the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board the enterprisers' desire for such mitigation.<sup>54</sup> To anyone familiar with General Caraway's personality and his habitual readiness to "take the bull by the horns" his denial of jurisdiction in the "A" sign problem could indicate only one thing - that he found it more expedient to employ tergiversation rather than to reject the petitioners outright. For no preceding High Commissioner or Deputy Governor of the Ryukyu Islands since 1945 had been so strong-willed or had imposed his personal will on both the people and circumstances with such determination.

The meeting of the AFDCB also saw the USARYIS Surgeon present his regular monthly report on injuries, deaths, and disease for the month of February 1963. It was as follows:<sup>55</sup>

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Deaths, motor vehicle accidents								
Injuries, 2-wheeled motor vehicle accidents	7		1			6		

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	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Injuries, 4-wheeled motor vehicle accidents		8		2			5	1
Days lost, all motor vehicle accidents		328		23			304	1
Injuries, affrays								
Individuals hospitalized		14		3	2	1	8	
Days lost		359		45	14	4	296	

The number of personnel hospitalized as a result of venereal diseases and the time lost through hospitalization were as follows:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>HOSP</u>	<u>DTY</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
In-patient treatment	3	3		2	1			
Days lost	22	22		17	5			

Officers of the All-Ryukyu "A" Sign Enterprisers' Federation met again on 20 March to discuss the most appropriate tactics to be adopted on the basis of the latest developments in their war with the military. The result of their deliberations was a decision to appeal to the High Commissioner for alleviation of the new criteria through the GRI Executive Branch and the Legislature until the end of the month. Then, if their appeal had borne no fruit, they should hold a rally in the USCAR-GRI Plaza in Naha to be attended by all the "A" sign enterprisers and their employees from throughout the Ryukyus. Some of the more desperate enterprisers present urged that they jointly break the horns of the dilemma on which they were all impaled by boldly turning in their "A" signs, in the same way as the bars and restaurants of Nago had done.

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Apparently, since the greater part of the food and drink enterprises could not have continued to operate on the strength of their patronage from Okinawans alone, this "lunatic fringe" believed that if there were no authorized places for the troops to spend their leisure hours and their working capital, the military authorities would have to respond to the resulting morale problem by lowering the bars. Though this recommendation was overwhelmingly rejected, it does present an interesting subject for reflection--viz., would the military have yielded, if it had been adopted, or would the enterprisers have been the first to capitulate?<sup>56</sup>

After remaining quiescent for a time, 20 of the 27 chairmen of "A" Sign Enterprisers' Associations from throughout the Ryukyus met in Koza on 5 April 1963 to rack their collective brains for a defense against the relentless advance of the 1 August deadline. After much talk and more disagreement, the attendants effectively demonstrated that imaginative thinking was just not included among their economic assets. The best idea with which they could come up was to submit one "last" petition for a year's postponement of the date on which the new criteria would go into effect, provided they were unable to persuade the military to revise the provisions of the new standards. If this petition failed of its purpose, the federation would dissolve itself, as a peculiarly Oriental way of emphasizing that it could not "take responsibility for the future unity of 984 'A' sign enterprisers throughout the Ryukyus." Federation Chairman Yonezo Seda (who had been elected to that post on 12 December 1962) announced that he would attend the next meeting of the Disciplinary Control Board in the capacity of observer, and would convey the "final" attitude of the enterprisers.<sup>57</sup>



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On 10 April the Vice-Mayor of Nago, the chairman of the "A" Sign Enterprisers' Association, and two other officials of the association called at the USARYIS Provost Marshal's office to discuss the possibility of certain establishments in Nago's being recertified. By way of clearing the air - which had been rather heavily charged since the "A" sign establishments in the northern town had to a man turned in their "A" certificates - the visitors explained that they desired good relations with the American community and that there was no anti-American feeling in Nago.

The military officials then asked the obvious question: why had they turned in their "A" signs in a grand gesture of renunciation? Rumors had already been seeping down from the north concerning the true reason for this quixotic act, and the Nago Vice-Mayor substantiated their general basis in fact with his explanation. It seemed that a local sanitary inspector employed by Nago itself had told one of the local proprietors that not only would his place of business not meet the new criteria, but when the military revoked his "A" sign, he would also forfeit his GRI license. Thus, he would soon find himself out of business entirely! The word quickly spread abroad, and bar and restaurant owners, who normally depended on Ryukyuan and tourist trade from Monday through Friday of each week and found in the military week-end trade a merely supplemental source of income, decided to turn in their "A" signs to avoid the loss of their GRI licenses, as well.

The Provost Marshal officials explained to the visitors that this was "normally not the case" and that revocation or suspension of "A" sign certification did not necessarily entail revocation of a local license, unless there was a local law to that effect. The Vice-Mayor was certain

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that Nago had no such law and that the inspector had simply given erroneous information. He added that this individual had been "thoroughly oriented" since the costly incident!

Inasmuch as the northern delegation desired to get their establishments certified as soon as possible, the Provost Marshal's Office promised to send two sanitary inspectors to Nago the next day to provide advice in taking whatever measures were necessary for eventual certification.

True to their word, the military officials sent the inspectors north on 11 April to look over six places which had indicated their desire to obtain the "A" sign. The inspectors' finding was that four of the six establishments could meet the new criteria with remodeling. The quartet stated that they would apply for certification as soon as possible.<sup>58</sup>

On the same day, Colonel Brownlow, the AFDCB chairman, conducted a group of GRI officials on a tour of various areas and establishments in Koza and Futenma. The purpose of the tour was to point out establishments already possessing "A" signs which would retain them under the new criteria, and, by contrast, those places that would lose their "A" signs because the owners had done little or nothing toward meeting the new criteria.

Following the tour, the central district Legislators and other high officials gathered at USARYIS Headquarters to urge once more that the effective date for inauguration of the stiffened standards be set back. Colonel Brownlow replied that the new criteria could not be abated under any circumstances--they had, in fact, already been enforced in some areas as an initial step in their gradual application throughout the Ryukyus--and there

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was "no room for consideration of a petition by the enterprisers to postpone the enforcement of the criteria for a year."<sup>59</sup>

Upon conclusion of the regular business at the 18 April meeting of the Disciplinary Control Board, Chairman Seda of the All-Ryukyu "A" Sign Enterprisers' Federation was allowed to address the attendants. Having expressed his understanding of Colonel Brownlow's explanation that there would be no postponement of the new rules' implementation, Seda declared that he would still like to inform the board why he had submitted the petition prepared by the Federation on 5 April. Contrary to what they might have previously supposed, it was not the plight of the enterprisers that gave him concern. Rather, it was the strong likelihood that a great number of employees would be thrown out of work, forcing many of them to resort to illegal businesses or, in the case of female employees, to prostitution and "street walking." Thus, it was plain that Seda's motives were purely altruistic--that venal considerations had no part in them.<sup>60</sup>

A fun-loving editor of the English-language daily Okinawa Morning Star, Robert Prosser, found the new firman of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board a far less serious matter than did the Okinawan bar and cabaret owners who would be more personally affected by the tightened restrictions, if we can judge from his editorial on the subject, entitled "Bar Operators' Manual."<sup>61</sup>

The beautiful dreamer department of the U.S. Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board has issued a new set of instructions which are intended to improve the health and morals of all within hearing distance. The instructions govern the establishing and operation of bars, cabarets and other deadfalls which cater to members of the military. The ukase points out that unless the establishments involved adhere to the rules as set forth, they will not be allowed to display the military sign of approval.

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The rules, unfortunately, may be somewhat difficult to interpret, let alone follow.

According to description of the new criteria governing bars which display the "A" sign of approval, such bars must be located on main streets or on main routes of travel. A person given to argument might contend that any path or highway on which a bar is located would become a main route of travel for a person intent upon reaching the bar in question.

The board also takes it upon itself to rule in the case of one or more bars in a building, thus apparently ruling out those enterprisers who hope to elevate the standards of their establishments through joint enterprise.

Bar management on Okinawa is a highly specialized field. It involves the corruptibility of officialdom, preposterously high liquor taxes which encourage black marketing, and a callous disregard for the human rights of farmers' daughters who are frequently sold to bar operators. It is not likely that a single document, no matter how lofty in sentiment, will alter the situation.

A start in the right direction might be made, however, by reducing the per bottle tax on imported liquor and raising the bar operator's license fee.

Editor Prosser may also have had a personal axe to grind, since he, being a "commercial entrant" was not eligible to buy tax-free liquor, and the "preposterously high" taxes on alcoholic beverages struck directly at his own pocketbook.

Early in May 1963, 10 bars in Koza City voluntarily turned in their "A" sign certificates to the Disciplinary Board. Although no reason for this action was offered, it was generally believed that it was because the new criteria which would come into force on 1 August would render future operations too difficult.<sup>62</sup>

At the 17 May meeting of the Disciplinary Control Board the chief subject for discussion was the question of placing off-limits the area of Naha City known as Uebaru-Ku, which was situated in the former Oroku-Son.

This action was deemed essential by both the USARYIS Provost Marshal and the USCAR Public Health Department because of the district's location, immediately contiguous to the south gate of Naha Air Base.

A joint Army-Air Force vice investigation team which had inspected the area on April 25th and 26th found a situation that was almost incredibly bad, in view of the "A" sign system's existence, of frequent warnings and lectures to servicemen on Okinawa, and of the large number of men assigned to military police duty on the island. The streets were found to contain open sewer ditches on both sides, and, at night, were so dark in some places that a person could not see where he was stepping, thanks to the total absence of street lights. The only illumination, in fact, was provided by the small neon lights on the tawdry establishments in the area. The matter of pedestrian safety would have been a grave one, in the absence of sidewalks or pedestrian cross-walks, had it not been that the very nature of the narrow, pock-marked, and rocky streets made rapid vehicular movement lunatic and almost impossible. During rainy weather (an academic situation in 1963, when the worst drouth in a century afflicted the Ryukyus) these same roads became deep pools interspersed with muddy, slippery stretches that should have discouraged the most inveterate habitue of bars and other dens of iniquity. All in all, sanitary conditions were very bad, with garbage-strewn drainage ditches stagnating throughout the area.

Most of the buildings were poorly constructed of wood--scrap and very inferior lumber, at that--which thus made them logical candidates for

destruction by fire. Although seven bars in Uebaru exhibited and cherished the old "A" sign, the investigating team was confident that none of the establishments in the district would meet the requirements for "A" sign certification under the new criteria. The wonder, in fact, was how they had ever achieved such certification previously!

In the course of their investigation, the team observed Ryukyuan females accompanying U.S. Forces personnel to living quarters adjacent to six different "A" sign establishments; while women in various other hotels, tea houses, and private dwellings not blessed with the "A" symbol, as well as "street walkers" solicited the team for purposes of prostitution and made the mistake of escorting them to living quarters therein. Furthermore, so brazen was the black-marketing activity that the investigators had no difficulty in observing two cases of beer and two bottles of tax-free liquor being taken into one of the bars by U.S. Forces personnel, while another tax-free bottle of liquor was carried into another bar by a U.S. serviceman. One man freely told a team member that he regularly supplied a bar girl with tax-free cigarettes, liquor, and various other items. Still other men were seen walking around the area with sacks bearing the REX (Ryukyus Exchange) imprint and bottles of liquor, but the investigators were unable to learn their destinations.

The native populace living in Aza-Uebaru evinced little respect for police authority, and it was evident that this attitude "rubbed off" on the servicemen frequenting the area.

Immediately after the death of an Okinawan woman resident of Uebaru from suspected Japanese "B" encephalitis on 24 April, sanitary inspectors



from the Naha Health Center and USCAR conducted their own inspection of the area. They found that the victim's typical Ryukyuan wood-frame house was without screened windows or doors, that the stagnant drainage ditches adjacent to the dwelling contained floating fecal matter and refuse, that heavy mosquito breeding existed, and that the outdoor pit-type toilet was not equipped with fly-proofing. In the surrounding area heavy mosquito breeding and floating refuse were found in all the drainage ditches, as were numerous pit-type toilets without fly-proofing, and several piles of refuse.

Upon discovery of these conditions, GRI ordered the occupants of all houses to clean their premises and all adjacent drainage ditches no later than 29 April. Insect and rodent control personnel from the Naha Health Center applied insecticide as a larvicide to all mosquito breeding places and as a residual to the interior of all Ryukyuan houses within a radius of 50 meters from the encephalitis victim's residence.

In consequence of all this, the Vice Control Section of the USARYIS Provost Marshal's Office recommended that the "A" signs be withdrawn from all certified establishments in the Uebaru area, that the area be placed off-limits, and that periodic military police patrols be conducted.

Not surprisingly, the Disciplinary Control Board recommended at its 17 May meeting that Uebaru be placed off-limits and that six bars in the district have their "A" signs revoked. On 28 May the CINCPACREP approved this action, and on 7 June patrols began enforcement.

That the new criteria for bars and restaurants were not absolutely like the storied law of the Medes and Persians, "which altereth not," was

demonstrated by the decision made by the AFDCB in the case of Henoko Village. The ku-cho (village chief or headman) and the chairman of the Henoko Bar Association had petitioned the board to recognize their city plan, which called for the establishment of a recreation and entertainment area that would contain the majority of the bars and restaurants. If the board did accept this proposal, it would be waiving its own limitation of three large bars or six small ones within a 200 x 200 meter area. The petition further sought authorization of 56 bars and restaurants, a number which the village considered adequate to cater to the needs of American patrons in the area. (Interestingly enough, Henoko presently had 97 certified bars and restaurants; hence, the "city fathers" were gratuitously offering to eliminate 41 of them! The circumstances and reasoning behind this inexplicable move would prove valuable to the student of human nature.)

The various provost marshals representing the different services on Okinawa who were present at the meeting stated that it was easier to control an area and enforce regulations if the bars and establishments frequented by military personnel were located generally in the same area. As a result of this expression of experts in the field of law enforcement, the Disciplinary Control Board voted to waive the density requirement, in order to permit Henoko (or like communities) to carry out "reasonable city planning" by concentrating the bars in a given area, "when the board felt it not to be detrimental to the health and welfare of the troops."<sup>63</sup>

Normally the chairmanship of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board was passed on to another branch of the Armed Forces every six months,

which meant that an officer of the 3d Marine Division would have taken over on 1 July 1963. However, the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands (Lieut. General Paul W. Caraway) came to the conclusion that to rotate the chair at that particular time, just one month before the new criteria for "A" sign establishments became effective, could easily result in the enterprisers' misconstruing the situation and thus give the program a repulse from which it would be a long time in recovering.<sup>64</sup>

A petition from Mayor of Koza City, asking that Yaejima-Ku ("New Koza") be designated as an approved area under the new criteria, was reviewed by the Disciplinary Control Board at its regular meeting of 20 June. The consensus of the members was that if the area was found acceptable under the terms of the new criteria, those establishments conforming with the standards would be given "A" sign certification. Conversely, if the environment was found not acceptable, the establishments would be refused certification. Each place of business would stand or fall on its own merits. The recorder for the board volunteered that a recent survey of the area had revealed that it did not meet the standards specified in the new criteria, and, moreover, considerable work would be necessary before it could meet them.

The final act of the Armed Forces Disciplinary Board at its meeting of 20 June was to reject a petition from the All-Ryukyu "A" Sign Enterprisers' Federation requesting a three-month extension for the effective date of the new criteria from 1 August to 1 November 1963. Such a delay, said the federation, was necessary, since construction projects currently in



progress were being delayed by the unavailability of equipment and construction workers, in addition to difficulties encountered in raising the requisite funds to finance these costly improvements.<sup>65</sup>

Phaseout of the Okinawa Housing Corporation.

At the 29 January 1963 meeting of Subcommittee No. 1 of the Ryukyus Area Joint Committee, the Air Force representative, Colonel Robert H. Workman, advised the other members that the assets of the Okinawa Housing Corporation (OHC) would be phased out in the near future, commencing with the Bucknerville area in southeastern Okinawa. He recommended that the remaining families in the latter area be moved to other habitable OHC units as they became available. In future allocations of housing, the Bucknerville assets would be excluded, reducing the total OHC houses from 439 to 366.<sup>66</sup>

Effective February 1963, the Air Force began allocating OHC houses quarterly from both the gross and net listings. Each service's proportionate share of this housing was based on the percentage figure for the respective service concerned.<sup>67</sup> However, at this time there still existed the possibility that the Navy would wish to acquire the houses of the OHC. At the 66th meeting of the Area Joint Committee (which was made up of the Commanders of the four services on Okinawa) on 8 February, General Caraway stated that there was still ample time for the Navy to acquire the OHC assets, if it so desired.<sup>68</sup>

At the meeting of the Area Joint Committee on 12 March, Captain Thomas L. Andrews, Jr., USN, repeated an earlier request that the Navy be allowed

to utilize any or all OHC houses that were serviceable and not occupied. To this Major General Robert M. Stillman, the 313th Air Division Commander, replied that there were three houses in Naha which the Navy might use, but that the Air Force planned to use the other OHC units allocated to it as soon as renovation was completed. He expressed his belief that if housing units were habitable and met the established standards, then they should by all means be occupied. However, if houses were not approved under the local joint standard, then no military service should be allowed to occupy them; for it was not "right for any service to use sub-standard housing for concurrent travel approval."<sup>69</sup>

On 15 April the OHC assets were advertized for sale in the various newspapers on the island by the U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa. The conditions applicable to the sale were described in the Invitation for Bid, and copies were distributed to all interested persons, including the armed services.

In connection with the sale of the OHC assets, the Area Joint Committee recommended the following actions, as a means of insuring the expeditious transfer of the houses with the least amount of inconvenience to the military:

1. Rental rates should be established in accordance with Joint Service Regulations (Inspection and Control of Private Housing), which could be put into effect when Department of Defense (DOD) personnel signed a lease with the owner.

2. Each service should arrange to vacate the quonsets and relocate the occupants within 90 days following the transfer of title to the purchaser.

3. Rental rates should be established for quonsets applicable to the 90-day period, in accordance with the Joint Service Regulations cited in (1) above.

4. The successful bidder should be informed as to the appropriate U.S. authorities to be contacted for the purpose of offering the rental of the houses to DOD personnel.

The Area Joint Committee agreed that a letter should be dispatched to each OHC tenant advising him of the impending sale of his home and the expected termination date of his lease with OHC. In effect, this letter would give the tenant 90 days' notice, and, in addition, would advise that the OHC furniture he was using would be sold. Any new tenants occupying OHC houses between the date of this meeting and the date of the sale would be similarly notified. Every effort would be made to notify tenants of the actual date of sale, with a minimum of 30 days' notice to be assured.<sup>70</sup>

On 17 May 1963, the 313th Air Division Personnel Directorate sent a letter to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB and to the 51st Air Base Group at Naha AB, giving details of the disposition to be made of OHC assets and where the present occupants would fit into the future picture.

