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


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

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SECRET

**HISTORY**  
*of the*  
**313<sup>TH</sup> AIR DIVISION**



PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

DO NOT DESTROY

No. 0206689

**1 January - 30 June 1963**  
**SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS**  
**VOLUME II**

SECRET

313 IO-H-0029

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Monday, 10 June 1963

#### MOCK WAR--A REAL THREAT

BANGKOK (AP)--A 25,000-man force assembled from eight nations this week will attempt to dramatize Western military readiness in a region where the communist shadow has been lengthening.

The force, the largest ever assembled by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, will be deployed along an imaginary battle line stretching through Thailand's northeast provinces--across the border from Red-threatened Laos.

Should the communists succeed in their campaign to take over the neighboring kingdom, military experts consider the northeast provinces the most likely place to become the next battleground in the Southeast Asia heartland.

Communist subversion is already a problem in that isolated and backward region.

The purpose of the massive SEATO effort is to test the ability of a joint army to fight under conditions most likely to exist in case of a communist attack from across the Mekong River frontier.

An eight-day exercise opening Tuesday will pit the SEATO army against a mock aggressor force. Defensive delaying action will be followed by a counter-offensive.

Making up the bulk of the SEATO army will be a 7,000-man American task force built around two Army battle groups, including the paratroopers, some 1,300 jungle fighters from the Commonwealth countries of Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and 16,000 Thai troops.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Wednesday, 12 June 1963

#### SEATO EXERCISE BEGINS

BANGKOK (S&S)--The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization opened an exercise in northeast Thailand Tuesday--an exercise that many observers feel is a practical reminder to the communists that overt aggression can be met with force.

Included among the 25,000 troops in the SEATO army are a 7,000-man American task force built around two Army battle groups, including paratroopers and some 1,300 jungle fighters from the Commonwealth countries of Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and 16,000 Thai troops.

The Philippines will also send a contingent.

The exercise, dubbed "Dhanarajata," is the largest military maneuver ever held in Thailand.

Eight nations are taking part in the mock war. It will last until June 24, when participating units will stage a parade in Bangkok.

The U.S. Army's top military specialist in plans and operations, General Paul D. Harkins, commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was to arrive in Bangkok Monday.

Harkins and his party will remain in Thailand until June 13. He will return later to observe other exercise highlights through June 25.

The SEATO field forces will be commanded by U.S. Army Lt. Gen. James K. Woolnough. Woolnough also was scheduled to arrive in Bangkok Monday. Paratroopers of the Okinawa-based 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinf.), 503d Inf., commanded by Col. Robert L. Rowan, will provide a spectacular highlight of the exercise. The unit, which forms the backbone of SEATO's lightning-quick retaliatory power, will stage the largest personnel and cargo drop in the history of Southeast Asia.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Thursday, 13 June 1963

# C-124'S FLYING TROOPS TO THAILAND

KADENA AB, Okinawa (OI)--Air Force C-124 Globemasters of the 1503d Air Transport Wing (MATB) left Kadena AB Tuesday with men and equipment of the 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry in support of SEATO Exercise Dhanamajata.

The exercise is in Thailand and involves Army and Air Force units of SEATO countries.

The 1505th Support Sq. (MATB) is the Kadena unit coordinating the movement of troops and supplies. The squadron will provide support until the exercise is completed.

Pacific Air Forces is providing personnel for the staff of the exercise director. In addition it is manning and performing the functions of the Air Force component commander and the air operations center for the exercise.

Airlift of many of the ground forces will be accomplished by transport and cargo aircraft from PACAF facilities. Those aircraft will also provide logistical support during the exercise.

Taking part in the exercise will be Air Force F-100 Super Sabre jet fighters from Cannon AFB, N.M., RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance jets from Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center at Shaw AFB, S.C., and C-130 Hercules assault airlift aircraft from the Air Force's 838th Air Div., with headquarters at Sewart AFB, Tenn.

En route to Thailand the fighter and recon aircraft were refueled



by SAC KC-135 tankers.

The movement of forces from the continental United States to Thailand, and their return after the exercise, is controlled by the Pacific Air Forces Control Center located at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Friday, 14 June 1963

#### MASSIVE AIRDROP SLATED

By SID WHITE  
SAS Okinawa Bureau Chief

LOPBURI, Thailand--Exercise Dhanarajata, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization's largest ground exercise--will be highlighted Friday with a massive airdrop by the U.S. 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Inf.

The maneuver, involving the entire battle group, will be conducted at Roi Et to meet a theoretical communist uprising in a SEATO member country.

The ground exercise will also get under way the same day at four other locations and will involve Force Tango, made up completely of Thai forces, and Force Sierra, composed of American and British Commonwealth forces.

The SEATO exercise began officially on Tuesday with a command post paper exercise which ran two days.

Thursday, the third day, was taken up with a live firing demonstration at Lopburi.

The six-day field exercise, which follows the 503d Airborne assault, is designed to meet a theoretical communist insurgent uprising in a SEATO nation, and an open attack by a theoretical communist country.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Tuesday, 11 June 1963

OKINAWA UNIT

'ROCK' IS READY TO DROP IN THAILAND

BANGKOK (IO)--For the first time in Thailand's long history, its skies will be blanketed with the open canopies of American parachutes.

Paratroopers of the Okinawa-based 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinf), 503d Inf., commanded by Col. Robert L. Rowan, will provide a spectacular highlight in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Exercise Dhanamajata. This highly mobile unit forms the backbone of SEATO's lightning quick retaliatory power in the event of any overt aggression, bolstering the defenses of any threatened member nation.

Upon landing in Thailand, the 503d will tie-in with elements of the Royal Thai army, Commonwealth Forces, and U.S. Forces in the SEATO muscleflexing exercise.

Nicknamed "The Rock" for its heroic two-week assault against overwhelming Japanese forces on the island of Corregidor over 17 years ago, the 503d will be staging the largest personnel cargo drop in the history of Southeast Asia.

Since arriving on Okinawa in 1960, "The Rock" has taken part in five major field exercises and joint maneuvers with the Philippine and Republic of China armies.

The 503d maintains its razor sharp edge of combat readiness through constant training at its home base.

From the early stages of preparation to the jumpmaster's final "go," sending the combat ready men raining from the skies, the entire operation

functions with the clockwork precision of the professional fighting man.

Movement of troops to the marshalling area, the final check of personal equipment and loading into the giant aircraft is the climax of long months of training. Every man must be skilled not only in basic infantry tactics, but in airborne procedure as well. The 503d completed its 30,000th individual jump recently since arriving on Okinawa.

Within seconds after the lead man streaks toward the earth, the sky fills with a seemingly never-ending stream of blossoming white canopies.

An awesome sight to any enemy, airborne operations such as Corregidor, the Battle of the Bulge, and the beachhead at Normandy have endeared the airborne to the heart of every infantryman.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Saturday, 22 June 1963

EXERCISE DHANARAJATA  
AIR STRIKE FORCE HELPS SEATO

By Sid White  
S&S Okinawa Bureau Chief

DON MUANG AIRFIELD, Thailand--SEATO Exercise Dhanarajata has received realistic air backing in its mock war games from planes of the Composite Air Strike Force (CASAF), a part of the Tactical Air Command (TAC).

Eighteen F-100 jets from the 527th Tactical Fighter Sq. at Cannon AFB, N.M., four RF-101 twin-jet planes from the 29th Tactical Recon Sq. at Shaw AFB, N.C., and 12 C-130 four-engine transports from the 50th Troop Carrier Sq. at Sewart AFB, Tenn.; hopped the Pacific to take part in the two-week Southeast Asia Treaty Organization exercise.

Col. Merle C. Brown, deputy commander, Troop Carrier Wing at Sewart and the CASAF mission commander, said all mission aircraft and equipment made the trip to Thailand in three days.

Brown, himself a C-130 aircraft commander, said, "We supported the jets in coming over here, bringing out everything they brought with them with the exception of the pilots who drove the airplanes.

"After we got here the fighters went under SEATO fighter control and we went under the airlift control, all under the air operation center of the SEATO exercise director."

The jets made it out with stops at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and Guam, and in-flight aerial refueling, he said. The C-130s made stops at Hickam, Guam and Clark AB, in the Philippines.

"We are part of TAC," the colonel explained. "We are a small package

of tactical capability, highly mobile, which can be moved to any part of the world with no notice, and make pretty good time getting there."

During Exercise Dhanarajata all planes in the force received mission assignments from the Air Operations Center at Camp Erawan, the SEATO field forces headquarters.

The fighters flew numerous close air support strikes; the transports airlifted cargo and passengers and airdropped both supplies and paratroopers, and the reconnaissance jets flew regular tactical visual and photo reconnaissance missions.

"They have been keeping us busy," Brown said. "We made several heavy drops of fuel and food to troops in the field and the personnel drops at Udorn in the latter phase of the ground exercise."

Lt. Col. William T. Phillips, 50th Troop Carrier Sq. commander, added, "This is what we are trained for--the quick movement into an area where the tactical fighters are deployed to a forward area.

"We have two jobs actually. First, to transport the personnel and equipment associated with the fighter unit. Concurrently we also bring our own personnel and equipment to perform logistical and tactical missions in the theater of operations."

"It could be Thailand this week," he said, "and the Middle East two months from now. We are trained for worldwide operations."

He said any participation in war games is valuable for the experience gained by crew members and to highlight any defects in the transporting of equipment and methods of operating away from home.

Besides the busy schedule of airlifts and drops, Brown said, the C-130 crews were all checked out in Thailand in cargo extraction methods, in which cargo on pallets is jerked from a plane flying at low altitudes



when a trailing hook catches a wire across the runway.

All the crews also were trained in the low level pop-up system, he added. In this system, the transports approach a drop zone "on the deck" at high speeds, then zoom up to drop altitude, perhaps 1,500 feet, depending on the load, then drop to tree-top level again after the cargo is discharged.

Phillips said the force brought along a maintenance section of about 50 specialists, including a maintenance officer, to provide for self-sufficient repair of their aircraft.

S/Sgt. John W. Travers, of Murfreesboro, Tenn., an instrument specialist, said, "We're having fairly good luck. There has not been too much wrong. We have our own parts kits but so far haven't been very busy. We are fortunate in having good aircraft."

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Friday, 21 June 1963

'RIGHT ON THE DECK'  
CAMERA JETS OVER CUBA SHOWED SEATO HOW

By Sid White  
S&S Okinawa Bureau Chief

DON MUANG AIRFIELD, Thailand--Members of the tactical reconnaissance squadron which took photographs at low level of Cuba during the crisis there last fall have been doing the same work here during SEATO exercise Dhanarajata.

Four RF-101 supersonic twin-jet aircraft of the 29th Tactical Recon Sq., of the 363d Tactical Recon. Wing at Shaw AFB, S.c., flew across the Pacific to participate in the SEATO maneuver.

The jets arrived as part of a composite air strike force mission, which included 18 F-100 tactical fighters and 12 C-130 transports. The jets used in-flight aerial refueling to make the trans-Pacific trip with stops only at Hawaii and Guam.

Capt. Thomas L. McNierney, commander of the task force here for the exercise, said President Kennedy personally awarded his unit the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for their work over Cuba last October and November.

"All of our Cuban reconnaissance was right on the deck," he said.  
"That is our speciality."

McNierney, who made two of the Cuba flights himself, said many of his unit's planes were shot at, but none were hit while they made low-level and high altitude reconnaissance.

All of his craft carry six aerial cameras, he explained, which can be used individually or in any combination desired. Much of their



reconnaissance was done visually.

The captain said his task force arrived in Thailand completely equipped to be self-sufficient. Besides eight pilots, some 85 other specialists were included, with a maintenance officer, photo officer, air intelligence officer, photo interpretation officer and weather officer along as a composite force from their wing.

Their equipment also included complete photo and dark room facilities, he said.

"We have been taking many, many pictures. They are distributed to the requesting agencies through the 315th Air Div. Transport Movement Control Office."

"A SEATO type operation like this is real good," he said. "It irons out any kinks in operating with various types of people from the different countries participating in the exercise."

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Ryukyuan Review  
Friday, 14 June 1963

# IX CORPS SETS UP SEATO SENIOR HQS

BANGKOK, Thailand--The senior headquarters for all United States and commonwealth tactical ground forces for the SEATO Exercise Dhanarajata will be the Okinawa-based IX U.S. Army Corps. The Corps will be redesignated force "sierra" for this largest of all SEATO exercises and will be commanded by Major General Lawrence J. Lincoln.

The Corps will operate directly under the Commanding General, SEATO field forces. The mission of the headquarters is to insure administration and logistical support to all of the units of force "sierra." The 2nd Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry from Okinawa, 25th Infantry Task Force from Hawaii, and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. This responsibility is to include that all of the ground and airborne forces and headquarters are kept in a high state of readiness and accomplish all the assigned SEATO missions.

IX Corps was activated at Fort Lewis, Washington, on October 24, 1940, and was responsible for the defense of the northwest United States. It moved to Leyte in the Philippines in preparation for the invasion of Japan in 1945. With the end of World War II the Corps was assigned occupation duty with the Eighth United States Army in Japan. During its service in Korea, IX Corps earned nine battle honors while participating in nine major campaigns plus receiving two Republic of Korea presidential citations for combat actions. The Corps headquarters transferred to Okinawa in 1956 and was assigned to United States Army, Ryukyu Islands where last year it provided the U.S. Army Staff Support for the SEATO exercise "air cobra".



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Friday, 14 June 1963

SOME U.S. TROOPS  
TO STAY IN THAILAND

LOPBURI, Thailand (AP)--Some elements of the U.S. 25th Inf. Div. will remain in communist-threatened northeast Thailand for several weeks after the current Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) exercise ends, American military sources revealed Wednesday.

Earlier, SEATO exercise director General Chitti Navisathien of Thailand said the United States had requested that some U.S. troops be permitted to remain in Thailand and this has been granted.

Two battle groups from the Hawaii-based 25th are participating in the SEATO exercise which got under way Tuesday in the jungles of northeast Thailand. The possibility that U.S. troops would remain in Thailand had been mentioned frequently in recent weeks but was not confirmed until now.

Military sources said the remaining troops will participate, in small unit action in Thailand's jungles and forests. They will also complete some civic action projects, such as school building and well drilling, started during the exercise.

Chitti was noncommittal when asked how long the U.S. units would remain, but did say "not as long as the last time." He was referring to this time last year when President Kennedy sent marines and infantrymen here following major communist incursions into Laos.

These units remained about three months before Kennedy pulled them back to their Pacific bases. Some units stayed through late November.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Saturday, 15 June 1963

#### MASS DROP IN THAILAND

CLARK AB, P.I. (S&S)--Seven hundred U.S. Army paratroopers took off from here early Friday in a dozen transport planes to be dropped over Thailand as SEATO Exercise Dhanawajata gets under way just a few hundred miles from where real battles are being fought in Laos and Vietnam.

The Okinawa-based soldiers were to jump into an undisclosed drop zone in Thailand some time after daybreak Friday, officials said.

They are commanded by Col. Robert L. Rowan and are made up of units of the 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinforced), 503d Inf., based on Okinawa.

Jumping in the lead plane Friday was to be an Air Force Combat Control Team to set up communications and prepare the drop zone for the main paratroop force. The Air Force team was to be accompanied by a crack 60-man Army assault team that was to jump from the same plane.

A six-man U.S. Marine paratroop unit from the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Co. in Hawaii, led by Capt. Charles E. Daniels, will also hit the silk in the opening phase of the operation. They were to set up forward air control posts to guide the fighter planes to targets against a mythical aggressor force.

Reliable sources said part of the drop zone may be under as much as six feet of water in an area swollen by monsoons. The paratroopers are equipped with inflatable life jackets against such an eventuality.

The air transports include about a dozen C-124 Globemasters from Det. 1, 315th Air Div., Naha AB, Okinawa. The flight is being led by Col. Jack L. Crawford, detachment commander.



In Lopburi, Thailand, more than 50,000 people watched a preview demonstration Thursday of the military might that will take part in the exercise.

King Bhumibol Aydulet of Thailand headed a list of Thai and foreign dignitaries and officers who watched a live firing exercise of weapons ranging from the U.S. Army's Little John Rocket to pistols and machine guns.

A preview of difficulties that face the soldiers popped up during the demonstrations.

Four vehicles of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars participating in the show got bogged down on the muddy roads.

An M-41 tank from the Combat Support Co., 1st Battle Group, 5th Inf., 25th Inf. Div., rumbled out and pulled the mired vehicles free.

A crowd pleaser during the demonstrations was free fall parachute jumps by 18 American, Thai and Commonwealth parachutists.

Royal Air Force Sgt. James S. Robertson, an instructor in an RAF parachute school, landed right on the target, a white X in the jump area. He was presented a 1,000 baht (\$50) note and a handshake from Thai Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Sunday, 16 June 1963

# SEATO AIR DROP BULLSEYE

ROI ET, Northeast Thailand (AP)--Some 700 American paratroopers air-dropped into Thailand Friday in support of massive SEATO war games in this communist-threatened region.

The paratroopers--members of the 2d Battle Group, 503rd Airborne, 25th Inf. Div.--gave the remote Roi Et area of Thailand its most dramatic military show in memory as they spilled out of nine giant transport planes and landed en masse in muddy rice paddies.

The role of the paratroops was to fill a gap in an imaginary battle line stretching from Thailand's northern corner through the northeast which bulges out into Laos.

As the troops landed in full battle gear, they came under theoretical attack from a mock aggressor group made up of other elements of the 503rd who had flown in a few days earlier to take up "enemy" positions in the surrounding jungle.

To the left of the paratroopers were 1,300 battle-toughened Commonwealth soldiers from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, and to their right, another U.S. battle group, the Fifth Inf. "Bobcats," also of the 25th Div., based in Hawaii.

Further up the line, spreading to the north were some 16,000 Thai troops, facing an "aggressor" force made up of other Thais.

Original plans called for the airborne unit to fly straight from its Okinawa base to the drop zone to dramatize American ability to rush to the aid of an ally. But storm conditions in the Okinawa area caused



a last-minute diversion to Clark AFB in the Philippines.

The paratroops also airdropped 200,000 pounds of support equipment, including two self-propelled 106mm guns, vehicles and supplies. The several thousand spectators who ringed the drop area--most of them local villagers who had walked miles to watch the show--scattered for cover as the heavily laden chutes seemed about to descend on them. But all dropped safely in the prearranged zone.

There was only one casualty witnessed during the paratroop's descent--PFC. William J. Patrick of Edgewater, N.J., who apparently wrenched a knee on landing.

The hour-long airdrop was one of several U.S. attempts in the exercise so far to point up American readiness to back SEATO to the hilt in case of a shooting emergency.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Thursday, 20 June 1963

MASS DROP SUCCESSFUL--BUT A BIT SOGGY

By Sid White  
S&S Okinawa Bureau

WITH THE 2D AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP, ROI ET, THAILAND--The hard hitting paratroopers of the 503d Inf. who jumped into Thailand for SEATO exercise Dhanarajata agree their mass drop was a good one, if a bit soggy.

In all, 706 members of the 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinforced), 503d Inf., from Okinawa, made the jump last Friday to kick off the ground exercise phase of the SEATO maneuver.

Sixty-six men jumped first in a combat control team to set up assembly aids and assist the others who followed.

The landing zone northeast of the small town of Roi Et, about 285 miles northeast of Bangkok, was a paddy field area covered in some places with six to eight inches of water. Most of the drop zone had a base of oozy mud.

Col. Robert Row, commanding officer of the 503d, who jumped in with his men, said:

"I think it was a fine jump. We had a little more wind than we expected and the ground was soggy, but we had only four minor injuries--two ankles, one shoulder and one back, and that is pretty good.

"For myself, I landed in thick mud, then was dragged about 70 feet because my hands were muddy and I couldn't loosen my chute releases. Every time I tried, my hands would just slip off."

First Sgt. Lester M. Clark, 38, of Denver, the sergeant major of the task force, added:



"I landed right in a foot of water and was dragged about 10 feet before I could release my parachute. I packed up about 10 pounds of mud. My pockets were full of it, and my helmet was full.

"Over-all, I think it was a very successful jump. Anytime you can get up and walk away it is a good one."

"It was a good jump, real good," said Pvt. Stephen R. Grater, 19, of Walnut Creek, Cal., with Hq. Co. "I landed real good myself. It was easy, if you like landing in rice paddies."

PFC Gary J. Wilmot, 20, St. Paul, Minn., a cook, said he thought it looked good. But, he came ahead by plane.

"It was one of my roughest landings," said PFC R. Bruce Fegley, 21, of Portville, N.Y., a radar operator in Hq. Co. "But, the jump was okay. I was oscillating and came in backwards. I did a somersault and tangled in my risers."

M/Sgt. Robert N. Burnette, 35, of Fayetteville, N.C., platoon sergeant in B Co., said: "My jump was about the hardest landing I've made. I think it was due to the humidity."

"I had a pretty good landing, in a clear area with no water," said SFC Charles Ellis, 35, of Richmond Heights, Fla., a squad leader in B Co.

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RYUKYUAN REVIEW  
Friday, 14 June 1963

#### 503D AIRBORNE STRIKES IN SEATO EXERCISE

BANGKOK--June 11, 1963 marked the first time in the long history of Thailand that its skies were blanketed with the open canopies of American paratroopers.

Paratroopers of the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, commanded by Colonel Robert L. Rowan, provided a spectacular highlight in Southeast Asia Treaty Organization's "Exercise DHANARAJATA." This highly mobile unit forms the backbone of SEATO's lightning quick retaliatory power in the event of any overt aggression, thus bolstering the defenses of any threatened member nation.

Nicknamed "The Rock" for its heroic two week assault against overwhelming Japanese forces on the Island of Corregidor over 17 years ago, the 503d Infantry staged the largest personnel cargo drop in the history of Southeast Asia.

Upon landing in Thailand, the 503d Infantry tied in with elements of the Royal Thai Army, Commonwealth Forces, and U.S. forces in the SEATO "muscle-flexing" exercise.

Since arriving on Okinawa in 1960, the 503d Infantry has taken part in five major field exercises and joint maneuvers with the Philippine and Republic of Free China Armies.

The 503d Infantry maintains its razor sharp edge of combat readiness through constant training at its home here on Okinawa. The first ring of the alert telephone brings the entire unit to life with a perceptible snap, and its troopers are ready for either an exercise or the real thing.



From the early stages of preparation to the jumpmasters' final "go", sending the combat ready men raining from the skies, the entire operation functions with the clockwork precision denoting the professional fighting man.

Movement of troops to the marshalling area in the cool night air, the final check of personal equipment, and loading into the giant aircraft is only the climax of constant, tireless training, both individual and unit. Every man must be skilled not only in basic infantry tactics, but in airborne procedure as well.

Within seconds after the lead man streaks toward the earth, the sky fills with a seemingly never-ending stream of blossoming white canopies. An awesome sight to any enemy, airborne operations such as Corregidor, the Battle of the Bulge and the beach head at Normandy have endeared the hearts of every Airborne infantryman.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Tuesday, 18 June 1963

REDS ADD REALISM  
TO SEATO 'SCRIPT'

BANGKOK (AP)--A 25,000-man SEATO army battled a mock "aggressor" force in northeast Thailand Sunday amid reports of a fresh outbreak of real fighting in next-door Laos.

News dispatches from the Laotian capital of Vientiane said pro-communist forces, backed by North Vietnamese, were on the move within 50 miles of the Mekong River border with Thailand. One report claimed pro-Red Pathet Lao troops had captured the town of Tha Thom 42 miles north of Thailand.

The latest developments in the neighboring kingdom appeared to be coming perilously close to the scenario envisaged for the current SEATO war games, the biggest ever staged by the eight-nation alliance.

The basic plot of the exercise pits the SEATO army against Red aggressors who have swept into Thailand from the north. The communist forces, according to the script, earlier had crossed into "Country A" (Laos) after a Red uprising there had been crushed, then moved against "Country B" (Thailand).

A communique issued by SEATO field forces headquarters said "under cover of darkness SEATO forces staged a voluntary withdrawal from "Country A" to inside Thailand." It added that throughout the night "aggressor patrols and probing actions" took place "supported by artillery fire."



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RYUKYUAN REVIEW  
Friday, 21 June 1963

SEATO TROOPS WITHDRAW  
IN THIRD DAY OF EXERCISE

BANGKOK, Thailand—The SEATO Exercise "DHANARAJATA" began its third day of operations by meeting exceptionally strong aggressor attacks during the early morning hours. All SEATO Forces withdrew from along the borders of Thailand to prepare defensive positions within Thailand.

Considerable difficulty was encountered due to refugees who have clogged all avenues of withdrawal in an attempt to escape the Aggressor Forces. SEATO Forces are doing everything in their power to aid the refugees and to get them to the rear as soon as possible, but due to their great numbers, they are not only creating problems for the friendly troops in their withdrawal, but are holding up the steady flow of supplies to the front.

Aggressor aircraft were especially active during the night and seriously damaged several SEATO planes on the ground and inflicted numerous casualties. Under heavy pressure by the aggressor, the SEATO Forces continue to withdraw to the rear and prepared to slow down the aggressor momentum. Later in the morning, SEATO Forces established final defensive positions along a vital line of defense.

SEATO Air Forces countered with numerous preplanned strikes, a large number of visual reconnaissance and photographic missions. It is now apparent that the SEATO Air Forces have gained air superiority.

SEATO Forces are being aided in their efforts by a friendly Thai civilian population which has volunteered to a man to do anything in their power to stop the Aggressor Forces from overrunning their beloved country.

In contrast to civilian aid to the SEATO Forces, intelligence reports general civilian uprisings in various areas under Aggressor control. These uprisings have caused redeployment of Aggressor Tactical elements in an attempt to gain control of the situation.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Thursday, 20 June 1963

SEATO SET TO 'HIT BACK'

BANGKOK (AP)--Exercise Dhanarajata went into its second phase Tuesday as SEATO forces prepared for a counterattack against an "aggressor" force which had swept in from across the northern border of Thailand.

Earlier in the day U.S. and Commonwealth troops received a personal welcome from Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej. He visited the field headquarters of SEATO's massive 25,000-man army engaged in war games in the northeastern region of his country.

He noted that the troops "have been able to see conditions in this country....similar to those they may some time have to fight in."

Tuesday elements of the 2d Battle Group, 503d Airborne, dropped onto the airfield at Udorn, 50 miles south of the Laos border in a simulated assault. Details of the action were not immediately available.

It was the second airborne assault of the games.

SEATO spokesmen, describing the "action" along the simulated battle line, said "patrol activity was vigorous" as contact was made with the enemy.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Wednesday, 19 June 1963

SEATO PLANES SMASH 'ENEMY'

S/SGT ROBERT G. FISHER  
S&S Philippines Bureau Chief

LOPBURI, Thailand--SEATO air forces taking part in exercise Dhanarajata here have claimed that "aggressor" air forces have been reduced to 50 per cent of operating capability.

Spokesmen at Air Component Command (ACC) headquarters said air superiority was gained after only four days of activity in the SEATO air-ground exercise.

More than 222 sorties have been flown by some 90 tactical aircraft of the various SEATO member nations participating in Dhanarajata, they said, 125 of which were made in less than 48 hours.

The planes operate from seven Thai airfields under operational control of the ACC, commanded by Maj. Gen. Theodore R. Milton, who is also commander of the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark AB in the Philippines.

Included are planes from the Royal Thai, the Royal New Zealand, and the Royal Australian Air Forces, as well as the U.S. Air Force.

Officials said 201 tactical offense sorties were flown in air strikes against "enemy" air field and supply lines, as well as providing close tactical air support of SEATO field forces. Seven aerial reconnaissance sorties were made in answer to requests from SEATO unit commanders and 14 air defense interceptor sorties were sent against aggressor aerial assaults.

The SEATO planes were continuing Monday on strip alert standby, poised for any eventuality in a "realistic example of how the armed forces



of member nations rally together for an effective collective defense against aggression," an official statement said.

ACC headquarters said the airlift buildup preparatory to Dhanajarata, dubbed Operation Tidal Wave, was "very successful." More than 50 U.S. Air Force cargo transports saturated various points in Thailand with personnel and equipment from various staging areas outside the country.

Some 31 planes from the 315th Air Div., and other Military Air Transport Service units flew more than 3,500 passengers and 153 tons of supplies into Korat, Thailand.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Wednesday, 19 June 1963

### SEATO SMASHES 'INVADER'

By SID WHITE  
S&S Okinawa Bureau Chief

FORCE SIERRA HQ., Korat, Thailand--Southeast Asia Treaty Organization forces struck back in a smashing counter-offensive all along northern Thailand Tuesday to repel simulated communist invaders as Exercise Dhanarajata approached its end.

The widespread counter-offensive northward followed four days of defensive withdrawal by the 24,000 SEATO forces participating in the exercise, the largest held by SEATO.

The attack coordinated with a parachute drop of C Co., 2nd Airborne Battle Group (Reinf.), 503rd Inf., at Udorn near the northern border fronting on troubled Laos.

The field exercise was to end at noon Wednesday with the theoretical defeat of the communist invaders. The exercise, which opened June 11, will formally end Thursday with a critique and closing ceremony at SEATO field forces headquarters at Lopburi.

Most of the 700 men in the 503d Inf. were expected to leave for their home base in Okinawa shortly after conclusion of the field maneuver. The airborne unit parachuted into Thailand in the opening day of the ground exercise.

Men in the 1st Battle Group 5th Inf., 25th Inf. Div., who flew in from Hawaii, were expected to prepare for their return home as soon as the ground exercise ended.



The two American battle groups formed the major part of Force Sierra, which fought the exercise on a line stretching across about half of northern Thailand. Also in Force Sierra was a Commonwealth brigade.

Maj. Gen. Laurence J. Lincoln, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands and IX Corps, has headed Force Sierra throughout the exercise.

In theory, the SEATO member forces rushed to Thailand to defend a hypothetical member nation from communist-led insurrection and open aggression. The defensive withdrawal, over a simulated period of three weeks, enabled a buildup of SEATO strength to the point where it could push the invaders back.

The counter-offensive, given realism by aggressor forces which harassed SEATO forces with raids and attacks, was supported by jets from the 527th Tactical Fighter Sq., which flew to Thailand from Cannon AFB, N.M., for the exercise, the 509th Fighter Interceptor Sq., and aircraft from the Thai, British, Australian and New Zealand Air Forces.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Saturday, 22 June 1963

THANARAT HAILS  
SEATO DEFENSE

LOPBURI, Thailand (AP)--Thailand's prime minister said Thursday that a massive SEATO air-ground exercise has reassured his country it can rely on the eight-nation alliance for "prompt and effective support" in case of a communist attack.

Prime Minister Marshal Sarit Thanarat spoke at the close of the eight-day exercise at its field headquarters here. He described Thailand as an "immediate target area" of the communists but said "after this demonstration of unity and purposefulness we . . . will rest assured that, if we should be attacked, we will be able to rely on SEATO."

Thai General Chitti Navistira told an audience of top SEATO diplomats and military observers that "our alliance is not as some people claim it to be, deprived of will and means. It has some teeth to bite if need be." The reference was obviously to communist charges that SEATO is a "paper tiger."

Senior military observers of the United States, Britain, France, Australia, the Philippines, Pakistan and New Zealand expressed general agreement with Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasab, his country's chief representative at the war games, that the exercise proved "SEATO is, in fact, a fighting alliance."



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Friday, 21 June 1963

SEATO WAR GAMES END;  
LIFTED MORALE OF THAIS

BANGKOK (AP)--A 25,000-man SEATO army staged a "vigorous" counter-offensive against a mock communist enemy force Wednesday, and a SEATO spokesman announced, "we won."

The announcement brought to an end an eight-day air-ground exercise, the most ambitious ever held by the eight-nation alliance.

Exercise Dhanarajata will come to a formal close Thursday at exercise headquarters at Lopburi, 100 miles north of Bangkok, with ceremonies and a critique of the war games.

Preliminary comments on the results of maneuvers expressed satisfaction over the way the joint army performed against a simulated Red attack from the north, obviously from Laos where a real war is being waged against pro-communist forces.

Thailand's deputy prime minister and defense minister, General Thanom Kittikachorn, told local newsmen the games should "make the enemy think twice before committing any aggression" in this region.

He added the exercise served to boost the morale of Thailand's soldiers and people.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Wednesday, 26 June 1963

#### SEATO MIGHT ON PARADE

BANGKOK (UPI)--SEATO troops which recently concluded massive defensive exercises in northeast Thailand, paraded Monday in Bangkok before the king and crowds of tens of thousands.

Armored might, including tanks, "Little John" missiles and conventionally armed troops from Thailand, SEATO Commonwealth members, the United States and the Philippines, participated in a motorized parade down Bangkok's long and wide Rajdamnern Ave.

It was the final activity of Exercise Dhanarajata, which began June 11 and involved tough days for troops maneuvering through rain and mud in defensive and counter-offensive maneuvers, not far from the border of troubled Laos.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Thursday, 27 June 1963

THAILAND 'SAVED'  
BY SEATO DRILL

BANGKOK (UPI)--Military authorities of the eight SEATO nations said that exercise Dhanarajata "saved" Thailand from becoming another Korea and probably forestalled a Vietnamese-style campaign of communist terror.

A UPI poll of the staff and field officers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization nations, who just finished this largest SEATO maneuver ever attempted, found them confident that any attempted Red grab of Thailand--from within or without--can be defeated.

In the exercises, carried out by nearly 25,000 men, SEATO forces defeated both a counter-insurgency attack and invasion from the northern borders of Thailand.

"If Dhanarajata had been a real communist-inspired revolt followed by an invasion, Thailand would have been another Korea," one Commonwealth officer explained.

"The exercise was the first time we have ever been able to put our combined defensive forces on the testing block," he said. "And we found the machinery badly in need of a tune-up. We'll be fit once these bugs are eliminated."

An American colonel said the most important benefit derived from the 10-day operation was the exposure of SEATO's weaknesses.

"Certainly we accomplished things," he said. "We showed that air power can be delivered to Southeast Asia from the U.S. in less than two days, and that paratroops could be dropped in the fighting area in a

matter of hours. But most important, we learned we had communications and supply problems that could have been fatal in a real attack."

The Thais, who were co-hosts in the exercise and who fielded most of the troops, said the communications failures were the most important weakness exposed by the test.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Saturday, 29 June 1963

SEATO DRILL GAVE REDS  
SOMETHING TO THINK ABOUT

KADENA AB, Okinawa--"There was a definite lesson for friend and foe alike in our maneuvers in Thailand," the commander of all SEATO forces in the largest maneuver ever held by the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization said here Thursday.

Lt. Gen. James K. Woolnough, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Pacific, landed on Okinawa from Thailand for an overnight stop and then continued Friday to his headquarters in Hawaii.

Accompanying the three-star general, who commanded 25,000 troops in the field exercise Dhanarajata, was Maj. Gen. Laurence J. Lincoln, deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands and IX Corps.

Lincoln commanded Force Sierra, a major tactical field force in the exercise that included American and British Commonwealth forces.

In a planeside press conference, Woolnough said, "You'd really have to ask the communists if Operation Dhanarajata is going to be a deterrent to their try for expansion in Southeast Asia, but we're more than satisfied with our show of strength."

"The greatest lesson we learned was working together successfully on a joint staff, and working together all the way down the line from top to bottom," Woolnough said.

"Our power of strength was being able to deliver the goods in such a short time--like having F-100 jet fighters in Thailand in 24 hours from their Stateside bases," the general added.

Woolnough told newsmen that problems did arise, "but none that we

can't solve."

He was emphatic in stressing that this was the most valuable exercise SEATO has ever held.

"All the nations involved now have an idea of terrain and communication problems of that area and will be able to operate better from the lessons learned," he said.

Woolnough said that the 25th Inf. Div.'s battle group which has remained in Thailand instead of returning to Hawaii where it is based is the third such unit from Hawaii to train in northern Thailand.

"The unit will concentrate on normal field training such as small unit tactics while furthering their knowledge of the terrain in northern Thailand," he said.



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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Friday, 21 June 1963

U.S. ARMY VEHICLES  
STRANDED IN THAILAND

UDON, Thailand (UPI)---Eleven Army Signal Corps vehicles were stranded at Udon Wednesday when Thai authorities demanded cash payment of 2,000 bahts (\$100) before allowing the jeeps and vans to be shipped by rail from this eastern Thai city to Bangkok.

The vehicles were part of the 125th Signal Corps unit from Hawaii and had been taking part in operation "Dhanarajata." At the conclusion of the exercise Wednesday the American officers went to Thai railroad authorities headquarters to arrange for the shipment of their jeeps and vans back to Bangkok.

They were told by the chief of the staff of the Sixth Military District, Col. Poon Piya Rutut, that it would cost about \$7.50 for each jeep and \$11 for each van in baht (Thai currency), at Udon, before loading.

JUSMAG authorities in Udon have the authority to arrange American military shipments but they did not have the 2,000 bahts.

Last reports said the American Army was trying to contact the JUSMAG authorities in Bangkok to either get a better credit rating in Udon or find \$100, so the 125th Signal Corps can leave there.

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PACIFIC STARS AND STRIPES  
Saturday, 22 June 1963

TROOPS CEMENT  
THAI FRIENDSHIP

S&S S.E. Asia Bureau

WITH THE 2D AIRBORNE BATTLE GROUP, Northeast Thailand--American troops in the field here during Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Exercise Dhanarajata have further cemented good relations with the Thai people.

Besides formal civic action programs pursued by most units to help the Thai people, the spontaneous expressions of welcome and good will from people everywhere brought constant comment from the troops.

"What is really amazing down here is the friendly attitude of the people," said Sgt. Maj. Richard D. Finn, 41, of St. Louis, sergeant major of the 2d Airborne Battle Group (Reinf.), 503rd Inf., which parachuted en masse into the country to kick off the ground maneuver phase of the exercise.

Thais in the countryside continually waved and shouted greetings as the paratroopers passed by, either in convoy, in individuals or on foot.

Thousands gathered to watch the airborne troopers parachute in, and many handed out cold soft drinks and fruit in greeting.

While the mock battle raged with the paratroopers manning foxholes and defensive positions, curious Thais invariably gathered wherever Americans were to watch and shout "Sawadi" (hello), amidst smiles and hand waves.

"We slept next to a farmhouse one night," said SFC Charles Ellis, 35, of Richmond Heights, Fla., "and the Thais brought us mats and pillows to



sleep on. We couldn't refuse them; we had to accept. They brought us water and soft drinks. They don't have much, but they offer whatever they have. So, we accept, and give them some of our C-rations in return.

"The Thai people are really friendly," remarked Pvt. Stephen R. Grater, 19, of Walnut Creek, Cal., a bandsman in Hq. Co.

"What surprised me the most is that many people would come up and speak to us in English. They learned it in school, and although it was not always good English, it was good enough."

"I think this has been a really good people-to-people program," said Sgt. James D. Coates, 32, of Alton, Ill., a weapons squad leader. "We get to know the people by coming over here, and if we ever had to come over here in combat we would know the terrain and the country."

"I think the Thais are about the friendliest people we ever encountered," he said.

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OPERATION OUTPOST  
NAHA AIR BASE  
Friday, 14 June 1963

#### 51ST TEAM BIDS TO POCKET 'SMALL CHANGE'

Some 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing crews have been selected for an exercise June 27-29 which will match the entire "defense team" here against those at four other F-102-equipped installations in this year's "Small Change VII" competition.

Equipment for the live-firing tournament will include radar scopes on the ground, "Deuces" in the air, GAR missiles, T-33 "target" aircraft and other apparatus.

It will also include the men operating the radar equipment, weapons directors, missile loaders and the pilots. Dozens of trophies are awaiting the top men at the five bases and the fighter-interceptor units themselves.

Competing against the 51st in "Small Change" are teams from Yokota, Misawa and Itazuke air bases in Japan, and Clark AB, P.I. Only F-102s are entered in the event.

The 6002nd Standardization Evaluation Group at Kadena is judging the event and will visit the five bases in turn. The 51st will step through its paces June 27-29.

Testing will run the gauntlet of air defense. Up for grading are Air Defense Direction Centers (AC&W sites), including their intercept directors, technicians and height finder operators. Munitions loading teams and materiel support at the installations are also in contention.

Awards will also go to the top pilots, the top wing, the top AC&W sector and the top interceptor squadron.



All will be involved in the exercises which will each include 16 F-102 sorties, some for actual missile firings and some for profile firing, or combatting a simulated attack by a simulated aggressor using offensive tactics against defense systems.

The 51st so far has named its pilots and weapons director teams and their alternates, but had not yet decided which load crew from the 51st A&E Squadron will arm the Deuces here.

Pilots will be Maj. Ethan A. Grant, Captains John C. Bailey, Al M. Yahanda and William H. Morgan, and 1st Lt. Allen W. Melvin. Alternates are Captains Harry L. McLamb, Lee E. Williams and Keith N. Hall, and 1st Lt. Robert S. F. Jennings.

Depending on which AC&W site is employed for the exercise, Capt. William G. Shideler, SSgt. F. R. Steinman and ALC W. O. Mitchell are standing by at Yoza Dake as intercept director, intercept technician and height finder operator respectively.

At Okino are Capt. Robert V. Baird, ALC F. Ryczyk and ALC H. E. Burnette. Capt. Philip J. Morris at Kume is an alternate intercept director.

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OPERATION OUTPOST  
NAHA AIR BASE  
Friday, 16 August 1963

NAHA MISSILE LOADERS SCORE  
TO CRAB 'SMALL CHANGE' POT

Seven members# of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing's maintenance complex were named to the Pacific Air Forces entry in the 1963 Air Force world-wide interceptor meet in October as the results of the recent "Small Change" competition between PACAF interceptor units was announced this week.

Scoring 460 points out of a possible 600 to take first place in the munitions loading phase of the contest was the seven-man Naha team.

Heading the team was ALC James G. Alumbaugh, aircraft crew chief, of the 51st Organizational Maintenance Sq. The team consisted of ALC Kenneth A. Hurrell, team chief; ALC Melvin J. Saunders, A2C Gary D. Clark, A2C William W. Moore, Jr., A2C Raymond C. Prohaska and David J. May. The sextet are all members of the 51st A&E Sq.

Lt. Gen. Maurice A. Preston, commander, Fifth Air Force, presented the seven with their trophies at an awards banquet last weekend in Japan.

Grabbing first place in the flying category of the contest was the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Sq. of Misawa AB, Japan, a former unit of the 51st FIW; while the weapons controller's category was won by a team from the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force, which are stationed near Misawa AB.

Material honors also went to Misawa.

The combined team will represent PACAF in October in the F-102 "Delta Dagger" phase of "William Tell," the bi-annual Air Force interceptor meet. Competing against them for top honors in the F-102 slot will be teams



representing the Alaskan Air Command, Air Defense Command, Air National Guard, Air Training Command and United States Air Forces in Europe.

Tyndall AFB, Fla., will be the site of the event.

Speaking at the awards banquet on "Small Change" was Col. Joel D. Thorvaldson, who headed the judging, and stated "that the entire contest was a competition among champions."

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FACILITY MODIFICATION PROGRAM

CRITICAL ITEMS (S):

1. Emergency exhaust door opening system (all sites): This provided a previously lacking emergency system for the opening of exhaust tunnel doors. It required the shut-down of the site hydraulic system rendering the complex non-operational. It took two weeks per complex to accomplish.
2. Pressure seals, main door (all sites): New seals were required on all launch bay doors to provide a tighter and more durable seal that would prevent shock-wave overpressures from entering the launch bays.
3. Main cell-door water leaks (all sites): All of the water-filled launch bay doors leaked continuously. To correct this, the doors were drained and filled with a special light weight, porous concrete which had the same density as water.
4. "74°" switch (all sites): This mod replaced the existing switch (that prevented missile launch until cell door was open to at least 74°), with a more reliable moisture resistant switch. It also included the replacement of the "firing line" circuit cabling with a new shielded-type.
5. Diesel exhaust gate valve (all sites): This mod provided a positive shut-off of diesel exhaust gases to the main or auxiliary exhaust plenum. This was necessary to permit maintenance of blast valves in the plenums without requiring generator shut-down (which would make a complex non-operational).
6. By-pass and shut-off valves, diesel water piping (sites 3 and 4):  
This mod improved the reliability of the diesel water valves which

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switch the cooling system from external to internal cooling when a launch alert is initiated.

7. Common-header, compressed air (sites 1 and 2): The common-header provided separation between the two compressed air tanks to permit maintenance on a single tank without having to shut down both.

NON-CRITICAL ITEMS (U):

1. Flush toilets (all sites): Needed to replace the highly unsatisfactory chemical toilets that were initially designed into the system.
2. Sally ports (sites 3 and 4): This mod added a second gate to the security fencing to increase access security to the sites.
3. Storage buildings (all sites): To provide much needed (and non-existent) outside storage facilities for drums, POL, etc.
4. Hill Removal (site 3): To improve line of sight security.
5. Erosion control (sites 3 and 4): To prevent soil from eroding from the security fences.
6. Weather protection, exterior CO<sup>2</sup> controls (all sites): This involved the spraying of a weather-proof plastic on all outside CO<sup>2</sup> fire extinguisher controls.
7. Air conditioner reset device (sites 1 and 2): The reset device permitted the mechanical resetting of the fresh air intake damper for the launch control center.
8. Air Police shelters (all sites): This involved the installation of much-needed window screens in the gate, guard houses, and a general improvement of facilities.

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ANNEX D AFCS

COMMUNICATIONS

1. (SECRET) Secured circuits did not exist between the Missile Launch Control Center (MLCC) and missile launch sites. This necessitated use of KAC 125 and delayed timely receipt of exercise messages at the launch sites. However, based on initial telephone contact and assuming a tactical situation permitting transmission in the clear, alert notification was satisfactory. Installation of the programmed secured circuits is required to insure timely message receipt when security is required.
2. (SECRET) Operation of the TRC-75 radio net connecting the MLCC and missile launch sites was unsatisfactory. Equipment was non-operational at complex 3B and 4A. Receivers at other locations were noisy and the transmitter at the MLCC was marginal due to poor modulation.

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Ltr, Hq PACAF (PFCIN), 29 May 63, Readiness Inspection of the 498th Tactical Missile Group (U)

1st Ind (498CR)

10 JUN 1963

Hq, 498th Tactical Missile Group, APO 239

TO: 313AD (CMDR)  
5AF (5FCIG)  
PACAF (PFCIN)  
IN TURN

(U) The following explanations of the findings of the readiness inspection report, Bearcat 51, paragraphs 29 through 50 are submitted:

29. (S) Reference para 8. The requested readouts of our set-ins were made during the period immediately following the launch evaluation. Crews were primarily occupied with closing launch doors and returning the sites to O/R status. In a number of instances crew members were handed blank mission data sheets and requested to obtain set-ins. Explanations were not made of the purpose of the request. The energies of some crew members were diverted from re-hardening the site to removing panels to obtain set-ins. The ORI team members then took the set-ins and returned to the base. No attempt was made to verify suspected discrepancies at the site. As a result, reading errors were reported as discrepancies. The Commander, 498TMG was informed of these discrepancies the same afternoon. Later that evening he personally checked Site II where five discrepancies had been reported. No actual discrepancies were found. At the sites the changing of set-ins is a frequent occurrence. Complete and partial re-settings as a result of weather changes, guidance set replacement and recycle checks, are made on an average of five times a day. Since we are well aware of the opportunity for error our procedures have been well established and enforced. Set-ins are furnished by the LCO to Mechs 1, 2 and 5 who are responsible for making changes. Following this, the NCOIC makes an independent reading and record of set-ins without reference to the target folder. This is returned to the LCO who checks them against the target folders. Discrepancies are immediately detected and corrected repeating the procedures until all set-ins are correct.

Reference para 25a. During the ORI, an immediate spot check was instituted after we were appraised of this situation. One of the two errors verified by us was a difference of .0077 degrees in the azimuth data set-in. This was caused by an erroneous entry in the target folder which was immediately corrected. The second error was a difference of .06 in the latitude of the range axis setting, also corrected. We suspect that a crew member set the value .03 on the wrong side of the 46.00 mark and the checking NCOIC also misread it. We are not attempting to justify these errors and because of the frequency with which set-ins are made, the 498TMG has and will continue to take strong supervisory action to insure the validity of mission set-ins. Actual errors were corrected immediately and only one missile required recycle.



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30. (U) Reference para 14. Late reporting was due to transportation delays. Buses are being picked up 15 minutes earlier to insure reporting at the correct time. Headcount at briefings is mandatory and late personnel are reported to respective squadron commander by MLCC duty officer for appropriate action. Reporting for crew change at the sites has never been a fixed time. Quality and scope of crew briefings has been improved. Inputs are carefully screened to insure only pertinent material is presented.

31. (U) Reference para 18. Standard mechanical clocks for all sites have been on order since 8 May 62 and follow-up action periodically initiated. Seven clocks were received on 6 June 63 from Base Supply and EDD for those remaining on requisition is 6 July 63.

32. (S) Reference para 22. All site commanders, operations officers and launch control officers have been required to achieve 100% on a quarterly examination of EAF and PPC. In addition, an extensive training and evaluation program has been established to insure that launch control officers and supervisory personnel are completely familiar with PPC and EAF. No-notice tests and spot checks are being given by standardization and evaluation personnel to insure complete knowledge. All site commanders and operations officers will become O/R not later than 20 June 1963.

Reference para 24a. Launch officer in question has been given additional individual training. Also see answer to para 22 above.

Reference para 26a. See para 22 above.

33. (U) Reference para 23e. Standardized training folders and cover sheets are now required by a 498 Tactical Missile Group regulation. All evaluation forms are now properly annotated. In the future, evaluation forms will not be signed until completely filled in.

Reference para 25d. Extraneous forms and leave requests have been removed from the folders and frequent reviews of the training folders are being accomplished by training officers. All crew members who require special weapons certificates, (LCO, NCOIC, MECH 3 and MECH 5) have certificates in their records. The LCO in question did have a "Bomb Commanders Certificate" rather than a Special Weapons Certificate. At one time the special weapons training was referred to as "Bomb Commanders School" by the training organization. A new appropriate certificate will be issued. Certificates of training will be prepared (and training accomplished if necessary) for those specified airmen. This organization interprets PACAF Manual 51-5 as requiring training within a year from the O/R date, not the date the school was last completed.

Reference para 26d. Missing transition crew training folders were kept at the squadron operations section as these personnel had not yet reported to the sites for training. Initial sheets have been appended to

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MIF's. Missing MIF publications are on order and receipt is estimated 1 August 1963. Missile safety briefings had been attended and were recorded on a separate form. PACAF Form 245's are now being used to record this training.

34. (S) Reference para 24. All eight complexes were contacted simultaneously by conference call and it was not possible to pass a bad message edition to a single complex only. The LCO copied the code group wrong and compromised an envelop before verifying the correct edition number. He then directed his attention to the expend actions and neglected to report the compromise. Special emphasis is being placed on compromise procedures in the PPC/EAF training program.

35. (S) Reference para 24. Two-man areas are specially marked and crews have always received special emphasis in training and evaluations in this subject. Directives at this level and higher headquarters are available and clear on this subject. We will continue to place special supervisory attention on this matter and make it a special subject of our evaluations and spot checks.

36. (S) Reference para 24b. Those individuals who did not follow checklists have been given additional training and will receive special spot check evaluations.

Reference para 25. See answer to para 24b above.

37. (U) Reference para 25e. All foreign matter has been removed from cable troughs. Daily inspections and cleaning are required.

38. (S) Reference para 25c. The Technical Order does not require use of the external mire or leveling at every recycle. The use of the internal mire is authorized by Technical Order procedures. We do not use the external mire, except at sunrise or sunset, due to ground heat wave distortion. T/O procedures require the comparison and verification of external and internal setting angles only once every 30 days. Those crew chiefs who were unfamiliar with the location of the mire targets are now fully knowledgeable of the location.

