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313TH HISTORY of the AIR DIVISION



1 JANUARY 30 JUNE 1964

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
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HISTORY OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964


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APPROVED BY



JAY T. ROBBINS
Major General, USAF
22 September 1965

FIFTH AIR FORCE, PACIFIC AIR FORCES, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE



Republic F-105D Thunderchief
United States Air Force

313th AD, 1964-I

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313th AD, 1964-1

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

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313th AD, 1964-1, Chronology

CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE

313TH AIR DIVISION HISTORY

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

1964

- 1 Jan. Lieutenant General Wallace M. Greene succeeds General David M. Shoup as Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, and simultaneously is elevated to the rank of general. General Shoup retires from active service.
- 3 Jan. 313th Air Division Operations Order (OPORD) 321-64: HABU STRIKE COMEX, is published and distributed.
- 6 Jan. 313ADIV OPORD 322-64: WING OVER, is published.
- 6 Jan. 313ADIV OPLAN 187-64: SCATER, is published.
- 8 Jan. The 6313th Support Squadron is redesignated the 6313th Services Squadron, without change in location, and is assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena AB, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 6313th Materiel Squadron is discontinued at Kadena AB, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 6313th Transportation Squadron is designated and organized at Kadena AB, where it is assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 18th Supply Squadron is organized at Kadena AB and is assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group at Naha AB is redesignated the Headquarters, 51st Combat Support Group, without change in location, and is assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 51st Support Squadron at Naha AB is redesignated the 51st Services Squadron, without change in location, and is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 51st Civil Engineering Squadron at Naha AB is relieved from assignment to the 51st Air Base Group and is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

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8 Jan. The 51st Air Police Squadron at Naha AB is relieved from assignment to the 51st Air Base Group and is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 51st Materiel Squadron at Naha AB, assigned to the 51st Air Base Group, is discontinued, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963. Reverting to the control of the Department of the Air Force, the 51st Materiel Squadron is also inactivated.

The 51st Transportation Squadron is organized at Naha AB with an O/T strength of six officers and 296 airmen, and is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 51st Supply Squadron is organized at Naha AB, and is assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

The 6351st USAF Dispensary is discontinued at Naha AB, and in its place is simultaneously organized the 51st USAF Dispensary, which is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

13 Jan. 313ADIV OPLAN 27-64 is distributed.

16 Jan. Annex N, 313ADIV OPLAN 1-64 is published.

19 Jan. Mr. Shannon B. B. McCune departs Okinawa to return to civil life, having served 18 months as the first civilian Civil Administrator of the Ryukyu Islands. All previous incumbents were U.S. Army officers, brigadier generals in most cases. Mr. McCune is to be succeeded by Mr. Gerald D. Warner, heretofore the Political Adviser (POLAD) to the High Commissioner.

23 Jan. The first pilot to be killed in the crash of an F-105D assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing is lost when a plane of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron piloted by Captain Carl B. Larsen crashes one-half mile from Osan AB, Korea, while attempting to land. One Korean civilian is also killed.

25 Jan. Phase I of Exercise QUICK RELEASE, a USARPAC Army-Air Force maneuver on Okinawa, commences with the arrival of the first troops of the 25th Infantry Division Brigade Task Force from Hawaii. During this phase, which is to run through 9 February, the balance of the brigade task force, as well as a Forward Floating Depot from Subic Bay, P. I., are scheduled to arrive on Okinawa, and the supplies and materiel stocked aboard the ships are to be issued to the troops who will participate in the exercise in the Northern Training Area.

1964

- 27 Jan. Mr. Stephen Ailes is confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Secretary of the Army, succeeding Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, who moves up to the post of Deputy Secretary of Defense.
- 27 Jan. Exercise HABU STRIKE COMEX is conducted this date and on the 28th. Exercise headquarters is in a tent pitched at Camp Kue, adjacent to Kadena AB, while the Northern Training Area is used for the actual exercise play.
- 28 Jan. The 658th Tactical Hospital, Kadena AB, is inactivated, per PACAF SO G-7, dtd. 9 Jan. 1964, the personnel being reassigned to the 6332d USAF Dispensary, Kadena AB, per 6313th ABW SO A-1416, dtd. 4 May 1964.
- 29 Jan. 313ADIV OPORD 322-64 is distributed.
- 29 Jan. Building T-4F, a quonset in the 313th Air Division Headquarters area previously housing the records staging function, is razed by an Okinawan contractor. T-4F was originally erected in 1948 for a staff agency of Headquarters, 1st Air Division, and is the last of the many temporary structures which successively housed Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, 1st Air Division, Thirteenth Air Force, Twentieth Air Force, and 313th Air Division. The records staging function, incidentally, is transferred to two quonsets— T-248 and T-249— in the 6313th Air Base Wing area.

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- Jan. R-177, Easley Range, at Camp Hansen, is expanded to approximately three times its original size, giving the users of this area maximum flexibility and an over-all increase in potential.
- Jan. Warning Area W/173 is expanded by approximately one-third to afford a more realistic flight area for the BQM-34A Firebee drone.
- 7 Feb. 313ADIV OPORD 323-64: BIG TRUCK, in support of a Taiwan deployment, is published and distributed.
- 7 Feb. Mr. Gerald D. Warner, the erstwhile Political Adviser to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, is sworn in as Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus in the Pentagon office of Secretary of the Army Stephen Ailes. (This takes place at 1200 hours, E.S.T., 6 February).
- 8 Feb. 313ADIV OPLAN 324-64: DICE DROP, supporting a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Command Center CPX (command post exercise) is published and distributed.
- 10 Feb. 313ADIV OPLAN 32-64: Defense of Southeast Asia, supporting 5AF OPLAN 32-64, is published and distributed.
- 10 Feb. 313ADIV OPORD 325-64: Exercise JOSS STICK FIGHTER, is published and distributed. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena AB, is designated as the host unit for the period 18-28 March 1964.
- 10 Feb. Phase II of Exercise QUICK RELEASE, which runs from this date through 13 February, sees troops of the 25th Infantry Division Brigade Task Force move from the staging area at Yomitan Airfield to the Northern Training Area. F-105 aircraft of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing provide air reconnaissance and fire support against simulated guerrillas.
- 11 Feb. 313ADIV OPLAN 23-64: Defense of Hong Kong, in support of 5AF 23-64, is published and distributed.
- 14 Feb. Phase III of Exercise QUICK RELEASE, involving the return of the 25th Infantry Division Brigade Task Force and the simulated aggressor forces from the Northern Training Area to Central Okinawa, the turn-in of supplies and equipment, the reloading of the Forward Floating Depot, and the return of all troops to their home station and the Forward Floating Depot to Subic Bay, commences this date and concludes on 25 February.
- 14 Feb. Six F-105's of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, supported by C-130's and C-124's of the 315th Air Division and KB-50's of the 41st Air Division, depart Kadena AB for RNZAF Ohakea, via Andersen AFB, Guam, under 313ADIV OPORD 322-64: WING OVER.

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- 17 Feb. Exercise DICE DROP, a JCS CPX, begins this date and concludes on 19 February.
- 17 Feb. The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters, 313th Air Division, moves from Building 15, one of the two permanent 313th Air Division Headquarters buildings, to Buildings T-241 and T-242 in the 6313th Air Base Wing Headquarters area, as a tangible step in the consolidation of division and wing Judge Advocate functions.
- 22 Feb. The Operation WING OVER task force participates in the RNZAF Armed Forces Day.
- 28 Feb. 313ADIV OPLAN 99-64: Military Operations against North Viet Nam, supporting 5AF OPLAN 99-64, is published and distributed.
- 28 Feb. 313ADIV OPORD 326-64: JUMBO, in support of a firepower demonstration at Nightmare Range, Korea, is published and distributed.
- 3 Mar. 313ADIV OPORD 327-64: HABU STRIKE - FIREPOWER, is published and distributed.
- 13 Mar. The 1199th USAF Field Activities Squadron (Hq Comd) is designated and organized at Kadena AB.
- 16 Mar. Exercise SILVER LEAF, a no-notice Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) for elements of the 315th Air Division, is conducted in conjunction with elements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), U.S. Army. Approximately 24 C-124 aircraft operate through Kadena AB during a four-day period.
- 17 Mar. Exercise BIG TRUCK is conducted at Kung Kuan, Taiwan, in accordance with 313ADIV OPORD 323-64 until 25 March 1964. The purpose of BIG TRUCK is to exercise the 18th TFW deployment plan for a reconnaissance task force (RTF) and complete the maximum number of unit training requirements while deployed.
- 19 Mar. General Jacob E. Smart, Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, presents Colonel George B. Simler, Commander of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 1963 Tactical Unit Flying Safety Award.
- 23 Mar. 313ADIV OPORD 328-64: AIR BOON CHOO, is published and distributed. This responds to Fifth Air Force's directive that 12 F-105's of the 18th TFW deploy to Korat AB, Thailand, and four RF-101's of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) deploy to Don Muang AB, Thailand on 20 April 1964, to participate in the SEATO exercise of the above name. The Commander, 313th Air Division is assigned responsibility as over-all mission Commander for all Fifth Air Force forces participating in AIR BOON CHOO during both the deployment and redeployment phases.

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- 25 Mar. Exercise JUMBO is held on Nightmare Range, Korea, for the purpose of demonstrating a maximum concentration of air-delivered ordnance in a minimum time and in close coordination with artillery fire.
- 5 Apr. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, one of America's all-time greatest soldiers and statesmen, dies (6 April, Okinawa time).
- 8 Apr. The term of General Curtis E. LeMay as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, is extended to 1 February 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson.
- 8 Apr. 313ADIV OPLAN 250-64, providing for the periodic deployment of 18TFW aircraft to Taiwan for short periods, is published and distributed.
- 20 Apr. Annex E to 313ADIV General War Plan (GWP) 1-64 is published and distributed.
- 20 Apr. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) begins AIR BOON CHOO at Don Muang Airport, Bangkok, Thailand. (The exercise gets its name from Royal Thai Air Force Commander, Air Chief Marshall Boon Choo Chandrubeksa.) The 10-day maneuvers involve units of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand.
- 21 Apr. 313th Air Division Headquarters instructs Thirteenth Air Force to destroy 313ADIV OPORD 302-63, which is being replaced by 313ADIV OPORD 323-64.
- 24 Apr. 313th Air Division requests Fifth Air Force to delegate launch authority for Quick Strike typhoon evacuations to the Commander, 313th Air Division.
- 1 May Major General William R. Collins, USM, assumes command of the Third Marine Division, vice Major General James M. Masters, Sr., in ceremonies at Stilwell Field, Camp Sukiran.
- 1 May 313ADIV OPORD 329-64: AUMEE III, is published. AUMEE III is a joint 1st Special Forces/Republic of China exercise in which the 313th Air Division units involved are to provide the Exercise Director USAF tactical air support in the roles of sterilizing the drop zone, neutralizing enemy positions, interdiction of lines of communication, and strip alert for immediate strike requests.
- 4 May The first four F-105F two-place jet fighter aircraft are received by the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Kadena AB, for use in training pilots.

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- 6 May 313ADIV OPLAN 102-64: JOSS STICK, supporting PACAF OPORD 102-64: JOSS STICK, is published.
- 11 May 313ADIV OPORD 331-64: JOSS STICK FIGHTER 1/64, is published. This order provides guidance for tactical deployment to Base Butterworth, Malaysia, during the period 17-26 June 1964.
- 11 May The 313th Air Division Command Center is established and manned.
- 18 May 9AF-3-64/332-64 OPORD HABU STRIKE FIREPOWER, is published. This provides for a demonstration of personnel and heavy drops to include assembly and a company-sized attack utilizing supporting weapons and USAF close air support, to be conducted for visiting cadets of the Air Force Academy on 13 June 1964. The exercise participants are to be the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate).
- 22 May The 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) at Kadena AB is relieved from assignment to Fifth Air Force and is assigned to PACAF, per PACAF SO G-63, dtd. 5 May 1964. The 400th MMS (T) is attached to 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support, including summary, special, and general court-martial jurisdiction, non-judicial punishment under provisions of Article 15, UCMJ, and administrative board actions.
- 23 May The Emergency Operations Element Console at the 313th Air Division Command Center is declared fully operational. Messages are dispatched to PACAF and Fifth Air Force stating that all voice communications pertaining to emergency actions will be routed through the 313th Air Division EOE.
- 28 May A total of 36 USAF personnel enrolled in the 173d Airborne Brigade parachutists' school receive the parachutist's badge--supposedly the first such course authorized by USAF that is not conducted at Fort Benning, Georgia.
- 28 May Messages are received from CASF, PACAF, and Fifth Air Force that two Air Commando Squadrons will be assigned to Kadena AB during the period 1/67. The aircraft to be assigned will be C-123's, A-1E's, and C-47's, totalling 61. The personnel will number 693.
- 1 June The Okinawa Flight Information Region adopts standard Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) holding patterns and procedures.

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- 1 June 313ADIV OFPLAN 15-64: Civil Disturbance and Labor Strike Plan, is published and distributed. The object of this plan is to provide detailed guidance for and establish policies and procedures to be used in the control of civil disturbances or labor strikes occurring within the boundaries of Air Force installations in the Ryukyu Islands. It also furnished guidance on Air Force assistance in the control of civil disturbances occurring outside military installation boundaries should the use of joint forces be required.
- 2 June 313th Air Division requests postponement of Joss Stick Fighter to 10 August 1964 because of the F-105 modification program. Fifth Air Force concurs and recommends 2-11 September, with an alternate proposal of 30 September - 9 October.
- 8 June Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing, at Kadena AB, is discontinued, and in its place is designated and organized Detachment 8, 20th Weather Squadron, per MATS SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964. The new detachment is attached to Detachment 15, 20th Weather Squadron, at Osan AB, Korea, for operational control, and to the 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena AB, for administrative and logistic support.
- Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing, at Naha AB, is discontinued, and in its place is designated and organized Detachment 14, 20th Weather Squadron, per MATS SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964. The new detachment is attached to Detachment 15, 20th Weather Squadron, at Osan AB, Korea, for operational control, and to the 51st Combat Support Group, at Naha AB, for administrative and logistic support.
- 10 June The joint Air Force/Army weapons demonstration which was to be given for the Air Force Academy cadets on 12-13 June is canceled because of the F-105 modification program and the diversion of C-130's to higher priority missions.
- 10 June 313th Air Division is informed by Fifth Air Force that the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing is to furnish three RF-101's and a Photo Processing Cell (PPC) for Exercise SKY SOLDIER VI, to be conducted from 23 October through 5 November 1964. The purpose of this exercise on Taiwan will be to improve the combat readiness of units participating; to exercise the airborne capabilities of the U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade and the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) Airborne Regiment; to exercise all phases of carrier air support, including personnel and heavy equipment drops, air landings of equipment and personnel, and aerial re-supply; to exercise all phases of tactical operations; and to exercise signal communications.

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1964

- 15 June Vice-Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, relieves Vice-Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, as Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in a change of command ceremony aboard the attack carrier Kitty Hawk, at Yokosuka, Japan.
- 22 June The 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) assumes operational responsibility for the Bishagawa Ammunition Complex from the 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, Kadena AB. The complex is designated as the PACAF Theater Resupply Facility.
- 23 June General Earle G. Wheeler, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, succeeds General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Taylor is named Ambassador to the Republic of Viet Nam.
- 24 June Lieutenant General Harold K. Johnson is named U.S. Army Chief of Staff, with the rank of general, vice General Earle G. Wheeler.
- 25 June 313ADIV GWP 1-64, which provides guidance, policy, and direction to 313th Air Division units for the initial operations of a general war, is published.
- 27 June Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, succeeds Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Jr., USN, as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Admiral Moorer is promoted to his four-star rank for this post.

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313th AD, 1964-1

CHAPTER I

MISSION AND RESOURCES

313th AD, 1964-1, Chap. 1

CHAPTER 1

MISSION AND RESOURCES

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION MISSION AND THE COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Remark has been made in the history of the 313th Air Division immediately preceding this one of the durability that seemed to mark the mission directive which Fifth Air Force had issued for this command on 24 November 1961. For the mission of an Air Force organization to remain unchanged after the passage of 25 months was sufficiently remarkable to warrant comment. Therefore, the continued retention of that same mission directive without alteration for another half year constituted a phenomenon which lent an interest to Fifth Air Force Regulation Number 23-4 just slightly less than that attaching to the Dead Sea Scrolls or the original manuscript of the Ten Commandments.

In general terms, Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4 directed the 313th Air Division to maintain all its assigned and attached forces in a state of combat readiness so complete as to insure the success of any military operations which higher authority might direct or circumstances might necessitate.¹

In the matter of air defense, the 313th Air Division continued to be responsible for the same area as in the past--one encompassed within imaginary lines drawn from 30° N., 145° E., southwest to 23° N., 132° E.,

west to 23° N., 123° E., north to 30° N., 123° E., thence east to the starting point at 30° N., 145° E.--until 30 June 1964.² On that date, however, Fifth Air Force issued a new version of its regulation covering division areas of responsibility within its command.

The new edition of 5AFR No. 55-18 retained the same latitudinal limits for 313th's area of responsibility, but extended the longitudinal range both east and west. As of 30 June 1964, the 313th Air Division was to be responsible for the area west of a line connected by the points 30° N., 123° E., extended thence east to 30° N., 160° E., thence south to 23° N., 160° E., thence west to 123° E., 23° N., thence north to 29° N., 123° E., thence west to 29° N., 122° E. extended.³

Established as a subordinate command of Fifth Air Force, the 313th Air Division was provided with a headquarters at Kadena Air Base (AB), Okinawa, on the same site previously occupied serialim by Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, 1st Air Division, Thirteenth Air Force, and Twentieth Air Force. In addition, it was furnished such units and facilities as were deemed essential to the performance of its mission and the execution of Fifth Air Force air defense responsibilities in the 313th Air Division area or the Okinawan Air Defense Sector, as it was also known.

More specifically, the Commander, 313th Air Division (Major General Albert P. Clark since 18 July 1963) was responsible for the following tasks and duties:

1. Exercising command of all assigned units, except for such direct control over offensive tactical forces as the Commander, Fifth Air Force retained.

2. Controlling and/or supporting the various attached units, as directed.

3. Organizing, administering, equipping, and training the assigned and attached units and combat crews in accordance with directives, policies, and plans issued by either Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters.

4. In coordination with commands having contiguous, related, or supporting responsibilities, preparing such plans as should be required to support Fifth Air Force emergency and contingency war plans.

5. Insuring that combat training was conducted in accordance with existing directives and was oriented toward the development of an operational capability consistent with the tasks assigned in current war plans, operational plans, and operations orders.

6. Insuring that all combat units and those directly supporting combat units were furnished with plans, directives, and operational orders and command policy guidance in sufficient detail to provide the total guidance necessary to the maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

7. Insuring the publication and maintenance of general and domestic emergency plans.

8. Monitoring the development and conduct of training programs to include:

- (a) The technical training necessary to fulfill Fifth Air Force requirements for technical and other specialized personnel.

(b) General military training, in accordance with applicable Air Force unit training standards.

(c) Assisting in aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other training for military personnel of friendly foreign nations under the Military Assistance Program (MAP), as required.

(d) Such other training as might be directed.

9. Contributing toward the development of:

(a) The tactics and techniques of aerial warfare.

(b) Requirements for new weapons and weapon systems.

(c) Improved utilization of current weapons and weapon systems.

10. Providing aircraft for and supervision over the annual flying requirements of assigned and attached aircrew personnel, in accordance with AFR 60-3.

11. Providing administrative and logistic support, as directed.

12. Supporting the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Military Air Transport Service (MATS), and other USAF activities, in accordance with the current priorities of programmed units, as reflected on the latest USAF programming document.

13. Exercising operational control of forces other than those of the United States, when so directed.

14. Exercising operational control of U.S. Army and Navy anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile units of the Army's 30th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense), and other anti-aircraft artillery

made available for integration into the 313th Air Division air defense system.

15. Representing CINCPAC and CINCPACAF in the coordination of all airspace and air traffic control matters within the Okinawa Flight Information Region.

16. Conducting search and rescue operations as directed.

17. Organizing and administering an effective flight, missile, nuclear, and ground safety program within all assigned and attached Air Force units.

18. Providing for sustained internal security and expanded security emergency protection of assigned Air Force installations.

19. Providing for the development, construction, maintenance, and operation of assigned installations required to support the mission.

20. Exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over assigned units of Fifth Air Force in the Ryukyu Islands.

21. Coordinating with and providing assistance to other U.S. military services and governmental agencies as follows:

(a) By formulating and jointly preparing plans for use in local ground defense, search and rescue, civil disturbances, typhoons, natural disasters, military facility recovery, emergency non-combatant evacuations, and special demonstrations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies.

(b) By coordinating with the appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine commanders to insure uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

- (c) By participating in combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marines, and governmental agencies, as directed by the Commander, U.S. Forces.
- (d) By contributing personnel to the Joint-Service Ryukyuan Armed Forces Police (RAFP) and the Ryukyus Army and Air Force Exchange Service (REX).
- (e) By providing a base, training facilities, and support for Naval Fleet Activities offensive and defensive training and weapons testing operations, upon the completion of the appropriate agreements.
- (f) By supporting the CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands (Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA) in the discharge of his joint service responsibilities by serving as the Air Force member of the Area Joint Committee and by providing appropriate Air Force membership on the Joint Planning Group, all sub-committees, and panels.
- (g) By coordinating all Air Force activities having an impact on the civil economy or affecting civil activities with the appropriate local U.S. governmental authorities.
- (h) By supporting the High Commissioner (HICOM) of the Ryukyu Islands (another of the titles held by General Caraway, who was also Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) and IX Corps, and CINCPACREP, Ryukyu Islands) in the discharge of the United States civil administration responsibilities in the Ryukyus.

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22. Insuring that all commanders and staff officers were familiar with the principles and policies contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications: "Unified Actions Armed Forces."

23. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all assigned units reporting directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division.

24. Insuring that mission directives had been prepared for all units of the 313th Air Division, and requiring that they be reviewed semi-annually and brought up to date when found necessary.

On matters pertaining to the mission and responsibilities of the air division, the 313th Air Division Commander was authorized to communicate directly with other Fifth Air Force subordinate commanders and with the commanders of friendly forces, unless Fifth Air Force or higher headquarters should direct otherwise.⁴

In addition to the foregoing Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4, which set forth the 313th Air Division's organization and mission, the responsibilities delegated to the 313th Commander and those specifically retained by the Fifth Air Force Commander continued to be defined in the so-called "Burns letter" of 27 June 1960, as revised on 1 August 1960.

According to this letter, which bore the signature of the Fifth Air Force Commander of that period, Lieutenant General Robert W. Burns, "a degree of direct control of all Fifth Air Force strike forces by this headquarters [Fifth Air Force] is essential in assuring a quick reacting atomic force under current policy of employment of atomic weapons." Moreover, this degree of direct control extended beyond the "centralized control traditional in the employment of conventional forces." Then

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by way of further clarifying a knotty subject, he defined control as "Authority which may be less than full command, exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations."

Having thus disposed of these lexicographic matters, General Burns devoted the next few paragraphs to describing in detail "the minimum control that Fifth Air Force intended to retain and exercise over tactical striking forces" of the 313th Air Division:

1. The ordering, directing, and monitoring of maneuvers and deployments of forces in the exercise of emergency and contingency war plans.
2. The ordering and monitoring of routine and special force deployments.
3. The ordering, directing, monitoring, and evaluating of combat readiness training programs.
4. The controlling and directing of the wartime employment of strike forces through the Fifth Air Force Operations Centers. This system would provide direct communication between Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and the tactical wings.
5. The control and direction of the peacetime employment of forces under the Quick Strike Program.
6. Such other control as operational necessity might dictate.

General Burns pointed out that the retention of direct control of tactical wings by his headquarters would have the effect of reducing the number of personnel needed on 313th Air Division's Operations staff. For this headquarters to have such officers assigned would only involve a duplication of the Fifth Air Force effort in the direction and control

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of the strike forces. On the other hand, he did consider it "necessary and desirable" for the 313th Air Division Commander to keep himself and key members of his staff informed concerning the planned employment and operational readiness of the strike forces assigned to his command, in order that he might be prepared to carry out effectively the responsibilities assigned him by Annex "E" and described in the Command Relationships Annex of the WPC.

At this point General Burns labored the argument that no augmentation of the 313th Commander's Operations staff was warranted by the mission directive's requirement that this headquarters assure the accomplishment of combat readiness training, the preparation of plans and orders, and the provision of command policy and guidance, along with sundry other responsibilities in connection with the command and control of tactical striking forces. On the contrary, he declared, these responsibilities, extensive though they were, could well be discharged by the existing staff, with the assistance of the Inspector General's office and the tactical wing staffs. (Of course, at the time this letter was written, the 313th Air Division headquarters included an Office of the Inspector General, but this function had been eliminated on 1 January 1963; therefore, no assistance could now be looked for from that source.)

Finally, said General Burns, Fifth Air Force's control of the tactical striking forces would be exercised through direct communication with the tactical wings and groups, with information copies of all correspondence between the Fuchu headquarters and these tactical units, other than that of a routine nature, being furnished 313th Air Division.⁵

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Besides Fifth Air Force Regulations 23-4 and 55-18 and the "Burns letter," the mission of 313th Air Division in 1964 was also governed by Fifth Air Force Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63, which had been published on 10 January 1963.

In accordance with the directive of the President of the United States that all governmental agencies were to take appropriate steps to insure continuity of their essential functions in the event of cataclysmic disaster resulting from enemy nuclear attack, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces promulgated PACAF Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63. Serving as a framework around which the plan would function were four possible alternative disaster situations--Conditions "ALFA PACAF," "BRAVO PACAF," "ALFA 5AF," and "BRAVO 5AF."

Under Condition "ALFA PACAF" the entire operation of Headquarters, PACAF had been totally destroyed, and any few survivors there might be were incapable of any action. In these circumstances, Alternate Headquarters, PACAF (Advance) would be activated at Fuchu Air Station (Headquarters, Fifth Air Force), and Alternate Headquarters, PACAF (Rear) would be activated at McClellan AFB, California (Sacramento Air Materiel Area).

Under Condition "BRAVO PACAF," there would have been enough warning of the impending attack for all essential non-interruptable functions--or at least a sufficient number of them--to be moved to an emergency relocation site. In these circumstances the Advance Headquarters, PACAF, located at Kunia, an underground fastness on Oahu which was hopefully described as "bombproof," would be manned to an extent commensurate with the condition of alert (DEFCON), while the PACAF Rear Headquarters would remain at Hickam AFB, rather than being transferred to McClellan AFB.

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Under Condition "ALFA 5AF," enemy nuclear attack would have totally destroyed Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, in addition to Headquarters, PACAF, again leaving few, if any, survivors. In these circumstances, the Commander, Thirteenth Air Force, at Clark AB in the Philippines, would activate Alternate Headquarters, PACAF (Advance) and act as CINCPACAF; while an Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force (Advance) would immediately be activated by the 41st Air Division at Yokota AB, Japan. Then, if the Commander, 313th Air Division determined that both Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and the 41st Air Division had been subjected to a surprise attack and he could not contact either by means of the existing communications, he would assume the position of Commander, Fifth Air Force, activating Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force (Reorganized) at Kadena AB.

Accordingly, the staff agencies of 313th Air Division Headquarters should (1) be prepared to perform the essential wartime functions of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, including (a) maintenance of required facilities, (b) possessing thorough familiarity with the Fifth Air Force Alternate File and insuring that it was stored in a secure location, separate from and independent of the files of Headquarters, 313th Air Division, (c) conducting a periodic review of the Fifth Air Force Alternate File to insure its state of currency and that adequate procedures for its prompt use were in effect, and (d) possessing a thorough familiarity with the wartime mission and functions on very short notice; (2) insure that communications facilities necessary to implement this plan were provided; (3) assume command and activate Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force (Reorganized) at Kadena AB as soon as it was known for certain that both Headquarters, Fifth Air Force and Headquarters, 41st Air Division had been annihilated. This

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done, 313th should notify Headquarters, PACAF (presumably the alternate advance headquarters functioning at Clark AB) and all PACAF subordinate units of its assumption of command and the activation of Alternate Headquarters, Fifth Air Force (Reorganized) at Building 159, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa.

Under Condition "ALFA 5AF," the senior surviving officer in Fifth Air Force would, whenever possible, serve as the Fifth Air Force Commander. However, in order to insure continuity of command, the Commander, 41st Air Division, would initially act as Commander, establishing his command post at Yokota AB. Then, as we have seen, in the event command could not be exercised by the 41st Air Division, by reason of its own destruction, the Commander, 313th Air Division would act as Commander, Fifth Air Force. However, if command could not be exercised as thus outlined, as a result of the obliteration of Headquarters, 313th Air Division along with 41st Air Division and Fifth Air Force, the senior officer of such organizations as were still in communication with one another would assume Fifth Air Force command responsibilities for them. Whenever this senior officer assumed Fifth Air Force command responsibility, he might operate from one of the prepared Alternate Headquarters, or he could establish a new headquarters, whichever he deemed the more appropriate.⁶

At 313th Headquarters, the Fifth Air Force Alternate Files for implementing the above measures were maintained by the Classified Section of the Director of Administrative Services. These files consisted of selected publications and duplicate copies of documents and reports necessary to conduct essential wartime functions at alternate locations. Material for the file was originated by the office of primary responsibility at Fifth

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Air Force and forwarded to the alternate locations on a special file transmittal form.

On 29 October 1963, Colonel Richard D. Goree, the 313th Air Division Director of Operations, reminded all the staff agencies that 313AD COP 17-63 required a periodic review of the Fifth Air Force alternate files by each one of them. This meant that after the initial review, each agency was expected to review its files to weigh the adequacy and currency of the material contained therein once each calendar quarter, beginning in January 1964. If a staff agency concluded that a file was of no value, it should recommend its elimination. Or, if it determined that changes to specific documents or procedures were desirable, the staff agency should describe in precise terms what revisions needed to be made.⁷

313th Air Division's Continuity of Operations Plan 17-63 provided for a battle staff, to be composed of a limited number of personnel who would be convened upon the call of the Commander during periods of tension, contingencies, or general war. This battle staff provided the 313th Air Division Commander with (1) A quick headquarters reaction to various emergency situations; and (2) A central control agency for the progressive conditioning of the headquarters for general war under strategic warning conditions such as periods of tension or contingency operations.

The specific functions and actions of the battle staff would be entirely dependent upon the particular defense condition (DEFCON) in effect. Any given DEFCON might be established immediately without intermediate steps separating it from normal peacetime operations. The battle staff would provide the guidance and control for orderly transition into

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the announced DEFCON, assuring that all required preliminary and intermediate actions were taken as rapidly as possible.

The battle staff would be composed of the following key and support staff personnel, who were to be prepared to man it at such time as it was activated, with an alternate also to be designated for each position:

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>OFFICE</u>
Division Commander	0066	313CR
Vice Commander	0066	313CR
Director of Operations	0036	313OC
Director of Materiel	0046	313MC
Plans/Programs Officer - Operations	0076	313OC-P
Logistics Plans Officer - Operations	6316	313OC-P
Intelligence Staff Officer	2016	313OC-I
Comm-Elec Staff Officer	3016	1962CG
Offensive A/C Opns Officer	1416	18TFW
Tac Missile Opns Officer	1824	498TMG
Def Opns Staff Officer	1416	51ADCC
Disaster Control Officer	1435	313DCC

The bulk of the planning and preparation for 313th Air Division's acceptance of responsibilities as Headquarters, Fifth Air Force under Condition "ALFA 5AF" would, of course, have to be performed during normal circumstances (DEFCON5). The Division Command Center (DCC) would provide space and assign duty stations as appropriate for the battle staff members, establish procedures for alerting the battle staff, and provide a situation briefing, with division staff assistance, to key 313th battle staff per-

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sonnel upon their recall to battle staff positions. This briefing would take place at recall plus one hour, or whenever otherwise directed by the 313th Commander.

Upon the declaration of DEFCON 4, accelerated action would be taken to insure the completion of all the requirements set forth under DEFCON 5. At this time the Continuity of Operations Plans and DEFCON Checklists would be reviewed for completeness and adequacy, then revised where this was found necessary.

During DEFCON 3, all officers designated to man the division battle staff would be placed in an "on call" status to facilitate their immediate availability, as would all other personnel performing essential functions. These readiness actions were, however, to be executed as inconspicuously as possible.

Immediately upon the declaration of DEFCON 2, the Headquarters, 313th Air Division battle staff would be activated and the majority of the positions manned for the performance of essential functions. At the discretion of the 313th Commander--and depending upon the situation existing--the battle staff might be ordered completely manned at this time. Those positions which were activated would establish a 24-hour duty schedule.

Upon the declaration of DEFCON 1, all essential positions were to be manned immediately and would remain continuously manned to the maximum extent compatible with working space and requirements. At this time complete preparations for implementation of war plans would be made.

Subsidiary to the division battle staff would be a Logistic Control Center (LCC), whose purpose it was to advise the 313th Commander and his

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staff on all matters pertaining to logistical support and to perform such materiel actions as were required to accomplish the combat mission. The LCC would be manned by the Logistic Plans Officer (who, as we have seen, was also a member of the battle staff) and selected personnel from the Materiel Directorate, who would normally function on a 24-hour basis in the Division Command Center, Building 159, when the 313th Director of Materiel determined that it should be activated.⁸

Revised Missions of Subordinate Organizations.

The Mission of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing: By contrast with Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-4, which set forth the mission of the 313th Air Division with a permanence rivalling the laws of the Medes and Persians, 313ADR No. 23-6, published by this headquarters on 21 January 1963 to guide the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, proved to be about as long-lived as a Ku Klux Klan rally in Harlem or a government of the Republic of Viet Nam.

On 27 January 1964, this headquarters issued a spanking new version of 313th Air Division Regulation No. 23-6, which set forth in detail the mission and responsibilities of the 51st Wing. In general terms, this mission would consist of conducting air defense operations within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility and the adjacent areas, including the activities of the ADCC, the four AC&W radar stations, the fighter interceptor squadron, and air defense missile units of the U.S. Army, and providing, as the Commander, 313th Air Division, might direct, administrative and logistical support for units attached to Naha Air Base.

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The 51st FIW was organized as an Air Force controlled (AFCON) unit assigned to the 313th Air Division, and was provided with a headquarters, a combat support group, and such facilities, equipment, personnel, and assigned units as were considered necessary to carry out the mission.

The Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, subject to policies established by 313th Air Division and directives of higher headquarters, exercised command jurisdiction over the 51st Wing and its assigned and attached units. While so doing, he was directly responsible to the 313th Air Division Commander for:

1. Providing such staff assistance and advice as might be required by the Commander, 313th Air Division on air defense matters. He was designated Deputy Commander, 313th Air Division (Air Defense).
2. Providing aircraft, equipment, and personnel needed for execution of the air defense mission, as might be directed.
3. The operational control of all U.S. Army anti-aircraft units for sector air defense, operational control of Naval and Marine anti-aircraft units when shore-based, and operational control of anti-aircraft gunfire from ships' batteries when such fire was in defense of shore installations located within the 313th Air Division sector of responsibility.
4. Preparing and maintaining plans to conduct air defense operations.
5. Contributing mobile strike forces, support personnel, and equipment support of PACAF contingency war plans.
6. Augmenting the defensive forces of other Fifth Air Force air divisions when the situation so dictated.

7. Providing a command and control center (the Naha Air Defense Control Center) for the conduct of the air defense mission for the Okinawa Air Defense Sector.

8. Mutually coordinating and standardizing air defense information and procedures with adjacent air defense sectors.

9. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached to his command for flying.

10. Unit training incidental to assigned organic forces engaged in air defense.

11. Developing and conducting aircrew, ground crew, technical, and other specialized training programs for military personnel of friendly foreign countries under the Military Assistance Program.

12. Coordinating with appropriate local Army, Navy, and Marine Commanders to insure the uninterrupted operation of jointly used facilities and installations.

13. Conducting combined training and operations with local Army, Navy, Marine, and governmental agencies as frequently as was necessary to insure the success of all planned joint operations.

14. Providing field maintenance to all organizations assigned, attached, or transient on Naha Air Base. This would include the deployment of mobile maintenance team personnel and equipment, as necessary, to support the Naha-based C-130 aircraft utilized in performance of 315th Air Division's intra-theater airlift mission.

15. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in accordance with plans formulated by 313th Air Division, to the

maximum extent consistent with the requirements of the primary mission.

16. Issuing mission statements for all assigned units and insuring semi-annual review and updating if required.

17. Performing such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division.

The 51st FlW Commander was authorized the usual direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force Logistic Command (AFLC) depot commanders and the heads of civilian agencies on routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. However, direct communication on other than such routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters would require the specific approval of Headquarters, 313th Air Division.⁹

The Mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing: Enjoying even shorter shrift than the 51st Wing's mission as stated in 1963 was that edition of 313ADR No. 23-13 which had prescribed the mission of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on 16 April 1963. On 27 January 1964, this infant version was superseded by a new one which reiterated that the mission was to maintain assigned aircraft and personnel in a high state of readiness and to provide the capability of executing fighter missions designed to destroy enemy forces and facilities.

In addition to this unclassified mission statement, a Secret directive made the 18th Wing responsible for planning, exercising, and supporting tactical fighter missions which would utilize nuclear weapons in support of immediate retaliatory capability (Quick Strike), general war plans (GWP), and contingency war plans (limited war). A secondary part of the

classified mission called for the maintenance of a "limited war" capability to plan, exercise, and support tactical fighter missions with conventional ordnance, if required.¹⁰

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was organized as an AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division. As such it was provided with a headquarters, facilities, equipment, and personnel, together with the assigned tactical and maintenance units necessary to carry out its mission.

Exercising command, administrative, and operational control of assigned and attached units, except when otherwise specified by competent authority, the 18th Wing Commander was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for:

1. The accomplishment of offensive aircraft operational staff requirements for 313th Air Division. When so designated, he was assigned additional duty as the 313th Air Division Deputy Commander for Offense.
2. Providing aircraft for and proper supervision of the combat readiness flying training and routine flying training programs of Air Force personnel on flying status when assigned or attached for this purpose to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.
3. Providing supply, equipment, fuel, war readiness materiel (WRM), aircraft engine, and ammunition support to assigned and attached organizations and the Military Assistance Program.
4. Providing continuation training for bomb commanders, to insure their continued combat readiness status.
5. Developing and conducting training programs to fulfill requirements for technical and specialized personnel training and

such other training programs as might be directed.

6. Providing organization and field maintenance support of assigned, attached, and transient aircraft as required in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFM) 66-1 and other applicable directives.

7. Issuing mission directives for each assigned unit of the wing and insuring their semi-annual review and updating, if required.

8. Participating in disaster relief and domestic emergencies, in accordance with current plans, after first taking into consideration the requirements of the 18th's primary mission.

9. Performing special missions and such other tasks as might be directed by the Commander, 313th Air Division, or by higher headquarters.

10. Establishing and maintaining a Wing Command Center (WCC) on a 24-hour-per-day basis. The WCC would be fitted with the display facilities and communications necessary to control offensive aircraft operations. The WCC would maintain the current status of aircraft, crews, and weapons, and would display the strike routes of 18th Tactical Fighter Wing aircraft. In addition, status information would be maintained on the aircraft of other wings that were launched from bases in areas of mutual interest.

The Commander of the 18th TFW was authorized direct communication with local Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine, and AFLC depot commanders, as well as with the heads of civilian agencies, on routine administrative and logistical matters. All policy matters and direct communications with other major commanders would, however, be handled by Headquarters, 313th Air Division, except when specific authorization was granted. Direct

communication was authorized between the 18th WCC and the 5AFCC at Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, Fuchu Air Station, Japan.¹¹

The Mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group: Although the mission of the 498th Tactical Missile Group at Kadena had been described in 313ADR 23-4 of 3 January 1963, it, too, was superseded early the following year, on 27 January 1964. The classified mission of the 498th TMG continued to be the maintenance of a 24-hour alert posture with TM-76B Mace missiles in hardened (100 PSI) launch sites on the island of Okinawa, where they provided a quick-reacting, all-weather, nuclear strike capability against high priority predetermined targets on the Communist Chinese mainland in support of PACAF war plans.¹²

According to the new version of 313ADR No. 23-4, the 498th was organized as an AFCON unit assigned to the 313th Air Division, with operational control vested in the Commander, Fifth Air Force. For this purpose it was provided with a group headquarters, two operations squadrons (the 873d and 874th Tactical Missile Squadrons), the 498th Missile Maintenance Squadron, a unique supply facility (Missile Automatic Supply Technique), a depot maintenance facility, and four operational launch sites.

While the Commander of the 498th Tactical Missile Group exercised command, administrative, and operational control of the assigned units, he was directly responsible to the Commander, 313th Air Division, for the following:

1. The fulfillment of all launch responsibilities as contained in the current and supporting General War Plan (GWP) and Operations Plans.

2. The augmentation of Fifth Air Force's combat capability, as directed.

3. Provision of transition and continuation training to launch crews to insure their continued combat readiness status.

4. The development and conduct of training programs to insure fulfillment of technical and specialized organizational personnel requirements.

5. The conduct of unit training, in accordance with AFR 50-2 and Air Force Unit Training Standard 5-1.

6. Participation in disaster relief and domestic emergencies in support of 313th Air Division and 6313th Air Base Wing current plans and consistent with mission requirements.

7. The establishment and maintenance of a Group Command Center (GCC) on a 24-hour-per-day basis. This GCC would display the current status of its weapons, crews, targets, launch bays, and sites, and would be fitted with such communications as were necessary to control the group offensive operation.

8. Insuring the preparation of mission directives for all of the assigned units of the 498th Tactical Missile Group and requiring that they be reviewed semi-annually and updated, if necessary.

9. Such other tasks as the Commander, 313th Air Division should direct.

The Commander, 498th Tactical Missile Group, was authorized direct communication with local Army, Navy, Marine, and AFLC Depot Commanders and the heads of civilian agencies on routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters pertaining to his mission. Direct Communication

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on other than routine operational, logistical, and administrative matters would require the specific approval of 313th Air Division Headquarters, though direct communication between the Fifth Air Force Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and the 498th GCC was authorized.¹³

INCHOATE PLANNING FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

PACAF's Proposed Organization of 1 November 1963.

In its Fountain of Youth-like quest for the perfect organization, Headquarters, United States Air Force (USAF) had turned its attention to the existing structures at Kadena and Naha Air Bases on Okinawa as early as 17 December 1962, but it was not until almost another year had gone by that some indication of the shape and dimensions the new organization would take began to emerge from the murky area of amorphous planning.

During that period, Headquarters, USAF had emphasized the importance of standardizing organizations whose missions were roughly the same, believing that this would free commanders to concentrate on their primary mission, thus expediting the decision-making processes. And the sought-after efficiency would be best achieved by consolidating as many functions as possible.

By 1 November 1963, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) had already received authority to standardize the organization structure at certain bases in Japan, and, with these to serve as models, was ready to complete the action, wherever found appropriate, throughout the command. Among the bases thus rendered eligible for study and probable reorganization were Kadena and Naha Air Bases on Okinawa, as well as their parent headquarters, the 313th Air Division. While the proposed organizational charts forwarded

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by PACAF to Fifth Air Force on 1 November made no attempt to liquidate the 313th Air Division itself, they suggested drastic changes for both bases--- though those at Naha would be far the more revolutionary.

The Commander of the 313th Air Division, to begin with, would have directly under him a Deputy Commander for Operations (DC/O) and a Deputy Commander for Materiel (DC/M), as well as a Director of Safety and an Inspector. Reporting directly to the DC/O would be the 12th, 44th, and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (until its replacement by an F-4C rotational squadron some time in the latter part of 1964), the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, the 873d and 874th Missile Squadrons, and the 623d Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) Squadron. Thus, the 313th Air Division Commander, through his Deputy Commander for Operations, would reclaim direct control over units which had been functioning under the Commanders of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 498th Tactical Missile Group, and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, all three of whom were to be eliminated under the PACAF scheme of things.

The USAF plan, as described by PACAF, also envisaged the shadowy position of a Deputy for Air Defense, who would report to the Deputy Commander for Operations, rather than directly to the 313th Air Division Commander, as heretofore. For some years the Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base, now nominated for extinction in the USAF proposal, had also occupied the position of Deputy for Air Defense, on an ex officio basis. Now, however, since he would no longer be around to serve in the latter capacity, it would become necessary to assign another colonel to that position, probably in a full-time status.

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Reporting directly to the Deputy Commander for Materiel would be a Chief of Supply and a Chief of Maintenance. Under the former would be one unit, the 313th Supply Squadron; while the latter would reign over five different organizations--the 313th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Field Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, and the 313th Missile Maintenance Squadron--the first four of whom were currently assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and the last-named to the 498th Tactical Missile Group.

Replacing the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena would be the 313th Combat Support Group, comprising four units--the 313th Air Police Squadron, the 313th Transportation Squadron, the 313th Civil Engineering Squadron, and the 313th Services Squadron. The support group would be assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, as would the 313th USAF Dispensary and the 558th Air Force Band.

As a result of Project Clearwater, the Headquarters, 315th Air Division would be transferred from Tachikawa Air Base (AB), Japan, to Naha AB, where it would replace the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing as the base organization. Eliminated in the process would be the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Headquarters itself and five subordinate organizations bearing the designation "51st"--the Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, the Organizational Maintenance Squadron, the Supply Squadron, the Field Maintenance Squadron, and the USAF Dispensary. Additionally, and quite predictably, since there would be no further need for it, Detachment 1, Headquarters, 315th Air Division, which had provided direct governance of the 21st, 817th, and 35th Troop Carrier Squadrons at Naha AB, would quietly vanish from the local scene.

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Under the proposed reorganization, the 315th Air Division Deputy Commander for Operations would exercise direct control of the 21st and 817th Troop Carrier Squadrons, already at Naha AB; the 815th Troop Carrier Squadron, the 6485th Operations Squadron, the 7th Aerial Port Squadron, the 5th Communications Squadron, and the 5th Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron, all located at Tachikawa AB; and the 315th Troop Carrier Group, which was operating in Southeast Asia. The 35th Troop Carrier Squadron, presently at Naha AB, was to be transferred to the CONUS or discontinued.

The 315th Air Division Deputy Commander for Materiel would be supported by a Chief of Supply, who would exercise direct control of the 315th Supply Squadron, and a Chief of Maintenance, who would control the 315th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, the 315th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, the 315th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, and the 315th Field Maintenance Squadron.

Also assigned to the 315th Air Division Headquarters would be the 315th USAF Dispensary and the 315th Combat Support Group. The Commander of the 315th Combat Support Group would be the Naha Base Commander, with his assigned units consisting of the 315th Air Police, Transportation, Civil Engineering, and Services Squadrons.¹⁴

Since PACAF, in its letter of 1 November 1963, had asked Fifth Air Force to offer comments and suggestions for improvement on the foregoing proposals by 2 December, the latter in its turn wrote 313th Air Division on 15 November requesting that this headquarters record its comments and suggestions not later than 26 November 1963. While the Fuchu headquarters generally agreed with the PACAF structure as portrayed in the charts accom-

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panying the letter of November 1st, it did not believe that the Deputy for Air Defense should be placed under the Deputy Commander for Operations. Instead, he should report directly to the 313th Air Division Commander. Less importantly, Fifth Air Force suspected that PACAF's inclusion of an Inspection function on the division staff was inadvertent, inasmuch as USAF had directed elimination of this function at echelons below Air Force level and 313th had not possessed this luxury item for nearly a year.¹⁵

General Clark's Counter-Proposal of 27 November 1963.

On 27 November 1963, Major General Albert P. Clark, the 313th Air Division Commander, responded at some length to Fifth's letter, but did not confine himself to mere "comments and suggestions" on the PACAF proposal. On the contrary, his remarks might more accurately be described as "strenuous objections" to the concepts set forth by the Hickam headquarters and tentatively indorsed, for the most part, by Fuchu.

He began his counter-argument by pointing out that any reorganization of the 313th Air Division aimed either at stanching the theater-wide outflow of dollars or at reducing manpower requirements must at the same time insure that the "existing high level of effectiveness" of the assigned and attached combat units was continued, that 313th's collateral responsibilities were competently discharged, and that "an appropriate Air Force position and image in the Ryukyu Islands" were preserved.

Unless the mission of the 313th Air Division were reduced in scope appreciably, it was not realistic to expect any important manpower savings that were unaccompanied by a corresponding decline in the quality of performance. For the "diversity, scope, and magnitude" of the missions assigned

313th made it an organization unique in the PACAF command. To cite an example of this peculiarity, General Clark noted that four "highly complex" weapons systems were assigned to 313th, together with a complicated manual air defense ground environment system; and personnel had to be first trained, then maintained, in a state of combat readiness to operate them. In addition, complex logistics and personnel supporting systems had to be managed and operated; while support for a wide variety of additional assigned and tenant organizations, including elements of some of the other military services, imposed its special demands. Moreover, air traffic control and associated airspace matters in a Flight Information Region (FIR) covering 360,000 square miles constituted other responsibilities assigned 313th Air Division through the attached 1962d Communications Group (AFCS). Still other matters which were time-consuming for the 313th Commander and his staff were those of local inter-service negotiations and joint committees and political subjects.

Further complicating the air division's task was the responsibility for two major bases--Kadena and Naha--situated 17 miles apart, besides four widely dispersed AC&W sites (Miyako Jima Air Station, Kume Shima Air Station, Yoza Dake Air Station, and Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station). In addition, there were several gunnery and bombing ranges, auxiliary airfields, and isolated communications sites.

Before higher headquarters definitely decided to make drastic changes in the structure of the Air Force organization in the Ryukyu Islands, it should bear in mind that the readiness status of the combat units assigned to the 313th Air Division was "currently second to none in the Air Force" and should, therefore, approach "with great caution" any thinking along these lines.

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It was logical to assume that 313th would continue to serve as an alternate headquarters for Fifth Air Force as long as the latter was based in Japan, since this provided at least some hope of assuring continuity of command and control in the event of a nuclear holocaust involving Fuchu Air Station. This responsibility, in its demands for staffing and facilities, strongly influenced the optimum organizational structure.

In view of the variety, number, and complexity of the weapon systems assigned to the 313th Air Division, a "wide spectrum of highly specialized technical, professional, and managerial competence" was necessary to assure the availability of combat-ready personnel and weapon systems when needed. General Clark was of the strong opinion that only through specialization at the wing/group level could the required degree of competence be attained. That is, a direct association must exist--a "triangular relationship" between the tactical wing/group commanders and their operational units on the one hand and their maintenance elements on the other.

As the 313th Commander saw it, the PACAF proposal to reorganize the 313th Air Division into a standard structure failed to consider the great differences between the 313th Air Division and those in Japan (the 39th, 41st, and 315th Air Divisions) for which the standard structure had been designed. The latter were essentially single base and single weapon system organizations. Thus, in redesignating wings as divisions, "the proven triangular relationship between the highly specialized team of commander, operational units, and maintenance elements" remained undisturbed. By the same token, the adoption of such a structure for the 313th Air Division would destroy this specialized team relationship at the single weapon

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system (wing/group) level, and would instead place reliance on staff officer-directed arrangements requiring the handling of these management responsibilities by two coordinating lateral staff agencies, each having functional responsibilities spread over four or more weapons systems in addition to their supporting systems and collateral responsibilities.

The division commander, in addition to his other duties, would be required to control and act as arbiter in the continuous competition of the Operations and Maintenance functions for all these weapons systems. The inevitable consequence, in the opinion of General Clark, was that "a management monstrosity would be created, which would be doomed to failure by the complexity of managing, maintaining, and operating the several weapon systems." And, equally inevitably, a loss of combat effectiveness would result.

In consideration of the foregoing, the 313th Air Division Commander and his staff had developed an organizational structure which they believed to be consistent with the objectives previously stated by PACAF, and which would insure 313th's ability to perform its missions in an "effective, economical, and professional manner." This structure would see the air division stripped of all functions which could be performed at a lower level, leaving it with direct control over only Operations and Materiel activities. The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, and the 498th Tactical Missile Group structures would be retained, but would be relieved of all non-tactical support responsibilities. They would, however, retain responsibility for weapon systems operations and maintenance, including the maintenance of transport aircraft. As for the non-tactical support elements at Kadena and Naha Air Bases, they would be

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combined in an Okinawa Base Command, in which would be centralized all possible functions.

In consonance with PACAF's proposal of 1 November 1963, General Clark agreed that the 315th Air Division, emasculated by Project Clearwater transfers and inactivations of its Japan-based units, should logically move to Naha Air Base. But he did not concur in the assignment to 315th of base command responsibilities at Naha, feeling that to do so would nullify the savings and management improvement which could be achieved through the adoption of an Area Base Command concept. In fact, there was no doubt in his mind that duplication and overlapping of functions would inevitably result. Therefore, the 315th Air Division, if brought down to Naha from Tachikawa, should be assigned a tenant status, and the maintenance responsibility should be continued as it had been. After all, this arrangement appeared to be working well; and, besides, since the 315th Air Division was a "suitcase headquarters," it ought to retain its mobility by not becoming encumbered with additional responsibilities for real property and other base functions that would hobble Pegasus himself. Conversely, the more permanent nature of the air defense mission and resulting stability of command and supervisory personnel would assure a greater continuity in the maintenance function if performed by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. Furthermore, it should be realized that if 315th Air Division did move to Naha from Tachikawa, whether as a tenant or as the base command headquarters, PACAF and USAF would have to provide additional dormitory and headquarters facilities to accommodate the personnel of the migrant troop carrier organization.

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At the same time, several important benefits would accrue to the Air Force's effectiveness through the establishment of an Area Base Command, in the opinion of the division commander. Firstly, the operating commander would be freed of all responsibilities not directly connected with the maintenance of his equipment or the training of his unit. Thus, the ability of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to pick up and move out on a redeployment or in response to a contingency action would be vastly assisted. Secondly, improved management of the Kadena/Naha support complex that would enable it to cope with changing force postures and mission requirements would be achieved. It should be borne in mind that this complex was quite likely to outlive the units currently assigned to it, and its extensive involvement in staging and trans-theater exercises could be expected to continue. Thirdly, 313th felt that in the present proposal it had demonstrated the maximum functional consolidation in the areas lending themselves to such action through use of the Area Base Command concept and by streamlining the 313th Air Division Headquarters. Finally, the establishment of an Area Base Command would permit greater flexibility in the allocation and utilization of available resources to meet peak operational requirements, since the support requirements for both Naha and Kadena would be controlled by one commander. Thus, the existing competition between Air Force units on Okinawa for critically limited local resources "could be more judiciously handled."

In closing, General Clark suggested to Fifth Air Force that it might be considered "timely and appropriate" to redesignate the 313th Air Division as Fifth Air Force Headquarters (REAR), with no change in the assigned mission. Such a move would "improve Air Force posture

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vis-a-vis other services in the Ryukyus, would resolve potential confusion and inconsistency which could attend the establishment of two division level headquarters on this small island, and would probably assist this headquarters in activating a realistic capability to provide for continuity of operations for Headquarters Fifth Air Force in the event of catastrophe or future force structure changes."¹⁶

PACAF's Tentative Organizational Structure of 3 January 1964.

On 3 January 1964, Headquarters, PACAF advised Fifth Air Force and 313th Air Division that new organizational charts for the latter which it had just prepared on a tentative basis were incorporating several changes previously recommended by the Fuchu headquarters in a letter of 17 December 1963 devoted to the subject of the "Organizational Structure for PACAF." Although it can not be known with certainty, it seems probable that the Fifth Air Force letter had been influenced by the arguments and recommendations contained in General Clark's aforementioned epistle of 27 November 1963.

Perhaps the most important item in the PACAF proposal was the discontinuance of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 498th Tactical Missile Group, and the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base. By way of replacement, two major organizations would be established directly under the 313th Air Division Commander--a Deputy Commander for Operations (DC/O) and a Deputy Commander for Materiel (DC/M). Directly under the DC/O, in turn, would be the 12th, 44th, and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 873d and 874th Tactical Missile Squadrons; while the authority of the DC/M would be delegated to two

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officials--a Chief of Supply and a Chief of Maintenance. Only one unit, the 313th Supply Squadron, would fall under the jurisdiction of the former; but under the Chief of Maintenance would come the 313th Organizational Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Field Maintenance Squadron, the 313th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, and the 313th Missile Maintenance Squadron. The Safety and Staff Judge Advocate functions would come directly under the 313th Air Division Commander, as would the 313th USAF Dispensary, the 558th Air Force Band, and the 15th Physiological Flight.

Replacing the discontinued 6313th Air Base Wing would be a quite similar organization, the 313th Combat Support Group, which would operate directly under the 313th Air Division. The Information Office and Directorate of Personnel, hitherto integral elements of the division staff, would be transferred to the combat support group headquarters, where they would function in an additional duty capacity for the 313th Air Division.

The Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha AB would continue to report directly to the 313th Air Division Commander in his role of Deputy for Defense, and the 51st FIW would be retained as the prime user organization at that base, instead of giving way to the 315th Air Division. In a more revolutionary vein, PACAF recognized the extensive aircraft control and warning (AC&W) responsibilities of the 51st Wing by elevating the four radar sites to the status of squadrons--the present Detachment 1, 623d AC&W Squadron at Miyako Jima Air Station (AS) becoming the 627th AC&W Squadron, Detachment 2 at Kume Shima AS becoming the 628th AC&W Squadron, Detachment 3 at Yoza Dake AS becoming the 629th

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ACEW Squadron, and Detachment 4 at Okino-Erabu Shima AS emerging from the administrative metamorphosis as the 630th ACEW Squadron.

In recognition of the additional air defense responsibilities of the 313th Air Division Commander resulting from his having operational control of the Army's 30th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense), comprising eight Nike Hercules and eight Hawk missile batteries, PACAF contemplated the assignment of an appropriate staff to the DC/O. In addition to retaining the three troop carrier squadrons of the 315th Air Division presently at Naha in a tenant status, PACAF considered it desirable to move the 315th Headquarters down there, also as a tenant organization. However, this last proposal would have to await the decision of USAF, in the context of ultimate Project Clearwater decisions.

In a structural arrangement much like that of the 313th Air Division itself, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander would have under him a Deputy Commander for Operations and a Deputy Commander for Materiel. Directly under the former would be the Air Defense Control Center (ADCC), the 623d ACEW (not identified as to type--i.e., whether a squadron, a group, or just what), the 627th, 628th, 629th, and 630th ACEW Squadrons, and the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, until its replacement by a TAC rotational squadron, already scheduled for the latter part of 1964.

Under the Deputy Commander for Materiel were again two major subordinates--the Chiefs of Supply and Maintenance. The domain of the Chief of Supply was confined to a single unit, the 51st Supply Squadron; while four squadrons--the 51st Organizational Maintenance, 51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance, 51st Munitions Maintenance, and 51st Field Maintenance Squadrons--would report directly to the Chief of Maintenance.

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The 51st Combat Support Group, which was to replace the existing 51st Air Base Group, would be composed of the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron, the 51st Transportation Squadron, the 51st Air Police Squadron, the 51st Services Squadron, and the 51st USAF Dispensary.

In recent months, said PACAF, it had received a number of indications that Headquarters, USAF was studying the PACAF organizational structure on Okinawa as "a clearly visible target for reduction." Particularly had USAF singled out the coeval existences of the 313th Air Division, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 498th Tactical Missile Group, and the 6313th Air Base Wing at one base as apparently duplicative and excessive. The Hickam Manpower people had, therefore, designed their proposed alternate organizational structure with an eye to:

1. Emphasizing the tactical/operational mission, including support of separate squadron deployments for PACAF war plans and for Tactical Air Command (TAC) augmentation, rather than wing deployments, and identifying the air defense and air offense missions as separate entities at separate locations.
2. Minimizing the large administrative/logistic/support complex.
3. Reducing the number of headquarters and levels through which necessary work had to be inspected, audited, and supervised.
4. Providing a basis for reasonable savings in manpower which could be applied to outstanding deferred requirements, the most noteworthy being the corrosion-control problem on Okinawa.
5. Preserving the need for and recognition of a division headquarters structure on Okinawa, both because of area civil relation-

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ships and as a "fall-back rear headquarters" organization for Fifth Air Force.

6. Recognizing the physical separation of the two bases on Okinawa and providing each with an operational and support structure tailored to the mission.

7. Precluding "precipitous action" by Headquarters, USAF, which would include a demand for severe reductions in manpower as an accompaniment to organizational realignments which the Washington headquarters should direct.

PACAF considered the operational and weapons system management responsibilities which it was proposing for the 313th Air Division to be comparable to those of the air divisions in Japan.

Recent statements of the President and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the subject of economies which the military as a whole must carry out made it "desirable to emphasize the tactical mission" in PACAF's organizational structure while minimizing the support function. It was one of the bitter, but nonetheless undeniable, facts of life that the terms "base command" and "support operations" were always anathema during an economy drive; hence, they should be avoided like the plague. If PACAF itself and its subordinate commands failed to acknowledge this unpleasant truth, the result could easily be an imposition of reductions in strength that could ill be afforded.¹⁷

313th's Reaction of 17 January 1964.

On 9 January 1964, Colonel Richard D. Goree, 313th's Director of Operations, sent the foregoing PACAF letter to the Commanders of the 6313th

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Air Base Wing, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 498th Tactical Missile Group, the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, and to the 313th Director of Materiel to solicit their comments and recommendations concerning the organization which the Hickam headquarters was proposing for the 313th Air Division.¹⁸

Comments and Recommendations of the 6313th Air Base Wing: The reply received from Colonel John R. Roche, Commander of the 6313th Air Base Wing, was brief and did not indicate a great deal of thought or effort on his part--perhaps because Colonel Roche knew that he would be rotating to the United States in June and would not be around when the great reorganization took place.