OHC houses occupied by U.S. Forces personnel at the time of transfer of title of the property from the Okinawa Housing Corporation to the successful bidder for acquisition would be considered as approved off-base rental property. This status would continue in effect until the tenant vacated the property.

Leases between tenants and the OHC would become null and void upon



the transfer of title of property to a new owner. Negotiation of a new lease between the present tenants and the new owner would follow existing procedures for off-base rentals, excepting that the customary inspection and approval would not be required. It was not anticipated that an increase in rent would ensue.

The sale of utilities systems was not included in the invitation for a bid on OHC houses. Upon the transfer of title to a new owner, free utilities would no longer be furnished, but those tenants electing to continue occupying OHC houses would become eligible for the same cost-of-living allowances as were paid to the occupants of off-base rentals.

All quonsets belonging to the OHC were to be salvaged, being vacated within 90 days following the execution of a sales contract with the successful bidder.

The furniture owned by OHC would be removed from the houses within 20 days after transfer of control of the property to the successful bidder. Eligible Air Force OHC occupants might request replacement furniture from the Base Housing Services.

Any OHC houses unoccupied at the time of transfer of title to a new owner would be considered in the same category as other off-base rental property, which meant that the provisions of 313th Air Division Regulation 34-6 would apply.

The occupants of OHC housing could apply for on-base quarters upon the transfer's becoming effective, provided they were eligible for such quarters as defined by existing directives and that they had at least six months' overseas retainability at the time the quarters were assigned.

Occupants of OHC housing electing to apply for on-base quarters would be integrated into appropriate housing lists in accordance with existing procedures; however, such applicants, regardless of their eligibility, would not displace the top three applicants on any housing waiting list, nor would they displace any personnel already programmed for base housing.<sup>71</sup>

At the meeting of the Area Joint Committee on 11 June 1963, General Paul W. Caraway, USA, the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands, informed the other members that some details were being worked out on the OHC sale in connection with utility and water service arrangements. Captain Andrews, the Navy member, reported that the Department of Defense had put a stop to the construction of new quarters on Okinawa, a move which could delay the letting of contracts for this programmed construction.<sup>72</sup>

The Proposed Satellite Communication Tracking Facility on Okinawa.

At the meeting of Subcommittee No. 6 (Communications-Electronics) of the Ryukyus Area Joint Committee, on 19 March 1963, Captain Otis E. La Grone, of the U.S. Army Signal Group, briefed the attendants on a proposed satellite communication tracking facility to be constructed on Okinawa. A survey team which had recently visited the island had considered four different sites and assigned the following order of preference--Sobe, Deragawa and Tengan, or Awase. The last-named was the only one of the four sites belonging to the Air Force, being the AIRCOM transmitter site. The others were Army installations.

Preliminary plans called for an initial van-type installation, with permanent construction for the facilities to follow.

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The subcommittee discussed various aspects of the proposed installation, including its location, its effect on existing communications, and the support that might be required. Firm guidance was to be initiated through channels by the Satellite Tracking Communication Agency within 30 days.<sup>73</sup>

At the next meeting of Subcommittee No. 6 on 16 April, Captain La Grone informed the members that "Project Anna" was the name to be given to the forthcoming satellite tracking facility. He also briefed them on the requirements, scheduling, and location of the facility.<sup>74</sup>

Thereafter, for the remainder of the historical period, nothing more was reported in the minutes of Subcommittee No. 6 concerning the projected satellite communication tracking facility on Okinawa.

The Defense Communications Agency Midrange Plan.

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) Midrange Plan (MRP) was aimed at the consolidation of all U.S. global military communications under a single government agency for the purpose of more efficient management and control, and to enhance reliability and speed of service for all military departments. Task 24 of this plan pertained to the consolidation of all long-haul common user communications systems on Okinawa into one system that would be managed, operated, and controlled by the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

As the agency of primary interest, the Signal Group was directed in February 1963 to conduct a feasibility study of the consolidation of long-haul military communications on Okinawa. For this purpose, a working group of Army and Air Force personnel was formed.

In March the feasibility study was submitted to Headquarters, U.S.

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Army, Pacific (USARPAC), at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. The study stated that consolidation was indeed feasible; however, since several means of achieving consolidation existed, the study did not recommend any specific course. Later the same month the feasibility study was returned by USARPAC for the inclusion of a specific recommendation for consolidation, for reaccomplishment in the form of an implementation plan, and for re-submission, once the first two items were completed.

The resulting implementation plan was coordinated at the local command level on Okinawa and forwarded to USARPAC for analysis. As thus prepared, it proposed the following:

1. That the DCS systems be consolidated at the Army Tengan transmitter site, the Army Sobe receiver site, and the Army relay at Futenma.
2. Although the implementation plan pointed out that there was a requirement for non-DCS systems for all the services and that it was possible to consolidate these in the Air Force transmitter site at Awase, the Air Force receiver site at Ie Shima, and the Air Force relay station at Kadena Base Operations, the matter was not resolved or finalized in the plan submitted to USARPAC.
3. Systems that were of interest solely to USAF would be controlled by the Air Force. These comprised the following:
  - (a) Relays under Air Force operation with allocated circuits in the DCS.
    - (1) Airopnet Relay.
    - (2) Pafconet Relay.

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- (3) Matcomtel Relay.
  - (4) AF Data Com Relay.
  - (5) Weather Relay.
  - (6) USAFSS Relays.
- (b) Relays with transmitters and receivers operated and maintained by the Air Force. These comprised:
- (1) Aeronautical station.
  - (2) Air Defense Control Center (ADCC) circuitry (off-island).
  - (3) USAFSS (CW and DF).
  - (4) Weather intercept, facsimile and news service (receive only).

Several considerations had to be taken into account in connection with the consolidation plan, despite the general unanimity with which the services accepted the necessity for it at the local level. Firstly, the implementation plan was a proposal and not as yet an approved plan. Secondly, the guidelines given were not always clear; therefore, the degree of consolidation that would eventually come about was not firm. Thirdly, future Air Force and Army requirements were not available at this level, and the current plan contained almost no allowance for expansion. Therefore, if additional DCS circuits should become necessary, it was possible that the entire plan would have to be modified.

The 313th Air Division position was that the plan was technically adequate. However, this headquarters was of the opinion that the proposal might not be the most economical, considering the possibility of future expansion's becoming unavoidable and necessary.<sup>75</sup>

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## FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	News Article, "Only Approved Establishments Are 'On Limits,'" <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 3 Nov. 1953.
2	--	News Article, "Okinawa's 'A' Signs Discontinued by GRI," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 8 Nov. 1958; News Article, "November 15 Day of Change from 'A' to '1-2-3' Rates for Bars, Restaurants," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 8 Nov. 1958.
3	--	News Article, "Disciplinary Control Board Has 1st Meeting," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 21 Feb. 1959.
4	--	News Article, "Disciplinary Control Board Meets," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 14 Mar. 1959.
5	--	News Article, "More Koza Establishments Declared Off-Limits," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 30 Mar. 1962.
6	--	News Article, "Military Officer Denies Rumor about Off-Limits," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 10 Feb. 1962.
7	--	News Article, "More Koza Establishments Declared Off-Limits," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 30 Mar. 1962.
8	--	News Article, "Welfare Department Director Denies Report He Asked for Revival of A-Sign System," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 18 Apr. 1962.
9	--	News Article, "Military Announces New System for Operation of Bars and Cabarets," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 8 Apr. 1962.
10	--	USCAR Office of Public Affairs (OPA) Press Release #2332, "Certification System for Bars, Cabarets," 11 Apr. 1962; News Article, "A-Sign Establishments To Be Limited to 1,250," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 10 Apr. 1962.
11	--	News Article, "Military To Inspect and Approve Bars and Cabarets," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 24 Apr. 1962.
12	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
13	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
14	--	News Article, "Postponement of Preliminary Examination of Bars and Cabarets To Be Requested," <u>Ryukyu</u>



Footnote No.	Document No.	
14	--	<u>Shimpo</u> , 24 Apr. 1962; News Article, "Bar and Cabaret Operators Perturbed about Adoption of A-Sign System," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 26 Apr. 1962.
15	--	News Article, "104 Bars and Cabarets in Koza City Approved," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 2 June 1962.
16	--	News Article, "'Off-Limits Cyclone' Hits Central Okinawa," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 30 June 1962.
17	--	Commentary, "Revocation of A-Signs," <u>Daigen-Shogen</u> column, <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 7 July 1962.
18	--	Editorial, "Ryukyuan Government and Problem of A-Sign," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 26 July 1962.
19	--	News Article, "Forty-Two Establishments Lose A-Signs," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 8 Aug. 1962.
20	--	Editorial, "In Connection with the Cancellation of A-Signs," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 10 Aug. 1962.
21	--	News Article, "Military Police Group and Deputy Civil Administrator Differ in Views on A-Sign Problem," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 10 Aug. 1962; News Article, "Confiscation of A-Sign within Purview of Disciplinary Control Board," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 13 Aug. 1962; News Article, "Prostitution Reason for Off-Limits, Say Military Officials," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 14 Aug. 1962; News Article, "Military Representatives Fail To Attend 'A-Sign' Roundtable Conference," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 22 Aug. 1962.
22	--	News Article, "A-Sign Problem Discussed," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 13 Sept. 1962.
23	--	News Article, "A Sign Storm Hits Again: 35 Establishments Lose Signs for Prostitution," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 13 Sept. 1962; News Article, "Joint Meeting To Be Held Tomorrow," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 13 Sept. 1962.
24	--	News Article, "Koza Police Suspend Business of Four Cabarets," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 13 Sept. 1962.
25	--	News Article, "Warn 18 Bars in Koza of Revocation of A-Sign," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 27 Sept. 1962.
26	--	News Article, "A-Sign To Be Cancelled Permanently If Prostitution Found," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 2 Oct. 1962.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
27	--	News Article, "A-Sign Bar Operators Rally in Koza," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 4 Oct. 1962; News Article, "Bar Operators Meet," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 9 Oct. 1962.
28	--	News Article, "Ten A-Sign Licenses May Be Revoked," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 6 Nov. 1962; News Article, "Alleviation of A-Sign System Petitioned," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 5 Nov. 1962.
29	--	News Article, "A-Signs Will Not Be Reissued," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 10 Nov. 1962.
30	--	News Article, "Confiscation of A-Signs Notified to Nine Bars," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 19 Nov. 1962.
31	--	Press Release #2850, USARYIS OPA, "New Criteria Developed for Bars, Cabarets," 14 Dec. 1962; News Article, "Military Announces New Criteria for Bars and Cabarets," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 15 Dec. 1962; News Article, "Application Procedure for A-Sign Licenses Changes," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 27 Dec. 1962; News Article, "Adopt New Criteria for Licensing Bars Catering to Armed Forces," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 16 Dec. 1962; News Article, "New Criteria for A-Sign Bars Established," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 8 Jan. 1962.
32	--	News Article, "A-Sign Enterprisers Seek Postponement of New Military Criteria," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 9 Jan. 1963.
33	--	News Article, "A-Sign System To Be Continued," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 10 Jan. 1963; News Article, "New A-Sign Criteria Post Problematical Points," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 14 Jan. 1963; Minutes of Meeting of the Okinawa AFDCB on 17 Jan. 1963, pp. 4-5.
34	--	News Article, "Military To Enforce New A-Sign Criteria," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 11 Jan. 1963.
35	--	News Article, "A-Sign Enterprisers To Seek Moderation of New Criteria," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 15 Jan. 1963.
36	--	Minutes of the Meeting of the Okinawa Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board (OAFDCB) on 17 Jan. 1963, p. 5.
37	--	<u>Ibid.</u>

Footnote No.	Document No.	
38	--	News Article, "Revision of New A-Sign Criteria To Be Sought," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 28 Jan. 1963.
39	--	News Article, "New A-Sign Criteria To Become Effective 1 August," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 15 Feb. 1963; News Article, "New RASP Laws Irk Bar Owners," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 17 Feb. 1963; 1st ind., (ltr., Recorder, OAFDCB, to Secretary, CINCPACREP, R.I., sub.: Minutes, Meeting of the Disciplinary Control Board, 23 Jan. 1963), CINCPACREP, R.I., to OAFDCB, 4 Feb. 1963.
40	--	News Article, "A-Sign Problem Developing into Political Issue," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 15 Feb. 1963.
41	--	News Article, "Enforcement of New A-Sign Criteria Not Yet Decided," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 16 Feb. 1963.
42	--	Minutes of Meeting of the OAFDCB, 21 Feb. 1963.
43	--	News Article, "Koza Assembly Surveys A-Sign Establishments," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 28 Feb. 1963.
44	--	Minutes of Meeting of the OAFDCB, 28 Feb. 1963.
45	--	News Article, "A-Sign Cancellation of 27 Establishments Recommended," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 2 Mar. 1963; News Article, "Koza City Assembly and A-Sign Enterprisers Seek Moderation of Criteria," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 13 Mar. 1963.
46	--	News Article, "Alleviation of New A-Sign Criteria To Be Requested," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 16 Mar. 1963.
47	--	News Article, "In 'Sympathy': Nago Bar Owners Give Up A-Signs," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 16 March 1963; News Article, "Nago Enterprisers Return A-Sign Licenses to Provost Marshal," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 17 Mar. 1963.
48	--	News Article, "Alarmed at Rate: GRI Sets Aside \$60,000 in Social Disease Battle," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 19 Mar. 1963.
49	--	News Article, "In 'Sympathy': Nago Bar Owners Give Up A-Signs," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 16 Mar. 1963.
50	--	News Article, "A-Sign Criteria Expected To Be Enforced in August," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 19 Mar. 1963.



Footnote No.	Document No.	
51	--	News Article, "Enterprisers To Appeal Moderation of A-Sign Criteria," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 19 Mar. 1963.
52	--	Minutes of Meeting of AFDCB, 19 Mar. 1963.
53	--	News Article, "New A-Sign Criteria To Be Enforced," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 19 Mar. 1963.
54	--	News Article, "Sugar, A-Sign, and Other Problems Discussed at Ota-Caraway Meeting," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 20 Mar. 1963.
55	--	Minutes of Meeting of AFDCB, 19 Mar. 1963.
56	--	News Article, "Measures for New A-Sign Criteria Discussed," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 22 Mar. 1963; News Article, "A-Sign Problem Shows Signs of Complication," <u>Okinawa Times</u> (evening edition), 22 Mar. 1963.
57	--	News Article, "One Year Postponement for Enforcement of New 'A' Sign Criteria To Be Requested," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 6 Apr. 1963.
58	--	Minutes of Meeting of AFDCB, 18 Apr. 1963.
59	--	News Article, "New A-Sign Criteria in Force," <u>Okinawa Times</u> , 12 Apr. 1963; Minutes of Meeting of AFDCB, 18 Apr. 1963.
60	--	Minutes of AFDCB, 18 Apr. 1963; News Article, "New A-Sign Criteria To Be Enforced in August," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 20 Apr. 1963; News Article, "A-Sign Cancellation Warning Issued," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> (evening edition), 17 Apr. 1963.
61	--	Editorial, "Bar Operators' Manual," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 16 Dec. 1962.
62	--	News Article, "Ten Bars in Kosa Return A-Signs," <u>Ryukyu Shimpo</u> , 9 May 1963.
63	--	Minutes of Meeting of the AFDCB, 17 May 1963.
64	--	Minutes of the Seventy-fifth Meeting of Subcommittee No. 1, Area Joint Committee, 21 May 1963.
65	--	Minutes of Meeting of the AFDCB, 20 June 1963.

<u>Footnote No.</u>	<u>Document No.</u>	
66	--	Minutes of Seventy-first Meeting of Subcommittee No. 1, Ryukyus Area Joint Committee (RAJC), 29 Jan. 1963.
67	--	Minutes of the Seventy-second Meeting of Subcommittee No. 1, RAJC, 26 Feb. 1963.
68	--	Minutes of Sixty-sixth Meeting of the RAJC, 8 Feb. 1963, dtd. 15 Feb. 1963.
69	--	Minutes of Sixty-seventh Meeting of RAJC, 12 Mar. 1963, dtd. 15 Mar. 1963.
70	--	Pre-RAJC Agenda for Sixty-eighth Meeting of RAJC, 9 Apr. 1963, dtd. 11 Apr. 1963.
71	--	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313PC) to 51st Air Base Group (ABG) and 6313th Air Base Wing (ABW) (CR), sub.: Assignment and Occupancy of Public Quarters and Rental Housing, 17 May 1963.
72	--	Minutes of Seventieth Meeting of RAJC, 11 June 1963, dtd. 18 June 1963.
73	--	Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee No. 6, 19 Mar. 1963, dtd. 27 Mar. 1963.
74	--	Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee No. 6, 16 Apr. 1963, dtd. 19 Apr. 1963.
75	--	Defense Communications Agency (DCA) Midrange Plan, n.d.; (included in AJC folder for March 1963 with Minutes of Subcommittee No. 6, 19 Mar. 1963, dtd. 27 Mar. 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>
Commander	Major General Robert M. Stillman (1 January - 30 June)
Vice Commander	Colonel John H. deRussy (1 January - 25 June)
	Vacant (25 June - 30 June)
Protocol Officer	Captain Marvin Rosenglick (1 January - 30 June)
Aide de Camp	Captain Crawford O. Shockley (1 January - 30 June)
Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Robert M. De Bord* (1 January - 30 June)

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Director of Administrative Services	Lieut. Colonel Robert M. De Bord (1 January - 30 June)
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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Inspector General	Lieut. Colonel George C. Edwards (1 January - 27 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Dennis J. Clark (27 May - 30 June)

\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Administrative Services, 313th Air Division.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
<u>JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION</u>	
Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel William H. Yates (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF INFORMATION</u>	
Information Officer	Lieut. Colonel Merritt G. Garner (1 January - 30 June)
Deputy Information Officer	Mr. Robert L. Lansche (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
OIC, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa	Major Henri L. Tapie* (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY</u>	
Safety Officer	Major John W. Brunson (1 January - 30 June)
Nuclear Safety Officer	Captain Bruce E. Graham (1 January - 30 June)
Ground Safety Officer	Mr. Jack B. Stephens (Civilian)** (1 January - 11 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Dennis J. Clark (11 February - 27 May)
	Captain Karl J. Toth (Acting)*** (27 May - 30 June)

\*Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Ground Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

\*\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Flying Safety Officer, 6313th Air Base Wing.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON</u>	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel Paul V. Davis* (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN</u>	
Staff Chaplain	Lieut. Colonel Kenneth G. Parks** (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER</u>	
Staff Comptroller (Accounting and Finance Staff Officer)	Lieut. Colonel Norman W. Todd (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Operations	Colonel Wallace R. Jordan (1 January - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Charles V. Garino*** (1 January - 21 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith*** (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division	Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith (1 January - 21 May)
	Major Colin J. Walker (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Plans Branch	Major Gerald D. Fitzgerald (1 January - 30 June)

\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6332d USAF Dispensary, and Director, Base Medical Service, Kadena Air Base.