Reference para 26c. See answer to 25c above.

39. (S) Reference para 26. The EAF index file in question was a typewritten copy and is being reproduced to insure readability. A printed copy of the PACAF EAF was also available to the LCO in question. The individual has been rebriefed and will be spot checked to insure that his computation procedures for launch time are correct. Additionally, see answer to para 22 above.

40. (U) Reference para 26d. Missing publications are on order and receipt is estimated 1 August 63.

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41. (S) Reference para 26c. This is a recognized problem area primarily concerning test sets "L" and MB-1's. ECL 267 has been changed to authorize an increase of three test set "L's". They have been shipped. Of the 14 MB-1 testers authorized, 6 were on hand and 6 were in PMEL at the time of the ORI. WRAMA agreed during the April Hi-Value Conference to obtain and ship two additional MB-1's. Estimated delivery date is 15 July 1963.

42. (U) No para reference. The two 4000A trailers are in the ACE section for corrosion control, rehabilitation and repair. Both units are AWP. Estimated date for completion is 15 Sept 63.

43. (C) Reference para 5a, Annex A. Grounding procedures of missiles are established by launch area Technical Orders. Appropriate personnel have been rebriefed and this is now a special subject of Stan/Eval spot checks. Cables will be modified to conform with your suggestions not later than 1 July 1963.

Reference para 5b. Bay grounding points had been inspected but not stenciled. Stenciling will be completed by 1 July 1963.

Reference para 5c. Grounding points are at a low spot in the bay. The missile characteristically dumps some fluid overboard during tests. Corrective action to keep this fluid away from the grounding points will be taken by 1 August 1963.

44. (S) Reference para 6b(1), Annex A. New launch bay fire emergency procedures include contingencies for emergencies with the launch doors open or closed.

45. (S) Reference para 6b(2), Annex A. MLCC, CSC and the Weapons Convoy Commander will utilize a common frequency during convoy movement. Check point reporting has been standardized to minimize frequency use.

46. (S) Reference para 6b(3)(a), Annex A. Changes to T.O. 11N-20-11 are on order. EDD is 1 Aug 63. New supplements to AFR 122-4 are now on hand.

Reference para 6b(3)(b). Explosive signs will be repainted in accordance with AFM 32-6. Estimated completion date, 1 August 1963.

Reference para 6b(3)(c). AFTO Form 22's are being prepared on checklist changes and will be submitted to WRAMA not later than 20 June 63.

Reference para 6b(3)(d). The lack of a bay fire detection system is of continued concern to this organization. The Directorate of Nuclear Safety, Operational Review of the TM-76MK 28 weapons system dated 12 April 1963, recommended that a fire detection device or method be installed on

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an expedited basis. We understand that PACAF has approved a TV system in principle based on a 498TMC study of 1962. The 1962d Comm Gp is presently preparing an Advanced Communications-Electronic Requirements Plan which will outline details. It will be forwarded by 15 July 1963.

47. (U) Reference para 1, Annex B, Part I. At the time in question a direct phone link existed between the gatehouse and the launch control center. During an emergency a launch crew member stands by in the LCC at this phone. Neither this organization nor the CSC personnel desire an open microphone intercom type device as it can only cause confusion in the LCC. If the present phone is out of order, the LCC can be contacted by CSC radio through CSC and/or MLCC. It is not our desire to rely on the guard personnel for primary source of information concerning an emergency. This is the function of the crew NCOIC who always reports to the scene. Initial notification of emergencies can be adequately reported to launch control officers by use of the existing direct phone line.

48. (U) Reference para 3a, Annex B, Part I. Access control procedures have been the subject of a review by all gate guards and will continue to be a spot check for supervisory personnel.

Reference para 3b. Contractor personnel are being accounted for IAW appropriate procedures.

Reference para 3c. Padlocks have been secured for vehicle gates.

49. (U) Reference para 4a, b, c, d, e, Annex B, Part I. Deficiencies in gatehouse security are primarily the result of design deficiencies. Work orders have been accomplished to segregate the controller, to provide an electric lock on the access door, to provide for a duress device to the LCC and to grill required windows and glass panels.

Reference para 4f. The drum has been removed and personnel briefed as to its proper location.

Reference para 4g. Access lists are maintained at CSC not at the sites. Those referenced have been removed. SOP's have been re-accomplished and organized for ready reference.

50. (S) Reference para 2, Annex D. Discrepancies in TRC-75 radios are immediately reported to responsible personnel at the 1962d Comm Gp. See 1962d Comm Gp answers to Annex D. Reasons for technical and supply deficiencies that result in equipment being marginal or out of commission will be reported by the 1962d Comm Gp.

WARREN E. VINZANT  
Colonel, USAF  
Commander

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HEADQUARTERS  
6313TH AIR BASE WING (PACAF)  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

12 JUN 1963



REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 6313CEI-RP

SUBJECT: Report of Real Estate Highlights from March 1962<sup>7</sup> Through 10 June 1963

TO: 313 Air Div (OI-8)  
ATTN: Mr. Peterson

1. In compliance with your telephone request of 4 Jun 63 the following information is submitted for Kadena Air Base and its Satellite Installations:

- a. No additional land was acquired during this period.
- b. No land was released to the land owners during this period.
- c. The Deragawa Communications Annex was transferred to the U.S. Army effective 1 Jul 62. The land area transferred consisted of 130.18 acres. The gross annual rental for this acreage was \$22,222.92. The total prepaid rental for 62.17 acres was \$98,015.06, leaving a current annual rental of \$11,622.69. All buildings and utilities were transferred by separate Engineer Form 290 dated 30 Jun 62. (Reference Real Estate Vouchers #63-4 and #63-32, Real Property Account 2988 REF, Kadena Air Base.)
- d. The completion and transfer of Operational Facilities is as follows:
  - (1) Kadena Site Nr. 1: The Engineer Form 290 was signed as accepted 7 April 1962. The total dollar value was \$2,963,854.00.
  - (2) Kadena Site Nr. 2: The Engineer Form 290 was signed as accepted 25 August 1962. The total dollar value was \$2,375,213.00.
  - (3) Kadena Site Nr. 3: The DD Form 1354 was signed as accepted 1 Jan 63. The total dollar value was \$2,931,124.44.
  - (4) Kadena Site Nr. 4: The DD Form 1354 was signed as accepted 1 Jan 1963. The total dollar value was \$2,952,856.44.
  - (5) Operational Support Facilities for the above, which are located on Kadena Air Base, were accepted and the ENG Form 290 was signed 29 Jan 62. The dollar value of these facilities was \$1,079,348.00.
- e. Various facilities constructed by AF Contract which were recorded to the Real Property Records during this period amounted to \$304,842.40.



f. Facilities constructed by Non-Appropriated Funds were Airmen's Club Warehouse, Building Nr. 432, value \$13,275.25, and an addition to the NCO Club, Building Nr. 621, value \$49,362.00. Total Non-Appropriated Fund construction was \$63,237.25.

g. Other construction by the District Engineer which was recorded to the Real Property Account amounted to \$2,808,077.00.

FOR THE COMMANDER

*D. C. Oldershaw*

D. C. OLDERSHAW  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Base Civil Engineer

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RR RJAPAD RJAOKC  
DE RUHPCR 8A  
R 200400Z  
DA SVC  
BT  
RR RJAPAD RJAOKC RJHPK, RUAWCR  
DE RUHPCR 23A  
R 192045Z  
FM DISTENGR USA PACOCEAN  
TO RUAWCR/DISTENGR USA OKINAWA  
INFO RJHPKM/CINCPACAF  
RJAPAD/5TH AIR FORCE, FUCHU AS  
RJAOKC/313 AIR DIVISION, OKINAWA  
DA GRNC  
SECRET. CITE PODGB 6063.

REFERENCES:

A. PODGB 6062;

B. POCGM 2517 SUBJECT: "BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR M-SITES (S)."

OCE ADVISES STRUCTURES DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE A WILL NOT RESIST 50 PSI BLAST WAVE BECAUSE OF HIGH DRAG PRESSURE LOADING. NO TEST DATA AVAILABLE FOR SUCH STRUCTURES WITH STIFFENING RIBS. RIBS NOT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT FAILURE FOR EARTH-COVERED STRUCTURES WITH FLOOR AT GRADE. PLUMBOB STRUCTURES WERE COMPLETELY BURIED, SO THAT HIGH DRAG PRESSURES WERE NOT EXERTED ON STRUCTURES.

OCE RECOMMENDS REINFORCED CONCRETE EARTH-COVERED IGLOOS. FOR 25-FOOT WIDE STRUCTURES, 12-INCH BARREL AND 18-INCH MONOLITHIC MAT FOOTING REQUIRED. SEPARATE 4-INCH SLAB ON RESILIENT MATERIAL ADDED WHERE CONTENTS SENSITIVE TO HIGH FLOOR ACCELERATIONS. FOR REAR AND WING WALLS AND FOR FRONT WALL LHGYE EARTH COVERED, 15-INCH SATISFACTORY. WING WALLS SHOULD BE PERPENDICULAR TO FRONT WALL IF POSSIBLE. FOR 12-FOOT WIDE STRUCTURES, ALL THICKNESSES CAN BE PROPORTIONATELY LESS.

FOR FINAL DESIGN BLAST DOOR SHOULD BE AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE, AND BOTH DOOR AND EXPOSED PORTIONS OF FRONT WALL SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO RESIST REFLECTED ACD DRAG PRESSURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARMY TECHNICAL MANUAL, CAPABILITIES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS, TM 23-200, NOVEMBER 1957, CONFIDENTIAL, AND ENGINEER MANUALS 1110-345-413 THRU -416. WHERE PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL WITHIN STRUCTURE IS REQUIRED, SHIELDING FROM INITIAL AND NUCLEAR RADIATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED. FOR 50 PSI RANGE, 5-1/2 FEET OF EARTH OVER ONE FOOT OF CONCRETE OR 4-1/2 FEET OF CONCRETE WITH NO EARTH FILL WILL BE REQUIRED FOR INITIAL RADIATION.

REQUEST BUDGET ESTIMATE AS CONFIRMED IN REFERENCE B BE REVISED TO REFLECT REINFORCED CONCRETE STRUCTURE AS RECOMMENDED BY OCE AND FORWARDED TO CINCPACAF NOT LATER THAN 22 AUGUST 1958.

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CFN 22 1958

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P R 201902Z ZES  
FM CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB TH  
TO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
INFO RJAPAD/COM5AF FUCHU AIRSTA JAPAN  
RJAOKG/COMDR 313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWRA/DISTRICT ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RUHPCR/DIVENGR USA PACOCEAN HONO  
AF GRNC

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/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFCIE-ER 16568.

ATTENTION: DIRECTOR OF INSTALLATIONS. SUBJECT IS OKINAWA M-SITE ITEM INCLUDED IN PACAF FY-60 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM, TOTALLING \$7,816,000 (\$5,816,000 IN FY-59 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM AND \$2,000,000 IN FY-60 MCP). FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, THIS HQ ESTIMATES THAT THE OKINAWA M-SITE OPERATIONAL FACILITY WILL COST APPROXIMATELY \$10.9 MILLION. THIS IS APPROXIMATELY \$3.1 MILLION ABOVE THE PRESENT ESTIMATED PROGRAMMED COST. ADDITIONAL FUNDS IN THIS APPROXIMATE AMOUNT WILL BE REQUIRED. COST IS BASED ON \$3.2 MILLION FOR SOFT HOUSEKEEPING AND MAINTENANCE FACILITIES PLUS HARDENED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT BISHAGAWA, \$115,000 FOR HARDENED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT YAETAKE AND APPROXIMATELY \$7.6 MILLION FOR THE HARDENED FIRING COMPLEX (BASED ON USAF DESIGN) AT THE SIX LAUNCH SITES. THIS HQ HAS BEEN ADVISED THAT THE DESIGN OF THE HARDENED TM-76 FIRING COMPLEX WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, PROBABLY UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ARDC. IT IS REALIZED THAT NO REALISTIC COST ESTIMATE CAN BE PREPARED UNTIL THESE SHELTERS ARE DESIGNED AND SITE ADAPTED TO OKINAWA. THE COST ESTIMATES FOR THE HARDENED FIRING COMPLEX CAN BE REFINED AT A LATER DATE, PENDING COMPLETION OF FINAL DESIGN BY ARDC.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25 D. C.

AFOCE-R

1 April 1959

SUBJECT: Designation and Assignment of Air Force Missile Sites

TO:	ADC	AU	HQ COMD	TAC	USAFA
	AMC	AAC	MATS	USAFE	
	ARDC	CAIRC	PACAF	USAFSS	
	ATC	CONAC	SAC		

1. The provisions outlined in Air Force Regulation 87-5, as amended, "Assignment, Designation, Activation, Inactivation, Classification and Transfer of Air Force Installations", will be followed in designating and assigning Air Force missile sites presently being included in the Air Force Inventory.

2. Further clarification and guidance for implementation of AFR 87-5 concerning missile sites is as follows:

a. A non-self-supporting and separately located missile site will be designated as a "detached installation". These sites will be assigned to the primary installation as designated in the Program Document, USAF Program, Bases, Units and Priorities.

(1) These sites will be designated "Air Force Missile Sites" to be preceded by the name of the primary installation. Multiple missile sites detached from the same installation will be further identified by a numerical number suffix.

b. A self-supporting and separately located missile site will be designated as a primary installation. These sites will be designated as "Air Force Missile Station" preceded by the geographical name best identifying the site or the memorialization name, if appropriate. The responsibility for publication of General Orders will remain with this Headquarters.

c. All missile sites will be assigned code "MSL" presently listed in the attachment to AFR 87-5.

3. USAF Installations Characteristics Reports, AF Form 1192, will be reported in accordance with existing AFR 87-18. For Air Force Missile Sites Item 8 will reflect the Primary Installation Name. Item 9 will reflect the Permanent Installation Number assigned to the Primary Installation. For Air Force Missile Station (Para sub b above). Item 8 will be the same as item 6 and Item 9 will be the same as item 4.



MEMO to ALMAJCOM, subj: Designation and Assignment of Air Force  
Missile Sites, (Cont'd)

Item 36 will contain Function Code P. Item 20, type of Installation,  
will be completed to reflect Primary, Detached-Other or Detached Air  
Force Leased, as appropriate. The primary installation to which the  
detached installation is assigned will be reflected in Item 40, In-  
stallation Supplying Logistical Support.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

s/t/WILSON RALSTON  
Colonel, U. S. Air Force  
Deputy Chief, Real Estate Div.  
Directorate of Civil Engineering,  
DCS/O

PFCIE-MCR

1st Ind

Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, APO 953, 21 Apr 1959

TO: Commander, Pacific Air Forces Base Command, APO 953  
Commander, Thirteenth Air Force, APO 74  
Commander, Fifth Air Force, APO 925

BFP

AFOCE-R, Hq USAF, 1 Apr 59, subj: Designation and Assignment of Air Force Missile Sites

5FCIE-C-R

2d Ind

Hq Fifth Air Force, APO 925, 7 May 1959

TO: 6313ABW (3) 6431ABG (3) 6314ABW (3)  
6167 Sup Sq (3) 6175ABG (3)

INFO TO: 313AD 314AD PACAF

1. References:

- a. Air Force Regulation 87-5A, dated 5 May 1958.
- b. PACAF Supplement #1 to AFR 87-5, dated 28 January 1958.
- c. Fifth Air Force Supplement #1 to AFR 87-5, dated 26 June 1958.

2. Procedures in the basic correspondence apply to the designation and assignment of real estate for separately located Air Force Missile Sites and Stations.

3. Newly acquired missile sites and stations which are not an integral part of another existing Air Force installation will be reported to this headquarters in accordance with reference 1c, for publication of USAF General Orders immediately following the acquisition of real estate.

4. Initial report on AF Form 1192 will be submitted in accordance with AFR 87-18, for new missile location that is identified as a separate installation on the General Order. When appropriate, submit AF Form 1192 change report having items 1 through 11, 41 and 43 completed, to identify missile location acquired as a part of another installation.

5. Installation Inventory of Existing Facilities, RCS: 1-AF-217 report, will be prepared and submitted in accordance with AFR 93-4 for installation having real estate improvements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

IRA S. COLES, JR.  
Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Director of Construction  
DC/S Installations



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PRIORITY

X AF

MSG PFCOP 7142  
10 March 1959

HEDADIV 313TH KADENA AB OKINAWA

5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN

SECRET/313IE-P C-4-16. This message in seven parts. Part I. Subject is Relocation of M-Site Support Facilities. Part II. Reference PACAF Secret message PFCOP, 7142, 10 March 1959, to your Headquarters, info this Headquarters. Part III. After careful consideration of all salient features in close coordination with representatives of your Headquarters, it is the considered opinion of this Headquarters that the M-Site construction originally planned for Bishagawa should be constructed at Bishagawa, and not, repeat not, be transferred to Kadena Air Base. Part IV. In reaching this conclusion, the principal points considered were: (A) All possible construction areas on Kadena Air Base present violations of noise level criteria, excessive traffic congestion problems, wide dispersal of living and operational areas; and, are much further removed from sites which they support than Bishagawa; (B) Greater construction costs on Kadena Air Base negate savings in resultant deletions of personnel support facilities; (C) While the current AF Form 800 for Kadena Air Base indicates a surplus of airman dormitories in the end position FY-63, the strength figures used were for a total of 5,168 airmen, whereas the current programmed strength is 6,517 airmen, using a strength of 845 airmen for the 498th TMG; (D) Research further revealed 1,550 temporary airman dormitory spaces carried on AF Form 800 as usable-substandard. Of these spaces, 929 fall in one of the three following categories: (1) 929 are unavailable and/or unsuited for troop housing because of lack of sanitary facilities, location in areas objectionable for troop housing (isolation, immediately adjacent to family housing, etc.) (2) Are suited and being utilized to satisfy urgent requirements for Air Base Wing Admin. Automotive Maintenance, etc., or; (3) Are scheduled for use as AFSS Operations and Administration (Academy Area); (E) Of the 621 airman dormitory spaces presently available for troop housing (out of the 1,550 shown on AF Form 800), 127 spaces in the Whitehorse Area erected in 1946 will be removed from inventory upon vacation by AFSS early in 1960; and, 242 spaces in scattered areas and erected in 1946, will be removed from inventory as soon as typhoon-resistant space becomes available; thus, leaving 252 quonset spaces erected in 1952, programmed for disposal in FY 62. (F) Since previously-prepared cost estimates for constructing dormitories at Bishagawa and Kadena Air Base indicates the cost at Kadena Air Base exceeds the cost at Bishagawa by 800 dollars per man, no monetary savings would be effected by relocation to Kadena Air Base; (G) Bishagawa offers simplified control and operation, without creating traffic and facility

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HEDADIV 313TH KADENA AB OKINAWA

congestion, while still being near enough to Kadena Air Base to utilize Kadena personnel and other support facilities. Part V. The location of the Missile Operations Center will require further investigation from the communications point of view, but it appears desirable to construct this facility underneath the Group Headquarters building at Bishagawa. Part VI. Site plans previously forwarded for Bishagawa will require minor modifications when a firm Unit Manning Document for the 498th TMG is announced. Part VII. Final resolution of the maintenance concept at the launching sites will affect the site plans for the launch sites, and possibly the scope and siting of the maintenance facilities at Bishagawa.

Mr. James I. Mason, Chief, RP&P Br.

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WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Installations Officer

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DE RJHPKM 96  
P 160119Z  
FM CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HI  
TO RJAPAA/COMDR 5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
INFO RJEZHQ/C OFS USAF WASH DC  
RJWXBR/CWNC SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR  
RJMADA/COMDR 3D AIRDIV ANDERSEN AFB GUAM MI  
RJAOKC/COMDR 313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKI

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/SECRET/PFCIE-ER 8459

ACTION 5AF, INFO HQ USAF (ATTN: AFCE), CINCSAC, 3AD, AND 313AD.  
THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART 1. REFERENCE CINCSAC MESSAGE  
SECRET/DPL 3821, 11 APR 9, SUBJ: (S) IRBM SURVEY OF OKINAWA, AN  
INFORMATION COPY OF WHICH IS BEING RE-TRANSMITTED TO 5AF AND 313AD,  
O-42. BY DIRECTION OF USAF AND CINCSAC, A 3D AD SURVEY TEAM HEADED  
BY MAJOR GENERAL MONTGOMERY IS PRESENTLY ENROUTE TO OKINAWA TO ACCOM-  
PLISH, FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, A SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE  
DEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA OF AN IRBM SQUADRON. DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS,  
ASSUMPTIONS, AND CRITERIA ARE PROVIDED IN ABOVE REFERENCED MESSAGE.  
PART 3. PERFORMANCE OF THIS SURVEY HAS THE APPROVAL OF THIS HQ, AND  
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH 3D AD REGARDING DETAILS  
OF THE SURVEY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT 3D AD BE PROVIDED ALL POSSIBLE  
ASSISTANCE. YOU ARE CAUTIONED THAT THIS EXERCISE SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED  
AS AN INTENTION TO DEPLOY AN IRBM SQUADRON AND THAT THE PURPOSE AND DETAIL  
OF THE SURVEY SHOULD ONLY BE DISSEMINATED TO PERSONNEL WHO MUST HAVE  
KNOWLEDGE FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT. PAR 4. FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, SELECTION  
OF IRBM SITES MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO JEOPARDIZE PROGRAMMED OKINAWA  
TM-76B DEPLOYMENT. PR D T TM-76B SITE SELECTION IS FIRM AND SHOULD NOT  
BE ALTERED AT THIS LATE DATE. FURTHER, YOUR FORTHCOMING DECISION OF  
TM-76B SUPPORT BASE (BISHAGAWA VS KADENA) MUST BE MADE KNOWN IMMEDIATELY  
IN ORDER THAT IRBM SUPPORT BASE WILL NOT CONFLICT. PREVIOUS PACAF/5AF  
IRBM SITE RECOMMENDATIONS SUMMARIZED IN YOUR TOP SECRET MESSAGE 5FOTT  
58-693 B, 25 FEB 58, SHOULD BE MADE KNOWN TO 313AD AND 3D AD SURVEY  
TEAM FOR THEIR INFORMATION.

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FM CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB TH  
TO RJAPAA/COMAFFIVE FUCHU AIRSTA JAPAN  
RJAKC/COM313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

SECRET/PFCIE-ER 8464

ACTION 5AF AND 313AD. FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CINCSAC, DATED 11 APR 59, IS RE-TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: FFUN UK SECRET/DPL 3821. SUBJECT: (S) IRBM SURVEY OF OKINAWA. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO SECTIONS. SECTION 1. THE FOLLOWING HQ USAF MESSAGE, AFOOP 58288, DATED 27 MAR 59, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE. THIS MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART 1. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY, REQUEST YOUR HQ PROVIDE ASSESSMENT ON DEPLOYMENT OF AN IRBM SQUADRON TO OKINAWA BASED ON FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS: (A) SQUADRON WILL BE U.S. MANNED AND UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCSAC. (B) SQUADRON WILL BE COMPLETE WITH 15 MISSILES, 15 LAUNCHERS, AND ASSOCIATED GSE FROM OUTSET. (C) CONSTRUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY U.S. (D) WHAT AUSTERE FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE OR WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DEPLOY SQUADRON ON AUSTERE BASIS WITHIN 60-90 DAYS AFTER DECISION UNTIL PERMANENT FACILITIES AVAILABLE? PART 2. STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT MADE "POLITICAL DECISION" ON DEPLOYMENT OF IRBMS TO OKINAWA. YOUR ASSESSMENT MUST BE BASED UPON AVAILABLE INFORMATION. RECOGNIZE THIS MAY DEGRADE YOUR ASSESSMENT; HOWEVER, PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL ESSENTIAL AT THIS TIME. PART 3. BASED UPON ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS WE REQUEST YOUR PRELIMINARY VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH ADDITIVE INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE. INFORMATION DESIRED ON FOLLOWING: (A) ESTIMATE ON FUNDS REQUIRED TO PREPARE FACILITIES FOR AUSTERE INTERIM OPERATION OF JUPITER OR THOR SQUADRON. (B) ESTIMATE ON ADDITIONAL TIME AND FUNDS REQUIRED TO PREPARE PERMANENT FACILITIES. (C) CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AND ORDER OF MAGNITUDE COSTS FOR BOTH JUPITER AND THOR IF POSSIBLE. RECOGNIZE FINITE COSTS CONTINGENT ON-SITE SURVEY FOR WHICH NO AUTHORITY EXISTS AT PRESENT. PART 4. IF PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO VISIT AREAS BEING CONSIDERED, CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT UNFAVORABLE SPECULATION. THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO REPRESENT A DECISION TO DEPLOY AN IRBM SQUADRON TO OKINAWA. UNQUOTE. PART 2. REQUEST 3D AD SEND A SURVEY TEAM TO OKINAWA TO DETERMINE: (A) MOST SUITABLE SUPPORT BASE. (B) FACILITIES WHICH COULD BE USED FOR IRBM SUPPORT AND MAXIMUM INFORMATION REGARDING QUESTIONS POSED IN ABOVE HQ USAF MESSAGE. (C) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF LAUNCH POSITIONS WHICH COULD BE LOCATED ON OKINAWA IF A SEPARATION DISTANCE OF 15 MILES BETWEEN LAUNCH POSITIONS WAS FOLLOWED. (D) ANY FACTORS WHICH WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE DEPLOYMENT OF IRBM SQUADRON TO OKINAWA. PART 3. THE PURPOSE AND DETAIL OF THIS SURVEY SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED ONLY TO THOSE PERSONNEL WHO MUST HAVE KNOWLEDGE TO ACCOMPLISH THE PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY. THIS SURVEY SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN INTENTION TO DEPLOY AN IRBM SQUADRON TO OKINAWA. REQUEST THE REPORT OF SURVEY BE FORWARDED TO THIS HQ BY TWX AND THAT THIS HQ BE ADVISED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF ANTICIPATED COMPLETION DATE. PART 4. FOR PACAF. REQUEST 3D AD BE GIVEN APPROVAL TO PERFORM SURVEY AS OUTLINED ABOVE. THIS HQ AUTHORIZES 3D AD TO COORDINATE DIRECTLY WITH PACAF REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE SURVEY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT 3D AD BE PROVIDED NECESSARY ASSISTANCE BY PACAF TO DETERMINE INFORMATION REQUESTED IN HQ

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USAF MESSAGE. SECTION 2. THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY GUIDANCE REGARDING IRBM REQUIREMENTS. IT IS REALIZED THAT THERE MAY BE QUESTIONS REGARDING DETAILS OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM: HOWEVER, THE SURVEY DIRECTED HEREIN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS PRELIMINARY IN NATURE ONLY. A DETAILED TECHNICAL SURVEY WILL BE PERFORMED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF MAJOR COMMANDS INVOLVED IF AN IRBM SQUADRON IS DIRECTED TO BE DEPLOYED TO OKINAWA.

A. CONSOLIDATED RIM FACILITY. OVERALL 260 FT X 140 FT, PLUS 30,400 SF GROUND AREA AND A TOTAL AREA OF PLUS 40,200 SF INCLUDING MEZZANINE. FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES WILL UTILIZE THIS FACILITY: (1) GSE MAINTENANCE. (2) GENERAL SHOP AREAS. (A) GROUND POWER. (B) ELECTRIC POWER. (C) PAINT SHOP. (D) HYDRAULIC SHOP. (E) WELDING SHOP. (F) SHEET METAL AND MACHINE SHOP. (3) PROPULSION MAINTENANCE. (4) MISSILE BAY AREA. (5) CONTROL ELECTRIC. (6) TEST EQUIPMENT. (7) MECHANICAL ROOM. (8) GUIDANCE AND FLIGHT CONTROL. (9) COMMUNICATIONS CENTER. (10) READY ROOM. (11) LATRINE (2). (12) TOOL CRIB. (13) OPERATIONS TRAINING. (14) CONTROL ROOM. (15) STAND TEAM. (16) RECORDS AND ANALYSIS. (17) QUALITY CONTROL. (18) OFFICES. (19) CLASSROOM. (20) JOB CONTROL.

B. TECHNICAL STORAGE. (1) SPARE PARTS STORAGE - 40,000 SF. (2) SHED STORAGE - 2,500 SF. (3) OFFICE SPACE - 1,000 SF. TOTAL - 46,500 SF. C. LCX PLANT. 25 T/DAY, BUILDING - 50 FT X 100 FT, 5,000 SF. D. RP-1 STORAGE. BACK-UP STORAGE OF 25,000 GALLONS. E. AMMO STORAGE (ON-BASE). (1) MULTI-CUBICLE MAGAZINE 2 CELLS - 758 SF. 1,000 NR, CL 10 - 480' FEE; 800' EASE. (2) SEGREGATED STORAGE. 6 BAYS - 1,000 NR CL 10 - 480' FEE; 800' EASE. F. LAUNCH POSITION. (1) THREE LAUNCH EMPLACEMENTS AT 700' ON-CENTER MINIMUM. (2) ONE MASTER CONTROL AREA. (3) ONE GATE HOUSE. (4) ACCESS AND SUPPORT ROADS. (5) PERIMETER FENCE. (6) PLUS: MINUS 112 ACRES. (7) MULTI-CUBICLE, ONE CELL - 376 SF - 1,000 NR CL 10, 480' FEE; 800' EASE. (8) SEGREGATED STORAGE, 2 BAYS - 1,000 NR EMPLACEMENTS IN 5 LAUNCH POSITIONS (EACH AS MENTIONED ABOVE) SEPARATED BY 15 NAUTICAL MILES. UNQUOTE.

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HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
United States Air Force  
APO 925 San Francisco, California

5FOPR-P

20 APR 1959

SUBJECT: 498th Tactical Missile Group Support Complex

TO: Commander  
313th Air Division  
APO 239

Inclosed for your information and retention is a copy of a message which outlines Fifth Air Force position on the question of siting the support complex for the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
Msg 5FOPR-P 03938  
(SECRET)

N. J. KASUN  
Lt Col, USAF  
Ch. Programs Division  
PPR Directorate, DCS/O

605451

**SECRET**

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ROUTINE

AFFIVE FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN

PACAF HICKAM AFB T.H.

SECRET/5FOPR-P 03938. FOR OPERATIONS. ATTN: PFOOP-O. THIS MESSAGE  
IN 4 PARTS. PART I. REFERENCES: A. SECRET PFOOP 7142 DTG 10/0241Z  
MAR. B. TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. E. CLARY YOUR HQ ON 10 APR  
AND 15 APR 59. C. USAF STUDY, SUBJ: KADENA TRP HOUSING, DATED 22 JAN  
59. PART II. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUEST CONTAINED IN REF A, THIS  
HQ HAS CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE FEASIBILITY OF REPROGRAMMING 498TH TMG  
SUPPORT FACILITIES TO KADENA AB RATHER THAN BISHIGAWA. THIS HQ CONTINUES  
TO RECOMMEND THAT THE BISHIGAWA SUPPORT COMPLEX PLAN BE APPROVED AS  
SUBMITTED. PART III. IN ADDITION TO JUSTIFICATION ORIGINALLY INCLUDED  
IN PROGRAMMING BISHIGAWA, SEVERAL ADDITIONAL FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED  
IF THE 498TH TMG IS TO BE REPROGRAMMED TO KADENA: A. THE DELETION OF  
1938 ROTATIONAL SAC SPACES REFLECTED IN REF C. DOES NOT, IN FACT, PRODUCE  
ANY SURPLUS TROOP HOUSING (THE CRITICAL FACTOR) AT KADENA AB SINCE THE  
ONLY FACILITIES MADE EXCESS BY THIS ACTION ARE CONCRETE PADS ON WHICH  
TENTS MAY BE ERECTED. B. 1500 TEMPORARY SUBSTANDARD, USABLE DORMITORY  
SPACES AT KADENA ARE PLANNED FOR REMOVAL BY FY 62, THUS THE APPARENT  
LARGE SURPLUS IN BILLETING WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE. C. WHEN ONLY THE  
REMAINING PERMANENT BILLETING FACILITIES ARE MATCHED AGAINST FY 4/62  
PROGRAMMED PERSONNEL STRENGTHS, AIRMEN AUTHORIZED STRENGTH EXCEEDS  
AIRMEN BILLETS BY 263. D. IF ONE AIRMAN DORMITORY WERE CONSTRUCTED ON  
KADENA TO PROVIDE FOR THE SURPLUS IN C. ABOVE, THE COST WILL APPROXIMATE  
\$315,000, THUS REDUCING POTENTIAL DOLLAR SAVINGS. E. YOUR HQ HAS

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FAVORABLY CONSIDERED AN ADDITIONAL 2198 SPACES FOR 5AF QUICK STRIKE AUGMENTATION AND AS A RESULT ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL WILL BE STATIONED AT KADENA. F. CASAF FORCES DEPLOYING TO KADENA WILL INCREASE THE BASE POPULATION BY 400-800. G. THIS HQ HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE F-105 WSPO TEAM THAT AN INCREASE (UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME) IN PERSONNEL CAN BE EXPECTED WITH CONVERSION TO THE F-105 AIRCRAFT. H. PROGRAMMING THE 498TH TMG TO KADENA WILL TOTALLY SATURATE BILLETING FACILITIES AND REMOVE ALL FUTURE FLEXIBILITY. I. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT 5AF HQ MAY BE MOVED TO OKINAWA WITHIN THE TIME PERIOD WHEN THE TM-76B IS OPERATIONAL. KADENA IS A LOGICAL LOCATION. J. REPROGRAMMING THE 498TH TMG TO KADENA WILL CAUSE DELAYS WHICH MAY BE COMPOUNDED TO CREATE A SLIPPAGE IN THE DEPLOYMENT. PART IV. IN VIEW OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, PLUS SUCH OBVIOUS BISHIGAWA ADVANTAGES AS OPERATIONAL INTEGRITY AND REDUCED TRAFFIC CONGESTION, THIS HQ REAFFIRMS ITS POSITION IN RECOMMENDING BISHIGAWA AS THE 498TH TMG SUPPORT SITE.

5FOPR-P/bsh

APRIL 1959

WALTER E. CARPER, MAJOR, USAF

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62

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AFOCE-CO, Hq USAF, 28 April 1959, Subject: Support Facilities for  
TM-76B (MACE)

PFSCE-PP

1st Ind

6 MAY 1959

Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, APO 953, San Francisco, California

TO: Commander, Fifth Air Force, APO 925

1. Forwarded for your information and necessary action.

2. References:

a. PACAF Operational Plan 112-58A

b. Okinawa District Engineer letter, POOGM, dated 5 Mar 1959, subject: Revised Program Cost Estimates of FY 60 Military Construction Program.

c. Okinawa District Engineer letter, POOGM, dated 10 Apr 1959, Subject: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Site, to 313th AD, of which we were info addressees.

d. Okinawa District Engineer letter, POOGM, dated 22 Apr 1959, subject: PCE Tab A Site Plan and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Site, to 313th AD, of which we were info addressees.

3. Present manpower requirements in support of PACAF Operational Plan 112-58A are furnished for your information and guidance as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Airmen</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Group Headquarters	25	106	131
b. TM Squadron	31	188	219
c. Maintenance Squadron	17	365	382
d. Support Squadron	5	188	193
Total	78	847	925

4. In view of the anticipated high cost of the hardened launch shelters, and USAF's request that expenditures for additional support items be confined to the minimum consistent with operational requirements, it is requested that the scope and cost of all items submitted in Program Cost Estimates be reviewed and revised, so as to be compatible with the desires of Headquarters USAF and latest manpower figures. It is requested that this headquarters be immediately furnished

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AFOCE-CO, Hq USAF, 28 April 1959, Subject: Support Facilities for  
TM-76B (MACE)

with the information and data requested in paragraphs 33 and 4 of the  
basic letter, as design of support facilities will be held in abeyance  
pending USAF's receipt and evaluation of this information.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

DANE F. JUSTICE, Sr.  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Engineering Programs  
AC/S Civil Engineering

SECRET



63  
**SECRET**

SUBJECT

498th TMG Headquarters Building and MOC

TO: 313IE

FROM: 313OC-E

DATE: 18 May 59

Maj E. L. Watts/mm/46166

1. Reference SECRET message, this office, 313OC-E C-4-67 dated 30 April 1959, information copy forwarded your office.
2. Fifth Air Force SECRET message, 5FOAC-T-R 04629E, dated 7 May 1959 is quoted for your information and file.

"REFERENCE YOUR MESSAGE 313OC-E-C 4-67. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I. THE 900 SQUARE FEET REQUIRED FOR THE 200 LINE TELEPHONE EXCHANGE IS ADDITIONAL SPACE REQUIRED WITHIN THE BISHIGAWA COMPLEX. EQUIPMENT IS NOT INTENDED TO BE HARDENED AND WILL NOT BE INSTALLED IN MOC. IT MAY BE INSTALLED IN GROUP HEADQUARTERS OR ANY OTHER BUILDING WITHIN THE COMPLEX. PART II. HQS, GEEIA, YAMATO AS, PRESENTLY ENGINEERING FLOOR PLAN FOR COMBINED COMM CENTER-MOC AT BISHIGAWA AND RELAY SITE AT YAE-TAKE. DRAWINGS WILL INCLUDE EQUIPMENT LOCATION AND SUPPORTING DUCT SYSTEMS. WILL ADVISE AVAILABILITY DATE OF DRAWINGS AFTER MEETING WITH GEEIA ON 4 MAY 1959."

ERNEST L. WATTS, Major, USAF  
Directorate of Operations

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**SECRET**

RR RJAOKC DGX

DE RJAPAA 456

R 220704Z

FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB TH

RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

//S E C R E T//5FOPR 05224. REFERENCES: A. PACAF MSG PFCOP 004

DTG 202033Z MAY. B. PACAF MSG PFMLP 5122 DTD 061922Z JANUARY.

REFERENCE B. OUTLINED PACAF POSITION CONCERNING SUPPORT OF ARMY  
PERSONNEL AT YAETAKE ON AN INDEFINITE BASIS. THIS HQ UNAWARE OF ANY  
PROGRAMMING ACTIONS WHICH WILL CHANGE THIS POSITION. ALTHOUGH ARMY  
PERSONNEL COULD BE SUPPORTED ON AN INTERIM BASIS, IT IS RECOMMENDED  
THAT THEY PROGRAM THEIR OWN FACILITIES.

BT

22/0735Z MAY 1959

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POOGM, USAEDO, 10 Apr 59, Subj: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Site

313IE-E

1st Ind

30 APR 1959

Hq, 313th Air Division, APO 239, San Francisco, California

TO: District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa, APO 331, San Francisco, California

1. Review of the basic submittal elicits the following comments: (S)

a. Tab "A" - Site Plans: (U)

(1) Site Plan, M-Sites: Concur. (U)

(2) Site Plan, Bishagawa - Support Facilities (U)

(a) Maintenance Buildings: Subject to approval of PACAF, predicated on the maintenance concept newly accepted, which will incorporate a maintenance facility at each launch site, comparable to a Butler type warehouse, approximately 40 feet by 100 feet in size. This will be resolved in ample time prior to the anticipated predesign conference at your Headquarters, which will be announced by PACAF in the near future. (U)

(b) Missile Operations Center and Communications Center (combined): This facility is currently the subject of a separate Communications Study, and resolutions reached will be announced at the earliest practicable date; however, for planning purposes, this Headquarters is considering placing the MOC and Communications Center as a hardened facility, below the Group Headquarters. Further information will be supplied at an early date. (S)

(3) Site Plan, Yaetake - Operations Building (Hardened): Siting as indicated is subject to final resolutions reached in connection with a separate Communications Study now underway. You will be advised promptly of determinations. (U)

b. Tab "B" Single Line Drawings: Tentatively concur, subject to predesign conference and approval by PACAF in the near future. (U)

2. The Mogas Storage facility is considered appropriately sited; however, double outlet dispensing should be incorporated, to facilitate rapid and more flexible refueling of organizational vehicles. (U)

3. Final approval of the Bishagawa Complex is anticipated at an early date, and you will be advised accordingly. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. J. Hellmann

L. A. STARR  
Major, USAF  
Chief, Administrative Services

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**SECRET**

POOGM, USAEDO, 22 Apr 59, Subj: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B  
Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Sites (U)

313IE-E

1st Ind

30 APR 1959

Hq, 313th Air Division, APO 239, San Francisco, California

TO: District Engineer, U.S. Army Engineer District, Okinawa, APO 331,  
San Francisco, California

1. Review of the basic inclosures elicits the following comments:

a. Tab "A" - Site Plans - Six M-Sites: Concur with sites  
as indicated. (U)

b. Tab "B" - M-Site Structure (Hardened): The layout  
generally conforms to the latest plans envisioned at this level;  
however, further details pertaining to the structural aspects will  
emanate from OCE at a later date. For your information, it is desired  
to point out that a predesign conference was conducted at Headquarters  
USAF, on 23 April 1959, in connection with the hardened sites, with  
OCE represented. Accordingly, it is expected that further developments  
on the hardened sites will be forthcoming in the near future. (S)

2. The new maintenance concept as announced by representatives  
of Headquarters Fifth Air Force during their last visit to this station  
in connection with the Mace Program, introduces a maintenance facility  
at each launch site, comparable to a Butler type warehouse, approximately  
40 feet by 100 feet in size. Site location and further details will be  
furnished at the earliest practicable date. (S)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

L. A. STARR  
Major, USAF  
Chief, Administrative Services

L. J. Hellmann

**SECRET**

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67

**CONFIDENTIAL**

FROM: CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB TH  
TO: COMDR 5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN (AIR MAIL)  
INFO: COMDR 313th AIR DIV KADENA AB (AIR MAIL)

CONFIDENTIAL/PFSCE-PP 9148

Reference Okinawa District Engineer SECRET letters, POOGM, dated 10 April 1959 and 22 April 1959, subject: PCE Tab A Site Plans and Tab B Single Line Drawings for Operational Facility, Okinawa M-Site, to 313th AD, upon which both of our headquarters were info addressees. Detailed information on facilities have not yet been made available to this headquarters. cursory review of facilities to be provided at Bishigawa indicates hardened MOC lacking and no security fencing around four (4) Butler-type maintenance buildings and warehouses. Security fencing considered a requirement, inasmuch as these buildings will be utilized for maintenance and storage of classified equipment and components. Consideration should be given to paving of area between the Butler-type maintenance buildings to allow all-weather parking of units awaiting maintenance or delivery to sites. Further consideration should be given towards provision of facilities for engine check-out operations adjacent to the maintenance facility, to include fixed shelters for "start fuel supply set, engine checker and power supply", with paved access roads, blast fence and blast pads. In the Motobu-Yaetake area, consideration should be given in the facility planning for one (1) 40' x 100' Butler-type building, for maintenance in that area. Building should be located at one of the northern launch sites, real estate permitting, and will be utilized for checking guidance and control systems on a frequent basis. This

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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will preclude excessive transportation of nose cones and associated components and will permit higher "OR" rates. Advise.

05/1631Z May 1959

DANE F. JUSTICE, Sr.  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Engineering Programs  
AC/S Civil Engineering

CONFIDENTIAL



SECRET

68

DEFERRED

FROM: 313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

TO : 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

/SECRET/3130C-E C-5-63. FOR 5FOAC. SUBJECT TM-76B LAUNCH SITES.  
MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART ONE. REFERENCE YOUR 5FOPR-P-P 04826.  
LATEST SINGLE LINE OF SITE PROFILE BETWEEN YAE TAKE AIR STATION 26  
DEGREES, 37 MINUTES, 48.6 SECONDS NORTH, 127 DEGREES, 55 MINUTES,  
24.3 SECONDS EAST AND HENOKO LAUNCH SITE 26 DEGREES, 32 MINUTES, 11.5  
SECONDS NORTH, 128 DEGREES, 01 MINUTES, 54.5 SECONDS EAST, REFLECTS  
NO INTERVENING MASS THAT WOULD PREVENT AN ACCEPTABLE COMMUNICATIONS  
SYSTEM. EXAMINATION FURTHER REVEALS NO IMPROVEMENT IN LINE OF SITE  
PROFILE BY RELOCATING HENOKO SITE TO YOUR RECOMMENDED COORDINATES  
26 DEGREES, 33 MINUTES, 00 SECONDS NORTH, AND 128 DEGREES, 01 MINUTES,  
56 SECONDS EAST. ALSO, LAND ACQUISITION IN THE CAMP SCHWAB AREA IS  
ESSENTIALLY RESOLVED AND FIRM. HOWEVER, ANOTHER FIELD SURVEY IS BEING  
CONDUCTED AND THIS PROBLEM WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE TM-76B WSPG  
CONFERENCE TO BE HELD AT KADENA AB THE 8, 9, 10 JUNE 1959. PART TWO.  
REFERENCE MY 3130C-E-C 4-67, 30 APRIL 1959 AND YOUR ANSWER 5FOAC-T-R  
04629E, 7 MAY 1959. QUERY, IF ENGINEERED FLOOR PLANS TO INCLUDE  
EQUIPMENT LOCATION AND SUPPORTING DUCT SYSTEMS FOR ALL SITES WILL BE  
AVAILABLE FOR USE AT THE ABOVE MENTIONED PENDING CONFERENCE.

27/0222Z MAY 1959

607101

ERNEST L. WATTS  
MAJOR, USAF  
DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

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HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PFSCE-PR

28 MAY 1959

SUBJECT: (Confidential) Acquisition of Real Estate in the Ryukyus for  
Missile Sites and Supporting Facilities thereto

TO: 5AF

1. References:

- a. Paragraphs 3 and 8, PACAFREG 87-1
- b. 313th AD letter, dated 21 April 1959, subject: Request for Approval to Acquire 104 Acres of Land in the West Easley Range Area (U).
- c. 313th AD letter, dated 2 April 1959, subject: Request for Approval to Accept Transfer of 69 Acres of Camp Schwab from the U.S. Marine Corps and to Acquire 35 Acres of Additional Land (U).

2. References b and c request authority to acquire real estate heretofore not under control of the military organization, which this headquarters cannot provide until the following is resolved:

a. Paragraph 2h of both references b and c make the statement, "Local coordination with the CINCPACREP and the high commissioner cannot be made at this time", without providing background or justification. Approval to acquire real estate cannot be given by this headquarters without their coordination. Further, the political ramifications involved, and the reaction of the local population to the acquisition of new additional real estate on Okinawa, are so sensitive that in the past there have been riots and representation to the U.S. Congress in protestation thereof. This could well recur at this time, perhaps with added vigor and embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force. It follows that local coordination is extremely necessary.

b. While both the request for new land in the West Easley Range area and the Camp Schwab area contain the required statement, "no existing suitable military facility is available to meet the requirement", it is provided without substantiation or background. In view of the sensitive situation, pointed out in "a" above, it is considered advisable that the stated non-suitability of existing lands under military control be more adequately supported, or further investigated, to preclude

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subsequent embarrassment to this command. In this respect, it is requested that you confer with the TM-76B advisors scheduled to attend the forthcoming Pacific area WSSG Conference during 8 to 10 June 1959 in determining more specifically your real estate requirements. Every possible adjustment must be made to use existing real estate and to avoid the acquisition of new land.

3. Right of Entry to the sites will be required for site adaptation in September and lease rights for construction some time during December 1959. Accordingly, clarification of the problems herein is desired prior to the start of FY 60. This will allow approximately 120 days for the acquisition of real estate and Right of Entry, which is considered the minimum to preclude delaying construction.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

DANE F JUSTICE, SR  
Colonel, USAF  
Director of Engineering Programs  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
Civil Engineering

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70

ROUTINE (COURIER)

X

AF

FROM: 313AIRDIV KADENA AB

TO: 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

INFO: DIST ENGR USA ENGR DIST OKINAWA (COURIER)

SECRET/313IE-E/ C-6-10. This message in four parts. Part I. Reference Fifth Air Force Secret Message 5FOPR-P, 05441, subject: "Missile Launch Sites", dated 29 May 1959. Part II. Joint field survey conducted by the District Engineer and this headquarters, in connection with request contained in Part IV of cited reference, reflects the following results: (A) BOLO AIRFIELD, possible between Azimuths 355 degrees at 2 miles and 10 degrees at 0.85 miles; (B) TANCHI (West Easley Range), possible for Azimuths 25 degrees at 3 miles and 35 degrees at 1.3 miles and 260 degrees at 7 miles on Bolo Point; (C) MOTOBU QUARRY, possible for Azimuth 340 degrees at 0.6 mile and 300 degrees at 3.5 miles on Sesoko Island; (D) MOTOBU AIRFIELD, possible around Azimuths 295 degrees at 0.7 mile and between Azimuths 100 degrees and 140 degrees at various distances. Mountains violate 9 degree criteria between 140 degrees and 180 degrees. Possible between 180 and 195 degrees at various distances. Possible between 205 degrees and 220 degrees at 4 miles on Sesoko Island; (E) HENOKO (Camp Schwab), possible all Azimuths at various distances except for some blind spots to the northeast; (F) GIMBARU, possible all azimuths at various distances except between 75 degrees and 170 degrees (ocean). PART III. Your reference to an alternate site in the Camp Schwab area is not understood. Formerly, an alternate site in the West Easley Range area was considered,

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313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

but later rejected by your headquarters. PART IV. Details reflected herein should be the subject of discussion, during Mace Conference at Kadena Air Base, period 8 through 10 June 1959.