One suggestion he did make was that the 313th USAF Dispensary should be placed under the 313th Combat Support Group, to coincide with the structure depicted on the PACAF charts for the 51st Combat Support Group, instead of having it report directly to 313th Air Division. He also commented that the chart of the proposed structure did not make it clear where several essential services would be located. For example, would the Personnel function be established at both the 313th Combat Support Group and the 51st Combat Support Group, or would this be a combined function located at Kadena only? Also, he inclined to the belief that the Information and Comptroller functions should be assigned to the support group. (Since this is what PACAF had proposed, it is hard to understand why Colonel Roche raised this point.)

His conclusion was that the proposed structure would require the base organization to perform the same job it had been doing all the time, but with the designation of "group" rather than of "wing."¹⁹

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SECRETComments and Recommendations of the 498th Tactical Missile Group:

While the Commander of the 498th Tactical Missile Group doubted his ability to add "anything substantial" to the comments and recommendations made during the conferences of November and December 1963 on the subject of the ideal organizational structure for the 313th Air Division, he did proceed to enumerate a number of reasons for not consolidating the several headquarters at Kadena Air Base into a single one.

Not too surprisingly, Colonel Warren E. Vinzant did not acquiesce in the wisdom of discontinuing the Headquarters, 498th Tactical Missile Group. For one thing, the existing organization was not duplicative in either the operational or support mission, as charged by USAF and the Department of Defense. While it was true that many major organizations did indeed exist on Kadena, this fact did not of itself mean that the present management structure was duplicative. On the contrary, an argument could be made that the location of so many units on one base was actually a form of economy.

Although the organization which PACAF proposed was designed to emphasize the tactical mission, as he saw it, the new arrangement would actually de-emphasize it. This was bad, since the tactical units as presently constituted were cohesive in nature, and any "further breaddown in this integrity would tend to change or diffuse their missions from one of combat orientation to one of management orientation." This, in spite of the fact that the units' reason for being on Okinawa was specifically to support combat objectives. In the opinion of Colonel Vinzant, the existing "tried organization," which could insure that these objectives were met, was more important than an organization tailored to peacetime management purposes.

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The 498th Commander also noted that the majority of the resources at Kadena were presently consumed in providing administrative and logistic support for units other than tactical units. He regarded the base as an administrative/logistics compound which "should not be minimized," regardless of PACAF's ideas to the contrary.

One of the stated objectives of the proposed PACAF structure had been the reduction of the number of headquarters and levels through which necessary work had to be inspected, audited, and supervised. From his point of view at the working level, commented Vinzant, he did not feel that he had been "overinspected, overaudited, or oversupervised" because of the existence of Headquarters, 313th Air Division or Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

Whereas PACAF thought to obtain an appreciable saving in manpower through the reorganization--a savings which could be applied to various requirements hitherto deferred for lack of personnel, the 498th Commander thought that any economies in manpower brought about by the reorganization would be so insignificant that they would go almost nowhere toward solving this problem.

Colonel Vinzant agreed with PACAF's belief that a division headquarters structure was needed on Okinawa, but he sharply disagreed with the proposal for elimination of the 6313th Air Base Wing, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and 498th Tactical Missile Group headquarters. If the Hickam headquarters initiated the inactivation of these organizations simply to "beat USAF to the draw," it would be doing itself a distinct disservice, and, in fact, might be mistakenly anticipating an undesirable course of action which USAF would never direct, if persuasive arguments

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were advanced for its suspension. After all, the management structure represented by the three headquarters in question could not be replaced by an expansion of the air division staff.

Once more, where PACAF had seen a parallel between the operational and weapon system management responsibilities proposed for the 313th Air Division and those already in effect for the air divisions in Japan, Colonel Vinzant felt that they were "so dissimilar as to preclude any substantial gains in operational effectiveness or manpower savings" through adoption of PACAF's proposed structure. It should be borne in mind that the 498th TNG was the only organization of its kind in PACAF, its sole mission that of employing nuclear weapons in support of a general war. Therefore, it would surely be in the best interests of the Air Force to retain the existing command and organizational structure of the 498th TNG as a separate group functioning directly under the operational control of PACAF.²⁰

Comments and Recommendations of the 313th Air Division Director of Materiel: Colonel Mitchell A. Cobeaga, the division Director of Materiel, who had also been asked to comment on the organizational structure proposed by PACAF, answered on 14 January 1964 that the recommended organization was undoubtedly "manageable." However, if this structure were adopted, it must be understood that the Deputy Commanders for Operations and Materiel would both have to "wear a second hat" as the 313th Air Division Operations and Materiel staff officers. This would be made necessary by the requirements of 313th Air Division area and civil relationships for Operations and Materiel participation on Joint Sub-Committees.

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as well as to assist and advise the 313th Commander on Operational and Materiel matters concerning the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. These two ancillary roles would make it imperative that the DCS/O and the DCS/M be augmented.

He was also convinced that the merger of the 18th TFW and the 498th TMC would throw a large additional workload on the Materiel managers. Accepting as actual fact the possibility that the Maintenance Control complex would be augmented to provide supervision to both aircraft and missile maintenance, one could readily see that the great difference in the missions of the two systems would place "a tremendous load" on a single Chief of Maintenance. To avoid such a situation, he recommended that consideration be given to establishing a Chief of Maintenance for aircraft and a second Chief of Maintenance for missiles. As a precedent for such an arrangement, Colonel Cobeaga recalled that SAC employed this form of organization wherever both aircraft and missiles were assigned to the same wing.

Respecting potential manpower savings, he could not visualize any under the proposed organization, unless PACAF had no intention of augmenting the Deputy Commanders for Operations and Materiel to take care of the aforementioned additional workload, or unless it contemplated having the 18th TFW Chief of Maintenance complex assume the missile responsibility without benefit of any reinforcement. In his opinion "this would be a cardinal sin and result in the deterioration of a potent deterrent."

In the matter of counter-proposals, which Colonel Goree had requested, Colonel Cobeaga could think of only two. The first of these was that 313th

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should resubmit its original proposal of 27 November 1963. The second was that 313th should remain a monitoring agency, while the rest of Kadena was reorganized under the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, with the same structure recommended for the 313th Air Division. In the latter case, also, the concept of a double Chief of Maintenance should be considered carefully.²¹

Comments and Recommendations of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing: As might have been expected, however, it was the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's energetic Commander, Colonel George B. Simler, who responded to Colonel Goree's request for comment and recommendations with the most thought-provoking reply. Noting that the basic aim of Headquarters, USAF was to "emphasize the tactical/operation mission, support TAC deployments, and identify the air defense and air offense missions as separate entities at separate locations," it became incumbent upon 313th, he asserted, to offer an organizational structure which could provide exactly that capability. This meant that the local organization must be "as basic as possible, unencumbered by unrelated functions and able to concentrate its activities."

The PACAF proposal of 3 January 1964 solved precisely one-third of the organizational problem for Okinawa in that it provided an elementary command (wing/base) for Naha which would be capable of effectively handling air defense as "a separate entity at a separate location," while simultaneously supporting the 315th Air Division. Conversely, the 18th Commander remarked, it disregarded the essentiality of a senior Air Force representative for the Ryukyus with the responsibilities associated with that position. It must be brought home to PACAF that the 313th Air Division was actually a unique organization--the only one of its kind, in

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fact, within the Pacific Air Forces. The basic precept in the formulation of any organizational realignment should be that the command responsibility and workload of a local political inter-service relationship must not be combined with its associated policy function, nor indirect operational supervision with a direct operational activity.

Colonel Simler agreed with the PACAF suggestion that the existence of four headquarters--313th Air Division, 18th TFW, 6313 ABW, and 498th TNG--at Kadena was "apparently duplicative and excessive." But he insisted that any new arrangement of organizations must provide "a homogeneity of functions and not create a span of control beyond that normally expected or effectively controllable."

Respecting PACAF's attempt in its proposed reorganization to emphasize the tactical/operational mission and to identify the air defense and air offense missions as separate entities at separate locations, he was wholly in accord with this approach and felt that it could be most effectively realized by the creation of wing/base organizations at both Naha and Kadena. At the same time, certain similar functions could be combined at division level as a means of meeting the requirements for minimization of the large administrative-logistic-support complex.

On one point Simler took sharp issue with PACAF: the statement that the operational and weapon system management responsibilities which the latter was proposing to 313th Air Division were comparable to those of the air divisions located in Japan. On the contrary, said he, this was "the furthest [sic] thing from fact," and that it was an erroneous conception must be "carefully presented and forcefully endorsed."

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Since it was his firm belief that a wing/base organization could be operated as efficiently and effectively as at other Fifth Air Force bases, the 18th Commander urged the division to propose an organizational structure along the lines of one of the two plans which he was attaching to the letter. The one he thought preferable retained the 313th Air Division as the senior Air Force organization in the Ryukyu Islands, but he suggested that it be redesignated as Fifth Air Force Rear. In addition, this plan retained the 498th TNG and the 18th TFW, but called for an 18th Combat Support Group assigned to the latter, in place of the existing 6313th Air Base Wing, assigned directly to the air division.

As an alternative, he offered a plan in which 313th Air Division Headquarters would vanish, to be reincarnated as PACAF Representative, Ryukyus, or as Fifth Air Force Rear, and directly under it would come an 18th Air Division, as well as the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing at Naha Air Base. To the 18th Air Division would be assigned the 18th Combat Support Group, the 12th, 44th, and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 873d and 874th Missile Squadrons.²²

Colonel Simler's Personal Proposal to General Clark.

Whether by coincidence or by design is not known, but on the same date, 13 January 1964, that Colonel Simler replied to Colonel Goree's request for comments and recommendations in connection with the PACAF proposal, the 18th Commander addressed a second personal communication on the subject to General Clark, in response to a previous request by the latter that he do so.

On an earlier occasion, Simler reminded his superior, he had recommended that Kadena operate under a single wing/base structure--i.e., as

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at Naha the Air Base group or combat support group commander would, unlike the present arrangement, come directly under the tactical wing commander in the chain of command. Now he was renewing that recommendation "as basic to the requirements and best interest of the Air Force activity at Kadena."

It was in this one respect only that he was at variance with the recommendations contained in 313th's letter of 27 November that a centralized Okinawa Base Command be established for both Kadena and Naha Air Bases. At the same time, he felt that the failure of PACAF to comprehend the far greater scope of the 313th Commander's responsibilities, as compared with those of an air division commander in Japan, meant that 313th would have to prepare a carefully-conceived presentation, while also enjoying General Clark's personal active interest at the general officer level. This was, he believed, so essential to a continuing successful operation that it could not "be treated lightly or ignored."

A single wing/base organization for Kadena could, Colonel Simler declared, operate as effectively and efficiently as its counterparts in Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces. So convinced was he of the truth of this that he could not understand how any hesitation or doubt in the matter could possibly exist! On the basis of his experience as a former Commander of the 6313th Air Base Wing, coupled with his present assignment to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and supported by the statements of other senior officers of equal local experience, Simler believed that he could safely make several observations, with little likelihood of contradiction:

Firstly, the existing "cooperative" relationship between the major tenant on Kadena (the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing) and the base command

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(the 6313th Air Base Wing) was "tenuous at best and entirely dependent upon personalities," a situation contravening basic military doctrine and organizational concept.

Secondly, the importance of the activities which might appear to demand an air base wing would be found exaggerated if critically compared with actual requirements. While he did not wish to imply that the support function was not important, he did contend that its role had been diminished by recent organizational changes, so that it did not really possess a responsibility any greater than that of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing or the 41st Air Division support groups. Moreover, he was confident that its role could be further reduced if the actions contained in his attached proposal were adopted. Once this was done, it would have the effect of permitting the support organization to concentrate even more intensively on the services support function for which it had been designed.

Thirdly, on a practical note, if General Clark himself did not propose realignment of the base organization in one form or another, higher headquarters was pretty certain to direct such an alteration. Hence, it behooved 313th Air Division to seize the initiative in this matter if it wished to guide the course the reorganization would take.

As Simler saw the situation, it was reasonable to assume that PACAF would end up with a larger share of USAF personnel resources, including colonels in particular, under the concept of a headquarters with two single wing/base organizations than it would if the support function were consolidated, as 313th had recommended, in an Area Base Command. Not only could this be "vitally important" in any expanded operation that

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might be required, but the division commander could also expect to acquire a higher experience level in the senior positions.

It will be recalled that 313th, in its letter of 27 November 1963, had recommended that the 498th Tactical Missile Group be retained as an entity, but relieved of all non-tactical support responsibilities; while PACAF had suggested on 3 January 1964 that the group headquarters be eliminated and the two tactical squadrons placed under the 313th Air Division Deputy Commander for Operations. Colonel Simler favored the former solution, if possible, but was confident that if USAF did not permit retention of the 498th Tactical Missile Group, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing could absorb it without undue indigestion. However, certain associated organizational changes would have to be made, and some spaces reduced. Everything considered, he did not recommend dissolution of the 498th, and, furthermore, past discussions on the subject had led him to believe that General Jacob E. Smart, CINCPACAF, desired to retain the existing group organization.

The 18th Commander agreed that "the time was ripe to redesignate the 313th Air Division as 5AF Rear or PACAFREP Ryukyus, which would leave the way open for eliminating the 313th Air Division per se and redesignating the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to the 18th Air Division." While this was "admittedly a political move," it would give the appearance of reducing the number of headquarters.

In closing, Colonel Simler urged General Clark to adapt his reorganization proposal of 27 November to one of the alternatives he (Simler) had just presented, since the proposal in question had covered all the "essential ingredients," so that it now required only a basic framework that would

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be "in consonance with the facts of life both here [on Okinawa] and at PACAF and USAF."²³

313th's Revised Proposal of 17 January 1964: Armed with these recommendations of Colonel Simler, in particular, as well as those of Colonel Roche, Colonel Vinzant, and Colonel Cobeaga, this headquarters once more addressed itself to PACAF and Fifth Air Force on the subject of the division's organizational structure on 17 January. Commencing on a note of sweet reasonableness, 313th said that it concurred in the reorganization proposals PACAF had presented in its letter of 3 January, insofar as they pertained to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and Naha Air Base. At the same time, 313th was prepared to accept the Hickam headquarters' stand on the dangers of an Okinawa Base Command, in which the management of all support for the Air Force on Okinawa would be centralized. However, it still did not concur in the new proposals concerning the nature of the Kadena complex, feeling that the reasons it had given on 27 November 1963 were still valid.

Any effort to increase operational efficiency by consolidating the various weapons systems at Kadena and by downgrading the level of the support organization in order to achieve savings in manpower would be "ill-advised." For, while "symmetry and standardization of organization structures" were useful control devices, their application here would appear to be "hazardous," since Air Force operational capabilities in the Western Pacific were "in a state of flux" as a result of re-equipping and redeployment actions affecting almost all units. This was no time, then, to experiment with "a highly successful organizational structure"

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representing 66 per cent of the PACAF Quick Strike Force and a major portion of the total PACAF contribution to the 1965 Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOT).

Even keeping in mind the admittedly severe pressures for manpower savings that were then being applied, well-established standards for effective supervision and control could not be abandoned with impunity. The plan for eliminating the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 498th Tactical Missile Group assumed that one commander and his staff at the next higher level could provide "the same outstanding supervision and control" which had brought these two important elements of 313th's deterrent strike forces to "the highest state of combat readiness" and then maintained them in that state. This implied that the division commander would somehow have to manage this while simultaneously meeting the demands of the existing complex air division mission.

313th went on to explain that its earlier recommendation that an area support command similar to the Kanto Base Command at Tachikawa AB, Japan, be established had reflected its view of the magnitude, importance, and appropriate management level of this responsibility. To attempt to meet Air Force support responsibilities in the Kadena base complex with an organization operating at the group level would be unrealistic for a complex containing 10,500 military/civilian personnel, 3,000 families, 21 tenant units, 16 off-base sites, one of the largest and most strategically important staging and marshalling bases in the Pacific theater, and the largest and busiest air traffic control area in the Pacific.

Vital long range Air Force interests would be ill-served by deliberately allowing, or even risking, a degradation in the ability of the Kadena

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complex to meet the demands of joint contingency plans in "a dynamic and unpredictable time period." In this connection, it appeared that where such vital interests were involved, the requirement "should be squarely defended, rather than concealed behind a dangerously inadequate organizational structure."

Differing from the force structure trend in other areas, the outlook for Okinawa-based forces was stable, as far as could be determined, with the support responsibilities showing a steady upward trend as a result of pressures created by Project Clearwater-type actions. The program for Kadena revealed the addition of a tactical reconnaissance wing and a reconnaissance technical squadron, plus additional tenant units, in FY-1966. Additionally, pressures by the other services to gain an increased use of existing Air Force facilities on Okinawa were continuing and could be considerably encouraged by any apparent reduction in the units assigned. (This argument was the one most likely to receive a sympathetic hearing by higher headquarters, since for some time there had lurked in the background of all planning for Kadena and Naha the possibility that the Department of Defense might direct the sharing of these bases with Navy or Marine units. Such an occurrence would, of course, be "sheer disaster!" Therefore, the possibility that an Air Force facility on Okinawa was not being utilized to the fullest must never get abroad!)

In an unusually dramatic appeal to the sensibilities of officials at Headquarters, PACAF, 313th added that the Air Force could "ill-afford at this juncture of its history to gratuitously place on the alter of austerity the 18th, one of its most illustrious tactical fighter wings." After

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all, they were lightly discussing the extinction of an organization which could boast uninterrupted service in the Pacific since the year 1927, in the course of which it had won 25 battle honors during World War II and the Korean War. Admittedly, an appeal based on tradition and esprit de corps might at first glance to have no place in traditionally unsentimental budgetary considerations. Nevertheless, no Air Force commander could "ignore the clear implications of such an action on the esprit and motivation of personnel whose pride of unit was a very real, cohesive force and one of the most basic, yet most ephemeral of management tools." To assume that, even under the most inspired leadership at the next higher level, the elimination of a famous fighter wing as an active Air Force organization would have no serious effect on combat effectiveness "would be to ignore the lessons of military history."

In view of the above points and the data previously presented in the letter of 27 November 1963, 313th now had the following recommendations to submit: (1) The reorganization of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing should follow 313th's earlier proposal of 27 November 1963, but modified by consolidation of the Personnel, Staff Judge Advocate, Procurement, and Information functions at division level. (2) The reorganization of the Kadena complex should effect little change in the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 498th Tactical Missile Group, both of which were to report directly to Headquarters, 313th Air Division and would retain their present assigned squadrons, except for the recently-organized 18th Supply Squadron, which could be withdrawn from the 18th Wing and reassigned to the new 313th Combat Support Wing. The latter wing would also include the 313th Trans-

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portation Squadron, the 313th Air Police Squadron, the 313th Civil Engineering Squadron, the 313th Service Squadron, and the 313th USAF Dispensary.

(3) PACAF should provide the strongest possible support for these recommendations in higher headquarters.²⁴

Colonel Simler's Recommendations of 16 March 1964.

On 16 March 1964, Colonel George B. Simler, our letter-writing friend who commanded the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on the side, again took pen in hand to recommend that the 6313th Air Base Wing be redesignated the 18th Combat Support Group, he having learned recently that USAF intended to proceed with its plans for such an organizational demotion. As ammunition to back up his nomenclature nomination, the 18th Wing Commander reminded 313th that the 18th was already performing all aircraft maintenance, including field maintenance, all supply functions except those concerning household furnishings, and the greater part of the over-all flying activities and responsibilities for Kadena Air Base. In addition, all aircraft assigned to Kadena were possessed by the 18th TFW. Besides, the functions essential to the conduct of the 18th Wing's mission included airfield facilities, transportation, and the indirect support functions of "controller" [comp-troller?], food service, and the like.

The existing organizational structure depended upon the presence of well-informed and cooperative commanders in each area, who were at the same time independent of one another. While this arrangement had proved successful in varying degrees--chiefly in accordance with the character and personality of the successive commanders of the various organizations--it was not consistent with established command or organizational concepts.

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In view of manpower and personnel reductions known to be forthcoming and the absence of a corresponding decrease in workload, the 18th Wing was, Colonel Simler believed, best equipped to provide general supervision of a combat support group. This was only logical, since the activities of the combat support group should be primarily concerned with the combat mission, and the mission of the 18th involved the largest single flexible Air Force unit on Okinawa, while also making the greatest demands upon the combat support unit.

Granted that placing the combat support group directly under the 18th Wing would increase the latter's responsibilities and workload, as it indubitably would, the support group was not so large as to defy proper management. Moreover, the truth of this contention had been demonstrated by the success with which similarly-organized units at Clark, Itasuke, Yokota, and Misawa Air Bases were operating at that very time.

Assignment of the combat support group to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing would place it under a senior commander who could provide direction on the basis of primary and corollary mission requirements--a procedure conforming to the provisions of Project ICE.

All things considered, then, Colonel Simler felt no hesitation about again recommending that the combat support group be prefixed with the designation "18th."²⁵

General Clark's Comments on PACAF's Revised Proposals for Reorganization.

On 21 March 1964, Colonel William Burke, the PACAF Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, wrote General Clark to seek his comments on revised proposals which the Hickam headquarters had formulated for the reorganization

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of certain Kadena-based units. The 313th Commander did not reply until 18 May, but his letter was lengthy and the obvious distillation of considerable thought on the subject. He and his staff had, he said, given careful study to the various forms which the reorganization could take, always bearing in mind the current mission requirements, changes in units programmed for the next two years, the trend toward more austere manning, and, above all, their belief that Okinawa would become "increasingly important to the U.S. Western Pacific defense posture in the years immediately ahead."

In his opinion, two aspects of 313th's proposal as portrayed in the charts appended to the present letter warranted special comment and emphasis. These concerned the Kadena Base Support Unit and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

In connection with the former, General Clark expressed "grave concern" about the "pressures and trends to downgrade and standardize the Kadena Base Support Unit." The scope and diversity of the tasks assigned the support group were indeed "impressive"--so much so that the reaction of visitors from all levels when thereon was almost invariably one of "amazement." This fact supported the general in his belief that, as a general rule, the Air Force's organization policy and decision-making agencies, through lack of understanding, "inaccurately" lumped them with other "typical" or "standard" units. Furthermore, he wished again to emphasize that, "besides the unusually large parent base, with its heavy commitments as an operational, marshalling, and staging facility for all U.S. military services in the war and contingency plans," there were 16 off-base sites,

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21 tenant units, 10,500 military/civilian personnel, and 3,000 families that had to be supported. And, certainly not alleviating the problem, current programs and trends pointed to a substantial growth in these support requirements. In addition, because of the limited size of his staff, General Clark found it necessary to delegate to the support unit at Kadena certain responsibilities, some of them involving local political and inter-service matters.

During recent months, 313th had undergone serious losses of manpower spaces, and, since many "hard-core functional areas" were closely controlled by higher levels of command, the brunt of the space reductions had been borne by support organizations. The result of this practice had been the creation of critically austere manning authorizations in most support functional areas. Coming as this did at the same time that the air base wing was being demoted to a combat support group, those officials of 313th Air Division who were concerned with the problem could logically expect to see Kadena manned with personnel of correspondingly inferior skills and experience. The ultimate consequence would be the imposition of greater demands upon commanders and chiefs of activities that they personally supervise operational functions more closely, thereby automatically reducing the time available to them for fulfilling their other role as staff officers.

It was quite necessary that these facts be understood fully and given due consideration at all levels of command involved in decisions affecting 313th's manpower and organizational structure. In General Clark's opinion, they left no doubt that, unless primary staff elements were assigned, the support unit organization should be provided with primary staff support

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elements, the USAF position on the Japan-based air divisions and support units notwithstanding.

Turning from the subject of Kadena to that of Naha, General Clark noted that 313th's representatives had discovered during the current manpower exercise at PACAF that USAF had given the latter a "substantial" manpower allocation for the GPA-73 program. (This was a highly complex, very costly radar environmental system then being considered for installation at Naha AB.) However, the existence of these spaces as a resource to be considered in the continuing organizational studies had not been disclosed to this headquarters. Since the resulting ignorance of this element in the overall picture had prevented 313th from analyzing its effect on the organizational structure of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, he declared that he "must place a reservation" on the division's previous concurrence in the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing structure as proposed by PACAF. A final recommendation would now have to await a re-evaluation of the requirements based on the more current manpower data.

At the same time that he welcomed and even invited a manpower requirements analysis by members of the Fifth Air Force or PACAF staffs for the purpose of evaluating the views he had expressed, General Clark urged both headquarters to support his proposal "and strongly indorse it to Headquarters, USAF for approval."²⁶

PACAF Announces the Impending Discontinuance of the 6313th Air Base Wing.

Thus matters stood with respect to the reorganization of the 313th Air Division until August 1964, when a radiogram was received from CINCPACAF advising that the 6313th Air Base Wing was scheduled to be discontinued at

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Kadena AB and would be replaced by an AFCON unit combat support group on 8 December 1964. Although no numerical designation had yet been approved by USAF, CINCPACAF had requested that the new unit be named the 13th Combat Support Group.

PACAF was also going to ask USAF to approve an organizational structure along the general lines of that suggested by 313th on 18 May and subsequently approved by Fifth Air Force on 12 June 1964. Implicit in this was the hope that USAF would be willing to make an exception to the Air Force standard organization for a combat support group by permitting a deputy commander system for Okinawa. However, the PACAF people had received the impression that USAF Manpower officials would dash cold water on this request, as a result of the attitude manifested by the latter during informal conversations in July. At that time they had expressed strong reservations concerning this proposal. Nevertheless, since they had not rejected it outright, PACAF still held some slender hopes of persuading USAF to reverse itself and approve the recommendations of the Fuchu and Kadena headquarters.

Turning to the subject of Naha Air Base, PACAF said that since the GPA-73 radar control equipment was not scheduled to arrive until the first quarter of FY-1966, it was not going to suggest a reorganization of the four AC&W detachments into a like number of squadrons, at least not just then. Instead, the Hickam Manpower people would take advantage of the time interval to study the matter further. They hoped, in any case, to arrive at a definite position on this program no later than December 1964.

Apropos of the double deputy arrangement for the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, PACAF had conducted a review of the subject and was now incorporating in the Unit Manning Document (UMD) file the titles of Deputy Commander

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for Operations and Deputy Commander for Materiel. Since the maintenance, supply, and operational (tactical) squadrons were already assigned to the 18th Wing, it would not be necessary to publish special orders in connection with them. And with the title changes scheduled to be reflected in the next publication of the UMD, CINCPACAF regarded the reorganization of the 18th TFW as complete.²⁷

PACAF Requests a Waiver of the Established USAF Base Pattern for Kadena.

Back on 7 January 1964, Headquarters, USAF had directed the inactivation of the 6313th Air Base Wing not later than 31 December of the same year and the organization of a combat support group to replace it at Kadena Air Base. Then, PACAF, in a routine July report had established a definite date of 8 December 1964 and announced that the new organization would be designated the 13th Combat Support Group, provided USAF concurred in the choice of numbers.²⁸

On 24 September 1964, PACAF wrote USAF to request that the latter grant an exception to the pattern for base organizations established in a letter of 17 December 1962 by permitting the inclusion of a deputy commander staff for the proposed combat support group at Kadena. As reasons for making such an exception, PACAF noted that the new group would be assigned to the 313th Air Division, rather than to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and would contain other centralized functions, thus necessitating the delegation of responsibilities, including local political and inter-service matters, to the support group. In connection with this, USAF should realize that Kadena was an unusually large parent base, "with heavy commitments as an operational marshalling and staging facility for all U.S.

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Military Services in war and contingency plans." There were 16 off-base sites, 21 tenant units, and 10,500 military/civilian personnel, as well as 3,000 families who had to be provided support. Furthermore, the complex was programmed to increase substantially, not only through an influx of USAF units, but also from the arrival of units of other services.

Under the circumstances, PACAF deemed it only appropriate that the deputy commander system for the combat support group "be recognized as essential for the execution of its assigned mission."²⁹

The charts accompanying the PACAF letter to USAF left 313th Air Division Headquarters with only five assigned staff agencies--the Operations Directorate, the Materiel Directorate, the Staff Judge Advocate (who would also serve as the group SJA), the Office of Procurement (which would likewise serve in a dual capacity), and Administrative Services.

The Operations and Materiel Directorates would function as monitoring, advisory, and policy elements, with the exception of the Area Command Center personnel, and the number of spaces in these directorates would be held to a minimum to prevent duplication and "layering" of lower echelons. The Legal, Procurement, and Manpower functions were consolidated at division level and would not be duplicated at subordinate echelons. Procurement was consolidated at division level in order to preclude competition for limited services between the two bases and to elevate the Air Force's position with respect to other consumers for resources in the Ryukyu Islands. The Manpower and Organization section was consolidated at division level to eliminate an extra level of review and with an eye to subordinate unit harmony. The Personnel functions which must perforce be retained at division level

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would be consolidated with the 313th Administrative Services function to assure a better utilization of clerical positions.

Newly assigned to the 13th Combat Support Group would be the Offices of Information Services and Safety, though the directors of each would also serve on the 313th Air Division staff. Because of the distance separating Kadena and Naha Air Bases, it had been decided that both functions would be seriously hamstrung at times if they were consolidated at division level, as had been contemplated at an earlier stage of the reorganization planning. Also to be designated as a director was the Director of Operations; while other staff agencies would be composed of the Deputy Commander for Services, the Deputy Commander for Security and Law Enforcement, the Deputy Commander for Civil Engineering, the Deputy Commander for Personnel and Administrative Services, and the Comptroller, all of whom would additionally serve as advisers to the 313th Air Division Commander on matters pertaining to their particular fields.

The staff of the 13th Combat Support Group would be limited to those officials regarded as essential to the minimum staff support necessary for accomplishment of the group mission. In addition to their normal staff and operational management functions within the group itself, the directors (other than the D/O) and deputy commanders would represent the division headquarters and its tactical units in their primary areas of interest in inter-service matters when no such capability existed within the organization involved, or when that capability was inadequate. The assigned squadrons of the combat support group would be commanded by officers possessing administrative specialties, who would be responsible for the admin-

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istration, morale, welfare, and discipline of the assigned personnel. In this way the directorates and deputy commanderies could concentrate upon their functional staff, management, and operating responsibilities.

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing would be assigned to 313th Air Division and continue to operate under the standard double deputy wing organization.

Unaffected by the reorganization would be the 498th Tactical Missile Group, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (which was assigned to 313th Air Division and only attached to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing), and the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (whose commander would continue to act additionally as 313th Deputy for Defense.³⁰

USAF Approves the Waiver with Certain Specified Qualifications.

Back came the reply from Headquarters, USAF (the letter was signed by the Chief of the Organization and Requirements Division of the Manpower and Organization Directorate, Colonel Walter V. Gresham, Jr., who had been the 51st Air Base Group Commander at Naha Air Base from 25 November 1955 to 15 August 1956, then Commander of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing until 22 November 1957) on 16 October 1964, stating that PACAF's organizational proposal for Kadena was approved, with certain exceptions. The first of these suggestions with which USAF was not in agreement was the combining of Administrative Services with Personnel in the new group and assigning both to a Deputy for Personnel and Administration. The second was the assigning of Military Training to the aforementioned Deputy for Personnel and Administration. The third was the assigning of the Base Photo Laboratory to the Director of Information Services. The fourth was the assignment of Transportation to the Deputy for Services. The fifth

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was the separation of Personal Affairs from Military Personnel. And the sixth was the establishment of a base command post as an element apart from Disaster Control.

Colonel Gresham went on to explain that USAF believed that the function of Administrative Services within combat support groups should be maintained as a separate agency, responsible directly to the Commander. Military Training and the Photographic Laboratory had been standardized as a basic function of the Base Operations and Training Division throughout the Air Force. Transportation was regarded as so important that it should be treated as a major activity within the combat support group responsive directly to the Group Commander. As for Personal Affairs, USAF had standardized its location within the Military Personnel function.

Gresham added that he could not understand why PACAF felt a "Base Commander Post" was needed, since three other command posts were already located on Kadena Air Base. Not surprisingly, then, USAF could not authorize manpower for this function in those cases where the combat support group was situated on the same base with a tactical group or wing or with a division headquarters authorized a command post.

PACAF's proposed UND for the "6313th Combat Support Group," as he termed it, conformed to the criteria of Air Force Manual (AFM) 26-1, rendering it generally palatable to Headquarters, USAF, even though there were aspects of the Hickam proposal with which the latter did not agree. These minor deviations might be retained, nevertheless, if, in PACAF's opinion, they were necessary to the accomplishment of the combat support group mission at Kadena.

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The use of the terms and concepts of "deputy" and "director" was being discontinued for combat support groups--as would become generally known once AFM 26-2: Organization Policy and Guidance, then in the process of publication, was widely disseminated. According to this document, the standard composition of combat support groups supporting missions such as those connected with Kadena Air Base was as follows:

- Combat Support Group Commander
- Headquarters Squadron Section
- Personnel Division
- Comptroller Division
- Procurement Division
- Administrative Services Division
- Base Operations and Training Division
- Supply Division (in the case of multi-wing bases)
- Supply Services Division
- Civil Engineering Division
- Security and Law Enforcement Division
- Transportation Division
- Staff Judge Advocate
- Chaplain

It being the policy of USAF that squadron command positions should be utilized within the staff structure to accomplish the unit's mission, Colonel Gresham recommended that the squadron commanders of the combat support group also serve as chiefs of the appropriate divisions. For example, the Commander of the Civil Engineering Squadron would also be the Chief of the Civil Engineering Division. Since this could easily cause problems of overwork for the commander of a large squadron, USAF would authorize headquarters sections with a headquarters section commander for those squadrons having more than 350 assigned spaces.

Through some sort of oversight, PACAF had shown the 558th Air Force Band as a separate entity on its proposed organizational chart, directly responsible to the combat support group commander; but on the functional chart submitted the Hickam people had depicted the band as a subordinate

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element of Information Services. To settle any doubts on this point which PACAF might still be entertaining, USAF proclaimed that the band would report directly to the combat support group commander.³¹

PACAF indorsed the foregoing letter to 313th Air Division on 28 October 1964, with the comment that it provided the authority necessary for the latter to proceed with the reorganization of the combat support group at Kadena Air Base, "with certain exceptions to the proposal that was submitted." The effective date would be "about 8 December 1964," and PACAF promised to publish appropriate orders as soon as the letter from the Manpower and Organization Division of Headquarters, USAF was received.³²

The New Unit Is Y-clept the 824th Combat Support Group.

Thus far all the planning had indicated that the new organization at Kadena would be given the name of "13th Combat Support Group." However, on 20 November 1964, CINCPACAF notified this headquarters that USAF had just ruled out this designation, on grounds that the number "13" was historically associated with the 13th Bombardment Wing and its subordinate units and was, therefore, being reserved for future use in that grouping.

In the same message, CINCPACAF quoted USAF as stating that "on or about 8 December 1964," Headquarters, 6313th Air Base Wing and its subordinate squadrons would be discontinued and Headquarters, 824th Combat Support Group, with its subordinate squadrons, would be constituted. These squadrons would comprise the 824th Air Police Squadron, the 824th Civil Engineering Squadron, the 824th Transportation Squadron, and the 824th Services Squadron. Also effective 8 December 1964, the 6332d USAF

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Dispensary would be discontinued and the 824th USAF Dispensary activated. For reasons not given--and probably not especially interesting--the 15th Physiological Training Flight would retain its present designation.³³

THE 313TH AIR DIVISION ORGANIZATION AS IT EXISTED AT MID-YEAR 1964

Activations, Discontinuances, Redesignations, and Attachments at Kadena Air Base.

The 6313th Services Squadron: Effective 8 January 1964, the 6313th Support Squadron at Kadena Air Base was redesignated the 6313th Services Squadron, without a change in location, and the new organization was assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing.³⁴

The 6313th Support Squadron, incidentally, had enjoyed a brief existence of just three years and three days, having come into being on 5 January 1961 as a result of the redesignation of the 6313th Operations Squadron.³⁵

The 6313th Materiel Squadron: Also effective 8 January 1964, the 6313th Materiel Squadron was discontinued at Kadena Air Base, and its personnel were absorbed by other Fifth Air Force units.³⁶ As in the case of the 6313th Support Squadron, the 6313th Materiel Squadron had been created on 5 January 1961, through redesignation of the 6313th Supply Squadron.³⁷

The 6313th Transportation Squadron: One of the units discontinued at Kadena Air Base on 5 January 1961 as a part of the minor reorganization of that date was the 6313th Transportation Squadron.³⁸ Now, on 8 January 1964, in one of those amazing reversals which provide steady employment for sign painters and historians, the 6313th Transportation was

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again designated and organized at Kadena Air Base, where it was assigned to the 6313th Air Base Wing. Although the implementing PACAF Special Order impersonally stated that the personnel for the new squadron would "be furnished from sources available to the Commander, Fifth Air Force," they were, more specifically, drawn from the late membership of the simultaneously-discontinued 6313th Materiel Squadron.³⁹

The 18th Supply Squadron: Still another organization reincarnated for active duty on 8 January 1964 was the 18th Supply Squadron, which, unlike the Services and Transportation Squadrons, was assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, rather than to the 6313th Air Base Wing.⁴⁰

The 18th Supply Squadron, Fighter, Single Engine, as the unit was designated during its original materialization, had been constituted on 10 August 1948 and activated at Clark AFB, Philippine Islands, four days later. On 23 December 1949, still located at Clark AFB, it was redesignated the 18th Supply Squadron, Fighter, Jet. This identity was doomed to a brief life span, however; for on 20 January 1950 the name was changed to that of 18th Supply Squadron. Throughout these various manifestations, be it noted, the squadron continued to be assigned to the 18th Maintenance and Supply Group.

The Korean War left the 18th Supply Squadron undisturbed at Clark until 1 December 1950, when it was summoned to that embattled peninsula, pausing for only a few hours that date at Pusan East AB and Pyongyang East Airdrome, before moving on to Suwon AB; here it remained until 9 December, when orders were received for Chinhae AB. Here the squadron settled down until 27 December 1952, when it was transferred to Osan-Ni AB, its last home in Korea.

When the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing made its PCS movement to Kadena AB on 30 October 1954, the 18th Supply Squadron naturally came along, remaining there until its inactivation on 1 October 1957 except for a sojourn from 10 November to 11 December 1954 at Yontan Auxiliary Air Base, Okinawa, on the horrendously disorganized deployment of Exercise "Native Dancer." The inactivation referred to above came about as a part of the great reorganization of 1 October 1957 which saw the 6313th Air Base Wing designated and activated at Kadena Air Base to assume the base support responsibilities shouldered by the 18th Fighter Bomber Wing and the 18th Air Base Group after the demise of the old 6332d Air Base Wing on 1 May 1955.

Thus, the 18th Supply Squadron which was activated by the Department of the Air Force on 4 December 1963 and organized on 8 January 1964 was hardly a babe in arms, as military units go. The Korean War had brought it eight battle streamers--for (1) the Chinese Communist Intervention, (2) the first United Nations Counter-offensive, (3) the Chinese Communist Spring Offensive, (4) the United Nations Summer-Fall Offensive, (5) the Second Korean Winter, (6) the Korean Summer-Fall of 1952, (7) the Third Korean Winter, and (8) the Korean Summer-Fall of 1953. In addition, the squadron had received two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation Streamers--for the period 1 December 1950 to 31 January 1951, and for the period 1 February 1951 to 31 March 1953.⁴¹

The 658th Tactical Hospital: Back on 25 March 1959, the 658th Tactical Hospital had been activated at Kadena AB in replacement of the inactivated 18th Tactical Hospital, and had been assigned to the Headquarters, 1st Medical Services Wing (itself activated that same date at

Tachikawa AB, Japan), while being attached for administration and logistic support to the 6332d USAF Dispensary, Kadena Air Base.⁴² Now, however, it was decided at the highest level of Air Force command that the 658th Tactical Hospital was not essential to the needs of the service; whereupon it was inactivated, effective 28 January 1964, and its personnel were re-assigned to the 6332d USAF Dispensary.⁴³ Such little stir did this intramural liquidation cause that few persons on Kadena Air Base and only a handful in the 6332d USAF Dispensary itself were aware that it had taken place. Sic transit gloria!

The 1199th USAF Field Activities Squadron: On 13 March 1964 the 1199th USAF Field Activities Squadron (Headquarters Command) was designated and organized at Kadena Air Base. Its mission was so highly classified, however, that the details were denied to the present writer, as was its unit strength.

The 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater): On 22 May 1964 the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, was relieved from assignment to Fifth Air Force and was reassigned to PACAF, though its existing attachment to 313th Air Division for logistical and administrative support (including summary, special, and general court martial jurisdiction, non-judicial punishment under provision of Article 15, UCMJ, and administrative board actions--remained unchanged.⁴⁴

PACAF retained operational control, the Commander, 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) being directly responsible to CINCPACAF. Staff supervision of the squadron, hitherto delegated to the Fifth Air Force Director of Munitions, now became the responsibility of PACAF's Director of Supply and Services.⁴⁵

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Back in the latter part of 1963, Fifth Air Force had prepared a feasibility study to determine the best method of supporting the increased USAF conventional munitions program in the Pacific Theater. One aspect of the study assessed the desirability of amalgamating the existing mission of the 400th MMS (T) with the Bishagawa and Yamada conventional storage sites in Okinawa and Japan, which were operated by the 18th and 8th Tactical Fighter Wings respectively. (The 8th TFW was located at Itazuke AB, Japan.) If careful analysis indicated that such a consolidation was feasible and should prove advantageous, the 400th MMS (T) would be made a theater maintenance and resupply point for all types of munitions.

That portion of the study pertaining to the 400th MMS (T), the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, the 418th MMS, and the 313th Air Division was conducted during a five-day conference at this headquarters in October 1963, at which representatives of the foregoing organizations worked with Lieutenant Colonel Howard M. Paquin, 5FOMO, and Major Robert D. Murphy, 5FMAS, from the Fifth Air Force headquarters staff.

Subsequently, on 5-6 November 1963, Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr., and Major James H. Bauer, the Commander and Executive Officer of the 400th MMS (T) respectively, conferred with Colonel Francis E. Wingett, the Fifth Air Force Director of Munitions, and with other members of that agency, at Fuchu Air Station, regarding that part of the study pertaining to the 400th MMS (T) alone. As a result of this conference, Colonel Richard submitted a number of recommended changes to the original Fifth Air Force study on 19 November 1963. These, in turn, perceptibly influenced a final study by Major Murphy of Fifth Air Force Headquarters en-

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titled, "Support of the Increased USAF Conventional Weapons Program," which was sent to the Commander, 313th Air Division on 7 January 1964.⁴⁶

On 19 May 1964, Fifth Air Force asked PACAF what was to be the effective date for transfer of the Bishagawa functions of the 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron to the 400th MMS (T). Fifth also wanted to know if PACAF intended to direct the reassignment of personnel, which would be necessitated by the functional transfer. Again, would the Fifth Air Force study on the support of the increased USAF conventional weapons program be used as a departure point for the realignment of authorizations? And, finally, what was the approximate date on which PACAF would publish G-series special orders reorganizing the 400th and 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadrons?⁴⁷

On 27 May PACAF replied that the realignment of authorizations would be reflected in the command manpower operating program (CMOP) which Fifth would be receiving in July. Although PACAF requirements to support the USAF conventional weapons program had been validated, the Hickam headquarters did not expect that allocation action would occur soon enough to have any effect on the realignment actions. As for G-series special orders, PACAF advised that none would be required to bring about the proposed reorganization actions.⁴⁸

The next step in the changeover came on 18 June 1964, when the 400th MMS (T) notified Fifth Air Force that it would be prepared to accept the responsibility for conventional munitions in the Bishagawa complex as of 22 June, and that the Commander of the 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron had concurred in both the action and the implementation date. Now all that was required was Fifth's acquiescence.⁴⁹

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With remarkable celerity, Fifth Air Force replied the very next day that it approved the action, as well as the effective date of 22 June 1964, and that it would notify all agencies concerned with the transfer of responsibilities.⁵⁰

Meantime, in anticipation of acquiring these responsibilities, the Maintenance Division of the 400th MMS (T) had placed three officers on detached service to the 418th MMS in May for orientation and training in conventional munitions storage and maintenance methods. Even before this, in fact, a special orientation and familiarization course for key officers and NCO's of the 400th MMS (T) had been conducted in April by the 418th MMS Commander, Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr.

In early May the Supply Division of the 400th MMS (T) began to work with the 418th MMS in connection with the assumption of conventional munitions responsibilities. The account involved in the transfer comprised 300 line items with a monetary value of approximately \$54,000,000. In conjunction with accountability for the conventional munitions, the Supply Division also became responsible for the functions of the Conventional Munitions Inspection Section and the Inventory Section.⁵¹

Almost certainly the greatest problem thrust upon the 400th MMS by the transfer of the Bishagawa Ammunition Storage Areas to it was the shortage of personnel, 461XO's in particular. The Unit Manning Documents of the 400th for the period from 1 January through 30 June 1964 had been drawn up with an eye only to execution of the nuclear weapons mission, and thus contained no authorizations for accomplishment of the conventional munitions mission assumed on 22 June. One Chief Master Sergeant,

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AFSC 46190, was assigned from the 418th MMS on 19 June, and four days later 67 more personnel were reassigned from that organization. Even so, the 400th ended up short 64 men. In the highly essential 461X0 field 117 spaces needed to be filled, but only 62 men were supplied. In the 552X0 field, only three out of five spaces were filled. In the 645X0 field, two of five spaces were filled. And in the 646X0 field, the percentage was worst of all, as exactly one out of five personnel needed to do the job turned up in the flesh.

Because of the critical nature of this state of affairs, the 400th was seeking command assistance as the period ended.⁵²

The conventional munitions storage facilities transferred to the 400th MMS on 22 June 1964 consisted of two areas north of Kadena Village and lying on either side of Highway No. 1. The Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex (Permanent Installation No. 2998, as it had been designated by PACAF SO G-78 of 12 October 1961) was also known in official documents as Bishagawa Ammunition Storage Areas I and II. The main entrance of Area I at Bishagawa was approximately seven miles from 6313th Air Base Wing Headquarters on Kadena AB and ran for approximately three miles parallel to and on the east side of Highway #1. Area II was approximately nine miles from 6313th ABW Headquarters, sprawling along the west side of Highway #1 in the same general area.

The facilities within these two areas which came under the jurisdiction of the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) on 22 June 1964 were as follows:

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<u>Type Structure</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Standard above-ground magazine (AGM)--9,000 sq. ft. ea.	16
Steel Arch Igloo (SAI)--1,000 sq. ft. ea.	24
Concrete Arch Igloo (CAI)--	13
Quonsets	21
Improved Revetments	49
Unimproved Revetments	52

The administrative and supply offices and related functions were housed in eight quonset huts located just short of the main entrance to Area I of the Bishagawa Area. These were in addition to the 21 quonsets listed above as being inside the ammunition storage areas. Besides these, there was a box factory--a facility specifically designed for the manufacture of wooden boxes and crates to be used in the storage or shipment of munitions or other explosive materials and related equipment--which was included in the complex.

The total storage space available, except for improved and unimproved revetments, was 169,305 square feet; and this was beginning to be saturated by existing stocks and scheduled arrivals of munitions.

At the time the 400th assumed responsibility for Areas I and II, a new 50' x 80' permanent administrative building had been programmed for construction in FY-1965 to replace the existing inadequate and deteriorated quonset buildings used as offices. In addition, the predecessor 418th had requested the construction of two standard above-ground magazines and two storage sheds in FY-1965 and 18 above-ground magazines in FY-1966, as well as a munitions maintenance facility to meet the scheduled increase

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in storage and maintenance requirements. Unfortunately, it was discovered that an erroneous siting of the munitions maintenance facility had been made, which meant that if it were thus constructed, a violation of quantity distance criteria would be committed. Therefore, it became necessary for the Fifth Air Force Deputy Director of Munitions to cancel construction of this facility. Since it was nonetheless sorely needed for the maintenance of clustered bomb units (CBU), the 400th MMS immediately sought permission to convert an above-ground magazine to such a facility. Such a conversion of this building would result in an over-all reduction in monetary expenditures, while still providing the needed maintenance facility.⁵³

When the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron inherited the Bishagawa Ammunition Storage Sites on 22 June 1964, it developed that a considerable backlog of conventional munitions requiring maintenance existed. To correct this situation, the 400th MMS instituted improved management techniques and work procedures and revamped the maintenance line facilities even before it had officially assumed these responsibilities. The results of this fresh approach were little short of sensational. Whereas the 2.75" rocket head maintenance line had turned out an average of 3,498 rounds per month from January through May, the 400th MMS (T) increased production to 5,152 rounds in June by altering the physical layout of the maintenance line and adding dryer to the acid-proof paint used on the rocket head containers. Again, where the 750-lb. bomb renovation line had turned an average of 182 bombs per month during the first five months of 1964, the new management stepped up the figure to 990 bombs in June, by the simple expedient of employing fast-drying lacquer, instead of enamel.⁵⁴

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Although the following is not especially relevant to the consolidation of the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex with the 400th MMS (T), it was an event so important as to deserve recording in this history.

On 4 February 1964 a message was received from PACAF that a majority of the MK-43 nuclear weapons in USAF stockpiles were believed to contain a common deviciency. The 400th MMS was directed to carry out Retrofit B43-512 (also known as ALT-249) on a "round-the-clock" basis until the whole lot were inspected and corrected, where necessary. Since there was no way of knowing just which weapons were defective, every one had to be examined. Locally, the deficiency affected the capability of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's Quick Strike and Follow-On and HIGH GEAR weapons, as well as the PACAF Reserves, since the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) was responsible for performing the inspection and certifying the retrofit on all weapons.

Fully aware of the terrible impact of this situation on the PACAF nuclear capability, the personnel of the 400th expended every effort and succeeded in completing the retrofit on all the deficient weapons within 21 hours from the time the message was received. This rapid reaction won the squadron high praise from CINCPACAF, Fifth Air Force, and 313th Air Division.⁵⁵

On 22 June 1964, according to plan, the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) assumed operational responsibility for the Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex from the 418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, and it was designated as the PACAF Theater Resupply Facility.

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Detachment 8, 20th Weather Squadron: On 8 June 1964, Detachment 8 1st Weather Wing, was discontinued at Kadena Air Base as one element of a PACAF-wide reorganization of the Air Weather Service, and in its place was designated and organized Detachment 8, 20th Weather Squadron. The new detachment was attached to Detachment 15, 20th Weather Squadron, at Osan AB, Korea, for operational control, and to the 6313th Air Base Wing, Kadena Air Base, for administrative and logistic support.⁵⁶ The 20th Weather Squadron itself, incidentally, having been constituted, activated, and assigned by Headquarters, USAF, to the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), was organized at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, and further assigned by the latter to the 1st Weather Wing on 8 June 1964.⁵⁷ Thus, Detachment 8 and its sister offshoots were born on the same day as their parent unit!

Activations, Discontinuances, Redesignations, and Reassignments at Naha Air Base.

Headquarters, 51st Combat Support Group: Effective 8 January 1964, the Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group at Naha Air Base was redesignated Headquarters, 51st Combat Support Group, without change in location, and continued the former's assignment to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.⁵⁸

The name "51st Combat Support Group" was new to Air Force annals, but in noting the demise of the 51st Air Base Group it may be well to include an obituary of its career, since it had probably appeared on the active roll for the last time.

The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 51st Air Base Group was originally constituted on 10 August 1948,⁵⁹ and activated at Naha Air Field, Okinawa, on 18 August 1948.⁶⁰ The unit remained at Naha (which had meanwhile been renamed Naha Air Base) until 20 September 1950, when the ex-

agencies of the Korean War caused its transfer to Itazuke AB, Japan, on a "temporary" basis. Here it remained until 12 October 1950, when it removed to Kimpo AB, Korea. On 9 December 1950, the 51st Air Base Group returned to Itazuke AB, but lingered there only until 11 January 1951, when it transferred its base of operations to Tsukiki AB, Japan. Here it remained until 1 October 1951, at which time it moved on to Suwon AB, Korea, for what was by far its most extended temporary sojourn--until 26 July 1954!

It was during the stay at Suwon AB, on 16 June 1952, that the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron was redesignated Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group.⁶¹

On 1 August 1954, with the Korean War over for more than a year, the 51st Air Base Group returned to Naha Air Base, along with the parent 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, to relieve the 6351st Air Base Wing, which had been keeping the home fires burning while the 51st ABG was off fighting a war with its logistic resources.

On 25 October 1957, the 51st Air Base Group was inactivated and reverted to control of the Air Force, its place being taken by the 6431st Air Base Group.⁶² The latter then became the housekeeping organization at Naha AB for the next two-and-three-quarters years, until it was supplanted by the unsinkable 51st Air Base Group on 18 July 1960.⁶³ The 51st ABG was itself submerged by the 51st Combat Support Group on 8 January 1964, as described above.

The 51st Services Squadron: In a move linked with the redesignation of the 51st Air Base Group as the 51st Combat Support Group, the 51st Support Squadron at Naha AB was redesignated the 51st Services Squadron,

without change in location, and was assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group on 8 January 1964.⁶⁴

The 51st Support Squadron, for its part, had been designated and organized at Naha AB on 18 July 1960, at which time it was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group.⁶⁵

The 51st Supply Squadron: On 8 January 1964, the 51st Supply Squadron was organized at Naha Air Base and assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, having previously been activated by the Department of the Air Force on 4 December 1963.⁶⁶

The 51st Supply Squadron, Fighter, Jet, was originally constituted on 10 August 1948 and activated on 18 August 1948 at Naha AB, where it was assigned to the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group. On 1 February 1940 its designation was shortened by excision of the last two descriptive words in the title, leaving it as simply the "51st Supply Squadron." On 20 September 1950 it accompanied the greater part of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to Itazuke AB, Japan, to participate in the Korean War, as we have already seen the 51st Air Base Group do. On 12 October it moved to Kimpo AB, Korea, and on 9 December 1950 back to Itazuke AB. Tsuiki AB, Japan, was the next port of call for the displaced squadron, from 15 January to 1 October 1951, when a tour was spent at Suwon AB, Korea, until 21 October 1952. Back to Tsuiki AB went the 51st Supply Squadron on the latter date, and there it remained until 19 June 1954. The unit played Suwon again very briefly, from 20 June to 26 July 1954; then came the great "repatriation day," on 1 August 1954, when it returned to Naha Air Base--which had remained the squadron's permanent base throughout these peregrinations.

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On 15 August 1957 the 51st Supply Squadron was attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration, logistic support, and operational control;⁶⁷ but a short time later, on 25 October 1957, it was inactivated and reverted to control of the Department of the Air Force, together with the parent Headquarters, 51st Maintenance and Supply Group. To take its place the 6431st Supply Squadron was designated and activated at Naha AB the same date.⁶⁸ The latter squadron was in its turn discontinued effective 18 July 1960, and its place taken by the 51st Materiel Squadron.⁶⁹

Now, on 8 January 1964, the transition came full cycle, as the 51st Supply Squadron again came into existence, and it was from the discontinued 51st Materiel Squadron that the personnel to man it were drawn.⁷⁰

The 51st Materiel Squadron: As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the 51st Materiel Squadron was discontinued on 8 January 1964,⁷¹ and from its personnel resources were obtained the men needed to man the newly organized 51st Supply and Transportation Squadrons.

Considerably older than its sister squadrons, the 51st Materiel Squadron began life on 20 August 1940 with constitution of the 38th Air Base Group. The latter was organized into squadrons, including a materiel squadron, which were integral parts of the group rather than separate units constituted by the War Department.⁷² On 25 August 1940 the 38th Air Base Group, including its materiel squadron, was activated at Barksdale Field, Louisiana.⁷³ On 17 January 1941, the Materiel Squadron, 38th Air Base Group, was redesignated the 51st Materiel Squadron.⁷⁴

From Barksdale Field, the 51st Materiel Squadron went to New Orleans Army Air Base, Louisiana, on 25 April 1941, remaining there until 20 May

1942; then, on 22 May 1942, arrived at Fort Dix, New Jersey, where it paused until 30 June while awaiting shipment overseas. From 1 July through 12 July 1942, the squadron was at sea enroute to Gourock, Scotland, and on 14 July it arrived at Chelveston, England, where it was simultaneously redesignated the 51st Service Squadron.⁷⁵

Leaving Chelveston on 22 August 1942, the 51st Service Squadron moved to Westhampnett, England, until 31 October, when it again boarded ship--this time for North Africa. On 14 November it reached La Senia AB, Algeria, remaining there till 15 December, when it shifted its operations to Oujda, French Morocco. On 11 May 1943, however, the 51st Service Squadron returned to La Senia.

Seemingly never content to remain in one spot for any length of time, the squadron once more pulled up stakes and moved on--to El Bathan, Tunisia, this time--on 15 July 1943; but only 11 days later it was on its way to Sidi Ahmed, Bizerte, Tunisia. Another move within Tunisia came on 21 August 1943, the destination this time being Djedeide.

However, on 3 November 1943, the 51st Service Squadron took ship to Villacidre, Sardinia, where it enjoyed the longest stay in one place of its entire career--until 20 September 1944. It was during this period, on 26 August 1944, that the unit was redesignated the 51st Air Service Squadron.⁷⁶ Leaving Sardinia on 20 September 1944, the 51st transferred to Poretta Airdrome, Corsica, the following day, and operated out of there until 13 November, when orders came to move on to Neuilly-les-Dijon, France. The 51st Air Service Squadron arrived at its new home on 20 November 1944, and it was there that it was disbanded on 12 June 1945, the war having ended the previous month.⁷⁷

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There followed a long hiatus in the history of the squadron, until 30 June 1960 brought its reconstitution and redesignation as the 51st Materiel Squadron, which was activated that date, then organized effective 18 July 1960, with assignment to the 51st Air Base Group at Naha Air Base.⁷⁸ Now, on 8 January 1964, the 51st Materiel Squadron was consigned to the limbo of discontinued organizations, there to remain until such time as USAF should determine that it was again needed to perform a particular task.

The 51st Transportation Squadron: One of the two progeny of the defunct 51st Materiel Squadron was the 51st Transportation Squadron, which was activated by the Department of the Air Force on 4 December 1963, then organized at Naha Air Base with an O/T strength of six officers and 296 airmen and assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, effective 8 January 1964.⁷⁹

It was as the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron, Fighter, Jet, that the new organization had first served the Air Force, having been constituted on 10 August 1948 and activated on 18 August 1948 at Naha Air Base, where it was assigned to the 51st Air Base Group until 14 February 1949, when it was reassigned to the 51st Maintenance and Supply Group.

On 1 February 1950, it was redesignated the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron. That same year, on 20 September, the unit moved with the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to Itazuke AB, Japan, to assist in the Korean War effort. Next came duty at Kimpo AB, Korea, from 12 October to 9 December, and a return engagement at Itazuke from 9 December 1950 to 15 January 1951. From 15 January to 1 October 1951 the 51st Motor Vehicle

Squadron operated at Tsuiki AB, Japan, then transferred to Suwon AB, Korea. There it remained until 26 July 1954, when the 51st Wing and all its deployed units returned to Naha Air Base.

On 8 October 1956, the 51st Motor Vehicle Squadron was redesignated the 51st Transportation Squadron,⁸⁰ and it was thus under the latter cognomen that it was attached to Headquarters, 51st Air Base Group for administration, operational control, and logistic support on 15 August 1957.⁸¹ A short time later, on 25 October 1957, the 51st Transportation Squadron was inactivated, reverting to control of the Department of the Air Force.⁸²

Now, however, on 8 January 1964, the 51st Transportation Squadron rode again.

The 51st Civil Engineering Squadron: As an inevitable consequence of the redesignation of the 51st Air Base Group as the 51st Combat Support Group, the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron at Naha AB was relieved from its assignment to the former and was assigned to the latter, effective 8 January 1964.⁸³

The 51st Air Police Squadron: Similarly affected by the change in designation of the 51st Air Base Group was the 51st Air Police Squadron, at Naha AB, which was perforce relieved from assignment to that organization and reassigned to the new 51st Combat Support Group, effective 8 January 1964.⁸⁴

The 51st USAF Dispensary: On 8 January 1964 the 6351st USAF Dispensary at Naha AB was discontinued, and in its place was organized the 51st USAF Dispensary, which had been activated on 4 December 1963.⁸⁵ The new unit was assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group.⁸⁶

The 51st USAF Dispensary was not, strictly speaking, a new organization, though it had never before functioned under this identical designation. As the 51st Station Medical Group it had first been constituted on 10 August 1948, and had been activated on 18 August 1948 at Naha Airfield, Okinawa, where it was assigned to the 51st Fighter Wing (later redesignated "fighter-interceptor"). On 17 April 1949 it was renamed the 51st Medical Group, and it was under this appellation that it accompanied the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing to Itazuke AB, Japan, on 20 September 1950, as a result of the Korean War.

Kimpo AB, Korea, was the next stop, from 12 October to 9 December 1950, after which the 51st Medical Group returned to Itazuke. On 11 January 1951, however, the unit transferred to Tsuiki AB, Japan, settling down there until 1 October of the same year. From 1 October 1951 to 26 July 1954 the medical group was at Suwon AB, Korea, and it was during this period, on 8 March 1954, that it was redesignated the 51st Tactical Hospital.