\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Base Chaplain, Kadena Air Base.

\*\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief, Operations and Training Division.



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch	Major Colin J. Walker (1 January - 21 May)
	Vacant (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Logistics Branch	Major Robert J. Morris (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Lieut. Colonel Charles V. Garino (1 January - 21 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Current Operations Branch	Major William O. Lighty (1 January - 18 June)
	Major Raymond A. Williams (18 June - 30 June)
Chief, 313th Air Division Air Operations Center	Major John H. Bowers (1 January - 30 June)
Passive Defense Officer	Captain Donald D. Bendell* (1 January - 5 March)
	Major Robert W. McGuire* (5 March - 30 June)
Chief, Special Operations Activities	Lieut. Colonel Erick O. Linden (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Electronics Branch**	Captain Neal C. Brigham** (1 January - 23 January)
	Vacant (23 January - 30 June)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Lieut. Colonel Russell Powell (1 January - 10 June)
	Captain Clark E. Williams (Acting) (10 June - 30 June)

\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Assistant Chief, 313th Air Division Operations Center.

\*\*Position and Captain Brigham transferred to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, Naha Air Base, on 23 January 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Chief, Operations Intelligence Branch	Captain Clark E. Williams* (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Lieut. Colonel David W. Thompson (1 January - 11 June)
	Captain Roland F. Crim (Acting) (11 June - 30 June)
Manpower Management Officer	Major Robert E. Seekins (1 January - 21 May)
	Captain Robbie V. Young (21 May - 30 June)
Organization and Management Engineering Officer	Captain Roland F. Crim** (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Kadena Manpower Branch	Second Lieutenant Milton L. Haines (11 June - 30 June)
 <u>MATERIEL DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Materiel	Colonel George S. Roberts (1 January - 25 June)
	Lieut. Colonel George Edwards (Acting) (25 June - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Lieut. Colonel Francis Sikorski (1 January - 21 May)
	Vacant (21 May - 27 May)
	Lieut. Colonel George Edwards (27 May - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Seaweed Branch	Major Edward H. Freedman (1 January - 21 May)
	Vacant (21 May - 30 June)

\*Departed on 4 January 1963 for 90 days' TDY in Western New Guinea.

\*\*Captain Crim was TDY at Yokota AB, Japan, for 45 days, beginning 3 January 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 1

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus (SAPOR), and POL Officer	Captain Alvin G. Crawford* (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major Evan L. Stoll (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Armament Division	Major Edward Newman** (1 January - 31 May)
	Vacant (31 May - 30 June)
F-105 and Missile Maintenance Project Officer	Lieut. Colonel Frank A. Downey (1 January - 13 June)
	Vacant (13 June - 30 June)
Air Force Representative with the Ryukyus Exchange System	Lieut. Colonel Robert A. Maddocks*** (1 January - 9 May)
	Vacant (9 May - 30 June)
Chief, Transportation Division	Major Joseph A. West, Jr. (1 January - 4 June)
	Vacant (4 June - 30 June)
Air Traffic Coordinating Officer	Captain Louise N. Miller (1 January - 31 May)
	Vacant (31 May - 30 June)

\*Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

\*\*Retired from active duty on 31 May 1963, on Okinawa.

\*\*\*Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.



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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
<u>OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING</u>	
Civil Engineering Officer	Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby* (1 January - 3 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Douglas C. Oldershaw** (3 June - 30 June)
Assistant Civil Engineering Officer	Mr. Lloyd H. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
Civil Engineering Liaison Officer for Air Force Operational Facilities	Lieut. Colonel Joseph E. Mills (1 January - 11 June)
	Vacant (11 June - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT</u>	
Procurement Officer	Major Lynn J. Corp (1 January - 30 June)
Deputy Procurement Officer	First Lieutenant Alexander H. Newlands (1 January - 5 March)
	Second Lieutenant Charles F. Kelsch (5 March - 30 June)
Deputy Procurement Officer	CWO (W-2) Willie M. Johnson (1 January - 30 June)
<u>PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Personnel	Colonel Robert H. Workman (1 January - 21 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert J. Thornton (21 May - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Robert J. Thornton (1 January - 21 May)
	Vacant (21 May - 30 June)

\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering.

\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron and 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Civilian Personnel Officer	Mr. Louis W. Conroy, Jr. (Civilian)* (1 January - 30 June)

DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 6001ST SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) PACAF

Commander, OSI District Office #43	Lieut. Colonel James T. Emott (1 January - 30 June)
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DETACHMENT NO. 2, 1045TH OPERATIONAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING GROUP

Detachment No. 2 Commander	Colonel Alpheus W. Blizzard (1 January - 30 June)
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KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel George B. Simler (1 January - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Deputy Wing Commander	Colonel Jones E. Bolt (1 January - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer	Major Thomas B. Huddleston, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Operations	Colonel Floyd White** (1 January - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Materiel	Colonel John W. Carpenter (1 January - 30 June)
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John C. Neill (1 January - 30 June)
44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Toivo L. Akkola (1 January - 15 June)
67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Grady Morris (1 January - 30 June)

\*Assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing. Ex officio 313th Air Division Civilian Personnel Officer.

\*\*Promoted to the rank of colonel effective 25 March 1963.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander	Major Alexander P. Butterfield (1 January - 30 June)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Billy B. Wilson (1 January - 30 June)
18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr. (1 January - 8 April)
	Major James A. Head (8 April - 30 June)
18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Wilfred N. Joyal (1 January - 25 January)
	Lieut. Colonel Marvin H. Ahrens (25 January - 30 June)
498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Commander	Colonel Warren E. Vinzant (1 January - 30 June)
498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Deputy Commander	Lieut. Colonel Malcolm A. McNall (1 January - 30 June)
498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Executive Officer	Major Norman C. Bausch* (1 January - 30 June)
498th Missile Maintenance Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Major Kenneth C. E. Titmus (1 January - 15 February)
	Major Eugene F. Phillips (15 February - 30 June)
873d Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Harold K. Boutwell (1 January - 4 March)
	Lieut. Colonel Dudley A. Dilley (4 March - 30 June)
874th Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Vacant (1 January - 15 January)
	Major Raymond E. Geer (15 January - 30 June)

\* Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Staff Administrative Officer.



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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
658th Tactical Hospital Commander	Captain William H. Greendyke (1 January - 14 May)
	Captain David P. Connolly (14 May - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Commander	Colonel Charles H. Pierce (1 January - 28 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Williams (Actg.) (28 May - 1 June)
	Colonel John R. Roche (1 June - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel Arthur G. Durbeck (1 January - 14 May)
	Vacant (14 May - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Raymond S. Barnes* (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Williams (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of** Materiel	Lieut. Colonel Max A. Pinkerton (1 January - 31 May)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Walter C. Kurowski (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Security and Law Enforcement	Lieut. Colonel Theodore J. Newnam (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Services	Lieut. Colonel James L. Edmonds (1 January - 31 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Dudley W. Høgon, Jr. (31 May - 30 June)

\* Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief of Administrative Services, 6313th Air Base Wing.

\*\* Position of 6313th Air Base Wing Director of Materiel abolished with Lieut. Colonel Pinkerton's departure for the CONUS on 31 May 1963. Duties assumed by Director of Services, 6313th ABW.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering	Lieut. Colonel Theo J. Sowerby (1 January - 3 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Douglas C. Oldershaw (3 June - 30 June)
6313th Materiel Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald R. Nimmo (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Support Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald S. Irwin (1 January - 15 May)
	Major James C. Fournie (15 May - 30 June)
6313th Air Police Squadron Commander	Major Charles N. Dungan (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Civil Engineering Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Douglas C. Oldershaw (1 January - 30 June)
6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel Paul V. Davis (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 4, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain Richard B. Crabb (1 January - 23 April)
	Captain Richard C. Hausler (23 April - 30 June)
15th Physiological Training Flight Commander	Captain Frederick F. Thimm (1 January - 30 June)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (1 January - 8 April)
7th Tactical Depot Squadron** Deputy Commander	Major James H. Bauer (1 January - 8 April)
400th Munitions Maintenance* Squadron (Theater) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (8 April - 30 June)
400th Munitions Maintenance* Squadron (Theater) Deputy Commander	Major James H. Bauer (8 April - 30 June)

\*The 7th Tactical Depot Squadron was redesignated as the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) on 8 April 1963, per PACAF SO G-17, dtd. 21 March 1963.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
418th Munitions Maintenance* Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr. (8 April - 30 June)
1962d Communications Group (AFCS) Commander	Colonel James L. Caselli (1 January - 30 June)
6922d Security Wing (USAFSS) Commander	Colonel Robert T. Engle (1 January - 15 June)
	Colonel Donald A. Reed (15 June - 30 June)
6927th Radio Squadron Mobile (USAFSS) Commander	Major Robert G. Sandstrom (1 January - 30 June)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Lieut. Colonel George E. Bye (1 January - 30 June)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Clifford L. Martin (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing Commander	Lieut. Colonel Henry Baldi (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 2, 2875th Ground Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency Squadron Commander	Captain Marvin D. Meadows (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, Headquarters PACAF (Standardization/Evaluation Team) Commander	Colonel Joel D. Thorvaldson* (1 January - 1 February)
Detachment 1, Headquarters PACAF (Standardization/Evaluation Team) Deputy Commander	Lieut. Colonel Milton E. Nelson* (1 January - 1 February)
Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/ Evaluation Group Commander	Colonel Joel D. Thorvaldson* (1 February - 30 June)
Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/ Evaluation Group Deputy Commander	Lieut. Colonel Milton E. Nelson* (1 February - 30 June)

\*Detachment 1 (PACAF Standardization/Evaluation Team), Headquarters, PACAF, was discontinued on 1 February 1963. Simultaneously, Headquarters, 6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group was designated and organized at Kadena AB, per PACAF SO G-2, dtd. 4 Jan. 1963.



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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Detachment 2, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Commander	Major Richard N. Kosman (1 January - 24 January)
	Major James H. Watkins (24 January - 30 June)
Detachment 12, 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group (TAC) Commander	Major David G. Fisher (1 January - 30 June)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander	Colonel Lester C. Hess (1 January - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Operations	Colonel Dale S. Sweat (1 January - 13 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Craig H. Fairburn (13 June - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Materiel	Colonel Ralph S. Fuhmeister, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Administrative Staff Officer	Major Robert C. Allphin (1 January - 24 May)
	Major Leo A. Sussman (24 May - 30 June)
Chief, Combat Operations Division, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing	Lieut. Colonel Cecil V. Steed (1 January - 30 June)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Craig H. Fairburn (1 January - 13 June)
	Major Ethan A. Grant (13 June - 30 June)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Frank W. Allen (1 January - 10 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Elmer H. Jose, Jr. (10 June - 30 June)

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Armement and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Ernest S. McDonald (1 January - 30 June)
51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert W. Heggenberger (1 January - 11 May)
	Major Everett P. Musselman (11 May - 27 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Hubert K. Druhe (27 May - 30 June)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Roland L. Wolfe (1 January - 30 June)
6351st USAF Dispensary Commander	Captain William H. Greendyke (Actg.)* (1 January - 3 January)
	Lieut. Colonel Jerold L. Wheaton* (3 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Commander	Colonel Edwin R. Bane (1 January - 30 June)
Special Assistant to the 51st Air Base Group Commander	Lieut. Colonel Jesse W. Simpson (1 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Robert E. Woody (1 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Harris L. Jenson (1 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Director of Security and Law Enforcement	Lieut. Colonel John A. Webster (1 January - 30 June)
51st Support Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel James V. Merritt (1 January - 18 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Sam L. Almon (18 February - 30 June)
51st Civil Engineering Squadron Commander	Major Paul Heath (1 January - 30 June)

\*Additional duty as Director, Base Medical Service, Naha Air Base.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Materiel Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Sam L. Almon (1 January - 18 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert E. Harrison (18 February - 21 June)
	Captain Charles B. Weir (21 June - 30 June)
6051st Air Police Squadron* (Provisional) Commander	Lieut. Colonel John A. Webster** (1 January - 8 January)
51st Air Police Squadron Commander*	Lieut. Colonel John A. Webster** (8 January - 30 June)
Detachment 5, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain John R. Rogers (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Commander	Colonel Jack L. Crawford, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Deputy for Operations	Colonel Cornelius G. Brosnan (1 January - 30 June)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel Ned M. Letts (1 January - 30 June)
817th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel George F. Owen (1 January - 30 June)
345th Troop Carrier Squadron,*** Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel Richard D. Cote (1 January - 8 January)
35th Troop Carrier Squadron,*** Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel Richard D. Cote (8 January - 30 June)

\*The 6051st Air Police Squadron (Provisional) was discontinued effective 8 January 1963, and in its place was organized the 51st Air Police Squadron, per PACAF SO G-93, dtd. 21 Nov. 1962.

\*\*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Security and Law Enforcement, 51st Air Base Group.

\*\*\*The 345th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, was relieved from assignment to the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) effective 8 January 1963 and was assigned to TAC. Simultaneously, the 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, was organized and assigned to the 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo), per PACAF SO G-103, dtd. 21 Dec. 1962.



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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert P. Ash (1 January - 30 June)
2152d Communications Squadron Commander	Major John C. Morton (1 January - 31 January)  Major William S. Hodge (31 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division, Commander	Captain John L. Gordon (1 January - 8 April)
Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron Commander	Major Oscar W. Yetez (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Captain Ralph H. Middlebrook (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 3, 313th Air Division Commander	Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing Commander	Major Horace W. Meredith (1 January - 21 June)  Major Woodrow B. Huff (21 June - 30 June)

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APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE  
313TH AIR DIVISION OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT  
1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

January: Twenty numbered contracts totalling \$199,118 and 33 unnumbered contracts totalling \$9,645 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of January 1963.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2114, in the amount of \$51,229, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for repair of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron operational apron at Kadena Air Base (KAD 2-3).
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2131, in the amount of \$60,954, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for repair of Runway 23L at Kadena Air Base (KAD 21-3).
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2132, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to the Ryukyus Central Exchange (REX) for general merchandise for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2133, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Island Builders' Supply Co. for building and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2134, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Turco Products for miscellaneous items for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2135, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for rubber stamps for Naha Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2136, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Kogado Stamp Shop for rubber stamps for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2137, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Showa Electric Co. for electrical supplies for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.



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- January: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2138, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Matsuyama Shoji for plumbing and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2139, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Horikawa Hardware Co. for building and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2140, in the amount of \$1,248, was awarded to Hopkins and Mumfrey, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with construction of an addition to Building 2535 at Kadena Air Base.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2141, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Furugen Brothers Co. for building and hardware supplies for Kadena Air Base. This was not a fixed price contract.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2142, in the amount of \$1,100, was awarded to Hopkins and Mumfrey, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with the construction of a medical food inspection building at Naha Air Base.
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2144, in the amount of \$18,800, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for construction of an operational alert apron at Naha Air Base.
- (o) Contract AF 62(321)-2145, in the amount of \$25,000, was awarded to Blackledge Construction Co. for repair of Buildings T-617 and T-618 (the Schilling Service Center) at Kadena Air Base.
- (p) Contract AF 62(321)-2146, in the amount of \$7,000, was awarded to Yomitan Industries for interior and exterior painting of Buildings 10, 11, 12, 15, 20, 21, 25, 35, 37, 40, 42, 45, 47, 50, T-13, T-17, T-28, T-32, and T-36 at Onna Point (6927th Radio Squadron Mobile, USAFSS) (KAD 654-2).
- (q) Contract AF 62(321)-2147, in the amount of \$2,900, was awarded to Associated American Engineers Overseas, Ltd., for architectural-engineering services in connection with construction of a "No Break" power project for Buildings 159, 876, and 910 at Kadena Air Base (KAD-436-2, KAD-437-2, KAD-439-2, and KAD-440-2).

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- January: (r) Contract AF 62(321)-2148, in the amount of \$24,500, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for construction of an addition to Building 155 (Statistical Services) at Kadena Air Base.
- (s) Contract AF 62(321)-2149, in the amount of \$1,500, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with relocation of the jet engine test stand at Naha Air Base (NAH-37-3).
- (t) Contract AF 62(321)-2150, in the amount of \$4,887, was awarded to Kokusai Densetsu for installation of telephone supports for Building 62 (transport control center) at Naha Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of January 1963.

A total of \$5,030 was expended for 149 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of January 1963.

February: Three numbered contracts totalling \$6,814 and 29 unnumbered contracts totalling \$7,856 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of February 1963.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2152, in the amount of \$3,714, was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi for the repair of roads in the 6927th Radio Squadron Mobile (USAFSS) area at Onna Point.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2153, in the amount of \$3,100, was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for ready-mix concrete for Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2154, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Island Van and Storage Co. for packing and crating services for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of February 1963.

A total of \$3,796.00 was expended for 136 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of February 1963.

March: Fourteen numbered contracts totalling \$141,221 and 32 unnumbered contracts totalling \$14,900 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of March 1963.



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- March:
- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2155, in the amount of \$20,000, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for installation of air conditioning in Building 62 (transport control center) at Naha Air Base.
  - (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2156, in the amount of \$11,256, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of the water system at Miyako Jima Air Station.
  - (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2157, in the amount of \$1,500, was awarded to Associated American Engineers Overseas, Ltd., for architectural-engineering services in connection with repair of the ready crew facility at Kadena Air Base.
  - (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2158, in the amount of \$14,468, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for repair of the refueling vehicle storage area at Naha Air Base.
  - (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2159, in the amount of \$37,912, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for repair of the civil engineering building at Naha Air Base.
  - (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2160, in the amount of \$11,980, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of the electrical systems in Buildings 411, 413, and 413A at Kadena Air Base.
  - (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2161, in the amount of \$6,096, was awarded to Rutledge Construction Co. for alteration of the AIRCOM facility (Building 3409) at Kadena Air Base.
  - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2162, in the amount of \$8,000, was awarded to Shinkai Kensetsu for repair of the pier at Kume Jima.
  - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2163, in the amount of \$21,328, was awarded to Kanihisa Kensetsu for grass cutting services at Naha Air Base.
  - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2164, in the amount of \$3,136, was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for ready-mix concrete for Kadena Air Base.
  - (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2165, in the amount of \$3,000, was awarded to Paccon Corp. for alteration of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Operations Building at Kadena Air Base.
  - (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2166, in the amount of \$1,062, was awarded to D. F. Fischer and Sons, Ltd., for repair of hangar doors at Naha Air Base.



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- March:
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2167, a requirement type contract, was awarded to United Office Machine Co. for the repair of office machines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
  - (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2168, in the amount of \$1,483, was awarded to Asahi Construction Co. for painting of steel antenna towers at Onna Point (6927th Radio Squadron Mobile) (KAD-119-3).