04/0722Z June 1959

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Headquarters  
313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 313CE-E

9 JUL 1959

SUBJECT: Camp Mercy as Proposed TM-76B Launch Site (S)

TO: 5AF (5FOPR-P)

1. Reference: Secret Fifth Air Force message 5FOPR-P, 07464, subject same as above, dated 30 June 1959. (U)
2. Suggested siting for the proposed TM-76B Launch Site at Camp Mercy is attached hereto for your consideration. The siting adheres to criteria contained in the above referenced message with the exception of azimuths indicated therein, which are understood to be in error, as confirmed by Lt. Colonel J. O. Tyler of this headquarters. (S)
3. A Multiplex Map, scale 1:4,800, is also attached for correlation purposes in conjunction with the topographic sheet. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Civil Engineering Officer

- 3 Atch
1. Multiplex Map (1 cy)
  2. Reproduc. Topo. (1 cy)
  3. Prints of Topo. (2 cy)

Copy to:  
Okinawa Engineer District  
w/cy Atch 3

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DE RJAPAAA 407  
om 120138Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB TH  
INFO RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

//S E C R E T//5FOPR-P 08748. FOR PFOOP. THIS MESSAGE IN FIVE PARTS.  
PART I. A REVISION OF 161'S REVEALS NO POSSIBILITY OF REDUCING SUP-  
PORT COSTS TO MAXIMUM ESTABLISHED IN YOUR SECRET PFSCE-PP 409, 9 JULY  
59. YOUR LIMITATION UNREALISTIC IN VIEW OF FACT ESTIMATES PREVIOUSLY  
SUBMITTED VARIED BETWEEN 2.5 AND 2.8 MILLION DOLLARS AND WERE BASED  
ON MUCH LESS KNOWLEDGE THEN AVAILABLE CONCERNING REQUIREMENTS OF WEAPONS  
SYSTEM. FURTHER, PREVIOUS ESTIMATES DID NOT INCLUDE OKED CONTINGENCY  
AND ADMINISTRATIVE FEE. PART II. MAINTENANCE CONCEPT DEVELOPED AT  
YOUR HEADQUARTERS DEFINED NUMBER AND DIMENSIONS OF MAINTENANCE AND  
ASSEMBLY BUILDINGS AND MADE CLEAR NEED FOR SUB-MAINTENANCE AREA. EXISTING  
FACILITIES AT BISHIGAWA ARE NOT SATISFACTORY. ESTIMATED COSTS OF RE-  
HABING SUB-STANDARD FACILITIES FOR BILLETING WHEN COMPARED WITH NEW  
CONSTRUCTION REVEAL VERY LITTLE MONEY SAVINGS. FURTHER, THIS HEADQUARTERS  
FEELS YOUR SUGGESTION OF PRE\*FAB METAL BUILDINGS WILL NOT SATISFY TYPHOON  
RESISTANT REQUIREMENTS. PART III. THE PRESSURE OF FUNDING LIMITATIONS  
HAS CAUSED THIS HEADQUARTERS TO RECOMMEND SWEEPING CHANGES IN THE 498  
TMG POSTURE. (1) SUBSTITUTE DERAGAWA TRANSMITTER ANNEX AND WHITE BEACH  
TANK FARM LAUNCH AREAS FOR MOTOBU AND MOTOBU-QUARRY. BOTH ARE U.S.  
CONTROLLED AND TO BE RELEASED. THIS ALLOWS DELETION OF YAETAKE AND  
MOTOBU\*QUARRY SUB-MAINTENANCE AREA WITH ATTENDANT O&M AND COMMUNICATIONS  
SAVINGS. (2) RE-PROGRAM MAIN SUPPORT COMPLEX FROM BISHIGAWA TO KADENA  
AIR BASE. PRESENT PROGRAMMING DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT KADENA CAN SUPPORT  
498 TMG BY FY 4/61 WITH SOME ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION. PRELIMINARY STUDY  
SHOWS REQUIREMENT FOR FOLLOWING MAJOR FACILITIES: (1) MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY  
AND ASSEMBLY COMPLEX, (2) GROUP AND SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS, (3) DORMITORY  
FACILITIES, (4) MOTOR POOL ADDITIONS, AND (5) MOC. A PRESENT STUDY OF  
5AF REALIGNMENT OF FORCES, HAND CARRIED TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ON 13-16  
JULY 59, WILL, IF APPROVED, INCREASE KADENA BASE POPULATION AND REDUCE  
NUMBER OF EXISTING PERMANENT DORMITORIES AVAILABLE TO THE 498 TMG. WHEN  
THIS IS CONSIDERED, HOWEVER, A COMPARISON OF DEPLOYMENT TO BISHIGAWA VERSUS  
KADENA STILL REVEALS SOME DOLLAR SAVINGS AT KADENA, I.E., ROADS, DINING  
HALL, UTILITIES, ETC. IMPERATIVE THAT FUTURE UNPROGRAMMED ACTIONS  
AFFECTING MISSION AND POPULATION KADENA CONSIDER THAT 498 TMG DEPLOYMENT  
TOTALLY SATURATES ALL FACILITIES. PART IV. THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL  
FORWARD FINAL PACKAGE PROPOSAL ASAP. DETAILS WILL BE PRESENTED TO MR.  
CLARY, YOUR HEADQUARTERS, ON HIS ARRIVAL HERE 13 AUGUST. PART V. WHITE  
BEACH TANK FARM IS U.S. ARMY CONTROLLED AND PROGRAMMED FOR EARLY RELEASE.  
AIR FORCE MUST MAKE KNOWN REQUIREMENTS FOR A PORTION OF THIS 70 ACRE  
FACILITY PRIOR TO 15 AUGUST 1959. ANNUAL RENTAL FOR THEUSAF REQUIRED  
AREA IS ESTIMATED AT SIX TO SEVEN THOUSAND DOLLARS. REQUEST AUTHORITY  
TO EFFECT IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF WHITE BEACH TANK FARM. FURTHER REQUEST  
YOUR REPLY BE SENT ACTION TO 313 AIRDIV WITH INFO 5AF.

BT  
12/0150Z AUG 1959

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HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PFSCE-ED

2 September 1959

SUBJECT: FY 1960 Design Instruction No. 60/O-ZZ0q-XX/CE/3, Okinawa  
M-Site, Ryukyu Islands

TO: Division Engineer  
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean  
Building 96, Fort Armstrong  
Honolulu 13, Hawaii

1. Reference is made to Secret letter this headquarters, PFSCE-ED, dated 17 August 1959, Subject: "FY 1960 Design Instruction No. 60/O-ZZ02-XX/CE/2, Okinawa M-Site, Ryukyu Islands."
2. Request necessary action be taken to perform the work outlined in paragraph 2 of referenced letter for the following sites in the order of priority listed. It should be noted that two sites have been added and the priority has been rearranged from that of referenced letter.
  - a. Deragawa
  - b. White Beach
  - c. Mercy
  - d. Bolo Airfield
  - e. Ginbaru
  - f. Tancha
3. All other provisions of referenced letter will remain in effect.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. B. O'CONNOR, Lt Col, USAF  
Director, Engr & Const  
ACS/Civil Engineering

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RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 157  
R 030220Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN  
INFO RJAOKC/313AD KADENA AB RYUKYUS  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFOOP 148.

REFERENCE 5FOPR-P 08748 SECRET MESSAGE DATED 12 AUG 59. SUBSTITUTION OF DERAGAWA TRANSMITTER ANNEX AND WHITE BEACH TANK FARM LAUNCH AREA FOR MOTOBU AND MOTOBU QUARRY APPROVED. WITH THESE SUBSTITUTIONS, AGREE THAT YAE TAKE AND MOTOBU QUARRY SUB-MAINTENANCE AREA MAY BE DELETED AS 498TH TMG REQUIREMENT. YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR REPROGRAMMING MAIN SUPPORT COMPLEX FROM BISHIGAWA TO KADENA AB WILL BE ANSWERED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. REFERENCE PART FIVE OF YOUR MESSAGE, CINCUSARPAC IS BEING REQUESTED TO TRANSFER REQUIRED PORTION OF WHITE BEACH TANK FARM TO AIR FORCE. THIS MESSAGE CLASSIFIED SECRET BECAUSE IT MENTIONS DEPLOYMENT AND SITING OF A PROGRAMMED WEAPON SYSTEM.

BT

03/0246Z SEP 1959

610865

SECRET

0096

SECRET

75

MM RJAKC  
DE RJAPAA 473  
M 040737ZC  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RJAKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
INFO RJAKC/6313ABWG KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/5POPR-P 09547. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART I.  
PACAF AND FIFTH AIR FORCE REPRESENTATIVES WILL ARRIVE KADENA APPROX-  
IMATELY 2230 HOURS 8 SEPTEMBER ABOARD SCHEDULED MATS FLIGHT. PURPOSE  
IS DETAILED REVIEW OF FORMS 161 FORMS 800 AND OTHER SUPPORTING DOCU-  
MENTS RELATED TO DEPLOYMENTS OF 498TH TAC MISSILE GROUP. PACAF REP-  
RESENTATIVES WILL HAVE FINAL APPROVAL AUTHORITY. PART II. THE FOL-  
LOWING REPRESENTATIVES WILL MAKE UP THIS PARTY: FROM PACAF - MR. M.  
GRISWOLD, GS-14. FROM 5AF - MAJOR J. W. BAILY, MAJOR W. E. CARPER,  
CAPTAIN W. E. DIBBLE, CAPTAIN M. H. HAHNEY, CAPTAIN E. T. LEMESH.  
MARTIN AIRCRAFT COMPANY REPRESENTATIVE - MR. J. K. MCCOLLUM. PART III.  
REQUEST ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONFERENCE TO BEGIN 0900 HOURS 9 SEPTEMBER AND  
TO INCLUDE, FROM YOUR COMMAND, PROJECT OFFICERS FROM OPERATIONS, INSTAL-  
LATIONS, MANPOWER, COMMUNICATIONS, AS WELL AS OKED REPRESENTATIVES,  
VISITORS ANTICIPATE DEPARTING EVENING OF 10 SEPTEMBER, BUT WILL REMAIN  
UNTIL ENTIRE INSTALLATION PACKAGE MEETS PACAF FINAL APPROVAL. REQUEST  
NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR BILLETING AND MEETINGS.

BT  
04/0838Z SEP 1959

610911

SECRET

0097



76  
**SECRET**

Pacific Area TM-76B WSSG Meeting

313MC  
CE  
PC  
IG  
OC-E

313 OC-P

14 Sep 59  
Lt Col Tyler/41636/m

The following Secret message from Headquarters AMFPA, Wheeler AFB, TH is quoted for your information:

"SECRET/PFFW 59-0727. For AFOOP-TA-MM at Hq USAF; LMTM at Hq ASC; RDZSTC at Det #1 ARDC; THEM at Hq TAC; WRNIP at WRAMA; PLMLP at PACAF; 5FOOD-O at 5AF; PNFC at NAMAP; 313OC-P at 313ADIV; and Lt Col Sullivan at OTIG. Subject: Pacific Area TM-76B WSSG Meeting. This message in three parts. Part One for All: Reference my Secret PFFW 59-0632, 21 Aug 59. Hq USAF has notified AF agencies concerned to take appropriate action to plan and program for utilization of the TM-76B MACE. First unit to Okinawa has been scheduled for FY 4/61 and second unit to deploy FY 2/62. As a result of the above action, Hq AMFPA will hold the next Pacific Area TM-76B Meeting on 30 Sep and 1 Oct 59 at 0900 hours, Turner Hall, Fort deRussy, Honolulu, Hawaii. In conjunction with the TM-76B Meeting, Hq PACAF will conduct a missile symposium on 28-29 Sep at same location. Personnel planning to attend are requested to schedule their attendance by submitting their name, rank, organization, security clearance and request for billeting to this headquarters, ATTN: PFFW, not later than 21 Sep 59 to allow preparation of status report. In addition, each person assigned any action or making a report will prepare his presentation by typewritten format and submit a copy to the Chairman at the beginning of the meeting. Part TWO for PNFC at NAMAP: To preclude extensive TDY, suggest that your TM-76B WSSG Meeting be held here on 2 October 1959. Advise ASAP. Part Three for LMTM at Hq ASC. A separate message has been forwarded to your headquarters this date." (S)

2. Each agency will submit to 313OC-P agenda items, not later than 1500 hours 17 Sep 59. Negative reports are required.
3. Any reports required for presentation will be submitted in draft form to 313OC-P not later than 22 Sep 59.

JAMES O. TYLER, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Plans, Pgms & Rqments Div

100040

**SECRET**

0098

SECRET

77

TM-76B Program

3130C-E  
OC-M  
PC  
CE  
IG

3130C-P

14 Sep 59  
Lt Col Tyler/46136/m

1. The following message from Hq, PACAF is quoted for your information:

"SECRET/from PFCOP 165. Hq USAF has changed PACAF MACE B (TM-76B) program to deploy 18 missiles and GWW nose cones to Okinawa in fourth quarter FY/61 and duplicate deployment in second quarter FY/62. Similar deployment is programmed for USAFE. USAF and PACAF programming documents, operations concepts and PACAF operational plan are being amended accordingly. Based on above, PACAF operational plan will be rewritten to require all hardened TM-76B's held on rapid fire alert around the clock. With reduction of UE, two off-base launch sites can be deleted. Four remaining sites will accommodate two (four-missile) hardened shelters. Each of six missiles furnished, 32 will be hardened. Remaining four missiles and twelve nose cones will be utilized as spares. Advise soonest of your site selection for both deployment increments. Necessary action will follow to delete sites no longer required. Message is classified Secret because weapon system deployment is mentioned."

2. Direct quotation may be explained by visit from 5AF personnel.

JAMES O. TYLER, Lt Colonel, USAF  
Ch, Plans, Prgms & Rqmnts Div.

SECRET

100041

0099



SECRET

78

MM RJAOKC  
DE RJAPAAA 469  
M 160709Z  
FM 5F FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
INFO RJAOKC/6313ABG KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/5FOPR 10049. FOR 313 CC-P. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS.  
PART I. AS A RESULT OF 9-10-11 SEPTEMBER STAFF VISIT TO YOUR HEAD-  
QUARTERS BY 5AF REPRESENTATIVES, SEVERAL ACTIONS WERE ASSIGNED 313  
AIR DIVISION RELEVANT TO TM-76B. SUMMARY OF YOUR ACTION ITEMS  
FOLLOWS: (1) PREPARE AND SUBMIT TO APPROPRIATE LOCAL AGENCY STRONG  
JUSTIFICATION FOR CAMP MERCY. (2) OUTLINE IN DETAIL AND SUBMIT TO  
APPROPRIATE ARMY AGENCY THE USAF REQUIREMENT FOR PORTION WHITE BEACH.  
(3) RECOMMEND REPRESENTATIVE FOR MARTIN COMPANY TM-76B SCHOOL. (4)  
PROVIDE POSITION ON REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICER (1816) AT DIVISION LEVEL  
DURING PROGRAMMING PERIOD OF WEAPON SYSTEM. PART II. REQUEST INFORMATION  
COPIES TO 5AF ON ITEMS (1) AND (2).

BT  
16/0737Z SEP 1959

611255

SECRET

0100

79  
SECRET

MM RJAKC RJPHKM  
DE RJAPAA 419  
V 180122Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
INFO RJAKC/313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/5FOPR 10132. FOR PFOOP. REFERENCE A PFOOP 165, 12 SEP  
REFERENCE B PFOOP 161. THIS MESSAGE IN FIVE PARTS. PART I. DESPITE  
REDUCED MISSILE QUANTITY, VULNERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS LEAD TO RECOM-  
MENDATION THAT SIX SITES BE RETAINED, WITH EIGHT MISSILES ON TWO  
SITES AND FOUR MISSILES ON FOUR SITES. THIS HEADQUARTERS BELIEVES  
ADDED COST SITE PREPARATION IS MONEY WISELY SPENT. PART II. IF THIS  
DEPLOYMENT NOT ACCEPTABLE, SECOND CHOICE FOLLOWS: FIRST INCREMENT  
DEPLOY TO BOLO AND GIMBARU, SECOND INCREMENT DEPLOY WHITE BEACH AND  
DERAGAWA. THIS LEADS TO DELETION CAMP MERCY AND TANCHI. REASONS  
DELETION MERCY ARE (1) ARMY CONFLICTING REQUIREMENT WHICH MAY NOT  
BE RESOLVED IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO PERMIT PROGRAMMED CONSTRUCTION.  
(2) PERMIT GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN PROPOSED OFF-BASE DEPLOYMENT OF  
HARDENED ZEL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ON 3-MILE RADIUS KADENA. TANCHI DELETED  
BECAUSE OF HIGHER COST OF CONSTRUCTION. PART III. RECOGNIZING DESIRE  
TO KEEP TOTAL NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TARGETS AT MINIMUM IN SOUTHERN  
OKINAWA 3RD CHOICE FOLLOWS: 1ST INCREMENT DEPLOY TO BOLO AND GIMBARU,  
2ND INCREMENT DEPLOY WHITE BEACH AND TANCHI. THIS CHOICE ADDS TO SITE  
PREPARATION COSTS; HOWEVER, PROVIDES FOR ITEM (2), PART II THIS MESSAGE.  
PART IV. AGAIN THIS HEADQUARTERS STRONGLY RECOMMENDS APPROVAL DEPLOY-  
MENT AS OUTLINED IN PART I. PART V. REFERENCE B. FORMS 161 TO BE  
HAND CARRIED YOUR HDA BY GRISWOLD WILL INCLUDE INDIVIDUAL SITE ORIENTATION  
BASED ON OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION AS WELL AS COMPATABILITY WITH TERRAIN  
FEATURES. THIS POINT AMPLIFIED AT 24, 25 SEPT MEETINGS YOUR HEADQUARTERS.  
BT

18/0147Z SEP 1959

611390

SECRET

0101



80  
**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION  
United States Air Force  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

313CE

24 SEP 1959

SUBJECT: Transmittal of M-Program

TO: 5AF (5FSCE)

1. The basic submittal is forwarded for expeditious review and transmittal to higher headquarters. (U)
2. It is desired to emphatically point out, and re-emphasize that the programmed support facilities at Kadena Air Base, envisioned for the TM-76B Weapons System, are predicated entirely on the non-existence of such facilities to appropriately support the Mace programmed mission. Current AF Forms 800 reflect certain metal-clad, quonset type, useable substandard facilities at Kadena Air Base; however, present plans envision early inventory deletion of these flimsy and unsafe temporary structures, which have outlived their usefulness during the past years, through AF Forms 300 action. This action is considered in consonance with Headquarters USAF letter, AFOCE, 24 July 1959, Subject: Disposal of Buildings and Structures, since the facilities are derelict in nature and unquestionably beyond economical repair. (S)
3. This headquarters strongly recommends the adoption of the hardened launch site concept, to assure maximum survivability of materiel and personnel, in order to effect immediate retaliatory action. The concept as recommended will also assure resistance to high velocity typhoon winds, and reduce excessive corrosion deterioration to hi-value material and equipment. (S)
4. Family housing is critical, and deficits in this command are in excess of 1,600 units, with a waiting period of forty-eight weeks for officers and fifty-two weeks for airmen. The requirements for family housing in support of the 498th Tactical Missile Group are included in cited deficit. A specific housing request, however, is not included in this submittal, because this headquarters has been advised that funding, other than rental guarantee, will not be favorably considered for Okinawa. Included in the FY-61 Military Construction Program is a request for authority to construct 600 family housing units on Okinawa, under rental guarantee. Appropriate command assistance should be given this urgent problem. (S)

LJHellmann, Asst Civ Engr Ofr

313CE

40103

24 Sep 59

**SECRET**

500005

0102

# SECRET

5. The attached program has been developed through close coordination by representatives of PACAF, Fifth Air Force, Okinawa District Engineer, and this headquarters. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Civil Engineering Officer

- 2 Atch  
1. M-Program Brochure (4 cys)  
2. M-Program Brochure, Original  
(1 cy)

2  
SECRET

500005

0103



SECRET

81

PCAO62PAA072AAA104

RR RJAOKC

DE RJPAA 496

R 250700Z

FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

TO 313TH AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

//S E C R E T//5FOPR-P 11463. PERSONAL FOR MAJ BORDERS. PART I.  
5AF HAS AGREED TO RECLAMA TO PACAF AT THE CONFERENCE THE QUESTION  
OF USE OF MERCY AND DERAGAWA. HAVE INSTALLATIONS CONTINUE ACTION  
TO PROCURE MERCY FOR AF. PART II. C-130 DEPLOYMENT WILL BE WQ SQ  
NAHA - (SQ TACHIKAWA. PART III INDICATIONS ARE THAT 5AF & PACAF  
ARE AGAIN CONSIDERING HARDENED ZEL FOR 105'S. I WILL CHECK THIS AT PACAF.  
TYLER.

BT

25/0906Z SEP 1959

611662

SECRET

0104

SECRET

82

ROUTINE

FROM: 313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

TO : PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

INFO: 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

6313ABWG KADENA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)

SECRET/313CE C-9-103. This message in three parts. Part I. Subject is Cost Estimates for Missile Launch Sites - Okinawa. Part II. Supplemental cost estimates for Launch Sites 5 (Gimbaru) and 6 (Tancha) are as follows: (a) Cost for two typical launch sites if \$2,198,600 each, or total of \$4,397,200; (b) Non-typical work - Site 5 is \$83,000; (c) Non-typical work - Site 6 is \$76,700; (d) Total project cost for the two launch sites is \$4,557,000. Part III. Information contained in Part II was taken from District Engineer Form 3013, dated 25 September 1959, and is forwarded pursuant to the request of Mr. G.R. Griswold, PACAF representative, while TDY this station. Requirement for this information is also coupled with Weapons System Conference at Hawaii. Elements of cost comprise essentially same items as in other four launch sites. Detailed cost est will be forwarded under separate cover.

313CE

29/0450Z SEP 59

LJ Hellmann, Ast Civ Engr Ofc

WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Civil Engineering Officer

500007

SECRET

0105



CONFIDENTIAL

83

PCBO01PAA136AA051

MM RJAOKC

DE RJPAA 28D

M 040423Z

FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB TH

INFO RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

//CONFIDENTIAL//FROM 5FSCE-C-R 11-0353 ACTION PACAF  
(PFSCE-PR), INFO 313AIRDIV. REFERENCE PART II FURTHER REQUIREMENT  
FOR CAMP MERCY FOR TM76B. SINCE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION AVAILABLE  
THIS HQ ON ZEL, DECISION PROPOSED USE OF CAMP MERCY FOR ZEL IS LEFT  
TO YOUR HQ.

BT

04/0433Z NOV 1959

614251

CONFIDENTIAL

0106

84  
SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PFSCE-PP

13 NOV 1959

SUBJECT: Siting Review of Proposed Facilities in the Okinawa Missile Program

TO: 5AF (5FSCC-C-P)

1. Transmitted for your information and continued action are the following comments on the proposed siting of facilities in the Okinawa missile program.

Kadena Support Facilities

212-216	- Shop, Missile Service (7 ea)	- Siting approved
310-561	- G/M Storage, Components	- " "
390-331	- G/M Test Stand, Run-up Pad	- " "
610-245	- Hqs, Group, Tactical	- " "
722-211	- Dormitory, Airmen	- Siting is not approved. It is recommended that the Amn Dormitory bldgs proposed to be sited Southeast of Westmore Road be resited to maintain a minimum clearance of 20' between the bldgs and Westmore Road. Locate existing utility lines to show extent of new construction and assure siting does not conflict with existing utility systems.

M-Sites

390-531	- G/Missile Launch, Facil (Bolo)	- Siting Apvd.
390-531	- " " " (Tancha)	- " "
390-531	- " " " (Gimbaru)	- " "
390-531	- " " " (White Beach)	- " "

SECRET

615435



SECRET

2. It is requested that action be taken to revise and forward the Site Plan for Airmen Dormitories at the earliest possible date.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

FRED C H DAVIS  
Dep Dir of Engineering Programs  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
Civil Engineering

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, Hq PACAF (PFSCE-PP), 13 Nov 59, Siting Review of Proposed Facilities in the Okinawa Missile Program

1st Ind (5FSCE-C-P)

Hq 5AF

9 DEC 1959

TO: 313 Air Div (Base Engineer)

1. Reference telephone conversation held with your representative on 12 November 1959 regarding the siting of the proposed facilities in the Okinawa Missile Program. (U)
2. The basic correspondence indicating Headquarters PACAF review of the sitings for the above referenced subject facilities is forwarded for your information and continued action. Your attention is invited to note that the siting for the Airman Dormitory is not approved and that an alternate site is proposed. It is requested that a revised site plan for the Airman Dormitory be prepared incorporating the recommendations as indicated in the basic letter and forwarded to this headquarters as expeditiously as possible. (U)
3. It is the understanding at this headquarters that in addition to the area site plans for the Missile Program Facilities that detailed site plans at a scale 1" = 50' had been developed. It is requested that two each sepia reproducibles of drawings discussed in this paragraph and paragraph 2 above be transmitted to this headquarters. (S)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GEORGE F. MCGEOUGH  
Technical Director  
Dir/Construction

SECRET

615435

0109



SECRET

85

OCA 032PKA 027ZA041  
MM RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 231  
M 140215Z ZEX  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
INFO RJAPGB/PACGER TACHIKAWA AB JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB RI  
BT

/S E C R E T/ FROM PFEPP-PL 3644  
ACTION 5AF, INFO PACGER AND 313 AIR DIV. SUBJECT IS C-E PLANNING  
SUPPORT OF OKINAWA TM-76B INSTALLATIONS. REQUEST YOU TAKE IMMEDIATE  
ACTION TO PREPARE AND SUBMIT A CEIP PROVIDING FOR C-E SUPPORT OF THE  
OKINAWA TM-76B INSTALLATIONS. BASIC INFORMATION HAS BEEN DISCUSSED  
IN THE PREPARATION OF THE C-E ANNEX TO PACAF OPERATIONAL PLAN 112-59.  
CLOSE COORDINATION WITH 5TH AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IS REQUIRED TO ASSURE  
PROVISION OF NECESSARY C-E FACILITIES. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, CLOSED  
CIRCUIT TELEVISION IS NOW BEING CONSIDERED. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT  
HARDENED LAUNCH SHELTERS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO PROVIDE REQUIRED CABLE  
CONDUITS FOR TV. ANOTHER AREA IS OPEN TO FINAL DECISION BY OPERATIONAL  
PLANNERS. THIS INVOLVES THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF COMMUN-  
ICATIONS BETWEEN THE MOC AND LAUNCH SITES FOR UPDATING MISSILE GUIDANCE  
PROGRAMMING EVERY SIX HOURS. THE REQUIREMENT FOR A SECURE (ON-LINE  
TELETYPE) COMMUNICATIONS LINK BETWEEN THE MOC AND LAUNCH SITES FOR  
THIS PURPOSE HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

BT  
14/0310Z NOV 1959

614502

SECRET

0110

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
PO 299, San Francisco

86

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: 5FSCE-C

18 DEC 1959

SUBJECT: Appointment of Project Officer Okinawa Missile Program

TO: 313 Air Div

1. A joint meeting was held at this headquarters with PACAF representatives regarding the missile program at Okinawa. During this meeting, the PACAF representatives indicated that a requirement exists for appointment of an Air Force Project Officer located at Okinawa to monitor and assist in implementing the missile program. This requirement was generated by a request from the District Engineer, Okinawa, who indicated that both the District Engineer and the Architect-Engineer firm or firms employed on the design would require a responsible point of contact with the Air Force to insure that prompt action would be taken in obtaining information and coordination necessary for the accomplishment of the design. In view of the proximity of the 313th Air Division to the work site and the complexities of the projects involved, the responsibility for providing the required monitoring has been delegated to your headquarters.

2. This headquarters is fully cognizant of the limited personnel available to you at division headquarters level in the Civil Engineering field. Therefore, upon assumption of monitoring duties for the missile program, it is recommended that you reduce your workload by routing routine or less important actions direct from bases involved to Headquarters Fifth Air Force, thus freeing your personnel for accomplishment of these newly assigned duties. Due to general manpower reductions currently in process throughout the Far East area, it will be impossible to supplement your existing force with additional personnel.

3. Attached for your information are copies of correspondence between this headquarters and Headquarters PACAF concerning this problem. Particular attention should be paid to Headquarters PACAF 1st Indorsement which indicates that detailed procedures to be utilized in accomplishment of Project Officer's responsibilities will be furnished you by Mr. Griswold, PACAF Project Officer, in the near future.

4. Upon withdrawal of Attachment 1, this correspondence may be downgraded to UNCLASSIFIED.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GAYLE L. SMITH  
Colonel, USAF  
DC/S, Civil Engr

2 Atch  
1. Ltr, 5AF, 24 Nov 59, Construction  
in Okinawa  
2. 1st Ind, PACAF, 9 Dec 59 (U)

SECRET

615705

0111



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 925 San Francisco, California

5FSCE-C-P

24 NOV 1959

(U) Construction in Okinawa

PACAF (PFSCE-P)

1. (S) The impending design and construction of facilities to support the TM-76 weapons system in Okinawa will require the close coordination and cooperation of several military and civilian agencies.
2. (U) To provide the necessary means of accomplishing this coordination and eliminate possible design and construction slippage, it is recommended that an on-site Project Officer be appointed, vested with appropriate AFIR authority to accomplish the desired result. The requirement for appointing a Project Officer for this design and construction was generated by a recent trip by Mr. Griswold, Headquarters PACAF, who, in conjunction with the District Engineer, Okinawa, had agreed that such an appointment was necessary. This headquarters fully concurs in this requirement.
3. (U) It is estimated that this work can be accomplished within existing manpower resources and will serve as the focal point for dissemination of information and the resolution of questions generated by the Design and Construction Agency.
4. (U) Due to the vital actions that will be taking place in the very near future regarding the site adaptation of the OCE Design, it is requested that early action be taken on this proposal.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

GAYLE L. SMITH  
Colonel, USAF  
DC/S, Civil Engr

SECRET

615705

Ltr, Hq 5AF (5FSCE-C-P), 24 Nov 59, subj: (U) Construction in Okinawa

1st Ind (PFSCE-ED)

9 DEC 1959

Hq PACAF, APO 953

TO: 5AF (5FSCE-C-P)

1. Concur that an "On-site Project Officer" be appointed within existing manpower resources available to your headquarters. AFRCE responsibilities cannot be delegated and will remain with this headquarters. Mr. Griswold, Civil Engineering representative of this headquarters, will continue in his present capacity as the PACAF Project Officer for design and construction of the Okinawa M-Sites.
2. Your appointed "On-site Project Officer", at your discretion, should be authorized direct communication with this headquarters. This will facilitate and expedite dissemination of information, and the resolution of questions and problems arising at the site. This headquarters and your headquarters should be provided with information copies of all written correspondence pertaining to the project; telephone communications also should be made a matter of record, with information copies provided this headquarters.
3. The name of the person appointed as "On-site Project Officer" will be forwarded to this headquarters. Mr. Griswold, who is now on TDY at Headquarters USAF, will contact your Project Officer on his next TDY to the Far East in the near future, and at that time will establish a detailed procedure for insuring coordinated effort in carrying out this policy.
4. This indorsement does not contain classified information.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

JAMES S. BARKO  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy  
Assistant Chief of Staff  
Civil Engineering

615705



SECRET

87

HEADQUARTERS  
313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239, San Francisco, Cal.

FROM: 313CE

17 DEC 1959

TO : 6313 AB Wg (EE)

SUBJ: Support Facilities for M-Sites (U)

1. PACAF has indicated concurrence in the siting of all facilities on Kadena in support of the M-Sites with the exception of the Airmen Dormitory. In the instance of these facilities, re-siting will be accomplished to maintain a minimum clearance of 20 feet between the building and Westmore Road. Utility lines to be located to show extent of new construction and assure siting does not conflict with existing utility systems. (S)

2. A revised site plan will be accomplished and forwarded to this office not later than 23 December 1959. (U)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Civil Engineering Officer

Lt Col WW Robertson, Civ Engr Ofr 313CE 40103 16 Dec 59

500030

SECRET

0114

# SECRET

Ltr, Hq 313 Air Div (313CE), 17 Dec 59, Support Facilities for M-Sites

1st Ind BE-EP

Hq 6313 ABWg

TO: 313 Air Div (313CE)

1. Attachment #1 is submitted in compliance with para 2 of basic letter.
2. The base now has a requirement to utilize several temporary buildings for an indefinite period which will be in the way of the new Airmen Dormitory construction referred to in the basic letter.
3. Accordingly, the base is requesting consideration of re-siting these facilities as indicated on attachment area plan, attachment #2, and detailed site plans, attachments 3, 4 and 5.
4. The base preference is alternate site 1, 2, and 3 in that order as indicated on attachment #2, area plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J. W. ETTER  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Base Engineer

- 5 Atch
1. Site Plan (5 cys)
  2. Area Plan (5 cys)
  3. Alt. Site Plan (5 cys)
  4. Alt. Site Plan (5 cys)
  5. Alt. Site Plan (5 cys)

2nd Ind (313CE)

313 Air Division

18 February 1960

TO: 6313 ABWg (BE-EP)

Returned without action in that this office has been advised by PACAF that the barracks in support of the TM-76B Program have been deleted by USAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

WILLIAM W. ROBERTSON  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Civil Engineering Officer

5 Atch  
n/c

500030

# SECRET

0115



88

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 925 San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: 5FOPR-P

18 December 1959

SUBJECT: Tactical Missile Program (U)

TO: 313 Air Div                      314 Air Div                      58 TMG

1. The following information changing the PACAF TM-61C and TM-76B programs has been received from PACAF.

a. The 58th Tactical Missile Group at Osan and the 868th Tactical Missile Squadron at Tainan, with TM-61C's, will both deactivate in FY 2/62 instead of FY 2/62 and FY 4/62 respectively as previously programmed.

b. The 498th Tactical Missile Group will activate at Kadena in FY 3/61 instead of FY 4/61. The 873d Tactical Missile Squadron will also activate in FY 3/61 but will not receive TM-76B missiles until FY 4/61. The 874th Tactical Missile Squadron will activate in FY 1/62 and receive its missiles in FY 2/62.

2. Since organization of the 498th Tactical Missile Group operating locations, as reflected in the programming documents, coincides with the date of receipt of TM-76B missiles, the OL's at Bolo and White Beach remain programmed for FY 4/61 and those at Tancha and Gimbaru for FY 2/62.

3. These changes have been made in Volume 2, PACAF Program, and will be reelected in USAF PD 62-1.

4. Manpower authorizations in the CMOP were revised according to the previously announced programming. The changes reviewed above were received too late for further revision of the CMOP. PACAF headquarters will accomplish the acceleration of the program during the February updating.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

N. J. KASUN  
Lt Col, USAF  
Ch. Programs Division  
PPR Directorate, DCS/O

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DEFERRED

AF X

313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

SECRET/313CE C-12-68. Reference is your letter, 18 Dec 59, Subject: Appointment of Project Officer Okinawa Missile Program. This headquarters concurs in the necessity for an on the site Project Officer in connection with the Missile Program. Mr. Lloyd J. Hellmann, GS-13, of the Office of Civil Engineering, will assume these responsibilities.

30/0100Z Dec. 1959

Lt Col WW Robertson, Civ Engr Ofr  
40103

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PCA 012PKA018KWBO20  
RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKW 39  
R 090146Z ZEX  
FM 6920 SECURITY WG WHEELER AFB HAWAII  
RJAOKC/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
INFO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AB JAPAN

BT

/S E C R E T/ FROM WODT 1-8121. ACTION 313ADIV, INFO: PACAF (PFECs),  
5AF, USAFSS (OSD), AFSCC (SCS-1). THIS IS A TRANSEC ITEM. REFERENCE  
6920TH SECURITY WING WODC4 48452 (SECRET) DATED 24/2045Z APRIL 1959.  
PER YOUR REQUEST, (UNCL) 313 C-3 U-4-536, DATED 28/0609Z APRIL 1959,  
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS SUBMITTED: IT WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY  
THIS ORGANIZATION THAT THE TM-76 MATADOR MISSILE WOULD, IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE, REPLACE THE TM-61C MATADOR MISSILE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER. IT  
WAS ALSO ASSUMED THAT THIS CONVERSION WOULD BE INITIATED BY EITHER THE  
58TH TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP (TMGP), OSAN AB, KOREA, OR THE 6214TH TMGP,  
TAINAN, TAIWAN. HOWEVER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE INITIAL EMPLACEMENT  
OF THE TM-76 WILL BE ON OKINAWA. THIS WAS REVEALED IN A MESSAGE, DATED  
19 NOVEMBER 1959, FROM DIVENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, HONOLULU, HAWAII,  
AND SUBSEQUENT ANSWER FROM DISTENGR USAENGR DIST, OKINAWA, DATED 4  
DECEMBER 1959. THE MESSAGES REVEALED THAT THE PLANS AND DRAWINGS FOR  
TM-76 SITES 1 AND 2 WOULD BE COMPLETED BY 22 JANUARY 1960. THESE SITES  
ARE ASSUMED TO BE LAUNCHING SITES. AS OF THIS DATE, A DEFINITE UNIT  
SUBORDINATION OF THESE SITES IS UNKNOWN.

BT

09/0250Z JAN 1960

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91

OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION  
U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Thursday, 21 January 1960

The Ryukyu Shimpo (evening edition) - News Article (S) No. 271

'MACE' MISSILE COMING TO OKINAWA

(Washington, 19 Jan., Reuters-Kyodo) - According to the proceedings announced on 19 January, the leading staff of the U.S. Defense Department disclosed at the U.S. Congress on 13 January that Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles are not available yet in the Far East. In answer to a question of "whether there was any plan to establish an IREM site in the Far East, probably in Japan and Korea" at the secret session of the House Appropriations Committee on 13 January, General TWINING, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "We do not have any such plan. The U.S. will distribute all IREM's we have to our military bases in the Allied Powers (Note: England, Italy, and Turkey)." And General TWINING further stated that "'Mace' missile is to be sent to Okinawa."

This Mace missile is an ordinary tactical missile whose range is usually 1,000 kilometers, while its improved type has a range of 1,600 kilometers, and it can be equipped with nuclear warheads. However, General TWINING did not disclose which type of Mace missile is to be sent to Okinawa.

(Identical article in the Okinawa Times)



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION  
U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Saturday, 30 January 1960

The Okinawa Times (evening edition) - News Article (S) No. 378

'MACE' MISSILE SITE BE ESTABLISHED IN OKINAWA, U.S. DEFENSE  
DEPARTMENT DEMANDS OF CONGRESS AGAIN

According to a UPI telegram of 28 January from Washington, the U.S. Defense Department has again demanded that the U.S. Congress appropriate funds for the construction of a launching site for the "Mace" missile in both Okinawa and Germany. At the closed meeting of the Appropriations Committee held recently, Defense Secretary Thomas S. GATES, Jr. reportedly testified that "the U.S. Defense Department has appropriated, and is executing, \$125 million for the program to maintain 'Mace' missile launching sites in the budget of the current fiscal year, and now it is planning to demand funds in the amount of \$39,800,000 for the same purpose during the next ('61) fiscal year."

Defense Secretary GATES told the members of the Appropriations Committee that the U.S. Defense Department could secure launching sites for 'Mace' missiles in Okinawa and Germany by December 1961 with this fund.

Although the U.S. Defense Department's demand for appropriations for the construction of Mace missile launching sites in Okinawa and Germany during 1960 fiscal year was turned down by Congress, the Defense Department has been sanctioned by the U.S. Congress to appropriate the funds designated for other purposes to the Mace program, if necessary, to construct a launching site.

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ROUTINE

AF X

313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

SECRET EFTO/RADNOTE; FOR LT COL N. P. TUCKER PFSCE-ED, FROM R. R. GRISWOLD, TDY 313 AD. This message in four parts. Part I. Reference EFTO message PFSCE-PP 361. Siting facilities in North Hardstand Area not considered feasible for following reasons: A. SAC operations require their exclusive use of area during EWP and probably other extended periods. B. Design time in North area will be slightly less. Cost of construction approximately same because of extra utilities in North Area. Time of construction may be two or three months less in North Area. C. 313 AD and 5AF representatives opposed to utilization North Area because remote location from housing, administrative, and messing facilities will increase operating costs and require additional personnel. Pending further instructions, A/E will design facilities in original area. Part II. Revised comparative costs of shells only of buildings:

a. 3 MB3A Docks - 55,500 SF	\$286,000
b. 2 Docks 37,000 SF	\$191,000
1 Conc Whse 20,000 SF	120,000
Total 57,000 SF	\$311,000
c. 1 Conc Bldg. 28,000 SF	\$238,000
1 Conc Whse 20,000 SF	120,000
Total 48,000 SF	\$358,000

Savings utilizing 3 docks is \$25,000 over combination 2 docks and one conc. whse, and \$72,000 over all conc. bldgs. Part III. OKED is initiating design Group Hq with same plan submitted with Forms 161

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313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

and 3 docks sited in original area. Two docks will be joined together face to face to eliminate all sliding front doors. M&O project being prepared for 313AD for rehab quonsets for airmen dorms. Part IV. Inventory docks about 60% complete. Estimated date completion inventory is 1 March 60. Only major item noted damaged or missing to date is one truss.

08/0530Z Feb. 1960

SECRET

94

OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,  
OKINAWA ENGINEER DISTRICT, OKINAWA

PCCGM

25 February 1960

SUBJECT: Preliminary Drawings for Operational Facilities Site 2

TO: Division Engineer, US Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean  
Building 96, Ft Armstrong, Honolulu, 13, Hawaii

Assistant Chief of Staff/Civil Engineering, Headquarters PACAF  
APO 953, San Francisco, California  
ATTN: PFSCE-ED

Commander Fifth Air Force, US Air Force, APO 925  
ATTN: 5FSCE, APO 925

Commander 313th Air Division, US Air Force, APO 239  
ATTN: Civil Engineering

1. Transmitted for review and approval are preliminary drawings, preliminary design analyses and outline specifications.
2. Due to very short design time allowed for this project, it is requested that all reviews be expedited, and that POD and PACAF comments be sent by TWX so as to reach this District no later than 7 March 1960.
3. A cost control estimate based on the preliminary drawing is being prepared and will be forwarded on or about 29 February 1960.
4. Revised sheet 7 of 9 of the Civil Design analysis for Site 1 is also transmitted with this letter.

FOR THE DISTRICT ENGINEER:

5 Incls:

1. PRE 16-06-516  
sht 1-5 of 5
2. PRE 71-08-304  
sht 1-2 of 2
3. PRE 71-03-390  
sht 1 of 1
4. Prel Des Analysis  
& outline specs, utilities, elect.  
(civil-under separate cover)
5. Revised sht 7 of 9 of the Civil  
Design analysis for Site 1.

A. ROGGEVEEN  
Chief, Engineering Division

617311

0 1 2 3



JOB OPERATIONAL FACILITIES  
LOCATION SITE NO. 1  
DATE FEB. 1960 BUILDING  
BY K. SHINO

JOB NO. 2462  
SHEET NO. 1 OF 1

DESIGN ANALYSIS

OUTLINE SPECIFICATION

1. Road:

- a. Pavement type, hot plant mix, hot laid asphaltic concrete, 2" thick, on an 9" minimum compacted thickness stabilized aggregate base course.

2. Storm Drain:

a. Storm drain line:

- 1) Cast iron pipe, bell and spigot.
- 2) Concrete pipe, size 6" to 15", non-reinforced.
- 3) Concrete pipe, size 24", reinforced.

b. Catch basin:

- 1) Paved area, reinforced concrete, poured-in-place, with steel grating, welded.
- 2) Unpaved area, reinforced concrete, poured-in-place, with cast iron grating.

c. Headwall, reinforced concrete, poured-in-place.

d. Grouted stone ditch, hand-placed, cement mortar grouted.

3. Fencing: Chain link wire fence, concrete line posts, with 3 strands of barbed wire.

U. S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, OKINAWA  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ENGINEER  
APO 331, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

PRELIMINARY - DESIGN ANALYSIS  
AND OUTLINE SPECIFICATIONS

(CONTRACT NO DA92-328-ENG-155)

OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

SITE 1

OKINAWA

R. I.

CIVIL

THOMAS B. BOURNE ASSOCIATES, INC.  
ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTS

617311



JOB OPERATIONAL FACILITIES  
LOCATION SITE NO. 1  
DATE FEB. 1960 BUILDING  
BY K. SHINO

JOB NO. 2462

SHEET NO. 1 OF 9

DESIGN ANALYSIS

I. Location and Scope of Work:

This project is located within the boundary of Bolo Airfield. It is located on the low hills to the east of the abandoned runway, and west of Highway No. 6. The design consists of the siting of two units of Operational Facilities with Air Police Bldg., paved unloading area, security fence, POL storage tank, water supply, drainage, jeep patrol road and the selection of a marker site location with security fence.

II. Criteria:

The layout as shown on all drawings is based on O.C.E. contract drawing AW-33-37-09, and related documents, including all instructions and modifications as requested by P.O.D., PACAF and O.C.E. by secret messages.

III. Siting:

Two units, of four launcher cells each, are to be located facing a true azimuth of  $320^{\circ}$ . This bearing was given the AE as a site requirement. Separation of the two units is 31.25' from the outside walls of the end launcher cell as shown on Fig. 1. This project is sited in accordance with the criteria stated in the previous paragraph and memorandum from USAEDO on 60% complete preliminary drawings that were submitted by the AE.

This project is so located that all facilities and the area within the quantity distances, as defined in AFM-86-6, are within presently owned Air Force property. A small portion of the area within the quantity distance, as defined by AFL-136-5, is outside the AF boundary, see Drawing C-3. This has been discussed with USAEDO and the Using Agency and it is believed that this property need not be purchased.

The structures are located in a vertical plane so that all footings are on a favorable foundation material.

At the request of POD and PACAF the Marker area has been relocated to the area shown on Dwg. C-1 and C-2. The site selected is on one of the existing hard stands of the abandoned airfield. The marker located here need not be more than 20' high.

The existing taxiway and apron to the southwest of the site are to be used as an access road to connect the site to Highway Route No. 6.



#### IV. Master Station Control:

The horizontal and vertical controls are those set at the site by USAEDO as shown on sheet C-3. The horizontal and vertical controls are tied into the Military grid system and Okinawa datum.

Declination of Military grid north from true north: At this project area, the declination of Military grid north from true north is observed as N  $00^{\circ}-19'-23''$  E. This information was obtained from USAEDO on 19th November 1959.

The major control points for the new construction are designated by coordinates. Location of all structures and required criteria distances are indicated by distances and angles shown on Drawings C-2, C-3 and Fig. 1.

T.B.M. No. 270, elevation 78.31 was used for the vertical controls. The T.B.M. is a 1/2" diameter reinforcing rod located near the west end of the runway, and 160' east of the centerline. The location of the T.B.M. is shown on Drawing C-1.

#### V. Field Investigation:

Topographic survey information was furnished by the USAEDO, and is shown on Drawing C-3 of this report. The site lies on a low limestone terrace bounded on the west by the China Sea and on the east by a higher limestone terrace. The principal land forms are low steep limestone pinnacles, and shallow circular shaped depressions caused by cavern collapse. Many exposures of the overburden and bedrock materials are present in nearby abandoned quarries and road cuts. Low fault line scarps are exposed along the nearby coast line. The area is covered with low grass, brush, and potato and sugar cane fields. There are no existing structures to be removed and there are no existing utilities in the immediate area.

#### VI. Soil Investigation:

1. General: All borings and soils information was furnished by USAEDO. The boring logs are shown on Drawings C-2 and the boring locations are shown on Drawings C-2 and C-3. An estimated CBR value of 15 has been used for the preliminary design, as no laboratory value has been furnished as of this date.



## DESIGN ANALYSIS

2. Exploration: Ten core borings were taken at the proposed site. A two-inch I.D. spoon was used for sampling both the overburden and bedrock materials. The core samples obtained from these holes are stored at the USAEDO Foundations and Materials Branch warehouse.
3. Sequence and Character of Deposits: The site is underlain by a weathered, solution riddled, very often cavernous, coralline limestone. The limestone is overlain by layers of residual clay and silt from a few inches to four feet in thickness. No blasting will be required for excavation of the limestone.
4. Drainage: The area is drained by both surface and subsurface run off. The drainage system established for the abandoned air field is in good condition. No ground water was encountered in any of the core borings. Drill water return was lost at very shallow depths because of the solution riddled nature of the limestone.
5. Seismic Velocities: Seismic surveys performed in similar areas (Futema and Kadena Air Fields) indicate velocities ranging from 150 to 300 m/sec for the residual clay overburden and 1,000 to 1950 m/sec for the limestone formation.
6. Construction Materials: Nearby government construction is utilizing aggregate from Nagahama and Chibana quarries and beach sand from Kin and Onna.
7. Bearing Capacity: The estimated minimum bearing capacity for the limestone material is 4,000 pounds per square foot.

VII. Design:

1. Grading: The governing factors for setting the vertical elevation of the structures are: balancing earth work, setting all foundations on firm bearing material, elevation of water table and line of sight to the marker. The earth work has been balanced, but it will be necessary for the contractor to strip off all material classified on the boring logs as CH material and stock pile it separate from the limestone material. The CH material can be used for fill outside the structure area and the top 18" of fill over the entire area as necessary. Only the limestone material will be used as backfill around and over the structures and up to within 18" of the finished grade. The water table is approx. 50 feet below the lowest part of the structure.



2. Access Road, Unloading and Parking Area: There is an existing gravel road connecting the end of the taxiway with Highway No. 6. The roadway and taxiway are in a condition that is acceptable by the Using Agency and USAEDO for vehicular traffic. The existing road and taxiway (shown on Drawing C-1) are to be used in their present condition, and the new access road is to start at the edge of the large aircraft parking apron and extend 567 feet to the site. The new road will be 12' wide AC pavement with 4-foot treated shoulders on each side. At the entrance to the site the road will be widened to 18 feet with 4-foot shoulders on both sides. The widening is to allow two cars to pass at the gate entrance and the POL tank area. This system has been requested and approved by Using Agency, Security Forces and PACAF.

The unloading area for this facility is a paved area approximately 96 feet wide and 358 feet long graded with criteria slopes for unloading and drainage as shown on Drawing C-5. The trailer to be unloaded is approximately 33 feet long from forward wheel to rear of bed. A straight slope of 3.5% or approximately  $-2^{\circ}$  with the horizon is shown on OCE drawings. Design is based on an area sloping toward the structure at 3.5% for a distance of 46 feet. The outer 50' of the paved unloading area is sloped away from the structure for good drainage.

A space for parking 5 vehicles is located near the personnel entrance as requested. Vehicles parked in this location will not interfere with the auto-theodolite line of sight.

The pavement thickness is designed for H20-S16 live wheel loading, which is interpreted from the given vehicle loading requirements as follows:

- a. The load combination of the M-52 tractor and the F-6 refueling tractor will effect the heaviest load combination to be used in the design of roads for the TM Launching Facility.

- b. The weights of these items are:

Front wheels	M-52	8,200 pounds
Tandem	M-52	29,200 pounds
Tandem	F-6	33,700 pounds

- c. The load combinations of the M-52 tractor and modified M-269 trailer missile transporter are:

Front wheels	M-52	8,200 pounds
Tandem	M-52	23,878 pounds
Tandem	M-269	15,822 pounds



- d. The turning radius of the tractor missile transporter combination is 39 feet 3 inches. This necessitates street widths of 34 feet minimum when turning the tractor-trailer combination around a 90° sharp corner or curbing.

The design CBR value of compacted subgrade is assumed from a visual inspection of the site and a study of the boring logs to be not less than 15%.

The new access road, unloading area and parking area are to be paved with 2" thick asphaltic concrete pavement on a minimum 9" thick stabilized aggregate base course. All shoulders are to be treated with single bituminous surfacing. Design Reference: OCE Part 8 Chap. I.

3. Jeep Patrol Road: A jeep patrol road is to be provided inside the inner perimeter fence as shown on the Drawing C-3. The road is to be 8" wide, roughly graded, and paved with 6" compacted thickness of stabilized aggregate. This is in accordance with PACAF request.

#### VIII. Drainage:

The drainage system is to be a combination of surface and underground systems. Intersecting ditches are to be provided outside of the security fence on the uphill side to keep water from this site.

All main surface water courses are to be paved with grouted stone to provide rapid water discharge from the site. This is to insure protection of the underground structures and eliminate the possibility of soil erosion. Seven catch basins are to be installed at the edge of the door unloading ramp to collect water from the area of the unloading pavement and discharged (by sump pump) water from the underground structures. Two other catch basins are to be provided in the moat area as shown on the OCE Drawing. All water is collected by underground pipes and drained to daylight. Location, elevation and profile of drainage structures of this area are shown on Drawing C-5. Two 24" R.C. pipe culverts are to be installed under the access road to discharge surface water from within the area.

#### Subdrainage:

The area has a very low water table. The coralline limestone material here allows rapid percolation of the water down through the soil. It will not be necessary to drain the area with a system of underground piping. The air intake and exhaust stacks are being

## DESIGN ANALYSIS

revised to decrease the amount of water entering the structure to practically nil. As a safety precaution, a dry well will be installed immediately under the bottom of each stack to allow water to percolate into the soil.

The personnel entrance structure will be drained by a dry well immediately under the structure. At the time of construction a percolation test will be made to determine the size required. The dry well will be sized to take 271.7 mm. of water per 24-hour period. This is the largest rainfall recorded in a 24-hour period since 1936.

Formula:

The following design assumptions are used:

1. Duration curve 2.3 inches

Minimum of 10 min.