The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing returned to Naha AB on 1 August 1954, and with it came the 51st Tactical Hospital, which replaced the 6351st USAF Dispensary as the base medical facility, the latter being discontinued the same date.⁸⁷ But this arrangement proved only temporary; for the 6351st USAF Dispensary was again organized at Naha AB, with a strength of one officer and one airman, on 2 December 1954.⁸⁸ On 26 August 1955, the 51st Tactical Hospital was attached to the 6351st USAF Dispensary for all purposes,⁸⁹ and thus matters continued until 25 March 1959, when the 51st Tactical Hospital was inactivated.⁹⁰

Now, on 4 December 1963, the 51st Tactical Hospital was redesignated the 51st USAF Dispensary and activated, for organization on 8 January 1964 as an integral element of the 51st Combat Support Group.⁹¹

Detachment 14, 20th Weather Squadron: Effective 8 June 1964, Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing, at Naha Air Base, was discontinued, and in its place was designated and organized Detachment 14, 20th Weather Squadron. The new unit was attached to Detachment 15, 20th Weather Squadron, at Osan AB, Korea, for operational control, and to the 51st Combat Support Group, at Naha AB, for administrative and logistic support.⁹² The 20th Weather Squadron itself had been constituted, activated, and assigned by Headquarters, USAF, to the Military Air Transport Service (MATs), which organized it at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, and further assigned it to the 1st Weather Wing on 8 June 1964.⁹³

PERSONNEL

A detailed list of key personnel of the Headquarters, 313th Air Division, as well as all assigned and attached subordinate units at both Kadena and Naha Air Bases, is included as Appendix 1 to this history.

A base population report of the 313th Air Division, listing the authorized and the assigned strength of each organization as of the end of each month during the period January-June 1964 is included as Appendix 5 to this history.

A summary of all fatalities occurring among Air Force personnel, as well as Department of the Air Force civilians and Filipino employees of

the Air Force at both Kadena and Naha Air Bases is carried as Appendix 3 to this history.

FUNDS

Naha Air Base.

FY-1965 Program Accomplishment as Opposed to Tentative Annual Budget

Authorization Availability: The total operation and maintenance fund (P458) requirements of Naha Air Base for the Fiscal Year 1965 amounted to \$11,018,000, leaving \$3,945,000 unfunded by the adjusted Fifth Air Force tentative annual budget authorization (or "bogey," as it was known to budget officials) of \$7,073,000. Actually, the "bogey" issued by the Fuchu headquarters had been an even \$7,000,000, but Naha officials had found it possible to increase this figure by \$73,000, the amount of local reimbursements anticipated in excess of the anticipated reimbursement target of \$325,000.

By far the greatest part of the unfunded requirements derived from the cost of corrosion control of C-130 aircraft (\$2,023,000) and real property facility projects (\$829,000). The total of all other unfunded requirements came to \$1,093,000.

All fixed expenses had already been funded within the Fifth Air Force tentative annual budget authorization, with the possible exception of Object Class 2295A: Accessorial Charges for Subsistence. Here the total requirements were stated on the basis of the rates established by AFR 172-5 of 2 October 1963. However, funding within the "bogey" provided for requirements priced on the basis of billings received from

U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS), during the first two quarters of FY-1964. Therefore, until USARYIS completely solved its accessorial billing problems, no firm figure could be given.

The unfunded requirements in the travel category were primarily to be found in Object Class 2110: Transportation by ASIF (MATS). Naha Air Base made it a matter of policy that all temporary duty travel orders should direct travel by base aircraft, while "extreme measures" were taken to insure that MATS aircraft were used only when absolutely necessary to avoid greater costs in per diem payments.

The supply situation at Naha AB had improved during the first half of FY-1964, largely because of a concentrated effort placed upon reporting and shipping excesses. In this connection, the credits received from Defense Supply Agency (DSA) depots were taken into account in computing the base requirements.

All personnel on Naha Air Base were instructed in the necessity of conserving and stretching funds and insuring the maximum utilization of available resources. Also, active military and civilian suggestion award programs were coordinated with the Cost Reduction Program--though, by their very nature, many of the suggestions approved did not necessarily save money, some even involving an expenditure of funds. In addition, the stringent control policies in effect during FY-1964 would be retained in FY-1965, and Naha would continue to develop and refine the controls placed on all phases of financial management.

In the considered opinion of the 51st Combat Support Group Budget Officer, the additional \$3,945,000 requested from Fifth Air Force for

FY-1965 was vitally necessary if Naha was to retain the mission capabilities which it had demonstrated in recent inspections and Operational Readiness Inspections (ORI's).⁹⁴

The 51st Combat Support Group's Priority Listing of Unfunded Requirements: The Budget Officer for the 51st Combat Support Group included in his Annual Financial Plan for FY-1965 a list of 16 unfunded requirements, in the order of their priority, and briefly described the impact neglect of any one of them would have on accomplishment of the Naha base mission. These items were as follows:⁹⁵

Priority One - Contract Maintenance of Complete Aircraft (Corrosion Control of C-130's) - \$2,023,000. On 25-26 September 1963, a Corrosion Conference had been convened at Headquarters, PACAF, to negotiate corrosion work requirements for those PACAF C-130 aircraft undergoing MOD/IRAN (modification/inspection and repair as necessary) at Warner-Robbins Air Materiel Area and for those receiving corrosion treatment at Naha Air Base by a contract field team employed by the Dynalelectron Corporation. At this conference it was agreed that a re-evaluation of the funds required would be made after five aircraft had been processed through the Naha facility. (Subsequently, it was found, in the event, that corrosion treatment of these five C-130's ran to an average of 5,500 man-hours per aircraft.)

It was estimated that 93 PACAF C-130 aircraft would be processed through the Naha facility during FY-1964. Even as the FY-1965 Annual Financial Plan was being published (17 January 1964), a request for military manning to provide an Air Force capability for performing the proposed corrosion treatment on the C-130's was being studied at Headquarters,

USAF. If approved, this action would eliminate any need for contractual funds for aircraft corrosion control during FY-1965, provided implementation of this revised method took place at an early enough date. The current work force employed by Dynalectron Corporation, as of 3 January 1964, consisted of 54 Americans, 28 Japanese, and 51 Ryukyuans. The best estimate of the average cost per man-hour was \$5.00. Thus, 93 aircraft requiring 5,500 man-hours apiece at \$5.00 per hour would entail a total cost of \$2,557,500. Since the "bogey" already allotted for this item was \$535,000, this meant that an additional sum of \$2,023,000 was required to meet the expenditure.

Priority Two - Accessorial Charges for Subsistence - \$106,000.

The tentative annual budget authorization for subsistence accessorial charges was \$409,000. However, it was estimated that the total amount required to reimburse the Army for this item would come to \$515,996, leaving an additional sum of \$106,000 which would have to be funded. Of the total subsistence costs, \$236,376 were to cover perishable items and \$279,620 non-perishable. In the former category, \$32,240.40 was for port handling in the CONUS of 4,020 metric tons at \$8.02 per ton; \$12,944.40 was for overseas port unloading of the same 4,020 metric tons at \$3.22 per ton; \$21,064.80 was for overseas packaging, handling, and crating of 2,680 short tons at \$7.86 per ton; \$160,076.40 was for the ocean transportation of the same 4,020 metric tons at \$39.82 per ton; and \$10,050 was for the transportation within Okinawa of 2,680 short tons at \$3.75 per ton.

In the non-perishable category, \$52,570 was for the CONUS port handling of 7,000 metric tons at \$7.51 per ton; \$22,540 was for the overseas

port unloading of 7,000 metric tons at \$3.22 per ton; \$23,580 was for the overseas packaging, handling, and crating of 3,000 short tons at \$7.86 per ton; \$169,680 for the ocean transportation of 7,000 metric tons at \$24.24 per ton; and \$11,250 for the transportation of 3,000 short tons within Okinawa at \$3.75 per ton.

The dollar value of the items to be procured for subsistence in FY-1965, incidentally, was \$2,673,639. Thus, it can be seen that the total accessorial charges equaled approximately one-fifth the value of the goods themselves.

Priority Three - Transfer Account - Military Family Housing - \$58,000. A total of \$113,000 had been included in the Fifth Air Force "bogey" for this item, but \$58,000 more was needed to fulfill the requirements for Naha Air Base, making the total \$171,000.

Priority Four - Travel and Transportation of Persons - \$83,000. Of this figure, \$60,000 was for the transportation of personnel via ASIF (MATS), \$19,000 for per diem and incidental expenses, and \$4,000 for transportation by means other than ASIF and for incidental expenses connected therewith. The sum of \$462,000 had already been included in the "bogey" for the travel and transportation of personnel, making the total required for this item \$545,000.

Priority Five - Supplies and Materials Procured from the General Services Agency - \$416,000. While Fifth Air Force had funded a tentative annual budget authorization of \$531,000 for supplies and materials to be procured from the General Services Agency (GSA), the Naha Budget Officer calculated his base's requirements at \$947,000 for FY-1965,

leaving \$416,000 to be funded. The expenditures for items purchased through Sacramento Air Materiel Area (SMAMA) and the GSA during the 12 months from 1 January through 31 December 1963 had amounted to \$842,917.42. The funds previously requested to purchase items through SMAMA were now procured from the GSA as "Stores and Non-Stores Items." The large sum requested would, if allocated, be used to fund parts for approximately 450 vehicles and ground power equipment (GPE) of different makes and models. As in so many other areas, Naha budget officials were confronted with a corrosion problem that was "normally non-existent" at Stateside installations.

The total FY-1965 requirements were based on past experience concerning items issued, price trends, and an estimate of the items which would be converted from other DSA departments' inventory managers to the GSA. Since line item accounting was now in effect, issue experience acquired therefrom had shown a limited amount of excess and had assisted in establishing true levels which contributed to the large amount of dollars spent during the past 12 months.

Included in this general category of supplies and materials procured from the General Services Agency were administrative and janitorial supplies, such as office supplies, supplies to support dining halls, and typhoon supplies--these last essential for the protection of personnel lives and property. An estimated \$18,000 were required for typhoon tape, candles, water cans, and the like. Typhoon tape alone cost approximately \$4,000 annually and, like the other items, was indispensable. In actuality, neither 1962 nor 1963 had brought a destructive typhoon to

Okinawa; but this good fortune had not obviated the need for issuing typhoon tape, candles, water cans, and other emergency supplies, since it could not be known until after the typhoon was safely out of the way that Okinawa would not be included on its calling list. Obviously, the time to take precautions was before the storm struck, or was at least in a position to strike, with telling effect. Unfortunately, owing to the flaws making up a great part of human nature, far more of this equipment was issued than was strictly necessary, inasmuch as many people drew new issues of tape, in particular, for each approaching typhoon; yet, it was pretty certain that they had not used up the entire roll previously obtained a few weeks earlier. Thus it was that many and many a "junk heap" traversing the island's highways could be seen to be held together by nothing more durable than "typhoon tape!"

The estimated amount required for the purchase of automotive supplies to support the 450 assigned vehicles at Naha AB would be approximately \$200,000, on the basis of past issues, the corrosion of stocked items, and the purchase price paid to commercial vendors by the GSA. These requirements were over and above those in Object Class 2633, which were procured from the Army for special type vehicles.

Any excesses derived from automotive supplies unfortunately did not generate credits under existing accounting practices; thus, they must either be distributed to other PACAF bases or sent to Redistribution and Marketing. Either way, Naha Air Base would not recoup any funds from its excesses.

The spare parts required were all items common to vehicles and ground-powered equipment maintenance, such as tires, batteries, electrical

systems, engine parts, clutches, transmissions, plugs, and related auto parts. Since procurement via commercial outlets on Okinawa was limited, it was necessary for the base to satisfy its needs through GSA.

The C&E Store stocked and maintained levels of installation and engineer type items to provide parts and supplies for the repair of all buildings, roads, and grounds, for modification of existing facilities to meet new requirements, and for preventive maintenance. The type of supplies comprised refrigeration parts, hardware, electrical supplies, and plumbing supplies. The same types of items were required for support of the 623d ACEW Squadron's off-island sites. The Base Civil Engineers were responsible for the maintenance of buildings, improved grounds, roads, parking and storage areas, sidewalks, airfield pavements, petroleum storage areas, and airfield lights. These were, of course, over and above other buildings that were contracted out to commercial firms for maintenance and upkeep.

The Personnel Services Division was responsible for developing, providing, operating, and supervising welfare and morale programs for all military personnel and their dependents who were assigned or attached to Naha Air Base. The Air Force placed great importance upon the individual and his ability to do his job effectively. It was, then, the Personnel Division's job to provide the very best off-duty recreational program possible. To do this, it was necessary that all the Naha facilities such as hobby shops (arts, crafts, and automotive), service clubs, athletics, recreation (swimming pools, beach and boats, bowling center, etc.), libraries, dependent youth activities, theaters, and other activities be supplied

and equipped to the maximum extent possible, in order to provide a well-rounded off-duty recreational program. This was "doubly important" at Naha AB, because of "the complete non-existence of clean, wholesome recreational activities off-base." Alcoholic drinks in commercial establishments were "relatively inexpensive;" therefore, the consumption rate was "alarmingly high." This situation inevitably produced high incident rates and consequent courts martial, which then resulted in the subsequent loss to the Air Force of valuable manpower, which had been trained and outfitted at great expense. A total of \$30,232.90 was needed for Personnel Services supplies alone.

Priority Six - Supplies and Material Procured from the Defense Services Agency - \$168,000. The sum of \$554,000 had previously been authorized by Fifth Air Force in its bogey for FY-1965 for supplies and material to be procured from the Defense Services Agency, but the 51st Combat Support Group now found that \$168,000 more was needed to cover all the requirements in this area.

Priority Seven - Supplies and Materials Procured from Other (Army) Stock Funds - \$17,000. The Fifth Air Force "bogey" for this object class amounted to \$98,000, but budget officials at Naha AB estimated that an additional \$17,000 would be needed to cover expenditures expected to reach \$115,000. For the period 1 January through 30 November 1963 a sum of \$313,162 had actually been spent for this purpose, an average monthly figure of \$28,470. Of the total, \$75,000 had been spent on lumber products. Other funds had gone for "H" series vehicle parts and, in some instances, other vehicle parts; and for ground power

equipment (GPE) items that were available from the Army. The dollars in this area had amounted to approximately \$125,000.

The 51st Combat Support Group's current requirement was based, in part, on issue experience gained during the preceding year, and partly on the realization that the corrosion control project on the C-130 aircraft then going forward would increase its needs in consequence of the workload being expended on these aircraft. With the increased workload, the amount of support required by the 51st's materiel handling equipment was steadily increasing.

Another factor which needed to be taken into consideration was that the number of line items that could be stocked economically was limited because of deterioration and corrosion, past experience having demonstrated that it was less costly to purchase a majority of items in this object class as they were needed than it was to stockpile them and lose a good percentage to climatic conditions.

Priority Eight - Non-Tactical Radio Systems - \$4,000. A total of \$55,000 had been funded by Fifth Air Force in the FY-1965 tentative annual budget authorization for non-tactical radio systems, but budget officials calculated that a total of \$59,000 was needed for this purpose. Hence, an additional \$4,000 was requested. Making up the agencies for which these radio systems were required were the air police/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), base taxis, the maintenance expediter, civil engineers, fire crash organization, POL organization, and base medical dispensary.

The General Electric radios previously installed had proved very effective in increasing the efficiency of the Air Police operations on

Naha Air Base. The response time for both law enforcement and security incidents had been reduced by at least 85 per cent since these units were installed. Law enforcement problems such as accidents, fights, fires, family disturbances, prowlers, and thefts required the immediate attention of the Air Police. The instantaneous response necessary could, however, be provided only by constant communications between the desk sergeant and all patrols. The existing communications system was needed to maintain law and order on Naha Air Base.

To fulfill the security mission, all sentries on posts and patrols had to have direct two-way radio communication with Central Security Control. Portable radios allowed the sentries and sabotage alert teams to react quickly and efficiently to emergencies such as fires, accidents, and sabotage. (Air Force Manual 205-4B, incidentally, required that sabotage alert teams be equipped with portable radios.) Air Police vehicles also had to have two-way communications with Central Security Control. When vehicles were in the motor pool, the replacements had to be equipped with portable units. During "expanded security" conditions, the additional vehicles provided by the motor pool had to be equipped with portable radios. The portable units were also required during upload and disaster control exercises, as well as operations connected with on or off-base crash sites. In addition, they were necessary when additional guard posts were created for classified aircraft in transit and when weapons convoys were in movement.

During typhoons, telephone and electrical power failures frequently rendered the base communications system inoperative, except for those

communications provided by portable radios. During these times it was imperative that key personnel and units such as the Base Commander, the Typhoon Command Post, the fire department, the dispensary, the Army Category I unit, and the Marine Category I unit be equipped with communications. This need was in addition to the requirement for portable units levied by the Security people. No portable radios were presently provided as replacements when the units on hand became inoperative, and in the event these happened to be in contract maintenance for repair, the Air Police found themselves compelled to continue operations without them.

While it was difficult to arrive at even an educated estimate of the financial savings in police operations resulting from the assignment of portable radios, it was obvious that both the Security and the Law Enforcement missions were dependent upon instantaneous communications. Hence, the communications system must inevitably pay for itself in the increased efficiency it bestowed upon the Air Police at Naha AB.

The EOD alert vehicle on 24-hour dispatch was required by AFR 136-10/ Fifth Air Force Supplement to be equipped with a two-way radio. Operating on the same frequency as the Air Police, the EOD personnel were enabled to communicate with the latter at the scene of an accident or an incident involving either conventional explosive ordnance or special weapons.

As a result of the introduction of the transistorized radio program, Naha AB was now handling 20 per cent more runs per month. With radio-equipped taxis in operation, the "deadhead" mileage was reduced approximately 200 miles per day. At a rate of 10 cents per mile, this accounted for a monthly saving of \$440. In addition, non-productive man-hours for

the drivers who had formerly returned to the motor pool to receive instructions for their next run amounted to approximately 25 cents per hour, an average of four hours every day. The transistorized radio system, by eliminating this waste of man-hours, produced savings of some \$220 per month.

An additional use of the radio-equipped taxis--although not measurable in dollars and cents--was to be found during the storing of vehicles in permanent buildings in preparation for a threatening typhoon. At such times, the radios in the taxis rendered great assistance by providing immediate contact between personnel at the various emergency storage areas on base, thus enabling the maximum number of vehicles to be stored.

A survey conducted by the 51st Air Base Group had shown that the addition of five mobile radios to the base taxi fleet would permit Naha to release 10 vehicles for command use and, in the process, reduce its authorization by 10 vehicles. This would bring about a saving of approximately \$15,000 per year for vehicles; \$3,000 in maintenance costs, not including the man-hours saved each year; \$2,000 in annual airman pay; and, with the reduction of 10 vehicles from the base inventory, a saving of man-hours and more proper utilization of manpower. The total saving for Naha AB through the acquisition of five new non-tactical taxi radios would be approximately \$20,000 per year.

The efficient manner in which maintenance and supply conducted their business as a result of improved communications in support of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing's mission did not lend itself to tabulation in dollars and cents. Nevertheless, there were some identifiable savings.

The maintenance transportation fleet had been reduced by seven vehicles, and the towing equipment requirement reduced by four MB-3 Coleman tractors. In view of the purchase price and operating costs, this represented an annual saving of approximately \$105,000, plus an obvious reduction in the manpower required to operate the equipment. Additional benefits that resulted from the use of a radio system for expediting maintenance operations were (a) return trips to the workshops by maintenance and supply technicians were reduced to virtually zero; (b) maximum utilization of technical personnel was achieved through "yellow cab" type transportation service to and from the job, under radio control; (c) telephone requirements throughout the maintenance area were reduced; and (d) the time required to obtain POL, AGE, technical assistance, and replacement parts for mission aircraft was reduced. The USAF aircraft maintenance management concept as directed by AFM 66-1 was dependent upon the existing non-tactical radio net for realization. By the same token, any reduction in the existing radio communication capability would "critically and severely" hamper accomplishment of the maintenance mission.

The radios installed in the Civil Engineer vehicles were used to provide an integrated service call system, as required by AFM 85-1. Prior to the installation of the radios, the vehicles had found it necessary to make periodic trips to and from their shops merely to receive further orders, costing the organization valuable time and putting wasted mileage on the vehicles. Each crew had completed an average of only 15 work orders per day, with a serious backlog of priority work resulting. However, since installation of the radio system, the mileage on the controlled vehicles had been reduced to a total of 1,400 miles per month; the percentage of

non-production had been reduced to 25 per cent; and the compliant call crews were now averaging over 30 work orders per day. It was estimated that this radio net was thereby saving 20,000 man-hours and \$30,000 per year. The radio-controlled vehicles also increased the efficiency of the Base Disaster Control Teams, by giving the controlling agency instantaneous communication with each team leader in the field, and by expediting the dispatch of teams to the required location. The restoration of electric power during outages, which were frequent, owing to the highly corrosive atmosphere prevailing, was speeded up by approximately 25 per cent through the use of radio equipment. These improvements in service to Naha Air Base, made possible through the use of the currently-installed radio equipment, allowed each assigned organization to perform its assigned mission in a better manner, which in turn insured that the over-all base mission would be performed at peak efficiency.

Needed in addition to the existing radio equipment on hand in the Base Engineers was one transistorized 20-watt audio amplifier, to be mounted on the vehicle used by the crew responsible for the maintenance, repair, and checking of airfield lighting facilities and aircraft arresting barriers. Much of their work was conducted on the active runway, during which time constant contact by radio had to be maintained with the control tower, so that the workmen could clear the runway during landings and takeoffs. Although this vehicle presently had a radio installed, one man had to remain inside to maintain contact with the tower personnel, as the vehicle itself was parked away from the runway and the speaker was not loud enough to be heard by the men at work on the lighting facilities

and barriers. With the requested amplifier, the vehicle could still be parked the required distance from the runway and the driver assigned to productive work while still able to hear calls to clear the runway. This would result in an estimated saving of 730 man-hours and \$1,000 each year.

Emergency vehicles of the Fire/Crash Department were constantly scattered throughout the base, as well as off-base, in a stand-by status while on runway stand-by during abnormal fueling operations, welding jobs, engine starts, and other hazardous mission tasks.

The Fire Department had instantaneous and constant communication with all assigned vehicles. In the event help was needed for a serious fire or aircraft accident, support was forthcoming in a matter of moments, without dependence on telephone service. The fire crash personnel also enjoyed instant communication with the main fire station, as well as emergency areas, including the flight line. While the manpower and dollar savings resulting from the preservation of lives and Air Force property were difficult to estimate, there was no gainsaying that without the possession of reliable mobile radio communications, the base could very easily sustain the loss of a building or an aircraft. The requirement for the constant presence of modernized radio equipment in fire crash vehicles was of utmost importance, if the Fire Department was properly to carry out its mission of saving lives and protecting government property.

The Naha unit manning document was computed on the premise that two fires or emergencies would not occur at the same time; therefore, some of the fire/crash equipment was corss-manned, making it necessary to depend on the radios to keep the fire-fighting people advised, when out of

the station, if a fire or crash of higher priority occurred. When dealing with the preservation of life and property, it was impossible to place a monetary value on the savings, and the time saved through the possession of two-way portable radio would vary with each situation.

Prior to the installation of the non-tactical radio system on the refueling vehicles at Naha, a considerable amount of man-hours and funds had been expended in meeting the support demands of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing mission. The Refueling Section operated 24 hours a day on a seven-days-a-week basis, handling an average of 72 calls per day.

The distance from the refueling unit parking area to the far side of the runway was approximately two miles and required a travel time of 7-1/2 minutes. (Your four-minute milers could apparently do almost as well!) On many occasions in the past, the POL Section had dispatched a refueling unit to the far side of the runway, only to have the personnel learn upon their return that another aircraft in the same area required servicing. As might be expected, frequent repetition of this exasperating experience resulted in not only the obvious waste of man-hours but also a less tangible erosion of morale. As a direct consequence of this inefficient procedure, the Refueling Section had had to be manned by two 12-hour shifts, in order to meet the demands of the accelerated flying schedule.

After having its trucks equipped with radios, the section was able to fill the former demands while simultaneously reducing the working hour schedule to a more palatable pattern of three eight-hour shifts. In the process, the POL Section saved many dollars, not only in man-hours

but also in diminished wear and tear on the vehicles. The refueling unit dispatcher could now maintain a constant control over all his units, thus utilizing his men and equipment where they were most needed and increasing the refueling capabilities to the utmost.

During the 16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron's training exercises, when fast turnarounds were essential, the refueling units, through their radios, were in constant contact with the POL supervisor. Therefore, whenever a unit developed a malfunction, the latter could replace it without delay.

Although the 51st USAF Dispensary at Naha AB provided ambulance support for all areas south of Naha Air Base to the southern tip of the island, for Naha City--located four miles from the dispensary--and the Naha military port area, and for the area south of Minatogawa to Naha City, including the Machinato-Naha Army Dependent Housing Area, besides the 1,800-acre base itself, its ambulances were not equipped with two-way radios. All of these areas were serviced with frequent ambulance service on a 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week basis, and it was reasonable to assume that the utilization of a radio-dispatched ambulance would give increased efficiency to the medical care offered by this facility. Radio-dispatched vehicles would substantially reduce the very important time factor connected with the successful accomplishment of the medical mission. The equipment would be used to dispatch an ambulance immediately to the scene of a medical emergency or to reroute an ambulance to a corrected destination when the original information concerning an accident was found to be erroneous.

As an example of the latter type of situation, the 51st Dispensary had recently been told of an accident's having occurred south of Naha Air Base. The information received indicated that only one ambulance was needed; however, upon arriving at the scene, the corpsmen found that two persons had been injured in the accident, making a second ambulance necessary. Having no radio in the vehicle, one of the men hastily found a telephone from which he advised the dispensary that another ambulance was needed. The instructions he gave concerning the location of the accident were garbled, and the second ambulance had to find a telephone, then call in for new instructions. As it turned out, neither victim was hurt seriously enough to require medical attention; so what could have turned out to be a tragedy became simply a warning of "what might have been" and what should not be. Had the ambulances been radio-equipped, the necessary information could have been relayed to them at the scene of the accident or enroute.

The benefits that would be obtained from the installation of radios in the base ambulances were threefold: (1) more efficient dispatch of the ambulances to the scene of an accident; (2) the possible saving of life or limb; and (3) more effective use of the ambulances through their being rerouted to the scene of an accident while returning from a hospital run. The installation of radios in the ambulances of the 51st USAF Dispensary would provide it with a modern, efficient ambulance system that would effect "untold savings" in Air Force funds, while furnishing "a very necessary service" to both military personnel and dependents in the organization's area of responsibility.

Another organization which would benefit considerably from the allocation of two-way radios was Detachment 1 of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron. In the course of a loading operation, difficulties often arose which forced the Ramp Coordinator to walk or drive to Space Control. After resolving the problem, he then had to return to the aircraft, which might be two miles' distant. If a radio were available, this waste of time could be eliminated, helping the detachment to maintain definite schedules. Since Detachment 1 operated on a 24-hours-per-day, seven-days-per-week schedule, the use of mobile radio equipment would enable it to eliminate a vehicle driver presently required for coordination between the Ramp Coordinator and Space Control, resulting in an estimated annual saving of \$2,600.

During mobility movements such radio equipment had previously proved to be quite valuable, as, for example, in Southeast Asia the preceding summer, when a set of radios had made it possible for the Mission Commander to maintain direct contact with the personnel who were working on the flight at Naha AB. By contrast, at Kadena AB, where there were no radios, several problems had arisen and had had to be left for decision to the ranking man there, while the Mission Commander remained unaware of any difficulties until the aircraft were delayed in taking off. If radio contact had existed, he could have been informed and permitted to decide whether to leave a part of the load or delay the whole formation. As it was, one aircraft was late and arrived over the drop zone after the rest of the formation had already dropped their paratroopers and departed.

The marshalling of loads had always been a problem for Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron. Since no communications existed within the

marshalling area, loads quite often arrived early, late, or out of proper sequence. If, however, the detachment personnel in the marshalling areas had been equipped with radios, they could have been notified when to send specific loads. When loads arrived out of sequence, it took more time to get them to the correct aircraft. Moreover, experience had shown that two identical loads, one in sequence, the other not, could not be loaded in the same amount of time. The one in sequence could be loaded up to two days faster, as in the case of moving a full brigade or division; while if the loads arrived out of sequence, the 7th Aerial Port people had to wait until all the loads had arrived, then sort them and place them all at the aircraft before loading.

In some instances, they loaded 20 to 40 aircraft at the same time. At such times it was impossible for the loading supervisor to check all the aircraft, because of his other duties; but his NCOIC could. And, if problems arose, he could call the OIC, provided radios were available. Radios would constitute the only means of communication, since there were no telephones on the flight line at either Naha or Kadena.

Finally, if Detachment 1 were equipped with radios, the traffic officer could better control the daily operation and the Mission Commander could better control a large mobility movement.

Priority Nine - Contract Maintenance of Household Furniture and Appliances - \$26,000. The "bogey" funded by Fifth Air Force for contract maintenance of household furniture and appliances during FY-1965 amounted to \$44,000, a sum \$26,000 below the total of \$70,000 which the 51st Combat Support Group deemed necessary to cover additional requirements in this area.

At the time the Naha Budget Officer had prepared the annual financial plan for that base in January 1964, the 51st Combat Support Group possessed no capability of repairing household furniture. Thus, the business of repair had to be conducted by means of contracts with local Okinawan repair firms. The repair costs for the BOQ items, such as beds, bookcases, easy and straight chairs, davenports, writing desks, dressers, floor lights, mattresses, magazine racks, tables of various kinds, wardrobes, and pillows, were reasonable and considerably less than the cost of new items. The procurement cost of a bed, for example, was \$15, while the repair cost was only \$4.35--a difference of \$10.65. The procurement cost of a mattress was \$25, as opposed to the repair cost of \$4.50--a saving of \$21.50. The furniture in "non-housekeeping" (BOQ) quarters was deteriorating rapidly, making it essential that a long range repair program be put into effect immediately, if the high cost of repairs and even total losses were to be avoided. The sum of \$11,166.90 was required for this purpose.

As for the refrigerators in BOQ's, these had been installed at the time of the original construction, which was completed in 1953 and 1954. Now, owing to the long period of time these appliances had been in use, extensive maintenance was required. Approximately 33 per cent of them were scheduled for replacement, being too far gone to warrant rehabilitation, and the new ones were being procured against the FY-1965 budget. The remaining 67 per cent required immediate repair and/or refinishing. \$2,250 was needed for this purpose.

Another aspect of the household furniture account which involved contract amintenance was that of off-base quarters furniture. Because

of the constant use, frequent movement (often by untrained movers), and high turnover of off-base quarters furniture, its deterioration rate was much higher than that of the furniture in government quarters. The type of furniture issued to off-base private rental and privately-owned quarters consisted of rather ancient Far East Air Forces (FEAF), Okinawa Housing Corporation (OHC), Quartermaster, and some Fifth Air Force walnut items. The condition of this furniture in the off-base quarters was required. Most of the deteriorated furniture was Quartermaster, OHC, and FEAF types which, becoming excess, had been transferred from other PACAF bases. Naha Air Base had no household furniture repair capability and would continue to have none, unless additional personnel were authorized on the Unit Manning Document (UMD), though a minor furniture repair unit had been established and was in operation under the Base Civil Engineer function. \$35,958.05 was needed for the contract rehabilitation of such furniture.

The household appliances requiring contract repair and rehabilitation consisted of electric ranges, refrigerators, automatic washers, and washer wringers. Chiefly because of Naha's semi-tropical, very humid climate, the location of off-base quarters, and an electrical power current notoriously fluctuating, electrical appliances tended to deteriorate at an abnormally rapid rate. In addition, a majority of these appliances issued to off-base occupants were excess items transferred from other PACAF bases which had needed repairs of varying degrees when originally received. The estimated budget requirement of \$20,748 for contract maintenance was the minimum amount needed for reconditioning all marginal or reparable assets

currently installed in off-base quarters. Approximately 27 per cent of the appliances serviced on base by the Base Civil Engineers had been "green tagged" and subsequently repaired either by the Base Engineer Electrical Appliance Shop or through contract.

Priority Ten - Equipment - \$146,000. Although Fifth Air Force had funded the not inconsiderable sum of \$120,000 for equipment in its "bogey" for FY-1965, the 51st Combat Support Group found that an additional sum of \$146,000 was needed to meet all the estimated expenses in this line. The need for equipment funds arose from the construction of new facilities and expanded work areas, such as the new hangar and operations buildings, both of which had to be provided with initial equipment. In addition, much of the new equipment had to be purchased to replace items that had been repaired repeatedly to the point of no return, chiefly as a result of the extremely corrosive and destructive climate. The 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing considered its level of equipment on hand as compared with that which was authorized to be "healthily high." But this enviable situation could be maintained only by continuing what were deemed to be sound principles: forecasting new requirements in plenty of time and controlling equipment replacement.

Priority Eleven - Transportation of Things - All Other - \$9,000. Fifth Air Force had allocated a tentative annual budget authorization of \$48,000 for the transportation of items not covered more specifically under other priority object classes; however, the 51st's Budget Officer found this figure to be too small by \$9,000. Making up this rather amorphous item were on/off-base POL delivery, POL to installations, return of

empty POL drums, delivery of dairy products, delivery of perishables and of non-perishables, delivery of rations and materiel to sites, general military freight-truck, and depot funding for first destination transportation.

Priority Twelve - Custodial Services - \$38,000. The Fifth Air Force "bogey" for FY-1965 had contained no funds at all for custodial services in operational and alert areas and, for that matter, only \$18,000 for similar services in administrative and other areas; yet, the 51st Budget Officer calculated the requirements for the former at \$7,000 and for the latter at \$49,000. Thus, there existed a total deficiency of \$38,000.

In both areas, custodial services contracts would require that the following operations be performed: (a) Sweeping and/or vacuuming of all floors; (b) Waxing and buffing floors; (c) Mopping floors; (d) Cleaning rest rooms, toilet bowls, seats, urinals, and sinks; (e) Dusting furniture, venetian blinds, windows, walls, light fixtures, and water coolers; (f) Emptying and cleaning waste baskets; and (g) Washing windows.

Without such contract services each organization would have to take care of its own cleaning chores, which would necessitate the use of airmen and civilians for this purpose. Since most of these personnel were "highly trained and skilled technicians," this meant that valuable time would be squandered on ignominious manual and menial labor. Without question, contract labor, employing Ryukyuan workers, was considerably cheaper than airman or skilled civilian labor. Even more importantly, the use of contract labor for cleaning would allow each military indiv-

idual more time to devote to his primary duty. In any event, such a substitution of contract labor for military labor would constitute no revolutionary measure, if its authorization by AFR 91-2: "Custodial Services," was of any significance. The contract for custodial services for FY-1964 had increased the rates almost 50 per cent over those for FY-1963. Nevertheless, if good health and welfare were to be promoted, the cleanliness of work areas was essential and could not be adequately provided through spasmodic and haphazard efforts. Only by methodical and regular cleaning could such desirable conditions be achieved.

Priority Thirteen - Facility Projects by Contract - \$829,000.

At the time the 51st Air Base Group Budget Office prepared its estimate of the funds that would be needed for facility projects to be performed by contract, it had requested \$554,000 for this purpose. However, when Fifth Air Force presented its "bogey" for Naha Air Base, the figure allocated had been reduced to \$375,000. By the time the 51st Combat Support Group submitted its Annual Financial Plan for FY-1965 on 17 January 1964, it had become evident that the total requirements in this category would actually come to \$1,204,000. This meant that an additional \$829,000 would have to be allotted if the base was to do the many things which sorely needed to be done.

In the area of maintenance, the "bogey" had been \$188,000, but the true requirement was \$424,000--a difference of \$236,000. For repairs involving expenditures of \$25,000 or less, the "bogey" had been zero, but this was all right, inasmuch as no requirement for such items existed. The same was true of emergency repairs involving expenditures of \$50,000

or less. But the like good fortune did not hold true where alterations were concerned. Here the "bogey" had been a rather niggardly \$69,000, which contrasted ill with the \$282,000 required--a difference of \$213,000. For minor construction, the "bogey" had been \$108,000, as opposed to the \$498,000 now found necessary--a difference of \$390,000.

Priority Fourteen - Education Services for Air Force Personnel -

\$1,000. By comparison with the preceding item, Priority Fourteen was of minor importance indeed, if money involved were the criterion. Fifth's "bogey" for the provision of education services for Air Force personnel had been \$2,000, while the FY-1965 Annual Financial Plan found that a total of \$3,000 was needed for five group study high school classes, 13 foreign language or language laboratory instruction courses, and 12 other group study classes.

Priority Fifteen - Laundry and Dry Cleaning - \$15,000. While

Fifth Air Force had granted a "bogey" or \$27,000 for laundry and dry-cleaning for FY-1965, by 17 January 1964 the 51st Combat Support Group had come to the realization that \$15,000 more would be needed to enable servicing of all the items of organizational equipment for which the group was responsible. To be dry-cleaned were A-3 bags, helmet bags, sleeping bags, aircraft arm rest covers, aircraft cushion covers, drapes, field jackets, flying jackets, Mae West life vests, jacket liners, aircraft seat belts, both one and two-man aircraft seats, winter and summer flying suits, winter and summer flying trousers, and parkas. Requiring laundering were cooks' aprons, barracks bags, bedspreads, wool blankets, cooks' coats, painters' coveralls, cooks' frocks, luncheon cloths, mattress

covers, cotton pillowcases, rags, cotton sheets, PME Laboratory technicians' smocks, cooks' trousers, bath towels, face towels, and large and small medical wrappers. All of the foregoing items were authorized to be laundered or dry-cleaned at government expense.

Among the factors contributing to the inadequacy of the "bogey" were an increase in the number of items needing to be cleaned and in the cost of laundering linen. Pillowcases, for example, had increased from two cents each to four; sheets had risen from five cents each to six. And these increases alone accounted for \$5,040 of the additional money needed. Naha Air Base, including its three satellite ACEW sites at Miyako, Kume, and Okino-Erabu, supported a total of 4,000 personnel with laundry and dry-cleaning service, utilizing the facilities of the U.S. Army Quartermaster Laundry.

By laundering the rags used in maintenance shops and in support of the corrosion control program, the base eliminated the need for procurement of new rags after each use, thus saving needed supply funds. The laundering of luncheon cloths was required to permit the use of a clean cloth on each of the 200 tables in the dining halls for each meal to improve its appearance, provide more sanitary facilities, and contribute to improved morale.

Priority Sixteen - Equipment - \$11,000. The only one of the 16 priority listings not a Project P458 item, Object Class 3100: equipment, was instead a Project P478 item calling for an additional \$11,000.⁹⁶

Summary of Changes in Budget Actions at Naha Air Base: Extensive activity in funding actions by higher headquarters during the historical

period resulted in the following changes from the annual budget authorization in effect on 1 January 1964:

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>1 Jan 64 ABA</u>	<u>Increase (Decrease)</u>	<u>30 Jun 64 ABA</u>
P458	\$7,123,100	\$401,864	\$7,524,964
P478	79,790	(233)	79,557
P720	480,000	26,436	506,436

A 100 per cent obligation rate was achieved in all budget projects on the 30 June 1964 close-out report for FY-1964 base funds.

The FY-1965 Financial Plan/FY-1966 Budget was submitted to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, on 23 January 1964, supporting FY-1965 requirements as follows:

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>Total Requirements</u>	<u>"Bogey"</u>	<u>Added Requirements</u>	<u>Total Supported by Hq 5AF</u>
P458	\$11,018,000	\$7,073,000	\$3,945,000	\$8,997,000
P478	76,500	69,000	7,500	74,700
P720	639,000	510,000	129,000	530,000

Subsequent to submission of the FY01965 Financial Plan, several reductions in the total requirements occurred as a result of the following actions:

a. PACAF's decision to perform corrosion control of C-130 aircraft as an Air Force personnel project rather than through contract, beginning on 1 October 1964, reduced the stated P-458 requirements by \$2,238,000.

b. The PACAF determination that funding for the maintenance and repair of Army-owned housing in the Machinato/Naha Housing Area leased

by the Air Force was not an Air Force responsibility reduced the stated P720 requirements by \$102,000. However, not surprisingly, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS), did not concur with the PACAF ruling that this maintenance and repair was an Army common service funding responsibility. As of 30 June 1964, the problem was unresolved, and negotiations between the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing and USARYIS were still suspended pending resolution of the conflict between PACAF and Army policy directives.⁹⁷

Kadena Air Base.

6313th Air Base Wing Policy during the Fiscal Year 1965: The financial policy of the 6313th Air Base Wing during the Fiscal Year-1965 may be summarized as follows:

1. To provide maximum support to the missions of tactical units.
2. To disseminate all USAF, PACAF, Fifth Air Force, and 313th Air Division Policy Guidance received to all fund managers and operating officials.
3. To indoctrinate all personnel on Kadena Air Base concerning the necessity of stretching available dollars to insure maximum utilization of available resources.
4. To continue to develop and refine the controls placed on all phases of financial management as a means of conserving "the taxpayer dollar."
5. To protect the Air Force investment in resources.
6. To improve the living and working standards of Air Force personnel at Kadena Air Base.

FY-1965 Program Accomplishment As Opposed to Tentative Annual Budget

Authorization Availability: Anticipated valid appropriation reimbursements \$152,000 above the reimbursement bogey of \$550,000 established by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force enabled the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base to increase the Fifth Air Force-established P458 bogey of \$12,065,000 to \$12,217,000 for Fiscal Year-1965. The validity of the FY-1965 anticipated appropriation reimbursements was based upon the fact that the FY-1965 local funded amount was \$554,029--or \$37,126 lower than the figure of \$591,155 anticipated for FY-1964--thus substantiating conservativeness in the compilation of the estimate.

Within this bogey the 6313th Budget Officer had found it possible to cover all the mandatory fixed costs, with the possible exception of U.S. Army accessorial charges. This exception derived from changes in rates and "highly questionable" billing procedures on the part of the U.S. Army. Additional requirements in the amount of \$2,943,000 existed for FY-1965.⁹⁸

For purposes of comparison, we may examine a listing of P-458 actual funding for Fiscal Years 1962 through 1964, as well as the Fiscal Year 1965 requirement:⁹⁹

(1) FY-1962 actual funding: \$12,726,598; (2) FY-1963 actual funding: \$12,959,308; (3) FY-1964 funding to date: \$12,253,000; (4) FY-1965 tentative annual budget authorization (commonly known as the "bogey"): \$12,217,000; and (5) FY-1965 requirement: \$15,160,000.

Hard core fund shortages still existed for FY-1964 at this time (January 1964) in the amount of \$2,473,000, with many of them comprising

such fixed cost items as civilian pay, Okinawa land rental, accessorial charges, electricity, and the like. Even so, the total FY-1965 requirement of \$15,160,000 was \$1,922,000 less than the figure reflected in the FY-1965 budget estimate of 23 January 1963. This decrease in requirements could be attributed primarily to:

(1) Conversion of Kadena Base Supply to an electronic processing data system (EPDS), thereby providing management with factual data which made possible an aggressive stock leveling program and identification of substitute items. This resulted in reducing net supply requirements.

(2) Conservation practices in connection with consumption of electricity and water.

(3) Enthusiastic support of the Cost Reduction Program.

The additional funding of \$2,943,000 over and beyond the current bogey was "essential to insure the efficient and adequate operation and maintenance of Kadena Air Base for FY-65."

At the same time, the estimated budget for Base Operations and Maintenance (P-458) for the Fiscal Year 1966 was set at \$14,715,000.¹⁰⁰

The 6313th Air Base Wing's Priority Listing of Unfunded Requirements:

The Kadena Base Commander and his Budget Officer presented higher headquarters a list of 26 items that had not been funded for FY-1965 in the order of their priority, together with a brief account of the effect non-fulfillment of each would have on the mission of the 6313th Air Base Wing and the 313th Air Division. These items were as follows:

Priority One - Object Class 2526: Architectural-Engineering

Services - \$26,000. This amount of funds for architectural-engineering services was required to insure that Civil Engineer-type projects were committed and obligated "in a prompt and orderly manner." The bogey had contained no funds for this purpose.

Priority Two - Object Class 2540: Laundry and Dry Cleaning -

\$10,000. Sufficient funds for this purpose had not been provided for the past several years, even though it was one of the most essential requirements of all, in view of the factors of morale and health. The bogey for FY-1965 made \$42,000 available for this purpose, but \$52,000 was deemed necessary. In FY-1963 a total of \$42,736.30 had been spent for laundry and dry cleaning, and as of 1 December 1963, \$18,976 had been spent during FY-1964. By extrapolation, then, it was determined that \$50,260.07 would have been spent for this service by the end of June 1964. The increase was chiefly the result of higher prices for two of the most important items--the laundering of sheets increased from five to six cents each, and that of pillow cases from two to three cents apiece. This increased price would add approximately \$9,000 a year for these two items alone. In addition, there was the responsibility of the 6313th Air Base Wing for the 276-bed transit facility, which would cost \$2,500 a year, it having been transferred from the Airmen's Club to the base in August 1963. There were "approximately 8,000 personnel assigned" who would be using bedding, flying clothing, and other types of organizational property which must be laundered or dry-cleaned. "Approximately 5,300" of the

assigned personnel resided in BOQ and airmen dormitories. (This statement was misleading, inasmuch as all non-transient BOQ occupants hired their own native housemaids, who did all their laundry and were reimbursed out of the individual officer's or civilian's pocket.) Also, Kadena AB was required to provide housing facilities for personnel "on typhoon evacuation recovery, deployment in support of SAC and other missions, and in transit." Kadena Air Base, incidentally, utilized the U.S. Army Quartermaster Laundry because the base did not have facilities for rendering these services. In addition, the services thus provided were "far superior, both in quality and time consumed," to those offered by commercial sources.¹⁰¹

Priority Three - Object Class 2585: Storage of Household Goods - \$4,000. The non-temporary storage of civilian household goods was authorized by AFM 40-10. There were currently only 12 civilian employees of Kadena AB having household goods stored in the United States, but this number was expected to increase considerably as the result of the projected recruitment of additional employees in the near future. At present there were 427 cwt of lots in storage, costing an average of \$6.00 per cwt. With 194 more forecast for FY-1965, the total cost came to \$3,726.00--or \$4,000 in round numbers.¹⁰²

Priority Four - Object Class 2140: Rental of PAX Motor Vehicles - \$37,000. Although \$182,000 had been funded in the FY-1965 bogey, the Budget Officer estimated that an additional sum of \$37,000 would be needed, school bus requirements having increased every year since the establishment of the school system on Okinawa. Under the provisions of Item 2c of Contract DA 92-557-FEC-36714 with the Kokusai Bus Company of Tokyo,

Japan, services were to be provided at the rate of \$2.00 per hour for transportation requirements during non-school hours. The buses used would consist of one or more of the school-contracted buses, and the amount paid would be over and above the amount included in the contract for school buses, express buses, shuttle buses, and inter-base buses. By making this service available for bonafide Special Services activities at this low rate, the Air Force would find it both more convenient and more economical than if Air Force buses were used.¹⁰³

Priority Five - Object Class 2527: Master Planning - \$8,000.

Funds were required to update the master plans for Kadena Air Base and its 15 satellite installations--Awase Communications Annex, Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex, Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield, Irisuna Shima Air Range, Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex, Kadena Family Housing Annex, Kadena Site Number 1, Kadena Site Number 2, Kadena Site Number 3, Kadena Site Number 4, Kadena TACAN Annex, Motobu Auxiliary Airfield, Onna Point Administration Annex, Ryukyua Air Range, and Yontan Auxiliary Airfield. The bogey for FY-1965 contained no funds for this item.¹⁰⁴

Priority Six - Object Class 2680: Supplies Procured from the General Services Agency - \$665,000. The bogey for FY-1965 had contained \$795,000 for this item, but the Kadena Budget Officer estimated that a total of \$1,460,000 would be needed, making the tentative allocation \$665,000 short. The funding for the past several years had not insured adequate bench stocks nor stock levels, resulting in work slow-downs for lack of materials, in spasmodic buying, and in bare shelves--all of which could have an extremely adverse effect under emergency conditions.¹⁰⁵

Priority Seven - Object Class 2630: Supplies Procured from Stock Funds - \$120,000. This requirement consisted of automotive and non-automotive spare parts, chemicals, lumber, and other miscellaneous, unrelated items. The bogey had allocated \$250,000 for this purpose, but it was now estimated that a total of \$370,000 would be needed if the support mission of the 6313th Air Base Wing was not to be deleteriously affected. Consequently, an additional sum of \$120,000 should be made available.

Priority Eight - Object Class 2670: Supplies Procured from the Defense Services Agency - \$64,000. While a tentative budget authorization of \$747,000 had been allocated to Kadena Air Base for FY-1965, the half-year point found this figure inadequate to the needs of the 6313th Air Base Wing by some \$64,000. Specific items included in this object class were bedding, flying clothing, cotton cloth, electronic equipment, construction supplies, and general supplies, with sufficient funding having been provided for the last three of these. Such supplies as bed sheets, feather pillows, wool blankets, mattress covers, and pillow cases were needed for both replacement and initial issue to incoming personnel. In the case of mattress covers, incidentally, a shortage existed as the result of thefts by an organized ring. Although the thieves had been eventually apprehended, the stolen property was never recovered. While 500 new pillows were needed for initial issue, there would be no requirement for replacements, thanks to the existence of a "favorable" commercial rehabilitation operation in the Ryukyuan business community. On the other hand, pillow cases, mattress covers, wool blankets, and other textiles would require replacement, since

they had a shorter life expectancy in Okinawa's "very high year-round humidity rate, which exceeded 75 per cent." Current statistics compiled by the Base Equipment Management Office (BEMO) revealed that 30 per cent of these supplies had to be replaced each year.

Another item needed was Osnaburg cotton cloth, which was used in the manufacture of strafing, harmonization, and skip bomb targets for the Ie Shima bombing and gunnery ranges. A lack of funds to procure this cloth would prevent the training of 18th Tactical Fighter Wing pilots, thus reducing their combat readiness. Ordinary cotton cloth was used in the manufacture and repair of various covers for load trailers, pylons, missiles, test equipment, spare engines, and the like. A fund shortage would inevitably reduce the existing continuous maintenance capability regarded as necessary to prevent the untimely deterioration of equipment requiring protective covers. This would directly affect the tactical mission by allowing foreign and corrosive elements to enter spare engines, which would then have to receive further maintenance before they could be used.

Priority Nine - Object Class 2521: Maintenance Projects - \$621,000. While \$576,000 had been funded for this object class in the FY-1965 bogey, the 6313th Budget Officer calculated the actual requirements for that year at \$1,197,000, leaving the base \$621,000 short of its needs. As justification for having this not inconsiderable sum added to the authorization, he pointed out that deferment of the "highly essential" requirements included in the unfunded items could "only result in increased costs at a later date." Furthermore, the Air Force's investment on Okinawa was "well worth protecting."

Priority Ten - Object Class 2524: Alteration Projects - \$122,000.

Higher headquarters had been somewhat parsimonious when the purse strings were being loosened for this item, the bogey having amounted to only \$23,000, as opposed to the \$145,000 which the 6313th ABW now declared to be "very essential and for the most part ~~to~~ have a direct association with the operational mission.

Priority Eleven - Object Class 2525: Minor Construction Projects - \$201,000. Here Fifth Air Force had made absolutely no provision for funds to meet these requirements, which would, the Kadena Budget Officer believed, alleviate critical deficiencies of the physical plant at Kadena, to some extent at least.

Priority Twelve - Object Class 1290: Personnel Benefits - \$87,000.

At the time the tentative budget authorization for Kadena AB for FY-1965 was being worked out at Fuchu Air Station, Fifth Air Force had allocated what seemed to be a quite reasonable figure of \$245,000. However, subsequent to that time, Washington had approved the provision of severance pay for all Ryukyuan employees of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa, on the basis of the report submitted by the Kaysen (Dr. Carl Kaysen) Committee sent to the Ryukyus by the late President Kennedy in October 1961. No actual cost data were yet available, but a sampling of the termination records of local national employees over the preceding 12 months revealed (1) that an average of 350 terminations eligible for severance pay occurred each year, (2) that the average salary of these employees was \$50 per month, and (3) that the average length of service was five years. To obtain the average cost per employee, the average monthly salary was multiplied by the average number

of years of service. Thus, a rough figure of \$87,000 was arrived at as needed for the second half of the fiscal year--and this was "considered conservative." Given the normal content of greed common to men of all races and countries plus the peculiar sang froid with which a Ryukyuan appeared to face the prospect of unemployment, one could anticipate that many military employees would now quit their jobs, simply to draw the severance pay lying so enticingly to hand.

Priority Thirteen - Object Class 2565: Contract Maintenance of Office Machines - \$31,000. Owing to an excessively low unit manning document (UMD) authorization and an unrealistic skill and grade level structure for the Office Machine Repair Shop's UMD, a high percentage of the necessary annual overhaul of office machines had to be performed by means of contract maintenance. At the beginning of 1964, a total of 887 machines out of the 2,219 machines of all categories assigned to Kadena AB were overdue for the required annual overhaul, from as little as one day to as much as two years. Contributing to the work backlog were the loss of skilled personnel during FY-1964 and their replacement with apprentice or helper level mechanics, a total loss of supply support from December 1962 to September 1963 owing to the non-existence of local purchase funds and to changes in supply procedures, the possession of an excessive proportion of over-age machines with the increased maintenance problems associated with keeping them in operation, and the inability of the contractor responsible for a large percentage of the FY-1964 commitments to deliver the specified number of machines.

Making the picture worse, further losses in skilled enlisted personnel were scheduled to occur during the second half of FY-1964 and the early months of FY-1965, with their replacements again authorized at a lower skill level. Also hurting the work of the Office Machine Repair Shop would be the loss of two "highly skilled" Filipino employees who were being forced to return to the Philippines as the result of command policies regarding the employment of "third country" nationals on Okinawa. Still another injurious factor was the continuing problem of excessive lag time in the delivery of repair parts, because of the low priority that this category of maintenance enjoyed.

Rubber rolls for all the various types of office machines numbered 10,231, and, if purchased new, would cost approximately \$54,428.92. However, if funds were made available for contract maintenance, the rolls on hand could be restored to serviceable condition at a saving of \$43,890.99.

The bogey for Object Class 2565 came to \$30,000, but the sum of \$61,000 was actually needed, if the above objectives were to be attained.

Priority Fourteen - Object Class 2610: Ground POL - \$28,000.

The bogey for base-procured ground POL was \$180,000, but the Kadena Budget Officer estimated the actual requirement for FY-1965 at \$208,000--the additional \$28,000 comprising funds for solvents, hydraulic fluids, motor oils, lubricating oils, mogas, and diesel fuel. (This last item, by the way, was used for two purposes--to run the contract buses and as the base for the numerous types of chemicals employed as insecticides.)

Priority Fifteen - Object Class 2620: Fuels for Utilities,

Heating, and Cooking - \$35,000. There were approximately 392 permanent

type buildings and 553 temporary type buildings in use at Kadena Air Base and its satellite areas, with a total of some 3,539,917 square feet of floor space to be heated. The period in which space heaters could be expected to be used lasted "approximately six months (1 November through 30 April), depending on the severity of the weather." (Actually, most Novembers and Aprils were warm enough to make the services of a space heater necessary for only the most thin-blooded or the invalid.) Because of the nature of the construction of the buildings on Kadena and its satellite areas, which had in mind a tropical climate requiring plenty of ventilation, a large amount of heat was lost. This inefficient retention of the heat meant that a larger amount of fuel was necessary to heat the same number of cubic feet than would have been the case if the designers had been able to disregard the factors of heat and humidity.

In addition, there were seven on-base dining halls and three at outlying sites. Of these, two were already equipped with electric ranges, and it was anticipated that a third would be converted to electric ranges by 1 November 1964, leaving a total of 12 oil-fired ranges to be replaced by electric ranges. Each burner was fired on an average of 10 hours per day, for a total of 120 hours per day for the 10 dining halls. The average consumption was one gallon per hour for each burner. Five burners would operate for 365 days, for a total of 18,250 gallons; four burners would operate 300 days, for a total of 12,000 gallons; and the remaining three burners would operate 150 days, for a total of 4,500 gallons. The total requirement for the burners was 34,750 gallons. Another 162,243 gallons would be consumed for sterilizing, steam cooking, and food warming. The total requirement for mess hall facilities was 196,993 gallons.

Also, there were 75 diesel generators on Kadena AB itself, Ie Shima, the Awase Transmitter Site, the 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron area, Onna Point, Bolo Point, and the four 498th Tactical Missile Group launch sites, which supplied electricity in lieu of the island-wide power system. Of this total, four 350-KW and four 200-KW generators were at the 498th TMG sites and were operated 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. The other 67 generators were operated approximately 16 hours per month the year round.

The tentative budget authorization for Object Class 2620 was \$251,000, but the requirement for the whole fiscal year was placed at \$286,000, leaving a deficit estimated at \$35,000, which should be funded by higher headquarters.

Priority Sixteen - Object Class 2110: Transportation Via Airlift Services Industrial Fund (ASIF) - \$89,000. The temporary duty travel area was one of the most "fluid" at Kadena, as program changes occurring throughout the year made an accurate forecast of requirements impossible. Of the additional requirement of \$89,000, the sum of \$40,000 was for emergency leaves certified by the Red Cross, the number of which was increasing every year. The bogey had been \$233,000, but it was now believed that \$322,000 would come closer to actual needs.

Priority Seventeen - Object Class 2120: Per Diem and Incidental Expenses - \$92,000. While a tentative budget authorization of \$209,000 had been provided by higher headquarters, it was determined at the half way point in FY-1965 that \$301,000 would more nearly satisfy the requirements of the 6313th Air Base Wing for this item. The large majority of the costs under this object class were caused by operations plans, directives, and the

like, over which the 6313th Air Base Wing had no direct control. As it was, the additional requirement of \$92,000 which was requested was deemed "conservative."

Priority Eighteen - Object Class 2130: Transportation Other than ASIF - \$13,000. This item covered additional requirements for commercial travel for training and permanent changes of station, or re-employment leaves for civilian employees--which could not be denied under existing regulations. The bogey allocated was for \$36,000, but a total of \$49,000 was considered necessary.

Priority Nineteen - Object Class 2330: Communications - \$46,000. The tentative budget authorization had been \$106,000, but this was now found to be \$46,000 short of the \$152,000 figure which appeared to be the very minimum with which the mission could be accomplished. If the additional funds were not supplied, various vehicular radio systems vital to the support of the base mission (some of which had in fact been approved by Fifth Air Force, but not funded) could not be installed.

Priority Twenty - Object Class 2290: Transportation Other than by ASIF - \$247,000. The huge sum of \$1,043,000 had been tentatively funded for this purpose in the bogey for FY-1965, but when the 6313th ABW drew up the FY-1965 Annual Financial Plan, it found that \$247,000 was still needed--or a total of \$1,290,000. The Army accessorial charges used in arriving at these figures were based upon Army billings as of the date of the financial plan's preparation and the tonnage records of items received. Increased housing facilities would increase commissary procurement and sales,

thereby increasing accessorial costs. In addition, miscellaneous contract hauling rates were continually rising.

Priority Twenty-One - Object Class 2550: Education Services - \$6,000. Expanded facilities to house off-duty group study classes as a corollary to the University of Maryland program, which already required more space, were expected in FY-1965 and FY-1966, with greater emphasis being placed on the vocational or career-related course and the foreign language instruction. It was thought that the latter year would see, in coordination with the Defense Language Institute, the installation of standardized language laboratory facilities and "a tremendous upsurge" in this type of classroom program. The consolidation of education and training functions into one staff section subordinate directly to Personnel was expected to broaden the scope of the classroom program in conjunction with needs developed by the training section--in courses as different as mathematics, English fundamentals, speech, typing, military correspondence, electronics and radio theory, use of the slide rule, language classes in Japanese, and so on, which might be work-related.

In FY-1964 the classes had run at approximately 120 per year, with emphasis placed on the same priorities established by Headquarters, USAF. Approximately 36 per cent of the instructors were military; so could not be paid from appropriated funds, under the restrictions of AFR 34-8. The computations worked out showed the total class loads and costs, less the instructional costs of those teachers ineligible for payment from appropriated funds.

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The Fiscal Year-1966 could be expected to witness a tremendous rise in the higher priority type classes as facilities were added, more needs recognized through coordination with training, and language laboratories became available.

Another factor which it was anticipated would help produce the increase over FY-1964 in both FY-1965 and FY-1966 was the greater demand for college classes, particularly in the area of mathematics, with the narrowing availability of tuition assistance to USAF personnel having less than 26 months' service remaining before separation. Military teachers continued to provide the nucleus of the career-related courses and most of the mathematics courses. Faculty salary scales were ascending under 5AFR 34-4, which rewarded tenure, in addition to qualifications and previous experience.

The Kadena Education Center would, in Fiscal Year-1965, be operating as satellite activities another center at Onna Point, some 20 miles distant, for the 6927th Security Squadron, with testing, registration, and advisement services being furnished, and, on approximately 25 days a year, at Ie Shima, where the local detachment of the 1962d Communications Group would receive itinerant testing and advisement services.

Priority Twenty-Two - Object Class 2220: Transportation via Airlift Services Industrial Fund (ASIF) - \$4,000. A bogey of \$4,000 had been allocated for this purpose, but when the financial plan for FY-1965 was drawn up, the Budget Officer realized that this was only half the amount actually needed. Consequently, he asked that an additional \$4,000 be provided by higher headquarters. This increase in requested funding was based upon an anticipated increase in the number of people going on TDY for schools,

conferences, inspections, demonstrations, and administrative temporary duty.

The total figure of 3,624 personnel programmed to go on TDY during FY-1965 was based upon the requirements submitted to the USAF ATCO by the administrative services of all the organizations on Kadena AB and a compilation of these estimates on the basis of past J-1 reports prepared monthly by the ATCO.