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of March 1963.

A total of \$2,637.00 was expended for 123 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of March 1963.

April: Three numbered contracts totalling \$27,390 and 48 unnumbered contracts totalling \$14,662 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of April 1963. There were also 17 delivery orders and communications services authorizations totalling \$11,605.00.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2169, in the amount of \$2,902, was awarded to Turco Products for soaping of aircraft at Naha Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2170, in the amount of \$1,676, was awarded to Paccon Corp. for alteration of a latrine at Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2171, in the amount of \$22,812, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for construction of a periodic maintenance shop at Naha Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of April 1963.

A total of \$3,352 was expended for 131 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of April 1963.

May: Sixteen numbered contracts totalling \$230,274 and 56 unnumbered contracts totalling \$33,504 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of May 1963. There were also 29 delivery orders and communications services authorizations totalling \$33,897.00.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2172, in the amount of \$40,400, was awarded to Yonitan Industries for interior and exterior painting of family quarters at Kadena Air Base.

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- May:
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2173, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Barclay and Co., Inc., for thermofax supplies for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
  - (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2174, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanko Industry Co. for the repair of refrigerators at Kadena Air Base.
  - (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2175, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Oshiro Brothers Co. for the repair of mattresses at Naha Air Base.
  - (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2176, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Far Eastern Home and Club Furnishings Co. for the repair of wooden furniture for Naha Air Base.
  - (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2177, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanko Industry Co. for the repair of metal furniture at Naha Air Base.
  - (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2178, in the amount of \$1,395, was awarded to Associated American Engineers Overseas, Ltd., for architectural-engineering services in connection with Building 220 (the Base Finance Office) at Kadena Air Base.
  - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2179, in the amount of \$19,100, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for resealing joints in Warm-up Pad #7 at Kadena Air Base (KAD-161-3).
  - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2180, in the amount of \$2,684, was awarded to Turco Products for cleaning compound for Naha Air Base.
  - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2181, in the amount of \$1,500, was awarded to Associated American Engineers Overseas, Ltd., for architectural-engineering services in connection with administrative services at Kadena Air Base.
  - (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2182, in the amount of \$17,591, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for alteration of the maintenance dock at Naha Air Base.
  - (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2183, in the amount of \$37,892, was awarded to Kokuba Gumi for construction of an operational alert apron at Naha Air Base.
  - (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2184, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Chuo Haiden (Central Power Distribution Co.) for supplying electrical power for the Kosa AIRCOM Micro-wave Relay Tower.



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- May:
- (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2185, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Island Builders' Supply Co. for the repair of wooden furniture for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
  - (o) Contract AF 62(321)-2186, in the amount of \$22,047, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Corp. for construction of a taxiway apron at Naha Air Base.
  - (p) Contract AF 62(321)-2187, in the amount of \$87,665, was awarded to Nanyo Doken for the application of a protective coating on aircraft at Kadena Air Base.

One salvage contract in the amount of \$3,630.00 was awarded to Ota Shoten for iron and steel scrap during the month of May 1963.

A total of \$3,488.00 was expended for 131 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of May 1963.

June: Twenty-seven numbered contracts totalling \$501,093 and 66 un-numbered contracts totalling \$46,380 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities on Okinawa during the month of June 1963. There were also 24 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$43,325.00.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2188, in the amount of \$41,736, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for construction of a ground power equipment (GPE) maintenance shop at Naha Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2189, in the amount of \$47,710, was awarded to Rutledge Construction Co. for construction of a floodlight system at Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2190, in the amount of \$90,598, was awarded to Nankai Doboku for repair of airmen's dormitories at Kadena Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2191, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Okinawa Electric Motor Co. for the repair of fans at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2192, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Ishihara Kogyo to repair furniture at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2193, in the amount of \$117,000, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for repair of airmen's dining halls at Kadena Air Base.



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- June:
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2194, in the amount of \$11,241, was awarded to Asahi Construction Co. for the repair of electrical distribution system at Kume Jima Air Station (NAH-22-3).
  - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2195, in the amount of \$56,377, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Co. for repair of airfield shoulder stabilization at Naha Air Base.
  - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2196, in the amount of \$1,150, was awarded to Hopkins and Mumfrey, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with the Administration Building (#604) at Naha Air Base.
  - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2197, in the amount of \$1,400, was awarded to Hopkins and Mumfrey, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with a BOQ at Miyako Jima Air Station.
  - (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2198, in the amount of \$385, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with alterations to the Air Defense Control Center (Building #602) at Naha Air Base (NAH-34-4).
  - (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2199, in the amount of \$1,120, was awarded to Hopkins and Mumfrey, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with construction of an administration building for Detachment 3, 313th Air Division at Naha Air Base.
  - (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2200, in the amount of \$2,070, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with maintenance of the field maintenance hangar (Building #72) at Naha Air Base (NAH 50-4).
  - (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2201, in the amount of \$670, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with repair of the floor of the stage of the McConnell Theater (Building #1310) at Naha Air Base.
  - (o) Contract AF 62(321)-2202, in the amount of \$500, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with repair of the air conditioning system in the group conference room (Building #604) at Naha Air Base.

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- June:
- (p) Contract AF 62(321)-2203, in the amount of \$820, was awarded to G. H. Anderson and Associates, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with replacement of the floor of the Adams Gymnasium at Naha Air Base.
  - (q) Contract AF 62(321)-2204, in the amount of \$10,043, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for construction of a visual approach slope indicator system for Runway 5L/23R at Kadena Air Base (KAD-59-3).
  - (r) Contract AF 62(321)-2205, in the amount of \$4,150, was awarded to Shinkai Kensetsu for construction of utility ducts at Kadena Air Base.
  - (s) Contract AF 62(321)-2206, in the amount of \$24,997, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for construction of a Combat Control Center (CCC) at Kadena Air Base.
  - (t) Contract AF 62(321)-2207, in the amount of \$4,008, was awarded to Okinawa Denki Suido Kogyo Sua for the installation of cable at Naha Air Base.
  - (u) Contract AF 62(321)-2208, in the amount of \$24,851, was awarded to Okinawa Denki Suido Kogyo Sua for electrical rewiring of Stilwell Park houses at Kadena Air Base.
  - (v) Contract AF 62(321)-2209, in the amount of \$2,415, was awarded to Okinawa Denki Suido Kogyo Sua for the installation of an outside cable plant at Naha Air Base.
  - (w) Contract AF 62(321)-2210, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Central Appliance Service Co. for repair of washers at Kadena Air Base.
  - (x) Contract AF 62(321)-2211, in the amount of \$15,900, was awarded to Shinkai Kensetsu Co. for repair of water mains at Kadena Air Base.
  - (y) Contract AF 62(321)-2212, in the amount of \$4,100, was awarded to Bourne Associates International, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with construction at Naha Air Base.
  - (z) Contract AF 62(321)-2213, in the amount of \$22,000, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for installation of an air conditioning system in the Base Finance Office (Building #220) at Kadena Air Base.

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June: (aa) Contract AF 62(321)-2214, in the amount of \$18,271, was awarded to Okisui Construction Co. for repair of sections of fence at Naha Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of June 1963.

A total of \$3,471.00 was expended for 129 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of June 1963.



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APPENDIX 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

KADENA AIR BASE

	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales	\$ 9,834.48	\$11,141.47	\$15,056.68
Category 21 (Health & Appearance)		25.20	43.20
Category 22 (Health & Appearance)	124.15	262.43	121.20
Category 63 (Miscellaneous)			17.25
Category 69 (Miscellaneous)	<u>2,212.35</u>	<u>756.45</u>	<u>743.00</u>
TOTAL	\$12,170.98	\$12,185.55	\$15,981.33

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales	\$12,713.27	\$14,289.73	\$ 7,156.50
Category 22 (Health & Appearance)	215.90	269.33	191.47
Category 63 (Miscellaneous)			12.20
Category 69 (Miscellaneous)	<u>534.45</u>	<u>2,999.75</u>	<u>2,546.00</u>
TOTAL	\$13,463.62	\$17,558.81	\$ 9,906.17

TOTAL SALES - \$81,266.46

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 3

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION CLOTHING SALES ACTIVITIES

NAHA AIR BASE

	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales	\$6,276.15	\$5,624.98	\$6,515.82
Category 21 (Health & Appearance)			61.05
Category 22 (Health & Appearance)	393.70	210.35	360.19
Category 69 (Miscellaneous)	<u>136.75</u>	<u>157.50</u>	<u>          </u>
TOTAL	\$6,806.60	\$5,992.83	\$6,937.06

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales	\$7,375.28	\$6,884.27	\$3,528.12
Category 21 (Health & Appearance)			8.10
Category 22 (Health & Appearance)	<u>509.65</u>	<u>259.26</u>	<u>174.81</u>
TOTAL	\$7,884.93	\$7,143.53	<del>\$3,711.03</del>

TOTAL SALES - \$38,475.98



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APPENDIX 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

1963

MONTHLY COMPARISON PROFIT AND LOSS

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
January	\$4,247	\$(2,444)	\$3,445	\$(3,164)	\$5,283	\$ 264
February	7,412	321	5,928	440	9,788	959
March	3,596	(587)	4,633	1,800	4,748	1,841
April	5,814	177	2,028	1,656	4,206	3,456
May	3,600	2,637	825	(6,882)	268	1,208
June	7,251	(316)	4,065	3,783	3,195	(86)

NET PROFIT AND LOSS

CALENDAR YEAR TO DATE

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
January	\$ 4,247	\$(2,444)	\$ 3,445	\$(3,164)	\$ 5,283	\$ 264
February	11,659	(2,123)	9,373	(2,724)	15,071	1,223
March	15,255	(2,710)	14,006	(924)	19,819	3,064
April	21,069	(2,533)	16,034	732	24,024	6,520
May	24,669	620	16,859	(10,031)	24,293	4,799
June	31,920	(936)	20,924	(6,248)	27,488	4,714

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS  
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1963

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>January:</u>						
Total Sales	\$71,465	\$28,273	\$69,583	\$46,671	\$73,014	\$32,082
Food Sales	31,891	15,454	21,797	14,566	15,295	5,970
Beverage Sales	9,221	2,650	13,525	10,579	14,347	9,135
Package Goods Sales	10,849	5,125	19,152	12,786	3,020	-0-
Bingo Sales	4,516	557	2,643	1,297	1,849	-0-
Other Sundry Sales and Services	14,988	4,487	12,466	7,443	38,503	16,977
Other Activity Income	16,310	7,969	20,413	12,489	13,902	7,839
Dues Income	4,985	2,121	2,390	97	2,178	1,295
Other Misc. Income	112	210	160	737	2,012	185
<u>February:</u>						
Total Sales	\$67,863	\$26,902	\$67,413	\$45,182	\$77,600	\$35,101
Food Sales	30,799	14,784	21,848	13,533	18,511	6,488
Beverage Sales	9,790	3,079	14,582	10,858	15,170	9,424
Package Goods Sales	10,580	5,356	14,499	9,893	2,318	-0-
Bingo Sales	2,984	-0-	3,070	2,718	1,315	-0-
Other Sundry Sales and Services	13,710	3,683	13,414	8,180	40,286	19,189
Other Activity Income	18,364	8,776	23,305	15,394	17,991	9,244
Dues Income	4,640	2,049	2,479	133	2,310	1,313
Other Misc. Income	58	226	1,322	452	880	239
<u>March:</u>						
Total Sales	\$64,848	\$25,795	\$60,468	\$43,015	\$70,720	\$34,309
Food Sales	29,070	14,711	19,107	13,720	17,642	6,275
Beverage Sales	9,234	3,522	12,234	10,830	11,991	9,683
Package Goods Sales	9,271	4,438	14,099	9,002	2,602	-0-
Bingo Sales	3,974	-0-	3,127	2,472	1,569	768
Other Sundry Sales and Services	13,299	3,124	11,901	6,991	36,916	17,583
Other Activity Income	16,779	8,354	21,667	15,310	17,367	9,177
Dues Income	5,030	2,034	2,450	89	2,341	1,380
Other Misc. Income	957	142	796	193	1,004	167



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS  
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1963

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>April:</u>						
Total Sales	\$68,699	\$29,115	\$64,981	\$46,185	\$75,218	\$38,226
Food Sales	29,561	16,091	20,907	15,740	17,690	6,952
Beverage Sales	9,103	3,887	12,750	10,329	12,424	11,197
Package Goods Sales	9,673	5,237	15,074	9,558	2,466	-0-
Bingo Sales	4,957	-0-	3,751	2,287	2,195	1,292
Other Sundry Sales and Services	15,405	3,900	12,499	8,270	40,443	18,785
Other Activity Income	17,704	8,750	22,789	16,619	19,996	11,035
Dues Income	5,075	2,091	2,422	92	2,327	1,432
Other Misc. Income	129	76	527	264	1,038	160
<u>May:</u>						
Total Sales	\$68,453	\$31,480	\$62,503	\$47,813	\$73,278	\$36,413
Food Sales	30,387	17,991	18,981	16,131	18,129	6,690
Beverage Sales	8,562	4,127	12,582	12,078	12,643	10,830
Package Goods Sales	10,719	5,420	15,571	9,421	2,916	-0-
Bingo Sales	4,636	-0-	3,171	2,107	1,309	1,001
Other Sundry Sales and Services	14,149	3,942	12,198	8,076	38,281	17,892
Other Activity Income	22,753	12,221	21,932	14,721	29,393	14,446
Dues Income	4,860	3,402	2,387	82	2,271	1,315
Other Misc. Income	131	85	1,028	202	1,441	96
<u>June:</u>						
Total Sales	\$69,367	\$28,395	\$65,163	\$46,054	\$70,066	\$34,936
Food Sales	31,990	16,836	21,192	18,147	17,429	8,228
Beverage Sales	8,381	3,934	12,904	13,828	11,659	10,165
Package Goods Sales	11,287	4,716	16,669	9,318	3,403	-0-
Bingo Sales	4,688	-0-	3,138	2,421	1,265	762
Other Activity Income	19,855	6,918	24,256	18,705	27,026	13,328
Dues Income	4,675	3,033	2,285	1,562	2,258	1,290
Non-Operating Income	44	171	522	205	1,885	127

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1963

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>January:</u>						
Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,405	\$ 1,513	\$ 2,954	\$ 1,648	\$ 2,097	\$ 1,366
Salaries (US Civ)	1,171	314	1,258	203	687	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	17,557	9,734	16,439	10,334	18,776	9,636
Entertainment	7,940	4,040	8,149	9,170	10,681	6,203
Depreciation	2,426	1,016	3,399	1,984	2,470	841
Miscellaneous	919	381	941	622	2,153	455
<u>February:</u>						
Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,513	\$ 797	\$ 2,834	\$ 1,787	\$ 2,329	\$ 1,332
Salaries (US Civ)	1,103	263	1,567	205	746	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	16,940	9,611	15,660	10,875	18,206	9,834
Entertainment	7,607	3,477	8,460	7,946	10,433	5,924
Depreciation	2,590	938	3,452	2,113	2,389	723
Miscellaneous	862	369	927	1,131	2,095	448
<u>March:</u>						
Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,478	\$ 676	\$ 2,758	\$ 1,628	\$ 2,044	\$ 1,284
Salaries (US Civ)	1,060	263	1,220	-0-	1,004	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	15,949	9,163	14,787	9,507	16,855	8,987
Entertainment	7,736	3,990	8,474	8,169	9,778	5,172
Depreciation	2,657	1,069	3,473	2,127	2,474	1,145
Miscellaneous	890	349	1,351	694	2,742	449

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

# OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

## MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1963

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
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### April:

Salaries (Mil)	\$1,478	\$ 725	\$ 2,875	\$ 1,730	\$ 2,161	\$ 1,400
Salaries (US Civ)	1,207	262	1,378	-0-	1,149	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	17,268	10,135	15,954	10,526	18,231	10,331
Entertainment	7,238	4,175	8,919	9,496	10,803	5,578
Depreciation	2,581	1,233	3,594	2,148	2,412	1,172
Miscellaneous	872	389	1,269	633	2,112	630

### May:

Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,652	\$ 550	\$ 3,257	\$ 1,704	\$ 2,226	\$ 1,598
Salaries (US Civ)	1,107	258	1,328	-0-	675	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	16,216	9,822	14,976	10,877	17,387	10,234
Entertainment	8,816	4,559	9,190	10,244	11,583	5,603
Depreciation	2,430	1,187	3,588	2,066	2,407	1,160
Miscellaneous	945	434	1,192	5,680	2,461	901

### June:

Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,656	\$ 686	3,474	\$ 1,781	\$ 2,326	\$ 1,498
Salaries (US Civ)	1,087	268	1,340	-0-	675	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	17,082	10,000	15,927	10,934	16,720	10,002
Entertainment	6,785	4,425	8,599	8,450	8,753	5,920
Depreciation	2,496	1,314	3,594	2,087	2,481	1,163
Non-Operating Expenses	936	334	1,239	627	2,473	409



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

NUMBER OF MEMBERS

Month	<u>KADENA</u>			<u>NAHA</u>		
	Officers Open Mess	NCO Open Mess	Airmen's Open Mess	Officers Open Mess	NCO Open Mess	Airmen's Open Mess
January	1,088	2,390	2,178	676	1,628	1,456
February	1,043	2,479	2,310	680	1,588	1,448
March	1,089	2,450	2,341	688	1,567	1,528
April	1,049	2,422	2,327	697	1,570	1,570
May	1,004	2,389	2,271	681	1,540	1,447
June	947	2,285	2,258	594	1,567	1,425

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1963

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Month	Kadena Officers' Club			Kadena NCO Club			Kadena Airmen's Club			Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena		
	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Officers	NCO	Airmen
January	17	5	245	21	5	250	9	2	321	4.0:1	8.6:1	6.5:1
February	17	4	258	21	4	250	9	2	314	3.7:1	9.0:1	7.1:1
March	17	4	253	21	5	269	9	4	322	3.9:1	8.3:1	6.9:1
April	17	6	254	21	4	251	1	2	320	3.7:1	8.7:1	7.2:1
May	17	5	258	21	4	250	8	2	320	3.5:1	8.6:1	6.8:1
June	17	4	254	21	4	250	8	2	320	3.4:1	8.3:1	6.8:1

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1963

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Month	Naha Officers' Club			Naha NCO Club			Naha Airmen's Club			Ratio of Members to Employees Naha		
	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyuan	Officers	NCO	Airmen
January	6	1	144	8	1	150	6	-0-	146	4.5:1	*	9.6:1
February	6	1	146	8	1	147	6	-0-	148	4.4:1	*	9.4:1
March	6	1	144	8	-0-	150	6	-0-	151	4.6:1	9.9:1	9.7:1
April	6	1	148	8	-0-	156	6	-0-	155	4.5:1	9.6:1	9.8:1
May	6	1	147	8	-0-	162	6	-0-	155	4.4:1	9.1:1	9.0:1
June	6	1	147	8	-0-	164	6	-0-	154	3.8:1	9.1:1	8.9:1

\*Ratio over 10:1.