2. Runoff coefficient

Paved area - 1.00

Unpaved area - 0.60

3. Runoff calculation

$Q = CIA$       Where  $Q$  = quantity of runoff  
 $C$  = RUNOFF coefficient  
 $I$  = intensity  
 $A$  = drainage area in acres

4. Roughness coefficient

Mannings "n"	Concrete pipe	0.013
	Stone ditch	0.03

5. Capacity of culvert with headwall

$$Q = \frac{A \sqrt{2gh}}{1 + 0.3/D^{0.5} + 0.026L/D^{1.2}}$$



# DESIGN ANALYSIS

SHEET NO. 7 OF 9

Where Q = discharge capacity of culvert in ft./sec.  
 D = diameter of pipe in feet  
 A = cross sectional area of pipe in s.f.  
 L = length of pipe in feet  
 h = head on pipe in feet  
 g = acceleration of gravity

## 6. Inlet capacity

$$Q = AC \sqrt{2gh}$$

Where Q = inlet capacity in ft./sec.  
 A = net water area in s.f.  
 C = 0.6 for clogging  
 h = head in feet, (0.25 ft. used)  
 g = 32.2

## IX. POL TANK:

This 48,000 gal. tank location has been approved by all agencies involved to this time. The tank is underground. Both the tank and fill line are inside the security area. The tank can be filled from a tank truck by gravity flow. The flow from tank to control bldg. will be by gravity.

## X. Quantity Distance:

The quantity distance requirements determined from AFR 86-6 are shown on Drawings C-1, C-2 and C-3 as 380' for unbarricaded distance both front and rear and 190' barricaded distance both sides. The quantity distance requirements determined from AFL 136-5 is 316' barricaded distance both sides of launch cell which is also shown on the same drawings.

## XI. Restrictive Easements:

A restrictive easement, trapezoidal in shape, extending from a 330' base at the launch cells to the 50' square at the marker area, to maintain line of sight, is to be obtained, and the location is shown on drawing C-1.

# DESIGN ANALYSIS

SHEET NO. 8 OF 9

Line of sight from the theodolite to the marker area:

The height of the sight line is computed as follows:

At the launch cells, elev. of floor	131.17
<u>Height of the theodolite</u>	<u>3.00 (assumed)</u>
Height of eye elevation	134.17
Ground elevation at the marker area	51.00
<u>Height of marker from the ground</u>	<u>20.00</u>
Elevation of marker	71.00

Limit of line of sight is as shown on Drawings C-1 and C-3.

## XII. Clear Area:

A 100' wide strip outside of the outer fence line is to be cleared and treated with sodding as noted on Drawing C-3.

## XIII. Fencing:

A double security fence is to be installed around the facility. The outer fence must be a minimum distance of 100 feet from the nearest aboveground part of the structure. A separation of 8 feet is required between the two fences. A fencing is to be 7 feet high standard type consisting of concrete line posts, chain link wire mesh and three strands of barbed wire around the top. All water courses through the fence are to be man and dog proof. The area along the northwest side of the structure has been cut down sufficiently to allow the line of sight from the auto-theodolite to the marker to clear the top of the fence.

The separation of the double fence at the entrance is 70 feet to allow the longest vehicle to park for inspection between the two fences. See Drawing C-2 for layout of the area. This particular arrangement is as requested and approved by POD, PACAF and the Using Agency.

The marker area is to be 50' by 50' square. The area shall be fenced with the same type fence as used at the launcher site. One 3' wide pedestrian gate will be provided.

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## DESIGN ANALYSIS

SHEET NO. 9 OF 9

The following USAEDC Standard Drawings are used:

<u>Description</u>	<u>Dwg. No.</u>	<u>Sheet No.</u>	<u>Det. No.</u>
Concrete Headwall	40-05-02	1.B6	9
Man Proofing for Headwall	40-09-01	1.1A	14
Inlet (Single Grating) for Unpaved Areas	40-09-01	2.0A	15
7' and 10' Chain Link Wire Fence	40-16-03	1.0B	
7' and 10' Chain Link Wire Fence	40-16-03	2.0A	
7' and 10' Chain Link Wire Fence	40-16-03	3B	

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PP RJAKC  
DE RJESBN 7 04T  
P 261600Z ZEX  
FM WRAMA ROBINS  
RC RJHPKM/HICKAM AFB  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF  
RJAKC/313ADIV KADENA  
RJED SQ/ARDC DET 1 WPAFB  
BT

SECRET FROM WRNI WB-230  
ACTION HICKAM AFB (PFSCE-ED) USAF (AFOCE-CO); INFO 313AD, ARDC (RD ZSTC),  
5AF. URMSG SECRET PFSCE-ED 080, 20 FEB 60. THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS. PART  
I FOR HICKAM. THE EXISTING SURPLUS MB-3A MAINTENANCE DOCK PRESENTLY AT  
KADENA APPEARS TO BE SUITABLE FOR THE CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY  
AND PLANS ARE PRESENTLY BEING FORMULATED FOR ITS USE. SPECIFIC REQUIRE-  
MENT IS FOR APPROX 4,000 SQ FT DESIGNATED AS A CLASS II AIR CONDITIONED  
AREA. REQUEST A COMPLETE SET OF DRAWINGS DEPICTING THE ACTUAL LAYOUT OF  
THE BLDG BE FORWARDED THIS ACTIVITY AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. DRAW-  
INGS SHOULD INDICATE PRESENT WALL PARTITIONS, OFFICE SPACE, REST ROOMS,  
HEATING, LIGHTING, WALL AND/OR POWER OUTLETS SPECIFYING TYPE OF AC AND/OR  
DC POWER AND SUCH DETAILS CONSIDERED NECESSARY TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A COMPLETE CMF LAYOUT TO CONFORM WITH THE BUILDING SPECIFICATIONS.  
PART II FOR USAF (AFOCE\*CO) COMPLETE SHOP LAYOUT WILL BE FORWARDED UPON  
RECEIPT OF BUILDING DRAWINGS FROM HICKAM. SIGNED LOGISTICS SUPPORT  
MANAGEMENT.

BT  
26/2215Z FEB 1960

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SECRET

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DE RJHPKM 190  
M 200222Z ZEX  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJEZHQ/USAF WASH DC  
RJESBN/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
RJACKC/313TH AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RJEDSQ/ARDC DET 1 WPAFB OHIO  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED 080  
ACTION, USAF (AFOCE-CO), WRAMA (WRNIW); INFO, 313AD, ARDC DET NBR 1  
(RDZSTC), 5AF. REFERENCES (A) YOUR MESSAGE, SECRET/AFOCE-CO 71783,  
DATED 18 FEB 60; (B) YOUR MESSAGE, UNCLASSIFIED/AFOCE-CT 70123, DATED  
11 FEB 60. IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAYS WHICH MAY JEOPARDIZE SCHEDULED  
DEPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL, THIS HQ HAS REQUESTED PACIFIC OCEAN DIVISION  
TO INITIATE DESIGN SUPPORT FACILITIES, M-SITES OKINAWA ON FOLLOWING  
BASIS: METAL PREFABS FOR SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE AND G/M STORAGE;  
CONCRETE BLOCK FOR GROUP HEADQUARTERS; AND EXISTING SURPLUS MB-3A  
MAINTENANCE DOCK FOR CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY. THE GROSS AREA  
OF MB-3A DOCK IS ABOUT 19,130 SF COMPARED TO 14,161 SF AUTHORIZED IN  
REFERENCE (A). HOWEVER, COST OF ERECTION OF SURPLUS KADENA DOCK WILL  
BE LESS THAN COST OF FURNISHING AND ERECTING 14,161 SF PREFAB WITH  
25-FOOT CEILING. FINAL COST COMPARISON WILL BE FURNISHED ABOUT 1 MARCH  
60. CONCRETE BLOCK PROPOSED FOR GROUP HEADQUARTERS CONSIDERED MOST  
ECONOMICAL FOR THIS LOW CEILING PARTIALLY AIR CONDITIONED BUILDING.  
ESTIMATED BOD FOR GROUP HQ IS 7 AUG 61 AND FOR OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES  
IS 31 MARCH 61, PROVIDED CONSTRUCTION FUNDS FOR ADVANCE PROCUREMENT ARE  
AVAILABLE BY 1 APR 1960. FOR USAF: REQUEST APPROVAL OF THESE PROCEDURES.  
FOR WRAMA: REQUEST YOU FORWARD COMMENTS ON THE SUITABILITY OF THE MB-3A  
MAINTENANCE DOCK FOR CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY TO USAF (AFOCE-CO)  
AND PACAF (PFSCE-ED).

BT  
20/0315Z FEB 1960.

SECRET.

617426

0136

SECRET

97

FROM: HEDUSAF WASH DC

TO : PACAF

INFO: WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
313ADIV KADENA

/S E C R E T/CITE AFOCE-CD74500. ACTION PACAF (PFSCE-ED) INFO WRAMA,  
5AF, 313AD, ARDC DET 1 (RDXSTC), 1. REFUR PFSCE-ED 080 CONCERNING  
SUPPORT FACILITIES OKINAWA M-SITE. PROPOSED USE OF METAL PREFABS FOR  
SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE AND G/M STORAGE, CONCRETE BLOCK FOR GROUP HQS AND  
EXISTING SURPLUS MG-3A MAINTENANCE DOCK FOR CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE  
FACILITY IS APPROVED SUBJ TO WRAMA CONCURRENCE REGARDS CMF. BOD'S OF  
7 AUG 61 FOR GROUP HQS AND 31 MAR 61 FOR ALL OTHER SUPPORT FACILITIES  
ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THIS HQ. FUNDING ACTION IS IN PROCESS, AND UPON  
AVAILABILITY YOU WILL BE ADVISED.

01/2056Z MAR 1960

617727

SECRET

0137



SECRET

98

RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 24  
R 072333Z ZEX  
FM CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RBHGA/CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII  
INFO RBHPB/CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR  
RUFMDR/CINCUSARPAC FORT SHAFTER HAWAII  
RAJOKC/COMDR 313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWCR/DISTRICT ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RWAPAM/COMDR 5AF FUCHU AIRSTA JAPAN  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-PR 186

ACTION CINCPAC, INFO CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, 313AD, USAEDO, AND 5AF. SUBJECT IS ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTY FOR USAF TM-76B MISSILE PROGRAM, OKINAWA. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART 1. RESULTS OF ENGINEERING STUDIES FOR INSTALLATION OF TM-76B ON OKINAWA HAVE REAL REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL ELEVEN ACRES OF LAND AT THE TANCHI SITE. AREA SURROUNDS OBSOLETE TANCHI NIKE SITE NOW UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND TM-76B LAUNCH SITE. LOCATION: CENTRAL OKINAWA, APPROXIMATELY THREE MILES SW ONNA POINT AND TEN MILES NORTH KADENA AB, ALONG ACCESS ROAD LEADING TO PRESENT NIKE SITE NR 2. TERRAIN IS STEEP WITH ELONGATED RIDGES SEPARATED BY NARROW CANYONS AND VALLEYS. LAND IS COVERED WITH TROPICAL VEGETATION WITH NO U.S. MILITARY OR CIVILIAN IMPROVEMENTS. OTHER U.S. SERVICES AND AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY BEEN SCREENED BY USAEDO, AND NO OBJECTION OR REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN INDICATED. THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE NIKE SITE OR OTHER U.S. INSTALLATIONS IN THE CENTRAL PORTION OF OKINAWA. PART 2. THE CURRENT ENGINEERING SCHEDULE FOR CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES ON OKINAWA REQUIRES THAT SITE PREPARATION BE STARTED ON 1 APRIL. ACCORDINGLY, REQUEST ACQUISITION APPROVAL PRIOR TO 20 MARCH SO LOCAL ACTION MAY BE TAKEN TO EFFECT RIGHT OF ENTRY. PART 3. FOR CINCPACFLT AND USARPAC. IN VIEW OF THE SHORT SUSPENSE BY WHICH THIS HQ REQUIRES APPROVAL OF THE ACQUISITION, IT IS REQUESTED YOUR HQ NOTIFY CINCPAC BY ELECTRICAL MEANS OF ANY REQUIREMENT FOR LAND SPECIFIED IN PART 7 OF THIS MESSAGE. CINCPAC RECOMMENDS THIS METHOD OF EXPEDITING APPROVAL.

BT

07/2351Z MARCH 1960

SECRET

617900

0138

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE CIVILIAN DEPUTY ENGINEER

RICE

8 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Siting of Operational Site Nr. 3, Gimbaru

1. A meeting was held in the Engineer Conference Room, Building 210 for the purpose of discussing the siting of Operational Site Nr. 3, Gimbaru. The following persons attended the meeting:

Lt. Colonel William W. Robertson	313th AD, CE
Lt. Colonel James O. Tyler	313th AD, OC-P
Mr. L. M. Taylor	USAEG
Mr. Gerson Mandel	USAEG
Mr. W. J. McDonnal	USAEDO
Mr. J. G. Leighton	USAEDO
Mr. Philip A. Granek	USAEDO
Mr. Ottis Fowler	T. B. Bourne Assoc.
Mr. Myron A. Grayson	G-4
Mr. James B. Bevill	USAEG
Mr. Owen J. Sheeskey	USAEG

2. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the feasibility of relocating Operational Site Nr. 3 at Gimbaru to an area on periphery of the Army owned land. The Air Force representative indicated their acceptance to further study the possibility of relocating the proposed site but advised that certain operational requirements must be met and what effects the resiting would have on the Air Force program, as follows:

- a. Facilities must be located on high ground and have a cleared area in the direction of fire.
- b. Foundation of cells must be constructed on undisturbed ground.
- c. An area for the Theodolite must be available having a clear line of sight from the operational area.
- d. New soil surveys must be conducted and a seismologist requested from the States to make seismographic tests of the new area.
- e. Re-siting will require redesign of the foundation and will result in additional design cost and a loss of time.
- f. If project is resited, approval of new locations will have to be obtained by 313th from Air Force Headquarters.

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## CONFIDENTIAL

3. District Engineer advised that initial study was confined to the accepted area and surrounding areas were not investigated during the design stage. The District Engineer agreed to make further studies of the entire Gimbaru Range to determine if construction of the site at other locations was feasible. It was proposed that alternate locations would be marked and could be inspected by USARYIS personnel either on the 9th or 10th of March. The site selected for this inspection would be based on a very preliminary investigation and would be subject to future soils investigations.

4. Engineer representatives at this meeting advised the Air Force and the District Engineer that their primary concern was not in the amount of land that was required for the operational site, but the fact that the location selected seriously affected future utilization of Gimbaru Range as an Army training area. Conferees were advised that when the information was obtained from the District concerning alternate locations, this information would be used in arriving at a decision concerning the transfer of portion of Gimbaru Range to the Air Force.

L. M. TAYLOR  
Civilian Deputy Engineer

SECRET

100

RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 18D  
R 162330Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/CINCUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HAWAII  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

/SECRET/ FROM PFSCE-PR 196

SUBJECT IS USE OF PORTION GIMBARU FIRING RANGE FOR TM-76B MISSILE LAUNCH SITE NO 3 ON OKINAWA. REF IS 313ADIV LTR (313IE-P), 27 MAR 59, REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO ACCEPT TRANSFER GIMBARU FIRING RANGE FROM US ARMY (U), AND 2D IND THERETO, 29 APR 59. INFO CY OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE WAS ADDRESSED TO YOUR HQ. REAL ESTATE INVOLVED IS EXCESS ARMY LAND OFFERED TO AF FOR MISSILE USE DURING MARCH 59. ENTRY TO ALL REAL ESTATE FOR SITE PREPARATION ON TM-76B SITES IN OKINAWA SCHEDULED FOR 1 APR 60; ACCORDINGLY, YOUR ASSISTANCE REQUESTED IN EFFECTING AF RIGHT OF ENTRY TO GIMBARU. GIMBARU LAND WAS OFFERED TO AF DURING MARCH 59; HOWEVER, TRANSFER HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTED TO DATE. INFORMALLY UNDERSTAND DELAY DUE TO COMPLETION OF LOCAL ARRANGEMENT RELATING TO CONCURRENT SERVICE USE IN GENERAL GIMBARU RANGE AREA. URGENTLY REQUEST RAPID RESOLUTION OF ALL OUTSTANDING LOCAL PROBLEMS AND AF ENTRY TO LAND, SO CONSTRUCTION OF TM-76B MISSILE COMPLEX WILL NOT BE COMPROMISED.

BT

16/2357Z MAR 1960

618187

SECRET

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SECRET

101

RR RJAKC  
DE RJHPKM 202Z  
R 170316Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAKC/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
BT

/SECRET/ FROM PFSCE-PR 197

SUBJ: REAL ESTATE FOR TM-76B SITES OKINAWA. THIS MSG IN THREE PARTS.  
PART I. REF IS PART III YOUR SECRET 313CE C-3-23, 10 MAR 60. STATEMENT  
THAT "DISTENGR ADVISES CURRENT INSTRUCTION FOR SITE PREPARATION DOES NOT  
INCLUDE SITES 3 AND 4 AT THIS TIME" IS APPARENTLY BASED ON OBSOLETE  
INFO. PART 20F PACOCEAN DIV ENGR UNCLAS/EFTO MSG PODGM 3582, 1 MAR  
60, TO BCE WHICH SPECIFIES OKED IS TO CONTINUE DESIGN OF FOUR OPERATIONAL  
SITES QUOTED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE. PACAF MSG QUOTED IN PART FOR INFO:  
"IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQ USAF, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO  
CONTINUE WITH DESIGN OF FOUR OPERATIONAL SITES AND SUPPORT FACILITIES  
AS OUTLINED IN CURRENT DESIGN INSTRUCTIONS, THIS HQ. FOR THIS PROJECT  
ONLY, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADVERTISE WHEN BID DOCUMENT IS READY AND  
ITEM IS FUNDED." UNQUOTE. PART II. CONCERNING 80 PCT CONTRACT DRAWING  
CONFERENCE BEGINNING WEEK 4 APR 60, REQUEST YOUR REPRESENTATIVES BE  
PREPARED TO PRESENT COMPLETE UP-TO-DATE STATUS REAL ESTATE FOR ALL FOUR  
SITES. PART III. USARPAC ASSISTANCE TO EXPEDITE TRANSFER OF ARMY REAL  
ESTATE TO AF ACCOUNT BEING REQUESTED.

BT

17/0343Z MARCH 1960

618205

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED / SECRET

ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

X

AF

313TH AIR DIVISION KADENA AB OKINAWA

5AF FUCHU AIR STATION JAPAN

INFO: OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER, HQ, USARYIS, APO 331 (COURIER)  
OFFICE OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR, USCAR, APO 331 (COURIER)  
, APO 331 (COURIER)

CLASSIFIED/313IO C-3-44. PERSONAL TO GENERAL

BURNS FROM GENERAL SMITH. THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.

PART ONE. IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE UNFAVORABLE  
PUBLIC REACTION BOTH LOCALLY AND IN JAPAN, DETAILED PUBLIC  
RELATIONS PLAN BEING DEVELOPED ON MACE PLACEMENT HERE. BASIC  
PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY WILL BE TO KEEP PUBLICITY TO  
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AS LONG AS FEASIBLE WITH PREPARATIONS  
ADEQUATE TO MEET CONTINGENCIES. INTER-SERVICE COMMITTEE  
SELECTED TO DEVELOP PLAN INCLUDES 313TH DIRECTOR OF  
OPERATIONS AS CHAIRMAN, 313TH INFORMATION OFFICER, CIVIL  
ENGINEERING OFFICER, PLANS OFFICER, AND INFORMATION  
COORDINATOR FOR HIGH COMMISSIONER, POLITICAL ADVISOR TO

17 0547Z

MARCH 1960

313IO

BERNARD PETERS, LT COL, USAF  
40123 1 2

DALE O. SMITH  
MAJOR GENERAL, USAF  
COMMANDER



SECRET

313TH AIR DIVISION KADENA AB OKINAWA  
HIGH COMMISSIONER, OKINAWA DISTRICT ENGINEER PROJECT OFFICER, AND  
CHIEF, USCAR OFFICE PUBLIC AFFAIRS. PLAN WILL INCLUDE TIME-PHASE  
PROGRAM WITH APPROPRIATE RELEASES PREPARED AND READY FOR PRE-  
PLANNED RELEASE OR RELEASE IN ANSWER TO INQUIRIES IF NECESSARY.  
PLAN WILL INCLUDE BRIEFING OF AMBASSADOR LATE THIS MONTH BY TEAM  
FROM HERE WITH ANY MEMBERS FROM YOUR HQ. IF YOU CONCUR. PART TWO.  
HIGH COMMISSIONER AND I AM IN COMPLETE ACCORD THAT ANY OFFICIAL  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING PLACEMENT OF MACE HERE SHOULD BE MADE  
ONLY BY THIS HQ. AFTER PROPER LOCAL COORDINATION AND PREPARATION.  
STRONGLY RECOMMEND YOU REQUEST ALL HIGHER ECHELONS TO CONCUR WITH  
AND FOLLOW THIS POLICY. IN THIS CONNECTION, DISTRICT ENGINEER  
ADVISES

103

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 245D  
R 010253Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
RUAWCR/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFSCE-E-186/CAT "AC"  
ACTION PACOCEAN DIV ENGR, OKINAWA DIST ENGR, 5AF (5FSCE), AND 313  
AIR DIV (313CE). OUR CONFIDENTIAL PFSCE-E 144 TO HQ USAF; INFO COPY  
TO PACOCEAN DIV ENGR AND OKINAWA DIST ENGR, AND SUBSEQUENTLY FURNISHED  
5AF AND 313 AIR DIV BY OUR LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL, 23 MAR 60, SUBJECT:  
CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO OKINAWA M-SITES. HQ USAF REPLY TO  
REFERENCED MESSAGE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMPLIANCE, WHEN  
APPLICABLE; QUOTE. SUBJECT IS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTRUCTION  
EFFORT ON TM-76B FACILITIES. THIS MESSAGE IN 3 PARTS. PART 1 FOR  
PACAF. THIS REPLIES TO YOUR PFSCE-E 144. PART 2 FOR ALL. FOLLOWING  
POLICY ON SECURITY FOR CONSTRUCTION PHASE OF THESE FACILITIES, PROPOSED  
BY PACAF AND BASED ON MASTER SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE, DATED 15  
FEB 59 AND REVISED 15 MAY 59, IS APPROVED: (A) IN NECESSARY DEALINGS  
WITH PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS AND OTHER PERSONS WHOSE SERVICES ARE REQUIRED  
FOR SUCCESSFUL CONSTRUCTION, THE TERM "OPERATIONAL FACILITY" WILL  
CONTINUE IN USE; (B) WHERE TECHNICAL DETAILS OF CONSTRUCTION AND  
FABRICATION OR PART THEREOF, THE CONSTRUCTION AGENCY WILL INCLUDE THE  
NECESSARY INFORMATION IN THE INSTRUCTIONS AND DRAWINGS FURNISHED WHICH  
WILL BE MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY." PART 3 FOR ALL. CAUTION  
WITH RESPECT TO (B) ABOVE, ANY TECHNICAL DETAILS WHICH REVEAL CRITERIA  
USED AS BASIS OF DESIGN FOR LAUNCH FACILITIES MUST CONTINUE TO BE  
CLASSIFIED SECRET. UNQUOTE.

BT  
01/0335Z APR 1960

618589

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0145



SECRET

104

DE RJHPK, 23E  
M 052253Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAOKC/313TH AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWCR/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
AF GRNC

BT

UNCLAS/E F T O/PFSCE-ED 196

ACTION PACOCEAN DIV ENGR; INFO USAF (AFOCE-EA), WADD (RDZSTC), 5AF, 313TH AIR DIV, and OKINAWA DIST ENGR. FOLLOWING HQ USAF LETTER, AFOCE-EA, 31 MAR 60, SUBJECT: T/M LAUNCHING FACILITIES, 8-CELL STANDARD DESIGNS, QUOTED IN PART FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NECESSARY ACTION: QUOTE. PARAGRAPH 1: THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS WAS REQUESTED 22 MAR 60 TO PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF A STANDARD DESIGN FOR AN 8-CELL T/M LAUNCHING FACILITY TO BE USED IN PLACE OF TWO ADJACENTLY-LOCATED 4-CELL FACILITIES. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE THIS DESIGN AVAILABLE FOR USE WHEREVER PRACTICABLE CONSIDERING BENEFICIAL OCCUPANCY DATE (BOD), ECONOMY, AND LOCAL CONDITIONS AS TO DEPLOYMENT. PARAGRAPH 2: OCE ESTIMATES ARE APPROXIMATELY 14 WEEKS FOR PREPARATION OF STANDARD DESIGN DOCUMENTS AND 12 WEEKS FOR SITE ADAPTATION, BUT THIS SCHEDULE CAN BE COMPRESSED BY STARTING SITE ADAPTATION ON THE BASIS OF PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS AND ACCOMPLISHING SITE ADAPTATION CONCURRENTLY WITH DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD DRAWINGS. ESTIMATED SAVINGS ARE IN EXCESS OF \$250,000 THROUGH USE OF ONE 8-CELL STANDARD FACILITY INSTEAD OF TWO ADJACENTLY-LOCATED 4-CELL FACILITIES. PARAGRAPH 3: OCE IS REQUESTED BY COPY OF THIS LETTER TO FURNISH PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS OF THE 8-CELL DESIGN, FOR THE PURPOSE OF BEGINNING SITE ADAPTATION, TO PACAF AND USAF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER AF APPROVAL IS RECEIVED, AT BOTH THE 10 PCT AND 60 PCT REVIEW STAGES. PARAGRAPH 4: FOR PACAF: IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE ABOVE INDICATED SCHEDULE WILL NOT IMPOSE ON BOD FOR SITES IN THE FY-61 PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE TIME SAVING PROCEDURES CONTEMPLATED. IN THAT EVENT YOU ARE REQUESTED TO SUSPEND DESIGN EFFORT ON THOSE SITES PENDING RECEIPT OF THE PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. UNQUOTE. PROVIDED NO SLIPPAGE IN BOD WILL RESULT, REQUEST SITE ADAPTATION OF LAUNCH STRUCTURES FOR SITES 3 AND 4 BE HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING RECEIPT OF PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS OF THE 8-CELL DESIGN REFERENCED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF USAF LETTER. ADVISE THIS HQ AND ALL INFO ADDRESSEES THIS MESSAGE OF ACTION TAKEN.

BT

05/2329Z APR 1960.

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0146

SECRET

105

RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 55F  
R M 062334Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
INFO RBHPA/CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIRSTN JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
RUAWCR/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJEZHQ/OSAF WASH DC  
AF GRNC  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED-198  
FOR USAF (ACTION AFOCE-CD); INFO OSAF (SAFOI-1), CINCPAC, 5AF, 313 AIR  
DIV, PACOCEAN DIV ENGR, AND OKINAWA DIST ENGR. OUR SECRET PFCOI-P  
156, DTD 042014Z APR 60 (NOTAL). THE US EMBASSY, JAPAN, HAS REQUESTED  
THAT PACAF DEFER ADVERTISING FOR MISSILE SITE CONSTRUCTION ON OKINAWA  
UNTIL AFTER THE NEW SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN HAS BEEN RATIFIED BY  
THE DIET, A DELAY OF ABOUT SEVENTEEN DAYS. IN VIEW OF POLITICAL  
SIGNIFICANCE, THIS HQ RECOMMENDS THAT THE DELAY BE APPROVED. EVERY  
EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO ABSORB THE TIME LOST; HOWEVER, PHASING SCHEDULES  
FOR THE MACE PROGRAM HAVE ALREADY BEEN COMPRESSED TO A MINIMUM. SLIPPING  
THE ADVERTISING DATE SEVENTEEN DAYS WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN A CORRESPONDING  
SLIPPAGE OF BOD'S AND OPERATIONAL READINESS DATES. SINCE OPERATIONAL  
DATES DEPEND ON USAF COMMITMENTS, THE EMBASSY'S REQUEST IS FORWARDED  
TO YOUR HQ FOR APPROVAL  
BT  
07/0001Z APR 1960

618760

SECRET

0147



SECRET

106

DEFERRED

313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

SECRET/RADNOTE/For Lt Col Norman Tucker from R. R. Griswold, TDY

Kadena AB. This note in five parts. Part I. Scheduled dates

Operational Facilities Okinawa:

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Sites 1 and 2</u>	<u>Support</u>
Invitation	9 May 1960	1 Sept 60
Bid Open	9 June 60	1 Oct 60
Award	23 June 60	10 Oct 60
NTP	27 June 60	15 Oct 60
BOD	30 June 61	1 June 61

Part II. Schedule Sites 1 and 2 subject to following conditions:

- a. Items procured ZI arrive on schedule.
- b. Changes which require extension of time will extend BOD by that amount.
- c. Peculiar equipment will be installed after construction contractor is finished.
- d. For political reasons schedule may slip 17 days.

Part III.

Schedule support facilities subject to following conditions:

- a. Prefabs for storage and shop.
- b. Hems procured ZI arrive on schedule.
- c. Changes which require extension of time will extend BOD by that amount.

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# SECRET

313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

d. Peculiar equipment will be installed after construction contractor is finished.

3. Schedule contractor maintenance facility not known because design directive and details not received.

## Part IV.

### Grading Sites 1 and 2:

Invitation	5 April 60
Open bids	15 April 60
Award	18 April 60
Notice Proceed	22 April 60
BOD	30 June 60

Part V. 80 per cent stage contract drawings Sites 1 and 2 and 70% preliminary drawings support facilities except contractor maintenance facility approved subject to changes noted.

08/0614Z April 1960

2 2

500064

# SECRET

0149



107  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RJAKC  
DE RJOPKM 181F  
R 120257Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
INFO RUAWCR/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF/GRNC  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFSCE 025  
ACTION USAF (AFOCE-CD); INFO PACOCEAN DIV ENGR, OKINAWA DIST ENGR,  
5AF AND 313 AIR DIV. SUBJECT: CONSTRUCTION OF FUNCTIONALLY ADEQUATE  
SUPPORT FACILITIES, KADENA. REFERENCES: (A) OUR UNCLAS/EFTO/PFSCE  
18 OF 18 MAR; (B) YOUR REPLY UNCLAS/AFOCE-CD 83258 OF 4 APR; (C)  
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THIS DATE BETWEEN COL STEPHENS, AFOCE, AND LT  
COL O'CONNOR, THIS HQ. THIS MESSAGE IN 3 PARTS. PART 1. REVIEW PANEL  
CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES PACAF, OKINAWA DIST ENGR, PACOCEAN DIV  
ENGR, OCE, MARTIN CO., AND WSPC, IS UNANIMOUS IN CONCLUSION THAT FOR  
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY, SUPPORT FACILITIES MUST BE ALL-  
WEATHER CONSTRUCTION. THE PREFABRICATED CORRUGATED METAL SHEETED  
BUILDINGS PREVIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED BY DIST ENGR, WHILE STRUCTURALLY  
SOUND, ARE HIGHLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO WATER PENETRATION FURING TYPHOON CON-  
DITIONS. THIS CONDITION SUBJECTS EQUIPMENT AND FLOORS TO QUANTITIES  
OF WATER, MAKING IMPOSSIBLE RELIABLE MAINTENANCE AND TESTING OF MISSILES  
AND COMPONENTS FOR INTOLERABLE PERIODS. THIS CONDITION WILL IMPOSE AN  
UNACCEPTABLE FACTOR ON MISSION CAPABILITY. PART 2. RECENT MESSAGE FROM  
OKINAWA DIST ENGR STATES THAT PREVIOUS ESTIMATE, REFERENCE (A), FOR  
PREFABRICATED STEEL WAS BASED ON INCOMPLETE COSTS RECEIVED FROM THE  
MANUFACTURER, AND DID NOT INCLUDE SUCH REQUIRED ITEMS AS INSULATION,  
WEATHERPROOFING OR THE SPECIAL LARGE ACCESS DOORS, AFTER RE-EVALUATION  
OF THESE FACTS, DIST ENGR STATES THAT CORRUGATED METAL BUILDINGS WILL  
COST \$9.59/SF, WHEREAS BY USE OF PRE-ENGINEERED, PRECAST CONCRETE, A  
FUNCTIONALLY ADEQUATE FACILITY CAN BE PROVIDED AT INCREASED COST DIF-  
FERENTIAL OF LESS THAN 10 PERCENT. FURTHER, THIS RECOMMENDED AND  
FUNCTIONALLY ADEQUATE STRUCTURE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE ORIGINAL  
BOD. THIS TYPE OF STRUCTURE HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY THE PANEL MENTIONED  
AND IS STRONGLY FAVORED BY THEM. PART 3. USE OF THE PREFAB CORRUGATED  
SHEET METAL INVITES BREAKDOWN OF THE ELECTRONIC AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT  
WHICH IS USED TO TEST AND MAINTAIN COMPONENTS. AS NOSE CONES MUST BE  
SERVICED AT THE RATE OF 32 EVERY 96 HOURS, AN INTERRUPTION OF THIS  
FUNCTION FOR AS MUCH AS FOUR DAYS WOULD REDUCE TO ZERO THE CAPABILITY  
OF THIS MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR WEAPON SYSTEM. THE REVISED PRE-ENGINEERED  
STRUCTURE IS WELL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE FUNDS AVAILABLE AND WILL CON-  
TRIBUTE TO THE RELIABLE CONTINUITY OF THIS COMMAND TO FULFILL ITS MISSION.  
THE DIST ENGR HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO PROCEED WITH STRUCTURE ACCORDINGLY;  
HE HAS BEEN ASSURED OF CONFIRMATION BY 15 APR.

BT  
12/0319Z APR 1960

618874

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0150

108  
SECRET

THE MARTIN COMPANY

Refer to: MW-1209

12 April 1960

JVB:J-367

To: Commander, AMC, Aeronautical Systems Center  
U.S. Air Force  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

WHEN DETACHED FROM  
ENCLOSURE THIS COR-  
RESPONDENCE IS DOWN-  
GRADED TO SECRET

Attn: LMTM

Subj: Contract No. AF33(600)38016, Item 6, Partial Compliance, Weapon  
System Operational Capabilities Report

Ref: (a) Martin Co. ltr. MW-0300, dtd. 28 January 1960

(b) W-PAFB Ohio RDZSDC telegram to Martin Co. of 29 March  
1330 E

Encl: (1) (Secret-Restricted Data) (1 copy) ER 10711-1, TM-76B  
Weapon System Operational Capabilities Report

(2) DD-250 No. A6-01311 (3 Copies)

1. Reference (a) transmitted two copies of enclosure (1) for coordin-  
ation and requested distribution instructions. Directed changes having  
been incorporated, distribution is being made in accordance with  
reference (b). This is the first revision of the subject report and it  
supersedes the first edition, ER 10711.

2. The data in ER 10711-1 dates from December 1959. Since that time  
there have been several changes in the weapon system planning. Notable  
among these are the following:

a. MEMS (Missile Equipment Maintenance Set)

GEMS (Guidance Equipment Maintenance Set) unit testers are  
being increased from a one each basis to obtain better  
capability with work loads. FEMS (Flight Equipment Main-  
tenance Set) and SAMS (Safety and Arming Equipment Main-  
tenance Set) are being deleted from Tactical Missile Group  
Equipment as the cost in equipment and personnel is not  
justified in view of the light work load. Personnel re-  
quirements are being revised accordingly. FEMS and SAMS  
will be located at CMS facilities in the overseas theaters.

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Refer to: MW-1209

b. Launch Complex

It had been anticipated that two launch structures, each containing four missiles, would be located at one site. It now appears that, for the second phase of deployment, one four-missile launch structure may be located at one site, especially in USAFE.

c. Flight Planning

It has been resolved that preparation of the flight profiles - Altitudes and lateral deviations - will be accomplished in the overseas theaters.

d. Organization

The Tactical Missile Group will contain two Tactical Missile Squadrons instead of one. Each squadron will have two launch flights and each launch flight will have 10 launch crews.

3. Requests for additional distribution of this report should be made through the Weapon System Project Office, ROZSTC.

4. A second revision of the basic report will be published in June, 1960. Comments and suggestions for incorporation in that revision will be appreciated.

5. Please sign two copies of the DD-250 form and return them to:

The Martin Company, Baltimore 3, Md.  
Attn: Shipping Control, Mail No. 9065

6. When enclosure is removed or not attached, this letter is downgraded to Secret.

Very truly yours,

THE MARTIN COMPANY

WHEN DETACHED FROM ENCLOSURE  
THIS CORRESPONDENCE IS  
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET.

J. V. Bitner  
TM-76B Mace Technical Director

200313

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RR RJAOKC  
DE RJEZHQ 381  
E 182248Z ZEX

FM HQ USAF

TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
INFO RJAPAAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

//CONFIDENTIAL// "CAT AC" FROM AFOAC-CD 86955 ACTION PACAF  
INFO DIST ENGR OKINAWA, 5AF, 313AD. REF YOUR PFSCE-025 DTD 12 APR  
60, SUBJECT: "CONSTRUCTION OF FUNCTIONALLY ADEQUATE SUPPORT FACIL-  
ITIES, KADENA." USE OF PRE-ENGINEERED, PRECAST CONCRETE STRUCTURES  
FOR MAGE-B SUPPORT FACILITIES IS APPROVED BASED ON UNDERSTANDING THAT  
COST INCREASE WILL BE NOMINAL AND THAT NO SLIPPAGE IN BOD WILL BE  
INCURRED.

BT

18/2258Z APR 1960

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RR RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 293F  
RM 201852Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF  
TO RUHPB/DIVENGR USAENGRDIV PACOCEAN  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF  
RJAOKC/313AIRDIV  
RUAWCR/DISTENGR USAENGRDIST OKINAWA  
RJEDSQ/WADD  
AF GRNC  
BT

/C ON F I D E N T I A L/PFSCE-ED-228  
ACTION PACOCEAN DIV ENGR; INFO 5AF, 313 AIR DIV, OKINAWA DIST ENGR,  
AND WADD (REZSTC AND RDMFW). REFERENCE OKINAWA DIST ENGR MESSAGE  
CONFIDENTIAL POCGM 9023 DATED 13 APR 60 (NOTAL), WHICH STATED OKINAWA  
DIST ENGR'S POSITION AS TO THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF JOINT OCCUPANCY  
OF THE LAUNCH CONTROL CENTER BY THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTOR AND  
WEAPON SYSTEM CONTRACTOR. JOINT OCCUPANCY IS NOT INTENDED. IN ORDER  
TO EXPEDITE THE INSTALLATION OF WEAPON SYSTEM CONTRACTOR EQUIPMENT IN  
THE LAUNCH CONTROL CENTER TO MEET ESTABLISHED OPERATIONAL READINESS  
DATE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT BMD FOR LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS BE ESTAB-  
LISHED 90 DAYS PRIOR TO BOD FOR REST OF CONSTRUCTION. THIS REQUIRE-  
MENT IS TAKEN CARE OF IN SECRET OKINAWA DIST ENGR SCHEDULE FOR OPER-  
ATIONAL FACILITIES (SITES 1 AND 2) AND SUPPORT FACILITIES, DATED 13  
FEB 60. THIS SCHEDULE SHOWS BOD OF CONTROL CENTERS 92 DAYS AHEAD OF  
LAUNCH CELLS.

BT  
20/1730Z APR 1960

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

DE RJHPKM 200D  
R V 210240Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF  
TO RUAWCR /DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU  
RJAOKC/313AIRDIV

BT

//C O N F I D E N T I A L//PFSCE-ED 231.

ACTION OKINAWA DIST ENGR; INFO PACOCEAN DIV ENGR, 5AF AND 313 AIR  
DIV. OUR UNCLAS/EFTO/PFSCE 213. HQ USAF, BY CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE  
AFLOAC-CD UR AUNCH DATED 18 APR 60 (NOTAL &, APPROVED USE OF PRE-  
ENGINEERED, PRECAST CONCRETE #STRUCTURES FOR KADENA SUPPORT FACIL-  
ITIES, DASE MN UNDERSTANDING THAT COST INCREASE WILL BE NOMINAL AND  
THAT NO SLIPPAGE IN BOD WILL BE INCURRED. REQUEST YOU PROCEED WITH  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR PRE-ENGINEERED CONCRETE STRUCTURES.

BT

21/0324Z APR 1960

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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MM RJAOKC  
DE RJHPKM 24B  
RM 182311Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
INFO RJAPAZ/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKC/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF GRNC

BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED 225

ACTION PACOCEAN DIV ENGR K INFO CINCPAC, 5AF, 313 AIR DIV, AND OKINAWA  
DIST ENGR. REFERENCES: (A) 5AF MESSAGE SECRET 5-904 O-0359D DTG  
010718Z APR 60; (B) OUR SECRET PFSCE-ED 198 DTG 062334Z APR 60; (C)  
USAF MESSAGE SECRET AFOCE-DC 85738/ DTG 132029Z APR 60 (NOTAL). BY  
REFERENCE (C), HQ USAF CONCURRED IN RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCE  
(B) TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. EMBASSY, JAPAN, WITH RESPECT TO RESCHED-  
ULING ADVERTISING DATE FOR OKINAWA MISSILE SITE CONSTRUCTION. IN ACCORD-  
ANCE WITH REFERENCE (A), REQUEST BID PROPOSAL DATE OF 9 MAY 60 BE RESCHED-  
ULED TO 26 MAY 60. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS MAY RESULT IN SOME SLIPPAGE  
IN THE BOD'S.

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OPS IMMEDIATE

X

AF

313TH AIR DIVISION, KADENA AB OKINAWA

5AF FUCHU AIR STATION JAPAN

INFO: PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INFORMATION  
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CONF/313IO C-5-7. FOR 5FCOI.

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.

PART I. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ACTION DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

REFERENCE CONFIDENTIAL LETTER THIS HEADQUARTERS DATED 12 APRIL

1960, SUBJECT PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN FOR PHASE IN OF SPECIAL

EQUIPMENT, OKINAWA. EDITOR OF THE LOCAL AMERICAN LANGUAGE

NEWSPAPER HAS JUST ADVISED HE HAS RECEIVED A PRESS RELEASE

FROM THE MARTIN COMPANY GIVING DETAILS OF A RECENT CAPE

CANAVERAL SHOOT OF THE TM 76 WEAPON. RELEASE GOES INTO

CONSIDERABLE DETAIL ON CAPABILITIES OF THE WEAPON INCLUDING

RANGE AND FACT THAT IT CAN BE USED WITH NUCLEAR WAR HEAD.

RELEASE FURTHER INDICATES WEAPON IS SCHEDULED FOR OKINAWA.

3 0530Z

MAY 1960

313IO

BERNARD PETERS, LT COL, USAF  
40123 1 2

BERNARD PETERS  
LT COLONEL, USAF  
INFORMATION OFFICER

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313TH AIR DIVISION, KADENA AB OKINAWA

MARTIN REPRESENTATIVE AT YOUR HEADQUARTERS ASSURED INFORMATION OFFICER THIS HEADQUARTERS AT THE TIME OF RECENT VISIT HERE THAT MARTIN WOULD COOPERATE TO THE FULLEST IN AVOIDING ANY MENTION OF FUTURE PLACEMENT THIS WEAPON HERE. PART II. EVERY ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS TO ASSURE THAT NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY BE RELEASED ON THIS MATTER IN VIEW OF POLITICAL SITUATION HERE AND IN JAPAN. WE ARE ASKING LOCAL EDITOR TO EMBARGO THIS NEWS RELEASE AND BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT HIS COOPERATION. HOWEVER, IF THE MARTIN RELEASE WAS GIVEN WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY STORY WILL APPEAR IN OTHER MEDIA AND BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE HERE. STRONGLY RECOMMEND YOUR HEADQUARTERS TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE ACTION TO ELIMINATE ANY SUCH RELEASES IN FUTURE. PART III. FOR DIRECTOR, SAFOI. STRONGLY RECOMMEND MARTIN COMPANY BE REQUESTED TO ELIMINATE MENTION OF PLACEMENT THIS WEAPON SYSTEM ON OKINAWA IN ANY OF THEIR PRESS RELATIONS ACTIVITIES.

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HEADQUARTERS  
WRIGHT AIR DEVELOPMENT DIVISION  
AIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND  
United States Air Force  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: WWZSG

MAY 3 1960

SUBJECT: (U) Trip Report

TO: 313th AD (CE)  
APO #239, San Francisco, Calif.

Attached is Trip Report of the WSPO representative to the  
80% Site Adaptation Drawing Review, and subsequent confer-  
ences at Hq 5th Air Force and Hq PACAF.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DEWEY M. BASSETT	Atch
Assistant Chief, TM-76 WSPO	Cy Trip Report, 26
Office of the Deputy for Tactical Weapons	Apr60 (S) 1 cy
Directorate of Systems Management	

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## TRIP REPORT

by

Captain Robert H. Knapp  
TM-76 WSPO

26 April 1960

1. Reference WADD letter RDZWTC dated 9 February 1960 which transmitted a trip report of attendance at the 60% Site Adaptation Drawing Review. (UNCL)
2. A TM-76 Weapon System Team consisting of TM-76 WSPO, WADD Facilities and Martin Company personnel attended the 80% review of the Hardsite Adaptation drawings at the Okinawa Engineering District. (CONF)
3. The conference convened on Monday, 4 April 1960, but because of non-availability of transportation on an appropriate MATS flight, the team missed the welcome extended by the chief of the Okinawa Engineering District Office. (UNCL)

a. Tuesday, 5 April 1960.

(1) A review of the new Hq USAF Approved Weapon System Programming Document was accomplished with 313th AD, 5th AF and Hq PACAF personnel. No adverse comments were offered.

(2) Hq PACAF presented the construction schedule for sites 1 and 2 (16 cells) and the support facilities.

Sites 1 & 2

Support Facilities

9 May 60	Invitation for Bids	Maintenance Facilities BOD - 1 Jun 61
9 June 60	Bid Opening Date	Remainder of Support Facilities - 1 Jul 61
23 June 60	Award of Contract	Group Headquarters - 7 Oct 61
30 June 61	BOD for Both Sites	

Because of political implications with the Japanese Government, certain portions of this schedule will slip 17 days. It is the hope of OKED that the 17 days can be made up, probably by compression of the Bid time. (SECRET)

(3) It was noted that there is a difference between programming and actual construction BODs. This is caused by, among other things, the late arrival of trained personnel to the area. It was recommended that the above construction schedule be adhered to in order that possible slippages for unknown reasons will still allow the installation, check-out and verification of weapon system equipment on schedule. Conferees were in agreement that this difference was a matter pertaining to the Air Force and would not be made available to the C.O.E. (CONF)

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(4) The requirement for occupation of the control area, 90 days prior to BOD of the entire complexes, was explained by the Weapon System team. The Hq PACAF Facilities representative will approach the Corps of Engineers on this item. It was pointed out by 313th AD that weapons system equipment could not be accepted prior to scheduled dates because of the lack of storage space. (UNCL)

(5) WADD comments to Hq USAF resulting from review of the 60% site adaptation drawings were discussed. (See WADD TWX RDZSTC-2-1266E dated 29 February 60 and Hq USAF TWX AFOCE-EA-75549 dated 3 March 60). An investigation of the items listed in the referenced WADD TWX had not been accomplished by Hq PACAF or the Consultant Architect Engineer for the Okinawa Engineering District. It was established that this Architect Engineer does not have the capability to make the dynamic design analysis which is required on some of our comments. These items will be returned to the Office Chief of Engineers for investigation and incorporation if necessary. (UNCL)

(6) The following known changes and/or additions were presented to the conferees. It is noted that the Office, Chief Engineers, Pacific Ocean Division, Okinawa Engineering Division, and the Consultant Architect Engineer personnel were not in attendance.

- a. The criteria established by Hq USAF for fire extinguishing equipment.
- b. Change in missile trajectory under certain conditions.
- c. Special weapons requirement for positive control when firing the missile.
- d. Changes to the electrical diagrams.
- e. The 8-cell alternate design. (UNCL)

(7) Certain operational problems were presented by the user. There is:

a. A question at the using activity level that explosive disconnects associated with breakaway prior to launch may not be incorporated. If these disconnects are not used, the time to launch will be extended and the retaliatory capability will suffer. The question arises from knowledge that the Inspector General (Norton) has reviewed a study by the Weapons System Contractor concerning reliability of explosive devices. The WSPO is rechecking engineering reliability data and believes that reliability must be adequate to support the existing design.

b. A requirement to accomplish training identical to actual launch except for firing of the booster. There appears to be some items that will not presently allow this in the cells. An example is that during an actual launch, the explosive disconnects would be



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activated at 60% engine rpm. This problem is to be reviewed by 5th Air Force and their position will be forwarded through channels.

c. A requirement from the Special Weapons safety viewpoint to know the number and type of personnel that are in any one cell at any time. Air Force Special Weapons Center was to determine, recommend, and forward a method of operation to the Weapon System Team Captain on site. This was not accomplished, but the Weapon System Project Office is now in receipt of the recommendation and necessary action will be taken. (CONF)

(8) Security violations were discussed. Stateside commands have repeatedly sent messages to the user, either referring to the TM (Tactical Missile) facility or even referring to the TM-76B. It has been established that any item referring in any way to the missile or missile system is classified and that all messages must carry at least an EFTO. One reason for this is, once again, the political implication in the Far East. (CONF)

### b. Wednesday, 6 April 1960.

(1) The Weapon System Team Captain requested that at least the Okinawa Engineering District and the Consultant Architect Engineer be present for a more detailed discussion of the items presented under paragraph 3a(6). The PACAF Facilities representative concurred.

(2) The Office, Chief of Engineers representative presented three changes to the standard design document for approval on the basis of cost savings in construction. He stated that he represented Hq USAF and as such must save dollars wherever possible.

a. Change 1. -- The present design of the personnel entrance pit is of a hard configuration. No provision is made for debris collection; therefore, the entrance can not be used as an escape route after blast. A cost savings could be realized by reduction of the thickness of concrete up to the outside personnel blast door. No objections were offered; so this proposal was accepted. (UNCL)

b. Change 2. -- Relocation of the personnel entrance out in front of the loading area was suggested. A few feet of concrete could be eliminated, thus realizing another savings. Upon evaluation, it was determined that this could not be readily accomplished because of interference with siting of the azimuth alignment markers. The change was not accepted. (UNCL)

c. Change 3. -- It was suggested that the air intake for the launch control area be relocated from behind the cell doors to a position out in front on the other side of the paved loading area. It was apparent to the Weapon System Team that there would be an unknown quantity of HCL gas residue from the booster during launch. The OCE representative was asked what the cost savings would be and he said it would be considerable, but an estimated cost could not be established. The savings would be realized because relocation removes the intakes

from the area of reflected pressures. Because of the unknown quantity of HCL residue, it was recommended that a method of water "wash down" be included to dilute the HCL. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that the change introduced too many problems, and, since an estimated cost savings could not be established, the change would not be accepted. (UNCL)

(3) The Office, Chief of Engineers, P.O.D., OKED, and Consultant Architect Engineers personnel made themselves available for the first time in order that the items listed under paragraph 3a(6) could be presented. OKED stated that there was a capability in the field to design the fire extinguishing system from criteria presented. The PACAF Facilities representative stated that he would request authority from Hq USAF to accomplish same. The team was present at the 70% design review of the Assembly and Maintenance Facility. Although WADD WSPO and Facilities personnel were not primarily concerned with this review, the Martin Company representative did review them for Weapon System compatibility and found that they were acceptable. (UNCL)

c. Thursday, 7 April 1960.

(1) The Site Adaptation Drawings privately reviewed by the Office, Chief of Engineers and the Pacific Ocean Division representatives were presented to the Weapon System Team and using activity personnel for review and approval. The drawings were approved from a Weapon System Engineering viewpoint, provided that the original WADD comments (See 3a(5)) to the drawings were considered and incorporated if found necessary. This approval was also contingent upon incorporation of all requested changes that arose during the 80% design conference. (UNCL)

(2) During the 60% review, it was obvious that OKED wanted intimate weapon system participation at the 80% review. For some unknown reason, only formal contact had been made between OKED and the Weapon System Team to date. Therefore, our services were offered, and we were informed that OKED had no further questions. It was also stated that OKED would not need a Martin Company consultant during construction. This came as a complete surprise, as it had been the consolidated opinion of all that this would be advantageous. (UNCL)

d. Friday and Saturday, 8-9 April 1960.