Priority Twenty-Three - Object Class 2690: Supplies Procured from Commercial Sources - \$15,000. The bogey for this object class was \$86,000, but by mid-FY-1965 officials had come to the realization that a more realistic figure would be \$101,000. One of the major items comprised within this was the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) Okinawa. Major items included (1) Support items for a replacement television transmitting antenna, such as transmission line fittings, adapters, reducers, insulators, and antenna elements, worth \$2,750; (2) Support items such as custom guy lines and hardware for both the AM and television antenna towers worth \$2,200; (3) Support items for video equipment including vidi-cons, image orthicons, resistors, and capacitors worth \$8,800; (4) Support components for replacement radio studio and transmission equipment, including special tubes, resistors, capacitors, semi-conductors, connectors, cables, transformers, reactors, attenuators, and switches, worth \$7,150; (5) Support components for test and measuring equipment worth \$550; (6) Installations materials worth \$1,100; (7) Test slides, charts, transparencies, film in support of newly acquired rear screen projectors, and a cellomatic projector, used in video operations for both alignment and calibration, as well as for production use, worth \$2,750; (8) Support items

for disc and tape recorders, including discs, tapes, styli, and record playback heads, worth \$3,300; (9) Support items for a replacement television transmitter, such as tubes, contactors, transformers, reactors, relays, resistors, capacitors, and motors, worth \$12,000. The FY-1965 and 1966 budgets for this sub-object class indicated a 10 per cent increase over the FY-1964 budget because of a trend toward an increase of about that amount in the prices of equipment and supplies.

Besides these items for AFRTS support, other funds falling under this object class were needed for projects of a vastly different nature. \$7,200 would go for 6,000 cubic yards of cement sand to be used in the mixing of concrete products, sand sealing asphalt pavements, as filling for various construction projects, and as filler for sand bags used during typhoons to reinforce doors and roofs. Another \$3,400 was required for 2,000 cubic yards of 3/8" gravel aggregate to be used for bituminous seal coating and the manufacture of cold plant asphalt mix. Still another \$6,600 was required for 3,000 cubic yards of 1/2" gravel aggregate to be used in the mixing of concrete, asphalt cold plant mix, and in the application of graded aggregates in airfield and road repairs. Yet another \$21,000 was needed for 3,000 tons of hot mix asphalt, which would be used in asphalt paving maintenance and the repair of roads, runways, taxiways, etc., in support of the tactical mission. Should all of these funds not be made available, it would prevent repairs to the airfield and automatically create safety hazards to inbound and outbound aircraft.

Priority Twenty-Four - Object Class 3170: Equipment Procured from the Defense Services Agency - \$45,000. Although the sizeable sum of \$89,000

had been funded in the bogey for this purpose, an additional \$45,000 for fire extinguishers, flying clothing, and firefighters' clothing was now sought to meet the total of \$134,000 deemed indispensable.

Priority Twenty-Five - Object Class 3180: Equipment Procured from the General Services Agency - \$12,000. All items in this category were for the support of tenant organizations other than PACAF units. The bogey limitations did not permit their inclusion within the existing requirements.

Priority Twenty-Six - Object Class 3190: Equipment Procured from Commercial Sources - \$315,000. This item presented the strange picture of a bogey of only \$15,000 as against a total figure of \$330,000 felt to be necessary. Of this huge figure, \$15,000 would go for FM broadcasting equipment, including a transmitter. Although the enjoyment of static-free classical music by the inhabitants of Okinawa having FM receivers was merely a by-product of any FM station established on the island by AFRTS, it would probably outweigh in importance the primary purpose in such a station's being set up, as presented by wing budget officials. This raison d'etre was that it would enable military organizations to establish immediate contact with off-base personnel on a 24-hour basis during periods of recall or for emergency notifications. Housing shortages forced many key personnel of all the services to live off base; yet, in most cases, these people could not acquire a telephone. An FM transmitter would provide instant contact, in addition to furthering fulfillment of AFRTS's basic mission of dispensing information and education.

More important than an FM station was the need for a new transmitter to replace the existing television transmitter, which was built by RCA in 1945 and had become a fourth-hand piece of equipment by the time it arrived on Okinawa in 1955. Compounding its debility, the ancient transmitter had not been waterproof-packaged when shipped from the U.S., and, as a result, had suffered considerable deterioration during both shipment and storage. The wiring was rotten, metal parts in the circuits were badly worn, and important electronic components failed regularly, making the transmitter unsuitable for dependable station operation. Owing to the vintage of the equipment, replacement parts were often impossible to obtain. Finally, the tubes were short-lived and, being practically custom-built, cost nearly \$4,400 per set. In recent years the annual cost of such tubes had exceeded \$16,500. By contrast, the estimated annual cost of tubes with the proposed transmitter would not exceed \$2,200. The television transmitter and accessories, if purchased during FY-1965, would cost \$88,000.

The existing antenna and tower also needed replacing badly. Even when originally received, the antenna in place had not performed to accepted engineering standards because of its high voltage standing wave ratio--a deficiency inherent in the antenna design--and the ravages of slat-laden wind and typhoons during the five years it was in use had aggravated its condition to the point that it was now "borderline" in operations and performance. During the calendar year 1963 this situation had produced more than 60 hours of time off the air and had created a "fuzzy" picture when the station was on the air.

As for the tower supporting the antenna, it was too short to provide the line-of-sight coverage required to reach certain areas on Okinawa. Anyway, by reason of its deterioration from weathering, the tower would be "a risky support at best" for a new antenna. The high cost of \$88,000 for the antenna and its accessories and of \$55,000 for the tower and its accessories stemmed from the necessity for making them resistant to extremely strong typhoon winds.

Another expensive item included in the television station improvement program was a video-tape recorder, to cost \$50,000. Video-tape was regarded as "essential to any television originating system," and was particularly needed for AFRTS Okinawa to permit the assembling of complete mission programs, scene by scene, using personnel at the time they were available. Its employment would also provide a "security safe program vehicle" for sensitive subjects, since a program, once completed, could be submitted for approval to local security personnel with an absolute assurance that there would be no deviation during later airings. The use of video tape would further permit repeating important live material and programs without the cost of re-doing the programs. Another use would be for the internal training of AFRTS personnel to permit them to see the results of their production efforts--an after-the-fact critique being "by far the most effective procedure for personnel improvement in the telecasting field." Finally, video-tape would provide "a relatively economical medium for official use in preparing programs to tell the mission stories of the United States military and civil administrations

on Okinawa" in an area unique for the United States military's being "in control, rather than a guest of a foreign government."

Status of Funding for Kadena Air Base as of 30 June 1964:¹⁰⁶

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>Annual Budget Authorization</u>	<u>Reported Obligations</u>	<u>Balance</u>
458	\$12,880,834.00	\$12,880,834.00	\$-0-
472	33,044.52	33,043.91	.61
478	272,913.77	272,913.77	-0-
721	406,506.33	406,506.33	-0-
722	404,353.67	404,353.67	-0-
562	1,215,409.11	1,215,409.11	-0-

On 31 December 1963, the 6313th ABW Budget Office had stated that the base's P458 ABA was \$12,258,000. Between 1 January and 31 March 1964 Fifth Air Force/PACAF/USAF action on the first revision to the FY-1964 Financial Plan resulted in reductions amounting to \$571,900. This increased requirements from \$2,473,000 to \$3,044,900, and thereby resulted in the following actions:

1. Reducing the Ryukyuan employees' standard work week, wherever possible, from 48 to 44 hours.
2. Awarding no new contracts for the maintenance of equipment for the balance of the fiscal year.
3. Procuring no more equipment except those items of a reimburseable nature for the balance of the fiscal year.
4. Limiting supply procurement to those items directly associated with the combat capabilities of all organizations assigned to Kadena Air Base.

5. Deferring numerous facility projects scheduled to be built by contract until funding became available.

6. Observing strict conservation measures on the consumption of electricity, water, and fuels for heating.

Eighty-five per cent of the P458 annual budget authorization had been committed through 31 March 1964, and an all out effort was made to remain within the current funding. Although numerous inconveniences were encountered in almost every aspect of base activity in consequence of the critical fund shortage, the most detrimental effects were expected to be felt during the first months of FY-1965 as the supply pipeline for all types of essential items gradually dired up.¹⁰⁷

The Fiscal Year-1965/1966 Financial Plan/Budget Estimate:

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>FY-65 Requirements</u>	<u>Fifth AF Rec. Requirements</u>	<u>Tentative ABA</u>
P458	\$15,159,000	\$14,918,000	\$12,149,000
472	29,200	29,200	-0-
478	307,200	307,200	241,000
721	465,000	488,000	488,000
722	429,000	627,000	179,000

Although economy was practiced in many facets of Kadena operations and daily living, it became evident that more than a few critical requirements would have to slip from the current fiscal year until the next, and all indications were that the FY-1965 funding would be "very austere."

Between the dates of 22 April and 30 June 1964 the P-458 annual budget authorization (ABA) was increased by \$1,194,734. This increase

came as a result of action by Fifth Air Force, PACAF, and USAF on the second revision to the FY-1964 Financial Plan in conjunction with "fall-out" from other Fifth Air Force bases. These increases enabled Kadena to:

1. Resume the Ryukyuan employees' standard work week of 48 hours.
(This action was practically forced on the Air Force by threats of strikes, pressure from the Ryukyuan Legislature, newspaper editorials and articles in the local Japanese-language press, and the obvious political "hay" which Left-wing organizations were making through the discontent of Air Force employees whose pay checks had been made smaller by the economy measure.)
2. Resume obligations for the contract maintenance of equipment.
3. Fund all facilities maintenance by contract on which the contract action could be completed.
4. Procure "high priority" equipment, the most significant items being a television transmitter and an antenna for AFRTS Okinawa, at a cost of \$183,000. (Just why the Kadena Budget Office described these items as "high priority" equipment after assigning them the twenty-sixth and last position in its 17 January 1964 listing of unfunded priority projects is uncertain.)
5. Resume procurement of essential supplies in the areas of back orders and bench stocks.

The Annual Budget Authorizations for FY-1965; The annual budget authorizations for Fiscal Year-1965 were received on 29 June 1964. The tentative annual budget authorization (bogey) included in the FY-1965/

1966 Financial Plan/Budget Estimate which had been submitted to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force on 17 January 1964 compared with that approved as follows:

<u>Budget Project</u>	<u>Tentative ABA</u>	<u>Approved ABA</u>	<u>Increase (Decrease)</u>
P458	\$12,149,000	\$13,428,000	\$1,279,000
472	-0-	-0-	-0-
478	241,000	251,100	10,100
562	1,257,000	1,257,000	-0-
721	488,000	420,000	(68,000)
722	179,000	177,000	(2,000)

The approved annual budget authorization for P-458 funds for FY-1965 was the highest in the history of Kadena Air Base. Compared with the initial FY-1964 ABA of \$11,746,000, it was \$1,682,000 higher. With the exception of supplies and equipment, most requirements appeared to have been covered. The shortages remaining in the realms of supply and equipment were estimated at approximately \$1,000,000. If the current annual budget authorization could be retained or, better yet, increased during FY-1965, the base's funding problems would diminish considerably.¹⁰⁹

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	1	Fifth Air Force Regulation (5AFR) No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961.
2	2	5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations - Division/Wing Areas of Responsibility, dtd. 11 Sept. 1962.
3	3	5AFR No. 55-18, sub.: Operations - Division Areas of Responsibilities, dtd. 30 June 1964.
4	1	5AFR No. 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 313th Air Division, dtd. 24 Nov. 1961.
5	4	Ltr., Hq., 5AF to 313th AD, sub.: Hq. 5th Air Force Direct Control of Tactical Striking Forces, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960.
6	--	Fifth Air Force Continuity of Operations Plan (COP) 17-63, dtd. 10 Jan. 1963; 313th Air Division (313AD) COP 17-63, dtd. 20 May 1963.
7	5	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC-P) to 313MC, 313PC, 313TC, 313CE, <u>et al.</u> , sub.: Special File, 29 Oct. 1963.
8	--	313AD COP 17-63, dtd. 20 May 1963.
9	6	313ADR No. 23-6, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field - 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, 27 Jan. 1964.
10	--	History, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), 1 Jan. - 30 June 1964, p. 7.
11	7	313ADR No. 23-13, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 27 Jan. 1964.
12	--	Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) Operations Plan (OPLAN) 112-62, dtd. 19 Feb. 1962, par. 2.
13	8	313ADR 23-4, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 498th Tactical Missile Group, 27 Jan. 1964.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
14	9	Ltr., Hq., PACAF to 5AF, 315AD, <u>et al.</u> , sub.: Organization Structure for PACAF, 1 Nov. 1963, with charts.
15	10	Ltr., Hq., Fifth Air Force (5FOMO) to 313th Air Div. (CR), sub.: Organization Structure for PACAF, 15 Nov. 1963.
16	11	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to Hq., Fifth Air Force (5FCCR), sub.: Organization Structure and Mission for the 313th Air Division, 27 Nov. 1963.
17	12	Ltr., PACAF (PFLMO) to 5AF and 313th Air Div., sub.: Organization Structure for PACAF, 3 Jan. 1964.
18	13	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to 313MC, 51FIW (CR), 6313ABW (CR), 498TMG (CR), and 18TFW (CR), sub.: Organization Structure for the 313th Air Division, 9 Jan. 1964.
19	14	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to Hq., 6313th ABW, sub.: Organization Structure for the 313th Air Div., 9 Jan. 1964), Hq., 6313th ABW to 313OC, 16 Jan. 1964.
20	15	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to 498th TMG (498CR), sub.: Organization Structure for the 313th Air Division, 9 Jan. 1964), 498th TMG to 313th Air Div. (313OC), 14 Jan. 1964.
21	16	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to 313th Air Div. (313MC), sub.: Organization Structure for the 313th Air Division, 9 Jan. 1964), 313MC to 313OC, 14 Jan. 1964.
22	17	Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18CR) to 313th Air Div. (313OC), sub.: Organization Structure for the 313th Air Division, 13 Jan. 1964.
23	18	Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18CR) to 313th Air Div. (313CR), sub.: Organization, 13 Jan. 1964.
24	19	Ltr., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to PACAF and 5AF, sub.: Organization Structure for 313th Air Division, 17 Jan. 1964.
25	20	Ltr., Hq., 18th TFW (18CR) to 313th Air Div. (313CR), sub.: Organization, 16 March 1964.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
26	21	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC) to 5AF (5FCCR) and PACAF (PFCNC), sub.: Organization Structure for 313th Air Division, 18 May 1964.
27	22	PFLMO-O 6723-64, CINCPACAF to 313ADIV, Aug. 1964.
28	--	Ltr., Hq., USAF (AFOMOB) to PACAF (PFLMO), sub.: Air Base Wings and Combat Support Wings, 7 Jan. 1964;
	--	RCS AF-04, Hq., PACAF, July 1964 Report.
29	23	Ltr., Hq., PACAF (PFLMO) to Hq., USAF (AFOMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization, Kadena Air Base, 24 Sept. 1964.
30	--	Attachments to Ltr., Hq., PACAF (PFLMO), to Hq., USAF (AFOMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization, Kadena Air Base, 24 Sept. 1964.
31	24	Ltr., Hq., USAF (AFOMOB) to PACAF (PFLMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization, Kadena Air Base, 16 Oct. 1964.
32	24	1st ind., (Ltr., Hq., USAF (AFOMOB) to PACAF (PFLMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization, Kadena Air Base, 16 Oct. 1964), Hq., PACAF (PFLMO) to 313th Air Div., 28 Oct. 1964.
33	25	PFLMO-G 48231, CINCPACAF to 313AD, 20/2120Z Nov. 1964.
--	26	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313OC-M) to CINCPACAF (PFLMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization Changes - Kadena Air Base, 1 Dec. 1964.
--	27	Ltr., Hq., PACAF (PFLMO) to Hq., USAF (AFOMO), sub.: Combat Support Group Organization, Kadena Air Base, Aug. 1964.
--	28	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313JA) to 313OC-M, sub.: Organization, Hq., 313th Air Div. 29 Nov. 1961.
--	29	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313PC) to 313OC-M, sub.: Organization Headquarters 313th Air Division - Director of Personnel, 4 Dec. 1961.
--	30	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313PC) to 313CR, sub.: Organization 313th Air Division, Director of Personnel, 18 Dec. 1961.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
---	31	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313PC) to Chief of Manpower, 313th Air Div., sub.: Reorganization Directorate of Personnel 313th Air Division, 29 Dec. 1961.
---	32	Ltr., Maj. Gen. Charles M. McCorkle, Vice Comdr, 5th AF, to Maj. Gen. Robert M. Stillman, Comdr., 313th Air Div., sub.: Organization of Air Force Units on Okinawa, 14 Dec. 1962.
---	33	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (313AS) to Director of Administrative Services, 313th AD, sub.: Proposed Reduction of 313 Air Div. Administrative Services Personnel and Functions, n.d.
---	34	Unsigned Memo. within 313th AD Hq., sub.: Re-organization of 313AD, n.d.
---	35	Ltr., Hq., 313th Air Div. (CR) to 5AF (5FCCR), sub.: Organization Structure and Mission for the 313th Air Division, n.d.
34	36	PACAF Special Order (SO) G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
35	---	PACAF General Order (GO) 95, dtd. 7 Dec. 1960.
36	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
37	---	PACAF GO 95, dtd. 7 Dec. 1960.
38	---	<u>Ibid.</u>
39	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
40	36	<u>Ibid.</u>
41	---	Ltr., USAF Historical Div., Aerospace Studies Institute (ASI-HS) to PACAF (PFCOI-H), sub.: 18th Supply Squadron, 12 March 1964; personal knowledge of 313th Command Historian.
42	---	PACAF GO 10, dtd. 13 Feb. 1959; PACAF GO 18, dtd. 19 March 1959.
43	---	PACAF SO G-7, dtd. 9 Jan. 1964; 6313th AEW SO A-1416, dtd. 4 May 1964.
44	37	PACAF SO G-63, dtd. 5 May 1964.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
45	38	PACAFR No. 23-12, sub.: Organization and Mission - Field: 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), dtd. 18 June 1964.
46	--	History, 400th MMS (T), 1 Jan. - 30 June 1964, Appendix 2; 5FMAS 5FOMO 1927, 5AF to 313ADIV, 14/0755Z May 1964.
47	39	
47	40	5FOMO 5FMAS 64-0204E, Hq., 5AF to PACAF, 19/0530Z May 1964.
48	41	PFLMC-R 6461-64, PACAF to 5AF, 26/2328Z May 1964.
49	42	400AO-S-64-0470F, 400MMS(T) to 5AF, 18/1535Z June 1964.
50	43	5FMAS 0957, 5AF to 400MMS(T), 19/0630Z June 1964.
51	--	History, 400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), 1 Jan. - 30 June 1964, pp. 10, 11, 18.
52	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Appendix 3.
53	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , Appendix 4C.
54	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 10-12, 21.
55	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 19-20.
56	44	Military Air Transport Service (MATS) SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964.
57	44	<u>Ibid.</u>
58	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
59	--	Department of Air Force (DAF) Ltr. 322 (AFCOR 800e), 10 Aug. 1948.
60	--	1st Air Div. GO 39, dtd. 17 Aug. 1948, pursuant to the above cited DAF Ltr. of 10 Aug. 1948.
61	--	20th AF GO 40, dtd. 15 May 1952, pursuant to DAF Ltr. 322 (AFOMO 755g), 9 Apr. 1952, as amended by DAF Ltr. 322 (AFOMO 816g), 27 May 1952.
62	--	5AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957; PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957; PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
63	--	PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960, per DAF Ltr. AFOMO 442m, 30 June 1960.
64	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
65	--	PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.
66	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
67	--	5AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.
68	--	PACAF GO 22, dtd. 18 Sept. 1957; PACAF GO 34, dtd. 6 Nov. 1957; 5AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.
69	--	PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.
70	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
71	36	<u>Ibid.</u>
72	--	War Department (WD) Ltr. AG 320.2 (8-9-40) M (Ret) M-C, dtd. 20 Aug. 1940.
73	--	Hq., GHQ AF GO 20, dtd. 23 Aug. 1940.
74	--	WD Ltr. AG 320.2 A.C. (12-16-40) M (Ret) M-C, dtd. 17 Jan. 1941.
75	--	WD Ltr. AG 320.2 (7-10-42) MR-M-AF, dtd. 14 July 1942.
76	--	12th AF GO 142, dtd. 26 Aug. 1944.
77	--	WD Ltr. AG 322 (30 Apr. 1945) OB-I-AFRPC-M, dtd. 8 May 1945.
78	--	DAF Ltr. AFOMO 442m, 30 June 1960; PACAF GO 54, dtd. 12 July 1960.
79	-- 36	DAF AFOMO Ltr. 116n, 4 Dec. 1963; PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
80	--	Far East Air Forces (FEAF) GO 82, dtd. 12 Sept. 1956.
81	--	5AF GO 57, dtd. 6 Aug. 1957.
82	--	5AF GO 84, dtd. 22 Oct. 1957.
83	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
84	36	<u>Ibid.</u>

Footnote No.	Document No.	
85	--	DAF AFOMO Ltr. 116n, 4 Dec. 1963.
86	36	PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
87	--	20th AF GO 30, dtd. 26 July 1954.
88	--	20th AF GO 56, dtd. 18 Nov. 1954.
89	--	51st Fighter Interceptor Wing (FIW) GO 16, dtd. 26 Aug. 1955.
90	--	PACAF GO 10, dtd. 13 Feb. 1959; PACAF GO 18, dtd. 19 March 1959.
91	-- 36	DAF AFOMO Ltr. 116n, 4 Dec. 1963; PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
92	44	MATS SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964.
93	44	<u>Ibid.</u>
94	--	PACAF/Fifth Air Force FY-1965 Annual Financial Plan/FY-1966 Budget Estimate: Operation and Main- tenance (P-458): Naha Air Base, dtd. 17 Jan. 1964.
95	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
96	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
97	--	History, 51st FIW, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1964, pp. 106- 107.
98	--	PACAF/Fifth Air Force FY 65/66 Financial Plan/Budget Estimate for Operation and Maintenance: Kadena Air Base, dtd. 17 Jan. 1964.
99	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
100	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
101	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
102	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
103	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
104	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
105	--	<u>Ibid.</u>

Footnote No.	Document No.	
106	--	History, 6313th Air Base Wing, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1964, p. 67.
107	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 67-68.
108	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 68-69.
109	--	<u>Ibid.</u> , pp. 69-70.

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CHAPTER II

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

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OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

OPERATIONS OF DETACHMENT 3, 313TH AIR DIVISION

The mission of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, at Naha Air Base, Okinawa, as provided by Fifth Air Force Regulation No. 23-7 of 11 July 1960, was to perform radar evaluation services throughout the PACAF area of responsibility, conduct analyses of the Radar Quality Control Program, and act as an advisory agency on matters pertaining to electronic radiation characteristics. Detachment 3 was also expected to analyze such matters as the effects of refractive layers and solar disturbance on radar performance, the relationship of target aspect ratio to probability of detection, and validation of decibel ratings for different types of aircraft.

Detachment 3 was also responsible for providing special advisory service on specific electronic problems related to the operating efficiency of the aircraft control and warning (AC&W) system, as well as training for field personnel at new radar installations and electronic warfare training in support of ground radar sets. Finally, it was to support such other activities as might be directed by the Commander, Fifth Air Force.¹

Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, came under the direct operational control of Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, whose Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations exercised supervisory surveillance. The detachment was

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attached to the 51st Support Squadron at Naha AB for logistic support (excepting field maintenance) and administrative support (less the assignment and promotion of personnel) until 8 January 1964, when the support organization was redesignated the 51st Services Squadron, and after that date the detachment was attached to this new organization for the same purposes. Throughout the period 1 January-30 June 1964, field maintenance was provided by the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing. Inasmuch as the personnel of Detachment 3 were assigned to Headquarters, 313th Air Division, rather than to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, their records were maintained by the 6313th Air Base Wing at Kadena Air Base.²

On 5 January 1964, Captain Donald L. McGinnis and Mr. Robert R. McCarty, the Philco Contract Technical Services Representative, departed for Thailand to perform a classified special evaluation at Phitsanulok Air Station and a station evaluation at Korat Air Station. Four days later, a six-man team headed by Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) John G. Varner left to join the other pair in Thailand. All eight men returned to Naha on 26 January, and the reports on the two evaluations were published on 20 and 25 February respectively.

Mr. Ernest A. Ward, the RCA contract technical services representative, First Lieutenant James E. Wickell, and Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Dennis J. Hailstone flew up to Japan on 17 January to instruct the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) radar evaluation team in radar evaluation procedures and evaluation report formats. Their stay was a long one, lasting until 20 February.

On 20 January, Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa, the Detachment Commander,

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accompanied by Technical Sergeants Harry E. Anderson and Walter C. Armstrong, went to the Philippine Islands on a Quality Control investigation and training trip.

From 23 January through 3 February, a three-man team headed by SSgt Thad V. Smith worked at Yoza Dake Air Station (Site P-56) in southern Okinawa, repainting the plotting board.

February 3d was a busy day for SSgt James E. White and Airman Second Class (A2C) Charles L. Pahl, as they first drove up to Kadena Air Base to shoot a horizon profile on the Kadena TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) facility, then, with a third airman in company, departed for the Philippines to perform surveying and photography work on a proposed site to be constructed there. They finally returned on 18 February. Then, just six days later, two other airmen went to the Philippines to repaint the plotting board and wing boards at the 5th Tactical Control Group. The latter pair flew back to Naha on 4 March.

On 23 February, First Lieutenant Wickell, Mr. Ward, and a team of six departed for Tan Son Nhut Air Station (AS), just outside Saigon, Republic of Viet Nam, where they were to perform a station evaluation. One of the airmen returned to the home station on 6 March, but the balance of the team remained at Tan Son Nhut until the 21st of the month. The report on this evaluation was published on 8 April.

From 2 through 12 March, Captain McGinnis and four other personnel were at Don Muang AS, Thailand, performing a classified special evaluation, which was published on the last day of the month.

On 9 March, A1C William D. Cook and A1C Richard M. Massey went down to Danang AS, Republic of Viet Nam, to re-do the plotting board; then,

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this task completed, proceeded to Tan Son Nhut to modify the plotting board at that station as well. The duo returned to Okinawa on 21 March.

On 17 March, Captain Lee M. Brown and SSgt Hailstone departed for Fuchu AS, Japan, to attend the Fifth Air Force conference on unidentified flying objects (UFO) and to administer training to JASDF personnel on electronic warfare. Mr. McCarty, the Philco contract technician, joined them on the 19th. The members of the party returned to Naha on 26 and 28 March.

Captain Brown boarded a plane for Hickam AFB, Hawaii, on 2 April to coordinate matters for the classified special evaluation scheduled for the 150th AC&W Squadron, Hawaiian Air National Guard (HANG), being joined two days later by Mr. McCarty, CMSgt Varner, and three other men for the actual evaluation. On 20 April they were back on Okinawa. The team's report on this special evaluation was published on 11 May. Meantime, on 25 April, Captain Brown had succeeded Captain Mendonsa as the Commander of Detachment 3, 313th Air Division, the latter rotating to the United States on that date.

Technical Sergeants Harry E. Anderson and Walter C. Armstrong went to Japan on 10 April to provide technical assistance to Fifth Air Force on electronic warfare techniques, returning 10 days later.

On 29 April, A1C Harvey J. Shaler and Richard M. Massey flew south to Miyako Jima Air Station, Ryukyu Islands, on a plotting board repainting mission. By 3 May their work was finished, and they rejoined the detachment.

On 13 May, TSgt Anderson and SSgt Charles T. Bugg went to the Philippines to give electronic counter-measures (ECM)/electronic

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counter-counter-measures (ECCM) training to personnel at Paredes and Gozar Air Station, remaining there until Memorial Day.

On 17 May, SSgt Hailstone and SSgt Robert E. Culley departed for Taipei, Taiwan, to explain the new quality control (QC) procedures to personnel of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the Chinese Air Force (CAF). Three days later they were back on Okinawa.

Lieutenant Wickell, Mr. Ward, and five other team members left Naha for Can Tho, Republic of Viet Nam, on 31 May, for the purpose of performing a classified special evaluation. Three of the enlisted men returned on June 4th and the balance of the team on the 9th. The report on this evaluation was published on 24 June.

On the latter date, ALC William D. Cook and A2C David Ehrhart took off for Wallace AS, Philippine Islands, to paint the plotting board and wing boards, returning home on 17 June. Meantime, they had been joined at Wallace AS on 11 June by Captain Brown, Mr. McCarty, and four airmen, whose purpose was to conduct a classified special evaluation. The latter sextet were still in the Philippines at the close of the historical period on 30 June.

Airmen Cook and Ehrhart had been back on Okinawa only two days when they drove down to Yoza Dake AS on the 19th to repaint the plotting board. They returned the same day, but did not again visit Yoza Dake to complete their work until the 25th.³

OPERATIONAL READINESS

Exercise Quick Release.

Around mid-January 1964, Headquarters, United States Army Pacific

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(USARPAC), at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, announced plans for a month-long exercise, to be known as "Quick Release," beginning on 25 January, which would employ new concepts in the rapid deployment of combat forces and their equipment. In actuality, though, the fundamental concept for such an exercise had been conceived as far back as June 1963, when the principal staff officers of the U.S. Army IX Corps, whose headquarters was at Fort Buckner, Okinawa, had begun laying the ground work for an operation which would utilize the "forward floating depot" concept of supply for an air-lifted combat task force for the first time.

By late 1963, Exercise "Quick Release" had assumed much of its ultimate shape, and by the turn of the year it had taken its final form. All that was now needed was the approval of the Department of the Army--- and this was forthcoming early in January 1964.⁴

Involved in Exercise Quick Release were to be the coordinated movement of a 4,000-man Army brigade task force from Hawaii by air and the movement by sea of heavy equipment and supplies previously stored aboard converted victory ships moored in Subic Bay, Philippine Islands. These vessels, collectively designate "the forward floating depot," which were to be manned and maintained by the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service, would sail to the Ryukyu Islands in time to meet the troops arriving from Hawaii and furnish them the logistic support they would need during Quick Release.

The Army troops coming from Hawaii would be the 25th Infantry Division Brigade Task Force, with each soldier carrying with him only the minimum of essential personal and light combat equipment. All heavy equipment, including field artillery, tanks, motor vehicles, and other

essential hardware, would be issued from the forward floating depot upon the arrival of the troops.

This new approach to an old problem, now being tried for the first time in the Pacific Command, was expected to speed up the delivery of troops to trouble spots and reduce the requirements for airlift during the initial stages of an operation. For this reason it was vitally important that the equipment stored aboard the converted victory ships be in good condition, ready for use immediately upon being unloaded, and requiring no preliminary reconditioning or rejuvenation. To make this unlikely condition possible, a small detachment of U.S. Army technicians had been assigned to each of the forward floating depots--the Cheyenne, the Phoenix, and the Provo--to maintain the materiel on board in tip-top shape from the time it was loaded aboard at a port on the U.S. East Coast nearly a year before. The equipment was stored in sealed holds with the normally destructive humidity controlled, and, since being put aboard, had been inspected by the technicians every day.

If the results of Quick Release should prove to be all that the planners hoped for, it would be possible for Army task forces hastening to stamp out, or at least repel, future actual aggressions to fly into the trouble spot with only the minimum of essential personal and light combat equipment. During the two months following the close of the exercise, maintenance experts would appraise the effectiveness of the equipment and supervise the reloading of the ships.

Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway, USA, Commanding General, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands (USARYIS) and IX Corps, was named Exercise Director of "Quick Release."⁵

A total of 102 missions would be flown either into or out of Kadena Air Base in connection with Quick Release. Consequently, various organizations on that base were to be directly responsible for billeting 66 personnel for a 30-day period, furnishing 24-hour-a-day dining service for aircrews and support personnel, as well as inflight lunches for outgoing crews, providing transportation on a 24-hour-a-day basis, supplying a small dispensary with medical personnel and an ambulance on a 24-hour-a-day basis, assigning parking areas and actually parking more than 30 aircraft--most of them C-135's and C-124's, providing more than 1,000,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel and lubricants, assuring the security of aircraft and personnel, and anticipating all communications requirements.

The first of the three phases into which Quick Release was divided would run from 25 January until 9 February and would comprise the arrival of the troops of the 25th Infantry Division Brigade Task Force from Hawaii, the arrival of the forward floating depot at Naha Port from Subic Bay, and the issue of the supplies and equipment stocked aboard these three ships to the task force.

The second phase would last from 10 through 13 February and would involve the movement of the task force from central Okinawa to the Third Marine Division's Northern Training Area (which included portions of Higashi-Son, Kunigami-Son, and Ogimi-Son--three sparsely-settled, heavily-jungled areas made to order for counter-insurgency training) for the actual maneuver portion of the exercise.

The third phase, from 14 through 25 February, would consist of the return of the task force from the Northern Training Area to the marshaling area at Yontan Airfield in central Okinawa, the turn-in of the

supplies and equipment by the troops, the reloading of the forward floating depot, and the return of the "friendly forces" to Hawaii and the forward floating depot ships to Subic Bay.⁶

Aircraft and personnel of the 313th Air Division were to represent friendly forces in the exercise, conducting aerial reconnaissance, intercepting aggressor forces, and assisting in the destruction of enemy supply lines. RF-101 Voodoos of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron would be on call to perform aerial photography of the "enemy's" fortifications and movements. Then, if the opposition seemed to warrant aerial attack, simulated offensive air support sorties would be flown by six F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, for a total of 12 sorties each day. Two of the F-105's would be on a 15-minute alert status, while the other four would operate on a pre-planned schedule. These versatile aircraft, it might be mentioned, were capable of delivering a wide variety of offensive weapons at very high speeds and at either high or low altitudes. They could carry bombs either internally or externally, as well as missiles, rockets, jellied gasoline, and, in addition, they were equipped with Vulcan 20-mm. cannon capable of firing incendiary and armor-piercing shells at the rate of 6,000 rounds per minute.

Employing this weapon alone, the F-105 could set fire to ground installations, neutralize machine gun or mortar nests, destroy aircraft in the air or on the ground, and strafe with accuracy and devastating effect. Although not yet put to the actual test of war, it was believed that the Thunderchief's low, swift delivery of its assorted arsenal would assure it of high survivability in "brushfire" wars such as those then

being waged in South Viet Nam and Laos.

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Fitzgerald, the 313th Air Division's Chief of Plans and Programs Division, was to act as Director of the Air Support Coordination Center (ASCC) at Matsuda Range for the period 8-12 February. In addition, he would be the Air Liaison Officer for Exercise Quick Release Headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence D. Damewood, Operations Officer for the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron, would serve as the 18th Wing's Task Force Air Liaison Officer.⁷

The first part of Phase I went into effect on 27 January 1964, when the USNS Phoenix, one of the three former victory ships making up the forward floating depot, docked at Naha Port.

Meantime, nearly 400 soldiers of the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) from Fort Eustis, Virginia, had arrived at Kadena AB on 25 January aboard 24 C-135 jet transports, which took off from Langley AFB, Virginia, and made only one refueling stop, in Hawaii. To these men would be given the task of unloading the three converted victory ships with the precision and care for which they were trained. (As a matter of fact, the stevedoring troops came to Okinawa fresh from a three-week special training course in Virginia.) The responsibility for maintaining the heavy equipment sealifted from Subic Bay once it was ashore belonged to the U.S. Army Maintenance Command, while that for feeding and otherwise supplying the brigade task force rested with the U.S. Army Supply Services Command. Other local troops participating in Quick Release, in minor roles, were the 999th Signal Company (Support), elements of Headquarters Company, IX Corps, and a small contingent from the U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands Command.

While all this activity was taking place at widely-separated points of the globe, local USARYIS forces under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Leslie Lagler, the project officer for this aspect of Quick Release, had been constructing a tent camp at Yomitan (or Yontan) Airfield, one of the two most important Japanese air bases on Okinawa during World War II, as a staging area from which the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Task Force would launch its attack against the simulated guerrilla invaders in northern Okinawa.

On 27 January, the same day that the Phoenix put into Naha, semi-tropical rains and winds reaching as high as 47 knots buffeted the pup tents already erected, threatening to level the encampment. However, when Colonel Lagler returned the next day to survey the damage, he found that it was surprisingly light, that the tent city had survived beyond all reasonable expectation. In fact, he was able to report to his superiors that once "just a few odds and ends" were attended to, the area would "be ready."

The advanced group of the brigade task force flew in from Hawaii on 28 January and were transported to the Yomitan Staging Area to spend the night. Despite the previous day's heavy rains and winds, the new occupants voiced little criticism of the conditions they encountered, though they obviously derived no great joy from the ubiquitous mud left behind by the deluge. As one non-commissioned officer told a reporter who suggested that the living conditions prevailing at Yomitan just might be taking some of the edge off their enthusiasm, the incoming troops had been "looking forward to this exercise" and it would "take more than foul weather to get rid of us."⁸

The following day, 29 January, support elements of the 25th Infantry Division, including supply and maintenance technicians, flew into Kadena AB from Hawaii, with a fuel stop enroute on Wake Island, and prepared to start drawing their heavy equipment from the forward floating depot. Of the ships composing this depot, incidentally, the Phoenix had arrived at Naha Port on 27 January, as already seen, the Provo had arrived on the 29th, and the Cheyenne had completed the trio when she tied up early on the 31st.⁹

As the stevedoring specialist troops from Fort Eustis unloaded the equipment from the Phoenix and the Provo, the first two floating depot ships to arrive, a team of evaluators from the 25th Infantry Division checked every item to determine its condition. To their considerable satisfaction it was found that all equipment was "in excellent condition" and ready for immediate use.¹⁰

At 1258 hours on 30 January, 1 C-135 aircraft landed at Kadena with 75 troops of the 2d Brigade Task Force, and nine minutes later the big plane had been unloaded and the men were on their way to the Yomitan Airfield staging area. Thereafter, more C-135's and C-124's continued to arrive every few hours with troops of the 4,000-man brigade task force and special cargo that would be used in the exercise.

MATS handled the entire air support operation for Quick Release, utilizing both its WESTAF (Western Transport Air Force) and EASTAF (Eastern Transport Air Force) divisions. This support consisted of nine C-135's, which carried approximately 73 Army troops apiece, and eight C-124's, which were employed to transport more than 300,000 pounds of cargo, including blank ammunition and six helicopters in a partially

dismantled condition. The personnel flying the C-135's were stationed at Travis AFB, California; however, some of the big jets came from Langley AFB, Virginia. The C-124's were from the 1502d Air Transport Wing, Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and all the items they carried had originated in Hawaii.

The huge extraordinary ground operations workload was handled by personnel of the Kadena-based 1505th Support Squadron (MATS) on an accelerated shift, which, in effect, added one-third additional personnel to the ground support team. As another means of insuring that everything would go as smoothly as possible, 22 specialists in hydraulics and electronics peculiar to the C-135 were flown in from Travis AFB and Tachikawa AB, Japan. However, owing to the basic excellence of the C-135, the need for making repairs was almost non-existent.

Officials in charge of the trans-Pacific airlift were admittedly pleased with the way things were going. They were running well ahead of schedule, the troops and cargo being brought in and the planes taking off from Kadena for the return trip to Hickam faster than expected. The last element of the task force landed at Kadena on 5 February 1964.¹¹

With the unloading of the last piece of equipment from the MSTS Cheyenne on 3 February, the "forward floating depot" phase of Quick Release came to an end, and the three ex-victory ships took advantage of their temporary state of emptiness and unneededness to visit Japan for "normal maintenance." A lieutenant of the 2d Brigade Task Force, incidentally, commented that the equipment such as trucks, tanks, and artillery pieces coming off the ships was in "beautiful" condition.¹²

As for the men of the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service)

who had unloaded the forward floating depots, they devoted their duty time while waiting for Phase III of the exercise and its reloading of the equipment and supplies "to normal training exercises" conducted from their headquarters at Naha Port (a probable euphemism meaning that the men were free to go sight-seeing, to play golf, or whatever they pleased to do during the lull between unloading and reloading). The reloading was expected to take about six to seven days for each of the three ships, incidentally.¹³

By 1 February 1964, the little "tent city" at Yomitan Airfield was complete, with hundreds of small pup tents lined in neat rows as quarters for the nearly 4,000 men of the "friendly" force who would soon occupy them while awaiting orders to advance into northern Okinawa. In addition, the USARYIS Supply and Services Command and the USARYIS Engineering Group had constructed squad-size tents over wooden floors to house the headquarters and operations buildings for the task force. Other large tents served as warehouses. In addition, 12 mess halls were scattered through the several acres of tents. Even so--not too surprisingly--mobile canteen vans deployed to Yomitan Airfield by the Ryukyus Central Exchange constantly did "a land office business" in hamburgers and hot dogs. There were also 30 showers for the troops, with 24-hour hot water service, as well as a dispensary and a barber shop. More than three miles of telephone lines connected the tents with the operational headquarters and the outside community.

In one respect, however, the Yomitan tent city was in worse condition than it had been four days earlier. The heavy rains which had inundated the encampment when it was first erected continued with little

abatement, so that the roads winding through the area became veritable quagmires. Some tents were also blown away by the high winds which accompanied (or, more probably, delivered) the heavy rainfall; but, for the most part, the canvas stood fast against the persistent meteorological assaults.

Once arrived at Yomitan, the troops concentrated on drawing personal gear to supplement the individual arms and equipment which they had brought with them from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.¹⁴

In anticipation of Phase II of Exercise Quick Release, the troops of the 2d Brigade Task Force test-fired all their artillery on February 6th and 7th, after putting their equipment into working order and checking for possible damage that had been overlooked by the technicians assigned to the three forward floating depots.¹⁵

The "aggressor forces" in Exercise Quick Release were made up of troops from the Okinawa-based 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), a rifle company of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), personnel of the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific, a radio team from the 51st Special Operations Command at Torii Station, and personnel of the U.S. Army Medical Service Group. Commanding these motley guerrilla forces in the Northern Training Area would be Major Edwin E. Brooks of Company "D", 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), and under him would be both officers and enlisted men with actual experience in the Army's current counter-insurgency and advisory operations in South Viet Nam and Laos.

On Monday, 27 January, these aggressor forces moved into the area where the exercise was to be conducted and began constructing huts,

"villages," and an "aggressor headquarters building" over an area many square miles in extent. These were to be the objective of the friendly forces of the 2d Brigade Task Force in Phase II of Exercise Quick Release. At the same time, other "guerrillas" employed their talents in the preparation of ambush sites, strategic positions, and other obstacles calculated to dampen the ardor of the "righteous defenders." Although Major Brooks did not disclose the exact tactics which his people would adopt, it was expected that they would employ the methods characteristic of the shadowy brushfire wars that had kept Southeast Asia in a state of turmoil throughout the post-World War II period. Thus, they could be counted on to utilize the mountainous and semi-tropical jungles to stage ambushes, hit-and-run forays, and behind-the-lines attacks, giving the numerically and materially superior friendly forces no respite.

Captain Jerome Bruschette, a 1st Special Forces man who was the Operations and Plans Officer for the aggressor forces, told a Stars and Stripes correspondent accompanying the guerrillas that although they were "not supposed to win this war," he and his people were "going to get our licks in the best we can." In his mind, their superior knowledge of the terrain, acquired in past training exercises in the same area, and their "superb conditioning" would offset the advantage of greater numbers and quantities of supplies and materiel possessed by the friendly forces flown into Okinawa from Hawaii. The latter had reportedly received considerable jungle training in the Hawaiian Islands, but old Special Forces and Airborne hands inclined to discount the ruggedness of operations conducted in a group of islands best known for their Waikiki Beach, pineapples, and the hula dance.

Major Brooks, for his part, declared the terrain where they were operating to be the most impenetrable he had ever seen. However, he felt that the men he was commanding were a good match for the country's ruggedness.

Although Phase II was not scheduled to get underway officially until Monday, February 10th, the aggressors took 16 members of the 2d Brigade Task Force prisoner on the 7th when they found them wandering near the guerrilla headquarters. The Hawaiian-based troops claimed that they were lost, but the aggressors were disinclined to accept this story after finding on their persons maps of the area showing all the roads and trails.

The Stars and Stripes reporter was given a preview of a psychological weapon which the guerrillas planned to employ against the task force, when he was shown two sound trucks that had been rigged up to serenade the friendly troops every night with Chinese opera music and "rock 'n' roll" un-music. As a species of inoculation against broadcast appeals to surrender, as well as other propaganda weapons which the friendly forces could be expected to bring into play, Major Brooks had these sound trucks, audible up to a mile away, "entertain" his own guerrillas each day with the incredibly nerve-wracking records which would soon be played for the benefit of their enemies. The theory behind this strange tactic was, apparently, that after the invaders had listened to this din for a number of days, it was unlikely that hostile broadcasts and appeals would have much effect upon them.¹⁶

Early on Saturday, 8 February, the 2d Brigade Task Force, in groups of 25 vehicles, began moving out of the Yomitan Airfield staging area and up the coast in pursuance of their orders to "search, find, destroy,

or capture" the aggressor guerrilla band operating in the northern fastnesses. Preceding the main body of the task force were reconnaissance teams, and on the basis of their reports the task force commander and his staff revised the prepared estimates of the situation. (The 16 men captured by the guerrillas on the 7th had probably been members of such reconnaissance teams.) The task force arrived at the Camp Hansen training area late on the night of 8 February and spent the night there before pushing on to the Northern Okinawa Training Area the next morning.¹⁷

Late in the morning of 10 February, as the brigade task force sought out its first objective, two guerrilla supply caches, belonging to the aggressor forces known to be operating somewhere in the jungle, sporadic firing broke out. Despite this opposition, the supply depots were encircled and destroyed by early evening, with only light casualties to the brigade task force. Throughout the day, incidentally, the troops from Hawaii had been bombarded with propaganda pamphlets urging them to abandon a "hopeless cause."

Through captured prisoners, the brigade task force learned of a "redoubt" which the guerrillas were using as a base of operation. Additional intelligence uncovered the approximate number of the guerrillas and their sources of supply.¹⁸

The 2d Brigade Task Force posted double guards to prevent the guerrilla forces from infiltrating various camp areas during the hours of darkness, but such attempts were nonetheless successful from time to time. Prisoners were taken by both sides, then released to continue the war games after being held captive all day and subjected to some harassment.

Staff Sergeant Vern Hamilton, a correspondent for Pacific Stars and Stripes, wrote of a humorous incident which befell the Quick Release troopers on 11 February, and which was not in the script:

As the task force rounded a sharp curve in the narrow road, hot in pursuit of a group of guerrillas, they were suddenly cut off by a group of Okinawa children from a nearby country school, whose teacher had thoughtfully suspended classes for the afternoon, in order that the pupils (and their teacher) might enjoy this once-in-a-lifetime show. The column of tanks, weapons carriers, trucks, and the like tried to ease by the little horde of eager youngsters, but to no avail. The guerrillas had, it seemed, told the kids that the pursuing task force men would have gifts for them, and the children, willingly taking them at their word, swarmed around the vehicles so closely that the drivers did not dare to move them. As the children tugged at the trousers of the task force soldiers for the promised gifts, the guerrillas silently melted away into the jungle.

Finally, in desperation, one soldier had the happy thought of picking up a spent cartridge and handing it to a child, hoping that this would satisfy them and permit the tanks and armed personnel carriers to go back to their business of fighting a war. By this action the unidentified trooper demonstrated his ignorance of the genus Okinawa kodomo (child); for the youngsters, instead of being satisfied with this one present, evidently felt that they had been given carte blanche to gather the shiny brass cartridges. And in this dubious enterprise they were quickly joined by their mothers, who also scampered around on all fours, seeking the unusual treasure in the dust in front of and all around the "advancing" task force!

The frame of mind of the latter was not helped by the aggressors, who, safely ensconced on the next hill, sat hurling taunting cries at

Okinawa's frustrated defenders all the while.

Meantime, word of the brass bonanza had spread to the village itself, and more adults came running to get their share of the loot. Some soldiers lost their tempers and ordered the Okinawans to get out of the way, but the latter turned deaf ears on them.

The impasse was finally broken when a guerrilla prisoner was brought in and put on display over at the side of the road. The children rushed over to view the "villain," who was "having no easy time keeping his clothes in one piece." The tanks and other vehicles seized the opportunity to race past the throng of villagers and resume their interrupted pursuit. Of course, the guerrillas, from their hillside point of vantage, seeing that their respite was ended, vanished into the jungle.¹⁹

Besides the psychological advantage which aggressors naturally have, the guerrillas also enjoyed a familiarity with the terrain not shared by the defending forces, as well as the benefit of actual experience in counter-insurgency warfare in the Republic of Viet Nam. Many of the 1st Special Forces men had, in fact, earned decorations for their actions against the Viet Cong in that country. Despite all this favoring background, however, they were doomed men from the very start--and knew it! After all, the exercise script called for them to lose the war some time on Wednesday, 12 February, when the brigade task force was supposed to overrun the last guerrilla position. And a good soldier does not readily disregard the orders of a superior!²⁰

So this is exactly what came to pass. The task force soldiers continually pushed back the small guerrilla band until all were captured or "killed." When the aggressor command post was finally discovered and

captured, it was found to consist of a two-way radio, a sleeping bag for the commander, and a jeep—"all the essentials," according to Major Brooks, the guerrilla leader.²¹

With all the aggressors disposed of, the campaign in northern Okinawa came to an end on February 12th, and the long motorcade began threading its way back down the tortuous road to civilization and Yomitan Airfield early the next morning. The movement was completed on the 14th. On 15-16 February the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Task Force turned in the heavy equipment, including vehicles and artillery, which had been drawn from the forward floating depot and used in Quick Release. In the two-day interim between the end of the combat phase of the exercise and this turn-in, the soldiers had cleaned, serviced, and repaired the equipment to the best of their ability.

On 18 February, the first troops began the return flight to Hawaii in an operation that was expected to take about 10 days before it was completed. Some 20 MATS C-135's and C-124's made a total of approximately 50 flights between Okinawa and Hawaii before the airlift was completed. As on the incoming trip, the troops carried only their light combat and personal equipment, totalling about 1,000 pounds per aircraft.²²

The last group which had participated in Quick Release to leave Okinawa was the 117th Transportation Company (Terminal Service) from Fort Eustis, Virginia. Because of the care which had to be exercised in reloading the three vessels of the forward floating depot so that the first items needed in a future deployment, either in the form of

an exercise or in a genuine operation on hostile shores, would be the first to hand, it was some days before these men were able to check in at Kadena AB for return transportation to their home base.²³

In the latter part of March 1964, the Defense Department released some of its findings resulting from Exercise Quick Release and a subsequent careful analysis of the materiel employed therein. Even with the unscheduled handicap of heavy winds and pelting rain which beset the operation at the outset, Quick Release had gone off without serious complications, thus demonstrating that the procedure of "mating" air-delivered troops and sea-delivered equipment and supplies was both operationally and economically sound.

Previously, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had told Congress that if this test in the Pacific proved successful, the Defense Department would "propose an expansion in the forward floating base program next year."

The big question before the exercise had been whether or not the gear stored in the forward floating depots would be in combat shape when removed from "mothballs." As related above, the holds of the three ships had been specially prepared, so that the temperature and humidity could be strictly controlled to keep the equipment free of rust, corrosion, mildew, and mold--a major problem in hot, humid climates. Certainly, Subic Bay provided these hostile elements in profusion. The reports submitted by Army observers were that none of the equipment and supplies had deteriorated. None had to be replaced. There was no rot, and, in fact, the dehumidification system had worked so well that a "fresh wood smell" emanated from the packing cases nearly a year after they

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had originally been loaded.²⁴

Although the primary purpose of Quick Release was definitely to test the Army's forward floating depot concept, the 313th Air Division and other Air Force elements participating in varying degrees also succeeded in obtaining valuable experience and learning valuable lessons from the exercise. The more significant of these were as follows:

1. The preliminary development of plans and requirements in cooperation with the IX Corps Headquarters staff at Fort Buckner, Okinawa, established a keynote of teamwork, mutual understanding, and cooperation that continued throughout Quick Release.
2. While the field exercise was limited in scope, Air Force personnel and their counterparts of the 25th Infantry Division were afforded an opportunity for daily practice in employing certain tactical air concepts and procedures.
3. Communications systems of both services were employed under realistic conditions, affording the opportunity to field-check Air Force mobile equipment, Army signal elements, and tactical air control party air-ground equipment.
4. Although artillery action was not simulated in Quick Release, the importance of timing and coordination of Army ground movements with the employment of artillery and tactical air was exercised--i.e., company commanders first evaluated target objectives with an eye to the feasibility of employing organic artillery before considering the use of air power.
5. The value of accurate spot reporting was exercised on both friendly and aggressor movements and positions by tactical reconnaissance

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and fighter pilots. Reports were forwarded from the ground task force by Army ground communications and through the Air Force communications from the Wing Command Center to the Air Support Coordination Center (ASCC) at Director Headquarters. Inasmuch as the Army units were obliged to follow the OPLAN scenario, the spot report information was not realistic, but the capability to report timely, useful information was exercised through effective air-ground teamwork. Notwithstanding the minor role played by air action in Quick Release in terms of testing the forward floating depot concept, the opportunity for 313th Air Division to work with the 25th Division established a framework for Okinawa Air Force/Army inter-service continuation training requirements as envisaged in IX Corps 9AF-1-63/313ADIV OPLAN 320-63, "Habu Strike."*

Air Force communications during Quick Release were furnished by the 1st Mobile Communications Group of Clark AB, P.I., while Army communications were provided by equipment organic to the 25th Division Brigade Task Force and elements of the 999th Signal Company. Air Force equipment consisted of two TSC-15 radio communications vans, two MGC-6 teletype vans, and two GRA-53 UHF air-ground radios and their support power equipment. The communications complexes were located on Kadena Air Base itself and at Matsuda Range, in Ginoza-Son, approximately 20 nautical miles from the one at Kadena, as the crow flies. All voice traffic for immediate air requests and spot reporting was passed by means of 1st Mobile Communications Group equipment. Messages classified for purposes of training were passed by teletype, using crypto equipment.

*Described in History, 313th Air Div., 1 July-31 Dec. 1963, pp. 83-115.

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Some of the problems encountered were as follows: (1) The communications team was prepared for daylight operation only. However, this shortcoming was recognized even before the exercise got underway; therefore, prompt action was taken through the 1st Mobile Communications Group to obtain a sufficient number of additional personnel to make 24-hour communications service possible. Including these reinforcements, a total of 18 men operated and maintained the ground communications equipment during Quick Release. (2) The volume of the field phone at Kadena's Wing Control Center (WCC) was initially too low. However, some improvement in the sound level was effected through local adjustments, making voice contact possible throughout the exercise. (3) The UHF equipment at the Matsuda Range location was inoperative during a part of the exercise, but the outage did not seriously affect exercise procedures, since the equipment was primarily utilized to monitor air-to-ground transmissions. The provision for having UHF equipment at both the WCC and the ASOC appeared to be justifiable in view of the capability thus made available for furnishing spot reports and passing instructions for directing airborne aircraft to other targets. (4) While teletype outages occurred during 24.6 per cent of the exercise's duration, 71 encrypted messages were passed both ways, for a 100 per cent accomplishment of the over-all exercise objectives, notwithstanding the problems associated with propagation and equipment breakdowns.

Although solved or counteracted in varying degrees, the foregoing problems could have caused serious delays, unacceptable under actual combat conditions. Consequently, officials representing the Air Force in Quick Release concluded that exercises of this type served to provide

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"an excellent team training environment for equipment checks, maintenance requirements, and passage of operational traffic." They also noted that the "attitude, cooperation, and devotion to duty of Team 9-64 was outstanding."²⁵

A task force of six F-105's was stationed in Area "A" on Kadena Air Base, a remote location normally reserved for SAC aircraft, which was selected in order to permit the aircrews and maintenance personnel to perform under more realistic conditions. The 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron was directed to provide a task force commander, aircrews, operations personnel, and duty officers. An Army ground liaison officer (GLO) was assigned to brief the pilots on the Army tactical situation for each mission flown. The Operations buildings located in Area "A" were used for briefings, personal equipment storage, and the 1st Mobile Communications Group scramble lines and message center. However, the RF-101 sorties were flown out of their own squadron area, since all three of their missions were pre-planned and thus did not require the scramble alert facility for the dispatch of missions. Whenever possible, different aircrews were used for each sortie, in order to permit optimum crew training benefits. Over the three-day period, seven pre-planned and 12 immediate (unplanned) air strike missions were flown, for a total of 38 sorties.²⁶

The Air Support Coordination Center (ASCC) was collocated with the Army Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at the Matsuda Range. Administrative equipment such as aircraft status boards, forms, typewriters, and other "tools of the trade" was furnished by the Air Force, as was transportation for the personnel manning the ASCC. For its part,

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the Army provided field gear such as tables, chairs, and portable file cabinets, besides furnishing billeting and messing facilities. The ASCC manning consisted of the ASCC Director, an F-105 Operations Officer, an RF-101 Operations Officer, an Intelligence Officer, a Staff Weather Officer, an Intelligence Technician, and an Administrative Specialist and a clerk.

All immediate and pre-planned air strikes were processed in coordination with the Army G-3 Air Section, then transmitted directly to the 13WCC, using equipment belonging to the 1st Mobile Communications Group. Minor problems were encountered at first in message handling techniques, in utilizing forms, and in processing strike requests and spot reports. However, as practice brought experience, requests and appropriate records within the ASCC were handled expeditiously. In most instances, immediate requests were passed to the WCC in less than five minutes.

Although of no great moment, it may be worth three lines to note that all officer personnel manning the ASCC were dressed in the new "improved" field uniform, while the airmen wore fatigues (presumably unimproved) for operation under field conditions.²⁷

Under either exercise or actual combat conditions, the ASCC or ASOC administration needed to be completely self-sufficient in terms of equipment and supplies, except for billeting and messing facilities. Quick Release had been conducted on Okinawa itself; therefore, the ASCC had been fortunate enough to have access to 313th Air Division equipment supplemented by assistance from IX Corps. Since this situation would not obtain in most cases, exercise officials recommended that ASCC's

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and ASOC's be assigned a complete mobility package, including such "tools of the trade" as portable map and chart display boards, portable typewriters, filing cabinets, field safes, collapsible tables, chairs, and the numerous other impedimenta essential to administrative efficiency.

The scenario governing Exercise Quick Release had established objectives for the Air Force limited to close air support operations only. This role assumed air superiority by the friendly forces and included little or no requirement for interdiction play in the exercise. Because of the unrealistic nature of such a situation, the officials reviewing Quick Release recommended that the joint planning committees for future exercises include a time-phase period during which the ground forces would be subject to aggressor air attack. A combination of faked aircraft for intercept practice of the air superiority role and aggressor aircraft penetration and attack on friendly troops would be highly desirable. The Air Force play should also include interdiction of aggressor supply lines, armed reconnaissance of roads, and strikes on communications facilities, both friendly and hostile. In summary, the entire spectrum of air action to be employed in an actual battlefield situation should be made an integral part of all future exercises.²⁸

The exercise strikes were controlled by two 18th TFW forward air controllers (FAC's) under the supervision of an air liaison officer stationed with the brigade task force.

On 9 February (D minus 1) one RF-101 was dispatched at 1000I on a pre-planned photo reconnaissance of selected aggressor positions. The mission was successful, and photographs were delivered to the brigade task force by 1200I.

On 10 February (D-Day) 12 F-105 and two RF-101 sorties were flown.

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F-105's were dispatched in two-ship elements, and ordnance loads were simulated as directed by the ASCC. Both of the reconnaissance and four of the tactical fighter sorties were pre-planned strikes, while eight of the latter were immediate strikes. The targets included command posts, aggressor redoubts, column cover, bridges, and troop concentrations, while road armed reconnaissance was also an assigned mission.

On 11 February (D plus 1) one RF-101 sortie and 12 F-105 (two-ship element) sorties were flown against targets similar to those of D-Day.

On 12 February (D plus 2) 10 F-105 sorties (two-ship elements) were flown on strikes similar to those assigned on D-Day.²⁹

A number of benefits accrued to the participating forces from Exercise Quick Release, among them the following:

1. The value of accurate spot reporting was emphasized in identifying friendly forward positions, aggressor troop movements, and redoubt locations. Such information was obtained from photo reconnaissance and spot reporting by F-105 aircrews.
2. F-105 aircrews effectively demonstrated the ability of high-performance aircraft to seek out targets over dense mountainous terrain.
3. An opportunity was provided for the Air Force participants to work with FAC's employing voice procedures and techniques for describing target locations. (In the case of one difficult target location, an FAC directed F-105's onto the target by employing the F-105's capability for homing on FAC radio transmissions.)
4. The ground forces were impressed with the necessity for identifying forward positions by the use of panels.

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As a result of the deficiencies observed by the FAC's, they made several recommendations for improvements that should be incorporated into future exercises of a similar nature. One was that a UHF radio be located at the brigade command post for back-up and monitoring purposes, this unit being remoted from the UHF truck into the CP van, so that the delays produced by the necessity for walking back and forth would be eliminated. In Exercise Quick Release some air requests had come to the brigade CP from the battalion FAC on UHF because the Army communications were momentarily out during movements or the Air Force could not enter into the net on account of other operational traffic.

Another recommendation having its origin in adverse experience was that two speaker cords be furnished for the FAC vehicles, one about 10 feet in length and the other at least 30 feet long. Those supplied for Quick Release had been only about three feet long--far too short to permit the FAC's the movement necessary to observe aircraft and strikes. It was also recommended that speakers be available, as well as head sets.

Tarpaulins had not been provided for the brigade FAC trucks during Quick Release, despite the heavy rains that marked much of the exercise. The natural offspring of this lack of foresight was the realization that some form of cover should be available for any future all-weather operations.

When the brigade forward command post advanced to its forward position on the second day of the maneuver, communications with the rear CP were lost, except for FM radio. However, the traffic flowing into the FM radio did not permit the processing of air requests. This condition pointed up the need for an alternate communications net for

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air request actions.

It was further recommended that rides in Army helicopters be arranged for the forward air controllers during air strikes to permit them to observe relative troop positions associated with close air strikes.