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

KUME SHIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$(132)	\$(132)	104	\$1.00	2	-0-	6	*
February	311	179	110	1.00	2	-0-	4	*
March	497	676	97	1.00	2	-0-	4	*
April	391	1,067	111	1.00	2	-0-	4	*
May	395	1,462	102	1.00	2	-0-	4	*
June	43	1,497	113	1.00	2	-0-	4	*

\*Ratio over 10:1.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

MIYAKO JIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss CY to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 902	\$ 902	105	\$----	3	-0-	6	*
February	683	1,585	113	1.00	3	-0-	6	*
March	195	1,780	111	1.00	3	-0-	6	*
April	601	2,381	115	1.00	3	-0-	9	9.6:1
May	(14)	2,367	110	----	3	-0-	11	7.9:1
June	(156)	2,211	100	----	3	-0-	11	7.1:1

\*Ratio over 10:1.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

YOZA DAKE NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss CY to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 636	\$ 636	185	\$.50	3	-0-	20	8.0:1
February	1,143	1,779	172	.50	3	-0-	20	7.5:1
March	440	2,219	171	.50	3	-0-	19	7.8:1
April	604	2,823	164	.50	3	-0-	20	7.1:1
May	573	3,396	149	.50	3	-0-	21	6.2:1
June	391	3,787	154	.50	3	-0-	21	6.4:1

\*Ratio over 10:1.



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 4

OKINO-ERABU JIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss CY to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 621	\$ 621	95	\$1.00	5	-0-	4	*
February	588	1,209	102	1.00	5	-0-	4	*
March	908	2,117	96	1.00	5	-0-	4	*
April	1,069	3,186	103	1.00	5	-0-	4	*
May	398	3,584	104	1.00	5	-0-	6	9.5:1
June	111	3,695	96	1.00	5	-0-	5	9.6:1

\* Ratio over 10:1.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 5

APPENDIX 5

RATIONS ISSUED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMISSARIES  
ON OKINAWA

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1963

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 5

KADENA AIR BASE

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Field Ration "A"	112,716	113,905	102,062
Inflight Box Lunches	1,214	1,730	1,782
Inflight Food Packets	89	128	100
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	811	1,256	935
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	268	231	245
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	120	97	122
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	132	147	136
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	32	30	27
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	16	--	--
Pre-cooked Frozen Meals	--	216	--
Bitesize Meals	--	349	--

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Field Ration "A"	118,134	112,871	104,675
Inflight Food Packets	-----	70	825
Inflight Box Lunches	114	2,547	3,837
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	2,932	701	995
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	778	339	866
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	342	132	55
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	181	193	110
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	89	31	6
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	--	15	38
Meals - Philippine AF Personnel	--	--	2
Meals - Japanese Personnel	--	12	--
Pre-cooked Frozen Meals	12	188	258
Bitesize Meals	839	254	----
Sandwich Meal	----	----	261



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 5

NAHA AIR BASE

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Field Ration "A"	65,772	66,247	62,018
Inflight Box Lunches	1,280	1,287	600
Inflight Food Packets	84	25	71
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	25	38	87
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	623	685	633
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	50	21	35
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	28	8	18
Meals - Philippine AF Personnel	45	49	3
Meals - Royal AF Personnel	--	17	--
Meals - New Zealand AF Personnel	--	1	--
Meals - British Army Personnel	--	49	--
Pre-Cooked Frozen Meals	--	--	--

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Field Ration "A"	68,540	65,356	67,779
Inflight Box Lunches	1,131	1,589	1,784
Inflight Food Packets	78	32	304
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	160	193	93
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	861	927	1,178
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	89	215	133
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	12	34	1
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	--	41	48
Meals - Royal AF Personnel	6	--	--

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 5

KADENA AIR BASE

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$230,679.12	\$218,540.00	\$212,659.68
Bulk Sales to Clubs	46,655.70	35,954.61	36,960.10
Troop Issue	<u>127,223.72</u>	<u>126,424.52</u>	<u>108,360.87</u>
TOTAL	\$404,558.54	\$380,919.13	\$357,980.65

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$215,563.67	\$214,007.95	\$214,601.63
Bulk Sales to Clubs	38,018.45	43,490.13	35,994.92
Troop Issue	<u>121,038.10</u>	<u>115,479.72</u>	<u>108,150.48</u>
TOTAL	\$374,620.22	\$372,977.80	\$358,747.03

NAHA AIR BASE

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$121,362.93	\$113,105.14	\$108,948.03
Bulk Sales to Clubs	17,744.12	18,916.72	16,867.78
Troop Issue	<u>74,865.57</u>	<u>68,471.44</u>	<u>63,146.21</u>
TOTAL	\$213,972.62	\$200,493.30	\$188,962.02

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$123,257.60	\$126,407.66	\$106,951.31
Bulk Sales to Clubs	20,254.22	21,277.99	17,447.00
Troop Issues	<u>68,985.26</u>	<u>63,662.72</u>	<u>64,223.35</u>
TOTAL	\$212,497.08	\$211,648.37	\$188,621.66

313th AD, 1963-I

APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

JANUARY 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during January 1963	667,675#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	140#
Utilized within the Air Force	15,705#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	437,666#
Scrap on hand 1 January 1963*	452,698#
Scrap on hand 1 February 1963	466,862#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during January 1963	\$268,767.65
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	1,664,26
Utilized within the Air Force	6,515.57
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	152,444.74
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	97,122.77
Total excesses on hand 1 January 1963	987,007.18
Total excesses on hand 1 February 1963	998,027.49

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 8,549.36
Money collected from operation of the retail store	1,522.13
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>1,524.63</u>
TOTAL	\$ 11,596.12

\*NOTE: A total of 2,752,548# was posted in error and was inventory-adjusted to correct the balance.

Two spot bid sales were conducted during January 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

FEBRUARY 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during February 1963	284,519#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	5,694#
Utilized within the Air Force	9,548#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	233,104#
Scrap on hand 1 February 1963	466,862#
Scrap on hand 1 March 1963	503,035#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during February 1963	\$657,083.32
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	9,026.28
Utilized within the Air Force	10,610.54
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	297,191.37
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	60,026.76
Total excesses on hand 1 February 1963	998,027.49
Total excesses on hand 1 March 1963	1,278,255.86

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 3,101.40
Money collected from the operation of the retail store	4,832.81
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>1,578.90</u>
TOTAL	\$ 9,513.11

Three spot bid sales were conducted during February 1963.

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

MARCH 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during March 1963	243,072#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	643#
Utilized within the Air Force	8,998#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	470,966#
Scrap on hand 1 March 1963	503,035#
Scrap on hand 1 April 1963	265,500#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during March	\$1,715,061.67
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	27,003.52
Utilized within the Air Force	16,183.30
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	1,372,443.18
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	335,714.23
Total excesses on hand 1 March 1963	1,278,255.86
Total excesses on hand 1 April 1963	1,241,973.30

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 20,034.36
Money collected from operation of the retail store	11,403.21
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>2,038.45</u>
TOTAL	\$ 33,476.02

Three spot bid sales were conducted during March 1963.



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

APRIL 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during April	348,645#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	640#
Utilized within the Air Force	3,144#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	324,805#
Scrap on hand 1 April 1963	265,500#
Scrap on hand 1 May 1963	285,556#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during April	\$663,896.09
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	76,526.13
Utilized within the Air Force	94,114.36
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	334,875.78
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	182,683.20
Total excesses on hand 1 April 1963	1,241,973.30
Total excesses on hand 1 May 1963	1,217,669.92

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 14,886.11
Money collected from operation of the retail store	4,998.97
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>1,109.98</u>
TOTAL	\$ 20,995.06

Two spot bid sales were conducted during April 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

MAY 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during May 1963	1,174,386#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	5,543#
Utilized within the Air Force	7,296#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	246,747#
Scrap on hand 1 May 1963	285,556#
Scrap on hand 1 June 1963	1,200,356#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during May 1963	\$ 471,533.07
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	14,480.77
Utilized within the Air Force	2,487.58
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	274,722.81
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	116,414.60
Total excesses on hand 1 May 1963	1,217,669.92
Total excesses on hand 1 June 1963	1,281,097.23

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 6,107.74
Money collected from operation of the retail store	5,510.89
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>2,058.66</u>
TOTAL	\$ 13,677.29

Four spot bid sales were conducted during May 1963.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 6

SUMMARY OF 313TH AIR DIVISION REDISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING ACTIVITIES

JUNE 1963

(1) Scrap and Waste

Scrap received during June 1963	267,622#
Transferred to D.O.D. agencies (Army, Navy, Marines)	105#
Utilized within the Air Force	4,239#
Scrap disposed of by sale (Spot or seal bid, retail)	266,497#
Scrap on hand 1 June 1963	1,200,356#
Scrap on hand 1 July 1963	1,237,137#

(2) Surplus and Excesses

Total excesses received during June	\$ 870,981.10
Total excesses transferred (D.O.D.)	12,128.73
Utilized within the Air Force	66,625.13
Total excesses expended, destroyed, or inventoried	558,383.28
Total excesses disposed of by sale (Spot bid and retail)	327,355.15
Total excesses on hand 1 June 1963	1,281,097.23
Total excesses on hand 1 July 1963	1,187,586.04

(3) Monies Received

Money collected from spot bid sales	\$ 16,547.40
Money collected from operation of the retail store	10,777.71
Money collected from sealed bid sales	<u>1,892.48</u>
TOTAL	\$ 29,217.59

Three spot bid sales were conducted during June 1963.



313th AD, 1963-I

APPENDIX 7

TRANSPORTATION DATA FOR THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 7

<u>JANUARY</u>				
	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,709	1,665	300	302
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	1,301	803	185	181
Water - All Channels	99	136	5,024	2,019

<u>FEBRUARY</u>				
	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,453	1,172	273	302
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	1,155	574	170	203.2
Water - All Channels	132	133	6,204	2,214

<u>MARCH</u>				
	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,816	1,720	346	309
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	1,406	854	206	190
Water - All Channels	103	141	5,024	2,019

NOTE: Air cargo reflected in short tons. Water cargo reflected in measurement tons. Inbound airlift figures based on allocations only.

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 7

APRIL

	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,904	1,882	360	346
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	1,503	890	212	194
Water - All Channels	103	138	6,040	3,023

MAY

	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,475	1,983	417	204
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	999	1,128	289	132
Water - All Channels	74	126	5,441	3,512

JUNE

	<u>PASSENGERS</u>		<u>CARGO (TONS)</u>	
	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>	<u>Inbound</u>	<u>Outbound</u>
Air - All Channels	1,500	2,283	434	155
Air - Okinawa/CONUS	1,154	1,336	300	113
Water - All Channels	157	157	6,480	4,037

NOTE: Air cargo reflected in short tons. Water cargo reflected in measurement tons. Inbound airlift figures based on allocations only.



313th AD, 1963-I

APPENDIX 8

FLYING HOURS FOR OKINAWA-BASED AIRCRAFT

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 8

KADENA AIR BASE

	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>
F-100	455:50	651:30	157:30
RF-101	364:40	469:00	525:45
F-105	325:15	608:15	946:45
T-33	No Figures	387:45	No Figures
C-47	No Figures	209:30	No Figures
C-54	No Figures	91:45	No Figures

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>
F-100	113:00	82:15	48:00
RF-101	573:10	659:55	500:40
F-105	1385:25	1616:00	1170:00
T-33	422:35	402:10	279:15
C-47	258:40	205:05	178:45
C-54	148:55	155:55	80:00

NAHA AIR BASE

	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>
F-102A	546:20	476:03	564:00
C-130	238:15	1741:10	1878:00
T-33	No Figures	177:45	No Figures

	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>	<u>Flying Time</u>
F-102A	650:20	668:50	466:30
C-130	2061:15	2377:15	2322:00
T-33	192:50	229:10	183:00
H-19	74:35	47:00	38:00

313th AD, 1963-I

APPENDIX 9

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1963



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 9

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1963

<u>Month</u>	Det. 8 <u>Kadena AB</u>	Det. 14 <u>Naha AB</u>
January	1.44"	1.92"
February	1.28"	1.29"
March	1.19"	1.09"
April	2.26"	1.39"
May	0.58"	0.53"
June	<u>4.78"</u>	<u>1.92"</u>
TOTAL	11.53"	8.14"

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 10

APPENDIX 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM  
AT KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

January 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	2,453,832	670,152	5,587	12.5	900
Naha	1,903,120	395,173	399	120	1,338
TOTAL	4,356,952	1,065,325	5,986	132.5	2,238

February 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	2,595,211	963,928	10,179	174	384
Naha	1,725,040	373,000	0	102	1,596
TOTAL	4,320,251	1,336,928	10,179	276	1,980

March 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	2,453,832	670,152	5,587	12.5	900
Naha	1,903,120	395,173	399	120	1,338
TOTAL	4,356,952	1,065,325	5,986	132.5	2,238

April 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	3,907,406	1,007,244	8,005	321	516
Naha	1,849,840	402,493	619	120	2,148
TOTAL	5,757,246	1,409,737	8,624	441	2,664



313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

May 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	3,879,137	960,540	8,952	174	697
Naha	1,746,207	541,052	250	66	1,470
TOTAL	5,625,344	1,501,592	9,202	240	2,167

June 1963

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	4,113,794	1,336,884	12,109	18	368
Naha	1,573,571	294,004	969	189	1,956
TOTAL	5,687,365	1,630,888	13,078	207	2,324

313th AD, 1963-I, Appendix 11

APPENDIX 11

BASE POPULATION FIGURES

FOR

KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Hq 313th Air Division	42	47	64	82	27	26	2	2
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	18				
6313 AB Wg & Detachments	55	70	497	350	65	64	327	325
6313 AP Sq	10	8	619	633	2	2	231	230
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	9	219	209	90	88	790	798
6313 Mat Sq	21	17	558	566	30	29	603	598
6313 Sup Sq	12	1	210	105			113	111
6332d USAF Disp	32	35	86	78	3	3	33	31
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	19				
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	54	56	254	262	6	6	5	5
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	31	2	4				
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	29	5	4				
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	5	4				
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	28	33	32				
18 Fld Maint Sq	9	11	558	599			95	91
18 A&E Maint Sq	16	15	665	909			1	1
18 Org Maint Sq	6	7	333	387				
498 Tac Msl Gp	29	36	129	197	1	1	3	3
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	45	125	262				
874 Tac Msl Sq	23	1	124	2				
498 Msl Maint Sq	5	6	217	192				
TOTAL	482	490	4,741	4,914	224	219	2,203	2,195



## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	5				
7 TDS	29	29	171	162	1	1		
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	4	3				
11 Air Postal Sq	4	17	25	172			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	10	16	23	4	5	4	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	1	3	2	6				
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	22				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	13	15	1	5	2	2		
PACAF Manpower Valid Team	2	2	2	2				
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	12	38	38			5	4
1505 Sup Sq	23	21	175	188			71	70
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	6	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	37	415	379				
6927 RSM & Det	9	14	566	676				
FTD 911A	1	1	30	27				
FTD 911L, 315 Tech Sch	1	1	14	12				
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	1	1	25	23				
1038 Aud Gen	2	1	2	2	2	1		
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	21	56	59				
1962 Comm Gp	32	31	731	801	13	15	42	42
6003 Sup Sq (HAFS)					1	1		
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	8				
SAC Liaison Team	1	2		1				
AFLC					8	8		
307 Tac Ftr Sq (TDY)		30		156				
TOTAL	210	258	2,318	2,776	31	33	124	121
GRAND TOTAL	692	748	7,059	7,690	255	252	2,327	2,316
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	8,529							

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Assigned								
51 FIW	41	42	206	207	8	9	14	18
16 FIS	35	34	9	13				
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	6	465	518	3	3	84	84
51 A&E Maint Sq	10	11	262	251			2	4
51 Org Maint Sq	7	8	397	383			10	9
51 AB Gp	33	34	157	159	20	18	58	58
51 Sup Sq	10	10	120	93			65	63
51 Mat Sq	17	12	330	290	16	16	299	295
51 Civ Eng Sq	5	3	129	129	60	59	404	402
623 AC&W Sq & Detach	56	57	438	441			139	137
6351 USAF Disp	24	24	47	49	2	2	23	23
51 AP Sq	3	3	175	159			205	195
TOTAL	248	244	2,735	2,692	109	107	1,303	1,288

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
<u>Attached</u>								
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	17	46	52	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	76	91	90				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)		62		47				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	63	44	48				
33 ARS (MATS)	36	38	97	100				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	350	354	3	3	30	30
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	22				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	1	3	3				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	14	14			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	78	63			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			2	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	6	16	17			3	3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	26	25				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	24	19				
AFLC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
TOTAL	229	292	812	857	6	6	70	69
GRAND TOTAL	477	536	3,547	3,549	115	113	1,373	1,357
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	4,808							



## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 28 February 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Hq 313th Air Division	42	42	48	64	80	27	26	2	2
558 USAF Band	1	1	1	19	20				
6313 AB Wg & Detach	55	55	63	497	337	65	63	321	323
6313 AP Sq	10	10	7	619	613	2	2	231	230
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	9	9	219	213	90	87	789	792
6313 Mat Sq	21	21	9	558	440	30	29	604	596
6313 Sup Sq	12	12	10	210	289			113	111
6332d USAF Disp	32	32	36	86	79	3	3	33	31
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	2	19	22				
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	54	54	60	254	238	6	6	5	5
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	32	2	4				
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	30	5	4				
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	34	5	3				
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	25	27	33	32				
18 Fld Maint Sq	9	9	12	558	614			95	91
18 A&E Maint Sq	16	16	15	665	919			1	1
18 Org Maint Sq	6	6	8	333	398				
498 Tac Msl Gp	29	29	28	129	157	1	1	3	2
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	23	28	125	197				
874 Tac Msl Sq	23	23	24	124	123				
498 Msl Maint Sq	5	5	4	217	203				
TOTAL	482	482	487	4,741	4,985	224	217	2,197	2,184

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 28 February 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	5				
7 TDS	29	28	171	169			1	1
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	4	3				
11 Air Postal Sq	4	16	25	178			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	10	16	23	4	4	4	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	1	3	2	5				
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	23				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	13	16	1	5				
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2		2		2	2		
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	9	38	39			5	4
1505 Sup Sq	23	21	175	192			71	69
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	6	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	0	2	0	1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	35	415	379				
6927 RSM & Det	9	13	566	656				
FTD 911A	1	1	30	28				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	12				
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	1	1	25	24				
1038 Aud Gen	2	1	2	2			2	1
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	21	56	56				
1962 Comm Gp	32	31	731	805	13	14	42	41
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	8				
SAC Liaison Team	1	1		1				
AFLC					9	9		
307 Tac Ftr Sq (TDY)	25	30	4	156				
TOTAL	233	248	2,321	2,775	28	29	127	121
GRAND TOTAL	715	735	7,062	7,759	252	246	2,324	2,305
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	8,596							