(1) Friday was utilized by WADD Facilities and Martin Company representatives to make a visual inspection of the actual site locations.

(2) A discussion between the Weapon System Team Captain and the 313th AF Engineer on Saturday resulted in requesting a conference between OKED, 5th AF, Hq PACAF, and the Weapon System Team. The Okinawa Engineering District chief summarized the welcoming speech made on Monday. The more salient points were that:

a. It was to be understood that OKED was receptive to any comments from the Weapon System Team.



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b. Reemphasized that there would be no changes made to the standard design documents at their level.

c. Because there would be no changes to these documents, they did not see the necessity of having a Martin Company consultant on site during construction. (UNCL)

(3) A discussion on these three items resulted in:

a. The only inputs that had not been accepted were the Martin Company changes to the wiring diagrams. The OCE representative, although he had suggested and accomplished certain changes to the standard drawings, requested that the Weapon System changes be introduced into existing channels for incorporation in the standard drawings. (UNCL)

b. After the discussion regarding the need for consultation during construction, OKED agreed that there should be a Martin Company representative and that Hq USAF should withdraw enough money from MCP allocated funds to finance the effort. The team captain was requested and agreed to obtain the cost proposal from the Martin Company. (UNCL)

e. Tuesday, 12 April 1960. -- Briefed 5th Air Force Engineers on accomplishments to date and answered some questions on Weapon System. One interesting question centered around the method of including and paying for changes that no doubt will be made after a complex has been accepted by the Air Force. This particular item is being presented to WADD Facilities for resolution.

f. Friday, 15 April 1960. -- Met with Hq PACAF Operations and Maintenance Personnel and reviewed the new programming schedule. This document was not well received by these people. The two main items of concern were:

(1) Utilization of tactically trained crews to assist in making installation and check-out of equipment in the sites. It was their opinion that Hq AMC should accomplish this task.

(2) The "stair-stepping" of Operational Ready Dates was not concurred in. The Team Captain pointed out that the interrelationship of all items of the plan along with the availability of trained personnel govern the Operations Ready Date. (CONF)

g. A meeting was also held with the Hq PACAF Engineers with the following results:

(1) PACAF Engineers reconfirmed the requirement for an Air Force Civil and Martin Company Engineer on site from 1 September 1960 to 31 December 1961.

(2) A message was sent to OKED thru Pacific Ocean Division requesting that the Air Force be allowed early possession of the launch control areas.

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(3) The TM-76 WSPO would obtain, review, and, if in agreement, forward the cost proposal for the Martin Company consultant to Hq PACAF and OKED.

(4) More emphasis will be placed on keeping WADD informed on TM-76 correspondence originating in Hq PACAF. (CONF)

### h. Summary

(1) It is appropriate to point out that all three using activities--313th AD, 5th AF, and Hq PACAF--went out of their way to make our trip more productive and enjoyable.

(2) There was evidence that there was a "fence" between the Okinawa Engineering District and the Weapon System Team that was not there at the 60% Site Adaptation Review.

(3) The construction schedule is and will be adhered to.

(4) The Corps of Engineers is procuring the steel doors, generators, and blast valves because it is beyond the capability of OKED. The following schedule was presented:

	<u>Bids</u>	<u>Award Contract</u>
Blast Valves	11 April 60	23 May 60
Generators	6 April 60	19 May 60
Doors	20 April 60	6 June 60 (CONF)

(5) There will be an Air Force representative of Hq PACAF with a Martin Company consultant on site during construction pending funds availability.

(6) The responsibility of prime monitorship is being turned over to Hq WADD Facilities with the TM-76 WSPO to assist when called upon.

ROBERT M. KNAPP  
Captain, USAF  
Project Engineer, TM-76 WSPO  
Offensive Systems Division  
Directorate of Systems Management

- 3 Atchs:  
1. Attendance Roster 8 Apr 60 (U)  
2. Attendance Roster 8 Apr 60 (U)  
3. Attendance Roster 15 Apr 60 (U)

## CONFIDENTIAL



# CONFEREES ATTENDANCE ROSTER

Review of 80% Complete Contract Drawings for Operational Facilities,  
Sites 1 & 2 and 70% Preliminary Drawings for Support Facilities. The  
Attendees were present at all or a portion of the Reviews.

8 April 1960

## ATTENDEES:

Whitsitt, M. W.	Col	USAEDO
Raymond, D. A.	Lt Col	USAEDO
Tyler, J. O.	Lt Col	313th AD OC-P-R
Robertson, Wm	Lt Col	313th AD CE
Borchers, C. R.	Major	313th AD OC-P-R
Bailey, James M.	Major	5th AF 5FMLP-W
Morrison, James C.	Major	5th AF 5FOPR-P
Hahn, W. R.	Major	USAEDG
Perreault, A.	Captain	1381 GES APCS Ops
Courtney, T., Jr.	1st Lt	1381 GES (M) Ops
Clary, Eugene E.	Civ	PACAF (PFOOP)
Christinsen, E. M.	DAC	POD
Roggeveen, A.	DAC	USAEDO
McDonnal, W. J.	DAC	USAEDO
Lyon, Frank E., Jr.	Civ	T. B. Bourne Assoc.
Gregory, J. C.	DAC	POD
Schild, Roy C.	DAC	USAEDO
Mandel, C.	DAC	USAEDO
Griswold, R. R.	Civ	PACAF (PFSCE-ED)
La Fever, Mort	Civ	OCE
McCollum, J. E.	Civ	Martin Company 5th AF
Grenck, P. A.	DAC	USAEDO
Root, E. M.	Capt	313 PM
Knapp, Robert M.	Capt	ARDC-WADD-WWESG
Holtmann, R.	Lt	ARDC-WADD-WMMFSM
Worley, S. J.	Civ	Martin Company (Balte)
Fowler, O.	Civ	T. B. Bourne Assoc.
Bailey, C. B.	Civ	POD
Hunt, F. C.	Civ	POD
Novak, F. J.	Civ	POD
Lanier, R.E.H.	Civ	POD
Cristinsen, E. M.	Civ	POD

Atch #1

# CONFEREES ATTENDANCE ROSTER

Review of 70% Preliminary Drawings for Support Facilities for the  
Operational Facilities.

8 April 1960

## ATTENDEES:

Griswold, R. R.	Civ	PACAF (PFSCE-ED)
Borchers, C.	Major	313th AD OCP-R
Robertson, Wm.	Lt Col	313th AD CE
Bailey, J. M.	Major	5th AF 5FMLP-W
Clary, E. E.	Civ	PACAF (PFOOP)
Morrison, J. C.	Major	5th AF 5FOPR-P
Tyler, J. O.	Lt Col	313th AD 313 OC-P-R
Reddrick, A. D.	Capt	313th MC-LP
Root, E. M.	Capt	313th PM
Knapp, Robert H.	Capt	ARDC-WADD-WWESG
Holtmann, R.	Lt	ARDC-WADD, WWMFSM
McCollum, J. E.	Civ	The Martin Company (5th AF)
Worley, S. J.	Civ	The Martin Company (Balte)
N. R. Giani	Civ	Pacific A&E
Grenck, P. A.	DAC	USAEDO

Atch #2



CONFEREES ATTENDANCE ROSTER

Minutes of a Meeting Conducted at Headquarters PACAF on 15 April 1960.  
TM-76B Program

15 April 60

ATTENDEES:

Lt Colonel G. B. O'Connor, PFSCE-E. Hq PACAF

Lt Colonel M. P. Tucker, PFSCE-ED. Hq PACAF

Major N. D. King, PFORQ.) Hq PACAF

Captain R. H. Knapp, ARDC - WADD - WWESG

Lieutenant R. Holtmann, ARDC - WADD - WWMFSM

Mr. S. J. Worley, Martin Company (Baltimore)

Mr. C. Schoeppe, Martin Company (Tech Rep - PACAF)

Atch #3

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DE RJHPKM 251  
R 111936Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF  
TO RJAPAA/5AF  
INFO RUAWVR/DISTENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJACKC/313AIRDIV  
AF GRNC  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFSCE-E-262  
ACTION 5AF, INFO USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA, AND 313  
AIR DIV. THIS HQ HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE IN  
LOCAL OKINAWA NEWSPAPERS ON 10 MAY OF PROPOSED MACE CONSTRUCTION ON  
OKINAWA. SINCE THIS INFORMATION CANNOT NOW BE WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC  
ATTENTION, REQUEST YOU CONTACT AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TOKYO AND OBTAIN  
THEIR CONCURRENCE IN PROCEEDING WITH ADVERTISING FOR BIDS. DIST ENGR  
INDICATES HIS DESIRE TO ADVERTISE 20 MAY. SINCE YOUR HQ IS MONITORING  
THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PLAN, YOUR DECISION ON THIS MATTER WILL BE  
ACCEPTED BY THIS HQ. REQUEST NOTIFICATION TO THIS HQ OF YOUR DECISION,  
WITH INFORMATION COPIES TO USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA,  
AND 313 AIR DIV.

BT  
11/1959Z MAY 1960

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DE RJEDSO 2YA  
PR 121533Z ZEX  
FM WADD WPAFB OHIO  
TO RUAWCR/OKINAWA ENGINEERING DISTRICT U.S. ARMY ENGINEER  
INFO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AB TH  
RJAPAA/5TH AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
RJAOKA/KADENA AB RYUKYU ISLANDS OKINAWA 313TH AD  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L / FROM WWZSG-30536-E. OKED(POOVE); INFO:  
PACAF(PEWCE-ED); 5TH AF (5FSCE); 313TH(OC-P-R). REFERENCE CONFIDENTIAL  
POOVE-901 DATED 6 MAY 1960. IMMEDIATE DELIVERY REQUIRED. INFORMATION  
ON ESTIMATED COST OF HAVING A MARTIN COMPANY ENGINEERING CONSULTANT  
FURNISHED DURING CONSTRUCTION OF TM-LAUNCH FACILITY ON OKINAWA WAS  
SENT FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS CITE: WWZSG-30478-E, DATED 25 APRIL 1960  
TO YOUR OFFICE. A PARTIAL QUOTE OF THE MESSAGE FOLLOWS: QUOTE. A  
COST PROPOSAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND IT IS ESTIMATED THAT IT WILL COST  
APPROXIMATELY \$52,000 FOR A CONSULTANT HAVING AN INTIMATE ENGINEERING  
KNOWLEDGE OF THE TM-76 FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR STARTING 1 SEPTEMBER  
1960. UNQUOTE. THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL BECAUSE  
IT REVEALS POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF A WEAPON SYSTEM TO A SPECIFIC AREA.

BT  
16/1737Z MAY 1960

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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ROUTINE

HICOMRYIS OKINAWA

DEPT ARMY WASH

INFO: CINCUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HAWAII

CINCPAC

ZEN/CINCPACREP RYUKYUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L HC-LL 0192. For Civil Affairs.

1. USAEDO has advised that 11 acres of new land acquisition required for indefinite period for Air Force Operational Site 4, Onna Son. 10 acres for site and 1 acre for marker site and access road. Air Force presently has under temporary leasehold 12.96 acres of land which adjoins and will be used together with 10 acres for the site installation.

2. (C) Local screening of U.S. Services and Agencies confirms no land presently under control of U.S. are available for intended use and no local U.S. objection interposed to Air Force acquisition requirement.

3. (C) Army consent to proposed location for the site given after careful consideration of effect its operations would have on Nike Sites 2A and 2B, located respectively about 5,600 feet south-eastwardly and 6,000 feet northeastwardly. USAEDO advises design is such that operations at either facility cannot interfere with operations of the other.

HCRI-LL

ALBERT BARKIN, Col, JAGC, Dir, L&L

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JACK C. SMITH  
CWO W-3, AUS  
Admin Asst

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## CONFIDENTIAL

HICOMRYIS OKINAWA

4. (C) Land to be acquired predominantly non-utilized low grade forest land. Vegetation consists of weed, brush, and scrub pine. Village of Tancha located approximately 10,800 feet north of perimeter of proposed site boundary. There are no inhabitants at site proper, although proposed marker area is in village.

5. (C) Estimated annual rental for the 11 acres to be acquired if \$325.00.

6. (C) CINCPAC message 010310Z affirms he has concurred in acquisition of this real estate subject to HICOM final approval.

7. (C) HICOM interposes no objection to the acquisition of the 11 acres to be acquired nor to the use of the additional 12.96 acres presently under temporary leasehold for use of Air Force Operational Site.

8. (C) Request DOD validation for the acquisition of an indefinite leasehold interest in the 11 acres to be acquired, as well as for the 12.96 acres presently under temporary leasehold.

Dispatched: 0930I, 5 May 1960

HCRI-LL

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118  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, OKINAWA  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
APO 331  
San Francisco, California

POOVE

16 May 1960

SUBJECT: Review Conference, Air Force Operational Facilities, Okinawa

TO: Division Engineer  
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean  
Building 96, Fort Armstrong  
Honolulu 13, Hawaii

1. The conference for on-site review of 80% contract drawings for Operational Facilities was conducted in this office during the period 4-9 April 1960. During the final session on 9 April, Captain R. H. Knapp, Weapons System Project Officer, ARDC, made a proposal which cannot be resolved locally. His proposal was to provide an Air Force officer and a Martin Company engineer to the project during construction for resolving construction problems on the spot insofar as they may affect the weapons system.

2. This proposal was discussed thoroughly in detail and all ramifications introduced. In an effort to cooperate fully with USAF representatives, the District Engineer agreed to present the problem to the Division Engineer with the recommendation that it be discussed with appropriate Air Force agencies for decision at that level. Relevant points are:

a. This District has site adapted the approved standard plans. It is assumed that every foreseeable problem has been solved to insure compatibility of the weapon system and ground environment and is reflected in the standard plans. The minor changes made locally to these plans during site adaptation were thoroughly coordinated and have been approved by all concerned.

b. Construction contract will be awarded on the basis of approved contract drawings. Thereafter, the District has no intention of generating changes locally; however, as in any project, contingencies will arise locally which will probably cause changes. It would be wholly unrealistic to assume otherwise. Nevertheless, these will be generally resisted, held to an absolute minimum and thoroughly coordinated before the fact. Personnel of the District are quite familiar with weapons system generally and fully appreciate that a relatively minor construction change could seriously degrade the system.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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## CONFIDENTIAL

POOVE

16 May 1960

SUBJECT T: Review Conference, Air Force Operational Facilities, Okinawa

c. That justifiable changes will be generated by the Using Service is a certainty. It is the timing, scope, nature, and general impact of these changes which cannot be accurately forecast. The construction drawings translation of each change must be reviewed and approved by qualified weapons people. Rapid review and decision in such instances would be highly desirable. Captain Knapp's proposal is addressed directly to this latter situation. Specifically, he proposed for this purpose that:

(1) Headquarters, USAF, assign a qualified installation officer, after extra indoctrination on this weapon system, with authority to approve for the Using Service the construction design on any change. He would arrive on site about 1 September 1960 when construction will be well underway and remain through BOD of Sites 1 and 2 in June 1961.

(2) Headquarters, USAF, arrange for assignment of a Glen L. Martin Company engineer (not a Technical Representative) to assist the installations representative in his technical review and guidance. Same time frame as above.

(3) Extension of these two representatives beyond June 1961 would depend upon the status of Sites 3 and 4 at that time and experience to that date.

d. If the weapon system present design remains static, the value of these representatives on-site would be increased. However, if changes/improvements continue to be cranked in as additional and more reliable test data become available, their value will decrease proportionately as to their length of time away from home base. Thus, frequent trips to CONUS would be essential for reorientation.

e. Present arrangements make representatives of Martin Company and USAF agencies available to the District on an as-needed basis by requests through Headquarters, PACAF. As it now stands, we are completely confident of our ability to construct this project as desired. Therefore, this arrangement appears to be satisfactory. However, as mentioned in c above, we cannot possibly forecast the impact, which changes generated from outside sources will have on progress or funds.

3. At the request of the District Engineer, Captain Knapp furnished an estimate of \$52,000 for the cost of the Martin representative for a period of one year starting 1 September 1960. The estimate includes travel, per diem, and all other costs. No cost estimate for the Air Force officer was provided, since it is assumed he would be assigned to Okinawa on a permanent change of station, and no direct charges to the project would therefore result.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

PCOVE

16 May 1960

SUBJECT: Review Conference, Air Force Operational Facilities, Okinawa

4. If, after consideration of all factors, Headquarters, USAF, with its superior knowledge of the weapon system, concludes that approval and action on Captain Knapp's proposal is justified, the District Engineer interposes no objection. In such even, however, the costs involved should be funded from USAF R&D sources. If costs must be borne by MCAF sources, the funds should be withdrawn from the project by USAF and furnished directly to the agency providing the representatives.

5. It is recommended that this matter be coordinated with Headquarters, PACAF, then forwarded to OCE for resolution with Headquarters, USAF.

MENON W. WHITSITT  
Colonel, CE  
District Engineer

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**CONFIDENTIAL**



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**CONFIDENTIAL**

UNITED STATES  
ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT  
OKINAWA

POOGM

16 May 1960

SUBJECT: Climatic Conditions on Okinawa - Relative to the Installation  
of the TM 76B on Okinawa

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff/Civil Engineering  
Headquarters PACAF  
APO 953, San Francisco, California  
Attn: PFSCE

1. Transmitted for your information, inclosure 1, is report on "Climatic Conditions on Okinawa".
2. USAEDO does not have any information as to the tolerances of TM 76B system to withstand the very corrosive atmosphere which exists on Okinawa.
3. Based on the information contained in the inclosure, request confirmation that no additional air-conditioning or dehumidification is required other than presently planned for the launch sites and the Support Facilities.

FOR THE DISTRICT ENGINEER

1 Incl  
1. Climatic Conditions  
rpt for Okinawa

W. J. McDONNAL  
Assistant Chief, Engineering Division

619981

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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# CLIMATIC CONDITIONS ON OKINAWA

1. The following information is given to show relative values of design conditions for Okinawa and CONUS.

a. Condition No. 1 is that used for summer design on Okinawa (Ref. 4a).

b. Condition No. 2 is worst condition listed in 1959 ASHAE Guide for States (Typical States Ala., Fla., La.).

c. Condition No. 3 is representative of majority of States as listed in ASHAE Guide (Typical States Ark., Wash. D.C., Iowa, Md.).

d. Condition No. 4 is that used for winter design on Okinawa (Ref. 4b).

No.	Conditions	Relative Humidity	Humidity Ratio #Water/#Dry Air
1.	90° FDB 84.5° FWB	80%	.0246
2.	95° FDB 80° FWB	53%	.0187
3.	95° FDB 78° FWB	47%	.0168
4.	50° FDB 47° FWB	80%	-

Dew Point	Vapor Pressure
83°F	1.126 in Hg
75°F	.875
71.6°F	.785
43.8°F	-

2. General Physical weather data for Okinawa (Ref. 4c):

a. Average Temp.	72°F	Annual
b. Mean Max.	78°F	"
c. Mean Min.	66°F	"
d. Highest Rec.	96	"
e. Lowest Rec.	40	"
f. Mean Humidity	79%	"
g. Rainfall: (inches)	Mean (30 yr) 82.8 annual Max. in 24 hrs (39 yrs) 16.8 Max. in one-month (40 yr) 28.0 Min. in one month (40 yrs) 0.6 Rainy days (1 yr) 202	

h. Winds:

"The average strength of winds through the year ranges from gentle to moderate, with wind velocities of 38 mph (at least) recorded every month."

i. Number typhoons affecting the area (East China Sea):

Max 45 (per yr).  
Min 12 (per yr).



- j. Temp equalled or exceeded 10% of time in summer, 88°FDB, 81°FWB (ref 4d).

3. Just how bad are these Okinawa conditions?

a. Tests conducted by U. S. Navy (ref 4e) indicated that 60% RH is low enough to control microbiological attack (molds, etc.) "Rust and corrosion account for major portion of losses from deterioration; micro-biological attacks are in second place. Moisture by itself is not a serious causative agent but is essential to the electro-chemical deterioration of metals and to the life processes of microbiological and other forms of destructive organisms. Oxygen, ozone, sunlight, atmospheric contaminants, temperature, and moisture are all contributing factors" (Ref. 4e).

b. A study of the above design conditions and statements bring out the following facts about Okinawa:

(1) General climatic conditions are very favorable to development of molds and other microbiological attacks.

(2) The mechanical load on any equipment used to reduce moisture content of building or process air is three-to-five times that of any CONUS location. This is indicated by "amount" of water in air on Okinawa or more correctly the Humidity Ratio.

(3) Only 7-degree spread in temperature required in summer time for moisture to condense out on cold or chilled metal surfaces; only 6 degrees required in winter time (an example of this would be where metal plates, equipment, etc., in contact with cold ground or inside cool storage are exposed by open door or draft to exterior design conditions). This will cause many metal surfaces to be wet most of the time.

(4) The ability of moisture to infiltrate thru a vapor barrier is indicated by the vapor pressure difference on either side of the barrier. On Okinawa this "driving force" is at a very high initial level.

For example: Approx.  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times as much moisture would pass thru same vapor barrier on Okinawa as at Design Condition No. 2 in States if the inside of the building was maintained at 40% RH in both cases.

(5) Heavy concentrations of ocean water salts are to be found in the atmosphere during and after typhoon. Lighter concentrations may be expected throughout year. Evaluation of this "air salt" content factor is difficult and can only be general in nature, but a "salty tasting" incrustation has been observed on the windshield of a car located about a mile-and-a-half inland and at elevation of about 100 feet after a typhoon.

4. References:

- a. Letter to DE from Hqtrs US Army Forces Far East, dated 4 May 54.
- b. Mechanical Design Recommendations, Revised 4 Oct 56, USAED.
- c. Data a thru i compiled by Naha Observatory over a period of 30 unspecified years. Taken from typical Special Condition of USAED Okinawa Contract, FEC-906, page SC-08.
- d. PACAF Supplement 3 AFM 91-8 revised paragraph 163.
- e. Symposium Bulletin on Dehumidification published by American Society of Heating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, page 21.



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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Priority  
Routine

X

DA

PFSCE E 262 Conf.

DISTENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA

COMDR 5AF FUCHU AIRSTN JAPAN

INFO:

CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

DIVENGR USA PACOCEAN HONO HAWAII

COMDR 313th AIRDIV OKINAWA (COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL POCGM 9034

Ref: PACAF msg PFSCE-E-262, 11 May 60

USAEDO is prepared to advertise for bids on the  
Operational Facilities 20 May 60. Request what decision  
has been reached with regard to ref msg.

18

May

60

PPGM

P. A. GRANER, AF PROJECTS

36168

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W. J. McDONNAL  
Assistant Chief, Engineering  
Division

619992

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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SECRET

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MM RJAKC  
DE RJHPKM 389E  
M 182117Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF  
RJAKC/313AIRDIV  
RUAWRA/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE 040

ACTION USA ENGR DIV PACOCEAN; INFO 51-1, 313 AIRDIV, AND USA ENGR DIST OKINAWA. OUR CONFIDENTIAL PFSCE-E 262 DATED 11 MAY 60. 5AF ADVISES THAT RECENT NEWS RELEASES CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT MACE MISSILE HAVE RESULTED IN ORGANIZED POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN OKINAWA, INCLUDING A BAN-THE-MACE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY RYUKYU LEGISLATURE SPONSORED BY ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS. US EMBASSY HAS TAKEN UP MATTER WITH STATE DEPARTMENT. OPERATIONAL FACILITIES WILL NOT BE ADVERTISED PENDING APPROVAL THIS HQ. FOR OKINAWA DIST ENGR; THIS ANSWERS YOUR CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE POCGM 9034, DATED 18 MAY 60, TO 5AF, INFO THIS HQ.

BT

18/2155Z MAY 1960

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CONFIDENTIAL

122

DE RJAPAA 59D  
O 190619Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RUAWCR/DISTENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
INFO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
RUHPB/DIVENGR USA PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF GRNC

BT  
CONFIDENTIAL 5FOPR O-1049E.  
ATTN: POCOM. SUBJECT: BID PROPOSAL. REFERENCE YOUR CONFIDENTIAL  
MESSAGE POCOM 9034, AND PACAF CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE PFSCE-E-262,  
SUBJECT: BID PROPOSAL DATE FOR MISSILE SITE CONSTRUCTION. YOU ARE  
ADVISED THAT PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON DATE OF TWENTY SIX (26) MAY  
FOR BID ADVERTISING FOR OKINAWA MISSILE CONSTRUCTION IS STILL VALID.  
NO, REPEAT, NO ACTION WILL BE INITIATED PRIOR TO THAT DATE. THIS  
ACTION IS BASED ON DIRECT COORDINATION WITH US EMBASSY, TOKYO. YOU  
WILL BE INFORMED OF ANY CHANGES IN THIS PROJECT.

BT  
19/0703Z MAY 1960

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CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

123

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PFSCE-ED

19 MAY 1960

SUBJECT: Classroom and Space Requirements for MTD for TM-76B (S)

TO: 5AF (5FSCE)

1. Headquarters ATC has indicated a requirement for the following space for the Mobile Training Detachment (MTD) for the TM-76B:

- a. Six classrooms, each 20' x 20'.
- b. One technical order and instruction room, 20' x 20'.
- c. One projector room, 20' x 20'.

2. Further requirements include:

a. Location of all MTD facilities in one building in a relatively noise free area is preferred. The MTD will require access to the Missile Group Maintenance area, launch areas, weapon system power plants and other equipment to insure adequate instruction.

b. All rooms must be adequately lighted and ventilated. Air conditioning is desired.

c. Each room will be equipped with a minimum of two wall plug outlets for 110 volt, single phase current.

d. Blackout curtains or shutters must be installed at each window in the projector room.

3. The following information is required as soon as possible:

- a. Space required based on your proposed training program.
- b. Availability of this space in existing structures at Kadena Air Base.

c. Rehabilitation of quonsets or other structures for the MTD. Consideration should be given to quonsets adjacent to those being rehabilitated for airmen dormitories. A drawing showing the location of the structures to be rehabilitated, and a control cost estimate should be submitted. It is to be noted that the extent of rehabilitation should be in consonance

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with the policy of extreme austerity to provide the minimum necessary facilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

JAMES S. BARKO  
Colonel, USAF  
Dep ACS/Civil Engineering

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# SECRET

(S) Ltr, Hq PACAF (PFSCE-ED), 19 May 60, Classroom and Space Requirements for MTD for TM-76B (S)

1st Ind (5FSCE-C-P)

Hq 5AF

27 MAY 1960

TO: 313 Air Div (CE)

1. Forwarded for necessary action.
2. Reference paragraph 3c, basic correspondence. In addition to the rehab costs requested, request an alternate cost be submitted for typhoon proof facilities in the Group Maintenance Area. Alternate should be supported by a single line and siting sketch. Also, comparative time requirements should be given for design and construction.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

IRA S. COLES, JR  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director of Construction

2nd Ind (313CE)

313 Air Div

3 June 1960

TO: 6313 ABW (CR )

1. Forwarded for necessary action at your level. Particular attention is invited to paragraph 2, preceding indorsement.
2. Your reply and supporting documents for the basic requirements imposed are requested at the earliest practicable date.

FOR THE COMMANDER

LLOYD J. HELLMANN, DAFC  
Acting Civil Engineering Officer

# SECRET

620284



SECRET

124

082/24 May 60

R231530Z

FM WRAMA

TO PACAF

SECRET FROM WRG-593.

Personal to Maj. Gen. Smith from WRAMA Commander. Reference my Contractor Maintenance Facility programmed for Okinawa in support of TM-76B. Facility is scheduled to become operational in July 1961 and will employ approx. 74 contractor personnel. I am concerned with family housing for these personnel because qualified technicians will not volunteer for OS unless adequate family quarters are available on local economy or government housing. Will appreciate knowing theater plans for these personnel at your earliest convenience, and if I can be of any assistance.

23/1828Z May 1960

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SECRET

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ROUTINE

080030Z Jun 60

FR HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

TO WRAMA WARNER ROBBINS GA

SECRET PFMDC 128

Reurad Secret WRG 593 dtd 24 May 60. PACAF recognizes your concern with family housing for the contractor personnel operating the Maintenance Facility programmed for Okinawa. Adequate family quarters are not available from Govt housing. There is a shortage of rental houses in Okinawa and it would be against the best interests of service personnel to have these relatively high income contract people competing. Only solution to our mutual problem seems to be for the Martin and/or AC Spark Plug Co to find some way to add houses to the present total inventory even if this means, perhaps, that these two companies get involved in the real estate business.

08/0030Z June 1960

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SECRET

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047/14 Jun 60

DTG 131500Z Jun 60

FM WRAMA

TO PACAF

SECRET FROM WRG-641. Personal to General Blake from General Anderson. Reference PACAF message PFMDG 128. Your personal attention is urgently required in resolving theater housing problems for contractor technicians to be employed in performing depot level maintenance for the 76B Weapon System at Kadena. The facility is scheduled to become operational in Jul 61. Our current planning figure for manning purposes is forty-four technicians. Indications are that contractors will face extreme difficulty in obtaining qualified technicians to volunteer unless adequate family quarters are available. It is imperative that this matter be quickly resolved. If quarters cannot be provided at Kadena, we will re-program the depot maintenance facility in accordance with any recommendations you may have such as Japan or Clark Field. Resolution of this problem is urgent. If the facility is reprogrammed to another location, arrangements for appropriate transportation and other logistic matters must be revised.

13/1800Z Jun 1960

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127

PCAO82MX002PAA04AAK006

PP RJAOKC

DE RJAPAAK 6

P 240745Z

FM 5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN

TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

RJAOKC/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

RUAWRA/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA

INFO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC

RBHPA/CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII

BT

/S E C R E T/5FOPR O-1544

ACTION PFSCE, 313AIR DIV, DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST. INFO COFS USAF  
CINCPAC CP HM SMITH. REFERENCE SECRET PFSCE-PFSCE-328, THIS HQ RE-  
CEIVED CLEARANCE FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY TO ADVERTISE FOR BIDS FOR CON-  
STRUCTION OF MACE FACILITIES AT OKINAWA AT 1630I, 24 JUN 60. OKED  
HAS ADVISED THAT ADVERTISING FOR BIDS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED 2 TO 4  
WORKING DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF GO AHEAD.

BT

24/0755Z JUN 1960.

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128

SECRET

PCA 054PKA016KMB051  
RR RJACKA  
DE RJHPKM 184B  
R M 210231Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
INFO RBHPA/CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII  
RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
RJACKA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWCR/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-PFSCE-E 328  
ACTION 5AF; INFO CINCPAC, USAF (AFOCE), 313 AIR DIV, USAENGR DIV  
PACOCAN, AND USAENGR DIST OKINAWA. REFERENCES: (A) YOUR SECRET  
5FFOR-P 0-1112E DTG 240724Z MAY 60, TO OKINAWA DIST ENGR; INFO PACAF,  
313 AIR DIV, AND PACOCAN DIV ENGR. (B) OUR SECRET PFDOP 0043 DTG  
250025Z MAY 60, WHICH RETRANSMITTED REFERENCE (A) TO CINCPAC AND USAF  
(AFOCE) FOR INFO. NOW THAT SECURITY TREATY HAS BEEN RATIFIED, REQUEST  
EARLY DETERMINATION OF DATE ADVERTISING FOR BID FOR CONSTRUCTION OF  
MACE FACILITIES.

BT  
21/0334Z JUN 1960

SECRET

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SECRET

129

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 2600  
R 250137Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
RUAWC/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
INFO RBHPA/CINCPAC CP H M SMITH HAWAII  
RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
RJEDSQ/WADD WPAFB OHIO  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKA/313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE 061  
ACTION USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN AND USAENGR DIST OKINAWA; INFO CINCPAC,  
USAF (AFOCE), WADD (22" &), 5AF AND 313 AIR DIV. THIS MESSAGE IN 2  
PARTS. PART 1. FOR PACOCEAN DIV ENGR AND OKINAWA DIST ENGR:  
REFERENCE OUR SECRET PFSCE 040 DATED 17 MAY 60 (NOTAL) AP NW G THAT  
MACE FACILITIES, OKINAWA, WILL NOT BE ADVERTISED PENDING APPROVAL  
THIS HQ. BY MESSAGE SECRET 5(1904 0-1544, DTG 240745Z JUN 60 (NOTAL),  
5AF ADVISED CLEARANCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY TOKYO  
TO ADVERTISE FOR BID FOR CONSTRUCTION OF MACE FACILITIES ON OKINAWA.  
THEREFORE, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADVERTISE LAUNCH SITES NR 1 AND 2  
IMMEDIATELY. PART 2. FOR OKINAWA DIST ENGR: REQUEST THIS HQ BE  
ADVISED BY TELEPHONE, REFERRING ONLY TO ALPHABETICAL LISTING FOR  
REASON OF SECURITY, AND CONFIRM BY MESSAGE THE FOLLOWING: (A) DTE  
INVITATION FOR BIDS WILL BE ISSUED. (B) BID OPENING DATE. (C) CONTRACT  
AWARD DATE. (D) BOD FOR CONTROL ROOMS. (E) BOD FOR LAUNCH SITES.  
(F) CWE FOR LAUNCH SITES NR 1 AND 2.

BT  
25/0319Z JUN 1960

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SECRET

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PRIORITY  
Routine

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DA

DISTENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA

DIVENGR USA PACOCEAN HONO HAWAII

INFO: CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

COMDR 5AF FUCHU AIRSTN JAPAN

COMDR 313TH AIRDIV OKINAWA (COURIER)

SECRET POCGM 9036 (PACAF, ATTN: PFSCE, 5thAF ATTN: 5FOPR)

The fol msg is quoted for your info: Quote SECRET 5FOPR O-1544.

Action PFSCE, 313AirDiv, Dist Engr USAENGR Dist. Info COFS USAF, CINCPAC CP HM Smith. Reference Secret PFSCE-PFSCE-328 this Hq received clearance from American Embassy to advertise for bids for construction of Mace Facilities at Okinawa at 1630I, 24 June 60. OKED has advised that advertising for bids can be accomplished 2 to 4 working days after receipt of go ahead. Unquote.

Based on the above msg, USAEDO is prepared to issue invitations on the 30th of June with bid opening 16 Aug, Award 23 Aug, and NTP 30 Aug. Invitations will not be issued until approval from PCD is received.

27/0115Z June 1960

POCGM

P. A. Gransk, AF Projects  
36168

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A. ROGGEVEEN

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Priority  
Routine

X DA

PFSCE 061

DISTENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA

DIVENGR USAENGR PACOCEAN HONO HAWAII

CINCPACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

INFO: CINCPACAF CP H M SMITH HAWAII

COFS USAF WASH DC

CO WADD WPAFB OHIO

CO 5AF FUCHU AIRSTN JAPAN

CO 313 AIRDIV OKINAWA (courier)

CONFIDENTIAL PEOGM 9037

For PACAF ATTN: PFSCE 061, for COFS USAF WASH DC ATTN: AFOCE

References: A. PACAF msg PFSCE 061, 24 June 60.

B. Telecon Lt. Col Tucker Hq. PACAF with Mr. Granek

USARDO, 27 June 60, 1200 hours

1. Re part 2 of Ref A, the following info was given to Lt. Col  
Tucker by ref B.

- a. 30 June 60
- b. 16 Aug 60
- c. 23 Aug 60 and NTP 30 Aug 60
- d. 25 July 61
- e. 16 Oct 61
- f. 9,178,000

2. Bidding period has been increased to 45 days, to permit  
adequate time for bidders to obtain pricing stateside items and to

27/0830Z June 1960

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permit USAEDO to hold conference early July in Tokyo in effort to increase interest of Japanese contractors and enhance competition. DE feels only one repeat one contractor now on Okinawa has needed capability. Beating bushes in Japan considered essential.

3. Additional 45 days in construction period has been caused by delay in advertising which will find contractor starting construction in mid typhoon season. Until contractor gets out of ground with concrete, wet typhoons such as experienced last year will have much greater impact than later when work well advanced. 45 days our best judgment at this stage. If PACAF with concurrence POD feel compelling operational requirements leave no alternative but to waive this 45 days, we will try. However, recommend deployment planning at this late date fully consider this delay factor.

4. As possible alternate to above, it may be more palatable all concerned to provide separate completion dates for each site. Thus one site would specify completion in 12 months and the second in 15 months after notice to proceed. This would permit contractor to stagger crafts and reduce costs. Advise.

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DE RJPAA 127D  
M 300804Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
INFO RJACKA/313AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

SECRET FROM 5FMSS-AM 1206 FOR PFMSS-AS.  
ACTION PACAF INFO 313 AIRDIV. SUBJECT: SUPPLY FACILITY FOR TM-76B  
WEAPON SYSTEM (S). REFERENCE 5AF PROGRAM PLAN 59-P-11, 10 DEC 59,  
PARAGRAPH 3C, PAGE 8, BASIC PLAN, WHICH STATES THAT THE BOD FOR THE  
TM-76B SUPPORT FACILITIES AT KADENA AB WILL BE 5 JAN 1961. FURTHER  
REFERENCE PACAF PROGRAM PTAN 60-4, 7 MAR 60, WHICH REFLECTS BOD FOR  
SUPPORT FACILITIES WILL BE 15 JUNE 1961. DURING LAST TM-76B WEAPONS  
SYSTEM PHASING GROUP MEETING AT KADENA AIR BASE JUNE 1960, IT WAS  
MENTIONED THAT THE BOD FOR THE SUPPORT FACILITIES WAS NOW SCHEDULED  
FOR OCTOBER 1961. TO INSURE ORDERLY AND ADEQUATE PHASE IN OF SPARE  
PARTS, UME AND USE SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THE TM-76B WEAPON SYSTEM, IT IS  
ESSENTIAL THAT THE SUPPLY SUPPORT FACILITY BE COMPLETED NOT LATER THAN  
15 JUNE 1961. OUR JUNE BOD REQUIREMENT IS BASED ON CURRENT PHASE IN  
SHCHEDULES APPLICABLE TO RECEIPT OF FIRST MISSILES AND 498TH TMG PERSONNEL  
AT KADENA. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOUR HEADQUARTERS CONSIDER APPRISING  
HQ USAF OF THE NECESSITY FOR INSURING THAT THE 15 JUNE BOD REFLECTED IN  
PACAF PROGRAM PLAN 60-4 REMAIN FIRM. YOUR COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE  
RELATIVE TO THIS PROBLEM WILL BE APPRECIATED.

BT  
30/1000Z JUNE 1960

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415/7 Jul 60

DTG 071335Z Jul 60

FM WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA

TO PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

SECRET FROM WRG 706

Personal to General Blake from General Anderson. Reference my  
secret message WRG-641 dtd 13 Jun 60. Would appreciate info on  
your plans for housing for TM-76B Contractor Facility personnel.  
Information is needed at an early date to insure timely action for  
support of this weapon system.

07/1530Z Jul 1960

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ACTION: ROUTINE

ORIG. OR REFERS TO

FROM : PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

WRG 706, 7 Jul 60

WRG 641, 13 Jun 60

PFMDC 128 6 Jun 60

TO : WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA

SECRET PFCCS 488

PERSONAL TO GENERAL ANDERSON FROM GENERAL BLAKE.

References: (a) SECRET/WRG 641, 13 Jun 60. (b) SECRET/WRG 706, 7 Jul 60. (c) SECRET PFMDC 128, 6 Jun 60. This msg in four parts.

PART I. We appreciate the impact lack of housing will have on contractor's ability to man the CMF and recognize their services are equally important as military personnel stationed there. However, many circumstances exist which make any solution out of our hide very unpalatable. Our objective in any problem which involves housing on Okinawa is to try to add to the housing quantity or to send unaccompanied people. As an example, the Army recently was turned down by CINCPAC for accompanied status for sizeable Army units moving into Okinawa.

PART II. As mentioned in reference (c), there is not sufficient housing for military families presently assigned Okinawa. The average wait for on-base housing at Kadena and Naha is approximately 60 weeks, and in some areas there we are in competition with Army and Navy for available Government-controlled housing. No better situation exists in Japan or the Philippines, where the average wait for quarters ranges from 24 to 115 weeks in Japan and approximates 52 weeks in the Philippines. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that housing available on local economy is scarce, of low quality, and disproportionate in cost; and there are other objectionable features related to local housing. I am informed that these conditions have been clearly pointed out in weapon systems phasing meetings which included contractor's represent-

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PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

atives as well as members of WRAMA.

PART III. Furthermore, recent Congressional trends to deny funds for overseas family housing on basis of questionable advisability or need for military families to be at overseas establishments pose a policy problem of major proportion. Frankly, it appears to us that lacking family quarters and while seeking funds for additional housing for military families, we are in poor position to allocate quarters to non-military families; nor could Air Force justify use of contract funds or other possible appropriated dollar resources to take care of contractor's families.

PART IV. PACAF cannot agree that any location of CMF other than Okinawa in close proximity to weapons sites will meet PACAF operational needs. Information from weapons phasing groups is convincing that it would not be economically nor operationally practicable to locate CMF as far away as Japan or Philippines. Additional spares, GSE, transportation, environment and personnel required to support pipeline between these two activities (if separated) combined with close support required because of limited spares buy, make it imperative that a solution be found entailing no change in presently programmed location.

PART V. In summary, contractors must be apprised of fact that military housing resources would be most difficult to allocate. In this connection, our PFMD 128 of 6 June suggested Company financing. Our meaning was that the contractors involved should explore means of exploiting their own corporate capital and not funds furnished by Air Force contract. It is possible that some corporation arrangements using

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allowances which might be paid employees for housing could be used to provide living facilities on Government or other land on or in vicinity of Kadena. This type of housing might be similar to Rental Guarantee. It would probably require approval action of higher authority, but it is the only way we can see to obtain more housing on Okinawa which should be our objective in solving this problem.

12 July 1960

PFCCS

Col Walker

423218

GORDON A. BLAKE  
Major General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

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T/M OPERATIONAL FACILITY (8-CELL)

AW 33-37-10-60-CB

SPECIAL NOTES TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12 July 1960

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24 June 1960

T/M OPERATIONAL FACILITY (8-CELL)

SPECIAL NOTES TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER

At a meeting in Office, Chief of Engineers, on 11 Dec. 1959, the architect-engineer for the standard drawings was asked to prepare a document which would aid the Contracting Officer in the site selection, site adaptation, shop drawing checking, and construction phases in connection with the 4-cell facility. A similar document is presented herein for use with the 8-cell facility.

I. PURPOSE OF THE FACILITY:

To provide a structure for housing two groups of Martin Co. Mace Missiles (for a total of 8 missiles) and associated controls which would be capable of withstanding an enemy thermonuclear blast and then provide retaliatory capability.

II CRITERIA:

- (C) 1. Structure is to withstand effects of one 1-megaton thermonuclear surface burst 3400 feet away. (Design concepts employed for certain elements of this facility have been dictated by phenomena associated with thermonuclear blast (radiation, ground shock, overpressure and reflected pressures), and by compatibility with the weapons system. No changes in configuration shown on the standard drawings for the access tunnel, control area structure, service tunnels and stairs, and the cell are permitted. A certain latitude in configuration of the exhaust tunnel is permitted within the confines of instructions contained in these Special Notes.)
- (S) 2. Structure is to be capable of full operation for a minimum of one hour after the blast during which time the missiles will be fired.
- (C) 3. Each launch cell main and exhaust tunnel door is to be capable of opening within 1-1/2 minutes.

III ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE STANDARD DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS:

- 1. They are to be based on U.S. standards.
- 2. The site is level and dry.
- (C) 3. The soil has a seismic velocity of 2000 f.p.s.

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AW 33-37-10-60-CE

4. A water supply is available.
5. Commercial power will not be used.
6. Site adaptation to specific sites is to be done by others.

## IV. SITE ITEMS:

1. Electric Power: These standard drawings provide for complete generation within the facility. If it is determined that commercial power may be utilized, transformer and/or power conversion equipment may be installed in a "soft" site. Space only has been provided for installation of a circuit breaker on the 254/440 volt switchgear. If commercial power is utilized, the contractor will be required to add current limiting fuses on the load side of the 100 ampere frame circuit breakers in the 254/440 volt switchgear located in Control Area L. This is required because the 100 ampere frame circuit breakers have insufficient interrupting capacity to clear a bolted three phase fault. Sufficient impedance exists between the two Control Areas so that the 100 ampere frame circuit breaker in Control Area R will not require current limiting fuses. Fuse sizes shall be determined as follows: Up to a 30 ampere trip, use 200 ampere current limiting fuses; for 30-40 ampere trips, use 300 ampere current limiting fuses; for 70-100 ampere trips, use 400 ampere current limiting fuses. The above is based upon the use of a 750 KVA "soft" transformer. No conduits for service entrance have been provided.

2. Diesel Fuel Supply: A "soft" supply consisting of 1- 25,000 gallon storage tank has been located on the Plot Plan. This location may be adjusted to local site conditions. The tank is kept at least 50 feet from the structure in order to minimize oil seepage around, or possibly into, the structure after blast. The fill inlet should be located for easy access by the oil truck.

3. Water Supply: This facility requires a maximum of ten gallons per minute supply at 30 pound pressure. The water source and water softening equipment (if required) shall be provided in a "soft" site. After the blast, the facility operates off the "hard" supply in the Control Area.

4. Sewage Disposal: No provision is necessary for water borne sewage disposal. However, an area should be provided for the disposal of human wastes from the chemical toilet.

- (C) 5. Shock Isolation: The shock isolation systems have been designed for an assumed soil having a seismic velocity of 2000 feet per second. The systems will be adequate for soils having seismic velocities in excess of 2000 f.p.s. but will be inadequate for soils having less than 2000 f.p.s. If less than 2000 f.p.s. is encountered, a new site should be selected. The services of a soils engineer experienced in preparing seismic refraction profiles and

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in determining seismic velocities should be retained.

- (C) 6. Ground Water: The structural design of the facility has been based upon an assumed well-drained site having a water table no higher than 2 feet below the bottom of the foundation mat of the Control Area. Variations in the water table level should be investigated as thoroughly as possible. If the normal water table at a particular site is higher than assumed, or if there is a record of frequent high water conditions, the Contracting Officer should notify O.C.E. (The presence of a saturated soil affects the design under blast conditions in addition to the usual problems of up-lift and waterproofing).
7. Backfilling: Proper backfilling and compaction is extremely important over the Control Area structure and tunnels. The Contracting Officer should provide for the services of competent soils engineers to assure that the applicable portions of the specifications are adequately carried out.
8. Roads, Parking Areas and Walks: The Contracting Officer shall provide for the design of roads, parking areas and walks. Minimum dimensions for the paved area in front of the cells are shown on the Plot Plan. The weapons system manufacturer has requested that this paved area be sloped toward the cells at an angle to the horizontal between  $1^{\circ} 30'$  and  $2^{\circ} 00'$ . This will facilitate unloading of the missile and its launcher mechanism from the trailer truck. The paved area should extend up to the personnel entrance stairway to allow trucks to get close to the well when raising or lowering equipment. The turning radius of the vehicle is 40 feet and the design load is 9000 pounds per wheel. A service road should be provided to get to the rear of the installation.
9. Surface Drainage: The Contracting Officer shall provide adequate surface drainage. A catch basin is shown in the moat; it must be connected to a surface drainage system. There will be some intermittent discharge from the cell sump pumps into the moat when the concrete slabs are hosed down after spillage of AVGAS or JP-4 and from the sump pump in the Control Area which receives discharge from the sink in the Toilet Room and the equipment in the mechanical equipment area. Also there may be occasions when the cell doors are drained. Drainage for fresh air and exhaust shafts or tunnels and the personnel entrance shall be provided by means of gravity drains, dry wells or sump pumps as required by local conditions. Under no circumstances should exterior drainage be carried back into the sump in the Control Area.
10. Datum Reference: For reference purposes on these standard drawings an arbitrary horizontal plane has been established 30 feet below a reference point within the cell. This cell reference point has been established by the missile manufacturers and has been the means of coordinating cell and missile dimensions. The



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Contracting Officer should see that the reference elevations on the standard drawings are revised to suit actual site conditions.

11. Allowable Soil Pressure: This installation is based upon an assumed soil pressure of 2 tons per square foot.

12. Connection to Adjoining Facilities: It is assumed that there will be no connections to adjoining facilities in this 8-cell layout.

13. The method of grounding has been shown on the standard drawings. However, the Contracting Officer will have to measure the resistance to earth before installation of the system in order to determine the completed installation resistance to earth. A maximum of 5 ohms resistance is desired for protection of the weapons system. If such resistance to earth is excessive, it will be necessary to drive rods, or extend the counterpoise or take other measures applicable to the particular site.

14. Total Flooding CO<sub>2</sub> System: This is to be incorporated into the project when authorized by the Using Agency and funds have been made available. The storage tank has been shown on the drawings between the two cell groups. This location may be altered to suit site conditions, but the tank should be kept to the rear of the front wall of the cell structure. If the alternate exhaust tunnel door is used, the storage tank should be kept to the rear of the retaining wall in which the exhaust tunnel doors occur. (Rear as used herein means away from the direction of launch of the missile.)

### V. BUILDING ITEMS:

#### 1. Control Areas:

(C)a. Structural Concept of Control Areas: These buildings have been buried in the ground to provide maximum attenuation of ground shock and radiation effects. A minimum of 7 feet 6 inches of earth cover plus the fifteen inch concrete arch will reduce the initial radiation dosage to acceptable levels for personnel; it must not be reduced. The concrete arch and the foundation are, in effect, a concrete shell within which is an isolated steel floor for mounting the equipment. This steel floor is hung from a suspension system consisting of girders, pipe hangers and concrete ribs which only make contact with the concrete shell at the foundation. The separation of the suspension system from the concrete shall be maintained. The Control Area has been located and designed so as to reduce the acceleration level from 37.5 g's at the surface to 1 g. on the shock isolated floor. This level on the floor will insure the integrity of the mechanical equipment and the safety of operating personnel under blast.

b. In the design of the shock isolated floor, weights of

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equipment have been assumed (based upon American manufacturers' data and information from the Martin Co.). These weights are shown on pages 288, 298 and 301 of the Design Analysis. The floor system (i.e. floor beams and stringers) has been designed using these weights. A factor or safety of at least 10% is inherent in the design because the designers 1) have used less than the allowable working stresses for blast loading, 2) have used heavier members than required to restrict deflection and 3) in some cases have used heavier members than required for ease of framing. Therefore, no re-design by the Contracting Officer of the steel floor beams and stringers is anticipated.

c. The suspension system (girders and pipe hangers) is critical. It must be designed in accordance with actual reactions coming onto it from the floor system. These reactions must be balanced. This is to be done through the use of ballast-lead, steel or concrete may be used. The designers of the standard drawings have shown how ballast would be installed based upon the equipment layouts and weights discussed in paragraph b. above. If the actual weights and distribution of equipment match the assumptions, or if the actual weights and distribution of equipment produce reactions similar to those in the design analysis, the design for the girders, pipe hangers and ballast as shown on the standard drawings can be used.

However, it may be that the actual weights of equipment will not match the assumed weights; they might be higher or lower. If lower, there are two ways to handle the problem. The first way is to add enough ballast to bring the reactions up to those shown in the design analysis. The girders and pipe hangers can then be used. The second way is to add the minimum amount of ballast required to balance reactions and then re-design the girders and pipe hangers, using the method shown in the design analysis. (The obvious advantage of the second way is that less steel is required.) If equipment weights are higher than the assumptions, a re-design of the suspension system must be done by the Contracting Officer, using the principles of balanced reactions through proper placement of ballast.

The Contracting Officer is encouraged to consult with chief's office on any facets of the design for which assistance may be considered appropriate. This may include preparation of new design, or review of the Contracting Officer's design.

d. No re-design will be required of the ribs; an overload of 10% beyond the assumed weights is permissible with no over-stress.