Detachment #8, 1st Weather Wing, at Kadena Air Base, deployed a team composed of one forecaster and two observers to the Matsuda Range area occupied by the ASCC/TOC. Here it operated in a tent a short distance from the ASCC, employing a complete mobility package to furnish regular forecasts. Its forecasting capability proved self-sufficient, and "excellent service" was furnished to the ASCC/TOC as required.³⁰

Before Quick Release got underway, PACAF had directed, on 25 January 1964, that orientation flights for senior officers present to observe the exercise be conducted. Since the 313th Air Division was then short of the two-seated aircraft requisite for this purpose, the 39th Air Division, Misawa AB, Japan, was requisitioned for F-100F aircraft, together with their pilots. The sorties were scheduled to include low-level navigation, maximum performance climb, supersonic speed runs, ordnance delivery, aerial observation of staging areas and the exercise area, and in-flight refueling, when tanker aircraft were available.

All of the officers receiving these orientation flights were given a personal invitation by either the Commander or the Vice Commander of the host 313th Air Division. In addition, an Air Force vehicle met each of them at his quarters, and a tactical fighter pilot served as his escort. Before going aloft, the officer received a personal equipment

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fitting and briefing, as well as a mission briefing, after which still pictures were taken of the preparations for flight at the aircraft.

Following completion of the orientation flight, the participant was presented a certificate from the 313th Air Division Commander, a "mach buster" pin, and the photographs taken before his flight. A debriefing on the flight was conducted, followed by an escorted view of the F-105 and RF-101 aircraft set up on static display. An Air Force fighter pilot then escorted each officer back to his quarters.

In all, 24 of these orientation flights were made, and the favorable comments of the participants indicated that the program "very successfully demonstrated tactical fighter capabilities."³¹

Operation Wing Over.

As related in the History of the 313th Air Division immediately preceding this one, the Royal New Zealand and Royal Australian Air Forces had issued formal invitations to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) during the latter part of 1963 for a representation of USAF aircraft to participate in the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the RNZAF scheduled for 20 February 1964. This was then to be followed by a good will tour of two RAAF bases. The most prominent among the distinguished guests expected to be present at the anniversary celebration was Queen Mother Elizabeth, widow of the late King George VI, who would be accompanied by members of her retinue. This was, incidentally, the first year the United States Air Force had been asked to take part in Royal New Zealand Air Force activities.

Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, to whom PACAF delegated responsibility for attending to the myriad details connected with acceptance of the

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invitations, selected the 13th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, as the organization which would provide the visiting airmen and six F-105's, then delegated complete responsibility for the execution of Wing Over, as the operation was named by the U.S. Air Force, to the 313th Air Division. As for the RNZAF's "Air Force Day 1964," it was given the nickname "Operation Leap Year" by that service's planners.

To insure that everything went off as smoothly as possible, on 10 December 1963, Major General Albert P. Clark, the 313th Air Division Commander, personally led a 17-man team on a survey of two alternative routes that could be taken to get to Ohakea AB, New Zealand, and return from Australia. The first of these, identified as the "Pago Pago Route," would entail landings at Guam, Eniwetok or Kwajalein, Pago Pago (American Samoa), and Ohakea, New Zealand; while the second, referred to as the "Port Moresby Route," would require the F-105's to put down at Guam, Port Moresby in Australian New Guinea, Brisbane, Australia, and Ohakea, New Zealand.

The C-118 carrying the route survey party landed at all the above places, as well as at Sydney, Australia, thus enabling them to acquire an excellent first-hand knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of each, as well as of the various facilities, equipment, and supplies that would be needed if a particular airfield were to prove safe and practicable.

Having made a detailed analysis of these factors, the survey team recommended to PACAF and Fifth Air Force that the Port Moresby route be adopted, in part because of the much shorter distance involved. But, whether higher headquarters accepted this recommendation or not, it was

imperative that a decision concerning the route to be taken be made as quickly as possible, since all subsequent actions would be based on this determination.³²

Among the matters that would have to be attended to at as early a date as possible, stated General Clark upon his return to Kadena, were the following:

- (1) Tanker support must be allocated.
- (2) A preliminary allocation of six C-130's for airlift support would have to be approved.
- (3) Air rescue units would have to be alerted on the projected deployment.
- (4) Mobile TACAN and single sideband units, as well as supporting airlift, would have to be requisitioned, so as to be in position by 1 February 1964.
- (5) An operations order would have to be published as soon as possible, while a detailed fragmentary order must be completed no later than 16 January 1964.
- (6) The Royal New Zealand Air Force should be furnished information on the distinguished visitors planning to attend Project Wing Over, in the form of press kits and biographies.
- (7) The RNZAF must be furnished details of the static display plan.
- (8) The RNZAF and RAAF must be provided detailed planning data in the form of either a message or an operations order not later than 16 January 1964.
- (9) The RNZAF, RAAF, and the USAF air attache at Canberra, Australia, must be given information concerning all requirements

that would involve a long lead time.

(10) The RNZAF, RAAF, and the USAF air attache at Canberra, Australia, must be furnished specific data concerning fuel requirements of the task force.

(11) The RAAF must confirm the availability of the air bases at Townsville and Richmond for possible use.³³

Besides providing the RNZAF with USAF tactical air forces to participate in the former's observation of its Air Force Day and other ceremonies, Operation Wing Over would serve to demonstrate the mobility of PACAF's tactical air forces and provide joint training with the Royal Australian Air Force in air defense exercises.

The USAF Task Force Commander would exercise operational control of all the forces deployed in support of Wing Over, while the RNZAF would coordinate those operations associated with the RNZAF Day program, in addition to providing aircrew briefings for all flights in support of the exercise. It also agreed to furnish air-sea rescue and weather reconnaissance facilities for the F-105 in-flight refueling areas off the coast of New Zealand.

The Royal Australian Air Force, for its part, would coordinate operations of the F-105 aircraft during the air defense training exercises conducted from RAAF Williamstown and RAAF Amberley, and would provide a briefing on the tactics and procedures to be employed during this phase. The RAAF further agreed to furnish air-sea rescue and weather reconnaissance facilities for the F-105 in-flight refueling areas off the coast of Australia.³⁴

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing was directed to deploy six F-105

Thunderchief all-weather fighter-bombers to RNZAF Station Ohakea, at Bulls, New Zealand, with eight F-105's departing Kadena AB on 13 February for Andersen AFB, Guam. The air task force commander would be Colonel George B. Simler, Commander of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing.

The six aircraft selected to participate in Wing Over would leave Guam, weather conditions permitting, so as to arrive at Ohakea not later than 17 February, while the other two Thunderchiefs which had been utilized as ground and air spares on the departure from Guam would return to Kadena when no longer needed at Andersen AFB. The next day, February 18th, the mission F-105's would conduct practice flights at Ohakea, with the 19th designated as the weather alternate day for practice. The primary demonstration would be staged on 20 February, and a second demonstration would be given on the 22d. One F-105 would be placed on static display both days. The foregoing demonstrations would take the form of formation flights, aircraft handling, air-to-air refueling, high-speed flight, sonic booms, maximum performance takeoffs, and simulated air-to-ground attacks.

On 25 February 1964, the six F-105's would be deployed to RAAF Williamstown, Australia, where they would fly eight sorties in a clean configuration, acting as interceptors in an air defense exercise on 27 February. Then, on 28 February, the six F-105's would deploy to RAAF Amberley, Australia, where, on 2 March, they would fly eight sorties in an F50 configuration, acting as aggressors in an air defense exercise. On 4 March, the six Thunderchiefs would depart RAAF Amberley for Andersen AFB, Guam, and the following day would take off from the latter base for Kadena AB, their home station.³⁵

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As its role in Operation Wing Over, the 421st Air Refueling Squadron, 41st Air Division, stationed at Yokota AB, Japan, would send eight KB-50 tankers to RAAF Townsville, Australia, and RAAF Amberley, Australia, not later than 13 February 1964. The KB-50's operating from Townsville would refuel the F-105's over Port Moresby, New Guinea, then recover at that city's Jackson Aerodrome; while the four tankers operating from RAAF Amberley would refuel the F-105's east of Brisbane, then recover at Christchurch, New Zealand.

One KB-50 would be utilized for the air refueling demonstration flights on 18, 20, and 22 February. Another would be placed on static display at RNZAF Ohakea on February 20th and 22d. The four KB-50 tankers operating from Christchurch would provide refueling for the F-105 aircraft deploying from New Zealand to Australia on 25 February 1964, then recover at RAAF Townsville, Australia. These same KB-50 aircraft would provide refueling over Port Moresby for the F-105's deploying from RAAF Amberley to Andersen AFB, Guam, on 4 March 1964.

The 315th Air Division was directed to furnish a total of six C-130 Hercules aircraft for Operation Wing Over--five to support the F-105's and one to support the C-130's themselves. In addition, three C-124 Globemasters of the 1503d Air Transport Wing at Tachikawa AB, under the operational control of the 315th Air Division, though assigned to Military Air Transport Service, would provide enroute support for the KB-50's; while a fourth C-124 would airlift display material to be deposited at Tachikawa by PACAF for subsequent movement to Ohakea RNZAF Station. This material for display included a 28-foot model of John

Glenn's "Friendship Seven" space capsule and a 22-foot half-scale model of the X-15 manned rocket research aircraft.

One of the C-130 crews was to be qualified in parachute low altitude drop (PLAD) operations, since these would be included in the aerial show at Ohakea on both February 20th and 22d.

The 315th Air Division was also to provide an aircraft for static display at Napier, New Zealand, on 15 February. Then, on 20 and 22 February, three C-130's were to fly a formation fly-by, with a fourth acting as a static display aircraft at Ohakea. All 315th Air Division aircraft, including the attached C-124's, would be under the operational control of the 315th Air Division mission commander, Colonel L. D. Lutton, during the deployment to and redeployment from New Zealand. However, the support mission requirements of the F-105 and KB-50 aircraft would dictate the departure times and routes to be flown if they were unavoidably changed from those contained in the operations plan.

The 5th Communications Squadron, Naha AB, would operate the Naha air-ground radio station on 8992.5 kcs (single sideband and amplitude modulation equivalent from 2100Z to 1500Z during the exercise, establish and maintain voice and continuous wave (CW) communications between Tachikawa and Naha AB from 2100Z to 1500Z during the exercise, relay unencrypted position reports as directed by all aircraft participating in the mission, and forward through channels to Headquarters, 315th Air Division, a report of all calls successfully completed to and from aircraft flying south of 20° North Latitude.

The 1st Mobile Communications Group, stationed at Clark AB, Philippine Islands, would provide three mobile TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation)

and single sideband stations, with an output of 500 to 1,000 watts, which were to be deployed at Jackson Aerodrome, Port Moresby, at RAAF Station Amberley, Australia, and at RNZAF Station Ohakea, New Zealand, early enough to be operational on 10 February 1964. TACAN would enable the Wing Over aircraft to home in on its beacons from 190 miles, and, in the case of some planes fitted with special equipment, from as far as 300 miles. The single sideband (SSB) radio stations thus set up were to provide a high frequency (HF) point-to-point voice net between the three airfields at which they would be located and the departure base, Andersen AFB, Guam. The airlift required for the TACAN/SSB stations would comprise four more C-124's under the operational control of 315th Air Division and was to be requested by the 1st Mobile Communications Group. The HF air-ground stations along the deployment route were considered adequate for position reporting by the tanker and support aircraft. All control towers at the deployment bases were equipped with UHF radio, and all of them also had GCA, except for Ohakea, which lacked surveillance radar. One of the C-130 aircraft was to serve ingloriously, but usefully, as a stand-by UHF control station on the ground at Ohakea during the fly-by, for emergency employment in the event the UHF in the control tower became inoperative. In such an exigency, the aircraft would receive transmissions from the tower via VHF, then relay them to the F-105's by UHF.³⁶

Three movement control teams were to be established, each composed of one F-105-qualified officer, who would work with the 1st Mobile Communications Group detachments at Jackson Aerodrome, Port Moresby; RAAF

Amberley; and RNZAF, Ohakea. (Detachment 11, 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group, would provide movement control at Andersen AFB.) These movement control officers would proceed to their respective stations on the C-130 carrying the first advance party, where they would monitor both recovery and refueling area weather, insuring that weather reports, reconnaissance, and weather forecasts were forwarded to the interested agencies. Each movement control officer would be empowered to make a preliminary "go-no go" decision on the basis of weather predictions six hours prior to the scheduled takeoff of the F-105 aircraft; however, the final decision on whether or not to depart would be the responsibility of the F-105 task force commander three hours before the scheduled takeoff.

The movement control officer, initially stationed at RAAF Amberley, would move to RAAF Williamstown, Australia, after the F-105's had reached RNZAF Ohakea.³⁷

Detachment 1, 1st Weather Wing, at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, would provide a qualified weather officer to deploy with each of the three movement control teams (MCT). One was to be in place at Amberley RAAF Station by 11 February, at which time he would commence to provide planning outlooks at 0600Z each day. In addition, he would prepare mission-controlled forecasts for the deployment route leg from Port Moresby to Ohakea, New Zealand. A second weather officer was to be in place at Ohakea RNZAF Station by 15 February, where he would provide weather support to mission aircraft participating in the air show, then prepare a route forecast and briefing for the deployment of mission aircraft to Williamstown, Australia (near Melbourne) in time for him to be in place at the latter station on 25 February 1964. Here he would provide weather

support to mission aircraft participating in the scheduled air defense exercise and prepare a route forecast for deployment of the F-105's to Amberley. Another weather officer was to be in place at Amberley RAAF Station by 23 February to provide required weather support, including a mission-controlled forecast and briefing for the Amberley-to-Guam leg, together with a forecast for the Port Moresby AAR.³⁸

Aerial Survey Team #7 would provide a weather reconnaissance for the air refueling area at Port Moresby, extending from the Port Moresby mobile TACAN north on a radial of 357° for 100 nautical miles. The air refueling altitude was 20,000 feet, unless weather conditions dictated otherwise. The weather reconnaissance was to be conducted at least three hours prior to the time the F-105's departed from Andersen AFB, Guam, and from RAAF Amberley, Australia.³⁹

The Commander, 33d Air Rescue Squadron, Naha AB, Okinawa, would provide aircraft for precautionary orbit "XB" at 22°17' N., 133°40' E.; while the Commander, 79th Air Rescue Squadron, Andersen AFB, Guam, would furnish aircraft for precautionary orbit "XA" at 18°00' N., 139°33' E., and for temporary precautionary orbit "RE" at 07°40' N., 145°52' E.⁴⁰

The date established for departure of the Wing Over task force from Kadena AB was, as we have seen, 13 February 1964. Accordingly, eight F-105's of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, including the two spare aircraft accompanying the chosen sextet as far as Guam, were actually taxiing out for takeoff at 0900I that date, when word came to return to the parking apron, a 24-hour delay having been imposed for completion of a technical order compliance (TOC). As a result of this delay, the Thunderchiefs did not take off until 14 February 1964, at

1300 hours, with Colonel George B. Simler, the task force commander, flying the lead plane.

Although the flight to Andersen AFB was uneventful, a maintenance check upon arrival revealed that one aircraft's cabin pressurization was weak. This condition was corrected by replacing the canopy seal. Another F-105 with an ATM oil leak was made airworthy by replacement of the ATM. A third plane had an inaccurate doppler in its highly complex navigation system, but this was disposed of by aligning the doppler computer. A fourth Thunderchief indicated a gear unsafe light and horn, but upon being subjected to a retraction test, it checked out satisfactorily.⁴¹

Meantime, at 0700I, on 8 February, "Chalk One," the first C-130 carrying the advance party, had left Kadena for Andersen AFB on the first leg of the four-engine turbo-prop plane's trip to Ohakea RNZAF Station, New Zealand. The aircraft commander was Lieutenant Colonel Ralph S. Saunders, Commander of the 817th Troop Carrier Squadron, Naha Air Base. Four hours later, the Hercules touched down on Guam, leaving there at 0800 the next day, February 9th. Another four-hour flight brought it to Jackson Aerodrome, Port Moresby, New Guinea, where fuel was quickly taken on and the trip resumed within an hour. It was nearly 1900 hours that evening when "Chalk One" braked to a stop in front of Base Operations at Amberley RAAF Station, Australia. The next morning Colonel Saunders took off for the final destination, Ohakea RNZAF Station, just outside the city of Bulls, New Zealand.⁴²

Even before "Chalk One" landed at Ohakea, however, First Lieutenant Hugh Barton and four enlisted men of the 1st Mobile Communications Group

had arrived and become operationally ready to receive the incoming Wing Over aircraft within two hours. Similar TACAN teams had done likewise at Amberley and Port Moresby.

On 15 February, the morning after their arrival at Guam, the eight-plane F-105 task force led by Colonel Simler took off for RNZAF Station Ohakea, New Zealand. When the aircraft were 200 miles out and everything appeared to be going well, Simler released the two spares to return to Andersen AFB and thence to Kadena (no doubt to the disappointment of their pilots, who would have liked to make the trip to New Zealand and Australia).

The task force, flying at a ground speed of approximately 620 miles-per-hour, cruised at 30,000 feet until it neared the first air refueling point over Port Moresby, when the planes descended to 20,000 feet. The rendezvous with the four KB-50 tankers of the 421st Air Refueling Squadron, which had arrived at Townsville on the 11th and had headed back north for the refueling operation, was easily accomplished with the use of direction finding equipment and radar, particularly since the operation was blessed with excellent weather. The TACAN station deployed at Port Moresby insured that the KB-50 pilots would be able to maintain their proper airborne position for the refueling rendezvous with the F-105's. The refueling was uneventful, except for the inability of one aircraft to take on fuel from either drogue of one of the tankers, making it necessary for this plane to divert to another KB-50. The refueling completed, the Thunderchiefs, with full fuel tanks, soared back to 30,000 feet and continued southward, while the KB-50's of Tanker Force #1 recovered at

Jackson Aerodrome, then returned home to Yokota AB, Japan, with a stop-over at Andersen AFB.

The second refueling, with Tanker Force #2, took place when the task force was 200 miles east of Brisbane, Australia, and again excellent weather favored the operation, which, on this occasion, went smoothly throughout. As before, the temporary TACAN, at Amberley, assisted in the rendezvous. All RAAF air rescue Neptune aircraft were in place, and radio contact was made with each. The refueling operation completed, these four KB-50's, which had arrived at Amberley on the 12th, flew eastward to Christchurch, New Zealand, where they landed, to make their base of operations for the duration of Operation Wing Over.

After a flight of 3,345 nautical miles--over Gaverut Island, Olimarao Atoll, Momote Airfield on Los Negros Island in the Admiralties, Port Moresby, Townsville, the Coringa Islets, Brisbane, and Lord Howe Island--the six F-105's landed at Ohakea RNZAF Station on 15 February 1964, just one minute behind schedule and seven hours, 25 minutes out of Andersen AFB, Guam. In the process, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing task force had set an unofficial non-stop distance record for F-105 aircraft flying as a unit. Previous unit operational F-105 non-stop record distance flights had been 3,277 miles for one from Fairbanks, Alaska, to Eglin AFB, Florida, and 3,612 miles for a TAC flight from Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina, to Moron, Spain, in April 1963, which had required eight hours and 40 minutes. (Earlier non-stop F-105 delivery flights of greater distances were not considered to fall into the unit operational category.⁴³

On hand to greet the aircraft were RNZAF Group Captain Kenneth W. Trigance, the Ohakea Station Commander and official host to the Wing Over

task force, who had flown Beaufighters out of England for the Royal Air Force (RAF) during World War II, and who was now nearing the end of a long career, together with other representatives of the RNZAF, the RAF, the RAAF, and the U.S. Air Force itself.⁴⁴

On 18 February, two "round-the-house" flights were conducted, with three F-105's in each. One flight, under Colonel Floyd White, Director of Operations for the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, flew along the west coast of North Island, swung south from Auckland, and returned to Ohakea RNZAF Station, thus taking it over the chief cities and towns of that island. The other flight, led by Major Ralph P. Clark, concentrated its attention on the cities of Christchurch and Invercargill while in the process of circumnavigating South Island. Two RAF Victor bombers also overflew parts of New Zealand. The towns had been alerted to the fly-over times by the local press, and, as a result, thousands of people were to be seen on rooftops or standing in the streets as the Thunderchiefs passed overhead.⁴⁵

The following day, 19 February, two F-105's flew to Christchurch, New Zealand, where they staged a high speed fly-by and an air refueling demonstration with one of the KB-50's of Tanker Force #2, which was making that airfield its base while the Wing Over aircraft were in New Zealand. The Thunderchiefs then landed at Christchurch and went on static display at that chief city of South Island. Unfortunately, the 350 miles separating Christchurch--where the KB-50's, C-130's, and C-124's were based during the New Zealand phase of Wing Over--from the two-man Fifth Air Force Information team at Ohakea RNZAF Station prevented the latter from giving these support operations as much publicity as was desirable.⁴⁶

As a sidelight to the main event, it is interesting to note that the F-105's had also been scheduled to overfly the southern tip of South Island, and one factory owner had generously released all his workers to watch the event. Alas, a weather ceiling moved in so low that the F-105's canceled the flight. This by itself would have been bad enough, but when a flight of Vulcan bombers went ahead with their part of the joint exercise and roared over at 500 feet, thus getting under the overcast, the factory owner became extremely embittered toward the "undependable" Americans and proceeded to vent his wrath in a letter to the local newspaper, while his employees were so chagrined that they refused to report back to work for the rest of the day. (Of course, it is entirely possible that if the overflight had been thrillingly successful, the same workers would have been transported into such a holiday mood as to make further labor that day incongruous and impossible! So the poor factory owner would, in all likelihood, have lost, no matter what happened.)

That same day, February 19th, four C-130's demonstrated precision formation flying for the people of Christchurch, as well as their short field takeoff and landing capabilities, their high speed at low altitude endowments, and, by way of contrast, their very low speed drop capabilities. Since the Royal New Zealand Air Force was scheduled to receive three C-130 aircraft in the near future, interest in the Hercules transport's performance characteristics was considerably keener than it was in the C-124's and KB-50's.⁴⁷

The final rehearsal for the air display was held on 20 February, with the F-105's demonstrating a three-ship formation takeoff, high speed fly-by, air refueling on all the drogues of a KB-50, and individual low-level attacks on a simulated fortified position, in addition to creating

a sonic boom.⁴⁸ As we have seen, this date had been originally designated for the RNZAF anniversary day main show. However, when a forecast of inclement weather on the 20th was announced, the big event was set back to the 22d.

The great air display for which all the preceding had been a mere prelude came at Ohakea RNZAF Station on 22 February before a crowd estimated at 100,000 people--the largest gathering in New Zealand's history. Men, women, and children poured into the small base from the surrounding towns and farms to witness the biggest air show ever held in the Southern Hemisphere, arriving by car, train, bicycle, on foot, and on horseback. Illness prevented Queen Mother Elizabeth from attending as scheduled, but among the onlookers were the Governor General, high ranking members of the New Zealand government, civil and military leaders, and attaches from all over the world. The 90-minute show "went without a hitch."

RNZAF T-6 Harvards opened the spectacle with a "spectacular" stunt-flying exhibition, which was followed by various other New Zealand aircraft, including ancient Sunderland flying boats and DC-6 Yukon transports, in handling demonstrations. Then came the RAF Britannia and Beverley medium range transports, which were in turn followed by the RAAF's P2V-5 anti-submarine Neptunes and Hercules aircraft. Next came a U.S. Navy P-3 Orion, added at the last moment in recognition of the impending acquisition of this type aircraft by the RNZAF, and a U.S. Air Force Hercules, each plane flying low in demonstrations.

The trainers, cargo, and rescue planes having had their innings, the attack aircraft next appeared on the scene--RNZAF T-13 Canberras

and T-11 Vampires, followed by RAF Victors, described by an American reporter as "beautiful white jet bombers."

Then, most thrilling to the assembled multitude, came three F-105's led by Lieutenant Colonel William B. Craig, Commander of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, which streaked into the air, one astonishing the onlookers with a full-load maximum performance takeoff as it blasted skyward in a near-supersonic speed climb. A demonstration of handling the Thunderchief at supersonic speeds staged by Colonel George B. Simler, the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander, brought awed articulations from the crowd, but the probable high point of the show was the refueling of three F-105's by a KB-50 tanker as they flew low overhead.

The 315th Air Division's C-130's gave demonstrations of both slow and fast flying, followed by a short 800-foot landing through use of their reversible props, and an immediate maximum-power takeoff.

A crack team of RNZAF pilots, flying De Havilland T-11 Vampires, demonstrated precision flying and aerial maneuvers. After this, a RNZAF Canberra put on a good show with a series of sideslips, engine power cut-offs, re-starts, and rolls.

A land-air demonstration climaxed the show, with a combined air attack being hurled against a village held by the "enemy." Canberras, Vampires, and F-105's streaked in low, simulating close ground support cover with strafing, rocket, and bomb attacks. Then came drops of paratroopers from an RAF Argosy and heavy cargo from an RAF Beverley, a precision low-altitude resupply drop from a USAF Hercules while flying at over 200 mph and at 2,000 feet, and an air landing of soldiers and gear from an RNZAF Bristol Freighter and C-130 "Chalk Five," which had been diverted from static display at Ohakea on short notice when the RAAF

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C-130 scheduled to participate in the air landing assault mission went out of commission for maintenance. The demonstration concluded with a ground attack in which the enemy was engaged and destroyed. Explosions, smoke, and fire added to the realism of the simulated engagement.

Besides watching the spectacular air show, tens of thousands swarmed through the various static displayed, the models of "Friendship Seven" and the X-15 rocket research aircraft not surprisingly attracting the most attention. However, the U.S. Air Force's old workhorse, the C-124 Globemaster, also played host to a steady stream of people, while "waves of humanity" swarmed over the late model F-105, whose sister aircraft had been seen cavorting in the skies over Ohakea just moments earlier. Airmen on duty at these ground exhibits answered scores of questions asked by the spectators, including ones concerning the speed, cost, fuel consumption, fuel load, cargo capacity, and altitudes of the aircraft being viewed.

As the reporter for Pacific Stars and Stripes, who was fortunate enough to be present, saw it, the record crowd reflected New Zealand's "deep interest in air travel." And this interest undoubtedly had its origin in the wide spaces separating the South Pacific nation's towns and cities, in conjunction with the great distance at which New Zealand itself lay from Europe and North America. Any future growth would have to be accompanied by an acceleration in air travel.⁴⁹

Comments on the Royal New Zealand Air Force by the Wing Over Task Force Commander: To the official report on Operation Wing Over which Colonel George B. Simler, Jr., the Task Force Commander, submitted upon his return to Kadena Air Base, he appended his personal observations of

the RNZAF and the RAAF, including impressions of certain key military and civil authorities. Inasmuch as contact by the U.S. Air Force with the Royal New Zealand Air Force is quite limited, at best, it seems worthwhile to summarize his comments at this point.

To begin with, he found that the combat capability of the RNZAF was "extremely limited," the Canberra B-12 comprising the main tactical force. Although Number Seventy-five Squadron had recently been equipped with Vampire aircraft in anticipation of an expanded tactical air support role, these planes were so obsolete that they required hand-fabricated parts! At the time of the Wing Over visit, this squadron was commanded by Squadron Leader Brian Stanley-Hunt, an officer "aggressively interested" in developing the tactical air role. Like many other junior officers, however, he felt that introduction of the U.S. McDonnell F-4 aircraft, then in the planning stage, would not be in the best interests of the Royal New Zealand Air Force, simply because the high unit cost of the Phantom jet would so sharply limit the number which could be purchased that possession of it would be impractical. For, no matter how good an aircraft is, it can be in only one place at a time. Thus, quality can not entirely be substituted for quantity. Conversely, Squadron Leader Stanley-Hunt favored acquisition of the Northrop F-5 (a single place, mid-wing, gun-nose fighter version of the T-38A Talon) or a comparable aircraft, of which a considerably greater number could be obtained for the same amount of money.

A situation peculiar to the small size of the RNZAF was the influence which officers in the squadron leader and wing commander category possessed in the councils of the key Air Staff members. This group opposed to the

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purchase of a small number of costly F-4's was also concerned, "and rightly so," with the problems of maintenance that would be certain to arise in an aircraft as complex as the Phantom. Colonel Simler noted, in this connection, that the RNZAF was "strictly a 40-hour-week air force," and might not be capable, from the standpoint of technology, manpower, or finances, of assuming the burden of a highly complex weapons system.

Paradoxically, but not too surprisingly, in view of the contradictions inherent in human nature in general, this same coterie of officers wanted the most advanced aircraft (e.g., the F-4 or the TFX) if they would be available in worthwhile numbers--i.e., three or more squadrons. From his conversations with these officers, Simler had come to suspect that they looked upon the Royal Australian Air Force's purchase of the French Mirage III as a questionable decision.

As he saw it, the entire RNZAF operation, including maintenance, facilities, communications, and almost everything else, was so archaic that the U.S. Air Force must be prepared to lend extensive assistance if it hoped to see an ally of any consequence established in the land of the Southern Alps. The RNZAF officers and men had "the inherent capability and desire to become a full partner in the SEATO air picture," but the great danger was that they would become abjectly frustrated over the ancient equipment they were compelled to use and would allow their morale to go down the drain. After all, it would be almost too much to expect esprit to remain high despite the realization that their best planes were not good enough to take to the skies against even such countries as Indonesia and Communist China.

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The 18th Wing Commander found that there was general acceptance of the idea that the Chief of Air Staff had a time-phased plan for the improvement of the RNZAF. The recent and continuing purchase of C-130's and the possible purchase of P-3 (Lockheed Orion) anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft provided tangible evidence of such a plan's existence. At the same time, this acceptance was qualified by the knowledge that a "serious battle for funds" was going on between the Air and the Army Chiefs of Staff. From what Simler had been told while in New Zealand, this struggle had become "personally bitter."

In addition, there was apparently great reluctance to accept aid which might place New Zealand "in bondage." Nevertheless, the task force commander had "gained the distinct impression" that if such aid became necessary, the New Zealanders preferred to receive it from the United States rather than from Great Britain or Australia. (However, this "confidence" imparted to the visiting American colonel may not have been as candid as he assumed it to be. Only the most innocent (or rude) child would tell a rich uncle discussing the possibility of a gift that he would prefer to receive one from another relative!)

Air Vice Marshal Ian G. Morrison, Chief of the RNZAF Air Staff, was "a keen-eyed officer, outspoken and friendly in a reserved fashion." While not inclined to discuss future plans in other than broad, general terms, he was quite interested at the time of Operation Wing Over in C-130 and P-3 aircraft, with the latter in particular occupying much of his time. In his conversations with Colonel Simler, the Chief of Air Staff had expressed considerable interest in the F-4, not merely because of its high performance characteristics, but also because it had two

engines. The RNZAF budget being extremely tight, the loss of an aircraft from operational causes would be far more painful to that country's air service than it would be to the U.S. Air Force, for example (assuming in both cases that the pilot escaped unharmed). Therefore, the possession of a plane with two engines was regarded as a form of insurance against loss; whereas an inventory of single-engine aircraft always posed the danger of the loss of any whose power plant broke down while in flight. Moreover, the geographical position of New Zealand meant that any flight not made over the country itself had to take place over wide expanses of open water. Although the less expensive and less complicated Northrop F-5 also had two engines, Air Vice Marshal Morrison made no mention of it while talking with Simler.

The latter was told by other officers that Morrison was "more noted among his own people as a sharp administrator" than as an operator. At the same time, Colonel Simler felt that he was "genuinely interested in improving RNZAF-USAF relationships, including an expanded exchange/exercise program (funds permitting)."

Another important New Zealand officer was Air Commodore Thomas F. Gill, the Air Member for Supply. While having "just the reverse reputation" of Air Vice Marshal Morrison among RNZAF officers--i.e., his forte was considered to be operations rather than administration--Gill was also eager to improve the lot of the RNZAF, despite the competition for funds which would inevitably take place with the Army. His present position made him a person of importance in the business of new procurement, and rumor had it that he would soon be taking Morrison's place as Chief of the RNZAF Air Staff.

As Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Flying at Ohakea, Wing Commander G. R. B. Highet was naturally an individual with whom Colonel Simler had much close contact, in the course of which the latter conceived a high respect for the New Zealander. In his opinion, Highet had done such a good job that he should, if at all possible, be commended by General Jacob E. Smart, CINCPACAF. Simler ventured the belief that Wing Commander Highet was "a comer," citing the fact that he had been held over at Ohakea to supervise the air show before being allowed to proceed to his new assignment as Commandant of the RNZAF Staff School at Auckland. Of almost equal importance, at least from the USAF point of view, Highet was also "very pro-American."

The newly-created post of USAF Attache to New Zealand, incidentally, was occupied by Colonel John Burnett, Jr., an officer with a SAC background which definitely limited his tactical air knowledge and, accordingly, his value to the RNZAF. However, Colonel Simler found him to be eager and capable. Hence, he suggested that Burnett be encouraged to expand his tactical air knowledge by being invited to visit selected PACAF units for detailed indoctrination as soon as possible.⁵⁰

Wing Over Moves to Australia: In preparation for the second phase of Operation Wing Over, which would take the task force to Williamstown, Australia, the deployed maintenance people ran preflight inspections on each aircraft. At this time it was discovered that one of the F-105's had received foreign object damage (FOD) of sufficient severity to necessitate an engine change. As a result, four Thunderchiefs made the scheduled flight on 25 February, utilizing one air refueling enroute, while a fifth remained behind to provide the usual escort for the crippled

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plane upon completion of the engine change. This was accomplished the same day, enabling the two-ship element to make the flight from Ohakea to RAAF Williamstown on the 26th. The sustaining of FOD at Ohakea occasioned no real surprise, since the visiting USAF people had already noted, with no little apprehension, the loose gravel, stones, and other debris which cluttered the airfield runways, taxiways, and parking ramp. Besides ruining the one F-105 engine, the littered surfaces could also take credit for the destruction of a goodly number of tires, which fell victim to the gritty rubbish, slashed and torn.

The fuel servicing equipment, contracted for beforehand with Mobil of New Zealand, was somewhat limited, six hours being required to service the half dozen F-105's, and even then all tanks could not be filled completely, owing to the limited flow and pressure.⁵¹

Meanwhile, at 0600 (New Zealand time), 24 February, "Chalk #1" and "Chalk #2" had taken off from Christchurch and landed at Ohakea an hour later, there pausing only three hours before becoming airborne for RAAF Station Williamstown, where they arrived at 1430 the same day. Here they remained but two hours before again taking off for RAAF Station Richmond, which they reached at 1730 hours.

A third C-130, "Chalk #5," left Christchurch at 1100 on the 24th, landed at Ohakea at noon, took off again for Christchurch at 1700 the same day, and arrived there at 1800 hours. The next day, 25 February, "Chalk #5" joined "Chalks #3, #4, and #9 in a flight from Christchurch to Ohakea, which they reached at 1000 hours, just one hour after departure. Pausing only two hours, the four Hercules turbo-prop planes took off for Australia, three of them heading for RAAF Station Williamstown,

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while "Chalk #5" went directly to RAAF Station Richmond. Three hours after their arrival at Williamstown, Chalks #3, #4, and #9 joined Chalks #1, #2, and #5 at Richmond.⁵²

On 27 February, Foxtrot I, an air defense exercise, was conducted at RAAF Station Williamstown, with clean configured F-105's and RAAF F-86's acting as the interceptors, while Australian Canberras from RAAF Station Amberley served as the intruder strike aircraft. Control was provided by an AC&W unit in the Sydney area, as the F-105's flew in two-ship elements, making most of their intercepts at 45,000 feet. A total of eight sorties were scrambled and flown.

The following day, the six F-105's deployed to RAAF Station Amberley, and, while enroute, conducted a low-level navigation mission over the coastal towns lying between Sydney and Brisbane. The task force had hoped to overfly these two major cities of the continent "down under," as well as Newcastle and Ipswich, thus treating the good citizens to an unofficial air show. However, since Air Traffic Control required two-way communication and that facility did not have UHF capability, as did the F-105's, RAAF authorities were obliged to deny the USAF planes clearance to make the overflights.⁵³

On 2 March 1964, another air defense exercise, Foxtrot II, was conducted, with the F-105's and RAAF Canberras from RAAF Amberley acting as the strike aircraft this time--a role in which the Thunderchiefs were really more at home than in their previous appearance as interceptors. Again the RAAF F-86 Sabre Jets from RAAF Station Williamstown played their real-life role of interceptors and defenders of Australia's sacred soil. The F-105's were assigned targets in the Williamstown-New Castle-

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Sydney areas, flying the eight sorties called for.

While in Australia, Colonel Simler, the task force commander, visited the national capital, Canberra, at the personal invitation of Air Marshal Valstow E. Hancock, Chief of Air Staff, RAAF. While the latter was interested in conventional weapons employment, aircraft range, and radar, his primary interest was the all-weather feature of the F-105 radar, including ground map, contour map, and terrain avoidance. Throughout their conversation the air marshal emphasized that the RAAF "must get its weapons to the target despite enroute weather." Nor was he deterred by the current limitations of terrain avoidance radar. Simler found the Australian's grasp of the subject "impressive," and deduced that Hancock had been fighting an internal battle with the "old guard," who were unconvinced that ground map and weapon delivery radar could be developed to a high degree of reliability. Being an advocate of the "blind" delivery system, he naturally looked forward to the TFX aircraft. He was also a proponent of the two-place, two-engine fighter--a type into which both the TFX and the F-4 fell.

More to the point at Colonel Simler's level of command, Air Marshal Hancock was especially interested in enlarging the exercise/exchange activity with USAF units and personnel. Consequently, upon returning to Okinawa, the 18th Commander suggested that an invitation be extended to him or other key officers of the RAAF to observe radar delivery techniques, including navigation and terrain avoidance, as soon as two-place F-105F aircraft were operational within PACAF.⁵⁴

Comments on the Royal Australian Air Force by the Task Force Commander: As he had done in connection with the RNZAF, Colonel Simler

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attached to his official report on Wing Over a word picture of the Royal Australian Air Force and several of its officers with whom he had come into contact during the USAF visit to that country.

Although the RAAF, like the RNZAF, operated under financial restrictions, they were not nearly so stringent. Nevertheless, the limitation on funds was a popular topic of conversation at all levels in both air forces, and the Australian press had recently carried a series of articles criticizing the antiquity of the RAAF, especially in view of the present belligerence of Indonesia, which could quite conceivably see it next attempting to "redeem" the eastern half of New Guinea--that half belonging to Australia. Indonesia's arsenal of late model jet fighters supplied it by the Soviet Union and its fleet of C-130 transports given it by the United States made that nation a potential adversary not to be lightly esteemed.

The first Mirage III purchased from France arrived at Williamstown during the USAF visit, enabling Colonel Simler and the other USAF officers to scrutinize this aircraft closely. Before this, it had been undergoing suitability tests elsewhere in Australia. The Mirage was "a definite improvement" insofar as RAAF air defense interception capability was concerned, but it appeared to be limited to this role. In addition, Simler suspected that the RAAF would have trouble with the high performance aircraft, since it was a French product with a British-designed engine and American instrumentation. Hybrids are successful only rarely.

The B-47 bomber program was not enthusiastically supported in many quarters, owing to concern about its obsolescence, coupled with a paucity

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of maintenance skills for maintaining the American plane properly. On the other hand, even most of those officers not happy with the Stratojet's age and complexity recognized that a transition aircraft to bridge the interval until the arrival of the TFX was a necessity. And this consideration prevailed over dissatisfaction with the interim weapon.

As a result of his visit, Colonel Simler was more than ever persuaded that a definite requirement for an increase in exchange visits between the RAAF and the USAF existed. It was also obvious that an examination of terminology used in air defense and tactical air operations was necessary, in order to insure that the forces employed in any SEATO action used common terms of communication and reference. As it now was, operating techniques differed, radar control units were not accustomed to handling high performance aircraft, and ground handling equipment contained serious inherent differences and limitations. Too, ground control radar and communications such as UHF and TACAN, considered ordinary items of equipment with USAF, were extremely limited, antiquated, or even non-existent in the RAAF. In spite of all this, however, he believed that there were enough procedures and facilities common to the two services to make ready resolution of these problems possible.

At the time of the Wing Over task force's visit to Amberley RAAF Station, Air Vice Marshal Murdock had been conducting an inspection of that base, thus affording Colonel Simler an opportunity to chat with him. From these talks, the latter concluded that the Australian was not entirely satisfied with the purchase of the Mirage III planes, because they were single-engine aircraft carrying a one-man aircrew, while the air vice marshal appeared to favor two-engine jets manned by two people. In this attitude Murdock was in agreement with the position taken by his

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superior, Air Marshal Hancock, as we have seen. Simler gathered that the former was regarded as a "taskmaster" and a demanding commander. From their own conversations, the 18th Wing Commander found him "outspoken, with a technician's approach to aircraft and aviation. He will talk wing loadings, thrust ratios, etc."

Air Commodore Garrison, the OIC of RAAF Station Amberley, Simler wrote off as "A pleasant man running a forty hour week bomber station."

The Officer-in-Charge of RAAF Station Williamstown, Group Captain R. T. Susans, had spent three years in Paris in connection with the Mirage program. Not unnaturally, therefore, he was thoroughly convinced of the new plane's merits, though he was at the same time "intelligent enough to understand its limitations." A gentleman he was, and apparently one with a promising future in the RAAF, provided the Mirage did not "become an albatross." While he did not now believe in the feasibility of ground map, terrain avoidance radar (another way of saying that he was not enthusiastic about the F-105), Simler felt that with his native intelligence, Susans "could become a convert."

Group Captain R. H. Thompson, Officer-in-Charge of the 82d Wing at Amberley, was aware of the serious limitations of the Canberra, even while he had the bomber pilot's typical apathy for fighter operations. Apropos of Exercise Foxtrot I on 27 February, which had seen his Canberras taking the part of hostile strike aircraft, Thompson was unabashedly resentful of the tactics which had been forced on him, explaining emphatically that his bombers would never, under an actual battle situation, have come in at 45,000 feet, as they were required to do, but would instead have attacked at low level, since such was their established pattern of

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operations. Thus, the unrealistic tactics imposed on him by higher authority nullified much of the value of the exercise.

Colonel Simler apparently did not have much contact with Group Captain A. E. Mather, Officer-in-Charge of the 81st Wing at Williams-town, whose organization would soon be converting from F-86's to Mirage III's; for he described him simply as "a rough and ready commander who looks like he can do a good job."

Recommendations Made by Colonel Simler on the Basis of Wing Over:

The thing which appeared to be of foremost importance to Colonel Simler as a result of what he had observed during the deployments in New Zealand and Australia was the great benefits which would accrue to the United States if the potential of the RNZAF were exploited by supplying it with front line USAF equipment. By so doing, the U.S. would improve the SEATO force structure, relieve its own Air Force of a portion of its "excessive commitments," and create a situation that would act "as a ploy to bring the RAAF more in line with USAF doctrine, procedure, and equipment." This last argument he based on his knowledge that a natural rivalry existed between Australia and New Zealand, and that the larger country would be most unhappy if it woke one day to find the smaller partner in the ANZAC team armed with more modern and superior aircraft and aircraft armament. Therefore, circumstances obtained which might well "be exploited to advantage of the United States military and commercial interests."

The Wing Over task force commander recommended that unit, as well as individual, exchange among the USAF, RNZAF, and RAAF should be expanded. While there were many examples that could be cited, two stood out as of paramount importance--operational technique (RAAF conventional

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weapon delivery techniques were out of date) and ground environmental equipment limitations (viz., control radar/communication and ground handling equipment).

The USAF forces involved in the recent operation had worked "exceptionally well" together, and the exercise had been extremely valuable from this standpoint. Events had demonstrated that any special supply other than that programmed and carried by the support aircraft was not needed. Furthermore, even after making allowance for the fact that the maintenance personnel on the deployment had been especially selected for their skills, the performance of the F-105 aircraft had been quite gratifying, as no scheduled sorties had had to be canceled. As a matter of interest, the Thunderchiefs had flown 72 sorties and 197:25 hours during Operation Wing Over.

Simler asserted that future exercises should "definitely" be required to have advance parties in place at least 72 hours beforehand, and in these movement control parties should be included a representative of each participating unit, as well as an officer-in-charge. A responsible officer designated to effect any necessary coordination would be invaluable to all forces involved.

Finally, on the basis of his own recent experience, the colonel considered the appointment of a task force commander, responsible for over-all supervision, essential to the success of any similar future operation.⁵⁵

The Redeployment from Australia to Kadena: The six-plane Wing Over task force was scheduled to depart RAAF Station Amberley for Andersen AFB, Guam, on 4 March, but a pressure leak in the F-1 system hydraulic

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reservoir of one aircraft was discovered on engine start; so the takeoff was delayed for 24 hours, during which time the seals in the offending hydraulic reservoir were replaced. When a second attempt was made on 5 March, everything went smoothly, and the six F-105's put down at Andersen AFB that same day. After remaining on Guam for nearly two days, the task force set out for Kadena and home on March 7th, arriving some two hours later to find their wives, children, and rainy weather on hand to greet them. Before touching down, the planes staged two flyovers-- one with two columns of three planes each and the other a six-plane column.⁵⁶

The spectators who braved the nasty weather to welcome the returned warriors and good-will ambassadors may have noticed that each of the F-105's bore the emblem of the kiwi bird below the cockpit, but in the excitement of the homecoming it is doubtful that many of them took the trouble to learn how this national bird of New Zealand happened to be depicted on the aircraft of another country.

It had all begun when the first American planes arrived at Ohakea for Operation Wing Over, and friendly RNZAF airmen had welcomed their USAF counterparts by painting a kiwi on each visiting aircraft. Then, when the Australians arrived, they responded to this form of greeting by painting kangaroos on the RNZAF planes. The Royal Canadian Air Force people who had come to New Zealand for the anniversary celebration added green maple leaves to any aircraft within painting distance, and RAF men countered with the skull and cross bones insignie of their Victor bombers. Naturally, it didn't take long for the USAF personnel to take a hand in the game, so that in short order the silhouette of the F-105 and the

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flying red horse symbol of the 317th Troop Carrier Squadron's "Flying Jennies" began appearing on the aircraft of the Commonwealth nations. As one reporter wrote, "At the height of the battle, planes taking part in Operation Wingover often looked like flying picture galleries."⁵⁷

Lessons Learned from Wing Over: The chief problem which arose during the Operation Wing Over deployment was the lack of a part number listing for Cost Category III items maintained in the dispersal kit. Only a stock number listing was maintained on these items, and, since the new Technical Order 1F-105D-4 no longer listed stock numbers, considerable time was lost in trying to determine whether the required item was available or not. Under the existing system, it would be possible to go NORIS (Not Operationally Ready for Supplies) for an item that was actually on hand but which could not be identified owing to lack of cross-reference data from the part number to the stock number. As a result of this experience, Colonel Simler recommended that all items carried in the dispersal kits be listed in both part number and stock number sequence, in order that available items could be readily determined, whether requested by part number or stock number.

A second problem disclosed by actual operations was the improper marking of items taken on the deployment, or the outright failure to manifest them at all. As in other recent deployments, the supply personnel were called upon to break down all equipment taken on Wing Over into loads prior to departure from the deployment site. However, in trying to break the equipment into aircraft loads, the supply people found that many items listed on the manifest could not be readily identified from the listing. For example, some of the armament and

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electronics test equipment was described on the manifest as an "instrument shop mobility box," when in actuality it was a single piece of test equipment. In addition, after all items listed on the manifest were segregated, there still remained some 12 items that were not listed thereon. This situation made it necessary to contact the shop personnel responsible for the items and have them advise in which loads the items were to be included. These problems were the more annoying in view of the necessity for completely unloading and storing all cargo at each of the operational bases, then reloading it again at departure time, regardless of the length of time spent there. This wasteful procedure resulted from the lack of facilities for housing and billeting C-130 crews and the paucity of aircraft parking space at the fighter deployment bases.⁵⁸

The use of fuel types different from those used at RAAF bases had necessitated having recourse to commercial sources, because of the RAAF's inability to supply fuel from its own resources and a shortage of surface tankers and storage tanks. Consequently, JP-4 fuel had had to be manufactured and transported by sea tanker vessels to the various bases. In addition, portable, rubber-inflatable storage tanks had had to be placed at each base, as had commercial pumping units and surface tankers for the storage and transfer of fuel to the aircraft. As the USAF Air Attache to Australia commented, the substitution of Australian-produced JP-1 for the regular JP-4 used by the 18th TFW would have solved the greater part of these problems.

The Air Attache also had had to make arrangements for the manufacture, supply, distribution, and storage of liquid oxygen and water for F-105

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heavyweight takeoffs when it was found that the RAAF could not provide such support.

Owing to limited parking and support facilities and a maximum gross weight limitation of 180,000 pounds, it had been found that Port Moresby could not be used as a primary base to support tanker operations, despite the original plans to utilize it for this purpose.

The USAF Air Attache further noted that Project Wing Over communications traffic had taxed communications facilities at the Australian air bases to the utmost, so that considerable after-duty-hours employment became necessary. In the light of this experience, he recommended that when future operations of similar or greater magnitude were held, USAF communications personnel should be assigned in a temporary duty status to the communications centers.⁵⁹

Favorable Reaction to the Execution of Operation Wing Over: With Operation Wing Over completed and out of the way and leisure's having presented itself to stand back and assess its worth, the Royal Australian Air Force and the USAF Air Attache arrived at the joint conclusion that it had contributed significantly to the enhancement of the close relationship already existing between the air forces of the two nations. Accordingly, the task force commander and the supporting commanders, as well as the individual USAF personnel involved, were "to be complimented for their outstanding performance" during the exercise.⁶⁰

On 25 March 1964, General Jacob E. Smart, Commander-in-Chief, PACAF, addressed a letter of appreciation to Fifth Air Force in which he declared that both the planning and the execution of Wing Over had been performed "in the highest professional manner." The pilots and support personnel

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had displayed "a degree of competence and propriety" that reflected great credit upon the United States Air Force and upon the country itself. Perhaps of equal importance, they had "fulfilled the role of Ambassadors in Blue in an outstanding manner."⁶¹

On 8 April 1964, Major General Charles M. McCorkle, Fifth Air Force Vice Commander, indorsed Smart's letter to 313th Air Division, adding his "appreciation and congratulations" to those expressed by the PACAF Commander. On the basis of informal reports and newspaper clippings brought back from New Zealand and Australia, he knew that the exercises in both countries "down under" had been highly successful and mutually beneficial. The favorable, professional "image" created in the two countries visited certainly increased "the international credibility" of the U.S. Air Force and provided a greater understanding of its "mission, capabilities, and desire to share and support the ideals of freedom."⁶²

Finally, on 13 April 1964, Major General Albert P. Clark, the 313th Air Division Commander, whose deep interest in seeing to it that Wing Over would be an unqualified success had caused him to lead the preliminary route survey in person, indorsed the letters from Generals Smart and McCorkle to the Commanders of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing and the 1962d Communications Group, and to the 313th Air Division Director of Operations. While so doing, he took the opportunity to express in writing his appreciation "to all the supporting units and organizations whose work had contributed so much to the operation and made possible its successful completion by the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing."⁶³

Exercise Jumbo.

On 28 February 1964, 313th Air Division Operations Order 326-64,

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"Jumbo," was published and distributed. The purpose of this exercise, to be held on Nightmare Range, Osan AB, Korea, on 25 March 1964, was to demonstrate a maximum concentration of air-delivered ordnance in a minimum time, in close coordination with artillery fire.⁶⁴

Sixteen F-105's, plus three spare aircraft, deployed to Osan AB for Exercise Jumbo, supposedly in time to allow the pilots to make practice runs over Nightmare Range and insure their complete orientation. As it happened, though, General Hamilton Howze, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army and United Nations Command, Korea, insisted that the range safety criteria be rigidly adhered to, thus necessitating a last minute change in tactics and, in the process, stirring up considerable agitation on the part of the Air Force participants and observers. Among the latter were the 313th Air Division Commander, Major General Albert P. Clark, and Captain James L. Thompson, Chief of the 313th Programs Branch. General Clark departed early for a meeting with Lieutenant General Broadhurst, USA, of the UNC, Korea, Brigadier General Mitchell, USAF, Commander of the 314th Air Division, Colonel Evans, of the UNC, Korea, Colonel George B. Simler, Jr., Commander of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, and Colonel Jones E. Bolt, the 18th TFW Deputy Commander. In the warm discussions that ensued, General Clark backed Colonel Simler's position, though with the reservation that if the tactics had been clearly defined early in the planning, the issue--viz., close formation drop of six 750-lb. bombs for show--would have been rehearsed so carefully that safety would be practically guaranteed.

Although the exercise was scheduled for 25 March, as we have seen, very bad weather caused it to be set back to the weather alternate date

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of 27 March, and even then the day was marred by 35-knot gusty surface winds, an intermittent 1,000-foot overcast, and visibility of only half a mile, with snow. General Howze had invited more than 100 general officers to attend Exercise Jumbo, and, despite the nasty weather, a large percentage of them turned out at Nightmare Range, where the United Nations Commander personally regaled them with a description of the various events.

The first event consisted of the delivery of 24 750-lb. bombs by a formation of four F-105's. All were directly on target. By the time the impact had reached the reviewing stand, four F-105's, line abreast, had commenced firing the 20-mm. HEI/API (high explosive incendiary/armor-piercing incendiary) ammunition from their Gatling-gun-like Vulcan cannons. After a short burst, each aircraft fired 114 rockets, with all again being directly on target. The next event called for two flights of four aircraft to make a formation napalm drop. However, the flights were not properly lined up, causing them to make a dry run. Another pass was completed satisfactorily. The fourth flight had an abort, so that it arrived with only three aircraft. The total time of the 18th Wing's participation in Jumbo had amounted to approximately five minutes.

Looking back on the exercise, Captain Thompson wrote on 7 April that, in view of the breakdown of communications in the early planning phases of Jumbo, he recommended that 313th Air Division headquarters be represented at all future planning conferences involving any of its forces. In this case, because the planning was to be primarily one of tactics for the F-105, Major James S. Carson, the 18th's Chief of Operations and Training, had been designated the 313th Air Division representative.

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However, in Thompson's opinion, this arrangement had proved so unsatisfactory that he urged that any personnel designated to represent the division in the future should also be qualified and authorized to represent the Commander. In other words, Major Carson had represented 313th only nominally, and had enjoyed no personal discussions with General Clark during the planning stages.

Captain Thompson took a dim view of the 18th's aborted sorties, declaring that "when we are committed to provide 16 aircraft for an exercise of this magnitude [we should] show with 16."

Finally, whenever exercises of the nature of Jumbo were planned henceforth, great care should be taken to insure that the maximum delivery capabilities of the F-105 were demonstrated. (From this comment it is evident that the Programs Officer did not feel that these capabilities had been displayed by the 18th contingent's performance in Exercise Jumbo!)⁶⁵

Exercise Aumee III.

313th's Plans and Programs Division published 313ADIV OPORD 329-64, "Aumee III," on 1 May 1964, in connection with a joint U.S. 1st Special Forces Group-Republic of China (ROC) exercise. The 313th Air Division units involved were to provide the Exercise Director, as well as USAF tactical air support in the roles of sterilizing the drop zone, neutralizing enemy positions, interdicting lines of communications, and strip alert for immediate strike requests.

Captain James L. Thompson, the 313th Air Division Chief of Programs, attended a planning conference for Aumee III on 11-12 May 1964, which had

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been called to resolve problems already manifesting themselves even before the exercise actually got underway.

At that very time (12 May), however, all F-105's were grounded, and remained so until 20 June 1964. As a result, the Air Force participation in Aumee III was canceled on 18 May.⁶⁶

Planning for Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI.

On 13-14 May 1964 Captain Thompson and Lieutenant Colonel John C. Neill, Commander of the 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, attended a planning conference for Exercise Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI in Taipei, Taiwan. The objectives were to improve the combat readiness of the participating units; to exercise the airborne capabilities of the U.S. Army 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), which was situated on Okinawa, and the Nationalist Chinese Airborne Regiment; to exercise all aspects of carrier air support including personnel and heavy equipment drops, air landings of equipment and personnel, and aerial resupply; to exercise all facets of tactical air, including reconnaissance, counter-air interdiction, and close air support operations; and to exercise signal communications.

The two officers had scarcely returned to Kadena, however, when Fifth Air Force notified this headquarters that the 41st Air Division, rather than the 313th, would represent the Air Force in the exercise scheduled for 23 October-5 November. Captain Thompson thereupon sent his report covering the concepts and objectives of the exercise to Fifth Air Force on 18 May, for forwarding to 41st Air Division.⁶⁷

Subsequently, on 10 June 1964, Fifth Air Force informed 313th that the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was to furnish three RF-101's and a photo processing cell (PPC) for Sky Soldier/Tien Bing VI.⁶⁸

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SECRETThe Question of Quick Strike Force Typhoon Evacuation Procedures.

Early in the historical period, higher headquarters had authorized the evacuation of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing's Quick Strike ground alert force to Osan AB, Korea, whenever the approach of a typhoon to Okinawa rendered such a course of action advisable. Two alternative procedures were embraced in 18TFW OPLAN 85-64, "Quick Strike Typhoon Evacuation," and were approved by Fifth Air Force and PACAF. The first of these consisted of reconfiguring and relocating sufficient aircraft at Osan AB for weapon uploading to enable them to assume the Quick Strike posture. The second procedure was for the alert force to reassume its Quick Strike posture through the application of tactical ferry procedures, but only when so directed by Headquarters, PACAF.

On 19 May 1964, Colonel Richard D. Goree, 313th Air Division's Director of Operations, wrote Fifth Air Force a lengthy letter setting forth his reasons for vastly preferring the latter alternative, but with one important modification.

To begin with, the actions necessary to support the relocation of aircraft at Osan AB without utilizing tactical ferry procedures were "costly and time consuming." Experience indicated that 12 hours were required to reconfigure and reposition the aircraft at Osan after the decision to evacuate had been reached. In order to allow enough time for the deployment of F-105's to Osan and the downloading of the aircraft at Kadena after receipt of authority from Fifth Air Force to upload at Osan and permit the downloaded aircraft to be evacuated or hangared, it was necessary that the decision to request tactical ferry approval be made while the typhoon fringe winds of 50 knots or more were 72 hours

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away from Kadena.

Under the existing system, the request for tactical ferry authority had to be forwarded to the Fifth Air Force Command Center, for relay to Headquarters, PACAF, where the ultimate decision would be made. Any delays encountered in transmissions or any hesitations in making a decision could jeopardize the safety of the Quick Strike fleet should the request for tactical ferry be denied.

To reposition the Quick Strike aircraft at Osan under the first alternative was a huge task, with many ramifications. Numerous man-hours were wasted by the additional workload generated by the configuration changes and increased weapons handling involved. Also, the risk to personnel and the potential for accidents naturally increased proportionately with the amount of weapons handling. Thus, for an average deployment of five to seven days, the weapons handling was quadrupled. That is, when the danger of typhoon damage became imminent at Kadena, a weapon had to be uploaded at Osan and a weapon downloaded at Kadena for each sortie number.

Then, after the typhoon threat had passed, the weapons at Osan had to be downloaded and those at Kadena uploaded again. Even so, the overall capability of the Quick Strike force was diminished, since compatible weapons were not available from the Osan inventory. Such being the case, weapons had to be substituted willy nilly by hield and type, causing profile changes, increasing loading times, and resulting in enemy targets being covered with weapons of lower yield.

Another disadvantage was that the lead time required to execute a non-tactical ferry deployment safely resulted in the Quick Strike aircraft's being launched from Kadena prematurely and, more often than not,

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unnecessarily. Since 1959, only 11 typhoons out of 33 forecast to strike Okinawa had given Kadena winds in excess of 50 knots (and of these 11 only one, Typhoon Tilda, of October 1961, had produced winds of any consequence). Thus, it was evident that typhoon tracks which were forecast 72 hours beforehand simply did not possess the accuracy needed to prevent a high percentage of premature evacuations.

The annual typhoon evacuation rate for the 18th TFW was seven deployments, a factor constituting a major disruption of the normal training schedule. If to the period of actual evacuation one added the time consumed in uploading at Kadena and in downloading at Osan after the threat posed by the typhoon had passed, as well as in reconfiguring the F-105's upon their return to Kadena, it would be obvious that the interruption of the training schedule by these expected typhoon blows would be considerable.

Having described the costliness and damaging effects of reconfiguring and relocating sufficient Quick Strike aircraft at Osan AB for weapon uploading, Colonel Goree turned his attention to arguments supporting the use of tactical ferry as a standard procedure. In this connection, he asserted, the "airworthiness and reliability" of the F-105 had been demonstrated in the PACOM area through the normal mission requirements, through support of such deployments as "Wing Over" and "Air Boon Choo," and through support of the exercises conducted at Nightmare Range in Korea. These same qualities had been further emphasized by the rotational commitments of TAC and that command's programmed employment of tactical ferry by its Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) units in support of contingency and general war commitments.

A comparison of the man-hours involved in the two types of operations revealed a very great difference. If 18 Quick Strike aircraft

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(plus four spares) were deployed to Osan AB upon the declaration of Condition III for a typhoon, 180 man-hours would be consumed in altering them to the alert configuration, at the rate of 10 man-hours per aircraft. Another 126 man-hours would be required to prepare the F-105's for upload at Osan, at the rate of seven man-hours per aircraft, this operation consisting of dropping the centerline and bomb-bay tanks, installing the weapon rack, making a fire control check, and installing the thermal shield. A total of 432 man-hours would go into uploading at Osan (24 per aircraft) and 252 into downloading at Kadena (14 per aircraft), 324 into uploading at Kadena upon their return to Kadena (18 per aircraft) and 238 into downloading at Osan (16 per aircraft). Still another 72 man-hours would be needed to prepare the aircraft for the return flight to Kadena (four per aircraft), including removal of the weapons rack and installation of the fuel manifold, the bomb-bay tanks, and the centerline tank. Yet another 36 man-hours would be required to reconfigure the Thunderchiefs to a training status at Kadena (two per aircraft). In addition, the four spares taken along to Osan would require 40 man-hours to alter to an alert configuration and another eight man-hours to reconfigure to a training status upon their return to Kadena.