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 28 February 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
51FIW		42	38	206	185	8	8	14	13
16FIS		35	34	9	7				
51 Fld Maint Sq		7	6	465	529	4	3	84	83
51 A&E Maint Sq		10	11	262	261			2	4
51 Org Maint Sq		7	7	397	367			10	9
51 AB Gp		33	35	157	181	20	14	59	58
51 Sup Sq		10	14	120	208			65	63
51 Mat Sq		17	11	330	208	16	15	298	297
51 Civ Eng Sq		5	3	129	129	60	58	404	400
51 AP Sq		3	3	175	160			205	195
623 AC&W Sq & Det		56	58	438	469			139	135
6351st USAF Disp		24	24	47	49	2	1	23	23
TOTAL		249	244	2,735	2,753	110	99	1,303	1,280



## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 28 February 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Attached								
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	17	46	48	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	74	91	89				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)		63		46				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	61	44	52				
33 ARS (MATS)	36	35	97	97				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	13	14	349	360	3	3	30	30
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	21				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	1	3	3				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	14	13			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	78	64			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			2	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	6	13	18			3	3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	26	26				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	22	20				
AFIC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
TOTAL	230	288	806	860	6	6	70	69
GRAND TOTAL	479	532	3,541	3,613	116	105	1,373	1,349
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	4,906							

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1963

Organization

<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
Hq 313th Air Division	42	49	64	82	27	25	2	2
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	21				
6313 AB Wg & Det	55	56	497	352	65	63	323	319
6313 AP Sq	10	7	619	593	2	2	231	230
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	9	219	206	90	83	789	788
6313 Mat Sq	21	10	558	450	32	28	602	589
6313 Sup Sq	12	20	210	297			113	111
6332d USAF Disp	32	35	86	85	4	3	33	31
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	21				
18 Tac Ftr Wg Hq	54	59	254	212	6	6	5	5
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	32	2	5				
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	31	5	3				
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	33	5	4				
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	27	33	33				
18 Fld Maint Sq	9	11	558	615			95	91
18 A&E Maint Sq	16	16	665	937			1	1
18 Org Maint Sq	6	8	333	394				
498 Tac Msl Grp	29	26	129	128	1	1	3	2
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	28	125	178				
874 Tac Msl Sq	23	24	124	123				
498 Msl Maint Sq	5	4	217	224				
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>482</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>4,741</b>	<b>4,963</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>2,197</b>	<b>2,169</b>

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
<u>Attached</u>								
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	6				
7 TDS	29	29	171	171			1	1
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	4	3				
11 Air Postal Sq	4	17	25	182			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	10	16	22	4	4	4	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	1	2	2	5				
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	24				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	13	16	1	7	2	3		
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	9	38	41			5	5
1505 Sup Sq	23	22	175	192			71	70
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	6	6				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp		2		1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	35	415	381				
6927 RSM & Det	9	14	566	650				
FTD 911A	1	1	30	27				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	13				
Det 2, 2875 CEEIA Sq	1	1	25	23				
1038 Aud Gen	2	1	2	2	2	1		
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	21	56	56				
1962 Comm Gp	32	32	731	828	13	13	42	40
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	8				
SAC Liaison Team	1	1		1				
AFIC					10	10		
308 Tac Ftr Sq (TDY)	31	31	155	155				
TOTAL	239	255	2,472	2,806	32	32	125	121
GRAND TOTAL	721	743	7,213	7,769	259	243	2,322	2,290

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 8,736



## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
51 FIW		42	38	206	153	8	8	14	13
16 FIS		35	34	9	7				
51 Fld Maint Sq		7	7	465	524	3	3	84	82
51 A&E Maint Sq		10	12	262	280			2	3
51 Org Maint Sq		7	7	397	377			10	8
51 AB Gp		33	35	157	166	20	14	59	54
51 Sup Sq		10	15	120	198			65	63
51 Mat Sq		17	12	330	244	16	15	298	294
51 Civ Eng Sq		5	3	129	130	60	58	404	399
51 AP Sq		3	4	175	173		1	205	194
623 AC&W Sq & Det		56	55	438	460			139	136
6351 USAF Disp		24	22	47	48	2	1	23	22
TOTAL		249	244	2,735	2,760	109	100	1,303	1,268

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
<u>Attached</u>								
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	18	46	47	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	76	91	95				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)		62		45				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	64	44	51				
33 ARS (MATS)	36	32	97	95				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	326	372	3	3	30	26
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	2	19	19				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	1	3	3				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	12	14			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	78	64			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			2	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	6	12	18				
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	26	26				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	22	20				
AFLC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
TOTAL	229	289	780	872	6	6	70	65
GRAND TOTAL	478	533	3,515	3,632	115	106	1,373	1,333
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	5,038							

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
313 Air Division	41	47	61	81	27	26	3	2	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	21					
6313 AB Wg & Det	49	58	347	379	63	65	267	275	
6313 AP Sq	8	7	619	603	1	1	230	230	
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	9	227	210	89	82	773	786	
6313 Mat Sq	11	10	506	469	24	28	126	586	
6313 Sup Sq	19	20	375	323	9	0	561	109	
6332 USAF Disp	32	34	86	86	4	3	33	31	
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	21					
Hq 18 TF Wg		58		215	8	6	6	5	
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	32	5	3	36	32	5	3	
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	32	5	3					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	33	5	4					
15 Tac Rec Sq		27		34					
18 Fld Maint Sq		12		600			95	92	
18 A&E Maint Sq		9		598			1	1	
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	7	383	346			42	41	
18 Org Maint Sq	6	8	333	398					
498 Tac Msl Gp	29	25	93	158	2	1	3	2	
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	25	127	131					
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	25	124	123					
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	4	217	204					
TOTAL	363	478	3,168	4,664	227	212	2,098	2,119	



## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	1	6	6				
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	26	28	187	170	1	1		
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	3	3				
11 Air Postal Sq	3	17	27	194			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	10	16	22	4	4	2	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	5				
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	21	26				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	33	25	22	16	6	3		
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	9	41	44			5	5
1505 Sup Sq	23	23	193	193			71	70
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	5	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	35	415	376				
6927 RSM & Det	15	16	465	587				
FTD 911A	1	1	29	27				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	13				
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	1	1	25	23				
1038 Aud Gen	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	21	57	57				
1962 Comm Gp & Det 1 & 2	28	33	811	838	13	12	42	40
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	8				
SAC LIAISON Team	1	1	1	1				
AFLC					9	10		
31 Tac Ftr Sq (TDY)	31	31	155	155				
TOTAL	260	267	2,510	2,774	35	32	122	120
GRAND TOTAL	623	745	5,678	7,438	262	244	2,220	2,239

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 8,811

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
51 FIW		43	38	160	156	10	8	7	13
16 FIS		33	34	9	10				
51 Fld Maint Sq		7	6	459	497	4	3	53	80
51 A&E Maint Sq		12	12	287	296			0	3
51 Org Maint Sq		5	7	386	387			10	8
51 AB Gp		33	37	155	185	18	13	40	36
51 Sup Sq		14	15	175	186	5	4	245	245
51 Mat Sq		9	11	289	269	12	11	119	114
51 Civ Eng Sq		5	3	112	128	60	58	428	410
51 AP Sq		3	4	173	174	0	1	197	190
623 AC&W Sq & Det		55	55	437	481			139	135
6351 USAF Disp		23	21	49	49	2	1	23	22
TOTAL		242	243	2,691	2,818	111	99	1,261	1,256

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	18	48	46	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	80	91	93				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	60	43	41				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	63	43	49				
33 ARS (MATS)	35	36	108	104				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	349	368	3	3	25	24
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	2	19	20				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	1	3	3				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	12	16			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	78	62			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			2	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	6	12	20			3	3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	2	26	26				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	19	18	48	46	1	1		
AFLC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
Navy							0	9
TOTAL	290	295	860	871	6	6	65	72
GRAND TOTAL	532	538	3,551	3,689	117	105	1,326	1,328
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	5,088							



## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1963

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	Officer		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Hq 313th Air Division	41	45	61	84	27	25	3	1
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	21				
6313 AB Wg & Det	49	62	347	374	63	64	268	268
6313 AP Sq	8	7	619	614	1	1	230	230
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	8	227	212	89	83	778	782
6313 Mat Sq	11	10	506	472	24	24	130	128
6313 Sup Sq	19	20	375	330	9	8	561	574
6332d USAF Disp	32	35	86	84	4	3	33	31
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	22				
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg		57		220	8	9	6	6
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	33	5	4				
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	31	5	4				
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	33	5	4				
15 Tac Rec Sq		27		32				
18 Fld Maint Sq		11		603			95	92
18 A&E Maint Sq		8		577				
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	383	371			42	41
18 Org Maint Sq	6	7	333	384				
498 Tac Msl Gp	29	30	93	127	2	2	3	2
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	25	127	129				
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	25	124	157				
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	217	234				
TOTAL	363	486	3,168	5,059	227	219	2,150	2,156

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	1	6	7				
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	26	30	187	177	1	1		
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	3	3				
11 Air Postal Sq	3	17	27	189			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	10	16	23	4	3	3	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	5				
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	21	26				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	33	27	22	17	6	4		
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 8, 1st Wea Wg	12	9	41	43			5	5
1505 Sup Sq	23	24	193	189			71	70
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	5	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	34	415	355				
6927 RSM & Det	15	17	465	596				
FTD 911A	1	1	29	28				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	13				
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	1	1	25	25				
1038 Aud Gen	2	2	3	3	1	1		
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	21	57	56				
1962 Comm Gp & Det 1 & 2	28	36	811	874	13	12	42	38
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	8				
SAC Liaison Team	1	1	1	1				
AFLC					9	9		
TOTAL	229	244	2,355	2,646	35	31	123	118
GRAND TOTAL	592	730	5,523	7,705	262	250	2,473	2,274

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 8,794

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1963

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
51 FIW	43	44	160	154	10	8	7	13
16 FIS	33	34	9	10				
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	6	459	472	4	3	52	79
51 A&E Maint Sq	12	12	287	295			0	3
51 Org Maint Sq	5	8	386	405			10	8
51 AB Gp	33	39	155	189	18	16	40	36
51 Sup Sq	14	16	175	172	5	4	245	244
51 Mat Sq	9	10	289	274	12	11	119	114
51 Civ Eng Sq	5	3	112	125	60	58	428	409
51 AP Sq	3	4	173	182	0	1	197	194
623 AC&W Sq & Det	55	54	437	466			139	140
6351 USAF Disp	23	21	49	53	2	2	23	21
TOTAL	242	251	2,691	2,797	111	103	1,260	1,261



## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
<u>Attached</u>								
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	17	48	27	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	79	91	89				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	61	43	41				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	62	43	44				
33 ARS (MATS)	35	36	108	103				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	13	349	377	3	3	25	24
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	2	19	20				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	1	3	2				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	12	15			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	4	78	63			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			1	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	7	12	19			3	3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	2	26	25				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	24	20				
AFLC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
TOTAL	290	294	860	848	6	6	64	63
GRAND TOTAL	532	545	3,551	3,645	117	109	1,324	1,324

TOTAL INDEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,086

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Hq 313th Air Division	41	44	61	84	27	24	3	1	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	21					
6313 AB Wg & Det	49	55	347	390	63	64	268	266	
6313 AP Sq	8	7	619	609	1	1	230	229	
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	8	227	198	89	86	778	783	
6313 Mat Sq	11	11	506	457	24	23	130	128	
6313 Sup Sq	19	20	375	315	9	8	561	469	
6332d USAF Disp	32	35	86	84	4	4	33	31	
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	21					
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg		57		218	8	9	6	6	
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	28	5	4					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	31	5	4					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	33	5	4					
15 Tac Rec Sq		28		30					
18 Fld Maint Sq		9		577			95	92	
18 A&E Maint Sq		7		542			1	1	
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	383	380			42	40	
18 Org Maint Sq	6	7	333	370					
498 Tac Msl Gp	29	29	93	131	2	3	3	2	
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	25	127	146					
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	24	124	141					
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	217	232					
TOTAL	363	470	3,168	4,958	227	222	2,150	2,148	

## KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	1	6	7				
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	26	31	187	166	1	0		
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq	1	1	3	1				
11 Air Postal Sq	3	17	27	186			2	2
Dist Off 43, OSI	10	11	16	22	4	3	3	3
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	5				
658 Tac Hosp	4	3	21	26				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	33	29	22	19	6	5		
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 8, 1st Wea Wg	12	10	41	40			5	5
1505 Sup Sq	23	23	193	177			71	70
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	5	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1				
6922 Sec Wg	38	33	415	359				
6927 RSM & Det	15	16	465	584				
FTD 911A	1	0	29	28				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	13				
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	1	1	25	33				
1038 Aud Gen	2	2	2	2	1	1		
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	21	20	57	50				
1962 Comm Gp & Det 1 & 2	28	34	811	911	13	12	42	38
Det 2, 27 Comm Sq			7	7				
SAC Liaison Team	1	1	1	1				
AFLC					9	9		
TOTAL	229	241	2,355	2,645	35	31	123	118
GRAND TOTAL	592	711	5,523	7,603	262	253	2,273	2,266

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 8,308



## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
51 FIW		43	41	160	148	9	8	7	13
16 FIS		33	34	9	8				
51 Fld Maint Sq		7	5	459	461	4	3	52	79
51 A&E Maint Sq		12	13	287	280			0	3
51 Org Maint Sq		5	7	386	395			10	9
51 AB Gp		33	39	155	203	18	16	40	36
51 Sup Sq		14	16	175	176	5	5	245	244
51 Mat Sq		9	10	289	262	12	10	119	110
51 Civ Eng Sq		5	5	112	126	60	61	428	407
51 AP Sq		3	4	173	175	0	1	197	193
623 AC&W Sq & Det		55	54	437	473			139	140
6351 USAF Disp		23	19	49	50	2	2	23	22
TOTAL		242	247	2,691	2,757	110	106	1,260	1,256

## NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1963

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			
	OFF & WO		Enlisted		Citizens		Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
<u>Attached</u>								
Det 1, 315 Air Div	19	18	48	26	1	1		
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	77	91	89				
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	62	43	40				
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	66	43	40				
33 ARS (MATS)	35	35	108	112				
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	14	349	384	3	3	25	24
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	2	19	16				
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	1	2	3	3				
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	12	15			1	1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	4	78	62			29	29
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2			1	1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	4	12	15			3	3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	26	25				
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1				
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	24	21				
AFLC					2	2		
Coast Guard (Treas Dept)							5	5
TOTAL	290	295	860	851	6	6	64	63
GRAND TOTAL	532	542	3,551	3,608	116	112	1,324	1,319
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	5,057							

**SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS**



5AFR 23-4

5AF REGULATION  
NO. 23-4

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE  
APO 925 24 November 1961

### Organization and Mission - Field

#### 313TH AIR DIVISION

**PURPOSE:** To state the mission and responsibilities, and outline command relationships of the 313th Air Division.

1. **Mission.** The mission of the 313th Air Division is to maintain assigned and attached forces at a degree of combat readiness that will insure the success of directed military operations.
2. **Organization.** The 313th Air Division is a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force. It is provided with a headquarters and such units and facilities necessary to accomplish its mission and to carry out Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in the 313th Air Division area.
3. **Responsibilities.** The Commander, 313th Air Division, will:
  - a. Exercise command of assigned units except for that direct control retained by the Commander, Fifth Air Force, over offensive tactical forces.
  - b. Control and/or support attached units as directed.
  - c. Organize, administer, equip, and train assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies and plans issued by this and higher headquarters.
  - d. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, prepare plans as required in support of Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.
  - e. Insure that combat training is conducted in accordance with existing directives and oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders. Emphasis will be placed upon the specific plans and directives listed in Attachment 1.
  - f. Insure that all combat and combat direct support units are furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to maintain a high degree of combat readiness.

This regulation supersedes 5AFR 23-4, 8 Jun 60.

5AFR 23-4

g. Insure the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

h. Monitor the development and conduct of training programs to include:

(1) Technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(2) General military training in accordance with applicable AF Unit Training Standards.

(3) Assist in aircrew, ground crew, technical and other training for military members of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program as required.

(4) Other training as directed.

i. Contribute toward development of:

(1) Tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(2) Requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.

(3) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

j. Provide aircraft for, and supervision over, annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel outlined in AFR 60-3.

k. Provide administrative and logistic support, as directed.

l. Support the Strategic Air Command, Military Air Transport Service and other USAF activities in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units as reflected on current USAF programming document.

m. When directed, exercise operational control of forces other than those of the United States.

n. Exercise operational control of US Army and Navy antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units, and other antiaircraft artillery made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

o. Represent CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region.

p. Conduct search and rescue operations as directed.

q. Organize and administer an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units.

r. Provide for sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations.



s. Provide for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required in support of the mission.

t. Exercise general courts-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

u. Coordinate with and provide assistance to other United States military services and governmental agencies to include:

(1) Formulating and jointly planning local ground defense search and rescue, civil disturbance, typhoon, natural disaster, military facility recovery, emergency noncombatant evacuation, and special demonstration plans, with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies.

(2) Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

(3) Participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies as directed by the Commander, U.S. Forces.

(4) Contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Services Police Force and the Ryukyuan Army and Air Force Exchange Service.

(5) After completion of appropriate agreements, providing a base, training facilities and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations.

(6) Supporting the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands, in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership to the Joint Planning Group, all subcommittees and panels.

(7) Coordinating with appropriate local United States governmental authorities, all Air Force activities which have an impact on the civil economy or affect civil activities.

(8) Supporting the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyu Islands.

v. Insure that all commanders and staff officers are familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, "Unified Actions Armed Forces."

w. Insure preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Hq 313th Air Division.



5AFR 23-4

x. Insure that mission directives have been prepared for all units within the division and require that all mission directives be reviewed semiannually and updated when required.

4. Miscellaneous. On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the Commander, 313th Air Division, is authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate and friendly force commanders, except as otherwise directed by this or higher headquarters.