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- e. This floor will deflect under static load conditions; i.e. the girders will deflect and bring down the floor system with it. If the floor does not finish up exactly level with the floor of the tunnels, adjustment can be made in the steel plate which bridges the 6" "rattle space" around the floor. A slight difference in level will not affect the reaction of the system under blast.
- f. The checkered steel plate floor has been provided with openings for setting equipment and running utilities. Also removable sections have been provided for access into the underfloor area. It should be noted that the removable sections are screwed down to prevent their bouncing loose under blast conditions. Adjustment to the openings or the removable sections may be necessary when actual equipment is known.
- (C) g. This floor may react under blast by movement in any direction. This movement is in the magnitude of 2-1/2" vertically and 2" horizontally, relative to the concrete structure. The floor has been located so that sufficient space will be left during blast between the floor members and the structure to permit cables to "rattle" without damage to them.
- h. No equipment, ductwork, cables, lights, piping, etc. nor supports for same should be fastened to the concrete arch. The difference in accelerations and the resultant differential movement between the arch and the floor would probably cause failures to occur. Most of the equipment is mounted on the floor and must be securely attached to it. (When work benches, tables, and the like are installed, it should be remembered that there is this requirement for fastening down). For convenience in hanging ductwork, lights and pipes, a steel utility frame has been designed. This frame is supported from the shock isolated floor. Adjustments may be made in the field to this frame to suit actual conditions; in any case, minor members must be made the responsibility of the General Contractor since they will vary with the particular pieces of equipment and arrangement of runs.
- i. The floor in the mechanical equipment area of Control Area L is in three sections. This has been done to minimize vibration transmission from engines, motors and pumps. The space between the sections is wide enough to accommodate variations in movement under blast. The metal strip covering the space is fastened to one section only.
- (C) j. The blast valves will close under pressure from the blast wave. During this short period the diesel engines will draw combustion air from the mechanical equipment room and will exhaust into the same area. The blast valves will latch in a

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(C) closed position upon the first impulse of the blast wave. After 10 seconds a mechanical-electrical relay will activate to force the valves open again, after which the air intake-exhaust system will operate in the normal manner. To insure opening, a compressed air system has been designed to force them open. A dual set of valves has been supplied for the diesel exhaust system for maintenance purposes because carbon deposits may tend to bind the valves and defeat their purpose.

k. Emergency exit from the Control Area for use after blast if all other exits are unusable will be through the emergency door in the end wall of Control Area "L", up the inclined concrete pipe, up the rungs on the vertical shaft, and through the hinged grating cover. A plate has been placed over each of the latches to discourage unauthorized entry. If a rescue team has to enter the facility through this way, the grating can easily be burned out. The standard emergency door has handles both sides so that the rescue team may penetrate the blast door. If, for local security reasons, it is desired to remove this outside handle, it may be done without impairing the function of the door. A light in the Launch Control Room will indicate when the emergency door is open. No electrical locking device should be installed on this door.

l. Partitions between the Launch Control Room and Crew Room and around the Engine Start Fuel Cubicle have been detailed to be constructed of steel shapes and cement asbestos board. The intent is to provide a low-cost fire resistant partition having sections which can be removed. The Contracting Officer may substitute any locally available partition which will satisfy these requirements.

m. The floor of the Engine Start Fuel cubicle should be spark-proof, fire-proof and resistant to AVgas. A vinyl tile floor has been specified; this may be changed by the Contracting Officer to any locally available material meeting the above requirements.

n. The ventilating and air conditioning systems have been designed on the basis of a minimum outdoor temperature of 0° F. and a maximum summer outdoor temperature of 95° F. Air conditioning is provided only for the Launch Control Room and the Crew Ready Room. The mechanical equipment room temperature may rise to 15° above outdoor ambient resulting in an uncomfortable situation on hot, humid days. If extended period of work in this area are required during these hot days, it may be necessary to utilize portable fans in the space to improve circulation. If this is done, they should be anchored down in some fashion so that they don't become missiles under blast conditions.

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(C) o. The Control Areas are compact; space is at a premium throughout the installation. Care should be exercised in running ducts and pipes to keep access areas as clear as possible. Space allocations have been made on the basis of representative American pieces of equipment--therefore, foreign equipment should be examined from the point of view of size in addition to its functional characteristics.

p. Spare capacity for "soft" power requirements (security lights, sentry boxes, well pump, et.) has been provided in panels ROL and LOL. (After a blast these panels will be automatically de-energized). A demand load as indicated in the drawings has been estimated for these panels. The Contracting Officer should verify these loads or modify the feeder and circuit breaker accordingly.

q. No provision has been made for installing large assemblies of equipment in Control Area L after the complete structure is built; they will have to be "built-in". (All equipment in Control Area R and all weapons system equipment can be moved in through the access tunnels.) It is recommended that the sequence of construction for Control Area L should be: slab and footings, piers, ribs and struts, interior concrete wall, shock floor, arch roof, install large equipment, and finally, construct the end walls. If the installation is abandoned, partial demolition may be required for removal of equipment.

r. Reference is made to the electrical controls. It is suggested that the Contracting Officer direct the manufacturers of the controls to use relay and contact designations consistent with those shown on the contract drawings. This will facilitate interpretation of circuiting by the contractor and by inspection and operating personnel.

s. Fluid coolers are provided for the diesel engine cooling water during normal operations. If a thermonuclear blast occurs, these coolers will be put out of commission, and an automatic changeover will be made, through the operation of the light detector, to the water storage tank buried outside Control Area L. The engines will run on this "hard" supply until the temperature of the water rises to about 170°--or whatever temperature the high jacket water cutout is set at--a matter of five or six hours. It is essential that the "hard" tank be kept full of water so that it will act as a solid mass under blast conditions. The gage glass on the small make-up water tank in Control Area L should be checked under a normal operating schedule. Normally the float actuated valve on this tank will maintain the storage tank level.

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t. Two air-cooled condensers are connected to each of the 5-ton air conditioning units. One of these condensers is located in the moat and is for normal operations. The other condenser, located on the utility frame in the Mechanical Equipment space, will be used after a thermonuclear blast. A changeover will be made automatically through actuation of the light detector by means of a solenoid valve.

u. A cable support area has been provided below the shock floor in the Launch Control Room and the weapons power section of the Power and Mechanical Equipment Room. The weapons system power and signal cables will lay on the welded wire fabric and be tied to it. The welded wire fabric is 6" x 6" but larger holes may be cut in it if necessary to arrange the cabling.

### 2. Tunnels:

a. These tunnels serve two functions: to provide personnel and equipment access and to carry cables and piping. Headroom conditions should be closely watched during construction to prevent hazardous conditions to personnel.

b. During blast, the tunnels will be subject to acceleration forces. These may cause differential movement in relation to the Control Areas and Launch Cells. Expansion joints have been provided in the concrete, flexible connections in the piping, and slack in the cables to take care of this movement.

c. Interlocking devices on the personnel entrance doors are mounted on the inside face to prevent tampering. Conduit has been provided from these doors to the Launch Control Rooms to permit installation of signal devices or telephones, as required by local security.

d. The small blast doors; i.e. those measuring 3'6" x 7'-0", 6'-0" x 7'-0" and 3'-0" x 3'-0", are currently the subject of a separate design contract under the jurisdiction of the Office, Chief of Engineers. Details shown on the AW-33-37-10 set were taken from the unfinished standard drawings. The standard drawings may be requested from O.C.E.--reference number 60-12-02.

### 3. Launch Cells:

- (C) a. This semi-buried structure will receive the full effects of the surface burst; overpressure (and resultant reflected pressure) nuclear and thermal radiation, and acceleration due to ground shock. Thermal effects at the specified distance from the bomb will not be appreciable; the wood bumper may burn (or be blown off), the paint on the exterior metal work will burn off and the water in the main door may rise about 43°F. The air blast will wreck the light detector, soft antenna, personnel entrance, fluid

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- (c) coolers, and the CO<sub>2</sub> storage tank (if this additive item is on the job). None of these things will affect launching operations.
- (C) b. Radiation attenuation to the acceptable level of 10000 roentgens is accomplished by the earth fill which must not be reduced in thickness below 4'-6"; by the 4 foot thick concrete front wall; by the steel beams and water in the launch door; and by the steel plate exhaust door and length of the exhaust tunnel.
- (C) c. The structural components are expected to develop their full plastic strengths under blast loading; herefore, particular attention must be paid to the construction details shown on the drawings; reinforcement must be placed properly, laps welded as shown, etc. Plain bars must not be substituted for deformed bars.
- (C) d. Substitutions of the structural steel components of the launch cell door may be made provided the substituted sections have the same moment of inertia and section modulus as those on the standard drawings; built-up sections are allowable. It should be noted that the 36" deep beams may not be welded together other than as shown; each beam is expected to deflect individually under blast. The purpose of the seal between the flanges is to contain the water; any other method of providing this seal may be made provided it is waterproof and does not add strength to the flanges. The 1/8" sheet steel covers protect the seals; it does not affect the strength of the door and should not be rigidly fastened to the structural members.
- e. The filling of the cell door during the construction period may be accomplished from any available source. However, if for any reason it is emptied during operations, it is required that no more than two hours be taken to refill the door. Since each door requires about 12,580 gallons, 100 g.p.m. must be available. This supply can be from tank truck. The filling operation is done when the door is in its down position (1-1/2° to the horizontal). The inlet holes are near the top of the door; water should be piped in until it overflows. The air space at the top of the door is allowable; water is required only where the door is not backed up with concrete. The level of the water should be checked during normal maintenance recycling periods when the door is down. The inside of the door is painted to minimize the possibilities of rusting.
- f. The water in the door should not be allowed to freeze. If local weather data indicates protracted periods of sub-freezing, some method of heating the door should be provided. Thermostatically controlled electric immersion heaters operating off "soft"

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panels ROL and LOL could be used. It should be noted that the cell temperature will normally not be lower than 50° F. Also there will be some thermal effect from the sun depending upon orientation. If, during emergency maintenance periods, the door has to be down for a long period of time in freezing weather, the water should be drained out. It would then be subject to the two-hour filling requirements as described above.

g. The color of the exterior paint on the doors is left to the discretion of the Contracting Officer.

(C) h. The moat is provided to catch debris after a blast. It is impossible to predict the amount or character of the debris with any certainty, but the moat will provide some space for it to lodge. It should be noted that if a piece of debris prevents the door from opening fully, the missile may still be fired, provided it is opened 74-1/2° from the vertical.

(C) i. The cell has certain points which are critical in dimension; notably the clearances between the tail of the missile and the arch roof, and between the bottom of the booster bottle and the floor. These are most critical at the entrance to the cell. The dimensions given on the drawings for the interior of the cells should be considered as minimum. Formwork should be designed and placed with this factor in consideration. Also, care should be taken that piping serving the latches does not infringe upon the clearances for the wing tips. This clearance is provided by the slots in the insulation, which are 3'-11" on both sides of the arch centerline. Piping is permissible in the slots, provided it is higher than a plane drawn at 17°-10' to the horizontal, starting from any point of the slot at the front edge of the cell and extending toward the rear of the cell.

(j) j. The insulation on the arch has been placed there for acoustical reasons. Successful firings of the missile have been made from a test cell having the type of insulation which has been specified. Within the near future, firings will be made from another test cell. These may indicate that the insulation may be unnecessary or that a different type may be acceptable. The Contracting Officer should check with O.C.E. before contracting this item.

k. Space has been provided between the insulation and the arch to permit circulation of air and warming of the concrete surface; thus preventing condensation.

l. The missile shock attenuation system will be installed by the missile manufacturer on the supports provided by the building contractor. Care should be taken to construct these four supports at the design elevation.



AW 33-37-10-70-CE

m. Other items to be installed by the weapons manufacturer are the hydraulic lift system, hydraulic control box, engine start fuel controller, the azimuth alignment unit, the azimuth target, the junction boxes, and the nose air conditioner.

n. Both the "J" tube exhaust tunnel (shown on the standard drawings) and the straight-out exhaust tunnel (shown as the vertical exhaust door tunnel alternate) satisfy operational requirements. The choice of configuration is to be determined by the Contracting Officer on the basis of construction economy predicated on local terrain conditions. Regardless of the configuration selected, critical dimensions (tunnel length, diameter, door opening size) must be adhered to in order to assure maintenance of required aero-dynamic characteristics and radiation shielding.

The Contracting Officer has the following options:

- a. The eight foot diameter or eight foot square reinforced concrete tunnel sections are permissible with either configuration--"J" tube or straight.
- b. The round door must be used in the horizontal position only; the square door must be used in the vertical position only.
- c. If a square tunnel is used in connection with a round door, there must be a smooth transition from square to round, the transition commencing eight feet forward of the round door.
- d. If a round tunnel is used in conjunction with a square door, no transition is required. The aft end of the tunnel may terminate as a round cross section at the expansion joint. In this instance the open door area is larger than required. However, cost differential between a square vertical door and a round vertical door does not justify a separate design for a round door.

If the "J"-tube tunnel is used, the Contracting Officer should delete drawings applicable only to the straight out tunnel, and delete notes and data in the basic set applicable to the straight out tunnel.

If the straight out tunnel is used, the Contracting Officer should delete drawings applicable only to the J-tube tunnel, and delete and/or revise notes and data in the basic set applicable to the J-tube tunnel.

AW-33-37-10-70-CE

Critical items, such as the Hydraulic Control Panel on Sheet 38 have been flagged as being applicable only to the horizontal J-tube door and a reference is made to the sheet on which the Hydraulic Control Panel for the vertical door alternate occurs. However, items like the Plot Plan on Sheet 3 have not been so flagged, because they are more general in nature and must be adjusted to the specific terrain, tunnel configuration, and tunnel shape. For the convenience of the Contracting Officer, the drawings affected by the selection of the straight-out tunnel have been listed below:

3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 19, 29, 31, 34, 36, 40, 46

o. Drawings for the launch cell door have been prepared showing alternate designs utilizing welded plates or standard metric dimension sections. If standard U.S. sections are used, the appropriate drawings are sheets 22, 25, and 27.

If welded plates are used, the appropriate drawings are sheets 23, 25, and 27.

If metric dimension sections are used, the appropriate drawings are sheets 24, 26, and 28.



SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: AFOCE-DC

14 JULY 1960

SUBJECT Security, Mace TM-76B (U)

TO PACAF

1. References:

a. Hq USAF message AFOCE-DC 82058, dated 30 March 1960, which contained some guidance concerning security policy.

b. PACAF message PFCOI-P 156, dated 4 April 1960, which indicated a policy had been adopted to minimize publicity concerning deployment of tactical missiles.

2. This Headquarters continues to indorse the policy stated in reference b, of minimizing publicity concerning Mace deployment and further agrees that any publicity releases should be made by the USAF unit in the deployment area. However, it must be recognized that since advertising has started many persons, including foreign nationals, are fully aware of the location and purpose of the facilities. In order that the security policy to be followed in connection with this project is, in fact, consistent with what is actually taking place, this Headquarters proposes that the fact that tactical missile facilities are to be built on Okinawa be treated as unclassified information.

3. This does not mean that the policies stated in references a and b need be abandoned. The intent is merely to avoid placing persons handling construction plans, specifications, and correspondence in the position of compromising information by virtue of merely carrying on their work. This could easily occur since the construction plans and specifications are not classified. Your comments on this proposal are requested.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

CLIFFORD B. OLSON  
Colonel, U. S. Air Force  
Assistant Chief, Construction Division  
Division of Civil Engineering, DCS/O

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Ltr, USAF (AFOCE-DC), 14 Jul 60, Security, Mace TM-76B (U)

1st Ind (PFSCE-ED)

22 JUL 1960

Hq PACAF

TO: USAF (AFOCE-DC)

1. PACAF concurs with your proposal to treat as unclassified information the fact that tactical missile facilities are to be located on Okinawa.

2. The situation, both in Okinawa and Japan, requires that minimum publicity be given to the missile deployment.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

JOE C GOLDSBY  
Dep Dir of Engineering & Construction  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
Civil Engineering

621783

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137

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 313  
R 142333Z ZFF-2  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
INFO RJAOKA/313 ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RJAOKA/6313 ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

//C O N F I D E N T I A L//PFDOP 91  
ACTION 5AF, INFO 313 ADIV AND 6313 ABW. RECORDS AT THIS HEADQUARTERS  
INDICATE THAT BUILDING NBR 3417 (MATCON, AT KADENA) CONTAINS 7252  
SQUARE FEET OF SPACE NOT CURRENTLY IN USE. NO FUTURE REQUIREMENTS  
CAN BE IDENTIFIED HERE OR AT HQ PACAACS. THEREFORE, IT IS PLANNED THAT  
THE NEW STRUCTURE PROGRAMMED FOR THE 498TH TMG HEADQUARTERS BUILDING  
BE DELETED, AND BUILDING 3417 BE CONSIDERED AS AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE.  
REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS NLT 19 JULY.

BT  
15/0003Z JULY 1960

621450

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0216

SECRET

138

FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJZKD/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
INFO RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOKA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED-363. ACTION WRAMA (WRNH); INFO USAF (AFOCE-DCD),  
WADD (WWZSG), 5 AIR FORCE, 313 AIR DIV, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA AND  
USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN. SUBJECT IS CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY (CMF)  
THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS. PART ONE: REFERENCES: (A) OUR UNCLAS/EFTC/  
PFSCE-ED 349 DATED 6 JULY 60 TO USAF, INFO YOUR HQ, WHICH REQUESTED  
RECONSIDERATION OF USAF DENIAL FOR INCREASE IN SCOPE FROM 14,161 SQ  
FT TO 15,309 SQ FT FOR CMF. (B) YOUR CONFIDENTIAL WRNHPE 699 DATED  
1 JULY 60 TO USAF, IN WHICH YOU PROVIDED ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR  
INCREASED SCOPE OF CMF AND REQUESTED USAF RECONSIDER THEIR PREVIOUS  
DENIAL. (C) HQ USAF LETTER (AFOCE-CD), 12 JULY 60, SUBJECT: CONTRACTOR  
MAINTENANCE FACILITY (COPY FURNISHED YOUR HQ), IN WHICH USAF REFERENCED  
OUR UNCLAS/EFTC/PFSCE-ED 349 (REFERENCE A)), AND STATED IN PART THAT:  
"NO INCREASE IN SCOPE WILL BE AUTHORIZED BY THIS HQ WITHOUT DETAILED  
EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF WHY ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED."  
PART TWO. SINCE ORIGINAL SCOPE, DEFINITIVE PLAN AND OUTLINE SPECIF-  
ICATIONS FOR CMF WERE DEVELOPED BY YOUR HQ, WE BELIEVE DETAILED EXPLAN-  
ATION AND JUSTIFICATION OF WHY ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR CMF IS REQUIRED  
SHOULD COME FROM YOUR HQ. PART THREE. DESIGN BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE  
PENDING RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. TIME REMAINING FOR DESIGN AND  
CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITY TO MEET REQUIRED BOD 15 MAY 61 IS BECOMING  
CRITICALLY SHORT. REQUEST YOUR HQ OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR INCREASED SCOPE,  
OR FORWARD REVISED DEFINITIVE PLAN BASED ON 14,161 SQ FT SO THAT DESIGN  
CAN CONTINUE.

BT

15/0257Z JULY 1960.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

ROUTINE

AF

ORIG. OR REFERS TO  
PFDOP 91 dtd  
15 Jul 60

CONF

FROM: KADENA AIR BASE, OKINAWA  
TO : FIVE AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN  
INFO: PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)  
6313 CE SQ KADENA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL/MC 7-7.

REF PACAF CONF MSG PFDOP 91 DTD 15 JULY 1960. FOLLOWING INFO IS  
FURNISHED YOUR HQTRS. AT A MEETING OF THE KADENA AB FACILITY  
UTILIZATION BOARD ON 14 JULY 1960, BLDG NBR WAS REDESIGNATED 134-375  
(RAPCON CENTER); BLDG NBR P-3417 A MULTI-PURPOSE FACILITY. THE MAJOR  
PORTION OF THE BLDG WILL BE 610-244 HQ GP MAINT & SUPPLY WITH SMALLER  
PORTIONS TO BE DESIGNATED 134-375 RAPCON CENTER AND 217-772, SHOP  
RADIO AND RADAR, BASE.

15/0700Z JULY 1960

MC

ROBERT I. MANDELL, Lt Col., USAF

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO

ATTN OF: PFSCE-ED

SUBJECT: Housing Requirements for Contractor Maintenance Personnel

TO: 5AF (5FSCE)

15 JUL 1960

1. The problem of providing family housing for contractor personnel who will staff the Contractor Maintenance Facility at Okinawa has been considered by this headquarters. Attached for your information are copies of correspondence relating to this subject. General Blake's personal to General Anderson, PFCCS 488, dated 12 July 1960 (Attachment 5), states the PACAF position in this matter. You will be kept advised of any further developments.

2. When Attachments 1 thru 5 are withdrawn or not attached, the classification of Secret on this correspondence will be cancelled.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

PAUL K. WALKER  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy AC/S Civil Engr.

5 Atchs

1. Cy WRAMA msg Secret WRG-593  
dated 23 May 60
2. Cy PACAF msg Secret PFMD 128  
dated 8 Jun 60
3. Cy WRAMA msg Secret WRG-641  
dated 13 Jun 60
4. Cy WRAMA msg Secret WRG-706  
dated 7 Jul 60
5. Cy PACAF msg Secret PFCCS 488  
dated 12 Jul 60

**SECRET**

621540

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SECRET

141

DE RJHPKM 178C  
RM 160253Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU  
RUAWC/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJEDSQ/WADD WPAFB OHIO  
INFO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
RJESBEN/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAKKA/313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED-366

ACTION USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA, AND WADD (WWZSG);  
INFO USAF (AFOCE-CD), WRAMA (WRNH5, 5AF and 313 AIR DIV. SUBJECT  
IS OKINAWA TM-76B SUPPORT FACILITIES. THIS MESSAGE IN 4 PARTS. PART  
1. REFERENCE OKINAWA DIST ENGR MESSAGE UNCLAS EFTO PCOGM 1301 DATED  
11 JUL 60 (NOTAL), IN WHICH FOLLOWING BOD'S WERE FURNISHED, PROVIDED  
STIPULATED CONDITIONS WERE MET: CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY (CMF)  
AND SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE - JUN 61; GROUP HQ, COMPONENT STORAGE BLDG,  
AND ENGINE TEST STAND - DEC 61. PART 2. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: REQUIRED  
BOD'S TO ALLOW RECEIPT AND STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES, INSTAL-  
LATION OF MARTIN CO. PECULIAR EQUIPMENT, AND TO HAVE THE FACILITIES  
READY TO MEET USAF PROGRAMMED DATES FOR THE LAUNCH SITE COMPLETION ARE  
AS FOLLOWS: (A) STORAGE COMPONENT BLDG - 1 MAY 61. (B) CMF - 15 JUN  
61. (C) SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE - 1 JUN 61. (D) ENGINE TEST STAND - 1  
SEP 61. (E) GROUP HQ BLDG - STILL TO BE DETERMINED. CONSTRUCTION  
CONTRACTOR MAY BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE TEST WORK AND DEFICIENCY COR-  
RECTIONS AFTER BOD'S, PROVIDED NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES ARE TAKEN  
AND PROPER COORDINATION IS EFFECTED WITH USING AGENCY TO PREVENT INTER-  
FERENCE WITH MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT. PART 3. FOR PACOCEAN DIV ENGR  
AND OKINAWA DIST ENGR: IN ORDER TO MEET BOD'S SPECIFIED IN PART 2,  
FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED OR RECOMMENDED AS APPLICABLE: (A)  
PROCEED WITH DESIGN OF SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE, BASED ON DRAWING DATED  
1 JUN 60 REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 17B OF MEXD FOR RECORD, OKINAWA ENGR  
DIST (PCOGM), 22 JUN 60, SUBJECT: CMF AND SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE, AF  
SUPPORT FACILITIES, KADENA AB. WADD REVIEW COMMENTS ON PROPOSED LAYOUT  
WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT, AND ANY REQUIRED CHANGES SHOULD BE  
INCORPORATED AT THAT TIME. (B) CONTINUE TO HOLD DESIGN OF CMF IN  
ABEYANCE PENDING USAF DECISION ON WRAMA-PACAF RECLAMA FOR INCREASE IN  
SCOPE FROM 14,161 SF TO 15,309 SF. EARLY DECISION IS EXPECTED. (C)  
INITIATE PROCUREMENT ACTION FOR ALL GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT AND  
MATERIAL AS SOON AS FIRM REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS HAVE BEEN  
DETERMINED. IN THIS RESPECT, RECOMMEND ADVANCE PROCUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTION  
MATERIALS, SUCH AS PRECAST CONCRETE FRAMES AND SLABS, WINDOWS, DOORS  
AND ANY OTHER CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS THAT WILL PERMIT A REDUCTION IN  
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD TO BE PROVIDED IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT. (D) ADVER-  
TISE EACH ITEM OR GROUP OF ITEMS, INCLUDING STATE OF PREPARATION, AS  
SOON AS FINAL DESIGN OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS IS COMPLETED, AND AWARD EACH  
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT AS SOON AFTER ADVERTISING AS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE.  
(E) DESIGN OF BUILDINGS SHOULD BE SIMPLEST AND MOST EASILY CONSTRUCTED,

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BUT MUST PROVIDE A COMPLETELY USABLE FACILITY AND INCLUDE ALL REQUIRED ITEMS, SUCH AS MONORAIL HOISTS, ETC. (F) REVIEW PERIODS TO BE SHORTENED TO THE MINIMUM WITH ON-BOARD REVIEW TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. UPON COMPLETION OF PRELIMINARY DESIGN, CONTINUE DESIGN AND INCORPORATE REVIEW COMMENTS WHEN RECEIVED. AFTER YOU HAVE CONSIDERED ALL FEASIBLE WAYS OF MEETING REQUIRED BOD'S, ADVISE ALL ADDRESSEES, THIS MESSAGE, OF YOUR REVISED BOD'S FOR EACH FACILITY. PART 4. FOR WADD (WWCSG): REFERENCE OUR SECRET LETTER (PFMLP), 14 JUN 60, SUBJECT: TM-76B MAINTENANCE FACILITIES, AND USAF 1ST INDORSEMENT (AFOCE-CD), 6 JULY 60, WITH 2 ATTACHMENTS. DESIGN AGENCY, BY PART 3 THIS MESSAGE, IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH DESIGN OF SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE; HOWEVER, INFORMATION REQUESTED IS URGENTLY REQUIRED SO THAT CHANGES, IF ANY, CAN BE INCORPORATED BEFORE DESIGN HAS PROCEEDED TO POINT WHERE MAJOR REVISIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED RESULTING IN INCREASED DESIGN TIME.

BT

16/0320Z JULY 1960

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

142

ACTION PRIORITY

ORIG. OR REFERS TO  
PFDOP 91  
15 JUL 60

AF

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: 6313ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA

TO: 5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN

INFO TO: PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)

CONFIDENTIAL/BE-EP 7-9

ACTION 5AF (5FSCE-C-P), INFO PACAF (PFDOP), 5AF (5FOPR) AND 313AD (CE).  
BUILDING 3417 BEING USED TO FULL CAPACITY FOR MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF  
THE 1962ND AACS GROUP. THE 1962ND AACS GROUP WILL REQUIRE THIS SPACE  
CONTINUOUSLY. ACTION IS BEING TAKEN BY BASE ENGINEER TO REQUEST  
REDESIGNATION OF BUILDING P-3417 AS A MULTI-PURPOSE FACILITY WITH THE  
FOLLOWING FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES. 610-244 HQ GP MAINT & SUPPLY, 134-375  
RAPCON CENTER AND 217-772, SHOP RADIO AND RADAR, BASE. REQUEST 498TH  
HEADQUARTERS BUILDING REMAIN FIRM IN PROGRAM. THERE ARE NO EXISTING  
PERMANENT FACILITIES ON KADENA THAT CAN SERVE AS 498TH GROUP HEADQUARTERS.

19/2320Z JULY 1960

J. W. ETTER, Lt Col, USAF

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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SECRET

143

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 29B  
R 212149Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPB/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
INFOR RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RAOKA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWC/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
AF GRNC

BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE 082

ACTION USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN; INFO USAF (AFOCE-CD), WADD (WWZSG), 5AF, 313 AIR DIV, AND USAENGR DIST OKINAWA. SUBJECT IS TM-76B SCHEDULES, FY 61 INCREMENT, LAUNCH SITES NR 3 AND 4. THIS MESSAGE IN 3 PARTS.  
PART 1. REFERENCES: (A) OUR CONFIDENTIAL PFSCE-ED 338 DATED 28 JUN 60, WHICH AUTHORIZED PACOCEAN DIV ENGR TO PROCEED WITH DESIGN OF SITES 3 AND 4, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE BASED UPON OCE PRELIMINARY DESIGN OF T/M OPERATIONAL FACILITY (8 CELL). (B) UNCLAS EFTO DA 501835 ENGMC-EM 6941 DATED 19 JULY 60 FROM M CHIEF OF ENGRS, DA, TO PACOCEAN DIV ENGR, INFO OKINAWA DIST ENGR. WHICH STATED THAT UNSIGNED REPRODUCIBLE FINAL DRAWINGS, T/M OPERATIONAL FACILITY (8 CELL), AW 33-37-10, AIR MAILED 14 JULY 60 TO PACOCEAN DIV ENGR AND OKINAWA DIST ENGR. (C) SECRET LETTER, HQ WADD (WWZSG), 8 APR 60, SUBJECT: TM-76B PROGRAM PLAN (NOTAL), WHICH PROVIDED USAF-APPROVED PROGRAM DATES FOR VARIOUS PROGRAM ELEMENTS. PART 2. REQUIRED BOD'S FOR LAUNCH SITES 3 AND 4 TO MEET USAF-APPROVED TM-76B PROGRAM PLAN (REFERENCE (C)) ARE AS FOLLOWS: (1) SITE NR 3: CONTROL ROOMS - 1 DEC 61; LAUNCH SITE - 1 MAR 62. (2) SITE NR 4: CONTROL ROOMS - 1 APR 62; LAUNCH SITE - 30 JUN 62. REQUEST EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO MEET REQUIRED BOD'S. PART 3. ADVISE ALL ADDRESSEES, THIS MESSAGE, EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, YOUR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE TO INCLUDE FOLLOWING: (1) ADVERTISING DATE, CONTRACT AWARD DATE AND CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION DATE FOR ADVANCE GRADING OF SITES 3 AND 4, IF APPLICABLE. INCLUDE ESTIMATED AMOUNT P-331 CONSTRUCTION FUNDS REQUIRED AND DATE REQUIRED. (2) ADVERTISING DATE, CONTRACT AWARD DATE AND DELIVERY DATES FOR LONG LEAD TIME ITEMS, SUCH AS GENERATORS, BLAST DOORS AND BLAST VALVES. INCLUDE ESTIMATED AMOUNT P-331 CONSTRUCTION FUNDS REQUIRED AND DATE REQUIRED. (3) DESIGN COMPLETION DATES FOR SITES 3 AND 4. (4) ADVERTISING DATE, BID OPENING DATE AND CONTRACT AWARD DATE FOR SITES 3 AND 4. INCLUDE ESTIMATED AMOUNT P-331 CONSTRUCTION FUNDS REQUIRED AND DATE REQUIRED. (5) BOD'S FOR CONTROL ROOMS AND LAUNCH SITE FOR SITES 3 AND 4.

BT

21/2244Z JULY 1960.

SECRET

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144  
SECRET

RR RJAPKA  
DE RJHPKM 47C  
R 252020Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJWZKA/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAKA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/S E C R E T/ PAPA FOXROT SIERRA CHARLIE ECHO DASH ZERO EIGHT THREE.  
ACTION USAF (APOCE), WADD(WWZEG, WRAMA) WRNH), FIFTH AIR FORCE AND  
313 AIR DIVISION INFO USAENGR DIVISION PACOCEAN AND USAENGR DIST OKINAWA.  
SUBJECT IS OKINAWA TM-76B SUPPORT FACILITIES. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO  
PARTS. PART ONE. FOLLOWING SECRET MESSAGE FROM USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
DATED 19 JUL 20, TO PACAF AND USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR  
INFORMATION: "SECRET POOVE 9040. REFERENCE MESSAGE PFSCE-ED 366,  
16 JULY 20. ONE. THIS DISTRICT HAS IN PAST AND WILL CONTINUE IN  
FUTURE TO GIVE EVERYTHING WE HAVE TOWARD ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES THIS  
PROGRAM AS ESTABLISHED BY HQ PACAF. HOWEVER, THE VARIOUS OTHER USAF  
AGENCIES CONTINUE TO TAKE INORDINATE AMOUNT TIME TO SETTLE CRITERIA  
PROBLEMS AND TO REVIEW AND APPROVE DESIGN ALL AT EXPENSE OF LIMITED DESIGN  
AND CONSTRUCTION TIME ACC WITH LITTLE SENSE OF URGENCY DEMONSTRATED.  
AS EXAMPLE ONE CITE CASE OF CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY WHERE  
CRITERIA NOT FIRMED AT FEB 60 PREDESIGN CONFERENCE AND IS STILL NOT  
SETTLED TO DATE. THE BASIC PROBLEM HAS NEVER BEEN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION  
TIME BUT THE NEED FOR PROMPT COURAGEOUS DECISION IN MATTERS OF CRITERIA  
AND DESIGN APPROVAL. ACCORDINGLY ALL CONCERNED URGED TO GIVE THIS  
PROBLEM AREA CONTINUING ATTENTION TO AVOID FURTHER DELAY. TWO. ACTIONS  
SUGGESTED PART TWO YOUR MESSAGE FULLY CONSIDERED WITH NUMEROUS OTHERS.  
WHERE GOVERNMENT ADVANCE PURCHASE MATERIALS WILL CLEARLY CONTRIBUTE TO  
BETTER BOD, IT WILL BE DONE. EXTENSIVE MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL LONG  
LEAD TIME STATESIDE ITEMS INVOLVED AND PROCUREMENT MUST BE PLACED NOT  
LATER THAN SEP 60. CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY IS ONLY ITEM SUSCEPT-  
IBLE TO SEPARATE CONTRACT IN THIS SMALL AREA. OTHER ITEMS CAN BE  
PACKAGED AS STATED BELOW. THREE. PROPOSED SCHEDULE ALL ITEMS EXCEPT  
REPEAT EXCEPT CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY FOLLOWS, BASED ON ASSUMP-  
TIONS GIVEN: CONTRACT DRAWINGS COMPLETION-30 AUG 60; CONTRACT DRAWINGS  
APPROVED-30 SEP 60; INVITATIONS-7 OCT 60; OPEN BIDS-7 NOV 60; NOTICE TO  
PROCEED-15 NOV 60; BOD COMPONENT STORAGE BLDG-MAY 61; BOD SHOP MISSILE  
SERVICE-JUNE 61; BOD GROUP HQ AND ENGINE TEST-SEP 61. ASSUMPTIONS:  
A. WAIVE REQUIREMENT FOR PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS ON SHOP MISSILE SERVICE AND  
PREPARE ONLY FINALS. PACAF AND POD APPROVAL REQUIRED AT ONE. B. REVIEW  
AND APPROVAL FINAL DRAWINGS NOT TO EXCEED 30 DAYS SCHEDULED INCLUDING  
TRANSIT TIME. ESSENTIAL THAT INVITATIONS BE ISSUED NOT LATER THAN 7  
OCT. C. ANY POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL PACAF COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO DESIRES  
OTHER USAF AGENCIES CONCERNING PRELIMINARY DRAWINGS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED  
ARE RECEIVED NOT LATER THAN 29 JULY 60. D. NO MAJOR CHANGES ARE DIRECTED.  
FOUR. INTELLIGENT RE-EVALUATION BOD FOR CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY  
AT THIS POINT NOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE SEVERAL INTANGIBLES. IF  
SPACE SCOPE IS REDUCED, NEW FLOOR LAYOUT WILL BE REQUIRED AND PROBABLY  
WILL DELAY. UPON RECEIPT SCOPE DECISION TIME FROM THIS ITEM WILL BE  
CRITICALLY REVIEWED AND SCHEDULE FURNISHED PROMPTLY. UNQUOTE. PART TWO.  
CONFERENCE SCHEDULED WITH PACOCEAN DIVISION 21 JULY 60 TO DETERMINE MOST

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EXPEDITIOUS METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF DECISION.  
ALL ADDRESSEES, THIS MESSAGE, WILL BE ADVISED OF METHOD DECIDED UPON.  
BT  
25/2111Z JULY 1960

621682

SECRET

0225

145  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJACKA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFSCE-087

ACTION USAF (AFOCE-CD); INFO WADD (WVZSG), WRAMA (WRNH), USAENGR DIV PACCEAN, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA, 5AF AND 313 AIR DIV. SUBJECT IS AIR CONDITIONING OKINAWA MISSILE MAINTENANCE FACILITY. THIS MESSAGE IN 3 PARTS. PART 1. REFERENCES: (A) YOUR LETTER AFOCE-CD, 11 JUL 60, SUBJECT: AIR CONDITIONING, MISSILE MAINTENANCE FACILITIES (NOTAL), WHICH REQUESTED SPECIFIC AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR AIR CONDITIONING BE INDICATED. (B) WADD SECRET MESSAGE WVZSG-21-8-821 DATED 22 JULY 60, WHICH VERIFIED THAT CORROSION PROBLEM HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED IN MARTIN EQUIPMENT DESIGN. (C) OUR SECRET PFSCE 083 DATED 25 JULY 60. (D) YOUR UNCLAS AFOCE-CD 72214, DATED 26 JULY 60. PART 2. AREAS OF MISSILE MAINTENANCE FACILITY REQUIRING AIR CONDITIONING ARE THE CONTROL SYSTEM CHECKOUT AREA AND THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM CHECKOUT AREA SHOWN ON MARTIN DRAWING NR SK46595, SIP, MISSILE MAINTENANCE, DATED 22 JULY 60. TOTAL AREA IS APPROXIMATELY 9,000 SQ FT AND AIR CONDITIONING IS REQUIRED FOR HUMIDITY CONTROL AND NOT FOR PERSONNEL COMFORT. TEST EQUIPMENT IN THESE AREAS IS SIMILAR TO TEST EQUIPMENT IN THE 3,500 SQ FT OF CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY ALREADY APPROVED FOR AIR CONDITIONING. PART 3. REQUEST APPROVAL TO AIR CONDITION 9,000 SQ FT OF MISSILE MAINTENANCE FACILITY. EARLY DECISION IS REQUESTED DUE TO THE CRITICALLY SHORT TIME REMAINING FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THIS FACILITY, AS INDICATED BY REFERENCES (C) AND (D).

BT

30/0313Z JULY 1960

621811

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0226

146  
CONFIDENTIAL

DE RJHPKM 253C  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAWIX 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
INFO RJACKUS 313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RJACKA/6313 ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L PFODC 10390  
REFERENCE CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES PFDOP 91, 5FSCE-C-P 0733 AND MC 7-7.  
CURRENT Z-33 REPORT INDICATES NO DEFICIENCIES EITHER 610-244 (GP MAIN-  
TENANCE AND SUPPLY) OR 217-772, SHOP RADIO AND RADAR, BUILDING. ACTION  
WILL BE TAKEN TO DELETE THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HQ BUILDING FOR THE  
498TH TMG AS INDICATED IN PFDOP 91 UNLESS STRONG JUSTIFICATION TO THE  
CONTRARY IS RECEIVED BY 20 AUGUST 1960.

BT  
12/0354Z AUG 1960.

622189

CONFIDENTIAL

0227



147

**CONFIDENTIAL**

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

18 AUG 1960

PFSCE-ED

Air Conditioning of Missile Maintenance Facility, Okinawa (U)

Division Engineer  
U. S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean  
Building 96, Fort Armstrong  
Honolulu 13, Hawaii

1. The attached message from Headquarters USAF, CONFIDENTIAL AFOCE-CD/W 77601, dated 15 Aug 60, is for your information and guidance in the design of the Shop, Missile Service, Okinawa. Air conditioning of any portion of this facility is not authorized. However, mechanical ventilation with a high degree of filtration on air intakes is specified for the 9,000 sq ft occupied by the checkout of missiles and noses. This area must be sealed off from the remainder of the facility in order to insure that the air will be as nearly dust free as possible.

2. The remainder of the Shop, Missile Service, will be provided with mechanical ventilation in accordance with previous instructions.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

NORMAN P. TUCKER, Lt Col, USAF  
Acting Director of Engr & Const  
ACS/Civil Engineering

1 Atch  
Hq USAF msg Confidential  
AFOCE-CD/W 77601 dated  
15 Aug 60

622455

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJEZHA 383  
R 152122Z  
FM HQ USAF  
TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
INFO RJEDSQ/WADD WPAFB OHIO  
ZEN/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
RJWZKD/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJAOPA/313 AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
ZEN/COFE DEPTAR WASH 25 DC  
BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/ FROM AFOCE-CD/W 77601  
ACTION: PACAF. INFO: WADD (WWZSG), WRAMA (WRNH), OKED, OCE-D/A, 5AF,  
AND 313 AIR DIV. REFERENCE YOUR PFSCE-087, SUBJECT: AIR CONDITIONING  
OKINAWA MISSILE MAINTENANCE FACILITY. ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION HERE  
INDICATES THAT MAGNITUDE OF CORROSION PROBLEM IS AS YET UNDETERMINED.  
WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT AIR CONDITIONING A PORTION OF CONTRACT MAINTEN-  
ANCE FACILITY IS PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE DUST-FREE ENVIRONMENT REQUIRED  
BY HIGHER LEVEL MAINTENANCE PERFORMED IN THAT FACILITY. THEREFORE, IT  
IS NOT, REPEAT NOT, CONSIDERED THAT SPECIFIC CORROSION CORRECTIVE  
MEASURES ARE REQUIRED IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE MAINTENANCE  
FACILITY. FURTHER, OPINION HERE IS THAT MOVEMENT OF MISSILE FROM AIR  
CONDITIONED ENVIRONMENT TO OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE COULD RESULT IN CONDEN-  
SATION, THUS AGGRAVATING POSSIBLE CORROSION PROBLEM. IN VIEW OF HIGH  
HEAT EMISSION OF MARTIN EQUIPMENT, RECOMMEND THAT 9,000 SF AREA IN  
QUESTION BE PROVIDED WITH MECHANICAL VENTILATION WITH HIGH DEGREE OF  
FILTRATION ON AIR INTAKES. THIS RECOMMENDATION MADE FOR ABOVE STATED  
REASON AND IN BELIEF THAT MECHANICAL VENTILATION WOULD ASSIST IN COM-  
BATING CORROSION PROBLEM IF IT ARISES. IT IS NOT, REPEAT, NOT BELIEVED  
THAT ANY PROVISION MADE IN DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDING WOULD  
ENSURE COMPLETE PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE CORROSION OF MARTIN EQUIP-  
MENT WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE A WEAPON SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITY.

BT  
15/2126Z AUG 1960

**CONFIDENTIAL**

622236

0229

148  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO JAPAA75AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
INFO RJAOKA/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RJAOKA/6313ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L P F O R Q 326.

REFERENCE CONFIDENTIAL PFODC 10390 AND CONFIDENTIAL 5FSCE-C-P-0877,  
ACTION WILL NOT, REPEAT NOT, BE TAKEN TO DELETE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW  
498TH TMG HEADQUARTERS BUILDING.

BT

26/2351Z AUG 1960

622536

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0230



SECRET

149

RM 150247Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJWZKD/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
INFO RUAWRA/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
GJACKA?313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

SECRET PFSCE-ED-445. ACTION WRAMA (WRNHPB); INFO USAF (AFOCE-CD), WADD(WWZSG), 5TH AIR FORCE, 313TH AIR DIV, USAENGR DIST OKINAWA, AND USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN. SUBJECT IS CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE FACILITY (CMF), SUPPORT FACILITIES, OKINAWA. THIS MESSAGE IN FIVE PARTS. PART ONE. OKINAWA ENGR DIST SUBMITTED FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THIS FACILITY: (A) COMPLETE 60 TO 80 PER CENT CONTRACT DRAWINGS--26 SEP 60. (B) SUBMIT CONTRACT DRAWINGS--17 OCT 60. (C) APPROVE CONTRACT DRAWINGS--31 OCT 60. (D) ADVERTISE--11 NOV 60. (E) BID OPENING--12 DEC 60. (F) CONTRACT AWARD--19 DEC 60. (G) NOTICE TO PROCEED--22 DEC 60. (H) BENEFICIAL OCCUPANCY DATE--AUG 61. DESIGN COULD NOT BE INITIATED UNTIL AFTER RECEIPT OF SPECIFICATIONS AND CRITERIA, 22 AUG 60. PART TWO. SCHEDULE CAN BE COMPRESSED ONLY SLIGHTLY BY SUCH MEANS AS EXPEDITING REVIEWS BY TEAMS ON SITE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT UNDER MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS, BOD FOR CMF MIGHT BE OBTAINED EARLIER THAN AUG 61; HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED REALISTIC UNLESS CONSTRUCTION IS ACCELERATED, WHICH WOULD ADD TO CONSTRUCTION COST AN AMOUNT DEPENDING ON EXTENT OF ACCELERATION. PART THREE. CONSIDER CMF ESSENTIAL FACILITY FOR CALIBRATION OF MARTIN--AC SPARKPLUG PECULIAR EQUIPMENT TO BE INSTALLED AT LANUCH SITES AND FOR REPAIR OF CERTAIN PECULIAR ITEMS WHICH MAY BE DAMAGED IN TRANSIT TO OKINAWA. PART FOUR. YOUR HEADQUARTERS WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEPOT-CONTRACTOR MAINTENANCE OF TM-76B, HAS REQUESTED BOD 15 MAY 61, WHICH WILL PERMIT INSTALLATION OF TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT THEREIN BY 15 JUNE 61, WHICH IS BOD OF CONTROL ROOM, SITE ONE. PART FIVE. REQUEST YOU REVIEW SCHEDULE FOR INSTALLATION MARTIN--AC SPARK PLUG PECULIAR EQUIPMENT. IF BOD PRIOR TO AUG 61 IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO MEET YOUR SCHEDULE FOR OPERATIONAL READINESS OF SUPPORT FACILITIES, REQUEST YOU SUBMIT TO HEADQUARTERS USAF JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCELERATION OF CONSTRUCTION.

BT  
15/0308Z SEP 1960.

623045

SECRET

0231

CONFIDENTIAL

150

FM WADD WPAFB OHIO  
TO RJEZHQ/COFS USAF WASH DC  
INFO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
RJAPAA/5TH AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
RJAOKA/313TH AD KADENA AFB OKINAWA  
RJESBN/WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA

BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L / FROM WWZSG-21-9-838. NOFORN. USAF (AFOCE-CD)  
INFO PACAF (PFSCE-ED AND PFOOP) WRAMA (WRNH) PRIORITY ACTION IS REQUIRED  
TO PREVENT PROGRAM DELAY. REFERENCE AFOCE-CD 77601. THIS MESSAGE IN  
THREE PARTS. PART I. PACAF REPRESENTATIVES AT WEAPON SYSTEMS PHASING  
GROUP MEETING AT LOWRY AFB 15 SEP 60 STATED THAT HIGH DEGREE OF MECHANICAL  
FILTRATION APPROVED IN REFERENCE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO CONTROL DUST  
WITHIN BUILDING. PART II. WADD EXPRESSED VIEWS THAT MECHANICAL FIL-  
TRATION WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT SALT SATURATED ATMOSPHERE FROM ENTERING  
BUILDING, THEREBY CONTROLLING CORROSION. PART III. REQUEST USAF CLARIFY  
ISSUE IMMEDIATELY TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE DELAY CAUSED BY MISINTERPRET-  
ATION OF DESIGN DIRECTIVE ISSUED. THIS MESSAGE CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL  
AS IT REVEALS CRITICAL WEAPON SYSTEM CRITERIA.

BT

21/2150Z SEP 1960

623220

CONFIDENTIAL

0232

SECRET

151

DE RJESBN 433T  
R 221400Z ZEX  
FM WRAMA ROBINS AFB GA  
INFO RJEDSQ/AMC AERONAUTICAL SYST CN WPAFB OHIO  
RJEDSQ/WADD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO  
RJAPAA/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJACKA/313AIR DIV KADENA AF OKINAWA  
RUWARA/DIST ENG USAENGR DIST FORT BUCKNER OKINAWA  
RUHPB/DIV ENG USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU TH  
BT

SECRET WRNHPB-905.  
ACTION COFS ISAF AFOCE-CE, INFO AMC ASC LMDM; 2-2222, 5AF, 313AIRDIV,  
US ENGINEER DIST OKINAWA, USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN. REFERENCE PACAF SECRET  
MSG PFSCE-ED-445, & 15 SEP 60. BOD OF 1 JUNE 61 WAS ESTABLISHED BY  
WRAMA FOR PACAF CMN. PURPOSE OF CMF IS TO PROVIDE DEPOT FACILITIES  
OVERSEAS ADJACENT TO OR WITHIN VICINITY OF MISSILE MAINTENANCE SQUADRON  
AND TO PROVIDE CAPABILITY FOR REPAIR, CALIBRATION, VERIFICATION AND  
CHECKOUT ON EQUIPMENT IN SUPPORT OF HARD-SITE INSTALLATION. BOD OF  
15 JUN 61 HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR HARD-SITE NBR 1. AFTER RECEIPT AND  
REVIEW OF CMF SPECIFICATIONS, PACAF FURNISHED AUGUST 61 BOD. THIS DATE  
IS NOT SATISFACTORY AND IT IS DEEMED ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT JUNE 61  
BOD BE MET. ALL PLANNING WAS BASED ON CMF BEING IN OPERATION PRIOR TO OR  
DURING HARD-SITE INSTALLATION. SPARES WERE PROCURED ON THE BASIS OF  
EXPEDITIOUS CMF REPAIR. INSTALLED EQUIPMENT MUST BE CALIBRATED AND  
VERIFIED UTILIZING CMF DEPOT TOOLING. TIMELY SUPPORT IN ALL PHASES OF  
INSTALLATION MUST BE COHERENT TO PRECLUDE SLIPPAGES. A BOD FOR CMF AS  
STATED BY PACAF MIGHT POSSIBLY BE OBTAINED EARLIER THAN AUGUST 61 UNDER  
THE MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS; HOWEVER THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED REALISTIC  
UNLESS CONSTRUCTION IS ACCELERATED. THIS ACCELERATION OF CONSTRUCTION  
WOULD ADD TO THE CONSTRUCTION COST; THE AMOUNT BEING DEPENDENT UPON THE  
EXTENT OF ACCELERATION. IT IS REQUESTED THAT EVERY EFFORT BE EXPENDED  
TO BETTER THE AUGUST BOD AND MEET THE JUNE 61 BOD AS ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED.

BT  
22/2257Z SEP 1960

623287

SECRET

0233



CONFIDENTIAL

152

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJEZHQ 464"L  
R 302156Z  
FM HQ USAF  
TO RJEDSQ/WADD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO  
INFO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB TH  
RJAOKA/313TH AD KADENA AB RYUKYU ISLANDS OKINAWA  
RJAPAA/5TH AF FUCHU AS JAPAN

BT

//CONFIDENTIAL//FROM WFOCE-CA 90032

NOFORN. ACTION: WADD (WWZSG); INFO: PACAF (PFSCE); 313TH AD; 5TH AF;  
WRANDBXKWRNHFF). REF (A) OUR AFOCE-CD 77601, (B) YOUR WWZSG-21-9-8386.  
MECHANICAL VENTILATION WITH HIGH DEGREE OF FILTRATION RECOMMENDED  
PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HIGH HEAT EMISSION OF MARTIN EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER,  
IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE DUST CONTROL AND PREVENT AT LEAST A PORTION OF  
SALT IN AIR FROM ENTERING BUILDING.