Not included in the above figures were the man-hours spent in aircraft towing, drop tank defueling, refueling after the tanks were reinstalled, dearming, rechannelization, and the time spent in loading, profile changes, and study necessitated by weapons substitutions. Nevertheless, the total came to 1,758 man-hours per trip and 12,306 per year, on the basis of an average of seven evacuations.

If the same 18 F-105's and six spares were to reassume the Quick

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Strike posture through application of tactical ferry procedures, Colonel Goree hastened to point out, the total man-hours consumed in the tactical ferry operation would amount to only 90, and those for the average seven evacuations in a single year would come to but 630. Making up this far more modest figure were nine man-hours for buckling the weapons and preparing for flight (half an hour per aircraft), nine man-hours to prepare for the alert at Osan (half an hour per aircraft), 60 man-hours to put the six spare F-105's in an alert configuration (10 per aircraft) and 12 man-hours to reconfigure the six spares to a training status upon their return to Kadena (two hours per aircraft), and an additional seven man-hours to prepare an F-105 for uploading at Osan.

In view of these comparative figures, Colonel Goree recommended that tactical ferry procedures "be adopted as the standard method for typhoon evacuation of the Quick Strike Force, and that the decision to use tactical ferry procedures be delegated to the Commander, 313th Air Division or his designated representative," instead of continuing the painfully and dangerously slow procedure of having to consult Fifth Air Force and PACAF before acting. The latter, as well as the host 314th Air Division at Osan AB, would be notified and coordinated with promptly under the terms of Colonel Goree's proposal.⁶⁹

PROJECT ABLE MABLE

We have seen in the preceding 313th Air Division History that Headquarters, USAF had directed PACAF late in 1961 to provide aerial reconnaissance of certain vital areas of Southeast Asia. The upshot of this had been the promulgation of PACAF Operations Order 220-62 (ABLE MABLE)

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on 14/ January 1962, which called for visual and photographic reconnaissance by RF-101's--for the most part--operating from Don Muang, Thailand, Tan Son Nhut, South Viet Nam, or some other location which might be specified at a later date. The objects of their reconnaissance would be Laos, South Viet Nam, Thailand, and any other areas which PACAF might specifically authorize or direct.

The reconnaissance task forces were to be supplied by Fifth Air Force in the form of aircraft, qualified pilots, ground personnel, logistic support, and any other support which PACAF might direct or which Fifth itself should determine, after consultation with Thirteenth Air Force, to be desirable or necessary.

Operational control of all Fifth Air Force units and assets would be retained by the Fuchu headquarters until their arrival at Clark AB, when it would be transferred to Thirteenth Air Force. In addition, Fifth Air Force would, in coordination with Thirteenth, arrange for the rotation of aircraft and pilots or support personnel whenever it was deemed necessary to insure the maintenance of operational effectiveness on the part of the deployed forces.

Through their forward headquarters, the 2d Advance Squadron (ADVON), Thirteenth Air Force, would exercise operational control of all deployed reconnaissance task force (RTF) operations conducted in compliance with PACAF OPORD 220-62. The deployed reconnaissance forces would be directed by the RTF Commander, who would, in turn, be responsible to the senior 2d ADVON Commander present at the deployment location.

Thirteenth Air Force was to establish procedures and monitor the conduct of reconnaissance mission activity to insure the effectiveness

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of operations. It was also to provide T-33 or RT-33 aircraft as Mail Pouch couriers for the transport of reconnaissance products between operating locations or receiving agencies within Southeast Asia. The Clark headquarters was to insure the establishment of a mission aircraft flight-following procedure which would enable the probable position to be ascertained, in the event a plane was shot down or the pilot forced to bail out, and facilitate recovery of the latter. Thirteenth was further expected, within the limits of the cargo or transport aircraft assigned to it, to provide air transportation between Clark AB and the operating locations, as support of Project Able Mable should demand. Finally, it was to provide general supply support and equipment, including vehicular transport, communications support, and such other services as might be required.

The 315th Air Division, with headquarters at Tachikawa AB, Japan, was to provide intra-theater airlift transportation as required in deployment, supply and resupply, and redeployment associated with Project Able Mable.⁷⁰

The first two RF-101C Voodoos of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron to support Project Able Mable departed their home base at Kadena on 1 May 1962 and were joined by two more aircraft from the same organization later in the month. The four RF-101's of the 15th TRS making up the reconnaissance task force returned to Kadena on 15 November, being replaced by pilots of the 45th TRS from Yokota AB, Japan. Although only four aircraft had been deployed at any one time, a total of 25 squadron pilots were involved in the Able Mable operations through 15 November 1962, as a result of frequent rotations to Southeast Asia.

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Before the 15th TRS again assumed responsibility for the reconnaissance flights on 26 April 1963, the operations center was moved from Don Muang AB to Tan Son Nhut, because of a prohibition of overflights of Laos imposed by the U.S. State Department in the fall of 1962, which had been followed by a CINCPAC directive restricting tactical reconnaissance to the confines of South Viet Nam.⁷¹

The latter half of 1963 saw the reconnaissance task force acquire control of two RB-26's, in accordance with 2d Air Division OPLAN 125-64, thus bringing the total strength of the detachment to six RF-101's, two RB-57's, two RB-26's, two U-3B's, 21 officers, and 80 airmen. In July 1963 the entire organization was designated as Detachment 1, 33d Tactical Group, 2d Air Division, and placed under command of the 2d Air Division Staff Reconnaissance Officer. As part of the same action, the senior (field grade) officer of the 15th TRS present became the detachment Operations Officer, whereas he had previously commanded the organization during the period of his temporary duty in Southeast Asia.⁷²

SEATO Exercise Air Boon Choo (described in Chapter III of this history) took four RF-101's of the 15th TRS to Don Muang AB on 20 April 1964, with six photo laboratory personnel to operate the Photographic Processing Cell (PPC) also deploying. RTF Bravo, as it was named, flew an average of six sorties daily for the six days of the exercise against low-level targets, with 99 per cent of them being successfully photographed. The two umpires assigned to the squadron were impressed to the extent that they commented favorably on the "professional and competent" makeup of the squadron personnel.⁷³

Air Boon Choo concluded, RTF Bravo departed Don Muang on 30 April

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1964 and put down at Tan Son Nhut AB, just outside Saigon, the same day. Less than 24 hours later the task force pilots began flying missions under PACAF OPORD 220-62 (Able Mable), the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron having taken over responsibility for reconnaissance of Southeast Asia that date (1 May) from the 45th TRS until relieved on 1 November 1964. Since the operations order called for six RF-101's to be deployed at Tan Son Nhut AB, the 15th had also dispatched two additional Voodoo aircraft directly from Kadena to join the four coming in from Don Muang. The RTF was assigned 27 sorties per week, these flights to be made in support of the aerial photographic needs of the U.S. and South Vietnamese armies. In addition, strike and post-strike reconnaissance of U.S. Air Force and Republic of Viet Nam Air Force missions was to be flown.

On 19 May 1964 the 15th TRS was again committed to action in Laos when the Pathet Lao forces attacked the Plain des Jarres. The 15th formed part of the "Yankee Team," and was assigned all targets in Laos south of 18°30' N., the targets being lines of communication, military outposts, and airfields. As of the end of June, 64 sorties had been flown in Laos, with hostile fire being more evident in this area than in South Viet Nam, two of the RF-101's being hit by ground fire. The pilots brought back pictures proving that truck convoys were entering Laos from North Viet Nam—a practice which everyone was morally certain had been going on for a long time, but of which tangible proof had hitherto been lacking. During the last weeks in June 1964, the squadron flew several missions over the Plain des Jarres, but with armed F-100's now accompanying them.

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At first the requisite air-to-air refueling was provided by U.S. Navy A-3B's and A-4C's, but at mid-year USAF KB-50's had taken over the chore. Danang AB, Republic of Viet Nam, was also made available to the planes of the 15th TRS as a staging and recovery base.

In a less hazardous vein (the only shooting was by Voodoo aerial cameras), the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron had been tapped for two RF-101's to meet 313th Air Division's reconnaissance commitment for SEATO Exercise Ligtas (a Filipino word meaning "rescued" or "saved"), which was to be staged from 12 May to 10 June 1964--the 27th such SEATO maneuver since 1956. On 1 April two RF-101's were deployed to Clark AB to shoot area cover and road reconnaissance photography of the exercise area on Mindoro, a small island just south of Luzon. The diminutive task force flew 21 sorties in execution of the Fifth Air Force operations order, completing its mission ahead of schedule.⁷⁴

The following awards and decorations were awarded during the first half of 1964:⁷⁵

RTF Alpha: Reconnaissance Task Force of the year.

Captain Thomas A. O'Meara (A03058906): Reconnaissance Pilot of the Quarter.

Air Medals and Oak Leaf Clusters for combat support in Southeast Asia were awarded to the following personnel:

Major Alexander P. Butterfield (24747A): (25 Apr. - 30 Aug. 1963) - 1st Oak Leaf Cluster.

Major Alvar B. Wallin (A01100816): (13 July - 29 Sept. 1963) - 7th Oak Leaf Cluster.

Major Richard G. Thompson (42178A): (9 June - 21 Sept. 1963) - 1st Oak Leaf Cluster.

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Captain Donald P. Beck (57386A): (29 June - 18 Oct. 1963) -
3d Oak Leaf Cluster.

Captain Billy B. Boyd (A03033881): (20 May - 2 July 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain William J. Dault (A03025576): (14 June - 15 Oct. 1963) -
1st Oak Leaf Cluster.

Captain Howard A. Davis (A03038269): (7 Aug. - 30 Oct. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain George R. Hall (25106A): (14 May - 25 Aug. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain Hallett P. Marston, Jr. (A01910990): (29 June - 23
Oct. 1963) - 3d Oak Leaf Cluster.

Captain William L. McCord, Jr. (46544A): (11 May - 5 Sept.
1963) - Air Medal.

Captain Krendall E. Morris (58239A): (29 Apr. - 25 Aug. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain Thomas A. O'Meara (A03058906): (5 May - 29 Sept. 1963) -
1st Oak Leaf Cluster.

Captain Jerry A. Patton (A03037773): (29 May - 6 Aug. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain Robert W. Pitt (54188A): (1 May - 20 Sept. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain Harry V. Runge (45170A): (14 June - 30 Aug. 1963) -
Air Medal.

Captain Ernest W. Rutledge, Jr. (55298A): (30 July - 1 Oct.
1963) - Air Medal.

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Captain Burton L. Waltz (57337A): (3 May - 1 Sept. 1963) -
Air Medal.

The increased number of 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron pilots involved in the Southeast Asia commitment produced a travel problem. Heretofore, maximum utilization of C-130's had always been the policy of the squadron where intra-theater travel was concerned. And not too much difficulty was encountered even now in catching a ride on some of the many C-130's of Detachment 1, 315th Air Division, based at Naha AB, Okinawa, which flew down to Tan Son Nhut almost every day. It was the return trip from Saigon to Okinawa which produced the obstacles. This situation was brought about by the policy of the MATS people in Saigon that returning personnel must use commercial contract aircraft, if at all available, and that C-130's were not to be utilized unless no commercial contract flights were to be had. This practice often kept a recon pilot in Saigon for two or three days after his replacement had arrived, thus detracting from accomplishment of the squadron mission and maintenance of a General War Plan (GWP) posture demanded by highest priority plans. How the Saigon MATS representatives justified their position, in view of the explicit provision of PACAF OPOD 220-62 that 315th Air Division would furnish intra-theater airlift transportation "as required in deployment" is difficult to understand.

The proficiency flying which would normally have been flown at Kadena by the 15th TRS was quite limited throughout the period of RTF Bravo's deployment, since this commitment left very little flying time for the pilots remaining behind on Okinawa.⁷⁶

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FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	---	5AFR No. 23-7, sub.: Organization--Field: Detachment 3, Hq., 313th Air Division, dtd. 11 July 1960; PACAFR No. 55-8, par. 7c, dtd. 9 March 1962.
2	---	5AF GO 29, dtd. 24 June 1960; 313th AF GO 32, dtd. 1 Aug. 1960; 313th AD GO 42, dtd. 14 Dec. 1960; 5AF SO G-4, dtd. 11 Jan. 1962; PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.
3	---	History, Det. 3, 313th Air Div., 1 Jan.-30 June 1964, pp. 2-7.
4	45	News Article, "Plans for QR Begun Last June," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964.
5	46	News Article, "Exercise 'Quick Release' Set for February," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 17 Jan. 1964; News Article, "First Elements Arrive: 'Quick Release' Airlift Underway," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 31 Jan. 1964.
6	48	News Article, "Base Will Play Big Role in Army-Air Force Exercise: KAB Will Support 'Quick Release,'" <u>Kadena Falcon</u> , 23 Jan. 1964; News Article, "First Phase of 'Quick Release' Starts Tomorrow: Men & Material To Arrive by Air: Month-Long Exercise in Three Parts," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 24 Jan. 1964.
7	50	News Article, "Air Power Will Be Put to the Test," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 26 Jan. 1964; News Article, "Quick Release Adds F-105 Jets to Field Arsenal," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 6 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Air Force Readies for Exercise QR, 18th Tact. Fighter Wing To Play Important Role," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; History, Directorate of Operations (D/O), 313th Air Div., Jan. 1964, p. 2; Feb. 1964, p. 1.
8	53	News Article, "'Depot' Unloading Begins," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 30 Jan. 1964; News Article, "'Quick Release' Depots Arrive at Naha Port," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 28 Jan. 1964; News Article, "Weather Gets Jump on Exercise: Wing & Rain Pelt Yomitan's 'Tent City,'" <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; News Article, "In High Gear: Quick Release Ahead of Schedule," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 1 Feb. 1964; News Article, "MATS To Deliver 'Manpower' to Okinawa for Exercise QR," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; News Article, "Okinawa Units Designated in Exercise 'Quick Release,'" <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
9	59	News Article, "25th's Support Arrived Wednesday," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; News Article, "In High Gear: Quick Release Ahead of Schedule," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 1 Feb. 1964; In an article, "Cargo Unloading Nearly Over: Troops Set To Go," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 3 Feb. 1964, it is stated that the <u>Cheyenne</u> arrived on Saturday, 1 February.
10	56	News Article, "In High Gear: Quick Release Ahead of Schedule," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 1 Feb. 1964.
11	56 47 61 62	<u>Ibid.</u> ; News Article, "First Elements Arrive: 'Quick Release' Airlift Underway," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; News Article, "'Task Force' Readies for Phase II of Exercise: To Head North Monday for 3-Day Mock War," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 7 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Exercise Quick Release Is Over But a Lot of Cleaning Up Remains," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 24 Feb. 1964.
12	60 63	News Article, "Cargo Unloading Nearly Over--Troops Set To Go," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 3 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Last Load of Troops Due," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 4 Feb. 1964.
13	64	News Article, "Last Exercise Troops on Way," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 5 Feb. 1964.
14	65 66	News Article, "Quick Release Comforts: Yomitan Tent City Houses 4,000 Troops," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 1 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Windy, Wet--Good Training," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 3 Feb. 1964.
15	64	News Article, "Last Exercise Troops on Way," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 5 Feb. 1964.
16	67 68 69 70	News Article, "Okinawa Units To Be 'Enemy' in QR: 173d, 1st Sp Forces, B&VA To Fight Guerrilla War as 'Aggressor Forces,'" <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 31 Jan. 1964; News Article, "25th Inf. Unit Maps a March into N. Okinawa," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 7 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Quick Release Aggressors Are Poised To Strike," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 9 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Guerrillas Coil for Strike," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 14 Feb. 1964.
17	71 72	News Article, "In Exercise 'Quick Release': Task Force Moves North To Engage 'Guerrillas,'" <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 9 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Ready for Aggressors: Quick Release Task Force Heads for 'Battle,'" <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 14 Feb. 1964.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
17	72	<u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 10 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Up North: Task Force Faces Guerrilla Forces," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 14 Feb. 1964.
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18	74	News Article, "Task Force Destroys 'Enemy' Supply Dumps," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 11 Feb. 1964; News Article, "Task Force, Aggressors Meet in 3-Day Mock Guerrilla War," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 14 Feb. 1964.
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19	76	Feature Article, "A Not-So-Quick Release: Aggressors Throw a Curve at Task Force," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 13 Feb. 1964.
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CHAPTER III

OPERATION AIR BOON CHOO

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PLANNING FOR AIR BOON CHOO

On 12 March 1964, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) announced from its headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, that a tactical exercise to be known as Air Boon Choo would be held in Thailand in April as the 26th in a series of exercises which had been conducted since 1956. This latest in the series--named in honor of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) Commander, Air Chief Marshal Boon Choo Chandrubeksa--would be sponsored jointly by Thailand, the United States, and Great Britain, with participation by tactical air units from five of SEATO's eight "defense partners" and staff personnel from all eight nations taking part. The exercise director would be Royal Thai Air Force Vice Marshal Paieng Kantarat, with USAF Major General Sam Maddux, Jr., the Thirteenth Air Force Commander, and RAF Air Commodore Thomas N. Stack serving as his deputies. The exercise would be conducted in two parts--namely, the defense of Thailand against enemy and insurgent forces by Thai air and ground forces acting alone, and participation in the defense of Thailand by SEATO ground and air units. The purpose of the exercise was to develop, practice, and evaluate procedures for the control and coordination of air operations at various command levels, and to test combined logistics systems. It would also provide Thai armed forces practice in the conduct of limited civic action and counter-insurgency operations.¹

Although Air Boon Choo was actually sponsored by only Thailand, the United States, and Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand also contributed air and ground units. As for the other three SEATO nations, more lukewarm than the aforementioned, they contented themselves with sending staff personnel and observers.

Operating directly under the SEATO field forces would be Force Alpha, a corps-level ground headquarters, which would include a detachment from the Okinawa-based IX Corps commanded by Colonel Eugene M. Donohue, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, IX Corps. Physically located in headquarters at Camp Friendship, Korat, Thailand, Force Alpha would control the operations of SEATO units, including the 3d Thai Division, the 25th U.S. Infantry Division, the 28th Commonwealth Brigade (made up of one battalion each from Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), and armored cavalry, artillery, army aviation, and engineer units.²

On 19 March, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force ordered 313th Air Division to deploy 12 F-105's of the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing to Korat AB and four RF-101's to Don Muang AB, the latter also in Thailand, just outside Bangkok, on E-Day (20 April 1964) to participate in Air Boon Choo. The termination date of the exercise for the F-105's and RF-101's from Kadena would be E+11, following an aerial demonstration at Don Muang on 1 May, and the supporting 18th Tactical Fighter Wing elements were to redeploy to Okinawa the next day, E+12.

313th Air Division was assigned responsibility as over-all mission commander for all Fifth Air Force elements supporting the operation during both the deployment and the redeployment phases. This headquarters, in turn, stated in its Operations Order 328-64 (Air Boon Choo)

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of 23 March 1964 that the Air Component Commander (ACC), SEATO Field Forces, was to assume operational control of the F-105/RF-101 Task Force upon its arrival at the bed-down bases in Thailand during the period from 22 April through 1 May 1964.

The 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) was directed to station F-105-qualified movement control officers (MCO's) at Clark AB, Philippines, and at Korat AB not later than E-2. These MCO's would coordinate weather reconnaissance, overwater rescue, local crash and rescue service, and in-flight refueling. In addition, they were to transmit "Go-No Go" messages at 24, 12, eight, and five-hour intervals prior to the scheduled launch time. These "Go-No Go" and all other MCO messages would be transmitted to 313th Air Division, to the 18th TFW, the 31st Air Rescue Squadron, the 41st Air Division, the Thirteenth Air Force Command Center, to Headquarters Air Component Command, SEATO Field Forces, AOC, to the Fifth Air Force Command Center, to launch and recovery bases, and to enroute MCO's at Clark, Korat, and Don Muang Air Bases.

The same procedure would apply for the redeployment, except that the MCO's would operate at Tan Son Nhut AB, Republic of Viet Nam, and Clark AB. The Project Able Mable Detachment Commander would designate the movement control officer at Tan Son Nhut. The final task force "Go-No Go" message should be transmitted both six and three hours prior to launch, unless the situation required earlier notification.

All participating aircraft of the 18th TFW were to be turned around immediately upon arriving at Korat and their in-commission status reported to the Air Component Command Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), Korat AB. Colonel Floyd White, the 18th TFW Director of Operations, would be

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the ASOC Director for the period of the exercise.

In addition to the 313th Air Division, other Air Force commands which would be playing a part in Exercise Air Boon Choo were the 315th Air Division, the 41st Air Division, the 1st Weather Wing, and the Pacific Air Rescue Center. The 315th Air Division was to furnish airlift for the deployment, resupply, and redeployment of support personnel and equipment. The 41st Air Division would be responsible for furnishing 10 KB-50's for in-flight refueling of the F-105 and RF-101 aircraft during their non-stop deployment to Korat and Don Muang Air Bases and for their return flight. The 1st Weather Wing would provide mission control forecasts to the respective movement control officers at Clark, Korat, and Don Muang in sufficient time for them to transmit the required "Go-No Go" messages; while Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing, at Kadena AB, would provide enroute and terminal weather forecasts and briefings for the deployment of the F-105/RF-101 aircraft, with one forecaster to be in place at Korat not later than 18 April 1964. The Pacific Air Rescue Center (MATS) at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, was to provide rescue services on the leg from ARCP Poro Point to the destination, with the 31st Air Rescue Squadron at Clark AB doing the actual work.

In connection with the provision of weather forecasting and observing services for the exercise, Air Force meteorologists were assigned to most levels of the exercise command in an organization nearly paralleling Air Boon Choo elements from the field units to the joint command posts. The commander of the weather task force, Captain Bampen Xupravati of the RTAF, would also serve as the staff weather officer to the exercise director, RTAF Air Vice Marshal Kantarat; while other weathermen would

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accompany the field forces, such as the U.S. Infantry Division, into the forward areas. Lieut. Colonel Taylor Montague of the 30th Weather Squadron, 1st Weather Wing, would act as deputy commander of the weather task force and also serve as staff weather officer to the air component commander, Major General Sam Maddux, Jr.

To insure that all weather forecasters received the latest data available, a teletype network was to connect all the major weather locations and users. In addition, a centralized forecasting agency at Don Muang AB would furnish regular forecasts and special advisories.³

Logistic support for the F-105's which were to deploy to Korat would be based on a "bare strip" concept, with all necessary aircraft maintenance and supply being performed by the 18th Wing. Aircraft spares kits, tactical support personnel, equipment, and supplies would be deployed to Korat and Don Muang as required to support the exercise. The stockage of fuels and liquid oxygen (LOX) at the operating base was a responsibility of Thirteenth Air Force, but the 18th TFW would be expected to deploy four full LOX carts to Korat, with courier aircraft from Don Muang replenishing the supply each day.

The Commander of the 35th Tactical Group would arrange for the billeting of task force personnel at Korat and Don Muang, and would also provide vehicular support. Kitchen facilities and equipment were already available and would be operated by Thirteenth Air Force personnel, though the rations themselves would be supplied by the Army.

Four refueling units were to be available at Korat for the use of the F-105's of the 18th TFW, JP-4 being on hand at both Korat and Don Muang to support the entire operation. However, the task force commanders would have to bring with them the 7808 synthetic oil, special

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and peculiar lubricants, and hydraulic fluids which they would need during the exercise.

Enough maintenance personnel would accompany the task forces to perform organizational maintenance, in addition to which the minimum aircraft maintenance equipment capable of supporting the mission on an austere basis would be deployed. Any necessary maintenance beyond the capacity of the deployed units would be performed either by evacuating the aircraft to Kadena AB or, if this were impossible, by deploying a mobile maintenance team from that home base.

A photographic processing cell (PPC) already existed at Don Muang and would be available for the detachment from the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, but the latter should deploy such additional equipment and photographic supplies as were required to support the exercise.

Finally, Detachment 4, 1st Medical Service Wing, would deploy from Kadena Air Base to provide direct support for the 18th TFW contingent operating from Korat.⁴

EXERCISE AIR BOON CHOO IS STAGED

The first four days of Air Boon Choo were monopolized by more than 1,000 officers and men of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, following formal opening of the SEATO exercise at Don Muang AB by Premier Thanom Kittikachorn on 20 April 1964. The major participants in this all-Thai phase of the exercise were personnel from three tactical RTAF units--the 1st Wing at Don Muang itself, the 2d Wing at Koke Kathiem, and the 4th Wing at Tahkli--but lesser roles would be taken by elements of the 6th Wing

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(a transport unit at Don Muang) and two reconnaissance units--the 5th Wing at Prachub and the 7th Wing at Sattahib. Practically every type of RTAF aircraft was represented in some part of Air Boon Choo--jet F-86's and F-84's, conventional T-6's and T-28 trainers, C-123 and C-47 cargo planes, and several types of helicopters.

Royal Thai Army units which took part included elements of the 3d Infantry Division from Korea and the 4th Infantry Division from Chiang Mai, while the Royal Thai Navy's participation consisted of the flagship Pinklaw and the Chanburi Marine Battalion.⁵

On Monday, 20 April 1964, imaginary Communist aggressor forces attacked neighboring "Country A," whereupon the Royal Thai Armed Forces went on an immediate alert, as the Red invaders quickly overran "Country A" and began to infiltrate into Thailand itself. Early reports were that penetrations had occurred at border areas in the northern, northeastern, and eastern parts of Thailand, but that Thai civilian forces had managed to repel enemy terrorists, who had begun operating in conjunction with the actual hostile combat units. These retreating subversive elements were believed to be concentrating in the area of the eastern border. In almost simultaneous actions, the Thai supreme command headquarters issued orders to all the armed forces to begin counterattacks against the aggressors and the government of Thailand requested assistance from SEATO.

Despite the desperate efforts of the Thai armed forces, the thousands of troops and sizeable air force thrown into their military adventure by the Communist invaders proved irresistible initially. Within three days they had pushed deep into the northern half of the kingdom, and it

appeared to be only a matter of time until the whole country would succumb.

While the Thai troops and air force were sturdily resisting to the best of their ability in an endeavor to buy time, the SEATO forces were rallying to blunt the offensive of the aggressors. By the fourth day the organization was ready to commence air operations, its first task being to win control of the air--to destroy the enemy's aircraft in the upper ether and on the ground. The second task, overlapping the first, would be to support the SEATO ground forces that were being thrown into the scales with close air support and air interdiction missions.

As a correspondent of Pacific Stars and Stripes who was covering Air Boon Choo wrote in a news release from the scene, "a SEATO exercise is a human experience as well as a technical workout. It's a time when you have to see the other fellow's point of view, smooth out differences in techniques, and come up with a team instead of a group of individual units." In addition, on the technical side, "A hospital must be set up, there are letters to type, equipment must be moved to numerous locations, transportation must be set up, arrangements for security must be made, a communications network must be organized, and there are aircraft that must be flown with great precision and skill."⁶

Learning late in March that it had been designated to furnish 12 F-105's with their aircrews for participation in Exercise Air Boon Choo, the 44th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS), 18th TFW, set about the business of preparing itself for the task in hand. The pilots were selected and given briefings on air/ground operations, jungle survival, air defense operations, and current, as well as simulated, intelligence. In addition, a general briefing was held, covering local customs,

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weather, and hazards peculiar to the Thailand deployment area. The movement control officers were in place at least three days prior to departure of the F-105 task force, while all the maintenance and support personnel, as well as all the equipment, were in place at Korat and Don Muang Air Bases before the first tactical aircraft left Kadena.

The deployment was scheduled for 20 April, but when word was received that a fire truck would not be available at Korat until the following day, takeoff was delayed 24 hours and the task force aircraft took advantage of the opportunity to make local flights and check all systems.

The first of the two sections into which the task force was divided--three F-105's and four RF-101's--departed Kadena on 21 April, the former bound for Korat AB, the latter for Don Muang AB. Forty-five minutes later, the second section of nine F-105's took off for Korat, accompanied by two spare Thunderchiefs as far as the air refueling point. Here it was found that all the primary aircraft were functioning normally; so the airborne spares were refueled and sent back home to Okinawa. The aerial refueling involved the taking aboard of 10,000 pounds of jet fuel per aircraft from three KB-50 aerial tankers of Yokota Air Base's 421st Air Refueling Squadron led by Lieutenant Colonel Russell Paulson. The rendezvous with the KB-50's was normal, except that the tankers were not flying at refueling speed prior to join-up. During the initial contact, the latter flew along in a good formation, but, as the refueling progressed, they drifted several miles apart. Although the KB-50 could theoretically refuel three aircraft simultaneously by use of its probes and drogues, the F-105's were refueled individually, thereby causing some

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to be completed long before the others. In addition, the tankers did not "toboggan" together, thus producing an altitude separation at completion of the refueling. The net result of these two factors was that the individual planes of the task force encountered considerable difficulty in rejoining one another, owing to their great lateral and vertical separation.

Nevertheless, the 12 task force F-105's of the 44th TFS, led by their Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Grant R. Smith, landed at Korat AB, Thailand, after a non-stop flight covering 1,850 miles in just three hours, 40 minutes. This was, incidentally, to be the first time F-105's had been employed in one of the SEATO exercises. At the same time, the four RF-101's of the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, headed by Major Alvar B. Wallin, the squadron Operations Officer, flew in to Don Muang Air Base. As provided in 313th OPOD 323-64, which had envisaged a "bare strip" concept of operations, the 44th TFS people lived in grass shacks "of the most primitive type," the runway being, in fact, the only modern facility.⁷

Mention has been made of the Air Operations Center (AOC), but with no accompanying description of its composition, mission, or internal workings. This, then, may be as good a time as any for presenting a brief description of these matters.

The AOC was the nerve center of the tactical air operation, being the place where the air "battle" would be either won or lost. It functioned as the command post of the Air Component Commander, Major General Sam Maddux, Jr., and was the focal point for controlling all air operations, both offensive and defensive. Here the ACC had easy

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access to visual displays which would tell him the current status of all aircraft, as well as runway and weather conditions, radar and communications status, and enemy actions. In this connection, a continually changing display of the air battle was always available. It was in the AOC that tactical air weapons were committed, plans evolved, movement orders given, and enemy actions or intentions analyzed and anticipated.

Providing the AOC for Air Boon Choo was the 5th Tactical Control Group, a PACAF unit attached to Thirteenth Air Force, under the command of Colonel Albert B. Sperer, Jr. Involved in this were the providing of shelters, furniture, power, lighting, and internal communications for the many elements making up the AOC. The 5th Tactical Control Group was also responsible for moving, erecting, and dismantling the facility. These unglamorous chores were the responsibility of a 15-man 5th TAC initial support team from Clark AB, under the direction of Major Melvin Diamond, the group's project officer, who had been deployed to Thailand beforehand, on 30 March, to set up the AOC complex (a slightly unrealistic procedure, it would seem, if simulation of an actual surprise attack upon Thailand were the objective of the exercise!).

Back in February 1964, the 5th Tactical Control Group had set up an AOC facility at Clark AB, in order to determine exactly what form the layout should take, as well as to anticipate any problems which might arise. This done, the group had built a scale model of the facility for the use of the group staff in completing preparations for the exercise.

In addition to providing the facility itself and support personnel for the AOC complex, the 5th Tactical Control Group also furnished men to participate in the actual operation of the center during Air Boon Choo.

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However, these operations team personnel did not arrive at Bangkok until 20 April.⁸

In connection with the business of communications, the Air Force put something new on display in Air Boon Choo--the Mark-94 communications vehicle and the man pack. The Mark-94 was a highly sophisticated communications system with great range and was capable of "talking" to an aircraft overhead. When the terrain became too rough for a vehicle, the man pack--simply a radio strapped to a man's back--became the "walking ears" of the forward air control team.⁹

The exercise communications system was another item supplied by Clark Air Base, the 1st Mobile Communications Group having brought in more than one million pounds of equipment for the maneuvers.¹⁰

On Friday, 24 April, the second phase of Air Boon Choo opened with an air strike at 0600 hours by four F-100 Super Sabre jets against the enemy-held airfield at Chieng Mai in the north, the first time SEATO allies of Thailand had intervened against the Communist invaders during the current aggression. Ten enemy aircraft caught on the ground were destroyed by the surprise attack. In addition, the airstrip was bombed, so successfully that it was later reported to be pockmarked with craters. In all, more than 100 sorties were flown by the SEATO air arm. That same day, the Royal Thai Armed Forces which had been defending against the Communist foe were formally transferred to the SEATO Field Forces, as was an RTAF F-86 squadron which had not seen action during the first phase of the maneuvers.

Ground action became stabilized on all fronts as both SEATO and enemy patrols continued their probing actions all day, in an effort to

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locate weak spots along the lines. In the northeast there was an enemy buildup aimed at overrunning Udorn and its adjoining airfield. The Thai ground forces in that sector were relieved by SEATO ground units of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. In the east, increased enemy artillery fire was reported as the Thai forces on that front were replaced by SEATO ground units of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. Operational control of Thai ground forces relieved in these two areas devolved upon the 25th Infantry Division and the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, with the Thai troops themselves being held in reserve.¹¹

The SEATO tactical air forces mounted their busiest day of the exercise on Sunday, 26 April, flying 134 sorties against the Communist invaders. Targets for the jet fighters and bombers of the USAF, RAF, RAAF, RNZAF, and RTAF were enemy airfields, aircraft, and troop concentrations. So hard and often were these objectives hit that by nightfall SEATO intelligence sources assessed the in-commission strength of the aggressors at only 45 per cent of what it had been originally. This evaluation was substantiated by the accounts of captured enemy pilots, who also revealed that the enemy was preparing for a general withdrawal from the forward airfields in Thailand which he had seized in his initial almost unopposed onrush.

That same day, April 26th, two simulated U.S. Army Hawk missile battalions were introduced into Thailand to support two forward Air Support Operations Centers. The firing of these anti-aircraft missiles was controlled by the SEATO Air Operations Center through the Army Air Defense Controller at force headquarters, Tactical Operations Center. Air control of such air defense missiles was maintained as a means of

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insuring that friendly SEATO planes were not endangered.

Having won air supremacy from the enemy, the SEATO air forces centered their efforts of 27 April on smashing hostile troop concentrations, destroying transportation facilities such as railroads, highways, and bridges, and knocking out supply and ammunition dumps, tanks, and convoys. A total of 134 sorties were flown on these close air support missions.¹²

Although on the defensive in most sectors, the enemy threw a very determined attack against Ubon on the 27th with a combined force of tanks and troops. A Forward Air Control team flying reconnaissance was credited with turning back this assault by calling in SEATO tactical air units for an immediate air strike.

Evening of the 29th saw the Communist aggressor's air strength reduced to 74 aircraft, half of which were tactical types and half transport planes. The interdiction campaign against the enemy's logistic system during the past three days had been so increasingly successful that his front-line forces were known to be running out of ammunition and supplies. The SEATO Intelligence people predicted that the enemy effort could not be sustained much longer and that there would be an enemy withdrawal within the next few days. In fact, the dispersal of aggressor troop transports had already begun, but very active guerrilla forces were being left behind.

While simulated and real air activity continued apace, a real emergency occurred on Tuesday morning, 28 April, when the Don Muang control tower was rendered inoperative by a power failure. A USAF communications service MRC-94 mobile communications vehicle, originally

brought to Air Boon Choo for ~~PAC~~ use in controlling strike aircraft in the field, was rushed to the ¹International Airport at Don Muang, enabling operations to continue in normal fashion.¹³

Of the 165 sorties staged on 28 April, 117 were close air support missions and immediate air strikes directed by the forward air control, while the other 48 were bombing attacks, reconnaissance, and airlift missions.¹⁴

The only actual disaster to mar Air Boon Choo came when the exercise was in its final act. On 30 April a helicopter crashed in Sukothai Province, in north-central Thailand, killing a USAF captain and seven Thai officers.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand paid a visit to Force Alpha midway in the exercise and was honored by the men of the U.S. IX Corps who presented him a plaque designed by Sergeant Major Joseph Melillo, "as a symbol of SEATO solidarity and as a memento of thanks to the head of state of the host country." In addition, a flyby and scramble maximum performance takeoff were staged for the host monarch.

With the conclusion of Air Boon Choo on 30 April 1964, Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn declared, in a masterpiece of eloquence, that "It is considered timely and appropriate for SEATO member nations to have an opportunity to strengthen the power of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, so that SEATO can stand firmly against any form of aggression in the future." Immediately afterward, the F-105's were integrated into a mass flyby, which covered as many towns and villages as possible before terminating over Don Muang AB and Bangkok, the capital of Thailand.¹⁵

Whether the Prime Minister had in mind events currently transpiring

in neighboring Laos when he used the word "timely" in describing Air Boon Choo, there is no way of knowing, but certain it is that the political situation in that wobbly kingdom had taken a turn for the worse almost simultaneously with the opening of the SEATO exercise. On 19 April 1964, a right-wing military junta reported it had overthrown the coalition government of Premier Souvanna Phouma and placed him under house arrest, because the administration he headed had failed to solve Laotian economic problems or "improve the people's living conditions." The leader of the clumsy coup was General Kouprasith Abhay, Chief of the National Army Revolutionary Committee (NARC) and son of a former Laotian Premier, Khou Abhay.

The U.S. State Department reacted to early reports of the coup by stating that it was "categorically opposed" to any change of government in Laos.

Within 36 hours after the government was ousted, U.S. diplomatic sources were able to announce (somewhat prematurely, it subsequently became evident) that the military coup had collapsed and the situation was back where it had been before Prince Souvanna Phouma's overthrow. The general belief was that pressure applied on the coup leaders by U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Leonard Unger, had induced them to relinquish their briefly-held power and even to apologize for their attempt to take over the reins of government. The next few weeks in Vientiane were full of claims and counter-claims, negotiations, and unvaried confusion; but the eventual outcome was a weakening of the Rightist faction, a seizure of the Plain des Jarres by the Communist Pathet Lao Army, and a disillusioned shift toward the center on the part of General Kong Le, leader of the Neutralist forces, who now saw for the first time

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that the Pathet Lao were really an arm of North Viet Nam--as General Phoumi Nosovan and numerous others had been telling him for several years!¹⁶

The situation in Laos was still chaotic, but gradually settling down, when Exercise Air Boon Choo came to an end on 30 April 1964. Few of the participating tactical air units wasted time in setting out for their home bases, and this was true of those which had come from Okinawa. The 12 F-105's of the 44th TFS which Lieutenant Colonel Grant R. Smith had taken down to Thailand took off from Korat AB on 2 May in two sections. Those in the first section arrived at Kadena the same day without event, but two of the second had to abort, when one of them suffered a speed brake malfunction. These two departed later the same day, the trouble having been corrected, and staged through Clark AB, since the aerial tankers were no longer available to serve them. The laggards arrived back at Kadena on 3 May. The difficulties which had marked the refueling operations enroute to Thailand on 21 April were, incidentally and happily, conspicuous by their absence during the redeployment flight of the two main bodies.

During their sojourn at Korat, the planes of the 44th's task force had certainly played a large part in expelling the "aggressors" through the 101 sorties they had flown in support of Air Boon Choo. The speedy Thunderchiefs had wrested almost complete control of the air from the enemy's F-102's and F-86's in just 28 sorties; then, having disposed of this threat to operations, they had flown 48 sorties in simulated strafe, napalm, rocket, and dive bomb missions aimed at the destruction of front line enemy personnel and equipment. Thirty-two interdiction

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sorties employing rockets and bombs had been flown to knock out trains, trucks, gun emplacements, and command posts. All of this had cut enemy troop supply to a minimum, so that in the last days of the exercise they had been extremely short of ammunition.

During the first two days following their arrival at Korat, the F-105's had flown 27 orientation and local training missions to familiarize the aircrews with local procedures, terrain, and flying conditions in the general area, including all the alternate recovery bases. These sorties also served to acquaint traffic control personnel with high speed aircraft operations.

With the commencement of the exercise itself, the 44th TFS task force had also flown 23 sorties in air defensive operations, using five, 15, and 30-minute alerts as directed by the AOC. These missions were flown between flight level 250 and flight level 420, at speeds up to 1.2 mach. Here inadequate height-finding equipment manifested itself, and, during the initial part of the exercise, airborne control was poor, though it improved steadily with practice. Some sorties were scrambled, using afterburner climb for combat air patrol (CAP) missions, but it was learned that this was a procedure to be avoided, if at all possible, since it consumed more fuel than was otherwise necessary, subtracting from the total time available for CAP. The Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) air-to-ground communications with "Yankee" control at Korat had proved sub-standard, owing to "a very bad transmitter and low power output." However, the use of American personnel in all air-to-ground communications eliminated any language barrier.

A total of 78 sorties were flown in counter-air and close air support roles, as directed by the AOC and the ASOC. Some of the times over targets

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were not met, as a result of scramble information's not being received in time to make the target, and in some instances takeoff times were omitted altogether. The consequence of no takeoff time's being passed when airborne controllers were being utilized was simply that no controller was available at all, since the aircraft in which he was flying had generally exhausted its fuel supply and had been forced to land by the time the strike aircraft appeared. Communications with the airborne controllers were also "less than desirable" by reason of poor radio contact. The armament codes were usually not specified before launch, and unrealistic simulated configurations were given in relation to target distances. Thus, no consideration was given to the fact that some of the targets could not have been reached by an F-105 carrying the specified load, if it were also to return safely to its takeoff base. The F-105 task force commander, in recognition of this situation, recommended that AOC and ASOC personnel re-evaluate the type aircraft they were tasking for certain targets and fully realize the load requirements versus the target distance. Moreover, they should designate all armament loads as far in advance as possible.

On the other side of the coin, these same AOC and ASOC men had, for the most part, been thoroughly versed in their jobs and well qualified. After the first day of Air Boon Choo, the frag orders had been received in ample time to allow adequate preparation.

"Exceptionally competent" was the phrase applied by Lieut. Colonel Grant R. Smith to the forward air controllers (FAC's)--fully-qualified F-105 or Commonwealth jet pilots, who lived with the front line troops to direct all close support missions with a pilot's eyes and point of

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view, thus giving more accurate and effective close support. The FAC's from the Commonwealth air forces employed a combination of panels, smoke, and signal lights which proved very useful in target identification.

Neither pre-strike nor post-strike reconnaissance had been available, despite the fact that photographs of targets would have been most helpful in establishing aiming points, the best delivery headings, and the nature of enemy defenses. In addition, it was impossible to assess fully the damage inflicted on some interdiction type targets. Colonel Smith recommended that in future exercises reconnaissance sorties be flown and the resulting intelligence data and photographs be made available to operational units.

While the language barrier was eliminated from the air-ground communications through the use of American personnel, Colonel Smith was of the opinion that ground communications could have been improved by the exercise of some discretion in the assignment of priorities to messages. As it was, all messages were classified "Immediate," which meant that time and effort were constantly wasted in picking up messages at all times of the day and night. Moreover, the fact that all units participating in Air Boon Choo were made addressees for all messages indicated that the AOC people were guilty of not screening the TWX's before sending them out. And the consequence of their laziness was that large volumes of messages were received by many a unit for whom they had no pertinence. To prevent a similar situation from occurring in future exercises or actual operations, Colonel Smith recommended that AOC personnel be briefed on the importance of screening messages for the assignment of proper priority and designating the proper recipients.

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However, he felt that the use of information copies for units other than the primary receivers would prove "most helpful."

The navigational aids proved satisfactory, inasmuch as all the primary recovery bases were equipped with TACAN and adequate approach facilities. The radar controllers at Korat were "good and [they] improved each day," as they became more familiar with high performance aircraft. In addition, the control tower operators appeared "very competent and eager to assist at all times." However, not so satisfactory was the delay on the part of the Air Route Traffic Control (ARTC) in clearing the two sections of the task force for redeployment to Kadena on 2 May. The 40 minute and 30 minute delays suffered by the respective flights caused them to be late for the tanker rendezvous, thus bringing home to Colonel Smith the need for the establishment of better clearance procedures between the ARTC and local clearance facilities. This, he believed, could be accomplished by making local ARTC personnel in isolated areas aware of the importance of takeoff times in relation to tanker rendezvous and other operational matters. The problem could also be partially alleviated through coordination by AOC personnel.

Another shortcoming appeared in connection with motor transportation, as a result of the unavailability of parts and repair equipment. Thus, if any maintenance other than that of a minor nature was required, the vehicle became lost for the duration of the exercise. Generally speaking, though, local maintenance support was "very good, considering the facilities and equipment available." Colonel Smith reported that the personnel of Detachment 1, 35th Tactical Group were "most cooperative in their effort."

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The ground liaison officer and the Intelligence Officer assigned to the unit in the field had proved "most helpful in keeping abreast of current situations." So helpful were they, in fact, that the task force commander recommended such personnel be regularly assigned with the unit as part of the deployment package in future exercises or operations, they having proved invaluable in determining enemy positions and helping to plot the best routes to targets.

Although the mobility kits taken down to Thailand by the task force were generally adequate, it was felt that some improvements in the quantities or in the addition of other items not included in the Air Boon Choo deployment could be made. Therefore, it was recommended that in future exercises the speed brake control valves be increased from two to three and the vent suit blower motors from one to three, particularly if the exercise were held in a warm climate. The reason for the latter recommendation was that a failure of the vent suit blower motor would result in the loss of the automatic feature of cockpit temperature control. It was also recommended that the kits be inventoried periodically to insure that all the listed items were actually in the kit and in the proper quantities. Furthermore, several additional items should be included in the kits: (1) locally-manufactured formers for both wing tips; (2) a fiberglass repair kit; and (3) a spare battery for powered AGE (aerospace ground equipment).

Another discrepancy uncovered by Air Boon Choo was a considerable number of doppler failures, resulting, for the most part, from time-outs caused by excessive heat, the majority of the sorties having been flown at high speeds at low altitudes in ambient ground temperatures that ran

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generally in the upper 80's or lower 90's. Increasing the supply of parts was not regarded as the answer to this condition, since the problem of doppler time-outs at low altitudes as the result of overheating was a known defect of the F-105 aircraft which had not yet been solved, although already brought to the attention of the interested agencies.

Some problems were encountered in connection with powered AGE items, such as broken fan belts, engines hard to start, and the like. In future, therefore, consideration should be given to the length of the deployment, and bits and pieces known to have the highest failure rate--such as spark plugs, fan belts, etc.--should be included in the mobility kits.

No problems resulted from a lack of manpower or skill levels during Air Boon Choo, the number of personnel vis-a-vis the number of aircraft and the length of deployment proving to be adequate. All in all, then, the exercise had been "highly successful" from a maintenance standpoint. Only two sorties were lost because of a need for maintenance. The aircraft were flown from two to three times a day with very short turnaround times. Under these conditions, concluded Lieut. Colonel Smith, the success rate reflected "both the quality of operating equipment and personnel concerned."¹⁷

Exercise Air Boon Choo had demonstrated that the F-105 could operate successfully at deployed sites for short periods of time, utilizing a minimum of support equipment. Colonel Smith was sufficiently realistic, however, to realize that the high sortie success rate might have been partially due to the fact that no ordnance was expended. In other words, the abort rate would undoubtedly have been somewhat higher if the aircraft

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weapons systems had been exercised daily, since the problems associated with ordnance loading and arming would then have come into play.¹⁸

At the close of the week ending 9 May 1964, nearly 100 planeloads and several shiploads of equipment and supplies had redeployed to USAF, RAF, RAAF, and RNZAF air bases from Thailand, as had all the tactical aircraft that participated in Air Boon Choo.¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	108	News Article, "SEATO Air Drill Set for Thailand in April," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 12 March 1964;
	109	News Article, "'Air Boon Choo' Hits Final Phase," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 30 Apr. 1964; News Article,
	110	"KAB Personnel Join Air Boon Choo," <u>Kadena Falcon</u> , 23 Apr. 1964; News Article, "SEATO Exercise: Thai
	111	Forces Ready To Roll," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 19 Apr. 1964.
2	112	News Article, "'Aggressors' Infiltrate Border: IX Corps Troops Arrive for Thailand Exercise," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 23 Apr. 1964; News Article, "Exer-
	113	cise Air Boon Choo: IX Corps Soldiers Join in SEATO Maneuvers," <u>Ryukyuan Review</u> , 8 May 1964.
3	114	News Article, "U.S., Thai Airmen Watch Weather over Exercise," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 24 Apr. 1964.
4	---	313ADIV OPORD 323-64: AIR BOON CHOO, 23 Mar. 1964.
5	110	News Article, "KAB Personnel Join Air Boon Choo," <u>Kadena Falcon</u> , 23 Apr. 1964; News Article, "'Air
	115	Boon Choo' Held in Thailand: SEATO Exercise Begins," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 19 Apr. 1964.
6	116	News Article, "SEATO Drill Brings Out the Best in Air Power," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 27 Apr. 1964;
	117	News Article, "Mock Enemy in Advance," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 24 Apr. 1964.
7	118	News Article, "Supersonic Aircraft Join SEATO Air Exercise," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 25 Apr. 1964;
	119	News Article, "Kadena F-105s in Thailand for SEATO Exercise," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 23 Apr. 1964; News
	120	Article, "Base Tactical, Recon Aircraft in Air Boon Choo," <u>Kadena Falcon</u> , 30 Apr. 1964; Ltr., 44th Tac-
	121	tical Fighter Squadron (TFS) (CR) to 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) (DO), sub.: Task Force Commander's Final Report, 13 May 1964, Annex "A": Operations Narrative.

Footnote No.	Document No.	
8	122	News Article, "5th Tactical Control Group Provided AOC for Exercise," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 27 Apr. 1964.
9	123	News Article, "Tactical Air Power Ripens in Exercise Air Boon Choo," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 2 May 1964.
10	124	News Article, "'Air Boon Choo' in Final Phase," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 1 May 1964.
11	125	News Article, "Air Boon Choo Enters 2d Phase," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 28 Apr. 1964.
12	126	News Article, "SEATO 'Enemy' Blasted," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 29 Apr. 1964.
13	127	News Article, "SEATO Clobbers 'Enemy' Planes," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 30 Apr. 1964.
14	127	<u>Ibid.</u>
15	109	News Article, "'Air Boon Choo' Hits Final Phase," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 30 Apr. 1964; News Article,
	124	"Air Boon Choo in Final Phase," <u>Okinawa Morning Star</u> , 1 May 1964; Ltr., 44th TFS (CR) to 18TFW (DO),
	121	sub.: Task Force Commander's Final Report, 13 May 1964, Annex "A": Operations Narrative.
16	128	News Article, "SEATO Exercise 'Air Boon Choo' Opens in Bangkok," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 22 Apr. 1964; Numerous news articles and news magazine summaries of the Laotian situation.
17	121	Ltr., 44th TFS (CR) to 18TFW (DO), sub.: Task Force Commander's Final Report, 13 May 1964, Annex "A": Operations Narrative; Annex "B": Maintenance Narrative; News Article, "F-105's Return from Boon Choo," <u>Kadena Falcon</u> , 7 May 1964.
	129	
18	121	<u>Ibid.</u>
19	130	News Article, "Boon Choo Troops Head Home," <u>Pacific Stars and Stripes</u> , 7 May 1964; News Article, "Air Boon Choo Ends: Troops Return Home," <u>Kadena Falcon</u> ,
	131	14 May 1964.

313th AD, 1964-1

CHAPTER IV

BASES AND FACILITIES

313th AD, 1964-I

CHAPTER IV
BASES AND FACILITIES

NAHA AIR BASE

Installations Assigned to Naha Air Base.

Of the seven installations assigned to the real property account of Naha Air Base, four were elements of the Okinawa Air Defense System, another served one of these elements, and only two existed for a purpose unconnected with the AC&W system. The seven were as follows:

Hirara Air Strip (on Miyako Jima)
Miyako Jima Air Station
Kume Shima Air Station
Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station
Yoza Dake Air Station
Miwa Radio Beacon Annex
Naha Light Annex

The FY-1966 Military Construction Authorization Program.

On 17 January 1964 the PACAF Facilities Evaluation Panel reviewed the military construction programs for Naha Air Base for the Fiscal Years 1966 through 1970. The results of their deliberations were sent to Naha AB, where the Facilities Utilization Board (FUB) met on 18 February 1964 to review and establish the final priorities for these programs. Their decisions were as follows:¹

FY-1966 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS FUB PRIORITY</u>	<u>PACAF FEP ACTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED PRIORITY</u>	<u>NEW FUB PRIORITY</u>
AC&W Ops Fac (Higher Hqs Directed)	JOB	None	None	1	1
Warehouse Supply & Equip Base	41,105 SF	1	OK	2	2
Supply & Issue Shop	7,700 SF	2	OK	3	3
Shop Acft Maint Org (Dltd from FY-65 MCP)	8,100 SF	None	None	4	10
O.Q. Men (Advd. from FY-67)	40 MN	(67)-3	OK	5	5
Airman Dorm (Dltd from FY-64 MCP)	104 MN	None	None	6	6
Terminal Air Passenger Shop Acft Gen Purpose (MATS)	5,000 5,395	3 7	OK OK	7 8	7 8
Auto Maint Facility	14,040	6	OK	9	9
Store Comm (Addition)	7,000 SF	8	OK	10	4
Auto Maint Admin	4,100 SF	O&M	Transferred to MCP	11	11
Admin Facility	5,760 SF	O&M	Transferred to MCP	12	12
Hqs, Gp, Air Base Addn	2,136 SF	O&M	Transferred to MCP	13	13
Apron, Transit (Deleted from FY-63 MCP)	6,000 SY	None	None	Delete	Delete
Operational Apron (MATS)	32,000 SY	4	Delete	Delete	Delete
Squadron Ops	8,400 SF	5	Delete	Delete	Delete

FY-1967 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS FUB PRIORITY</u>	<u>PACAF FEP ACTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED PRIORITY</u>	<u>NEW FUB PRIORITY</u>
Base Theater		2	OK	2	1
AFCS Maintenance Facility		3	OK	3	2
Operational Apron		1	Restudy	Delete (Per 51MC)	Delete

FY-1968 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS FUB PRIORITY</u>	<u>PACAF FEP ACTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED PRIORITY</u>	<u>NEW FUB PRIORITY</u>
Water Storage Tank		1	OK	1	1
Replacement Education Center		2	OK	2	2
Library Addition		3	Delete in Favor of	Delete	Delete

FY-1969 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS FUB PRIORITY</u>	<u>PACAF FEP ACTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED PRIORITY</u>	<u>NEW FUB PRIORITY</u>
Civil Engineer Facilities		1	OK	1	1
Supplies & Equip Warehse		2	OK	2	2
Clothing Sales Store		3	OK	3	3

FY-1970 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS FUB PRIORITY</u>	<u>PACAF FEP ACTION</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED PRIORITY</u>	<u>NEW FUB PRIORITY</u>
Baseball, Football Athletic Field		1	OK	1	1
Recreation Gymnasium		2	OK	2	2
Swimming Pool and Bathhouse		3	OK	3	3

The FY-1965 P458 O&M Program.

At its meeting of 18 February 1964 the Naha Facilities Utilization Board also realigned the FY-1965 Operations and Maintenance Program priorities by integrating a number of projects that had previously been funded in the FY-1964 O&M Program but for which the funds had been withdrawn on 30 January 1964. Five projects were considered for integration in the priority listing for the FY-1965 O&M Program.

Four of these projects--NAH 314-2: Air Condition Base Operations; NAH 77-3: Construct Telephone Ducts; NAH 96-4: Construct M-37 Test Facility; and NAH 37-4: Construct an addition to TMC, Building 62--had been previously funded in the FY-1964 P458 O&M Program. However, in consequence of a funds cutback throughout the command, applicable FY-1964 funds were withdrawn on 30 January 1964 by Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, and the projects were now being reprogrammed for FY-1965. The fifth project, NAH 32-5: Maintain the Dispensary, had been previously included in the proposed FY-1965 O&M

Program, but had been improperly charged to P478 funding, when P458 funding should have been applied.

As a result of the action taken by the PACAF Facilities Evaluation Panel in its review of this program on 17 January 1964 and the integration of the above five items, the final priority listing was developed as follows:²

FY-1965 P458 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST 2521</u>	<u>COST 2524</u>	<u>COST 2525</u>
1	NAH 416-2	Corrosion Control Facility	\$	\$	\$24.9
2	NAH 41-4	Const Storage, Seg Mag			18.0
3	NAH 52-5	Const LOX Stor & Disp			20.0
4	NAH 37-4	Const Addn TMC Bldg			12.0
5	NAH 96-4	Const M-37 Test Facility			5.0
6	NAH 3-5	Maint Runway Lighting	26.0		
7	NAH 8-5	Maint Water Mains	26.0		
8	NAH 4-5	Maint Primary Dist Syst UG	50.0		
9	NAH 50-5	Emer Backup Power, Bldg 70			25.0
10	NAH 77-3	Const Telephone Duct			12.1
11	NAH 90-4	Maint Boiler, Hangar 72	5.0		
12	NAH 5-5	Maint Primary OH Dist	6.0		
13	NAH 30-5	Maint Taxiway #2	20.0		
14	NAH 41-5	Alter Power Cable, Bldg 3651		3.0	
15	NAH 29-4	Alter Jet Fuel Storage		25.0	
16	NAH 17-5	Alter Fuel Supply Lines		25.0	
17	NAH 18-5	Restripe Airfield Pavements	25.0		

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST 2521</u>	<u>COST 2524</u>	<u>COST 2525</u>
18	NAH 43-5	Maint Taxiway Lights - Warm-up Pads	\$15.0	\$	\$
19	NAH 47-5	Alter Bldg 48A, Dock to Terminal		3.5	
20	NAH 39-4	Const Repre Wea Obs			10.0
21	NAH 47-4	Maint/Const Addn to Photo Lab	6.0		4.0
22	NAH 16-5	Maint Misc Bldgs, J-Sites	40.0		
23	NAH 31-5	Maint Heating/Steam Line/ Dining Hall	10.0		
24	NAH 40-5	Acnd Receiver, Bldg 915		2.5	
25	NAH 13-5	Maint BAQs	36.0		
26	NAH 15-5	Paint Nose Docks	17.0		
27	NAH 12-5	Maint BOQ	12.0		
28	NAH 33-5	Maint Parking Areas, Comm/ Bus Terminal	10.5		
29	NAH 35-5	Alter Group Conf Room		5.0	
30	NAH 11-3	Const Sup/Issue Shop, Bldg 908 (BEMO)			24.0
31	NAH 7-3	Const/Alter CE Admin		7.9	17.1
32	NAH 44-4	Const Comm Ducts			10.9
33	NAH 55-5	Const Bldg, Det 1, 5th Comm			25.0
34	NAH 56-5	Const Addn to Power Plant, Kume Jima AS			8.0
35	NAH 57-5	Const Helicopter Pad, Kume			5.0
36	NAH 20-5	Const BOQ Addn, Okino-Erabu			24.0
37	NAH 21-5	Const BOQ Addn, Kume Jima			24.0
38	NAH 65-4	Const BOQ Addn, Miyako Jima			25.0

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST 2521</u>	<u>COST 2524</u>	<u>COST 2525</u>
39	NAH 314-2	Air Cond Base Ops	\$	\$25.0	\$
40	NAH 65-3	Air Cond Org Maint #50		17.4	
41	NAH 31-4	Air Cond Acft Engr I&R		7.9	
42	NAH 21-4	Alter Road, Kume Jima		3.0	
43	NAH 60-5	Const Incinerator			4.0
44	NAH 32-5	Maint Disp	5.0		
TOTALS			\$309.5	\$125.2	\$298.0

Relocation of the Mobile RAPCON/GCA.

The chief subject for discussion at the 18 March 1964 meeting of the Naha Facilities Utilization Board was the proposed relocation of the Mobile Radar Approach Control Center (RAPCON)/Ground Controlled Approach (GCA). Detachment 2, PAC GEEIA (Ground Electronics Engineering Installations Agency), had completed a site survey for relocation of the Mobile RAPCON site in response to an earlier 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing request addressed to the 2152d Communications Squadron.

This request was prompted by an impending redesignation of the runway ends to points approximately 500 feet south of the currently designated ends, in conjunction with an under-construction runway overrun extension to the south. If the touchdown point for Runway 18 were relocated a corresponding 500 feet south, precision approach radar coverage could not be provided up to the point of touchdown from the existing site. Under these circumstances, it would be necessary to relocate the Mobile RAPCON/GCA at an estimated cost of \$25,000 to \$30,000.

Representatives of the 2152d Communications Squadron briefed the

Facilities Utilization Board on a proposal of the Flight Facilities Office that the Runway 18 touchdown be moved only 250 feet south, rather than the full 500 feet. Should this course be adopted, it would not be necessary to relocate the Mobile RAPCON/GCA. It would, however, necessitate obtaining a waiver of standard criteria for a minimum GCA glide path height of 32 feet over the designated runway end.

The GEEIA representatives present concurred in this approach to the problem and advised that the waiver should be obtained with little difficulty, since the proposed glide path would actually be higher above the existing runway end than was the current GCA glide path, and aircraft making a GCA on Runway 18 (the secondary instrument runway) would have 1,000 feet of runway-strength pavement prior to touchdown. It was further pointed out that precision radar coverage for touchdown on the primary instrument runway (#36) would be increased by leaving the Mobile RAPCON/GCA site unchanged.