OFFICIAL:

JACOB E. SMART  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander

GREGORY Q. STANLEY  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF  
Asst Director of Administrative Services

1 Attachment  
Listing of Plans and Directives

LISTING OF PLANS AND DIRECTIVES

1. Training:

- a. PACAFM 51-2
- b. PACAFM 51-3
- c. PACAFM 51-4
- d. PACAFM 51-6
- e. 5AF OPlan 135-59
- f. 5AF OPlan 138-59

2. Operations:

- a. PACAFM 55-4
- b. PACAFM 55-5
- c. PACAFM 55-7
- d. PACAFM 55-8
- e. 5AF OPlan 109-59
- f. 5AF OPlan 146-60
- g. 5AF OPlan 164-60
- h. 5AF OPlan 175-60
- i. PACAF Procedures for Positive Control

3. Emergency and Contingency War Plans:

- a. 5AF GWP 1-61
- b. 5AF OPlan 25-61
- c. 5AF OPlan 27-60
- d. 5AF OPlan 32-59
- e. 5AF OPlan 152-60

2

5AFR 55-18

5AF REGULATION  
NO. 55-18

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE  
AFO 925 11 September 1962

### Operations

#### DIVISION/WING AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

**PURPOSE:** To delineate the areas of air defense responsibility to sector commanders within Fifth Air Force's Far East Air Defense Region.

1. Applicability. This regulation applies to air division/wing commanders designated as air defense sector commanders and pertains only to the area of responsibility chargeable to the Commander, Fifth Air Force.

2. Explanation of Terms:

a. Area of Responsibility. The geographical area assigned for the purpose of allocating surveillance and reporting responsibilities in consonance with air defense capabilities.

b. Air Defense Sector. The area of responsibility assigned to an Air Defense Control Center and bounded by established ADIZ.

c. Far East Air Defense Region. The area of responsibility assigned to Fifth Air Force.

3. Fifth Air Force Sector Commanders. The air defense sector commanders within the Far East Air Defense Region are as follows:

- a. Northern Air Defense Sector - Commander, 39th Air Division.
- b. Central Air Defense Sector - Commander, 41st Air Division.
- c. Western Air Defense Sector - Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing.
- d. Korean Air Defense Sector - Commander, 314th Air Division.
- e. Okinawan Air Defense Sector - Commander, 313th Air Division.

4. Responsibilities of Air Defense Sector Commanders. The sector commander has operational jurisdiction over the air defense forces in his sector and is responsible for the conduct of the air defense operation in his area of responsibility.

This regulation supersedes 5AFR 55-18, 14 Jan 60.

OPI: 5FODC (5FOOT-O-D)

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AU Lib ..... 1      Det 1, Hq PACAF, Kadena AB Okinawa .... 1  
PACAF (PFOOT) ..... 1



5AFR 55-18

5. Areas of Responsibility. The Far East Region is divided into the following areas of responsibility:

a. 39th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 45°45' N 145°45' E thence south along this meridian to 44°26' N 145°45' E thence southwest to 44°03' N 145°19' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°30' N 145°22' E thence to 43°24' N 145°35' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°26' N 145°48'30" E thence to 43°23'15" N 145°50'35" E thence 43°20' N 145°52' E thence three miles parallel from the coast of Hokkaido to 43°16' N 145°44' E thence to 42°47' N 146°23' E thence generally northeast, staying 40 nautical miles off the eastern flank of the Kurile Island chain to 52°30' N 160° E thence south to 38° N 160° E thence west to 38° N 144°38' E thence northwest to 39° N 142°30' E thence west to 39° N 140° E thence northwest to 42° N 131°40' E thence generally northeast staying 40 nautical miles off the eastern flank of the USSR to 45°45' N 138°45' E thence east to starting point 45°45' N 145°45' E.

b. 41st Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 38° N 160° E south to 30° N 160° E west to 30° N 134° E north to 36° N 134° E northwest to 37°17' N 133° E north to 41°35' N 133° E southeast to 39° N 140° E east to 39° N 142°30' E southeast to 38° N 144°38' E thence east to starting point 38° N 160° E.

c. 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. The area encompassed by the points 37°17' N 133° E southeast to 36° N 134° E south to 30° N 134° E west to 30° N 123° E north to 32° N 123° E northwest to 33° N 121°50' E east to 33° N 127° E north-east to 35°13' N 129°48' E to 36° N 130°30' E to starting point 37°17' N 133° E.

d. 313th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 30° N 145° E southwest to 23° N 132° E west to 23° N 123° E north to 30° N 123° E thence east to starting point 30° N 145° E.

e. 314th Air Division. The area encompassed by the points 41°35' N 133° E south to 37°17' N 133° E southwest to 36° N 130°30' E to 35°13' N 129°48' E to 33° N 127° E west to 33° N 121°50' E thence generally north, east and south along a line 40 nautical miles off the China-North Korea coast to a point 40 nautical miles southwest of the western end of the DMZ thence along center of DMZ to point 40 nautical miles northeast of eastern end of DMZ thence generally north along a line 40 nautical miles off the North Korea-China coast to point 42° N 131°40' E thence southeast to starting point 41°35' N 133° E.

OFFICIAL:

JACOB E. SMART  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander

GLADYS M. NELSON  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF  
Director of Administrative Services.

1 Attachment  
Map, Div/Wg Areas of Responsibility

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3

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 925 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 5FODC

27 June 1960  
Revised 1 August 1960

SUBJECT: (S) Hq Fifth Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking  
Forces (This supersedes letter dated 27 June 1960)

TO: 313th Air Div

1. This paper clarifies paragraph 3a, 5AF Regulation 23-4 which is the mission directive of the 313th Air Division. A degree of direct control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons. This degree extends beyond the "centralized control" traditional in the employment of conventional forces.

2. Control is defined as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations." The following is the minimum control that this headquarters intends to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces of your division:

a. Ordering, directing and monitoring maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.

b. Ordering and monitoring routine and special force deployments.

c. Ordering, directing, monitoring and evaluating combat readiness training programs.

d. Controlling and directing the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system provides direct communication between this headquarters and tactical wings.

e. Controlling and directing the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.

f. Such other control as operational necessity dictates.

3. The necessity for retention of direct control of tactical wings by this headquarters has reduced the requirement for personnel on your operations staff. It is not necessary or desirable

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SECRET

that your staff duplicate the efforts of this headquarters in the direction and control of our strike forces. I do however, consider it necessary and desirable that you keep yourself and key members of your staff informed on the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned your division in order that you may be prepared to carry out effectively, the responsibilities assigned to you in Annex E, and described in the Command Relationships Annex, of the WPC.

4. You will note that your new mission directive requires that you assure the achievement of combat readiness training, the preparation of plans and orders and the provision of command policy and guidance along with other responsibilities toward the command and control of tactical striking forces. I do not intend that these requirements should prompt an expansion of your operations staff. I believe that these responsibilities may be discharged within your present staff capabilities with the assistance of your inspection system and tactical wing staffs.

5. The control of tactical striking forces outlined in paragraph 2 above will be exercised through direct communication with tactical Wings and Groups. Information copies of all correspondence between this headquarters and tactical units of other than routine nature, will be furnished to your headquarters.

ROBERT W. BURNS  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander

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4

\*313ADR 23-6

313th AIR DIV REGULATION  
NO. 23-6

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239 21 January 1963

Organization and Mission - Field

51ST FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR WING

PURPOSE: To state the mission and responsibilities of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

1. Mission. The mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is to:

a. Conduct air defense operations within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility and the areas adjacent thereto, including the activities of the Air Defense Control Center, AC&W Radar Stations, fighter interceptor squadron and air defense missile units.

b. Provide, as directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division administrative and logistical support for units attached to Naha Air Base.

2. Organization. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is organized as an AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division. It is provided with a Wing Headquarters, an Air Base Group, facilities, equipment and personnel, and assigned units as are considered necessary to carry out the mission.

3. Responsibilities. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, subject to policies established by 313th Air Division and directives of higher headquarters, exercises command jurisdiction over the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing with its assigned and attached units. He is directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for:

a. Providing such staff assistance and advice as may be required by the Commander, 313th Air Division on Air Defense matters. He is designated Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division (Air Defense).

b. Providing aircraft, equipment and/or personnel incidental to the air defense mission as directed.

c. The operational control of all US Army anti-aircraft units for sector air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine anti-aircraft units when shore-based, and operational control of anti-aircraft gunfire from ships' batteries when such fire is in defense of shore installations located within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility.

\*This Regulation supersedes 313ADR 23-6, 17 Jan 62  
OPR: 313OC-M

313ADR 23-6

- d. Preparing and maintaining plans to conduct combat operations.
- e. Contributing mobile strike forces, support personnel, and equipment support of PACAF contingency war plans.
- f. Augmenting the defensive forces of other Fifth Air Force Air Divisions when situations so dictate.
- g. Operation of the Okinawa Air Defense Control Center.
- h. Mutually coordinating and standardizing air defense information and procedures with adjacent air defense sectors.
- i. Providing aircraft for, and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.
- j. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.
- k. Developing and conducting aircrew, ground crew, technical and other specialized training programs for military members of friendly foreign countries under the Military Assistance Program.
- l. Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine Commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.
- m. Conducting combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine and governmental agencies as frequently as necessary to insure the success of all planned joint operations.
- n. Providing field maintenance to organizations assigned, attached or transient on Naha Air Base. This is to include the deployment of mobile maintenance teams personnel and equipment, as necessary, to support the Naha based C-130 aircraft utilized in performance of their intra-theater airlift mission.
- o. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by this headquarters, to an extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.
- p. Issuing mission statements for all assigned units and insuring semi-annual review and updating, if required.
- q. The performance of such other tasks as may be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

313ADR 23-6

4. Direct Communications. The Commander, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing is authorized direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marines, and AMC Depot Commanders and heads of Civilian Agencies on routine operational, logistical and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication on other than routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters requires the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT M. STILLMAN  
Major General, USAF  
Commander

ROBERT M. DeBORD  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director, Administrative Services



7 5  
\*313ADR 23-13

313TH AIR DIVISION REGULATION  
NO. 23-13

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239 16 April 1963

Organization and Mission - Field

18TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING

PURPOSE: To state the mission and responsibilities of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

1. Mission: The mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing is to maintain assigned aircraft and personnel in a high state of readiness and to provide the capability to execute fighter missions designed to destroy enemy forces and facilities.

2. Organization: The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing is organized as an AFCON unit under O/T 1643R, with authorizations shown on a Unit Manning Document, and assigned to the 313th Air Division. It is provided with a headquarters, facilities, equipment, and personnel with assigned tactical and maintenance units necessary to carry out its mission.

3. Responsibilities: The Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, exercises command, administrative and operational control of assigned and attached units, unless otherwise specified by competent authority. He is directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

a. Accomplishment of offensive aircraft operational staff requirements for 313th Air Division. When so designated, he is assigned additional duty as 313th Air Division Deputy Commander for Offense.

b. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training and routine flying training programs of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for this purpose.

c. Provide supply, equipment, fuel, WRM, aircraft engine and ammunition support to assigned and attached organizations and the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

d. Providing continuation training for Bomb Commanders to insure continued combat readiness status.

e. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and specialized personnel training and such other training programs as may be directed.

\*This regulation supersedes 313ADR 23-13, 9 September 1959.  
OPR: 313OC-M

313ADR 23-13

f. Providing organizational and field maintenance support of assigned, attached and transient aircraft as required, in accordance with AFM 66-1 and/or other applicable directives.

g. Issuing mission directives for each assigned unit of the Wing and insuring semi-annual review and/or updating as required.

h. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with current plans consistent with requirements of the primary mission.

i. Performing special missions and such other tasks as may be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division or higher headquarters.

j. Establishing and maintaining a Wing Command Center (WCC) operating 24 hours a day. The WCC will have display facilities and communications necessary to control offensive aircraft operations. The WCC will maintain current status of aircraft, crews, weapons and display strike routes of parent wing aircraft. In addition, status information will be maintained on other wing aircraft to be launched from bases in areas of mutual interest.

4. Direct Communications: The Commander, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, is authorized direct communication with local Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Commanders and heads of Civilian agencies on routine administrative and logistical matters. All policy matters and direct communications with other Major Commanders will be handled by Headquarters, 313th Air Division except when specific authorization is granted. Direct communication is authorized between the WCC of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 5AFCC at Headquarters Fifth Air Force.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT M. STILLMAN  
Major General, USAF  
Commander

MARVIN ROSEGLICK  
Captain, USAF  
Deputy Director, Administrative Services

313th AIR DIV REGULATION  
NO. 23-4

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239 3 January 1963

\*313ADR 23-4

Organization and Mission - Field

498TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP

PURPOSE: To state the mission and responsibilities of the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

1. Mission. The mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group is to:

- a. Maintain the capability to execute a maximum launch effort against high priority pre-selected targets.
- b. Reference paragraph 2, PACAF OPS Plan 112-62, 19 February 1962, for the CLASSIFIED portion of this mission.

2. Organization. The 498th Tactical Missile Group is organized as an

AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division with operational control vested with the Commander, Fifth Air Force. It is provided with a Group Headquarters, Maintenance and Tactical units, facilities, equipment and personnel necessary to carry out its mission.

3. Responsibilities. The Commander, 498th Tactical Missile Group exercises command, administrative and operational control of assigned units. He is directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division for:

- a. Providing such staff assistance and advice as may be required by the Commander, 313th Air Division on tactical missile matters.
- b. Fulfilling responsibilities as contained in PACAF OPS Plan 112-62, 19 Feb 62.
- c. Developing flight profile planning to determine courses and altitudes as required.
- d. Augmenting the Fifth Air Force Combat Capability as directed.
- e. Providing transition and continuation training to launch crews to insure continued combat readiness status.
- f. Developing and conducting training programs to insure fulfillment of technical and specialized organizational personnel requirements.

\*This regulation supersedes 313ADR 23-4, 17 Jan 62,  
OPR: 313OC-M



G. Conducting unit training in accordance with AFUTS 10-25.

h. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in support of 313th Air Division and 6313th Air Base Wing current plans and consistent with mission requirements.

i. Establishing and maintaining a Missile Command Center (MLCC) on a 24 hour per day basis. The MLCC will display the current status of its weapons, crews, targets, maintenance and supply back-up, launch bays and sites. It will have communications as necessary to control the group offensive operation.

j. Insuring preparation of mission directives for all assigned units of the 498th Tactical Missile Group and requiring semi-annual review and updating of all mission directives, if necessary.

k. Other tasks as directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

4. Direct Communication. The Commander, 498th Tactical Missile Group is authorized direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marines and AMC Depot Commanders and heads of Civilian Agencies on routine operational, logistical and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct communication on other than routine operational, logistical and administrative matters requires the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division. Direct communications between Fifth Air Force TOC and the 498th MLCC is authorized.

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT M. STILLMAN  
Major General, USAF  
Commander

MARVIN ROSEGLICK  
Captain, USAF  
Deputy Director, Administrative Services

7

HEADQUARTERS  
1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) (HQ COMD, USAF)  
TEMPORARY BUILDING "E", 4TH & ADAMS DRIVE, S. W.  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SPECIAL ORDER  
GZ-31

20 December 1962

1. The Office of the Deputy Director of Special Investigations, (USAFE), is organized at Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany and assigned to 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF, Temporary Building "E", 4th and Adams Drive, S.W., Washington 25, D.C., effective 1 January 1963, with duty station at Wiesbaden Air Base, Germany. In addition, the following OSI districts, detachments and resident agencies are organized and assigned to 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF, same address as above, effective 1 January 1963. Detachments and resident agencies are further assigned to OSI districts as indicated.

a. Manpower authorizations and personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed and reassigned in other OSI units, in accordance with appropriate Non O/T Unit Manning Documents furnished by the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF.

b. Specialized technical investigative equipment and other OSI equipment will be reassigned where necessary in accordance with agreement to be made between USAFE, Headquarters Command and 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF commanders.

c. Administrative and logistical support will be furnished under the provisions of AFR 11-4 and AFR 172-8.

d. Upon discontinuance, the Headquarters, 7493d Special Investigations Wing histories, battle honors, emblems or awards will revert to the control of Headquarters, 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF.

e. Report completed action using the Air Force Organization Status Change Report (RCS: AF-01), (AFR 20-49).

f. Authority: AFR 20-27, DAF letter, 946M, subject: Reassignment of Certain Special Investigation Units, dated 7 December 1962 and Headquarters Command Special Order, G-86, dated 19 December 1962.

OSI District 61  
APO 742  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6295  
APO 755  
New York, New York

OSI District 62  
APO 125  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6298  
APO 238  
New York, New York

1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
SPECIAL ORDER GZ-31

OSI DETACHMENT 6241  
APO 125  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2411 (R/A)  
APO 120  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2412 (R/A)  
APO 241  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6242  
APO 179  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2421 (R/A)  
APO 203  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2422 (R/A)  
APO 22  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6245  
APO 147  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2451 (R/A)  
APO 194  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2452 (R/A)  
APO 167  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 2453 (R/A)  
APO 129  
New York, New York

OSI District 64  
APO 30  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6401 (R/A)  
APO 118  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6461  
APO 117  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6299  
FPO 100  
New York, New York

OSI District 63  
APO 230  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6301 (R/A)  
APO 115  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6329  
APO 247  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6350  
APO 253  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6351  
APO 10  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6353  
APO 83  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6354  
APO 17  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6355  
APO 87  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6356  
APO 119  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6931  
APO 239  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6932  
APO 324  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6933  
APO 16  
New York, New York



1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
SPECIAL ORDER GZ-31

OSI DETACHMENT 6464  
APO 113  
New York, New York

OSI District 65  
FPO 510  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6501 (R/A)  
APO 794  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6570  
APO 293  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6571  
APO 336  
New York, New York

OSI District 66  
APO 231  
New York, New York

OSI District 68  
APO 283  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6866  
APO 284  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6868  
APO 286  
New York, New York

OSI District 69  
APO 254  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7111 (R/A)  
APO 123  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7012  
APO 332  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7013  
APO 154  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6935  
APO 380  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 6982  
APO 665  
New York, New York

OSI District 70  
APO 332  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7001 (R/A)  
APO 80  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7002 (R/A)  
APO 292  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7008  
APO 108  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7081 (R/A)  
APO 245  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7009  
APO 69  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7010  
APO 57  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7011  
APO 132  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7016  
APO 171  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7024  
APO 12  
New York, New York

OSI District 71  
APO 223  
New York, New York

1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
SPECIAL ORDER GZ-31

OSI Detachment 7014  
APO 109  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7101 (R/A)  
APO 291  
New York, New York

OSI Detachment 7015  
APO 130  
New York, New York

2. The Office of the Deputy Director of Special Investigations, (PACAF), is organized at Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii, and assigned to 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF, Temporary Building "E", 4th and Adams Drive, S.W., Washington 25, D.C., effective 1 January 1963, with duty station at Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu, Hawaii. In addition, the following OSI districts, detachments and resident agencies are organized and assigned to 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF, same address as above, effective 1 January 1963. Detachments and resident agencies are further assigned to OSI districts as indicated.

a. Manpower authorizations and personnel rendered surplus by this action will be absorbed and reassigned in other OSI units, in accordance with appropriate Non O/T Unit Manning Documents furnished by the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF.

b. Specialized technical investigative equipment and other OSI equipment will be reassigned where necessary in accordance with agreement to be made between PACAF, Headquarters Command and the 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF commanders.

c. Administrative and logistical support will be furnished under provisions of AFR 11-4 and AFR 172-8.

d. Upon discontinuance, the Headquarters, 6001st Special Investigations Group histories, battle honors, emblems or awards will revert to the control of Headquarters 1005th Special Investigations Group (IG) USAF.

e. Report completed action using the Air Force Organization Status Change Report (RCS: AF-01), (AFR 20-49).

f. Authority: AFR 20-27, DAF letter, 946M, subject: Reassignment of Certain Special Investigation Units, dated 7 December 1962, and Headquarters Command Special Order G-86, dated 19 December 1962.