BT

30/2256Z SEP 1960

623786

CONFIDENTIAL

0234

153

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 953, San Francisco, Calif.

REPLY TO PFSCE-ED  
ATTN OF:

17 OCT 1960

SUBJECT: Installation of Special Cables in Operational Facilities,  
Okinawa (U)

TO: Division Engineer  
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Pacific Ocean  
Building 96, Fort Armstrong  
Honolulu 13, Hawaii

1. (C) At Site No. 1, Operational Facilities, Okinawa, it is highly desirable that the cabling operations by the Air Force be initiated by 1 May 1961, if possible. The BOD for the Control Building at this site is 1 June 1961. The work proposed prior to this date of 1 June 1961 consists of the installation of cables in troughs along the walls of the launch control room, power control room, the launch cells and the connecting structures. The connections of the cables to the equipment will be made later.

2. (U) It is requested that you advise this headquarters as soon as possible if these cabling operations can be initiated by 1 May 1961 at Site No. 1. If this is not feasible, request the earliest date these cabling operations can be initiated.

3. (C) This letter is classified Confidential because it links BOD's to a specific launch site.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

G. B. O'CONNOR, Lt. Colonel, USAF  
Director of Engineering & Construction  
AC/S Civil Engineering

SECRET

624114

0 2 3 5

CONFIDENTIAL

154

E RJAPAZ 125D  
M 270912Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN, JAPAN  
TO RJHPKM/PACAF HICKAM AFB, HAWAII  
INFO RJAOKA/313AIRDIV KADENA AB, OKINAWA  
RJAOKA/6313ABWG KADENA AB, OKINAWA  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L 5FMSS-AM 2692 ACTION PACAF (PFSCE-ED AND  
PFMSS-AS) INFORMATION 313AIRDIV 6313ABWG. SUBJECT: (U) 200KW  
GENERATOR SPARE PARTS. REFERENCE 313AIR DIV CONFIDENTIAL/313MC-LP-  
10-57, 25 OCT 60, AND SPARE PARTS LISTING FURNISHED BY US ARMY ENGINEER  
DIV, PACIFIC OCEAN, PER YOUR LETTER PFSCE-ED, SUBJECT: SPARE PARTS,  
TM-76B, 10 AUG 60. IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMY, IT IS REQUESTED THAT  
THE LIST OF RECOMMENDED SPARE PARTS FOR SUBJECT GENERATORS BE REVIEWED  
BY APPROPRIATE AMC AGENCY FOR ADEQUACY. SINCE THERE IS NO INDICATION  
OF SUCH A REVIEW, IT IS FELT THAT FOLLOWING A MANUFACTURER'S RECOM-  
MENDATIONS SOLELY MAY RESULT IN AN OVER-BUY OF NON-ESSENTIALS. REQUEST  
THAT AMC GUIDANCE BE FURNISHED ON AN EXPEDITED BASIS. FOR 313 AIR DIV  
AND 6313 AB WG ONLY. REQUEST REQUISITIONING ACTION BE WITHHELD PENDING  
REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE. (CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL AS IT REFERS TO  
CLASSIFIED MISSILE PROJECT.)

BT  
27/0915Z OCT 1960

200659

CONFIDENTIAL

0236



SECRET

155

HEADQUARTERS  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES  
United States Air Force  
APO 953, San Francisco, California

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: PFSCE

27 OCT 1960

SUBJECT: Officers' Quarters and Airmen Dormitory Requirements at  
Kadena Air Base

TO: USAF

1. Recent mission changes and the impact of contingency planning have again emphasized the end-position saturation of our hard-core Okinawan bases, unless prompt approval and funding of key support facility requirements is obtained. The build-up of our Quick Strike forces at Kadena, phase-out of Iwo Jima with the resulting transfer of the Hi-Gear operation to Kadena and accommodation of AFSS tenants from bases in Japan, which have been returned to the JASDF, have resulted in a steady personnel build-up at Kadena. With the activation of the 498th TM Group during 3/61 and the associated personnel build-up through 1/63, the requirement for airmen dormitories and officer quarters will, in fact, exceed the available assets by 733 dormitory spaces and 160 officer quarters. The deficiency of 733 airmen spaces and 86 of the officer quarters is directly attributable to the 498th TM Group activation.

2. In an effort to obtain the exact officer and airmen end position strengths at Kadena, and, therefore, the actual deficiencies in the subject facilities, a detailed study was made by the Manpower, Personnel, and Civil Engineer staffs at this headquarters. Only those documents which are the basis of review by your headquarters were researched. The impact of possible rental guarantee housing at Kadena was not considered in this study because of the indefinite status of this subject at this time. The results of the study are tabulated in attachments 1 and 2.

3. Three (3) specific programming actions have been taken by this headquarters in an effort to satisfy the airmen dormitory end-position requirement.

a. An item for 640 dormitory spaces was forwarded to Hq. USAF in September 1959. The requirement was substantiated as indispensable for direct support of the programmed 498th TMG

b. An item for 400 dormitory spaces was forwarded to Hq. USAF in November 1959 for inclusion in the FY 61 MCP. The requirement was substantiated in direct support of the Kadena Quick Strike build-up.

c. A project for 554 dormitory spaces was forwarded to Hq USAF in the FY 62 MCP.

624511

0 2 3 7

## SECRET

With the exception of the FY 62 MCP item, which has now been reduced in scope by your headquarters to 200 spaces, these project requests have been denied. It is the belief of this headquarters that the principal reason for denying these requests was the reporting discrepancy contained in the AF Z-33 report. Many deteriorated, unusable quonset dormitory facilities had been reported as usable assets. However, these buildings had long been abandoned and their deteriorated condition was such that they could not be rehabilitated. The AF Z-33 report has now been revised and does in fact accurately reflect the Kadena assets.

4. In addition to the above requests, the following programming actions have been taken in an effort to satisfy the officers' quarters end position deficiencies.

a. An item for 80 officers' quarters was forwarded to Hq USAF in the FY 59 MCP.

b. An item for 80 officers' quarters was forwarded to Hq USAF in the FY 61 MCP.

c. An item for 40 officers' quarters was forwarded to Hq USAF in the FY 62 MCP.

All three of these project requests have been denied.

5. The Okinawa TM 76 Operational Facilities Authorization and Funding for Sites 1 and 2, and the associated support facilities is in the amount of \$12,500,000, while the CWE's for these sites are now for a total of only \$6,359,236. It is understood that the intent of the authorization was to permit full operational capability of the weapon system. This headquarters proposes, therefore, to use this authorization and approximately \$1,663,450 of the above remaining funds for the construction of those officers' quarters and airmen dormitories which are requirements in direct support of the TM-76. Projects to provide 733 airmen dormitory spaces and 86 officers' quarters would be accomplished as follows:

a. Construction of 1,870 SF additions to each of the twenty-one (21) existing "H" type dormitories. These will provide 336 additional airmen dormitory spaces at an estimated cost of \$252,000, which is \$750 per man, rather than \$1,900 per man required for a completely new dormitory facility. The construction will be fully in accord with criteria and conform to the existing building design.

b. Construction of two (2) new 200-man dormitories for a total of 400 additional spaces at a cost of \$760,000. The unit cost of these facilities is \$1,900 per man, including support items and was the basis of our FY 62 MCP costing of a like item.

## SECRET

c. Construction of eighty-six (86) officers' quarters at a cost of \$651,450. The unit cost of these facilities is \$7,575 per officer, including support items and was the basis of our FY 62 MCP costing of a like item.

By taking this action immediately, it will be possible to provide the facilities in consonance with the TM-76 personnel build-up, at minimum cost to the Air Force and funded from an appropriation specifically intended to insure full operational capability of this missile group.

6. The TM-76 personnel build-up at Kadena of 954 officers and airmen will be completed during 1st quarter FY 63. (See attachment 3.) Your early consideration of our proposal to utilize a part of the remaining TM-76 authorization for construction of the required officers' quarters and airmen dormitories is requested, therefore, so that project engineering can be immediately initiated.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. W. CECIL  
Major General, USAF  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Administration & Logistics

- 3 atchs
1. Officer Qtrs Rqmt
  2. A/M Dorm Rqmt
  3. 498 TMG Personnel Build-Up



# SECRET

## KADENA AB OFFICER QUARTERS REQUIREMENT END POSITION 4/64

Officer Strength (1)	793
30 Sep CMOP (2)	<u>- 4</u>
Total officer strength	789
Officer grade civilian (3)	<u>62</u>
Total officer grade strength	851
Less Govt & indigenous Hsg (4)	<u>449</u>
Requirement	402
Less current assets (5)	<u>242</u>
Deficiency	160

1. As contained in PM 62-2, dated March 1960, on page 170, plus 109 transient requirement.
2. The 30 Sep 60 CMOP was forwarded to Hq USAF in Oct 60 for updating the PM.
3. Based on 28% of 222 (72% considered airmen grade). 222 from 30 Sep 60 CMOP.
4. As contained in RCS: AF Z-7, dated June 1960. It should be noted that the total number of available family quarters at Kadena is 1,308, of which 449 are officer type. It is not possible, therefore, to apply a rigid percentage factor to the end position strength as a method of determining what number of personnel will occupy family quarters. Rather, it is essential that only those family quarters actually available be considered in the computations.
5. As contained in RCS: AF Z-33, AF Form 800, Kadena AB, and forwarded as supporting document with FY 62 MCP.

624511

Attachment #1

# SECRET

0 2 4 0

KADENA AB AIRMEN DORMITORY REQUIREMENT  
END POSITION 4/64

Airmen strength (1)	6,467
30 Sep CMOP (2)	+ 80
Total airmen strength	6,547
Airmen grade civilian (3)	+ 160
Total airmen grade strength	6,707
Less Govt & indigenous hsg (4)	1,359
Requirement	5,348
Less current assets (5)	4,615
Total A/M dormitory deficiency	733

1. As contained in FM 62-2, dated March 1960 on page 170 plus 150 transient requirement.
2. The 30 Sep CMOP was forwarded to Hq USAF in Oct 1960 for updating of PM document.
3. Based on 72% of 222 (28% considered officer grade). 222 from 30 Sep 60 CMOP.
4. As contained in RCS: AF Z-27, dated May 1960. It should be noted that the total number of available family quarters at Kadena is 1,808, of which 1,359 are airmen type. It is not possible, therefore, to apply a rigid percentage factor to the end position strength as a method of determining what number of personnel will occupy family quarters. Rather, it is essential that only those family quarters actually available be considered in the computations.
5. As contained in RCS: AF Z-33, AF Form 800, Kadena AB, and forwarded as supporting document with FY 62 MCP.

498th TACTICAL MISSILE GROUP

PERSONNEL BUILD-UP

PERIOD	<u>CUMULATIVE</u>						
	<u>3/61</u>	<u>4/61</u>	<u>1/62</u>	<u>2/62</u>	<u>3/62</u>	<u>4/62</u>	<u>1/63</u>
Officers	17	21	41	47	59	74	86
Airmen	104	143	375	492	643	779	868
Total increase (1)	121	164	416	539	702	853	954

(1) Source: PACAF 30 Sep 60 CMOP updating. Includes base support.

624511

Attachment #3



# SECRET

Ltr, PACAF (PFSCE), 27 Oct 1960, Officers' Quarters and Airmen Dormitory Requirements at Kadena Air Base (U)

1st Ind (AFOCE-PD)

Department of the Air Force, Hq USAF, Washington 25, D.C.

TO: PACAF

1. This headquarters concurs that dormitories and officers' quarters were mentioned as supporting items in the original MACE authorization and appropriation clearances although specified as nine 80-man dorms and five 4-man officers' quarters. However, without regard to the initial program, OSD declined to approve a 200-man dormitory in the FY-1962 MCP. At present then, approval of additional dormitories will require OSD approval. Your deficits also generally agree with our computations although they will be lessened if additional family housing is provided as proposed in your "late starter" program.
2. In view of the above and the recent Presidential directives on dependent travel to overseas areas, immediate decisions on construction of your proposed package must be deferred. If dependents are not replaced in the full amount at Kadena, family housing may be available for alternate use.
3. It is proposed, therefore, that only 400 dormitories be considered at this time as an incremental request. Firm cost estimates should be provided as soon as possible so that this headquarters may take action to clear and release this dormitory construction. Additional construction at this location must be withheld pending future action on the Okinawa dependent problem.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

R. H. CURTIN  
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force  
Dep Dir for Civil Engineering Operations  
Directorate of Civil Engineering, DCS/O

625725

# SECRET

0 2 4 3

# SECRET

Ltr, PACAF (PFSCE), 27 Oct 1960, Officers' Quarters and Airmen Dormitory Requirements at Kadena Air Base (U)

2nd Ind (PFSCE)

13 DEC 1960

Hq PACAF

TO: USAF (AFOCE-PD)

1. Forwarded herewith are AF Forms 161/161A for the following projects:

a. Dormitory, Airmen	722-211	400 MN	\$ 760,000
b. Dormitory, Airmen, Addn	722-211A	336 MN	252,000
c. OQ, Men	724-414	86 MN	651,000

2. Reference your comment on the alternate use of family housing in light of the Presidential directive on overseas dependents. If and when a decision is made not to replace dependents in the full amount at Kadena, requirements for dormitory space may actually increase. For example, assuming a 60% reduction in the number of families now at Kadena and that all remaining families would be required to move from private into government owned quarters, we can expect an increased requirement for dormitory spaces. This situation arises from the requirement to billet unaccompanied officers, airmen and civilians who are equal in number to the number of families displaced. Preliminary studies indicate that after housing three (3) officers or NCO's in each government housing unit not required by the remaining families, we will have an additional requirement of about 500 dormitory spaces at Kadena over and above the requirement of 733 spaces indicated in the basic letter.

3. In addition, we now expect a double deployment in the first increment of personnel as a result of slippage in the USAFE program. This will result in a dormitory requirement for an additional 200 men beginning September 1962.

4. We request immediate authority to initiate design and earliest possible project approval and funding for the 400 space dormitory project. We further request your continued support for the remainder of the package.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

MATT T. MAXWELL  
Colonel, USAF  
ACS/Civil Engineering

625725

# SECRET

0244

156

SECRET

PP RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 94C  
P 280114Z ZEX  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAOKA/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
INFO RJAPAZ/5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN  
BT

/SECRET/PFSCE-PP 1210  
ACTION 313 ADIV, INFO 5AF. ATTN: CIV ENGINEERING. REFERENCE OUR  
SECRET LETTER, PFSCE-ED, 19 MAY 60, SUBJ: CLASSROOM AND SPACE REQUIRE-  
MENTS FOR MTD FOR TM-76B (S), AND SUBSEQUENT INDORSEMENTS THERETO.  
PART I: ON THE BASIS OF RECENT CHANGES AND PROPOSALS, THIS HQ HAS  
REQUESTED HQ USAF TO EXTEND THE OKINAWA OPERATIONAL FACILITIES AUTHOR-  
IZATIONS AND FUNDING FOR SITES 1 AND 2, TO INCLUDE: (1) THE CON-  
STRUCTION OF 1,870 SF ADDITIONS TO EACH OF TWENTY-ONE (21) EXISTING  
"H" TYPE DORMITORIES; (2) TWO (2) NEW 200 MN AIRMEN DORMITORIES; AND,  
(3) AN 86 MN BOQ TO PROVIDE FOR OUR END POSITION DEFICIENCIES. THERE-  
FORE, SITING OF THE PROPOSED TEMPORARY MTD FACILITIES IN OLD TEMPORARY  
AIRMEN DORMITORY AREA NO LONGER PERTINENT CONSIDERATION. THE DESIRABILITY  
OF PERMANENT FACILITIES FOR THIS MTD IS RECOGNIZED, BUT WE QUESTION THE  
NEED FOR NEW AND EXPENSIVE CONSTRUCTION. IN VIEW OF THE 1 AUG 61 BOD  
REQUIREMENT, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU AGAIN EXAMINE ALL EXISTING FACIL-  
ITIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE MTD CAN BE ACCOMMODATED ADEQUATELY  
WITHOUT NEW CONSTRUCTION. REQUEST THIS HQ BE ADVISED NOT LATER THAN  
4 NOV 60 ON YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS. PART II: FOR 5AF. THIS ACTION TAKEN  
BECAUSE OF TIME ELEMENT INVOLVED.

BT  
28/0149Z OCT 1960

624390

SECRET

0245



SECRET

157

RR RJACKA  
DE RJHPKM 238C  
R M 040255Z ZEX  
FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RUHPFS/DIV ENGR USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII  
INFO RJAPAZ/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
RJACKA/313AIR DIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
RUAWRA/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA  
AF GRNC  
BT

/S E C R E T/PFSCE-ED 548  
ACTION USAENGR DIV PACOCEAN; INFO 5AF (5FSCE), 313 AIR DIV (313CE)  
AND USAENGR DIST OKINAWA. SUBJECT IS BODS FOR SUPPORT FACILITIES,  
KADENA AB. REFERENCES: (A) OKINAWA ENGR DIST MESSAGE UNCLAS EFTO  
POCGM 2011 DATED 2 NOV 60. (B) YOUR UNCLAS EFTO PODGB 3071 DATED 28  
OCT 60. (C) OKINAWA ENGR DIST MESSAGE UNCLAS EFTO POCGM 1956 DATED  
25 OCT 60. (D) YOUR UNCLAS EFTO PODGB 3028 DATED 19 OCT 60. (E) OUR  
SECRET PFSCE-ED 366 DATED 15 JUL 60. (F) OKINAWA ENGR DIST MESSAGE  
SECRET POOVE 9040 DATED 19 OCT 60. THIS MESSAGE IN 5 PARTS. PART 1.  
REQUEST FOLLOWING CHANGES IN BODS LISTED IN REFERENCE (C): SHOP, MISSILE  
SERVICE - 1 JUN 61; G/M TEST STAND - 1 SEP 61. PAVEMENT TO BE IN PLACE  
TO PERMIT ACCESS TO ABOVE SITES ON SCHEDULED BODS. PART 2. IF THESE  
BODS ARE NOT MET, WE MAY BE UNABLE TO MEET USAF PROGRAMMED OPERATIONAL  
READY DATES, WHICH MAY JEOPARDIZE THE ENTIRE PROGRAM. IN ADDITION, IT  
WILL REQUIRE RESCHEDULING OF THE ENTIRE MARTIN CO., TACTICAL AIR COMMAND,  
AND AIR TRAINING COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAMS, AND THE WEAPON SYSTEM CON-  
TRACTOR PRODUCTION SCHEDULES. SINCE ALL THESE PROGRAMS ARE WELL UNDER  
WAY, THIS WILL RESULT IN HEAVY MONETARY LOSSES. PART 3. AS NOTED IN  
REFERENCE (D), EVERY MEANS IS AUTHORIZED IN PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION  
TO MEET THESE DESIRED BODS, AND NEGOTIATION IS AUTHORIZED FOR ALL SUPPORT  
FACILITIES OR ANY PART THEREOF TO INSURE SPECIFIED BODS ARE MET. PART 4.  
REQUEST YOU ADVISE THIS HQ NLT 10 NOV 60 YOUR CONCURRENCE WITH ABOVE  
SCHEDULE. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE BE INFORMED OF YOUR FINAL DECISION  
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, SINCE ALL FIRM BODS MUST BE PROGRAMMED INTO  
A PLAN FOR INSTALLATION AND VERIFICATION OF PECULIAR EQUIPMENT IN TIME TO  
ALLOW TRAINING OF REQUIRED PERSONNEL. PART 5. THIS MESSAGE CLASSIFIED  
SECRET BECAUSE IT REFERS TO DATES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF WEAPON SYSTEM.

BT  
04/0322Z NOV 1960

624625

SECRET

0246

SECRET

158

QA728PKAS36KMA256

RR RJAOKA

DE RJHPKM 212D

R 110252Z ZEX

R 110252Z ZEX

FM HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

TO RJEDSQ/AMC-ASC WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO

INFO RJEDSQ/WADD WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB OHIO

RJACKA/313ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

RJAPAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN

BT

//S E C R E T/PMFLP 521. ACTION FOR LMDM AT AMC-ASC; INFO FOR WWZSG AT WADD, 5FMLP AT 5AF. SUBJECT: SUPPORT FACILITIES FOR 498TH TMG, KADENA; OKINAWA. FOLLOWING ARE REVISED JODS AND BODS FOR SUBJECT FACILITIES:

ITEM	JOD	BOD
SHOP, MISSILE SERVICE	1 JUN 61	30 JUN 61
UTILITIES		30 JUN 61
CMF	1 JUL 61	31 JUL 61
G/M STORAGE		30 SEP 61
ENGINE TEST STAND		1 SEP 61
FENCING AND PAVING		3 OCT 61

JOINT OCCUPANCY DATES AS ABOVE MEAN THAT BUILDING SHELLS ONLY WILL BE READY ON THESE DATES, AND CONTRACTOR WILL BE WORKING IN BUILDING FOR ADDITIONAL THIRTY DAYS. ALTHOUGH PAVEMENT WILL NOT BE IN PLACE UNTIL 3 OCT 61, SUB-BASE AND BASE COURSE WILL BE IN SUCH CONDITION THAT USING AGENCY WILL HAVE ALL-WEATHER ACCESS TO FACILITIES AS REQUIRED. SUGGEST CONFERENCE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IMPACT OF THE ABOVE ON PACAF IGC PLAN. IN VIEW OF SLIPPAGE IN BODS, AND FACT THAT WE WILL BE UNABLE TO SECURE ENTRY TO LAUNCH SITES UNTIL EARLY AUGUST TO INSTALL INTER-AREA CABLING, I & C PLAN MUST BE EXTENSIVELY REVISED TO MEET OUR PRESENT OR DATES. REQUEST THIS MEETING BE HELD AT KADENA, OKINAWA, TO EFFECT CLOSE COORDINATION WITH OKED, 313TH AD, AND 9AF. TIME PHASING OF PERSONNEL PLANNING NECESSITATES EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING. SUGGEST ARRIVAL AT KADENA BY 27 NOV 60 OF PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH REWRITE OF PLAN TO INCLUDE MR. LANGSFORD OF MARCO. FINAL COORDINATION OF THE RESULTING REVISED I & C PLAN MAY BE EFFECTED. REQUEST CONFIRMATION. THIS MESSAGE CLASSIFIED SECRET, AS IT REVEALS PROGRAMMED DATES OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEM.

BT

11/0253Z NOV 1960

SECRET

200740

0247

SECRET

159

ACTION

PRIORITY

FROM: 6313ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA

TO: PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

INFO: 5AF FUCHU AIR STA JAPAN

313AD KADENA AB OKINAWA (COURIER)

SECRET BE-EP 11-11.

THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. A. REFERENCE SECRET MESSAGE  
PFSCE-PP 1211, 28 OCT 60. TM76B MTD CAN BE ACCOMMODATED  
ADEQUATELY WITHOUT NEW CONSTRUCTION BY OCCUPYING ONE HALF  
OF BUILDING 859 KADENA AIR BASE PROVIDING DET 3, 7651ST AC&I  
SQUADRON CURRENTLY OCCUPYING THIS SPACE CAN MOVE TO BUILDING  
#700 BISHIGAWA. THIS WILL REQUIRE AIR CONDITIONING, SECURITY  
FENCE AND MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO BUILDING #700 BISHIGAWA TO  
MAKE THE BUILDING FUNCTIONALLY SUITABLE FOR DET 3, 7651ST AC&I.  
ESTIMATED COST \$25,000. THIS IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO  
PROVIDE A FACILITY FOR TM76B MTD WITHOUT NEW CONSTRUCTION. AT  
THIS LEVEL IT APPEARS THAT NO IMPAIRMENT OF OPERATIONAL EFFECT-  
IVENESS WILL RESULT FOR DET 3, 7651ST AC&I BY THIS MOVE. HOWEVER,  
SUGGEST THIS BE COORDINATED WITH INTELLIGENCE YOUR HEADQUARTERS.  
REQUEST EXPEDITIOUS CONSIDERATION SO THAT IF APPROVED AN AF FORM  
734 CAN BE PREPARED FOR MODIFICATION OF BUILDING #700 BISHIGAWA  
WITHOUT DELAY. B. REFERENCE SECRET MESSAGE 5FSCE-S 2099, 7 NOV  
60. IT IS PLANNED THAT BOTH THE F105 MTD AND THE TM76B MTD WILL  
OCCUPY BUILDING 859 ON AN INTERIM BASIS WITH THE FACILITY REVERTING  
TO ITS DESIGNATED USE AS SOON AS A CONSOLIDATED FACILITY CAN BE

625029

SECRET

0248



SECRET

6313ABW KADENA AB OKINAWA

PROVIDED FROM MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDS. PARA E OF AFR 87-2 PROVIDES FOR THESE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS REQUESTED THEREFORE THAT RECONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE RESTRICTIONS SET FORTH IN REFERENCE B AND THAT KAD 328-2 MOD MTU BUILDING 859 BE APPROVED WITHOUT DELAY. IF THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED FAVORABLE, NEW CONSTRUCTION WILL BE THE ONLY SOLUTION TO AVOID A BREAKDOWN OF 18TFW MISSION.

18/0230Z Nov. 1960

BE-EP

GILBERT A. SMITH, JR., Maj, USAF, Base Engr

48022

625029

SECRET

0249

160  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

PP RJAOKA  
DE RJAPAZ 43D  
P 020345Z  
FM 5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN  
TO 313 AIRDIV KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FROM 5FCOI 0039M. FOR SUTHERLAND FROM VANDIVER.  
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PACAF PFCOI-P 036 TO OFFICE OF INFORMATION,  
OFFICE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, IS QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. QUOTE.  
THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PAR ONE. CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, DEPARTMENT OF  
ARMY QUERIED BY AMERICAN AVIATION MAGAZINE REGARDING MACE INSTALLATION AT  
OKINAWA AND INCLUDING NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED, COSTS, AND NECESSITY  
IN VIEW OF MATADOR UNIT ALREADY IN TAIWAN. COMMANDER 313TH AIR DIVISION  
ADVOCATES REFERRAL OF QUERY TO THE AIR FORCE AND COORDINATION WITH CIVIL  
AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AND STATE DEPARTMENT IN VIEW OF SENSITIVE NATURE  
OF PROGRAM AND STRESSED MINIMUM PUBLICITY. 5AF CONCURS IN THIS REQUEST.  
COMMANDER 313TH AIR DIVISION ALSO RECOMMENDS, AND 5AF CONCURS, THAT HIGHER  
HEADQUARTERS BE ADVISED THAT IF AT ALL FEASIBLE IN VIEW OF POLITICAL AND  
DIPLOMATIC FACTORS INVOLVED, MAGAZINE BE ASKED TO DEFER PUBLICATION OF THE  
FACTS UNTIL A FUTURE DATE. IF THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE, RECOMMEND FACTS BE  
FURNISHED AFTER COORDINATION WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AND STATE  
DEPARTMENT. PART TWO. IN VIEW OF THREE KNOWN PRIOR ANSWERS TO INQUIRY  
RELEASES AND ONE SPECULATIVE STORY THAT GREATLY EXAGGERATED COST FIGURES  
INVOLVED, THIS HEADQUARTERS ADVOCATES STRAIGHT NEWS ANSWER TO INQUIRY. PAST  
DISCLOSURE OF MACE SITES BY U.S. OFFICIAL IN OKINAWA PRIOR TO ELECTIONS DID  
NOT CAUSE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC REACTION BY OKINAWANS OR JAPANESE AS ANTICIPATED.  
WHILE THIS HEADQUARTERS CONCURS IN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM PUBLICITY ON THIS  
PROJECT, WE FEEL THAT IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE REFUSAL TO HONOR OR DEFERRING  
THIS INQUIRY CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED. ADDITIONALLY A SPECULATIVE STORY BY THIS  
MAGAZINE COULD DO MORE HARM THAN A RESTATEMENT OF INFORMATION ALREADY MADE  
PUBLIC. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION OF NECESSITY IN VIEW OF MATADOR LOCATIONS,  
SUGGEST REPLY TO BE, QUOTE: THE AIR FORCE IS CONTINUALLY MODERNIZING ITS  
FORCES AND IMPROVING ITS WEAPONS INVENTORY TO KEEP PACE WITH ADVANCING  
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND IN PRESENTING A BETTER DEFENSE FOR THE FREE WORLD.  
END QUOTE. REQUEST COORDINATION WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,  
STATE DEPARTMENT AND DOD: END QUOTE.

BT  
02/0411Z FEB 1961.

313IO-0065

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0250



161

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Monday, 13 March 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpo - News Article (M) No. 885

BASES FOR MACE MISSILE TO BE CONSTRUCTED ON OKINAWA

Tokyo Bureau - According to the special dispatch from Washington reported by the Tokyo Shimbun morning edition on 12 March, the 13 March issue of the U.S. magazine "Missiles and Rocket" says that the U.S. military is going to construct four bases for Mace B missile on Okinawa, and that these bases will be ready for use within this year. Because the residual sovereignty of Okinawa is held by Japan, the U.S. authority concerned is refraining from revealing it in fear of possible repercussions in Japan. But a greater portion of the important bases of Communist China are included within the 1,900-kilometer (some 1,179.9 miles) range of Mace B Missile, it is reported. The article further says as follows:

Correspondent McGUIRE of the said magazine reported from Naha that the responsible authorities of the Japanese Government who know this program, give approval to this program. According to the above magazine, the U.S. authorities concerned considered that there is nothing in the Far East which is regarded as the target of an ICBM with nuclear-warhead; however, they recently changed their idea since Communist China established industrial centers. Up to now, there were no bases of Thoror Jupiter IRBMs, or of the B-52 strategic bomber in the Far East. A B-47 Group in Guam, and



5th and 13th Strategic Air Force Groups with F-100D, F-101A, and A-3D strategic bombers stationed dispersedly in Okinawa, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan, and the 7th Fleet are the only U.S. force groups which have weapons with nuclear-warhead in the Far East.

The reason why the bases for Mace B missiles are not established in Taiwan is that Taiwan is not under the complete administration of the United States. Mace B Missile, the four bases for which will be constructed on Okinawa, is what was invented through improvement of the inner parts of Mace A Missile, and it is able to carry more fuel with itself than Mace A. The range of this missile is more than 1,900 kilometers (some 1,179.9 miles). It can fly at an altitude of 10,020 meters (some 32,865.6 ft.). Speed per hour is 1,040 kilometers (some 645.84 miles). But when it plunges toward the ground, its speed becomes supersonic. Mace B is a guided missile.

The "Matador" on Taiwan is guided by the radar base in the Pescadores; however, Mace B is guided by force of inertia. Therefore, it requires no guidance from a base. It is said that the U.S. strategic air force has been training personnel needed for Missile Mace groups since last November.

(Similar Article in the Okinawa Times)

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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Monday, 13 March 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpo (Evening Edition) - News Article (K)

No. 890

VARIOUS POLITICAL FACTIONS GOING TO OPPOSE CONSTRUCTION OF  
MACE MISSILE BASES

The report that the 13th March issue of the U.S. magazine "Missiles and Rocket" says that the U.S. military will construct four Mace B missile bases on Okinawa, and that they will be ready for use within this year, is what was already known in Okinawa. But, various political factions in the Legislature are attaching great importance to the report that the responsible officers of the Japanese Government who know about this program, give approval to it, and the fact that the Mace B Missile is an offensive weapon. Political parties are showing anxiety and dissatisfaction about it, and are going to discuss measures for preventing the Mace B Missile by holding an inter-party conference. In this connection, local political party leaders expressed their views as follows:

Secretary General SHINZATO Seitoku of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party:

"I had expected that international politics would move toward disarmament with the birth of the KENNEDY Administration. Upon hearing the report that Mace missile bases will be constructed on Okinawa at such a juncture, I feel great anxiety and dissatisfaction about it. I would



like to bring this matter into the general meeting of legislators to be held today, for discussion, and to seek measures for coping with the situation."

Secretary General TAIRA Ryosho of Okinawa Socialist Masses Party:

"We have successively adopted resolutions opposing the production, employment and experiment of any nuclear weapon. With the prospective bringing-in of the Mace missile, the inhabitants of Okinawa will again be forced to bear an unfavorable thing. Even Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan aims mainly at the promotion of stabilization of the Okinawan people's livelihood, and is not what allows limitless construction of military bases. The report says that Japanese Government gives approval to it. If it is true, this is an act of the Japanese Government in violation of its duty to the Okinawan people. We never want to make Okinawa an island which increases the tension of the Far East any more. So, we intend to launch a strong movement opposing it and to take measures for preventing bringing-in of the Mace missile by appealing to various quarters for cooperation."

Chairman SENAGA Kamejiro of Okinawa Peoples Party:

"With this report, it became more clear that the new Security Pact is a pact which aims at strengthening the North-east Asian military alliance, and that Okinawa is the key of the military alliance. Efforts of the Okinawa Prefectural people in cooperation with the Japanese people should be made toward acquisition of peace by abolishing the new Security



Pact. The warmongers of the KENNEDY Administration are hastening armament with nuclear weapons. We should attain reversion for the sake of our lives.

As for our party, I would like to do my best for reversion through opposition to the Mace missile, side by side with promoting a movement to protect our livelihood against the present high prices, and to obtain civil rights. I would like to bring the matter into the inter-party conference we shall have today, and ask for the opinion opposing it from the suprapartisan standpoint. And I hope that the will opposing it will be expressed at the plenary session of the Legislature to be convened tomorrow."

(Similar Article in the Okinawa Times evening edition)

163

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Tuesday, 14 March 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by CPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpō - News Article (M)

No. 833

CONSTRUCTION OF MACE WEAPONS SITES UNDER WAY

With regard to the report that Mace weapons sites will be constructed on Okinawa, the 313th Air Division on 13 March announced officially that four Mace weapons sites are being constructed on Okinawa. A spokesman for the Air Division stated that the contracts for construction have already been let for the construction of these weapons sites, and that construction is already under way, and will not require the acquisition of any additional land. By the way, the Legislature on 10 May 1960 adopted a resolution opposing the bringing-in of Mace weapons.

As to the Mace, the spokesman for the 313th Air Division announced as follows:

This is not news, since the original announcement was made in Washington more than a year ago, and the announcement was published in the local press, too. The Mace is actually a pilotless aircraft. It will contribute greatly to the security of the Ryukyu Islands and this entire area of Asia, and will act as a further deterrent to any potential aggression. Contracts for construction have already been let for the construction of these weapons sites. Construction is on land already leased to the United States Government, and will not require the



acquisition of any additional land. This project will result in the expenditure of \$15 million, much of which will be expended locally.

As to the location of the four sites, the spokesman refrained from announcing it for the reason of "with the purpose of securing safety." But he said that construction of these sites has already begun.

In this connection, Civil Administrator John C. ONDRICK stated as follows:

"Construction of these sites is necessary for the defense of the free nations. Historians say that if there had been such effective weapons as those of today, fifty years ago, World War II would not have broken out. Accordingly, it is necessary to have defensive power even for preventing the outbreak of war. I think it is not necessary to obtain approval of the Japanese Government for the construction works by the U.S. military on Okinawa."

(Similar Article in the Okinawa Times)



164

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Tuesday, 14 March 1961

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The Ryukyu Shimpo - News Article

(M)

No. 900

OLDP OPPOSING TO BRINGING-IN OF MACE WEAPONS

The Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party from 30 minutes after noon of 13 March held a general meeting of legislators at the lobby of the Legislature. At this meeting, a report was made on the proceedings of the conference conducted on 11 March between Civil Administrator John G. ONDRICK and OLDP officers. Following it, they discussed the problem concerning the construction of Mace weapons sites.

In his report on the proceedings of the conference with Civil Administrator ONDRICK, OLDP Secretary General SHINZATO Seitoku explained that though the Civil Administrator did not show an active interest in the establishment of the Japan-U.S.-Ryukyu Liaison Council, he seemed not necessarily to deny it, and accordingly that the OLDP Secretary General would do his utmost for materialization of the establishment of the Liaison Council.

Following it, they discussed the bringing-in of Mace weapons. As a result, they tentatively decided to oppose the bringing-in of Mace weapons, from the viewpoint that the Mace is an offensive weapon. But as there still remain obscure points about the Mace, they decided to make deliberation on the powers of the Mace and other points.

(Similar Article in the Okinawa Times)

165

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Wednesday, 15 March 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Okinawa Times - News Article (T)

No. 907

SOCIALIST MASSES PARTY PROPOSES ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION  
AGAINST CONSTRUCTION OF MACE MISSILE BASE

In connection with the Air Force announcement that construction is already under-way for Mace B missile base on Okinawa (aggressive nuclear weapons), each faction within the Legislature is adopting attitude of opposition to bringing into Okinawa of Mace missiles.

In connection with this problem, the Socialist Masses Party has decided to propose on the 15th the holding of a factional adjustment meeting with the Liberal Democratic and Peoples Parties, for a resolution of opposition against the construction of a Mace missile base.

In the afternoon of the 14th, all legislators affiliated with the Socialist Masses Party visited Civil Administrator John G. ONDRICK in order to ascertain where the Mace missile base is being constructed, but could not meet the Civil Administrator due to the latter's absence. Then, the OSMP legislators called on Director SATO Takegoro of the Nampo Liaison Office and called upon him to inquire of the Japanese Government whether it gave approval to the bringing into Okinawa of Mace missiles. To this request, Director SATO replied, "I have already reported about it to the Japanese Government, but the Japanese Government is not in a position to give approval to it."



In view of above, the Socialist Masses Party felt a need for the Legislature to express its will in the form of a resolution on this problem as soon as possible, and the party decided, as mentioned before, to propose the holding of a factional adjustment meeting on the problem on the 15th.

Statement of Legislator CHIRANA Hideo: "The formal Air Force announcement made it clear that the Pace missile base construction has already been started. So, we would like to ascertain where the subject base is being constructed by meeting with the Civil Administrator. Our party is absolutely opposed to bringing into Okinawa of such nuclear weapons and intends to do our utmost to check it. From such sense, we intend to propose the holding of a factional adjustment meeting on the 15th, so as to express the Legislature's will on this problem as soon as possible."

(Similar article in the Ryukyu Shimpo)



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Thursday, 13 March 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpo - News Article (10)

No. 930

JSP TO QUESTION ABOUT MACE B SITES CONSTRUCTION

(Tokyo Bureau) The establishment of nuclear missile, Mace B, sites in Okinawa has called forth great repercussions in Japan. It was decided that Acting Chairman MORIMAKA Moriyoshi of the Japan Socialist Party Okinawa Problem Measure Committee will probe into responsibility of the Japanese Government in the general interpellations at the House of Councilors' Budget Committee meeting on 18 March, by arguing that the construction of Mace sites in Okinawa will mean permanent U.S. possession of Okinawa. In particular, Mr. MORIMAKA will ascertain the truth of the report of an American magazine that the Japanese Government approved the establishment of the Mace sites. At the same time, it is expected that he will urge the Japanese Government to conclude an "administrative agreement" with the U.S. for smooth extension of aid to Okinawa and promotion of the people's living standard, and also demand that Japan should establish a special law for aiding Okinawa. Following are the gist of prospective interpellations:

1. Nuclear missile, Mace B, is an offensive weapon, and it is reported that the Japanese Government's approval was obtained for the construction of the Mace B sites, but is this true? If this is true, there will arise a contradictory situation in which Japan will be

charged only with the military responsibility in Okinawa and will be charged with no administrative authority.

2. In response to the questions of Messrs. UKEDA and OKADA, at the Diet, the Government authorities replied that the negotiations for return of Okinawa will be conducted through Japan-United States diplomatic channels instead of U.N. diplomatic channels, but it must be impossible to revise simply the Peace Treaty through negotiations between the two countries. The negotiation for return of Okinawa should be conducted through U.N. diplomatic channels.

3. Increase of aid to Okinawa is a matter of joy, but the Japanese Government should extend more positive aid in the form of application of the social security system and Irromote development which are most desired by the Okinawan people. For this purpose, it is necessary to conclude an "administrative agreement" with the United States to make Japan's Finance Law and Accounting Law applicable to Okinawa.

4. The three powers of legislation, judicial processes and administration in Okinawa are presently held by the High Commissioner of the U.S. Civil Administration, but doesn't aid to Okinawa mean assistance to the U.S., theoretically? What will be the connection between the High Commissioner and the Chief Executive? Won't it become difficult to increase aid to Okinawa if nothing is done about the present conditions?

5. By concluding the administrative agreement with the U.S., the Japanese Government should strive to settle problems involving travel,



protection of human rights and protection of livelihood, irrespective of the military bases. Is the Japanese Government prepared for it?

Mr. MOCHIMARU will press the government authorities with the above questions for an hour and a half, but if budget deliberation on the 18th encounter difficulties, it is possible that the questions will be postponed until the 20th.



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Saturday, 18 March 1961

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The Ryukyu Shimpō - News Article (F)

No. 952

ANTI-ATOM BOMB COUNCIL DECIDES ON MEASURES AGAINST BRINGING IN  
MISSILE MACE

The Okinawa Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council held an urgent Board meeting at the Okinawa Kaikan (hall) at 2 p.m., 17 March, and discussed the bringing into Okinawa of the Mace B nuclear missile. As a result, it was decided to announce a statement against the bringing in of Mace B. In addition, the following measures were decided on in order to launch an opposition movement throughout the Ryukyus:

1. A statement will be immediately made public; 2) the Legislature will be requested to pass an opposition resolution; 3) municipal assemblies will be requested to adopt an opposition resolution; 4) the Organ Paper Association will be requested to have the power of missile weapons published in the organ paper of each organization; 5) a signature-seeking campaign will be conducted between 25 March and 30 April, and places of signature collection will be in front of the Government building, in front of the Taiho Movie Theater, the Kainan Police Box, Koza, Futenma, and Kadena; 6) appeals will be made to various organizations in Japan; and 7) after completion of the signature-seeking campaign, a written protest bearing signatures will be sent to both the U.S. President and the Japanese Government through the Japan Council for Opposition to Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

The statement says, in gist, as follows:

"In spite of the opposition by the Anti-ACM Bomb Council and the Legislature, the U.S. has announced the construction of Mace B missile sites in Okinawa. This means changing the U.S. military base on Okinawa into an offensive base. The new U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Dr. Reischauer, has announced that 'the U.S. colonial rule of Okinawa is unnecessary and unwise.' But the military base here is being increasingly strengthened as a base to defend U.S. capital. This is contrary to the public opinion of the United States and the world and is a factor calculated to breed tension in the Far East. It was announced that approval had been obtained from the Ikeda Government. This is indicative of the war policy of the Japan-U.S. reactionary force under the new U.S.-Japan Security Pact setup. We will shatter this plot in cooperation with all peace forces in Japan. We hereby declare that we strongly request the withdrawal of all types of nuclear weapons from Okinawa and will prevent the Mace B missile from being brought in here, in cooperation with all the prefectural people."

(Similar article in Okinawa Times)



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Wednesday, 22 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article (M)

No. 1000

ANTI-MACE MOVEMENT DISCUSSED AT OPP MEETING

The Okinawa Peoples Party held its Standing Committee meeting on the afternoon of 21 March at the party headquarters to discuss wage hike struggle of the Government Employees Unions Federation and other labor unions, opposition to bringing in of MACE B, and the participation of the Okinawan representatives in the Japanese Diet. As a result, it was decided that the party will support the wage hike struggle of various labor unions, analyze reality of low wage and its basis, and at the same time, the party will work for prevention of the legislation of local civil service law which restricts rights of working masses and for the abolition of Ordinance No. 145, thereby protecting the livelihood and rights of the working people.

In connection with the opposition to bringing in of MACE B, it was decided to carry out a signature-collection movement in accordance with the decision of Anti-A-H Bomb Council. In order to develop it into a big mass movement, the party will hold a meeting of chapter chiefs on 26 March and decide on the activity policy of the chapters. With regard to the participation of the Okinawan representatives in the Japanese Diet, an agreement was reached to work for the application of the Japanese



public election law to Okinawa. For this purpose, the party will carry out a mass movement centering around the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council, and propose a signature-collection movement at the Executive Committee meeting of the reversion council.

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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Thursday, 23 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article Y.

No. 1014

DIETMAN OKA HARUO PRESSES GOVERNMENT WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MACE MISSILE BASES

Tokyo. At the meeting of the Foreign Relations committee held on March 22, Dietman Oka Haruo, in connection with the problem of bringing the Mace missile into Okinawa, asked the government what has become of the resolution adopted at last year's legislative session opposing the bringing in of the Mace missile into Okinawa, and what does the absence of consultation mean despite the fact that the minute of mutual agreement clearly stipulates that Japan will be consulted in case of attacks against Okinawa and other islands? And what did the government do when the resolution against the bringing in of Mace missile was sent to the Japanese government by the Legislature? Foreign Minister Kosaka and Director General Fujieda dodged the question, however, by stating that they will do what they can, and did not give any definite answer. Following the interpellation by Dietmen Kawakami (Communist Party) and Hotari (Socialist Party), at 10:45 a.m. Dietman Oka Haruo took the floor and pressed the government with questions. The questions asked were as follows:

Q. "You (Director General Fujieda) told us that you would like to strive for the realization of the resolution adopted by the Ryukyuan Legislature, and I want you to promise to do so.

A. I will do what I can if the resolution requires the effort of the Japanese Government.

Q. "Were there no talks about the bringing in of the Mace missile when you visited Okinawa last year?"

A. "No, I heard nothing about the matter at that time, but I was told that the Office of Public Affairs, USCAR, made an announcement on the matter on March 13."

Q. "Was that an information sent to the Japanese government?"

A. "No."

Q. "Was there any inquiry on the subject to the Japanese Government?"

A. "No."

Foreign Minister Kosaka. "I have inquired about the Mace missile, and in answer to my inquiry there were explanations about its powers, but it is no problem requiring previous consultation. Nothing was said about support of opposition to the bringing in of the Mace missile"

Q. "Even though it may not come under the heading of provisions requiring previous consultation, in the light of the minute of the mutual agreement about Okinawa, Japan naturally has a voice. Is not the bringing in of the Mace missile a menace to the safety of Okinawa?"

A. "Mace missile bases are necessary to eliminate the menace."



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Friday, 24 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - Editorial Y.

No. 1026

THE FAINT-HEARTED ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

The Mace missile problem of Okinawa has become the focal point of questions in the Japanese Diet at present. This situation has developed from an article in an American magazine which reported that the United States is constructing Mace missile bases in 4 places in Okinawa and that there are strong indications that Japan has consented to it. And the answers to the questions of opposition party Diet men are extremely ambiguous and besides there are even very weak-kneed utterances toward Okinawa.

For instance, Foreign Minister Kosaka to the question, "Is not the bringing in of the Mace missile a menace to the safety of Okinawa?" answered that it will remove that menace. It might be natural as an opinion of the American side, but it is almost unbelievable that such answer could have been given by a responsible official of the Japanese Government and makes us feel miserable indeed. To put it strongly, we may say that he has trampled Okinawan sentiment underfoot.

To the bringing in of the Mace missile the Legislature each time adopted an opposition resolution. In fact, concerning the Mace missile the Legislature adopted an opposition resolution on 10 May last year,

and at the plenary session today the Legislature is expected to adopt the opposition resolution again. Even though there is little likelihood of preventing the bringing in of the Mace missile by the American forces, it is not fair to question the effect of the resolution. Even though it may be brought in by force that does not mean we have acquiesced in the action. Therefore, to express our will in opposition to it is most natural. In the case of Japan there is an agreement with the United States to hold a joint consultation beforehand in the case of bringing in special weapons such as the Mace missile, but they say that it is not necessary because Okinawa is under complete administrative control of the United States. That is, the United States is free to introduce any weapon into Okinawa and that is why the United States values its military bases in Okinawa highly. Even then, however, it is highly questionable whether it is right for Japan to overlook such things forever. The fact that Japan reached an agreement to "consult beforehand" must be for the purpose of protecting the Japanese nationals from anticipated disadvantages. And if that is so, does not the Japanese government attitude of indifference to the missile problem of Okinawa amount to having forgotten to treat the Okinawan people as Japanese nationals?

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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Saturday, 25 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article Y.

No. 1041

ARGUMENT CENTERS ON THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE IN THE FAR EAST

The resolution in opposition to the bringing in of the Mace-B missile failed to arrive at a conclusion because the Liberal Democratic Party proposed to amend the resolution bill worked out by the representatives of the 3 political parties so that it was postponed to next week.

The draft bill for the opposition resolution to the bringing in of the Mace-B missile was worked out by representatives Kuwae (Liberal Democratic Party) Chibana (Socialist Masses Party) and Furugen (Peoples Party) on 22 March and its provisions were based on 1) That no nation should make or experiment with or use nuclear weapons and 2) that bringing in of a nuclear weapon that is obviously for attacking purposes increases tenseness in the Far East and causes the inhabitants apprehensions. But the Liberal Democratic Party contended that the wording (increases the tenseness in the Far East" should be deleted, for it tends to cause misunderstanding; but the Socialist Masses Party and the Peoples Party opposed the proposal on the ground that the elimination of the words will make the sincere desire of the people obscure; so that they could not reach agreement and decided to postpone putting it on the agenda



for the 24th at the Legislature. The opinions exchanged at the inter-party negotiation were as follows:

Tome (OLDP) "The phraseology 'the OLDP has always contended that manufacture, experiment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited' should be eliminated in the interest of making the provision clearer.

Also, the wording that the bringing in of the nuclear weapons into Okinawa increases the tense atmosphere in the Far East and threatens the safety of the inhabitants' should be eliminated, I think. That is, the United States declared that America will maintain its military bases on Okinawa as long as there is tension in the Far East, and it is apt to offer a foothold of that logic."

Chibana (OSMP) "We have always opposed the bringing in of nuclear weapons and we ought to make our opposition clear."

Furugen (OPP) "I would like to hear the idea of OLDP about the tension in the Far East?"

Tome "My reason for the elimination of those words is that they will support the American reason for bring in those nuclear weapons."

Chibana "Do you believe that peace in the Far East is maintained by the existence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa?"

Tome "It is not necessarily so, but it is better to oppose the bringing in of nuclear weapons from the world-wide viewpoint that the manufacture, experiment, and use of nuclear weapons ought to be prohibited."

Chibana "It is good to oppose from a universal viewpoint. But the poignant viewpoint of the Okinawan people should be given an expression."

Chibana "We are opposed to it because there really is a threat."

Furugen "I want to know wheter or not the Liberal Democratic Party believes that the bringing in of nuclear weapons into Okinawa actually intensifies the tense atmosphere in the Far East or not?"

Tome "It is neither yes nor no. I believe that it is best not to touch on this point in the resolution."

Shinzato. "This is a difficult question to answer and it requires careful consideration."

Furugen "To refrain from giving expression to the threat that is actually being felt and adopt a resolution to the effect that nuclear weapons should not be manufactured is a resolution that can be adopted even in Switzerland. Besides the establishment of the Mace missile bases in Okinawa obviously regards Communist China as an imaginary enemy and is aimed at attacking that enemy."

Tome "That is understandable, but we are not sanctioning the bringing in of the nuclear weapons."

Chibana "We would like to send a copy of the resolution to the Japanese government."

Shinzato "I support that move."

(Similar article in the Ryukyu Shimpo)

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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Sunday, 26 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article (M)

No. 1059

LEGISLATURE'S FAILURE OF ADOPTING ANTI-MACE  
RESOLUTION CALLS FORTH REACTION IN JAPAN

(Tokyo) The Mainichi Shimbun morning edition dated 25 March reported that the Legislature failed to adopt a resolution in opposition to bringing in of the Mace missile. The report made those who watched the move of the Legislature in expectation that the anti-Mace movement might develop into a supra-partisan movement keenly feel the difficulty of the Okinawan problem anew. In particular, this report dealt a blow to the opposition parties which intended to take up the matter in their arguments at the Diet session. On the other hand, those who have been deploring the situation of Okinawa in which the government and opposition parties have been failing to keep pace with each other ever since the settlement of the land problem, heaved a sigh of grief saying that the government and opposition parties again failed to reach an agreement. At the same time, these person note a need to do something about the situation.