In consonance with continuous efforts to reduce base operation costs, the board approved the proposal of the 2152d Communications Squadron and directed that a waiver be processed to leave the site unchanged.³

The Status of Construction at Naha AB as of 18 May 1964.

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>	<u>ECD</u>
ENG 580	Control Tower	\$90,000	92%	19 Jun 64
ENG 616	Field Maintenance Hangar	784,000	99	28 May 64
ENG 702	Mission Staging Ops	110,000	61	30 Jun 64
ENG 725	Alert Hangar Addition	119,000	28	4 Nov 64
ENG 726	Runway Overrun Addition	557,000	73	23 Oct 64
ENG 802	Cargo Parachute Shop	219,300	14	16 Mar 65

The Fiscal Year-1965 and Previous Years' Military Construction Program.

The status of MCP projects for the FY-1965 and previous years, which were not yet under construction as of 18 May 1964, was as follows:

<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
<u>FY65 MCP</u>			
Dep Elementary School	25,000 SF	\$366,000	Approved OSD, 31 Dec. 1963
Men's O.Q.	40-man	337,000	Approved OSD, 31 Dec. 1963
<u>FY64 MCP</u>			
Mission Staging Ops	8,400 SF	\$165,300	Deleted
Engine I&R Shop	12,000 SF	153,600	Deleted
Field Training Facility	12,000 SF	196,600	Authorization & Approp Obtd.
Service Club	15,760 SF	307,000	Authorization & Approp Obtd.

The FY-1966 - 1970 Military Construction Programs, as of 18 May 1964.FY-1966

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED BY 5AF</u>	<u>AS APPROVED BY PACAF</u>
1	AC&W Ops Facility		\$808,000	X	X
2	Base Sup & Equip Whse	41,105 SF	366,000	X	X
3	Supply & Issue Shop	7,700 SF	171,000	X	X
4	Commissary Store	7,000 SF	122,000	X	Deferred to 67
5	Men's O.Q.	40 MN	330,000	X	X
6	Airmen's Dormitory	184 MN	477,000	X	Deleted
7	Air Passenger Terminal	5,100 SF	148,000	X	Deleted
8	Gen Purp A/C Shop	5,395 SF	109,000	X	X
9	Auto Maint Shop	14,040 SF	287,000	X	X
10	Org Maint A/C Shop	5,700 SF	75,000	Deleted	Deleted

FY-1966

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>AS SUBMITTED</u>		<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>
		<u>SCOPE</u>			<u>BY 5AF</u>	<u>BY PACAF</u>
11	Auto Maint Admin	4,095 SF		\$ 87,000	X	X
12	Admin Office	5,760 SF		151,000	X	X
13	Air Base Gp Hq	2,136 SF		<u>46,000</u>		
	TOTAL			\$3,177,000		

FY-1967

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>AS SUBMITTED</u>		<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>
		<u>SCOPE</u>			<u>BY 5AF</u>	<u>BY PACAF</u>
1	Base Theater	5,974 SF		\$183,000	X	Deferred to 68
2	AFCS Maint Facil	3,600 SF		<u>88,000</u>	X	Deferred to 68
	TOTAL			\$271,000		

FY-1968

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>AS SUBMITTED</u>		<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>
		<u>SCOPE</u>			<u>BY 5AF</u>	<u>BY PACAF</u>
1	Water Stor Tank	750 TG		\$261,000	X	Deferred to 69
2	Education Center	6,000 SF		<u>116,000</u>	X	Deferred to 69
	TOTAL			\$377,000		

FY-1969

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>AS SUBMITTED</u>		<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>
		<u>SCOPE</u>			<u>BY 5AF</u>	<u>BY PACAF</u>
1	Civil Eng Facil	24,398 SF		\$416,000	X	X
2	Base Sup & Equip Warehouse	34,000 SF		348,000	X	X
3	Clothing Sales Str	3,625 SF		<u>41,000</u>	X	Deferred to 70
	TOTAL			\$805,000		

FY-1970

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>AS SUBMITTED</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>	<u>AS APPROVED</u>
		<u>SCOPE</u>		<u>BY 5AF</u>	<u>BY PACAF</u>
1	Multi-Purpose Athletic Field	1 EA	\$110,000	X	Deleted
2	Recreation Gym	20,500 SF	380,000	X	Deleted
3	Swim Pool & Bath-house	14,694 SF	315,000	X	X
TOTAL			\$805,000		

Status of the Naha AB Organization and Maintenance Construction Programas of 18 May 1964.

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>	<u>ECD</u>
NAH 1-4	Maint Roads	\$26,600	99%	25 May 1964
NAH 3-4	Maint Water Mains	30,300		30 Oct 1964
NAH 6-4	Paint Misc Bldgs	23,200	92	30 May 1964
NAH 14-3	Underground Elec Dist, Yoza Dake	33,000	97	1 Jun 1964
NAH 16-3	Medical Food Insp Facility	24,400	32	21 Jul 1964
NAH 26-3	Alter Power Dist at Miyako AS	20,600	3	27 Jul 1964
NAH 16-4	Maint Temp Depend. School	43,600	3	2 Nov 1964
NAH 28-4	Maint Theater Stage and Seats	17,100	0	19 Jul 1964
NAH 36-3	Maint Misc Whses	35,600	15	4 Oct 1964
NAH 50-4	Maint Field Maint Hangar	37,300	44	30 Jun 1964
NAH 57-4	Paint Permanent Family Housing	27,200	3	20 Jul 1964
NAH 2-4	Repair Warm-Up Pads	38,300	50	13 Jul 1964
NAH 64-4	Repair Runway Ends	18,800	50	13 Jul 1964
NAH 70-4	Repair Taxiway #2 Runway Access	18,900	100	
NAH 74-3	Maint Gymnasium	19,100	39	19 Jun 1964

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>	<u>ECD</u>
NAH 78-4	Maint Operational Apron	\$42,200		16 Aug 1964
NAH 87-4	Beauty Shop	13,000	1	12 Sep 1964
NAH 98-3	Yoza Dake NCO Club	12,000	53	Unknown
NAH 77-3	Const Telephone Ducts	12,100		
NAH 403-2	Const GPE Maint Shop	45,600	91	11 Jul 1964
NAH 37-4	Const Addn, TMC 62	12,000		
NAH 410-1	Addn to Disp	47,200	72	6 Jul 1964
NAH 314-2	Air Condition Base Ops	25,000		

The FY-1965 Operations and Maintenance Program for Naha AB as Submitted
to the Fifth Air Force Facilities Utilization Panel on 18 February 1964.

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY 5AF FUP</u>
1	NAH 416-2	Corrosion Control Facility	\$24,900	Approved
2	NAH 41-4	Const Seg Mag Storage	18,000	Approved
3	NAH 49-5	Emer Backup Power, Bldg 62	8,000	Deleted
4	NAH 52-5	Const LOX Stor & Disp	20,000	Approved
5	NAH 78-4	Maint Parking Apron	41,000	Deleted
6	NAH 89-4	Maint Taxiway Lighting	21,600	Moved up to FY 64 O&M
7	NAH 3-5	Maint Runway Lighting	26,000	Approved
8	NAH 8-5	Alter Water Mains	16,000	Approved
9	NAH 4-5	Maint Primary UG Dist Sys	65,000	Approved
10	NAH 50-5	Emer Backup Power, Bldg 70	25,000	Approved
11	NAH 90-4	Maint Boiler, Hangar 72	5,000	Approved
12	NAH 5-5	Maint Primary OH Dist	6,000	Approved

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY 5AF FUP</u>
13	NAH 30-5	Maint Taxiway #2	\$20,000	Approved
14	NAH 51-5	Const Missile Trailer Access	2,500	Approved for in-house
15	NAH 53-5	Modify MA-1A Barrier	10,000	Deleted
16	NAH 41-5	Alter Power Calble, Bldg 3651	3,000	Approved
17	NAH 29-4	Alter Jet Fuel Storage	25,000	Approved
18	NAH 17-5	Maint Fuel Supply Lines	25,000	Approved
19	NAH 18-5	Restripe Airfield Pavements	25,000	Approved
20	NAH 43-5	Maint Taxiway Lights - Warmup Pads		Approved
21	NAH 47-5	Alter Bldg 48A, Dock to Term	6,500	Approved
22	NAH 39-4	Const Repre Wea Obs	9,000	Approved
23	NAH 47-4	Maint/Const Photo Lab Addn	10,000	Approved
24	NAH 16-5	Maint Misc Bldgs at J-Sites	40,000	Approved
25	NAH 31-5	Maint Heating/Steam Line/ Dining Hall	10,000	Approved
26	NAH 36-5	Air Cond Tropo Bldg at Yoza Dake AS	1,200	Deleted
27	NAH 37-5	Air Cond. Tropo Bldg at Miyako Jima AS	1,200	Deleted
28	NAH 38-5	Air Cond Miwa Radio Transmitter Site	22,000	Deleted
29	NAH 39-5	Air Cond Transmitter, Bldg 5	2,500	Deleted
30	NAH 40-5	Air Cond Receiver, Bldg 915	2,500	Approved
31	NAH 54-5	Const Fence & Lighting, Refueling Yards	6,000	Approved Fence only, in-house

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY 5AF FUP</u>
32	NAH 13-5	Paint BAQs	\$36,000	Approved
33	NAH 15-5	Paint Nose Docks	17,000	Approved
34	NAH 6-5	Maint Fire Alarm System	10,000	Delete from Program; accomplish with service contract
35	NAH 12-5	Maint BOQs	12,000	Approved
36	NAH 14-5	Maint Misc Bldgs	47,000	Deleted
37	NAH 33-5	Maint Parking Areas, Comm/Bus Terminal	10,000	Approved
38	NAH 7-5	Maint Street Lights	15,000	Deleted
39	NAH 11-5	Maint Roads	25,000	Deleted
40	NAH 9-5	Maint of Air Condition, Bldg 72	3,000	Deleted
41	NAH 10-5	Maint of Air Condition, Bldg 1303	3,100	Deleted
42	NAH 34-5	Maint of Air Condition, Airmen's Club	1,000	Deleted
43	NAH 35-5	Alter Group Conf Room	9,000	Approved
44	NAH 11-3	Const Sup/Issue Shop, Bldg 908 (BEMO)	24,000	Approved
45	NAH 7-3	Const/Alter CE Admin	24,000	Approved
46	NAH 44-4	Const Comm Ducts	10,900	Approved
47	NAH 55-5	Const Bldg, Det 1, 5th Comm	25,000	Approved
48	NAH 56-5	Const Addn to Power Plant, Kume AS	8,000	Approved
49	NAH 57-5	Const Helicopter Pad, Kume AS	6,000	Approved
50	NAH 20-5	Const BOQ Addn, Okino AS	24,000	Hold in Abeyance
51	NAH 21-5	Const BOQ Addn, Kume AS	24,000	Hold in Abeyance

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY SAF FUP</u>
52	NAH 65-4	Const BOQ Addn, Miyako AS	\$25,000	Hold in Abeyance
53	NAH 58-5	Install MA-1 AF Lighting Panel	1,500	Deleted
54	NAH 25-5	Const Civ Personnel Admin	24,900	Transfer to 66 MCP
55	NAH 49-4	Install Security Lights at J-Sites	25,900	Hold in Abeyance; check power at sites
56	NAH 403-2	Const Auto Maint Admin	24,900	Transfer to 66 MCP
57	NAH 65-3	Air Cond Org Maint Bldg #50	17,400	Approved
58	NAH 34-4	Alter ADCC, Bldg 602	5,000	Deleted
59	NAH 77-4	Alter Bldg 70	17,000	Deleted
60	NAH 31-4	Air Cond Acft Eng I&R	7,900	Approved
61	NAH 21-4	Alter Road, Kume AS	3,000	Approved
62	NAH 69-4	Const Addn, Air Base Gp Hq, Bldg 604	25,000	Transfer to 66 MCP
63	NAH 60-4	Const Admin Bldg for Det 3, 313AD	25,000	Transfer to 66 MCP
64	NAH 59-5	Install Protective Shutters, Control Tower	7,000	Deleted
65	NAH 73-4	Alter Towers at J-Sites	24,000	Deleted
66	NAH 67-4	Const Fire Station at Miyako Jima AS	10,000	Deleted
67	NAH 9-3	Const CE Maint Shop	24,000	Deleted
68	NAH 38-4	Const AC&W Addn at Kume AS	14,400	Deleted
69	NAH 10-3	Const CE Pvmt/Gnds	24,000	Deleted
70	NAH 60-5	Const Incinerator	4,000	Approved
71	NAH 44-5	Air Cond Bldg 604	25,000	Deleted
72	NAH 45-5	Air Cond Theater at Yoza Dake AS	16,000	Deleted

<u>BASE PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY 5AF FUP</u>
73	NAH 46-5	Air Cond Dining Hall at Yoza Dake AS	\$11,000	Deleted
74	NAH 48-5	Air Cond Youth Center	25,000	Deleted
1	NAH 32-5	Maint Dispensary	5,000	Approved
2	NAH 29-5	Maint Family Hsg	20,000	Approved; funded FY-64
3	NAH 64-5	Alter Family Hsg	5,000	Approved

Status of Naha AB Non-Appropriated Fund Projects as of 18 May 1964.

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 20-4	Maint Skating Rink	\$6,200	Awaiting Funds
NAH 105-3	Const Addn to NCO Open Mess at Okino AS		Approved - Being readvertized for reasonable bid
NAH 311-2	Air Condition Youth Center	14,500	Scope being revised to provide less expensive mul eqmnt
NAH 89-3	Const Addn to Airmen's Open Mess at Naha AB		New Management revising scope of work for resubmission on or about 28 May 1964
NAH 98-3	Yoza Dake AS Club	12,000	Under construction
NAH 66-4	Addn to Bowling Alley	28,300	Siting approved - Essentiality and funding not yet obtained
NAH 82-4	Const Addn to Crafts Shop	11,200	Awaiting essentiality approval, siting, and funding
NAH 87-4	Beauty & Barber Shop	13,000	Under construction
NAH 88-4	Air Cond NCO Club	24,900	In Hq. USAF awaiting approval
NAH 99-4	Const/Alter Officers' Open Mess	45,000	Siting approved - Essentiality and funding not yet obtained
NAH 101-4	Concessionaire Restaurant	87,000	Awaiting siting approval
NAH 103-4	Package Sales Store	3,100	Construction contract being drawn up

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 104-4	Const Golf Maint Facility	\$ 5,000	Siting and essentiality approved - design being arranged
NAH 105-4	Install Equipment in Base Commissary	3,000	Design estimated complete 22 May 1964
NAH 61-5	Const Addn to NCO Club	50,000	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 63-5	Const Addn to Auto Hobby Shop	14,900	Program documents submitted to 5LP-S for submission
NAH 65-5	Const Riding Stable	20,000	Siting approved
NAH 66-5	Const Nursery School	24,000	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 67-5	Const Beach Bath House	5,000	Approved - Design not yet complete
NAH 89-5	Const Girl Scout Facility	14,500	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 90-5	Const Boy Scout Facility	25,000	Programming documents submitted to 5LJA for submission
NAH 78-5	Const Nursery	39,000	Programming documents submitted to 5LP-S for submission
NAH 73-5	Const Thrift Shop		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 74-5	Const Family Sewer Facility		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 72-5	Flying Circle		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 75-3	Red Cross Facility		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 76-5	Base Playground		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation

<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 77-5	Running Track		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 81-5	Cycle Track		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 82-5	Boat Dock		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 83-5	Skeet Range		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation
NAH 84-5	Archery Range		Project documentation scheduled for near future preparation

Status of the Naha AB FY-1965 Non-Appropriated Fund Program as Submitted to the Fifth Air Force Facilities Utilization Panel on 18 February 1964.

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>ACTION BY 5AF FUP</u>
1	NAH 68-5	Alt/Const Officers' Open Mess	\$45,000	Approved
2	NAH 61-5	Const NCO Club Addn	50,000	Approved
3	NAH 63-5	Const Auto Hobby Shop Addition	19,600	Approved
4	NAH 66-5	Const Nursery School	48,000	Approved
5	NAH 67-5	Const Beach Bath House	6,000	Approved
6	NAH 65-5	Const Riding Stable	20,000	Approved

Resubmissions and Items Received as Late Starters after Submission of the Naha AB Construction Program in February 1964.

<u>PROJ. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 41-3	Const Addn to 33d ARS Ops	1,440 SF	\$21,000	Recommend FY-1966 O&M Program
NAH 72-3	Air Cond Bldg 604	20 Tn	10,000	Recommend 1st Rev. Fin. Plan as Prior. #55A in program

<u>PROJ. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 62-4	Construct Bank	2,500 SF	\$30,000	Recommend FY67 MCF
NAH 65-4	Const BOQ Addn at Miyako	2,560 SF	25,000	Recommend disapproval, incl in FY66 MCF
NAH 86-4	Readiness Crew Bldg Addn	1,530 SF	23,000	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Prior 4A in program
NAH 96-4	Const Apron Jet Test Stands	1 EA	8,000	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Prio 4B in program
NAH 70-5	Const Parking Lot for Bldg 2405	1,000 SY	5,000	Recommend FY66 O&M
NAH 87-5	Maint Air Cond, Bldg 66		3,000	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Prior 20A in program
NAH 91-5	Air Cond Fire Station Sleeping Quarters	10-Ton	5,000	Recommend FY66 O&M
NAH 92-5	Air Cond Telephone Exch Bldg (3503)	5-Ton	2,500	Recommend FY66 O&M
NAH 94-5	Air Cond Chaplains' Offices	5-Ton	2,500	Recommend 1st Rev Financial Plan as Prior 61A in program
	Const Civil Engr Supply Bldg at Miyako AS	600 SF	5,000	Recmd FY66 O&M
	Replace Roofing, Telephone Exch Bldg (3503)	4,720 SF	1,500	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Priority #30A in program
	Install Twin Post Auto Lift, Bldg 2033	one EA	5,000	Recmd 1st Rev. Finan Plan as Priority #31A in program
	Replace Fire Station Roofing	8,780 SF	3,000	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Priority #34A in program
	Const Parking Lot for Bldg 56	1,900 SY	9,500	Recmd FY67 O&M

<u>PROJ. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	Resurface Base Fuels Parking Area	11,600 SY	\$11,000	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Priority 9A in program
	Const Storage Room & Walk-in Ice Boxes, Dining Halls 1 & 2	576 SF	3,000	Recmd const. in-house BCE
	Maint of Typhoon Screening, Dining Halls 1 & 2 (Replace with block like BOQs)		3,000	Recmd FY66 O&M
	Const Refueling Maint Bldg	3,200	64,000	Recmd FY67 MCP
	Alter air cond, A&E Maint Sq Bldg	4-Ton	1,600	Recmd 1st Rev Financial Plan as Priority 22A in program

Resubmissions and Items Received as Late Starters after Submission of the
Naha AB Non-Appropriated Fund Construction Program in February 1964.

<u>PROJ. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 311-2	Air Cond Youth Center	20-Ton	\$14,500	Being revised to use less expensive mul- tiple units
NAH 83-4	Air Cond NCO Club	30-Ton	25,000	In Hq USAF pending approval of Exception to Policy
NAH 99-4	Const/Alter Officers' Open Mess	2,321 SF	45,000	Siting approved; essen- tiality & funding not yet obtained
NAH 101-4	Concessionaire Restaur- ant	5,725 SF	87,000	Awaiting approval of siting which was for- warded to PACAF
NAH 103-4	Package Sales Store	420 SF	3,100	Construction Contract being drawn up
NAH 104-4	Const Golf Maint Facil	600 SF	5,000	Siting & essentiality approved - awaiting funds

<u>PROJ. NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>EST. COST</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
NAH 65-1	Const Addn to NCO Club	3,286 SF	\$50,000	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 89-5	Const Girl Scout Facil	1,800 SF	14,500	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 90-5	Const Boy Scout Facil	3,000 SF	25,000	Programming documents forwarded to 51JA for submission
NAH 78-5	Construct Nursery	3,000 SF	39,000	Programming documents forwarded to 51P-S for submission
NAH 73-5	Construct Thrift Shop	3,200 SF		Project documents scheduled for near future
NAH 74-5	Const Family Service Facility	3,000 SF		Project documents scheduled for near future
NAH 72-5	Model airplane flying circle			Project documents scheduled for near future
NAH 66-5	Const Nursery School	2,400 SF	24,000	Programming documents being prepared
NAH 75-3	Red Cross Facility	350 SF		Programming documents being prepared
NAH 76-5	Base Playground			Programming documents being prepared
NAH 77-5	Running Track			Programming documents being prepared
NAH 81-5	Cycle Track			Programming documents being prepared
NAH 82-5	Boat Dock			Programming documents scheduled for near future
NAH 83-5	Skeet Range			Project documents scheduled for near future
NAH 84-5	Archery Range			Project documents scheduled for near future

KADENA AIR BASE

Installations Assigned to Kadena Air Base.

Kadena Air Base, the site of Headquarters, 313th Air Division, and the largest Air Force facility in the Ryukyu Islands, had assigned to it the following installations during the first six months of 1964:

Awase Communications Annex (the AIRCOM Transmitter Site)

Hanza Ammunition Storage Annex

Ie Shima Auxiliary Airfield (including the airfield proper, the AIRCOM Receiver Site, and the bombing/gunnery/rocketry range)

Irisuna Shima Air Range

Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex

Kadena Family Housing Annex (known as Morgan Manor)

Kadena Site Number 1 (the 498th TMG's Bolo Point launch site)

Kadena Site Number 2 (the 498th TMG's White Beach launch site)

Kadena Site Number 3 (the 498th TMG's Ginbaru (Kin) launch site)

Kadena Site Number 4 (the 498th TMG's Tancha (Onna) launch site)

Kadena TACAN Annex

Koza Radio Relay Annex (the microwave tower in Goya-Ku, Koza City, linking the Awase Transmitter Site with the AIRCOM Communications Center in the Base Operations Building on Kadena Air Base proper)

Motobu Auxiliary Airfield (inactive as of 30 June 1957, but retained by the Air Force against the day when new use might be found for it)

Onna Point Administration Annex (home of the 6927th Security
Squadron (USAFSS))

Ryukyus Air Range

Yontan Auxiliary Airfield

The Status of Kadena AB Military Construction Programs for the Period
FY-1964 through FY-1970, as of 19 February 1964.

<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST PER ITEM</u>	
	<u>FY64 (APPROPRIATED)</u>		\$1,457,000
Area Search Radar	840 SF	\$ 83,000	
Airfield Pavement Lighting	LS	429,000	
Addn to Air Freight Terminal	13,700 SF	170,000	
Control Tower	4,962 SF	270,000	
Sub-Station	1 EA	<u>500,000</u>	
			\$1,457,000
Alteration of Awase AIRCOM Facility	LS	\$215,000	
Addition to AFSS Operations at Onna Point	12,810 SF	475,000	
	<u>FY65 (OSD APPROVED - 30 JAN 64)</u>		\$1,792,000
AIRCOM Facility at Base Opns	12,254 SF	\$361,000	
Test Cells	2 EA	261,000	
Addition to Squadron Opns	11,910 SF	80,000	To Be Deleted
Addn (Alt) to Readiness Crew Bldg	1,960 SF	43,000	
Chapel, with annex	11,110 SF	234,000	
Addn to Arm & Elect Maint Shop	4,440 SF	78,000	

FY65 (OSD APPROVED - 30 JAN 64)

<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST PER ITEM</u>
Dental Clinic	10,361 SF	\$500,000
Maint Control Admin Wing	8,225 SF	<u>235,000</u>

\$1,792,000

Ammo Storage	LS	\$110,000
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FY66 MCF

(FY64 DROPOUTS)

Airmen's Dormitory	200 MN	\$513,000
Men's O.Q.	40 MN	<u>350,000</u>

\$ 863,000

(FY65 DROPOUTS)

Women's O.Q.	40 MN	<u>238,000</u>
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\$ 238,000

(FUB PROGRAM - 13 JAN 64)

Shoulder Stabilization, R/W, T/W	197,000 SY	\$1,600,000
Dependent Elementary School	80,000 SF	1,200,000
Base Supply & Equip Whse	40,000 SF	320,000
Addn to Wing Hq, Bldg 99	16,290 SF	401,000
21-Dormitory Addn to Hq Sqdn		238,000
Addn to Commissary Store	4,596 SF	92,000
Addn to Flt Line Fire Station	2,990 SF	72,000
Base Theater	15,840 SF	400,000
Education Center	6,450 SF	125,000
Avfuel (Maint) Fuel Hydrant	12,100 LF	2,256,000

(FUB PROGRAM, 13 JAN 64)

<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST PER ITEM</u>
Central Post Office	5,300 SF	\$ 115,000
Power Check Pad	5,650 SY	<u>81,000</u>

\$6,950,000

(5TH AF ADDED)

Base Ammo Storage	18 Mag	\$1,184,000
Ammo Maintenance Shop	2,090 SF	<u>94,000</u>

\$1,278,000

(PACAF ADDED)

Operational Facilities		\$ <u>836,000</u>
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\$ 836,000

(NEW SUBMISSIONS)

Runway Overruns	16,700 SY	\$ 700,000
Operational Apron	36,770 SY	390,000
Fire Alarm System	LS	42
Aviation Fuel Hydrant (Const)	6 OL	<u>140,000</u>

\$1,272,000

(TENANT PROJECTS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR PACAF FUNDING)

Warehouse Supply & Equip, Base (MATS)		\$ 204,000
Air Passenger Terminal		<u>568,000</u>

\$ 772,000

(FLOATER)

Air Condition Commissary		\$ <u>61,000</u>
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\$ 61,000

FY66 REVISED PROJECTS - BY PRIORITY

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	Power Check Pad	5,650 SY	\$ 81,000
2	Operational Apron	36,770 SY	390,000
3	Const Avfuel Hydrant	6,000 OL	140,000
4	Stabilization of T/W Shoulder	44,200 SY	331,000
5	Men's O.Q.	40 MN	350,000
6	Women's O.Q.	40 MN	238,000
7	Elementary Dependent School	93,431 SF	1,717,000
8	Airmen's Dormitory	200 MN	513,000
9	Central Post Office	5,300 SF	110,000
10	Base Theater	15,940 SF	420,000
11	Base Sup & Equip Warehouse	20,746	240,000
12	Air Condition Commissary	65 Tn	61,000
13	Addn to Commissary Store	4,596 SF	153,000
14	Addn to Wing Hq Bldg (99)	9,450 SF	220,000
15	Addn to Line Fire Station	2,990 SF	72,000
16	Addn to Hq Sqdn Dormitories (23)	43,700 SF	276,000
17	Addn to RAPCON Bldg	---	---
18	Fire Alarm System	LS	42,000
19	Runway Overruns	16,700 SY	700,000

(PRIORITY TO BE ESTABLISHED BY PACAF)

Operational Facilities	LS	\$ 836,000
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(PRIORITIES TO BE ESTABLISHED BY FIFTH AF)

Ammo Storage, Base	18 Mag	\$1,184,000
Base Ammo Shop	2,090 SF	94,000

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>SCOPE</u>	<u>COST</u>
	<u>FY67 MCP</u>	
Replacement of Base Sup & Equip Warehouse	5,650 SY	\$ 81,000
Administrative Office	25,000 SF	591,000
Education Center	6,450 SF	140,000
Organizational Maintenance Hangar	23,913 SF	480,000
Aircraft Engine Install & Repair Shop	3,200 SF	70,000
Branch Bank	3,290 SF	57,000
Boundary Fence	21,300 FT	58,000
Runway 05R Overlay	LS	2,882,000
Addn (Gymnasium) to Crew Readiness Bldg (868)	3,200 SF	<u>64,000</u>
		\$4,423,000
	<u>FY68 MCP</u>	
Service Club	12,700 SF	\$ 276,000
Transient Apron	39,000 SF	505,000
Hazard Removal	LS	1,000,000
Runway 05L Overlay	LS	<u>3,214,000</u>
		\$4,995,000

FY69 MCP

Civil Engineer Covered Storage	14,880 SF	\$ 181,000
Replacement of Base Supply & Equipment Warehouse	14,000 SF	140,000
Replacement of Base Supply & Equipment Warehouse	14,000 SF	140,000
Replacement of Recreation Gymnasium	7,758 SF	<u>150,000</u>
		\$ 914,000

FY70 MCP

Recreation Bowling Alley	7,440 SF	\$ 164,000
Operational Apron	179,277 SY	1,076,000
Exchange Service Station	4,177 SF	100,000
Relocate Overhead Primary Distribution Line	11,100 LF	<u>89,000</u>
		\$1,429,000

Fifth Air Force's Review of the FY-1966 through FY-1970 Military Construction Programs for Kadena Air Base.

Early in March 1964 two members of the Kadena Base Civil Engineer organization carried the base Military Construction Programs for the Fiscal Years 1966 through 1970 to Headquarters, Fifth Air Force for review. The results of this review were as follows:⁴

FY-1966 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
1	Power Check Pad	Supported by 5AF
2	Operational Apron	Not supported as PACAF project. Submitted with recommendation that MATS support.
3	Avfuel Hydra Fuel	Not supported as PACAF project. Submitted with recommendation that MATS support.

FY-1966 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
4	Shoulder Stabilization	Not supported as PACAF project. Submitted with recommendation that MATS support.
5	Men's O.Q.	Supported by 5AF. (Note: A BOQ had been entered in the FY66-69 Program as a FY67 item. In reviewing the program to go before the 5AF and PACAF Evaluation Panel, the Kadena Base Civil Engineers determined that the basic data on hand would not support a BOQ in the FY67 Program; so it was withdrawn. Subsequently, in the process of re-establishing requirements, the average number of transients was found to have increased to the extent that Kadena could support a BOQ in FY67. This was noted at 5AF, and they suggested that the 6313th ABW put it back into the program, since it had previously been approved by USAF.)
6	Women's O.Q.	Supported by 5AF
7	Elementary Dependent School	Supported by 5AF
8	Airmen's Dormitory	Supported by 5AF
9	Central Post Office	Not supported by 5AF. Requirement not sufficient to support in austerity periods.
10	Base Theater	Supported by 5AF
11	Base Supply & Equip Warehouse	Supported by 5AF
12	Addn to Commissary Store	Supported by 5AF
13	Addn to Wing Hq	Supported by 5AF
14	Addn to Line Fire Station	Supported by 5AF, but reduced in scope to include only two truck stalls, no kitchen, classroom, or air conditioning.
15	Addn to Hqs Sq	Supported by 5AF
16	Fire Alarm System	Moved from FY 66 Program to FY70

FY-1966 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
17	Runway Overruns	Supported by 5AF
18	Telephone Duct Facility	5AF Supported because the Facilities Utilization Panel said Army Communications wanted the Air Force to keep this item in the program for the present, and they would fund it later. The panel changed funding from AFCS to PACAF.

PRIORITIES TO BE ESTABLISHED BY HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

Operational Facilities	Supported by 5AF
Ammo Maint Shop	Supported by 5AF
Base Ammo Storage	Supported by 5AF

FY-1967 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
1	Rebuild Runway 05R	Not supported by 5AF, pending a pavement evaluation study
2	Readiness Crew Addn to Bldg 868	Not supported by 5AF, because no support for a requirement could be established
3	Base Supply & Equipment Warehouse	Supported by 5AF
4	Admin Office	Supported by 5AF
5	Men's O.Q.	Supported by 5AF
6	Education Center	Supported by 5AF
7	Org Maint Hangar	Supported by 5AF
8	Eng Degreasing Plant (This item was "Shop, A/C I&R 766")	Supported by 5AF
9	Branch Bank	Supported by 5AF
10	Boundary Fence	Supported by 5AF

FY-1968 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
1	Rebuild Runway 05L	Nor supported by 5AF pending a pavement evaluation study.
2	Service Club	Supported by 5AF.
3	Hazard Removal	5AF supported a reduced scope of \$250,000, as supported by the PACAF Panel during Kadena project review.
4	Transient Apron	Not supported by 5AF - already in a FY-1966 project.

FY-1969 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
1	Civil Engineer Covered Storage	Supported by 5AF.
2	Base Supply & Equipment Warehouse	Supported by 5AF.
3	Recreation Gymnasium	Supported by 5AF, with increased scope to 20,500 SF.
4	Recreation Library	Supported by 5AF.

FY-1970 MCP

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>FIFTH AIR FORCE REACTION</u>
1	Recreation Bowling Alley	Supported by 5AF.
2	Exchange Service Station	Supported by 5AF, with reduced scope to conform to requirements in AFM 86-4.
3	Primary Overhead Distribution Line	Supported by 5AF.
4	Operation Apron	Not supported by 5AF, since the scope of this project was included in FY66 "Operational Apron" project.

The FY-1966 Maintenance and Repair Program (O&M) for Kadena Air Base.

At its meeting of 25 June 1964, the Kadena Facilities Utilization Board approved the FY-1966 Maintenance and Repair Program (O&M) for essentiality and priority as follows:⁵

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	KAD 71-6	Repair Bldg 15, 313ADiv Hq	\$ 20,000
2	KAD 59-6	Maint Storm Drainage, Displ	30,000
3	KAD 81-6	Maint Elec Primary Pwr Gen (Sites 1 & 2)	48,000
4	KAD 4-6	Maint Jet Fuel Storage (101 & 106)	3,200
5	KAD 77-6	Maint A/C Gunnery Range (Ie Shima)	15,000
6	KAD 62-6	Maint Non/Pot Water Sup (T-70) at Onna Point	5,000
7	KAD 105-5	Repair Storm Drainage, Displ (Sites 1, 2, 3, & 4)	10,000
8	KAD 80-6	Maint Elec Primary Power Generator	16,000
9	KAD 132-5	Maint Misc Bldgs (Paint Exteriors)	50,000
10	KAD 61-6	Maint Airmen's Dormitory	20,000
11	KAD 43-6	Maint Airmen's Dining Hall	37,500
12	KAD 64-6	Repair Exchange Service Station (407)	13,000
13	KAD 51-6	Maint Misc Bldgs (Roofs)	36,500
14	KAD 46-6	Maint Dispersed Parking Hardstands (101, 103, 105, 107, & 2209)	75,000
15	KAD 52-6	Rewire Misc Bldgs	15,000
16	KAD 22-6	Repair Field Training Facility (S-908)	10,100
17	KAD 53-6	Maint Misc Bldgs (General)	50,000
18	KAD 57-6	Maint Road	97,000
19	KAD 14-6	Maint Water Treatment Facility of Swimming Pool	2,100
20	KAD 58-6	Maint Avfuel Hydraulic Fuel System (Area B)	114,000

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
21	KAD 56-6	Maint Air Cond Plant	\$108,000
22	KAD 63-6	Maint Water Heaters in Misc Bldgs	18,000
23	KAD 72-6	Repair Base Theaters (T-620 & T-1785)	5,000
24	KAD 59-3	Maintain Security Fence	20,000
25	KAD 55-6	Paint Interior of Misc Bldgs	23,000
26	KAD 54-6	Paint Exterior of Misc Bldgs	65,000
27	KAD 690-2	Repair Underground Primary Dist Line	18,100
28	KAD 52-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs (T-1802, T-1811, T-1812, T-1822, & T-1870)	15,000

The FY-1966 Alteration and Minor Construction Program (C&M) for Kadena Air Base.

Another item approved by the Kadena Facilities Utilization Board for essentiality and priority at its meeting of 25 June 1964 was the FY-1966 Alteration and Minor Construction Program, as follows:⁶

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	KAD 47-6	Const Air-to-Ground Target (Ie Shima)	\$ 2,500
2	KAD 85-5	Const Elec Pwr Plant (Bldg 155)	25,000
3	KAD 25-5	Alter Line Fire Station (Bldg 3450)	24,200
4	KAD 28-6	Alter A/C Eng I&R Shop (Bldg 766)	20,000
5	KAD 20-6	Const Addn to POL Ops & Admin Bldg (3135)	2,500
6	KAD 33-6	Alter Dep Elementary School (21 H&K Houses)	21,000
7	KAD 54-4	Construct Admin Office	25,000
8	KAD 2-6	Alter Base Chapel Annex (Bldg 425)	25,000

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
9	KAD 31-6	Const Comm Power (Bldg 3419)	\$ 20,000
10	KAD 26-5	Alter TACAN Auto Start (5350)	20,000

The Revised FY-1965 O&M Program for Kadena Air Base.

Yet another item taken up and approved for essentiality and priority by the Kadena Facilities Utilization Board at its 25 June 1964 meeting was the Revised FY-1965 O&M Program. The product of their deliberations was as follows:⁷

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED COST</u>
1	KAD 141-4	Alter Bldg 10, 313ADiv Hq	\$ 6,000
2	KAD 147-5	Maintain Elec Primary Pwr Gen	3,000
3	KAD 148-5	Maintain Elec Primary Pwr Gen at Ie Shima	8,000
4	KAD 149-5	Maintain Elec Primary Pwr Gen at Onna Point	24,000
5	KAD 99-5	Maintain Jet Fuel Storage	8,600
6	KAD 4-4	Construct Weather Instrument Shelter	24,300
7	KAD 154-5	Maintain Ie Shima Gunnery Range	10,000
8	KAD 87-5	Maintain Air Cond (3409 & 4044)	96,000
9	KAD 42-5	Alter Woodworking Shop (700)	5,000
10	KAD 108-5	Alter Avfuel Fill Stands	25,000
11	KAD 2-4	Maintain Dispersed Parking Hardstands	100,000
12	KAD 564-1	Repair Open Mess Boiler (313)	6,400
13	KAD 76-5	Alter Elementary Dependent School	25,000
14	KAD 118-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	49,800
15	KAD 21-6	Alter Auto Maint Shop (242)	10,900

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED COST</u>
16	KAD 8-6	Alter Auto Maint Shop (244)	\$ 5,000
17	KAD 32-4	Maint Misc Bldgs	12,500
18	KAD 119-5	Maint Misc Bldgs	21,700
19	KAD 33-6	Alter Diesel Storage	2,700
20	KAD 26-6	Construct A/C Weapon Training	8,000
21	KAD 120-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	81,800
22	KAD 121-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	39,700
23	KAD 122-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	3,200
24	KAD 54-3	Alter RAPCON Center	2,900
25	KAD 123-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	29,700
26	KAD 124-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	19,000
27	KAD 116-3	Maintain Overhead Crane (244)	3,200
28	KAD 38-4	Construct Sup Facility AN/TPQ-11	3,500
29	KAD 72-4	Construct Sup Facility for Antenna (Ie Shima)	3,600
30	KAD 8-5	Maintain Operational Apron	15,000
31	KAD 50-4	Alter Ammo Storage Bldg	18,600
32	KAD 68-5	Maintain Avfuel Hydraulic Fuel System	113,900
33	KAD 617-2	Maintain Liquid Fuel Pipeline	19,200
34	KAD 128-4	Maintain Base Disposal & Salvage Whse	25,200
35	KAD 125-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	12,500
36	KAD 126-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	33,900
37	KAD 127-5	Maintain Misc Bldgs	33,700
38	KAD 128-5	Maintain Road (Onna Point)	21,000
39	KAD 129-5	Maintain Security Fence	8,400

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>ESTIMATED COST</u>
40	KAD 130-5	Maintain Ice Machines	\$ 10,000
41	KAD 75-3	Construct Emergency power, Bldg 15 (313AD Hq)	9,600
42	KAD 150-5	Alter Test Stand	23,800
43	KAD 82-4	Alter Ammo Maint Shop (4044)	3,700
44	KAD 111-4	Alter Underground Secondary Dist Line	2,700
45	KAD 43-5	Construct Water Well and Tank	13,500
46	KAD 131-5	Maint Misc Bldgs	39,700
47	KAD 437-2	Construct Comm Pwr (868)	12,900
48	KAD 439-2	Construct Comm Pwr (99)	12,900
49	KAD 62-4	Construct Kennel Support Facility	15,000
50	KAD 78-4	Construct Support Facility LP Antenna	10,000

The Long Range Alteration and Minor Construction Program for Kadena Air Base.

At the same 25 June 1964 meeting of the Kadena Facilities Utilization Board, the Base Civil Engineer presented a long range Alteration and Minor Construction Program for study and possible future revision by the board.

It was as follows:⁸

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	KAD 44-5	Construct Underground Primary Dist Line	\$ 15,000
2	KAD 112-4	Construct Elec Emergency Pwr Plant	25,000
3	KAD 7-6	Construct Road	2,200
4	KAD 22-5	Alter Fire Hydrants	6,300
5	KAD 29-6	Alter Auto Maint Shop (T-1987)	19,100
6	KAD 24-6	Alter 400 MMS Ammo Depot Storage (1105)	23,000

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
7	KAD 117-4	Construct Telephone Duct Facility	\$ 2,100
8	KAD 76-4	Alter Radio Relay Facility	4,000
9	KAD 3-6	Construct Fire Station Structure (Ie Shima)	25,000
10	KAD 697-2	Alter Elec Switch Station	4,500
11	KAD 42-6	Alter/Air Condition Commissary Store (409)	22,000
12	KAD 79-4	Construct Underground Primary Dist Line	17,900
13	KAD 79-6	Alter/Air Condition Medical Equipment & Supply Storage (701)	<u>2,500</u>
TOTAL			\$168,600

FY-1968

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	KAD 111-3	Alter/Air Condition Squadron Operations (56)	\$ 6,300
2	KAD 27-6	Alter Org Maint Hangar (T-791A)	6,800
3	KAD 76-6	Alter Sanitary Sewage Main	16,400
4	KAD 56-5	Alter Group Hq (99)	7,400
5	KAD 6-5	Construct POL Waste Tank & Burning Pit	11,300
6	KAD 49-6	Construct Airmen's Dining Hall (723)	10,000
7	KAD 311-1	Alter Civil Engineer M&R (234)	20,600
8	KAD 48-4	Alter Dependent Elementary School (M&K Area)	25,000
9	KAD 701-2	Alter/Air Condition Field Training Facility (S-903)	<u>24,700</u>
TOTAL			\$123,500

FY-1969

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
1	KAD 19-6	Construct AIRCOM Relay Center (100A)	\$ 10,000

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<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>PROJECT NO.</u>	<u>PROJECT TITLE</u>	<u>COST</u>
2	KAD 48-5	Alter Aircraft Arresting Barrier	\$ 25,000
3	KAD 1-6	Construct Addition to Central Post Office (403)	25,000
		TOTAL	<u>\$ 60,000</u>

FOOTNOTES

Footnote No.	Document No.	
1	--	Ltr., Hq., 51st Combat Support Group (51CES) to PACAF (PFSCE-PP), sub.: Minutes of the Facilities Utilization Board Meeting, 18 Feb. 1964, dtd. 6 Mar. 1964.
2	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
3	--	Ltr., Hq., 51st Civil Eng. Sq (51CES) to PACAF (PFSCE-PP), sub.: Minutes of the Facilities Utilization Board Meeting, 18 March 1964, dtd. 26 Mar. 1964.
4	--	Ltr., 6313th AEW Civil Engineer to Facility Utilization Board Members, sub.: Fifth Air Force Review of Kadena Air Base MCP's, FY66 through FY70, dtd. 13 Mar. 1964.
5	--	Ltr., Hq., 6313th AEW (CE) to Comdr., 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, Comdr., 1962d Communications Gp., <u>et al.</u> , sub.: Minutes of Meeting, Facilities Utilization Board, Kadena Air Base, 25 June 1964, dtd. 20 July 1964.
6	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
7	--	<u>Ibid.</u>
8	--	<u>Ibid.</u>

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APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

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APPENDIX 1

KEY PERSONNEL OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

HEADQUARTERS, 313TH AIR DIVISION

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NAME</u>
Commander	Major General Albert P. Clark (1 January - 30 June)
Vice Commander	Colonel James W. Newsome (1 January - 30 June)
Protocol Officer	2d Lieutenant John F. Gee, III (1 January - 11 February)
	2d Lieutenant John W. Boyce (11 February - 27 March)
	Vacant (27 March - 30 June)
Aide de Camp	First Lieutenant John M. Elle (1 January - 30 June)

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Director of Administrative Services	Lieut. Colonel Russell W. Betts, Jr. (1 January - 23 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Albert E. Hughes* (23 June - 30 June)

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

Staff Judge Advocate	Lieut. Colonel William H. Yates (1 January - 17 June)
	Major Timothy G. O'Shea (17 June - 30 June)

*Acting as Director of Administrative Services until arrival of new officer assigned as replacement for Lieut. Colonel Betts. Regular duty assignment: Assistant Personnel Officer.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
<u>OFFICE OF INFORMATION</u>	
Information Officer	Lieut. Colonel Merritt G. Garner (1 January - 30 June)
Deputy Information Officer	Mr. Robert L. Lansche (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
Command Historian	Mr. Wayne G. Peterson (Civilian)* (1 January - 30 June)
Officer in Charge, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Okinawa	Major Damon E. Eckles* (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT FOR SAFETY</u>	
Assistant for Safety	Major Earle T. Carothers, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Nuclear Safety Officer	First Lieutenant Hugh E. Killin, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Ground Safety Officer	Mr. Jack W. Dunseith (Civilian)** (1 January - 30 June)
<u>DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT</u>	
Director of Security and Law Enforcement	Lieut. Colonel Theodore J. Newman*** (1 January - 18 May)
	Captain David A. Baxter*** (18 May - 18 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Albert Feldman*** (18 June - 30 June)

*Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Ground Safety Officer,
6313th Air Base Wing.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Security and
Law Enforcement, 6313th Air Base Wing.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF SURGEON</u>	
Staff Surgeon	Colonel Paul V. Davis* (1 January - 6 February)
	Captain David P. Connolly* (6 February - 19 February)
	Colonel William H. Karmany* (19 February - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF CHAPLAIN</u>	
Staff Chaplain	Major Joe L. Morris** (1 January - 29 January)
	Major Kalman L. Levitan** (29 January - 30 June)
<u>OFFICE OF THE STAFF COMPTROLLER</u>	
Staff Comptroller	Lieut. Colonel Norman W. Todd*** (1 January - 30 June)
<u>OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Operations	Colonel Richard D. Goree (1 January - 30 June)
Assistant Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith**** (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Plans, Programs, and Requirements Division	Lieut. Colonel Gerald D. Fitzgerald (1 January - 30 June)

*Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director, Base Medical Service, Kadena Air Base, and Commander, 6332d USAF Dispensary.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Base Chaplain, Kadena Air Base.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Comptroller, 6313th Air Base Wing.

****Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief, Operations and Training Division.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Chief, Plans Branch	Captain Charles L. Kelly (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Programs and Requirements Branch	Captain James L. Thompson (1 January - 11 June)
	Major Robert C. Fern (11 June - 30 June)
Chief, Operations and Training Division	Lieut. Colonel Richard S. Griffith (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Current Operations Branch	Lieut. Colonel James C. Williams (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, 313th Air Division Air Operations Center	Major John H. Bowers (1 January - 30 June)
Passive Defense Officer	Major Robert W. McGuire (1 January - 10 June)
	Vacant (10 June - 30 June)
Chief, Special Operations Activities Division	Lieut. Colonel Erick O. Linden (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Intelligence Division	Lieut. Colonel John T. Whitescarver (1 January - 18 February)
	Captain Clark E. Williams (18 February - 30 June)
Assistant Chief, Intelligence Division	Captain Clark E. Williams (1 January - 18 February)
	Vacant (18 February - 27 March)
	2d Lieutenant John W. Boyce (27 March - 30 June)
Chief, Manpower and Organization Division	Lieut. Colonel Darwin R. Addis (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Kadena Manpower Branch	2d Lieutenant Milton L. Haines (1 January - 30 April)
	Vacant (30 April - 30 June)

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Chief, Naha Manpower Branch	Captain Robbie V. Young (1 January - 30 June)
Organization and Management Engineering Officer	Captain Marvin Rosenglick (1 January - 30 June)
 <u>MATERIEL DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Materiel	Colonel Mitchell A. Cobeaga (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Services Division	Lieut. Colonel Iver C. Fitschen (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Seaweed Branch	First Lieutenant Willard R. Chambers (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Inter-Service Supply and Services Branch	Vacant (1 January - 30 June)
Air Force Representative, Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Ryukyus (SAPOR) and POL Officer	Captain Alvin G. Crawford* (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Maintenance Division	Major William R. Catlin (1 January - 30 June)
Chief, Munitions Division	Lieut. Colonel Hoyt A. Jolly, Jr. (1 January - 9 May)
	Major Willard S. Oleson (9 May - 30 June)
Chief, Logistics Plans Division	Major Robert J. Morris (1 January - 12 June)
	Vacant (12 June - 30 June)
 <u>OFFICE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING</u>	
Civil Engineering Officer	Major Mark L. Nagel (1 January - 20 April)
	Lieut. Colonel Richard R. Sipes (20 April - 30 June)

*Detailed from the 6313th Air Base Wing.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Assistant Civil Engineering Officer	Mr. Lloyd H. Hellmann (Civilian) (1 January - 30 June)
 <u>OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT</u>	
Procurement Officer	Major Lynn J. Corp (1 January - 21 May)
	Captain John F. Thomason (21 May - 30 June)
Deputy Procurement Officer	Captain John F. Thomason (1 January - 21 May)
	Captain Joseph W. O'Toole (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Supply and Services Branch	Captain Joseph W. O'Toole (20 February - 21 May)
Chief, Procurement Support Branch*	Captain Joseph W. O'Toole (21 May - 30 June)
Chief, Contract and Administration* Branch	Captain John F. Thomason (21 May - 30 June)
 <u>PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE</u>	
Director of Personnel	Colonel Dean B. Brown (1 January - 30 June)
Assistant Personnel Officer	Lieut. Colonel Albert E. Hughes (1 January - 30 June)
Air Force Representative with the Ryukyus Exchange System	Lieut. Colonel Dudley W. Higon, Jr. (1 January - 16 March)
	Vacant (16 March - 26 March)
	Colonel Roscoe B. Blackledge (26 March - 30 June)

*On 21 May 1964 the Supply and Services Branch was eliminated, and the Procurement Office was divided into three branches--the Procurement Branch, the Contract and Administration Branch, and the Procurement Support Branch.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Civilian Personnel Officer	Mr. Louis W. Conroy, Jr. (Civilian)* (1 January - 30 June)

DISTRICT OFFICE #43, 1005TH SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS GROUP (IG) PACAF

Commander, OSI District Office #43	Lieut. Colonel George E. Hewitt (1 January - 30 June)
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DETACHMENT NO. 2, 1045TH OPERATIONAL EVALUATION AND TRAINING GROUP

Detachment No. 2 Commander	Colonel Alpheus W. Blizzard (1 January - 30 June)
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KADENA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS AND KEY OFFICIALS

18th Tactical Fighter Wing Commander	Colonel George B. Simler (1 January - 16 May)
	Colonel Jones E. Bolt (16 May - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Deputy Wing Commander	Colonel Jones E. Bolt (1 January - 16 May)
	Colonel Floyd White (16 May - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Executive Officer	Major Thomas B. Huddleston, Jr. (1 January - 14 May)
	Vacant (14 May - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Operations	Colonel Floyd White (1 January - 16 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Grant R. Smith (16 May - 30 June)
18th Tactical Fighter Wing Director of Materiel	Colonel John W. Carpenter (1 January - 30 June)
12th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel John C. Neill (1 January - 16 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Lawrence D. Damewood (16 May - 30 June)

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
44th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Grant R. Smith (1 January - 16 May)
	Lieut. Colonel William B. Craig (16 May - 30 June)
67th Tactical Fighter Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Grady Morris (1 January - 30 June)
15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Photo, Jet, Commander	Major Alexander P. Butterfield (1 January - 30 June)
18th Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Charles Lower (1 January - 30 June)
18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major James A. Head (1 January - 1 May)
	Lieut. Colonel John N. Bell (1 May - 30 June)
18th Organizational Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter A. Miller (1 January - 30 June)
18th Supply Squadron Commander*	Major Vincent A. Bauman (8 January - 30 June)
498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Commander	Colonel Warren E. Vinzant (1 January - 30 June)
498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Executive Officer	Major Norman C. Bausch** (1 January - 11 March)
	Vacant (11 March - 13 April)
	Major Harold L. Graybill** (13 April - 30 June)

*The 18th Supply Squadron was organized at Kadena AB and assigned to the 18th Tactical Fighter Wing on 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963. The new organization replaced and drew its personnel from the 6313th Materiel Squadron, which was discontinued by the same PACAF special order.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: 498th Tactical Missile Group (PACAF) Staff Administrative Officer.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
498th Missile Maintenance Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Major Eugene F. Phillips (1 January - 30 June)
873d Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Dudley A. Dilley (1 January - 30 June)
874th Tactical Missile Squadron (PACAF) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Henry R. Tillie (1 January - 30 June)
658th Tactical Hospital Commander*	Captain David P. Connolly (1 January - 28 January)
6313th Air Base Wing Commander	Colonel John R. Roche (1 January - 4 June)
	Colonel Cornelius G. Brosnan (4 June - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Deputy Commander	Colonel Cornelius G. Brosnan (1 January - 4 June)
	Colonel Roscoe B. Blackledge (4 June - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Raymond S. Barnes** (1 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Walter C. Kurowski (1 January - 17 June)
	Lieut. Colonel John L. Carkeet (17 June - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Services	Lieut. Colonel William E. Pitcher*** (1 January - 30 June)

*The 658th Tactical Hospital was inactivated on 28 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-7, dtd. 9 Jan. 1964.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Chief of Administrative Services, 6313th Air Base Wing.

***Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Commander, 6313th Support Squadron, until 8 January 1964, when the unit was redesignated the 6313th Services Squadron, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Operations	Lieut. Colonel Thomas J. Williams (1 January - 27 January)
	Major Eugene P. Bissell (27 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Security and Law Enforcement	Lieut. Colonel Theodore J. Newman (1 January - 18 May)
	Captain David A. Baxter (18 May - 18 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Albert Feldman (18 June - 30 June)
6313th Air Base Wing Director of Engineering	Major Mark L. Nagel (1 January - 20 April)
	Lieut. Colonel Richard R. Sipes (20 April - 30 June)
6313th Materiel Squadron Commander*	Major Vincent A. Bauman (1 January - 8 January)
6313th Transportation Squadron** Commander	Major George F. Uhl, Jr. (8 January - 30 June)
6313th Support Squadron Commander**	Lieut. Colonel William E. Pitcher (1 January - 8 January)
6313th Services Squadron Commander**	Lieut. Colonel William E. Pitcher (8 January - 30 June)
6313th Air Police Squadron Commander	Captain Robert H. Brooks (1 January - 5 May)
	Captain Robert W. Burlingame (5 May - 30 June)

*The 6313th Materiel Squadron was discontinued effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963, and its personnel were transferred to the simultaneously organized 18th Supply Squadron.

**The 6313th Support Squadron was redesignated the 6313th Services Squadron, and the 6313th Transportation Squadron was designated and organized at Kadena AB, effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963, and the 6313th Transportation Squadron was also created from resources of the former 6313th Support Squadron.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
6313th Civil Engineering Squadron Commander	Major Mark L. Nagel (1 January - 20 April)
	Lieut. Colonel Richard R. Sipes (20 April - 30 June)
6313th Headquarters Squadron Section Commander	Major James C. Fournie (1 January - 30 June)
6332d USAF Dispensary Commander	Colonel Paul V. Davis (1 January - 6 February)
	Captain David P. Connally (6 February - 20 February)
	Colonel William H. Kammany (20 February - 30 June)
Detachment 4, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain Lowell F. Peterson (1 January - 30 June)
15th Physiological Training Flight Commander	Captain Frederick F. Thimm (1 January - 30 June)
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Anthony H. Richard, Jr. (1 January - 4 June)
	Major James H. Bauer (4 June - 24 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Edward G. Abington (24 June - 30 June)
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater) Deputy Commander	Major James H. Bauer (1 January - 4 June)
	Vacant (4 June - 24 June)
	Major James H. Bauer (24 June - 30 June)
418th Munitions Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel George Wetzler, Jr. (1 January - 9 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Hoyt A. Jolly, Jr. (9 May - 30 June)

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
1962d Communications Group (AFCS) Commander	Colonel James L. Caselli (1 January - 30 June)
1962d Communications Group (AFCS) Deputy Commander	Lieut. Colonel Tilmon B. Cantrell (1 January - 30 June)
6922d Security Wing (USAFSS) Commander	Colonel John R. Neal (1 January - 30 June)
6927th Security Squadron (USAFSS) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert G. Sandstrom (1 January - 30 June)
1505th Support Squadron (Transport) Commander	Lieut. Colonel George E. Bye (1 January - 30 June)
11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Major Milton S. Mitchell (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert F. Durbin (1 January - 8 June)
Detachment 8, 20th Weather Squadron* Commander	Lieut. Colonel Robert F. Durbin (8 June - 30 June)
Detachment 2, Hq., 3d Air Division (SAC) Commander	Lieut. Colonel Edward E. Sandin (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 2, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Commander	Major Charles D. Boyer, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 2, 2875th Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency Squadron Commander	Captain Marvin D. Meadows (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 12, 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group Commander	Major David G. Fisher (1 January - 30 June)
6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group Commander	Colonel Joel D. Thorvaldson (1 January - 21 May)
	Colonel Abner M. Aust, Jr. (21 May - 30 June)

*Detachment 8, 1st Weather Wing, was discontinued at Kadena AB, and in its place was designated and organized Detachment 8, 20th Weather Squadron, effective 8 June 1964, per MATS SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
6002d Standardization/Evaluation Group Deputy Commander	Colonel Abner M. Aust, Jr.* (1 January - 21 May)
	Lieut. Colonel Milton E. Nelson (21 May - 25 June)
	Vacant (25 June - 30 June)

NAHA AIR BASE SUBORDINATE UNIT COMMANDERS

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Commander	Colonel Lester C. Hess (1 January - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Operations	Colonel Lloyd R. Larson* (1 January - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Deputy Commander for Materiel	Colonel David M. Taylor (1 January - 30 June)
51st Fighter Interceptor Wing Administrative Staff Officer	Major Leo A. Sussman (1 January - 28 March)
	Lieut. Colonel Walter A. Smith, Jr. (28 March - 30 June)
Chief, Combat Operations Division, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing	Lieut. Colonel Cecil V. Steed (1 January - 4 June)
	Major Elliott B. Black, Jr. (4 June - 30 June)
16th Fighter Interceptor Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Garnet D. Page (1 January - 30 June)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Elmer H. Jose, Jr. (1 January - 10 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert M. Gorham (10 February - 30 June)
51st Field Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Elmer H. Jose, Jr. (1 January - 10 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Robert M. Gorham (10 February - 30 June)

*Promoted to the rank of colonel effective 15 January 1964.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Organizational Maintenance Squadron Commander	Major Everett P. Musselman (1 January - 3 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Dino Del Vecchio (3 February - 30 June)
51st Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Ernest S. McDonald (1 January - 24 May)
	Major Billy F. Williams (25 May - 4 June)
	Lieut. Colonel Douglas A. Heimstead (4 June - 30 June)
623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Roland L. Wolfe (1 January - 30 June)
6351st USAF Dispensary Commander*	Lieut. Colonel Jerrold L. Wheaton** (1 January - 8 January)
51st USAF Dispensary Commander*	Lieut. Colonel Jerrold L. Wheaton** (8 January - 15 June)
	Captain Earle P. Battle (15 June - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Commander***	Colonel Lloyd R. Larson**** (1 January - 8 January)
51st Combat Support Group*** Commander	Colonel Lloyd R. Larson**** (8 January - 10 February)
	Colonel Charles H. Christmas (10 February - 30 June)

*The 6351st USAF Dispensary was discontinued effective 8 January and the 51st USAF Dispensary was simultaneously organized at Naha AB, where it was assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Jan. 1963.

**Additional duty as Director, Base Medical Service, Naha Air Base.

***The 51st Air Base Group was redesignated the 51st Combat Support Group effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

****Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Deputy Commander for Operations, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Air Base Group Executive* Officer	Lieut. Colonel Harold A. Wicklund (1 January - 8 January)
51st Combat Support Group* Executive Officer	Lieut. Colonel Harold A. Wicklund (8 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Director of* Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Harris L. Jenson (1 January - 8 January)
51st Combat Support Group* Director of Personnel	Lieut. Colonel Harris L. Jenson (8 January - 30 June)
51st Air Base Group Director of* Security and Law Enforcement	Major Frank J. Rahmer (1 January - 8 January)
51st Combat Support Group Director* of Security and Law Enforcement	Major Frank J. Rahmer (8 January - 30 June)
51st Support Squadron Commander**	Lieut. Colonel Walter A. Smith, Jr. (1 January - 8 January)
51st Services Squadron** Commander	Lieut. Colonel Walter A. Smith, Jr. (8 January - 30 June)
51st Transportation Squadron*** Commander	Major Gordon W. O'Dell (8 January - 27 January)
	Major David M. Robinson (27 January - 30 June)
51st Civil Engineering Squadron Commander	Major Paul Heath (1 January - 29 June)
	Captain Ernest G. Seaman (29 June - 30 June)

*The 51st Air Base Group was redesignated the 51st Combat Support Group effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

**The 51st Support Squadron was redesignated the 51st Services Squadron, effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963.

***The 51st Transportation Squadron was organized at Naha AB and assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group effective 8 January 1964, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963, its personnel being drawn from the former 51st Support Squadron.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
51st Materiel Squadron Commander*	First Lieutenant Thomas M. Thedford (1 January - 8 January)
51st Supply Squadron Commander*	First Lieutenant Thomas M. Thedford (8 January - 5 February)
	Major Bruce L. Lackey (5 February - 30 June)
51st Air Police Squadron Commander	Major Frank J. Rahmer** (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 5, 1st Medical Services Wing Commander	Captain Richard O. Ranheim (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Commander	Colonel Jack L. Crawford, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Deputy for Oper- ations	Colonel Clarence B. Slaughter, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) Deputy for Materiel	Lieut. Colonel Roger W. Manteuffel (1 January - 30 June)
21st Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel Donald C. Carlson (1 January - 30 June)
35th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel George D. Clark (1 January - 30 June)
817th Troop Carrier Squadron, Medium, Commander	Lieut. Colonel George F. Owen (1 January - 7 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Ralph S. Saunders (7 February - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 5th Communications Squadron, Division, Commander	Captain James D. Mellon, Jr. (1 January - 30 June)
2152d Communications Squadron (AFCS) Commander	Lieut. Colonel William S. Hodge (1 January - 30 June)

*The 51st Materiel Squadron was discontinued effective 8 January, per PACAF SO G-114, dtd. 24 Dec. 1963, and its personnel were transferred to the simultaneously organized 51st Supply Squadron.