OSI District Office 41  
APO 334  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 5  
District Office 45  
APO 76  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 42  
APO 74  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 46  
APO 925  
San Francisco, California

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
L ORDER GZ-31

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 42  
APO 928  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 43  
APO 239  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 43  
APO 235  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 44  
APO 953  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 45  
APO 970  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 2  
District Office 45  
APO 64  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 3  
District Office 45  
APO 18  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 6  
District Office 46  
APO 919  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 9  
District Office 46  
APO 70  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 10  
District Office 46  
APO 94  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 181  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 2  
District Office 46  
APO 100  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 3  
District Office 46  
APO 328  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 994  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 5  
District Office 46  
APO 929  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 929  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 49  
APO 140  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 50  
APO 143  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 50  
APO 146  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 50  
APO 137  
San Francisco, California



1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
SPECIAL ORDER GZ-31

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 42  
APO 928  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 43  
APO 239  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 43  
APO 235  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 44  
APO 953  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 45  
APO 970  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 2  
District Office 45  
APO 64  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 3  
District Office 45  
APO 18  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 6  
District Office 46  
APO 919  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 9  
District Office 46  
APO 70  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 10  
District Office 46  
APO 94  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 181  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 2  
District Office 46  
APO 100  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 3  
District Office 46  
APO 328  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 994  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 5  
District Office 46  
APO 929  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 929  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 49  
APO 140  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 50  
APO 143  
San Francisco, California

OSI Detachment 1  
District Office 50  
APO 146  
San Francisco, California

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 50  
APO 137  
San Francisco, California

1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) USAF  
SPECIAL ORDER GZ-31

OSI Resident Agency  
District Office 46  
APO 323  
San Francisco, California

OSI District Office 49  
APO 63  
San Francisco, California

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD N HAND  
Captain, USAF  
Administrative Officer

8

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-93

21 November 1962

1. The 51 Air Police Squadron, having been activated by Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 885m, 9 August 1962, is organized at Maha Air Base, Ryukyu Islands, and assigned to 51 Air Base Group, effective 8 January 1963.

a. Unit is organized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in O/T R4525C, 1 May 1958, paragraphs 1 and 2, Part I (Part IIA); strength, 2 officers and 180 airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

d. Upon organization unit is entitled to the history and to any battle honors, colors and emblem belonging to the 51 Air Police Squadron, inactivated 25 October 1957. Unit history, with information provided by the Director of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF concerning the existence of battle honors, colors and emblem will be forwarded to PACAF by the USAF Historical Division, Air University through automatic distribution. Requisition for the appropriate colors can then be made as prescribed in Air Force Regulation 35-75, 23 January 1954.

e. Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and AFOMO letter 885m, 9 August 1962.

2. Detachment 5, Headquarters, 6005 Air Postal Group, is designated and organized effective 1 January 1963 at Laverton RAAF Air Base, Australia.

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.



d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

3. Detachment 2, 848 Aircraft Control & Warning Squadron is discontinued effective 20 December 1962 at Wallace Air Station, Philippines.

a. Personnel will be absorbed by parent unit.

b. Supplies and equipment will be returned to supply channels in accordance with current directives.

c. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with paragraph 040406, Air Force Manual 181-5.

d. Funds will be disposed of and final reports submitted in accordance with current directives.

e. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

4. Air Police Squadron Provisional. 6051, is discontinued effective 8 January 1963 at Naha Air Base, Ryukyu Islands.

a. Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

b. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

E. W. METZGER JR  
Lt Col, USAF  
Deputy Director of Admin Services

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HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-103

21 December 1962

1. The following unit is relieved from assignment to 315 Air Division (Combat Cargo), Pacific Air Forces, and is assigned to Tactical Air Command, effective 8 January 1963, without personnel and equipment.

345 Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium

a. Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

b. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27; Headquarters, United States Air Force messages AFOP-BU-PF 97599, 26 November 1962 and AFOMO-P-2 63348, 19 December 1962.

2. The 35 Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, having been activated by Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 957m, 20 December 1962, is organized at Naha Air Base, Ryukyu Islands, and assigned to 315 Air Division (Combat Cargo), effective 8 January 1963.

a. Unit is organized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in O/T R2125, 1 October 1962, paragraphs 1 and 2b, Part I (Part LIH); strength, 62 officers and 27 airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

d. Organizational status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27; AFOMO letter 975m, 20 December 1962; and Hq USAF message AFOMO-P-2 63348, 19 December 1962.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

G-103

10

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-2

4 January 1963

1. Detachment 1, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, is discontinued effective 1 February 1963 at Kadena Air Base, Ryukyu Islands.

- a. Personnel will be absorbed by parent unit.
- b. Supplies and equipment will be transferred in accordance with current directives.
- c. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.
- d. Funds will be disposed of and final reports submitted in accordance with current directives.
- e. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.
- f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

2. Headquarters, 6002 Standardization/Evaluation Group, is designated and organized effective 1 February 1963 at Kadena Air Base, Ryukyu Islands, and is assigned to Pacific Air Forces.


- a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.
- b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.
- c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.
- d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.
- e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Air Force Manual 60-2, 7 December 1962.

G-2



3. Paragraph 1a, Special Order G-99, 7 December 1962, this headquarters, pertaining to attachment of units is amended to delete the parenthetical phrase "(not UE or E-AID)".

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

  
E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

DISTRIBUTION

20 - Det 1, Hq PACAF  
20 - 5AF  
20 - 13AF  
10 - 315 ADiv  
10 - 326 ADiv  
10 - 6313 AB Wg  
10 - each: 6011, 6012, 6220, 6221,  
6222, & 6223 AB Sqs  
10 - 6010 Tac Gp  
10 - 2 ADiv  
10 - 315 TC Gp  
10 - 8 A/Port Sq  
18 - Hq USAF (IAW AFM 10-3)  
68 - PACAF Staff  
2 - ARRC  
1 - AU (AUL)  
1 - file

10 11

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-3

11 January 1963

1. Detachment 2, 6220 Air Base Squadron, is designated and organized effective 15 January 1963 at Soc Trang, Vietnam.

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.


c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.

d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

2. Effective 1 February 1963, the Headquarters, 6002 Standardization/Evaluation Group, is attached to 313 Air Division for logistical and administrative support. Unit attachment includes: summary, special and general courts martial jurisdiction; non-judicial punishment under provisions of Article 15, UCMJ and administrative board actions. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

  
E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

DISTRIBUTION

20 - 5AF  
20 - 13AF  
10 - 313 ADiv  
10 - 2 ADiv  
10 - 6220 AB Sq  
10 - 6010 Tac Gp  
10 - 315 TC Gp (CC)  
10 - 315 ADiv (CC)  
10 - 6313 AB Wg  
10 - Det 1, Hq PACAF  
5 - CINCPAC  
18 - Hq USAF (IAW AFM 10-3)  
68 - PACAF Staff  
2 - ARRC  
1 - AU (AUL)  
1 - file

G-3

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1667

10  
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HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-10

1 March 1963

1. The following units are reorganized effective 8 April 1963, under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in Part I of O/T's as indicated. The strengths indicated are not the authorized strengths, but represent the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

UNIT	O/T COMPOSITION	OFFICERS	AIRMEN
25 Tactical Fighter Sq	R1645, 1 Feb 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIQ)	35	74
509 Fighter Interceptor Sq	R1635, 1 Apr 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIK)	44	20
16 Fighter Interceptor Sq	R1635, 1 Apr 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIL)	35	19
4 Fighter Interceptor Sq	R1635, 1 Apr 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIY)	27	19
40 Fighter Interceptor Sq	R1635, 1 Apr 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIY)	27	19
68 Fighter Interceptor Sq	R1635, 1 Apr 62, Para 1 & 2e, Part I (Part IIY)	27	19

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent units.

b. Units will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

d. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 982m, 21 February 1963.

2. Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces Special Orders indicated below, as reads "315 Troop Carrier Group (Combat Cargo)" are amended to read "315 Troop Carrier Group, Assault".

SPECIAL ORDER NUMBER	DATE	PARAGRAPH(s)
G-92	19 November 1962	1, 1a, 2
G-99	7 December 1962	1

a. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

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G-10



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

b. Authority: Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 982m, 21 February 1963.

3. Detachment 1, Hq 6010 Tactical Group, having been discontinued effective 8 December 1962, at Korat Air Base, Thailand, is reorganized effective 1 April 1963 at same location.

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.

d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

4. Detachment 6, Hq, 1 Medical Service Wing, is discontinued effective 1 April 1963 at Clark Air Base, Philippines.

a. Personnel will be absorbed by parent unit.

b. Supplies and equipment will be disposed of in accordance with current directives.

c. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.

d. Funds will be disposed of and final reports submitted in accordance with current directives.

e. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

5. Detachment 4, USAF Hospital Tachikawa, is discontinued effective 1 June 1963 at Yamato Air Station, Japan.

a. Personnel will be absorbed by parent unit.

b. Supplies and equipment will be disposed of in accordance with current directives

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Special Order G-10, Hq PACAF, 1 Mar 63


c. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with Air Force Manual 181-5.

d. Funds will be disposed of and final reports submitted in accordance with current directives.

e. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

  
E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

DISTRIBUTION

20 - 5AF  
20 - 13AF  
20 - 315 ADiv  
20 - 315 TC Gp  
20 - USAF Hosp Tachikawa  
20 - 1 Med Svc Wg  
20 - 6010 Tac Gp  
20 - 2 ADiv  
20 - 39 ADiv  
20 - 41 ADiv  
20 - 313 ADiv  
20 - 51 FI Wg  
20 - 8 TF Wg  
20 - 405 Ftr Wg  
10 - 35 TF Sq  
10 - 509 FI Sq  
10 - 16 FI Sq  
10 - 4 FI Sq  
10 - 40 FI Sq  
10 - 68 FI Sq  
10 - 8 Aerial Port Sq  
5 - CINCPAC  
18 - Hq USAF (IAW AFM 10-3)  
68 - PACAF Staff  
2 - ARRC  
1 - AU(AUL)  
1 - file

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HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-11

5 March 1963

So much of paragraph 1, Special Order G-10, this headquarters, 1 March 1963, pertaining to reorganization of certain units effective 8 April 1963, as reads "25 Tactical Fighter Sq" is amended to read "35 Tactical Fighter Sq".

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

G-11



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14

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-17

21 March 1963

1. The following units, having been constituted and activated by Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 990m, 13 March 1963, are organized effective 8 April 1963, under an appropriate Unit Manning Document, at locations indicated with capability as cited in Part I of O/T's as indicated. The strengths indicated are not the authorized strengths, but represent the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

<u>UNIT, LOCATION &amp; ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>O/T COMPOSITION</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>
405 Munitions Maintenance Sq Clark Air Base, Philippines Asgd: 405 Fighter Wing	R4485R, 1 Apr 63, Para 1, 2b, e, f, g, h, j, Part I (Part IIB, E, H, I, J, L)	8	329
408 Munitions Maintenance Sq Itazuke Air Base, Japan Asgd: 8 Tactical Fighter Wg	R4485R, 1 Apr 63, Para 1, 2a, e, f, g, Part I (Part IIA, G, H, J)	9	344
418 Munitions Maintenance Sq Kadena Air Base, Okinawa Asgd: 18 Tactical Fighter Wg	R4485R, 1 Apr 63, Para 1, 2a, f, g, Part I (Part IIA, H, J)	8	383
421 Munitions Maintenance Sq Misawa Air Base, Japan Asgd: 39 Air Division	R4485R, 1 Apr 63, Para 1, 2a, e, f, Part I (Part IIA, G, H)	9	232
403 Munitions Maintenance Sq Yokota Air Base, Japan Asgd: 3 Bomb Wg, Tactical	R4485R, 1 Apr 63, Para 1, 2c, e, f, g, Part I (Part IIC, G, H, I)	9	299

- a. Personnel will be furnished from parent units.
- b. Units will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.
- c. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.
- d. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 990m, 13 March 1963.

G-17

2. The following unit is redesignated as indicated and reorganized, effective 8 April 1963, without change in location or assignment.

<u>OLD DESIGNATION</u>	<u>NEW DESIGNATION</u>
7 Tactical Depot Squadron	400 Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater)

a. Unit is reorganized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in O/T R4485R, 1 April 1963, paragraphs 1 and 2k, Part I (Part IIM); strength, 29 officers and 172 airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 990m, 13 March 1963.

3. The 655 Tactical Hospital, having been constituted and activated by Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 989m, 13 March 1963, is organized at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, and assigned to 1 Medical Service Wing, effective 8 April 1963.

a. Unit is organized under an appropriate Unit Manning Document with capability as cited in O/T R4749, 1 April 1963, paragraphs 1 and 2, Part I (Part IIA, W); strength, 6 officers and 40 airmen. This strength is not the authorized strength, but represents the total of the composition as cited in Part II of the O/T.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume V, Air Force Manual 67-1.

c. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

d. Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and Department of the Air Force AFOMO letter 989m, 13 March 1963.

4. Detachment 1, 408 Munitions Maintenance Squadron is designated and organized effective 8 April 1963 at Yamada Ammunition Storage Annex, Japan.

a. Personnel will be furnished from parent unit.

b. Unit will be equipped in accordance with Air Force Regulation 400-32 and Volume VII, Air Force Manual 67-1

c. Personnel authorizations will be as contained in appropriate Unit Manning Document.

d. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

e. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

5. Detachment 1, 8 Armament & Electronics Maintenance Squadron is discontinued effective 8 April 1963 at Yamada Ammunition Storage Annex, Japan.

a. Personnel will be absorbed by parent unit.

b. Supplies and equipment will be disposed of in accordance with current directives.


c. Organizational records will be disposed of in accordance with paragraph 040406, Air Force Manual 181-5.

d. Funds will be disposed of and final reports submitted in accordance with current directives.

e. Air Force Organizational Status Change Report (AF-01) will be submitted in accordance with Air Force Regulation 20-49.

f. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

  
E. J. LATOSZEWSKI  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Admin Services

DISTRIBUTION

20 - 5AF  
20 - 13AF  
20 - 405 Ftr Wg  
20 - 8 Tac Ftr Wg  
20 - 18 Tac Ftr Wg  
20 - 39 ADiv  
20 - 3 Bomb Wg, T  
20 - 1 Med Svc Wg  
20 - 7 Tac Depot Sq  
20 - 8 A&E Maint Sq  
20 - 313 ADiv  
20 - 41 ADiv  
10 - 6102 AB Wg  
10 - 6139 AB Gp  
10 - 6313 AB Gp  
10 - 6143 AB Gp  
10 - 405 AB Gp  
10 - 6100 Spt Wg  
5 - Hq USAF (AFCSG)  
5 - CINCPAC  
18 - Hq USAF (IAW AFM 10-3)  
68 - PACAF Staff  
2 - ARRC  
1 - AU(AUL)  
1 - file



SO G-11, Hq 313AD, was the last of the series for 1962.

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HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-1

23 January 1963

ATTACHMENT OF UNIT: 1. ATO Field Training Detachments 909A and 909B are attached to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing for Administrative and Logistical support effective this date.

2. Legal Proceedings:


a. Commander, 313th Air Division, will exercise General Court Martial jurisdiction.

b. Commander, 51st Air Base Group will exercise Special and Summary Court Martial jurisdiction and actions under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice.

3. Command authority over all administrative separation actions pertaining to officer personnel is specifically retained by the Commander, Air Training Command. All other administrative actions such as those prescribed by AFR 35-66, 35-69, 39-16 and 39-17, will be administered by the Commander, 51st Air Base Group.

4. Authority: Air Force Regulation 11-4, 20-27 as amended and letter PFPTIR-ATCLO dated 20 Sep 62, subject, Special Orders of Attachment.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
ROBERT M. DeBORD  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION  
A

G-1

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HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-2

30 January 1963


Effective 1 February 1963, Headquarters, 6002 Standardization/Evaluation Group is attached to the 6313th Air Base Wing for Logistical Support (excluding Field Maintenance) and Administrative Support.

a. Above unit is attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing for Field Maintenance Support only.

b. Commander, 313th Air Division, will exercise General Court Martial jurisdiction. Commander, 6313th Air Base Wing, will exercise Special and Summary Court Martial jurisdiction and action under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice and administrative board actions.

c. Authority: Air Force Regulation 20-27 and paragraph 2, Special Order G-3, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, dated 11 January 1963.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
MARVIN ROSEGLICK  
Captain, USAF  
Deputy Director, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION

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G-2


17

HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-3

1 May 1963

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, during the temporary absence of MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT M STILLMAN, 1111A.

  
JOHN H. de RUSSY  
Colonel, USAF  
Commander

DISTRIBUTION  
A




18

HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-4

20 May 1963

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND - Under the provisions of Air Force Regulation 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 313th Air Division, effective this date, vice COLONEL JOHN H. de RUSSY, 1882A.

  
ROBERT M. STILLMAN  
Major General, USAF  
Commander

DISTRIBUTION  
A

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HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-5

14 June 1963

1. 35 Trp Carr Sq (M), PACAF, is attached to the 313 Air Division, PACAF, for General Court Martial jurisdiction effective 8 January 1963. Authority: SO G-103, Hq PACAF, 21 Dec 62 and AFR 11-4 as amended.
2. 35 Trp Carr Sq (M), PACAF, is attached to the 51 Air Base Group, PACAF, for Special and Summary Court Martial and action under Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, jurisdiction, effective 8 January 1963. Authority: SO G-103, Hq PACAF, 21 Dec 62 and AFR 11-4 as amended.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
MARVIN ROSENGLICK  
Captain, USAF  
Deputy Director, Administrative Services

DISTRIBUTION  
A

G-5

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HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 925 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-24

26 June 1963

Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of Fifth Air Force, effective this date, during the temporary absence of Lieutenant General Jacob E Smart, 592A.

CHARLES M MCCORKLE  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF  
COMMANDER



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HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE (PACAF)  
United States Air Force  
APO 925, San Francisco, California

SPECIAL ORDER  
G-25

30 June 1963

Under the provisions of AFR 35-54, the undersigned hereby assumes command of FIFTH AIR FORCE, effective this date, vice MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES M MCCORKLE, 1224A, relieved.

JACOB E SMART  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Commander

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

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