Some members of the Japan Socialist Party are suggesting the establishment of a supra-partisan group for the settlement of the Okinawan problems, by appealing to the Japan Liberal Democratic Party. It is expected that the JSP will hold a meeting of its Okinawa Problem Special Measure Committee on 27 March to discuss the matter formally.



On 25 March when it was reported that the Legislature failed to adopt the said resolution, the JSP Central Executive Committee issued an announcement with the view that growing tension of the situation in Laos will produce a danger to Japan. In its announcement, the JSP clarified its attitude to demand that the Japanese Government prohibit the utilization of U.S. Forces in Japan and military bases in Japan for military assistance to Laos, and at the same time, ask the U.S. not to utilize the military bases in Okinawa for a similar purpose.

The questions concerning the Okinawan problems involving the above matter were prepared, but no questions were posed because the Diet was thrown into confusion with the discontinuation of questions and answers involving the decrease in the national railway fare. However, there is no change in the schedule that Mr. MORINAKA Moriyoshi (JSP) will question various problems at the budget subcommittee meetings of the House of Councilors on 28 or 29 March and 30 March, while Mr. OKADA Haruo (JSP) will take up the problem involving Mace B at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting of the House of Representatives around 28 March.

JSP is expected to deal with the result of moves in Okinawa upon receiving detailed information, and the party is also expected to establish a group of interested persons centering around Councilor MORINAKA by calling out to the JLDP as means for dealing with the Okinawan problems which was decided as a basic policy at an earlier party convention. This method proved successful in dealing with the Japan-China diplomatic relations problem. The view of Mr. MORINAKA who

is proposing establishment of the aforementioned group is that there is need to set aside the difference in ideology between the government and the opposition and find a means of breaking through the present situation in which the government is evading every problem on the strength of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty by saying that the treaty was concluded between the victor and the defeated, thus hindering unity of the people in Okinawa. JSP is expected to adjust opinions in this regard by holding a meeting of the Okinawa Problem Measure Special Committee on the 27th.

It may be well to consider that such a move within the Japan Socialist Party is motivated by the following views of persons connected with Okinawa. That is, a reporter who is well informed about Okinawa and heard the news that the Legislature failed to reach an agreement stated, "The key to the settlement of the Okinawan problems lies in a suprapartisan move in Okinawa and the short cut to the settlement of the problems may be that the Japanese Government and the people will conduct a firm negotiation with the U.S. in compliance with the desire of the Okinawan side. The Okinawan side lacks a general policy of connecting their problems with missile sites and pushing their problems forward. The present situation is such that the Okinawan problems are made a tool of political strife, but it is wondered whether there is any possibility of maintaining a suprapartisan attitude as in the case of the land problem."

On the other hand, Chairman KAMIYAMA Seiryō of the Okinawa Prefectural People's Association in Tokyo deplored the situation by saying, "The



Okinawan people must have a keen feeling of dread (toward war) because of their experience during the last war, I believe. I also believe that the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party has the same feeling that Okinawa should not be involved in a war, but the OLDP changes its attitude according to the statement of the Japanese Government. The OLDP may well act according to its own views, and I cannot understand the attitude of the party. I feel as if a germ is building a nest within the government party of Okinawa."



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Monday, 27 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - Editorial Y.

No. 1068

THE ATTITUDE OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CONNECTION WITH THE  
RESOLUTION IN OPPOSITION TO BRINGING IN OF THE MACE MISSILE

There is a discrepancy in the thought and feelings between Japan and Okinawa toward the construction of the Mace missile base in Okinawa. The reaction caused in Japan by the shelving of the resolution against the bringing in of the Mace missile at the Legislature bespeaks of the discrepancy. Behind the shelving of the draft resolution by holding interparty negotiations on two occasions at no small pains appears to be some incomprehensible factor. This might be considered a paralyzed sense of those who live in a military base toward the military bases and it is similar to the idea that holds that whatever the American forces bring in is all right since the American military bases are here. The fact that they temporized the debate on the "tension in the Far East" might have been due to such irresolute viewpoint of the Liberal Democratic Party.

But in Tokyo they regard this attitude of Okinawan side as a puzzling problem; and they are wondering why an all-out opposition has not taken place. It is a fact that even though the American forces are busy making preparations in Okinawa, the bringing in of the Mace missile has given a delusion of a remote problem, and we have a feeling

that we can see the reason why the Legislature failed to adopt a resolution against the bringing in of the Mace missile. But, aside from the debate on the tension in the Far East, it may be necessary for the people who live in a military base to take a detached view of the military base. In this sense, the attitude of the Liberal Democratic Party is a good illustration that prevaricates one's own opinion.

To bring in the Mace missile to Okinawa, which is the most powerful military base in the Far East, might be strategic policy, but for affairs to go on fraught with problems as is the case this time, and yet be unable to express clearly one's stand, is no proper political attitude, we believe. And if they are unable to give an answer when asked whether or not they support the construction of missile base, that is worse still, for it lacks frankness. Man sometimes declines to give a definite answer, but when a political party makes its stand clear it must be one that stands to reason. But this is lacking in the case of the Liberal Democratic Party, which is unsightly in the eyes of others.



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Monday, 27 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article (M)

No. 1070

OLDP HAS TROUBLE IN ADOPTING TWO RESOLUTIONS

The adoption of two resolutions concerning "participation of Okinawan representatives in the Japanese Diet" and "opposition to bringing in of MACE B," which has been pending since the plenary session of Legislature held on 14 March, has been withheld twice in the Legislature because the attitude of the Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party remained undecided. The opposition Okinawa Socialist Masses and Okinawa Peoples Parties hold the view that since the Japanese Diet intends to take up these matters upon adoption of two resolutions by the Legislature, it is not wise externally to postpone the adoption of the two resolutions any longer. The opposition parties also hold the attitude that opinions should be adjusted ultimately by holding an inter-party meeting on 27 March and adopt the resolutions at the plenary session on 28 March.

However, while supporting the participation of Okinawan representatives in the Japanese Diet, the OLDP still holds the view that the party cannot agree to the proposal of the opposition parties to send formal representatives to the Japanese Diet through the revision of Japanese public office election law, on the ground that this is impossible in the light of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty.

As for the MACE problem, the OLDP contends that construction of U. S. military bases in Okinawa cannot be helped under the present



situation in which world peace is maintained by keeping a balance of power (between the East and West), and the party cannot agree to the opinion that bringing in of MACE Bwill immediately increase tension in the Far East. Thus, the party considers it difficult to adjust opinions unless the opposition parties make some concession. Such being the case, there is no alternative for OLDP but to push their way through on the strength of the majority, but in this case, the OLDP will be open to criticism for abusive use of their majority and the party has difficulty in deciding on its attitude.

The attitude of the OLDP toward these two resolutions is limited by the fact that the party intends to deal with these matters within the framework of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, but the opposition parties are showing a move to take advantage of this fact and attack the weakness of OLDP policy toward reversion to Japan.

Moreover, on the basis of series of these resolutions together with another resolution requesting the return of administrative authority, which was adopted at the beginning of the regular legislative session, both the OSMP and OPP are planning to send representatives of the various political factions to Japan prior to the departure of Prime Minister IKEDA for the U.S. in June, and make a strong request to Prime Minister IKEDA that the Okinawan problems will be taken up at the U.S.-Japan conference without fail.

In this connection, the OLDP holds the view that the party cannot agree to the dispatch of political party representatives amidst deliberation on the budget bill, but since Prime Minister IKEDA in his reply at the Diet stated that "the Okinawan problems will not be taken up at the forthcoming U.S.-Japan conference," it is considered that the opposition

parties will severely press the government party with questions. It seems, therefore, that the government party will be placed in a dilemma.



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Thursday, 30 March 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article Y.

No. 1112

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AGAINST BRINGING IN OF THE MACE MISSILE COMPLETED

The draft resolution against bringing in of the Mace missile could not be completed due to the proposal of the Liberal Democratic Party to amend the draft plan broadly but at the interparty negotiation held at 4 p.m. on the 29th the opposition made a generous concession and agreed to adopt the draft plan of the Liberal Democratic Party with a minor amendment and the matter was brought to a conclusion. Originally, all the representatives agreed to oppose the bringing in of the Mace missile, for it is a offensive weapon, but the Liberal Democratic Party objected to the wording of the draft plan, "It increases tension in the Far East and threatens the safety of the peoples' livelihood," and they could not reach agreement. But at the interparty negotiation held on the 29th they argued on the tension in the Far East furiously for a long time, then Legislator Chibana, who saw that it was impossible to adopt a resolution jointly by the 3 parties, offered to adopt the resolution worked out by the Liberal Democratic Party with a minor amendment, and all agreed then, and it will be introduced to the plenary session to be held on 31 March.

Incidentally, Legislator Chibana proposed to add to the opposition to the bringing in of the Mace missile, and suspension of construction

of the Mace missile base; so the Liberal Democratic Party accepted it. A copy of this resolution will be sent to the American President, president of the American Senate and the Speaker of the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of the Defense Department, the High Commissioner, and the Japanese government and the Diet and the House of Councillors will be requested to take proper steps.

The draft resolution follows: The U.S. 313th Air Division on 13 March announced that Mace missile B bases are being constructed in 4 places in Okinawa. The Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyus believes that manufacture, experiment and use of nuclear weapon should be prohibited throughout the world and adopted Resolution No. 5, strongly opposing the bringing in of the Mace missile and the construction of the Mace missile base on May 10, 1960. But the American authorities made the afore-mentioned announcement in defiance of the resolution of the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyus to our great indignation. Therefore, we request herewith that the bringing in of the Mace missile and the construction of the Mace missile bases be suspended immediately.

(Similar article in the Ryukyu Shimpo)



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Friday, 31 March 1961

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The Okinawa Nichi Nichi - Editorial (F)

No. 1128

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPENSATION MEASURE PRECEDES OPPOSITION RESOLUTION

The three political parties will jointly propose an anti-Mace resolution to today's session of the Legislature. The Legislature has adopted a similar resolution each time an advanced weapon was brought in. However, contrary to the people's desire, the U.S. military policy is in steady progress. Mace B missiles will be brought in even if the resolution is adopted. Since this problem will have a direct effect on the future livelihood of the people, the people-elected legislators should un-animously adopt the resolution in the interests of the people.

However, the adoption of such resolution gives us no assurance that no Mace missile will be brought in and that no danger will be caused. The question of whether the bringing in of Mace missiles will be dangerous or not to the people is a future problem. This, however, does not mean to oppose the opposition resolution. What is required is for legislators to establish compensation measures to cope with the result of the bringing in of such weapons as are dangerous to or threaten the security of the people's livelihood. Establishment of legal ground to guarantee the lives and property of the people is preferable to the adoption of an opposition resolution for the sake of mere opposition. Even the claim problem involving the Ishikawa jet crash took one year to reach settlement.

Resolutions by the Legislature were intended merely for opposition and not for the acquisition of compensation. In spite of protests, danger and anxiety have become intensified. Argument must not be centered on mere theory and it should be aimed at keeping the people from being involved in danger, causing no anxiety to them, and establishing compensation measures.

At any rate, the anti-Mace missile resolution will be adopted by the Legislature, but nothing has been done to cope with the result of the bringing in of Mace missiles. The Legislature, therefore, must give serious thought to what measures it should work out from now on. The people have been exposed to danger by the U.S. military. Human beings are not without error. This point must be given due thought, and it is desired that concrete compensation measures for the lives and property of the people be worked out to cope with the result of the bringing in of new weapons.



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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Saturday, 1 April 1961

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The Okinawa Times - News Article Y.

No. 1143

SECRETARY GENERAL YOSEYAMA SHIGERU ANNOUNCES HIS VIEWS ON RESOLUTION  
AGAINST MACE MISSILE

In connection with the interview between government leaders and Chairman Senaga and standing committee men of the Peoples Party held on 31 March at the Chief Executive's office and in answer to the opposition of the Peoples Party to bringing in of the Mace Missile and repeated adoption of resolutions at the Legislature against the bringing in of the Mace missile, Secretary General Shigeru Yoseyama announced his opinions as follows. "Because the resolution against the bringing in of the Mace missile has been adopted in a supra-party attitude at the plenary session of the Legislature, Chief Executive Ota respects the will of the people as the President of the Democratic Party. Especially concerning the opinion on the Mace missile, the government expects much of the world movement for the suspension of nuclear weapons testing. However, we must not overlook the fact that the adoption of new weapons of war is going on while international effort is being made for total disarmament is based on the balance of power between East and West. While it is supposed that the Mace missile is a weapon of attack, the Mace missile is a pilotless bomber and it is a strategic weapon, and I don't believe that it will intensify the tension in the Far East, nor do I believe the problem of the American bases can be settled by Okinawans alone."

178

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Sunday, 2 April 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpō (Evening Edition) - News Article (M) No. 1164

RESOLUTION OPPOSING THE CONSTRUCTION OF MACE  
WEAPONS SITES MAY NOT BECOME ISSUE IN JAPAN

An AP dispatch from Tokyo on 1 April reports as follows on the reaction of various Japanese political parties as to the resolution of the GRI Legislature opposing the bringing-in of the Mace weapons to Okinawa, commenting that Japanese political circles ignored the resolution.

The report says as follows:

"The GRI Legislature recently adopted a resolution opposing the construction of the Mace weapons sites on Okinawa, seeking the support of Japan. In Japan, however, the conservative parties, as well as the Japan Socialist Party, show little enthusiasm toward this resolution. The Japan Liberal Democratic Party authority concerned says that there is no reason for opposing the construction of the Mace weapons sites or the bringing-in of the Mace weapons, unless nuclear warheads are attached to these Mace weapons. On the other hand, top-class persons concerned with the Foreign Affairs Committee of Japan Socialist Party say that though they cannot comment on it from the standpoint of the party, because the party is not yet in receipt of detailed information, they can do nothing even if the U.S. brings missiles into Okinawa; in fact the only problem



is that the U.S. should remove the anxiety of the public in general about the missiles by insisting that the Mace is a weapon which is used for defensive purposes."

179

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Wednesday, 5 April 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Okinawa Times - News Article (M)

No. 1196

JSP ANTI-MACE ATTITUDE REMAINS UNCHANGED

(Tokyo) The Japan Socialist Party attached importance to the AP dispatch that the Japanese side takes little account of the Legislature's resolution in opposition to bringing in of MACE, and on 4 April, Chairman MORINAKA Moriyoshi of the JSP Okinawan Problem Measure Special Committee announced a statement in denial of the AP dispatch. Moreover, the JSP will hold a meeting of the National Movement Committee to study a new way of dealing with the Okinawan problems which has been pending. In connection with opposition to bringing in of MACE, it is reported that the JSP will express an attitude of opposition and work out measures to press the Japanese Government authorities with questions. The statement of Mr. MORINAKA was as follows:

1. It was reported in Okinawa that a 1 April AP dispatch from Tokyo said that a JSP member expressed his personal view by saying, "Even when the U.S. brings the missile into Okinawa, we cannot do anything about it." However, as a result of a survey, it was concluded that the JSP had nothing to do with it and the party denied the report.

2. The party has not changed its basic principle of demanding immediate return of administrative authority over Okinawa to Japan, and immediate withdrawal of military bases. On the basis of this principle, the party concludes that bringing in of MACE will intensify tension and.



threat in the Far East and will, rather, run counter to the purport  
of removing the tension as contended by the U.S. The JSP will oppose  
bringing in of MACE.

3. JSP will urge the Japanese Government to conduct formal  
negotiations with the U.S. for the settlement of the resolution of the  
Legislature.

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OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Wednesday, 5 April 1961

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the party concludes that bringing in of MACE will intensify tension and threat in the Far East and will, rather, run counter to the purport of removing the tension as contended by the U.S. The JSP will oppose bringing in of MACE.

3. JSP will urge the Japanese Government to conduct formal negotiations with the U.S. for the settlement of the resolution of the Legislature.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
U. S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands  
Draft Press Translation  
Wednesday, 12 April 1961

(The following translation is unofficial and is prepared for information purposes only and not for republication; reproduction of the translation by the Office of Public Affairs implies no responsibility or endorsement whatsoever by OPA as to the content or accuracy of the material contained therein.)

The Ryukyu Shimpō - News Article (F)

No. 1292

NAHA CITY ASSEMBLY ADOPTS RESOLUTION AGAINST THE BRINGING IN OF  
MISSILE MACE

The Naha City Assembly met on the morning of 11 April and disposed of more than twenty petitions. The plan to expand the water cleaning facilities at Tomari was discussed. The Assembly will meet again on the afternoon of 12 April to decide its attitude on the question.

At the meeting, city authorities proposed a \$850,000 loan for the water facility expansion project. The Assembly made a few questions on its technical aspect. A final decision on the proposal will be reached on the meeting of 12 April.

At the meeting of 11 April, the Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the bringing in of the Mace missile.



182

Press Translation

OFFICE OF INFORMATION  
Hq 313th Air Division  
APO 239

"WE DON'T WANT WAR"  
ANTI-ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMB COUNCIL HELD A RALLY

(The Okinawa Times, 21 June 1961)

Upon the arrival of the "Peace Marchers", who had marched around the island for a week, the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council held a rally at 7 p.m., June 20, at the plaza in front of the bus terminal in Naha.

Prior to attending the rally, both groups A and B of the "Peace Marchers" joined at the junction in Asato, Naha City, and, together with other civic organizations affiliated with the Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council, marched through the main street in the downtown area, and at 6 p.m. they arrived at the plaza where the rally was scheduled to be held.

About 500 marchers, with "Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs", and "No More Hiroshima" placards and rising sun flags in the van, marched through the main street carrying more than 40 red flags and "peace placards" and singing the "Anti-Atomic Bomb" song. The crowds along the route cheered and applauded the marchers.

Arriving at the plaza, the marchers took a brief recess, and at 7 p.m. the rally was started, the participants again singing the "Anti-Atomic Bomb" song. Following the election of the chairman of the rally, an address by the Chairman of the Board, and the reports of both the A and B group marchers, the representatives of the Government Workers Union,

Youth Association, Ryukyus University, and the Teachers' Association delivered their messages. The Okinawa Socialist Masses' Party, Okinawa People's Party, and the Okinawa Socialist Party read their message. After reading wires received from Japan's Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Council and Sohyo Labor Union, they adopted the declaration of the rally.

In front of the stage where the rally was held were slogans declaring "Anti-Mace Missile," "Do not Use Okinawa as the Base that Provokes a War," and "Total Disarmament and Anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs." "Opposition to Mace-B Missile," "Protest against the Infringement of Living Rights and Personal Rights of Te-Shinans by the U.S. military," were adopted in the name of the rally. They declared at the rally that they would "join the peace powers of the world in fighting for the abolition of atomic and hydrogen bomb bases on Okinawa and immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan." The rally was closed with the singing of "The Reversion of Okinawa to Japan."



183

Press Translation

OFFICE OF INFORMATION  
Hq 313th Air Division  
APO 439

WILL DISTRIBUTE HACE B MISSILES WITHIN YEAR  
TO FOUR AIR FORCE SITES IN OKINAWA

(The Ryukyu Shimpo, 26 June 1961,  
Evening)

CAPE CANAVERAL June 25, AP--Kyodo--The US Air Force announced that the US has completed the development program for the Hace B missile (2,400 kilometer of firing range) and will deliver it to Okinawa by the end of this year. The Hace B missile is the first US long-range nuclear war headed missile to be delivered to the Far East.

The missile made a successful 2,000-kilometer test flight from Cape Canaveral to the test ground in the Atlantic last week, completing its research and development stages. Within two or three months, after the completion of training of AF tactical units, the missiles will be delivered to the four sites located in Okinawa. The number of missiles to be delivered is kept top secret.

(Similar article in the Okinawa Times, June 26, Evening)

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OKINAWA PRESS TRANSLATIONS

U. S. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLAND  
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
TEL. 9941 EX 29

(Following translations are unofficial. They are prepared for information purposes only, and not for republication. Office of the High Commissioner assumes no responsibility whatsoever for content of translated items.)

The Okinawa Times (Evening Edition) - News Article

No. 2128

FEAR ENTERTAINED TOWARD  
ASSIGNMENT OF MACE B

Monday, 26 June 1961

In connection with a Washington report that Mace missile will be brought into Okinawa, USARYIS Headquarters said, "All we know is what we heard over the radio. We have not yet received any official information," and refrained from commenting on the matter. Following are the reactions of various circles to the Washington news:

Investigation and Research Division Chief FUKUCHI of Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council: "The Legislature adopted a resolution in opposition to bringing in of Mace B, while the Anti-A-H Bomb Council and various democratic organizations have been voicing opposition to it. The nuclear rocket called Mace B will be brought into Okinawa in disregard of the inhabitants' desire for peace. This is indication of the fact that the U. S. is taking the policy of giving priority to military affairs.

"It is also regrettable that the Japanese Diet took an indifferent attitude in this regard and failed to express strong opposition to it. The assignment of Mace B in Okinawa will increase the danger of Okinawa as a retaliatory base and will further delay the reversion to Japan. We must continue to carry out a movement in opposition to bringing in of nuclear weapons which threaten the people and destroys peace."



Legislator FURUGEN Saneyoshi of Okinawa Peoples Party: "The announcement has inseparable connection with the Japan-U. S. conference. The display of the sun flag on governmental and public buildings on legal holidays was approved as a measure to evade the prefectural people's anger for the failure of the return of administrative authority being taken up at the Japan-U. S. conference. Immediately after it or prior to Prime Minister IKEDA's departure for the U. S., the assignment of Mace B in Okinawa was decided.

"In the light of a series of these facts, I interpret that the IKEDA-KENNEDY conference was conducted on the basis of the idea of Japan-U. S. cooperation for making Okinawa a permanent U. S. dominion and strengthening the A-H bomb bases. The measure of bringing Mace B into Okinawa denotes the reconfirmation of the Asia aggression policy of the American imperialists. The prefectural people must make utmost efforts to frustrate such a policy in cooperation with the fellow countrymen in our fatherland and the people of the world who desire peace."

Secretary General SHINZATO Seitoku of Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party: "The feeling of the Okinawan people is beyond description on hearing that this kind of a weapon is being brought into Okinawa which experienced the ravages of war as the last hard-fought battlefield of World War II, and where the people are strongly desirous of peace. I have just been informed of the news, and we would like to study the party attitude after obtaining an accurate information with regard to the capacity of the weapon and other matters."

Legislator CHIBANA Hideo of Okinawa Socialist Masses Party: "Mace B is obviously an offensive weapon, and its assignment in Okinawa will

increase the tension in the Far East further and cause anxiety to the people. The Legislature unanimously adopted a resolution in opposition to bringing in the weapon. We would like to continue with the opposition movement in line with the resolution of the Legislature."

Board Chairman NAKANE Akira of Anti-A-H Bomb Council: "It is clear that the U. S. has been designating Okinawa as an offensive base ever since the conclusion of the Security Pact. This is designed to give pressure to the Asia-African racial movement for independence. The Okinawan inhabitants must cooperate with fellow countrymen in Japan and carry out an intensified peace movement by opposing bringing in of Mace missile which provokes war and disturbs peace. We hope to hold a board meeting immediately to decide on the attitude toward bringing in of the Mace B."



OKINAWA PRESS TRANSLATIONS

U. S. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
TEL. 9941 EX 29

(Following translations are unofficial. They are prepared for information purposes only, and not for republication. Office of the High Commissioner assumes no responsibility whatsoever for content of translated items.)

Tuesday, 27 June 1961

The Okinawa Times - Editorial

No. 2134

WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE BRINGING IN OF NUCLEAR MISSILE

An AP-Kyodo wire reports that the U.S. Air Force announced on 25 June that the United States will assign Mace B missiles to Okinawa this year. The Mace B is said to have a firing range of 2,400 kilometers and is the first American long-range nuclear rocket to be assigned in the Far East. The foreign dispatch also reports that it will be placed in four Okinawan bases after a test is conducted by a combat-ready unit in two or three months.

The efficiency and the number of the Mace are not known, but it can readily be imagined that the Mace rocket is a weapon of high efficiency in view of the fact that its firing range includes Communist China and since it has the character of a weapon of attack. The United States must have a good reason for distributing such a weapon to Okinawa. That is, Okinawa is the greatest base of defense against aggression in the Orient, and in order to maintain the peace of free countries, it is necessary to strengthen its defensive power. This is the consistent American reason for maintaining American bases in Okinawa. On the other hand, it is a fact that the assignment of such a missile weapon in itself will intensify the tension in the Far East. In this case, the tool of peace may irritate the other party extremely, with the possible result it may lead to a horrible war. Such being the case, the Okinawan inhabitants can ill afford

to support the establishment of missile bases, even though it may be indispensable for the defense of Okinawan bases.

During World War II the Okinawan people experienced enough sufferings and tragedies of war. They have first-hand knowledge of man's inhumanity to man perpetrated in a war. For this reason, we would like to believe that Okinawan inhabitants are determined to prevent war and maintain peace at any cost. The Legislature, reflecting this attitude of the people, has already adopted a resolution of opposition to the bringing in of missile weapons and appealed to the good sense of the world. The will of the Okinawan people was also conveyed to Prime Minister IKEDA through representatives of the Legislature and the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Council prior to his departure for Washington. The news that a nuclear weapon will be brought into Okinawa amounts to sowing a seed of "double worry" for the people, and we must not be off guard even for a moment because it is about to be effected without regard to the will of the people.

It is good and fine that Japan and the United States will cooperate in the stabilization of livelihood of the Okinawan people on the basis of agreement reached at the IKEDA-KENNEDY conference, but economic prosperity is valuable only when it is built on the foundation of peace. To speak of promoting the welfare and well-being of the people amidst the horrors of a war that might wipe out mankind from the earth, is like erecting a building on sand.

The Vienna conference between President KENNEDY and Soviet Premier KHRUSHCHEV brought about a faint ray of hope, but unfortunately, a nuclear



armament race is about to begin in Okinawa. We are absolutely opposed to  
such a move.

186  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 342D  
R 302114Z  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJEZHQ/OSAF WASH DC  
INFO RJAPAZ/5AF TUCHU AS JAPAN  
RJAOKA/313AD KADENA AB OKINAWA

BT

/C O N F I D E N T I A L/PFCOI-P 168. ACTION FOR SAFOI-3; INFO 5FCOI AND 313OI. THIS MESSAGE IN 3 PARTS. PART 1. ASSOCIATED PRESS RELEASE DATE-LINED CAPE CANAVERAL 26 JUNE 1961 CONCERNING MACE B DEPLOYMENT TO OKINAWA HAS INSTIGATED UNFAVORABLE NEWS MEDIA REACTION IN OKINAWA. STORY STATES MACE B, A LONG RANGE NUCLEAR ROCKET, WILL BE IN POSITION AT FOUR OKINAWAN SITES BEFORE END OF THIS YEAR. FURTHER STATES THAT THE DECISION TO PLACE THE 1500-MILE RANGE MISSILE ON OKINAWA WAS MADE ON RECOGNITION OF SWIFTLY GROWING RED CHINESE INDUSTRIAL EMPIRE. PART 2. ARTICLES OF THIS NATURE DEFINITELY DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS IN PACIFIC. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE AS TO SOURCE FOR AP ARTICLE. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY OF ASIAN NATIONS ON THIS POINT, NEWS RELEASE BY MILITARY AGENCIES OR CONTRACTOR (MARTIN COMPANY) LINKING OKINAWA AND MACE PROGRAM SHOULD NOT STRESS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF MACE B. PART 3. REQUEST THIS HEADQUARTERS BE CONSULTED ON NEWS RELEASES WHICH LINK OKINAWA AND MACE PROGRAM. SCP 4.

BT

30/2120Z JUNE 1961

31310-0077

**CONFIDENTIAL**

0 3 0 5



CONFIDENTIAL

187

RR RJAOKA  
DE RJHPKM 349D  
R 192118Z  
FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII  
TO RJAPAZ/5AF FUCHU AS JAPAN  
RJAOKA/313AD KADENA AB OKINAWA  
BT

/CONFIDENTIAL/PFCOI-P 181. FOR IO. FOLLOWING HEDUSAF MESSAGE  
QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION: FROM SAFOI-3C. 84800. REFERENCE YOUR  
MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL PFCOI-P 168. OUR INVESTIGATIONS SHOW THAT CAPE  
CANAVERAL DID NOT ISSUE RELEASE ON 26 JUNE 1961 CONCERNING MACE B AND PACAF.  
ASSOCIATED PRESS RELEASE WAS APPARENTLY DRAWN FROM PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE  
INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. OUR POLICY TO COORDINATE STORIES OF THIS TYPE WITH  
THE USING COMMANDS IS STILL IN EFFECT. SCP 4.

BT  
19/2121 JULY 1961.

31310-0115

CONFIDENTIAL

0306

SECRET

188

PP RJACKA  
DE RUAWRL 019  
P 130730Z  
FM HICOM RY OKINAWA  
TO RUAPAFF/AMEMB TOKYO JAPAN  
INFO RUEPDA/DA WASHDC  
TUMFPS/CINCUSARPAC FT SHAFTER HAWAII  
RUAWCR/CG USARYIS  
RJACKA/COMDR 313 AD OKINAWA  
DA GRNC  
BT

SECRET HC-LO 9179. DA FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS, PASS SEC STATE. 1. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON IMPENDING EMPLACEMENT AIR FORCE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, TM76B (MACE-B), ON FOUR SITES IN CENTRAL OKINAWA. SEVERAL MISSILES ALREADY AIRLIFTED TO OKINAWA. NOW BEING ASSEMBLED IN MISSILE SUPPORT AREA WITHIN KADENA AIR BASE. FIRST MOVEMENT OF MACE ON PUBLIC ROADS NOW SCHEDULED FOR END OF OCTOBER, MAY BE POSTPONED. WHEN ALL SITES OPERATIONAL (APPROXIMATELY DEC 1 1962) ESTIMATED AVERAGE OF ONE MISSILE ON THE ROAD EVERY DAY AS RESULT OF PERIODIC SERVICING.

2. THESE ROAD MOVEMENTS ARE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO MINIMIZE ANY DANGER, INCONVENIENCE OR OTHER ADVERSE EFFECTS UPON LOCAL POPULACE AND TO AVOID OVER-DRAMATIZATION. AMONG MEASURES NOW BEING CONTEMPLATED ARE: 1) WARHEAD, GUIDANCE SYSTEM WILL NOT BE LOADED WITH AIR FRAME; 2) JET FUEL WILL BE REMOVED IF EXPERIENCE SHOWS THIS NECESSARY (HOWEVER, ONLY 800 GALLONS INVOLVED, CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN CAPACITY OF CIVILIAN TRUCKS SERVICING GAS STATIONS THROUGHOUT OKINAWA); 3) ROAD RECONNAISSANCE WILL PRECEDE EACH MOVEMENT; ACTUAL CONVOY WILL CONSIST OF MISSILE VEHICLE PRECEDED BY RADIO-EQUIPPED PICKUP TRUCK-- NEITHER WILL CARRY ANY SPECIAL MARKINGS OR LIGHTS LIKELY TO DIFFERENTIATE THEM FROM THE HUNDREDS OF ARMED FORCES VEHICLES WHICH MOVE ALONG OKINAWAN ROADS EVERY DAY--NEITHER THE SIZE NOR THE ACTUAL HAZARDS INVOLVED BY THE MISSILE LOAD NECESSITATE ANY SPECIAL TREATMENT FROM PUBLIC SAFETY VIEW-POINT; 5) MISSILE UNIT COMMANDER HAS INAUGURATED DRIVER SAFETY PROGRAM WHICH WILL THOROUGHLY FAMILIARIZE PERSONNEL WITH ROUTES AND PROCEDURES TO BE USED--ALL CONCERNED RECOGNIZE KEY ROLE OF DRIVER IN AVOIDING ACCIDENTS, MINIMIZING INCIDENTS OF ANY SORT; 6) SUBJECT TO DOWNGRADING OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF PROJECT IT IS PLANNED THAT BEFORE INITIAL MOVEMENT, KEY GRI OFFICIALS (INCLUDING POLICE) WILL BE GIVEN SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON MOVEMENTS TO ASSURE THEIR COOPERATIVE UNDERSTANDING AND EFFECTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR CONTROL OF ANY INCIDENTS WHICH MAY OCCUR--EMERGENCY PLANS BASED ON CONCEPT OF FULL UTILIZATION OF CIVIL POLICE CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH SITUATION BEFORE ANY COMMITMENT OF MILITARY POLICE OF OTHER ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL; 7) NO SPONTANEOUS PUBLIC RELEASES CONCERNING MACE EMPLACEMENT NOW CONTEMPLATED, ALTHOUGH STATEMENTS BEING PREPARED TO COVER VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES, INCLUDING SPECIFIC QUERIES FROM PRESS. WHILE DANGER APPEARS REMOTE AT THIS TIME, THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE SPONTANEOUS UPSURGE OF PUBLIC COMMENT ON MACE BASED ON MASS OF MATERIAL ALREADY MADE AVAILABLE (FROM U.S.) PLUS FACT THAT UNLOADING AND ASSEMBLING OF MISSILES HERE AND CONSTRUCTION OF SITES HAS INVOLVED HUNDREDS OF OKINAWAN LABORERS.

3. FYI, CURRENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (SECRET NOFORN) PLACED ON SUBJECT OF INTRODUCTION OF MACE INTO OKINAWA. 313TH AIR DIVISION IS

SECRET

0307



# SECRET

REQUESTING DOWNGRADING TO ALLOW APPROPRIATE BRIEFINGS OF NON-U.S. OFFICIALS, AND TIMELY PUBLIC RELEASE OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION WHEN AND IF REQUIRED. CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE NOT RELEASABLE TO GOJ, ARE DESIGNED TO ACQUAINT YOU WITH PRESENT STATUS. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED CONCERNING ANY DOWNGRADING ACTION, ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN PLANNING, AND ANY PUBLIC RELEASE CONTEMPLATED HERE. MEANWHILE, DETAILS ON PHYSICAL AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MACE MAY BE OBTAINED BY EMBASSY FROM HEADQUARTERS FIFTH AIR FORCE, FUCHU AIR BASE (MAJOR MORRISON, TELEPHONE 4400). SCP 3

BT

CFN 44400 3

13/0733Z OCTOBER 1961

189

MM RJAOKA

ZDK

MM RJAPAZ RUAWRA RJAOKA RUHPFS

DE RJHPKM 265B

M 210114Z

FM PACAF HICKAM AFB HAWAII

TO RUHPFS/DIV ENGR USA PACOCEAN HONOLULU HAWAII

INFOR RJAPAZZ/5AF FUCHU AIR STN JAPAN

RJAOKA/313 ADIV KADENA AB OKINAWA

RJAOKA/498TACMSLGP KADENA AB OKINAWA

RUAWRA/DIST ENGR USAENGR DIST OKINAWA

AF GRNC

BT

U N C L A S E F T O/PFSCE-ED 559

FOR POD. INFO 5FSCE, 313CE, 498 CIV ENGR AND POOVE. SUBJ.: CURRENT WORKING ESTIMATES, OPERATIONAL FACILITIES, OKINAWA. REFERENCES: A. MESSAGE OKINAWA DIST UNCLAS EFTO POOVE 1946 DATED 17 OCT 61. B. YOUR MESSAGE UNCLAS PODGM 3044 DATED 9 OCT 61. THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I. REQUEST REVISED CURRENT COST ESTIMATES FOR OPERATIONAL FACILITIES IN SAME FORM AS SUBMITTED IN REFERENCE B. FURNISH DETAILED EXPLANATION WHY COST OF OPERATIONAL FACILITIES HAS BEEN INCREASED APPROXIMATELY \$243,000 OVER COST SHOWN IN REFERENCE B. PART II. BASED ON ESTIMATES FURNISHED BY THE DIST ENGR, THIS HQ ADVISED USAF THAT DAMAGES TO OPERATIONAL FACILITIES, PRINCIPALLY GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED MATERIALS, CAUSED BY TYPHOON TILDA WERE ABOUT \$50,000. REQUEST YOU SUBMIT ESTIMATE OF DAMAGES TO EACH SITE.

BT

21/0541Z OCT 1961.



190  
**SECRET NOFORN**

HEADQUARTERS  
313th AIR DIVISION  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
APO 239, San Francisco, California

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originator.

(U) AIR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

16 OCT 1961

Maps: ONC H-13 Scale 1:1,000,000

1. Mission:

The mission of the 313th Air Division is to maintain assigned and attached forces at a degree of combat readiness that will insure the success of directed military operations. The specific purpose of this estimate is to determine the degree to which leftist elements on Okinawa could interfere with the introduction into the operational weapons inventory of the Mace Missile.

2. Enemy Situation:

Enemy forces for the purpose of this estimate are considered to be the estimated 600 to 700 members of the Okinawa Peoples' Party, of whom an approximate 250 hold membership in the Okinawa Branch of the Japan Communist Party. In addition, there are an approximate 1,000 additional personnel who comprise the membership of such leftist organizations as the Okinawa Teachers Association, the Okinawa Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, and the Liaison Council for the Protection of Democracy, to list only a few. Resources of the enemy consist primarily of the hard core of 250 members of the Okinawa Branch, Japan Communist Party, led by Senaga, Kamejiro. At their disposal are only limited funds with a limited capability to produce handbills, leftist pamphlets, and other propaganda items. Additional resources available to the OPP and the OB-JCP are the facilities of Radio Peiping, Radio Moscow, and other Communist stations which on frequent occasions have publicized the efforts of the leftist organizations on Okinawa. The stated purpose of this estimate is to explore the enemy situation as it constitutes an obstacle to the introduction of the Mace Missile to Okinawa. In addition, it is intended that there should be considered as well the capability of the enemy to prevent operational utilization of the missiles once they have been introduced into the military inventory and reach an operational ready status:

a. Enemy Air Forces. None available.

Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals. Declassified  
after 12 years. DOD DIR  
5200.10

**SECRET NOFORN**

~~SECRET~~ # 4436

313IO-H-0122

0310



## SECRET NOFORN

b. Enemy Ground Forces. Although there are no available ground forces as such, the OPP consists of approximately 700 members who could be used for staging rallies and demonstrations in addition to passing out provocative literature. The main concentration of OPP members is in the city of Naha, with smaller cells scattered throughout the area between the southern tip of Okinawa and the northern city of Nago. The main OPP strength, however, is confined to Naha City and the immediate surrounding area.

c. Enemy Naval Forces. Not applicable.

d. Weather. Weather has but a small bearing upon this estimate. During periods of inclement weather, scheduled demonstrations would be severely handicapped as would rallies and other outdoor demonstrations.

e. Terrain. Terrain features near the various Mace sites vary considerably which determines accessibility to main highways and suitability for the staging of demonstrations. There are considerable differences in contour elevation, amount of vegetation, and proximity to main avenues of communication at the four sites. The White Beach Site is not only the most accessible from a main road but is nearest to the population concentration in Naha of the four sites. The site at Bolo Point, situated on a former Japanese air strip, is readily accessible by road, however, it is further removed from Naha than the White Beach Site and in a more remote area. The site at Tancha is located in rough terrain accessible only by a single road leading up from the main highway. The site at Gimbaru is situated in exceedingly rough terrain accessible by a single road.

f. Subversive Activities. There have been no reported instances of espionage or sabotage, however, there have been numerous indications of resentment, dissatisfaction, and strident propaganda directed against the introduction of Mace to Okinawa. Politically, the GRI Legislature twice has passed a resolution in opposition to the introduction of the Mace Missile to Okinawa. The initial Resolution, Number Five, was passed by the GRI on 10 May 1960. This resolution was reaffirmed by the GRI Legislature on 31 March 1961, by its Resolution, Number Seven, opposing importation of Mace into Okinawa and requesting discontinuance of construction of missile bases. In response to this activity the Chief Executive, Ota, has indicated that these resolutions reflect, and as such he: "Respects the will of the people." Mr. Ota is an appointed executive and this represents a neutral statement at best. There have been several resolutions passed by city assemblies in support of the two resolutions passed by the GRI Legislature. These resolutions have included adoption of similar policy by the Assembly Kitanakagusuku-Son, dated 29 March 1961, and an objection addressed to General Caraway from the Okinawa Teachers Association, dated 30 March 1961. A request for assistance in the matter addressed to the Japanese Government was signed by the Speaker of the GRI Legislature on 31 March 1961. A similar resolution was passed by the Naha City Assembly, dated 11 April 1961. An Anti-Mace Resolution was passed by the Kadena-Son Assembly, copies were sent



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to the President of the United States, President of the Senate, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the High Commissioner, on 3 April 1961.

g. Psychological Activities. There have been no known psychological warfare activities conducted by the OPP that can affect this mission.

### 3. Possible Enemy Courses of Action:

- a. Sabotage of Mace Sites and the Kadena maintenance facilities.
- b. Overt physical damage or sabotage to Mace Missiles en route between operational sites and Kadena Air Base.
- c. Passive resistance to the movement of missiles between operational sites and Kadena, to encompass such actions as forming a human roadblock, lying down in the path of a missile carrier, sit-down strikes at the entrance to the missile sites, and bodily blocking the movement of vehicles and personnel engaged in missile deployments between operational sites and Kadena Air Base.
- d. Demonstrations protesting the introduction of Mace to Okinawa. These could be in the form of marches, rallies, and other gatherings to demonstrate opposition to Mace.
- e. Propaganda to consist of pamphlets, handbills, etc., opposing the introduction of Mace and a further broadening of their campaign to encourage municipal assemblies to pass resolutions opposing introduction of Mace to Okinawa. In addition, within this same general area of propaganda, there would be included gatherings of petitions, the requesting of support of leftist organizations in Japan, and publication of the complete description and capabilities of Mace in various publications throughout Okinawa.

### 4. Analysis of Enemy Courses of Action:

- a. Sabotage. Sabotage is considered to be within the capabilities of the Okinawa Peoples' Party. There are, however, no recorded instances in the past when sabotage has been employed against any military installation on Okinawa. Sabotage could easily be accomplished on Kadena since it is essentially an open base employing hundreds of Ryukyuan personnel. Although all employees have been cleared, some could well be covert members of the OPP. Sabotage at one of the Mace Sites would be considered very difficult since the areas will be afforded a high degree of security protection.
- b. Physical damage to one of the Mace units en route to and from an outlying site could easily be accomplished. A taxi cab could be made to collide with the missile carrier. Landslides and rocks could easily be

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dislodged in some areas to block the highway at the time the missile was passing. During passage through areas of congestion en route to sites, speed of the missile carrier will be so slow that any determined saboteur or agent could damage the missile or the carrier by slashing the tires of the carrier, setting fire to the missile, or placing explosive charges on the vehicle.

c. Passive Resistance. In the area of passive resistance, the OPP and leftist organizations in sympathy with the OPP's aims in the Mace issue have a wide range of opportunities. Primarily, with the gathering of several hundred people, it would be easy to form a human roadblock across the entrance to any one of the Mace Sites preventing the passage of any missiles to and from the site. Such resistance could be conducted anywhere along the highways leading to any one of the four sites. Since a mass of people are required to conduct effective passive resistance of this sort, it would most likely occur in the vicinity of either the White Beach or the Bolo Point Sites. Additionally, such passive resistance could readily be practiced in any one of the several villages through which the missiles must pass en route to Kadena or the outlying sites. Again, it is estimated that this would most likely occur between Kadena and White Beach or Kadena and Bolo Point since the areas are more heavily populated.

d. Demonstrations, Marches, and Rallies. Since the center of the OPP and OB-JCP population is in Naha City, this is considered to be the most likely spot for demonstrations, marches, rallies, speeches, and display of banners and posters. It has been demonstrated from past experience that the OPP in conjunction with the Okinawa Teachers Association, labor unions, and other front organizations can command a large crowd and through effective speaking incite to near riot large masses of people, not necessarily members but sympathetic to the aims of these front organizations.

e. Propaganda. With the newspapers on Okinawa giving wide coverage to the activities of all political parties, including the OPP and other front organizations, opportunities for the conduct of a propaganda campaign against Mace are excellent. In addition, issues raised on Okinawa by front organizations receive immediate play over Radio Moscow and Radio Peiping who disseminate this information throughout the entire Southeast Asia area. Distribution of handbills, writing of pamphlets, making of provocative speeches, and other propaganda activities are not illegal on Okinawa. To date, although there have been considerable efforts made at stirring up interest in the Mace issue, reaction has been more apathetic than enthusiastic. In a 15 August 1961 study made by the USCAR Public Safety Department, it was determined that the Okinawa Peoples' Party, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party, labor unions, and intellectuals all were opposed to the introduction of Mace. This has been their announced



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policy, whereas, Okinawan farmers and fishermen who make up the balance of the population have shown little interest in the issue in spite of the propaganda efforts that have been made.

5. Conclusions: It is estimated that the probable courses of action which will be taken by the enemy in their efforts to oppose the introduction and utilization of Mace will consist of the following in the priority listed:

a. The conduct of a vigorous propaganda campaign. This effort was first laid on in March 1961 and has enjoyed a small degree of success. A reported 40,000 signatures were obtained on a petition opposing Mace which was presented to the Japanese Communist Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Support has been received from both Radio Moscow and Radio Peiping. Propaganda activities on Okinawa are limited only by the availability of funds to produce pamphlets, handbills, posters, and other propaganda media. This activity does not pose a direct threat to Mace in the immediate future.

b. Demonstrations Against Mace. There is a large body of OPP members, including sympathetic left wing groups, in Naha City. So long as property is not destroyed, traffic not obstructed, and demonstrations are peaceful by nature, the OPP is free to demonstrate, march, and rally as often as they desire. This action poses no threat to Mace so long as such demonstrations are peaceful.

c. Passive Resistance. Although passive resistance is entirely possible, at the moment it is estimated that passive resistance such as sit-down strikes, human roadblocks, etc. will not occur until after Mace has been placed into operation and the pattern of movement between outlying sites and Kadena Air Base becomes well established. This would enable the perpetrators of such passive resistance to select the time and place most favorable for their planned operation.

d. Sabotage. Although the opportunities for sabotage are numerous, it is considered not likely that sabotage will be considered as a possible course of enemy action until the enemy has exhausted all available means up to but not including sabotage, without having reached the goal which has been established for them, that is, opposition to Mace to where its utilization would be depreciated. Since there is no history of sabotage on Okinawa performed by Ryukyuan, it is considered most likely that if sabotage were to be considered as a course of action, it would be planned to be accomplished by an agent brought in from Japan, China, or the Soviet Union, covertly.

e. Physical damage to units en route to missile sites. This is considered a low priority course of action since again there have been no incidents of a physical nature which would hinder or delay introduction

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of Mace to Okinawa. Likewise, it is estimated that the OPP feels they still have much to be gained from pursuing an aggressive propaganda campaign supported by marches, rallies, and demonstrations. In addition, physical damage to one of the units would result in arrest, confinement, and trial of the perpetrators, provided, of course, they were apprehended. Overall, it is concluded that the OPP, JCP-OB, and other leftist organizations are incapable at the moment of doing anything to interfere with the introduction and utilization of Mace on Okinawa. They can and will continue to conduct propaganda campaigns, hold rallies, marches, demonstrations, and, at most, offer passive resistance once Mace is operational and the pattern of such operation becomes known.

6. This document is classified to prevent the disclosure of an Air Force estimate of enemy capabilities.

*Russell Powell*

RUSSELL POWELL  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Intelligence Division  
Directorate of Operations

1 Atch  
Chronological Listing of  
Significant Events



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17 March 1961

A six-point program of the CCPAHB to resist introduction of Mace:

- a. Induce GRI Legislature to pass a resolution opposing the introduction of the missile.
- b. Encourage each municipal assembly to pass a similar resolution.
- c. Publish a complete description and capability of Mace in various publications throughout Okinawa.
- d. Obtain signatures on a petition opposing Mace.
- e. Forward petition to JCPAHB and subsequently to the Japanese and U.S. Governments.
- f. Request support of leftist organization in Japan to assist Okinawan efforts by starting similar movements throughout Japan.

22 March 1961

Tokyo editorial charged that Japanese Government authorities are indifferent to the Mace Missile problem on Okinawa. Government evaded issue when pressed for action on Mace by Japanese Diet member.

31 March 1961

Signature campaign launched by OPP in opposition to Mace to support policy of the CCPAHB.

GRI Legislature adopted Anti-Mace Resolution. Chief Executive Ota "respects the will of the people."

3 April 1961

Kadena-Son Assembly passed a resolution opposing the establishment of Mace Missile Sites on Okinawa.

April 1961

Leaflet published by CCPAHB distributed to OPP members requested cooperation in conduct of signature campaign.

National Headquarters JCPAHB levied requirement on all Prefectural Councils to initiate campaigns opposing introduction of Mace into Okinawa.

1-20 April 1961

Fact gathering trip by member of the Osaka PPS to Okinawa to gather all available information on Mace Sites and introduction of the weapon to Okinawa. Items gathered were later released as an article in the magazine "Road to Peace". White Beach Site was the subject. Thirty copies were received by the OPP on Okinawa.

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June 1961 Propaganda rallies and peace marchers bearing banners in opposition to "bringing in of the fearful atomic and hydrogen bomb weapons and the Mace B Missile." Sponsored by OYA and other front organizations -- poorly attended.

Actual Acts in Opposition to Mace:

1 August 1961 Handbills distributed by OPP in opposition to introduction of Mace B Missile into Okinawa. Reported that 10,000 handbills were printed.

2 August 1961 Efforts made by leftist organization to secure all available information on Mace installations in Okinawa.

Reports that leftist organizations (OPP, OB-JCP, OCPAHB) have obtained a petition with 40,000 signatures opposing the introduction of Mace on Okinawa to be carried to seventh OCPAHB convention.

Rally in Naha during visit of Ambassador Reischauer. One of main topics was opposition to Mace. OPP proposed a joint OPP-OSMP petition be prepared and presented to Mr. Reischauer protesting introduction of Mace.

15 August 1961 Resolution passed by the 7th World Congress on prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs which called for "Opposition to the Introduction of the Mace B Missile and Construction of Mace Sites on Okinawa."

Study by USCAR Public Safety Department to determine degree of local opposition to Mace revealed that the OPP, OSP, labor unions, and local intellectuals are all opposed to the introduction of Mace. Belief that Mace is part of a scheme to draw Japan into a world war. Okinawan farmers and fishermen show little interest in the issue.

18 September 1961 No widespread popular support for the "Opposition to the Mace Missile" movement. No incidents of a physical nature which would hinder or delay construction of Mace Missile Sites on Okinawa.



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313TH AD SD NO. \_\_\_\_\_

313TH AIR DIVISION

# STAFF DIGEST

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20 FEB 1963

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
313AD STAFF DIGEST  
NUMBER 1

HEADQUARTERS 313TH AIR DIVISION  
APO 239 20 February 1963

## OPERATIONS

1. TACTICAL FLIGHTS TO JAPAN (SECRET). Because of certain political pressures, the Commander, 5AF has directed that no F-105s, except in cases of emergency, will be landed in Japan until after 27 April 63 elections. GP-4, classified SECRET because it reveals delivery plans for a weapons system in Japan. (LtCol Griffith/46136)
2. MANPOWER SURVEY OF 498TMG (UNCLASSIFIED). A Fifth Air Force Manpower team is scheduled to arrive at Kadena Air Base during March 1963 to review the organization, functions and manning of the 498th Tactical Missile Group. (Lt Col Thompson/46135)

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