**Additional duty. Regular duty assignment: Director of Security and Law Enforcement, 51st Combat Support Group.

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<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing* Commander	Major Woodrow B. Huff (1 January - 8 June)
Detachment 14, 20th Weather Squadron* Commander	Major Woodrow B. Huff (8 June - 30 June)
Detachment 3, 313th Air Division Commander	Captain Raymond R. Mendonsa (1 January - 25 April)
	Captain Lee M. Brown (25 April - 30 June)
Detachment 1, 7th Aerial Port Squadron Commander	Major Oscar W. Yetez (1 January - 30 June)
Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Squadron Commander	Captain Ralph H. Middlebrook (1 January - 30 June)
33d Air Rescue Squadron Commander	Lieut. Colonel Kenneth J. Mask (1 January - 24 February)
	Lieut. Colonel Donald E. Godbey (24 February - 30 June)

*Detachment 14, 1st Weather Wing, at Naha AB, was discontinued effective 8 June 1964, and in its place was designated and organized Detachment 14, 20th Weather Squadron, per MATS SO G-61, dtd. 12 May 1964.

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APPENDIX 2

CONTRACTS LET BY THE
313TH AIR DIVISION OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT
1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

CONTRACTS LET BY THE 313TH AIR DIVISION

OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

January: Forty-one numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$107,565 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of January 1964. There were also 44 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$71,625.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2263, in the amount of \$24,390, was awarded to Tokai Electric Installations Company for construction of a medical food inspection building at Naha Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2264, in the amount of \$7,233, was awarded to Konan Kensetsu Company for repair of the fuel tank and distribution system at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2265, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Barclay and Company for thermofax supplies for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2266, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Turco Products, Inc., for chemical compounds for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2267, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Toguchi Auto Parts Company for automotive parts for Kadena Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2268, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Tomari Motor Company for repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2269, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Okinawa Motors, Inc., for repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2270, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Miya's Garage for repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

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- January: (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2271, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Baxter Trading Company for the repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2272, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Hama's Garage for the repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2273, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to S & S Motor Company for the repair of vehicles assigned to Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2274, in the amount of \$43,633, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for maintenance work on the temporary buildings of the Naha Air Base dependents' school.
- (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2275, in the amount of \$20,649, was awarded to Okisui Construction Company for alteration of the primary power distribution system at Naha Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of January 1964.

Thirteen numbered contracts were awarded during the month of January 1964.

A total of \$4,788 was expended for 186 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of January 1964.

February: Forty-nine numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$82,751 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of February 1964. There were also 51 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$40,240.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2276, in the amount of \$27,151, was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Company for painting permanent family housing at Naha Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2277 and Contract AF 62(321)-2278 were sent to Fifth Air Force for approval.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2280, in the amount of \$24,421, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu for the construction of a readiness crew building at Kadena Air Base.

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- February: (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2281, in the amount of \$16,000, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the construction of an addition to Building 870, assigned to the 18th Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron, Kadena Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2282, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Y. Higa Enterprises for packing and crating services for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2283, in the amount of \$1,753, was awarded to National Cash Register Company for maintenance of duplicating machines at Kadena Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of February 1964.

Five numbered contracts were awarded during the month of February 1964.

A total of \$6,295 was expended for 246 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of February 1964.

March: Fifty-five numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$293,655 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of March 1964. There were also 19 delivery orders and communication service authorizations totalling \$9,583.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2278, in the amount of \$19,196, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for construction of an addition to Building 159 at Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2279, in the amount of \$70,757, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for maintenance work on the transient apron at Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2285, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Y. Higa Enterprises, Ltd., for intra-island drayage services for Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2286, in the amount of \$64,352, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for maintenance work on the base roads at Naha Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2287, in the amount of \$42,166, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for maintenance work on the operational apron at Naha Air Base.
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2288, in the amount of \$2,791, was awarded to Yomitan Industries Company for construction of an addition to Building 400 (the telephone exchange) at Kadena Air Base.

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- March:
- (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2289, a requirement type contract, was awarded to United Office Machine Company for the repair of office machines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
 - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2290, in the amount of \$20,615, was awarded to Okinawa Denki Suido Kogyo Sha for alteration of primary distribution line circuits #4 and #5 at Kadena Air Base.
 - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2291, in the amount of \$38, was awarded to Nago Telephone and Telegraph Office for telephone services for Kadena Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of March 1964.

Nine numbered contracts were awarded during the month of March 1964.

A total of \$4,990 was expended for 157 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of March 1964.

- April:
- Forty numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$100,039 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of April 1964. There were also 26 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$19,014.
- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2292, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Turco Products for providing chemical compounds for Kadena Air Base.
 - (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2293, in the amount of \$2,421, was awarded to Blackledge, Inc., for alteration of Building 92, the 6922d Security Wing (USAFSS) communications receiver facility, at Kadena Air Base.
 - (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2294, in the amount of \$4,830, was awarded to Associated American, Inc., for architectural-engineering services in connection with construction of an Aircom receiver antenna support for the 6927th Security Squadron (USAFSS) at Onna Point, Okinawa.
 - (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2296, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Okinawa Kensetsu Kogyo for hot mix asphalt for Kadena Air Base.

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- April:
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2297, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Ryukyu Asphalt Company for hot mix asphalt for Kadena Air Base.
 - (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2298, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to Okinawa Kensetsu Kogyo for ready-mix concrete for Kadena Air Base.
 - (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2299, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to JHW, Inc., for ready-mix concrete for Kadena Air Base.
 - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2300, a blanket purchase agreement, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for ready-mix concrete for Kadena Air Base.
 - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2277, in the amount of \$47,000, was awarded to Nanyo Doken Construction Company for maintenance work on Runway "B" at Ie Shima.
 - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2284, in the amount of \$31,500, was awarded to Rutledge Construction Company for maintenance work on water mains at Naha Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of April 1964.

Ten numbered contracts were awarded during the month of April 1964.

A total of \$4,596 was expended for 172 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of April 1964.

May: Fifty-six numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$73,601 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of May 1964. There were also 38 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$24,593.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2295, in the amount of \$1,705, was awarded to Barclay and Company for repair of thermofax machines at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2301, in the amount of \$980, was awarded to Mr. Motohiko Tanaka for tuning pianos at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2302, in the amount of \$233, was awarded to Fukuyama Shoji Company for maintenance of a refrigeration unit at Kadena Air Base.

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- May:
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2303, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Oshiro Brothers Company for repair of cushions for Naha Air Base.
 - (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2304, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanko Industry Company for repair of office furniture at Kadena Air Base.
 - (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2305, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Shonan Electric Industry Company, Ltd., for repair of fans at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
 - (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2306, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanko Industry Company, Ltd., for repair of household furniture at Kadena Air Base.
 - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2307, in the amount of \$3,270, was awarded to Okisui Construction Company for maintenance work on Hirara Auxiliary Airfield, Miyako Jima.
 - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2308, in the amount of \$2,967, was awarded to Yomitan Industries Company for maintenance work on Building 868, the readiness crew structure, at Kadena Air Base.
 - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2309, in the amount of \$22,500, was awarded to Okinawa Denki Construction Company for maintenance work on the taxiway lights at Naha Air Base.
 - (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2310, in the amount of \$4,494, was awarded to Pacific Air Construction, Inc., for installation of an automatic door on the base commissary at Naha Air Base.
 - (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2311, in the amount of \$10,699, was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Company for repair of the roofs of dependent houses in the North Terrace Housing Area at Kadena Air Base.
 - (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2312, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Okinawa Electric Motor Company for the repair of washers and dryers at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
 - (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2313, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanwa Shokai for the repair of stoves at Naha Air Base.
 - (o) Contract AF 62(321)-2314, a requirement type contract, awarded to Sanko Industry Company for the repair of mattresses at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.

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- May:
- (p) Contract AF 62(321)-2315, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Sanko Industry Company for the repair of furniture at Kadena and Naha Air Bases.
 - (q) Contract AF 62(321)-2316, in the amount of \$11,267, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for maintenance of the air conditioning system in Building 3417 at Kadena Air Base.
 - (r) Contract AF 62(321)-2317, in the amount of \$3,850, was awarded to Daimaru Paint Company for paint for Kadena Air Base.
 - (s) Contract AF 62(321)-2318, in the amount of \$3,480, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for custodial services for Kadena Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of May 1964.

Nineteen numbered contracts were awarded during the month of May 1964.

A total of \$6,591 was expended for 284 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of May 1964.

June: One hundred-seventeen numbered and unnumbered contracts totalling \$579,208 were awarded to local contractors and business firms for the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for Air Force activities in the Ryukyu Islands during the month of June 1964. There were also 17 delivery orders and communications service authorizations totalling \$38,755.

- (a) Contract AF 62(321)-2319, in the amount of \$40,687, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for interior rewiring of family housing at Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Contract AF 62(321)-2320, in the amount of \$17,847, was awarded to Rutledge Construction Company for the erection of a security fence at Kadena Air Base.
- (c) Contract AF 62(321)-2321, a requirement type contract, was awarded to Ishihara Kogyo Company for repair of refrigerators at Naha Air Base.
- (d) Contract AF 62(321)-2322, in the amount of \$14,971, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for the construction of an addition to Building 220 at Kadena Air Base.
- (e) Contract AF 62(321)-2323, in the amount of \$4,812, was awarded to Yomitan Industries Company for grass cutting at Naha Air Base.

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- June:
- (f) Contract AF 62(321)-2324, in the amount of \$26,006, was awarded to Nanyo Doken Construction Company for alteration of hardstands and erection of alert shelters at Kadena Air Base.
 - (g) Contract AF 62(321)-2325, in the amount of \$41,042, was awarded to Hashimoto Gumi for sealcoating of Runway "A" at Kadena Air Base.
 - (h) Contract AF 62(321)-2326, in the amount of \$8,199, was awarded to Fukuyama Shoji Company for maintenance of the sprinkler system at Kadena Air Base.
 - (i) Contract AF 62(321)-2327, in the amount of \$7,540, was awarded to D. F. Fisher & Sons, Inc., for repair of aerial unloading kits at Naha Air Base.
 - (j) Contract AF 62(321)-2328, in the amount of \$24,950, was awarded to Asahi Construction Company for modification and air-conditioning of the Base Operations Building at Naha Air Base.
 - (k) Contract AF 62(321)-2329, in the amount of \$28,698, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for custodial services at Kadena Air Base.
 - (l) Contract AF 62(321)-2330, in the amount of \$13,955, was awarded to Blackledge, Inc., for construction of an addition to TMC, Building 62 (Headquarters for Detachment 1, 315th Air Division) at Naha Air Base.
 - (m) Contract AF 62(321)-2331, in the amount of \$14,636, was awarded to Yokatsu Kensetsu Company for custodial services at Naha Air Base.
 - (n) Contract AF 62(321)-2332, in the amount of \$3,900, was awarded to Ryukyu Sankei Company for insecticide for Kadena Air Base.
 - (o) Contract AF 62(321)-2333, in the amount of \$52,499, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for maintenance work on taxiway and runway access pavements at Kadena Air Base.
 - (p) Contract AF 62(321)-2334, in the amount of \$2,376, was awarded to Ryukyu Denken Kogyo Kaisha for maintenance work on the AFRTS (Armed Forces Radio and Telephone Service) antenna tower in the Rycom Plaza area.
 - (q) Contract AF 62(321)-2335, in the amount of \$19,166, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for replacement of North Terrace Dependent Housing Area furnaces at Kadena Air Base.

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- June:
- (r) Contract AF 62(321)-2336, in the amount of \$6,006, was awarded to Okinawa Plywood Corporation for plywood for Naha Air Base.
 - (s) Contract AF 62(321)-2337, a requirement type contract, was awarded to the Recreation Association for alteration of newly-authorized fatigues for Kadena Air Base.
 - (t) Contract AF 62(321)-2338, in the amount of \$6,065, was awarded to Fukuyama Shoji Company for construction of a telephone duct facility at Kadena Air Base.
 - (u) Contract AF 62(321)-2339, in the amount of \$2,735, was awarded to Asahi Construction Company for the installation of wind measuring instruments at Kadena Air Base.
 - (v) Contract AF 62(321)-2340, in the amount of \$27,251, was awarded to DeMauro Construction Company for repair of the operational apron at Kadena Air Base.
 - (w) Contract AF 62(321)-2341, in the amount of \$12,884, was awarded to Maeda Gumi for maintenance of family housing at Naha Air Base.
 - (x) Contract AF 62(321)-2342, in the amount of \$51,069, was awarded to D. F. Fisher and Sons for Project KAD 41-4. This project called for the replacement of existing cork insulation with 4" cellular glass insulation, providing a magnetic starter for the refrigeration system fan unit, and replacing existing wiring for the refrigeration system in the Cold Storage Plant, Bldg. 737. In addition, the refrigeration system was to be repaired by removal of the existing 70-ton-capacity water-cooled condensing units and replacing them with a multi-circuit air-cooled condensing system of equivalent capacity. Replacement of the insulation was necessary, in view of the poor state of repair of the cork insulation, which had deteriorated to the point of actually falling out of place. A magnetic starter, such as was specified, was required to provide overload protection for the fan coil units already installed.
 - (y) Contract AF 62(321)-2343, in the amount of \$4,235, was awarded to the National Cash Register Company for the maintenance of duplicating machines located at Kadena Air Base.
 - (z) Contract AF 62(321)-2344, in the amount of \$8,388, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for construction of a warehouse in Area "A" of Kadena Airfield.

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- June:
- (aa) Contract AF 62(321)-2345, in the amount of \$11,384, was awarded to Daiichi Kogyo Company for Project KAD 36-3. This project called for maintenance work on the air conditioning system of Building 50, at the Receiver Site of the 1962d Communications Group on Ie Shima, including removal of the two existing 20-ton-capacity water-cooled condensing units and their replacement with air-cooled condensing systems of equivalent capacity; modification of exhaust and intake air ducting to accommodate the installation of the air-cooled condensers; installation of necessary new wiring complete with feeder and mains; repair and restoration of all existing installations affected by the construction. The water tower used in conjunction with the air conditioning system had scaled and otherwise deteriorated beyond economical repair, making it essential that it be replaced.
 - (bb) Contract AF 62(321)-2346, in the amount of \$79,247, was awarded to Zentaro Gumi Construction Company for exterior painting of family houses in Stilwell Park, Kadena Air Base.
 - (cc) Contract AF 62(321)-2347, in the amount of \$3,755, was awarded to Sanzen Gumi Construction Company for construction of a telephone duct facility at Kadena Air Base.
 - (dd) Contract AF 62(321)-2348, in the amount of \$5,647, was awarded to the Ryukyu Kokusai Densetsu Company for construction of a telephone duct facility at Naha Air Base.
 - (ee) Contract AF 62(321)-2349, in the amount of \$1,905, was awarded to East Asia Services Company, Inc., for zinc chromate primer for use at Kadena Air Base.
 - (ff) Contract AF 62(321)-2350, in the amount of \$5,687, was awarded to the Technical Coating and Chemical Corporation for zinc chromate primer for use at Kadena Air Base.
 - (gg) Contract AF 62(321)-2351, in the amount of \$5,794, was awarded to the Central Appliance Service Company for installation of a "dairy box" at Naha Air Base.
 - (hh) Contract AF 62(321)-2352, in the amount of \$18,500, was awarded to Sanwa Kogyo for maintenance work on the base theaters at Kadena Air Base.
 - (ii) Contract AF 62(321)-2353, in the amount of \$12,558, was awarded to Okisui Construction Company for construction of a weather observation station at Naha Air Base.

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- June: (jj) Contract AF 62(321)-2354, in the amount of \$3,163, was awarded to Westpac, Inc., for installation of an air conditioning system in Central Security Control at Kadena Air Base.
- (kk) Contract AF 62(321)-2355, in the amount of \$6,085, was awarded to Daiichi Kogyo Company, Ltd., for maintenance work on the air conditioning system in Building 409 at Kadena Air Base.

No salvage contracts were awarded during the month of June 1964.

Thirty-seven numbered contracts were awarded during the month of June 1964.

A total of \$4,357 was expended for 146 cash purchases by the Imprest Fund Officer during the month of June 1964.

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APPENDIX 3

313TH AIR DIVISION FATALITIES

JANUARY - JUNE 1964

APPENDIX 3

313TH AIR DIVISION FATALITIES: JANUARY - JUNE 1964

- 23 January 1964 - Captain Carl Burt Larsen (49905A), 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, died as a result of a military aircraft accident one mile east of Runway 27, Osan Air Base, Korea. Interment at Arlington National Cemetery.
- 23 January 1964 - Mr. Juanito Rosalado Rimpula, Filipino national employee of the U.S. Air Force, LML-15, 6313th Civil Engineering Squadron, paid from appropriated funds. Died of coronary arteriosclerosis, acute, at the Camp Kue Army Hospital, Okinawa. Burial on 28 January 1964 at International Cemetery, Naha, Okinawa.
- 21 February 1964 - TSgt James A. Queen (AF15643189), 51st Air Police Squadron, died of a heart attack at Naha Air Base. Remains returned to Scappoose, Oregon.
- 10 March 1964 - Captain Charles T. Kochi (61916A), 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, became missing as a result of an aircraft accident approximately 60 miles northeast of Kadena AB, Okinawa. The search was suspended on 14 March 1964, and Captain Kochi was declared dead as of 10 March 1964.
- 17 March 1964 - ALC Marion C. Francis (AF18511150), 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, drowned in Nago Bay, Okinawa, when the HH-19 helicopter in which he was enroute to his new duty station at Okino-Erabu Shima Air Station plunged into the water. Remains returned to Belton, Texas.
- 20 March 1964 - Colonel Frank E. Stetson (Retired) (A0363235), died of a myocardial infarction, acute, at the Camp Kue Army Hospital. Colonel and Mrs. Stetson were visiting Okinawa as part of a tour of the Far East at the time of his death. The disposition of the remains is unknown.
- 28 March 1964 - SSgt Robert E. Cole (AF35875343), 18th Supply Squadron, died at his quarters, T-6 Tobaru, Koza City, Okinawa, as a result of massive upper gastro-intestinal hemorrhage with ruptured esophageal varices, portal cirrhosis. Burial was at Camp Nelson National Cemetery, Nicholasville, Kentucky.

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- 3 June 1964 - Mr. Konoshin Minato, Ryukyuan national employee of the U.S. Air Force, RWB O-5, 6313th Air Police Squadron, paid from appropriated funds, died as a result of an acute heart attack and massive, spontaneous, right cerebral hemorrhage. Death occurred at Koza Central Hospital, Koza City, Okinawa. Disposition of remains unknown.
- 6 June 1964 - ALC Albert L. Matthews (AF15566697), 623d Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, died as a result of a fall on Miyako Jima, Ryukyu Islands. Disposition of remains unknown.

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APPENDIX 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

1964

MONTHLY COMPARISON PROFIT AND LOSS

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
January	\$ 1,928	\$ 4,431	\$ 6,181	\$ 3,682	\$ 4,021	\$ 7,554
February	10,168	6,576	12,845	10,122	8,800	12,132
March	2,456	5,362	11,736	3,435	10,285	6,493
April	4,294	4,137	11,582	2,572	5,987	6,164
May	4,417	5,859	8,663	5,809	7,490	2,581
June	128	5,725	10,897	4,520	3,717	3,636

NET PROFIT AND LOSS

CALENDAR YEAR TO DATE

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
January	\$ 1,928	\$ 4,431	\$ 6,181	\$ 3,682	\$ 4,021	\$ 7,554
February	12,096	11,007	19,026	13,804	12,821	19,686
March	14,552	16,368	30,762	17,239	23,106	26,179
April	18,846	20,505	42,344	19,812	29,092	32,343
May	23,263	26,364	51,007	25,621	36,583	34,924
June	23,391	32,089	61,904	30,141	40,300	38,560

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1964

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>January:</u>						
Total Sales	\$73,905	\$34,115	\$68,197	\$46,767	\$82,312	\$32,684
Food Sales	37,916	19,635	23,061	17,415	23,341	10,803
Beverage Sales	11,413	5,854	14,880	13,770	16,117	13,129
Package Goods Sales	9,471	5,112	17,851	10,598	4,781	-0-
Bingo Sales	4,372	89	3,041	2,460	1,283	325
Other Activity	11,682	9,967	20,932	17,701	17,192	12,304
Income						
Dues Income	5,395	3,105	2,481	1,569	2,000	1,478
Non-Operating Income	836	73	306	330	775	148
<u>February:</u>						
Total Sales	\$85,452	\$36,031	\$71,977	\$53,734	\$80,626	\$38,639
Food Sales	43,355	20,087	25,539	19,533	24,674	12,173
Beverage Sales	14,313	6,743	15,117	15,645	17,291	16,097
Package Goods Sales	11,614	5,276	17,694	12,445	4,478	-0-
Bingo Sales	5,741	512	24,744	20,622	1,753	1,219
Other Activity	16,076	12,496	24,585	20,725	19,534	14,302
Income						
Dues Income	5,065	3,030	2,374	1,656	2,060	1,565
Non-Operating Income	557	84	46	76	890	416
<u>March:</u>						
Total Sales	\$74,356	\$32,004	\$65,672	\$48,080	\$70,176	\$36,181
Food Sales	38,489	18,312	23,389	18,814	23,560	11,174
Beverage Sales	10,646	5,142	13,972	14,299	15,607	15,124
Package Goods Sales	9,409	4,923	14,309	9,589	3,769	-0-
Bingo Sales	5,394	873	4,672	2,880	2,182	1,372
Other Activity	15,680	12,557	19,991	19,593	20,573	13,815
Income						
Dues Income	5,200	3,185	2,459	1,640	1,949	1,701
Non-Operating Income	165	47	290	275	1,300	198

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF PROFITS - 1964

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>April:</u>						
Total Sales	\$84,946	\$34,643	\$71,372	\$51,645	\$67,255	\$37,747
Food Sales	42,552	19,691	27,089	19,735	22,727	12,400
Beverage Sales	12,055	5,850	15,738	15,898	18,239	15,453
Package Goods Sales	10,057	5,547	15,429	10,669	4,361	-0-
Bingo Sales	7,303	437	2,959	2,499	1,394	994
Other Activity Income	16,438	11,307	22,009	20,346	18,486	14,924
Dues Income	5,325	3,090	2,463	1,591	1,999	1,597
Non-Operating Income	485	78	298	572	879	195
<u>May:</u>						
Total Sales	\$81,152	\$37,133	\$70,613	\$52,998	\$61,336	\$35,700
Food Sales	42,641	19,276	27,971	20,272	26,632	12,100
Beverage Sales	10,904	6,105	14,942	16,075	18,058	15,528
Package Goods Sales	8,782	5,449	13,824	10,688	4,158	-0-
Bingo Sales	6,242	572	4,228	3,234	1,675	1,051
Other Activity Income	15,981	11,549	24,067	19,003	21,056	13,847
Dues Income	5,030	3,180	2,390	1,627	2,131	1,712
Non-Operating Income	827	189	336	429	1,694	297
<u>June:</u>						
Total Sales	\$83,377	\$38,069	\$73,224	\$50,430	\$45,157	\$33,357
Food Sales	42,363	18,857	29,421	19,383	11,418	11,351
Beverage Sales	10,716	5,859	14,579	14,407	17,440	14,190
Package Goods Sales	9,826	5,521	13,581	10,800	4,316	-0-
Bingo Sales	8,201	725	5,988	3,084	2,713	7,816
Other Activity Income	20,022	11,606	22,757	23,046	16,872	13,667
Dues Income	4,720	2,975	2,340	1,562	1,718	1,629
Non-Operating Income	135	149	720	531	980	328

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS
MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1964

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
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January:

Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,300	\$ 528	\$ 2,831	\$ 1,307	\$ 2,562	\$ 1,570
Salaries (US Civ)	1,321	280	1,762	300	1,575	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	16,817	10,336	16,054	9,266	16,867	6,491
Entertainment	8,826	4,710	9,273	7,943	11,754	7,131
Depreciation	3,731	1,372	3,754	2,198	3,279	1,199
Non-Operating Expenses	92	118	304	433	447	189

February:

Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,308	\$ 741	\$ 2,830	\$ 1,412	\$ 2,491	\$ 1,677
Salaries (US Civ)	1,130	375	1,561	-0-	1,607	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	15,918	9,933	14,899	9,891	15,009	7,944
Entertainment	9,639	4,897	8,214	7,944	11,027	5,552
Depreciation	3,841	1,377	3,318	2,202	3,415	1,201
Non-Operating Expenses	102	44	46	76	15	24

March:

Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,208	\$ 730	\$ 2,635	\$ 1,343	\$ 2,397	\$ 1,841
Salaries (US Civ)	1,268	250	1,639	-0-	1,304	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	15,723	9,544	14,926	9,435	13,168	7,470
Entertainment	10,616	4,819	8,595	7,044	11,319	8,574
Depreciation	3,771	1,378	3,280	2,206	2,962	1,203
Non-Operating Expenses	696	46	21	49	148	38

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS

MONTHLY COMPARISON OF EXPENSES - 1964

Month	Kadena Officers Club	Naha Officers Club	Kadena NCO Club	Naha NCO Club	Kadena Airmen's Club	Naha Airmen's Club
<u>April:</u>						
Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,349	\$ 785	\$ 2,795	\$ 1,528	\$ 2,549	\$ 1,935
Salaries (US Civ)	1,320	250	1,801	-0-	1,132	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	17,344	10,247	16,356	9,645	13,149	8,827
Entertainment	12,203	4,831	10,985	8,666	12,774	9,119
Depreciation	3,782	1,382	3,320	2,332	2,810	1,172
Non-Operating Expenses	70	23	750	495	929	66
<u>May:</u>						
Salaries (Mil)	\$ 1,415	\$ 839	\$ 2,745	\$ 1,756	\$ 2,560	\$ 1,783
Salaries (US Civ)	1,440	250	1,547	-0-	825	-0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	16,638	9,865	15,443	9,722	11,569	8,396
Entertainment	12,214	5,018	9,941	8,722	11,366	11,049
Depreciation	3,781	1,390	3,355	2,275	3,010	1,166
Non-Operating Expenses	162	17	79	2,527	430	100
<u>June:</u>						
Salaries (US Civ)	\$ 1,492	\$ 250	\$ 1,560	\$ -0-	\$ 825	\$ -0-
Salaries (Ryukyu)	16,564	10,282	16,586	10,164	11,666	8,537
Salaries (Mil)	1,614	882	2,719	1,808	2,276	1,880
Entertainment	14,780	4,888	10,351	8,998	10,805	8,575
Depreciation	3,831	1,393	3,249	2,281	2,894	1,176
Non-Operating Expenses	42	37	50	21	40	67

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NUMBER OF MEMBERS

Month	<u>KADEMA</u>			<u>NAHA</u>		
	Officers	NCO	Airmen's	Officers	NCO	Airmen's
	Open Mess	Open Mess	Open Mess	Open Mess	Open Mess	Open Mess
January	1,026	2,480	2,000	614	1,569	1,478
February	1,037	2,374	2,060	621	1,656	1,565
March	1,044	2,459	1,949	625	1,640	1,701
April	904	2,463	1,999	623	1,591	1,597
May	1,027	2,390	2,131	640	1,627	1,712
June	949	2,340	1,718	591	1,562	1,629

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OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1964

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Month	Kadena Officers Club			Kadena NCO Club			Kadena Airmen's Club			Ratio of Members to Employees Kadena		
	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Officers	NCO	Airmen
January	13	5	279	31	7	264	22	4	274	3.4:1	8.2:1	6.6:1
February	10	4	273	33	6	257	33	6	257	3.6:1	8.0:1	6.0:1
March	11	4	274	29	7	263	22	3	283	3.6:1	8.2:1	6.3:1
April	11	4	270	37	7	270	20	3	263	3.2:1	7.8:1	7.0:1
May	11	4	283	33	6	270	26	2	251	3.4:1	7.7:1	7.6:1
June	13	8	285	33	6	285	24	2	227	3.8:1	7.2:1	6.8:1

31st AD, 1964-I, Appendix 4

OPEN MESS ANALYSIS - 1964

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

Month	Naha Officers Club			Naha NCO Club			Naha Airmen's Club			Ratio of Members to Employees		
	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Mil	US Civ	Ryukyu	Officers	NCO	Airmen
January	5	1	150	8	1	164	6	0	112	3.9:1	9.1:1	*
February	5	1	151	8	0	164	8	0	109	4.0:1	9.6:1	*
March	5	1	146	8	0	158	10	0	113	4.1:1	9.9:1	*
April	5	1	137	8	0	160	10	0	113	4.4:1	9.5:1	*
May	5	1	151	8	0	167	10	0	115	4.1:1	9.3:1	*
June	4	1	151	8	0	168	10	0	118	3.8:1	8.9:1	*

*Ratio over 10:1

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 4

KUME SHIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss to date	Number of Members	Dues	Mil	Number of Employees US Civ	Ryukyuan	Ratio of Members to Employees
January	\$ 1,270	\$ 1,270	103	\$1.00	5	-0-	4	*
February	655	1,925	105	1.00	5	-0-	4	*
March	542	2,467	97	1.00	5	-0-	6	8.8:1
April	998	3,465	98	1.00	5	-0-	6	8.9:1
May	847	4,312	98	1.00	5	-0-	5	9.8:1
June	442	4,754	90	1.00	5	-0-	5	9.0:1

*Ratio over 10:1

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 4

MIYAKO JIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss CY to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 370	\$ 370	86	\$1.00	3	-0-	13	5.4:1
February	837	1,207	88	1.00	3	-0-	13	5.5:1
March	236	1,443	89	1.00	3	-0-	13	5.6:1
April	(387)	1,056	97	1.00	3	-0-	14	5.7:1
May	616	1,673	100	1.00	3	-0-	14	5.9:1
June	277	1,950	101	1.00	2	-0-	14	6.3:1

() indicates loss

5th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 4

YOZA DAKE NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	Net Profit and Loss CY to Date	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 1,006	\$ 1,006	172	\$.50	3	-0-	22	6.9:1
February	874	1,880	172	.50	3	-0-	21	7.2:1
March	1,089	2,969	173	.50	3	-0-	22	6.9:1
April	855	3,823	189	.50	3	-0-	24	7.0:1
May	396	4,219	175	.50	3	-0-	23	6.7:1
June	545	4,764	198	.50	3	-0-	23	7.6:1

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 4

OKINO-ERABU JIMA NCO CLUB

Month	Net Profit and Loss	CY to Date Net Profit and Loss	Number of Members	Dues	Number of Employees			Ratio of Members to Employees
					Mil	Civ	Ryukyuan	
January	\$ 873	\$ 873	94	\$1.00	5	-0-	6	8.5:1
February	570	1,443	95	1.00	5	-0-	6	8.6:1
March	587	2,030	99	1.00	5	-0-	6	9.0:1
April	693	2,723	100	1.00	5	-0-	7	8.3:1
May	453	3,175	88	1.00	5	-0-	6	8.0:1
June	966	4,141	89	1.00	5	-0-	6	8.1:1

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 5

APPENDIX 5
BASE POPULATION FIGURES
FOR
KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN			Non-U. S. Citizens	
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd			
Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd
313 Air Division	43	42	84	78	24	24		3	1
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	18				243	17
6313 AB Wg & Det	55	51	348	382	53	55	4	230	27
6313 AP Sq	8	8	617	595	1	1		732	6
6313 Civ Eng Sq	8	9	217	204	87	84		252	770
6313 Svc Sq	11	11	187	184	20	23		270	735
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	146	146				28	2
6332d USAF Disp	32	37	84	83	4	4			
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	19	7	8		6	4
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	57	57	198	204					
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	4					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	4	4					1
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	4	4					11
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	24	33	27				140	12
18 Sup Sq	11	13	507	466	23	22		94	9
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	7	644	596				1	17
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	7	431	458					11
18 Org Maint Sq	7	5	368	341				42	11
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	367	371				1	7
498 Tac Msl Gp	28	27	93	132	3	3			8
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	32	126	169					
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	25	125	155					
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	216	242					
TOTAL	472	477	4,841	4,882	222	224	4	2,042	2,038

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U.S. Citizens	
	Attached	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/ApAsgd	ApAsgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg		2	2	6	5				
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)		26	24	156	155	1	1		4
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Sq		1	1	3	3				
11 Air Postal Sq		4	16	26	202			2	1
Dist Off 43, OSI		13	10	22	20	4	4	3	
Det 2, 315 Air Div		2	2	6	6				
658 Tac Hosp		4	4	25	27				
6002 Stan/Eval Gp		33	32	22	20	6	5		
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg		12	8	42	41			5	1
1505 Sup Sq		23	21	195	177			90	7
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq		1	1	6	5				
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp		2	2	1	1				
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)		38	40	331	348				18
6927 Sec Sq & Det		14	17	477	548				13
FTD 911A		1	1	26	26				
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch		1	1	14	14				
Det 2, 1045 CE&T Gp		22	22	55	55				4
1962 Comm Gp & Det		27	29	799	925	12	12	39	11
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq		2	2	41	24			11	2
1038 Aud Gen		3	3	3	2	1	1		
PACAF Manpower Val Team		2	2	2	3	1	1		
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)		1	1	8	8				
AFLC						9	9		

TOTAL	235	243	2,312	2,659	34	33	0	150	61
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GRAND TOTAL	707	720	7,153	7,541	256	257	4	2,192	2,099
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TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 9,613

MAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U.S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/AP Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/AP Asgd
51 FIW	40	42	154	149	9	9		7	
16 FIS	33	32	8	7	4	4		61	
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	10	554	478				1	
51 A&F Maint Sq	12	12	255	278				6	
51 Org Maint Sq	8	5	400	399			18	39	781
51 Comp Svc Gp	33	36	154	218	16	16		128	
51 Svc Sq	11	11	89	87	3	3		416	
51 Civ Eng Sq	6	4	118	104	59	56		122	
51 Trans Sq	4	4	90	88	2	2		198	
51 AP Sq	3	4	174	158		1		116	
51 Supply Sq	8	8	294	272	11	12		133	
623 AC&W Sq & Det	54	48	437	457				22	
51 USAF Disp	23	25	48	52	2	2			
TOTAL	242	241	2,775	2,747	106	105	18	1,249	781

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 January 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U. S. Citizens	
Attached	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd
Det 1, 315 Air Div	18	18	26	34	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	74	91	89					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	59	43	41					
317 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	62	43	41					
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	24					
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	305	371	3	3		21	
33 ARS (MATS)	24	25	85	85					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	5					
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	16	14				1	
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	80	73				27	
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2				1	
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	4	21	18				3	
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	25	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1					
Det 3, 313th Air Div	4	4	24	19					
TOTAL	279	273	788	841	4	4		53	
GRAND TOTAL	521	514	3,563	3,588	110	109	18	1,302	781
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,029									

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 29 February 1964

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Asg	Asg	Non/Asg
313 Air Division	43	44	84	81	24	25		31	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	18					1
6313 AB Wg & Det	55	54	356	360	53	54	4	241	17
6313 AP Sq	8	9	617	614	1	1		231	26
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	9	223	207	87	83		737	10
6313 Svc Sq	12	11	199	190	19	21		252	770
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	149	149	1	1		271	735
6332d USAF Disp	32	37	84	86	4	4		28	1
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	18	0	0			
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	57	55	200	213	7	8		6	4
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	4	5					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	4	5					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	3					
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	26	33	24					1
18 Sup Sq	11	13	508	450	23	25		141	11
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	8	644	592				96	12
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	7	431	449				1	9
18 Org Maint Sq	7	8	368	363					17
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	367	358				42	7
498 Tac Msl Gp	28	26	93	148	3	3		1	11
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	35	126	165					6
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	28	125	152					8
498 Mal Maint Sq	1	1	216	240					
TOTAL	474	491	4,904	4,890	222	225	4	2,050	1,646

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 29 February 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	N/Ap Asgd
<u>Attached</u>									
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	5					
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	26	24	156	152	1	1			
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq	1	1	3	3					1
11 Air Postal Sq	17	17	206	203				3	
Dist Off 43, OSI	13	11	22	20	4	4			
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	5				2	
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	25					
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	33	33	22	22	6	5		5	1
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	10	42	41				91	7
1505 Sup Sq	23	23	196	187					
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	5	5					
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1					18
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)	38	40	331	346					12
6927 Sec Sq & Det	18	18	523	583					
FTD 911A	1	1	26	26					
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	14				1	2
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	2	2	24	24					
1038 Aud Gen	4	3	2	2	1	1			
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	22	22	55	55				39	3
1962 Comm Gp & Det	27	29	799	886	12	12			11
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	4	1	1			
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)	1	1	8	8					
AFLC					13	11			
TOTAL	252	249	2,442	2,617	38	35	0	141	59
GRAND TOTAL	726	740	7,346	7,507	260	260	4	2,191	1,705
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH:	9,671								

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 29 February 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U.S. Citizens			Non-U.S. Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Non/Ap
Assigned									
51 FIW	40	40	154	155	9	9		7	
16 FIS	32	32	8	7				58	
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	9	554	465	4	4		1	
51 A&E Maint Sq	12	13	255	267				5	
51 Org Maint Sq	8	7	400	409			17	39	751
51 Comp Svc Gp	33	36	154	204	16	16		129	
51 Svc Sq	11	11	89	87	3	3		415	
51 Civ Eng Sq	6	5	118	105	59	55		126	
51 Trans Sq	4	5	90	87	2	2		199	
51 AP Sq	3	4	174	155		1		119	
51 Supply Sq	8	8	294	268	11	11		133	
623 AC&W Sq & Det	54	46	437	467				22	
51 USAF Disp	23	26	48	52	2	2			
TOTAL	241	242	2,775	2,728	106	103	17	1,253	751

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 29 February 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Mon/Ap	Asgd	Ap
Det 1, 315 Air Div	18	16	26	30	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	74	91	91					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	62	43	43					
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	60	43	40					
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	24					
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	305	385	3	3		21	
33 ARS (MATS)	25	26	85	86					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	6					
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	16	14				1	
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	80	77				26	
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2				1	
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	4	21	22				3	
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	25	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	1	1					
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	4	24	20					
TOTAL	280	273	788	865	4	4	0	52	0
GRAND TOTAL	521	515	3,563	3,593	110	107	17	1,305	751

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,083

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U.S. Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap	Non/Ap
313 Air Division	46	50	81	88	24	24		3	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	19					1
6313 AB Wg & Det	47	52	383	387	53	54	4	252	17
6313 AP Sq	8	9	743	667	1	1		231	26
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	10	226	208	87	84		778	9
6313 Svc Sq	11	12	199	202	19	21		254	773
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	151	148	1	1		284	689
6332d USAF Disp	32	37	82	91	4	4		32	1
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	18					
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	55	57	200	212	7	8		6	4
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	6					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	5					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	4	3					
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	26	33	25					1
18 Sup Sq	11	9	510	461	23	22		137	10
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	7	630	607				98	12
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	7	426	443				1	9
18 Org Maint Sq	7	8	368	363					17
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	367	364				42	7
498 Tac Msl Gp	22	25	93	145	3	3		1	14
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	33	126	163					7
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	30	125	151					9
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	216	244					
TOTAL	461	493	5,009	5,020	222	222	4	2,119	1,606

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap
<u>Attached</u>									
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	10					
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	25	24	93	145	3	3		1	14
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq	1	1	3	3					
11 Air Postal Sq	17	17	198	198				2	1
Dist Off 43, OSI	13	12	22	23	4	4			
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	5					
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	23					
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	30	33	21	20	6	5			
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	11	42	41				5	1
1505 Sup Sq	23	23	196	191				89	8
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	6	4					
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1					
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)	38	39	331	349					20
6927 Sec Sq & Det	15	18	523	616					12
FTD 911A	1	1	27	27					
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	14					
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	2	2	24	25				1	1
1038 Aud Gen	4	4	2	2	1	1		3	0
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	22	22	56	56					3
1962 Comm Gp & Det	27	28	799	858	12	12		40	11
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	4					
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)	1	1	8	9					
AFLC					8	8			
TOTAL	245	250	2,468	2,624	32	31	0	140	61
GRAND TOTAL	706	743	7,477	7,644	254	253	4	2,259	1,667

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 9,574

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U.S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Non/Ap
Assigned									
51FIW	38	40	153	155	9	9		7	
16 FIS	33	31	8	9				58	
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	8	672	477	4	4		1	
51 A&E Maint Sq	12	12	255	270				5	
51 Org Maint Sq	8	7	400	406			17	38	777
51 Comp Svc Gp	27	34	152	235	16	16		129	
51 Svc Sq	11	11	103	88	3	3		414	
51 Civ Eng Sq	6	5	118	106	59	55		125	
51 Trans Sq	3	4	78	86	2	2		197	
51 AP Sq	3	4	174	154		1		118	
51 Supply Sq	8	7	294	270	11	11		133	
623 AC&W Sq & Det	54	43	434	447				22	
51 USAF Disp	23	26	49	54	2	2			
TOTAL	233	232	2,890	2,579	106	103	17	1,247	777

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 March 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
Attached	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Asgd	Asgd	Non/Asgd
Det 1, 315 Air Div	17	17	22	29	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	77	91	90					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	63	43	43					
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	61	43	42					
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	24	3	2		21	
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	305	356					
33 ARS (MATS)	24	26	85	85					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	6				1	
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	17	16				26	
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	80	77				1	
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2				3	
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	3	18	23					
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	25	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	5	5	1					
Det 3, 313th Air Div	4	4	26	22					
TOTAL	278	279	788	840	4	3	-	52	-
GRAND TOTAL	511	511	3,678	3,497	110	106	17	1,299	777

TOTAL DEPENDENTS: 5,106

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1964

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-Citizens	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd
313 Air Division	46	48	81	86	27	22		3	0
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	19					1
6313 AB Wg & Det	48	53	383	386	48	54	4	250	15
6313 AP Sq	8	9	743	692	1	1		231	26
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	11	226	213	87	84		775	7
6313 Svc Sq	11	12	199	200	19	21		253	1,442
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	151	140	1	1		284	3
6332d USAF Disp	32	37	82	87	4	4		32	2
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	18					
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	55	57	200	217	7	7		6	4
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	6					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	34	4	5					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	38	4	4					
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	27	33	26					
18 Sup Sq	11	12	510	464	23	21		137	1
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	10	630	619				97	11
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	10	426	445				1	12
18 Org Maint Sq	7	8	368	356					10
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	8	367	360					19
498 Tac Msl Grp	22	28	93	153				42	7
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	28	126	160	3	3		1	14
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	33	125	149					8
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	216	241					8
TOTAL	461	506	5,009	5,046	220	218	4	2,112	1,590

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U.S. Citizens	
Attached	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	9	1	1			4
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	25	24	157	151					
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq	1	1	3	3				2	1
11 Air Postal Sq	4	3	26	26				3	
Dist Off 43, OSI	12	12	23	23	4	4			
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	6	6					
658 Tac Hosp	4	4	25	23					
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	30	33	21	22	6	5		5	1
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	11	42	42				89	9
1505 Sup Sq	23	24	196	187					
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	4	4					
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1					21
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)	38	39	338	340					9
6927 Sec Sq & Det	15	18	513	563					
FTD 911A	1	1	27	28					
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	15	15				1	2
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	2	2	23	23					
1038 Aud Gen	4	4	2	2	1	1			3
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	22	22	56	56				40	11
1962 Comm Gp & Det	26	28	760	854	12	12			
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	4					
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)	1	1	8	7	9	10			
AFLC									
TOTAL	230	237	2,254	2,389	33	33	0	140	61
GRAND TOTAL	691	743	7,263	7,435	255	253	4	2,252	1,659
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 9,963									

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap	Non/Ap
51FIW		38	40	153	150	9	7		7
16FIS		33	32	8	8				
51 Fld Maint Sq		7	9	672	470	4	4		56
51 A&E Maint Sq		12	12	255	273				1
51 Org Maint Sq		8	6	400	393				5
51 Comp Svc Gp		29	36	151	332	16	15		38
51 Svc Sq		11	11	103	87	3	3		128
51 Civ Eng Sq		6	6	118	101	59	55		412
51 Trans Sq		3	4	78	81	2	2		123
51 AP Sq		3	4	174	158		1		196
51 Supply Sq		8	7	294	269	11	11		116
623 AC&W Sq & Det		54	58	434	438				133
51 USAF Disp		23	25	49	52	2	2		22
TOTAL		235	250	2,889	2,812	106	100	1,237	786

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 April 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Non/Ap
<u>Attached</u>									
Det 1, 315 Air Div	17	19	22	29	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	81	91	91					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	61	43	43					
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	64	43	41					
5 Comm Sq, Det 1	1	1	19	24				23	
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	12	302	345	3	2			
33 ARS (MATS)	24	24	85	81					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	7				1	
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	16	16				29	
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	5	80	77				1	
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2				3	
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	3	18	23					
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	25	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	5	5	1					
Det 3, 313th Air Div	4	4	24	22					
TOTAL	278	284	782	826	4	3	0	57	-
GRAND TOTAL	513	534	3,671	3,638	110	103	16	194	786

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,106

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1964

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-Citizens		
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Asgd	AP Asgd	Non/Asgd
313 Air Division	46	48	81	89	27	30		4	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	19					1
6313 AB Wg & Det	48	52	383	352	48	52	4	248	17
6313 AP Sq	8	8	743	702	1	1		231	26
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	11	226	224	87	84		773	6
6313 Svc Sq	11	13	200	199	19	20		243	1,418
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	151	137	1	1		283	3
6332d USAF Disp	32	41	84	109	4	4		32	1
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	17					
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	55	56	200	217	7	8		6	4
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	4	6					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	35	4	6					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	38	4	4					
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	26	33	28					1
18 Supply Sq	11	11	510	442	17	17		134	7
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	10	630	641				96	12
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	12	426	456				1	9
18 Org Maint Sq	7	8	368	357					20
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	9	367	355				42	7
498 Tac Msl Grp	23	30	93	146	3	3		1	14
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	28	126	173					7
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	32	125	150					8
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	216	262					
TOTAL	462	512	5,012	5,091	214	220	4	2,094	1,567

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1964

Organization	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U.S. Citizens	
Attached	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	N/Ap Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	9					
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	25	24	157	150	1	1			6
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq	1	1	3	3					
11 Air Postal Sq	3	4	26	26				2	1
Dist Off 43, OSI	13	12	23	23	4	4		3	
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	7					
658 Tac Hosp									
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	30	32	21	22	6	5			
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg	12	10	42	42				4	1
1505 Sup Sq	23	24	196	202				81	7
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	4	5					
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	3					
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)	38	37	338	335					16
6927 Sec Sq & Det	15	18	513	581					9
FTD 911A	1	2	29	33					
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	13					
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	2	2	42	28				1	
1038 Aud Gen	4	4	2	2	1	1			
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	22	22	55	77					3
1962 Comm Gp & Det	26	28	760	840	12	13		38	11
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	4					
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)	1	1	8	3					
AFLC					9	9			
TOTAL	226	231	2,247	2,413	33	33	0	129	54
GRAND TOTAL	688	743	7,259	7,504	247	253	4	2,223	1,621

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 10,021

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap	Asgd
51 FIW.	38	39	153	159	9	6		7	
16 FIS	33	29	8	8					
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	8	672	511	4	4		56	
51 A&E Maint Sq	12	12	255	281				1	
51 Org Maint Sq	8	7	400	409				5	
51 Comp Svc Gp	29	35	151	177	14	13	18	36	773
51 Svc Sq	11	11	103	97	3	3		128	
51 Civ Eng Sq	6	6	118	123	59	55		413	
51 Trans Sq	3	5	78	83	2	2		123	
51 AP Sq	3	4	174	200		1		196	
51 Supply Sq	8	7	294	306	11	10		116	
623 AC&W Sq & Det	54	57	434	438				133	
51 USAF Disp	23	25	49	53	2	1		22	
TOTAL	235	245	2,889	2,845	104	95	18	1,236	773

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 31 May 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U.S. Citizens	
Attached	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Mon/Ap	Asgd	Ap
Det 1, 315 Air Div	17	17	22	33	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	83	91	94					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	58	43	43					
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	62	43	40					
Det 1, 5 Comm Sq	1	1	19	23					
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	11	305	338	3	3		20	
33 ARS (MATS)	24	25	85	78					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	7					
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	18	16					1
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	6	80	76					25
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2					1
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	3	19	23					3
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	24	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	5	5	1					
Det 3, 313th Air Div.	4	4	24	22					
TOTAL	278	284	787	832	4	4	0	50	-
GRAND TOTAL	513	529	3,676	3,677	108	99	18	1,286	773

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,106

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1964

Organization Assigned	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens Ap Asgd	N/Ap Asgd	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd			
313 Air Division	46	46	81	93	27	30	4	1	
558 USAF Band	1	1	19	18				17	
6313 AB Wg & Det	48	55	383	357	48	52	4	26	
6313 AP Sq	8	5	743	692	1	1		6	
6313 Civ Eng Sq	9	11	226	228	87	84		1,418	
6313 Svc Sq	11	13	200	200	19	20		3	
6313 Trans Sq	5	5	151	143	1	1		1	
6332d USAF Disp	32	39	84	106	4	4			
15 Phy Tng Flt	2	2	19	19			6	4	
Hq 18 Tac Ftr Wg	55	59	200	216	7	8			
12 Tac Ftr Sq	36	37	4	5					
44 Tac Ftr Sq	36	36	4	5					
67 Tac Ftr Sq	36	37	4	5				1	
15 Tac Rec Sq	25	27	33	32			131	7	
18 Supply Sq	11	11	510	447	17	22	96	12	
18 Fld Maint Sq	8	8	630	657			1	9	
18 A&E Maint Sq	7	10	426	467				20	
18 Org Maint Sq	7	7	368	371			42	7	
418 Mun Maint Sq	8	7	367	289			1	14	
498 Tac Msl Gp	23	32	93	131	3	3		7	
873 Tac Msl Sq	23	34	126	181				8	
874 Tac Msl Sq	24	37	125	149					
498 Msl Maint Sq	1	1	216	270					
TOTAL	462	520	5,012	5,080	214	225	4	2,084	1,561

KADENA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens		Non-U.S. Citizens		
Attached	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	N/Ap Asgd
Det 4, 1st Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	9					6
400 Mun Maint Sq (T)	25	23	157	209	1	1			
Det 3, 9 Aero Med Evac Sq	1	1	3	2				2	1
11 Air Postal Sq	3	3	26	26				3	
Dist Off 43, OSI	13	13	23	21	4	4			
Det 2, 315 Air Div	2	2	5	7					
6002 Stan/Eval Gp	30	32	21	22	6	5			
Det 8, 1 Wea Wg (20 Wea Sq)	12	8	42	41				4	1
1505 Sup Sq	23	22	196	219				88	7
Det 3, 7651 AC&I Sq	1	1	4	4					
Det 12, 4440 A/C Del Gp	2	2	1	1					16
6922 Sec Wg (USAFSS)	38	39	338	333					9
6927 Sec Sq & Det	15	18	513	567					
FTD 911A	1	2	29	29					
FTD 911L, 3415 Tech Sch	1	1	14	11				1	
Det 2, 2875 GEEIA Sq	2	2	42	33					
1038 Aud Gen	4	4	2	2	1	1			3
Det 2, 1045 OE&T Gp	22	20	55	49				34	11
1962 Comm Gp & Det	26	27	760	811	12	12			
PACAF Manpower Val Team	2	2	2	4					
Det 2, Hq 3d Air Div (SAC)	1	1	8	8					
AFLC					9	9			
TOTAL	226	225	2,247	2,408	33	32	0	132	54
GRAND TOTAL	688	745	7,259	7,488	247	257	4	2,216	1,615

TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 9,926

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U. S. Citizens	
	Assigned	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap	Asgd	Ap	Non/Ap
51 FIW	38	41	153	129	9	6		5	
16 FIS	33	28	8	7	4	4		55	
51 Fld Maint Sq	7	7	672	504				1	
51 A&E Maint Sq	12	12	255	290				5	
51 Org Maint Sq	8	7	400	404	14	13	19	36	797
51 Comp Svc Gp	29	35	151	154	3	3		126	
51 Svc Sq	11	11	103	96	59	56		413	
51 Civ Eng Sq	6	5	118	125	2	2		124	
51 Trans Sq	3	5	78	83		1		193	
51 AP Sq	3	4	174	182	11	10		116	
51 Supply Sq	8	7	294	300				131	
623 AC&W Sq & Det	54	53	434	441	2	1		21	
51 USAF Disp	23	24	49	54					
TOTAL	235	235	2,889	2,792	104	96	19	1,226	797

NAHA AIR BASE

As of 30 June 1964

Organization	MILITARY				CIVILIAN				
	Officer		Enlisted		U. S. Citizens			Non-U. S. Citizens	
Attached	Asgd	Auth	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd	Ap Asgd	Non/Ap Asgd
Det 1, 315 Air Div	17	19	22	29	1	1			
21 TC Sq (315 AD)	76	83	91	92					
35 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	54	43	42					
817 TC Sq (315 AD)	62	60	43	41					
33 ARS (MATS)	24	24	85	79					
2152 Comm Sq (AFCS)	12	10	300	328	3	3		21	
5 Comm Sq (315 AD)	1	1	19	23					
Det 5, 1 Med Svc Wg	2	2	6	6				1	
Det 2, 11 Air Post Sq	1	1	16	15				25	
Det 1, 7 Aer Port Sq	6	6	80	77				1	
Det 1, Dist Off 43, OSI	2	1	3	2				3	
Det 14, 1 Wea Wg (MATS)	4	3	13	23					
FTD 909F (ATC)	1	1	24	24					
1038 Aud Gen (Hq Comd)	4	4	5	1					
Det 3, 313 Air Div	4	3	24	21					
TOTAL	278	272	779	803	4	4		51	
GRAND TOTAL	513	507	3,668	3,595	108	100	19	1,277	797
TOTAL DEPENDENT STRENGTH: 5,346									

313th AD, 1964-I

APPEN IX 7

FLYING HOURS FOR OKINAWA-BASED AIRCRAFT

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 7

FLYING HOURS FOR OKINAWA-BASED AIRCRAFT

KADENA AIR BASE

<u>JANUARY</u>		<u>FEBRUARY</u>		<u>MARCH</u>	
	<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>
F-105D	1,693:35		1,468:35		2,125:00
RF-101C	441:40		426:25		441:45
T-33A	387:40		442:00		292:00
C-47A	189:20		145:00		236:00
C-54D	105:15		91:00		128:00
<u>APRIL</u>		<u>MAY</u>		<u>JUNE</u>	
	<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>
F-105D	2,144:00		956:00		310:00
F-105F			174:00*		203:00
RF-101C	442:00		633:00		553:00
T-33A	403:00		354:00		356:00
T-39					41:00
C-47A	180:00		134:00		141:00
C-54D	134:00		108:00		120:00

(*126:00 ferry time)

NAHA AIR BASE

<u>JANUARY</u>		<u>FEBRUARY</u>		<u>MARCH</u>	
	<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>
F-102A	427:30		495:00		576:10
T-33A	225:55		210:30		186:05
C-130A	2,176:15		2,133:05		2,385:35
HU-19	60:20		No figures		No figures
<u>APRIL</u>		<u>MAY</u>		<u>JUNE</u>	
	<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>		<u>Flying Time</u>
F-102A	734:05		622:15		644:00
T-33A	201:20		178:40		210:00
C-130A	2,402:55		2,252:05		2,256:40
HH-19	No figures		No figures		44:20

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APPENDIX 8

RATIONS ISSUED BY THE AIR FORCE COMMISSARIES

ON OKINAWA

1 JANUARY - 30 JUNE 1964

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KADENA AIR BASE

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Field Ration "A"		87,951	81,804
Inflight Box Lunches	2,220	3,136	3,030
Inflight Food Packets	98	275	222
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	767	717	837
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	349	440	300
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	59	102	85
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel			
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel			49
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	25	29	28
Meals - Republic of Philippines AF Personnel	26	54	28
Pre-cooked Frozen Meals	526	154	
Bulk Issue Inflight		8	1
Meals - Japan Air Self Defense Force Personnel		10	

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Field Ration "A"	96,247	79,906	84,643
Inflight Box Lunches	3,742	4,797	5,348
Inflight Food Packets	603	270	429
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	591	377	386
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	382	261	238
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	201	7	3
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	1		
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	58	15	
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	30	29	28
Meals - Republic of Philippines AF Personnel	50	59	
Pre-cooked Frozen Meals	216	504	
Bulk Issue Inflight	29	15	14

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NAHA AIR BASE

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Field Ration "A"		47,521	47,735
Inflight Box Lunches	2,418	2,463	2,526
Inflight Food Packets	63	128	111
Pre-cooked Frozen Meals			
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	218	215	69
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	1,014	970	979
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	31	117	185
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel	25	31	
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	40	56	34
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	5	70	84
Meals - Republic of Philippines AF Personnel			

<u>Ration Issues</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Field Ration "A"	48,208	42,044	43,271
Inflight Box Lunches	1,948	2,079	2,152
Inflight Food Packets	105	39	81
Meals - U.S. Marine Personnel	114	118	72
Meals - U.S. Army Personnel	801	696	677
Meals - U.S. Navy Personnel	202	200	262
Meals - U.S. Coast Guard Personnel	1		1
Meals - Thailand AF Personnel			43
Meals - Republic of Korea AF Personnel	25	27	25
Meals - Republic of Vietnam AF Personnel	68	71	36
Meals - Royal Air Force Personnel		46	
Sandwich Meals		149	

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KADENA AIR BASE

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$241,549.45	\$256,214.32	\$229,284.14
Bulk Sales to Clubs	63,827.98	58,886.46	61,381.53
Troop Issue	<u>96,262.79</u>	<u>97,277.31</u>	<u>88,186.04</u>
TOTAL	\$401,640.22	\$412,378.09	\$378,851.71

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$263,400.88	\$243,005.62	\$248,189.90
Bulk Sales to Clubs	70,804.26	56,489.20	65,795.84
Troop Issue	<u>93,746.63</u>	<u>86,425.57</u>	<u>89,337.43</u>
TOTAL	\$427,951.82	\$485,920.39	\$403,823.17

NAHA AIR BASE

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>	<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>MARCH</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$134,287.94	\$127,685.90	\$132,075.44
Bulk Sales to Clubs	32,314.16	31,728.13	34,305.66
Troop Issue	<u>46,038.57</u>	<u>50,149.91</u>	<u>56,920.60</u>
TOTAL	\$212,640.67	\$209,563.94	\$223,981.70

<u>Commissary Sales</u>	<u>APRIL</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>
Cash Sales (Store)	\$128,183.69	\$117,393.71	\$131,656.37
Bulk Sales to Clubs	40,229.15	37,770.06	35,112.47
Troop Issue	<u>48,244.36</u>	<u>47,958.36</u>	<u>49,661.92</u>
TOTAL	\$216,657.20	\$203,122.13	\$216,430.76

313th AD, 1964-I

APPENDIX 9

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1964

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 9

RAINFALL DATA FOR 1964-I

<u>Month</u>	<u>Det. 8 Kadena AB</u>	<u>Det. 14 Naha AB</u>
January	6.14"	6.19"
February	2.16"	2.64"
March	4.60"	3.45"
April	.73"	1.07"
May	7.62"	11.74"
June	<u>25.00"</u>	<u>17.84"</u>
TOTAL	46.25"	42.93"

313th AD, 1964-I

APPENDIX 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM
AT KADENA AND NAHA AIR BASES

313th AD, 1964-1, Appendix 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

January 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	4,440,493	1,054,914	10,656	78	648
Naha	<u>1,940,435</u>	<u>544,914</u>	<u>406</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>1,580</u>
TOTAL	6,380,928	1,599,828	11,062	136	2,228

February 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	5,090,667	927,000	8,832	157.00	779.5
Naha	<u>1,951,360</u>	<u>372,608</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>167.25</u>	<u>1,302.0</u>
TOTAL	7,042,027	1,299,608	8,832	324.25	2,081.5

March 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	4,602,027	1,092,931	16,062	210	804
Naha	<u>1,673,403</u>	<u>371,649</u>	<u>1,108</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>2,154</u>
TOTAL	6,275,430	1,464,580	17,170	269	2,958

April 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	4,874,340	1,136,308	12,177	78	1,038
Naha	<u>1,559,140</u>	<u>332,487</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>1,170</u>
TOTAL	6,433,480	1,468,795	12,177	186	2,208

313th AD, 1964-I, Appendix 10

ISSUES OF AVIATION PETROLEUM

(All Figures in Gallons)

May 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	3,592,688	931,945	13,390	6.0	652
Naha	<u>1,491,836</u>	<u>367,801</u>	<u>605</u>	<u>116.5</u>	<u>1,404</u>
TOTAL	5,084,524	1,299,746	13,995	122.5	2,056

June 1964

<u>Base</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	<u>115/145</u>	<u>1100 Oil</u>	<u>1010 Oil</u>	<u>7808 Oil</u>
Kadena	2,434,058	813,118	9,210	198	240
Naha	<u>1,543,650</u>	<u>423,664</u>	<u>318</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>1,988</u>
TOTAL	3,977,708	1,236,782	9,528	300	2,228

DOCUMENT TO ROLL INDEX

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